THE

loNG ROAD HOME

U.S. Prisoner of War Policy

and Planning in Southeast Asia

Vernon E. Davis

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VERNON E. DAVIS received the A.B. and

IvLA. degrees in history from the University of

Rochester. Following service in World War II

he joined the Historical Division of the Joint

Chie:fs of taff, where from 1946 to 1977 he was

hisrorian. deputy chief, and editor. He is the

author of the (wo-volume work The Orgallizational

Del elopmellt ofthe Joint Chiefs ofStaff in World

lLn' If. From 19r until his death in 1996 he

\\'a a consultant for the HistOrical Office 111

the: Office of the Secretary of Defense.

jacker photographs: Ceremony at Pentagon during

:'-!ational Week of Concern for POW/MIA, with

'"mis ing men" flyover, March 29, 1972
THE LONG ROAD HOME

u.s. Prisoner ofWar Policy

and Planning in Southeast Asia
THE LONG ROAD HOME

u.s. Prisoner ofWar Policy and

Planning in Southeast Asia

Vernon E. Davis

Historical Office

Office ofthe Secretary of Defense

Washington, D.C. "2000
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Davis, Vernon E.

The long road home: U.S. prisoner of war policy and planning in

Southeast Asia/Vernon E. Davis.

p. em.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975 - Prisoners and prisons. 2. Prisoners

of war - Vietnam. 3. Prisoners of war - United States. I. Title.

DS559.4.D39 2000

959.704'37-dc21 99-058295
Foreword

The author of this book, Vernon E. Davis, died before he could see itin print. A scholar of exceptionally high standards, Davis was

thorough in research, passionate in quest of accuracy, and unceasing in

his pursuit of clarity of expression. The result of his exacting effort is a

work that makes an authoritative and illuminating contribution to a complex and controversial subject.

Vernon Davis earned A.B. and M.A. degrees in history from the University of Rochester. After service in combat as an infantryman in Europe

in World War II he joined the Historical Division of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, where he spent more than 30 years as a historian, deputy chief, and

editor. He authored a two-volume work, The Organizational Development

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II, and edited volumes in the

series, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy. After retirement from

the JCS Historical Division he undertook and completed the preparation of

this volume.

The Long Road Home is a companion work to the recently published

book on the prisoner of war experience in Southeast Asia-Honor Bound

by Stuart 1. Rochester and Frederick Kiley. The two books were prepared

at the request of former Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements,

Jr. Some of the early research and drafts of a few chapters are the contribution of Wilber W. Hoare, Jr., and Ernest H. Giusti, former JCS historians

who helped initiate the project. Davis carried forward the research and

writing to completion over a period of many years and is entitled to the

fullest credit for production of the final text and documentation.

This history of Washington's role in shaping prisoner of war policy

during the Vietnam War reveals the difficult, often emotional, and vexing

nature of a problem that engaged the attention of the highest officials of

the U.S. government, including the president. It examines frictions and

disagreements between the State and Defense Departments and within

Defense itself as a sometimes conflicted organization struggled to cope
11 THE LONG ROAD HOME

with an imposing array of policy issues: efforts to ameliorate the brutal

conditions to which the American captives were subjected; relations with

families of prisoners in captivity; the proper mix of quiet diplomacy and

aggressive publicity; and planning for the prisoners' return. At a pivotal

juncture the Department of Defense exerted a major influence on overall

policy through its insistence in 1969 that the government "Go Public"

with information about the plight of prisoners held by the North Vietnamese and the Viet Congo There is evidence that this powerful campaign

contributed to the gradual improvement in the treatment of the prisoners

and to their safe return in 1973. The detailed account of negotiations with

the North Vietnamese for the withdrawal of American forces from South

Vietnam makes clear how important in all U.S. calculations was securing

the release of the prisoners.

The volume was prepared for publication by Stuart Rochester, who

edited the final draft with a diligence and care that reflected Davis's high

standards. Frederick Kiley, drawing on a vast store of knowledge of the

subject, was a valued colleague and reliable source of information and

advice throughout the project. Alice Cole, Ronald Landa, Max Rosenberg,

John Glennon, Dalton West, and Josephine Dillard all made significant

contributions along the way. Ruth Sharma provided editorial assistance and

superior skills in preparing the several drafts and the final version of the

manuscript.

Davis benefited greatly from oral histories, especially those with former

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Roger Shields, and Frank Sieverts, as

well as with others who played key roles during this period. Their generous

granting of interviews and willing responses to queries helped to resolve

issues that might otherwise have remained puzzles.

This publication has been reviewed and its contents declassified and

cleared for release by concerned government agencies. Although the manuscript itself has been declassified, some of the official sources cited in

the volume may remain classified. This is an official publication of

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but the views expressed are those

of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Department

of Defense.

ALFRED GOLDBERG

OSD HISTORIAN
Contents

1. Prisoner ofWar Policy Before Vietnam 1

The Geneva Conventions 2

Korean war Experience 6

The Deftnse Advisory Committee 11

The Code ofConduct and Its Implementation 13

The Training Issue 19

Resolution ofthe Training Issue 24

2. Organizing for Policy Decision and Planning 31

DoD Discontent with State PWActivities 32

Informal Interdepartmental Relations 38

A New Level ofActivity-the Emergence ofHarriman 41

Decision to Establish a Prisoner ofWar Policy Committee 43

Organization and Working Methods ofthe DoD

PW Policy Committee 48

Scope and Accomplishments ofthe

Policy Committee Under VVarnke 51

3. The Department of State and Prisoner of War Policy,

January 1%4 to May 1966 55

Initial Perception ofthe PWProblem 55

Department ofState Organization for PWAffairs 57

The Problem ofExecutions Commands Attention 59

The JCRC and the Application ofthe Geneva Convention 61

The Threat ofVVar Crimes Tritlls Becomes More Definite 68

Ambassador Htlrriman Takes Over 72
IV Contents

4, Ciimax and Decline ofthe War Crimes Trials Issue 75

5. Action on Other Fronts: Efforts to Obtain Release of Prisoners 85

The Hertz Case 85

The Vogel Affiir , 88

Reciprocal Release 90

Repatriation ofSick and Wounded 96

Internment ofSick and Wounded in Neutral Territo~y 98

Exploration ofOther Routes , 99

The Clandestine Approach: The BUTTERCUP Chamlel 101

Ransom 104

The Involvement ofAmerican Peace Activists 105

6. Efforts to Ameliorate the Conditions of Captivity 113

Prisoners' Mail 114

PackagesfOr Prisoners 121

Us. lvleasures to Counter Exploitation ofPrisoners 123

Protesting Mistreatment: The Stratton Incident 124

Hanoi Rejects Inspections 127

Prisoner Identification 128

Relations with the News Media 129

Defense Pressure fOr a Stronger Public Challenge to Hanoi 132

7. Casualty Reporting, Notification, and Assistance to Next of Kin 136

Casualty Reporting 136

Casualty Notification 138

Assistance to Next ofKin 143

8. Changing Attitudes Toward the Code of Conduct .., 151

Strict Interpretation ofthe Code "." 152

Developing Thought on Treatment ofReturned Prisoners 154

Actions ofthe DoD PW Poticy Committee 157

Influence ofthe Pueblo Incident 159

A Pronounced Change ofView "." 164

9. Early Repatriation Planning 167

The Basic Directive of8 june 1968 167

Further Refinement: The Directive of18 january 1969 172
Contents v

10. Emergence of the PW/MIA Task Group/Task Force 177

New Leadership for the PWPolicy Committee 177

The PWIMIA Iask Group and Iask Force 179

Impact ofthe Sexton Release 188

A Further Test: The Elias-Gartley-Charles Release 192

11. The Go Public Campaign 197

The Go Public Campaign Begins 201

The Frishman-Hegdahl Press Conference 206

Widening ofthe Go Public Campaign 209

Congressional Effirts 211

The Department ofState 214

The American Red Cross 217

Private Groups and Individuals 219

The National League ofFamilies 220

H. Ross Perot 222

The Campaign's Results 226

12. Other Defense Actions and Initiatives 229

The Role ofAntiwar Activists in Prisoner Return 229

A Policy on Early Release 234

A Round ofOrganizational Proposals 237

Gaining the President's Attention 240

Responding to the President's Call 245

The Borman Mission 247

The PW Issue's Place in the Negotiating Scheme 250

The Son Tay Raid 253

13. A Bitter Lesson 257

Building on South Vietnam's Unilateral Release Effirt 258

Pressingfor Inclusion ofAble-Bodied Prisoners 261

The President's Peace Proposal of7 October 1970 265

Release or Neutral Internment ofLong- Term Prisoners 270

The "570 Release" Proposal 274

Hanoi's Encouraging Response 276

The Outcome 280
VI Contents

14. Repatriation Planning: A Central Issue Resolved 283

Designation ofCentral Processing Sites 284

Processing Time Overseas 287

Laird:r Directiue 297

Adjustments during Implementation 299

Policy on Next-ofKin Tmuel 303

Selection ofthe Primtlry Joint Processing Center 305

15. Repatriation Planning: Rehabilitation and Readjustment 307

The Rehabilitation/Readjustment Study 308

Career Counseling 313

Fami{y Counseling and Long- Term Medical k/ollltoring 314

The General Progress olPlanning: The Washington Conftrence 319

Involuenzent ofthe European Comnli/nd 323

Another M,~jor Planning Conference 324

Agreement on Repatriation olCiuilians 327

16. Repatriation Planning: Public Affairs and Conduct in Captivity 330

The Public Affiirs Challenge 330

Preparation ofa Central Public Affairs Directille 331

The DoD Public Affilirs Guidance 334

The Public A./filirs Conjh-ence 339

Conduct in Captiuity 340

Agreed Principles 341

The Article 31 Warning and Possible Prillileged Statusfor Returnee

Debriefings 343

A Proposed High-Lelle! BOtlrd ofReview 349

Laird and the Broader Context ojPublic Opinion 353

17. Mail and Packages 356

Package Mailing at ChristllltlJ 1968 358

Hanoi)' "New Policy" on Ptlckages 360

Currency Tiwzsrnittal 369

Marked Progress on Letter Mail 372

Us. BidsfOr Further 1rnprollement 376

A Re!tlpse in Letter Mail 379

The Filjitl F!ow ofLettersfrom the South 383
Contents Vll

18. Information and Assistance for PW/MIA Families 391

Briefing Tours 392

The Family Assistance Program 398

19. The National League and Other Family Organizations 406

Rise ofthe National League ofFamilies 406

DoD Assistance to the League 410

Family Opinion as a Political Factor 413

20. PW/MIA Legislation and Benefits 430

Benefit ProlJisions in Effict as ofjanuary 1973 432

Gartley's Proposals : 447

21. Negotiations for Peace 453

22. Operation Homecoming 491

Final Preparation fOr Repatriation 491

Release ofthe Prisoners 498

Return ofthe Laotian PWS and the Rest ofthe Prisoners.. 508

Return Home and Final Processing 518

23. Conclusion 526

Perceptions ofHomecoming 526

Efficts ofthe Go Public Campaign 531

Prisoner ofWar Benefits 535

Role ofthe Families 537

Conduct in Captivity 540

The MIAs 544

Notes 549

Selected Bibliography 599

Index 603

THE LONG ROAD HOME

u.s. Prisoner ofWar Policy

and Planning in Southeast Asia

1

Prisoner of War Policy

Before Vietnam

Treatment of prisoners of war has often excited strong passions

between nations since the earliest days of organized warfare, but

rarely has it attracted and held the attention of the public during a conflict as it did in the United States during the Vietnam War. The plight

and uncertain future of American servicemen in the hands of the enemy

in Southeast Asia had a powerful emotional impact on the government

and people of the United States far out of proportion to the number of

captives involved. Indeed, the fact that the prisoners were not so numerous

as to lose their individual identity no doubt contributed to the acute

public and official reaction to evidence of mistreatment, enemy threats of

war crime trials, and the prolonged duration of confinement. The relatively

high rank of the prisoners in Vietnam and their high visibility as propaganda pawns also help explain the intensity of the public reaction compared with World War II and the Korean War, which claimed far larger

numbers of prisoners and missing.* The contentious aftermath of the Vietnam War, marked by lingering uncertainty and acrimonious recriminations

over the fate of captured or missing servicemen who never returned and who

are presumed dead, assured continuing controversy with respect to the

U.S. government's own official policies relating to the prisoners of war,

which are the primary subject of this volume.

Law and custom, designed to make warfare as humane as possible by

eliminating unnecessary cruelty and bloodshed, evolved haltingly and erratically over the millennia. In modern times the progress of law can be charted

* American prisoners of war, missing, and unaccounted for numbered some 3,000 for the

Vietnam War, about 15,000 for the Korean War, and more than 200,000 for World War

II. The figures for Korea and World War II must be regarded as approximations at best.
2 THE LONG ROAD HOME

through such landmarks as the two international conferences at the

Hague, in 1899 and 1907, and the subsequent conference in 1929 that produced the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war (PWs). Following World

War II, representatives of the United States and 60 other nations gathered

in Geneva to undertake the revision and extension of international law in

the light of the experience of the recent conflict. Four treaties, known collectively as the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, resulted

from these deliberations. Three were revisions of earlier agreements, one

on ameliorating the condition of the sick and wounded in land warfare,

another dealing with sick, wounded, or shipwrecked sailors, and the third,

the prisoner of war agreement. The fourth was entirely new-the Geneva

Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. I

The Geneva Conventions

The most widely known of the four treaties and the one of primary

importance to this history is the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed on 12 August 1949.* Notably longer than

the 1929 document it replaced (143 articles compared to 97), the new

convention defined in more detail the rights of prisoners of war and the

conditions of their captivity. The revised version also sought to deal with

special problems that had emerged during World War II, an example being

the attempt to remove uncertainties about the status of such participants

as the Free French Forces and members of organized resistance movements.

The underlying principle remained that of the 1929 document and the

earlier Hague Convention: Persons removed from the fighting through

capture were not to be the objects of further violence. No longer a menace

to the detaining power, prisoners were to be treated humanely and with

respect for their persons, under rules that would neither lessen the chances

of victory nor increase the likelihood of defeat for any belligerent.

The Geneva Convention of 1949 took effect as the 61 original signatories

deposited their ratifications and other nations acceded. It became binding on

the United States on 2 February 1956, six months after Senate ratification.

The agreement embodied the international consensus on the standards

for humane treatment of prisoners of war, their rights and privileges, and

the obligations of their captors. It won nearly universal endorsement as the

years advanced. By 1970, 123 governments had subscribed to the convention,

including all those then involved in the hostilities in Southeast Asia. 2

* When appearing in the text hereaftet, "the Geneva Convention" refers to this

agreement.
Prisoner of War Policy Before Vietnam 3

Particular provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention will be described

as they become pertinent to this study. On the striking subject of war crimes,

however, which became a key element of the captivity experience in

North Vietnam, some introductory comment is desirable.

The Geneva Conventions were drafted at a time when thought on war

crimes and the manner of passing judgment on them was dominated by

the precedents set by the Allied Powers at the conclusion of World War II.

Those precedents arose from the establishment, proceedings, and judgments

of the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo and from

the subsequent trials conducted in the American Zone under a law passed

by the Allied Control Council for Germany. Basic to what came to be called

"the Nuremberg principles" was the conviction that international law applied

to individuals, who were therefore responsible and liable to judgment for

their actions. Accordingly, individual officials and persons in military service

could be arraigned for complicity in crimes that formerly were chargeable

only to governments.

By agreement in August 1945, the United States, the United Kingdom,

France, and the Soviet Union issued a charter for the Nuremberg Tribunal's

trials of major Axis war criminals whose offenses had "no particular geographical location." The charter listed three categories of offenses: war crimes,

crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. The first encompassed

such long-recognized violations of the laws and customs of war as the killing

of hostages, abuse or murder of prisoners of war, wanton destruction of

towns and cities, and other devastation not justified by military necessity.

The other two categories defined additional offenses under international

law for which individuals might be held responsible. Crimes against

humanity included extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other

large-scale atrocities against a civilian population. Crimes against peace, the

Nuremberg Charter read, consisted of "planning, preparation, initiation or

waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,

agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy

for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing."3

In 1945 and 1946 some questioned the wisdom or validity of these

extensions of international law; others criticized the ex post facto nature of

the law's application and the exceptional, ad hoc jurisdiction the victors

claimed for their tribunals. Although these questions continued to be raised

thereafter, they had been largely overridden by Resolution No. 95 of the

United Nations General Assembly. Approved unanimously on 11 December

1946, it reaffirmed "the principles of international law recognized by the

Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgment of the Tribunal."
4 THE LONG ROAD HOME

A year later the General Assembly instructed its International Law Commission to formulate the Nuremberg principles more precisely when preparing

a draft code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind. 4

Thus, at the time the 1949 Geneva Convention was drafted, it was

accepted that individuals might be tried for violations of international law

and among these were offenses variously described as crimes against peace

or against mankind or, more loosely, as "war crimes," principally the purposeful initiation and waging of aggressive war. 5 Directly or by indirection,

the Geneva Convention incorporated the elements of this concept. It did so

with certain refinements and with constant attention to preserving the particular rights of prisoners of war.

In the Geneva Convention's section on judicial proceedings, Article 99

read as follows:

No prisoner of war may be tried or sentenced for an act which

is not forbidden by the law of the Detaining Power or by international law, in force at the time the said act was committed.

No moral or physical coercion may be exerted on a prisoner

of war in order to induce him to admit himself guilty of the act

of which he is accused.

No prisoner of war may be convicted without having had

an opportunity to present his defense and the assistance of a

qualified advocate or counsel.

The insistence on providing for an effective defense was repeated elsewhere in the Convention; indeed, Article 130 stated that "willfully depriving

a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial" was a "grave breach"

of the Convention, in a category with willful killing, torture, and subjection

to biological experiments. Articles 102 and 106 declared that prisoners of

war might be sentenced only by the same courts and under the same procedures as applied to members of the armed forces of the detaining power,

and that they must have the same rights of appeal as such members.

Another safeguard against arbitrary action, strongly advocated by the

United States and other Western nations at Geneva, had been included by

less than unanimous vote. It lay in the single sentence of Article 85:

"Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for

acts committed prior to capture [alleged war crimes, almost exclusively]

shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention."

Thus an individual's status as a prisoner of war would be unaffected

during proceedings arising from war crimes charges or while serving any

sentence imposed. In the latter circumstance, provision would continue for

unhampered visits and interviews by delegates of the nation designated as
Prisoner of War Policy Before Vietnam 5

Protecting Power, or by representatives of the International Committee of

the Red Cross (ICRC) and the prisoner would still have the right to register complaints with them about the conditions of captivity. He would also

be entitled to send and receive mail, including at least one parcel monthly,

to take regular exercise in the open air, and to receive medical care as

needed and spiritual assistance as desired.

The Soviet Union had led the opposition to adoption of this version of

Article 85, and it entered sevetal reservations when signing the Convention.

One read, in part: "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not consider itself bound by the obligation, which follows from Article 85, to extend

the application of the Convention to prisoners of war who have been convicted under the law of the Detaining Power, in accordance with the

principles of the Nuremberg trial, for war crimes and crimes against

humanity.... " On its face, and as later clarified in a note to the Swiss

government in 1955, this Soviet reservation did not portend a wholesale

subversion of the Geneva Convention's protections. Prisoner of war status

would lapse only upon conviction of a war crime, after the fair trial assured

by the Convention and the exhaustion of all appeals. The individual would

then be confined under the same penal conditions as convicted nationals

of the detaining power, without special privileges. The Soviets gave assurance

that upon completion of his sentence the prisoner would regain PW status,

including the right to ultimate repatriation under the same terms as

his fellows. (,

More serious grounds for concern arose when all other Communist

nations subscribing to the Geneva Convention attached a similar reservation

regarding Article 85, with some variations in wording. North Vietnam in

1957, for instance, spoke of prisoners "prosecuted and convicted for" war

crimes. Again, if strictly construed, this would appear not to divest a man

of PW status until the moment of conviction, but the North Vietnamese

might apply a different interpretation, insisting that the language justified

denying his rights from the beginning of prosecution. 7

As with all other provisions of the Geneva Convention, the force of

Article 85 or of the reservations attached to it depended on an idealized

conception of how sovereign nations would behave. The underlying assumption was that in all circumstances the signatories would give greater allegiance

to strict fulfillment of their obligations under the Convention than to any

other national interest. The soundness of this assumption was open to doubt

and, indeed, the Korean War of 1950-53 had already provided an example of

the way Communist nations were likely to conduct themselves.

Since the war in Korea began less than a year after initial signing of the

Geneva Convention, few nations had completed the ratification process, and
6 THE LONG ROAD HOME

the convention had not yet come into force as a solemn obligation of the

several participants in the hostilities. Nevertheless, North and South Korea,

Communist China, and the United States on behalf of the United Nations

forces all certified their intention to abide by the convention to some

degree. North Korea ignored the offer of the International Committee of

the Red Cross to send observers to check on compliance, however, and it

identified only 110 ofits prisoners in two token reports to the ICRe's Central

Prisoners of War Information Agency. The United Nations Command had

transmitted data on 192,495 prisoners in its custody by the end of 1951,

and it was facilitating the regular visits of ICRC inspectors to some 50 PW

camps in South Korea. R

More to the point, the Communists disregarded the carefully drawn

provisions of the Geneva Convention relating to conviction for war crimes.

North Korea and Communist China condemned the participation of the

United Nations forces in the hostilities as a gross act of aggression. When

UN military personnel were taken captive, the Communist nations held

their guilt as war criminals to be self-evident and beyond any need of confirmation by judicial proceedings. As war criminals, the prisoners deserved

summary execution, and the world should know that only the "humane and

lenient policy" of their captors caused them to be spared. This lenient

policy, the Communists said, followed from recognition that the prisoners

were but common men who had been misled into serving as agents of the

imperialist warmongers who controlled their governments. Though their

acts had denied them the rights of prisoners of war, such men deserved the

opportunity to receive instruction that would allow them to learn the truth

while in captivity. Then they would surely perceive the duplicity of their

leaders, renounce their own role in the conspiracy against world peace, and

acknowledge the justice of the Communist struggle against the forces

of aggression.')

Later, in 1955, the United States ratified the Geneva Convention without

reservations, but with a stipulation rejecting those made by other nations.

It stated that "the United States accepts treaty relations with all parties to

that convention, except as to the changes proposed by such reservations. "10

Korean war Experience

The Korean War served to illuminate the uses of the Geneva Convention

and the current state of international law, but even more significant was the

influence it had subsequently on consideration of prisoner of war matters

within the United States. The war of 1950-53 was the most recent major
Prisoner of War Policy Before Vietnam 7

conflict involving U.S. forces. More importantly, it was the first in which

American servicemen suffered extended captivity in Communist hands. When

the United States later became involved in Vietnam, once again with Asian

Communists, the expetience ofthe Korean War appeared even more pertinent.

Brutality, degradation, and neglect marked the treatment of prisoners

by the Notth Koreans and the Communist Chinese, who shared little

concern for the survival of individuals and paid little heed to the Geneva

Convention, despite pretensions to the contrary. Official records, admittedly

incomplete, placed the death rate among U.S. prisoners at 38 percent,

nearly four times that of World War II. The total included large numbers

of men who perished during long winter marches to prison camps in the

northernmost reaches of North Korea. Ill-fed and confined with limited

protection against the severity of the climate, many others succumbed

to sickness, exposure, and mistreatment, with death hastened in a few

instances apparently by simple despair.

Still, maltreatment and deprivation had often enough been the lot

of prisoners of war. The Korean experience added a new dimension-the

comprehensive exploitation and indoctrination of the Americans in

furtherance of the enemy's political aims. As official U.S. writings later stated,

the Communists made the prison compound an extension of the battlefield,

and their treatment of prisoners was "but another weapon in the world-wide

war for the minds of men." In the camps, political and ideological warfare

continued, directed against the prisoners and, through them, against world

support for the United Nations effort. I I

In Korea, systematic interrogation formed part of the Communist

program against the prisoners, but with unexpected features that caught

many men off guard. Except for officers and others suspected of having

technical knowledge, the questioning for military information was usually

not extensive. When prolonged, it more often had the purpose of forcing

the American to sign a false statement than of wringing a disclosure of

classified data from him. For use in their worldwide propaganda, the

Communists valued most highly the "confession" of a downed airman that

the United States had engaged in bacteriological warfare. More commonly,

however, the questioning on military particulars gave way to an insistence

that the prisoners provide accounts of their home life and educational background, their work experience and political beliefs, even their hobbies and

club memberships. The man who complied with a seemingly harmless request

for a written personal history often found himself enmeshed in further

difficulties. The interrogator compelled him to write more, supply greater

detail, explain inconsistencies, or defend himself against charges of lying, in

a process intended to increase the man's sense of helplessness and supply the
8 THE LONG ROAD HOME

questioner with leverage for further pressures. Already controlling all physical aspects of the prisoner's existence, the enemy sought to establish moral

and psychological dominance as well.

The interrogation also helped the enemy to spot weaknesses and

identify potential collaborators. Concurrently, the captives had to endure

an unrelenting indoctrination, whose rationale, under the "lenient policy,"

has already been described. Besides instructing the prisoners in the "truth"

regarding the war, the enemy wanted to etode their normal allegiance and

enlist them in the Communist cause. It would best serve the enemy's purpose

if the prisoners became willing converts in response to the constant lectures, discussion sessions, and readings of Marxist literature. Failing that, the

Americans might at least be led into uncertainty about the justification for

U.S. involvement in the war and into suspicion of the motives of the national

leaders who had brought it about. Thus sensitized to Communist arguments,

they might ultimately return home with a greater disposition to see evidence that U.S. policy was in thrall to Wall Street and that capitalism meant

oppression of the many for the benefit of the few. But more immediately the

indoctrination sought to induce prisoners to sign peace petitions, issue

condemnations of their country's role in the hostilities, and send letters home

appealing for abandonment of an unjust war. These statements, like the

confessions of germ warfare and the deliberate bombing of civilian targets,

provided grist for Communist ptopaganda.

Response among the American prisoners varied. A minority accepted

the Communist world view expounded by their captors or sought safety and

favored treatment by appearing to accept it. Known as "Progressives," these

men willingly joined peace committees and advanced study groups; they

responded when called upon to write articles, make propaganda broadcasts,

or exhort other prisoners to join them in denouncing "American aggression

in Korea." Another minority, called "Reactionaries," urged resistance to the

indoctrination and refused to write or sign statements, despite the consequences. The majority were neither active resisters nor active collaborators.

This middle group included many young servicemen who were genuinely

confused and reduced to indecision by the ideological onslaught. Unversed

in political argument and generally ill-informed regarding their nation's

history and the actual workings of its economic and political institutions,

they could not oppose enemy discussion leaders who criticized America's

foreign policy and internal problems in a way that made the Marxist interpretation of them seen unanswerable. Others, with more worldly experience

or armed with a native skepticism of all political dogma, were less affected

and later reported that they had "played it cool." They adapted as best they

could, giving enough attention to the lectures and required readings to offer
Prisoner of War Policy Before Vietnam 9

no provocation, yielding what seemed necessary to assure survival but volunteering little.]2

In the end the prolonged indoctrination had little permanent effect on

the political and social outlook of the prisoners. Few, if any, were converted

to a genuine allegiance to the Communist faith. But the indoctrination program, which spread doubt and suspicion and set some Americans against

others, did serve the enemy's purpose of preventing concerted resistance among

the prisoners. The captors applied further measures of control, such as separating officers and senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) from the remaining

prisoners, removing strong resisters to special detention, encouraging the fear

of informers, and assigning Progressives to positions of minor authority

within the camps.

During the war, Communist broadcasts gave heavy play to the germ

warfare confessions, peace petitions, and other statements by prisoners. The

record of the U.S. servicemen in Korean captivity reached the American

public more fully with the return of the survivors following the armistice

agreement of July 1953. The early assessments of their behavior tended to

emphasize the failures and provided material that lent itself readily to

sensational treatment in popular articles. News accounts of investigations

of alleged misconduct within the military services reinforced this negative

emphasis. Readers could easily gain the impression that collaboration with

the enemy had been widespread, that the U.S. prisoners generally had

lacked strong attachment to American ideals and principles, and that many

had been subverted by "brainwashing" techniques employed by their captors.

An unfavorable judgment of the performance of the U.S. prisoners

became established in the public consciousness. The im pression that there

had been a broad failure to exhibit the discipline, courage, and unity that

the nation expected of its fighting men hardened into accepted fact, and

with it a belief that in compiling this record the prisoners had departed

widely from the standards of the past. Some publicists writing on the subject

during the 1950s saw evidence of a "softness" in American society and a

decline in the effectiveness of home, church, and classroom in instilling

patriotism and strong moral character in the rising generation-a deterioration that they held must be reversed if the United States was to survive

the challenge of the Cold War. Other and possibly more objective study

of the Korean War record showed much that could be used to dispute the

unfavorable verdict, but the results of such investigation appeared for the

most part after the prevailing view had become established and interest in

the subject had waned. Earlier publications under such titles as "Why Did

Many GI Captives Cave In?" had had their effect, and the negative opinion

had already passed into the realm of common belief. U
10 THE LONG ROAD HOME

During the immediate postwar years another set of unfavorable impressions arose over the treatment of the recovered prisoners of war by their

parent services. It was here, more than in appraising the overall performance of the American prisoners, that the normal public sympathy for those

who had undergone the ordeal of captivity came into play. Also, at the conclusion of a war whose failing public support and unsatisfying results created

an atmosphere quite different from the euphoria of V-] day in 1945, the

military officials who would judge, and sometimes indict, the returning

PWs were not held in particularly high esteem themselves.

On 24 September 1953, as repatriation of the main body of former

prisoners was drawing to a close, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson

issued a statement concerning the judgments that might be passed on

their conduct while in enemy hands. He sought to allay suspicions that the

military authorities were intent on punishing every instance of culpable

behavior and would press charges that made little allowance for the conditions of captivity. Wilson pledged that any action resulting from the

investigations "will be on an individual basis" and "will be just and fair

and in line with established facts and evidence." "We do not as a general

principle condone those who made false confessions contrary to the interests

of their country, or whose actions caused their fellow prisoners added

misery," he continued, but such cases would be "carefully and sympathetically examined by the service concerned to ascertain whether in any of them

there has been an unreasonable failure" to meet the standards expected of

prisoners of war. He also expressed "high praise and admiration for those

who resisted the Communists' efforts to break them down. Their fortitude

will be recognized." 14

As the services proceeded with their investigations, real or apparent differences in the treatment accorded the returnees began to attract attention.

Constantly in the news for a period of more than two years, the unfolding

story sometimes inspired charges that officers were being dealt with less

severely than enlisted men, but the strongest public dissatisfaction arose

over inequities ascribed to lack of uniformity among the services. IS

An article in the New York Times in May 1954 was captioned "Policy

on P.W.'s Now Shaping Up: Air Force Is Lenient, Marines Most Strict,

and the Army Somewhere in Between." By the following year the Army was

commonly thought of as the service most inclined to a stiff-necked, by-thebook approach. It was the only one with cases still under investigation in

1955 and the only one to bring charges that required trials by court-martial.

However, the underlying statistics had all but guaranteed a higher incidence of Army cases. The 3,973 Army men recovered from Korean captivity

represented nearly 90 percent of all returnees. The Navy, in contrast, had
Prisoner of War Policy Before Vietnam 11

repatriated only 31 men and quickly announced that its investigations

revealed no evidence sufficient to justify charges of misconduct. 16

The contrast remarked upon more frequently, however, was between

the Army's resort to courts-martial leading to penal sentences and the decisions of the Air Force, reached in the closed sessions of a board of review.

After surveying 83 cases of suspected misconduct, the board cleared 69

officers and airmen and concluded that none of the charges before it warranted court-martial proceedings, since in all instances it had found evidence

of duress and other extenuating circumstances. For the 14 men not cleared,

the board recommended separation from the Air Force, though with honorable discharges, unless during further hearings the men could show cause

why they should be retained. Thus there was an appearance of inequity,

and probably some substance of it as well, and unfavorable public and congressional comment on the matter had not lessened during 1955. In June,

the national commander of one veterans group charged the Department of

Defense with "double talk" in its reply to his call for imposition of a uniform

policy in handling prisoner of war cases. I?

The Deftnse Advisory Committee

DoD officials had in fact been concerned from the first with the PW

problems revealed by the war, and, more recently, with the emerging question

of public confidence in their handling. Initial assessments of the prisoner

experience all pointed to the conclusion that the u.s. servicemen had been

unprepared for the indoctrination and interrogation procedures they encountered in Korea. Officials were quickly convinced that service training must be

redirected and extended to cover such contingencies. Efforts to define policy

and prescribe new training culminated in the appointment of the Defense

Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War in May 1955. In informing President Eisenhower of this action, Secretary Wilson stressed "the importance to

our national security of providing members of the Armed Forces with every

means we can devise to oppose the techniques of physical, mental and moral

persuasion employed by nations within the Soviet orbit." He forthrightly

described another concern-the fact that "divergent action of the Military

Departments has created in the minds of the public an impression of injustice with respect to repatriated prisoners from the Korean conflict."IH

The Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War began its work

under the chairmanship of Carter L. Burgess, assistant secretary of defense

(manpower and personnel), with General John E. Hull, USA (Ret), as vice

chairman. The other committee members were the assistant secretaries with
12 THE LONG ROAD HOME

manpower responsibilities in the three military departments, one retired

senior officer from each of the four services, and the assistant secretary of

defense (health and medical). The advisory committee studied reports and

heard testimony from an extensive list of public officials, military commanders, educators, representatives of labor, religious, and veterans groups,

psychologists, psychiatrists, and other medical experts, and former prisoners

of war. It completed two months of deliberations with the preparation of

a report, transmitted on 29 July 1955 to Secretary Wilson, who released the

main body of the text as a pamphlet, entitled POW- The Fight Continues

After the Battle. I

')

In reviewing the prisoner experience in Korea, the advisory committee

concluded that the unfavorable picture that resulted from the early assessments was overly harsh. It cautioned against making "the some-equals-all

deduction" and cited from the record instances of courageous resistance

and selfless devotion to comrades. It pointed out, for instance, that of the

78 Air Force men against whom the Communists had applied extreme

physical and psychological coercion to extract confessions of germ warfare,

38 had signed, but 40 had not. Overall, the committee averred, when

full account was taken of the conditions of captivity, "the record seems

fine indeed."

To show that crimes against fellow prisoners and unforced participation in acts harmful to the United States occurred less frequently than

commonly supposed, the advisory committee recounted the statistics

on follow-up disciplinary actions. Of 4,428 prisoners recovered, 565 had

emerged from the initial screening by military intelligence agencies with

their conduct under question, but 373 of these cases had been cleared or

dropped after further investigation. Thus there appeared to be substantial

evidence of culpability against only 192 suspects. This figure, less than 5

percent of the total number of returnees, might be further reduced, since

112 of the cases were still in various stages of investigation.

The advisory committee also tried to remove what it considered a

public misapprehension that the services had differed in their handling of

misconduct charges, that some men had '''had the book thrown at them'

while others went free." It asserted that each of the services had thoroughly

investigated all alleged cases of misconduct, following "generally identical

criteria" and under the overall surveillance of higher DoD officials. The disposition of all cases was "as consistent, equitable, and uniform as could be

achieved by any two or more boards or courts" and "no case was brought for

court martial action in which there was evidence of duress, brainwashing or

any other type of coercion." Even so, the committee recommended further
Prisoner of War Policy Before Vietnam 13

review of the sentences resulting from such proceedings, so that any found

to be excessive might be reduced.

Thus the Defense Advisory Committee went to considerable lengths

to counter misconceptions and blunt criticism of the experience and handling of the Korean PWs, but their effort to correct the record had little lasting

effect.* If their report did little to alter prevailing assumptions, their recommendations had important consequences nonetheless, for even as they sought

to balance the postwar indictment, members saw a need for new measures

of training and indoctrination to prepare U.S. servicemen to perform with

greater steadfastness and discipline when in captivity. The final sentence of

the report bespoke the same concern that had led to the committee's appointment: "The Korean story must never be permitted to happen again."

The Code ofConduct and Its Implementation

The committee's investigation confirmed that "the U.S. Armed Forces

have never had a clearly defined code of conduct applicable to American

prisoners after capture." All the services had regulations bearing in part on

the subject, as well as traditions of loyalty and fortitude that historically had

generally been well exemplified by the performance of captured Americans,

but there was no comprehensive codification of expected behavior. The

committee unanimously called for "a unified and purposeful standard of

conduct for our prisoners of war backed up by a first class training program," and recommended that the president issue as an executive order the

six-point Code ofConduct that it had prepared. Clearly, the committee viewed

the code as a document of cardinal importance, with a status and authority

higher than that of a DoD directive.

A series of short declaratory statements made up the proposed Code

of Conduct, each supported by several paragraphs of explanation. The

primary text of the articles read as follows:

I

I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard

my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in

their defense.

* The book that probably did most to fix the negative image of prisoner performance in the public mind had yet to be published-Eugene Kinkead's In Every

War But One (1959).
14 THE LONG ROAD HOME

II

I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command I will

never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.

III

If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available.

I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will

accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

IV

If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow

prisoners. I will give no information nor take part in any action

which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take

command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed

over me and will back them up in every way.

V

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound

to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will

evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability.

I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country

and its allies or harmful to their cause.

VI

I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made

my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States

of America.

The drafting of Article V, regarding behavior under interrogation, generated the most discussion. Since this was also the section of the code whose

interpretation and translation into training programs caused the most

controversy in the future, its origin and intent are of particular interest.

In taking testimony the committee had heard a variety of opinions

on standards that should guide the serviceman when subjected to enemy

interrogation. Some witnesses called for adherence to what was termed the

"Spartan Code," an absolute refusal to answer any question beyond providing name, rank, serial number, and date of birth in fulfillment of the Geneva

Convention's requirement that prisoners identify themselves. Others argued

that this prescription was unrealistic; few prisoners had succeeded in holding to it in the past and fewer still could be expected to do so when facing

the type of physical and psychological coercion the potential enemies of

the United States were known to employ. As the report noted, "doctors and
Prisoner of War Policy Before Vietnam 15

psychiatrists generally conceded that 'every man has a breaking point.

Many prisoners in World War II were forced beyond 'name, rank and serial

number.' And nearly every prisoner in Korea divulged something." If it

was accepted that a determined interrogator would almost always draw

some response from a prisoner, the guidance might better be along the lines

of "talk, but don't say anything." Some intelligence experts counseled that an

interrogator's questions could be evaded and that training could provide a

man with the means of holding his own in such a contest.

One distinguished officer put forward a more novel suggestion, both

in a magazine article and before the advisory committee. Rear Adm.

Daniel V. Gallery believed that the United States could frustrate the

enemy's purpose entirely and spare its men the ordeal of torture by authorizing U.S. servicemen to "sign any document the communists want them

to or appear on radio or TV programs and deliver any script the Reds

hand them." At the same time the United States should declare to the world

that it was following this policy, under which any prisoner statement or

confession broadcast by the captors must be held to have no validity.20

The committee rejected Gallery's proposal, primarily because of the consequences a man might suffer if his confession enabled the enemy to convict

him as a war criminal. According to the reservation maintained by the

Communist-bloc nations, this would remove him from the protection of

the Geneva Convention.

The section of the report that reviewed the conflicting views

concluded:

The Committee agreed that a line of resistance must be

drawn somewhere and initially as far forward as possible. The

name, rank and service number provision of the Geneva Conventions is accepted as this line of resistance.

However, in the face of experience, it is recognized that the

POW may be subjected to an extreme of coercion beyond his

ability to resist. If in his battle with the interrogator he is driven

from his first line of resistance he must be trained for resistance

in successive positions. And, to stand on the final line to the

end-no disclosure of vital military information and above all

no disloyalty in word or deed to his country, his service or

his comrades.

Throughout, the serviceman must be responsible for all of

his actions. This in brief is the spirit and intent of the Code of

Conduct which the Defense Advisory Committee recommends. 21
16 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Though formally published and apparently clear, this statement may

not have expressed exactly the meaning most committee members intended.* Certainly one of its elements did not appear explicitly in the text

of the Code of Conduct. The second sentence of Article V read "I will

evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability." The idea

of resistance in successive stages, while possibly derivable from the verb

"evade," did not stand out as the obvious meaning, particularly in view of

the overriding imperative in the flrst sentence: "I am bound to give only

name, rank, service number, and date of birth." And though helpful in

other respects, the explanatory paragraphs that the committee attached

to Article V also lacked any delineation of the idea of resistance in successive positions:

When questioned, a prisoner of war is required by the Geneva

Conventions and permitted by this Code to disclose his name,

rank, service number, and date of birth. A prisoner of war may also

communicate with the enemy regarding his individual health or

welfare as a prisoner of war and, when appropriate, on routine

matters of camp administration. Oral or written confessions true or

false, questionnaires, personal history statements, propaganda

recordings and broadcasts, appeals to other prisoners of war,

signatures to peace or surrender appeals, self criticisms or any

other oral or written communication on behalf of the enemy or

critical or harmful to the United States, its allies, the Armed Forces

or other prisoners are forbidden.

It is a violation of the Geneva Conventions to place a prisoner

of war under physical or mental torture or any other form of

coercion to secure from him information of any kind. If, however,

a prisoner is subjected to such treatment, he will endeavor to avoid

by every means the disclosure of any information, or the making

* When consulted several years later during the controversy over interpretation, Burgess

and Hull apparently gave little support to the advocates of training for resistance in

successive positions. One spokesman who did insist that this, rather than a single line of

resistance, was what the committee had intended to endorse was Brig. Gen. S.L.A.

Marshall, USAR (Ret), military historian and principal editorial writer for the Detroit

Free Press. First a witness before and then an informal consultant to the Advisory Committee, Marshall had actually taken part in the drafting of the Code of Conduct, but he was not

a committee member. His account of his role and his impression of the Burgess committee's intention may be found in Report of the Air Force Advisory Committee on Prisoners

of War, 25 Nov 63, 153-59, TF files. He later repeated the story when the Code of

Conduct reclaimed public attention after return of the crew of the U.S.S. Pueblo from

North Korean captivity in December 1968. Marshall, Itr to ed, New York Times, 23 Mar 69;

Marshall, "The Pueblo and the Code," The New Leader, 14 Apr 69,10-11.
Prisoner of War Policy Before Vietnam 17

of any statement or the performance of any action harmful to the

interests of the United States or its allies or which will provide aid

or comfort to the enemy.

Russia and the Communist Bloc nations have made a significant reservation to Article 85 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Under this reservation a prisoner of war who may be convicted of

an alleged war crime under the laws ofthe captors, loses the protection

afforded a prisoner ofwar by these Conventions. Therefore the signing of a confession or the making of a statement by a prisoner

is likely to be used to convict him as a "wat criminal" and thus,

according to this Communist Bloc device, deny to him any protection under the terms of the Geneva Conventions, including

repatriation until his sentence is served. 22

President Eisenhower issued the "Code of Conduct for Members

of the Armed Forces of the United States" as Executive Order 10631 on

17 August 1955. The introductory text, which invoked his authority as

commander in chief as well as president, included the following paragraph:

Evety member of the Armed Forces of the United States is

expected to measure up to the standards embodied in this Code of

Conduct while he is in combat or in captivity. To ensure achievement of these standards, each member of the Armed Forces liable

to capture shall be provided with specific training and instruction

designed to better equip him to counter and withstand all enemy

efforts against him, and shall be fully instructed as to the behavior

and obligations expected of him during combat or captivity.2\

The next day Secretary Wilson moved to disseminate the Code of

Conduct and to institute the training that it required by issuing a memorandum to the secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Fotce on "Training

and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of Conduct." It

was notable both for the comprehensiveness of the training objectives and

for the latitude allowed the services in developing the program "required

by their particular needs." The objectives ranged from "education in the

basic truths and advantages of our democratic institutions and in the

fallacies of Communism" to instruction in "methods by which enemy

interrogation and indoctrination are resisted or avoided." Further, "specialized training appropriate to service and individual requirements must be

given in evasion and escape, resistance, prisoner organization and survival."

The training, progressing from general to more detailed instruction, was to

continue throughout the serviceman's career.
18 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Wilson attached the outline for a training and education program

developed by the Defense Advisory Committee. It, too, contemplated that

each service would "design its own program" in line with Defense guidance.

