Review of the Federal Bureau of 

Prisons’ Monitoring of Contract Prisons

Office of the Inspector General

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of the Inspector General

U.S. Department of Justice

Evaluation and Inspections Division 16-06 August 2016
i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY*

Introduction

The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), which is the component of the 

Department of Justice (Department) responsible for incarcerating all federal 

defendants sentenced to prison, was operating at 20 percent over its rated capacity

as of December 2015. To help alleviate overcrowding and respond to congressional 

mandates, in 1997 the BOP had begun contracting with privately operated 

institutions (often referred to as “contract prisons”), at first on a smaller scale and 

later more extensively, to confine federal inmates who are primarily low security, 

criminal alien adult males with 90 months or less remaining to serve on their 

sentences. As of December 2015, contract prisons housed roughly 22,660 of these 

federal inmates, or about 12 percent of the BOP’s total inmate population. These 

contract prisons were operated by three private corporations: Corrections 

Corporation of America; GEO Group, Inc.; and Management and Training 

Corporation.1 The BOP’s annual expenditures on contract prisons increased from 

approximately $562 million in fiscal year (FY) 2011 to $639 million in FY 2014. In 

recent years, disturbances in several federal contract prisons resulted in extensive 

property damage, bodily injury, and the death of a Correctional Officer. 

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated this review to examine 

how the BOP monitors these facilities. We also assessed whether contractor 

performance meets certain inmate safety and security requirements and analyzed

how contract prisons and similar BOP institutions compare with regard to inmate 

safety and security data. We found that, in most key areas, contract prisons 

incurred more safety and security incidents per capita than comparable BOP 

institutions and that the BOP needs to improve how it monitors contract prisons in 

several areas. Throughout this report, we note several important corrective actions 

the BOP has taken, in response to findings and recommendations in our April 2015

audit of the Reeves County contract prison, to improve its monitoring of contract 

prisons, including in the areas of health and correctional services.

2

The BOP’s administration, monitoring, and oversight of contract prisons is 

conducted through three branches at BOP headquarters and on site. According to 

the BOP, at each contract prison, two BOP onsite monitors and a BOP Contracting 

Officer, in cooperation with other BOP subject matter experts, oversee each 

contractor’s compliance with 29 vital functions within 8 operational areas, including 

correctional programs, correctional services, and health services. The BOP 

 *

 Redactions were made to the full version of this report for privacy reasons. The redactions 

are contained only in Appendix 9, the contractors’ responses, and are of individuals’ names or 

information that would enable an individual to be identified.

1 In January 2007, the BOP awarded a contract to Reeves County, Texas, to operate the 

Reeves County Detention Center compounds R1 and R2 (RCDC I/II). Reeves County subcontracted 

operation of RCDC I/II to the GEO Group, Inc.

2

 See Department of Justice OIG, Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Contract No. 

DJB1PC007 Awarded to Reeves County, Texas, to Operate the Reeves County Detention Center I/II, 

Pecos, Texas, Audit Report 15-15 (April 2015), iii.
ii

monitors contractor performance through various methods and tools that include 

monitoring checklists, monitoring logs, written evaluations, performance meetings, 

and regular audits.

Results in Brief

We found that in a majority of the categories we examined, contract prisons 

incurred more safety and security incidents per capita than comparable BOP 

institutions. We analyzed data from the 14 contract prisons that were operational 

during the period of our review and from a select group of 14 BOP institutions with 

comparable inmate populations to evaluate how the contract prisons performed 

relative to the selected BOP institutions. Our analysis included data from FYs 2011 

through 2014 in eight key categories: (1) contraband, (2) reports of incidents, 

(3) lockdowns, (4) inmate discipline, (5) telephone monitoring, (6) selected 

grievances, (7) urinalysis drug testing, and (8) sexual misconduct.3

 With the 

exception of fewer incidents of positive drug tests and sexual misconduct, the 

contract prisons had more incidents per capita than the BOP institutions in all of the 

other categories of data we examined. For example, the contract prisons 

confiscated eight times as many contraband cell phones annually on average as the 

BOP institutions. Contract prisons also had higher rates of assaults, both by 

inmates on other inmates and by inmates on staff. We note that we were unable to 

evaluate all of the factors that contributed to the underlying data, including the 

effect of inmate demographics and facility locations, as the BOP noted in response 

to a working draft of this report. However, consistent with our recommendation, 

we believe that the BOP needs to examine the reasons behind our findings more 

thoroughly and identify corrective actions, if necessary.

The three contract prisons we visited were all cited by the BOP for one or 

more safety and security deficiencies, including administrative infractions such as 

improper storage of use-of-force video footage, as well as more serious or systemic 

deficiencies such as failure to initiate discipline in over 50 percent of incidents 

reviewed by onsite monitors over a 6-month period. The contractors corrected the 

safety and security deficiencies that the BOP had identified. As a result, the BOP 

determined that each prison was sufficiently compliant with the safety and security 

aspects of its contract to continue with the contract during the period covered by 

our review. However, we concluded that the BOP still must improve its oversight of 

contract prisons to ensure that federal inmates’ rights and needs are not placed at 

risk when they are housed in contract prisons.

Our site visits also revealed that two of the three contract prisons we visited 

were improperly housing new inmates in Special Housing Units (SHU), which are 

normally used for disciplinary or administrative segregation, until beds became 

available in general population housing. These new inmates had not engaged in 

 3

 We selected these categories of data to analyze as potential safety and security indicators 

because they provided information on areas addressed by American Correctional Association standards 

on security and control, inmate rules and discipline, and inmate rights, and because these data were 

tracked by both the contract prisons and the BOP institutions. See Appendix 1 for more information 

on our methodology, including our data analysis. 
iii

any of the behaviors cited in American Correctional Association standards and BOP 

policies that would justify being placed in such administrative or disciplinary 

segregation. When the OIG discovered this practice during the course of our 

fieldwork, we brought it to the attention of the BOP Director, who immediately 

directed that these inmates be removed from the SHUs and returned to the general 

population. The BOP Director also mandated that the contracts for all contract 

prisons be modified to prohibit SHU placement for inmates unless there is a policybased reason to house them there. Since that time, the BOP informed us that the 

practice of housing new inmates in the SHU is no longer occurring in the contract 

prisons and that the BOP has not identified any further non-compliance to date 

regarding this issue.

Finally, we found that the BOP needs to improve the way it monitors contract 

prisons. We focused our analysis on the BOP’s Large Secure Adult Contract 

Oversight Checklist (checklist) because, as described by BOP operating procedures, 

it is an important element of the BOP’s Quality Assurance Plan, as well as a 

mechanism BOP onsite monitors use to document contract compliance on a daily 

basis. We believe onsite monitors are best positioned to provide the BOP’s quickest 

and most direct responses to contract compliance issues as they arise. We found 

that the checklist does not address certain important BOP policy and contract 

requirements in the areas of health and correctional services. As a result, the BOP 

cannot as effectively ensure that contract prisons comply with contract 

requirements and BOP policies in these areas and that inmates in contract prisons 

receive appropriate health and correctional services.

 

For health services, the checklist does not include observation steps to verify 

that inmates receive certain basic medical services. For example, the observation

steps do not include checks on whether inmates received initial examinations, 

immunizations, and tuberculosis tests, as BOP policy requires. We also found that 

monitoring of healthcare for contract compliance lacks coordination from BOP staff 

responsible for health services oversight. 

For correctional services, the checklist does not include observation steps to 

ensure searches of certain areas of the prison, such as inmate housing units or 

recreation, work, and medical areas, or for validating actual Correctional Officer 

staffing levels and the daily Correctional Officer duty rosters.

Recommendations

We make four recommendations to the BOP to improve the monitoring and 

oversight of its contract prisons, including enhancing its oversight checklist, which 

we believe should assist the BOP in ensuring that the significant number of inmates

it houses in these facilities receive appropriate health and correctional services and 

that the contract prisons are safe and secure places to house federal inmates.

4

 4

 After incorporating the BOP’s formal comments into this report, the OIG also provided a

copy of the final report to each contractor. The OIG has reviewed the contractors' responses, which 

are attached as Appendix 9. The analysis in our report is based on information BOP has provided, and 

the OIG has determined that the contractors' responses do not affect our analysis or the conclusions 

reached in this report. 
iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................ 1

Background ........................................................................................ 2

Contract Prisons .................................................................................. 4

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW............................................................................ 13

Contract Prisons Had More Safety and Security-related Incidents per 

Capita than BOP Institutions for Most of the Indicators We Analyzed ......... 14

OIG Site Visits Revealed Safety and Security Concerns and 

Inappropriate Housing Assignments ..................................................... 27

The BOP’s Monitoring of Contract Prisons Needs Improvement ................. 31

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................ 44

Conclusion........................................................................................ 44

Recommendations ............................................................................. 45

APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY OF THE OIG REVIEW....................................... 46

Interviews ........................................................................................ 46

Site Visits ......................................................................................... 46

Data Analysis .................................................................................... 48

Document Review .............................................................................. 50

APPENDIX 2: CONTRACT PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS AND VITAL 

FUNCTIONS.......................................................................... 51

APPENDIX 3: LARGE SECURE ADULT CONTRACT OVERSIGHT CHECKLIST 

OBSERVATION STEPS IN CORRECTIONAL AND HEALTH 

SERVICES ............................................................................ 53

APPENDIX 4: THE OIG’S MEMORANDUM TO THE BOP ON THE HOUSING OF 

NEW INMATES IN SPECIAL HOUSING UNITS ............................. 55

APPENDIX 5: THE BOP’S RESPONSE TO THE OIG’S MEMORANDUM ON THE 

HOUSING OF NEW INMATES IN SPECIAL HOUSING UNITS .......... 58

APPENDIX 6: COMPARISON OF SECURITY INDICATORS AMONG 

CONTRACTORS ..................................................................... 60
v

APPENDIX 7: COMPARISON OF SECURITY INDICATORS BETWEEN CONTRACT 

PRISONS AND BOP INSTITUTIONS .......................................... 64

APPENDIX 8: THE BOP’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT .......................... 68

APPENDIX 9: THE CONTRACTORS’ RESPONSES TO THE DRAFT REPORT........... 70

APPENDIX 10: OIG ANALYSIS OF THE BOP'S RESPONSE.................................. 78
1

INTRODUCTION

The mission of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is to protect society by 

confining federal offenders in correctional facilities that are safe, humane, costefficient, and secure, and to provide reentry programming for the inmates to ensure 

their successful return to the community. Since the early 1980s, there has been an 

unprecedented increase in the federal inmate population — from approximately 

25,000 in fiscal year (FY) 1980 to nearly 219,000 in FY 2012. According to a 2013 

congressional report, since 1980 the federal inmate population has increased, on 

average, by 6,100 inmates each year.5

 However, since FY 2013, when the BOP 

inmate population reached its peak of 219,298, the population has been declining

— to 197,645 in December 2015, a decrease of 21,653 inmates (or approximately 

10 percent) over that 2-year period. In spite of this downward trend, the BOP 

currently operates at about 20 percent over its rated capacity, and costs spent on 

the federal prison system are predicted to continue to rise.

6

To help alleviate overcrowding in BOP institutions and respond to 

congressional mandates, in 1997 the BOP began contracting with privately operated 

institutions (often referred to as “contract prisons”), at first on a smaller scale and 

later more extensively, to confine inmates who are primarily low security, criminal 

alien adult males.

7 Many of the inmates incarcerated in these contract prisons are

Mexican nationals with convictions for immigration offenses who have 90 months or 

less remaining to serve on their sentences.8

 As of December 2015, contract prisons 

housed roughly 22,660 of these federal inmates, or approximately 12 percent of the 

BOP’s total inmate population. These prisons were operated by three private 

corporations: Corrections Corporation of America (CCA); the GEO Group, Inc. 

(GEO); and Management and Training Corporation (MTC). 

 5

 Nathan James, The Federal Prison Population Buildup: Options for Congress, R42937

(Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 22, 2013) (accessed July 28, 2016).

6

 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Summary (accessed July 28, 

2016).

7

 Two congressional actions precipitated the BOP’s use of contract prisons to house low 

security inmates. The National Capital Revitalization Act of 1997 mandated that the BOP designate 

District of Columbia sentenced felons to correctional facilities operated or contracted for the BOP. 

Congress also recommended that the BOP operate the Taft Correctional Institution as a private facility. 

Since that time, the BOP has developed large scale contracts with the private sector to confine 

specialized populations.

8

 The BOP refers to this as a Criminal Alien Requirement when soliciting for bids that require 

contract prisons to house this specific type of inmate population. There are exceptions to the Criminal 

Alien Requirement for three facilities: (1) the Rivers Correctional Institution also houses low security 

adult males from Washington, D.C.; (2) the Taft Satellite Camp houses minimum security adult males 

who are U.S. citizens; and (3) the now-closed Willacy County Correctional Center housed criminal 

alien adult males serving sentences of 3 months or less. 
2

Background

In recent years, disturbances in several contract prisons have resulted in 

extensive property damage, bodily injury, and the death of a Correctional Officer.

Examples include:

• In December 2008 and January 2009, the Reeves County Detention Center 

had a riot on its Compound III and Compounds I and II, respectively.9

 A 

2015 Office of the Inspector General (OIG) audit of the Reeves Detention 

Center Compounds I and II cited a BOP After-Action Report from the 2009 

riot: “While low staffing levels alone were not the direct cause of the 

disturbances, they directly affected Security and Health Services functions.”10 

• In February 2011, inmates at the Big Springs Correctional Center physically 

assaulted prison staff. The contractor reported that the inmates were 

dissatisfied with the staff’s response to a medical emergency on the 

compound that resulted in the death of an inmate. 

• In May 2012, a Correctional Officer was killed and 20 people were injured 

during a riot at the Adams County Correctional Center. The disturbance 

involved approximately 250 inmates who, according to contemporaneous 

media reports, were angry about low-quality food and medical care, as well 

as about Correctional Officers the inmates believed were disrespectful.

• In February 2015, at the Willacy County Correctional Center, inmates set 

fires and caused extensive damage to the prison. As a result of the damage 

to the prison and the BOP’s determination that the contractor could no longer 

perform the required services, the BOP terminated its contract for this 

facility. 

In April 2015, the OIG issued an audit of the Reeves County Detention 

Center Compounds I and II, which house over 2,400 federal inmates.

11 The OIG 

found that the contractor had failed to comply with contractual requirements in the 

areas of billing and payment, correctional and health services staffing, and internal 

quality control. The audit identified almost $3 million in costs that were either 

unallowable or unsupported or funds that should be put to better use. Also, we 

found that from the start of the contract in January 2007 to March 2009, there were 

no minimum staffing requirements for the institution because the BOP had sought 

to reduce costs. After an inmate riot in 2009, the BOP established the minimum 

 9

 The Reeves County Detention Center is located in Reeves County, Texas, and has three 

compounds that house inmates for the BOP. Compounds I and II are one facility consisting of multiple 

housing units within a secure perimeter. Compound III is a separate facility.

10 DOJ OIG, Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Contract No. DJB1PC007 Awarded to

Reeves County, Texas, to Operate the Reeves County Detention Center I/II, Pecos, Texas, Audit 

Report 15-15 (April 2015), iii.

11 DOJ OIG, Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Contract No. DJB1PC007.
3

Correctional Officer staffing requirement in the contract. Nevertheless, the OIG’s

2015 audit also found that the institution had significant issues meeting its 

minimum staffing requirement in health services. Additionally, the audit identified 

areas that needed improvement relating to internal quality control, such as fully 

documenting monitoring activities and tracking corrective action plans for 

significant deficiencies.

The OIG also found that contract prison officials at Reeves County had 

converted a general population housing unit into a “modified monitoring unit” that 

was being used to isolate and restrict movement of inmates whose behavior they 

believed was jeopardizing the safety of staff and other inmates. A review of the 

modified monitoring unit showed that there was a lack of specific policies and 

procedures to address inmate placement in and release from this unit, as well as its

operation, and to ensure inmate due process and other rights were preserved. 

In response to the aforementioned findings from the 2015 OIG audit report, 

the BOP took the following actions at the Reeves County facility: (1) reviewed its 

contract costs to identify and remedy those costs that were either unallowable or 

unsupported, (2) updated the BOP’s oversight checklist for all the contract prisons 

and trained onsite monitors on how to use that tool to properly document 

monitoring activities, (3) issued guidance to the Reeves County contractor staff 

instructing them to create a corrective action plan for each significant deficiency 

identified during internal audits, and (4) developed new operational procedures for 

the modified monitoring unit at Reeves. Based on actions the BOP had taken, the 

OIG closed the recommendations made in its 2015 audit report. 

The OIG initiated this review in order to examine how the BOP monitored its 

contract prisons during FY 2011 through FY 2014. In that context, we also 

assessed the contractors’ compliance with the terms of the contract in selected 

areas of inmate safety and security. Finally, we analyzed data from the 14 contract 

prisons that were operational during the period of our review and a select group of 

14 BOP institutions with comparable inmate populations to evaluate how the 

contract prisons performed relative to the selected BOP institutions in key areas. 

Our fieldwork, from April 2014 through February 2015, included interviews, data 

collection and analysis, and document review. We interviewed BOP officials, 

including Central Office administrators and staff responsible for oversight and 

management of contract prisons. We conducted site visits to three contract 

prisons: the Giles W. Dalby Correctional Facility and the Eden Detention Center in 

Texas and the Rivers Correctional Institution in North Carolina. During each site 

visit, we interviewed BOP onsite monitors, contract staff, and inmates. We also 

toured the sites, observed staff and inmate activities, attended staff meetings, and 

reviewed logs and records. Appendix 1 has a detailed description of the 

methodology of our review.

In this section, we discuss contract prisons that incarcerate federal inmates 

designated to the custody of the BOP. We then discuss the contract requirements, 

followed by the BOP’s current structure and process for monitoring and oversight of 

the contract prisons. 
4

Contract Prisons

At the time of our review, three private corporations, CCA, GEO, and MTC,

operated 14 BOP contract prisons. Collectively, these contract prisons provided

approximately 27,000 beds for federal inmates.12 Figure 1 below shows the 

location and population of the BOP’s contract prisons managed by each contractor

as of December 2014. 

 12 Our analysis includes data from the 14 contract prisons that were operational from FY 2011 

through FY 2014. In March 2015, the BOP terminated its contract with the Willacy County 

Correctional Center in Texas following the February 2015 riot. The contract for the Northeast Ohio 

Correctional Center expired on May 31, 2015, with no option to renew. In December 2014, the BOP 

entered into a new contract with GEO to operate the Great Plains Correctional Facility in Oklahoma. 

Operations at this contract prison began in June 2015.
5

Figure 1

Location and Population of BOP Contract Prisons13

Source: BOP 

 13 Figure 1 reflects the contract prisons and their population at the time of our fieldwork. In 

January 2007, the BOP awarded a contract to Reeves County, Texas, to operate the Reeves County 

Detention Center compounds R1 and R2 (RCDC I/II). Reeves County subcontracted operation of 

RCDC I/II to the GEO Group, Inc. Figure 1 reflects the combined population for these two facilities 

that are operated under two separate contracts.
6

Contract Requirements

The BOP’s contracting process is governed by the Federal Acquisition 

Regulations (FAR) and the Justice Acquisition Regulations. The BOP’s acquisition 

policy supplements the FAR and the Justice Acquisition Regulations and provides 

uniform acquisition procedures.

14 Contractors must comply with all applicable 

federal, state, and local laws and regulations, as well as all applicable executive 

orders, case laws, and court orders. In addition, contractors must follow a number 

of BOP policies and requirements as defined in their contracts.

15 One specific

requirement applicable to all contract prisons is obtaining and maintaining

accreditation from the American Correctional Association (ACA) and the Joint 

Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations.16 Contractors also must 

meet 29 functions that the BOP has identified as vital to contract performance (see 

Appendix 2). The vital functions can range from creating an adequate security 

inspection system to providing nutritionally adequate meals and ensuring inmates 

have access to healthcare. The 29 vital functions fall under 8 operational areas,

each of which is assigned a percentage that correlates with contractor performance: 

1. Administration (10 percent),

2. Correctional Programs (10 percent),

3. Correctional Services (20 percent),

4. Food Service (15 percent),

5. Health Services (15 percent),

6. Human Resources (10 percent),

7. Inmate Services (15 percent), and

8. Safety and Environmental Health (5 percent).

A contract prison may receive a monetary deduction for less than satisfactory 

performance in any one of these areas.17 The BOP determines the number of vital 

functions that were unsatisfactory under each operational area and then calculates 

a deduction amount based on the percentages assigned to each operational area. 

