2015 IL App (1st) 132631 FIRST DIVISION APRIL 27, 2015 No. 1-13-2631 MARILYN KAYMAN , ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of P laintiff -Appellant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 10 L 14429 ) JANICE MATTHEWS RASHEED , ) Honorable ) Lynn M. Egan, Defendant -Appellee. ) Judge Presiding. JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM deli vered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Connors concurred in the judgment and opinion. O PINI ON ¶ 1 Following a jury verdict in the circuit court of Cook County awarding her zero damages for future pain or medical treatment, p laintiff

- appellant Marilyn Kayman appeals from various evidentiary rulings and contends that the jury's verdict was against th e manifest weight of the evidence. ¶ 2 BACKGROUND ¶ 3 This case arises from a motor vehicle col lision on January 30, 2009 , in which Kayman's vehicle was was struck from behin d by a vehicle driven by defendant

- appellee Janice Matthews Rasheed. Kayman went to an emergency room at Hinsdale Hospital shortly after the accident but was discharged on the same day. Due to persistent neck pain and other symptoms, Kayman

v isited her family physician , Dr. John Conroy, on Feb r uary 4, 2009. She was subsequently referred by Dr. Conroy to Hinsdale Orthoped ics, where she was treated b etween 2009 and 2012

. At the recommendation of Hinsdale Orthopedics, Kayman underwent phy sical therapy and was also prescribed medical devices to use at home to help alleviate her pain

.1-13-2631

2 ¶ 4 Kayman sued Rasheed , claiming that the accident had caused her neck and back pain, headaches, and other symptoms. Rasheed admitted negligenc e in s triking Kayman's vehicle , but disputed the extent to which the 2009 collision caused Kayman's alleged injuries

. In Kay man's pretrial dep osition, she denied any problem with neck or back pain prior to the January 2009 collision

. 1 However, medical records revealed that Kayman had com pl ained of neck and back pain in January 2005 and May 2006 and underwent an MRI in 2006 as a result of these complaints. In March 2012, Rasheed's counsel deposed Dr. Conr oy . Although he had not bee n Kayman's physician at the time of these prior complaints , Dr. Conroy was shown med i cal records corresponding to Kayman's 2005-06 neck and back pain complaints and testified regarding these records

. ¶ 5 On October 16, 2012, the trial court agreed to continue the previously scheduled trial date in order to allow Kaym an more time to complete her discovery obligations, including her disclosu re of trial witnesses pursuant to Illinois Supreme Cour t Ru le 213(f). Ill. S. Ct. R. 213(f) (eff. July 1, 2002). The court subsequently explained that it granted the continuance ou t of a "desire to proceed to a trial on the merits rather than precluding plaintiff from presenting certain claims because of discovery violations." ¶ 6 Trial was continued to February 11, 2013. On that date, the court heard argument on various motions in li mine

. Among these motions, Rasheed moved to bar Kayman from presenting a "day

- in

- the

- lif e" video which purported to show Kayman demonstrating her
presc ribed daily exercise routine and equipment she used to treat her injuries

. Rasheed

1 The actual deposition was not made part of the appellate record, but Kayman does not dispute that her deposition testimony denied prior neck or back p ain.1-13-2631

3 complained that the video was untime ly and cumulative . Kayman acknowledge d the vide o had not been disclosed until about two week s earlier , but argued it was created recently so as to accurately reflect Kayman's exerci se routine as of the time of trial. ¶ 7 The trial court barred the video as untimely , not ing the trial had been continued in October 2012 "solely because of plaintiff's failure to comply with discovery request s." The trial court remarked that "d ay - in

- the life films need to be disclosed like any other piece of evide nc e and the issue comes down to whether the disclosure is ti mely ." Although the court acknowledged t he desire to demonstrate Kayman's current routine, it nonetheless found disclosure w a s untimely , especiall y as the trial date had been continued due to Kay man's lack of compliance with discovery. Thus the court granted Rasheed's motion to bar the video. ¶ 8 In another motion , Rasheed argued that Kaym a n should be barred from seeking damages for lost wages related t o time spent attending physical therapy sessions . Rasheed argued that Kayman had admitted she was a salaried employee , that her employer did not penalize her for goi ng to physical therapy sessions, and thus she " didn't suffer any kind of w age loss." Kayman 's counsel acknowledged "s he was on a salary, she didn't lose her money" but that "she took off time from work during the workday to go get physical therapy." In response to the trial court's questions, Kayman 's counsel confirmed that she did not have to use vacati on time or sick time but argued she suffered " not a loss of income " but a " loss of time ." The court granted the moti on to preclude the claim, finding there was no compensable loss in income or benefits. ¶ 9 During the same argument, Kayman raised the issue of whether, with respect to Kayman's emergency room rec ords , " the Court will allow [counsel] in closing argument to read from those records if a witness has not specifically be en testifying about those records ." The1-13-2631

4 court responded that if Rasheed stipulated that these were business records, " they would be admitted and you can comment in closing argument on all ad mitted evidence and the reasonable inferences the refrom." However, t he cou rt further stated that "[m] erely because something is admitted as an exhibit doesn’t mean it goes back to the jury room." Rasheed's counsel stipulated on the record that the emergency room records were business records, but stated "we're obviously objectin g as to those records being read into evid e nce. " ¶ 10 In another motion in limine, Rashee d sought to preclude admission of a photograph showing significant damage to the front of Rasheed's car from the impact with Kayman's vehicle. Kayman argued the photo should be admitted to show that "it w as a very serious accident" and to demonstrate the severity of Kayman's injuries

. Further, a s Rasheed had testified i n her deposition that her vehicle was only traveling at a speed of five miles per hour at the time of impact, Kayman argued the photograph was also admissible as impeachment evidence