Resistance in successive positions was again not mentioned specifically in

the committee document, but one section on the training of units and individuals destined for combat would be cited in later discussions as providing sanction for that concept. Instruction, the committee wrote, should be

designed to:

d. Equip the individual to resist enemy interrogation for military

advantage and efforts to exploit him for propaganda and other

purposes harmful to our cause by training in-

(1) Enemy methods and techniques ofinterrogation and coercion.

(2) The enemy use of "false confessions," questionnaires, written

and oral statements and other devices to further his purposes.

(3) Methods and techniques of thwarting interrogation and

exploitation; the use of ruses and stratagems to evade and avoid

the disclosure of important information; the necessity of concealing vital military information.

It should be noted, however, that Wilson sent the committee's tramlng

guide to the departmental secretaries "for your information"-that is,

without the force of a directive. 24

The Code of Conduct, lastingly identified as the response of the U.S.

government to deficiencies that the Korean War had revealed in the performance of its fighting men in captivity, constituted the principal but

not the sole product of the advisory committee's labors. Other committee

recommendations, most of them classified, did not appear in the published report. One, in a confidential memorandum of 11 July, dealt with

the lack of an organization that might insure uniform treatment of returned prisoners. Although the committee members had referred approvingly in their public repon to higher level DoD supervision, when writing

privately they showed a clear awareness that this oversight had covered

only a limited segment of service dealings with the returned men. Higher

authorities had reviewed only the misconduct cases in which court-martial

action was proposed; these were not to proceed to trial without the approval

of the secretary of defense. There had been no review or testing of the comparability of the many instances in which a military department decided

not to press charges. The committee stated:
Prisoner of War Policy Before Vietnam 19

At present there is no single Agency or Office designated to coordinate all matters pertaining to prisoners of war. This lack of

over-all coordination has caused the Department of Defense

embarrassment, fostered unilateral action and contributed to

public dissatisfaction with Service actions. In addition, the Committee is convinced there must exist some effective means to

supervise implementation of such of the Committee recommendations as may be approved. 25

To remedy this deficiency the committee offered a draft directive,

which Secretary Wilson issued on 18 August 1955 as DoD Directive

5120.22. It designated the assistant secretary of defense (manpower and

personnel) "as having primary cognizance within the Department of

Defense for coordinating all policy matters pertaining to prisoners of war

and Department of Defense civilian employees in Communist hands."

Subject to his coordination, normal responsibilities touching on the PW

area were to be performed by the assistant secretary of defense (legislative

and public affairs), the general counsel, and the assistant to the secretary of

defense (special operations). A later agreement accorded the assistant secretary of defense (international security affairs) somewhat greater autonomy

when dealing with the Department of State on aspects of PW policy having

political or diplomatic implications.26

It appeared that DoD Directive 5120.22 had erected a framework

of responsibilities and relationships that would stand Defense in good stead

whenever questions of prisoner of war policy arose in the future. The more

immediate employment for the system, however, was the one the advisory

committee had highlighted-to oversee the implementation of Code of

Conduct training and other recent decisions pertaining to PW affairs.

The Training Issue

The tralOlOg programs developed by the military services displayed

differences of scope and emphasis-legitimately enough, in view of the

nature of Secretary Wilson's memorandum of 18 August 1955 and the

differing requirements of their respective operational circumstances. It is

possible, however, that the extent of variation in approach that might result

had not been fully appreciated. The Marine Corps, for instance, preferred to

stress the broad inspirational statements in Articles I, II, and VI of the Code

of Conduct in training designed to instill fighting spirit and unit pride and

to foster "a Marine's inherent distaste and contempt for ever becoming a

prisoner of war."27 The Marine Corps program also covered those parts of
20 THE LONG ROAD HOME

the Code that governed conduct in captivity, but less intensively than the

instruction given in the Air Force. That air crews operating over enemy territory were vulnerable to capture was undeniable, and the obligation to see

that their men were realistically prepared for that contingency weighed

heavily on Air Force leaders. 2H

All of the services adopted the broad terminology of the Advisory Committee's training guide: Phase I, general and introductory training; Phase

II, more intensive instruction for units and personnel preparing for combat; Phase III, advanced and sometimes individually designed training for

special mission forces. The Air Force program, the most fully developed,

drew on the results of psychological studies of group and individual behavior

under stress and gave more prominence than the other services to exercises

involving simulated interrogation and confinement. The latter activity was

a feature of the Phase II training, centered at the USAF Survival School at

Stead AFB, near Reno, Nevada, which all combat crews had to attend.

The Air Force set forth its doctrine on resistance to interrogation in

two command messages during January 1956. The first, whose language

showed a clear derivation from the statement of intent in the Defense

Advisory Committee's report, read as follows:

Air Force policy is that its captured personnel will give

only name, rank, serial number, and date of birth and will evade

answering further questions to utmost of his ability. Article 5 of

the serviceman's Code of Conduct, however, recognizes that the

enemy may not adhere to the Geneva Convention and that under

extreme duress not all men in all situations can strictly maintain

such policy without undue risk to health and life. Consequently,

if in his battle with the interrogator, the airman is driven from

his first line of resistance, he should assume successive positions

of resistance, standing on the final line that "there will be no

disclosure of vital military information." Above all, the Air Force

will not condone disloyalty in word or deed to his country, service or comrades. 29

The second message, 15 days later, responded to quenes ftom field

commands by describing the concept more fully:

Code of Conduct training should be with objective of convincing airmen that resistance to interrogation and exploitation

by enemy is possible even under pressure, as illustrated by many

ruses successfully employed in past.
Prisoner of War Policy Before Vietnam 21

Successive positions of resistance include:

1. Adhere to name, rank and number and evade answering

all further questions by ourright refusal. Claim ignorance,

inability to talk, to think, to comprehend, to remember, etc.,

as long as possible.

2. If forced repeat forced into second position speak only

of things which are known beyond doubt to be unclassified.

If in doubt, information will be considered classified.

3. If forced to assume more active resistance, use tactic of:

a. Overload interrogator with misleading, inaccurate data.

b. Distort statements.

c. Stall, ramble, use idiomatic language, be stupid or vague.

d. [Claim duties did not involve access to particular classified information.]

e. Conrradict himself, have poor memory.

4. Final resistance-no disclosure of vital military information

and above all, no disloyalty to country, service or comrades.

Position #1, designed for Phase I training, is overriding mandate

and should receive full emphasis. Subsequent positions are exceptions repeat exceptions to be used only in extreme repeat extreme

emergency and are not to be introduced in training program

prior to second phase. Their application is limited only by individual ingenuity and training effort expended .... \0

The steps taken by DoD to insure wide dissemination and publicity

for the Code of Conduct included the production of a series of posters

using the work of prominent artists to illustrate each of the Code's articles.

Also, a revised and expanded unclassified pamphlet for troop information

and education replaced an earlier issue that had not gone much beyond

presentation of the text of the Code. The new version of "The U.S. Fighting

Man's Code" appeared in August 1959. The section that discussed Article V

concluded with the following:

In the face of experience, it is recognized that you, if you should

become a POW, may be subjected to an extreme of coercion. Still,

you must resist to the limit of your ability. Don't expect to fall

back to successive lines of resistance. Once you have gone beyond

the first-your name, rank, service number, and date of hirthin almost any respect whatever, you have taken the first step that
22 THE LONG ROAD HOME

leads to collaboration. On the first line you must endeavor to

stand to the end.'!

This approach clearly conflicted with the Air Force approach in its

Phase II training, yet the pamphlet had been published for use throughout

the Department of Defense; it bore the endorsement of the secretary of

each military department and the chiefs of all the services. Air Force leaders

had apparently found themselves able to accept the pamphlet on the assumption that it was intended for use in general and introductory training,

where it would meet the need for instructional material easily comprehended by all servicemen. In fact, the pamphlet's text was not incompatible with the Code of Conduct training that the Air Force provided to

its new recruits in Phase 1. But the Air Force assumed that its different

principles of instruction would continue to be justified in the Phase II

program, tailored to the particular needs of a more select group: combatready air crews of above average education and professionalism, capable

of absorbing complex training in the techniques of resistance they might

have to utilize in captivity. The Air Force continued to rely on Wilson's

guidance of August 1955 as authority for its separate program to meet

its unique requirements.

Whether intentionally or not, the Air Force acquiescence in publication of the 1959 pamphlet had avoided a confrontation over the difference

between its view of the Code of Conduct and the interpretation given by

the other services. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps had resolved the

question of how to teach resistance to interrogation and propaganda

exploitation in favor of single-minded adherence to the name-rankand-serial-number line for both Phase I and Phase II training. Service

traditions played a strong part in shaping this view, but it also derived from

a plain reading of the Code of Conduct's text. The Air Force had looked

beyond that to find justification for the training it believed its combat crewmen must have, to material in the Defense Advisory Committee's report

and training guide and to the results of scientific studies sponsored by the

Air Force.

Several more years elapsed before the doctrinal differences became a

serious issue. In January 1963, the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, raised

the matter in the following message to the chief of naval operations:

1. U.S. Navy pilots who have attended the USAF Advanced

Survival School at Stead AFB, Nevada, have received training in

"second posture of resistance to interrogation." This training,

which permits disclosure of information beyond name, rank and

serial number, is in direct conflict with U.S. Navy interpretation
Prisoner of War Policy Before Vietnam 23

of Article V of U.S. Military Code of Conduct as taught by

Navy Fleet survival schools. The resulting confusion detracts

from resistance training ... and may severely jeopardize the

position of American POW's detained in any type conflict.

2. Request the above difference in interpretations ... be resolved,

and guidance be provided which establishes a firm policy with

respect to any Cold War situation as well as general warY

Thus the problem came before the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Predictably, as an issue involving strongly held views and touching on individual

service prerogatives, it proved a difficult matter for that body to deal with.

Months of discussion merely confirmed that the differences were irreconcilable at the JCS level, and on 3 October 1963 the Joint Chiefs submitted

the issue to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. 33

The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps chiefs, with the concurrence of

JCS Chairman General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, contended that the

Code of Conduct, as set forth in Executive Order 10631 of 1955 and amplified in DoD Pamphlet 1-16 of 1959, permitted a captive serviceman only

one line of resistance to interrogation: name, rank, serial number, and date

of birth. They noted, however, that the "permissive language" of Secretary

Wilson's memorandum of 18 August 1955 and the fact that its attached

training guide was open to broad interpretation had encouraged service

divergences in the indoctrination of military personnel regarding Article V,

resulting "in two codes of conduct-one which does not permit successive

lines of resistance, and one which does." Such ambiguity could lead to a

senior prisoner of war adhering to one code while others junior to him

lived by another. "The effect on POW discipline would be chaotic."

The majority members strongly recommended replacement of the

Wilson memorandum of 1955 by a directive specifying that all personnel

would be "deeply and similarly indoctrinated in a single standard of resistance to POW interrogation." They considered that the officially approved

pamphlet of 1959 already superseded the advisory committee's training

guide, which Secretary Wilson had circulated "for information." Further,

the majority held that training that allowed for fallback positions weakened

the will to resist, gave advantage to the enemy, and placed an unreasonable

demand on the serviceman for rational decision and evaluation when under

extreme stress. They were convinced that the man would be better prepared

for interrogation by thorough and unvarying indoctrination in a single

line of resistance.

Air Force Chief of Staff General Curtis E. LeMay presented the

opposing view with equal conviction. He declared that "any policy which
24 THE LONG ROAD HOME

recommends name, rank, service number and date of birth as the prisoner's

sole defense against enemy interrogation and exploitation is unrealistic."

This policy had not worked in past wars, where prisoners with few exceptions had gone beyond that line when subjected to intensive questioning.

He argued that the wording of Article V showed a "clear acceptance of the

fact that in certain cases it will not be humanly possible to stop at this point"

when in the hands of an enemy whose actions were not constrained by

regard for the Geneva Convention. Though pledged to evade further questions to the utmost of his ability, the man "must be trained as to how he

can still honorably resist" if pushed beyond his utmost limits. A policy that

permitted giving this level of training, apart from the general indoctrination,

was of particular concern to the Air Force. Not only did air crews face the

hazard of capture, but their technical knowledge and other expertise made

them prime targets for the enemy interrogator. Given their mission, these

officers were also more likely to be the object of attempted exploitation for

propaganda purposes, as in the germ warfare confessions extorted during

the Korean War. Men likely to become special targets needed special training;

such training the Air Force was providing at Stead AFB, in full conformity,

its leaders believed, with the spirit and intent of the Code of Conduct.

LeMay thought Wilson's memorandum and the attached training

guide soundly conceived. They permitted the services to "vary their training

in keeping with the learning capability of the individual and the importance

of the information he is required to possess." By authorizing instruction in

techniques of resistance beyond the single line of name, rank, and serial

number, they took account of the probability that that line would sometimes

be breached. Rather than the cancellation recommended by his ]CS colleagues, LeMay urged reaffirmation of the 1955 policy.

Resolution ofthe Training Issue

In his response to the ]CS memorandum three months later, on 3 ]anuary 1964, Secretary McNamara rejected the recommendations of both

parties to the controversy. He recognized, he said, an inconsistency in the

guidance and in the approaches the several services had been following. This

required correction, but he saw a need for additional information before a

policy decision could be made. He doubted that any service was providing

proper and sufficient instruction to its men with regard to the situation that

would confront them as prisoners of war. A possible exception was the Air

Force, but he was concerned that by giving instruction in successive lineof-resistance techniques that service might be unintentionally encouraging
Prisoner of War Policy Before Vietnam 25

its personnel to use them "before they have reached the point beyond which

they cannot be expected to hold to the short response." Furthermore-and

significantly-the secretary could not agree to different types of training

being given personnel who were "equally susceptible to capture."

McNamara asked the Joint Chiefs to review thoroughly the Code of

Conduct training currently under way within each service and then to "develop

specific recommendations for instructional materials for use in training all

members of the Armed Forces." His further comments, moreover, prescribed

what the nature of those instructional materials should be:

I believe that the wording of Article V of the Code of Conduct, providing that the individual will evade answering questions

beyond name, rank, service number and date of birth "to the utmost

of my ability," must continue to be binding on military personnel.

I believe further in the principle that once a man is placed in a position where it is beyond his ability to resist answering further

questions, he must understand that any further responses are made

entirely on his own responsibility, and that the degree of accountability to which he will ultimately be held will depend upon the

nature of those responses and their results. Accepting these fundamental principles, I can see the need for a program which will ensure

(a) that the military man clearly understands his obligations and

responsibilities in this regard, (b) that he is properly informed and

instructed as to what he can expect from his captors, and (c) that

there is a consistent approach by all Services in this matter. 14

By the date of the McNamara memorandum the issue had been in contention for nearly a year. The Air Force leaders continued to strive for an

outcome that would accommodate their view. The belief that the USAF

program fulfilled the true intent of the Code of Conduct was held as

fervently by the department's secretary, Eugene M. Zuckert, as by his professional subordinates. Further, as one internal communication had put it,

"part of the Air Force stake in this ideological controversy is the fact that we

have trained over 70,000 combat crew members along the Air Force line."35

In September 1963, a month before the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their opposing views to the secretary of defense, Zuckert had

appointed a special Air Force Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War to

evaluate the resistance training for airmen. Some of the members came

from civilian life, including the distinguished lawyer who served as chairman, Victor A. Sachse, but this hardly lessened the partisan character

of the committee in the eyes of many observers. The Sachse committee

reviewed Air Force training materials, heard the testimony of Air Force
26 THE LONG ROAD HOME

experts, studied USAF scientific reports, and sent one of its members to participate in the resistance training course at Stead AFB. "In brief," read the

committee report of 25 November 1963, "we conclude that United States

Air Force policies are consistent with, and in fact required by, Executive

Order 10631." Limiting military personnel to a single line of response

they again considered "unrealistic." So, too, was the DoD pamphlet that

appeared to set that limit, if the only acceptable interpretation was one

that would "equate the endeavor of the prisoner of war to stand on name,

rank, serial number, and date of birth, with a rigid requirement that he

succeed in doing so. "36

The advisory committee recommended that the secretary of the Air

Force reaffirm existing policies and training and that he "respectfully advise

the Secretary of Defense" of the committee's conclusions. Zuckert immediately brought the report to the attention of the Office of the Secretary

of Defense (OSD), but it was evident that it did not greatly influence

McNamara's reply of 3 January 1964. Later in January, Zuckert formally

submitted the advisory committee's report to McNamara, with three

recommendations based on its conclusions. First, Zuckert urged that it

be considered by the Joint Chiefs in developing their recommendations.

A 314-page document, the report reproduced a number of studies as well

as much of the testimony taken, and Zuckert characterized it as the most

extensive and up-to-date review of the subject available within the military

services. Second, he suggested the desirability of establishing within Defense

an agency with responsibility for gathering, analyzing, and retaining all

information on PW policy, training, and prisoner recovery activities. Third,

adopting the boldest of his advisory committee's proposals, Zuckert recommended that the USAF resistance training program be considered for joint

use by all services until uniform instructional materials could be developed. 37

It is perhaps understandable that there was a touch of asperity in

McNamara's rejection of the last of these recommendations, which he termed

inconsistent with the guidance in his memorandum of 3 January. But he

did refer the Air Force Advisory Committee's report to the Joint Chiefs for

consideration in connection with their existing assignment, and he also asked

them for recommendations on the proposed establishment of a Defense

repository for all PW information. 38

The Joint Chiefs submitted their memorandum to the secretary of

defense on 28 May 1964. With the major questions already settled by the

secretary's guidance, they voiced no dissenting views. They endorsed unanimously the interpretation of the Code of Conduct McNamara had provided,

and their statement, often in the secretary's own words, could not be faulted

for lack of rigor. As a controlling principle, the ]CS declared that "there
Prisoner of War Policy Before Vietnam 27

must be uniform indoctrination in support of the entire Code of Conduct."

Their survey of training within the services had confirmed that there already

existed a general uniformity of scope and content, except for the manner

and methods of teaching resistance to enemy interrogation. To supersede the

Wilson memorandum of 1955, "which has caused the existing divergency,"

they recommended a new Defense directive, for which they provided

a draft. 39

The JCS draft appeared on 8 July 1964, with only technical changes,

as DoD Directive 1300.7, "Training and Education Measures Necessary to

Support the Code of Conduct." The emphasis on uniformity of indoctrination ran throughout the directive. Its objectives were to insure that:

A. The Military Departments maintain energetic, uniform, and

continuing training programs in behalf of the Code of Conduct,

including training whereby individuals are taught to resist under

the varying degrees of hostile interrogation.

B. All training programs in support of the Code of Conduct

inculcate in each member of the Armed Forces:

1. A clear and uniform understanding of his obligations,

responsibilities, and the behavior expected of him in combat

or captivity.

2. A positive and unswerving acceptance of, belief in,

and devotion to the spirit and letter of the Code of Conduct, and the recognition that the Code is a binding military

obligation.

3. An unqualified determination and belief in his ability

to oppose and defeat physically, mentally, and morally all

enemy efforts against him, his fellow Serviceman, and his

country during peacetime, combat, or captivity.

4. A confidence in his ability to deny information and to

resist enemy interrogation, exploitation and indoctrination.

C. There is a consistency in all Department of Defense Code of

Conduct training programs and training materials.

The assistant secretary of defense (manpower), in coordination with the

secretaries of the military departments, received the task of insuring "that

all joint training materials conform with the above policies and the guidance contained in the inclosures hereto."4o

The major enclosure-the extensive and specific "Guidance for Development of Training Programs and Instructional Material in Support of the

Code of Conduct"-set forth the principle of resistance on the single line of

name, rank, serial number, and date of birth. Its paragraph I B (3) specified
28 THE LONG ROAD HOME

that each serviceman would be instructed, among other things, III enemy

interrogation methods and techniques. The instruction should:

(a) Include description of the adverse physical and mental conditions under which these methods and techniques are effected.

(b) Explain how resistance can be accomplished under the

varying interrogation techniques and degrees of coercion which may

be utilized by an enemy in order to assure the Serviceman's ability

to adhere to the provisions of subparagraph (c) below.

(c) Explain that dogmatic refusal to answer a question of an

interrogator with: "I will not answer your questions"; "I will not

say anymore"; "My orders are to give my name, rank, Service

number, and date of birth; I will not give you anything else"; or

to claim inability to think, to claim ignorance, to claim inability

to talk, and to claim inability to comprehend, constitute adherence

to name, rank, Service number, and date of birth.

This instruction will be so explicit that each servIceman

understands:

1. The consequence of not holding to name, rank, Service

number, and date of birth.

2.. [almost verbatim from the McNamara memorandum] That

the wording of Article V of the Code of Conduct providing that

the individual will evade answering questions beyond name, rank,

Service number, and date of birth "to the utmost of my ability,"

is binding on all military personnel. It is a principle that once a

man is placed in a position where it is beyond his ability to resist

answering further questions, further responses are made on his

own responsibility.

*******

i. That should he be subjected to extremes of coercion, he

will avoid the disclosure of any information, the making of any

oral or written statement, or the performance of any act harmful

to the interests of the United States or its Allies, detrimental to

fellow prisoners, or which will provide aid or comfort to the enemy.

At the drafting stage Air Force representatives had made an effort

to introduce statements that would still allow USAF instructors some

opportunity to speak of what a man might do when forced to go beyond

the prescribed response. lJ ] But the passage taken from the McNamara

guidance clearly ruled out official teaching of successive line-ofresistance techniques. Equally definite was the requirement for uniform
Prisoner of War Policy Before Vietnam 29

traInIng methods and materials. But beyond that, the strict construction

embodied in the Defense directive of 8 July 1964 introduced a new and

more demanding tone that affected all activity in support of the Code of

Conduct. Instruction should lead each member of the armed forces to

"the recognition that the Code is a binding military obligation"-a statement in some degree more exacting than President Eisenhower's original

declaration in 1955 that every member of the armed forces was "expected

to measure up to the standards embodied in this Code of Conduct." Thus,

more than formerly, the Code tended to take on the attributes of a military

order, with the corollary that any failure to fulfill its provisions would be

a chargeable military offense.

In their reply of 28 May 1964 the Joint Chiefs had also referred briefly

to the report of the Air Force Advisory Committee, noting their consideration of its findings and recommendations. They dealt at some length with

the question of establishing a Defense agency charged with the assembly,

analysis, and maintenance of all information on prisoner of war policy,

training, and recovery and recommended against it. Observing that each

service already had an office with functional responsibilities in this area,

they maintained that the existing organization at the OSD and JCS levels

could handle any joint actions desired by the secretary of defense. Also,

the JCS had already included in the proposed 000 directive a requirement that each military department establish a system for "exchanging

lessons learned and other material incident to the Code of Conduct to

further coordination and cross-fertilization of knowledge and effort."

The Joint Chiefs closed their memorandum by stressing a principle that

would underlie much of the future consideration of captivity mattersthat the dedication to duty that the Code imposed on every member of

the armed forces required in turn that the U.S. government fulfill its

"unqualified obligation to spare no reasonable effort in obtaining the

earliest possible release of any US military personnel should they have

the misfortune to become prisoners. "12

Nothing more was heard of the idea of establishing a central 000

repository for PW policy information and relevant research findings. Even

if accepted, however, it would have gone only a short way toward filling an

organizational void that had opened at the OSD level. Wilson's Directive

5120.22 of 18 August 1955 had placed responsibility for department-wide

coordination of policy matters pertaining to prisoners of war with the

assistant secretary of defense (manpower). On 26 June 1963 this directive was

rescinded, with a simple notation that it had "served the purpose for which

it was issued. "4.3 The action was a routine one, apparently an incident in a
30 THE LONG ROAD HOME

general review for the purpose of removing outdated and unnecessary

regulations. Along with other evidence, the fact that the cancellation generated no recorded discussion indicates that the directive was already a

dead letter.*

Apart from the contention over Code of Conduct training, prisoner

of war matters were not of major concern at that moment in 1963, but

recision of the directive may have been unfortunate. The time when the

United States would participate on a large scale in the Southeast Asian

hostilities lay less than two years ahead. The introduction of U.S. ground

combat forces into South Vietnam and the launching of air operations

against the North in 1965 made inevitable the emergence of a PW-MIA

problem of constantly widening dimensions. Whether DoD would have

benefited from the existence-on record but long in disuse-of a formal

assignment of central coordinating responsibility can only be a matter for

speculation. As it was, several years elapsed before the department's leaders

developed a comprehensive and purposeful organization, directed from the

OSD level, to manage the complex of PW/MIA problems.

* The responsibility vested in the assistant secretary of defense (manpower) by DoD

Directive 5120.22 quickly became identified almost exclusively with the task of

assembling and presenting reports to the Defense Advisory Committee, which Secretary

Wilson had asked to reconvene briefly each year to review progress in the implementation

of the several decisions that had resulted from its report. The last of these annual meetings occurred in 1958. The lack of pressing policy questions in the area of PW affairs

thereafter may help to explain the lapse of the 1955 directive into an inactive status,

which appears to have been complete by late 1960. The basic definition of the functions

and authority of the assistant secretary of defense (manpower) was contained in 000

Directive 5120.27. A revision of this document issued on 31 January 1961 made no mention of the PW coordinating responsibility, either directly or by cross-reference to 000

Directive 5120.22.
2

Organizing for Policy Decision

and Planning

The dominant ro~e of the Office of the Secre~ary of Defe~se in Ope.ration HomecomIng-the return to the United States In the spnng

of 1973 of nearly 600 Americans from their captivity in Vietnam-was a

marked departure from the practice of previous conflicts. Under similar

circumstances at the time of the Korean armistice in 1953, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff had largely established policy, while the military services and the

U.S. Far East Command had provided detailed planning, coordination,

and direction of recovery of U.S. prisoners of war. In 1973, by contrast,

a small full-time task force in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense, International Security Affairs (ISA), augmented by a few representatives of the military services, directed the homecoming activity on an

almost minute-by-minute basis. This arrangement followed from a decision

made in mid-1967 whereby OSD assumed primary responsibility for policy

formulation in prisoner of war matters.

Since 1953 OSD had grown in size, authority, and competence. In particular, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) had established

its primacy as the foreign affairs arm of the Department of Defense and the

principal channel for dealing with the Department of State. But the distinctive organization that evolved for PW matters under OSD developed only

haltingly until 1967 because of bureaucratic resistance to change, slow recognition of the increasing scope of the problem, and some delay in accepting

that the United States was, and would continue to be, engaged in a fullscale war.

Organizational development for PW matters within the Department of

Defense lagged also because of the unchallenged oversight of the Department

of State, until 1969, in all matters of policy and operations looking toward

return of the captured Americans. Pursuit of that goal was almost exclusively

31
32 THE LONG ROAD HOME

a diplomatic function, involving relations with foreign governments and

international organizations and attempts to engage the captors in negotiations. Since these activities lay squarely in State's realm of authority and

expertise, Defense agencies generally were limited to a supporting roleone that officials tended to see as best discharged without disturbing

existing methods and relationships. A memorandum from Deputy Secretary

of Defense Cyrus Vance in July 1966 reinforced State Department authority.

It enjoined Defense personnel to defer to State's principal officer in this

field as the "single spokesman" for the U.S. government in matters affecting

prisoners of war.]

Proposals for organizational change within DoD generally derived

from a desire to strengthen interdepartmental relations and to improve the

channels for exchange of information with the State Department. Most of

the proposals also reflected the continuing dissatisfaction in the Pentagon

with the apparent ineffectiveness of State's efforts on behalf of the prisoners.

The latter feeling had a part in shaping recommendations that the Joint

Chiefs of Staff submitted to the secretary of defense on 26 February 1964-

the date that may be taken as a starting point for tracing the evolution of

high-level organization for prisoner of war policy and planning within DoD.

DoD Discontent with State PWActivities

Unhappiness in the Pentagon with State's handling of PW matters

was not exclusively a product of the Vietnam War. It first became manifest

following an incident in Korea in May 1963, when two U.S. Army captains

on a helicopter check of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) landed in North

Korea and were held there on charges of spying. Despite diplomatic efforts

to obtain their freedom, including approaches to the Soviets and to the

Chinese Communist representative in Warsaw, discussion in the UN General

Assembly, mediation attempts by the International Committee of the Red

Cross, and agreement by some U.S. allies to refuse visas to North Koreans,

the pilots remained in captivity.

In January 1964 State and Defense officials in Washington were preparing a joint message to the commander in chief, United Nations Command,

concerning a direct approach he proposed to make to the North Korean

commander about return of the pilots. The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to

broaden their consideration of the specific problem to embrace the release of

other U.S. military personnel in Communist hands, including seven Army

men held by the Viet Cong in Vietnam since the fall of 1963, and to look

to future cases as well. It was typical of the way Washington perceived the

problem at the time that the Joint Chiefs did not treat the incidents in
Organizing for Policy Decision and Planning 33

South Vietnam as a special category nor did they anticipate that the U.S.

military involvement there was destined to expand into the major commitment it ultimately became.

In a memorandum for the secretary of defense on 26 February 1964,

the Joint Chiefs expressed their increasing concern about recovering

military captives from the Communists. They pointed out that U.S.

security interests would continue to require military personnel to expose

themselves to capture in such situations as the patrols along the Korean

DMZ, advisory duties in Vietnam, and reconnaissance missions over

Communist-bloc territory. The U.S. government had an obligation to

protect these men insofar as possible and to obtain their release if detained.

The chiefs recognized that continuing diplomatic efforts had been made

to free the nine captives held by the North Koreans and the Viet Cong,*

but without success. They realized that part of the difficulty lay in the

lack of formal relations with either North Korea or North Vietnam, which

limited the opportunities for direct diplomatic leverage. The experience

to date led them to conclude that "stronger, nondiplomatic pressures

should be considered."

The Joint Chiefs recommended that Secretary McNamara propose to

the secretary of state and perhaps the National Security Council new and

more effective measures to secure the release of U.S. personnel then in

Communist custody. In addition, the United States should improve its

readiness to institute countermeasures in response to any capture incident in the future. The chiefs believed the actions open to consideration

should include both military and diplomatic measures of varying degrees

of severity. They explored the possibilities in more detail in several attachments to the memorandum. 2

While ISA studied the JCS proposal, a new capture incident occurred;

waiting to observe its outcome may have contributed to the delay in further

action. On 10 March 1964 a U.S. Air Force RB-66 strayed into the air space

of East Germany and was shot down by Soviet aircraft. The three crewmembers parachuted into Soviet custody. Foremost among the representations

made by the State Department was Secretary Rusk's solemn assurance to the

Soviet ambassador on 19 March that the reconnaissance bomber had not

been engaged in an intelligence mission. Rusk coupled this with a warning

not to make a major incident of the affair and with firmly worded reminders

of the effect that continued detention of the airmen might have on other

projects requiring U.S.-Soviet cooperation. The Soviet authorities returned

one flyer two days later and the remaining two on 27 March.]

* The commonly used term for the insurgent force in South Vietnam, more formally

known as the National Liberation Front.
34 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Writing to Rusk on 4 April 1964, Deputy Secretary Vance expressed

appreciation for the State Department's efforts to date, including the recent

success in Germany, but said he shared fully the JCS concerns. In view

of the continuing difficulty of applying diplomatic leverage to the Communists, he proposed a search for new and more effective means of obtaining

the release of captuted U.S. personnel. Vance named Deputy Assistant

Secretary of Defense (ISA) Peter Solbert as his representative and suggested

that a State Department official work with Solbert to develop a program. 4

In connection with Solbert's assignment, ISA asked the Defense

Intelligence Agency for a study of incidents since the Korean War involving release by Communist countries of captive U.S. military personnel.

ISA believed that insight into past Communist behavior could assist

in the assessment of measures that might now be proposed. While it

seemed unlikely that any "universally applicable formulae" would be

revealed, any information that might lead to improved methods of

dealing with Communist-bloc countries on prisoner release or exchange

would be welcomed.)

The resume of release incidents reached ISA late in April, with an

accompanying commentary from the Joint Staff. Analysts in the Joint

Staff had been unable to discern a pattern or identify factors consistently

favorable to release of captives in the evidence available. If any conclusion

could be drawn it was simply that prisoners were freed when their intelligence or propaganda value was exhausted or when the Communists expected

to profit in some way from their release. Diplomatic representations could be

effective where normal relations existed and a range of quid pro quo inducements was available; they were obviously less effective where direct contact

did not exist. The International Committee of the Red Cross was perceived

as useful in contacting prisoners and ascertaining their welfare but of little

help in procuting their release. 6

On 5 May 1964 Solbert sent the Joint Staff resume and a copy of

the original JCS memorandum of 26 February to Jeffrey C. Kitchen, deputy

assistant secretary of state for politico-military affairs, with a proposal that

they meet to discuss the matter. Since no clear-cut findings had emerged

from the study, Solbert suggested that Kitchen's staff might improve its usefulness by filling in the political context in which each incident had

occurred. His own conclusion was that "what might be called extraneous

factors are at least as important in influencing Communist behavior as any

specific steps we might take."7

At this stage the momentum generated by the Joint Chiefs' February

memorandum began to subside in a mixtute of inconclusive meetings and

further study. On 8 June Solbert advised the director of the Joint Staff that
Organizing for Policy Decision and Planning 35

he and Kitchen had concluded that "our experience in negotiations for

the release of U.S. military prisoners of the Communists still does not

permit us to choose confidently between alternate means." Therefore, State

would survey the experience of the CIA in captivity matters and request of

the British any pertinent data from their anti-guerrilla campaign in Malaya.

Defense had agreed to obtain the views of the commanders of the unified

commands regarding incidents in their areas. 8

Replies from the commanders revealed no more of patterns and common factors than the earlier resume. 9 Whether the State Department ever

obtained any useful information from the CIA and the British is not clear

from DoD records. In any case, the study effort ended by early fall. Meanwhile, after a full year of detention the two helicopter pilots had been returned

by the North Koreans in May, under conditions humiliating to the United

States. lo Now the only U.S. military prisoners were those held in South

Vietnam by the Viet Cong, with whom not even an indirect channel of

negotiation existed.

In one of his earlier exchanges with Solbert, Kitchen had indicated

some of the basis for State's reservations regarding the course advocated

by the ]CS. Military measures applied against North Vietnam in an effort

to secure prisoner releases would "run the risk of being confused with

military pressures for other goals," with effects that might be contrary to

overall U.S. policy in Vietnam. Kitchen thought "an inherent ambiguity"

in the situation came to light when the following question was considered:

"Should pressures be applied on North Vietnam, or on the Viet Cong in

South Vietnam, in order to effect release of American prisoners?" Writing

in May 1964 he observed that "the US is not in a position to exert direct

military pressure on the Viet Cong, and it would be difficult or impossible

to relate South Vietnamese pressure on the Viet Cong to the case of

American prisoners. North Vietnam would most likely deny any connection

with the Viet Cong or the American prisoners if efforts were made to apply

pressure on it in order to effect their release."

Currently State's principal attempts to aid the captive Americans were

made through the International Committee of the Red Cross, Kitchen

wrote. "Such efforts at the moment appear to offer the best channel through

which to establish contact with the prisoners and to work for their ultimate release."11

Suspicion persisted in some quarters of Defense that State lacked wholehearted commitment to finding a solution to the PW problem. After a

meeting of State and Defense officials in November 1964, Solbert observed

that the questions and comments of the military representatives had showed

them clearly skeptical that everything possible was being done to retrieve
36 THE LONG ROAD HOME

the prisoners of war. Contributing to this skepticism was a lack of knowledge concerning the actions undertaken by the Department of State, and

Solbert thought there was a corresponding ignorance in that department of

information available in Defense.

In a memorandum for Solis Horwitz, assistant secretary of defense

(administration), on 29 December 1964, Solbert underscored the need for

improvement in the exchange of PW information among State, Defense,

and the intelligence agencies. Further, he believed State needed to clarify

its internal organization for handling PW affairs, ideally through the designation of a single office to exercise that responsibility. Defense, also, should

develop clear lines of authority. Within OSD, he noted, manpower, ISA, and

public affairs officials, the comptroller, and the assistant to the secretary of

defense for legislative affairs all were concerned with some aspect of the

PW problem, and "there may be others." Solbert saw the need for a focal

point established in Defense to deal with a counterpart in State. The

designated OSD office could also establish uniform procedures within DoD,

respond to congressional queries, and assist the military departments in

meeting the needs of the prisoners' next of kin.

Apparently Solbert had thought the Office of the Deputy Assistant

Secretary of Defense (Manpower) for Military Personnel Policy would be

the appropriate focal point in OSD, but his discussions revealed that

officials there opposed changing the arrangement under which the military services dealt directly with State. While reaffirming ISA's responsibility

for policy directed at obtaining the release of prisoners, Solbert asked

Horwitz to determine where responsibility properly lay for policy and procedures relating to the exchange of information with State on individual

prisoner cases. 12

On 11 January 1965 Horwitz announced in a memorandum to ISA

his conclusion that ISA should have the responsibility for information

exchange with State.

The establishment within OSD of a special office or agency to act

as a DoD focal point to carry out procedures does not appear to

be necessary. ISA is already the focal point for policy aspects. The

military departments are capable of and have traditionally exercised

direct contact as operating agencies with State, the Congress and

next of kin on matters pertaining to individual service members,

and no reason is seen to superimpose an OSD operating office over

the military departments in this instance.

It is recommended that a Department of Defense Directive be

developed by ISA, assisted by the military departments, in which

the policy is enunciated, desired procedures are delineated and
Organizing for Policy Decision and Planning 37

the responsibility for carrying out the policy and procedures is

assigned to the military departments. 1l

ISA accepted the decision and instigated the next move. At a StateDefense meeting on 15 January 1965 the two departments agreed to provide each other with a list of points of contact for various actions relating

to prisoners of war. In transmitting the Defense list to State on 3 February, the director of ISA's Policy Planning Staff, Brig. Gen. John W. Vogt,

USAF, made it clear that on casualty reporting, dealings with next of kin,

and all matters concerning specific individuals, the military services would

communicate directly with State. For this purpose he listed officials in all

four of the services. Since no redrawing of lines of responsibility had

occurred at the OSD level, points of contact there remained about as

before, in ISA, Public Affairs, and the Office of Legislative Liaison. The

contact list contained no reference to OASD(Manpower).]4

This essentially ended the process begun by the JCS in calling for new

and more effective measures on behalf of the prisoners. No such measures

were adopted; no improved organization for formulating them was developed; even the suggestion that ISA draft a DoD directive was not pursued.

Pentagon officials continued to view the State Department's approach

to PW matters as largely reactive and tending to concede the initiative to

the Communists.

The military leaders made further recommendations for strong action

after the Viet Cong executed three captive Americans later in 1965, but

again JCS proposals gained little more than acceptance in principle, even

though by then the United States was engaged both in ground combat in the South and an air campaign against North Vietnam and was

committing ever larger forces to these undertakings. The first incident,

the murder of an Army sergeant in June, was coupled with Viet Cong

threats of further executions if the South Vietnamese government carried

out the death sentences it had imposed on imprisoned VC terrorists.

On 1 July the Joint Chiefs requested approval of retaliatory air strikes

against a power plant and a fuel storage area in North Vietnam if another

prisoner execution occurred or a U.S. official was kidnapped or assassinated. Secretary McNamara approved the concept but ruled out advance

decisions on specific reprisal targets; he decided the listing of possible

targets should continue, however, along with efforts to ensure the readiness

of retaliatory forces. 15

When the Viet Cong executed two more U.S. soldiers in September the

Joint Chiefs firmly supported the retaliatory measures recommended by

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in Saigon, which included striking a new

category of targets in North Vietnam and publishing a list of the Viet Cong's
38 THE LONG ROAD HOME

political leaders with notice that the United States considered them to be

individual war criminals subject to legal trial and punishment. Expanding

on the first of these proposals, the Joint Chiefs declared that timely military operations were essential when attempting to deter the Communists

from further atrocities. The air strikes should occur with a minimum of

delay and "should depart significantly from the restraints observed" in

previous operations so that Hanoi would unmistakably recognize the attacks

as reprisals for the execution of prisoners. They recommended two targets

for immediate strike whenever word was received that another U.S.

serviceman had been put to death. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed

that "the adoption of an appropriately firm and clear policy with regard to

US protection of the rights of our prisoners should be confirmed by an

early public pronouncement of this policy, at the highest official level, in

the plainest and strongest terms."I(,

In his reply in early November 1965 McNamara noted that the

JCS recommendations had been reviewed with the Department of State.

He reaffirmed the permission to list possible reprisal targets but pronounced that "no decision on U.S. military courses of action in the event of

future executions of U.S. prisoners should be taken in advance." As for the

recommended high-level public statement, McNamara wrote that "the two

Departments are considering whether a demarche to the USSR might be

more effective in transmitting our views regarding treatment of prisoners."17

It was a reply likely to heighten the military leaders' impatience with the

apparent unwillingness of State to countenance any action beyond its own

customary diplomatic procedures.

During the last months of 1965 the search for new and more effective

measures to obtain release of prisoners of war took second priority to halting the executions and forestalling war crimes trials. The State Department

achieved success in the first of these emergency objectives and won at least a

temporary stay in the second, chiefly by exercising un publicized diplomatic

pressure through third countries. Within the Pentagon these accomplishments

seem to have received less than full credit, owing perhaps to incomplete information or to a tendency to discount State's actions as no more than should

be expected. The main concern continued to be the lack of perceptible progress

toward freeing the U.S. captives, who numbered over 70 by the end of 1965.

Inftrmal Interdepartmental Relations

Operating under a rather tenuous point-of-contact arrangement,

interdepartmental relations on PW matters were intermittent during 1965
Organizing for Policy Decision and Planning 39

and lacked the coherence that regularly scheduled meetings of designated representatives might have given them. The need for more detailed

information and more frequent discussion of mutual concerns manifested

itself at the working level, however, and there an effort arose to draw the

interested parties together in an informal association that would partially

fill the organizational void. The initiative came from the Army staff,

mainly officers under the deputy chief of staff for personnel (DCS/PER),

who telephoned invitations to State, OSD, DIA, the American Red

Cross, the Navy, and the Air Force to a meeting in the Pentagon on

1 September 1965. 18

Three State Department officials and a vice president of the American Red Cross (ARC), Robert C. Lewis, attended the meeting, as did nine

members of various Army staff agencies, a DIA representative, and the

chiefs of the Navy and USAF Casualty Branches. Although invited, ISA

and OSD Public Affairs did not participate. The purpose stated in the

agenda was simply "to exchange information pertaining to detainees and

personnel missing in Vietnam," but in fact the discussion at the September

gathering ranged over most of the subjects that were to persist as problems

throughout the war-release of information, notification of next of kin

and subsequent relations with the families, mail and packages, and actions

to gain release of the captives. At the session's end the attendees voted

overwhelmingly to continue the meetings and to hold another the first of

the following month. 19

Meetings occurred monthly thereafter, with the Army acting as sponsor and providing the chairman, and with a Joint Staff officer added to the

attendance. Much of the discussion went toward developing standard

procedures for handling the basic aspects of PW administration, leading

finally to a special meeting on 9 November 1965. There representatives of

State, ARC, and the casualty branches of the four military services produced a "Memorandum of Understanding... on the Assignment of

Responsibilities for Americans Held Captive in South East Asia." This

agreement defined for the first time the methods by which the services would

render casualty reports to the State Department and to the American Red

Cross, the responsibilities of the ARC in its dealings with the International

Committee of the Red Cross, and the procedures for handling letters and

packages to and from prisoners of war. With some alterations to conform to

changing circumstances, this agreement remained in effect throughout the

period of the Vietnam War. 20

When the informal interdepartmental group met again in December,

attendance by State, ARC, DIA, the Joint Staff, and Army continued, but

the other military services did not appear, possibly having concluded that
40 THE LONG ROAD HOME

drafting of the memorandum of understanding had largely fulfilled the

purpose of the sessions. In any case, the desire to bring the other services

back to the table prompted the Army members to begin seeking a sponsor

for the meetings at the OSD level. They found some encouragement in the

fact that in December an ISA official was present for the first time, with

promise of regular attendance thereafter. 21

By the February 1966 meeting Navy and Marine Corps representatives

had returned, and OSD Manpower and OSD Public Affairs had also

joined. Army members pressed again for sponsorship at the OSD level.