The BOP and the contractors have quality control mechanisms to ensure that these 

 14 BOP Program Statement 4100.04, Bureau of Prisons Acquisition Policy (May 19, 2004).

15 Such BOP polices include those on the use of force and inmate discipline. The contractors 

are permitted to develop their own policies in certain areas, such as the operation of Special Housing 

Units and healthcare, based on ACA and other standards. The contract contains administrative and 

program requirements, including all services, activities, deliverables, and the timelines for specified 

work throughout the life of the contract. 

16 The ACA is a private, nonprofit organization that administers a national accreditation 

program for all components of adult and juvenile corrections. The Joint Commission on Accreditation 

of Healthcare Organizations accredits and certifies healthcare organizations and programs in the 

United States. Joint Commission accreditation certifies that an organization meets certain healthcare 

performance standards. 

17 The BOP may also award a contractor an annual award fee based on exceptional 

performance. However, the award fees were removed from contract prison solicitations in June 2010. 

All contracts awarded after that date do not include an award fee. During the time of this review, 

12 of the 14 contract prison contracts still contained the award fee provision. 
7

vital functions are carried out in accordance with the contract. The contractors’ 

quality control is known as the quality control program, and the BOP’s is known as 

the Quality Assurance Plan (QAP). We describe each of these internal controls

below.

Quality Control and Quality Assurance

BOP contracts place the responsibility for quality control on the contractor 

rather than on the BOP. Each contractor must maintain a quality control program

with audit tools that incorporate, among other government requirements, the 

29 vital functions in the 8 operational areas described above and detailed in 

Appendix 2. The audit tools define the contractor’s work, which is evaluated during 

required internal inspections. The tools specify the documents to examine, 

sampling techniques, span of time for review, processes to observe, persons to 

interview, and desired outcomes. A Quality Assurance Specialist and a trained 

team of contract staff conduct audits monthly or every other month based on their 

prison’s specific audit tools.

18 The contractor provides the audit results to its 

corporate headquarters and the BOP. Each contractor’s corporate headquarters

conducts an annual audit of its prisons and provides the results to the BOP. If the 

contractor identifies a deficiency, which generally is considered to be a deviation 

from the contract, a weakness in internal controls, or an instance of 

nonconformance with an ACA standard affecting the quality of service provided, the 

contract staff generates a corrective action plan to monitor and resolve areas of 

nonconformance.

19 Onsite monitors and contract staff oversee the implementation 

of corrective actions until deficiencies are resolved. When a deficiency is serious 

enough to affect the quality of service, the onsite monitors may suggest a 

nonrecurring deduction in the monthly contract payment. We discuss deficiencies 

and the role of BOP onsite monitors below. 

The BOP’s QAP is based on contract requirements as defined in the FAR.

20 

The QAP includes oversight monitoring checklists, Contract Facility Monitoring 

(CFM) review guidelines, and the contractor’s quality control plan. We discuss 

these aspects of the BOP’s QAP below. 

 18 The Quality Assurance Specialist manages the contract prison’s internal audits, reviews the 

results of the audits, and assists prison staff with implementing a corrective action plan for any 

deficiencies as discussed below. 

19 A corrective action plan is the contract prison’s written plan for correcting identified 

deficiencies and is submitted to the BOP within 30 days after receipt of the final CFM report or other 

notice of deficiency.

20 The BOP’s October 14, 2015, Privitizaton Management Branch Operation Procedures state: 

”The contract facility QAP, oversight monitoring checklists, and random samplings of the contractor’s 

performance, as well as their quality control program, are examples of the Bureau’s QAP efforts.” The 

BOP’s QAP also includes a formal annual audit of contractor performance by the Contract Facility 

Monitoring team, but this annual audit does not fulfill the same function of documenting day-to-day 

monitoring activities between audits. We discuss these BOP efforts in more detail below. 
8

Contract Monitoring and Oversight

The BOP’s administration, monitoring, and oversight of its 14 contract prisons 

is shared by three branches: the Privatization Management Branch (PMB) of the 

Correctional Programs Division; the CFM Branch of the Program Review Division;

and the Privatized Corrections Contracting Section within the Acquisitions Branch of 

the Administration Division. These three branches work in different ways to ensure 

contract compliance and consistency in the monitoring and oversight of the contract 

prisons’ operations. The PMB is responsible for general oversight of the contract 

prisons, the CFM Branch provides subject matter expertise in the form of 

operational reviews, and the Privatized Corrections Contracting Section provides 

contractual oversight. We discuss in more detail the role of each below. 

Privatization Management Branch

In December 2001, the BOP created the PMB to monitor and oversee the 

operations of the BOP’s contract prisons. A Branch Administrator oversees two 

sections, Field Operations and Support and Development, each led by an Assistant 

Administrator. The Assistant Administrator for Field Operations coordinates all field 

operations and manages field resources. Within Field Operations, three regional 

Privatization Field Administrators (PFA), two onsite monitors at each contract 

prison, and five discipline-specific specialists at BOP headquarters provide 

operational support to the PMB field staff and contract prison staff. The PMB field 

staffs (PFAs and onsite monitors) are responsible for oversight and liaison activities 

on their respective contracts to ensure contract compliance. The Assistant 

Administrator of Support and Development leads a team of Program Specialists and 

Management Analysts who provide administrative support to the field staff. The 

field staff uses a number of monitoring tools to directly oversee the contract 

prisons. We discuss the PMB’s field staff and monitoring tools below. 

• Privatization Field Administrators. PFAs provide contract management 

and oversight for three to five contract prisons, supervise the two onsite 

monitors at each prison, review all oversight work and documents, and 

ensure consistency among the contracts.

• Onsite Monitors. Each contract prison has a Senior Secure Institution 

Manager (SSIM) and a Secure Oversight Monitor (SOM). The SSIM, under 

the direction of a PFA, has primary responsibility for ensuring contract 

compliance onsite and provides administrative direction in accordance with 

the FAR. The SSIM also ensures population levels are within the contract 

requirements, gathers information and formulates reports for the BOP’s 

Central Office, and assists the SOM with onsite monitoring. The SOM, under 

the direction of the SSIM, oversees the contract prisons’ operations, mainly 

through daily observations and liaison with prison staff.

The SSIM and SOM conduct routine inspections and daily reviews of the eight 

operational areas in all departments of their assigned contract prison. The 

PMB operating procedures require the SSIM and the SOM to monitor the 
9

contractor’s performance through various methods and tools, including

monitoring checklists, monitoring logs, written evaluations, and performance 

meetings.

o Large Secure Adult Contract Oversight Checklist (checklist). The checklist 

contains approximately 70 observation steps, relating to the 8 operational

areas, which the onsite monitors must observe and document every 

month.21 Onsite monitors at each contract prison document their 

observations on the checklist and rate each operational area as 

“compliant” or “non-compliant.” The appropriate PFA receives the 

completed checklist by the 20th of the following month.

o Monitoring and Notice of Concern (NOC) Logs. Onsite monitors are 

required to keep a monitoring log and a NOC log.

22 The monitoring log 

helps the onsite monitors track and review the completion and results of 

internal and external audits required by the contract. A NOC is a 

memorandum the PMB staff submits to a contractor when the contractor 

is performing below a satisfactory level and the deficiency is more than 

minor or is a repetitive deviation from the contract requirements. Once a 

NOC is issued, the contractor must provide a written corrective action 

plan to the oversight staff, who ensure that the contractor implements 

and maintains its plan. BOP policy requires onsite monitors to use the 

NOC log to track NOCs until the deficiencies are resolved.

o Written Evaluations. The onsite monitors write evaluations of contract 

performance as required by the FAR, the Contracting Officer, or the PMB’s 

internal procedures.23 The FAR requires the BOP to use the Contractor 

Performance Assessment Reporting System to provide a record, both 

positive and negative, of a given contractor’s performance during a 

specific period of time. In addition, the PMB’s operating procedures

require onsite monitors to issue the Oversight Facility Summary Report, a 

management-level assessment of the contractor’s performance focused 

 21 The checklist is generally standardized, but the oversight staff may vary its monitoring 

according to a contract’s specific requirements. For example, Rivers Correctional Institution is 

required by contract to have a residential drug abuse treatment program because its population 

consists of approximately 50 percent U.S. citizens, primarily from the Washington, D.C., metropolitan 

area, many of whom have drug dependencies and who will return to the community when they 

complete their sentence. 

22 In response to recommendations in the OIG’s report on the Reeves County contract prison, 

the BOP has incorporated the functions of the monitoring log and the NOC log into the checklist and 

added a step for documenting the contractor’s follow-up efforts regarding identified deficiencies as the 

BOP no longer uses either log. See DOJ OIG, Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Contract No. 

DJB1PC007. Later in this report, we briefly discuss our findings on the BOP’s use of the monitoring log 

during our review.

23 The Contracting Officer ensures that the contractor adheres to the terms and conditions of 

the contract and has the authority to negotiate, award, cancel, and terminate contracts on behalf of 

the government.
10

primarily on quality of work and responsiveness to the BOP, annually and 

semiannually.

o Performance Meetings. The SSIM, SOM, and Contracting Officer have 

performance meetings with the contract prison management staff at least 

monthly. These meetings provide a management-level review and 

assessment of the contractor's quality of work and responsiveness, as 

well as a forum to discuss operational issues and oversight findings. 

Additionally, contract management staff from each operational area report 

on issues of significance within their respective departments.

In addition to the onsite monitors, the PMB has subject matter specialists for 

disciplinary hearings, intelligence, and health systems, who each provide 

operational assistance to the PMB field staff within their field of expertise.

These specialists support the BOP’s QAP, assist in monitoring contract 

compliance, and serve as Contracting Officer’s Representatives. 

Contract Facility Monitoring Branch

Within the BOP’s Program Review Division, the CFM Branch consists of 

subject matter experts who use a comprehensive audit tool to conduct annual and 

ad hoc reviews of the contractor’s performance in all of the vital functions, test the 

adequacy of internal controls, and assess risks in program and administrative 

areas. The CFM staff uses guidelines based on specific contract requirements,

professional guidelines referenced in the contract, and applicable BOP policies. 

A CFM audit report can result in four levels of deficiency:

1. first-time deficiency,

2. repeat deficiency,

3. repeat repeat deficiency, and

4. significant finding.24

When the CFM team identifies repetitive or significant findings at a contract 

prison, the team may return for a follow-up assessment before the next annual 

audit. This follow-up may be a full or partial audit of the problematic department 

depending on the findings and/or level of deficiency previously identified. When a 

deficiency is serious enough to affect performance in the operational areas, the 

onsite monitors may suggest a deduction to the contractor’s payment.

The CFM team includes a physician and a physician’s assistant. In 

conjunction with CFM’s annual review, the PMB’s Health Systems Specialist (HSS) is 

tasked with the responsibility to assist in the oversight of contractor performance in 

 24 Repeat deficiencies stem from failed internal controls that were developed to correct a 

noted deficiency. The BOP uses the term “repeat repeat deficiency” to describe a deficiency that is 

repeated twice or more. A “significant finding” generally consists of a series of related deficiencies 

that, taken together, constitute a failure of the program component. A significant finding can also be 

caused by a single event that results in a systemic program failure.
11

the area of health services. The HSS conducts a thorough review of health services 

at each contract facility at least every 6 months, or more frequently if the HSS 

determines it is needed.

Privatized Corrections Contracting Section

 

The Privatized Corrections Contracting Section is responsible for contract 

procurement and administration, including cost agreements, and the assignment 

and supervision of Contracting Officers at each of the contract prisons. The section

also assists the PMB’s oversight staff with contract interpretation and provides 

advice on contract requirements and NOC issuance. If a CFM audit finds serious 

deficiencies, the onsite PMB monitor writes a deduction proposal to the Contracting 

Officer. The Contracting Officer may consider other types of action, such as 

contract modification, in addition to deductions. In cases of numerous “repeat 

repeat” or significant deficiencies that go uncorrected over time, the BOP may issue 

a “cure notice” to indicate to the contractor that the BOP may terminate the 

contract if the problem is not corrected.

Expenditures on Contract Prisons

From FY 2011 through FY 2014, the BOP’s annual expenditures on contract 

prisons increased 13.7 percent, from approximately $562 million in FY 2011 to 

$639 million in FY 2014. Since contracts with private prisons are fixed-price

contracts, the payment amount does not change based on costs such as resources 

or time expended by the contractor.25 An accounting of costs for specific 

departments or operations is not provided to the BOP. The contractors are 

responsible only for submitting an invoice to the BOP at the end of each month. 

The monthly invoice includes the monthly operating price that was negotiated prior 

to the start of the contract, which ensures the contractors receive a minimum 

payment from the BOP to staff the facilities and cover expenses as provided in the 

contract.

Because the BOP does not receive the breakdown of cost information under 

the fixed-price prison contracts, we were not able to analyze and compare costs 

incurred by function or department between the contract prisons and BOP 

institutions as part of this review. Moreover, we were unable to compare the 

overall costs of incarceration between BOP institutions and contract prisons in part 

because of the different nature of the inmate populations and programs offered in 

those facilities. The BOP does calculate the overall per capita annual and daily 

costs for housing its inmates in both BOP institutions and contract prisons. 

However, because of the factors discussed above, we do not draw, and caution 

 25 According to the FAR, this type of contract is preferred when contract costs and 

performance requirements are reasonably certain, the government wishes to motivate a contractor to 

enhance performance, and other incentives cannot be used because contractor performance cannot be 

measured objectively. As stated in the FAR, fixed-price incentive contracts are to the government’s 

advantage because the contractor has to “assume substantial cost responsibility and an appropriate 

share of the cost risk.”
12

against drawing the conclusion from that data, which is summarized below, that 

contract prisons are necessarily lower cost than BOP intitutions on an overall basis. 

See Figures 2 and 3 for the BOP’s annual costs per capita to house inmates in BOP 

low security institutions and contract prisons, respectively. 

Figure 2

Annual Per Capita Costs for BOP Institutions

FY 2011 – FY 2014

 Source: BOP

Figure 3

Annual Per Capita Costs for Contract Prisons

FY 2011 – FY 2014

Source: BOP

Based on this data from the BOP, for the 4 years of our review, the average annual

costs in the BOP institutions and the contract prisons per capita were $24,426 and 

$22,488, respectively.

$23,780 $24,200 $24,473 

$25,251 

$20,000

$21,000

$22,000

$23,000

$24,000

$25,000

$26,000

FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014

Annual Per Capita Costs 

$22,951 $23,003 

$21,838 $22,159 

$20,000

$21,000

$22,000

$23,000

$24,000

$25,000

$26,000

FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014

Annual Per Capita Costs
13

In this regard, the BOP’s inability to analyze and compare costs for major 

expenditures such as medical and food-related expenses between the contract 

prisons and its own institutions is significant. The Government Performance and 

Results Act Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRA) mandates that federal agencies post 

on their public websites performance plans that include all programs in the agency’s 

budget. One of the required objectives of the performance plans is to “establish a 

balanced set of performance indicators to be used in measuring or assessing 

progress toward each performance goal, including, as appropriate, customer 

service, efficiency, output, and outcome indicators.” The GPRA defines the 

efficiency measure as “a ratio of a program activity’s inputs (such as costs or hours 

worked by employees) to its outputs (amount of products or services delivered) or 

outcomes (the desired results of a program).” Without the ability to compare costs, 

however, the BOP is unable to evaluate whether the contractors’ services are 

consistent with the value or quality of service the BOP should be receiving based on 

the amount of money that is being spent and, therefore, is unable to comply with 

this aspect of the GPRA.

26

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) expressed similar concerns

in a December 2013 report that assessed the extent to which opportunities exist to 

enhance the transparency of information in the BOP's budget justifications for 

congressional stakeholders and decision makers.27 The GAO found that the BOP's 

budget justification for FY 2014 included $2.5 billion for Inmate Care and Programs 

such as medical services, food service, education and vocational training, 

psychology services, and religious services. However, the budget justification did 

not include a breakdown of proposed funding amounts for each of these categories. 

The BOP’s budget justification for FY 2014 also included $1.1 billion for “Contract 

Confinement,” and, consistent with our discussion above, that category did not 

specify how those costs were to be allocated. We agree with the GAO that such

data would be useful in identifying trends and cost drivers that may affect future 

costs.28

 26 The GPRA “directs OMB [Office of Management and Budget], each fiscal year, to determine 

whether each agency's programs or activities meet performance goals and objectives outlined in the 

agency performance plans and to submit a report on unmet goals to the agency head.” See GPRA 

Modernization Act of 2010, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., S. 1116. 

27 GAO, Bureau of Prisons: Opportunities Exist to Enhance the Transparency of Annual 

Budget Justifications, GAO-14-121 (December 6, 2013) (accessed July 28, 2016).

28 The GAO recommended that the Attorney General consult with congressional decision 

makers on providing additional BOP funding detail in future budget justifications and, in conjunction 

with the BOP, take action as appropriate. According to the GAO, the Department concurred with the 

GAO’s recommendation and consulted with congressional Appropriations Committee staff to expand 

the level of detail in the two most recent budget requests, including an exhibit in the BOP’s FY 2015 

and FY 2016 budget submissions that provided additional details on BOP programs and activities. 

However, those submissions did not provide greater transparency or more cost information with 

regard to the BOP’s expenditures on contract confinement.
14

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW

Contract Prisons Had More Safety and Security-related Incidents per Capita 

than BOP Institutions for Most of the Indicators We Analyzed 

One way to assess how effectively the BOP monitors its contract prisons is to 

compare the statistical profile for contract and BOP institutions on key inmate 

safety and security incidents. To evaluate how the contract prisons performed 

relative to the BOP’s institutions, we analyzed data from the 14 contract prisons 

that were operational during the period of our review and 14 selected BOP 

institutions with similar population sizes, geographical locations, and security levels,

comparing data in eight key areas that were relevant to American Correctional 

Association (ACA) standards and were tracked by both the contract prisons and the 

BOP institutions: (1) contraband, (2) reports of incidents, (3) lockdowns, 

(4) inmate discipline, (5) selected grievances, (6) telephone monitoring, 

(7) urinalysis drug testing, and (8) sexual misconduct.29 With the exception of 

having fewer positive drug tests and sexual misconduct incidents, we found that the 

contract prisons had more incidents per capita than the BOP institutions in all of the 

other key areas.30 We discuss the results of our analysis below. Unless otherwise 

stated, we calculated monthly and annual averages per 10,000 inmates. See 

Appendix 1 for more details regarding our methodology and Appendix 6 for the full 

results of our analysis. 

Contract Prisons Had More Frequent Incidents per Capita of Contraband Finds, 

Assaults, Uses of Force, Lockdowns, Guilty Findings on Inmate Discipline Charges, 

and Selected Categories of Grievances

In three-quarters of the data categories we analyzed, the contract prisons 

had more safety- and security-related incidents per capita than the comparable BOP 

institutions. The contract prisons had more frequent incidents per capita for three 

of the four types of contraband we analyzed: cell phones, tobacco, and weapons. 

Also, we examined 10 types of reports of incidents and found that the contract 

prisons had higher rates of assaults and uses of force. In addition, the contract 

prisons had more lockdowns, more guilty findings on serious inmate discipline 

charges, and more grievances submitted by inmates in selected categories. Finally, 

although the contract prisons are not subject to a minimum requirement for 

 29 In this review, we were not able to evaluate all of the factors that contributed to the 

underlying data. Where our interviews or document analyses provided explanations for the data 

findings, we note this. However, we also note a number of areas where we believe the BOP needs to 

examine the reasons behind our findings more thoroughly and identify corrective actions. The BOP 

indicated in response to a working draft of this report that a number of factors, including inmate 

demographics and facility location, may result in variance in the data reported in these categories. 

According to the BOP, as of January 2014 inmates incarcerated in private facilities were primarily nonU.S. citizens with 72.1 percent from Mexico, while the selected BOP institutions had an average of 

11.8 percent non-U.S. citizens. See Appendix 1 for more information on our methodology, including 

our data analysis.

30 However, overall, we found that inmates at the contract prisons filed fewer grievances in all 

categories (including those beyond our eight selected categories).
15

monitoring inmate phone calls, we found that they monitored a lower percentage. 

We discuss these findings in greater detail below.

In addition to the specific categories of findings discussed in this section, we

looked at the overall frequency of incidents among the three private prison 

contractors. The extent to which one contractor’s facilities performed better or 

worse than others on these indicators varied. Overall, the GEO Group’s (GEO) 

contract prisons had more incidents per capita compared to those operated by the 

Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and the Management and Training 

Corporation (MTC) for contraband finds, several types of reports of incidents, 

lockdowns, guilty findings on inmate discipline charges, positive drug test results, 

and sexual misconduct; that CCA contract prisons had the highest rates of inmate 

fights and inmate assaults on other inmates; and that MTC contract prisons had the 

highest rates of inmate grievances and monitored the lowest percentage of inmate 

telephone calls. Appendix 6 provides the full results of our analysis of the key 

indicators by contractor. Among the contract prisons, the Rivers Correctional 

Institution (GEO), D. Ray James Correctional Institution (GEO), and McRae 

Correctional Institution (CCA) most often had more incidents per capita in the 

categories of data we analyzed, though again the number of categories and extent 

of the differences varied.