. ¶ 11 The court held that the photograph of the vehicle damage would not be admissible for the purpose of demonstra ting the severity of Kayman's injuries, as it was "beyond the kin [ sic ] of the average juror to correlate it to a particular type of physical injury." However, the court held the photograph would be admissible "to impeach def endant's testimony that th e accident occurred when the vehicles were traveling 5 miles per hour," finding that the average juror would understand that th e damage shown was "far in excess of what one typi cally sees with a vehicle traveling 5 miles per hour." The court emphasized the photograph was for impeachment
purp oses only on the issue of speed but not to be argued as evidence of the nature of Kayman's injuries.1-13-2631

5 ¶ 12 The trial court also heard argument reg arding the admissibility of the portions of Dr. Co nroy 's depositi on referencing Kayman's 2005 -06 pre - accident complaints of back and neck pain. Kayman ar gued that since Rasheed failed to offer any expert wi tness testimony suggesting any relationship between the prior complaints and Kayman's current symptoms, the evidence of prior injury was inadmissible. Rasheed countered that, in light of Kayman's deposition testimony denying prior neck or back problems , the excerpts from Dr. Conroy's deposition were adm issible for impeachment purposes. ¶ 13 The court recognized that Rasheed had not laid a fo undation for the 2005

- 06 complaints to be admitted as substantive evidence , but agreed that "because [Kayman] denied under oath ever having those complaints, it is proper for impeachment purposes. " The court specified that
Dr. Conroy's deposition could be admissible "for impeachment use only, and it's impeachment on [Kayman's] credibility." The court explained that Kayman had to "pick her poison" in deciding whether she w ould acknowledge the prior complaints in her trial testimony : Kayman could avoid introduction of Dr. Conroy's deposition if she acknowledged the 2005 -06 complaints on direct examina tion, but the co urt cautioned that her acknowledgement of prior complaints would also "open herself up to be asked about it" on cross- examination

. ¶ 14 The case proceeded to trial on February 14, 2013. Kayman first called Rasheed to testify as an adverse witness. Rasheed acknowledged that h er v ehicle rear

- ended Kayman's but testifi ed that she did not recall the speed of her vehicle at the time. In response to counsel's question as to whether she " agree [d] tha t [her] car was not traveling 5 miles an hour at the time of the impact ," Rasheed answered that she did not remember. Kayman 's counsel also asked Rasheed to quantify the impact of the collision :1-13-2631

6 " Q. Now, ma'am, you would agr ee that the impact between

your car and Ms. Kayman's car was significant?
A. Yes. Q. You would agree that the impact to your car – from your car to her car was heavy? A. When you say – Can you give me a scale? Like *** Q. Sure. On a scale of one to ten, one being a light tap and ten being a very strong impact, you would agree that it's much closer to ten? A. I would have to say I know it's nowhere near one or two

o r three, but I can't really remember how much stronger it was than that."
After this testimony , Kayman 's counsel attempted to introduce the photograph of the damage to Rasheed's car , but was stopped by the court. ¶ 15 Kayman's next wit ness was Dr. Marie Kirincic, a physician employed by Hinsdale Orthopedics specializing in reha bi litation and pain management. Dr. Kirincic stated she had first treated Kayman in November 2010 for neck pain, numbness, and tingling, and she opined that it was more likely true than not that the source of Kayman's pain was the vehicle collision. ¶ 16 Dr. Kirincic acknowledged that Kayman went to the emergency room on the day of the accident and followed up on a later date with Dr. Conroy. However, she offered no testimony regarding th e findings of those visits. Dr. Kirincic also explained that Kayman had previously been treated by another physician at H insdale Orthopedics, Dr. Mark A. Lorenz, in February1-13-2631

7 2009 . With the aid of Dr. Lorenz's no tes, Dr. Kirincic ex plained that an exam at that time revealed "moderate degenerative changes" at the bas e of Kayman's neck

. Dr. Kirincic t estified that the degenerative condition "pr obably" made her more susceptible to injury at the time of the vehicle accident and that the degenerative condition was "probably " aggravated by the accident. ¶ 17 Dr. Kirincic further testified that since Novemb e r 2010 she had treated Kayman for pain in her neck and upper back, muscle spasms , and numbness and tingling in her extremities. She testifi ed that "every few mont hs" in 2011 she had given Kayman "trigger point injections" to relieve muscle tightness in her shoulders and neck. Dr. Kirincic also instructed Kayman to use a

“ TENS unit, " an electronic device using ele ctrodes to relieve muscle spa s ms . She also testified that Kayman underwent physical therapy and acupuncture and had since continued to attend
p hysical therapy and perform related home exercises. Dr. Kirincic testified that throughout 2012 she continued to treat Kayman for chronic pain in her neck and back of the head, muscle spasms, and headaches . Dr. Kirincic opined that these symptoms more likely than not were caused by the January 2009 vehicle collision

. ¶ 18 When a sked about Kayma n's most recent visit in Febr uary 2013, which was jus t before trial, Dr. Kirincic stated t here had been a "little progress with her pain, but it’s still there." When

as ked for her opinion regarding whether Kayman will "ever completely get ri d of the muscle
spasm ," Dr. Kirinci c testified : "Probably not. She might still have this chronic myofa s cial pain with better days and worse days, and she will learn to cope with it and — and know what to do with certain bad flare -ups." Thus, Dr. Kirincic agreed this was a "permanent" condition. ¶ 19 Regarding future treatmen t, Dr. Kirincic opined that Kayman would probably need "at least quarterly or half -a- year visits for med ic ation refills and maybe physical therapy on1-13-2631

8 occasions." She also testified that Kayman " might nee d occasionally some trigg er point injections," al thou gh acknowledged the frequency was "hard to predict." Likewise, Dr. Kirincic testified that Kayman might need additional cours es of physical therapy in case of a n occasional