They argued that the matters discussed affected the Department of

Defense as a whole and that OSD chairmanship would stimulate additional representation from the other services, possibly extending to officials

at the policy level. The ISA, Manpower, and Public Affairs attendees "agreed

to take it under advisement and provide an answer at the next meeting."22

Officials in ISA soon concluded that the matters dealt with in the conference were chiefly in the realm of personnel services and hence did not

fall in their area of primary concern. The meetings seemed worthwhile

and ISA would still participate, but the topics discussed were "not of such

a policy nature" as to warrant assumption of the chairmanshipY

Meanwhile the OSD Manpower representative, Col. M. P. DiFusco,

investigated whether his own office might provide OSD oversight of the

conference while leaving the administrative burden of arranging, convening, and recording the meetings to be borne by the military services on

a rotating basis. To discuss this and other possible arrangements he met with

representatives of the four services in late February. DiFusco reported to his

superior that while all parties recognized that the conference could not substitute for normal policy and operational channels, it was beneficial to

those attending and should continue. Moreover, the Navy and the Air Force

(which had missed the last three meetings) had agreed to participate actively

thereafter and would enlarge their representation to include personnel policy

officials as well as those responsible for casualty reporting. He recommended

informing ISA and the other interested DoD agencies that Manpower would

assume responsibility for OSD's role in arranging furure meetings. 24

Beginning with the meeting on 17 March 1966 the conference was

sponsored by OSD Manpower, though the meeting chairmanship rotated

among the services. In an opening statement DiFusco emphasized that the

purpose of the conference was to exchange information and to discuss mutual

problems and ideas for their solution; the conference was not intended to

act on its own or "outside the Service oriented channel." The 22 attendees

included the usual representation from State, ARC, DIA, ISA, and the

Joint Staff, plus the four military services. 2

)
Organizing for Policy Decision and Planning 41

With little change in form and attendance, the conference continued

to meet thereafter. Its name, like its procedures and recordkeeping, was

never formally standardized, though it appeared most frequently as "the

OSD Conference on Prisoners and Missing in Vietnam." Discontinued in

June 1971, it resumed meeting in mid-1972 to serve as a lower-level coordinating mechanism during the intensified planning for Operation

Homecoming. During its early years, however, the OSD conference was the

one forum in which PW problems were discussed freely among the interested

agencies, where administrators of casualty branches could informally review

their requirements with OSD policymakers, and where matters could be

pursued directly with the representative of the American Red Cross, who

was unfailing in his attendance. These features yielded benefits in the entire

area of PW affairs, but even with the assumption of sponsorship by OASD

Manpower in March 1966 the conference clearly did not have the stature

to carry the principal burden of interdepartmental coordination. Further

developments in that direction, however, were soon to come.

A New Level ofActivity-the Emergence ofHarriman

In the spring of 1966, when North Vietnamese threats of war crimes

trials intensified, the highest levels of the U.S. government began to give

serious attention to the development of an organization to deal with PW

matters. The spur to action came from an influential member of Congress,

Senator Robert F. Kennedy of New York. In a letter to Secretary of State

Dean Rusk on 19 April 1966, Kennedy expressed his concern and frustration over the paucity of imaginative action undertaken on behalf of the

prisoners of war. He had come away from a meeting with Philip B.

Heymann, acting head of State's Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs

(SCA), convinced that the government was not doing enough for the

prisoners or their families. His criticism of State Department inaction

corresponded with the thoughts of many in the Pentagon:

Too often... we neglect a possible course of action because

we think it will not work-instead of trying it to see if it works or

not. For example, I asked whether any attempts had been made

to negotiate prisoner exchanges directly with either North Vietnam

or the Viet Congo The answer was that approaches had been made

through the International Red Cross. But no approaches had been

made either directly or through the Soviet Union. No efforts had

been made to find a non-governmental third party to negotiate

on behalf of the prisoners or their families-to take the role James

Donovan played in the Cuban prisoner exchange, for example.
42 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Mr. Heymann suggested that all the efforts we have made

have been rebuffed by the DRY and the yc. But in at least one

case-the negotiations for the release of Gustav Hertz-the YC

did make a responsive offer last year, which we then refused. They

no longer stand by the offer, which we are now prepared to accept;

but they did make at least this one positive step.

At any rate, I do not think we can speculate on what the YC or

DRY response would be to any approach.... I want to add my

concern to yours, to urge that efforts to free them go forward with

all possible speed. 26

Kennedy's complaining stirred not only the State Department but

the White House as well and led to the creation of an Interdepartmental

Prisoner of War Committee "to devise and obtain action on additional

measures looking toward establishment of contact with, and hopefully

release of, American prisoners of the Viet Cong and the DRY." It met for

the first time on 29 April 1966 under Heymann's chairmanship. Membership came mainly from the bureaus of the State Department, with single

representatives of the CIA, the Joint Staff, and OSDY

Three weeks after formation of the Interdepartmental Committee,

Secretary Rusk took an action that proved to be of greater significance. On

18 May 1966 he announced the appointment of Ambassador at Large

W. Averell Harriman to assume general supervision of the department's

actions relating to both U.S. and enemy prisoners of war in Vietnam. 28

This appointment appears to have evoked enthusiasm and high expectations in the Pentagon. Mainly to avoid confusion in public statements

concerning the threatened war crimes trials, but at least partly to indicate

000 support for Harriman, Deputy Secretary Vance issued a directive on

26 July 1966. "I believe it would be most desirable if one individual in

the Department of State were designated to be the spokesman for the entire

Government on all matters relating to POW's," he wrote. Vance indicated

that 000 officials should confine their comments to a simple statement

that the United States was doing everything possible to protect the rights

of its missing personnel and leave all substantive statements on U.S. or

enemy prisoners of war in Vietnam to the State Department. Thus, the

memorandum had the effect of making Harriman the single spokesman for

the U.S. government on all PW matters. 29

The Interdepartmental Prisoner of War Committee began its work

with optimism and a schedule of monthly meetings. As time went on,

however, and the few projects that did emerge from its discussions foundered

on Vietnamese Communist intransigence, the meetings became less frequent

and the discussions less consequential. The departure of Heymann from his
Organizing for Policy Decision and Planning 43

post in SCA may also have been a factor. The meetings trailed off in 1967,

and by midyear they had ceased. 3D

The Interdepartmental Committee proved no more effective in

reaching a solution to the PW problem than had earlier arrangements.

Harriman's efforts, though pursued with considerable vigor and evident personal concern for the plight of the prisoners of war, also brought few

immediate results. True, the executions ended and threats of war crimes

trials diminished. But the release of the prisoners, or even the assurance of

humane treatment, seemed as distant as ever in early 1967, and dissatisfaction with the situation grew more pronounced in the Pentagon. That feeling

ranked high among the influences that soon converged to produce a signal

advance in the 000 organization for dealing with PW affairs.

Decision to Establish a Prisoner o/War Policy Committee

Formation of the Department of Defense PW Policy Committee III

July 1967 occurred largely as the result of strong Air Force initiatives.

A major figure in influencing Air Force officials to take the lead was

Col. James L. Monroe, a reservist who had been closely associated with

PW matters since the end of World War II, while on active duty and later

as a social science research contractor working in the Washington area.

His views crystallized during his service as the secretary to the Air Force

Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War that assisted the secretary of the

Air Force during the Code of Conduct controversy in 1963. Thereafter

Monroe became increasingly convinced that responsibility for dealing

with prisoner of war matters within 000 was too diffused when located at

the level of the military departments. He saw a need for central direction

and stronger organization at the 050 level to permit both comprehensive

and uniform treatment of PW problems and more effective representation

of Defense interests within the U.S. government. At various times, including periods of active duty in his mobilization assignment in the Air Force

Directorate of Plans, Colonel Monroe sought opportunities to press his

views on officials in the Pentagon.

In mid-1965 Monroe succeeded in attracting the attention of Secretary

of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert, but his proposals for organizational

change were turned back by a report to the secretary from the Air Force

chief of staff, General John P. McConnell. On the basis of a full review by

the Air Staff, McConnell found Air Force programs in the PW area in

good order, with no need to establish a central office at the secretary's level
44 THE LONG ROAD HOME

to provide coordination and greater emphasis. He thought even less

desirable the formation of a separate OSD agency to monitor PW activities, pointing out that the Joint Chiefs had recommended against such

a proposal in 1963 and Secretary McNamara had accepted their advice. As

for Monroe's belief that the Air Force should be more active in initiating recommendations to the Department of Defense and the State Department, McConnell held that the Joint Chiefs were adequately discharging

this responsibili ty.'l

Failure did not dissuade Monroe, and the unfolding events of 1966

deepened his conviction that primary oversight of PW affairs belonged

at the OSD level. This was the year when it became generally recognized

that the United States was indeed engaged in major hostilities in which

the number of prisoners lost to the enemy would undoubtedly increase.

In early August 1966 Monroe presented his ideas in a conversation with

Dr. E. T. Ferraro, deputy under secretary of the Air Force for manpower.

To explore the subject further Ferraro convened a meeting on 16 August,

attended by Lt. Gen. J. B. Lampert, deputy assistant secretary of defense

(manpower), and Brig. Gen. W. W. Berg, deputy assistant secretary for

military personnel policy, in addition to Monroe and several Air Staff representatives. General Lampert dominated the discussion with his insistence

that the existing arrangements were proper and sufficient. The main conclusion reached was that there was "no wish to encourage further

centralization of authority in OSD. Those present appeared to believe

that the Service Secretaries should retain maximum responsibility."'2

It could be argued that this view merely restated a principle embodied

in recent pronouncements by the highest officers of the Defense Department. General Lampert pointed to a letter of 25 July 1966 in which

Deputy Secretary Cyrus Vance had advised Harriman that he was relying

on the secretaries of the military departments and their staffs to manage

PW affairs within each service (in this instance, specifically, to see to the just

and uniform treatment of returned prisoners). Lampert also stressed the contribution made to the effectiveness of the existing system by the meetings

of the OSD Conference on Prisoners in Vietnam, monitored and supported

by General Berg's office. The conference was "designed to be the clearinghouse for exchange of information so that representatives who attend can

insure that adequate action is taken in their own agencies."

Nevertheless, an acknowledgment of the possibility that present

arrangements might not be sufficient to address the ultimate need appeared

in another recorded conclusion of the discussion on 16 August 1966: "There

was general concern that the situation be watched very closely so that we

will be prepared for any contingencies which might develop. It was noted
Organizing for Policy Decision and Planning 45

that the number of prisoners is increasing steadily and that if these numbers

became extremely large, it may then be necessary to create some sort of a

standby central mechanism to monitor their situation. "33

The possibility of organizational change, thus tentatively raised,

received reinforcement as the war intensified. Less than a year later Colonel

Monroe's advocacy was to be rewarded with success. During a brief period

of active duty in June 1967 he received the task of preparing a short statement that would provide information and reassurance to the next of kin

of prisoners of war in Southeast Asia. In a memorandum for Secretary of

the Air Force Harold Brown he called attention to what he saw as deficiencies in DoD's handling of PW affairs.

Starting with his immediate problem, communication with next of

kin, Colonel Monroe described Air Force casualty reporting and assistance

to the families as well organized and receiving closer attention from OASD

(Manpower) than formerly. Nevertheless, performance of these duties suffered

from lack of timely information and recurring turnover of staff personnel,

so that those involved were often ill-prepared to advise families on conditions of captivity, the progress of diplomatic and other recovery efforts, and

what to expect when their serviceman returned home.

As for intelligence, Monroe observed that while CIA had increased

the number of personnel assigned to PW matters, no comparable increases

had occurred within DIA or the military services. He believed that lack of

enterprise by Defense officials had allowed CIA to assume the chairmanship of the weekly meeting with DIA and service representatives, held

primarily for analysis of PW letters received by the next of kin. This

correspondence, obtained from the families with specific promises that it

would be used only in the interests of the individual prisoner, had been too

widely disseminated. Moreover, it was being filed by some security agencies for possible use as evidence of misconduct, a breach of faith he found

greatly disturbing.

Monroe noted that ISA held primary responsibility for the Defense

aspects of interdepartmental coordination, but it had insufficient authority

and expertise to take the lead in a broader program to obtain the prisoners'

release. Other Defense activities in such areas as personnel management,

public affairs, and intelligence he judged too compartmentalized as discrete

functions. There existed a need for comprehensive policy guidance and a

central action office to infuse energy, impose uniformity on service plans

and programs, and strengthen the Defense performance in interdepartmental consultations.

Of more fundamental concern, Monroe found a lack of positive action

and initiative in general. U.S. counterpropaganda efforts, especially those of
46 THE LONG ROAD HOME

the State Department in publicizing enemy violations of the Geneva Convention, he judged essentially defensive and reactive. He believed the United

States wholly in the right in protesting violations and advocated exploiting this advantage more widely, particularly in the West. In the sufferings

of the U.S. prisoners and their families he saw a theme that could erode

North Vietnam's "pious image" as the unoffending victim of U.S. bombardment. If properly organized, DoD could play an important role in

a government-wide effort to place the North Vietnamese on the defensive

through "sustained and orchestrated" publicity on the PW issue. 34

When Secretary Brown received Monroe's memorandum on 6 July

1967 it already bore a strongly favorable endorsement from his executive

assistant, Col. Brian S. Gunderson, who had several years' experience with

PW matters. Gunderson offered his own views on the subject in a covering

memorandum. Seconding most of Monroe's criticisms and adding detail to

some, he stressed the fragmentation of decisionmaking both in the Air Force

and DoD and the urgent need for a top-level, centrally directed program. He

recommended that Brown forward Monroe's proposal for a unified Defense

approach to Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze and urge its approval.

Gunderson also commented forcefully on the use being made of the

prisoners' letters by several agencies, including the FBI, in developing files

of derogatory information on some individuals. Gunderson said that the

program of soliciting such correspondence from the wives lacked authoritative guidance regarding the sensitivity of the letters and the need for controlled and limited distribution, leaving the military services open to being

justly accused of betraying a trust. Moreover, he found it unacceptable that

outside agencies should presume "to judge our flyers." This responsibility

belonged to the Department of Defense alone; controlled distribution of

the PW letters on a strict need-to-know basis was necessary to safeguard

that prerogative:'5

When Secretary Brown asked for a review of the Monroe and

Gunderson memorandums by the Air Staff, officers disputed some of

the allegations of specific deficiencies but endorsed the central idea of

raising primary consideration of PW affairs above the service-JCS level.

The Air Staff prepared documents for General McConnell's use in placing

the proposal before the JCS, but it suspended the action on learning that

Brown had sent his own memorandum to the deputy secretary of defense. 3G

Secretary Brown's 17 July memorandum for Nitze combined elements

of the Monroe and Gunderson submissions with other material in an

effective presentation of the need for organizational change. Brown cited

diffusion of responsibility within the department as a leading explanation

for the fact that Defense contributions to solution of the PW problem "have
Organizing for Policy Decision and Planning 47

to date been infrequent and piecemeal." Stronger central direction could

encourage initiatives and more readily engage DoD's full resources in a

well-ordered program. Brown noted that the Air Force chief of staff

and other senior officials shared his belief that raising the direction

of PW affairs to the OSD level would promote positive policies and the

effective advocacy of Defense ideas in interdepartmental councils. Such

a demonstration of DoD's dedication to the welfare and protection of the

prisoners would also yield benefits in terms of public understanding.

Brown recommended the establishment of a 000 committee with

broad powers in PW affairs. He also called for a directive prohibiting the

use of letters received from the families for any purpose "adverse to the

interests of the POW concerned. ".17

Deputy Secretary Nitze approved Brown's proposals with little delay.

After a brief investigation of the organizational aspects of PW efforts in

OSD by Assistant Secretary Horwitz had confirmed that such activities

were indeed scattered among many agencies, Nitze issued a comprehensive

directive on 26 July 1967. Recognizing a need for "formal policy guidance

and better definition of the functional responsibilities covering paws,"

the memorandum prescribed new organizational arrangements as follows:

Mr. Paul C. Warnke, Assistant Secretary of DefenseDesignate (International Security Affairs) is assigned primary

staff responsibility for the Defense POW Program. He will exercise

overall supervision within DoD for the totality of the program

and will insure timely and proper coordination among those

DoD components concerned. In addition, he will act as the point

of contact for DoD with the Department of State on POW matters.

To advise and assist Mr. Warnke, there is established, under

his chairmanship, a DoD POW Policy Committee. This Committee

will consist ofthe Secretaries ofthe military departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Manpower), the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), the

General Counsel and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, or

designees of the foregoing who can speak authoritatively for their

principals. The Committee will meet upon the call of its Chairman.

With the assistance ofthe Committee, Mr. Warnke will coordinate

ongoing programs, develop plans and policies and recommend new

courses of action in the following areas:

1. POW welfare.

2. Propaganda and counter-propaganda campaigns.

3. Correlation and analysis of information about POWs

from all sources.

4. Assistance and information for families of POWs.
48 THE LONG ROAD HOME

5. Recovery efforts.

6. Repatriation planning.

Recommended plans and actions with respect to the above or

related areas will be forwarded to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary

of Defense for approval.

The directive also prohibited use of letters from the prisoners in any

way that might be adverse to their interests. Such correspondence, when

received from the families, was to be used only for intelligence purposes and

"shall be privileged." Access to it by any investigative agency was denied. 58

Brown had emphasized the need for a "positive, imaginative, and

centrally directed" program; Nitze's directive of 26 July 1967 gave promise

that this might be achieved. Certainly it meant that henceforth 000

would at least be as coherently organized to deal with PW matters as the

Department of State. The appointment of Warnke to "exercise overall supervision within 000 for the totality of the program" nearly duplicated the

wording of Ambassador Harriman's assignment within State and made

him Harriman's counterpart in the Pentagon. The provision that plans and

actions developed by the 000 PW Policy Committee would be recommended

to the secretary or deputy secretary of defense for approval held the further

promise that the subject would receive continuing high-level attention.

The Nitze directive did not appear to excite resentment or opposition

in any quarter of the military departments or the JCS organization. Under

Secretary of the Navy Robert H. B. Baldwin quickly announced his support

and revealed that the Navy had been preparing to second Brown's recommendations. "We all agree," he wrote Nitze on 28 July, "that POW policy

is a most important subject which requires the type of high-level coordination and attention directed by you.")') By this date, recognition of

the potential scope of the PW problem and dissatisfaction with the results

obtained under existing arrangements had made service officials receptive

to change. They were willing to abandon the traditional view that responsibility for PW affairs should in all respects be retained by the military

departments and were ready to seek a more effective and coherent policy

under OSD direction.

Organization and Working Methods ofthe DoD PWPolicy Committee

Warnke moved immediately to organize the committee authorized

by the directive. He called on the agency heads named as members to send

representatives to an initial meeting on 11 August and asked each member
Organizing for Policy Decision and Planning 49

to provide a briefing paper describing PW activities in his area of responsibility and to submit suggestions for improving current programs or starting

new ones. 40

Initial appointments of representatives to the DoD Prisoner of War

Policy Committee reflected not only organizational differences among the

services in managing PW affairs but also uncertainty regarding the subjects

that would be most prominent on the committee's agenda and the level

at which the committee would deal with them. This in turn reflected the

nature of the PW problem itself, which cut across many different areas

of activity, from personnel to international relations, at levels ranging from

routine casualty administration to the highest policy consideration. In

choosing representatives, some agency heads named personnel policy officials

while others selected legal advisers or operational staff officers. As the scope

of the committee's business became clearer, agencies altered their representation, often sending more than one expert and making increasing use of

experienced action officers. Thus, during the 18 months that Warnke headed

the committee, attendance grew from 16 at the first meeting to a relatively

consistent 24, half of them officers below general or flag rank. 41

Initially, most agencies appointed top-echelon officials to the committee. OSD representation included General Berg from Manpower, Deputy

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) Daniel Z. Henkin, and both

Frank A. Bartimo and Benjamin Forman from OSD General Counsel.

Administrative support for the committee came initially from one of

Warnke's assistants in ISA, Charles W. Havens III, who provided the agenda,

wrote and distributed summary minutes of the meetings, and acted as chief

adviser to Warnke on PW matters. In early November 1967, Capt. John W.

Thornton, USN, joined ISA to provide full-time support to the chairman

in his committee duties. Thornton, who had been a prisoner for more

than two years during the Korean War, was given the title of assistant for

prisoner of war matters, later changed to military adviser for prisoner of

war affairs. Gradually he took over the administrative duties from Havens

and became the expert to whom Havens and Warnke turned for advice. 42

Among its first items of business, the policy committee took up its

relationship to two working groups already in existence. The first was, of

course, the OSD Conference on Prisoners and Missing in Vietnam. At the

October 1967 meeting of the conference an OSD representative announced

that Havens considered the group to be associated with the Warnke

committee and that it should furnish its meeting minutes to the policy

committee for study and possible action. Some members opposed any

formalization of the conference since this might inhibit the free exchange
50 THE LONG ROAD HOME

of information the group enjoyed. There may have been a further thought

that the consistent attendance of State and ARC representatives, who

contributed so notably to the worth of the meetings, would not be compatible with designation of the conference as a subcommittee of a Defense

Department agency.43

After further consideration, Warnke's staff indicated in December that

a change of status was no longer contemplated, and the 050 conference

continued to meet on an informal basis, without any direct organizational

relationship to the 000 PW Policy Committee. Since, under its ground

rules, it took no formal actions and developed no recommendations to higher

authority, the conference was only indirectly the source of proposals that

occasionally reached the Warnke committee. In turn, it received no communications or assignments from that body. Notice of the policy committee's

actions was itself a part of the information exchange that continued to be

the principal activity of the conference.44

The second working group was the informal conference of intelligence representatives of the services, DIA, and CIA that CIA had organized

in October 1966, called the Interagency Prisoner of War Intelligence Group

(IPWIG). It met weekly at CIA headquarters, primarily to analyze letters

from captives to their next of kin. Shortly before the initial meeting of

the 000 PW Policy Committee a CIA spokesman indicated that because

of IPWIG's informal character it was experiencing certain "support

problems." Actions of the policy committee on 11 August 1967 responded

both to that situation and to the recently enhanced concern over 000

responsibility for maintaining the privileged status of the letters. The military services undertook to "review funding and personnel policies" relating

to IPWIG. In addition, DIA's deputy director, Vice Adm. Vernon L.

Lowrance, was to "review DIA's participation in IPWIG and submit his

recommendations for improving this group"-the unspoken purpose being

to bring the IPWIG function under 000 control as soon as possible. 45

Approved terms of reference appeared in October for what was

now formally titled the Interagency Prisoner of War Intelligence Ad Hoc

Committee (IPWIC). Chaired by DIA and responsible to the policy committee, IPWIC would provide a focal point within Defense for all

intelligence concerning missing or captured U.S. personnel. The four

military services, DIA, and CIA made up the membership, and IPWIC

continued to meet weekly.46

From time to time the policy committee used other ad hoc groups

and committees. At the initial meeting in August it had asked a recently

formed Navy-Air Force Air Crew Working Group to review the basis on

which the two services were classifying airmen lost in Southeast Asia as
Organizing for Policy Decision and Planning 51

either prisoners of war or missing in action and to seek agreement on a uniform standard. The working group produced an agreed set of classification

criteria by the beginning of November, after which it apparently ceased

to function. Much more enduring was the Working Group for Proposed

Publicity Programs, established in November 1967 and composed of representatives from Public Affairs, Manpower, ISA, and the four services. Its

title was soon shortened to Public Affairs Working Group to reflect the

broadening of its concern from a few specific proposals to the whole range

of publicity problems relating to prisoners of warY

While the policy committee under Warnke made considerable use of

subcommittees and working groups, the committee itself accomplished

the greater part of its business, with all members taking an active part

in the discussion. During the first five months of its life, in 1967, the

committee met frequently and without a set schedule, averaging somewhat

more than one meeting every two weeks. As it made assignments and

launched programs to deal with the most pressing issues, the committee's

meetings became more regular but less frequent; throughout 1968 they

occurred monthly. Decisions appeared in the summary minutes, which

also specified who was to take implementing action. Though normally

restricting attendance to members and their representatives, the policy

committee allowed one exception. Ambassador Harriman's special assistant,

Frank A. Sieverts, appeared by invitation at a December meeting in 1967

and soon afterward was placed on the distribution list for the committee's

minutes. Sieverts became a regular attendee in August 1968.4H

Scope andAccomplishments ofthe Policy Committee Under Warnke

Nitze's directive of 26 July 1967 bestowed on Warnke a broad and

inclusive authority over all PW matters within the Department of Defense.

It placed responsibility on him as assistant secretary of defense (ISA) and

not on the DoD PW Policy Committee as a whole. Warnke was to coordinate ongoing programs, develop plans and policies, and recommend new

courses of action "with the assistance of the Committee." In preparation for

the first meeting he asked members to make suggestions for improving

current programs or initiating new ones, and after identifying the most

pressing problems, he set the committee to work at once. From the range of

the problems and Warnke's manner of attacking them it became immediately apparent that he harbored no doubt that his authority extended to all

areas of the Department of Defense touching on PW affairs and that he

meant to wield this authority decisively.49
52 THE LONG ROAD HOME

The main limitation on the scope of Warnke's actions was the policy

established by Nitze's predecessor, Deputy Secretary Cyrus Vance, which

made the Department of State and particularly Ambassador Harriman the

"single spokesman" of the U.S. government in PW matters. Discussion at

the initial meeting of the policy committee revealed strong feelings within

the services over the restrictive effect of the policy on release of information

about DoD's own activities. Without exception service representatives viewed

the Vance memorandum as creating an image of service indifference to the

POW question. 50

In August Warnke asked Daniel Henkin, the 050 public affairs representative on the committee, to investigate the origins of the policy and

recommend any changes required by current circumstances. Henkin's

research convinced him that the Vance memorandum had aimed primarily

at avoiding untimely statements and maintaining a single policy line in the

period when war crimes trials were threatened. He thought the directive should

remain in effect as general guidance, since lower echelons of the defense

establishment had no reason to be commenting on PW affairs in any event.

Some modification of the policy appeared necessary, however, when applied

to officials at the 050 level. Henkin believed the policy had dampened initiative and imaginative thought within OSD, even as it fostered in the State

Department a disposition to act in PW matters without fully consulting

other interested agencies. Under the current rules, Henkin pointed out, 000

could not even announce that it had formed a policy committee, nor could

it release, except through the State Department, information on 000

activities that would be reassuring to PW/MIA families and the public. He

recommended seeking an agreement with State on what subject areas that

department would reserve to its own spokesmen and what types of information 000 might release after suitable coordination. 51

Later in August 1967 Warnke advised the committee members that he

had taken up the single spokesman policy with McNamara and Nitze but

found them unwilling to disturb the existing arrangement. Accordingly, the

policy would continue in force, with the understanding that when Defense

wanted PW information released, Public Affairs would coordinate with

State's public affairs office and Warnke would communicate with Harriman.

One item of information had been cleared, however. Warnke stated that as

soon as next of kin had been notified by the services, 000 would announce

formation of the Prisoner of War Policy Committee, the existence of which,

originally secret, was no longer classified. 52

Although State's official primary role in PW affairs continued, the

advent of the 000 PW Policy Committee had brought a change of spirit
Organizing for Policy Decision and Planning 53

nevertheless. In responding to Warnke's request for program suggestions,

several members had stressed the need for greater initiative. If the single

spokesman policy was not to be changed, it should at least be construed as

imposing no restraints on the forceful presentation of 000 recommendations. As Henkin put it, there was no need "to act as if State's monopoly

on talking about these matters extended also to thinking about them. "5.3

Under Warnke's leadership 000 showed itself less disposed to defer to the

Department of State. Since Defense now had a high-level committee devoted

to PW affairs while Harriman continued to operate without a comparable

supporting organization in the State Department, State often found itself

reacting to DoD-initiated proposals.

Despite expanding activity during the first 18 months of the policy committee's existence, results were not readily visible. By early January 1969 few

of the major problems the committee had faced at its beginning had been

resolved; few seemed even close to resolution. Little success had been

registered in improving the lot of the U.S. captives held by North Vietnam,

much less those held by the Viet Congo Public affairs efforts, still impeded

by the single spokesman policy, remained limited and of little effect. Intelligence, although improving rapidly, was not yet reliable enough to support

forcible recovery efforts. Much had been accomplished in providing assistance and information for the families of prisoners of war, as Warnke noted

in his final report to Nitze before leaving office, but coordination with the

State Department in the information area and cooperation by the public

media on news coverage still needed improvement. So much detailed work

remained to be done on repatriation planning that it would be the principal

problem occupying the committee and its subordinate structures for the next

four years.

Nevertheless, the policy committee under Warnke had made substantial

contributions. The policies, precedents, and procedures it developed had a

controlling influence on the progress of events through the return of the

captive Americans in 1973 and beyond. First in importance was the basic

directive governing repatriation and the treatment of returnees, issued in

June 1968. Though subsequently modified by more detailed instructions, it

established the principles that guided the ultimate homecoming operation.

Other significant actions included the committee's contributions to keeping

the PW issue in the forefront at the Paris negotiations and its decision to

defer all consideration of changes to the Code of Conduct while the war was

10 progress.

In summing up the work of his committee on 14 January 1969, Warnke

wrote: "I do not want to give the impression that the Committee feels that
54 THE LONG ROAD HOME

it has realized its objectives or that it is comfortable with the present PW

situation. The enemy still have not recognized the basic guarantees of the

Geneva Convention such as providing us with the names of the men it holds.

Similarly, numerous items of unfinished business will remain until our men

are returned home." Nonetheless, he was proud of the committee's efforts

"and generally pleased with our accomplishments to date. "54
3

The Department of State and Prisoner of

War Policy, January 1964 to May 1966

Initial Perception ofthe PWProblem

During 1963 and 1964 the declared purpose and the gradual, incremental nature of U.S. involvement in Vietnam hardly suggested that

the United States would eventually become a full participant in the war. As

U.S. forces in increasing numbers entered into combat in 1965 and after,

recognition that the United States was engaged in a large-scale war came

only slowly to many in Washington. The absence of any dramatic event or

pronouncement that marked a definite transition to a state of war, together

with a lingering resistance to the idea itself, delayed the realization. Given

this climate of opinion, it is not surprising that awareness of the intractable

nature and potential dimensions of the PW/MIA problem developed slowly

as well.

At the end of 1963 Washington perceived the position of the seven

men held by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam as scarcely different, in a legal

sense, from that of the two helicopter crewmen imprisoned following an

emergency landing in North Korea. Since the United States did not consider

itself at war, none of the captured was designated a "prisoner of war."

Instead, beginning in 1964, they were officially referred to as "detainees,"

in conformance with a recent amendment to the Missing Persons Act that

defined a category of captive "detained in a foreign country against his will."

This designation gave way to prisoner of war, in mid-1966, partly out of

recognition that the United States was a belligerent in Southeast Asia, but

chiefly to bring the terminology into accord with the U.S. claim that the

captives were entitled to the protections of the Geneva Convention. l

Detainees, who might be termed "prisoners of the Cold War," had earlier

included air crews forced down in Communist countries and other personnel

55
56 THE LONG ROAD HOME

who had crossed a Communist boundary, usually inadvertently, and who

had been held for varying periods. Retrieval of such detainees was a diplomatic responsibility, except in Korea where, under the armistice agreement,

the United Nations Command and Communist forces maintained a "military situation" on opposite sides of a demilitarized zone. Therefore, the

Department of State exercised an unquestioned authority over efforts to

obtain the return of servicemen held by Communist governments other than

North Korea. It conducted formal negotiations, as in the case of flyers who

landed in the USSR, or, where governments not recognized by the United

States were the detaining powers, through third countries or the Red Cross.

By and large, these methods sufficed through 1963. Because they did

succeed to an acceptable degree, officials gave little thought to changing

them, especially in the absence of a state of war. They found it possible to

view the advisory personnel captured by the Viet Cong as differing from

the usual detainees only in that they had been taken forcibly rather than

interned after straying across a border. In 1963 and 1964 there seemed to

be no particular reason to doubt that the measures that had freed earlier

captives would prove effective, however slowly, for those held in Vietnam.

This point of view, combined with State's perception of no feasible alternative course, accounted in large part for the department's devotion to

the customary practices of diplomacy and to what sometimes seemed to

Defense officials to be an excessively legalistic approach to the problem of

the detained men.

An important result of the gradual transition to a war status in Vietnam

was that early release of captured U.S. personnel became the basic objective

of PW policy. The numerous official documents supportive of this policy

often quoted two statements of the post-Korean War period. When submitting their recommended Code of Conduct in July 1955, the members of

the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War had said that "America

must always stand behind every American upon whom befalls prisoner of

war status and spare no reasonable effort in obtaining their earliest possible

release back to our side." When promulgating the code President Eisenhower

declared that "no American prisoner of war will be forgotten by the United

States. Every available means will be employed by our government to establish

contact with, to support and to obtain the release of all our prisoners of war."2

Nevertheless, early return of its captured men is not the normal expectation for a power at war. Article 118 of the Geneva Convention provides, and

the rest of the document presumes, that prisoners of war will be repatriated

"after the cessation of active hostilities." Exceptions are set forth in Articles

109, 110, and Ill. Seriously sick or wounded prisoners, if willing, are to be

sent back to their own country. Those expected to recover within one year
Prisoner of War Policy, January 1964 to May 1966 57

may be interned in a neutral country. If agreed to by the powers concerned, prisoners of war held in captivity for a long period may likewise be

interned on neutral territory. But U.S. officials viewed the few early instances

of capture in South Vietnam as not differing greatly from other incidents in

the Cold War, and they sought to obtain early release. Had there been a

formal declaration of war before the United States committed sizable forces

to combat, or had a recognizable front developed, as in Korea, early release

might have been abandoned in favor of the more conventional post-hostilities

repatriation. But by the time the U.S. government began to act in full recognition that it was engaged in a major war, early release had already been the

declared objective for several years and was firmly established as policy.

In Washington there appeared to be an unspoken resolution not to give

in to the idea that the captives faced an imprisonment stretching into the

indefinite future. To some officials a sudden break that would allow a quick

solution to the PW problem seemed an ever-present possibility. Even after

Americans had been held in Hanoi for several years and U.S. authorities

had begun giving serious attention to internment in a neutral country as

a desirable alternative, the hope of early, direct repatriation was kept alive

by the occasional release of a few U.S. prisoners of war and the opening

from time to time of seemingly promising channels for negotiation with

the Communists.

Department ofState Organization for PWAffairs

Until the appointment in May 1966 of W. Averell Harriman to exercise general supervision over all PW matters, the diffusion of responsibility

for policy and administrative actions among several bureaus and offices

of the State Department often troubled Defense officials. Earlier DoD

attempts to establish precise points of contact within the State Department

had enjoyed only short-term success at best. In April 1966 the director of

the Joint Staff again asked ISA to identify those in State responsible for

PW functions. Rear Adm. F. J. Blouin tesponded for ISA that the Bureau

of Security and Consular Affairs had recently been designated the principal

point of contact, but the Legal Adviser and certain other bureaus would

continue to handle operational matters within their purview.>

At first glance, the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (SCA) seemed

a somewhat unusual agency in which to lodge responsibility for PW policy

and administration. Its functions, and the statutes from which they derived,

appeared far afield from the concerns of war. Major activities included administration of the immigration and nationality laws, issuance of passports and
58 THE LONG ROAD HOME

visas and related services, and coordination of U.S. participation in refugee

programs. The title of SCA's chief, although he ranked with the assistant

secretaries of state, was administrator, in keeping with the largely administrative activities of the bureau. His involvement in PW affairs followed

from another responsibility-protection and welfare of U.S. citizens and

interests abroad. Within the bureau this function belonged to the Office of

Special Consular Services (SCS), which also had responsibility for coordinating the representation of U.S. interests through a third government when

regular diplomatic relations did not exist.

As the agency whose regular business included the extrication of U.S.

citizens from misadventures abroad, SCA had been called upon as a matter

of course to respond to the early instances of capture in Vietnam. The incidents, some of which had more the character of abductions than military

actions, were not regarded at the time as foreshadowing a PW problem

of increasing proportions. The slight expansion of SCA's usual role that

occurred seemed natural enough, and without a declaration of war or other

jarring event to cause a change, the administration of PW affairs not only

began but continued in a peacetime mode.

In addition, SCA discharged certain routine administrative functions

that brought it into regular touch with the military services and made the

bureau by far their most frequent point of contact in the State Department.

The services sent their casualty reports to SCA, which placed them in Red

Cross channels, thereby initiating a request to the International Committee

of the Red Cross (ICRC) to "intercede"-that is, to seek information on

the status, health, and whereabouts of the missing servicemen. It was to

SCA, until November 1965, that the next of kin sent their letters for the

prisoners, to be forwarded through Red Cross channels. Beginning in

September 1965, SCA representatives regularly attended the monthly meetings of the OSD Conference on Prisoners and Missing in Vietnam, which

the military services viewed as their most valuable forum for exchange of

information and discussion of PW policy.

Although SCA was the State Department agency most intimately

involved in PW affairs, it had no comprehensive authority in the field. As

Admiral Blouin had advised the Joint Staff, even the recent designation

of SCA as the principal point of contact did not mean that other State

Department elements would defer to it when prisoner matters fell within

their respective purviews. For example, the Legal Adviser had an important

role in preparing the U.S. resolution denouncing reprisals that the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross adopted in Vienna in October 1965-

one of the measures in the campaign to halt executions of U.S. prisoners in

Vietnam. The Vietnam desk of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs in the
Prisoner of War Policy, January 1964 to May 1966 S9

Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs had cognizance over actions requiring negotiations with the South Vietnamese government. And on major issues of prisoner

policy the senior leaders of the department, particularly Under Secretary

George W. Ball and his immediate staff, became directly involved.

Nevertheless, for day-to-day operations and coordination with 000,

the American Red Cross, and the ICRC, State's center for PW affairs was

SCA, at least up to May 1966. Even after the appointment of Harriman, the

SCA chief continued to chair the new Interdepartmental Prisoner of War

Committee.* Much of the time he and his assistants were more visible and

certainly more accessible to the Joint Staff and officials most concerned with

PW matters within the military departments than was the "single spokesman"

himself. During most of this period, until early 1966, the SCA administrator

was Abba P. Schwartz, who had headed the bureau since 1962.

The Problem ofExecutions Commands Attention

In the months between the spring of 1964 and mid-196S the State

Department's activities on behalf of the prisoners remained at a routine level.

Its officers generated few initiatives and achieved no visible results. The

attention of the nation, and especially of the Congress and executive branch,

focused elsewhere-on the Tonkin Gulf incidents in August 1964 and the

resulting congressional resolution, the increasing terrorist forays against

U.S. installations in South Vietnam, the beginning of limited air strikes

against targets in North Vietnam in February 1965, and the introduction of

combat units thereafter that brought the number of U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam to the 50,000 mark by June. It was widely expected

that these displays of U.S. power would soon bring Hanoi to halt its aggression or even to negotiate a general settlement in Vietnam. In these circumstances State saw few opportunities to attempt to talk to the Communists

abour the prisoners of war, and it confined itself largely to pursuing the

customary ICRC procedures on behalf of the missing men. At this time,

repatriation of the handful of prisoners was only a secondary objective compared to the more consequential results expected from the U.S. intervention.

Furthermore, the situation of the captives did not seem particularly

alarming. Officials in Washington assumed that those in the hands of the

Viet Cong were suffering some privation, probably including frequent movement and other hardships arising from the nature of the insurgents' guerrilla

warfare. They believed, however, that the prisoners of the VC were being

'See Chapter 2.
60 THE LONG ROAD HOME

treated relatively humanely, given the circumstances. Similarly, there were

early indications that the North Vietnamese treated their American prisoners

with some regard for the requirements of the Geneva Convention. The family

of the first prisoner of Hanoi-Lt. Everett Alvarez, J r., USN, who was

shot down on 5 August 1964-received 19 letters from him through JCRC

channels between September 1964 and March 1965. Receipts for two parcels

sent to him earlier by the JCRC had reached that organization by 30 April

1965. On 18 February 1965 the North Vietnamese Red Cross had formally

accepted transmission of Red Cross parcels, but less than a month later it

informed the JCRC that it would handle only those sent by close relatives.

And even though in May 1965 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)

declared that no more mail would be accepted through the JCRC, some

correspondence with Alvarez continued by that channel. 4

When Army Sgt. Issac Camacho, captured in November 1963, escaped

to rejoin U.S. forces in mid-July 1965, he gave interrogators a picture of

life as a captive of the Viet Cong much like they had expected. Intentional

physical brutality against him and his fellow prisoners had been rare. Of

the seven held with him, four had been given letters from their families

and parcels from the ICRC in June, and three had been allowed to write to

their families in July. Food was bad and medical treatment primitive by

U.S. standards, but both were about what the VC themselves received. Only

the report of the execution of Sergeant Bennett, which had come to Camacho

from a guard, gave any sign of a calculated major violation of the Geneva

Convention by the Viet Cong.)

The Viet Cong shot Sgt. Harold G. Bennett, USA, on 24 June 1965.

The Department of State denounced the act, which the Viet Cong's political

leadership, the National Liberation Front (NLF), later described as reprisal

for the public execution of a Communist terrorist by the South Vietnamese

government. The department reacted more vigorously when the executions of

Capt. Humbert R. Versace and Sgt. Kenneth M. Roraback on 26 September

became known. The Viet Cong had now demonstrated their determination to

fulfill threats of reprisal against U.S. captives for the shooting of convicted

VC terrorists by the Saigon government. Since the executions of Versace and

Roraback coincided with Hanoi's issuance of threats to try U.S. pilots as war

criminals, fears that the situation of the captured Americans was becoming

precarious grew in Washington. (,

The course to follow in trying to prevent reprisal executions had already

been explored by the State Department in a case involving one of its own

people, Gustav Hertz, a foreign service officer assigned to the U.S. Agency for

International Development. The Viet Cong had seized Hertz on 2 February

1965 while he was riding a motorbike in the Saigon area. In April the VC
Prisoner of War Policy, January 1964 to May 1966 61

radio broadcast a threat to execute him if the South Vietnamese government carried out the death sentence of Nguyen Van Hai, a terrorist highly

valued by the NLF. At State's behest, the South Vietnamese postponed Hai's

execution, eventually putting it off indefinitely after a series of VC threats

and State Department representations.?

For a time State maintained that it could not press the Saigon government for futther suspensions of its legal processes on the basis of generalized

NLF threats of reprisal against U.S. military prisoners (Hertz, a civilian,

linked by name to a specific Communist terrorist, was regarded as a special

case), but the department abandoned that stand when the fate of Versace

and Roraback became known. At the urging of the United States the South

Vietnamese government agreed to hold executions of terrorists in abeyance

while still keeping them under sentence of death. Apparently satisfied that

they had achieved their objective, the NLF authorities refrained thereafter

from deliberately killing U.S. prisoners as an act of reprisal, though serving

notice that they reserved the right to do so if the Saigon government gave

them cause. 8

While acting to eliminate any excuse for VC reprisals, the State Department exerted pressure on a number of other fronts. By fortunate coincidence,

the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross opened in Vienna less

than a week after Versace and Roraback were murdered. On 7 October 1965

the chairman ofthe U.S. delegation, Ambassador Robert F. Woodward, introduced a resolution that was adopted in plenary session two days later by a

vote of 117 to 0, with 6 abstentions. Condemning the use of prisoners of

war as "objects of retaliation," the conferees called for the full application of

the protections of the Geneva Convention, including the judicial safeguards for those charged with offenses. "All authorities involved in an armed

conflict" were called upon to insure that the ICRC could "carry out its

traditional humanitarian functions to ameliorate the conditions of prisoners

of war." The State Department immediately asked friendly governments

around the world to support the resolution in their contacts with Communistbloc governments.')

The IC'RC and the Application o/the Geneva Convention

The "traditional humanitarian functions" of the ICRC are referred to

but not precisely defined in a number of the articles of the Geneva Convention. Article 125, on welfare societies and relief facilities for prisoners of

war, specifies that "the special position of the International Committee of

the Red Cross in this field shall be recognized and respected at all times."
62 THE LONG ROAD HOME

In describing the rights of protecting powers to visit PW camps and to

interview prisoners, Article 126 states: "The delegates of the International

Committee of the Red Cross shall enjoy the same prerogatives." Article 10

provides that whenever protection by some government uninvolved in the

dispute cannot be arranged, "the Detaining Power shall request or shall

accept ... the offer of the services of a humanitarian organization, such as

the International Committee of the Red Cross, to assume the humanitarian

functions performed by Protecting Powers under the present Convention."

Thus some of the grounds for the ICRe's claim to particular status as the

agency overseeing the application of the Geneva Convention can be found

in the document itself.