31

Contraband

We examined two sets of contraband data: (1) annual data on cell phone 

confiscations and (2) monthly data on confiscations of drugs, weapons, and 

tobacco.32 These types of contraband are especially harmful, among other reasons 

because they can allow inmates to continue to operate criminal enterprises during 

incarceration, enable violence and support addictions, or serve as alternate forms of 

currency for inmates. We found that, on average, the contract prisons annually 

confiscated eight times as many cell phones per capita from FY 2011 through 

FY 2014. In terms of overall totals, contract prisons confiscated 4,849 cell phones 

compared to 400 confiscated in the BOP institutions.33 Figure 4 below shows the 

per capita number of cell phones found at contract prisons and BOP institutions by 

year.

 31 For example, Rivers had the highest rates of contraband finds (excluding cell phones), 

inmate assaults on staff, uses of force, guilty findings on inmate discipline cases, inmate grievances, 

positive drug tests, inmate-on-inmate sexual misconduct, and the lowest phone monitoring rate. We 

found that D. Ray James had the highest rate of disruptive behavior incidents, as well as the second 

highest rate of inmate assaults on staff. McRae had the highest rate of inmate suicide attempts and 

self-mutilation, the second highest rate of positive drug tests, and the third highest rates of cell 

phones found and inmate grievances. The extent of the variation differed substantially among

different indicators. 

32 The data on cell phones confiscated in the BOP institutions came from the BOP’s annual Cell 

Phones Recovered reports, which are not broken out by month, so we analyzed annual rather than 

monthly data on cell phones confiscated in the contract prisons as well as other BOP institutions.

33 These numbers include cell phones found on inmates as well as anywhere within contract 

prisons or BOP institutions. For the contract prisons, the contractors provided the count of cell 

phones.
16

Figure 4

Per Capita Cell Phones Confiscated at 

Contract Prisons versus BOP-managed Institutions

FY 2011 – FY 2014

Source: OIG analysis of BOP and contractor data

The large volume of cell phones confiscated at the contract prisons compared 

to the BOP institutions during the period of our review was striking. Further, we 

found that two contract prisons (Big Springs and Adams County) accounted for 

3,981 of the 4,849 (82 percent) cell phones confiscated at the 14 contract 

prisons.34 Table 1 shows the total number of cell phones found at Big Springs, 

Adams Country, and the remaining 12 contract prisons, reflecting the substantial 

volume of cell phones that were confiscated. 

Table 1

Cell Phones Found at Big Springs, Adams County, and the 

Remaining Contract Prisons, FY 2011 – FY 2014

Contract Prison FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 Total

Big Springs 786 1,068 813 331 2,998

Adams County 8 24 390 561 983

Remaining 12 Contract 

Prisons 238 117 210 303 868

Totals 1,032 1,209 1,413 1,195 4,849

Source: OIG analysis of contractor data

According to contractor data, Big Springs accounted for 2,998 of 4,849 cell 

phones (62 percent) confiscated at the 14 contract prisons. While the number of 

cell phones confiscated at Big Springs peaked at 1,068 in FY 2012, confiscations 

decreased by 70 percent, to 331 in FY 2014. According to a Privatization Field 

Administrator (PFA), the high number of cell phones confiscated at Big Springs was 

 34 As of September 2014, Big Springs’ inmate population was 3,403, the largest of the 

contract prisons, and Adams County’s was 2,304. Together, these two prisons accounted for 

20 percent of the total combined population of the BOP’s 14 contract prisons at that time.

403.9

441.1

484.1

427.0

42.2 15.1

59.9 50.1

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014

Phones per 10,000 Inmates

Contract Prisons

BOP Institutions
17

due to the prison’s proximity to a public road and passersby being able to throw cell 

phones over its perimeter fence. The PFA stated that installing a tall net around the 

perimeter fence in the spring of 2013 helped reduce the number of cell phones 

entering the prison in that manner. The PFA stated that the prison also worked to 

improve relations with local law enforcement so that more cell phone incidents were 

fully prosecuted. 

By contrast, the number of cell phones confiscated at Adams County 

increased from 8 in FY 2011 to 561 in FY 2014. In May 2012, there was a riot at 

the prison, and subsequently the contractor instituted heightened security 

measures, including new gates, increased security staff coverage, and greater 

controls over inmate movements. According to the prison’s self-assessment, these 

measures resulted in an increase in contraband finds. However, even without the 

cell phones confiscated at Big Springs and Adams County, there were still more 

than twice as many cell phones confiscated at contract prisons than at BOP 

institutions during the period of our review. Staff confiscated 868 phones during 

this period in the remaining 12 contract prisons, compared to 400 confiscated in all 

14 BOP institutions.

While the numbers may not have been large relative to the cell phone 

confiscations, we also found that the contract prisons had more frequent weapon 

and tobacco confiscations per capita than the BOP institutions but less frequent

drug confiscations. Table 2 shows the average monthly finds per capita for these 

three types of contraband over the period of our review. 

Table 2

Average Monthly Finds Per Capita for Weapons, Tobacco, and 

Drugs at Contract Prisons and BOP Institutions

FY 2011 – FY 2014

Weapons Tobacco Drugs Combined

Contract Prisons 3.2 2.5 1.8 7.6

BOP Institutions 1.8 1.9 3.0 6.6

Note: Due to rounding, the combined numbers are not an exact sum of the individual 

contraband categories. Averages are per 10,000 inmates.

Source: OIG analysis of BOP and contractor data

On average, the contract prisons had nearly twice as many weapons 

confiscated as BOP institutions (3.2 compared to 1.8) monthly. Also, the contract 

prisons had 2.5 tobacco finds monthly, on average, compared to 1.9 in the BOP 

institutions. Conversely, the BOP institutions had more drug finds than the contract 

prisons, with 3 monthly, on average, in the BOP institutions compared to 1.8 in 

contract prisons. Overall, we found that the contract prisons had 7.6 contraband 

finds in all 3 categories combined, more than the 6.6 finds in these 3 categories in 

the comparable BOP institutions. 

We note that not all of the contract prisons found contraband in every 

category over the 4 years of our review. We did not compare contraband 

interdiction efforts between the contract prisons and BOP institutions as part of this 
18

review.35 Therefore, we were unable to evaluate whether higher rates of 

contraband finds actually indicated more contraband present in either a contract 

prison or a BOP institution, a more aggressive or effective program for discovering 

and confiscating contraband, or some combination of those or other factors. 

However, where the disparity between contract prisons and BOP institutions is 

greatest, such as in cell phone recoveries, this may reflect at least to some extent a 

problem that should be examined and addressed by the BOP.

Reports of Incidents

We analyzed data on 10 types of incidents: (1) assaults by inmates on 

inmates, (2) assaults by inmates on staff, (3) sexual assaults by inmates on staff, 

(4) inmate deaths, (5) inmate fights, (6) cell fires, (7) inmate suicide attempts and 

self-mutilation (combined), (8) inmate suicides, (9) disruptive behavior by inmates, 

and (10) staff uses of force on inmates.36 We found that the contract prisons had 

higher rates of inmate-on-inmate and inmate-on-staff assaults, as well as higher 

rates of staff uses of force. We also found the contract prisons had comparatively 

equal rates of fights and suicide attempts and self-mutilation, and that the contract 

prisons had lower rates of disruptive behavior incidents. 

As to the first two types of incidents, our analysis showed a higher rate of 

assaults in the contract prisons than in the BOP institutions, both by inmates 

against inmates and by inmates against staff. Per capita, the contract prisons 

reported a 28 percent higher average of inmate-on-inmate assaults (3.3 assaults 

monthly, on average, compared to 2.5 on average in BOP institutions).37 An 

analysis of these assaults per capita by year indicated that both the contract 

prisons and the BOP institutions saw their numbers rise in FY 2012; but the rise 

was more dramatic in the contract prisons and remained high through FY 2014. 

Figure 5 below shows the per capita inmate-on-inmate assaults each year. 

 35 The OIG is separately reviewed and reported on the BOP’s contraband interdiction efforts. 

See DOJ OIG, Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Contraband Interdiction Efforts, Evaluation and 

Inspections (E&I) Report 16-05 (June 2016).

36 The first two categories of general assaults do not include sexual assaults by inmates on 

inmates or by staff on inmates, which we discuss separately under sexual misconduct, below. 

37 See Appendix 1 for the formula used to calculate the percentage differences presented 

throughout this section.
19

Figure 5

Per Capita Inmate-on-Inmate Assaults in Contract 

Prisons and BOP Institutions

FY 2011 – FY 2014

Source: OIG analysis of BOP and contractor data

With regard to inmate-on-staff assaults, we found that the contract prisons 

reported well more than twice as many such incidents each month on average as 

compared to the BOP institutions: 4.2 assaults monthly, on average, in the 

contract prisons versus 1.6 in the BOP institutions. One contract prison, D. Ray 

James, accounted for 155 of 526 (29 percent) of the assaults on staff in all contract 

prisons from FY 2011 through 2014, including 114 assaults on staff in FY 2012 

alone. A PFA told us that D. Ray James, operated by GEO in Folkston, Georgia, was 

having significant performance issues on its contract during this period and that the 

BOP had issued a cure notice in the fall of 2012.38

However, the PFA said the contractor had subsequently made personnel 

changes at the prison and its performance had noticeably improved. Our analysis 

found that the number of inmate-on-staff assaults at D. Ray James was reduced 

after FY 2012, with only one assault recorded in FY 2014. Figure 6 below shows the 

per capita numbers of assaults by inmates on staff each year.

 38 The PFA stated that a cure notice is issued to a contract prison that is not meeting the vital 

functions of its contract and indicates that the BOP is on the brink of ending the contract. Federal 

Acquisition Regulation 49.607 specifies that a cure notice is required when a contract is to be 

terminated for default before the delivery date. In FY 2012, D. Ray James received 47 notices of 

concern (NOC), more than double the highest number of NOCs that any other contract prison received 

in a 1-year period during the 4-year period of our review. 

28.6

42.3 42.5

39.3

29.4

37.0

27.9

25.7

20

25

30

35

40

45

FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014

Assaults per 10,000 Inmates

Contract Prisons

BOP Institutions
20

Figure 6

Per Capita Assaults by Inmates on Staff in Contract

Prisons Compared to BOP Institutions

FY 2011 – FY 2014

Source: OIG analysis of BOP data

With regard to the other selected incidents, our analysis of BOP and 

contractor data also found that the contract prisons had 17 percent more use-offorce incidents; approximately the same rate of inmate fights, self-mutilations, and 

suicide attempts; and a 29 percent lower rate of disruptive behavior incidents. 

Appendix 6 shows the monthly averages and 4-year totals for each of these types 

of incidents. 

Finally, we found few instances of inmate-on-staff sexual assaults, cell fires, 

and suicides in either the contract prisons or the BOP institutions. We excluded 

inmate deaths from the discussion above because they can occur for reasons 

unrelated to security, such as age-related illness, and the clinical adequacy of 

inmate medical care fell outside the scope of our review.

39 However, we did 

analyze comparative data on reports of incidents of inmate deaths to evaluate the 

existence of disparities in the inmate death rate between the contract prisons and

BOP institutions. While we found that the contract prisons actually had a lower

monthly per capita average of inmate deaths compared to BOP institutions —

0.4 inmate deaths compared to 1.2 in the BOP institutions — we still believe that 

any disparity in the inmate death rate bears closer examination to determine the 

causes for differing rates and any steps that might be taken to reduce such 

occurrences. See Appendix 6 for the results of our analysis for all 10 types of 

incident reports. Overall, we believe the BOP needs to examine the frequency of 

 39 In 2008 and again in 2010, the OIG completed an audit of the BOP’s efforts to manage 

inmate healthcare. See DOJ OIG, The Federal Bureau of Prison's Efforts to Manage Inmate Health 

Care, Audit Report 08-08 (February 2008), and Follow-up Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ 

Efforts to Manage Inmate Health Care, Audit Report 10-30 (July 2010). See also DOJ OIG, Review of 

the Impact of an Aging Inmate Population on the Federal Bureau of Prisons, E&I Report 15-05 (May 

2015), and Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Medical Staffing Challenges, E&I Report 16-02 

(March 2016).

33.7

69.0

52.4

35.0

21.1 21.6

13.0

21.3

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014

Assaults per 10,000 Inmates

Contract Prisons

BOP Institutions
21

these different types of incidents in its contract prisons and determine what 

corrective action may be required to address them.

As the BOP emphasized in response to a working draft of this report, no two 

BOP or private facilities are identical demographically. We acknowledge that 

inmates from different countries or who are incarcerated in various geographical 

regions may have different cultures, behaviors, and communication methods. The 

BOP stated that incidents in any prison are usually a result of a conflict of cultures, 

misinterpreting behaviors, or failing to communicate well. One difference within a 

prison housing a high percentage of non-U.S. citizens is the potential number of 

different languages and, within languages, different dialects. Without the BOP 

conducting an in-depth study into the influence of such demographic factors on 

prison incidents, it would not be possible to determine their impact. 

Lockdowns

During a prison lockdown, inmates are restricted to their quarters and their 

movements and communication are also restricted, often in response to a 

disturbance or incident that threatens the secure and orderly running of the prison. 

According to the BOP:

The purpose of a lockdown of a correctional facility is to ensure the 

security of the institution, maintain control of the inmate population, 

and ascertain the concerns of the inmate population. Lockdowns are 

often a precautionary measure used to maintain control during a 

period of inmate dissention. During each lockdown, oversight staff 

monitors the contractor’s actions and progress to return the institution 

to normal operations as quickly as possible.

During the period of our review, contract prisons reported more lockdowns than the 

comparable BOP institutions. The contract prisons reported 30 partial lockdowns 

and 71 full lockdowns, while the BOP institutions reported no partial lockdowns and 

11 full lockdowns, meaning that these security measures occurred more than 

9 times as often at contract prisons.40 Moreover, 12 of the 14 (86 percent) contract 

prisons reported full or partial lockdowns, while only 6 of the 14 (43 percent) BOP 

institutions reported lockdowns. Of the 12 contract prisons that reported a full or 

partial lockdown, Big Springs had the highest number, with 28 of the 101 partial 

and full lockdowns reported, or 28 percent of all contract prison lockdowns. Among 

the reasons cited in the data we obtained for lockdowns at Big Springs and other 

contract prisons were inmate demonstrations, fights, inmate assaults on staff, 

attempts to introduce significant contraband, conflicts between inmate gangs or 

racial groups, food strikes, inmates refusing to work, shakedowns, and local 

environmental or weather emergencies. In some cases, the contractors’ 

descriptions of the circumstances surrounding lockdowns noted that inmates 

expressed concerns over specific issues, including medical care, commissary prices, 

 40 A partial lockdown affects only some housing units in a prison; a full lockdown affects the 

entire prison.
22

inmate pay, movement restrictions, and television channels. While we could not 

review the basis for lockdowns in the context of this review, the greater number of 

such incidents at contract prisons suggests a need for the BOP to examine and 

address the issue.

Discipline

We analyzed inmate discipline data on charges such as murder, assault, 

sexual assault, possession of weapons or drugs, setting fires, fighting, and 

participating in riots or demonstrations. We found that the contract prisons had a 

higher number of guilty findings on these types of serious offense charges. The 

contract prisons had 77.9 guilty findings monthly on average (10,089 over 

4 years), compared to 64.7 in the BOP institutions (7,439 over 4 years).41 We 

believe that a higher incidence of substantiated misconduct may be an indication of 

greater inmate behavioral challenges in contract facilities, which merits further 

analysis and action by the BOP.

Grievances

Contract terms specify that the contract prisons must develop their own 

internal grievance policies and adhere to federal regulations setting forth 

procedures for inmates to receive formal review of issues of concern to them.42 

As part of our analysis, we selected eight categories of grievances we deemed 

particularly relevant to safety and security to analyze collectively and separately.43 

We selected grievances related to medical care and food because each was 

specifically identified among reasons that led to lockdowns at contract prisons, as 

detailed above. In addition to medical care and food, the grievance categories we 

selected as particularly relevant to this analysis were conditions of confinement, 

institutional operations, safety and security, sexual abuse or assault, Special 

Housing Units (SHU), and complaints against staff. We found that in these eight 

categories collectively, inmates at the contract prisons submitted 24 percent more 

grievances: 32.2 grievances per month, on average, compared to 25.3 for the BOP 

institutions. 

Individually, not all of the eight grievance categories we selected had a larger 

number of grievances or showed notable differences.44 However, our analysis did 

show that, per capita: 

 41 Our analysis of the discipline data included sexual misconduct incidents that were also 

analyzed separately, as described below.

42 28 C.F.R. 542.

43 Because the contract prisons sometimes used different descriptions for the same types of 

grievances and some descriptions were more detailed than necessary for the level of our analysis, we 

consolidated and standardized the grievance categories. 

44 Not all contract prisons had grievances in all of the categories. See Appendix 7 for a 

detailed comparison between contract prisons and BOP institutions for each of the eight grievance 

categories. 
23

• Contract prison inmates submitted more than twice as many grievances 

regarding prison staff as inmates in the BOP institutions, averaging 

12.9 monthly compared to 6.2 in the BOP institutions. 

• There were more grievances regarding SHUs at the BOP institutions, with an 

average of 2.4 monthly compared to 0.2 monthly in the contract prisons.

• There were more food grievances at the contract prisons, on average 

2.1 food grievances monthly compared to 1.2 in the BOP institutions. 

• There was little difference in the number of medical grievances (14.3 at the 

contract prisons versus 14.1 at the BOP institutions on average monthly).

However, overall, we found that inmates at the contract prisons filed fewer 

grievances in all categories (including those beyond our eight selected categories). 

According to BOP data, inmates at the contract prisons filed, on average, 

72.6 grievances per month compared to 121.5 grievances at the BOP institutions 

and a higher percentage of grievances were granted in the contract prisons. The 

overall rate of inmate grievances granted in the contract prisons over the 4 years of 

our review was 8.1 percent, while in the BOP institutions 5.2 percent were granted. 

Of the 8,756 total grievances filed by inmates at the contract prisons from FY 2011 

through FY 2014, 1,800 (21 percent) were related to medical concerns, 

1,538 (18 percent) were complaints about prison staff, and 1,186 (14 percent) 

were related to the inmate disciplinary process. Figure 7 below shows the most 

common categories of grievances in the contract prisons.

Figure 7

Most Common Inmate Grievance Categories 

in the Contract Prisons, FY 2011 – FY 2014

Note: Less common types of grievances included in the 

“Other” category (mauve) included transfers, classification, 

telephone and mail, institutional operations, conditions of 

confinement, and alleged violations of federal or state laws 

and regulations.

Source: OIG analysis of BOP and contractor data

By comparison, in the BOP institutions, of 14,098 total grievances filed by 

inmates, 3,451 (24 percent) were related to inmate discipline, hearings, and 

Medical/Dental (21%)

Staff Complaints (18%)

Discipline/Hearings/Appeals (14%)

Property (7%)

Sentence Computation (5%)

Programs (5%)

Food (3%)

Other (29%)
24

appeals, followed by 1,609 grievances (11 percent) on medical concerns and 

1,332 grievances (8 percent) on sentence computation issues. The remaining 

47 percent of grievances at contract prisons and 57 percent of grievances at BOP 

institutions were related to categories including inmate classification, transfers, 

legal access, work assignments, residential reentry centers, and telephone and 

mail. Figure 8 below shows the most common categories of grievances in the BOP 

institutions. 

Figure 8

Most Common Inmate Grievances Categories 

in the BOP Institutions, FY 2011 – FY 2014

Note: Less common types of grievances included in the 

“Other” category (mauve) included residential reentry 

centers, telephone and mail, work assignments, SHUs, and 

legal access issues.

Source: OIG analysis of BOP and contractor data

Comparison of the distribution of grievances between the contract prisons 

and the BOP reveals that the concerns of inmates in the contract prisons are more 

focused on medical and dental issues (21 percent of the contract prison grievances 

as opposed to 11 percent of the BOP institution grievances). Similarly, the 

percentage related to staff complaints is much larger at the contract prisons than 

the BOP institutions (18 percent in the former compared to 5 percent in the latter). 

The higher focus on particular areas in contract prison grievances suggests that the 

BOP should examine those areas and develop plans to address any underlying 

issues.