" flare -up," and that Kayman would remain on muscle and nerve medications. ¶ 20 Kayman's counsel asked Dr. Kirinci c if she expected that the cos t of Kayman ' s treatment s (including physical therapy, injections , and doctor's visits ) to remain the same in the future. Dr. Kirincic responded: "We don't know what will happen next year, but right n ow [they] probably
won't change." Asked for her opinion as to whether Kayman's pain would continue, Dr. Kirincic responded: "It's a lready fluctuating between minimal and sever e, so she has wide ranges, but
ye s." Notably, Dr. Kirincic was not asked to provide, and did not offer, any specific figures or estimates for the expected costs of Kayman's treatment. ¶ 21 On cross

- examination , Dr. Kirincic admitted that Kayman did not come to see her until November 2010, over a year and a half a fter the January 2009 vehi cle collision . Dr. Kirincic also acknowledged that s he had never reviewed the records from Kayman's emergency room visit on the date of the accident, nor had she reviewed the records from Dr. Conroy, Kayman's primary physician. Dr. Kirinci c also admitted that she did not have any medical records for Kayman that predated January 2009. ¶ 22 When asked about records f rom Kayman's February 2009 visit to Dr. L orenz , Dr. Kirincic agreed that an X- ray had indicated spondylosis, or degenerative changes in the spine

. She acknowledged that this condition was part of the natural aging process and that such degenerative changes could not have been related to the accident because they take several y ears to develop. She also a cknowledged tha t records from Kayman ' s April 200 9 visit with Dr. Lorenz1-13-2631

9 reflected that Ka y man had no complaints of neck pain and that Dr. Lorenz had recorded that Kayman's whiplash had "resolved." Dr. Kirinci c agreed that such i njuries typically "resolve within f our to six weeks," and that some pati en ts can recover from such injuries, even with underlying degenerative spin al changes. She likewise acknowledged that September 2009 notes from Dr. Lorenz found Kayman ' s mobility was much improved and that her numbness or tingling had subsided. Dr. Kirinci c also agreed that Kayman had a diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome which was unrelated to the accident and which could also be a cause of numbness and tingling in her fingers. ¶ 23 Dr. Kirincic admitted the possibility that pre

- existing degenerative changes in Kayman's spine could be causing some of Kayman 's pain , regardless of the vehicle accident. She agreed that there were many possible causes of muscle pain or spa s ms , including lack of sleep or stress, and that Kayman had in fact reported stress. Dr. K irincic also acknowledged that Kayman had not reported her 2006 MRI when she first saw her for treatment

. Dr. Kirin c ic also confirmed that she had not instructed Kayman to restrict her phy sical activities , and she testified that Kayman was working and was a member of a health club

. ¶ 24 On redirect exam ination , in referen ce to Dr. Lorenz's April 2009 note that Kayman had

" resolved " her whiplash, Dr. Kirincic acknowledged that such symptoms could return

. Dr. Kirincic reiterated her opinion that, although it was possible that a degenerative condition caused Kayman’s symptoms, she believed it was more likely than not that her pain was caused by the 2009 accident. ¶ 25 On re

- cross - examination , Rasheed ' s counsel asked D r. Kirincic if it was likely "that any injury she suffered in his accident was merely a temporary aggravation of her underlying1-13-2631

10 degenerated conditio n and was then resolved" in April 2009. Dr. Kirincic answered : "It's hard to say, but it ' s possible that most of her symptoms resolved at that tim e, and then she had another flare

- up later." No other medical witness was called by either party. ¶ 26 Kayman testified on February 14, 2013. She recalled that on the day of the accident, after exchanging contact in formation with Rasheed and speaking with a police offic er, she initially declined medical treatment and went home. However , later that day she experienced neck pain, headache and nausea. She went to the emergency room at Hinsdal e Hospital, where
X- ra y s were taken , she spoke with a doctor, and was discharged. ¶ 27 Kayman testified that her pain worsened and she saw her family physician , Dr. Co nroy,

on Feb r uary 4 , 2009. Dr. Conroy referred her to Dr. Lor enz , who in turn prescribed pain medi c ation and physical therapy. She began going to physical ther apy two to thr ee times a week and testified that her physical therapists had instructed her to do daily exercises with a foam tube, pilates ring, and other devices, which she continued to use regularly. ¶ 28 Kayman t esti fied that her physical therapy and medication helped to alleviate, bu t did not eliminate, her neck pain and headaches

. She a cknowledged that she had improved somewhat as of April 2009, following her firs t course of physical therapy sessi ons , b ut that her symptoms worsened, leading her to return to Dr. Lorenz in September 2009. After a second round of phys ical therapy, Kayman testifie d she was referred to Dr. Kirincic for more specialized pain management b ecau se it was "the next best course of treatment" other than surgery. Kayman testified that on a number o f visits, Dr

. Kirincic administered trigger point injection s that temporarily relieved her neck pain, but the relief lasted for only about two weeks after each visit.1-13-2631

11 ¶ 29 Kayman testified that each night she used a TENS unit , prescribed by Dr. Kirincic , whic h she described as a device with electrodes that stimulate d her ne ck muscles and helped her sleep

. She also testified that each day she uses a home traction machine and continues to follow a routine of daily home exercises. Apart from her doctor's visits , Kayman testified she had attended about 40 physical therapy sessions last ing about one hour each. Kayman testified that she did not miss full work days to attend physical therapy, but would eithe r go to session s before work or that during the work day s he would leave for physical therapy and return to work after each session. ¶ 30 Also on Kayman 's direct exam, she acknowledged that in 2005 and 2006 she had episodes of pain in her back which had prompted her to visit h er family physician. She recalled that in 2005 she experienced back pain "b etween my shoulder blades" for three to six days after carrying a laptop computer on her shoulder. In 2006, she again had back pain in the same area for approximately two weeks ; she recalled this injury occurred after "s training with the gardening, carrying flats of flowers

