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HomeThe Secretary of StateRemarks & Releases...Marking Fifteen Years Since Russia’s Invasion and Occupation of Georgia

# 									Marking Fifteen Years Since Russia’s Invasion and Occupation of Georgia							

Press Statement

Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

August 7, 2023

Fifteen years ago, Russia invaded the sovereign nation of Georgia and occupied 20 percent of its territory.  The United States remains steadfast in our support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders.  The lives of the conflict-affected populations have forever been altered by Russia’s actions.  With deepest respect and heartfelt sympathy, we remember those killed, injured, and displaced by Russia’s forces.

Russia’s actions during its occupation, including the Kremlin’s malign disinformation campaigns, so-called “borderization,” and mass displacement still cause untold hardships.  As in Ukraine, the people of Georgia have suffered the consequences of Russia’s contempt for international law and desire to dominate its neighbors.

The United States remains determined to hold Russia accountable for its obligation under the 2008 six-point ceasefire agreement to withdraw its forces to pre-conflict positions and allow unimpeded access for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.  Russia must also reverse its recognition of the so-called independence of Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions.  These actions are essential for hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people to be able to return to their homes safely and live with dignity.

After fifteen years, the United States remains unwavering in our support for the people of Georgia and for their overwhelming desire for Euro-Atlantic integration, as they defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity, and seek a peaceful solution to the conflict.

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#### Randell Wayne WILKEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 80-199.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 24, 1981.

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Bruce Zeidel, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Ondina Felipe, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed on the authority of *Aiken v. State,*390 So.2d 1186 (Fla.1980).

LETTS, C. J., and ANSTEAD and MOORE, JJ., concur.
I

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 3554

To authorize immediate haying and grazing during 1996 on certain lands

enrolled in the conservation reserve program in the State of Tennessee.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 30, 1996

Mr. BRYANT of Tennessee (for himself, Mr. TANNER, Mr. HILLEARY, Mr.

CLEMENT, Mr. DUNCAN, and Mr. WAMP) introduced the following bill;

which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture

A BILL

To authorize immediate haying and grazing during 1996

on certain lands enrolled in the conservation reserve program in the State of Tennessee.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. EMERGENCY HAYING AND GRAZING ON CER4 TAIN CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM

5 ACREAGE IN TENNESSEE.

6 (a) HAYING AND GRAZING AUTHORIZED.—Notwith7 standing section 1232(a)(7) of the Food Security Act of

8 1985 (16 U.S.C. 3832(a)(7)), the owner or operator of
2

•HR 3554 IH

1 a farm or ranch located in the State of Tennessee may

2 hay and graze land that—

3 (1) is part of that farm or ranch;

4 (2) is enrolled in the conservation reserve estab5 lished under subchapter B of chapter 1 of subtitle

6 D of title XII of such Act (16 U.S.C. 3831 et seq.);

7 and

8 (3) is designated as conservation practice 1

9 land.

10 (b) EFFECTIVE PERIOD.—Subsection (a) shall be ef11 fective during the period beginning on the date of the en12 actment of this Act and ending on September 30, 1996.

Æ
#### MICHAEL F. MANGAN, ADMINISTRATOR OF MARY E. PILLOW, DECEASED, v. THE UNITED STATES.

[54 C. Cls., 207 ; 254 U. S., 494.]

Judgment- was rendered in favor of the United States in the court below. On appeal the judgment was affirmed, and the Supreme Court decided:

To establish a claim under Judicial Code, section 162. to the proceeds of property seized by the Government under the abandoned property act of March 12, 1863, the claimant must prove his ownership at the time of seizure.

Mr. Justice Clakke

delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court January 3, 1921.
IB

Union Calendar No. 400

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 3553

[Report No. 104–754]

To amend the Federal Trade Commission Act to authorize appropriations

for the Federal Trade Commission.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 30, 1996

Mr. OXLEY (for himself and Mr. MANTON) introduced the following bill; which

was referred to the Committee on Commerce

AUGUST 2, 1996

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union

and ordered to be printed

A BILL

To amend the Federal Trade Commission Act to authorize

appropriations for the Federal Trade Commission.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Federal Trade Com5 mission Reauthorization Act of 1996’’.
2

•HR 3553 RH

1 SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION.

2 Section 25 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15

3 U.S.C. 57c) is amended by striking ‘‘and not to exceed’’

4 and inserting ‘‘not to exceed’’ and by inserting before the

5 period the following: ‘‘; not to exceed $107,000,000 for

6 fiscal year 1997; and not to exceed $111,000,000 for fiscal

7 year 1998’’.
Union Calendar No. 400

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 3553

[Report No. 104–754]