The ICRC has a worldwide responsibility in performing its role as

impartial intermediary between belligerents and protector of prisoners of

war. It draws financial support in the form of contributions from most of

the signatory nations of the Geneva Convention and from national Red

Cross societies. Since the committee's members (up to 25) are all Swiss

citizens, its effectiveness over the years has owed much to the traditional

neutrality of the Swiss and their government. During the Vietnam conflict,

however, the impartiality practiced by the international committee and the

European cultural attitudes of its members were apparently poorly understood by East Asians generally and distrusted particularly by the Asian

Communists. It seems likely, therefore, that the DRV and the NLF were

sincere in their opinion that the ICRC lacked true neutrality. In any case,

they appear to have dealt with the committee only when they could see a

definite advantage to themselves; otherwise, they consistently refused to

acknowledge its role. Mainly for this reason the ICRC was able to do little

for the American prisoners in Southeast Asia.

Nevertheless, reliance on the services of the ICRC was the recognized

international practice, sanctioned by treaty and tradition. During the period

when U.S. prisoner of war policy was taking shape, State Department

officials saw no reason to depart from this orthodoxy, and first recourse in

nearly all matters was to the ICRe. In practice, the international committee

proved cautious and sometimes difficult to move; its concern for maintaining an independent and impartial stance often drained its utterances

of the forcefulness that American officials urged. The actions that the ICRC

did attempt had particular value in making visible to the world the justice

and legality of the U.S. position.

When the State Department publicly denounced the executions of

Versace and Roraback in September 1965 it declared that "the United States

Government is asking the International Committee of the Red Cross to take

all possible action within its competence with respect to these violations of
Prisoner of War Policy, January 1964 to May 1966 63

the 1949 Geneva convention."lo The department thereby reemphasized the

central role in U.S. policy of relations with the ICRC and of the formal

commitment to the convention that the United States had made some

weeks earlier in response to a communication from the ICRC vice president,

Jacques Freymond. On 11 June 1965 Freymond had declared that the warfare in Vietnam constituted an armed conflict within the terms of the

Geneva Convention and reminded the participants of their obligations as

signatories. He included in this number the National Liberation Front,

since the ICRC considered the NLF bound by the agreements signed by

the two recognized governments in Vietnam. The Viet Cong shared in the

protections of the convention if they were captured wearing uniforms or

emblems clearly indicating membership in an armed force. Such captives

were to be treated humanely as prisoners of war, and the ICRC asked for

lists of those so captured. Freymond had addressed letters to this effect to

the U.S. secretary of state, to the governments in Hanoi and Saigon, and to

the NLF, although delivery to the latter was apparently delayed because of

lack of direct means of communication with the insurgents.!!

The secretary of state had not responded immediately, no doubt wishing

to be assured that observance of the Geneva Convention by U.S. forces was

currently at an acceptable level. More troublesome and time-consuming

were the efforts required to convince the South Vietnamese government

that it should not only return a formal assurance of compliance but also

take the necessary steps toward living up to such a pledge. The government of Premier Nguyen Cao Ky yielded only grudgingly; after promise

of increased U.S. assistance in enlarging and improving the GVN's prison

camps it finally gave assent.

Secretary Rusk's formal reply to Freymond's letter on 10 August 1965

declared that the United States was observing the prisoner of war convention in Vietnam and expected the other parties to the conflict to do likewise.

Plans were being developed for expansion of PW facilities in South Vietnam,

and instruction of U.S. personnel in the requirements of the convention was

being increased. Rusk pointed out that the enemy's use of disguise and his

frequent disregard of the accepted principles of warfare made application

of some provisions of the agreement difficult. Nevertheless, the U.S. government would cooperate fully with the ICRC in carrying out "its traditional

and valuable humanitarian mission."12

The next day the South Vietnamese minister of foreign affairs informed

the ICRC delegation in Saigon that his government was "quite prepared to

abide by the provisions of the Geneva Agreements and to make an active

contribution to any efforts undertaken by the International Committee of

the Red Cross to ensure implementation of those provisions." He declared
64 THE LONG ROAD HOME

that the Geneva Convention, "although not yet promulgated" in Vietnam,

had always been followed, and the VC prisoners had invariably received

humanitarian treatment. He hoped that the Viet Cong would reciprocate. 13

In Western eyes, including those of the U.S. government, the GVN

commitment was not reassuring. The statement that VC prisoners were at

that time receiving humanitarian treatment was hardly credible. News

accounts of torture appeared daily in the world press, with photographs.

Military prisoners were kept in civilian jails with ordinary criminals, and

ICRC visits and inspections had not been permitted. The government refused

even to call VC captives prisoners of war, labeling them "communist rebel

combat captives." That the GVN was "quite prepared" to carry out the requirements of the convention was likewise questionable. The government lacked

suitable physical facilities for confinement, and providing them was destined

to take another year.

If the statement given to the ICRC could be regarded at least as one

of intent, the intent was largely that of the United States government. It

required continuing high-level pressure to persuade Premier Ky to respond

fully to U.S. demands for conscientious observance of the Geneva Convention. To secure acceptance by the lower echelons of his government required

further time and effort. But the South Vietnamese response of August 1965

had recorded a formal pledge whose fulfillment U.S. officials could press

for, and their exertions toward that end were sufficiently visible to the

ICRC that most members of that organization understood the sincerity

of the effort. Nevertheless, the GVN's incomplete compliance remained a

complicating factor in State Department-ICRC relations for some years. 14

South Vietnamese mistreatment of VC captives and the delay in rectifying it would have appeared more egregious had not the Vietnamese

Communists decided upon outright rejection of the ICRe's call for

observance of the Geneva Convention. Having received no DRV reply to

Freymond's letter of 11 June 1965, the ICRC dispatched a telegram on

23 July. On 19 August, it sent another letter to Hanoi requesting fulfillment of specific obligations-publication of full lists of prisoners of war

and other detained persons, authorization for the IeRC to visit prisoners

and interview them without witnesses, and provision of mail and parcel

privileges for all the captives.])

The initial North Vietnamese response in a letter to the ICRC on

31 August 1965 was less an answer than a diatribe. It contained numerous

allegations of breaches of the Geneva Convention and other laws of war

by the United States and its allies. In particular, the DRV condemned the

bombing of North Vietnam as an act of aggression. It considered "the

pilots who have carried out the raids-pirates destructing the property
Prisoner of War Policy, January 1964 to May 1966 65

and massacring the population of the Democratic Republic of Vietnamas felons caught redhanded and liable to trial" under the laws of the DRY.

The added statement that captured pilots were nevertheless treated well

did little to mitigate the menacing cast of the letter. IG

The DRV reply was disturbing to the ICRe. On 24 September it

renewed by letter the requests made on 19 August and proposed that an

ICRC delegate go to Hanoi. Because it seemed likely that treatment of U.S.

prisoners as war criminals would be based on the reservations to Article 85

stated by the DRV and other Communist-bloc countries at the time of ratification of the Geneva Convention, the ICRC took special pains to make the

legal position clear: "Since legal proceedings seem to have been entered

into against the prisoners of war because of acts committed before their

capture, we call your attention to articles 82 and the following ones ....

We think that in spite of the acts [of] which they are accused and for which

the Detaining Power may seek to have them answer before the courts, these

prisoners remain beneficiaries of the conventional statute."ll

About a week later the ICRC received a letter from the president of the

North Vietnamese Red Cross, dated 27 September 1965, that contained a

"Declaration of the Red Cross of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam concerning barbarous crimes perpetrated by the Government of the United

States in its actions jeering at the Geneva agreements for the protection

of war victims." In tone, the declaration exceeded even the vituperative

character of the earlier DRV tirade. In content, it confirmed and reinforced

the North Vietnamese government's stand. 18 Had the Red Cross society of

any Western nation made a similar representation, the ICRC would probably

have replied with a strong rebuttal, if not censure. No such response seems

to have been contemplated in this case, perhaps because the international

committee did not wish to see the DRV Red Cross withdraw into silence or

perhaps because it felt the attack on U.S. actions not entirely unjustified.

The ICRC often seemed disposed to place the most generous interpretation possible on Vietnamese Communist actions. In part this stemmed

from an earnest desire to draw the DRV and NLF into a dialogue in the hope

of persuading them to adjust their behavior to the international norm.

But it seemed to U.S. officials involved that the Committee also shared the

view of a large part of the European intellectual and middle classes on the

war in Vietnam, regarding ir as a matter the United States should have left

to the contending parties within the country to settle. The United States was

seen as deploying its power against a clearly inferior opponent in order to

prevent fulfillment of aspirations that might well be those of a majority of

the Vietnamese. This disposition, while not ultimately controlling the

ICRe's actions, did incline its members toward a view of the DRV as a
66 THE LONG ROAD HOME

beleaguered underdog whose strong emotions and lack of civility had

some excuse. Still, the ICRC could not deny or ignore the illegality of

the DRV's position, which the recent declaration by the North Vietnamese

Red Cross had so strongly restated. As Schwartz of SCA reported from

Geneva in October, so long as the United States adhered to its position of

legality and humanity and so long as it made honest efforts and reasonable

progress toward securing South Vietnamese compliance, the ICRC was

basically "on our side." 1')

The Viet Cong's response ro Freymond's letter came from the NLF

representative in the Soviet Union. It tejected the ICRe's assertion that

since both recognized governments in Vietnam had subscribed to the

Geneva Convention, the activities of the National Liberation Front fell

under its provisions. The insurgents refused to be bound by what others had

done; as nonsignatories, they acknowledged no obligation. Furthermore, the

NLF described itself as not in a position to apply, literally, the provisions of

the convention owing to the nature of the war the Viet Cong were fighting.

The letter also contained a rejection of the U.S. protest concerning the

executions of Versace and Roraback. 20

The NLF's reply reached the international committee on 26 October

1965, and the ICRe's Far East expert, Jean Pierre Maunoir, expressed appreciation when acknowledging it a month later. He noted without objection

the claim that war conditions made literal application of the agreement

impracticable, and he found ways to contest the NLF's denial that it was

bound by the convention without arguing further about the legal effect of

certain signatures on the document. The Geneva treaty, ratified by nearly

every government in the world, was "an integral part of the law of nations,"

Maunoir wrote, and both its benefits and its obligations extended to

individuals as well as to the signatory states. He attempted to place a positive

construction on the NLF's statement that the captives were nevertheless

receiving humane treatment. Having just spoken of "the few fundamental

rules which are at the basis of these Conventions," he asked "has not the

National Liberation Front made them voluntarily its own, when it decided

to spare the lives of captured members of the enemy armed forces, to feed

them, give them medical attention and refrain from all onslaughts on their

lives or physical integrity, even to release them?" He suggested that the NLF

could signify its continuing commitment to this course by furnishing

complete prisoner lists, allowing the captives mail privileges and relief

parcels, and permitting an ICRC delegate to visit them. 21

Maunoir refrained from commenting on the response given to the U.S.

protest over executions; he simply informed the NLF representative in Moscow that it had been transmitted to the United States. Schwartz reported that
Prisoner of War Policy, January 1964 to May 1966 67

in a recent discussion Maunoir had questioned the desirability of using the

JCRC as "a postman to deliver protests," since that would undermine confidence the JCRC was attempting to build up with the DRV and NLFY

By November 1965 the major warring parties had declared their

basic positions on the Geneva Convention. The United States had pledged

compliance; it would do everything it could to fulfill the commitment. The

government of the Republic of Vietnam had also pledged compliance, bur

its progress toward that end was slow and never fully satisfactory to the

JCRe. The North Vietnamese government remained obdurate in its rejection of obligations under the convention, despite its status as a signatory.

Moreover, beginning in February 1966 it attempted to bolster its position

with a new argument, specious even on its face. Despite the basic statement

in Article 2 of the convention that it encompassed not only declared wars

but "any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of

the High Contracting Parties," the DRV asserted that because neither it nor

the U.S. government had declared war, the Geneva Convention did not

apply and there were no "prisoners of war."23 As for the National Liberation Front, at times it would introduce one or all of the arguments in the

Hanoi line in denying any obligation under the convention, but for the

most part it held to the two major reasons set forth in October 1965-its

nonsignatory status and the nature of guerrilla warfare.

When analyzing the DRV position State officials thought they could

discern a number of reasons that might have led the Communists to deny

the protection of the Geneva Convention to the U.S. prisoners. To recognize

the PW status of the downed pilots would be to acknowledge that the United

States and the DRV were engaged in a lawful war, an admission that would

have belied the propaganda picture of a peaceful and innocent people gratuitously mauled by an aggressive giant. Also, the DRV might have found it

impossible to admit to its citizens that it was powerless to punish enemies,

even those enemies held in its prisons. Then, too, Hanoi must surely have

recognized that concern in the United States for the captive Americans

represented a valuable asset that might be turned to advantage. And again,

looking to both propaganda and operational advantage, the DRV might

have thought that holding the airmen for trial, though a further departure

from the requirements of the convention, might publicize the "injustice" of

the bombings and even deter future raids. As for the JCRC and its requests,

Hanoi apparently viewed the committee as a Western, bourgeois institution, all too ready to interfere in the internal affairs of North Vietnam if

allowed the opportunity.

Fewer subtleties appeared necessary in explaining the Viet Cong attitude. The State Department recognized the probable validity of the claim
68 THE LONG ROAD HOME

that full observance of the Geneva Convention was impossible under conditions of guerrilla warfare. Also, the NLF leaders knew that little reciprocal

benefit was to be expected for VC captives in Saigon, where for some time

they were not recognized as prisoners of war, and then inconsistently.

Finally, the Viet Cong may have become convinced of the usefulness of

reprisals, not only for halting the execution of terrorist comrades but for

causing dissension between the South Vietnamese government and its

American ally. In a memorandum for Schwartz in early 1966, SCA Deputy

Administrator Philip B. Heymann summarized these hypotheses and offered

a further thought on why the Geneva Convention won assent as a matter of

course in Washington but appeared less appealing to Hanoi. The Geneva

Convention embodied a concern, peculiar to Western nations, for sustaining

rhe rights of individuals against governments. Moreover, it was weighted in

favor of those who possessed modern weapons for conventional warfare.

Within the letter ofthe Geneva document, bomb-throwing terrorists could be

treated as criminals; pilots captured after sowing destruction from sophisticated aircraft were prisoners of war. 24

The Threat ofWar Crimes Trials Becomes More Definite

Hanoi contended fiercely that the American flyers were not prisoners

of war but criminals apprehended in the commission of acts of barbarity

against the people and public property of North Vietnam. In taking this line

it appears rhat the DRV leaders were animared in the main by genuine outrage over the bombing. They must have felt, as well, a galling frustration at

seeing a war that had hitherto been fought on grounds of their own choosing,

and for the most part according to rules they themselves had set, now

brought home to them so painfully by forces they could not effectively

combat. But if Hanoi's reaction to the air attacks was basically emotional,

many of the resulting moves appear to have been carefully calculatedforemost among them the elaboration of the charge of criminality against

the American airmen during the late months of 1965. Increasingly the

North Vietnamese asserted that such malefactors deserved to be prosecuted

before a tribunal that would pass judgment on their crimes in the name

of mankind.

Complaints received from Hanoi earlier in the year had not been so

clearly intended to build a basis for judicial proceedings against the American

flyers, since it was primarily the U.S. government that was condemned.

An important instance was the protest lodged by the DRV Red Cross with

the ICRC in July 1965 and subsequently forwarded through the American
Prisoner of War Policy, January 1964 to May 1966 69

Red Cross to the State Department for reply. In it the North Vietnamese

presented specific allegations accompanied by photographs of the bombing

of medical facilities at three locations in their country, and they also charged

the United States with using gas warfare. In reply to the ARC on 24 September, Schwartz said that the United States had attacked no targets its

forces could identify as medical. The three localities mentioned had long

been identified as the sites of military installations. Without questioning the

genuineness of the photographs, Schwartz pointed out that the facilities

had no markings to identify them as medical, as required by the Geneva

Convention. Furthermore, they were located in close proximity ro legitimate

military targets-again, a contravention of the convention. As to the charges

of gas warfare, he said the United States had never used chemicals harmful

to either animals or human beings in Vietnam. Schwartz asked that the

ICRC make its own inspections of the sites of alleged violations to determine

the validity of the charges. 25

ARC officials forwarded Schwartz's reply ro Roger Gallopin, direcrorgeneral of the ICRC, who passed it on to North Vietnam sometime in

October 1965. Thus it arrived in Hanoi too late to have any effect on the

decision to reject the Geneva Convention's obligations, which the DRV

had announced in late August and the North Vietnamese Red Ctoss had

confirmed in its September declaration. That DRV authorities might have

accepted Schwartz's rebuttal of the charges as even relevant was, of course,

unlikely, as was the chance that they might be prepared to admit any fault

on their part in establishing medical installations near purely military targets

and then leaving them unmarked. The latter practice, at least, seems to have

been a matter of policy, since it continued throughout the war. Apart from

rejecting the ICRe's offer to conduct investigarions of the alleged violations,

the Norrh Viernamese chose not to answer. 26

After 1 Oerober 1965 the character of Communist indictments against

the United States changed. Now, whether in communications to the ICRC,

radio broadcasts, or elaborate pamphlets and broadsides, DRV charges seemed

clearly aimed at procuring worldwide sympathy for the North Vietnamese

people as victims of U.S. aggression and at building a case for prosecuting

the American airmen. While the threats of war crimes trials may never have

been more than a propaganda device, the bulk of the evidence points to a

serious intention to wreak some sort of public vengeance on the captive flyers.

By October, State Department officials considered the threat credible,

and they made protecting the lives and well-being of the captives in Hanoi

their objective, to be achieved without pursuing the propaganda advantage

that might be derived from depicting the enemy as brutal and uncivilized.

Like the ICRC, State remained committed to winning enemy adherence to
70 THE LONG ROAD HOME

the Geneva Convention by low-key persuasion and appeals to good faith,

avoiding stronger measures for fear of rousing the DRV to adamant resistance to all pressures for complianceY

In implementation of this policy, Under Secretary of State George Ball

wrote to the ICRe's president, Samuel A. Gonard, on 2 October 1965.

Taking note of the reports from Hanoi that indicated the DRV would treat

the prisoners as war criminals, he urged the ICRe to make every effort to see

that the captives were shielded by the Geneva Convention. In addition, he

asked that the ICRC exhort the North Vietnamese to mark their hospitals

and to locate them apart from military installations. The United States, he

repeated, was using every precaution; its airmen had not bombed any structures bearing medical markings. 2R

The same avoidance of sensationalism characterized the actions of the

U.S. delegation at the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross in

Vienna in early October 1965. Although championing full application of

the protections of the Geneva Convention, the U.S. representatives made no

direct attempt to condemn the DRV or the NLF by name. Schwartz, who

came resolved to avoid political controversies, spent much of his time in

private conversations with ICRC officials. Among other things, he urged

that President Gonard and Vice President Freymond engage themselves and

the full prestige of their offices in an intensified effort to gain access to

the prisons of North Vietnam. If their direct appeals to Hanoi brought no

result, the ICRC leaders might consider duplicating the move their predecessors had used with some success during the Korean War-charter a

Swiss plane and fly to North Vietnam without an invitation. 29

Schwartz continued his conversations later in Geneva, covering nearly

the entire range of PW questions then current. He was able to report that

in its attempts to assist the U.S. prisoners the ICRC had sought out DRV

and NLF representatives in Moscow, Prague, Budapest, Paris, and Phnom

Penh. It had used the Vienna conference as an opportunity to contact other

representatives and had attempted to enlist the Red Cross organizations in

the USSR, Cambodia, France, the United Kingdom, and other countries in

its efforts to influence Hanoi. In addition, Maunoir had applied for a visa

to the North Vietnamese capitaPO

The balkiness of the South Vietnamese in responding to requests for

specific actions in compliance with the Geneva Convention caused particular concern to the ICRC at this time. The international committee viewed

the United States as the senior partner of the U.S.-GVN alliance, and, as

such, largely responsible for correcting South Vietnam's delinquencies, which

the committee saw as hampering efforts to win better treatment for the

U.S. prisoners. Although apparently more ready to condemn violations by a
Prisoner of War Policy, January 1964 to May 1966 71

Western-dominated partnership than to censure barbarous actions of the

DRV and VC, the ICRC was willing to meet Schwartz part way. At the

Vienna meeting, ICRC authorities agreed to replace their senior representative in Saigon, who for a number of reasons had become unacceptable

to the South Vietnamese government. In the improved atmosphere that

resulted, the United States scored an important advance before year's end.

Yielding to Washington's insistence, the Saigon government on 21 December 1965 for the first time allowed an ICRC inspection of its prison camps.3l

During the conversations between Schwartz and the ICRC leadership

the latter suggested that the United States could further strengthen its

position in international law by arranging for a third nation to act as the

protecting power for U.S. interests in the Vietnam conflict. Under normal

application of the Geneva Convention, representatives of the protecting

power could enter the territory of the country holding prisoners; administration of the convention's provisions there would come "under their scrutiny."

The ICRC thought nothing would be lost by exploring this possibility and

suggested that Hanoi would more likely accept an East European nation

than others. As for success in the venture, however, the committee was anything but optimistic. 32

State officials were not noticeably sanguine either, but in the face of

mounting evidence that the DRV might take some spurious legal measures

against imprisoned U.S. airmen, they could leave no reasonable course

··untried. For that matter, some weeks earlier the ]CS had also recommended

"vigorous actions to establish a Protecting Power." The United States began

to canvass certain neutral nations-not those of Eastern Europe whose

governments seemed committed to supporting Hanoi-in the hope of

finding one willing to serve and acceptable to the North Vietnamese. The first

approached, France, excused itself on the grounds that it had no diplomatic

relations with the DRY. It would, however, on a "case-by-case basis and for

humanitarian reasons" talk unofficially to the North Vietnamese about PW

matters. The British, though "equally willing to be helpful," held themselves

unable to take on the formal functions of a protecting powerY

Since request and refusal took time, it was well into November before

the State Department petitioned a third country, Canada, to take on the

assignment. Although Canada was a member of the International Control

Commission (ICC), charged with overseeing the implementation of the

Geneva Agreements of 1954 in the former states of Indochina, Washington

felt that this would not be inconsistent with Canada's functioning as a

protecting power, particularly if the representatives employed were not the

same. But Canada declined, the authorities in Ottawa having concluded that

the potential for controversy over possible conflict of interest was too high.
72 THE LONG ROAD HOME

After several African nations had also offered "cogent reasons" for not

accepting, the United States solicited the government of the United Arab

Republic (UAR) in Cairo. In early January 1966 the UAR agreed to serve, but

Hanoi rejected the arrangement soon afterward, declaring once again that

the captive Americans were war criminals rather than prisoners of war. J4

Now that the North Vietnamese had made it clear that they would

accept no state as a protecting power, Washington turned back to the International Committee of the Red Cross. In Geneva in February Schwartz asked

the ICRC to offer itself as a substitute for a protecting power in accordance

with the procedure set forth in Article 10 of the convention. State believed

rejection by Hanoi certain, but again, it wished to leave no possibility

unexplored. Hanoi's refusal, formally placed on record, might have its future

uses; the ICRC offer to serve might even inhibit reprisals or trials. JS

Ambassador Harriman Takes Over

Pressing the U.S. proposal on a reluctant ICRC proved to be one of

Schwartz's last duties. On his return to Washington he found that controversies surrounding his tenure (largely in matters of immigration policy

and passport administration, rather than PW affairs) had reached a point

where his continuation in office was unacceptable to his superiors. Schwartz

resigned as administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs

on 6 March 1966; Phillip B. Heymann became acting administrator. JG

While Heymann had had experience as a deputy, Schwartz had enjoyed

a unique qualification in handling prisoner affairs-a close and longstanding rapport with senior ICRC officials. Reforging this important link to the

Swiss overseers of the Geneva Convention was of particular concern to the

Department of State and the reason, possibly, that a faster pace of activity

set in thereafter.

April 1966 saw a definite quickening in State Department planning and

initiative in prisoner of war matters. By no means could this be attributed

solely to the intervention of Senator Robert Kennedy, whose conference

with Heymann on 14 April did spur a number of actions, including the

founding of the Interdepartmental Prisoner of War Committee later in the

month.* The increased traffic in memorandums with titles beginning "Fresh

Approaches ...," "Renewed Approaches ...," or "Proposed Actions..."

largely predated the Kennedy meeting. Heymann was centrally involved in

these activities, as was Frank A. Sieverts, then serving as a special assistant

to Under Secretary Ball.l?

*See Chapter 2.
Prisoner of War Policy, January 1964 to May 1966 73

The idea of dispatching an emissary to assure the ICRC of the U.S.

interest in continuing a close relationship also predated the KennedyHeymann conversation, but the idea's rise to greater prominence shortly

thereafter may have owed something to anticipation of criticism from the

senator. On 18 April Sieverts suggested to Ball that the department ask

Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman to go at once to Geneva. While

he thought any real accomplishment improbable, Sieverts indicated that

Harriman's prestige offered the best chance of deriving some benefit from

the current situation. At the least, his participation would demonstrate the

department's concern..18

Sieverts's assessment proved sound. Harriman's visit stirred the ICRC

to action in several directions, but the committee still encountered Communist intransigence at every turn. The chief results were the increased

involvement of Harriman in PW affairs and the public visibility of the visit

itself. Shortly afterward, on 18 May 1966, the State Department announced

that Harriman would "assume general supervision of Department actions

concerning prisoners held by both sides in the conflict in Viet-Nam." It was

a development that raised the hopes of all concerned with the plight of the

prisoners that now something would be achieved..19

Harriman entered upon his new duties with a flurry of activity, moving

on every front, domestic and foreign, that appeared to offer any reasonable

hope of success. To provide support, the department assigned Sieverts as

Harriman's special assistant for PW matters. Some of the initiatives generated by Harriman were implemented or followed up by SCA, and that

bureau continued to serve as the principal day-to-day point of contact with

the American Red Cross and DoD. Indeed, SCA's status appeared to be

improving when its acting administrator was named to chair the new

Interdepartmental Prisoner of War Committee in April 1966, but the committee's subsequent lapse into routine discussions belied this promise.

Contributing notably to its decline in importance was Harriman's disinclination to use the interdepartmental committee, either for coordination or

the detailed development of projects. His preferred working methods did

not tolerate the kind of institutionalization entailed in working with or

through such a group. He thus retained a considerable freedom of action and

a great measure of personal responsibility. He made independent judgments

and took independent actions, often venturing beyond established positions

in his quest for some opportunity to help the prisoners."o

An important result of Harriman's go-it-alone tendencies was the

development of Sieverrs into the State Department's foremost expert and

chief operator in PW matters. A foreign service reserve officer with political experience, Sieverts became not only staff bur idea man and alternate
74 THE LONG ROAD HOME

for Harriman. Later, when Harriman left for the preliminary peace talks

in Paris in the spring of 1968, Sieverts took charge, in fact if not in name,

of the State Department's PW actions in Washington.

Among the matters pending when Harriman visited Geneva in May

1966 was the U.S. proposal that the ICRC offer to assume the duties of

a protecting power. Since receiving it from Schwartz in late February the

ICRC's leaders had temporized and sought excuses. Apparently they believed that functioning as a protecting power would impair their ability to

act on other PW problems in Vietnam and that even making the offer might

seem to the North Vietnamese to degrade the image of neutrality the ICRC

wished to maintain. Pressed on the issue again in talks with Harriman on

6 May, Gonard pointed out that the proposal required approval by both

parties to the war, and the Communists had been unbending in their

negative answers. He also mentioned that a high-ranking Polish diplomat

had told him the threats of war crimes trials were no more than psychological warfare, that they would never be carried OUt. 41

Gonard and his colleagues agreed that the right of a warring power to

petition for the ICRC's services was clear, and they could hardly refuse to

act on a formal request from the United States government. Harriman provided one later the same day. Three weeks later, on 25 May, the ICRC sent

a letter to Hanoi offering to perform the duties of a protecting power. As

expected, the offer was in vain. Hanoi rejected it on 27 July 1966. Attempts

to establish a protecting power ceased, and none was ever appointedY
4

Climax and Decline of the

War Crimes Trials Issue

The attempt by the United States to arrange for a protecting power for

the prisoners, pursued from October 1965 to its ultimate failure in

July 1966, constituted part of a shifting, gradually escalating U.S. response

to evidence that Hanoi might actually place the captured servicemen on

trial. Already a consistent theme in the enemy's propaganda, the charge that

American airmen were war criminals whose just punishment awaited the

convening of a tribunal recurred more frequently in the last months of 1965,

accompanied by increasing signs that Hanoi's leaders might indeed be

in earnest.

There could be little doubt, for instance, that official sponsorship lay

behind the meeting held in one district of North Vietnam on 30 October

1965, reportedly attended by "a large number of representatives of public

organs and army units in the area." After hearing the "U.S. imperialists"

condemned for their savage actions against "market places, hospitals, and

schools," the attendees unanimously adopted a resolution urging the government to bring the captured American pilots before the Supreme People's

Court as war criminals. Even if the rally had been spontaneous rather than

staged, it was clear that there had been an official decision to publicize the

event. An English-language broadcast from Hanoi described it, noting that

"many of those who had lost their children because of U.S. air raids took

the floor to denounce the U.S. aggressor's crimes." The newscast of 1 November also spoke of "similar meetings" elsewhere in North Vietnam. 1

Reinforced by publicity of this sort, the threats of prosecutions

emanating from Hanoi took on greater credibility. Then, in early December,

the U.S. government received information that the Democratic Republic

of Vietnam planned to inaugurate war crimes trials later that month, on

the fifth anniversary of the founding of the National Liberation Front. The

75
76 THE LONG ROAD HOME

State Department immediately asked the governments of the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Poland to advise Hanoi of U.S. concern; it also

raised the subject informally with the Soviet embassy in Washington. At

State's request, the British approached both the Soviet and Polish governments as a followup measure. Though otherwise noncommittal, the Poles

agreed to pass the message, but the Soviets refused, as did the North Vietnamese liaison officer with the International Control Commission, when

approached by a Canadian representative. Nevertheless, there was a strong

impression in Washington that "our representations would reach official

ears in Hanoi." Talk of prisoner prosecutions in the North Vietnamese

capital subsided for the time being. 2

The State Department's strategy of diplomatic pressure, developed in

consultation with the Department of Defense, had won acceptance almost

by default. The dearth of alternatives had been starkly apparent to State

and OSD representatives during a working level review on 16 December

1965, when they agreed that the United States should press on with the

diplomatic campaign to deter trials and to obtain a protecting power.

Retaliation through trials and executions of enemy captives was out of the

question, and resort to reprisal strikes against North Vietnamese population centers was politically undesirable. Should U.S. airmen be executed,

however, retaliatory bombing of legitimate military targets was not to be

ruled out.

Further, the participants concluded that they could best support the

diplomatic effort by publicizing effectively the difference between the trials

threatened by the Communists and the treatment of enemy prisoners by

the United States and its allies, while also pursuing measures that would

strengthen the contrast. They agteed to support and publicize the establishment of an improved system of prisoner classification in South Vietnam

that would eliminate the basis for many of the criticisms leveled at current

GVN methods. Releases of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese prisoners by

the Saigon government, appropriately featured in the news media, would

also be "most helpful."3 As it happened, none of these measures could be

fully implemented before the threats of war crimes trials subsided at the

end of 1965, but all remained as elements of the U.S. prisoner of war policy

in the later years when trials had ceased to be an active issue.

State tended to attribute to U.S. diplomatic activity the falling off of

menacing statements from Hanoi, but the enemy's change of tone in fact

coincided with the beginning, just before Christmas 1965, of what was ultimately a 37-day pause in the bombing of North Vietnam by U.S. aircraft.

This action by President Lyndon Johnson, part of a peace offensive aimed

at bringing the Vietnamese Communists to the negotiating table, may have
The War Crimes Trials Issue 77

contributed more directly to the abatement of DRV threats. Subsequent

developments provided at least circumstantial evidence to this effect. Within

two weeks after the president ordered resumption of the bombing, on 31

January 1966, the North Vietnamese ambassador in Cairo was heard to

say that the captured airmen were not entitled to the protections of the

Geneva Convention and should face trial as "criminals against humanity."4

The threat from Cairo proved only the first by Hanoi's spokesmen of a new

series that grew in number and ferocity through midyear.

The North Vietnamese were engaged in a concerted campaign to

justify war crimes trials, whether or not a decision to institute them had

been made. In February the DRV distributed worldwide a 40-page pamphlet

describing how U.S. "air pirates" constantly violated the Geneva principles

by intentionally bombing schools, churches, hospitals, and other shelters

inhabited by helpless and innocent victims. On 18 May the head of the

DRV Red Cross wrote to ICRC President Gonard protesting "new and

extremely barbarous crimes" against churches, schools, hospitals, and populous districts. These deliberate acts warranted war crimes trials, he said,

although in the same letter he ruled out any ICRC investigation of the

bombing sites. On 8 June the U.S. embassy in Saigon reported "unusual

intensity and shrillness" in the Hanoi media, which a French observer in

the North Vietnamese capital thought might presage trials in the near

future. Hanoi's anger reached an even greater intensity after the first major

raids on oil storage facilities near Hanoi and Haiphong on 29 June.)

The furor in North Vietnam had its echo in the South, although the

Viet Cong could scarcely make a good propaganda case against the few

prisoners they held, most of them enlisted men captured in small-unit

ground actions. Threats were made, as when a NLF representative in Prague

assured an American Red Cross official in April that trying the U.S.

prisoners for their crimes was the determined policy of the Viet Cong, but

it seemed obvious that the insurgents in the South were merely following

the North Vietnamese lead. If Hanoi went to the point of holding trials,

so would the National Liberation Front. If Hanoi stopped short of taking

the crucial step, the NLF, with so little evidence to support charges, was not

likely to proceed. 6

Although worried and wary, U.S. officials did not become truly

alarmed for the safety of the American prisoners during the first half of

1966. They viewed the threats from Hanoi seriously enough, but their

anxiety was frequently allayed by signs that the North Vietnamese were undecided about carrying them out. The statement by a Polish official, passed

on to Harriman by Gonard in early May, that Hanoi's fulminations about

war crimes trials were intended only as psychological warfare, apparently
78 THE LONG ROAD HOME

received some credence. Soon afterward, when a Canadian miSSIOn was

preparing to go to Hanoi with a peace proposal involving the existing International Control Commission, State asked the mission leader, Ambassador

Chester Ronning, to raise the question of prisoners ofwar but not to mention

the trials because recent events indicated that the DRV would not go through

with its threats. That in early June the government of Ho Chi Minh agreed

to accept the Ronning mission could in itself be interpreted as showing a

more reasonable attitude. In addition, channels for possible negotiation with

the DRV through East Germany, Laos, and Algeria appeared temptingly

open throughout much of this period, keeping alive the hope that some

arrangement for prisoner exchanges might be reached with the North Vietnamese. Given the sum ofthese developments, State Department intelligence

officials still believed in mid-June 1966 that no war crimes trials impended

and that the chief putpose of the DRV's threats, as with so much of its propaganda, was to gain a cessation of the bombing campaign.?

Nevertheless, the u.S. government could not afford to discount entirely

the possibility that the DRV was deadly serious in its threats. Outing June

officials on both sides of the Potomac studied that contingency in an atmosphere of increasing tension. Near the end of the month their attention

focused on the "Scenario of USG Response" that Frank Sieverts had drafted

following a preliminary discussion within the Interdepartmental Prisoner

of War Committee. Until the North Vietnamese actually announced the

convening of tribunals or the United States received conclusive evidence that

trials were scheduled, basic policies would continue in force; that is, U.S.

efforts to deter the Communists would be confined to private and diplomaric channels. Officials believed that a campaign publicly challenging

Hanoi's right to hold trials and rejecting the imputation of criminality

might "goad" the North Vietnamese into making good their threats. The

airmen's claim to status as prisoners of war under international law would

nevertheless figute importantly in U.S. actions. A State Department legal

adviser had already summed up in a memorandum the legal basis of the

U.S. position on prisoners of war, for use as needed by State and Defense

Department spokesmen. 8

With the beginning of July, enemy activities seemed to portend a

hardening of putpose. At this point, interrogators in northern prison camps

began extracting from U.S. airmen confessions of war crimes, statements

opposing the war, and apologies to the people of North Vietnam. Most of this

material the North Vietnamese publicized widely. A more serious event

occurred on 5 July 1966 (6 July in Hanoi), when the DRV paraded dozens

of prisoners, handcuffed in pairs, through the streets of Hanoi to demonstrate to the world the righteous wrath of the victimized populace against
The War Crimes Trials Issue 79

the criminal aggressors. Small groups and individual pilots had earlier

been subjected to similar calculated humiliation, but this time, apparently,

the crowds got out of hand and the prisoners were stoned, beaten, or otherwise attacked.

Finally, most ominous in the light of these events, an article in the

Hanoi newspaper Nhan Dan, voice of the Communist Party in North Vietnam, set forth in detail the legal bases for war crimes prosecutions of U.S.

airmen. Assisted by East German experts, Nhan Dan outlined a case resting

on the precedents of the Nuremberg trials, on the international convention

against genocide, and on a DRV decree of 20 January 1953. The last

provided severe punishment for offenses against the security of North

Vietnam and the destruction of its public property. Shortly after the Nhan

Dan article appeared, a broadcast from Prague specified 20 July or 4 August

for the opening trials. 9

Now convinced that trials were imminent, with sentences of death as

the possible outcome, the State Department went into action on 12 July, two

days after the Nhan Dan article. It cabled U.S. embassies in nine nationsfriendly, Communist, or uncommitted-forwarding a firm message to be

passed by the host governments to the DRV that war crimes trials would

be a "serious mistake." The U.S. government rejected allegations of war

crimes against the prisoners, who, as uniformed members of the armed

forces, were fully entitled to the protection of the Geneva Convention. Any

action to prosecute them would be nothing more than "disguised reprisals"

for U.S. assistance to South Vietnam against DRV aggression. It would

have "a deeply disturbing effect on Ametican public opinion" and would

force the U.S. government "to consider seriously what action might be

appropriate under the circumstances."lo

The cable of 12 July provided the central direction for what Harriman

described to the secretary of state a few days later as "a major diplomatic

campaign to warn the DRV of the inadvisability of holding war crimes

trials." In support of this move the State Department sought out every

avenue that might bting home to the DRV the gravity of U.S. concern and

the opposition of much of the world to the course on which the North Vietnamese seemed bent. It made approaches of varying degrees of formality

to the International Committee of the Red Cross and the World Council

of Churches and to Pope Paul VI and the secretary-general of the United

Nations, U Thant. The department also utilized several channels in seeking

to persuade the Soviets to exert their influence with Hanoi-through their

ambassador in Washington, through the U.S. ambassador in Moscow, and

through the prime ministers of Great Britain and India during scheduled

visits to the Soviet capital. And State instructed its diplomatic and consular
80 THE LONG ROAD HOME

posts everywhere to press the U.S. view on officials and opInIOn leaders

in their host countries. II

On the home front, Under Secretary of State George W Ball personally

relayed to Senator Frank Church the suggestion that a denunciation of the

DRV's announced intentions by congressional "doves" might be particularly effective. Both Vice President Hubert Humphrey and the secretary of

state spoke out, though with noticeable restraint. Rusk told a Senate subcommittee that war crimes prosecutions would be "a very, very grave development

indeed," but he hoped that "sober judgment" would still prevail among the

leaders in North Vietnam. 12

On 20 July at a scheduled news conference, the first question posed

to President Johnson concerned the war crimes issue. The president's reply,

forthright but carefully measured, avoided threats. He expressed his strong

feeling "that these men, who are military men, who are carrying out military

assignments in line of duty against military targets, are not war criminals

and should not be treated as such." He assured the press that the government had taken every step to see that "proper representations on this subject"

were made. The president stressed the willingness of the U.S. government "to

sit down at a conference table under the sponsorship of the International

Committee ofthe Red Cross, to discuss ways in which the Geneva Conventions

of 1949 can be given fuller and more complete application in Vietnam."

Another questioner failed to elicit any specific comment on measures the

United States might take in the event trials actually occurred but did garner

phrases for the headlines: "I think the people of this country and the peaceful people of the world would find this action very revolting and repulsive,

and would react accordingly."13

Some of the multiple efforts mounted by the government were destined

to fall short of their mark. Communist nations refused to pass on the U.S.

message, though some of them no doubt advised Hanoi of the approach.

In Cairo, the North Vietnamese ambassador to the United Arab Republic

rejected that government's attempt to hand him a note bearing the U.S.

warning. Soviet authorities announced that they would play no part in the

matter, and the North Vietnamese ignored President Johnson's proposal

for consultations.

The response to the U.S. campaign in other quarters, however, was

highly gratifying to Washington. Canada, India, and France, in addition to

the UAR, agreed to transmit the message in the State Department cable,

and American diplomats obtained assurances of strong support for the

U.S. position from a number of other governments-Turkey, Belgium, Italy,

and Brazil among them. The ICRC, acting quickly on Harriman's protests,

cabled the DRV foreign minister on 14 July and followed up with a letter
The War Crimes Trials Issue 81

the next day, citing the obligations of Geneva Convention signatories with regard to humane treatment of prisoners and calling attention to the articles

governing trials. The World Council of Churches, the UN secretary-general,

and the Pope all issued statements deploring the likely consequences of

war crimes prosecutions, and the Japanese foreign minister publicly condemned Hanoi's intended action as "contrary to commonly accepted

understanding of international law. "14

In the United States, 17 dovish senators joined Senator Church on

15 July in a "plea for sanity." They warned North Vietnam against treatment of the captives that would arouse the American public to insist on

"swift and sure" retaliation. Demonstrating that reprisals against U.S. servicemen were intolerable even to those who most strongly opposed the war,

this pronouncement reinforced the more bellicose utterances of the congressional hawks. Leading members of the latter persuasion threatened,

for example, that North Vietnam would be made "a desert" if trials were

held, or completely destroyed if prisoners were executed. These declarations

occurred in an atmosphere of upsurging public hostility and revulsion

against the idea that American military men should be spoken of in the

same terms as the leaders of Nazi Germany and subjected to war crimes prosecutions by a vengeful enemy. To North Vietnamese leaders the evidence

of unified opinion in the United States coupled with the warnings and

counsels of restraint from other sources presumably carried the message that

persistence in their present course might have dire consequences, even if not

pressed to the point of provoking massive U.S. military retaliation. Hanoi

already faced the prospect of a drastic loss of respect among people otherwise neutral or sympathetic to its cause. Even the Communist-bloc nations

showed themselves less than enthusiastic in support of the DRV l5

The United States government followed a considered policy of avoiding open threats of military retaliation, at least until it became clear that

the lives of the prisoners were in jeopardy or that the North Vietnamese

had abandoned all restraints in maltreating them. "Hinting at possible

retaliation," but not more than that, was an important part of the diplomatic

campaign against trials as Harriman outlined it for Secretary Rusk on

16 July. Both the wording of the initial State Department cable and the

president's choice of the phrase "react accordingly" were in this vein. Stronger

statements could be left to members of Congress, the media, and the public

and might even be more effective for being nonofficial. To insure against

any "foot-in-mouth" frustration of the policy, both State and Defense issued

orders to all personnel to refrain from making statements concerning what

punishment might be visited on North Vietnam. For members of his own

department, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance issued more inclusive
82 THE LONG ROAD HOME

guidance on 26 July, instructing them to regard "one individual in the

Department of State"-clearly, Harriman was intended-as "the spokesman for the entire Government on all matters relating to POWS."16

Military backing for the diplomatic campaign had been under review,

and on 15 July Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, commander-in-chief, Pacific

(CINCPAC), submitted to JCS his recommendations for measures to discourage the North Vietnamese from holding trials and the response to be

made if they carried their threats to conclusion. His ideas for deterrence did

not run beyond the measures the U.S. government had already instituted or

planned, but Sharp's further recommendations for military action if trials

actually occurred took a stronger line. He believed that trials and executions, if not countered by significant punishment, would strike heavily at the

morale of the forces under his command. CINCPAC thought his superiors

should consider the destruction of government buildings in Hanoi, devastation of North Vietnamese port facilities, and the mining of Haiphong

waters-all actions forbidden him under the existing U.S. strategy of graduated response. 17

Admiral Sharp's views and the similar recommendations of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff won no immediate endorsement in the State Department.