Monitoring of Inmate Phone Calls

The BOP requires that BOP institutions monitor at least 5 percent of inmate 

phone calls.45 Contracts do not require the contract prisons to monitor a specific 

percentage of inmate phone calls. However, a Privatization Management Branch 

(PMB) Intelligence Specialist told us that the BOP recommends that the contract 

 45 Regional BOP Directors may set higher monitoring goals, ranging from 10 to 15 percent of 

calls monitored randomly for BOP institutions within their region. See DOJ OIG, The Federal Bureau of 

Prisons’ Monitoring of Mail for High-Risk Inmates, E&I Report I-2006-009 (September 2006). 

Discipline/Hearings/Appeals (24%)

Medical/Dental (11%)

Sentence Computation (9%)

Classification (9%)

Transfers (7%)

Programs (6%)

Staff Complaints (5%)

Other (27%)
25

prisons monitor a minimum of 5 percent of inmate phone calls. The Intelligence 

Specialist stated that it is good correctional practice to monitor at least 5 percent of 

calls to gather intelligence. We found that all but two of the contract prisons met or 

exceeded the BOP’s 5 percent phone call monitoring standard on average each 

month from FY 2010 through FY 2014. However, collectively, the contract prisons 

monitored fewer phone calls than the BOP institutions. Our analysis found that the 

BOP institutions monitored 21 percent of all inmate phone calls on average each 

month, compared to only 8 percent at the contract prisons. 

We also found that the number of inmate phone calls that the contract 

prisons can monitor is limited by the unavailability of both bilingual staff and 

technological resources. With the exception of the Rivers Correctional Institution 

(Rivers), which houses approximately 50 percent of its inmates from the District of 

Columbia, most of the contract prison population consists of foreign national 

inmates, many of whom are Mexican nationals serving sentences for immigration 

violations.

46 At Rivers, staff told us that one full-time translator and another staff 

member monitored Spanish-language phone calls in addition to performing their 

other duties but were not able to monitor all phone calls that should have been 

monitored. We found similar circumstances at another contract prison we visited,

where a single bilingual officer was responsible, among other duties, for monitoring 

all Spanish-language calls. 

We were also told that the contract prisons do not have the same telephone 

technology that is available to BOP institutions to monitor inmate phone calls. A 

PMB Intelligence Specialist told us that with access to the BOP’s TRUINTEL system, 

it was possible for staff to listen to inmates’ phone calls in the BOP institutions 

through a desk telephone or through their desktop computers. Therefore, various 

staff in different departments throughout the institutions could monitor phone calls. 

However, staff at contract prisons do not have access to TRUINTEL or the 

intelligence it provides from other BOP institutions, nor are contract prison inmate 

phone calls recorded in TRUINTEL, all of which limits contract prisons’ and the 

BOP’s opportunities to gather intelligence. 

Even though contract prisons are generally meeting the minimal monitoring 

standard, we believe that the lower monitoring rate at contract prisons and the 

personnel and technological hurdles faced there are issues that the BOP should 

consider and address.

The Contract Prisons Had Fewer Incidents per Capita of Positive Drug Tests and 

Sexual Misconduct 

Another indicator of safety and security in a prison setting is the number of 

positive drug tests and sexual misconduct incidents per capita. Our analysis 

indicated that the contract prisons had fewer inmates who tested positive for drugs 

through urinalysis testing than the BOP institutions. We also found that the 

 46 As of FY 2013, 96 percent of the BOP’s inmate population in contract prisons consisted of 

foreign nationals. 
26

contract prisons had lower rates of guilty findings on serious disciplinary charges of 

inmate-on-inmate sexual offenses. Additionally, the contract prisons had fewer 

allegations of sexual misconduct by staff against inmates. We discuss these 

findings in greater detail below.

Urinalysis Drug Tests

According to BOP policy and contract requirements, contract prisons and 

other BOP institutions must drug test 5 percent of inmates every month. We found 

that, per capita, the contract prisons had fewer positive urinalysis drug test results, 

on average monthly (2.1) than the BOP institutions (3.4), with a total over 4 years 

of 263 positive results in the contract prisons compared to 376 in the BOP 

institutions. However, the contract prisons also drug-tested a slightly lower 

percentage (7 percent) of inmates on average each month than the BOP institutions 

(8 percent). Despite the lower testing percentage, on average over the 4-year 

period of our review, all contract prisons drug tested over 5 percent of inmates per 

month, exceeding contract requirements.47 Given the limitations of the BOP’s data, 

which included only the number of inmates tested and the number of positive and 

negative results, we were not able to determine whether the lower per capita 

positive drug test results in contract prisons reflected less drug usage, an issue with 

the drug testing procedures being followed in those facilities, or some combination 

of these; but we believe that these are issues that merit closer examination and 

analysis by the BOP.

Sexual Misconduct

We analyzed two types of sexual misconduct data: (1) guilty findings on 

disciplinary charges of inmates committing sexual misconduct against other 

inmates and (2) allegations of staff sexual misconduct against inmates. In both 

categories, the data that we reviewed generally reflected that the contract prisons 

had fewer incidents per capita than the BOP institutions. 

However, we found that some of the data on inmate-on-inmate sexual 

misconduct was recorded inconsistently, for both the contract prisons and the BOP 

institutions. BOP Intelligence Specialists produce monthly intelligence reports on 

the contract prisons with the number of reported sexual assault incidents, as well 

as a breakdown of categories of inmate-on-inmate sexual misconduct allegations. 

A PMB Intelligence Specialist told us these two types of data should be consistent 

with each other; however, we determined that the overall number of incidents and 

the number of incidents by category were frequently inconsistent. In addition, data 

on inmate discipline cases with sexual misconduct guilty findings indicated more 

inmate-on-inmate misconduct in contract prisons than was recorded in the monthly 

intelligence reports. Further, the BOP institutions reported no inmate-on-inmate 

sexual misconduct incidents, even though the data on inmate discipline in the BOP 

 47 The contract requires the contractor to adhere to BOP Program Statement 6060.8, Urine 

Surveillance and Narcotic Identification (March 8, 2001). The program statement stipulates that each 

institution should randomly drug test 5 percent of its total population each month. 
27

institutions also showed guilty findings on sexual misconduct charges. The BOP’s 

contract prisons are currently subject to Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2012 (PREA) 

reporting requirements in their contracts, as are the BOP’s noncontract institutions 

by statute.48 However, since the rules for PREA took effect in August 2012, as part 

of this review we did not evaluate the contract prisons’ compliance with PREA or 

how it may have affected the contract prisons’ sexual misconduct incident 

reporting. 

Given the limitations of the data on reports of incidents for inmate-on-inmate 

sexual misconduct, we focused our analysis on inmate discipline cases that resulted 

in guilty findings for charges of sexual misconduct.49 Over the period of our study, 

we found that the contract prisons had approximately 9 percent less guilty findings

on average annually in sexual misconduct cases than the BOP institutions. The 

contract prisons had 16.6 guilty findings annually, on average, as opposed to 

18.1 in the BOP institutions. However, we also found that 50 of 156 (32 percent) of 

the contract prison inmate-on-inmate sexual misconduct guilty findings occurred at 

one contract prison, Rivers, between FY 2011 and 2014, and we believe that the 

disparity between different facilities on this issue warrants closer examination by 

the BOP. 

Staff-on-inmate sexual misconduct is not tracked through reports of 

incidents, which apply only to inmate misconduct. Instead, allegations of staff 

misconduct against inmates must be reported to the BOP’s Office of Internal Affairs 

(OIA). Our analysis of OIA data found that the contract prisons reported fewer 

misconduct allegations than the BOP institutions.50 During our review period, the 

contract prisons reported 97 staff sexual misconduct allegations compared to 

139 staff sexual misconduct allegations reported from the BOP institutions. 

Adjusting for population differences, the contract prisons averaged 9 allegations 

annually, compared to 15 on average in the BOP institutions. Of course, no level of 

sexual misconduct is acceptable, and we strongly encourage the BOP to continue to 

work to address this issue in both contract prisons and BOP institutions. 

OIG Site Visits Revealed Safety and Security Concerns and Inappropriate 

Housing Assignments

The BOP requires all of its contract prisons to provide a safe and secure 

setting for staff and inmates and to maintain ACA accreditation throughout the term 

of their contract. We found that while each contract prison we visited was cited for 

at least one safety or security deficiency during the period of our review, these 

 48 PREA requires prisons to track allegations of sexual misconduct incidents. The OIG 

analyzed emerging issues with PREA implementation in Progress Report on the Department of Justice’s 

Implementation of the Prison Rape Elimination Act, E&I Report 15-1 (October 2014). 

49 Specifically, we analyzed Codes 114 (Sexual Assault by Force), 205 (Engaging in Sexual 

Acts), 206 (Making Sexual Proposals or Threats to Another), and 229 (Sexual Assault without Force).

50 Contract prisons and BOP institutions are required to report all allegations of staff sexual 

misconduct to the OIA. The OIA then notifies the OIG Investigations Division about the allegations, 

and the OIG decides which it should investigate and which should be referred back to the OIA for 

investigation or delegation to institutional staff to investigate. 
28

issues were addressed by the contract prisons and each maintained ACA 

accreditation throughout the period covered by our review. However, during our 

fieldwork, we learned that two of the three facilities we visited housed newly 

received general population inmates in the SHU, inconsistent with ACA standards 

and BOP policy, and neither prison had been cited for a deficiency as a result. 

Safety and Security Deficiencies

In addition to the concerns relating to inmate placement in the SHU detailed 

below, we discovered that some contract prisons experienced other safety and 

security issues during the period of our review. The three contract prisons we 

visited were each cited for one or more safety and security related deficiencies. A 

contract prison receives a deficiency when it violates a policy that affects the quality 

of service provided under the contract. These included administrative infractions, 

such as improper storage of use-of-force video footage, as well as other deficiencies 

that the BOP determined were more serious or systemic in nature, such as a failure 

to initiate discipline in over 50 percent of incidents reviewed by the onsite monitors 

over a 6-month period. However, the contractors corrected the safety and security 

deficiencies that the BOP identified. As a result, the BOP determined that each 

prison was sufficiently compliant with the safety and security aspects of its contract 

to continue with the contract during the period covered by our review.51 Table 3 

shows the safety and security indicators within the correctional services area and 

the number of deficiencies the BOP identified during our review period.52 

Table 3

Number of Deficiencies Received in Contract 

Prisons the OIG Visited, FY 2011 – FY 2014

Security Indicators Dalby Eden Rivers

Use of Force 1 1 0

Reports of Incidents 0 1 0

Inmate Death Notifications 0 0 0

Inmate Urinalysis Testing 1 0 0

Inmate Disciplinary Hearings 0 2 0

Sexual Assaults 0 1 0

Inmate Grievances 0 0 0

Contraband 1 1 1

Lockdowns 0 0 0

Suicides 2 0 0

TOTAL 5 6 1

Source: BOP data

During our review period, the 3 contract prisons we visited collectively 

received 12 deficiencies in the security indicators we analyzed. The Giles W. Dalby

 51 To maintain a contract, a contract prison must remain compliant with each operational area 

of the contract. See Contract Requirements in the Introduction for discussion of the operational areas. 

52 The three contract prisons were also cited for deficiencies in other areas not included in 

Table 3, such as administration, food service, and human resources.
29

Correctional Facility (Dalby) received five deficiencies in four areas: use of force, 

inmate urinalysis testing, contraband, and suicides (two). The Eden Detention 

Center (Eden) received six deficiencies in five areas: use of force, reports of 

incidents, inmate disciplinary hearings (two), sexual assaults, and contraband. 

Rivers received one deficiency for contraband. Of the three contract prisons, none 

was found deficient in the policy requirements pertaining to the areas of inmate 

death notifications, inmate grievances, or lockdowns.

We determined that for each of the safety and security related deficiencies 

that BOP onsite monitors identified during our study period, the contractor 

responded to the BOP and took corrective actions to ensure the prison was in 

compliance with policies and the contract. Depending on the severity of the 

security deficiency, corrective actions included providing training or retraining to 

the affected staff, increasing supervisory oversight, revising policy, and/or taking 

disciplinary action against staff. None of the three prisons lost its ACA accreditation 

because of these security related deficiencies.

Two of the Three Contract Prisons We Visited Routinely Housed Newly Received 

General Population Inmates in the SHU

At two of the three contract prisons we visited, we learned that all newly 

received inmates were housed in the SHU due to lack of available bed space in 

general population housing units, which is contrary to both ACA standards and BOP 

policies. Dalby placed new inmates directly into administrative segregation in the 

SHU for an average of 20 days pending available bed space in the general 

population. At the time of our visit, 73 inmates were housed in the SHU at Dalby. 

The Warden informed us that a majority of these were new inmates awaiting beds 

in the general population. Similarly, Eden housed new inmates in administrative 

segregation in the SHU for an average of 21 days before a bed became available in 

the general population. At the time of our visit to Eden, 71 of the 100 inmates in 

the SHU were waiting for beds in the general population. 

The placement of general population inmates in the SHU due to lack of bed 

space is inconsistent with the ACA standard that states that an inmate may be 

placed in administrative segregation if the inmate’s continued presence in the 

general population poses a serious threat to life, property, self, staff, other inmates, 

or the security or orderly running of the institution.53 Under ACA standards, an 

inmate can also be placed in the SHU for disciplinary segregation or detention only 

if a disciplinary committee or Disciplinary Hearing Officer has determined, after an 

impartial hearing, that the inmate is guilty of a serious rule violation. The 

placement of inmates in the SHU due to lack of bed space in the general population 

is also inconsistent with parallel BOP policies, which explicitly state that “when 

 53 According to BOP policy, other appropriate reasons for placement in administrative 

segregation include being under investigation for an alleged rule violation or criminal act, pending 

investigation for a criminal trial, protective custody for the inmate, or pending transfer to another 

institution. 
30

placed in the SHU, you [an inmate] are either in administrative detention status or 

disciplinary segregation status.”54 

Management at both Dalby and Eden acknowledged that the newly received 

inmates had not engaged in any conduct that warranted their placement in the 

SHU. Yet, once placed in the SHU, these new inmates became subject to the same 

security measures as inmates placed in administrative segregation for specific 

security related reasons. These measures included restricted and controlled 

movements; limited access to programs such as educational or vocational 

programs, as well as work details; and limited telephone calls.55

While using the SHU to house new inmates is inconsistent with both ACA 

standards and BOP policy, we found that neither contract prison had been cited for 

a deficiency for this practice. According to contract prison management and BOP 

staff, contract prisons housed new inmates in the SHU because both the BOP and 

its contractors had interpreted language in their contracts as permitting SHU beds 

to be included in the general population bed count, rather than in a separate 

category. Moreover, according to the contracts, “The contractor does not have a 

right of refusal and shall accept all designations from the BOP.” We were told that 

the BOP sent new inmates to Eden because there appeared to be beds available 

based on the inmate population data provided by the contractor, even though the 

beds were actually in a SHU, and Eden could not refuse to accept these new 

inmates under its contract. Wardens at both Dalby and Eden told the OIG they 

believed that housing new inmates in the SHU was not good correctional practice.56 

When the OIG learned about this practice, we brought it to the attention of 

the BOP Director (see Appendix 4 for the Inspector General’s letter to the BOP 

Director). In response, the BOP Director informed the Inspector General of the 

following: (1) All new inmates awaiting general population bed space had been 

removed from the SHU and housed in the general population; (2) all movement 

into contract prisons was discontinued if the movement would result in SHU 

placement; (3) 5 of the 14 contracts were modified to address this issue (9 of the 

14 contracts did not contain language that required modification prior to the 

Inspector General’s letter); and (4) all 14 contracts prohibit SHU placement for 

inmates unless there is a policy-based reason to house them in administrative or 

disciplinary segregation. The BOP Director further stated that the onsite monitors 

and Contracting Officers would ensure contract compliance, especially regarding 

placement of inmates in the SHU. (See Appendix 5 for the BOP Director’s response 

 54 BOP Program Statement 5270.10, Special Housing Units (August 1, 2011).

55 Inmates in administrative and disciplinary segregation may leave their cells only under 

handcuffed escort by Correctional Officers for 1 hour of exercise, 5 times per week, or for showers 

several times per week. Also, inmates must have meals provided to them in their cells. Finally, 

counselors and medical and other program staff are required to visit the SHU daily to meet with each 

inmate individually at their cell. All of these activities are very time intensive for the staff.

56 The Warden at Dalby informed us that the prison and the BOP had just signed a contract 

modification to expand the number of beds in the general population and reduce the previously 

required number of SHU beds, thereby creating sufficient beds in the general population for newly

received inmates.
31

to the Inspector General addressing this issue.) Since that time, the BOP informed 

the OIG that the practice of housing new inmates in the SHU is no longer occurring 

in the contract prisons and that there has been no further non-compliance identified 

to date by the BOP regarding this issue. 

The BOP’s Monitoring of Contract Prisons Needs Improvement

We found two principal areas of concern with the BOP’s monitoring of 

contract prisons: (1) a tool the BOP onsite monitors use to monitor day-to-day 

contract compliance, the Large Secure Adult Contract Oversight Checklist 

(checklist), does not address certain important BOP policy and contract

requirements in the areas of health services and correctional services and (2) the 

monitoring of health services for contract compliance lacks coordination among BOP 

staff responsible for health services oversight. As a result, the BOP’s day-to-day 

monitoring may be less effective in ensuring that the inmate population it houses in 

contract prisons receives appropriate health and correctional services. We discuss 

each of these issues in more detail below.

In April 2015, the OIG issued a report on the Reeves County contract prison 

that included findings and recommendations related to the BOP’s monitoring of all

contract prisons.57 In response to the OIG’s recommendations, the BOP took many 

corrective actions, including in the areas of health and correctional services. In 

addition, the BOP informed us of additional steps taken in response to concerns 

identified in this current review. Below, we acknowledge the BOP’s efforts to 

improve its monitoring of contract prisons and discuss additional steps the BOP 

should take to further ensure that these facilities are safe and secure places to 

house federal inmates. 

The Onsite Monitors’ Checklist

We found that the checklist, a monthly contract monitoring tool onsite 

monitors use to document their day-to-day efforts to ensure contract prisons

comply with BOP policy and contract requirements, could be further improved. We 

focused our analysis on the onsite monitors’ checklist because, as described by the 

PMB operating procedures, it is an important element of the BOP’s Quality 

Assurance Plan, as well as a mechanism used to document contract compliance on 

a daily basis. We believe onsite monitors are best positioned to provide the BOP’s 

quickest and most direct responses to contract compliance issues as they arise. 

The checklist has observation steps, which are instructions on how to document 

contractor performance requirements. However, we determined that observation 

steps for health services do not contain steps to verify that inmates receive a 

number of basic medical services. Also, while the BOP made revisions to the 

checklist in response to the findings of the OIG’s Reeves County audit as discussed 

below, the revised checklist does not include observation steps to assess some vital 

 57 See DOJ OIG, Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Contract No. DJB1PC007 Awarded to 

Reeves County, Texas, to Operate the Reeves County Detention Center I/II, Pecos, Texas, Audit 

Report 15-15 (April 2015), iii.
32

functions in the contracts related to correctional services, such as conducting 

adequate searches and gathering intelligence.

58 In addition, for some functions, 

the checklist still contains vague observation steps. Further, onsite monitors at the 

contract prisons we visited did not use the checklist or monitoring logs to track 

contractors’ corrective actions. Finally, the BOP lacks a review process for the 

checklist to ensure that observation steps accurately verify contract compliance. As 

a result, the BOP may not be able to monitor as effectively whether contract prisons 

comply with BOP policies and contract requirements on a day-to-day basis.

Observation Steps for Health Services Are Inadequate to Verify that Inmates 

Receive Basic Medical Services 

To support the monitoring of contract compliance in health services, the BOP 

developed seven observation steps in the checklist for onsite monitors to verify that 

a contract prison’s health services comply with its contract. At the time of this 

review, we determined that none of the seven health services checklist observation 

steps, individually or when considered together, examined whether the contractors 

were providing basic medical care to the inmates. Rather, the observation steps 

were primarily administrative procedures such as checking that biohazard 

procedures followed contractor policy, ensuring staff interactions with inmates were

confidential, recording the percentage of inmates in chronic care, and checking that 

deceased inmates were properly fingerprinted. As a result, the BOP onsite monitors 

were not verifying each month whether inmates in contract prisons were receiving 

basic medical care. 