. " Kayman testified that she took over -the-counter drugs and her symptoms resolved. She testified that she did not receive any medical attention for back pain between May 20 06 and the vehicle acciden t in January 2009. ¶ 31 Regarding her current symptoms, Kayman t estified that she suffers from daily headaches , as well as " pain emanating from my cervical areas of my spine. " She testified that pain interfere s with her ability to travel, made driving more dif ficult, and prevented her from participating in recreational activities such as tennis . She testified that she continues to take daily pa in medications and uses the TENS unit and traction machine each day

. Notably, the appellate1-13-2631

12 record d oes not contain a transcript of the cross

- examination of Kayman, and the parties' briefs do not describe the contents of such testimony. ¶ 32 On February 19, 2013, outside the presence of the jury, th e court heard argument from counsel regarding the proposed content of their up coming closing argument s. In particular, Kayman's counsel sought to display a number of enlarged, poster

- sized copies of pages from medical records of Kayman 's emergency room visit , as well as records of certain visits to Dr. Lorenz and Dr. Kirincic

. Kay man a rgued that , to the extent such records had been admitted into evidence as business records , she had the right to use them during closing argument. Rasheed objected , and t he court proceeded to review each record at issue

. ¶ 33 With respect to the emergen cy room records, the court noted that the jury had not heard any details about Kayman's t reatment at the emergency room

. T he court expressed concern that the records included discharge instructions, as well as diagnoses and specific medications . As no wi tness had offered testimony on these topics, the court su s tained the objection. Kayman ' s counsel insisted that he could "use documents that wer e admitte d in evidence i n closing argument." The court replied that it was "inappropriate" to use " selected pie ces of records, whic h *** have been admitted into evidence but no one's ever spoken about them." The court explained it would bar the records during closing argument because "the opportunity and risk of confu sing the jury is great," noting that counsel "h ad an opportunity to elicit t estimony from medically

- traine d persons about these documents " but had failed to do so. As no witness had discussed the documents, the court reasoned, "t o now simply read them or read selected portions of them *** does create the risk that a jury is going to misunderstand what is contained therein."1-13-2631

13 ¶ 34 Rasheed similarly objected to Ka yman ' s request to display medical records from Kayman’s visit to Dr. Conroy on February 4, 2009

. The court sustained the objection , noting that, a lthough Dr. Conr oy had been deposed, the parties had "made a strategic decision not to utilize any portion of t hat evidence deposition so no juror has heard abou t this care and treatment of plaintiff with any specificity." The cour t found that use of these records in closing was "fraught with problems" as they included " many things that have never been talked ab out and could confuse the jury, " such as specific medications prescribed to Kayman. ¶ 35 Similarly , the court barred Kayman from displaying notes from a February 2009 visit to
Dr. Lorenz that contained " specific findin gs that have never been mentioned by any witness ." Although Kayman argued that Dr. Kirincic had already testifie d regarding Dr. Lorenz’s findings , the court found that the actual record wa s " fraught with a ll sorts of information that the jury has never heard anything about." The court similarly held that Dr. Lorenz's records of visits in September 2009 and September 2010 would not be displayed because they contained findings and opinions that had not been discussed during trial testimony. Although the cour t recognize d that Dr. Kirincic had testified that she reviewed c ertain of the records in forming her opinions , the court determined this did not necessarily mean that they could be published to the jury during closing argument. ¶ 36 With respect to the contents of Rasheed's closing argument , Kayman objecte d to Rasheed’s proposed use of a slide presentat ion that included bullet -point references to particular findings in the medical records , incl uding a reference to the April 2009 record from Dr. Lorenz reporting that Kayman's whip lash had "resolved." The co urt permitt ed such references, reasoning that such findings had been introduced as substantive evidence through Dr . Kirincic's1-13-2631

14 testimony and that Kayman had not objected

. Kayman's counsel complained that allowing Rasheed to reference such records was unfair since the court had disallowed her from displaying medical records in her closing argument . The court responded that although Rasheed ' s
p resentation was " simply hi ghlighting four bullet point entries " of documents that had been specifically discussed in Dr. Kirincic's testimony, Kayman had sought to display entire pages of medical records, including " medical diagnoses that were never put be fore this jury, " which created " lots of opportunities to confuse the jury." ¶ 37 After overruling Kayman's objection to Rasheed 's references to medical records, the parties gave closing arguments. Rasheed's counsel argued that the medical r ecords showed that plaintiff had made a "full recovery" by April o f 2009 and asked that the jury, at most, award the amount of medical expenses only through that date

. Rasheed’s counsel also noted that Kayman had not disclosed her 2006 MRI for back pain to either Dr. Loren z or Dr. Kirincic when they treated her

. A transcript of Kayman's closing argument was not included in the appellate record. ¶ 38 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Kayman in the total amount of $13,244. The
verdict form reflected tha t the jur y awarded $ 900 for past pain and suffering and $12,344 for medical expenses incurred . The jury did not award damages for past or future disability, expected future pain and suffering , or future medical expenses

. The court entered judgment o n the verdict on February 19 , 2013. ¶ 39 Kayman filed a motion for new trial which asserted several errors, including the claim that the trial court abused its disc retion in precluding her use of medical records in her closing argument. Kayman argued that the preclusion of these docum ents was prejudicial because they1-13-2631

15 supported her theory of ca usation , and she argued that the court had unfairly allowed Rasheed's closing argument to refer to medical records while not allowing Kayman to do the same. ¶ 40 Separately, Kayman asserted erro r in the trial court's ruling that evidence of her prior injury, as described in Dr. Conroy's deposition, would be admissible for impeachment purposes

. Kayman argued that pursuant to Voykin v. Estate of DeBoer , 192 Ill. 2d 49 (200 0 ), the evidence should have b een barred because Rasheed had not provided an " expert witnes s to testify that the prior pain, injury or treatment had any rel evance to the case ." Kayman additionally asserted error in the court's decision barring her wage