Heymann described them to William P. Bundy, assistant secretary of state

for Far Eastern affairs, on 18 July as possibly counterproductive in that

they might excite the North Vietnamese to even greater ferocity against

the prisoners. Moreover, the recommended course would have the effect of

"grossly distorting our military and diplomatic strategy in Vietnam." Heymann's view reflected the larger concept held by Harriman, who was now

calling for immediate development of a State Department position on each

possible step of military retaliation. Intent on avoiding overreaction,

Harriman foresaw an explosive growth of political pressures for retaliation

following any announcement of trials, and he wished to keep the situation

under control. I8

Harriman had already presented Secretary Rusk with a plan for U.S.

reaction should trials be announced. It did not contemplate an immediate

military response. The objectives were to prevent public outrage from foreclosing presidential options in the war, to satisfy the public that everything

possible was being done, and to find means of turning the trials into a propaganda gain for the United States while inspiring expressions of international

opinion that would discourage extreme sentences. To launch the program,

the president would issue a statement declaring that the United States would

not be provoked or deterred by the trials and would carryon the war with

renewed dedication for the single purpose of resisting aggression in Southeast
The War Crimes Trials Issue 83

Asia. He would describe such measures, by then already in progress,

as the dispatch of personal letters to other heads of state and UN officials

asking their support and to the ICRC requesting that it act as protecting

power during the trials. He would announce American insistence on the

right to provide the prisoners with counsel, sending an eminent jurist (for

example, Thurgood Marshall, the U.S. solicitor general) to defend them.

Other steps to implement the plan would include pressing the ICRC to

speak out against the trials and to insist that the North Vietnamese comply

with the Geneva Convention. \9

Harriman had proposed a presidential address designed more to

restrain passions than to enlist the nation's support for intensified hostilities. He apparently acted with strong assurance that President Johnson's

avowals that the United States sought no wider war would hold even in the

face of war crimes prosecutions. That he was in close touch with the White

House was beyond doubt. A few days earlier, at a State-DoD meeting to

consider actions in response to war crimes trials, Harriman emphasized

his concern that the congressional and public reaction would be intense. He

quoted a respected congressman as saying that "if such trials are held, we

should wipe North Vietnam out, hitting civilian targets as well as military."

One of those present recorded that Harriman "observed in this connection

that the U.S. should not take on the face of the enemy and said he was

reflecting the President's feeling in noting that we would not hit civilian

targets as reprisals for trials or even executions."

After Harriman's departure from the meeting the discussion continued;

a Navy representative advocated a formal declaration of war if any U.S.

prisoners were executed. One participant noted that the State representatives,

while not foreclosing the idea completely, strongly opposed this, and yet

another recorded Sieverts as saying, "at the highest level there is no disposition I am aware of to use executions as grounds for reprisals."20

As it turned out, no retaliatory measures were needed. About 20 July

the DRV hard line began to give way. The first public indication was the

absence of the term "war criminals" from cables that Ho Chi Minh sent

to three antiwar activists in the United States on that date. The next day a

French correspondent on the scene reported finding no one in informed

circles who would confirm that trials were imminent. On 22 July the same

newsman wrote that trials would be postponed to permit further investigation and that, when tried, the prisoners would be charged as criminals

against the Vietnamese nation, not as war criminals. One day later,

Hanoi announced the formation of a "committee to investigate war crimes

of US imperialists in Viet-Nam," adding that the committee had already
84 THE LONG ROAD HOME

held its first meeting. When, on 24 July, Ho Chi Minh, replying to a representative of the Columbia Broadcasting System, stated that there was "no

trial in view," the immediate crisis had passed. 21

Ambassador Lodge in Saigon promptly sent Washingron his evaluation

of Hanoi's retreat. He believed the DRV feared most that the hostile

response of U.S. public opinion could lead to increased military pressure.

The apprehension in Hanoi was reinforced by the "breadth of US protests"

and the "lack of wholehearted support" from other Communist states.

Inasmuch as the North Vietnamese had never set forth a specific plan, they

were spared the necessity of acknowledging an about-face. Lodge believed

the investigating committee was a device to postpone a decision and to

avoid an irrevocable stand. 22

On 28 July the State Department circulated to the field its general assessment of the postponement. Hanoi was thought to have made a "tactical

withdrawal" in the face of strongly expressed anti-trial sentiment, but it

might be playing for time to develop a new legal theory drawn from DRV

law rather than Nuremberg precedents. The current position allowed Hanoi

to continue parading its war crime allegations on the world stage while

holding open its option to institute trials. The State Department instructed

its emissaries to emphasize, when thanking host governments for their

cooperation in the campaign to forestall the prosecutions, that Hanoi had

neither renounced its intention to try the prisoners nor accepted its obligations under the Geneva ConventionY

The possibility that the Vietnamese Communists might again raise the

war crimes issue remained a factor in State Department thinking up to the

final working out of the agreement in Paris that ended U.S. participation

in the hostilities. Sieverts, preparing a position paper for the opening of

peace negotiations in 1968, pointed out that in 1966 the DRV had only set

aside the trials, not abandoned them, and that since then Hanoi's war

crimes commission had produced much "documentation," mainly of bomb

damage. From time to time, as late as mid-1969, the North Vietnamese reasserted their right to try pilots as war criminals.
5

Action on Other Fronts: Efforts to

Obtain Release of Prisoners

The overriding importance of the war crimes issue during June and

July 1966 limited the attention that Ambassador W. Averell Harriman

could give to other matters following his appointment to coordinate PW

affairs in May. None of his initiatives in the other areas came to a halt, however, and some were furthered by the same diplomatic correspondence that

focused on the trials. The most important of his efforts were aimed at the

release or exchange of the U.S. prisoners held in North and South Vietnam.

Attempts at release or exchange had begun before Harriman's appointment, of course, but throughout 1964 the Communist refusal to open any

channel for discussion ofthe matter had blocked all approaches. But in February 1965 the behavior of the Viet Cong after their capture of Gustav Hertz

seemed to promise a breach in the wall of silence, a small opening that might

lead to negotiation for rhe release not only of this U.S. foreign service officer

but also of military prisoners.

The Hertz Case

Gustav Hertz fell into the hands of the Viet Cong on 2 February 1965

while riding a motorbike in the environs of Saigon.* Sometime later his

wife received letters indicating that the captors were willing to negotiate his

release, though whether for ransom or other considerations was not clear.

Nothing came of this approach and no action of significance occurred until

April, when a Communist broadcast threatened reprisal against Hertz if

* See Chapter 3.

85
86 THE LONG ROAD HOME

the Saigon government carried out a death sentence imposed on a VC

terrorist, Nguyen Van Hai. At U.S. insistence, South Vietnamese authorities put off Hai's execution, and Washington initiated efforts worldwide,

through diplomatic and other channels, to get Hertz released. In South

Vietnam, intelligence reports that the Viet Cong were serious about entertaining the release of Hertz led U.S. embassy officials into four months of

fruitless ransom negotiations, from May through August 1965.

Distressed by the apparent futility of the State Department's endeavors,

Mrs. Hertz and other family members petitioned for more effective action

by the government. They obtained support from several members of

Congress, most prominently Senator Robert Kennedy. Knowing that the

National Liberation Front had established the first of its foreign missions

in Algiers, Kennedy approached the Algerian ambassador in Washington as

a possible source of information. Subsequently the Algerians reported that

Huynh Van Tam, the NLF representative in Algiers, had responded to their

query concerning Hertz by indicating readiness to exchange Hertz for Hai

and possibly to discuss "other matters" as well. 1

At this point negotiations came to a halt, under circumstances that

remain obscure. Obviously, discussions with Tam could not proceed without

assurance that the South Vietnamese were willing to exchange Hai. Perhaps

the initial soundings of the attitude of the Saigon government proved unfavorable or, as some sources suggest, U.S. officials decided not to raise the

question at all, believing that whether or not the death sentences of terrorists like Hai were carried out had become such a sensitive issue within

South Vietnam that protests led by political opponents might sweep the current government from office if it yielded to U.S. urgings for Hai's release.

Also mentioned as a reason for not entering on negotiations with Tam at

that time was concern that a Hertz-Hai exchange would set a precedent

encouraging the Viet Cong to take other Americans as hostages. 2

While still assessing the possibilities of the Tam channel the State

Department continued its other efforts to get Hertz released. Abba Schwartz

emphasized to the International Committee of the Red Cross in October

1965 the "special nature" of the case-a civilian under threat of reprisal execution-and suggested that the difficulties seen by the U.S. government

in a one-for-one trade might be overcome by including Hertz and Hai in a

broader exchange. Washington then became more insistent in asking Prime

Minister Nguyen Cao Ky to release Hai in the event the NLF agreed to free

Hertz, and in December Ky assented. On 4 January 1966 an ICRC representative, Jacques de Heller, met with Tam in Algiers, bur Tam said a Haifor-Hertz trade could no longer be considered, claiming that Saigon's

execution of another terrorist captured with Hai had both ended hopes of
Efforts to Obtain Release of Prisoners 87

including that second man in the trade and deepened the NLF's suspicions

of the opposing side's trustworthiness in such exchanges. However, Tam now

broached the possibility of a more extensive exchange of prisoners, possibly

including Hertz, and suggested holding a conference of NLF, ICRC, and

U.S. government representatives to discuss it. He insisted on the utmost

secrecy in making arrangements. 3

De Heller returned to Geneva with this latest information, which both

State and the ICRC found encouraging. State officials planned their next

step with awareness that the prospect of U.S.-NLF consultations would

arouse apprehension among some members of the Saigon government, who

feared that such contacts would bolster the National Liberation Front's

claims to recognition as a legal entity and legitimate spokesman for some

or all of South Vietnam. On 12 January 1966 the State Department cabled

the embassy in Saigon that it intended to adhere to the established U.S.

policy of meeting anywhere and any time on behalf of the captive Americans, whether the other party was a recognized regime or not, and in this

instance hoped to have the ICRC involved. State could give assurances that

U.S. negotiators would avoid publicity and would restrict discussions to the

subject of prisoners. The embassy was asked to make these points clear to

the foreign minister of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN) while assuring him

that he would be kept informed of developments. 4

On 15 January 1966 State advised the ICRC of its willingness to talk

with enemy representatives at any time under ICRC auspices, and the international committee prepared to advance the matter in an early meeting with

Tam. The level of secrecy he had called for might be difficult to maintain,

however, since international press attention to the NLF mission in Algiers

had been rising, with prominent mention of Tam as the man in charge. At

a Paris press conference on 15 January Sanford Gottlieb, an American

citizen and official of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy

(SANE), spoke of his recent conversations with both North Vietnamese

diplomats there and NLF representatives in Algiers. At one point he said he

had received the impression that the NLF would react favorably to a proposal for an exchange of American and Communist prisoners of war if put

forward by the United States either directly or through an intermediarya remark that caused alarm among State officials as potentially damaging

to their current endeavor. Two days later the New York Times carried a dispatch headed "Algiers Rumors of U.S.-Vietcong Peace Contacts Persist."o

De Heller returned to Algiers, where he handed Tam a letter from ICRC

Director-General Roger Gallopin on 19 January. After cordial discussions,

Tam agreed to inform the NLF of U.S. willingness to meet. Two days

later, however, in a reply to Gallopin's letter, he stated that he could not
88 THE LONG ROAD HOME

accept any communication from or have any dealings with the ICRe.

Should there be any publicity given their recent discussions, Tam added,

he would deny them absolutely.('

Though some in the State Department speculated that unwanted

scrutiny by the press might have caused Tam to cut communications,

Schwartz and Gallopin considered it more likely that Tam had elaborated

on the original proposal without prior clearance from the NLF and had

found himself out on a limb. Or, the rejection of the ICRC in January

1966 may have been an early expression of the NLF's "no intermediaries"

policy in dealing with the United States, which became more explicit as the

year advanced. In any event, in evaluating the Tam affair later, Sieverts described the State Department as holding no illusions that the Viet Cong

had ever been serious about exchanging Hertz for Hai. As soon as the U.S.

government and ICRC got down to specifics, he pointed out, the NLF

backed away. Like some others interested in the case, however, Senator

Kennedy remained convinced U.S. authorities had lost the best opportunity

to obtain Hertz's release when they hesitated to respond to Tam's first offers

to negotiate. 7

Hertz's name did not again figure in attempts to arrange prisoner

exchanges. Perhaps the NLF considered him too valuable as a hostage in preventing executions of their agents held by the GVN. In August 1966 and

again in July 1967 the Viet Cong reported through Prince Norodom Sihanouk

of Cambodia that Hertz was in good health. In November 1967, however,

Sihanouk informed Mrs. Hertz that her husband had died, apparently of

malaria, on 24 September. H

The Vogel Affair

Not long before the Tam episode drew to a close another promising possibility for prisoner exchanges cropped up, again in a location far removed

from the battleground in Southeast Asia. On 7 January 1966, U.S. representatives in Berlin reported an approach by a German lawyer, Wolfgang

Vogel, and his colleague, Jurgen Stange, both of whom had been involved in

arranging the return to the West of detainees from Communist countries in

Europe. Claiming high-level support in the East German government, Vogel

said that he had been authorized to mediate an exchange of 10 American

PWs for a like number of captive members of the North Vietnamese People's

Army (PAVN). There was a condition to be met, however. Vogel's principals

linked the exchange with the release by the United Kingdom of two convicted spies, a man and wife named Kroger. Vogel proposed, as a preliminary

step, the exchange of lists of prisoners each side desired to have returned. In
Efforts to Obtain Release of Prisoners 89

asking the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the needed data, Assistant Secretary of

Defense (ISA) John T. McNaughton described the Vogel overture as offering

the most hopeful prospect to date of obtaining the release of at least some

of the captives.'!

The Joint Chiefs furnished a list showing three categories: 11 men

identified as prisoners in North Vietnam; 45 airmen known to have gone

down in DRV territory but not yet identified as prisoners; and 131 listed as

missing or detained, whereabouts unknown. In addition, they recommended

that the United States use the expected negotiations as an opportunity to

seek an exchange of lists of all rhe prisoners held by each side.

In developing their position on the Vogel proposal the JCS for the first

time had to consider policy on order of return in a partial repatriation, and

the resulting determination had bearing on all future instances of early

release. The Joint Chiefs concluded that if a limit was imposed on the

number to be exchanged, the sick and wounded should have first priority.

Beyond that, prisoners should have priority in the order of their date of

detention, regardless of grade or military service. Using any other criteria,

such as intelligence value, might complicate agreements and operate to the

detriment of the U.S. captives. III

Although suspicious of Vogel's offer, the State Department moved

energetically to take advantage of whatever opportunity might eventuate.

It secured the assent of Prime Minister Ky to his government's role in an

exchange. It checked with the British, but found them "very reluctant" to give

up the Krogers. Nevertheless, State instructed its Berlin representatives to

meet with Vogel, give him the prisoner lists, and ask for a list from the DRy' 11

At the mid-January meeting Vogel insisted that the Krogers were

essential to any exchange and only reluctantly accepted the proffered lists.

Although he claimed to have full authority from the East German government, it appeared that Vogel had had no direcr contact with the North

Vietnamese. Suspicion deepened that the East Germans were merely using

him in an attempt to retrieve the Krogers. 12

Afrer one more January meeting the negotiations lapsed, though not

owing to any reluctance of the U.S. authorities to continue talking. At

midyear Vogel tried to revive the talks, saying that Hanoi had been responsible for the five-month hiatus, which had probably occurred because the U.S.

government was making too many approaches through too many channels,

whereas the North Vietnamese wanted to use only one. East Germany, seeking increased prestige within the Communist world, wished to be that

channel. State replied immediately, accepting East Berlin as the channel if

approved by Hanoi but declaring that the United States would not forego

action elsewhere while the negotiations continued. U
90 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Again nothing came of the renewed conversations, but Vogel and

Stange appeared once more in late January 1967. They offered at least two

and possibly five or six wounded U.S. flyers purportedly being held in East

Germany in exchange for the Krogers. More skeptical than ever, the State

Department turned again to the British, who in early March absolutely

rejected any deal for the Krogers and asked that they not be the subject of

any further discussion with the two Berliners. The Vogel approach, once

thought so promising, had played OUt. 14

Reciprocal Release

An exchange of prisoners in wartime normally requires communication with the enemy, if not directly then through intermediaries. If no

responsible representative of the enemy will talk-and this was so in Vietnam in 1965-66-the only type of exchange possible is a de facto, informal

exchange, which U.S. officials spoke of as "reciprocal release." Under this

procedure, one party to a conflict returns one or more prisoners of war to the

other side in the hope that the enemy will respond by freeing a corresponding

number of captives. Reciprocal release remained an element of Washington's

prisoner of war policy from December 1965 to the closing days of American

involvement in hostilities, though the record showed few instances of reciprocity by the enemy.

The first expression of the reciprocal release policy occurred in late

1965, prompted by the Viet Cong's release of Army Staff Sgts. Claude D.

McClure and George E. Smith through Cambodia on 5 December. Probably

the enemy sought nothing more than propaganda advantage in setting free

these two men, whose conduct and statements suggested they had been converted to an antiwar stance and become alienated from the U.S. military.*

Certainly there were no indications, as in some later releases, that the Viet

Cong hoped to receive any of their own people in return. Nevertheless,

Washington officials saw an opportunity to turn the situation in the direction

of reciprocal release and to do so in a manner compatible with their primary

concern at the time-the U.S. campaign to prevent war crimes trials.

On 15 December 1965 a joint State-Defense message instructed the

U.S. embassy in Saigon to consult the GVN about promptly handing over

"more than two PAVN prisoners" to ICRC representatives for return to

North Vietnam. The message stated explicitly that the accompanying

publicity should not describe this release as a response to that of Smith and

* See Stuarr I. Rochester and Frederick Kiley, Honor Bound: American Prisoners of War in

Southeast Asia, 1961-1973,249-50.
Efforts to Obtain Release of Prisoners 91

McClure, though "this inference would be widely drawn." Washington

authorities hoped that going beyond a tit-for-tat response by setting free

"more than two" would give impetus to the venture and win credit as a

"reasonable and humanitarian gesture" surpassing the Viet Cong's original

move. The guidance also directed that the publicity avoid characterizing

the event as proof of the North Vietnamese army's presence in South

Vietnam. It would, however, identify those freed as PAVN soldiers and

express the hope that further prisoner exchanges would follow.

Officials in Washington expected that Hanoi would vehemently deny

that the released men were of Northern origin, but they nevertheless hoped

the U.S. action would bring some response. They had a further objective

of placing the United States and South Vietnam "in as favorable a light as

possible with international opinion," which could have some weight in dissuading the DRV from staging war crimes trials. The U.S. policy would be

broadly supportive of the ICRe's efforts as well. The international committee, which was thinking of commending the Viet Cong for release of the

two sergeants, could also express approval of the Saigon government's

action. With a rough balance of moral advantage restored between the two

sides, the ICRC might be in a better position to engage the DRV in a discussion of trials and prisoner of war treatment generally. 15

As expected, the GVN agreed to the U.S. proposal, and Hanoi denounced

the impending release, but meanwhile a month had passed. On 18 January

1966 State noted that passage of time had foreclosed any opportunity to

connect a release of PAVN soldiers with Smith and McClure. Washington

officials felt they could not call on the Saigon government to abandon a

project originally promoted by the United States, but "in view of contacts

underway elsewhere" (apparently meaning Tam and Vogel), they asked the

embassy to urge that it be held to "a low-key, small-scale release" with minimum publicity to avoid undue affront to the North Vietnamese. The

embassy's efforts were unavailing. The GVN staged the ceremonious transit

of 21 North Vietnamese soldiers across a bridge in the Demilitarized Zone

on 30 January, without ICRC participation and with a level of fanfare that

made State officials wince. In their view, Saigon had turned the affair into

a propaganda stunt that might undercut other efforts on behalf of the

U.S. prisoners. 16

This less than auspicious beginning foreshadowed some of the difficulties that would arise from the need for South Vietnamese cooperation in

implementing a policy of reciprocal release. The "trading material" used in

this form of barter with the enemy had to be obtained from the Saigon

government, since the United States did not retain custody of the insurgents and North Vietnamese soldiers captured by its forces. The practice of
92 THE LONG ROAD HOME

transferring all prisoners to the South Vietnamese government, followed during the advisory period and the early months of active U.S. involvement, had

been formalized in the Westmoreland-Co Agreement, negotiated by the

commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV)

and the GVN's minister of defense on 27 September 1965. For reasons of

language commonality and overriding political interest and to insure effective gathering of intelligence from the captives, South Vietnam maintained

custody of the prisoners. Operational, logistical, and cultural considerations

further reinforced the logic of the Westmoreland-Co Agreement, which remained in force throughout the hostilities.1 7

The reluctance of the South Vietnamese government to return anyone

to the enemy side who might rearm and rejoin the battle constantly

hampered American initiatives aimed at reciprocal release. The GVN's

leaders objected particularly to freeing native South Vietnamese who had

been captured while serving the rebel cause. They rarely relented in their

insistence on turning loose only well-screened captives willing to renounce

insurgency and take up civilian pursuits in areas under GVN control. For

reciprocal release to work, however, prisoners had to be returned outright

to the enemy. As Frank Sieverts observed, unless the releasees wanted to

rejoin the Viet Cong and were able to do so, "the gesture is meaningless,

except for superficial propaganda." IX

Ky and his ministers were more tractable about repatriation of PAVN

prisoners, as they had demonstrated in the return at the DMZ bridge in

January 1966. Here the opportunity to display evidence of North Vietnamese aggression in the South made the release of a few individuals worth the

risk that they would again appear in the enemy's battalions. Hanoi countered

such actions by repeatedly denying the presence of any PAVN personnel

below the DMZ. It was willing to accept, it said, the release of any revolutionary brothers suffering at the hands of the illegal and oppressive Ky

regime. These unfortunates could come North or remain in the South as they

chose, but to call them North Vietnamese soldiers was a calumny and a

hoax. North Vietnam maintained this position up to the signing of the peace

agreement. With little doubt, Hanoi's military personnel received an indoctrination consistent with this policy, probably along the following lines:

Even if captured in PAVN uniform, they were to claim to be from the South.

They were not to write to their families in the North. If offered release to

return home, they were to refuse; if released, they were to remain in South

Vietnam and join VC forces. Militant PAVN prisoners in the South Vietnamese prison camps apparently enforced this doctrine on wavering comrades.

When the GVN planned to return 18 PAVN soldiers on 20 July 1966

to mark the twelfth anniversary of the Geneva Accords, 12 of those selected
Efforts to Obtain Release of Prisoners 93

refused on the grounds that they were South Vietnamese serving in North

Vietnamese units. Left to themselves, Saigon's generals might have forced

their return, but the United States insisted on adherence to the principle

of voluntary repatriation. The Ministry of Defense therefore had to search

among generally reluctant PAVN prisoners to find volunteer replacements. On 20 July only 13 men crossed the bridge in the DMZ to the North

Vietnamese side. 19

Typical of the obstinacy of the GVN on the release issue was its action

in freeing three Viet Cong in early 1967. On 4 January the insurgents had

returned three captive civilians to Allied control, two of them Americans.

The United States government persuaded the Ky regime to liberate a like

number of Viet Cong, but Saigon did so in a manner that did not constitute a true exchange and was hardly calculated to elicit a further response

from the NLF. Those chosen had indicated they had no intention of returning to active insurgency, and the Saigon authorities released them to the

custody of their families and kept them under surveillance. 2o

The next incident contributed even less to the advancement of Washington's policy. On 23 February 1967 the Viet Cong freed two soldiers, Sgt.

Sammie N. Womack and PFC Charles E. Crafts, and the next day the

United States announced its intention of releasing two VC in return. But

getting the GVN to give up any captive of possible value to the enemy proved

an insurmountable problem. On 8 March the State Department instructed

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to explain to the South Vietnamese that

the United States, in the interest of its men in captivity, felt compelled to

insist that two prisoners be returned to the VC forces. The embassy replied

that Ky wished to release only "repentant" captives, just as the Viet Cong

did. Early in April a joint State-Defense cable suggested an alternative:

GVN agreement to the freeing of two captives from among those still being

processed in U.S. custody. The Saigon government remained adamant. On

5 May 1967 the State Department finally gave up the attempt to fulfill

its announced intention in view of the embassy's opinion that pushing the

Ky government to concur would endanger further cooperation on prisoner

matters. Earlier, in March, the Saigon authorities had set loose 20 Viet Cong,

but none of them actually returned to NLF control. 2\

Thus far the U.S. reciprocity policy, when pursued in tandem with a

refractory South Vietnamese government, could hardly be counted a success.

As State pointed out to Lodge's successor, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker,

in mid-May, rather than taking the lead in initiatives that would generate

a widening response from the other side, the U.S.-GVN releases had for the

most part been reactions to those of the enemy. A more successful instance

of U.S. influence on the GVN's actions occurred on 12 June, however, when
94 THE LONG ROAD HOME

the Saigon government freed four Viet Cong outright, in the presence of

an ICRC delegate. Embassy spokesmen described the release to newsmen as

involving U.S.-captured prisoners, freed at U.S. request, with hope for reciprocal action by the insurgentsY

Through mid-1967 all captive Americans set free had been held by the

Viet Cong, but for the better part of a year the United States had been striving to engage the North Vietnamese in reciprocal releases as well. Here the

United States could operate more freely, with a reduced requirement for cooperation from the Saigon government, because U.S. authorities had acquired

a modest stock of trading material of their own.

Nineteen surviving crew members of three North Vietnamese PT boats,

sunk after attacking U.S. naval forces in the Tonkin Gulf, had been picked

up on 1 July 1966. Taken in international waters, these were prisoners that

Hanoi could not easily disavow. Also, under a somewhat strained interpretation of the Westmoreland-Co Agreement the prisoners did not have to

be transferred to South Vietnamese custody. Recognizing that these captives

offered opportunities for barter, the U.S. government took every precaution

to preserve the North Vietnamese crewmen as an available resource. Held

aboard ship until compliance with the Geneva Convention's requirement for

confinement on land could not longer be delayed, they were then moved to

a special compound in Da Nang. CINCPAC, rather than COMUSMACV,

retained control. Should the GVN question the arrangement, the U.S.

embassy was prepared to explain that the Westmoreland-Co Agreement

applied only to agencies under MACV. State and Defense issued joint

instructions for the intelligence utilization of the human prizes under procedures designed to minimize the possibility that the crew members would

become unwilling to be exchanged. The captors took special precautions to

prevent prisoners from knowing if one of their comrades had compromised himself, since a compromised man would not be likely to accept

repatriation for fear of punishment at the hands of his government. 2

'

Under Harriman's direction, State sought to draw the DRV into discussion of an exchange of prisoners involving the PT boat crews. It chose

the North Vietnamese mission in Laos as the most promising avenue for

contact. On 17 July 1966 State instructed the U.S. charge in the Laotian

capital to deliver a note to his DRV counterpart offering to discuss repatriation of crews and other prisoners on mutual terms. On the same day,

to emphasize the legality of the U.S. position under the Geneva Convention,

the U.S. mission in Geneva was to deliver a list of the captives to the ICRC.

In Vientiane, however, the DRV representative returned the American

note unopened. 24

Harriman turned to other channels, chiefly the ICRC and the Cambodian government. He apparently hoped to set up some sort of PW exchange
Efforts to Obtain Release of Prisoners 95

facility in Cambodia based on the precedent of the release of Smith and

McClure through Phnom Penh. In August the United States offered to

exchange 17 of the PT crew members for American prisoners of war and to

repatriate the remaining 2 who had been wounded at the time of capture,

releasing them unconditionally in conformance with Article 110 of the

Geneva Convention. Despite medical opinion that the two were not so

gravely wounded as to be eligible for direct repatriation under Article 110,

Washington seized on their release as a device to court enemy reciprocation. 25

On its part, Hanoi perceived this situation as an opportunity to cripple

certain U.S.-GVN clandestine operations north of the DMZ, which involved

the unpublicized capture of North Vietnamese civilians, mostly farmers

and fishermen, who were detained for a period to gain intelligence and then

released. For the United States, meeting the requirements of the Geneva Convention was unacceptable in this instance, since furnishing lists of prisoners

and allowing ICRC inspections would amount to public acknowledgment

of the operations. The DRV clearly hoped to force just such an exposure in

September 1966 when it protested the kidnapping by "marauding pirate

ships" of 150 of its citizens. After receiving another protest on 1 November,

the ICRC asked State for a list of the 131 prisoners (150 less the 19 PT

boat personnel already reported) and for permission to visit them. The

department managed to fend off the ICRC for the time being, and after

some delay occasioned mainly by the necessity of communicating through

the Cambodian foreign office, Hanoi agreed to receive the two wounded PT

boat crew members. Their return took place in March 1967 without leaks

to the media that might have led the DRV to reject other releases, but there

was no response in kind. 21'

Although temporarily encouraged by the "success" of this release, the

State Department saw its hopes of further gain from possession of the

crewmen come to naught. It was almost a year later, in February 1968,

when the North Vietnamese for the first time set three U.S. pilots at liberty.

Neither the circumstances nor the pronouncements of DRV leaders suggested that their motivation had anything to do with reciprocity or a desire

to retrieve the other PT boat personnel. Nevertheless, the United States responded by releasing three of the crewmen in March 1968, and it returned

all the remaining 14 in October after Hanoi had freed three additional

airmen. Expressions of hope for reciprocation by Hanoi accompanied the

release of the last group of crew members, but 10 months elapsed before

the DRV liberated three more U.S. prisoners, in August 1969.27

In a later summing up State acknowledged that North Vietnamese

leaders had been unmoved by U.S. efforts to deal with the PW problem

on a basis of reciprocity. "They deny any comparison of the prisoners,
96 THE LONG ROAD HOME

referring to u.s. prisoners as 'war criminals' and to NVN/VC prisoners as

'Vietnamese patriots illegally held."'2H

Repatriation ofSick and Wounded

Of the actions available during 1966 and 1967 that might induce the

Communists to engage in reciprocal release, direct repatriation of sick and

wounded North Vietnamese soldiers seemed the most promising. In the

first place, the humanitarian appeal of sending the sick and wounded home

could be expected to generate pressure on both the DRV and the NLF from

public opinion throughout the world. Second, Articles 109 and 110 of the

Geneva Convention required it-unless refused by the prisoner-and thus

the measure had the enthusiastic support of the International Committee

of the Red Cross. Not only did this course give ICRC representatives a

visible part to play; it also sustained their view of the convention's scope

by demonstrating that it could be applied in a civil, guerrilla-type conflict

as well as in formally declared wars. The U.S. effort could, and did, lead

to greater willingness by the ICRC to press Hanoi on prisoner matters.

Third, repatriation of sick and injured PAVN personnel did not meet

the same resistance from Saigon that release of able-bodied prisoners

encountered. The GVN was entirely willing to send back people who were

not likely to take up arms again if by doing so it could please the u.S.

government, placate the ICRC, and in the process call attention to the

fact that North Vietnamese soldiers had been captured in the South.

Finally, the United States stood to gain greatly if it could establish mutual

repatriation of sick and wounded as an operating principle. In 1966 South

Vietnamese prison camps held hundreds of PAVN soldiers. Most of them

were in good health, but the seriously sick or wounded among them numbered more than the total of all Americans held by the Communists. Within

the smaller complement of U.S. prisoners of war, on the other hand, many

were known or presumed to be qualified for direct repatriation under Article 110. Repatriation under that article, whether general or reciprocal, could

result in the recovery of a high proportion of the captive Americans.

Consideration of sick and wounded repatriation began in Washington

in June 1966, following a recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The effort became more intensive in the fall, when it received a special

stimulus from the communique issued at the close of the Manila Conference, 24-25 October 1966, which President Johnson had attended with

leaders of Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, South Korea, the Philippines,

and South Vietnam. One paragraph of the Manila communique cited a resolution recently adopted by the executive committee of the League of Red
Efforts to Obtain Release of Prisoners 97

Cross Societies that called for compliance with the Geneva Convention in

the Vietnam conflict and, particularly, for "immediate action to repatriate

seriously sick and wounded prisoners of war." The leaders gathered in

Manila "agreed to work toward the fulfillment of this resolution, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, and indicated

their willingness to meet under the auspices of the ICRC or in any appropriate forum to discuss the immediate exchange of prisoners. "2') During

the following nine months, repatriation of the sick and wounded had

highest priority with State Department officials concerned with PW affairs.

Inasmuch as the South Vietnamese government presented no obstacle

to this type of exchange, the primary difficulty was the absence of a means of

communicating with the DRY. Hoping to overcome this block, Harriman

went personally to Algiers in early December 1966 and attempted to meet

with Hanoi's ambassador there. Harriman was prepared to offer the unconditional immediate release of North Vietnamese sick and wounded. In the event

the DRV consented to repatriate U.S. captives qualified under Article 110,

the United States would also return the 19 PT boat personnel plus all other

Vietnamese prisoners desiring to go to North Vietnam. Harriman's attempt

failed, however, since neither DRV nor NLF representatives would consent

to meet with him.\()

Shortly after this disappointment the United States began planning a

unilateral release of sick and wounded North Vietnamese, to be effected with

the cooperation of the ICRC during Tet in 1967. As a result, on 3 February

of that year 28 PAVN soldiers were repatriated across the DMZ. Three

days later DRV Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong declared Hanoi's opposition to the ICRC role in such actions. His government would accept

the release of "compatriots," he said, but wanted no intermediaries. The

ICRC sent a further message emphasizing the readiness of the United States

and GVN to repatriate North Vietnamese sick and wounded and appealing to the DRV to cooperate, but in early March the committee's leadership

informed a U.S. representative in Geneva that the ICRC would be reluctant

to participate in future releases in the absence of DRV approval. 1J

Hoping that Hanoi's rejection of intermediaries might indicate willingness to accept direct contact with the United States government, the State

Department attempted an approach through the DRV representative in

Laos. Acting with GVN concurrence, on 12 April 1967 the department transmitted to the U.S. charge in Vientiane a note for delivery to the DRV mission.

The United States offered unconditional return of PAVN sick and wounded

and asked only that the North Vietnamese set the time and place. It also

proposed the exchange of other captives on a basis of reciprocity. Once again,

however, efforts to open communications with Hanoi proved futile. 12
98 THE LONG ROAD HOME

In the meantime, South Vietnamese concessions in response to the

ICRe's demands concerning its role in Saigon had given rise to a period of

unusually good relations between that government and the committee's

delegate, now Jacques de Heller. In April 1967 he reacted favorably to a

GVN proposal to repatriate 50 PAVN sick and wounded and urged his

superiors in Geneva to lend support. Relaxing its nonparticipation policy,

the ICRC consented to coordinate the release with the United States and

GVN. It agreed to notify the North Vietnamese government about one

month in advance, stating the time and place of transfer, and to proceed

with the repatriation without waiting for an answer. l3

It soon became obvious that everyone connected with this project

on the Allied side had been overly sanguine. The ICRC screened 261 PAVN

prisoners, finding 110 both qualified for repatriation under the sick and

wounded provision of the convention and well enough to travel. But of the

110, only 39 agreed to go. These were released to DRV control on 12 June

1967 at a bridge over the Ben Hai River in the DMZ, but media coverage

was disappointing and little credit was realized from the event. The repatriation took place with full cooperation of the ICRC, but when the United

States pressed for a commendatory statement, the Swiss chose to remain

silent to avoid jeopardizing further prisoner exchanges or undermining the

committee's longstanding efforts "to establish a position of confidence with

Hanoi." Hanoi, on the other hand, could be satisfied with the success of its

tactics. Its policy of instructing its personnel not to accept repatriation or

acknowledge their Northern origin was working well. It had condemned the

U.S.-GVN initiative in advance; in a propaganda broadcast early in June

Hanoi advised its listeners that the United States and irs Saigon "puppet," in

a "crafty maneuver" designed to distract attention from their own aggressions, would soon push across the 17th parallel a number of persons they

falsely claimed were captured North Vietnamese soldiers. 34 And finally,

Hanoi had regained its men without giving up anything, without even corresponding with the United States. Washington and Saigon came away from

the operation with little more than the good will of the ICRe. Nevertheless,

the United States continued to seek opportunities for direct repatriation of

seriously sick and wounded enemy soldiers. There was always the hope that

next time the rulers of North Vietnam might respond more humanely.

Internment a/Sick and Wounded in Neutral Territory

Article 110 of the Geneva Convention provides an alternative to direct

repatriation of seriously sick and wounded prisoners of war: removing them

to a neutral country. Immediate exploration of the possibility of internment
Efforts to Obtain Release of Prisoners 99

in neutral territory was one of the measures recommended by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff on 10 June 1966. 35 For a time, however, the idea received only

secondary attention, largely because direct repatriation was more desirable

and, for many reasons, more practicable. If worked out in conformance with

the detailed provisions of the convention on the subject, neutral internment

would involve both finding a government willing to receive the prisoners

and establishing mixed medical commissions to screen the potential internees

and "make all appropriate decisions regarding them" (as specified in Article

112). The convention provided that a majority of each commission's membership would be drawn from neutral countries, certified to and actually

appointed by the ICRC Clearly this course would require the North Vietnamese to acknowledge obligations under the Geneva Convention and to

accept foreign intercession and ICRC oversight well beyond what they had

rejected in the past.

Nevertheless, in response to the JCS recommendation the Interdepartmental Prisoner of War Committee did begin consideration of the

internment alternative in the latter half of 1966. Of the neutral nations

that might accommodate prisoners and be acceptable to the Communists,

Cambodia was the one most discussed in Washington. Officials saw advantages in the country's geographic location. Moreover, Prince Sihanouk and

his wife had occasionally expressed sympathy for the suffering of the

prisoners and their families. Consideration of Cambodia ended rather

abruptly in April 1967, however, when a Swiss approach, undertaken at

U.S. request, met with a rudely worded rejection from Sihanouk, apparently

annoyed by U.S. actions not related to prisoners. 36 Serious consideration

of neutral internment lapsed for a time, but the subject came up again, in

different circumstances, during 1971.*

Exploration o/Other Routes

At its initial meeting on 29 April 1966 the Interdepartmental Prisoner

of War Committee took up first the problem of finding some means of

communicating with the DRV and the NLF. The committee decided to

investigate all possible lines of action, among them approaches through

neutral third countries-Pakistan and Cambodia initially-and mounting

a direct approach (at that time not yet attempted) through the DRV

mission in Laos. The committee encouraged the American Red Cross to

develop contacts with its counterparts in other nations in an effort distinct from its continuing relationship with the ICRC Those present also

* See Chapter 13.
100 THE LONG ROAD HOME

resolved to investigate the use of "non-governmental individuals" as intermediaries, as in the negotiations with Cuba over the Bay of Pigs prisoners, cited

as a model by Senator Kennedy in his recent letter to Secretary Rusk. *.17

Thus, when Harriman took over as PW coordinator in mid-May he had

at hand a variety of channels to choose from in attempting to open a dialogue with the enemy. In effect, he chose them all. The American Red Cross

had already responded to the interdepartmental committee's urging by

embarking on a prolonged effort to engage the North Vietnamese Red Cross

in correspondence. Harriman let this proceed, as he did the approaches

through third countries. He assumed control over the efforts at direct communication with the DRV, where the text to be used was in process of

clearance, and he pressed the search for a private individual to act as intermediary with the NLF.

In its final form, the note to the North Vietnamese government sought

agreement on bilateral discussions of prisoner treatment and exchange,

with the added suggestion that the conversations "could be more fruitful if carried out without publicity." The department instructed the U.S.

charge in Vientiane, Emory C. Swank, to pass it to the North Vietnamese

charge, which he did on 13 June 1966. His Vietnamese opposite accepted

the note for delivery to Hanoi, but he avowed that there were no PAVN

personnel in the South to exchange and that allegations of their presence

were "pure calumny."18

The fact that the DRV representative had not rejected the note outright was encouraging, and Harriman cabled further instructions to Swank

in a somewhat optimistic vein. When the North Vietnamese diplomat

returned from Hanoi about mid-July, however, he made no move to communicate with Swank, leading the U.S. charge to surmise that DRV leaders

were unwilling to respond to a direct approach. His suspicion was confirmed

on 20 July when the later U.S. note concerning the PT boat personnel was

returned unopened. Hanoi was not ready to talk. 1'!

The attempt to make contact with the NLF through a private intermediary met with no better fate. Prior to Harriman's appointment, State had

several candidates under consideration, most notably Bernard Fall, a French

citizen and prominent scholar and writer on the Indochina war. Harriman's

choice, however, was Wilfred Burchett, an Australian Communist newsman

who had helped the mainland Chinese in their propaganda exploitation of

U.S. prisoners during the Korean War and who had talked with Camacho,

Smith, McClure, and Roraback in their jungle prison in 1964. t The first

* See Chapter 2.

t Burchett's account of these interviews appeared in the Baltimore Sun, 10 May 64. See

also Rochester and Kiley, Honor Bound, 78-79.
Efforts to Obtain Release of Prisoners 101

problem in utilizing Burchett, however, was that no one in official

Washington knew where he was; it proved necessary to find the intermediary through an intermediary. Robert Shaplen, a writer for The New

Yorker and an acquaintance of Burchett, got word to him in Phnom Penh,

where the Australian was living at the time. 40

Burchett agreed to the U.S. proposal. He carried into NLF-controlled

territory the word that Washington was seeking an exchange of prisoners,

but, failing that, would welcome any overture in compliance with the

Geneva Convention, such as prisoner lists and mail privileges. The initial

result of his conversations with NLF representatives was a letter to Shaplen

from a member of the NLF Central Committee, Tran Buu Kiem, on 15 July

1966. Kiem declared that the United States could "hardly expect to benefit

from a normal solution to the problem" so long as the larger matter of U.S.

aggression in South Vietnam was unresolved. 4!

Burchett's mission ended in failure. He got no agreement on release of

prisoners and little information. On 13 September he reported through a

British diplomat in Cambodia that the NLF had "no answer at this time,"

attributing this response to the insurgents' desire not to give an impression

of weakening. On the other hand, to the surprise of some in Washington,

Burchett had proved entirely reliable, neither betraying U.S. interests nor

seeking any personal benefit from his American connection. Later, in early

February 1967, he again acted as an intermediary with the NLF, passing on

a message thanking the insurgents for the recent release of two American

civilians. The U.S. communication invited attention to a reciprocal release

by the Saigon government, suggested further exchanges, and asked for consideration of the fact that Americans in captivity required more food than

did the average Vietnamese. This approach was no more successful than the

first, and there was some indication that Burchett's standing with the Vietnamese Communists had declined, perhaps because of his undertaking

missions for the United States. In any case, the NLF, like the DRV, was not

ready to talk. 42

The Clandestine Approach: The BUTTERCUP Channel

Some months later, toward the end ofJuly 1967, the leaders of the NLF

signaled a change of mind-they were now prepared to negotiate prisoner

exchanges. The reversal may have owed something to the fact that a clandestine channel was now available, one that employed no outsiders

as intermediaries and that took account of the NLF's apparent obsession

with secrecy. The main motivation probably came from the NLF's desire to
102 THE LONG ROAD HOME

recover important cadre leaders held prisoner by the Saigon government,

such as the 40 NLF district and regional cadre arrested in recent months

in MR-4, the most southerly of the military districts in South Vietnam.

Washington analysts believed their loss had seriously disrupted the insurgents' organization. 4

.3

The clandestine channel to the NLF, known as BUTTERCUP, had

been opened for a broader purpose than discussion of prisoners. As a step

in Washington's search for a negotiated resolurion of the war, in February

1967 U.S. aurhorities in Saigon released a woman who, like her husband,

Tran Buu Kiem, was a member of the NLF Central Committee. The

message she carried to him indicated U.S. interest in establishing a covert

channel for discussing a solution to the conflict. The NLF gave no response

until about a month after the extensive arrests of cadre in MR-4. On

27 July a leading member of the NLF's governing body, Tran Bach Dang,

ordered an emissary to convey a proposal on negotiating a prisoner exchange to the U.S. aurhorities. On reaching Saigon the messenger, one Sau

Ha, fell into the hands of the South Vietnamese police on 15 August with a

letter to Ambassador Bunker in his possession. This unmasking of what was

supposed to be a close-hold channel was to trouble U.S. relations with the

South Vietnamese in the future; for the present, however, it occasioned only

a slight delay in transmittal. On 19 August, General Nguyen Ngoc Loan,

chief of the GVN national police, passed a copy of Sau Ha's letter to

the embassy.

The Sau Ha letter proposed that Bunker arrange the release of eight

Communist prisoners, identified by name. In exchange, the NLF would

free a number of their American captives. The possibility that some

prisoners held in North Vietnam would be included in the exchange was

mentioned, but this apparently depended on the GVN initiating a request

to the National Liberation Front. The latter proposal may have been one

of the many ploys the NLF used to try to wrest some sort of recognition

from Saigon. In his letter Sau Ha named three of the eight captive Communists as possible intermediaries in dealing with Dang. The document

ended with a request that Bunker insure proper treatment of the VC prisoners by Saigon during the negotiations for reciprocal releases. 44

With the approval of South Vietnamese President Thieu, Prime Minister Ky, and General Loan, one of the suggested intermediaries, Truong

Binh Tong, was released to make contact with Dang. Tong started out on

9 September 1967, bearing a note that presented three alternatives for negotiating exchanges. First, Dang could appoint Tong his spokesman; as such,

he would be free to travel with immunity from arrest. Second, an American

spokesman could go to Dang's headquarters under safe conduct. The third
Efforts to Obtain Release of Prisoners 103

alternative offered safe conduct for Dang to meet directly with U.S. representatives in an area of his choosing.