Onsite monitors and PFAs told us they did not have the medical expertise to 

provide additional monitoring in health services beyond the observation steps in the 

checklist. They stated that the onsite monitor’s position was intended to be that of 

a generalist, rather than a subject matter expert with the clinical knowledge needed 

to evaluate the quality of medical care provided. However, in the PMB Health 

Systems Specialist’s (HSS) opinion, even without medical expertise, the onsite 

monitors could perform additional health services oversight steps to help ensure the 

contractors provide basic medical care.59 The HSS is responsible for providing 

medical oversight training programs for PMB staff, as well as coordinating oversight 

of the contractors’ medical services with the BOP’s Contract Facility Monitoring 

(CFM) Branch and the Health Services Division (HSD), conducting annual reviews 

and site visits of contract prison medical departments, and providing clinical 

guidance in a written site visit report to help the contractors correct medical 

deficiencies. In June 2014, at an annual training conference attended by all PMB 

staff, the HSS trained the onsite monitors and PFAs on how they could verify 

whether inmates received basic medical care, such as an initial medical examination 

within 14 days of arrival at the prison, and whether they received immunizations, 

 58 Appendix 3 provides sample observation steps from the health services and correctional 

services sections of the checklist that the onsite monitors use.

59 In response to a working draft report, the BOP told us that the HSS whom we interviewed

during the course of our review has since retired. The BOP stated that the new HSS has extensive 

experience in the review, analysis, and monitoring of healthcare provided to inmates.
33

tuberculosis tests, and chronic care appointments, all as required by BOP policy. 

The HSS stated that these verifications involve checking entries and corresponding 

dates in SENTRY and do not require any medical expertise.60 However, the HSS 

told the OIG that there had been no discussion regarding whether the PMB could

add these observation steps to the checklist, and he was not familiar with the 

checklist or its contents. 

Following the OIG’s 2015 report on the Reeves County contract prison, the 

BOP updated the checklist to include an observation step in the health services 

section that requires onsite monitors to run a chronic care roster in SENTRY to 

determine whether the contractor is current with follow-up care and 

appointments.61 While the BOP has updated the checklist to include chronic care, 

the health services section of the checklist still does not include other steps that 

could help ensure basic medical care, such as verifying that initial examinations and 

immunizations are provided.

During our site visit to one contract prison, we learned there was no full-time 

physician, as required by its approved staffing plan, for the 8-month period 

between December 2013 and August 2014.62 The dentist position was also vacant 

for approximately 6 weeks during this time. We found that despite these 

vacancies, which we believe are critical for ensuring basic inmate healthcare, the 

onsite monitor’s checklists showed that the prison was in compliance with all health

services observation steps. However, the BOP’s annual CFM review at this prison in 

August 2014 resulted in a significant adverse finding in health services, with 

11 deficiencies in administration and patient care, including 6 repeat deficiencies 

from the previous year.63 The CFM results stated: 

There were inadequate controls in the clinical care and staffing area of 

Health Services to ensure compliance with established procedures and 

practices. These inadequacies create a lack of appropriate 

intervention, treatment, and programs to promote a healthy, safe, and 

secure environment. Many issues from previous [monitoring] have not 

 60 SENTRY is the BOP’s primary mission support database. It collects, maintains, and tracks 

critical inmate information, including location, medical history, behavior history, and release data. 

SENTRY does not currently track the dates of initial medical examinations and immunizations.

61 The BOP’s updated observation step on chronic care was not in response to a specific 

recommendation made in the OIG’s 2015 audit of the Reeves County contract prison.

62 The OIG also found medical understaffing in the 2015 audit of the Reeves County Detention 

Center. DOJ OIG, Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Contract No. DJB1PC007, 22–26. The report 

raised concerns that medical understaffing on the part of the contractor was financially incentivized 

because it cost the contractor less to pay penalty deductions for understaffing than to staff the prison 

adequately. 

63 Five of the six repeat deficiencies cited were for failure to provide medical appointments 

and treatment required by contract and BOP policy, and a sixth deficiency was for not conducting 

dental appointments as policy required.
34

been corrected. Medical needs and documentation were incomplete, 

including reports.64 

 

Specific health services deficiencies cited in the CFM review included failing to 

provide prescribed antiviral therapy for inmates with hepatitis C, not following up 

with inmates with positive tuberculosis test results, missing preventive care 

evaluations and dental exams, and failing to provide some immunizations. During 

the period in which these deficiencies occurred, the checklists indicated that the 

prison was in compliance with all seven of the health services observation steps. 

However, none of the seven observation steps touched on the fundamental 

deficiencies cited by the CFM review. We believe that PMB should establish 

additional observation steps in the monitoring checklist to ensure inmates are 

receiving basic healthcare as required by the contract and to enable earlier 

identification of deficient inmate health services. 

In response to a working draft of this report, the BOP provided the OIG with 

a copy of a new Health Services report that is generated quarterly by the HSS to 

provide documentation of any issues reported to the HSS pertaining to medical 

services at contract prisons, which occurred during the reporting period, and 

information regarding unresolved issues during prior reporting periods. According 

to the BOP, the purpose of the Health Services report is twofold. First, the report 

provides objective data of various areas in medical services over a specified time 

frame.65 When sufficient data is collected, statistical analysis can detect significant 

trends and predict outcomes in contractor performance.66 Second, the report 

provides detailed information regarding how each issue originated, progressed, and 

resolved.67 Such information can be useful in retrospectively evaluating and 

potentially improving processes within health services. The BOP stated that the 

Health Services report is submitted to the Assistant Administrator of Field 

Operations within 30 days following the end of the quarter. The report is then 

distributed to all PMB Administrators. Any issues warranting contractor attention 

are discussed by the PFA and onsite monitors for appropriate action. Finally, the 

 64 BOP Program Review Division, Contract Facility Monitoring Final Report, Eden Detention 

Center (August 2014), 3.

65 The data sources for the quarterly reports include reports of BOP onsite staff (Senior 

Secure Institution Manager/Secure Oversight Monitor), contract staff, PFA reports, Office of Medical 

Designations, and HSS ad hoc reviews.

66 The new Health Services report covers Active tuberculosis, Administrative Remedy 

Responses, Administrative Issues, Catastrophic Cases, Contract Facility Monitoring, Critical Vacancies, 

Deaths, Hunger Strike, Infectious Disease – Not associated with tuberculosis, Involuntary Treatment, 

Joint Commission Accreditation, Other Concerns – Not Otherwise Specified, Patient Care, Policy 

Updates, Reduction in Sentence, Restraints, Sentinel Events/Root Cause Analysis, Subject Matter 

Expert On-Site Visits, Transfer Requests/Form 770, and Transfer – Treatment Complete – Form 413. 

The total number of events for each category is calculated and subtotaled for each facility during the 

reporting period.

67 The quarterly report provides a review of any CFM activity, as well as HSS follow-up visits,

during the reporting period. Onsite monitors use the HSS site visit report to supplement their CFM 

follow-up report. The HSS site visit report provides medical-specific expertise to the CFM follow-up 

report.
35

BOP stated that a new tracking system was generated and the first HSS quarterly 

report was produced for the third quarter of 2015.

The Checklist Does Not Include Observation Steps to Address Some Vital 

Functions Related to Correctional Services in the Contract

While the BOP’s annual CFM review provides a comprehensive annual audit of 

the contract prisons’ compliance with BOP policy and contract requirements, onsite

monitors use the checklist as a monitoring tool on a monthly basis to ensure 

contract prisons comply with BOP policy and contract requirements between annual 

audits. However, the checklist does not include observation steps to address policy 

requirements related to some of the vital functions in each contract. For example, 

one vital function in correctional services, which ensure the safety and security of 

the prison, states: “An adequate security inspection system is provided to meet the 

needs of the institution.” We found that the only related observation step on the 

checklist does not adequately address this vital function.68 The observation step 

states: “Include observation of staff routinely performing searches (use of metal 

detectors, pat searches at entrances/exits).” However, the checklist does not 

include any observation step to verify the contractor is performing searches 

required by BOP and contractor policies in other areas of the prison, including 

inmate housing units and cells, recreation, work and program areas, medical areas,

and visiting areas, or that there is a comprehensive inspection system in place that 

ensures the safety and security of the prison.

69

Also, there is no observation step to monitor the inmate urinalysis drug 

testing program. BOP policy requires that 5 percent of a prison’s population be 

tested randomly each month. Specified inmate groups receive additional testing. 

For example, members of confirmed disruptive groups must be tested each month. 

Inmates who have been identified as suspects of prohibited acts, such as drug use,

through intelligence gathering are supposed to be tested throughout an extended 

period of time, and inmates found to have committed prohibited drug-related acts 

are to be tested monthly for the subsequent 24 months.

70 Without consistent 

monitoring to ensure the testing is accomplished, the BOP cannot ensure that 

contract prisons comply with BOP policy on an ongoing basis. The annual CFM 

 68 In response to a working draft of this report, the BOP stated that the vital function of 

ensuring security inspection systems can encompass an enormous number of functions and that the 

language in the checklist reflects this appropriately. The BOP also specified that there are two 

checklist steps to ensure security inspection systems are in place by the contractor. Additionally, the 

BOP stated that contract prisons are accredited by the ACA, which further requires the contractor to 

have a security inspection system in place.

69 CCA Policy 09-05, Section 5(E) 1-2, for example, requires inmate cells to be searched 

randomly on a daily basis during each shift. ACA Standard 4-4192 (2014 supplement) requires that: 

“Written policy, procedure, and practice provide for searches of facilities and inmates to control 

contraband and provide for its disposition. These policies are made available to staff and inmates. 

The institution’s search plans and procedures should include the following: unannounced and 

irregularly timed searches of cells, inmates, and work areas; inspection of all vehicular traffic and 

supplies coming into the institution; etc.” 

70 BOP Program Statement 6060.08, Urine Surveillance and Narcotic Identification 

(November 24, 1999).
36

review does include monitoring of inmate urinalysis drug testing, as well as the 

security inspection system requirement discussed above, but we believe the BOP 

should consider adding observation steps on the monthly checklist to document 

compliance between CFM reviews.71

In addition, the checklist does not require onsite monitors to verify contract 

prisons’ correctional services staffing levels. Correctional Officers ensure the safe 

and secure operation of the contract prisons. All contractors have a BOP-approved 

staffing plan and are required to meet certain staffing levels defined in each 

contract.

72 For correctional services, if contractors fall below a monthly average of 

90 percent of the BOP-approved staffing plan, they are subject to deficiencies and 

financial deductions. However, there is no observation step to verify that the total 

number of Correctional Officers is consistent with the BOP-approved staffing plan. 

Given, for example, Correctional Officer leave, training, and part-time schedules,

the actual staffing within contract prisons could fall below staffing levels as stated 

on monthly invoices. The PMB Administrator told us that this is an oversight 

activity that onsite staff could perform. We believe that adding an observation step 

to the checklist to periodically verify that the actual number of Correctional Officers

is consistent with the BOP-approved staffing plan will ensure that staffing levels 

have not fallen below what is required to help ensure a safe and secure 

environment for staff and inmates.

In a response to a working draft of this report, the BOP stated that the PMB 

field staff reviews and certifies the monthly invoice and staffing reports that are 

submitted by the contractors. The invoice and certification memorandum are then 

reviewed for final certification by the PMB’s Assistant Administrator, Support and 

Development, and routed for payment. The contractors’ staffing reports indicate 

the number of required staff, the number of staff provided, and the percentage of 

staff provided based on the approved staffing plan. However, based on our review 

of a monthly invoice and staffing report provided by the BOP, we could not 

determine whether all staff on duty were actually Correctional Officers.

73 During

 71 In response to a working draft of this report, the BOP stated that intelligence gathering is a 

function obtained, tracked, and analyzed by PMB’s two Intelligence Specialists. The PMB Intelligence 

Specialists remain in constant contact with the contractors’ intelligence staff, who provide information 

related to disruptive groups, cell phone introduction, urinalysis testing, alcohol testing, phone 

monitoring, and use of force at all current contract locations. The information provided is compiled

into a quarterly report that is shared with the PMB field staff. Additionally, the PMB Intelligence 

Specialists conduct monthly intelligence video conferences among PMB field staff to share intelligence. 

72 A staffing plan lists the number, type, and allocation of the contract prison’s staff that is 

required to be maintained throughout the life of the contract. In addition, each contractor is required 

to maintain staffing level percentages in correctional services, health services, and all other 

departments. Appendix 1 provides more detail on staffing levels at each of the three prisons at the 

time of our review. 

73 Concerns regarding the verification of staffing levels were raised during our site visit to a 

contract prison. Some Corrections Counselors told us they were being asked to fill in as Correctional 

Officers in more than just temporary or relief roles, such as when Correctional Officers go to meals or 

to meetings. PMB onsite staff we interviewed at each contract prison we visited were not aware of 

such a practice, and we were unable to verify the Corrections Counselors’ statements because PMB 

onsite monitors do not verify the approved staffing plan or the daily roster. 
37

any 3-month period, if the contractor falls below the staffing requirement for 

2 months, the PMB staff issues a deficiency. 

The Checklist Contains Vague Observation Steps

We found several vague or repetitive observation steps on the checklist that

resulted in inconsistent and insufficiently documented monitoring activities or 

responses by onsite monitors. For example, we found that the onsite monitors are 

supposed to determine whether trends exist in grievances and reports of incidents,

but the steps do not describe how monitors are supposed to determine and analyze 

trends or over what timeframe the trends are to be analyzed. We reviewed 

48 months of the onsite monitors’ documentation of the observation steps in these 

two areas and found that onsite monitors generally record “no identifiable trends” 

or “no trends,” or do not address trends at all. However, we performed trend 

analysis on reports of incidents and grievances the BOP collected to determine any 

significant differences in total numbers from FY 2011 through FY 2013 for the three 

contract prisons we visited. At one contract prison, we found that reports of 

incidents had increased 192 percent from FY 2011 through FY 2013, yet monitors in 

the facility had not reported or analyzed the trend. We believe that such limited 

responses from onsite monitors may be the result of unclear expectations for 

determining, analyzing, and documenting trends on a monthly oversight tool. 

However, we found it troubling that the PMB’s Assistant Administrator told us that 

he does not think it is necessary for the PMB to look at long-term trends. While the 

BOP’s primary responsibility is to monitor the contractor, identifying and analyzing 

trends is crucial to enabling the BOP to identify potential problem areas that could 

affect inmate safety and security, to enhance monitoring efforts in those specific 

areas, and to notify the contractor to promptly identify causes and solutions. 

Another vague observation step states: “The contractor is responsible for 

the movement of inmates within a 400-mile radius of the contract facility. Observe 

actual process of inmate movement.” The observation step includes examples of 

inmate transportation; however, there is no guidance on what specifically should be 

observed and how often or how many times it should be observed.74

We also found that, due to such vague observation steps, onsite monitors 

varied in how they documented their observations and PFAs had inconsistent 

expectations regarding how onsite monitors were to complete the observation steps

to ensure the contractor is performing in accordance with BOP standards. We

showed the three regional PFAs examples of onsite monitors’ documentation 

regarding the inmate movement observation step and asked whether the 

documentation met their expectations. Each PFA had a different understanding and 

expectation for what the observation step required and what they believed would 

be adequate documentation from the onsite monitors. As a result, their 

 74 Following the OIG’s 2015 Reeves County audit report, the BOP revised this observation 

step to include the words, “to ensure procedures are in accordance with contractual and policy 

requirements” (see Appendix 3 of the current report). However, the BOP’s revision still does not 

specify how often or how many times the movements should be observed.
38

assessment of the adequacy of the onsite monitor’s responses varied, as did the 

rationale for those assessments, an example of which is shown in Table 4. 

Table 4

Onsite Monitor Response to an Observation Step and PFA Expectations

from Onsite Monitors

Observation Step Onsite Monitor 

Response

PFAs 

PFA 1 PFA 2 PFA 3

The contractor is 

responsible for the 

movement of inmates 

within a 400-mile radius 

of the contract facility. 

Observe actual process 

of inmate movement. 

Examples of inmate/

transportation include, 

but are not limited to, 

outside medical care, 

funeral and bedside 

trips, transfer or 

movement to/from 

other government 

facilities and airlift sites.

The contractor 

escorted nine 

inmates in medical 

trips during this 

observation period.

The contractor is 

responsible for 

movement inside a 

400-mile radius. 

The contractor has 

been making 

regular weekly 

scheduled transfers. 

The contractor also 

receives Self 

Surrenders.

The response 

is inadequate. 

The onsite

monitor 

should

observe an 

actual inmate 

movement. 

The response 

is inadequate.

The PFA would 

expect to see if 

policies were 

followed, if 

there were any 

concerns, and 

any security 

considerations. 

The response 

is adequate 

because the

onsite

monitor 

recorded

what they 

observed. 

Sources: Large Secure Adult Contract Oversight Checklist and OIG interviews with PFAs

We also found observation steps that were repetitive. One observation step 

stated: “Review the results of internal/external audits conducted during this 

period. Determine if corrective action has been implemented as reported by 

contractor. This includes a sampling of corrective actions to the CFM, ACA, and 

corporate audits.” Another observation step stated: “List all internal/external 

audits conducted this period.” These two observation steps required onsite 

monitors to review the same audit documents. During the OIG audit of the Reeves 

County contract prison, auditors were told that having these duplicative observation 

steps was confusing to the monitors, with the result that the monitors did not fully 

complete the steps.75 

In our 2015 audit report on the Reeves County contract prison, we

recommmended that the BOP consider consolidating the two quality control 

observation steps in the checklist into a single observation step, as well as consider 

reviewing and updating guidance provided to PMB field staff to ensure the onsite 

monitors provided accurate and complete information in their monthly checklists. 

In response, the BOP combined the two repetitive observation steps into one 

observation step on the checklist and drafted guidance to PMB field staff to ensure 

that the checklist was accurate and complete. While the recommendation in the 

2015 report did not ask the BOP to revise the whole checklist, the BOP chose to do 

 75 DOJ OIG, Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Contract No. DJB1PC007, 30.
39

so. We believe that, although the BOP addressed the recommendation in the 2015 

report by updating the checklist, it still should address some of the observation 

steps that are vague, such as how monitors are supposed to analyze trends and 

monitor inmate movement.

The BOP Lacks a Regular, Substantive Review Process for the Oversight 

Checklist to Ensure that Observation Steps Verify Contract Compliance

Although the checklist is one of the tools the PMB onsite staff uses to monitor 

contractor compliance and performance, it is not substantively reviewed on a 

regular basis to ensure that it is the most effective and efficient tool possible. We 

found that the PMB does not ensure its observation steps represent the most 

important activities that onsite monitors should observe to ensure contract 

compliance. The PMB Administrator told us that the PMB reviews the operating 

procedures annually and that the checklist is an attachment to those operating 

procedures. However, the PFAs stated that revisions to the checklist usually occur 

only in response to a significant incident. For example, one PFA said that in 2012 

the PMB added an observation step to the checklist to require the onsite monitors 

to review video recordings of SHUs in the aftermath of a suicide in one contract 

prison. We found that the checklist was last updated in 2012 in response to this 

and other incidents at contract prisons and has not been updated since then.76 As 

a result of the lack of regular, substantive review of the oversight checklist, the 

BOP cannot be certain that the observation steps in its primary onsite monitoring 

tool effectively verify contractor compliance. 

In response to the Reeves audit report, the BOP updated the checklist and 

provided additional guidance to PMB field staff to ensure the checklist is filled out 

accurately and completely. Additionally, in response to a working draft of this 

report, the BOP stated that the regional PFA reviews the checklist monthly to 

ensure the onsite monitors complete each observation step. When comments or 

concerns arise, the PFA annotates such by the affected step.77 PFAs present and 

address appropriate information obtained from checklist during weekly PMB 

Administrator meetings. While the BOP’s action is commendable, we believe that 

the BOP should review the checklist regularly and proactively, rather than

reactively, such as in response to a significant incident, to determine whether the 

observation steps need updating. 

 76 A PFA told us that the PFAs and BOP management planned to discuss whether the 

contractors’ quality control programs and the BOP’s Quality Assurance Plan are doing what they want, 

including whether the observation steps in the checklist and onsite monitor responses to the 

observation steps are appropriate. The PMB planned to hold this discussion in December 2014 but 

delayed the meeting so that it could consider the results of this review during that process. 

77 The BOP provided the OIG with a copy of an annotated checklist. According to the BOP, 

there is no policy or guidance regarding the reviewing and revising of the checklist. The updating of 

the checklist is done on an as-needed basis.
40

Onsite Monitors at the Contract Prisons We Visited Did Not Use the 

Monitoring Logs to Track Contractors’ Corrective Actions

When the BOP identifies deficiencies in contractor performance through CFM

reviews or notices of concern (NOC), the contractor must submit a corrective action 

plan to the onsite monitors. The PMB operating procedures require onsite monitors 

to maintain monitoring logs to track and review the results of internal and external 

audits required by each contract. We found that onsite monitors in the three 

contract prisons we visited did not consistently use monitoring tools such as the 

monitoring logs to document whether the contractor had successfully corrected 

deficiencies identified by external audits. 