A BILL

To amend the Federal Trade Commission Act to

Commission.authorize appropriations for the Federal Trade

AUGUST 2, 1996

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the

State of the Union and ordered to be printed
§ 435.227 Optional eligibility for individuals under age 21 who are under State adoption assistance agreements. ( a ) *Basis.* This section implements section 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(VIII) of the Act.
( b ) *Eligibility.* The agency may provide Medicaid to individuals under age 21 (or, at State option, under age 20, 19, or 18): ( 1 ) For whom an adoption assistance agreement (other than an agreement under title IV-E of the Act) between a State and the adoptive parent(s) is in effect;
( 2 ) Who the State agency which entered into the adoption agreement determined could not be placed for adoption without Medicaid coverage because the child has special needs for medical or rehabilitative care; and
( 3 ) Who, prior to the adoption agreement being entered into— ( i ) Were eligible under the Medicaid State plan of the State with the adoption assistance agreement; or
( ii ) Had household income at or below the income standard established by the agency in its State plan in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section.
( c ) *Income standard.* The income standard established under this section may not exceed the effective income level (converted to a MAGI-equivalent standard in accordance with guidance issued by the Secretary under section 1902(e)(14)(A) and (E) of the Act) under the State plan or under a demonstration program under section 1115 of the Act as of March 23, 2010 or December 31, 2013, whichever is higher, that was applied by the State to the household income of a child prior to the execution of an adoption assistance agreement for purposes of determining eligibility of children described in paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) of this section.
( d ) *Limit Eligibility* The agency may limit eligibility under this section to children for whom the State, or another State identified in the State plan, has entered into an adoption assistance agreement.
[81 FR 86454, Nov. 30, 2016]
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                          35,914
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                 2,080
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    204,761
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                        565,348
<ALLOWANCE>                                      8,360
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 838,971
<DEPOSITS>                                     650,718
<SHORT-TERM>                                    44,854
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              4,332
<LONG-TERM>                                     73,750
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         5,213
<OTHER-SE>                                      60,104
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 838,971
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 45,052
<INTEREST-INVEST>                               12,072
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   395
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                57,519
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              24,082
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              28,559
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           28,960
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    2,636
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                               (380)
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 27,754
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  8,230
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       8,230
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     7,341
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.42
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.41
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    4.35
<LOANS-NON>                                      4,623
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                   485
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 7,274
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                    2,122
<RECOVERIES>                                       572
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                8,360
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             8,360
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0


</TABLE>
From: Garth Tayler [ mailto:gtayler@brick.com ]

Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2015 12:56 PM

To: Raymond, Gabrielle

Cc: 'Susan Miller'; Terry Schimmel

Subject: RE: Emailing: Green Brick HgTesting Results

- 032515BIA

- to EPA May 4 2015_REV150512

Dear Ms Raymond

Sorry about the confusion. Checking our labeling confirms that this sample was from our Birmingham Plant BHP. I attach the corrected spreadsheet for your attention. Regards

Dr. Garth Tayler

Technical Director Acme Brick Company Fort Worth, Texas. (817) 907 1208 (cell) (817) 8708354 (office)

<< Green Brick Testing Results

- 032515BIA

- to EPA May 4 2015_REV150512.xlsx>>

From: Raymond, Gabrielle [ mailto:graymond@rti.org ]

Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2015 11:03 AM

To: Garth Tayler

Cc: 'Susan Miller'; Terry Schimmel

Subject: RE: Emailing: Green Brick HgTesting Results

- 032515BIA

- to EPA May 4 2015_REV150512

Hello Mr. Tayler,

Thank you for providing the deposit information for all of the Acme samples. I made the correction to the Sample description for the BHP plant, thank you for catching that.

In reviewing the spreadsheet, I came across two plants that I was unsure of their location.

Are the Acme BHP and Acme

- Jenkins Pelham the same plant?

If so, does the plant have an alternate name for the location? The Acme Pelham location appears to be the site of a showroom in the Birmingham area, is it also a plant or 2 plants?Our current inventory of brick facilities only includes Acme/Jenkins facilities in Coosada, AL; Montgomery, AL; and Jordan, AL.

