J-S56018-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

GORDON CHARLES WILLIAMS

Appellant No. 45 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 14, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0002854-2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED AUGUST 19, 2016

Appellant, Gordon Charles Williams, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered December 14, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of 

Berks County, following his conviction of Rape of a Child, Indecent Assault, 

Corruption of Minors, Endangering the Welfare of Children and Indecent 

Exposure.1 No relief is due. 

The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows.

In January 2010, [B.H.] and Appellant lived at 928 Church 

Street in the City of Reading with four children, including eightyear-old [K.H.] (“the victim”). The other children included [T.B.], 

[K.H.], and [R.W.]. [R.W.] is the son of [B.H.] and Appellant, 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(c); 3126(a)(7); 6301(a)(1); 4304(a)(1); and 

3127(a), respectively. 
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who were engaged to be married and had moved in together in 

2005.

On January 8, 2010, [B.H.] left work early at 2 p.m. She 

arrived home approximately seven minutes later, where she 

found the front door and deadbolt both locked. When she walked 

inside, all the lights were turned off. ... [B.H.] did not see or hear 

Appellant in the kitchen, so she went upstairs. At the top of the 

stairs, she looked into her daughters’ bedroom and saw a large, 

dark lump that did not look like the normal blanket she would 

expect to see. [B.H.] turned the light on, and she saw Appellant 

and [the victim] on the bottom bunk of a bunk bed. Both were 

naked from the waist down, and Appellant was holding [the 

victim’s] hip up against him. [The victim] had stayed home from 

school because she felt sick. 

[The victim] began screaming and crying and she ran to 

the middle of the room where her pants were laying. [B.H.] 

began yelling, and Appellant eventually pulled up his pants and 

walked down the steps. [B.H.] told [the victim] to stay in the 

room, and she ran down the stairs after Appellant. Downstairs, 

Appellant was holding [R.W.] and he said, “Daddy has to go 

now.” [B.H.] and Appellant exchanged some physical blows, and 

then [B.H.] called 9-1-1 as Appellant left the home.

Officers arrived at the house to investigate. Later that day, 

[B.H.] took [the victim] to the hospital to be examined. Dr. 

Renee Riddle, a pediatrician at Reading Hospital, testified that 

[the victim] had some bruising on her buttocks and a tear in her 

hymen. One week later, the tear was healed, indicating that the 

tear likely occurred around the time of the initial evaluation. 

Sometime that day, Appellant went to the home of 

Kimberly Hawley, a friend of the family. He seemed “unusual” 

and “nervous,” and he asked for some money in order to travel 

to Harrisburg on a bus. Later, Kimberly received a phone call 

from [B.H.], who hysterically explained what had happened.

Zach Smith of the Berks County Sheriff’s Department was 

working in the warrant division on January 15, 2010. Smith was 

assigned to go to 62 North Second Street in Hamburg, Berks 

County to serve a warrant for Appellant. After Smith had 

knocked and announced his presence, Appellant opened the door 

and then turned to walk away. Smith took Appellant to the 

ground and handcuffed him. Once Appellant was brought to his 
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feet, Smith noticed that his neck and shirt were bloody. Smith 

saw there was small razor on the ground.

[The victim] testified that Appellant began abusing her at 

age four. She remembered that detail because it began before 

she was potty-trained. Appellant raped her repeatedly 

throughout the ensuing years by putting his penis in her vagina. 

Appellant also would touch his penis to her mouth, which she 

refused. [The victim] often cried because of the physical pain, 

and he would insist that she be quiet. The assaults occurred in 

the bathroom, the laundry room, Appellant’s bedroom, and [the 

victim’s] bedroom.

[The victim] eventually revealed additional details to 

William Kase, then a criminal investigator with the City of 

Reading Police Department. [She] described Appellant’s penis 

and stated that he had inserted his penis into her vagina on 

January 8, 2010 before her mother entered the bedroom.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/7/15 at 2-3 (record citations omitted). 

A jury convicted Appellant of the aforementioned charges. The trial 

court sentenced Appellant to a term of 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment.2

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. This 

timely appeal followed. 

Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his postsentence motion challenging his convictions as contrary to the weight of the 

evidence. A challenge to the weight of the evidence “concedes that the 

evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict, but seeks a new trial on the 

ground that the evidence was so one-sided or so weighted in favor of 

acquittal that a guilty verdict shocks one’s sense of justice.” 

____________________________________________

2 The trial court determined that the Commonwealth failed to meet its 

burden of proving that Appellant was a Sexually Violent Predator. 
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Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1015 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal 

denied, 99 A.3d 925 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). A verdict is said to be 

contrary to the evidence such that it shocks one’s sense of justice when “the 

figure of Justice totters on her pedestal,” or when “the jury’s verdict, at the 

time of its rendition, causes the trial judge to lose his breath, temporarily, 

and causes him to almost fall from the bench, then it is truly shocking to the 

judicial conscience.” Commonwealth v. Davidson, 860 A.2d 575, 581 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (citations omitted), aff’d, 595 Pa. 1, 938 A.2d 198 (2007).