- loss claim, as she "suffered a l oss of her time" due to her visits to physical therapy appointments. ¶ 41 Kayman's motion for new trial also asserted that the court erred in precluding admission of the photograph of damage to Rasheed's vehicle, which Kayman argued could be admitted either " to corroborate that the P laintiff was injured" or as impeac hment of Rasheed's trial testimony that she did not remember the speed at the time of impact

. Kayman's motion also asserted error with respect to the c ourt's decision to bar her from i ntroducing a day

- in -the- life video, arguing that its "disclosure immediately before trial is no[t] prejudicial." ¶ 42 With respect to the jury verdict, Kayman argued tha t the f ailure to awa r d damages for future pain , future medical expenses, and future disability was again st the manifest weight of the evidence in light of Dr. Kirinci c 's testimony . Kayman argued tha t the cumulative effect of these

errors was to deny pl aintiff a fair trial, entitling her to a new trial. ¶ 43 The c ourt denied Kayman's motion for a new trial on Jul y 22, 2013. With respect to the use of medic al records in closing argument, the court noted that the question of admissibility is distinct from w hether evidence "can or should be published to the jury." The court emphasized1-13-2631

16 that Dr. Kir incic never commen ted on either the emergency room records or records from Dr. Conro y. Although the court a cknowledged that Dr. Kirincic had commented on Dr. Lorenz 's records at tria l, the court noted that Kayman's counsel d id not isolate particular findings but sought to " present the records in their entire ty ." The court reasoned that it had discretion not to allow med ical records that are too complex for the jury to under stand and found the records at issue "clearly contained information that the jury could not underst an d on i ts own," such as "post- treatment instructions and medical terminology never discusse d before the jury." Although the court acknowledged it ha d permitted Rasheed's counsel to reference certain portions of Dr. Lorenz's records, the court explained tha t "defendant's exhibit, unlike plaintiff ' s, highlighted those sections into four bullet points without referring to any extraneous information," whereas Kayman sought to display entire pages to the jury. ¶ 44 Regarding the evidence of prior injury contained in Dr. Conroy's deposition, the court recognized that Voykin gene rally requires a defendant to elicit expert evidence demonstrating why the prior injury is relevant . However, the trial court explained that in this case "Dr. Conroy's testimony was admitted be cau s e Dr. Kirincic opined that plaintiff's accident aggravated
a p reexisting degenerative condition in her neck." The trial court found the situation was similar

to Felber v. London , 346 Ill. App. 3d 188 (2004) , which held that a treating physician's test imony about the effec ts of an accident on a preexisting condition obviated the need for additional expert testimony t o admit evidence of the prior condition. ¶ 45 Regarding Kayman's attempt to present a wage

- loss claim for time spent at physical therapy sessi ons , the court emphasized that "plaintiff admitted during trial that she did not lose1-13-2631

17 any wages or benefits as a result of her injuries" and the "wage

- loss claim was properly disallowed because she failed to demonstrate any compensable loss." ¶ 46 With respect to the photograph of damage to Rasheed's vehicle, the court reasoned that the average juror "without expert assistance lacks the knowledge necessary to correlate the damage depicted in the photograph with the specific neck and ba c k injuries a lleged by plai ntiff."
T he court acknowledged its pretrial ruling that the photograp h could impeach Rasheed's testimon y regarding the speed at impact, but found that "plaintiff's counsel failed to elicit any testimony regarding the nature of the impact" from Rasheed. ¶ 47 T he court also rejected Kayman's contention that it erred in barring her day- in

- the life video. The court reasoned that it was inappropriate to admit the video "disclosed only two weeks befor e the trial date that was expressly ex tended due to plaintiff's e arlier dis covery failures." The

court no ted that day

- in -the- life videos "do not constitute substantive evidence" but stated "this does not mean such vid eos can be disclosed at any time before trial." ¶ 48 Finally, the trial court rejected Ka yman's argument th at the jury's failure to award damages for future medical treatment was again st the weight of the evidence . The court stated that "the jury had no ob ligation to accept Dr. K irincic's testimony" and that the jurors " may have discounted Dr. Kirincic's testi mony for a number of reasons." The court reasoned it would not "usurp the jury's role as fact finder by second guessing their damage award." ¶ 49 Kayman filed a timely noti ce of appe al on August 14, 2013, within 30 days of the denial of her posttrial motion. Thus, we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a). Il l. S. Ct. R. 303(a) (eff. May 30, 2008).1-13-2631

18 ¶ 50 ANALYSIS ¶ 51 Kayman's appeal reiterates many of the alleged errors discussed in her motion for new trial, namely: (1) that the trial court should not have barred Kayman from presenting certain medical records to the jury during closing arguments ; (2) that the trial court erred in ruling that evi dence of Kayman's prior injury wo uld be admissible as impeachment evidence ; (3) that the court erred in barring Kayman's use of the photograph of vehicle damage ; (4) that the trial court erred in barring Kayman's presentation of a day- in -the- life video; and (5) that the court erred in barrin g a wage - loss claim bas ed on Kayman's physical therapy appointments . Kayman a lso reiterates her contention that the jury verdict was against the ma nifest weight of the evidence and urges that the cumulative e ffect of the alleged errors denied her a fair t rial. ¶ 52 We fi rst discuss the trial court's rulings precluding Kayman from displ aying certain medical records to the jury during closing arguments. The deferential abuse of discretion standard of review applies : "The scope of closing argument is within the s ound discretion of the trial court an d the reviewing court will reverse only if the argument is prejudicial." (Internal quotation marks omitted .) Drakeford v. Universit y of Chicago Hospitals , 2013 IL App (1st ) 111366, ¶ 50. ¶ 53 Kayman relies largely on the fact that the parties had stipulated that the records at issue were business records, yet "[t] he court later prevented [her] fr om using th ose very same records during closing argument." Kayman argues on appeal that although the trial court made "the disti nction between admitting the records and publishing them to the jury, the court fails to justify why the records could not be commented on during closing, other than the possib ility of confusing the jury."1-13-2631