**Sam ple** 

**Num**

**ber Gro** 

**up Num** 

**ber Compan** 

**y Pla** 

**nt Sampl** 

**e Descri**  **ption Date**  **Sample**

**s Sent Date** 

**Data**

**Receive**

**d Hg** 

**Conte**

**nt [ppb]**  **LOI [%]**  Geolog

ic

Descri ption Age Latitude (Decimal Degrees) Longitude (Decimal Degrees)

1166

2 6087 Acme BHP BHPmi

x 12/15/2

014 2/6/2015 16.1 5.21 Clay

and

Shale Mississi ppian/P ennsylv

anian N

33.628190 W

86.409876

1066

5 5753 Acme

Jenkins Pelh

am Green

Brick 6/26/20

14 7/11/201

4 15 5.67 Clay

and

Shale Mississi ppian/P ennsylv

anian N

33.628190 W

86.409876

Thank you,

Gabrielle

Gabrielle Raymond

RTI International

3040 Cornwallis Road

P.O. Box 12194 Research Triangle Park, NC 27709

Phone: (919) 541

- 7015

----- Original Message

-----

From: Garth Tayler [mailto:gtayler@brick.com]

Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2015 4:09 PM

To: Raymond, Gabrielle <graymond@rti.org>

Cc: 'Susan Miller' <SMiller@bia.org>; Terry Schimmel <btschimmel@gmail.com>

Subject: Emailing: Green Brick HgTesting Results

- 032515BIA

- to EPA May 4 2015_REV150512

Gabrielle Herewith information on our materials you requested. The query you had on line 16: BHP....DTPMix ; the correct entry is: BHP....BHPMix.

Thanks

Dr. Garth Tayler

Technical Director Acme Brick Company Fort Worth, Texas. (817) 907 1208 (cell) (817) 8708354 (office)

<< Green Brick HgTesting Results

- 032515BIA

- to EPA May 4 2015_REV150512.xlsx>>
**Exhibit
      32.2**


**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. §1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of SpectraScience, Inc. (the “Company”) on
      Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, James Dorst, Chief
      Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as
      adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
      that:





1.
 
      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





/s/
                James DorstJames
                Dorst
              Chief
                Financial Officer
              November
                13, 2008
40798.

#### HYATT v. THE STATE.

Hall, Judge.

The defendant was convicted for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants and driving while his driver’s license was revoked. He assigns error on the overruling of his motion for new trial on the general and one special ground. On the question whether the defendant was driving the car just before his arrest there was testimony that the defendant was driving and testimony that another person was driving. The evidence, though in conflict on this and other issues, was sufficient to support the conviction.

The special ground contends that the trial court restricted the defendant’s right to be questioned by his counsel while he *352was making an unsworn statement. The ground shows that counsel elicited from the defendant the fact that at the time of the arrest and charges upon which he was tried the defendant had a pocket knife and a ease was made against him for having a concealed weapon. State’s counsel made an objection that the defendant was going into something irrelevant, but the ground does not show that the court ruled out the statements elicited from the defendant, or refused to permit counsel to ask the defendant any other questions or to permit the defendant to make any other statements offered, or took any other action adverse to the defendant. This ground is therefore without merit.

Decided September 24, 1964.

*Wyatt & Wyatt,*for plaintiff in error.

*Wilson P. Darden, Solicitor,*contra.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Bussell, J., concur.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                           1,828
<SECURITIES>                                       100
<RECEIVABLES>                                    5,857
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      2,524
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                11,496
<PP&E>                                           4,864
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  22,460
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           14,089
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         2,550
<OTHER-SE>                                      59,401
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    22,460
<SALES>                                          1,160
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 4,084
<CGS>                                            1,383
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    3,201
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 6,426
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 444
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (5,610)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (5,610)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (5,610)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.22)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.22)
        

</TABLE>
STATE OF VERMONT

ENVIRONMENTAL COURT
In re: Appeal of Russell Collins, Therese Collins, Gary Collins, and Ammie Collins } } } } } Docket No. 267

- 11

- 00 Vtec

Decision and Order
Appellants Russell and Therese Collins and Gary and Ammie Collins appealed from a decision of the Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) of the Town of Fairlee denying conditional use approval for a child

- care business in a single

- family residence. Appellants are represented by Christopher Dye, Esq.; the Town is repres ented Andrea L. Gallitano, Esq. The Court held the trial on the merits on August 15, 2001, took a site visit, and issued its findings and conclusions on the record that the permit was granted for up to 12 full