Additionally, the onsite monitors received the results of the contractors’

internal quality control audits but did not regularly document on the monitoring logs 

whether the contractors had corrected those deficiencies. One onsite monitor told 

us that he would take it as “gospel” if the contractor told him it had found and 

corrected deficiencies during its monthly internal audits. 

Our 2015 report on the Reeves County contract prison found that onsite 

monitors were not using monitoring logs to document their monitoring and 

follow-up on the contractor’s corrective actions. We recommended that the BOP 

take steps to ensure that PMB field staff at Reeves County document its follow-up 

efforts to ensure that the contractor’s corrective actions are monitored and 

addressed in a timely manner. In response to the OIG’s recommendations, the 

BOP has incorporated the functions of the monitoring log into the checklist to 

include an observation step for documenting follow-up efforts on corrective actions. 

We believe that the BOP’s actions will help ensure the onsite staff tracks corrective 

actions consistently. 

Monitoring of Health Services for Contract Compliance Lacks Coordination among 

BOP Staff Responsible for Health Services Oversight

One major area of concern with the BOP’s monitoring of contract prison 

facilities is whether inmates are receiving adequate medical care. Four separate 

oversight activities regarding contract prison health services involve both medical 

and nonmedical specialists. These oversight activities are: (1) ongoing PMB onsite 

monitoring of contract compliance, including health services; (2) annual reviews by 

the PMB’s HSS; (3) an annual CFM review, which includes a physician who 

evaluates the health services operations; and (4) contract physician mortality 

reviews of each contract prison inmate death when it occurs.

78 We found that 

communication between staff responsible for these oversight activities is limited, 

that they do not routinely share the results of the various reviews, and that no one 

person or office reviews the monitoring results. Additionally, while the onsite 

 78 When an inmate dies in a contract prison, within 24 hours the contractor is required to 

conduct a mortality review and submit to the BOP a written report that includes a clinical synopsis of 

events leading up to the death. BOP policy then requires that a physician external to the BOP 

independently review the contractor’s mortality review. The BOP’s mortality reviews are the 

responsibility of the HSD. 
41

monitors generally receive the results of the HSS and CFM reviews as well as the 

results of individual mortality reviews performed by the BOP’s contract physician, 

we found that there are no procedures for them to require corrective action from 

the contractor when the BOP’s contract physician identifies deficiencies during an 

individual mortality review. This resulted in deficiencies going uncorrected for 

extended periods. Accordingly, we determined that the BOP is unable to effectively 

identify problem areas among the contract prisons or contractors or to proactively 

take action before a problem becomes acute or systemic. 

In order to ensure that inmates in contract facilities are getting appropriate 

healthcare, it is vital that health services information be shared among the PMB’s

onsite monitors, the Program Review Division’s CFM physician, the PMB’s HSS, and 

the BOP’s contract physician in the HSD. The PMB’s operating procedures state 

that “PMB staff is encouraged to maintain an open dialog with CFM staff and provide 

correspondence highlighting any problems or concerns.” However, we identified 

instances in which health services information sharing was not occurring. For 

example:

• The HSS shares responsibility for coordination and oversight of the delivery 

of health services in contract prisons and, among other duties, is responsible 

for providing professional guidance to contract prison medical staff and 

developing procedures that describe how medical care of inmates is 

assessed, evaluated, and documented. However, we found that at the time 

of our review the HSS responsible for overseeing the delivery of health 

services in all of the contract prisons did not have input into the development 

of the health services observation steps in the checklist used by the onsite 

monitors; was unfamiliar with the checklist; and did not receive monthly 

copies of completed checklists from the onsite monitors.

79

• The CFM physician and the BOP’s contract physician both review the 

contractor’s procedures and the circumstances surrounding inmate deaths at 

the contract prisons for the required mortality review. However, the CFM 

physician told the OIG that he is unsure whether the BOP’s contract physician

reviews all of his reports and he has never seen any of her reports.

Further regarding mortality reviews, we found that: (1) there are no

procedures or guidance for the onsite monitors to require corrective action from the 

contractor when the BOP’s contract physician identifies deficiencies and (2) the 

BOP’s CFM physician, instead of the BOP’s contract physician, was conducting the 

contract prisons’ mortality reviews, which is inconsistent with the requirements in 

the contract. According to the contract, the BOP must have an external physician 

consultant to review all mortality records quarterly. The contract also states that, if 

 79 In response to a working draft of this report, the BOP informed us that when the PMB 

revised the checklist following the OIG’s 2015 report on the Reeves County contract prison, the HHS 

did provide input into the checklist revisions. The BOP further informed us that, “Any concerns 

identified by oversight staff regarding health services from the checklist steps are often discussed by 

field staff with the HSS and PFA to determine the level of non-compliance and what action(s) should 

be taken. All future revisions to the health services component on the checklist will include the HSS.”
42

the external consultant (the BOP’s contract physician) recommends improvement 

action, the contractor must address each recommendation and report any actions 

taken to the BOP Medical Director within 90 days of receiving the 

recommendations. When mortality reviews identified deficiencies, the reviewing 

CFM physician did not provide the onsite monitors with guidance on what corrective 

actions they should require from the contractor.80 We found examples at both the 

Eden Detention Center and the Rivers Correctional Institution where the reviewing 

CFM physician had cited deficiencies, such as delayed or incomplete treatment, in 

the contractors’ medical management or protocols surrounding an inmate death. In 

one instance, when an inmate had trouble breathing, the contract prison medical 

staff told him to place a sick call, which would put him on a list of inmates waiting 

to be seen by medical personnel instead of being treated immediately. However, 

after he died, the mortality reviews showing this deficiency gave the onsite 

monitors no guidance on what steps to take to require corrective action. As a 

result, contractor deficiencies went uncorrected and corrective actions were delayed 

at both facilities.

81 Delaying corrective action increases the likelihood that 

deficiencies identified in a mortality review could be repeated, thus putting other 

inmates at risk.82 

We believe that the communication among the PMB, the Program Review 

Division, and the HSD needs to be improved, and that the roles of those responsible 

for ensuring health services are provided to federal inmates housed at contract 

prisons should be more clearly defined. Without proper information sharing and 

coordination in the oversight of health services at the contract prisons, there is the 

risk to inmates from healthcare deficiencies that may not be identified or addressed 

in a timely fashion, as well as a significant potential for wasted resources such as 

time and costs in the BOP’s duplication of efforts. The latter may also result in the 

BOP paying for duplicate services or for services that are not actually provided.

83

In response to a working draft of this report, the BOP stated that there is 

ongoing communication between those responsible for determining whether

 80 By contrast, when the CFM physician finds deficiencies related to inmate deaths during the 

annual CFM review, the onsite monitors must require corrective action from the contractor.

81 An onsite monitor told us he had discussed the mortality review results with his supervisor, 

a PFA; but they decided not to issue a NOC because it was the reviewing physician’s word against the 

contractor staff physician’s and they did not have the medical expertise to judge between them. 

Rather, they decided to wait until the next annual CFM review for a determination of whether to 

require corrective action from the contractor.

82 In response to a working draft of this report, the PMB Administrator told us that since April 

2015 the CFM physician is no longer conducting the mortality reviews and that the contract physician 

is conducting all mortality reviews for both BOP institutions and contract prisons. The contract 

physician now writes recommendations for deficiencies found during the mortality review, as required 

by the statement of work. According to the BOP, the contract physician has conducted a total of six 

mortality reviews since April 2015. Of the six reviews conducted, one contained a recommendation. 

83 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that insufficient monitoring of corrective 

actions in BOP institutions leads to repeated deficiencies and significant findings that weaken the 

BOP’s opportunity to maximize cost savings in correctional services. GAO, Bureau of Prisons: 

Information on Efforts and Potential Options to Save Costs, GAO-14-821 (September 2014) (accessed 

July 28, 2016).
43

healthcare requirements are being met in the BOP’s contract prisons. The PMB 

Assistant Administrator, Field Operations, supervises the HSS and ensures CFM 

follow-up visits and quarterly reports are completed in a timely manner. The 

Assistant Administrator also provides guidance regarding PMB policy and 

operations, as well as administrative support, including travel and equipment 

authorizations. In addition, the HSS communicates freely with the HSD regarding 

any matters involving medical services at contract prisons.

84 The HSS reviews the 

CFM reports and working papers generated by the CFM physician and CFM Health 

Services Examiner. The HSS uses the CFM reports and working papers to focus the 

scope of the CFM follow-up site visits. The CFM staff is available to clarify any 

items in the CFM reports; however, according to the BOP, the need for clarification 

has been minimal since the CFM reports have proven to be thorough and 

unambiguous.

 84 The BOP stated that the HSS has worked closely with several staff in the HSD, including the 

Medical Director, Assistant Director, Senior Deputy Assistant Director, National Health Services 

Administrator, Assistant National Health Services Administrator, Chief of Quality Management, 

National Infection Control Consultant, Chief Social Worker, Chief Psychiatrist, Chief of Medical 

Designations, Regional Medical Director, Regional Quality Managers, Regional Social Workers, and 

Regional Counsel. 
44

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

The BOP’s mission is to protect society by confining federal offenders in 

correctional facilities that are safe, humane, cost-efficient, and secure, and to 

provide reentry programming to ensure their successful return to the community. 

To carry out this mission, the BOP relies on contract prisons to house federal 

inmates and help alleviate overcrowding at its own institutions. To ensure these

prisons house inmates in a safe and secure environment and that they comply with 

their contracts, the BOP has developed a multilayered approach to monitoring 

them. 

In a majority of the categories we examined, we found that contract prisons 

incurred more safety and security incidents per capita than comparable BOP 

institutions and that the BOP could improve its contract monitoring efforts in 

several areas. Our analysis of data on safety and security indicators found that 

contract prisons had more incidents per capita than BOP institutions in threequarters of the categories we examined. While the contract prisons had fewer 

positive inmate drug tests and sexual misconduct allegations than BOP institutions, 

they had more frequent incidents of contraband finds, assaults, uses of force, 

lockdowns, guilty findings on inmate discipline charges, and selected categories of 

grievances. Neither we nor the BOP know the extent to which demographic factors 

play a role in these differences; but, in order to ensure that federal inmates are 

housed in safe and secure facilities, the BOP should evaluate why contract prisons 

had more safety and security incidents in these categories and identify possible 

approaches for corrective action. 

The three contract prisons we visited were all cited for one or more safety 

and security deficiencies during the review period. Because the contractors 

corrected the deficiencies the BOP had found, the BOP determined that the prisons 

were sufficiently compliant with the safety and security aspects of their contracts to 

continue their contracts with them. However, the BOP still must improve its 

oversight to ensure that federal inmates’ rights and needs are not placed at risk 

when they are housed in contract prisons. We also found that contract prisons we 

visited housed new inmates in Special Housing Units, inconsistent with American 

Correctional Association standards and BOP policy. The OIG brought this to the 

BOP’s attention, and the BOP immediately took corrective actions to address it. 

In addition to the current review, in April 2015, the OIG issued an audit 

report on the Reeves County contract prison that included findings and 

recommendations related to the BOP’s monitoring of all contract prisons. 

Throughout this report, we note several corrective actions the BOP has taken to 

improve its monitoring of contract prisons in response to the OIG’s 2015 audit 

report, including in the areas of health and correctional services. We also note 

several steps the BOP has taken in response to concerns identified in that report. 

Commendable as these steps are, we identified in this review additional areas in the 
45

BOP’s monitoring of its contract prisons that could be improved. First, as a

monitoring tool to ensure compliance with BOP policy and contract requirements, 

onsite monitors use the Large Secure Adult Contract Oversight Checklist (checklist)

of observation steps related to each operational area established in the contact. 

However, the checklist does not address certain important policy and contract 

requirements in the areas of health and correctional services. For health services, 

the checklist does not include observation steps to verify that inmates receive a 

number of basic medical services. Similarly, for correctional services, the checklist 

does not include observation steps to address policy requirements related to some 

of the contracts’ vital functions, such as providing an adequate security inspection 

system. Deficiencies related to contract prisons’ security inspection systems could 

jeopardize the safety and security of inmates and prison staff, and the BOP should 

address them promptly. 

Finally, we found that the checklist contains vague observation steps, which

may cause confusion and may result in onsite monitors not fully completing the 

observation steps. With more specific observation steps and clearer expectations 

for how onsite monitors should document their observations, the BOP could better

ensure accurate and consistent monitoring of each contract prison. Moreover, the 

BOP should review the checklist regularly and proactively, rather than reactively, 

such as in response to a significant incident, to reflect the most important activities 

for contract compliance and determine whether the observation steps need 

updating.

Recommendations

To ensure that the contract prisons are, and remain, a safe and secure place 

for housing federal inmates, we recommend that the BOP: 

1. Convene a working group of BOP subject matter experts to evaluate why 

contract prisons had more safety and security incidents per capita than BOP 

institutions in a number of key indicators, and identify appropriate action, if 

necessary.

To improve monitoring and oversight of BOP contract prisons, we recommend 

that the BOP:

2. Verify on a more frequent basis that inmates receive basic medical services

such as initial medical exams and immunizations. 

3. Ensure that correctional services observation steps address vital functions 

related to the contract, including periodic validation of actual Correctional 

Officer staffing levels based on the approved staffing plan.

4. Reevaluate the checklist and review it on a regular basis with input from

subject matter experts to ensure that observation steps reflect the most 

important activities for contract compliance and that monitoring and 

documentation requirements and expectations are clear, including for 

observation steps requiring monitors to engage in trend analysis.
APPENDIX 1

46

METHODOLOGY OF THE OIG REVIEW

In this review, the OIG examined the BOP’s monitoring of its 14 private 

contract prisons from FY 2011 through FY 2014. We also examined how the 

contractors performed in selected areas related to inmate safety and security and 

how the contract prisons compared to similar BOP institutions on those indicators. 

Our fieldwork, from April 2014 through February 2015, included interviews, site 

visits to three contract prisons, data analysis, and document reviews. The following 

sections provide additional information about our methodology.

Interviews

We interviewed 16 BOP officials and staff with roles in overseeing and 

monitoring contract prisons, as well as an external medical consultant. From the 

Correctional Programs Division’s Privatization Management Branch (PMB), we 

interviewed the Administrator, an Assistant Administrator, two Intelligence 

Specialists, a Disciplinary Hearing Officer Specialist, a Health Services Specialist, 

and three Privatization Field Administrators. From the Program Review Division, we 

interviewed a Medical Officer. We also interviewed the Chief of the Quality 

Management Branch within the Health Services Division. 

During our site visits, we interviewed five PMB onsite monitors and one 

Contracting Officer. The PMB briefed us on its role in managing and monitoring the 

contract prisons. We also interviewed 34 contract prison staff, including Wardens, 

Assistant Wardens, Chiefs of Security, intelligence staff, Special Housing Unit (SHU) 

staff, Disciplinary Hearing Officers, grievance coordinators, unit managers, 

counselors, case managers, compliance and quality assurance managers, and an 

interpreter. Finally, we interviewed 28 contract prison inmates, including 

10 housed in SHUs at the time of our interviews.

Site Visits

We visited three contract prisons, one from each private contractor: Giles W. 

Dalby Correctional Facility (Management and Training Corporation (MTC)), Eden 

Detention Center (Corrections Corporation of America (CCA)), and Rivers 

Correctional Institution (GEO Group (GEO)). We selected our site visits based on a 

comparison of data analysis results from the 14 contract prisons for FY 2011 

through FY 2013 (FY 2014 data was not yet available at the time of the site 

selection analysis). We requested and received from the BOP data in eight 

categories we considered indicators of prison safety and security:

1. contraband,

2. reports of incidents,85

 85 In this category we analyzed assaults by inmates on inmates, assaults by inmates on staff, 

sexual assaults by inmates on staff, deaths, fights, cell fires, suicide attempts and self-mutilation

(combined), suicides, disruptive behavior, and uses of force.
47

3. lockdowns, 

4. inmate discipline, 

5. telephone monitoring, 

6. grievances, 

7. urinalysis drug testing, and

8. notices of concern (NOC).

We selected these categories of data to analyze as potential safety and security 

indicators because they provided information on areas addressed by American 

Correctional Association (ACA) standards on security and control, inmate rules and 

discipline, and inmate rights. Additionally, these data were tracked by the contract 

prisons.

For each type of data, we calculated monthly or annual averages per capita, 

then ranked the 14 contract prisons from the highest to lowest averages. Each 

prison that fell in the highest three averages on a measure was assigned three, 

two, or one points, respectively, for that measure based on whether it had the first, 

second, or third highest average. Additionally, we weighted some data categories 

that we deemed to be of greater significance for security by adding an additional 

point to those already given by the rankings (that is, those categories received 

four, three, or two points, respectively).86 We then ranked each contract prison 

based on how many points it received and selected the contract prisons that 

received the most points from each of the three contractors for our site visits.

During the site visits, we toured the contract prisons, including the SHUs; 

interviewed staff and inmates; attended staff meetings; reviewed log books; and 

observed the activities of staff and inmates. Below is a brief profile of each contract 

prison at the time of our site visits. 

Giles W. Dalby Correctional Facility (Dalby)

MTC operated the Dalby Correctional Facility in Post, Texas. As of the end of

FY 2014, the prison housed an average of 1,800 inmates daily. The average age of 

inmates at Dalby was 38, and its average sentence length was 59 months. The top 

three inmate offenses at Dalby were drug trafficking (47 percent), immigration 

(47 percent), and violence (3 percent). At the time of our review, the staff-toinmate ratio was 1:6 and the Correctional Officer ratio was 1:11. Dalby’s overall 

staffing was at 92 percent; its Correctional Officer staffing was at 91 percent; and 

its medical staffing was at 90 percent. Dalby provided specialized vocational 

classes such as electrical trade, building trade, and computer-assisted drafting. 

Dalby offered inmate programs that exceeded the minimum requirement of its 

contract. 

 86 The weighted categories were contraband, selected types of incident reports, lockdowns, 

discipline, selected types of grievances, positive drug tests, and NOCs.
48

Eden Detention Center (Eden)

CCA operated the Eden Detention Center in Eden, Texas. As of the end of 

FY 2014, the prison housed an average of 1,458 inmates daily. The average age of 

inmates at Eden was 39, and its average sentence length was 67 months. The top 

three inmate offenses at Eden were drug trafficking (48 percent), immigration 

(46 percent), and violence (3 percent). At the time of our review, the staff-toinmate ratio was 1:6 and the Correctional Officer ratio was 1:9. Eden’s overall 

staffing was at 89 percent; its Correctional Officer staffing was at 87 percent; and 

its medical staffing was at 78 percent. Specialized inmate programs included 

eyeglass repair, crocheting, and computer classes. Like Dalby, Eden offered inmate 

programs that exceeded the minimum requirement of its contract. 

Rivers Correctional Institution (Rivers)

GEO operated the Rivers Correctional Institution in Winton, North Carolina. 

As of the end of FY 2014, the prison housed an average of 1,414 inmates daily. 

The average age of inmates at Rivers was 40, and its average sentence length was 

86 months. The top three inmate offenses at Rivers were drug trafficking 

(43 percent), immigration (18 percent), and violence (20 percent). At the time of 

our review, the staff-to-inmate ratio was 1:4 and the Correctional Officer ratio was 

1:9. Rivers’ overall staffing was at 96 percent; its Correctional Officer staffing was 

at 94 percent; and its medical staffing was at 92 percent. Specialized inmate 

programs included commercial driver’s license, building construction technology, 

and computer applications. In addition, Rivers offered a work program whereby 

inmates repaired used wheelchairs to be sent to people in need around the world. 

Since Rivers housed inmates to be released and returned to the Washington, D.C., 

area, it also had reentry and drug abuse programs. Like Dalby and Eden, Rivers 

offered inmate programs that exceeded the minimum requirement of its contract. 

Data Analysis

We analyzed security-related data from the 14 contract prisons and a select 

group of 14 comparable BOP institutions to evaluate how the contract prisons 

performed relative to the selected BOP institutions. The comparable BOP 

institutions housed male inmates with the same security level (low), similar 

population sizes, and similar geographical locations as the 14 contract prisons.87 

For our comparison, we used BOP institutions in the following locations:

• Allenwood (Pennsylvania),

• Bastrop (Texas),

• Beaumont (Texas),

• Big Spring (Texas), 

• Butner (North Carolina),

 87 Most of the contract prison inmates were criminal aliens, and many were serving time for 

immigration offenses; most of the inmates in the BOP institutions were U.S. citizens. 
49

• Elkton (Ohio), 

• Forrest City (Arkansas),

• La Tuna (Texas),

• Loretto (Pennsylvania),

• Oakdale (Louisiana),

• Seagoville (Texas),

• Terminal Island (California),

• Texarkana (Texas), and 

• Yazoo City (Mississippi). 

