[Cite as State v. Reaper, 2022-Ohio-555.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

ERIE COUNTY 

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. E-21-010 

 

 Appellee Trial Court No. CRB2000283 

 

v. 

 

Shawn M. Reaper DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: February 25, 2022 

* * * * * 

 Kevin J. Baxter, Erie County Prosecuting Attorney, and 

 Kristin R. Palmer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

 Russell V. Leffler, for appellant. 

. 

* * * * * 

OSOWIK, J. 

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from an April 2, 2021 judgment of the Erie County 

Municipal Court, Milan, Ohio, sentencing appellant to serve a prison term of 180 days, 

with 60 days suspended, a five-year term of probation, and classifying him as a Tier 1 sex 
2. 

offender, following appellant’s no contest plea on one count of unlawful sexual conduct 

with a minor, in violation of R.C. 2907.04(A), a misdemeanor of the first degree. 

{¶ 2} For the reasons set forth more fully below, this court vacates appellant’s plea 

and sentence, reverses the trial court judgment, and remands the case to the trial court. 

{¶ 3} Appellant, Shawn M. Reaper, sets forth the following two assignments of 

error on appeal: 

 “I. It was error for the trial court to take a plea without [first] telling the appellant 

he could be facing [Tier 1] sex[ual] [offender] registration [requirements]. 

 “II. It was error for the court to find the sexual incident that was the basis of the 

charge was not consen[s]ual.” 

{¶ 4} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. This case stems 

from a sexual encounter transpiring between appellant, who was 18-years-old at the time 

of the incident, and a 15-year-old female, who had been appellant’s neighbor and friend 

for several years prior to the encounter. 

{¶ 5} Appellant later moved into the girl’s home, following the suicide of his 

sister. After moving in with the girl’s family, appellant asked her father if he could date 

his daughter. Her parents responded that their daughter was too young to date appellant 

and they did not approve. 
3. 

{¶ 6} Despite the disapproval, the girl and appellant subsequently became 

intimate. They engaged in sexual intercourse on one occasion. This appeal stems from 

that sexual encounter. 

{¶ 7} Approximately five months after the sexual encounter, the parents of the girl 

indirectly learned of it via social media postings and confronted their daughter regarding 

what had occurred. 

{¶ 8} At this juncture, the girl acknowledged to her parents that she and appellant 

had engaged in sex on that occasion and that it had not been consensual on her part. 

{¶ 9} Thereafter, a law enforcement investigation commenced. The investigators 

ultimately determined that the sexual encounter between the two did not constitute felony 

conduct. Thus, the matter was pursued at the misdemeanor level. 

{¶ 10} On September 4, 2020, appellant was charged with one count of unlawful 

sexual conduct with a minor, in violation of R.C. 2907.04, a misdemeanor of the first 

degree. 

{¶ 11} On September 9, 2020, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. On 

December 18, 2020, following voluntary negotiations, appellant entered a change of plea, 

to no contest, on the charge. A presentence investigation was ordered. The propriety of 

the change of plea underlies this appeal. 

{¶ 12} On March 12, 2021, prior to appellant’s sentencing, the trial court 

conducted an R.C. 2950.01 evidentiary hearing for purposes of determining whether the 

sexual incident between the parties had been consensual. 
4. 

{¶ 13} In the course of the evidentiary hearing, opposing testimony was presented 

to the trial court by the two parties to the disputed occurrence. The girl testified that she 

was raped by appellant. She maintained that she said no and did not engage in sex 

willingly. 

{¶ 14} Conversely, appellant testified that she invited him into her bedroom to 

watch television, she initiated the encounter, she did not say no, and she engaged in it 

voluntarily. 

{¶ 15} There were no other witnesses. There was no non-testimonial evidence 

presented. The record is devoid of independent, objective evidence regarding what 

occurred. 

{¶ 16} Following the hearing, the trial court found that the sexual encounter had 

not been consensual, thereby triggering Tier 1 sex offender status and requirements for 

appellant. 

{¶ 17} On April 2, 2021, appellant was sentenced to 180 days in prison, with 60 

days suspended, a five-year term of probation, and was ordered to register as a Tier 1 sex 

offender, pursuant to R.C. 2950.01. 

{¶ 18} The record reflects that appellant was given no advance knowledge by the 

trial court regarding the possibility of facing a sexual offender classification prior to 

entering his change of plea. This appeal ensued. 
5. 

{¶ 19} In the first assignment of error, appellant maintains the trial court erred in 

the complete failure to inform appellant at any time prior to appellant’s change of plea of 

the possibility that appellant could be classified as a sex offender. We concur. 

{¶ 20} Crim.R. 11(D) establishes, “In misdemeanor cases involving serious 

offenses the court * * * shall not accept such plea without first addressing the defendant 

personally and informing the defendant of the effect of the pleas of guilty, no contest, and 

not guilty and determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily.” (Emphasis 

added). 

{¶ 21} In conjunction, the Ohio Supreme Court uniformly holds that, “Due 

process requires the defendant’s plea be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; 

otherwise, the defendant’s plea is invalid.” State v. Bishop, 156 Ohio St.3d 156, 2018-

Ohio-5132, 124 N.E.3d 766, ¶ 10. (Emphasis added). 

{¶ 22} Of particular relevance in our consideration of the merits of this case, the 

Ohio Supreme Court decision in State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 

164 N.E.3d 286 is illustrative. 

{¶ 23} Dangler discusses in detail the constitutional due process importance of the 

trial court alerting a defendant prior to the acceptance of a change of plea of the potential 

applicability of a sexual offender status and requirements as a result of the change of 

plea. 