Battlefield activity frustrated Tong's attempt to reach Dang, and he

returned to Saigon. Thereupon U.S. officials arranged a MACV operational

standdown of 42 hours, with an appropriate cover story, to permit Tong safe

passage. Tong arrived at the VC headquarters on 11 October, met with Dang,

and returned to Saigon about two weeks later with a reply. Dang claimed

to have full authority from the NLF Presidium to negotiate. He asked for

the release of Sau Ha and good treatment for a group of prisoners, listed by

name. If these condirions were met, Tong would return to Communist headquarters to work on the release of American PWs. The note concluded with

a discussion of conditions for subsequent negotiations. 45

For reasons not clearly discernible, BUTTERCUP never came to full

flower. An important factor in this failure may have been the suspicion

with which some important elements in the Saigon government regarded

any contact between American officials and the NLF. About the end of

November, rumors of secret U.S.-VC negotiations surfaced in the South

Vietnamese capital, apparently originated by General Loan or his close associates. Loan, a leader among those who resented U.S. influence in the South

Vietnamese government, was involved in the protracted power struggle

between Thieu and Ky, and talk of U.S. "interference," with implications

of possible betrayal of the GVN in separate negotiations with the

VC-NLF, struck at Thieu's position and his policy of close cooperation with

Washington. During the first week of December reports of U.S.-VC negotiations appeared in the Saigon press and were discussed in the national

legislature. American representatives found it necessary to deny that any

meeting had taken place (which was true, inasmuch as negotiations had

involved only the BUTTERCUP messenger) and to state publicly that the

United States would undertake no meetings without the South Vietnamese

government's knowledge. 46

Despite this unwelcome attention, the BUTTERCUP messenger continued to shuttle between U.S. officials in Saigon and Tran Bach Dang's

headquarters. On at least one occasion he carried letters for some of the U.S.

captives. The exchanges of notes, which went on for several months, resulted

in the covert release by the GVN of six NLF political cadre members. The

Viet Cong released only two Americans, PFC Luis A. Ortiz-Rivera, USA, and

Lance Corporal Jose Agosto-Santos, USMC, on 22 January 1968. That same

week the Viet Cong freed a number of ARVN personnel, though which

were genuine BUTTERCUP releases and which were "repentant" prisoners

turned loose for other purposes was never clearY
104 THE LONG ROAD HOME

State Department officials tried hard to maintain and broaden the

BUTTERCUP exchanges, arranging overt releases of VC prisoners in

numbers equal to those set free by the Viet Cong, whether identifiable as

BUTTERCUP or not. They followed up on one of Dang's requests by

repeatedly pressing the Saigon government to afford NLF prisoners better

treatment. Nevertheless, the message exchange came to a halt about the end

of March 1968. The cause of the interruption seems to have been NLF resentment over the deaths of three of its imprisoned political cadre members,

two of whom had been named in BUTTERCUP requests. Whether these

deaths were the result of GVN mistreatment or, as General Loan claimed,

incidental to a VC attack on a police station at a time when the prisoners were

being removed to another facility, could not be determined by U.S. officials.

In any case, there were no further contacts with Dang during 1968. 4R

Ransom

Earlier, in October 1966, Harriman had asked for the views of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff on the desirability of an effort to ransom U.S. and

Allied prisoners in North Vietnam. It is likely that he did so out of dedication to exploring every possible avenue of release and establishing a

record of its consideration, for an official as experienced as Harriman could

hardly have misjudged how the JCS would reply.

The military leaders opposed a ransom attempt. They cited the undesirable precedent that would be established for future conflicts, the possibility

that a ransom offer would be taken as a sign of weakening U.S. resolve, and

the contribution to the enemy's resources that "ransom in any economic

form" would provide, at a time when the United States was pursuing other

measures to discourage trade with North Vietnam and Communist China.

The Joint Chiefs had also considered the propaganda opportunities a ransom approach would present for the enemy, and they listed the following

stratagems that Hanoi might employ:

(l) Setting an unreasonably high price.

(2) Varying rhe ransom or agreeing to free on the basis of race, rank,

religion, and/or nationality.

(3) Agreeing to ransom only a selected fraction of the PWs.

(4) Specifying conditions which would tend to create dissension

between U.S. and other Free World forces.
Efforts to Obtain Release of Prisoners 105

(5) Identifying ransom with "war criminal" charges.

(6) Presenting counterproposals with which the United States

might not be able to comply.49

Further, the Joint Chiefs believed that the idea of ransom, once introduced, could weaken adherence to the Code of Conduct, and they pointed

to another undesirable aspect of the proposal. If, as Harriman's question

implied, the ransom effort would apply only to North Vietnam, "the vast

majority of those who would benefit would be officers." "Serious problems

could arise on grounds of discrimination and preferential treatment" unless

similar action was taken on behalf of the men held in the South, most of

whom were enlisted personnel.

"If we are to realize the objectives of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War," the military leaders concluded, "the United States must not be a

party to undermining it by special arrangements of this nature." Instead, the

U.S. government "should continue its efforts to rally world-wide support for

its position of abiding by the letter and the spirit ofthe Geneva Convention. "50

Adoption of ransom as the official policy ofthe U.S. government received

no further serious consideration, then or later.

The Involvement ofAmerican Peace Activists

American peace groups and opponents of the war played a conspicuous

part in several ofthe more widely publicized releases ofAmerican PWs, beginning in 1967. The single instance in that year involved a prominent member

of the antiwar movement, Tom Hayden. Hayden had previously traveled

to North Vietnam in December 1965 in company with Staughton Lynd, a

Yale historian and member of the Quaker faith, in response to an invitation

for two non-Communist Americans concerned with peace to visit Hanoi.

While there they met with one U.S. prisoner and had an interview with

DRV Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. In 1967 Hayden was one of several

antiwar Americans who received a North Vietnamese invitation to participate in a seminar-style meeting with delegations from Hanoi and the

National Liberation Front in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, in September.

During that conference a high NLF offlcial, Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, told

Hayden that her organization was considering a release of American prisoners, but not to offlcial representatives of the U.S. government. The

NLF wished to place the releasees in the custody of American citizens who

stood for peace, such as those attending the Bratislava seminar. Mme. Binh

thought the transfer could be arranged through Cambodia. 51
106 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Following the Bratislava meeting Hayden and others of his party

traveled to Hanoi, where they were allowed to talk with three captive

Americans. Hayden's visit ended amid increasing indications that the NLF

was preparing to release some U.S. prisoners held in the South as a gesture

of goodwill ro the American people. On receiving more definire word

while in Paris in early November, he went to the Cambodian capital,

Phnom Penh, where the NLF diplomatic mission informed him that three

American prisoners would be released to him for escort homeward on commercial airlines. The NLF spokesman stressed that there should be no

intervention by the U.S. government, such as placing the men under military orders and transferring them to military aircraft as had occurred when

Smith and McClure passed through Phnom Penh in 1965. Any such action

would jeopardize future releases. 52

On 11 November 1967 Hayden met Army Sgts. Edward R. Johnson,

Daniel L. Pitzer, and James E. Jackson, Jr.-prisoners the Viet Cong radio

claimed had "sincerely repented the crimes they committed against rhe

South Vietnamese people." Two of the men were black, and the Viet Cong

broadcast said their release was intended to underscore Vietnamese Communist sympathy for the American Negro's struggle against oppression.

Other statements emphasized the NLF's desire to hand the men over to their

families or to representatives of "progressive American organizations."5)

On 12 November Hayden accepted responsibility for the three servicemen and accompanied them aboard a Czechoslovakian airliner bound for

Bombay and Beirut and a connecting flight through Paris to New York. By

his statement at a press conference before departure and in private consultations Hayden sought to impress U.S. authorities with the importance of not

interfering with these arrangements. When U.S. officials met the party on

arrival in Beirut they intervened in a manner that Hayden acknowledged

was "in no way a pressure play." Given the debilitated condition of one of

the men and the lengthy journey that faced them, the offer made was so

reasonable and considerate it could hardly be refused. The three Army

sergeants and their escort were invited to take a break from the travel

schedule, staying in embassy quarters where they could enjoy a full night's

sleep, take showers, eat American food, and have an opportunity to telephone

their families. The men could take a later flight the following day, using

commercial air reservations already made by the embassy. Although State

and Defense officials had earlier favored evacuation of the men by military

aircraft, the U.S. government complied with Hayden's recommendations. 54

After the stopover in Beirut, Hayden's group reached New York on the

evening of 13 November. The three former prisoners passed immediately

into the control of Stare and Defense representatives and departed for
Efforts to Obtain Release of Prisoners 107

medical treatment and family reunions in Washington or at Fort Bragg,

North Carolina. Meeting with Ambassador Harriman soon afterward, Hayden

expressed his gratification that U.S. authorities had understood the delicacy

of the situation and had refrained from overriding the arrangements for return as a private party. Harriman advised the press that he had asked for the

meeting in order to thank Hayden for his role in facilitating the release. 55

The first freeing of prisoners from North Vietnam also took place

with the assistance of American peace activists, mainly David Dellinger. Like

Hayden an occasional visitor to North Vietnam, Dellinger was the editor of

Liberation magazine and, beginning in 1967, chairman of the National

Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam. In response to an

overture from Hanoi in early 1968 he designated two representatives, Father

Daniel Berrigan, S.J., and Professor Howard linn of Boston Univetsity, to go

to North Vietnam to serve as escorts for U.S. airmen soon to be released.

The usual means of reaching the North Vietnamese capital was the flight

operated by the International Control Commission, which made six trips

a month from Saigon through Phnom Penh and Vientiane to Hanoi

and back. 56

On 16 February 1968 Berrigan and linn accompanied Lt. (jg) David P.

Matheny, USN, and two Air Force officers, Maj. Norris M. Overly and

Capt. Jon D. Black, on the ICC liaison flight from Hanoi to Vientiane, where

a party from the U.S. embassy in Laos entered the plane, with Ambassador

William H. Sullivan in the lead. Sullivan offered the five men transport to

the United States on medevac aircraft, which would be quicker than commercial transport and could provide medical care on board. Sullivan said

the three returnees were free to choose, but he stated positively that their

superiors in Washington preferred that the transfer to military aircraft take

place. The three officers saw this as amounting to an order, but compliance

was delayed while a further argument ensued between the ambassador and

the two escorts. The latter objected that Sullivan was pressuring the men to

follow a course that would violate the humanitarian spirit in which the

exchange had been conceived. Berrigan and linn declared that although

the North Vietnamese had not made use of commercial routing a formal

condition of the release, they had clearly indicated that a switch to travel

under official auspices would be displeasing. The two peace activists maintained that disregard of this preference could jeopardize future prisoner

releases-a consideration that they thought deserved greater weight than

Washington appeared to be giving it. Faced with Sullivan's reiteration of the

official position, Berrigan and linn withdrew, declining the places offered

them on the military jet. Matheny, Black, and Overly left immediately on a

short flight to the U.S. base at Udorn, Thailand, then on to the Philippines
108 THE LONG ROAD HOME

and across the Pacific, reaching Andrews AFB near Washington just after

midnight on the morning of 18 February.57

In the press Berrigan and Zinn continued to charge that Ambassador

Sullivan had virtually dictated the airmen's choice, with pointed references

to the White House as the source of his instructions. They were convinced

that this "cold-blooded mishandling" of the pilots' return had endangered

further releases. Radio Hanoi did not take up this line, however, and the

North Vietnamese announced another impending release less than five

months later, on the eve of America's Independence Day. The procedure followed was that of the previous release. A message to David Dellinger led to

the designation of representatives from the antiwar movement to receive

the three airmen scheduled to be set free. 5R

In view of the controversy that continued to surround the earlier transfer the State Department tried to ascertain whether the mode of travel had

any real bearing on Hanoi's attitude toward further releases. Nothing very

definite emerged until after the Paris peace talks began in May 1968, when

Ambassador Harriman was able to pursue the matter in informal conversations with Xuan Thuy, the principal North Vietnamese negotiator. When

first approached during the customary tea break in a negotiating session

Xuan Thuy merely expressed resentment that the three prisoners let go in

February had been "whisked away" from their peace group escorts, but in

a fuller discussion on 24 July he condemned U.S. actions more forcefully,

using material from Berrigan and Zinn's account of what had occurred.

Thuy said Hanoi was now ready to release three more Americans but only

if assured that they could return home in the company of their antiwar

escorts, without interception by U.S. military authorities. Both Harriman

and his deputy, Cyrus Vance, contested the peace escorts' version of the

previous return. The three pilots had made a free choice, they insisted, and

further releasees would likewise be free to decide whether to return with

the civilian escorts or accept the medevac flight offered by U.S. officials.

Harriman and Vance gave assurances that if the men chose to continue

with the escorts, the U.S. government would not interfere. Thuy's parting words were, "Let these pilots get back easily and it will be good for

future cases. "5,)

Convinced that "the chance of adverse effect is not worth taking,"

Harriman recommended compliance with the enemy's terms, assuming the

men did not require immediate medical care and subject to the addition

of at least one U.S. official to the party: "Pilots must be given their choice,

but it should be made clear to them that U.S. Government does not in any

way object to their returning commercial." Harriman thought there need

be no concern about appearing to let Hanoi call the tune. After all, "it is
Efforts to Obtain Release of Prisoners 109

the most normal thing in the world for the pilots and U.S. Government to

be giving consideration to encouragement of future releases. "(,0

The Washington authorities agreed that if Hanoi now conditioned

further releases on the means of return, "we have no choice but to accede."

They recognized that the peace group would "gain favorable publicity by

completing this 'humanitarian' deed" on its own, but the group spokesmen

would attract far more attention if able to charge that the U.S. government

had stolen the pilots away. Accordingly joint State-Defense instructions

went to Ambassador Sullivan in Vientiane, the probable scene of the first

face-to-face meeting with the returning airmen. He should make clear to

them that they had a free choice and then "offer military transportation to

entire group including peace escorts, stressing advantages of comfort,

medical attention and speedy return for reunion with families. If peace

escorts reject government flight and pilots express preference to return

with them, ... Sullivan should not urge them to return via military."(,]

Ambassador Sullivan and his staff hastened to arrange for either quick

transfer to the military medevac channel or onward travel by commercial

airline. In the process he had occasion to return a spirited reply to another

message from Washington instructing that if the releasees elected to travel

commercially, the U.S. government should not take on the expense of

first-class fares when making their reservations. Sullivan called this "just

about the most niggardly piece of bureaucratese I have ever encountered"-

probably the work of "green-eye-shaded penny pinchers."

It should be understood that, if these men go back commercially,

it will be because North Vietnamese will, in effect, have made it a

condition of their release.... Therefore, I see absolutely no sense

in giving them pejorarive treatment in travel when they are acting

under force majeure. Not only would their psychological condition

merit first class travel, but such travel is one way to keep them away

from the curious and the press. Moreover, any officer who has spent

several months in a prison camp deserves a little human consideration upon his release.

"Consequently," Sullivan wrote, we are going ahead with contingent

reservations for first class travel," covering the three pilots and the escort

officer to be assigned from the embassy. "If Defense declines [to] pay more

than tourist class fare, my entire country team has volunteered that we

will take up a collection to pay the difference from our own pockets." Less

than eight hours later Harriman weighed in with his opinion, noting that

"if private contributions are needed, fund would be vastly over-subscribed,"

and he and others of the U.S. delegation in Paris would consider it a
110 THE LONG ROAD HOME

privilege to take part. However, he was confident that on mature reflection all concerned would feel as he did, that first-class fares provided by

the government were fully justified. 62

In mid-July the North Vietnamese government had published the

names of the three Air Force officers chosen for release: Maj. James F. Low,

Maj. Fred N. Thompson, and Capt. Joe V. Carpenter. Soon afterward the men

began their association with the delegation of three American peace advocates, whose senior member was Stewart Meacham of the American Friends

Service Committee. Delayed both by the staging of various ceremonies and

press conferences and, according to the Vietnamese, by a disruption of the

flight schedules, they did not leave Hanoi until 2 August 1968.63

Ambassador Sullivan met the ICC flight in Vientiane. Besides offering the overnight hospitality of the embassy he explained the two travel

alternatives. The three pilots chose to remain with Meacham's escort group

and fly by common carrier-a decision "made on basis indications they

had received from DRV authorities that this was expected," according to

Sullivan's report. As Carpenter later recorded it, "We felt certain that they

would be more likely to considet further releases if we played it this way,"

and he noted that "the Ambassador seemed satisfied with our choice." Without objection from the antiwar delegation, a foreign service officer joined

the party, and it reached New York on 4 August 1968. 64

At a meeting in the Pentagon a few days later, Frank Sieverts reported

that Ambassador Harriman was satisfied with the way return travel had

been handled and believed the current formula was the proper one. There

remained no doubt that departures from the intended travel arrangement

did matter to the leaders in Hanoi and hence might be a factor in their

future decisions. Recognizing this, the U.S. government might well refrain

from insisting on rigorous application of the principle that the men were at

all times members of a military service of the United States and subject to

its jurisdiction. Accordingly, policy now prescribed allowing a free and unpressured choice rather than precipitating a contest for physical custody

of the returnees. Though questioned by some officials of the succeeding

administration,* it still prevailed a year later, in August 1969, when the North

Vietnamese, of their own volition, once again set three prisoners free.!»

For all the usefulness of the pacifist intermediaries in securing release of

U.S. prisoners, the activities of peace groups and protesters were an embarrassment to the U.S. government in its prosecution of the war. The Department

of State found it additionally disturbing that Tom Hayden and others made

their initial trips to Hanoi in contravention of a passport provision prohibiting travel to such countries as Communist China, Cuba, North Vietnam, and

* See Chapter 12.
Efforts to Obtain Release of Prisoners III

North Korea. A succession of federal court decisions largely disposed of

the controversy over this matter but probably deepened the feelings of resentment in some quarters of the department. In January 1967 the Supreme

Court ruled that certain criminal penalties in the basic immigration law,

long relied on as the ultimate sanction against violators of travel restrictions,

did not apply. State officials continued to revoke the passports of noncompliant travelers as an administrative measure, but in December 1967 a lower

court's decision in a suit brought by Staughton Lynd placed further limits

on the department's authority. Accordingly, in March 1968 the State

Department published new passport regulations, described in the press as

giving notice "that it will no longer try to punish persons who travel to Communist countries that have been declared 'off limits' to American citizens. "66

Harriman and Sieverts had been less concerned with maintaining a

stern official demeanor toward violators of the travel restrictions than with

keeping lines of communication open to any of the peace activists who had

an avowed interest in the prisoners. The two officials sought wherever possible to use visitors to Hanoi for the advantage of the captive Americans,

to obtain identification of prisoners and information on their condition, to

carry mail in and out, and to call attention to actions the U.S. government

was taking with the hope of establishing reciprocal release or repatriation of

the sick and wounded. They counted it a particular success when Stewart

Meacham took 40 letters with him in August 1968 and brought out 49,

including one from a prisoner previously listed as missing. Usually, members of the antiwar movement who made the journey proved willing to

share what they had seen and heard with the department's officialsY

State Department spokesmen welcomed each of the three-man releases,

but after 1967 the expression of thanks to the antiwar representatives for

their role did not figure prominently in the government's statements. It

seemed apparent that the Communist leaders had settled on a new program

of using American peace advocates in a way that fostered the protest movement in the United States even as it allowed the North Vietnamese and their

Viet Cong allies to counter some of the adverse publicity they were receiving on the prisoner issue. Thus Hanoi described the release of three airmen

to Berrigan and Zinn as "vivid proof of the lenient and humanitarian

policy" of the North Vietnamese government, even at a time when its territory was under severe bombardment from U.S. aircraft. 68 The program also

suited Hanoi's purposes in that selected captives could be handed over to

representatives of the antiwar movement without giving any satisfaction

to the U.S. government's desire for direct negotiations on release and other

aspects of prisoner treatment. Hanoi depicted these events as a people-topeople exchange, in which the Vietnamese People's Committee for Solidarity
112 THE LONG ROAD HOME

with the American People had nominal charge of the pflsoners 10 the

in terval between their selection and actual release.

At all times the initiative remained exclusively with the North Vietnamese, whether in inviting American war protesters to Hanoi or in

deciding on and scheduling the prisoner releases. Although some peace

activists made public statements and wrote letters appealing for more

captives to be freed, analysts in the State Department did not credit them

with bringing about any of the releases. In fact, officials believed they had

evidence of specific requests that had been rebuffed. Inescapably, the service that antiwar Americans did perform in facilitating the return of U.S.

prisoners also furthered aims of the Communist leadership with which the

American pacifists did not necessarily agree. Washington officials saw

nothing to shake their conviction that for the enemy in Vietnam, prisoner

releases were measures of war, decided upon as a matter of high policy and

calculated propaganda, not as a yielding to humane sympathies.6~
6

Efforts To Ameliorate the

Conditions of Captivity

Although the Johnson administration had made the early release of

U.S. prisoners its prime objective, it sought to ameliorate the conditions of captivity as well. The goal was to win for the prisoners the fullest

possible application of the provisions of the Geneva Convention.

Besides the articles barring torture and other mistreatment, three provisions of the convention received particular attention from Washington

officials concerned for the welfare of the American servicemen in captivity.

Article 122 required that a warring power promptly and systematically furnish information on the identity, state of health, and mailing address of all

prisoners under its control, in a manner that "shall make it possible quickly

to advise the next of kin concerned." Article 126 required the belligerent

country to permit inspection of its prisons by representatives of the designated protecting power and by the International Committee of the Red

Cross. The enemy made no move to honor either obligation, and success in

eliciting compliance with these two articles appeared unlikely any time

soon. On the other hand, the requirements of Articles 70, 71, and 72

regarding the right of prisoners to send letters and receive mail and parcels

had been at least partially or unevenly observed by the North Vietnamese

from early August 1964 when the first U.S. airman, Navy Lt. Everett Alvarez,

Jr., fell into their hands.*

The prospect of obtaining full compliance on exchange of mail tantalized State Department officials throughout the war. The attempt to gain this

seemingly slight concession from the enemy occupied more of their time

and effort in the years 1965 to 1968 than any other aspect of PW affairs

except early release.

* See Chapter 3.

113
114 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Prisoners'Mail

When the Democratic Republic of Vietnam placed successive restrictions in March and May 1965 on the ICRe's attempts to transmit letters

and packages to the American prisoners, the mail problem emerged in its

true proportions. Before May 1965, the frequency of letters to and from

Alvarez had seemed a hopeful sign that Hanoi did not intend to ignore

entirely the provisions of the Geneva Convention regarding mail, although

nothing had been received from several other pilots believed to be held

with Alvarez in North Vietnam. The announcement of tighter controls extinguished such hopes. It now appeared probable that the North Vietnamese

enemy was using denial of mail privileges as a means of punishing or influencing the American captives.

As for mail to prisoners held in South Vietnam, there was little evidence on which to base an assessment of enemy policies. Neither Red Cross

officials nor the U.S. government had any channel through which to talk to

the National Liberation Front. By September 1965 it was known that the

NLF had established a "Red Cross of Liberation" but had made no move

toward affiliation with the international organization in Geneva. Between

5 February 1964 and 25 May 1965 the ICRC had sent 23 letters and 4

relief parcels through the Cambodian Red Cross, considering it the best

available channel. But not until Sgt. Issac Camacho escaped in July 1965

and the families of two other prisoners of the Viet Cong received letters

that same month did anyone in the Free World know that the parcels

and at least six of the letters had reached their destination. The Viet Cong

allowed five of its captives to write, but only once. The remaining summer months brought no further letters out of the insutgent-dominated

areas of South Vietnam.]

Such was the situation when the first meeting of the Army-sponsored

Conference on Prisoners and Missing in Vietnam occurred in the Pentagon

on 1 September 1965.* Of the PW matters discussed in the meeting, mail

appeared to be the primary concern. It became immediately evident that

lack of information about deliveries to the prisoners and absence of clear

guidance on channels to be used by next of kin had caused confusion in the

casualty branches of the military services. While it was understood that

the principal channel was through the State Department to the American

Red Cross and from there to the ICRC, the Navy and Air Force had been

uncertain that letters for prisoners in North Vietnam should follow this

route, and a backlog of mail had built up as a result. Army representatives

questioned the need for transmitting mail through the Bureau of Security

* See Chapter 2.
Efforts to Ameliorate the Conditions of Captivity 115

and Consular Affairs in State, which merely passed it on to the ARe.

State's representatives, however, insisted on continuing to receive the letters,

claiming that their number was not great enough to present a problem. 2

Within two months, however, the increasing volume of family letters

and the growing conviction that channeling mail through SCA was both

time-consuming and unnecessary led to a special meeting of service, State,

and ARC officials. These representatives agreed on a "Memorandum of

Understanding ... on the Assignment of Responsibilities for Americans

Held Captive in Southeast Asia," dated 9 November 1965. The most

important effects of the agreement were to remove the State Department

from involvement in the routine aspects of mail transmittal, without

diminishing its control over policy matters, and to enlarge the role of the

American Red Cross. The agreement accorded the ARC considerable flexibility in its handling of the mail and in dealing with the ICRC on the subject.

Specifically, the military services were now to advise families to send

all mail for missing persons directly to the ARC, which would forward it

to the ICRC for retransmittal. Families would be free, however, to use any

other channel that might be more successful in reaching the prisoners, and

they were asked to inform their service contact office of any that proved effective. Similarly, the American Red Cross could seek alternate routes and

could, with the concurrence of SCA, bypass the ICRC if deemed advisable.

The memorandum of understanding contained further measures

designed to give U.S. officials a surer knowledge of the mail traffic and, if

necessary, some control. A key move was persuading the ICRC to change its

method of forwarding the mail it received from prisoners. Rather than

sending PW letters directly to the family addressee as had been customary,

the ICRC now was requested to pass them all through the American Red

Cross. The ARC would then dispatch the prisoner mail to the families,

but it would alert SCA and the service casualty branches by providing

them with copies of its own transmittal letters. At the next step the casualty

branches were to obtain from the families copies of all PW letters and

furnish them to SCA for analysis by the State Department's intelligence

bureau, together with information given by next of kin about any mail

received through channels other than the ICRC-ARe.

The memorandum of agreement continued in effect the criteria for

letters written by relatives, as prescribed earlier by the ICRe. Only the next

of kin (father, mother, wife, or child) or legal designee of the missing person

was authorized to send mail. Letters could not be long or overly frequent

and should contain only personal news. As for parcels, for the time being

only the standard one provided by the ARC would be forwarded, under

arrangements coordinated with the State Department. J
116 THE LONG ROAD HOME

The understanding of 9 November 1965 did much to clarify procedures for handling PW mail within the jurisdiction of the U.S. government.

It could not be expected to have much bearing on the success of future

mail deliveries to the prisoners, however, or on their writing privileges.

These matters would be decided by the Vietnamese Communists, and for

the present the only means of influencing them was through diplomacy,

directly by the Department of State or indirectly through rhe ARC.

In dealing with the mail, as with certain othet aspects of PW affairs,

State used th~ ARC as an extension of itself, often to undertake projects

that might have greater prospect of success if handled at other than the

official level. Of special importance to the department was development of

some means of dealing with the NLF without arousing the sensitive South

Vietnamese government to protest or giving the insurgents grounds for

a claim that the United States had recognized their organization. For a

time, as in the Tam affair,* the JCRC was the chosen agent, but the NLF

soon showed itself determined to push the international organization out

of the picture. The State Department responded by intensifying its relationship with and reliance on the ARC.

The National Liberation Front made its first move to shut out the

JCRC on 4 January 1966, when its representative in Prague wrote to the

international committee calling on it to stop transmitting mail addressed to

prisoners of the Viet Congo The letter stated that the NLF was authorizing

prisoner families to send mail and gifts "through the intermediary of NLF

services in the country and abroad, without it being necessary nor advisable to resort to any other intermediary." To underscore the NLF's rejection

of an JCRC role, the Prague representative returned mail the committee had

recently attempted to forward through Moscow and Prague."

Although the ICRC was striving to obtain some mitigation of the NLF

edict, the State Department and the ARC agreed that it was time to seek a

new channel to transmit mail to the U.S. servicemen held in South Vietnam. On 25 January 1966, ARC President James F. Collins asked the president of the Czech Red Cross for assistance in developing another route,

possibly from the ARC to the Czech Red Cross to the NLF representative

in Prague. When this overture brought no meaningful response Deputy

Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson on 4 April asked Collins to

consider sending a Red Cross official to Prague to discuss mail and possibly

other humanitarian issues with the NLF representative.'

The ARC sent one of its vice presidents, Ramone S. Eaton, but the

Czech Red Cross refused to assist him in arranging the desired meeting,

almost certainly because the NLF had made clear that it would tolerate no

* Sec Chapter').
Efforts to Ameliorate the Conditions of Captivity 117

intermediary, not even a Communist one. Eaton could not ask for assistance

from the American embassy in Prague without impairing the nongovernmental character of his mission, which both State and ARC were anxious to

preserve. I

' He therefore went twice, alone, to meet an NLF functionary,

Pham Van Choung, who subjected the American to the usual preliminaries

of a discussion with the NLF-a long recital of the historical repression

and more recent brutalities visited on the Viet Cong, in this case backed

up by pictures and articles from Life and other publications. Then followed

a review of the Viet Cong's humanitarian policy toward prisoners, which

he said was controlled by the head of the NIPs Red Cross of Liberation.

When Choung finally got to the question of PW mail he had nothing new

to offer. Letters sent to NLF offices overseas would reach the Liberation Red

Cross, he said, but that organization had difficulty delivering the mail

because of U.S. bombing.

Choung refused to accept the family letters that Eaton carried,

apparently because Eaton, as a Red Cross intermediary, stood between the

NLF and its sought-after recognition by the U.S. government-even such

slight acknowledgement as might be afforded by requiring the families to

write directly to an official NLF representative. Further, Choung suggested

that relatives who wanted their letters to get through should demand that

the United States end the fighting. Clearly prisoner mail policy was an

instrument of the NLF's psychological warfare. Delivery of letters to and

from prisoners was to be used as a means of influencing not only the captive Americans but their families as well, and through them, the government

in Washington. 7

Soon after the initial pronouncement of the NLF's "no intermediaries"

policy in January 1966, U.S. officials detected signs that North Vietnam

was similarly disposed to eliminate the International Committee of the Red

Cross from the picture. In late February, ICRC president Samuel A.

Gonard, on a visit to Washington, informed Secretary Rusk that Hanoi had

recently been returning all PW mail transmitted through the ICRe. This

rejection of the lCRC role was strongly reinforced by the fact that during

the first part of the year 12 families received letters from prisoners asking

that correspondence (one letter a month, from close relatives only) be

addressed to them at "Camp of Detention of U.S. Pilots Captured in the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam, C/O Hanoi Post Office, D.R.V."H

The DRV bid for direct transmission of PW mail presented the

military services and the State Department with an array of problems.

Abandoning the Red Cross channel would eliminate one of the links to

the ICRC and end the reliable accounting of the volume of correspondence that was possible when all letters went through the ARe. The services

would become more dependent on the cooperation of the next of kin for
118 THE LONG ROAD HOME

information about mail frequency and routes of transmission since they

would have no way of knowing that prisoner letters had arrived unless

notified by the recipients. They feared also that opening up direct mail

channels to the captive Americans might prompt other individuals or

groups to write to the prisoners, which could work to the detriment of

the PWs or cause Hanoi to halt delivery entirely.9

Despite doubts and reservations, the prospect of getting a regular mail

system established led the Navy and Air Force to encourage the 12 families

to use the Hanoi address. The State Department had concurred, and it moved

to have U.S. postal regulations changed to permit direct transmittal of mail

to Hanoi. Such traffic had been forbidden in deference to a declaration

made by the government in Saigon more than 10 years earlier that all post

offices in North Vietnam were "closed." Observing the State Department's

requirements for minimum publicity and no contact with North Vietnamese authorities, U.S. postal officials arranged informally with Hong

Kong's postmaster general for the forwarding to North Vietnam of mail

conforming to the terms of the Universal Postal Union. Approved items

included letters, post cards, aerograms, and certain printed matter but not

packages or registered letters. 1o

Anxious not to jeopardize delivery of letters from those families who

had been asked to use the Hanoi address, the military services sought to hold

all others to the Red Cross channel. In this they largely succeeded, although

they could not prevent other families from attempting to correspond

directly if they chose to do so. The policy continued in force even after a

Canadian diplomat advised the U.S. embassy in Vientiane, on 18 June 1966,

that Hanoi authorities had said the direct channel was open to next of

kin of all prisoners. II

A number of considerations, in addition to those previously mentioned,

underlay the reluctance to give up the Red Cross toute. First was the lack of

evidence that letters were regularly reaching the captives through whatever

channel. Then there was the suspicion that a system of direct correspondence

gave the Communists greater leverage against the prisoners. By further curtailing the opportunities for outside monitoring, it might remove any

remaining restraint on the captor's power to grant or withhold mail privileges as reward or punishment. Third, the ICRC, which desired to maintain

its mailman role if possible, had continued to forward letters to Hanoi for

the men in North Vietnam and by June was able to say that none were

being returned. In the monthly meetings of the Conference on Prisoners and

Missing in Vietnam, State representatives stressed the desirability of working through Red Cross agencies whenever possible. In the absence of clear

indications that another mail channel to North Vietnam was better, the

one offered by the ICRC ought to be retained. 12
Efforts to Ameliorate the Conditions of Captivity 119

The ICRC had to admit defeat, however, in its attempts to send mail

to U.S. prisoners in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong consistently refused to

accept mail through a third party. On 4 May 1966 a news release from

Algiers gave the address of an NLF office in that city to which letters for

prisoners of war might be directed. Washington was hesitant to allow

families to write to the Algiers address, but since the ICRC returned as

undeliverable all mail directed since January to prisoners of the Viet Cong,

the Algiers office seemed the only possible route. In July, the ARC sent to

Algiers more than 200 items of mail it had been holding for captives in

South Vietnam, and thereafter it used that channel regularly. After October

1966 the military services made no further efforts to prevent families from

sending letters, and even packages, directly to Algiers. 13

With direct routes of correspondence available, continued insistence

on use of Red Cross channels became impractical. More and more families

received letters from their captive serviceman asking them to use the Hanoi

address. Other next of kin wrote both directly and through the Red Cross to

miss no possibility of getting letters through. In January 1967 even the family

of Everett Alvarez, the one prisoner of war who had regularly received correspondence through the ICRC, turned to using direct mail. Finally, in

March 1967 the State Department recommended ending the limitation on

direct correspondence, and the services notified all families that the Hanoi

and Algiers addresses were open for use. 14

Almost immediately the amount of mail transmitted by the ARC and

the ICRC began to fall off, both in absolute numbers and, more strikingly,

in relation to the rising count of known prisoners and missing men who

might be prisoners. In April 1967 the ARC transmitted 354 letters. At the

end of that month there were 582 men (in North and South Vietnam but

excluding Laos) listed as "active" by the IeRe. By the end of September,

against 746 active cases, the number of next-of-kin letters passing through

the ARC had fallen to 283. By March 1968 the month's letter total was 258

while active cases had risen to 975. 15

By the spring of 1968, writing directly to Hanoi clearly offered a better

means of getting letters to prisoners of war-at least to the 80-odd men

the DRV authorities were then permitting to write-than sending them

through the Red Cross. Of 7,421 letters forwarded by the ARC and ICRC

through the end of January 1968, only a few were known to have been

received by the addressees. The direct mail record was better, though just

how much better was not determinable because some families did not keep

the services fully informed about either the frequency or the content of

letters they received. 16
120 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Lacking assurance that mail sent through either channel would reach the

prisoners, Washington officials continually sought other and possibly more

reliable routes. The ARC repeatedly appealed to the North Vietnamese Red

Cross for a meeting on the subject or for assistance in establishing regular

deliveries. These requests encountered either silence or a response limited

to reiteration of Hanoi's assertion that the captives, although not entitled to

the Geneva Convention's protection, were being treated humanely. The

ARC then tried to enlist the help of "sister societies" in East European Communist countries in persuading the DRV to relent, but without success.

As the U.S. delegation prepared for the preliminary peace negotiations in

Paris on 10 May 1968 the situation regarding mail delivery to American

prisoners in Vietnam remained essentially what it had been almost two

years before, controlled not by the terms of the Geneva Convention but

by the pol icies of the D RV and N LF, whose leaders remained defiantly

unreceptive to appeals from Washington.

As for mail coming from the North Vietnamese prison camps, at the

end of 1966 the DRV had found a new way to use this correspondence as a

weapon of war in its campaign to turn the American public against the struggle in Southeast Asia. Suddenly it stopped transmitting letters through

international mail channels and began to send them out with visiting antiwar activists, American journalists sympathetic to the DRV cause, and foreign pacifists and supporters. Between 2 January 1967, when the normal mail

transmission ceased, and the opening of the Paris talks more than 16 months

later, almost all letters from Hanoi came via such visitors. When 1968 ended,

157 letters were known to have reached the families during the year; fewer

than 10 came through international mails. Returning visitors placed the

letters in domestic mail channels or even delivered them to the families in

person rather than passing them to the ARC or a government agency.]~

By using peace groups and other sympathizers as the sole means of transmitting PW letters the Hanoi authorities hoped to advance the standing of

the antiwar movement with both PW families and the American public

and to persuade the families to look on the peace groups and activists as a

benevolent and comforting source of information about the prisoners.

Whether the Communists succeeded in inf1uencing either the public or

families by this maneuver cannot be determined. Successful or not, the effort

cost them nothing.

Besides meeting frustration at every turn when attempting to arrange

for reliable delivery of letters to American prisoners, U.S. officials had difficulty in demonstrating that captured North Vietnamese troops, held in

the South, were being accorded the mail privileges prescribed by the Geneva

Convention. During the first half of 1966, when Washington was struggling
Efforts to Ameliorate the Conditions of Captivity 121

to bring the treatment of enemy prisoners of war into line with the convention, the State Department brought pressure to bear on the Saigon

government to get North Vietnamese captives to write to their families. In

accordance with their indoctrination, however, the Communist prisoners

generally refused. In June 1966 a special effort did elicit 40 letters, which

were sent to the ICRC for transmission to Hanoi. The DRV authorities returned them all, claiming they had no knowledge of the writers. Any hope

that Hanoi could be induced by example to loosen its limitation on PW

mail was clearly doomed. I')

Packagesfor Prisoners

Article 72 of the Geneva Convention provides that prisoners of war

"shall be allowed to receive by post or by any other means individual parcels or collective shipments containing, in particular, foodstuffs, clothing,

medical supplies and articles of a religious, educational or recreational

character." During the early captivity ofAlvarez the Hanoi authorities allowed

him to receive two Red Cross packages but then ceased to accept them. The

same pattern prevailed in the South. Four parcels reached prisoners of the

Viet Cong through Cambodia in mid-I965, but none thereafter. Unstinting

efforts of the IeRC and ARC to get additional parcels through proved

unavailing. Soon after the mail route to Hanoi through Hong Kong was

opened in February 1966 the ARC tried to broaden it to include parcels, but

without success. Its repeated requests to the North Vietnamese Red Cross to

permit the delivery of packages brought no reply.211

With the approach of Christmas in 1966, Navy and Air Force officials

decided to test what seemed to be a tendency of the DRV to moderate the

conditions of captivity somewhat at that season. Together with the families

they prepared packages for the 22 prisoners who had furnished the Hanoi

Camp of Detention address. Since the Hong Kong channel did not handle

parcel post, another had to be found. American postal authorities secured

the cooperation of the Austrian Post and Telegraph Administration (APTA),

which tried to arrange a route for the packages through Prague, Moscow, and

Peking, to Hanoi. All except Hanoi signified their willingness to participate.

In the absence of a timely response from Hanoi, the Austrians forwarded 14

packages without any assurance that the North Vietnamese would accept

them. Writing on 25 January 1967, a DRV official advised APTA that Hanoi

rejected the arrangement, noting that "we do not maintain relations with

the administration of the American postal services." All of the parcels were

returned to the senders. 21
122 THE LONG ROAD HOME

It appeared in September 1967 that the embargo on parcels might be

lifted. On returning from a trip to Hanoi, American journalist David

Schoenbrun reported being told by officials there that the way was open

for prisoners to receive packages, under supervision of rhe D RV's Red

Cross society. Eager to seize this possible opening, the ARC cabled the

North Vietnamese Red Cross on 6 October asking for information

about mailing procedures and whether packages might be sent through

Hong Kong. The reply later that month gave a clear signal that nothing had

changed. Offering no comment whatever on mail, it merely repeated Hanoi's

standing assertion that the captured pilots "do not come under the disposition of the Geneva Conventions" but nevertheless "are always the object of

humane treatment."22

As arranged in consultations with State and postal officials, the military services then undertook a massive mailing of Christmas packages,

both to known prisoners and to men listed as MIA. The operation involved

packages of two to three pounds in weight, made up individually by

the next of kin in such manner as to avoid the appearance of government

sponsorship, for mailing through the Austrian channel to Hanoi in successive groupS.2.3

Once more, the effort proved futile. Even before the second group of

packages left the United States, APTA sent word, on 15 November 1967, that

a large number of parcels had been returned to Austria. In all, 465 packages

made the journey eastward. Almost all came back, marked "Refuse par Ie

service du Viet-Nam." State Department officials expressed some minor gratification that the Soviets had acknowledged the parcels as legitimate PW

mail and had honored the Geneva Convention's provision for nonassessment of postage. The prompt return, however, suggested that the packages

had not gotten beyond Moscow and that the rejecting notation had been

added there, presumably on instructions from North Vietnam. 24

As with letter mail, no essential change in the package mail situation

occurred through most of 1968. When the preliminary peace discussions

began in Paris in May no package had been allowed to reach a prisoner

through the mails since the early parcels for Alvarez and the four received

by prisoners of war in the South in 1965. In the context of the Paris talks,

and with the approach of Christmas 1968, the DRV finally announced an

exception to its exclusionary policy.*

* For an account of this and subsequent developments, see Chapter 17.
Efforts to Ameliorate the Conditions of Captivity 123

us. Measures to Counter Exploitation ofPrisoners

If Washington's efforts to secure mail privileges for the U.S. prisoners were marked by frustration and disappointment, there had at least been

some spotty results owing to Hanoi's willingness to accede to Articles 70,

71, and 72 of the Geneva Convention when it suited the Communists'

purpose. But with respect to Articles 122 and 126, the requirements having

to do with publishing the identity of captives and the inspection of prisons

by neutral observers, neither the DRV leadership in the North nor the NLF

in the South found any reason to relent at all. On the subject of prisoner

identification, secrecy rather than disclosure worked to the Communists'

advantage, as continued uncertainty about the fate of men missing in action

could be expected to cause families greater distress than knowledge of their

capture-and, the DRV assumed, bring greater pressure on the American

government to end the war. With regard to both identification and inspection, the DRV continued to maintain that the captured U.S. pilots were war

criminals and therefore outside the protection of the convention.

Nonetheless, Washington pressed on with demands for compliance,

especially after Viet Cong documents seized in the summer of 1966 confirmed the Communist intent to exploit their American hostages for political

and propaganda purposes. 25 On 20 July 1966, when the DRV appeared determined to stage war crimes trials, President Johnson publicly invited the

enemy to join in a conference under ICRC auspices to consider all aspects

of the application of the Geneva Convention to the war in Vietnam.

Although Ho Chi Minh signaled later in the month that there was "no trial

in view," Harriman and his colleagues moved to keep the president's proposal alive. In this undertaking Harriman had to energize a reluctant ICRe.

When giving an account of consultations with ICRC President Gonard at

the end of August, the head of the U.S. mission in Geneva, Ambassador

Roger W. Tubby, reported Gonard's statement that if his organization invited

North Vietnamese participation in such a conference, a favorable reply from

Hanoi was highly unlikely. Therefore the international committee did not

contemplate "any further steps in this direction." Harriman was not to be

turned aside. Fifteen days later the ICRC forwarded to the DRV foreign

minister a formal communication from the United States government calling for a conference under ICRC auspices. The letter expressed Washington's

desire to discuss the Geneva Convention in reEnion to prisoners of war in

Vietnam and announced President Johnson's willingness to consider a reciprocal reduction of hostilities, either before or during the conference.