When the challenge to the weight of the evidence is predicated 

on the credibility of trial testimony, our review of the trial court’s 

decision is extremely limited. Generally, unless the evidence is 

so unreliable and/or contradictory as to make any verdict based 

thereon pure conjecture, these types of claims are not 

cognizable on appellate review. Moreover, where the trial court 

has ruled on the weight claim below, an appellate court’s role is 

not to consider the underlying question of whether the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is 

limited to whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion in 

ruling on the weight claim.

Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 282 (Pa. Super. 2009) (internal 

quotes and citations omitted).

In support of his claim that the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence, Appellant asserts that the victim’s mother, B.H., coached the 

victim to testify against the Appellant regarding the sexual assault in order 

to avoid a custody battle over the couple’s minor child. Appellant’s claim is 

wholly speculative and unsupported by the evidence. 

As noted, the Commonwealth established that B.H. came home on 

January 8, 2010, to discover Appellant in bed with the victim, both of whom 
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were naked from the waist down. A subsequent medical examination of the 

victim on the day of the incident established that she had sustained bruises 

to her buttocks and a tear in her hymen. Dr. Riddle testified that the fact 

that the tear had healed approximately one week later suggested that the 

tear likely occurred around the date B.H. discovered Appellant in bed with 

the victim. Additionally, the victim testified that Appellant had repeatedly 

raped her—for over four years—and stated specifically that Appellant had 

inserted his penis into her vagina on January 8, 2010. 

In light of the overwhelming evidence presented, we find that the 

verdict does not in any respect shock one’s sense of justice. The figure of 

justice is firmly rooted to her pedestal. The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion, and Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim must fail.

Appellant lastly argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court 

was manifestly excessive. This claim challenges the discretionary aspects of 

Appellant’s sentence. A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence 

must be considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right to 

pursue such a claim is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 

270, 274 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). 

An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a 

four-part test:

[We] conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902

and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, 

see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal 
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defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial 

question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate 

under the Sentencing Code, 42. Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(quotation marks and some citations omitted). 

Here, Appellant challenged his sentence in a post-sentence motion and 

filed a timely appeal. Appellant’s brief also contains the requisite Rule 

2119(f) concise statement. We must now determine whether Appellant’s 

challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence raises a substantial 

question. 

“A substantial question will be found where an appellant advances a 

colorable argument that the sentence imposed is either inconsistent with a 

specific provision of the Sentencing Code or is contrary to the fundamental 

norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 

107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 117 A.3d 297 (Pa. 

2015) (citation omitted). “[W]e cannot look beyond the statement of 

questions presented and the prefatory 2119(f) statement to determine 

whether a substantial question exists.” Commonwealth v. Christine, 78 

A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. 2013), aff’d, 125 A.3d 394 (Pa. 2015) (citation 

omitted). 

Here, Appellant claims in his Rule 2119(f) statement that the “the 

sentencing court did not consider the requisite sentencing factors, namely 

the rehabilitative needs of the defendant nor the circumstances particular to 

this individual case.” Appellant’s Brief at 8. Appellant further contends that 
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the trial court abused its discretion when it “ignored Appellant’s request to 

consider other than the statutory maximum.” Id. 

“[A] generic claim that a sentence is excessive does not raise a 

substantial question for our review.” Christine, 78 A.3d at 10 (citation 

omitted). “Additionally, this Court has repeatedly held that an allegation that 

the trial court failed to consider particular circumstances or factors in an 

appellant’s case go to the weight accorded to various sentencing factors and 

do not raise a substantial question.” Id. at 10-11 (citation omitted). 

While Appellant argues that the sentencing court failed to consider his 

rehabilitative needs and the “circumstances of the case,” in substance he 

merely argues that the court failed to sufficiently address factors of record. 

The sentencing court had prepared and reviewed a pre-sentence report. See 

N.T., Sentencing, 12/14/15 at 55. Where the sentencing court had the 

benefit of reviewing a pre-sentence report, we must

presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant 

information regarding the defendant's character and weighed 

those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors. A 

pre-sentence report constitutes the record and speaks for itself. 

In order to dispel any lingering doubt as to our intention of 

engaging in an effort of legal purification, we state clearly that 

sentencers are under no compulsion to employ checklists or any 

extended or systematic definitions of their punishment 

procedure. Having been fully informed by the pre-sentence 

report, the sentencing court's discretion should not be disturbed. 

This is particularly true, we repeat, in those circumstances where 

it can be demonstrated that the judge had any degree of 

awareness of the sentencing considerations, and there we will 

presume also that the weighing process took place in a 

meaningful fashion. It would be foolish, indeed, to take the 
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position that if a court is in possession of the facts, it will fail to 

apply them to the case at hand.

Commonwealth v. Hallock, 603 A.2d 612, 616 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citation 

omitted). As the sentencing court in this case did have the benefit of a presentence report, we must presume that he considered all relevant 

sentencing factors and fashioned an individualize sentence.

Based on the foregoing, we are constrained to find that Appellant’s 

claim that the sentencing court did not adequately consider relevant factors 

of record fails to raise a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. 

Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1266 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 104 

A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014) (“[A]rguments that the sentencing court failed to consider 

the factors proffered in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721 does present a substantial 

question whereas a statement that the court failed to consider facts of 

record, though necessarily encompassing the factors of § 9721, has been 

rejected.”). 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/19/2016