To conduct our analysis, we requested from the BOP eight categories of data 

from FY 2011 through FY 2014:

1. contraband,

2. reports of incidents,

88

3. lockdowns,

4. inmate discipline,

5. telephone monitoring,

6. grievances,

7. urinalysis drug testing, and

8. sexual misconduct.

We selected these categories of data to analyze as potential safety and security 

indicators because they provided information on areas addressed by ACA standards 

on security and control, inmate rules and discipline, and inmate rights, and because 

these data were tracked by both the contract prisons and the BOP institutions. 

For the contract prisons, a primary source of data for monthly inmate 

population snapshots, cell phone confiscations, reports of incidents, telephone 

monitoring, and urinalysis drug testing was the PMB Special Investigative 

Supervisor Monthly Tracking and Monitoring Report, which consolidated the 

monthly intelligence reports the individual contract prisons submitted to the PMB. 

The individual contract prisons provided data to the BOP on confiscations of 

contraband drugs, tobacco, and weapons; lockdowns; and grievances. The BOP 

provided information on BOP institutions and on inmate discipline in both BOP and 

contract prisons. Its sources included SENTRY, TRUINTEL (for confiscations of 

contraband drugs, tobacco, and weapons), and its annual Cell Phones Recovered 

reports (for confiscations of contraband cell phones). The BOP’s Office of Internal 

Affairs provided data on allegations of sexual misconduct by staff against inmates 

for both the contract prisons and the BOP institutions. 

Since the contract prisons and BOP institutions had a range of inmate 

population sizes that varied from month to month, we adjusted for these population 

 88 The specific types of reports of incidents we analyzed in this category included assaults by 

inmates on inmates, assaults by inmates on staff, sexual assaults by inmates on staff, deaths, fights, 

cell fires, suicide attempts and self-mutilation (combined), suicides, disruptive behavior, and uses of 

force. 
50

differences by calculating rates per capita where possible. As of September 2014, 

the combined inmate population of the 14 contract prisons was 27,987 and the 

combined population of the 14 BOP institutions was 22,562. In most cases we 

calculated the average annual rate per capita, or, where monthly data was 

available, the average monthly rate per capita. Since the per capita figures often 

ranged from .001 to .00001, except where otherwise noted in the body of the 

report, we give per capita rates per 10,000 inmates to present the numbers in an 

accessible format. In some cases we also provided total numbers unadjusted for 

population differences to give the reader additional perspective on the scope of the 

data we analyzed.

To perform the analysis, we calculated both summary and average monthly 

or annual per capita figures for each prison, the aggregate for both contract prisons 

and BOP institutions, and the same figures for all contract prisons by each of the 

three contractors. We also compared the data analysis results between individual 

contract prisons by examining how often each prison fell in the highest or lowest 

three on each indicator. To calculate the averages per capita, we used monthly and 

annual population snapshot data the BOP provided for each contract prison and BOP 

institution. To calculate percentage differences between various indicators for our 

comparisons between the contract prisons and BOP institutions, we used a standard 

formula to divide the difference between the two numbers by their average. That 

is, where the first value is x and the second value is y, we used the formula 

[(x-y)/([x+y]/2)]*100. We present the results of the analysis in the color-coded

Table 8 in Appendix 7. In Table 8, we designate as “roughly equal” those indicators 

where the average difference per 10,000 inmates times the number of months or 

years comprised less than 3 percent of the total number of occurrences over the 

4-year period.

Document Review

We reviewed BOP and contractor documents, including the contracts 

established between the BOP and each contractor, program statements, policy 

documents, operating procedures, quality assurance plans, quality control plans, 

monthly intelligence reports, personnel position descriptions, performance work 

plans, contractor staffing plans, and Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting 

System reports. We also reviewed BOP onsite contract monitoring documents 

including monthly checklists, monthly performance meeting minutes, monthly logs, 

annual and semiannual performance reports, contractor self-assessments, Contract 

Facility Monitoring (CFM) reports, NOCs, letters of inquiry, and summaries of 

corrective actions in response to CFM deficiencies and NOCs. From the contract 

prisons, we reviewed sample reports of incidents, use-of-force after-action reports, 

contractor internal audit reports, inmate grievances, grievance logs and grievance 

summary reports, Disciplinary Hearing Officer reports, discipline logs, SHU reports, 

SHU logs, intelligence meeting minutes, and institutional intelligence reports. 

Finally, in the area of health services, we reviewed screenshots and tutorials from 

electronic recordkeeping systems, mortality reviews for contract prison inmate 

deaths, and CFM working papers.
APPENDIX 2

51

CONTRACT PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS AND VITAL 

FUNCTIONS

Table 5 lists each contract requirement and the vital functions essential to 

successful performance, summarizes the vital functions, and specifies the 

percentage of total contract value attributable to each contract requirement.

Table 5

Performance Requirements Summary

CONTRACT REQUIREMENT: ADMINISTRATION (Quality Control) 10%

Vital Function #1 The contractor's Quality Control Program serves to identify deficiencies 

in the quality of services throughout the entire scope of the contract 

and implements corrective action before the level of performance 

becomes deficient.

CONTRACT REQUIREMENT: CORRECTIONAL PROGRAMS 10%

(Unit/Case Management, Grievance Procedures)

Vital Function #2 Inmates are appropriately classified and managed commensurate with 

security and custody requirements to promote institution and public 

safety.

Vital Function #3 Staff evaluates the needs of inmates and manages their program 

participation.

Vital Function #4 Staff is accessible and communicates effectively with inmates to 

promote positive institutional adjustment.

Vital Function #5 A program for inmate grievances exists, which provides for the 

expression and resolution of inmate problems.

CONTRACT REQUIREMENT: CORRECTIONAL SERVICES 20%

(Security/Control/Inmate Accountability/

Computer Security and Information Systems)

Vital Function #6 A safe and secure environment is provided for staff and inmates 

through effective communication of operational concerns. This 

includes verbal and written instructions, post orders, institution

supplements, information dissemination, training, and crisis 

prevention.

Vital Function #7 Intelligence information related to security concerns is gathered for 

dissemination to appropriate contract and BOP staff.

Vital Function #8 An adequate security inspection system is provided to meet the needs 

of the institution.

Vital Function #9 An adequate level of emergency readiness is maintained to respond to 

institution emergencies.

Vital Function #10 Appropriate operational and security requirements applicable to all 

computer and information systems are maintained.

CONTRACT REQUIREMENT: FOOD SERVICE 15%

Vital Function #11 Policy, procedures, and practices are in place for a safe, secure, and 

sanitary environment.

Vital Function #12 Meals are nutritionally adequate, properly prepared, and attractively 

served.

Vital Function #13 Policy, procedures, and essential resources are identified, developed,

and managed to meet the operational needs of the Food Service 

Program.
52

Table 5 (Cont’d)

CONTRACT REQUIREMENT: HEALTH SERVICES 15%

Vital Function #14 Open access to healthcare is provided for all inmates in an 

environment that is safe and secure.

Vital Function #15 Quality healthcare is provided utilizing qualified personnel and 

resources in accordance with applicable standards.

Vital Function #16 Health information data is recorded accurately, legibly, in a timely 

manner and maintained in accordance with applicable BOP policy.

Vital Function #17 All inmates are screened for mental health, substance abuse, and 

other behavioral problems and receive appropriate intervention, 

treatment, and programs to promote a healthy, safe, and secure 

environment.

CONTRACT REQUIREMENT: HUMAN RESOURCES 10%

Vital Function #18 Adequate staffing levels are maintained.

Vital Function #19 Staff resources are properly administered and managed.

Vital Function #20 All resources are managed to ensure training requirements and needs 

are provided.

CONTRACT REQUIREMENT: INMATE SERVICES 15%

(Commissary/Laundry/Telephone/Trust Fund)

Vital Function #21 Inmates are provided the privilege of an inmate telephone system and 

obtaining merchandise through the operation of a commissary. 

Effective security measures are in place to prevent misuse of the 

telephone system.

Vital Function #22 Inmate funds and property are properly maintained and accounted for 

during incarceration.

Vital Function #23 Clothing, linens, toiletries, and laundry services are provided to 

inmates.

(Education and Recreation Programs)

Vital Function #24 The needs of the inmate population are evaluated and General 

Educational Development, English as a Second Language, and 

recreational programs are provided. Programs are accessible for the 

inmate population, and program availability is communicated.

(Mail/Receiving and Discharge/Records)

Vital Function #25 The institution provides inmate mail services, which include timely 

processing and accountability of funds, special mail, and general 

correspondence. Special care is given to the detection of contraband 

and prohibited acts.

Vital Function #26 Inmates are lawfully committed and processed in a safe and secure 

environment, with emphasis on the detection and elimination of 

contraband from their persons and property.

Vital Function #27 The appropriate execution, processing, and verification of documents 

are performed to ensure the accurate and timely release of inmates.

(Religious Services)

Vital Function #28 Impartial religious leadership is provided through resources and 

programs to accommodate the free exercise of religion and diverse 

needs of inmates.

CONTRACT REQUIREMENT: SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL 5%

HEALTH/FACILITIES

Vital Function #29 All facilities are safely operated and maintained in accordance with 

applicable laws, codes, and regulations.

Source: BOP
APPENDIX 3

53

LARGE SECURE ADULT CONTRACT OVERSIGHT CHECKLIST 

OBSERVATION STEPS IN CORRECTIONAL AND HEALTH 

SERVICES

Table 6

Observation Steps in Correctional Services and Health Services

No. Sample Correctional Services Observation Steps

(1) Observe to determine if the contractor is providing perimeter security in accordance with the 

contract.

(2)

Observe SHU [special housing unit] procedures during all three shifts and compare 

observations to contractor policy, practices, procedures, i.e., movement of inmate in 

appropriate restraints, property allowances, security practices, and visits by required staff.

(3)

The contractor is responsible for the movement of inmates within a 400-mile radius of the 

contract facility. Observe actual process of inmate movement to ensure procedures are in 

accordance with contractual and policy requirements. Examples of inmate/ transportation 

include, but are not limited to, outside medical care, funeral and bedside trips, transfer or 

movement to/from other government facilities, and airlift sites.

(4) Observe vehicle sally port operations to determine if they are consistent with the 

contractor’s policy and procedure manual.

(5) Observe contractor’s procedures for processing incoming packages and boxes to ensure they 

are in accordance with local policy.

No. All Health Services Observation Steps

(1) Observe access to health records and verify that access is controlled by the health authority.

(2)

In the event of an inmate death:

A. Did the contractor immediately notified BOP and submitted a written report within 

24 hours,

B. Did the contractor obtained fingerprints of the deceased (right thumb or right index 

and dated & signed the fingerprint card and hand delivered the fingerprint card to the 

COR.

C. If death is due to violence, accident surrounded by unusual or questionable 

circumstances, or is sudden and the deceased has not been under immediate medical 

supervision did the contractor notify the coroner of the local jurisdiction to request 

review of the case, and if necessary, examination of the body.

D. Review contractor’s records to determine if the deceased inmate’s property was 

inventoried & forwarded to the designated family member, the nearest of kin, or the 

Consular Officer of the inmate’s country of legal residence.

Note: SSIM shall track the timely submission of the contractor’s mortality review 

and follow up to ensure a response is received from Health Services Division.

(3)

Review any allegations of sexual abuse/assault to ensure the procedures followed were in 

accordance with the BOP program statement. (Reported via 583, Sentry assignments 

keyed, follow ups conducted timely, etc)
54

Table 6 (Cont’d)

No. All Health Services Observation Steps (Cont’d)

(4)

Observe inmates housed in observation cells or cells in medical and determine if the:

A. Logs are maintained in accordance with contractor’s policy?

B. Inmates are receiving services in a timely manner (i.e., food service, hospital

rounds, etc.)?

C. Inmates on suicide watch are supervised in accordance with local procedures?

(5) Observe Health Services staff interactions with inmates to determine if inmates are being 

afforded confidentiality, supervision in medical, etc.

(6) Check bio-hazard procedures to ensure they are in accordance with contractor’s policy.

(7) Run a Chronic Care roster (SMDG eq N***/Column #4 SELD, #5 ARSD/Seq 4) Determine if 

contractor is current with follow up care and appointments – any dates are past due.

Note: At the time of our review, the complete checklist contained nearly 70 observation steps in 

8 categories, including the correctional services and health services steps listed here. The BOP 

revised some of the observation steps in the checklist in response to the 2015 OIG audit on the 

Reeves County contract prison. The red text above reflects some of the BOP’s revisions.

Source: BOP
APPENDIX 4

55

THE OIG’S MEMORANDUM TO THE BOP ON THE HOUSING OF 

NEW INMATES IN SPECIAL HOUSING UNITS
56
57
APPENDIX 5

58

THE BOP’S RESPONSE TO THE OIG’S MEMORANDUM ON THE 

HOUSING OF NEW INMATES IN SPECIAL HOUSING UNITS
59
APPENDIX 6

60

COMPARISON OF SECURITY INDICATORS AMONG 

CONTRACTORS 

Table 7

Comparison of Security Indicators among Contractors

FY 2011 – FY 2014

KEY

Red

The Corrections Corporation of America’s (CCA)

contract prisons had a higher rate on this indicator 

(or, for telephone monitoring and drug testing, a 

lower average percentage).

Purple

The GEO Group's (GEO) contract prisons had a 

higher rate on this indicator (or, for telephone 

monitoring and drug testing, a lower average 

percentage).

Blue

The Management and Training Corporation’s (MTC)

contract prisons had a higher rate on this indicator 

(or, for telephone monitoring and drug testing, a 

lower average percentage).

INDICATOR

CONTRACTOR

CCA GEO MTC

Adams County, 

Cibola, Eden, 

McRae, Northeast 

Ohio

Big Springs, D. Ray 

James, Moshannon 

Valley, Reeves I & 

II, Reeves III, Rivers

Dalby, Taft, 

Willacy

Contraband

Cell Phones

Annual Average 

Confiscations per 

10,000 Inmates

314.6 462.1 31.3

Drugs

Monthly Average 

Confiscations per 

10,000 Inmates

1.4 2.4 1.3

Weapons

Monthly Average 

Confiscations per 

10,000 Inmates

2.3 3.2 5.0

Tobacco

Monthly Average 

Confiscations per 

10,000 Inmates

0.8 4.8 0.7
61

Table 7 (Cont’d)

INDICATOR

CONTRACTOR

CCA GEO MTC

Adams County, 

Cibola, Eden, 

McRae, Northeast 

Ohio

Big Springs, D. Ray 

James, Moshannon 

Valley, Reeves I & 

II, Reeves III, Rivers

Dalby, Taft, 

Willacy

Reports of Incidents

Assaults by Inmates 

on Inmates

Monthly Average 

per 10,000 Inmates 4.1 3.6 1.5

Assaults by Inmates 

on Staff

Monthly Average 

per 10,000 Inmates 3.7 6.0 1.3

Sexual Assaults by 

Inmates on Staff

Monthly Average 

per 10,000 Inmates 0.15 0.07 0.11

Deaths Monthly Average 

per 10,000 Inmates 0.3 0.4 0.5

Fights Monthly Average 

per 10,000 Inmates 5.4 3.7 1.7

Setting a Fire Monthly Average 

per 10,000 Inmates 0.1 0.2 0.1

Suicide Attempts and 

Self-mutilation

Monthly Average 

per 10,000 Inmates 1.1 1.0 0.5

Suicides Monthly Average 

per 10,000 Inmates 0.055 0.000 0.064

Disruptive Behavior Monthly Average 

per 10,000 Inmates 1.0 3.1 0.5

Uses of Force 

(Immediate and 

Calculated)

Monthly Average 

per 10,000 Inmates 4.3 5.9 1.8

Lockdowns

Full and Partial 

Lockdowns Total per Prison 7.6 9.5 2
62

Table 7 (Cont’d)

INDICATOR

CONTRACTOR

CCA GEO MTC

Adams County, 

Cibola, Eden, 

McRae, Northeast 

Ohio

Big Springs, D. Ray 

James, Moshannon 

Valley, Reeves I & 

II, Reeves III, Rivers

Dalby, Taft, 

Willacy

Discipline

Guilty Findings on 

Serious (100- and 

200-Level) 

Disciplinary Incident 

Report Charges

Monthly Average 

per 10,000 Inmates 70.7 92.1 60.2

Telephone Monitoring

Inmate Phone Calls 

Monitored

Monthly Average 

Percentage of Calls 

Monitored

8.7% 7.6% 5.8%

Grievances

All Grievances

Monthly Average 

Submitted per 

10,000 Inmates

48.6 74.4 111.5

Grievances in 

Selected Safety and 

Security Categories

Monthly Average 

Submitted per 

10,000 Inmates

18.4 28.2 65.6

Complaints about 

Staff

Monthly Average

Submitted per 

10,000 Inmates

7.1 9.6 30.3

Conditions of 

Confinement

Monthly Average 

Submitted per 

10,000 Inmates

0.2 1.8 3.2

Food

Monthly Average 

Submitted per 

10,000 Inmates

1.0 1.9 4.5

Institutional 

Operations

Monthly Average 

Submitted per 

10,000 Inmates

0.0 0.9 3.6

Medical and Dental 

Grievances

Monthly Average 

Submitted per 

10,000 Inmates

9.6 13.9 23.5
63

Table 7 (Cont’d)

INDICATOR

CONTRACTOR

CCA GEO MTC

Adams County, 

Cibola, Eden, 

McRae, Northeast 

Ohio

Big Springs, D. Ray 

James, Moshannon 

Valley, Reeves I & 

II, Reeves III, Rivers

Dalby, Taft, 

Willacy

Grievances (Cont’d)

Safety and Security

Monthly Average 

Submitted per 

10,000 Inmates

0.5 0.04 0.0

Special Housing Unit

Monthly Average 

Submitted per 

10,000 Inmates

0.03 0.1 0.5

Urinalysis

Percentage of 

Inmates Tested

Monthly Average 

Percentage Tested 7.5 7.0 6.4

Positive Drug Tests Monthly Average 

per 10,000 Inmates 2.0 2.3 1.6

Sexual Misconduct

Allegations of Staff 

Sexual Misconduct 

against Inmates

Annual Average per 

10,000 Inmates 7.3 10.3 7.7

Guilty Findings on 

Disciplinary Incident 

Charges of Inmate 

Sexual Misconduct 

against Inmates

Annual Average per 

10,000 Inmates 10.4 24.3 11.7

Source: OIG analysis of BOP and contractor data
APPENDIX 7

64

COMPARISON OF SECURITY INDICATORS BETWEEN CONTRACT 

PRISONS AND BOP INSTITUTIONS

Table 8

Comparison of Security Indicators between 

Contract Prisons and BOP Institutions

FY 2011 – FY 2014

KEY

Purple

Contract prisons had a higher rate on this 

indicator (or, for telephone monitoring and 

drug testing, a lower average percentage).

Blue

BOP institutions had a higher rate on this 

indicator (or, for telephone monitoring and 

drug testing, a lower average percentage).

Green

Contract prisons and BOP institutions were 

roughly equal on this indicator. (See 

Appendix 1 for a further explanation of our 

criteria for determining this.)