{¶ 24} In Dangler, appellant’s change of plea resulted in a Tier III sex offender 

classification. Although the trial court did notify appellant prior to the plea that it would 
6. 

result in appellant having to register as a Tier III sex offender, unlike the complete failure 

to inform by the trial court in the instant case, appellant nevertheless maintained that the 

trial court failed to completely explain all of the specific requirements which would 

accompany appellant’s sexual offender classification. 

{¶ 25} The Dangler court emphasized, “Because a no contest or guilty plea 

involves a waiver of constitutional rights, a defendant’s decision to enter a plea must be 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary * * * if the plea was not made knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily, enforcement of that plea is unconstitutional.” Dangler at ¶ 

10. (Emphasis added). 

{¶ 26} The Dangler court subsequently elaborated that the key consideration in 

resolving such change of plea cases is, “[W]hether the dialogue between the court and the 

defendant demonstrates that the defendant understood the consequences of his plea.” Id. 

at ¶ 12. 

{¶ 27} The Dangler court next determined that, “[W]e proceed with the 

assumption that the [sex offender registration] scheme as a whole constitutes a penalty 

for purposes of Crim.R. 11. Id. at ¶ 20. 

{¶ 28} Dangler ultimately concluded that, “[A]lthough R.C. Chapter 2950 

contains a mixture of remedial and punitive elements * * * the statutory scheme as a 

whole * * * [is] punitive * * * Because the trial court in this case advised Dangler that he 

would be subject to the registration requirements of that statutory scheme, the trial court 
7. 

did not completely fail to comply with Crim.R. 11’s maximum penalty advisement 

requirement.” Id. at ¶ 22. (Emphasis added). 

{¶ 29} Conversely, there was no advisement whatsoever given by the trial court to 

appellant in the present case so that appellant even arguably understood the consequences 

of the plea. The record shows that there was a complete failure to inform appellant of a 

potential sex offender classification prior to his change of plea. 

{¶ 30} Of further significance to our resolution of this case, we look to an Eighth 

District Court of Appeals case that is substantively akin to the factual scenario presented 

in this appeal. 

{¶ 31} This is another case in which the trial court completely failed to inform the 

defendant prior to the change of plea of the possibility of a sex offender classification 

resulting from the change of plea. 

{¶ 32} In State v. Brown, 2020-Ohio-4474, 158 N.E.3d 972 (8th Dist.), the court 

concluded that, “[T]he record is clear that the trial court did not even mention sex 

offender classification until after it accepted Brown’s pleas * * * the trial court’s 

omission of any reference to sexual offender classification at the change of plea hearing 

constituted a complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11 and the defendant’s guilty plea 

was, therefore, void.” Brown at ¶ 29-30. (Emphasis added). 

{¶ 33} Accordingly, in our consideration of the merits of this case, we have 

scrutinized the transcripts of the December 18, 2020 change of plea hearing. 
8. 

{¶ 34} At the change of plea hearing, the trial court stated to appellant, “If you 

plead no contest, you’re waiving certain constitutional rights * * * Those rights include 

your right to a trial on this charge.” 

{¶ 35} In addition, the trial court further advised appellant that, “This court could 

sentence you to the maximum penalty provided in the law for this offense, which is up to 

six months in jail and a fine of $1000. Do you understand that?” 

{¶ 36} Appellant replied, “Yes, Your Honor.” 

{¶ 37} No other references to other possible consequences resulting from the 

change of plea were relayed to appellant by the trial court prior to his change of plea. 

{¶ 38} The record of evidence clearly reflects that the trial court omitted and 

completely failed to inform appellant of the possibility of a sexual offender classification 

resulting from appellant’s change of plea prior to accepting the change of plea. 

{¶ 39} We find that the record in this case shows that the trial court erred in 

completely failing to advise appellant of the potential sex offender classification resulting 

from his change of plea, as required by Crim.R. 11 and Dangler, and consistent with 

Brown. 

{¶ 40} This omission constituted a breach of Crim.R. 11. Accordingly, we find 

that appellant’s plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. Thus, the 

plea is invalid and void. 

{¶ 41} In conjunction with the above, and as held by the Ohio Supreme Court in 

State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 643, “[S]tructural errors 
9. 

are constitutional defects that * * * affect the framework within which the trial proceeds, 

rather than simply being an error in the trial process itself * * * Such errors permeate the 

entire conduct of the trial * * * [S]o that the trial cannot reliably serve its function as a 

vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence.” Perry at ¶ 17-18. (Emphasis added). 

{¶ 42} We further find that the above-described Crim.R. 11 violation, and the 

constitutional infringement resulting from the violation, likewise constituted structural 

error. It precluded a reliable determination of appellant’s guilt or innocence. 

{¶ 43} Wherefore, we find appellant’s first assignment of error well-taken. 

{¶ 44} In appellant’s second assignment of error, appellant maintains that the trial 

court erred in the March 12, 2021 determination, subsequent to the December 18, 2020, 

change of plea hearing, that the sexual encounter occurring between the parties was not 

consensual. 

{¶ 45} Given our determination in response to the first assignment of error, 

finding that the trial court breached Crim.R. 11(D) during the change of plea hearing, 

thereby rendering the plea void, we consequently find that the trial court’s subsequent 

determination on the issue of consent, which would not have occurred but for the void 

change of plea, is likewise void as a matter of law. 

{¶ 46} Thus, we find that appellant’s second assignment of error is moot based 

upon our determination in response to appellant’s first assignment of error. 
10. 

{¶ 47} On consideration whereof, we vacate the plea, vacate the sentencing 

judgment resulting from the void plea, and reverse and remand this case to the trial court. 

Appellee is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. 

Judgment reversed. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________ 

 JUDGE 

Christine E. Mayle, J. 

____________________________ 

Gene A. Zmuda, J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

____________________________ 

JUDGE 

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.