Hanoi never gave a direct reply, leaving it to be understood that the DRV

would not accede to such a conference. 26
124 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Meanwhile, on 7 October 1966, the ICRC again offered to meet anywhere with DRV representatives for conversations on conditions of captivity.

An earlier proposal that Gonard travel to Hanoi for discussions had met

with a polite refusal, but this latest ICRC offer was ignored altogether. By

early February 1967, when the U.S. mission in Geneva reviewed the status of

ICRC efforts, hope for any conference or general discussions with Hanoi

on application of the Geneva Convention had diedY State therefore turned

its attention to specific requirements of the convention, particularly to

ICRC visits and inspections. During the next month, strong evidence of

North Vietnamese mistreatment of the prisoners made institution of these

measures especially urgent.

Protesting Mistreatment: The Stratton Incident

From the time when captive Americans were first paraded through the

streets of Hanoi as a precursor to possible war crimes trials, indications of

deliberate abuse of prisoners had filtered through the bamboo curtain. The

evidence, however, was never sufficiently firm or publicly demonstrable to

enable the United States government to charge the North Vietnamese with

cruelty. Much of the evidence was based on inference, drawn from the

growing number of "confessions," "apologies," and criticisms of U.S. war

policies by captured pilots that Hanoi published or broadcast to a worldwide audience. Washington officials, analyzing the statements closely, viewed

them as the products of duress if not of the "brainwashing" techniques commonly attributed to all Communist governments. The absence of hard

evidence gave them pause, however, as did certain contrary indications,

such as the appearance of criticisms of u.S. policies in prisoners' letters

to their families. It was less certain that these statements were the product

of physical coercion, although intelligence analysts surmised that the DRV

authorities might have prescribed their inclusion as a condition for permission to write. The u.S. government needed solid grounds if it was to

go to the public or approach foreign governments with a direct attack on

Communist mistreatment of the prisoners of war. The lack of such solid

evidence and of reliable information on the prisoners' physical condition

made impartial inspections by the ICRC all the more desirable. co

Then, on 6 March 1967, the DRV made a mistake that gave Washington an opening for launching an intensive campaign against Communist

mistreatment and for renewing efforts to get ICRe inspectors into North

Vietnam. At a Hanoi news conference attended by journalists and photographers of the world press, including Life correspondent Lee Lockwood,
Efforts to Ameliorate the Conditions of Captivity 125

DRV officials played a taped statement, said to be that of Lt. Cdr. Richard

A. Stratton. At the drawing of a curtain, the Navy pilot himself appeared

on the stage. According to Lockwood, Stratton's eyes were glazed, his nose

bright red, and his color unnatural. Without speaking, he bowed thrice to

the audience, left, center, and right, and then repeated his puppet-like

movements at the command of a DRV officer. A French diplomat was

heard to exclaim "frightful," and an East German press representative later

remarked that it was beyond comprehension what the North Vietnamese

had done to Stratton and what they intended by this display. A correspondent also noted that Lt. Cdr. Charles N. Tanner's published confession

that he had bombed villages under orders to achieve "total annihilation" was

obviously forced. By referring to actions of fellow airmen "Ben Casey" and

"Clark Kent," fictional characters familiar to most Americans of the television

generation, Tanner had signaled the fabricated nature of his confession. 2')

The State Department reacted initially with a restraint that reflected uncertainty about just what Stratton's performance represented and reluctance

to take any step that might lead to worsening the treatment of the captives.

Harriman wrote a letter of protest to the DRV on 24 March, which the ICRC

forwarded a week later. He noted that it had not been possible to verify the

North Vietnamese claims that their treatment of U.S. captives was consistently

humane, given Hanoi's refusal to permit either impartial inspection of prison

conditions or the regular exchange of mail between prisoners and families.

But beyond that, "in recent weeks information has come to our attention

which casts the most serious doubts upon the North Viet-Namese statements

.... We have reluctantly come to the conclusion that some of the U.S. airmen

are being subjected to emotional or physical duress, which is a flagrant violation of the Geneva Conventions."\O

Gonard followed this with a letter of his own at the beginning of April.

A few days later the State Department advised all posts that U.S. embassies

in New Delhi and Stockholm had already raised the subject with their host

governments, and the message asked that others do the same. Nine embassies

in major capitals were to ask host governments to intervene with the DRV

and, especially, to urge the North Vietnamese to let the ICRC visit the prisons.

The Swedes and Japanese agreed to do SO.'1

The State Department made public the substance of Harriman's protest on 3 April 1967, and for an article that recounted the Stratton incident

in Life's 7 April issue Harriman produced a shorter version of his statement, which the magazine highlighted so that few readers would miss it.

The press accounts and pictures of Stratton's ordeal set off public expressions of protest and revulsion, abroad as well as in the United States. The

negative response was not lost on the North Vietnamese. By midyear they
126 THE LONG ROAD HOME

were making strenuous efforts to counteract the adverse publicity from

the Stratton affair. 32

Hanoi's realization that it had erred with Stratton did not come soon

enough to keep it from repeating the mistake. Another propaganda display

on 6 May 1967 featured recently captured and visibly injured pilots whose

suffering and humiliation appeared in widely distributed films. Through the

ICRC the U.S. government lodged an immediate protest of this "flagrant

violation" of the Geneva Convention, though with little expectation of a satisfactory reply from the North Vietnamese. The ARC made a somewhat different approach in a cable to the North Vietnamese Red Cross on 23 May,

appealing on humanitarian grounds for the repatriation of seriously ill and

injured prisoners such as those paraded on 6 May.33

Some weeks later, on 17 July 1967, the White House issued a measured

statement of the U.S. position in a press release:

The United States Government has been greatly concerned

at the plight of Americans held prisoner by the National Liberation Front and North Viet-Nam. More than 20 American soldiers

and several American civilians are believed held by the National

Liberation Front. We know that more than 160 American military

personnel are confined in North Viet-Nam. Several hundred more

are considered missing because the National Liberation Front and

North Viet-Nam withhold the names of prisoners and generally

prohibit most prisoners from sending letters. We are gravely concerned that some of these prisoners may not be treated humanely.

The claims of the National Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese that they are treated humanely cannot be verified, because

neutral observers or organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross have not been allowed to visit the prisoners

and inspect their places of detention.

Viet Cong and North Vietnamese prisoners held by the Government of Viet-Nam are confined in camps inspected regularly by

the ICRe. These prisoners include many captured by U.S. forces

and turned over to the Government of Viet-Nam for safekeeping

under the provisions of the Geneva convention. Their treatment

and the conditions of their confinement have been humane and in

accord with the convention, as verified by these neutral observers.

*******

The United States calls on the National Liberation Front and

North Viet-Nam to permit impartial inspection of all prisoners

and urges them to repatriate those sick and wounded prisoners who

qualify for repatriation under the convention.
Efforts to Ameliorate the Conditions of Captivity 127

The Governments of the United States and Viet-Nam have

repeatedly made clear both publicly and privately through many

channels their desire to bring about an exchange of prisoners. The

Government of the United States reiterates its desire and its willingness to discuss such exchanges at any time and in any appropriate

way, using intermediaries or directly, by public means or privately. 34

Hanoi Rejects Inspections

By the time this statement appeared the U.S. government had in hand

an outright rejection of neutral and ICRC inspections from Hanoi. At

Harriman's behest the Swiss government had broached the subject through

its ambassador in Peking. Hanoi responded with a note stating that, since

there had been no declaration of war, the North Viernamese government did

not regard the pilots as prisoners of war and therefore "could not accept an

official intervention by the International Red Cross Committee on the

basis of the Geneva Conventions." The Swiss ambassador in Washington

passed the text of the DRV note to Harriman on 6 July 1967. Several weeks

later the U.S. mission in Geneva reported the ICRe's decision not to

renew, "for time being," its frequently rebuffed request for admission to

North Vietnam. 3)

During the campaign to gain the right of inspection State Department

officials had found it disconcerting that the ICRC did not hold Hanoi

solely to blame for the failure of its efforts to visit North Vietnamese prisons.

Some ICRC members considered that more might have been accomplished

had the United States been willing to make certain concessions, chiefly by

announcing a pause in bombing operations over North Vietnam so that

ICRC-sponsored negotiations might proceed.

In December 1965 Ambassador Tubby had advised the ICRC that the

U.S. government would give the international committee the same notice of

bombing pauses that it gave its allies. This would assist the ICRe in timing

its requests to Hanoi and would tend to negate the excuse given by the DRV

in turning down earlier applications for entry-that the foreign visitors

would be endangered by U.S. bombing. The arrangement fell short of what

the ICRC leadership had in mind. In July 1966 in Geneva, Gonard advised

Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, that the international committee contemplated asking the United States to proclaim a

temporary halt in bombing operations over North Vietnam for the specific

purpose of letting the ICRC make an approach, on both PW matters and

broader issues of the war. Goldberg tried to dissuade the ICRC president,

pointing out among other things that two earlier bombing pauses had drawn
128 THE LONG ROAD HOME

no positive response from the North Vietnamese. The State Department

immediately commended Goldberg's action and supplied additional arguments for his use, in a cable drafted by William P. Bundy, assistant secretary

of state for Far Eastern affairs. Bundy saw a decided risk in linking the

PW program with broader negotiations; if the captive Americans were to be

retrieved before the end of the war it was necessary that the issue remain a

separate one. Furthermore, he feared that a call by the JCRe for a bombing

pause might lead the DRV to use the prisoners in other attempts to inf1uence

U.S. military operations. These and related dangers, particularly North Vietnam's use of bombing pauses as the opportunity to reinforce and resupply

its troops, made Gonard's proposal unacceptable.'i'

The U.S. diplomatic effort headed off the bombing halt proposal for

the present, but it failed to extinguish the idea within the ICRe. Although

the State Department assured the international committee on several occasions that U.S. authorities would see to it that no military activity endangered

the JCRC delegates if they were indeed permitted to visit North Vietnam,

ICRC officials repeatedly returned to the bombing pause proposal and did

not conceal their disappointment in the American refusal. In March 1967

Jacques Freymond, a member and former vice president of the committee,

again raised the issue. The State Department replied that without assurance

of reciprocal restraint on the part of Hanoi the United States could not

commit itself to such a pause. When he found the department still firmly

opposed in June, Freymond acknowledged the validity of the objections

from the U.S. point of view, but he remained convinced that without a cessation of the bombing no approach to the DRV would be worthwhile. v

Prisoner Identification

U.S. officials tried their utmost to hold the enemy fully accountable

for providing identification of prisoners as required by Article 122 of the

Geneva Convention, but they pursued this objective with lesser intensity

than some others bearing on the conditions of captivity. To begin with,

absence of proper identification did not threaten the serviceman's life or

well-being as directly as did war crimes charges or abuse by jailers not

subject to outside observation. For that matter, under normal application of

the Geneva Convention no need existed for unusual exertions by one belligerent to induce the other to turn in prisoner lists, and for some time

State Department officials followed the usual procedure of relying on the

ICRC to establish and operate the Central Information Agency defined by

Article 123, to which both sides would report. Finally, State determined that
Efforts to Ameliorate the Conditions of Captivity 129

even exhaustive efforts would likely be unavailing on an issue on which the

Vietnamese Communists never gave the slightest indication that they could

be moved, unlike their behavior on the mail issue.

Suffering most from the cruelty of Hanoi's no-lists policy were the next

of kin, who remained in a state of anxiety, not knowing whether husband,

son, or father was dead or alive. The prisoners, for their part, endured the

anxiety of being unable to inform their families of their survival. Usually

the North Vietnamese did allow a prisoner to write home once he had been

identified to the outside world through propaganda broadcasts, films, or

interviews. Whether the return letters that the family hastened to dispatch

actually reached the addressee rested entirely with his captors and might depend

primarily on the man's behavior in camp or his conduct under interrogation.

From time to time U.S. authorities called on the enemy to supply PW

lists. More often, they pointed to Hanoi's failure to identify prisoners as one

of its violations or the Geneva Convention. They also tried, not always successfully, to demonstrate their own side's fulfillment of the requirement by

inducing the Saigon government to furnish rosters of its prisoners to the

ICRe. In May 1967 State concurred in an ICRC suggestion that the committee send a list of MIA personnel to Hanoi with a request for information

on their status:" If the DRV failed to respond, the ICRC would send capture

cards, the standard form for notification of captivity, to North Vietnam in

the hope that the enemy might allow the prisoners to complete and return

them. 1R All efforts failed. After mid-1968 the commitment to press for

identification of the prisoners was taken up by the U.S. representatives at

the Paris peace talks.

Relations with the News Media

From the beginning State Department officials used care and restraInt

in presenting their concerns about prisoners of war to the public. They

believed that confronting the American people with an issue so charged

with emotion could have repercussions extending to even more brutal

treatment or the captives and to increased anguish for their families. Public

feeling might become so inflamed as to effectively close off some of the

options available to U.S. policymakers. State was sensitive as well to the fact

that some kinds of publicity could endanger the success of current or

future negotiations concerning the prisoners.

Reflecting a general sentiment in the U.S. government early in the war,

the State Department was willing to provoke public and media reaction

only when it had a specific and limited objective in doing so, as in mid-1966
130 THE LONG ROAD HOME

when it sought to quell Hanoi's threats to try American alfmen as war

criminals. With that objective achieved, State officials returned to their

policy of discrete public utterances on most aspects of PW affairs that

required diplomacy, including attempts to negotiate releases. The known

aversion of the Vietnamese Communists to publicity or speculation about

contacts reinforced State's-and others'-inclination to keep public discussion of prisoner of war questions at a low key.

Most official statements about prisoner of war matters came from State

Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey or appeared as White House

press releases. Public statements on the subject made in person hy President

Johnson, Harriman, or Secretary Rusk were rare and usually moderate in

tone. During 1966 Rusk consistently avoided being drawn into extended

exchanges about PWs. At a press conference on 5 August he gave assurance

that "we are working every day on the problem of prisoners," but "it would

actually get in the way of that effort if I were to discuss that in any detail. "39

As previously noted, Harriman and others protested the Stratton incident during March and April 1967 and condemned the further exhibiting of

prisoners in May. When later that year the North Vietnamese stepped up

their propaganda campaign to "prove" that allegations of PW mistreatment

were unfounded, the State Department broadened its own response. To

counter Hanoi's release of more pictures of American prisoners and its use of

the airwaves for prisoner statements and interviews in which some reference

to "good treatment" was a standard feature, State devoted the August issue of

its "Viet-Nam Information Notes" entirely to prisoners of war. This publication once again reviewed the several provisions of the Geneva Convention,

contrasting at every point the record of the Communists with the faithful

compliance of the United States and the GVN and stressing Hanoi's failure

to permit the ICRC or neutral observers to test its claims of humane treatment. 40

The tone of the State Department's material was primarily that of a dignified effort to keep the record straight. It fell considerably short of the

all-out campaign of public condemnation and full exploitation of the weaknesses in Hanoi's position that some in DoD were now beginning to advocate.

It was noted in the Pentagon that the August release "received only cursory

comment in the U.S. and foreign news media."41

Another opportunity to counter Communist propaganda presented itself

almost immediately. Aware that an official East German news agency was

offering extensive film footage of one North Vietnamese prison compound

to Western press and television outlets for a price, the State Department

moved to insure that no American purchaser would use the films without

suitable cautions and disclaimers. Well in advance it provided material for

articles describing this "trafficking" in Communist propaganda and alerting
Efforts to Ameliorate the Conditions of Captivity 131

readers to the doubtful validity of a film production so open to stagemanaging and selective editing. *42

The State Department offered no objection when Deputy Secretary of

Defense Paul Nine proposed a more pointed condemnation of the Communist film production. In a press release on 14 October 1967 he denounced

it as a calculated effort to exploit the captive Americans and charged that

the act of parading and photographing prisoners was in itself a violation

of the Geneva Convention. "In view of the deep interest we all have in the

welfare of our service personnel in enemy hands," Nine wrote, the desire of

news organizations to obtain the films was understandable, "but it is important that the American people know that these films are communist

propaganda and that this propaganda is being sold for hard cash."43

The East German films and still photographs appeared on TV and

in the American press soon afterward, most notably in Life's issue of

20 October. They purported to show the daily life of the U.S. prisoners, in

bare but clean surroundings and with amenities such as showers, reading

matter, and religious counseling. The U.S. media invariably presented the

information with acknowledgment of its Communist origin and usually

with accompanying comment by U.S. officials. One picture in Life

depicted two pajama-clad Americans approaching a table heavily laden

with a variety of foods. Its caption-"A Showcase Lunch"-left little doubt

that the editors thought the scene too good to be true. The New York Times

used similar caution in presenting the story and made the point that State

officials wished to see stressed. In an editorial on 16 October the paper

observed that films produced by the Communists would not convince the

American public that the prisoners were receiving humane treatment.

Rather, it said, North Vietnam should agree to regular Red Cross inspection of its detention camps.44

One aspect of State's relations with the media was unique to the conflict in Vietnam, at least in twentieth-century experience. It involved travel

by newsmen to enemy territory during hostilities and reliance on the newsmen for information and intelligence not otherwise available. In this

period, before 1968, a U.S. passport carried notice that it was not valid "for

travel to, in, or through North Vietnam unless specifically endorsed for

such travel under the authority of the Secretary of State," but it was mainly

North Vietnamese restrictions that kept enterprising U.S. journalists and

* The camp, which the American PWs called "Plantation" and which the North Vietnamese utilized as something of a Potemkin village to exhibit the captives before visitors

and journalists, is discussed at length in Rochester and Kiley, Honor Bound, ch 18; the East

German shoot is treared on p. 345.
132 THE LONG ROAD HOME

other American visitors away from Hanoi. Months before the DRV authorities began to soften their exclusion policy toward the end of 1966, the State

Department started to validate passports of newsmen and others with legitimate reasons to visit Communist-held areas of Southeast Asia. In the 15

months from May 1966 to August 1967, 169 U.S. citizens, almost all of

them reporters, received validations for travel to North Vietnam. The

first newsman to go was Harrison E. Salisbury of the New York Times,

in December 1966, but not everyone who received approval actually

made the journey. It appeared that the Hanoi government admitted to

its territory only those known to favor its cause or to oppose U.S. participation in the war, plus a few others whose prestige made it worthwhile

to play the chance that they might be favorably influenced by the visit. 4)

The State Department practice of permitting journalists to enter North

Vietnam gave some of them greater scope for expressing their antipathy to

U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, but it did have compensating advantages.

Intelligence analysts found reports on conditions in Hanoi useful as general

background for their assumptions regarding the prison environment and

enemy policies. Some journalists did see a few prisoners and were allowed

to bring their letters out. Occasionally, as with Salisbury in January 1967

and David Schoenbrun later in the year, the travelers brought back more

definite word of DRV policy changes and current attitudes, obtained during conversations with high-level officials. On their return from Hanoi a

number of reporters went to the State Department for debriefings, and some

of the antiwar activists also were willing to talk to U.S. officials. 4!,

Defense Pressure for a Stronger Public Challenge to Hanoi

Although 1967 had seen more recourse than usual to official statements

deploring enemy practices, quiet, persistent diplomacy remained State's preferred tactic to gain humane treatment for the Americans imprisoned in

Southeast Asia or obtain their early release. After October 1967 State officials

resumed the strategy of limiting comment on most aspects of the PW issue.

When striving to establish and sustain a dialogue with the opposing side it

did not seem desirable to carryon a campaign of public condemnation of

the enemy at the same time.

Earlier, the State Department's commitment to quiet diplomacy and

the rationale that supported it had enjoyed general acceptance, but by

mid-1967, when the DoD PW Policy Committee was formed, dissatisfaction with the policy's results had grown within the Department of

Defense. The critics did not dwell primarily on the failure to obtain any

significant release of prisoners; they were more disturbed by the way the
Efforts to Ameliorate the Conditions of Captivity 133

low-key approach limited response to the enemy's worldwide propaganda

campaign. As viewed from the Pentagon, State appeared unwilling to challenge with sufficient aggressiveness the claims and assertions made by

Hanoi. Within the new Defense policy committee opinion strongly favored

a more forceful and public counterpropaganda effort. Several proposals

advanced by the military services during the fall of 1967 expressed this sentiment, and committee chairman Paul Warnke established the Working Group

for Proposed Publicity Programs to consider them."?

The first proposal came from the Marine Corps in early October and

bore the endorsement of Under Secretary of the Navy Charles F. Baird. The

paper noted Hanoi's extensive use of "captured U.S. personnel in interviews, movies, TV, voice tapes, and press releases in an attempt to influence

U.S. and world opinion." The Marine Corps thought there was sufficient

evidence to refute the enemy's repeated claims of just and humane treatment of PWs and to engender skepticism about the authenticity of the

prisoners' broadcast confessions and antiwar statements. It reviewed some

of the material that "would tend to derogate Hanoi's position in world

public opinion" if widely publicized but that had "gone virtually unnoticed"

in the media. The Marine Corps called attention to the effect of unfavorable

world opinion on North Vietnamese behavior on the few occasions when

the United States had made full use of the power of adverse publicity, particularly in turning back the threat of war crimes trials. It believed a similar

effort now could bring pressure to bear on the North Vietnamese to abide

by the Geneva Convention.4~

The Army also urged a stronger publicity program. "As it is now," its

submission read, "most of our actions are devoted to putting out brush fires

started by enemy propaganda activities. We need a strategy which aggressively

grasps the initiative for us and keeps the other side reacting in the desired

direction. "49

In mid-November 1967 the Air Force outlined an information program

designed to "influence world opinion to the point that Hanoi will feel compelled to afford proper treatment to U.S. PW's." Among other objectives,

it should "acquaint the domestic audience (and where possible the foreign

audience) with Communist propaganda techniques" so that any Hanoi news

coverage of U.S. prisoners would be "viewed in its true context." The Air

Force recommended wide use of the government's resources and targeting

of institutions and elements of society ranging from the national media

and members of Congress to veterans groups, the academic community,

and Rotary, Kiwanis, and Lions clubs at the local level. Sil

All members of the Working Group for Proposed Publicity Programs

favored taking the vigorous approach suggested in the several submissions.
134 THE LONG ROAD HOME

They believed the guiding principle should be "when we have the facts,

advise the people." At its meeting on 22 November the DoD Policy Committee agreed. 5J

In view of State's designation as the "single spokesman" and the recent

failure to obtain Secretary McNamara's backing for a move to reconsider

State's role,* the policy committee could not pursue a major publicity campaign on its own. Interdepartmental consultations ensued, and what emerged

in January 1968 tended toward the circumspection favored by State rather

than the extensive campaign of open publicity the Air Force had sketched.

A joint United States Information Agency-State-Defense message to principal posts of the U.S. Information Service (USIS) worldwide called on

them to take "unobtrusive counteraction" against Hanoi's use of films and

prisoner interviews to spread the impression that the captors were treating

the American prisoners well. In countries where the enemy's propaganda

was having measurable success, USIS operatives were to counteract it "by

helping opinion-makers to realize, and to articulate, the key point that

North Vietnamese claims to humane treatment of American captives should

be viewed with suspicion and, in any case, cannot be accepted without independent verification." US IS personnel at other posts were to join in a

general effort to stimulate international opinion critical of Hanoi's refusal

ro fulfill its obligations under the Geneva Convention. 52

Defense officials who had supported more far-ranging action must

have been disappointed with the adopted program. It engaged far fewer

of the government's resources than they had wished, and it offered little

scope for informing the public in the United States. However, events then

took a turn that made it inopportune to press further for an expanded

publicity program. By early April 1968 there was, for the first time, a

real possibility that open, formal negotiations with the enemy would

soon begin.

In light of the changed circumstances the DoD PW Policy Committee advanced no new proposals during the rest of the year, but the idea of

using an aroused world and domestic opinion to support demands for

improvement in the conditions of captivity was not wholly put aside. For

impatient DoD participants in the process the desire to go to the public

with a forceful condemnation of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong

treatment of captured Americans remained strong, as did the conviction

that valuable opportunities to do so were slipping by.))

The preliminary negotiations for the four-party conference on

peace in Vietnam opened in Paris in May 1968. Harriman headed the

* See Chapter 2.
Efforts to Ameliorate the Conditions of Captivity 135

U.S. delegation, though still carrying his additional assignment as coordinator of PW affairs. He was to retain the coordinator's post through the

remainder of the Johnson administration but necessarily had to leave

more and more of its duties to his principal assistant, Frank Sieverts.

High hopes attended the delegation's departure for Paris. Now, for the

first time since American servicemen entered the barren cells of the DRV

or were penned in the NLF's cages, officials of the U.S. government could

speak face-to-face with those of Communist Vietnam about prisoners. But,

with reasonable assurance that the bombing of their homeland was at an

end and with ready appreciation of the major bargaining asset their captives

represented, the Hanoi authorities were unwilling to move toward a separate

and early agreement on the return of prisoners of war. The next five years

were to prove nearly as frustrating as the previous ones for the U.S. officials

who worked in Washington, Paris, Geneva, and Saigon in the interest of

the prisoners and missing in action.

Though not always well regarded in the Pentagon at the time, the State

Department's performance in the PW arena in the years prior to the Paris

negotiations is hatdly open to criticism. Admittedly, like others before

him, Harriman failed to attain his chief goal, the release of the prisoners.

Neither did he achieve his secondary objective, the observance by Hanoi

and the NLF of the letter and spirit of the Geneva Convention in their

handling of captives. Nevertheless, it is clear that Harriman and his colleagues unhesitatingly pursued every lead and realistic opportunity that

could possibly bring about a release or exchange or an easing of the lot of

the Americans while in Communist hands. They were equally untiring in

placing inquiries and advancing proposals through third parties in the

hope of eliciting a North Vietnamese response. Rather than anything

wanting in the quality and resourcefulness of these efforts, it was the

exceptional determination of the enemy that best explained the disappointing results. Short of unleashing the force necessary to beat North Vietnam

into the ground, or giving in to Hanoi's demands for U.S. withdrawal and

abandonment of the South Vietnamese government, there appeared to be

no practical way to speed the return of the prisoners or to induce the enemy

to comply with the Geneva standards.
T

7

Casualty Reporting, Notification,

and Assistance to Next of Kin

Casualty Reporting

he reporting of casualties was an inescapable part of the business of

the Deparrmenr of Defense. The Vietnam conflict brought this

activity to new prominence and also accelerated a trend toward standardization of the procedures.

Since mid-I960 the military services had used the single DD Form

1300 to certify each individual case of death or missing status. Centralized

statistical accounting of all types of casualties incurred by U.S. personnel

in Southeast Asia began in December 1963, overseen by Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Charles J. Hitch. He called on the military

departments to submit cumulative figures for the period 1 January 1961

through 9 December 1963 and to render weekly reports thereafter. With

separate columns for Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand, the report form gave

the number of casualties "resulting from actions by hostile forces" by categories of killed, wounded or injured, missing, and captured or interned.

Another tabulation covered casualties from other than hostile action. 1

During 1964 the number of servicemen reported as "captured or

interned" remained small, never exceeding 10. This low number undoubtedly contributed to the decision in September 1964 to change the designation to "detained"-a category defined in a recent amendment to the

Missing Persons Act as "detained in a foreign country against his (their)

will."* This terminology DoD regarded as "more appropriate to present

conditions than 'captured or interned' which customarily is associated with

a condition of declared war." Accordingly, beginning with the first weekly

* PL 88-428 (14 Aug 64).

136
Casualty Reporting and Notification 137

report in October 1964, captured servicemen were listed as "detained" and

were referred to thereafter as "detainees." 2

This usage continued through 1965 and into 1966, but the increased

U.S. military involvement in Vietnam and the steadily growing numbers

of "detainees" caused second thoughts. By mid-1966 Navy officials were

agitating for straightforward use of "prisoner of war," and their position

gained the endorsement of the other services and the State Department. In

July Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) Thomas D. Morris submitted the matter to Deputy Secretary Cyrus Vance with an unqualified

recommendation that he direct the change.

As our level of involvement has increased, and as the problem of

missing and captured personnel has taken on major significance,

the use of the "detained" language, particularly in the press release

format ... , has become increasingly troublesome. At the present time, Hanoi refers to captured U.S. fliers as "pirates" and "war

criminals" and publicly threatens to try them as criminals. Any

usage of terms by us which tends to derogate from our prisoners'

entitlement (0 the rights of "prisoners of war" is potentially

embarrassing to the major effort now in progress to force Hanoi,

as a signatory to the Geneva Conventions, to accord our personnel

the rights of prisoners of war ....j

Vance signed the order on the same day he received it, 19 July 1966,

reinstating "captured or interned" as a category in the weekly statistical

repott. He also directed that "references to such personnel in official correspondence should be in the status of 'prisoner of war' or 'prisoner' rather

than 'detainee. "'4

The casualty reporting system brought the Department of State, the

American Red Cross, and the International Committee of the Red Cross

into action to locate the missing and possibly detained and to begin seeking their return. State's responsible agency was the Bureau of Security and

Consular Affairs, particularly its Office of Special Consular Services (SCS).

The Memorandum of Understanding on the Assignment of Responsibilities for Americans Held Captive in South East Asia, worked out by

representatives of SCA/SCS, the services, and ARC on 9 November 1965,

regularized the procedures that had developed up to that time.* Besides

scheduling regular reporting dates, the agreement dispensed with formal

requests for action, stipulating instead that dispatch of a Form 1300 would

cause further action steps to occur automatically. \

* See Chaprer 2.
138 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Each week the military casualty branches furnished SCS with a

numerical summary of men missing and possibly detained, and at month's

end they provided SCA with a list of all possible detainees by name,

rank, serial number, date and place of incident, and the parent service's

judgment on the likelihood of capture. The monthly report showed changes

resulting from later information on previous cases, and it recapitulated

the new cases recorded during the month, each of which had been the subject of a Form 1300.

The casualty branches sent copies of the forms for Vietnam to ARC

and State. ARC would then request the ICRC to seek information about

the status, health, and whereabouts of the missing serviceman and, generally, to intercede on his behalf. Unless otherwise instructed, ARC was free

to pass all information contained in the casualty report to the ICRe. The

procedure differed somewhat for persons lost in Laos and other areas

outside Vietnam. Here copies of the Form 1300 went to State, to be forwarded to the ARC only after coordination with the appropriate geographic

desks within the department. (,

Casualty Notification

The military casualty branches also had responsibility for notifying

the next of kin of a family member missing in action and thereafter providing any new information on his status. Each service traditionally performed

this duty for its own members, and rhe responsibility was acknowledged anew

in the memorandum of understanding of 9 November 1965.

Notification procedures and frequency of subsequent communication

with the families varied among the services. The Army, which had the

most fully developed system during the early years of the Vietnam conflict,

kept in touch with the next of kin on a monthly basis in 1965. There was

no 000 regulation imposing uniformity of procedure on the services.

There existed only a 000 instruction pertaining to "Notification of Next

of Kin in Event of the Death of Military Personnel on Active Duty," which

prescribed notification "either by an officer in person or by commercial

communication [that is, by telegram]."7

In late 1965 only the Navy and Marine Corps sought to use personal

notification by a uniformed representative in all instances, including missing in action. The Army and the Air Force more often relied on the traditional telegram, a practice that might have continued had not questions

arisen about the performance of the telegraph service itself. On 11 February

1966 Senator Richard B. Russell, chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Casualty Reporting and Notification 139

Committee, wrote to Secretary McNamara describing incidents that he

said had "created considerable ill will for the military services." One

involved receipt of a notifying telegram by ordinary mail "two days after

the date it was transmitted by Western Union." More disturbing instances

reported from California and Georgia indicated it was common practice to

entrust delivery of the telegrams to taxi drivers. Senator Russell thought it

should be possible to arrange for a more personal and considerate way of

notifying next of kin.

Russell's letter brought immediate action. On 25 February Deputy

Secretary Vance addressed the secretaries of the Army and Air Force.

It has come to my attention that the next of kin of men who

die or are missing in action in Vietnam are being notified by

telegram delivered by mail, messenger or taxicab. Such impersonal

procedures are not in keeping with the interest in the welfare of

our men and their families which the President and all of us

have repeatedly emphasized.

Effective immediately, I desire that you institute a procedure

under which the next-of-kin of Vietnam casualties are notified in

person by a military officer, to the fullest practicable extent.

He called for a report within one week. 9

The Army responded that it would soon institute throughout the continental United States the personal notification system it had already been

testing in one area. The Air Force, which had previously provided personal

notification only where families resided in the immediate vicinity of major

bases, undertook to expand its procedure "to make full use of every Air

Force facility throughout the United States and overseas." Secretary of the

Air Force Harold Brown reponed that commanders were required to notify

the Casualty Division, USAF Military Personnel Center, Randolph AFB,

Texas, within four hours when an Air Force member was killed or missing

in Southeast Asia. The Casualty Division, operational 24 hours a day,

would then contact the Air Force facility nearest to the family-possibly

even a school or recruiting center-to learn whether it could accomplish

personal notification within a reasonable length of time. If not, the

Casualty Division would dispatch a telegram to the family and direct the

closest Air Force base capable of providing casualty assistance "to make

personal contact with the next of kin within 24 hours." 10

These Air Force procedures proved fairly typical of the system for

dealing with next of kin as it developed in all the services during 1966. By

late summer fulfillment of the Vance requirement for personal notification

and a conscientious striving to aid the families of the missing had
140 THE LONG ROAD HOME

brought actual practice well beyond that prescribed in existing regulations. 11

Somewhat belatedly, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) on 6 April 1967 issued an instruction-"Casualty Procedures for

Military Personnel"-that superseded the previous instruction that pertained

only to notification of next of kin when a serviceman died. In the paragraphs

quoted below it provided a general policy pronouncement and a set of standards that the military departments were for the most part already observing:

[v. CASUALTY NOTIFICATION

A. General notifiwtion policy. [t is the general policy of the

Department of Defense that, in the event a military member becomes a casualty while on active duty, the next of

kin of that member be notified as promptly as possible

in a dignified, humane, and understanding manner.

B. Initial notification.

1. [n battle casualty cases involving death or missing person status, the initial notification will be

made to at least the primary next of kin in person

by a uniformed representative designated by the

Military Service concerned, unless unusual circumstances preclude such procedure. This personal

notification will be promptly confirmed by telegraphic or written communication.

5. Regardless of the notification procedure used, care

will be taken to insure that no information which

might be offensive to the next of kin, such as

burial details and monetary provisions in a death

case, is included in the initial notification.

C. Follow-on notifications. Contact will be maintained in

appropriate casualty cases-e.g., serious or very serious

illness or injury, missing, captured-to keep the next of

kin regularly and currently informed until the case has

been finally resolved.

V. CASUALTY ASS[STANCE

In appropriate casualty cases such as death, miSSIng, missing

in action, or captured, the Military Service concerned will

appoint an assistance officer, who will personally contact the

next of kin within 24 hours following initial notification. He

will, to the extent the next of kin desire, provide guidance and

assistance with such matters as burial arrangements, claims

for monetary benefi ts, dependen t transportation and transportation of household goods, dependent benefits, and special
Casualty Reporting and Notification 141

financial and legal problems arising from the serviceman's

casualty status as are pertinent to the particular case. The

assistance officer will maintain contact with the next of kin

until the casualty case is finally resolved. 12

The system encompassed initial notification, periodic communications from the central casualty office of the parent service, and more

immediate support from a locally assigned assistance officer. The prescribed procedures accorded with the longstanding tradition of "taking

care of our own," but they went beyond previous practice in providing continuing personalized attention to the needs of each family.

Fulfillment of this ideal was no easy task. Besides having to meet increasing manpower requirements for the casualty assistance function, the

services faced difficulties in deciding what to say to the next of kin of

men missing or captured. The letters they sent periodically could provide

instruction on the procedures for dispatching mail to the missing family

member, advice on regulations and legislation affecting the next of kin,

and general assurances that the U.S. government was doing everything

possible to insure the prisoners' welfare and arrange for their return. The

officers who wrote them could not help but know, however, that, above

all, the families longed for definite information on the status, health,

and location of their servicemen and news of specific efforts to gain the

men's release.

The chief obstacle to satisfying the desire for definite information

about the missing was, of course, the enemy's policy of neither acknowledging captures nor providing prisoner lists to the ICRe. The services

passed information to the next of kin as soon as it was obtained, but their

efforts depended mainly on the analysis of letters received from the prisoners, gleanings from Foreign Broadcast Information Service reports and the

monitoring of foreign publications, interviews with travelers returned

from Hanoi, and the debriefings of the handful of escapees and releasees,

none of whom, before February 1968, had been held in North Vietnam.

Through 1966 the volume of information from these sources was meager.

By the end of that year the total number of prisoner letters received was

still under 200, and these had been written by only 47 of the captives. U

Earlier in 1966 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had asked the Defense Intelligence Agency to seek from the U.S. Intelligence Board an assignment of

highest priority for the collection of intelligence about the prisoners of war.

They called for intensified efforts by all agencies of the government to

obtain intelligence on the location and characteristics of prisoner detention

areas and the number and identity of Americans held. This endeavor,
142 THE LONG ROAD HOME

undertaken with the approval of the secretary of defense, had the ultimate

objective of initiating operations for the forcible recovery of the captives. 14

Intelligence findings supplemented the information gained from more

open sources, but security considerations limited what could be released to

the families. In August 1967, when Charles Havens and John Rhinelander

surveyed current PW problems for Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

Paul Warnke, they suggested that the reticence of the intelligence specialists might be restricting the flow to an unnecessary degree. Rhinelander

noted that he was "not certain how much of the intelligence information is

kept locked up within the intelligence community and how much is passed

on to the Casualty Section and State," and he recommended that the 000

PW Policy Committee review the matterY Improved coordination throughout the intelligence community and stronger emphasis on finding releasable

items of interest to next of kin were among the policy committee's objectives when it called on DIA to prepare a new charter for a reconstituted

Interagency Prisoner of War Intelligence Committee.*

Authorities gained substantial new information about the missing

during 1967. The number of prisoners writing letters reached 80 by the

year's end, and North Vietnam contributed even more material to work

from when in the wake of the worldwide reaction to the Stratton incident

in March, Hanoi mounted an extensive campaign to disprove U.S. charges

of mistreatment. It included the release of films and still photographs and

a stepped-up schedule of prisoner statements and interviews, all of which

were subjected to intelligence analysis in the United States, as was the information derived from the increasing number of journalists, peace activists,

and other visitors admitted to North Vietnam during 1967. 000 maintained relations with the TV networks that allowed it to alert families

when film reports of interest to them were scheduled for broadcast, and

sometimes the families contributed new insights on the identity or condition of captives. 16

As more families learned their loved ones were being held prisoner,

they increased pressure on the U.S. government to assure relatives it was

making every effort to obtain release of the captives. For some time the

details of the State Department's endeavors to obtain the prisoners' freedom were not widely known within the 000, but in any event information on negotiations in progress was not disclosable. Thus, when

corresponding with the families, service casualty officers had neither the

knowledge nor the authority to elaborate on the guarded statements made

public by the Department of State. During a meeting with Ambassador

* See Chapter 2.
Casualty Reporting and Notification 143

Harriman, scheduled at his request on 14 July 1966, service casualty branch

representatives described with great earnestness their need for guidance

on what to say about u.s. diplomatic activities. Harriman promised to help

them, mainly by supplying copies of letters he and other State officials had

used in responding to queries from the public. But his further on-the-spot

attempt to formulate a statement only illustrated anew the narrow range

of acceptable comment. Next of kin could be told that the United States

was doing everything possible to draw North Vietnam into negotiations

by working through friendly nations that had diplomatic relations with

Hanoi, he said, but without mentioning names of countries.]7

Harriman's subordinates fulfilled his promise of help by supplying

model letters from time to time to the casualty branches. In late October

1966, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) Morris wrote to Philip

Heymann, SCA's acting administrator, proposing additional arrangements. Heymann readily accepted the suggestion that his office issue a

monthly report summarizing releasable information on efforts to learn the

status, protect the welfare, and secure the return of the prisoners. 18 The information compiled by the State Department rarely went beyond what had

already been publicly released in Washington, but it allowed PW families

throughout the country to learn officially of activities that might have

received little attention in their local papers and newscasts. The monthly

report gave casualty officers assurance that they were providing the fullest

information available and were speaking with one voice when communicating with the next of kin. They were quick to protest when the State

Department's monthly summary lapsed briefly in early 1968. 19

Assistance to Next ofKin

Aside from dealing with the ongoing concern of next of kin with the

status and whereabouts of their loved ones, the government also had to

answer questions and provide assistance in the practical areas of pay

accounts and allotments, family medical care and other benefits, housing,

and problems of moving and storage. The families often needed legal

assistance in transactions that would normally require the signature of

the missing man, such as income tax returns or the sale of an automobile registered in his name. The services also kept PW relatives advised

of new legislation applying to them. While some of the legislation later

enacted tended to grant the prisoners and their families special dispensations, one of the first laws to enter the books, in late 1967, simply
144 THE LONG ROAD HOME

removed an inequity. A letter to next of kin from the Air Force Accounting and Finance Center explained the particulars with admirable clarity:

On 1 Sep 1966, Public Law 89-538 (Uniformed Services Savings

Deposit Program) was enacted. This permitted certain members

of the Uniformed Services to take part in a savings program which

pays them a rate of interest currently set at 10% per annum, compounded quarterly. Members who were in a missing or captured

status on that date had no opportunity to participate and many

who have been reported in a missing or captured status since that

date had not made an election to take part. On 19 Oct 1966 the

Comptroller General ruled that unless the member had started an

allotment for deposit in the savings program, we could not act in

his behalf. Public Law 90-122, 3 Nov 1967 now permits us to

make deposits for missing or captured members.

The letter provided detailed instructions on how to II1ltlate partICipation

in the savings program, which had a legal maximum of $10,000. 211

The services made a conscious effort to write letters that displayed compassion and genuine concern for the problems and anxieties of the families.

As early as October 1964, after reading the file of a serviceman recently

executed by the Viet Cong, the Army chief of staff, General Harold K.

Johnson, directed that correspondence to the next of kin "be more personalized and convey the maximum amount of information consistent

with security restrictions."21 The Air Force pursued the same ideal; its official letters generally attained the desired tone by being cast in the first

person. One sent to an Air Force wife in early 1966 gave the particulars on

content, frequency, address, and channeling of letters to her missing husband and then continued as follows:

At the same time we should like to ask that you keep a copy of

each letter which you send him. Then, if you receive any form of

communication from him, please forward to this headquarters

the original of his letter (or a photostatic copy) together with the

envelope in which it was received and the copies of your letters to

him. I realize that this will appear to you to be an invasion of

privacy. I want to assure you that our only reason for asking this

of you is to provide our intelligence experts with every possible

advantage in interpreting the information contained in his letter.

All material that we receive will be carefully examined, photostatic copies will be made and the originals will be returned to you.

The information gained from his letter may prove to be important

and in all cases it will be used in checking through every possible

source in an attempt to clarify his status.
Casualty Reporting and Notification 145

The same letter evidenced concern for another aspect of the family's privacy:

It is very important that you should know that an otganization

calling itself the "Viet Cong Sympathizers Arms Fund" has initiated a campaign of threats and harassment against families of

U.S. servicemen in Vietnam. Its activities include anonymous telephone calls requesting money and, in exchange, offering to provide

information about the service member. 1n some instances, the caller

falsely advises that the member is dead. In othet instances, families

of deceased members have received derisive postcards requesting a

contribution to the Viet Cong Sympathizers Arms Fund from their

insurance proceeds. This harassment is being investigated to ascertain subversive connections. The effectiveness of the investigation

depends, in part, on timely receipt of information related to these

incidents. If you should receive any communications or telephone

calls of this nature, please notify the nearest Air Force Office of

Special Investigations or the Federal Bureau of Investigation before

taking any action whatsoever. 22

Earlier, in May 1965, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

Arthur Sylvester had taken an action intended in part to shield the families from public attention and unwanted intrusions by the press and others.

With the concurrence of the military departments, he directed that next

of kin and home address be omitted from official announcements about

servicemen missing in action. The information made public would be limited

to what the serviceman was required to divulge if captured: name, rank, serial

number, and date of birth. Anything further, Sylvester wrote, could reveal

"information about him which his captors might use to his detriment." The

order also instructed service representatives to caution family members

against release of information that might have harmful consequences. 21

The task of aiding and communicating with the next of kin grew

steadily as casualty lists grew. In round figures, the number of known

prisoners doubled during 1966 and doubled again in 1967, to reach

approximately 300, while the roster of missing men increased even more.