19 ¶ 54 Kayman's argument is unavailing, as t he trial c ourt has discretion to preclude admission or publication o f evidence to prevent jury confusion. "Even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by such factors as prejudice, confusion, or potential to mislead the jury." Gi l l v

. Foster , 157 Ill. 2d 304, 313 (1993); s ee also Werner v. Nebal , 377 Ill. App. 3d 447, 454 (2007) ( "[E]ven if evidence is arguably relevant, the trial court
may still exclude the evidence if it would confuse *** the jury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) ). This is certainly the case with medical records containing terminology unfamiliar to

a lay jury. See Troyan v. Reyes , 367 Ill. App. 3d 729, 736 (2006) ( "Like all business reco rds, medical re cords may be exclude d if they are not rel eva nt or are too complex fo r the jury to understand on its own." ). ¶ 55 Kayman does not dispute that t he records at issue contained medical t erminolog y that had not been previously explained in the t estimony of Dr. Kirincic, the lone witness with any medical expertise. Kayman chose not to seek introduction of these records through Dr. Kirincic or any other witness with medical kno wledge. Had Kayman don e so, Dr. Kirincic could have been asked to explain to the jury the medical terminology contained in the recor ds , and Rasheed would have had an opportunity to conduct cross

- examination regarding the contents of the records. Instead, Kayman inexplicably attempted to present the contents of these records to the jury for the fi rst time during closing argument

. Give n the court's valid concern about jury confusion, we do not find tha t the trial court acted unreasonably in declining Kayman's requests to display these records during closing argument, even if the records were otherwise admissible

. ¶ 56 W e next address Kayman' s contention that the trial court erred in holding that evidence of her p rior complaints of back pain in 2005 and 2006 would be admissible as impeachment1-13-2631

20 evidence. Kayman relies on our supreme court's holding in Voykin v

. Estate of DeBoer , 192 Ill. 2d 49 (2000) , which generally requires a defendant to produce expert testimony to support admission of evidence of a plaintiff's prior injury. In that decision, o ur supreme court recognized that "[i] n most ca s es, the conne c tion between the parts of the body and past and current injur ies is a subject that is beyond the ken of the average layperson ." Id. at 59. As a result, "if a defendant wishe s to introduce evidence that the plaintiff has suffer e d a prior i njury *** the defendant must introduce expert evidence demonstrating why the prior injury is relevant to causation, damages, or some other issue of consequence. This rule applies unless the trial court, in its discreti on, determines that the nature s of the prior and current injuries are such that a lay
perso n can readily appraise the relationship, if any, between those injuries without expert assistance." Id. ¶ 57 The Voykin court recognized that "a prior injury may be relevant as impeachment, " but that "[t] his does not mean, however, that every undisclosed prior injury to the same part of the body is grounds fo r impeachment ." Id. at 58. Rather, "[j] ust as with the substantive admission of evidence, trial courts should not permit inquiry into this area unless the prior injury is relevant to a fa ct in consequence , i.e. , whether the prior injury negates caus a tion or negates or reduces the def endant's dama ges." Id. ¶ 58 I n denying Kayman 's motion for a new trial, the trial court acknowledged Voykin 's holding but stated that "Dr. Conr o y's t esti mo ny was admitted because Dr. Kirincic opined that plaintiff’s accident aggravated a preexisting degenerative condition in her neck. " The trial court thus found this case similar to Felber v. London , 346 Il l. App. 3d 188 (2004). In Felber , which also involved a motor vehicle acc ident, the Second District of this court concluded that there was1-13-2631

21 no abuse of discretion in the admission of evidence of the plaintiff's prior injuries where "the jurors could readily appraise the relationship between the injuries of which Felber complaine d *** and her preexisting injur ies without additional expert assistance." Id. at 193. Specifically, as the Felber jury had hear d testimony from plaintiff's treating physician "about the possible effects of the collision on Felbe r's preexisting condition, " the court concluded that this was "precisely the type of testimony that obviates the need for additional expert testimony " that would otherwise be required under Voykin

. Id. ¶ 59 Although w e agre e with the trial court that Rasheed did not need to produce s upporting
expe rt testimony to admit the evidence of Kayman's prior injury , we do so for a different reason than that stated in the trial court's denial of Kayman's posttrial motion. Specifically, although the trial court relied on Felber , it appears that Felber is factually distinguishable. In this case, the evidence of prior injury subject to the disputed motion in limine was th e discussion of the 2005

- 06 complaints contained in Dr. Conroy's testimony. Although Dr. Kirincic testified that Kayman showed signs of an ongoing degenerative spinal condition, Dr. Kirincic did not offer specific testimony regarding any relationship between Kayman's 2005 -06 complaints of back pain and the injuries allegedly caused by the January 2009 collision with Rasheed's vehi cle. Thus, it is not apparent that there was "precisely the type of testimony that obviates the need for additional expert testimony" that was present in Felber. See Felber , 346 Ill. App. 3d at 193. That is, Dr. Kirincic's testimony alone would not be s ufficient to take this case out of the general rule expressed in Voykin that expert testimony is required to support admission of a prior injury. See Voykin , 192 Ill. 2d at 58-59.1-13-2631

22 ¶ 60 However , we agree with trial court's earlier reasoning

— expressed in its orig inal pretrial ruling— that the evidence of the 2005

- 06 complaints contained in Dr. Conroy's deposition would nevertheless be admissible for impeachment, had Kayman failed to acknowledge such prior complaints in her trial testimony. Kayman contends that , p ursuant to Voykin, "the court shou ld not have deem ed the testimony of Dr. Conroy to be admissible fo r impeachment " as Rasheed did not offer expert testimony discussing any causal link between Kayman's 2005-0 6 back pain and her current symptoms. However, i t is well established that, apart from relevance on substantive issues, evidence of a prior inconsistent statement may be a dmissible for impeachment