- time children, conditioned on the construction of the circular driveway as presented at trial. The Court invited the parties to file their proposed language for any additional permit conditions.
Based on the evidence and ruling at trial and the proposed conditions submitted by the parties, a conditio nal use permit is hereby granted to Appellants for the operation of a licensed family child care facility serving up to twelve full

- time children, subject to the following conditions:
1. Appellants shall construct a semi

- circular or loop driveway in the fr ont yard of the property, as shown on Exhibit 5, intended for one

- way use in connection with the licensed family child care facility.
2. All vehicles coming to the property to deliver or pick up children in connection with the licensed family child care f acility shall use the driveway by entering at the westerly access and exiting at the easterly access, as shown on Exhibit 5.
3. Appellants shall assure that no vehicle coming to the property to deliver or pick up children in connection with the licensed f amily child care facility shall back out of the driveway into the street.
Nothing about this approval or these conditions limits the personal use of the property by Appellants or their guests, unrelated to the licensed family child care facility. Any incre ase in the number of children to be served by this facility must be approved as an amendment to this approval.

Done at Barre, Vermont, this 17 th day of August, 2001.

___________________ Merideth Wright Environmental Judge
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. James DUPREES v. Frank BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 65070.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 4, 1979.

In re James Duprees, applying for writ of habeas corpus. Franklin Parish. No. 15,-909.

Denied.
#### § 493.1201 Condition: Bacteriology.

If the laboratory provides services in the subspecialty of Bacteriology, the laboratory must meet the requirements specified in §§ 493.1230 through 493.1256, § 493.1261, and §§ 493.1281 through 493.1299.
No. 99-712.

#### Anderson *v.*United States.

C. A. Armed Forces. Certiorari denied.
§ 436.110 Individuals receiving cash assistance. ( a ) A Medicaid agency must provide Medicaid to individuals receiving cash assistance under OAA, AFDC, AB, APTD, or AABD.
( b ) For purposes of this section, an individual is receiving cash assistance if his needs are considered in determining the amount of the payment. This includes an individual whose presence in the home is considered essential to the well-being of a beneficiary under the State's plan for OAA, AFDC, AB, APTD, or AABD if that plan were as broad as allowed under the Act for FFP.
#### CHATTANOOGA BOILER AND TANK COMPANY, Appellant, v. William RITTENBERRY and Monsanto Corp. and Monsanto Textiles Company, Appellees.

No. KK-211.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Feb. 9, 1979.

Robert D. Bell, of Fisher, Bell, Hahn, Winn & Rubel, Pensacola, for appellant.

J. Nixon Daniel, III, of Beggs & Lane, Pensacola, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm the judgment notwithstanding verdict entered in favor of Monsanto, the employer of Rittenberry, following the entry of a verdict in favor of the third party tortfeasor, Chattanooga, on its claim for indemnity against Monsanto. Chattanooga had alleged Monsanto was actively negligent in causing certain injuries suffered by its employee, Rittenberry, during the course of employment, while Chattanooga was only passively negligent. There can be no claim for indemnity, under the circumstances, by a third party tortfeasor against an injured party’s employer. *Seaboard Coast Line R. Co. v. Smith,*359 So.2d 427 (Fla.1978).

The judgment notwithstanding verdict is AFFIRMED.

MILLS, Acting C. J., and ERVIN, J., concur.

BOOTH, J., specially concurring.

BOOTH, Judge,

specially concurring.

The facts here do not bring cause within the rule of *Home Indemnity v. Edwards,*360 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) and cases cited therein, therefore, I concur.
§ 456.501 UR plans as a condition for FFP. ( a ) Except when waived under §§ 456.505 through 456.508, FFP is not available in expenditures for Medicaid services furnished by a hospital or mental hospital unless the facility has in effect a UR plan that meets the utilization review requirements for Medicare under section 1861(k) of the Act.
( b ) A facility that participates in Medicare and Medicaid must use the same UR standards and procedures and review committee for Medicaid as it uses for Medicare.
( c ) A facility that does not participate in Medicare must meet the UR plan requirements in subpart C or D of this part, which are equivalent to the Medicare UR plan requirements in §§ 405.1137, 482.30, and 482.60 of this chapter.
[43 FR 45266, Sept. 29, 1978, as amended at 51 FR 22042, June 17, 1986; 61 FR 38399, July 24, 1996]
#### Jimmy Lee JEFFERY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 75-634.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Sept. 10, 1975.

PER CURTAM.

Appeal quashed.