INDICATOR CONTRACT 

PRISONS

BOP 

INSTITUTIONS

Contraband

Cell Phones

4-year Total 4,849 400

Annual Average 

Confiscations per 

10,000 Inmates

317.1 38.3

Drugs

4-year Total 220 330

Monthly Average 

Confiscations per 

10,000 Inmates

1.8 3.0

Tobacco

4-year Total 397 214

Monthly Average 

Confiscations per 

10,000 Inmates

2.5 1.9

Weapons

4-year Total 418 206

Monthly Average 

Confiscations per 

10,000 Inmates

3.2 1.8
65

Table 8 (Cont’d)

INDICATOR CONTRACT 

PRISONS

BOP 

INSTITUTIONS

Reports of Incidents

Assaults by Inmates on 

Inmates

4-year Total 423 289

Monthly Average per 

10,000 Inmates 3.3 2.5

Assaults by Inmates on 

Staff

4-year Total 526 184

Monthly Average per 

10,000 Inmates 4.2 1.6

Sexual Assaults by 

Inmates on Staff

4-year Total 13 2

Monthly Average per 

10,000 Inmates 0.1 0.02

Deaths

4-year Total 54 127

Monthly Average per 

10,000 Inmates 0.4 1.2

Fights

4-year Total 459 465

Monthly Average per 

10,000 Inmates 3.9 4.0

Setting a Fire

4-year Total 20 5

Monthly Average per 

10,000 Inmates 0.1 0.04

Suicide Attempts and 

Self-Mutilation

4-year Total 125 89

Monthly Average per 

10,000 Inmates 0.9 0.8

Suicides

4-year Total 4 4

Monthly Average per 

10,000 Inmates 0.03 0.03

Disruptive Behavior

4-year Total 256 274

Monthly Average per 

10,000 Inmates 1.8 2.4

Uses of Force 

(Immediate and 

Calculated)

4-year Total 548 455

Monthly Average per 

10,000 Inmates 4.5 3.8
66

Table 8 (Cont’d)

INDICATOR CONTRACT 

PRISONS

BOP 

INSTITUTIONS

Lockdowns

Full and Partial 

Lockdowns

4-year Total 101 11

Number of Facilities 

with Lockdowns 12 6

Inmate Discipline

Guilty Findings on 

Serious (100- and 200-

Level) Disciplinary 

Incident Report 

Charges

4-year Total 10,089 7,439

Monthly Average per 

10,000 Inmates 77.9 64.7

Telephone Monitoring

Inmate Phone Calls 

Monitored

Monthly Average 

Percentage of Calls 

Monitored

7.6% 21.1%

Grievances

All Grievances

4-year Total 8,756 14,098

Monthly Average 

Submitted per 10,000 

Inmates

72.6 121.5

Percent Granted 8.1% 5.2%

Grievances in Selected 

Safety and Security 

Categories

4-year Total 3,969 2,883

Monthly Average 

Submitted per 10,000 

Inmates

32.2 25.3

Complaints about Staff

4-year Total 1,538 719

Monthly Average 

Submitted per 10,000 

Inmates

12.9 6.2

Conditions of

Confinement

4-year Total 161 134

Monthly Average 

Submitted per 10,000 

Inmates

1.5 1.2

Food

4-year Total 247 133

Monthly Average 

Submitted per 10,000 

Inmates

2.1 1.2
67

Table 8 (Cont’d)

INDICATOR CONTRACT 

PRISONS

BOP 

INSTITUTIONS

Grievances (Cont’d)

Institutional Operations

4-year Total 171 20

Monthly Average 

Submitted per 10,000 

Inmates

1.1 0.2

Medical and Dental

4-year Total 1,800 1,609

Monthly Average 

Submitted per 10,000 

Inmates

14.3 14.1

Safety and Security 

(Contract Prisons Only)

4-year Total 25 N/A

Monthly Average 

Submitted per 10,000 

Inmates

0.2 N/A

Sexual Abuse or Assault 

(BOP Institutions Only)

4-year Total N/A 9

Monthly Average 

Submitted per 10,000 

Inmates

N/A 0.07

Special Housing Unit

4-year Total 27 259

Monthly Average 

Submitted per 10,000 

Inmates

0.2 2.4

Urinalysis Drug Tests

Percentage of Inmates 

Tested Monthly Average 7.1 8.1

Positive Drug Tests

4-year Total 263 376

Monthly Average per 

10,000 Inmates 2.1 3.4

Sexual Misconduct

Guilty Findings on 

Disciplinary Incident 

Charges of Inmate 

Sexual Misconduct 

against Inmates

4-year Total 156 175

Annual Average per 

10,000 Inmates 16.6 18.1

Allegations of Staff 

Sexual Misconduct 

against Inmates

4-year Total 97 139

Annual Average per 

10,000 Inmates 8.7 14.5

Source: OIG analysis of BOP and contractor data
APPENDIX 8

68

THE BOP’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT
69
APPENDIX 9

THE CONTRACTORS' RESPONSES TO THE DRAFT REPORT

Amcrica'^ Leader in Pjrtncr&hipCorrcctu

rs.--us.'jK

ViM Parfnsrs^.p Oewicip<wnf

August 8, 2016

Dcpui}' X'isisinr.t hispector General

U.S. Department ofJu.sticc

Office ofthe Insptx:lor General

Evaluation and In.spcclion.s Division

Washington, D.C.

Dear

CCA appreciates the opportunity to review and eommcnt on the Oniee of the Inspector General.

U.S. Department ofJu.stice (OlG's) draft report resulting from u review ofIhe Federal Bureau of

Prisons (BOP) monitoring of contract prisons. We share the interests of the OIG and the BOF in

ensuring contract prisons are operated safely and securely and in compliance with contract

requirements. We are also committed to working in partnership with the BOP to address any

recommendations in furtherance ofthesc yoals.

The comments we would like to pronde arc regardingthe section of the repoil tilled "Contract

Prisons Had More Safety and Sccurity-rclatcd Incidcnt.s per Capita than BOP Institutions for Most

ofthe Indicators We Analyzed." We appreciate the OlG's candor that "vvc were unable to evaluate

all of the factors that contributed to the underlying data, including Ihc effect of ininute

demographics und facility loc<Jtions." We also rccogni/e that the OIU therefore qualified its

findings regarding safety und security related incidents; for example, the analysis of contraband

seized is ctivcalcd with the acknowledgement thai Ihe 010 did not exatnine or comparc the

interdiction efforts of contract and BOP-operated prisons. We therefore support the OlG's

rccommetidationthat the BOP c.'iamine the data more thoroughly. CCA is committed to continual

improvement in its facility operations, especially as it relates to inmate and staff safety and

security, and will cooperate with any examination conducted by the BOP ofthe factors leading to

the incidcnLs in contract prisons.

We believe thai demographic variables, particularly as they relate to housmg a homogenous

foreign national population, will have a significanl impact on rates of inmate misconduct. Our

experience has been that the criminal alien population hou.sccl in contract prisons has n higlicr rate

ofSecurity 'Hireat Group (STG) members and associates (including border. VIe.xican and Central

American gang5)and groups of inmates that strongly dcllne their identity by geographical areas,

such as ihc Mexican state they arc from, than U.S. citizen populations of the comparablesecurity

level housed in most BOP facilities.

10B<jncnH\lls8oij!e\farC,Nashviue. Tennessee 372l5.Phone 615-262-30Cd.Fax: 615-263-2050.*wwccacom

70
August8,2016

Page 2 of2

There is also robust research literaliirc, including rcscarch conducted on BOP populations,'

indicatingthat STG-aniliated inmatesarc significuntly more hkcly to be involved in violcncc and

misconduct, even after controlling for individual cbLiractcristics of inmates that prior research has

established arc associated with violent piedispositions, Additionally, these S TG-arilliated inmates

and geographic groups oikn have significant rivalries based on conflicts that originate outside of

the prison system, leading to inter-group conflict and violcncc. Furthermore, there is much less

intelligence and background infonnalion available to assist corrcctional managers in managing

foreign national inmates than njost systems would have on a U.S. citizen.

We look forward to furtherdiscussions with the BOP regarding the data and recommendations in

the report and collaboration on any policy or opcratinnal changes.

Sincercly,

Natasha K. Metcalf

' Gaes, G.;Wallace, S.;Oilman, F... Klcin-SafVran, J. &Suppa. S. (2002). The influence of prison

gang affiliation on violence and other prison misconduct. The Prison Journal, 82 (i), 359oS5.

71
Aiisiist 9. 2016

Deputy Assistant Lispector General

U.S. Depaitnient ofJustice

Oftice ofthe Inspector Genei*al

Evaluation and Inspections Division

1425 New York Avenue. NW. Suite 6100

Washington. D.C. 20530

The GEO Group, Inc

Corporate Headquarters

One Pari( Place. Suite 700

621 Nwlhwest 53*^ Street

Boca Raton. Rorida 33457

TSL-581 699 5833

FAX; 561 699 7738

www.geogfDUP-Com

Re: The GEO Gi'oup's Comments to the

Fonnal Draft ofReview ofthe Federal Bureau ofPrisons' Monitoring of

Contract Prisons

Dated July 2016

Dear[

The GEO Group. Inc. (GEO) appreciates the oppoiiunit>' to conmient on the

foiinal cU'aft of the above referenced repoit. We have revie\^•ed the di'aft and have

the following for your consideration.

One of the 3 reconunendations is that a working group of subject matter experts

convene to evaluate why conti-act prisons had more safety and seciuity incidents

per capita than BOP institutions and identify actions. A key ingredient of tiiat

review would likely be to evaluate the settings, populations, and repoiting systems

ofthe 14 contract and 14 BOP facilities. Any evaluation •\\ill requii'e comparisons

of the salient elements of all 28 facilities. Wliereas the 14 contract prisons are

discussed in detail in the repoit. the 14 BOP facihties are only listed once in the

Methodology section. Tliere are some references that, if enlianced. ^^•ould add to

the understanding of the reader and to the ftinher fiilfillment of the fii'st

reconmiended action item:

1. Discussion of the difference in population demogi'aphics.

Tliere are notable differences in the population housed at the conti-act facilities

Cciiminal aliens) and the BOP facilities (U.S. citizens). Tliat difference is

briefly noted in two foomotes in the repon and one in Appendix I. but the

impact of the difference is not discussed anywhere in the report. The 3

footnotes acknowledge that the Criminal Alien Requirement (CAR) applies to

72
ee©

all contract facilities, except parts of 2 ciuient facilities (noted on page 1.

footnote 6). Tlie report states that tlie selected BOP facilities have "siniilai*

population and seciuity levels." (page 15. first paragraph). Appendix 1

explains it a little differently by saying on page 53 imder Data Analysis that the

comparable BOP housed male iimiates with the "same secuiity level (low),

similar population sizes, and similar geogi'aphical locations..." (emphasis

added) For the following reasons. GEO believes that the differences in the

population demograpliics are critical to the imderstanding ofthe collected data:

a. CAR facility populations are ciiminal ahens and not U.S. citizens. As a

gi'oup. the CAR population is veiy homogeneous, with 72.1 % being from

Mexico and tlie majority of the rest being fiom a few Centi-al American

countries. (Only 11.8 % of the BOP population is non-US. citizens.) As

such, the contract facihty population resj^onds as one to any issue. I'eal or

perceived. The group leaders can control or direct a lai-ge majority of the

population in a much larger fasliion than in facilities with a mixed U.S.

citizemy. Traditional populations do not follow recognized imuate leaders

in a "one for all and all for one" mentality. Tliis is a factor is analyzing the

8 categories as certain proliibited acts are higher in CAR facilities for this

reason and tlie need for facility lockdo\Mis is liigher.

b. An additional effect oftliis CAR population on the data analysis is that the

conti'aband nimibers. paiticulaily the cell phones, are greatly affected by

housing the CAR population. The Texas GEO facilities (Reeves and Big

Spring) are significantly affected due to the proximity'' to Mexico and the

large numbers of Mexican National inmates in the facilities. Tliis issue is

not significant in the BOP facilities.

c. The CAR population comes with a high nmiiber of gang affiliations. That

factor alone may result in increases in the level of violent incidents in the

CAR facilities. See attached report "Tlie Influence of Piison Gang

Affiliation on Violence and Other Prison Misconduct"' Tlw Piisoii Jotinial,

82 (B), S59-3S5. See attached. This 2001 report, researched and authored

by 3 BOP subject matter experts, specifically discusses the citizenship

factor, distinguishing the citizens of Coliunbia and Mexico, in pait because

of the high diiig ti'affickiiig aspects of those populations. Gang affiliated

iimiates were more likely to be involved in dmg. propeit}\

accoimtability... (page 16) Membersliip in some of the gangs such as the

Texas Syndicate and the Mexakanemi was associated with increases in

ahuost all fonus of misconduct.

Page 2 of4

73
oe©

For tlie above reasons. GEO would request tliat the repoit include additional

infonnation on die differences in the population demogi-aphics and its effect on the

data analysis.

2. Differences in CK'ersiglit and Reporting.

An additional factor tliatmight be enliancedin the repoit A\'ould be a con^arison of

the amoiuit and depth of existing oversight of the contract facilities with the

oversight of the BOP facilities. Wliereas the contract facilities operate using tlie

BOP policies and systems to a large degi'ee (SENTRY being one), the obligation of

fiill and constant repoiting and transparency is part of the good business

relationship between GEO and the BOP. Tliat relationship exists at the facility,

regional and Washington. D.C. levels. Tlie expectation is that GEO will report all

incidents in a timely fashion and the contract facilities are evaluated on that

thorougli and prompt repoiting in the C'PARs and in the Contract Facility

Monitoiing. The ACA accreditation process at the conti*act facilities is more

extensive than the same for the BOP facilities and possibly results again in

additional reporting of incidents of all kinds. It seems that tliis difference in

repoiting was realized in the inconsistent numbers on the contract facilit)' sexual

misconduct as reported by the facilities and as reported in montlily intelligence

reports.

In addition it should be noted that each conti'act facility has 2-4 on-site monitors

who are not replicated at the BOP facilities. Tliis is additional monitoring

manpower dedicated to daily review of operations, daily repoiting ofincidents and

daily ti'acking of compliance. There is no dedicated monitoring staff at the BOP

facilities.

The cunent extensive review and oversiglit may have contiibuted to the higher

contract facility mimbei's in sevei'al ofthe S categories.

GEO sincerely thanks tiie Office ofInspector General for tliis conespondence and

•\^^ould welcome the oppoiliuiity to add to tliis discussion at any time if there ai«

questions about the above comments.

Sincerely.

Patricia McNaii* Pei^sante

Executive Vice President. Contract Compliance

Page 3 of4

74
cc: George C. Zoley. Chaiiinan and CEO

J. David Donaliue. SVP. U.S. CoiTectious

Pnblo Paez. W. Coiporate Relations

Dep. Asst. Lispector General. Dept. ofJustice

Dept. ofJustice

Attachment

Page 4 of4

75

ee©
A Leader in Social Impact

Scott Marquardt

President

August 9,2016

DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPEaOR GENERAL

US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Tliankyou for llie opporiunity to comment on the Formal DraftReview of the Federal Bureau of Prisons'

Monitoring of Contract Prisons, July 2016. MTC strongly disagrees v/ith the conclusions and inferences of

this report. Anycasual reader would comc to the conclusion that contract prisons arc not as safe as BOP

prisons. The conclusion is wrong and is not supported by the work done by the GIG.

The comparison of iwo sets of prisons is comparing apples and oranges. Tl)e contract prisons are holding

criminal aliens. The 016 reports that 90%of the inmates In the contract facilllies are Mexicans. Ifthe 016

looked into the composition of the BOP prisons, it would find a much more balanced demographic mix.

The normal practice is to disperse groups as much as practical to weaken any STG groups operating In a

facility.Anydifference Isincident rates would be far more attributable to tills factor tiian whether the

prison Is a contract prison or BOP facility. (Thispoint is made on page 22 but the limitation Islost In the

bodyof the report. Ifthe 016 conducted some interviewsof BOP and contract officials, this fact could be

easily substantiated.)

MTC has wardens that have worked in contract prisons after careers In the BOP.They report that

contractors bend over backwards to fullydisclose any incident. BOP wardens have more discretion In

reporting. The OiG should go backand interviewthese wardens for themselves to test our assertion.

Each of the assertion in the report should be given to the BOP for further Investigation. The

inflammatory conclusions that contract prisons are lesssafe is not supported by the facts and should be

re-written.

SpeclHcconcerns we have are:

Page i, paragraph I; page 2, paragraph 1: Disturbances are mentioned from recent years In contract

facilities. No mention is made of disturbances in BOP facilities. The list of incidents on Page 2 In contract

facilities is very unfairwithout a similarlistof major incidents at the 14 BOP facilities. Anyreader is going

to come to an unjust conclusion v/ithout a balanced report.

Page 12 and 13. The contract facilities clearlyoperate at a lower cost. The OlG's information supports

this. Why does the OIG resist saying it? It's interesting to note the resistance of the OIG to report that

POBoxlO I 500 North Marketplace Dr, I CKntervillo, UT 84014

Direct: (801) 693-28C0 | wvAV.iiUclrsins.com
contract prisons operate at a lower cost, but relieson muchless reliablesupport for the assertion that

contract prisons are less safe.

Page15, heading. Theheadingmakesan assertion that relies on a comparisonof apples and oranges.

Thephrasing of the headingsand Initial sentences shouldreflect the problem Inmaking the comparison

using facilities with very different populations.

Page 15, last paragraph. The BOP facilities should not be referred to as comparable institutions in the

document. They house very different populations.

Page16 and 24 to 26.The Inferencethat grievances represent a prisonwith highersafety concerns Is

wrong.Grievances are an integral part of conflict resolution in a positive way. Lack of grievancescan

indicate an Inmate's lackof trust of the prison's problem resolution process. The fact that Inmates are

widely using the system can showIt's working and resolving concerns beforethey becomeIncidents. The

conclusion of the report is misguided.

Page 16, last paragraph. Confiscationsof more ceil phones, or more contraband, doesn't necessarily

mean that there is more contraband cominginto the facility. It can also mean that the prison has a more

effective systemof detectingand removing contraband. Theconclusion againismisguided. Atmost, this

data could be an indication that further study iswarranted bythe BOP. Our point Is made at the bottom

ofPage 19 but only after the questionable assertion Is fully developed. The limitation shouldbe Inthe

first sentence ofthis section.

Page26, phone calls. The report says the requirement isdifferent for BOP and contract facilities and

further reports that all private contractors are meeting the "recommendation" of 5% monitoring. But

the report presents this In a negative light on contract prisons.

Thankyou againfor the opportunity to providea response to this report and we lookforward to

ongoingevaluation of performance.

Again, we appreciate the opportunity share our perspective.

Sincerely,

Scott Marquardt

77
APPENDIX 10

78

OIG ANALYSIS OF THE BOP’S RESPONSE

The OIG provided a draft of this report to the BOP and the three contractors. 

The BOP’s response is included in Appendix 8 above. The contractors’ responses 

are included in Appendix 9. Below, we discuss the OIG’s analysis of the BOP’s 

response and actions necessary to close the recommendations. 

Recommendation 1: Convene a working group of BOP subject matter 

experts to evaluate why contract prisons had more safety and security incidents 

per capita than BOP institutions in a number of key indicators, and identify 

appropriate action, if necessary.

Status: Resolved. 

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated 

that a core group of subject matter experts will be selected to evaluate the rate of 

safety and security incidents per capita within the private contract facilities 

compared to other BOP institutions, and to determine appropriate action, if 

necessary.

OIG Analysis: The BOP’s actions are responsive to the recommendation. 

By October 31, 2016, please provide a list of the selected subject matter experts; a 

schedule of planned work group meetings; copies of meeting agenda for each work 

group meeting held by October 31, 2016; copies of BOP data or other information 

the subject matter experts considered to evaluate the rate of safety and security 

incidents per capita within the private contract facilities compared to other BOP 

institutions; and documentation of any appropriate action recommended, if 

necessary. 

Recommendation 2: Verify on a more frequent basis that inmates 

receive basic medical services such as initial medical exams and immunizations.

Status: Resolved. 

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated 

that it will draft guidance on procedures to ensure Health Systems Specialists verify 

that medical services are provided to inmates on a more frequent basis than 

biannually.

OIG Analysis: The BOP’s actions are responsive to the recommendation. 

By October 31, 2016, please provide copies of guidance on procedures to ensure 

Health Systems Specialists verify that medical services are provided to inmates on 

a more frequent basis.

Recommendation 3: Ensure that correctional services observation steps 

address vital functions related to the contract, including periodic validation of actual 

Correctional Officer staffing levels based on the approved staffing plan.
79

Status: Resolved. 

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated

that it will draft guidance on procedures to ensure periodic validation of actual 

Correctional Officer staffing levels based on the approved staffing plan to determine 

whether the contractor is meeting the required staffing levels.

OIG Analysis: The BOP’s actions are responsive to the recommendation. 

By October 31, 2016, please provide copies of guidance on procedures to ensure 

periodic validation of actual Correctional Officer staffing levels based on the 

approved staffing plan to determine whether the contractor is meeting the required 

staffing levels.

Recommendation 4: Reevaluate the checklist and review it on a regular 

basis with input from subject matter experts to ensure that observation steps 

reflect the most important activities for contract compliance and that monitoring 

and documentation requirements and expectations are clear, including for 

observation steps requiring monitors to engage in trend analysis.

Status: Resolved. 

BOP Response: The BOP concurred with the recommendation and stated

that a work group, to include subject matter experts, will convene annually to 

ensure appropriate trend analysis and updates to the checklist.

OIG Analysis: The BOP’s actions are responsive to the recommendation. 

By October 31, 2016, please provide a list of the selected subject matter experts; a 

schedule of planned work group meetings; copies of meeting agenda for each work 

group meeting held by October 31, 2016; copies of BOP data or other information 

the subject matter experts considered to ensure appropriate trend analysis; and 

documentation of any recommended updates to the checklist, if necessary.
80

The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General 

(DOJ OIG) is a statutorily created independent entity 

whose mission is to detect and deter waste, fraud, 

abuse, and misconduct in the Department of Justice, and 

to promote economy and efficiency in the Department’s 

operations. Information may be reported to the DOJ 

OIG’s hotline at www.justice.gov/oig/hotline or 

(800) 869-4499.

Office of the Inspector General

U.S. Department of Justice

www.justice.gov/oig