. See People v. Moses , 11 Ill. 2d 84, 87 (1957) ("Evidence of prior inconsistent statements by a witness i s admissible to impeach his credibility. [Citation.] Such evidence is not admitted as proof of the truth o f the facts state d out of court, but to cast doubt on the t estimony of the witness by showing his inconsistency *** ." ). ¶ 61 In this case , had Kayman cho sen to testify at trial that she had no history of back complaints , the 2005- 06 complaints referenced in Dr. Conroy's deposition would constitute prior inconsistent statements

. Such evidence would impeach Kaym an's credibility, creating a basis for admissi on independent of the substantive issue of causation

. Kayman complains that the trial court's rulin g gave her " no choice at all as far as how to proceed on this issue, i.e. , [Kayman] was forced to introduce the evidence" of the 2005

- 06 complaints during h er dire ct examination or risk impeachment wi th Dr. Conroy's deposition. However , the trial court was entirely correct in instructing Kayman that she had to "pick her poison" — she could either acknowledge the prior complaints at trial, or deny any history of back problems and face impeachment with her prior inconsistent statements.1-13-2631

23 ¶ 62 We next address Kayman's contention that the trial court should have permitted the admission of the photograph of damage to Rasheed 's vehicle, either as substantive evidence on Kayman's injuries or as impeachment evidence. "The admission of evidence is largely within the discretio n of the trial court, and its ruling s will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Werner v. Nebal , 377 Ill. App. 3d 447, 454 (2007). ¶ 63 We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in holding that the photograph was not admissible for the purpose of establishing the ext ent of plaintiff's injuries. "[T] his court has previously upheld circuit court rulings dismissing photographic evid ence of a plaintiff 's vehicle damaged in a collision where the circuit courts found the photogr aphs to be irrelevant absent

ex pert testimony and thus inadmissible as evidence of the extent of a plaintiff 's injurie s suffered in the collision. [Citations.] " Williams v. City of Evanston , 378 Ill. App. 3d 590, 599 (2007). In this case, the trial court could reasonably conclude , as sta t ed in its posttrial order, that an

" average juror , without expert assistance , lack s the knowledge necessary to correlate th e damages depicted in the photograph " with Kayman's alleged injuries. ¶ 64 With respect to Kayman's attempt to use the photograph for impeachment on the issue of the speed of Rasheed's vehicle , we agree with the trial court's c onclusion that Kayman's counsel
"f

ailed to elicit any testimony regarding the nature of the impact ." The trial court had held tha t the photograph would be admissible to impeach Rasheed on the issue of speed, based upon Rashee d 's depo sition testimony that her car was only traveling at a sp eed of five miles per hour

. However, at t rial, Rasheed made no statement which opened the door to impeachment on this topic. Rather, Rasheed stated that she could not recall her speed:1-13-2631

24 " Q. No w , you do recall how fast your car was trav eling at the time of the impact? A. No, I don't. Q. You would agree that your car was not traveling 5 miles an hour at the time of the impact? A. I just don't remember. It's been four years."
¶ 65 Moreover, although testimony by Rasheed that the impact was minor could have opened the door to use of the photogr aph for impeachment , Rasheed at trial acknowledged the collision

was not a minor imp act

. Rather, asked to describe the impact on a scale of 1 to 10 , "one being a light tap and ten being a very stron g impact," Rashee d testified that the impact was " nowhere near one or two or three, but I can 't really r e member how much stronger it was than that." Kayman argues that Rasheed " should not be able to avoid impeachment by simply stating that she does not remember." Howev er, a s Rasheed offered no testimony at trial minimizing the speed or force of impact, there was simply no basis to use th e photograph of vehicle damage as impeachment on that issue. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in barring its admission

. ¶ 66 We next address Kayman's contention that the trial court erred when it denied her request to use a day

- in -the- life video purporting to show the daily exercises prescribed as part of her physical therapy program . The video was disclosed to Rasheed 's counsel approximately two weeks prior to the trial date. We again note our deferential standard of review: "The admission of a videotape or similar exhibit as demonstrative evidence is within the sound discretion of the circuit court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. [Citation.] An abuse of1-13-2631

25 discretion occurs when the ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when no reasonable person would take the same view." Spyrka v. County of Cook, 366 Ill. App. 3d 156, 16 6- 67 (2006) ; see also Don n ellan v. First Student, Inc. , 383 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 1051 (2008) ( "We review a trial court's admission of a day

- in -the-life video for an abuse of discretion, which occurs only when no reasonable person would agree with the decision of the trial court." ). ¶ 67 Kayman argues that as demonstrative evidence, day

- in -the- life videos are not subject to preclusion due to u ntimely disclosure; she relies on Do nnellan 's holding that disclosure of a video the da y before trial proceedings was not pr ejudicial

. Don nellan , 383 Ill. App. 3d at 1052- 53 (noting that as day

- in -the- life videos are demonstrative and intended "to illustrate evidence regarding a p arty's life at the time of trial," disclosure just before trial "was not prejudicial")

. In this c ase , the trial court acknowled ged Donnellan but found it distinguishable because Kayman's trial date was " prev iously delayed because [Kayman] failed to comply with standard discovery requests." The trial court found it "inappropriate to admit plainti ff 's day

- in -the- life video when it was dis clos ed only two weeks before the trial date that was expressly exte nded due to plaintiff's earlier discovery failures." ¶ 68 Although Kayman correctly notes that, as demonstrated by Do nellan , late disclosure does

not automatically bar admission of a day

- in -the- life video , that decisio n does not suggest that untimeliness may never be a valid reason for preclusion of such a video. Rather , we are mindful that matters involving trial scheduling and management are left to the tri al court's sound discretion , which is affo rded significant deference. See In re D.T. , 212 Ill. 2d 347, 356 (2004) (" 'Abuse of discretion' is the most d eferential standard of review - next to no review at all - and is therefore traditionally reserved f or decisions made by a trial judge in overseeing his or her1-13-2631

26 courtroom or in maintaining the progress of a trial.")

. Although day

- in -the- life videos may not be substantive evidence, Kayman does not cite any authority suggesting that the trial court has les s discretion , or that we should apply any less deference in reviewing the trial court's dec isions regarding the use of demonstrative evidence. ¶ 69 As Kayman does not dispute that the trial date was initially delaye d due to her conduct, we cannot say that no re a sonable person would agree with the trial court's decision in this instance to deny the use of the video. Rather, the trial court could reasonably conc lude th at allowing the vid eo to be disclosed just before trial would , in effect , improperly reward Kaym an for dela ying the original trial date. Thus, we cannot say that preclusion of the video was an abuse of discretion. Moreover, although Kayman argues that "barring the video prejudiced [her] case for damages in that it diminished her ability to demonst rate" her physical therapy exercises, the transcript reflects that she testified in detail regarding her various home exercises and that the jury view ed the devices prescribed by her physical therapists

. ¶ 70 We next turn to Kayman's contention that the trial court erred in granting Rasheed's motion in limine precluding Kayman from claiming lost wages a rising out of her physical therapy sessions. Notably, Kayman admits she suffered no lost compensation from her employer, whether in the form of hourly wages, salary, benefits, or otherwise. Indeed, her counsel acknowledged in argument on the motion in limine that "the re's no question she was on a salary, she didn't lose her money," but that she "took off time from work during the workday" to obtain physical ther apy. At trial, Kayman testified that she did not miss entire work days, but would leave work, attend a physical therapy appointment for approximately one hour, and retur n to her workplace the same day; otherwise, she would simply go to physical therapy be fore work.1-13-2631

27 ¶ 71 Likewise, Kayman's appellate brief ing makes no claim of monetary loss, but argues only that she "suffered a loss of her time as a result of her visit to physical therapy appointments." Kayman cites no authorities suggesting that a wage loss claim may be supported merely by a plaintiff's time spent obtaining medical treatment, absent any calculable loss of monetary compensation or employment benefits. Although Kayman notes the Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction that a plaintiff may recover for th e " value of (time) (earnings) (profits) ( salaries) (benefits) lost" (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 30.07 (2011) ), there is no claim in this case that Kayman was paid by the hour or otherwise lost earnings as a result of the time spent in p hysical therapy

. It is well

- settled that "[t] here can be no recover y of speculative or unproved damages." Thornhill v. Midwest P hysician Center of Orland Park , 337 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1051 (2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in trial court's refusal t o allow plaintiff to present testimony of future lost wages where plaintiff admitted that she remained employed full

time) . As Kayman did not identify any cognizable economic damages arising from her physical therapy sessions , the court did not abuse its discretion in precluding her wage loss claim. ¶ 72 Apart from the trial court's rulings, Kayman separately argues that the failure of the jury to award damage s for future pain and suffering , future medical expenses, and future disability was against the manifes t weight of the evidence. Kayman relies on the testimony of Dr. Kirincic that Kayman would likely continue to experience symptoms and receive period ic medical

treatment

. Kayman argues on appeal that Dr. Kirinci c established that Kayman “ is expected to ha ve pain and suffering, di s ability, and medical treatment into the future" and that the cost of such treatment " would be sim ilar to what the cost for medical care is now."1-13-2631

28 ¶ 73 "A verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclu sion is clearly evident or where the findings of the jur y are unrea sonable , arbitrary and not based upon any of the evid ence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maple v. Gustafson , 151 Ill. 2d 445, 454 (1992)

. "[I]t is the province of the jury to reso lve conflicts in the evid e nce, to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, and to decide what w e igh t should be given to the witnesses' testimony." Id. at 452. ¶ 74 Contrary to Kayman's position, the jury was not obligated to award damages for future pain or medical treatment after Dr. Kirincic offered her opinion that Kayman would have future pain and medical care . Rather, even without any conflicting tes timony disputing Dr. Kirincic's opinion, the jury was ent itled to find that Dr. Kirincic's testimony was not credible. "[A] jury's province as fa ct finder is not impermissibly invaded even by expert testimony expressed in absolute terms, since jurors remain free to disbelieve and d is re gard such testimony." Lange v. Freund , 367 Ill. App. 3d 641, 651 (2006) (citing Zavala v. Powermatic, Inc. , 167 Ill. 2d 542, 545 (1995)). Notably, the most explicit testimony rega rding future medical costs elicited from Dr. Kirincic was the equivocal statement that "[w] e don’t know what will happen next year, but right

now [t hey] probably won't change." Especially as Kayman failed to present any witness offering
any specific estimate of the dollar amou nt of an y future medical costs, the jury could reasonably have concluded that Kayman had not offered sufficient proof of such damages

. Alternatively , t he jury could have also concluded that an award of future damages was unsupported in light of Dr. Kirincic's admission s on cross - examination regarding other possible causes of Kayman's symptoms . In any event, i t is not our role to second

- guess such credibilit y determinatio ns, and1-13-2631

29 t he jury's decision not to award fu ture damages does not render the verdict against the manifest weight of the evidence. ¶ 75 Kayman claims that she was denied a fair trial as a result of the cumulative effec t of the trial court's all e ged errors

. "Where the cumulative effect of errors made by a trial court so depri ves a party of a fair trial that the verdict may have been affected, a new trial is necessary." Mueller v. Phar

- Mor , Inc. , 336 Ill. App. 3d 659, 670 (2000). However, as discussed above, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in its rulings or that the jury's verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we do not find that Kayman is entitled to a new trial. ¶ 76 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. ¶ 77 Affirmed.