The number of military dependents affected by the loss and the range of

problems arising from their varied circumstances multiplied accordingly.

Strong as was the dedication of most casualty assistance officers in

responding to the needs of the families to the fullest extent allowed by law

and regulation, they did not escape public criticism. Though often illfounded, the criticism surfaced relatively early and thus played a part in

insuring that the family assistance program received central direction and

high-level attention in its formative stage. The principal charges and rumors

derived from an Associated Press release of 24 August 1966. Transmitted
146 THE LONG ROAD HOME

to AP affiliates throughout the country, it portrayed DoD as laggard in providing assistance to the families of servicemen captured or missing in

Vietnam and insensitive in applying its regulations to individual cases of

distress. The article implied that families generally were suffering financial

privation, since it was claimed that pay and allotments of the missing were

automatically stopped for an extended period and family access to commissaries, medical care, and government housing was immediately cut off. The

second of these allegations was entirely untrue; the first, based on incomplete information, was a gross distortion. Actually, existing family support

allotments continued without change. Where delay did occur-though

usually not beyond two weeks-was in beginning a special additional allotment from the serviceman's pay at a level designated by the man himself

before departing on a Southeast Asia assignment, to become effective should

he subsequently fall into the captured or missing status. Beyond that, each

military department had statutory authority to manage the pay accounts

of missing persons, including the power to make further adjustments In

family allotments if this proved necessary.24

The news articles based on the AP release generally had the tone of

one published in the Washington Evening Star, headlined "Legal

'Non-Persons'-Red Tape Snarls POW's Kin." McNamara and Vance reacted

by directing an investigation and the preparation of a press release describing the system of providing for PW/MIA dependents. The investigation, in

fact, disclosed little evidence of dissatisfaction among those receiving the

help of casualty assistance representatives. The AP report appeared to be

traceable to the complaints of a single service wife, whose attributed remarks

did not square with the official record of her circumstances. Moreover, some

of the cited conditions afflicted service families generally, even those whose

service member was not captive or missing or even in combat, such as

the frequent unavailability of on-base housing or the fact that medical care

was not always readily obtainable when military facilities were distant

or overburdened. 25

OSD officials, however, did not presume that the handling of

family assistance could not be improved. After consultations that included

Secretary McNamara, Assistant Secretary Morris in August 1966 called on

each military department to request a weekly report on casualty assistance

activities that would list each new case and detail the action taken by the

officer assigned to aid the family. Morris stipulated that the under secretary

of each military department review the report personally "to make doubly

certain that problems of severe hardship are not allowed to drift, especially

where an increased allotment to the family is indicated. "2('
Casualty Reporting and Notification 147

A further investigation of the casualty notification and assistance activities of the four services occurred during the following months, directed from

the office of Deputy Secretary Cyrus Vance. Having reviewed the findings,

Vance concluded that the news articles about next of kin "being treated shabbily by the Government" were unwarranted and untrue, and he so advised

the secretaries of the military departments in May 1967: "Far from being

criticized, all personnel concerned should be commended for the overall

excellence and effectiveness of their work. Their efforts in easing the burdens and solving the problems of the families ... and the sensitivity and tact

which they have displayed in all phases of casualty notification and assistance

are a source of satisfaction to me and, I trust, to them."27

Three months later the DoD PW Policy Committee came into operation, with "assistance and information for families of POWs" as one of its

chartered responsibilities. Besides keeping the services' performance of the

assistance function under continuing review, Warnke and the committee

gave attention to expediting the release of information of interest to the

next of kin. They realized that one means of building confidence in DoD

was to get word of new developments and government actions to the families through service channels ahead of public release. This generally worked

well, but not when it came to the August 1967 issue of the State Department's "Viet-Nam Information Notes." That document, which contained

the fullest exposition to date of the government's efforts on behalf of the

prisoners and of the contrasting records of the two sides in honoring the

Geneva Convention, had already advanced too far toward publication to be

held up. Still, it turned out to be a useful communication that retained its

timeliness for long afterward and was extensively used as an enclosure

when corresponding with next of kin. 28

Thereafter the policy committee generally succeeded in giving prior

notice to the families, particularly since DoD played an increasing part in

initiating the government actions that deserved their attention. Such was

the case, for instance, when Deputy Secretary Paul Nitze issued his statement

on 14 October 1967 condemning, both as propaganda and as a violation of

the Geneva Convention, the Communist practice of selling films purporting to show the daily life of the prisoners.* Later, on 3 May 1968, after a

policy committee review of its own records to identify accomplishments

that might bring some comfort to the families, Warnke sent a letter with the

results to the secretaries of the military departments, intended for reproduction and dispatch to all next of kin. 29

In performing the assistance function the services often displayed

unusual resourcefulness and flexibility in meeting individual needs, but

some desires of the next of kin could not be accommodated. One Army wife,

* See Chapter 6.
148 THE LONG ROAD HOME

in understandable distress over Hanoi radio's attribution of a propaganda

statement to her husband, wanted to counterattack by releasing letters he

had written in a happier time, which she believed would attest to his

loyalty. The policy committee concluded that "her plan should be discouraged because the enemy still had custody of her husband and her action

might create additional hardships for him."30

Another case, more significant from a policy standpoint, and already

pending when the committee was formed, was taken up at its first meeting on 11 August 1967. Some weeks earlier Mrs. Phillip N. Butler, wife of

a Navy pilot whose letters confirmed his status as a prisoner of the North

Vietnamese, had requested State Department validation of her passport

for travel to North Vietnam. State officials had informed OSD that the

Defense position would govern the action taken on Mrs. Butler's application

and similar requests. In response to earlier, more tentative inquiries from

next of kin, each of the services had counseled that attempts to travel to

North Vietnam would be contrary to the best interests of the prisoners,

the relatives involved, and the United States. While hewing to this line, the

policy committee saw the need for more than a simple denial of the Butler

request. As the report under consideration noted, "Mrs. Butler recently indicated to Navy representatives that she would be inclined to follow the Navy's

advice, but believes that she is entitled to an unequivocal and reasoned

answer from State." Providing such an answer would ease acceptance of the

decision, not only by Mrs. Butler but by the American public, should the

matter receive attention in the press. 3l

Warnke informed Harriman on 26 August 1967 that t,hose concerned

with PW affairs in the Department of Defense held unanimously that

State should advise Mrs. Butler the validation could not be granted. "We

believe," Warnke continued, "that Mrs. Butler should be provided with as

complete an explanation of the basis for the decision as security considerations permit," and he enclosed a suggested reply. It touched on nearly all the

reasons contained in Warnke's fuller, classified exposition of the Defense

position. Besides mentioning the lack of assurance that the North Vietnamese would allow her to visit her husband, it asked her to contemplate

the likely effect on his morale and that of other prisoners should a meeting

occur. It stressed that while in North Vietnam she would be a hostage of

the enemy, entirely beyond U.S. diplomatic protection and with no

guarantee of safety. "All the crucial determinations would be controlled

by North Vietnam," Warnke stated. He had amplified this in his covering letter by sketching some of the propaganda initiatives that would be
Casualty Reporting and Notification 149

available to Hanoi. Warnke also advised Harriman that "promptly after

Mrs. Butler receives your letter a Flag Officer will call on Mrs. Butler and

explain to her personally the reasons for our position. This would be consistent with our view that the military services must continue to assume primary

responsibility for counseling relatives on issues involving the welfare

of PW/MIA.",2

Shorter and less personal than Warnke's suggested text, State's letter to

Mrs. Butler carried the signature of the Acting Administrator, SCA, rather

than that of Ambassador Harriman, as recommended by 000. It based the

denial simply on "the considered judgment of the Department of Defense and

the Military Services that such a trip would be against the best interest of the

prisoners and would not be in the national interest," leaving it to Navy representatives to explain the reasons more fully. The policy, however, was clear.

Requests from the relatives of prisoners for authorization to travel to North

Vietnam "cannot be approved at the present time.""

To summarize, the notification and assistance program for next of

kin had benefited from high-level attention and clear directives at an early

stage. By mid-1967 the program operated in a generally satisfactory, sometimes even exemplary, manner. Once the armed forces had reached the

prescribed standard for notification procedures, there arose no serious complaints about the way families received word that their serviceman was

missing or captured. Still, an Army report of August 1967 noted that

"constant difficulty is experienced because insufficient information is

available to satisfy those who request it, particularly next-of-kin. "l4 Though

the fault here lay mainly with the enemy, the service spokesmen felt

keenly the lack of data on the location and physical condition of

the prisoners and their inability to say whether or not a missing man

had been captured. Nor could they supply any details about U.S. diplomatic efforts, but much other information of interest to next of kin was

available, including instructions on mailing procedures and notice of

legislation affecting PW/MIA dependents. After August 1967 the flow

of information increased somewhat as a result of the work of Warnke and

the policy committee.

For the next year or so the assumption that information and assistance were being provided to the families in an effective manner went

largely unchallenged. When Deputy Secretary Nitze again called on the

military departments to review their casualty notification and assistance
150 THE LONG ROAD HOME

activities, their replies in June 1968 contained not a single recommendation

for substantive improvement. 35 *

One other important, somewhat earlier development warrants mention. In a memorandum for the under 'secretaries of the military departments in August 1966, Assistant Secretary Morris referred to the repeated

statements of President Johnson that the United States was prepared to

negotiate regarding prisoners of war whenever and wherever the government of North Vietnam wished. Noting that "the Department of Defense

must be ready, possibly on very short notice, to provide the United States

negotiators with complete information for their use," he asked each service

to maintain an individual dossier on every man listed as captured or

missing in action in Southeast Asia. Secretary Morris prescribed that each

dossier include, as a minimum: (l) a copy of the most recent official photograph; (2) complete identification data drawn from personnel and medical

records; (3) a copy or extract of official assignment orders; (4) a summary

account of the time, place, and circumstances of the man's loss; and

(5) a listing of all information subsequently received about the individual.

He enjoined the services to coordinate among themselves and with DIA

to insure full exchange of casualty information and standardization

of dossiers. 36

The services largely succeeded in assembling the folders by the end of

November 1966. Only the requirement for a recent photograph presented

much difficulty. The Marine Corps did have an official file of pictures of

its personnel; the other services often had to appeal to the next of kin

to obtain one. In November the Air Force reported its collection of nearly

300 dossiers in place in the Personnel Readiness Center adjacent to the Air

Force Command Post in the Pentagon. 37

The timely establishment of a separate folder for each captured or

missing serviceman created a resource that received frequent use in the

following years. The initial effort, and the continuing one of keeping the

dossiers up to date, drew together information from the casualty reporting system, from intelligence reports and the monitoring of broadcasts

and publications, and from the prisoners' letters obtained from the next

of kin.

* More critical assessments of the family assistance progtam that atose in later years are

discussed in Chapter 18.
8

Changing Attitudes Toward

the Code of Conduct

T he experience of repatriating pnsoners of war following the

Korean armistice of 1953 had provided the Department of

Defense with a number of useful lessons. One of them related to the manner in which the military services had dealt with their returnees: Inequities

arising from the application of different standards and patterns of treatment to the returned prisoners would not escape notice, with condemnation

in public forums and the press as the likely result. The news accounts of

the time fixed in the public mind an impression that there had indeed

been marked and unjustifiable differences in the severity with which

offenses committed in captivity were judged. That impression was not

erased by a finding to the contrary in the report of an advisory committee to

the secretary of defense in 1955. 1

The Korean experience had demonstrated that uniformity of treatment

was necessary, both to provide justice and to preserve the image of honor

and orderly procedure that each service wished to maintain. Moreover,

any action that might trigger a public perception of differences should be

avoided. The officials concerned with PW affairs began giving increasing

attention to these considerations late in 1964. By then the roster of known

prisoners had ceased to be solely an Army list; before long it contained

names from all the services. By June 1968, when DoD published its first

directive on repatriation processing, the requirement for equal treatment

was beyond question. The directive in fact began: "In the interest of facilitating uniformity .... "2

151
152 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Strict Interpretation ofthe Code

Even more directly a legacy of the Korean War was the Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States, promulgated

by President Eisenhower's Executive Order 10631 of 17 August 1955.

Differing service views on the concept that should be followed in Code

of Conduct training had led to intensive discussion within the Joint

Chiefs of Staff during 1963. The controversy related almost solely to interpretation of the code's Article Y, reading as follows: "When questioned,

should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank,

service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions

to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.'"

After Secretary McNamara gave prescriptive guidance for resolution

of the matter, 000 Directive 1300.7, issued on 8 July 1964, set forth

specific "Guidance for Development of Training Programs and Instructional Material in Support of the Code of Conduct."* Among other things

it provided that training should be so explicit that each serviceman

would understand:

1. The consequence of not holding to name, rank, Service number, and date of birth.

2. That the wording of Article V of the Code of Conduct providing that the individual will evade answering questions beyond

name, rank, Service number, and date of birth "to the utmost of my

ability," is binding on all military personnel. It is a principle that

once a man is placed in a position where it is beyond his ability

to resist answering further questions, further responses are made

entirely on his own responsibility. [This repeated, almost word for

word, Secretary McNamara's pronouncement on the marteL]

"On his own responsibility" was not a release from the obligations of the

Code, as the further language made clear:

... should he be subjected to extremes of coercion, he will avoid

the disclosure of any information, the making of any oral or

written statement, or the performance of any act harmful to the

interests of the United States or its Allies, detrimental to fellow

prisoners, or which will provide aid or comfort to the enemy.4

• See Chapter I.
Changing Attitudes Toward the Code of Conduct 153

Further, the guidance called for instruction in the provisions of the

Geneva Convention of 1949 relating to prisoners of war and in the principle that each serviceman remained accountable for his acts under the

Uniform Code of Military Justice at all times, even while in captivity.

The whole constituted a considerable training task, further complicated

by the differing thrust and purpose of the Code of Conduct and the

Geneva Convention. In a prison camp, uncertainties would no doubt arise

over which should govern in particular cases, especially since the precepts

would have to be applied from memory.

One such instance of uncertainty that appeared repeatedly in the early

Vietnam PW experience concerned correspondence with next of kin. When

offered the opportunity to write a letter to his family, a prisoner well indoctrinated in sticking to "the Big Four" and making no written statements

sometimes reasoned that providing the enemy with family names and

home address would breach the code. Also, might not letter writing be

viewed as one of the "special favors" that Article III specified should never

be accepted from the enemy? Indeed, there was evidence that some

instructors had encouraged this line of reasoning.

A conference on techniques of evasion, escape, and personnel recovery

at CINCPAC's headquarters in December 1965 brought to light additional instances of variation in the training that combat personnel serving

in Southeast Asia had received regarding permissible behavior under the

Code of Conduct. The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded by issuing approved

guidance to all commanders and staff agencies on 9 March 1966. After

dealing with several other aspects of the code, they noted that "another

point apparently subject to individual misconception in operating units

involves correspondence between captives and their next-of-kin and the

execution of Capture Cards."

Article 71 of the Geneva Convention provides that prisoners are

allowed to send and receive correspondence, and to do so is also

completely in accord with the Code of Conduct. Completion of

the Capture Card contemplated by Article 70 of the Geneva Convention is also in accordance with the Code of Conduct. However,

combat personnel should be cautioned against including information in their letters or Capture Cards which would be helpful

to the enemy or harmful to the United States or its allies.

Another paragraph of the guidance treated a broader consideration:

The Code of Conduct was developed and promulgated with full

cognizance of the fact that our enemies do not always adhere to
154 THE LONG ROAD HOME

the laws of war and frequently violate the prOVISIOns of the

Geneva Convention. US military personnel are obligated to adhere

to the provisions of the Code of Conduct regardless of threats of

death. The obligation to continue resistance by all means at their

disposal is not lessened by the misfortune of capture. No conceivable modification to the Code would prevent the Hanoi regime

from making or carrying our threats or ... trying, on trumped up

charges, captured US personnel for alleged war crimes. Therefore,

there is no requirement to modify the Code of Conduct nor the

standards it represents in response to unilateral declarations by

hostile powers.)

Thus official commentary on the Code of Conduct through the early

years of the Vietnam conflict reaffirmed the strict interpretation of its provisions. It could be expected that further questions of interpretation would

arise and that training would probably undergo changes of emphasis as

knowledge grew of the enemy treatment and exploitation of the prisoners.

Developing Thought on Treatment ofReturned Prisoners

The next round of consideration bearing on the Code of Conduct shifted

attention to the treatment of u.s. servicemen after their return from captivity. Ambassador W. Averell Harriman initiated this reexamination in a

"Personal and Confidential" letter to Secretary McNamara on 13 June 1966,

barely a month after he assumed PW responsibilities within the State

Department. "Under traditional military practices returned prisoners are

subject to possible court martial or other legal proceedings relating to their

conduct and statements while held captive," Harriman wrote.

. . . The two prisoners released by the Viet Cong last December,

Sgts. Smith and McClure, underwent lengthy interrogation and

investigation leading to a possible court martial, and after several

months received general discharges. A Navy pilot, Lr. Commander

Klusmann, escaped from the Pathet Lao in 1964 after several

months of confinement, much of it under extremely adverse conditions. Having come through this ordeal he underwent protracted

legal proceedings in the course of which he suffered a nervous

breakdown. He subsequently recovered and returned to active

duty. No prisoners have been released by the North Vietnamese

authorities, bur I understand records are being kept of statements

attributed to them and other items relative to possible legal proceedings they might face after their release.
Changing Attitudes Toward the Code of Conduct 155

I recognize the obvious sensitivity of this subject, but I would

raise the question whether it is necessary to proceed in this

manner with regard to repatriated prisoners in light of the unusual citcumstances of this conflict.

Harriman made clear he was not speaking of men who might have betrayed

their comrades or who had willingly lent themselves to the enemy's propaganda purposes.

But where the alleged misconduct consists of isolated and possibly

ambiguous statements, and where much of the evidence comes

from post-release de-briefings of the prisoner himself, I would

propose for your consideration that a decision to proceed with

formal investigation or indictment, or a public announcement

thereof, might be held in abeyance pending high level review, perhaps by yourself personally.

Harriman expressed his belief that "we run a danger of making ourselves

appear unnecessarily heartless and of handing an additional propaganda

subject to the enemy if present practices continue to take their automatic

course."G

Deputy Secretary Vance responded, saying that he shared Harriman's

concern about the problem of dealing with returned prisoners in such a

way as to preclude propaganda exploitation by the enemy. He observed

that there was a legitimate requirement for debriefing of released or

escaped prisoners to obtain intelligence, including identification of other

captives, and "to develop experience factors for evaluating the Code of

Conduct .... Though this process can be distorted by an unscrupulous

enemy for propaganda advantage, I can assure you that it is limited to

essential military purposes and is not an automatic inquisition designed

to harass the man and to ferret our bases for punitive action." Vance wrote

that in the few instances that had occurred so far the processing of returnees had been carefully followed by the secretary of the military department

concerned, that this monitoring would continue, and that officials could

be relied on to "bring to my attention any case in which proposed actions

of the processing authorities are of doubtful propriety." The deputy secretary closed with the further assurance that both Harriman's letter and his

response had been circulated to the services.?

Vance issued a memorandum on that same day, 25 July 1966. In it he

charged the departmental secretaries with maintaining "a continuing personal surveillance over the post-release processing of captured personnel,
156 THE LONG ROAD HOME

with emphasis on the necessity for avoiding any connotation that released

prisoners are automatically subjected to disciplinary action." He noted

that "interdepartmental coordination to assure reasonably uniform disposition of cases involving prisoners from among the four military services

is also an important objective."R

Several weeks earlier Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown had

invited McNamara's attention to Air Force Regulation 200-27 on "Debriefing of Returnees," dated 23 December 1965. Through its issuance, Brown

wrote, "we have provided detailed instructions within the Air Force to

insure that our intelligence needs would be met, while at the same time safeguarding the rights and reputations of our returning airmen." The central

statement in AFR 200-27 was the following:

Air Force policy is to show returnees every possible consideration and courtesy in reinstating them in their active Air

Force commitment. Captivity is nor a state of culpability, and

processing should not imply that it is .... It is important that

a returnee understand that the purpose of the debriefing is to

obtain positive foreign intelligence information and information

which may prove helpful to other personnel, and that his actions

are not being documented to determine his culpability. When all

possible information useful for intelligence, planning, and training has been obtained from a returnee, and he has been determined fit, he will be restored to full duty.

The debriefing was to be conducted solely by intelligence specialists. The

regulation appeared not to bar later investigations of possible misconduct

during captivity, but it showed a clear intent not to allow that type of interrogation to intrude on the principal debriefing.'!

Brown suggested that the policy and procedures adopted by the Air

Force "might well be worth recommending to the other Services, in the

interest of assuring comparable treatment of all returnees." OSD took no

such action, however, nor did it issue detailed instructions to further the

"coordination to assure reasonably uniform disposition of cases" that Vance

had spoken of in his memorandum of 25 July 1966. Probably the explanation

lay in the absence of immediate instances that might have called the Vance

instructions into play. During the entire year of 1966, only three prisoners

escaped and returned to U.S. control; not one was set free by the enemy.

The numbers increased in 1967, however, and the release of two Army

men by the Viet Cong in February may have been what stimulated the

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) to take action in

the following month.
Changing Attitudes Toward the Code of Conduct 157

In March Brig. Gen. William W. Berg, deputy assistant secretary for

military personnel policy, addressed a memorandum to the military departments. He foresaw that at some point it would become necessary to assess

the effectiveness of the Code of Conduct and its associated training in the

light of the experience of the Vietnam conflict and that "the problem

of assuring reasonably uniform disposition of any necessary cases of

disciplinary or administrative actions" could become a significant issue.

Accordingly, Berg called on each department to forward case summaries of

the experiences of any of its men who had escaped or had been released

from captivity in Southeast Asia and to specify whether disciplinary or

administrative action based on conduct while a prisoner had been taken or

was contemplated. He made this reporting a continuing requirement. Berg's

memorandum set no guidelines but did imply that some might later be

developed as the record of proposed disciplinary actions grew. IO

Actions ofthe DoD PWPolicy Committee

Several months later, on 26 July 1967, Deputy Secretary Nitze created

the DoD PW Policy Committee and also laid down the policy that prisoner

letters received from the families for intelligence analysis would be treated as

privileged correspondence, barred from use for investigative purposes. Nitze's

charge to the policy committee did not specifically mention the Code of

Conduct, but the subject could hardly be avoided when developing the

repatriation plan or considering how to react to Hanoi's broadcasts of prisoner statements and "confessions." 11

At an early stage the policy committee concluded-apparently by

common consent rather than by formal action-that no change in the Code

of Conduct should be considered while the Vietnam War continued. In a

typical expression of the prevailing view an Air Force official declared in

November 1967 that while the supporting training programs should be

reviewed continually in the light of the Vietnam experience, reevaluation of

the code itself would be premature. The Vietnam conflict provided the

first opportunity to test the code in practice, and no judgment should be

passed on the need for revision until the full record became available for

study. The Air Force stressed practical considerations as well, arguing that

to make changes at that time would be to create "a double standard ...

detrimental to the capability of current PWs to adhere to The Code in

accordance with their understanding."12
158 THE LONG ROAD HOME

The disposition to meet newly recognized problems by improving and

extending the training guidance became evident in the policy committee's

handling of a matter first taken up at its meeting on 15 September 1967. Increasingly the North Vietnamese authorities were staging sessions at which

selected journalists interviewed a few of the prisoners-also selectively

chosen, it must be presumed. Apart from the prohibition against making

any statement detrimental to the interests of the United States, the code contained nothing directly applicable to contacts with newsmen, and current

training programs offered no instruction on conduct as an interviewee.

The question before the policy committee was, "Should we discourage

contact between American PWs in Hanoi and the news media?"!)

The potential benefit of interviews in terms of acquiring new or more

detailed information about the health and identity of prisoners was obvious.

Any hope of further gain, however, such as exposure of a true picture of the

treatment the men were receiving, seemed to depend on the chance that

the enemy would occasionally misjudge the interview's impact, as in the

Stratton incident. In every other respect the advantage lay with the enemy

and his complete control of the situation, not to exclude the use of interrogators posing as newsmen and the doctoring of recorded statements.

Comments on the problem submitted by the services also took note of the

disabilities under which a prisoner-interviewee would labor. Long isolation,

for instance, could impair his ability to judge the possible propaganda value

of his answers. The services expressed concern about the damage to his future

career that an officer might suffer should he unwittingly serve the enemy's

purposes.1 4

The 000 PW Policy Committee reached the conclusion that "the Services should not encourage our servicemen to be interviewed if captured,"

but it also agreed that "the United States should not discourage U.S.

newsmen from seeking interviews with PWs in NVN or delivering letters

and packages." The somewhat contradictory nature of these two propositions

reflected the need to take account of existing State Department policy, which

was to encourage journalists to request meetings with prisoners. IS

At subsequent meetings the committee considered what instructions the

services should issue to make this policy known. All agreed on the need for

additional training "to alert servicemen to the dangers of seemingly innocent press interviews." Daniel Henkin, representing OASD (Public Affairs),

thought the guidance should not take the form of a flat prohibition of participation in interviews, since this would "burden the POW with an additional

area of risk in terms of the code of conduct."IG The Navy and Air Force

instructions barely skirted prohibition, however, by stressing avoidance
Changing Attitudes Toward the Code of Conduct 159

of interviews. The Air Force text expressed it rather bluntly: "The Code of

Conduct requires that every PW be responsible for his action while in PW

status. The PW may prevent future problems for himself by simply following the policy of not granting any type of interview with any member of

the news media."ll

The Army also called for reliance on the Code of Conduct, but it recognized that "a PW may not be able to avoid being interviewed in the sense

that the enemy can expose him to questions and camera." In this situation,

the Army said, "it is his behavior that counts and which he must contro!,"

guided by his pledge under the code to make no statement harmful to the

United States. ls

Like the other services, the Army added instruction on prisoner interviews to its regulation on education and training in the Code of Conduct.

The revised AR 350-30 issued on 8 July 1968 contained a new paragraph

on the need to "provide the soldier with the necessary knowledge to respond

appropriately to the many nonviolent ways in which an enemy may seek to

use him as a source of intelligence or as a propaganda asset." In accordance

with the JCS guidance of 1966, AR 350-30 now made explicit that the

code permitted the prisoner to write letters, subject to the usual cautions

about content. Further, "if forced to be presented to newsmen for interviews, his action must reflect the same guidelines used in letter writing."19

Other features of the revised AR 350-30 further indicated that increasing knowledge of the conditions of captivity in Southeast Asia was affecting

official attitudes toward the Code of Conduct and the training given in its

support. The 1964 version, now superseded, had largely repeated the text

of DoD Directive 1300.7, even enhancing its stern prescriptions by placing

"to the utmost of my ability" in italics. It also included the requirements for

instruction in the consequences of not holding to the "Big Four" answer,

emphasis on the principle that "further responses are made entirely on his

own responsibility," and advice to the soldier that "he may dogmatically refuse

to answer any question of an interrogator which goes beyond his name,

rank, and service number. "20 The revision of 1968 omitted all these passages,

though it retained the provision that if subjected to extremes of coercion,

the serviceman must make no statement damaging to his country's interests.

Influence ofthe Pueblo Incident

When the Army issued its revised regulation in mid-I968 the Pueblo

incident was moving the Code of Conduct to the forefront of public
160 THE LONG ROAD HOME

discussion. In January the U.S.S. Pueblo, a Navy intelligence collection

auxiliary ship operating in international waters in the Sea of Japan, had

been surrounded by North Korean patrol boats and boarded by an armed

party. One sailor was killed in the attack and several wounded. Before other

U.S. forces could intervene the Pueblo was conducted to a North Korean

port, and Cdr. Lloyd M. Bucher and the 81 members of his crew were

taken captive. 2 \

The seizure on the high seas was illegal. Even if the Pueblo, contrary

to its orders, had entered the claimed I2-mile territorial waters of North

Korea, seizure was not sanctioned by international law; in such circumstances the aggrieved nation was expected only to enforce a demand that the

intruder depart. President Johnson condemned North Korea's "wanton

and aggressive act," and the United States took the matter to the United

Nations Security Council and mounted a diplomatic offensive to obtain

release of the ship and crew. North Korea rejected UN jurisdiction and

charged that the Pueblo had been taken while pursuing its electronic

espionage mission in territorial waters-a "crime" for which it demanded

U.S. acknowledgment, apology, and pledge of nonrepetition. While official

discussion of the matter proceeded within the Korean Military Armistice

Commission at Panmunjom, the North Koreans, by the exercise of extreme

brutality and what seemed to Bucher and his men to be a credible threat of

death, extracted "confessions" that the spy ship had violated the coastal zone. 22

Already well publicized in the U.S. press, the Pueblo case received even

more attention and editorial comment because of the manner of its resolution. After months of refusing to accede to the demand that the United

States apologize for illegal actions it denied had taken place, the U.S. government settled on a formula for gaining the return of the men, though

not of the ship. The chief U.S. negotiator at Panmunjom signed a "solemn

apology" for having conducted espionage activities within North Korea's

territorial waters. Before doing so (and, curiously, with the prior knowledge

and acquiescence of the North Korean authorities), he issued a formal declaration that the statement was false and was being signed "to free the crew

and only to free the crew."* On 23 December 1968, after 11 months of

captivity, the 82 officers and men of the Pueblo, together with the body of

their shipmate, crossed the demarcation line in Korea to U.S. control. 23

* In memoirs published in 1993 Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., revealed how U.S. officials

devised this formula that met the opposing side's requirements. In tightly controlled North

Korea the government needed a U.S. confession and apology for broadcast to its own citizens as a triumphant conclusion consistent with the one-sided account they had received

of the affair. At the same time the government had the capability of shielding its people

from knowledge of the U.S. repudiation, which Washington was at liberty to broadcast to

the rest of the world. William J. Crowe, Jr., The Line o/Fire, 68.
Changing Attitudes Toward the Code of Conduct 161

Following the return of the crew to San Diego in time for Christmas

reunions with their families and the announcement that a Navy Court

of Inquiry would soon be convened, the press pointed out the contrast

between the action of the u.S. government and what was expected of its

servicemen in captivity. Under what Time called the "rigid superstoical

Code of Conduct promulgated by President Eisenhower," the servicemen

were expected to undergo torture and possible death rather than subscribe

to the kind of statement the U.S. representative had signed. The Code of

Conduct was "in trouble," u.s. News 6' World Report asserted, and other

commentators called for its reconsideration, to find "a formula more in

line with the psychological and military realities of the times." Assistant

Secretary of Defense (ISA) Paul Warnke, soon to leave office with the

change of administration, seemed to agree. In January 1969 a national

magazine quoted him as finding it "unthinkable that these men will be

court-martialed for signing a false statement. All the confession shows is

the bestiality of the treatment they received. The harm done to the national

interest is next to nil. "24

Meanwhile the Navy Court of Inquiry had begun its sessions. At an early

point the officer serving as the court's counsel took note that the Pueblo

crewmen had been illegal detainees rather than prisoners of war inasmuch

as no hostilities existed. Accordingly, he declared, the Code of Conduct did

not apply. Later in the proceedings he reversed this stand, acknowledging

that his first statement had been made without benefit of the opinion of

the Navy's judge advocate general. Under the counsel's revised interpretation

that the code applied in all circumstances, the inquiry reviewed the signing

of confessions by members of the crew and pressed for justification in

the light of each man's understanding of the Code of Conduct. However,

no findings drawn from this line of questioning appeared in the final action

of the court, which recommended that Commander Bucher be tried by

general court-martial on charges relating to the circumstances of the boarding and surrender of the ship and the incomplete destruction of its classified

gear and documents. Higher naval authorities concurred in the findings

but recommended reducing the proposed disciplinary action to a letter

of reprimand. In May 1969 Secretary of the Navy John H. Chaffee then

directed that all charges against Bucher and other officers be dropped,

declaring that "they have suffered enough." 21

In the public discussion of the Pueblo incident there had been frequent reference to its bearing on the judgment ultimately to be made on the

actions of the servicemen still captive in North and South Vietnam. In this

connection the conclusions of most lasting significance came from hearings conducted by a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee,
162 THE LONG ROAD HOME

headed by Rep. Otis G. Pike of New York. Convening on 4 March 1969,

the subcommittee undertook to inquire into the national security implications of the loss of the Pueblo and also to examine the possible need for

changes in the Code of Conducr. 26

Two naval officers addressed the latter point in extended testimony.

Vice Adm. Charles K. Duncan, chief of naval personnel, said that in light of

recent events the Navy had conducted a review that revealed no valid basis

for modification of the Code of Conduct. He submitted a brief written

statement of the Navy's position that characterized the code in a way that

departed notably from the commonly held understanding of its meaning

and intent:

The Code of Conduct represents a formal expression of

the standards of military conduct understood and accepted by

most countries for centuries. It serves as a guideline to be followed by all members of the armed forces, particularly when in

a captured or detained status.

It is a professional and inspirational rather than a penal

code. Failure to live up to the full extent of its obligations is not

a criminal offense. Adequate authority exists under the Uniform

Code of Military Justice for those malfeasances which can

properly be termed criminal acts. Should a servicemen engage in

actions punishable under the UCMJ he may be prosecuted under

that statute, but not under the Code of Conduct.

The final paragraph took up again the basis for the Navy's conclusion

that modification was undesirable:

It is recognized that inhuman treatment and the application

of psychological techniques have succeeded in individual cases

in forcing involuntary departures from the standards set forth

by the Code, and can be expected to do so in the future. Notwithstanding these past and possible future departures, it would be

unwise to officially advocate voluntary departures for any reason.

The individual must be expected to adhere to both the spirit and

the letter of the Code of Conduct to the full extent of his

physical, mental and moral resources. The wisdom of this view

of the Code of Conduct has been confirmed by former captives

in SEASIA who found it a source of strength in situations of

severe duress.

In the discussion that followed, Admiral Duncan even suggested that

"perhaps the word 'violating' should not be used in connection with
Changing Attitudes Toward the Code of Conduct 163

the Code of Conduct. 'Departure from,' or 'not living up to the fullest

extent' may be more applicable."27

In supporting testimony Rear Adm. Joseph B. McDevitt, the Navy's

judge advocate general, echoed Duncan's characterization of the Navy's

view of the code as a professional and inspirational rather than penal

document. That view, McDevitt said, derived from the recommendations

of the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War that had drafted

the code in 1955 and from pronouncements made after its promulgation

by Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles. The tone of these statements differed considerably from that used in more recent official

reaffirmations. In 1957 Quarles had advised the secretary of the Navy that

"it was never the intent of the Department of Defense that the Code of

Conduct, in and of itself, be used as a basis for punishment." The advisory

committee had believed that "consideration for the conditions of captivity"

should be a factor when weighing charged offenses. Thus it held out a

prospect of compassionate judgment that had later been all but extinguished by the rigorous interpretation placed on the Code of Conduct by

Secretary McNamara in early 1964. 28

The Pike subcommittee submitted a unanimous report to the Committee of Armed Services in July 1969, finding that the Code of Conduct

did require revisions and clarification. Certainly there was a need for clarification of the code's applicability in ambiguous situations such as the Pueblo

seizure, and the Pike subcommittee scored the confused handling this

matter had received before the Navy Court of Inquiry. Of more pertinence

to Vietnam, the subcommittee believed that where U.S. prisoners were not

accorded the protections of the Geneva Convention, "the code of conduct

should provide some latitude for the detainee." The members endorsed

the concept of the code as a suggested guide to conduct having no penal

sanctions; training in the military services, they said, should be designed

accordingly. But they did not agree with the Navy's testimony that consideration of modifying the code should be postponed until after repatriation

of the Vietnam prisoners of war. The subcommittee termed this "more a

policy of convenience than of necessity" and saw no reason why DoD

should not begin comprehensive studies immediately.29

While the subcommittee report had no binding effect, it stood as a clear

expression of the attitudes prevailing within one of the committees of the

Congress that would surely insist on exercising its prerogative to review

and issue judgments on all future DoD actions in this area. Taken together

with the comments that had appeared in the press, it provided forewarning of the climate of opinion Defense officials might encounter when
164 THE LONG ROAD HOME

it came time to receive and process the returnees from Vietnam. Whatever

the record ultimately showed regarding the men's faithfulness and fortitude in living up to the Code of Conduct, the validity of the code itself

would likely be under question as well.

A Pronounced Change a/View

In fact, there had already occurred within DoD a change of attitude

and emphasis regarding the code. The three-paragraph statement presented

by the Navy witnesses before the Pike subcommittee in April 1969 had

been presaged by an internal, classified Air Force communication two

months earlier indicating that the Air Force, independently and on the

advice of its judge advocate general, had officially adopted the same position.

The classified letter, dated 12 February 1969 and promulgated to all USAF

activities, constituted "a restatement of perspective and policy" regarding

the purpose and application of the Code of Conduct:

2. The standard of conduct prescribed by the Code is a formalization of the basic obligations of a member of the United States

Armed Forces to his country, his service and his comrades. These

obligations are traditional and would be effective irrespective of

the promulgation of a formal Code of Conduct ....

3. Uncertainty concerning the Code of Conduct results from a

tendency to judge PW behavior vis-a-vis the Code. Such judgments are inappropriate and moreover are irrelevant when

considering guidance on expected behavior. The Code of Conduct

is not nor was it ever intended as a means for judgment. It is not

a vehicle for enforcement. The several precepts of the Code are

phrased deliberately in the first person as a personal standard for

the individual .... There is, in fact, no arbitrary standard against

which behavior is judged. All of the circumstances of captivity are

considered on an individual basis. The individual who adheres to

the Code to the utmost of his ability can be assured that behavior

as a prisoner will be considered with justice and understanding.

Still, the letter continued, servicemen must not be misled into believing that "actions while a prisoner are not punishable at all. A prisoner

remains subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and other applicable directives."30

Even this Air Force pronouncement was not the earliest official expression of the new perspective on the Code of Conduct. OSD had written to
Changing Attitudes Toward the Code of Conduct 165

Senator J. William Fulbright on 10 February 1969, commenting on a proposal submitted by one of his constituents:

It should be pointed out that the Code of Conduct is in effect

a CREED which embodies those concepts of personal behavior

adhered to by members of our Armed Forces since the early days

of our Republic. There has been some misconception in the public

media that a violation of the high standards of the Code of Conduct, in and of itself, would subject a member of the Armed Forces

to court-martial. This is not true. It is true that certain conduct

by prisoners of war may constitute a violation of the Uniform

Code of Military Justice and therefore might subject a serviceman to court-martial proceedings. ' \

There was no dissent from this position III any quarter. By early June

the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the Army and Air Force individually

had endorsed the substance of the three-paragraph statement the Navy

had made before the Pike subcommittee. 12 Thus during the first half of

1969 the view that the code was an inspirational guide having no punitive sanctions had gained acceptance within 000. The emergence of this

view marked a major step in relaxing the dogmatism of the McNamara era.

While the change cannot be considered apart from the context of public

and congressional discussion of the Pueblo case, it seemed to result primarily

from the virtually unanimous professional advice of the service judge advocate generals. Legal officers had rarely wavered in the opinion that charges

could be brought only on the basis of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,

but, apparently overawed by statements of their superiors that treated the

Code of Conduct as a binding regulation, they had not begun to press the

point until late 1968.

The new way of speaking of the Code of Conduct narrowed the grounds

for controversy, and it also accorded well with an action taken by the 000

PW Policy Committee in early January 1969. The committee at last put

on formal record its longstanding conviction that no revision of the code

should be considered until after hostilities ended. Testimony of the Navy

witnesses during their congressional appearance had followed this line and

so did a plan developed within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense (M&RA). The latter outlined "a long-range phased review" of the

Code of Conduct. Phase 1 would not terminate until all of the men then

in captivity had been released and fully debriefed and the military departments had assembled the data on individual experiences. II Later, 000

made no move to advance this schedule when the Pike subcommittee called

for an immediate start on comprehensive studies.
166 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Common acceptance that the Code of Conduct was an inspirational

guide for the individual and not the basis for legal assessment of his

behavior in captivity had a further effect. By avoiding the varying

judgments that might arise from some of the admitted ambiguities of the

code it notably enhanced the prospect that a single standard of justice

would prevail.
9

Early Repatriation Planning

Planning for the repatriation of prisoners of war from Southeast

Asia began in early July 1967 when the Joint Staff took up the task

of defining the principles to be followed in the reception and processing

of the returnees. The staff initiated this action to assist the Joint Chiefs

in providing policy on a subject with important bearing on command

responsibilities and future military operations. The end product was intended to be a directive, approved by the secretary of defense, that would

guide the detailed repatriation planning of the military services and the

unified commands. \

The Basic Directive 0/8 June 1968

Within a few weeks the DoD Policy Committee was established, with

centralized supervision of repatriation planning as one of its functions.

The committee accepted without question the prerogative of the JCS to

originate action in this subject area and put off consideration of repatriation while awaiting the paper being prepared in the Joint Staff. It showed

little concern over slippage of the predicted completion date, since no end

to the war was in sight; neither was there any immediate prospect of negotiations that might lead to a large-scale exchange of prisoners. In the last

quarter of 1967 repatriation planning seemed less pressing than such other

activities as devising actions to discredit Hanoi's propaganda exploitation

of the prisoners and coordinating the Christmas package mailings for

that year. 2

By the time the Joint Chiefs completed their deliberations, however,

the enemy's Tet offensive of February 1968 had occurred, profoundly

affecting the U.S. perspective on the war and setting important changes

in motion. The Joint Chiefs submitted their recommended policy on

167
168 THE LONG ROAD HOME

repatriation processing to the secretary of defense on 30 March 1968. On

the following day President Johnson declared that he would not be a

candidate for reelection and at the same time announced his decision to

halt all air and naval bombardment of North Vietnam except in the

vicinity of the DMZ. Inviting the leaders in Hanoi to join in a "series of

mutual moves toward peace," he renewed the U.S. proposal for negotiations. This time the president's initiative met with a prompt and mainly

favorable response from the enemy. In further exchanges between Washington and Hanoi the latter sometimes reverted to the harsh and accusatory

language of the past, but the chief issue now under contention was choice

of a site for the prospective peace talks. At length the two sides agreed on

Paris as the scene for negotiations, to begin in May.3

Early in this course of events the 000 PW Policy Committee had taken

up the review and revision of the repatriation policy drafted by the ]CS.

It accepted most of the paper's fundamental elements, including the roles

the ]CS had conceived for the services, the unified commands, DIA, and

other components of the Department of Defense. The commander of the

unified command in whose area the prisoners were released would exercise

initial conttol over the returnees until the parent service assumed responsibility for individual processing. Placed under medical auspices from the

first, the men would undergo intelligence debriefing and evacuation to service hospitals, normally in the continental United States, when medically

feasible. Throughout these procedures the welfare and morale of returned

personnel would be of prime importance, with careful attention given to

their personal, psychological, and spiritual needs. 4

In rewriting the ]CS paper the policy committee clarified or expanded

on a number of points, often as the result of considerations raised by OSD

General Counsel. For example, with reference to the statement in the ]CS

text that returned prisoners of war "enjoy certain legal rights and privileges

which must be recognized at every stage of the processing," the General

Counsel's representative thought specific instances of these rights might

well be cited, most notably the right to avoid self-incrimination. 5

The ]CS draft also contained a matter-of-fact statement that "any

evidence of misconduct on the part of a returned US prisoner of war ...

will be referred to the Service of the suspected or accused person." Assistant

Secretary of Defense (M&RA) Alfred B. Fitt reminded his committee colleagues of the directive issued by Cyrus Vance in 1966, which had stressed

avoidance of any implication that returned prisoners were automatically

subjected to disciplinary action. He cautioned that the application given

the draft provision "should be in consonance with, and not go beyond

the intent of," the Vance memorandum."
Early Repatriation Planning 169

Besides attempting to clarify these and other points, the policy committee made two significant changes: it gave unmistakable ptimacy to the

goal of uniformity, and it provided an overall coordinating authority

that might ensure effective implementation. The JCS had cited a need fot

"uniform procedures" and "uniformity in the processing," but the policy committee substituted a phtase with broader connotations-"uniformity of

treatment"-and gave it a more prominent position in the text. Also, by

rephrasing the opening sentence the committee made "facilitating uniformity" the keynote of the paper.

The policy committee wrote language into the directive that guaranteed

a continuing role for the committee and particularly its chairman, the

assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. Its original

charter had given no clear indication that the committee was to be involved

in the ultimate implementation of the repatriation plan. The new provision

established that while each service would process its own members, central

supervision of the whole exercise would come from the OSD level.?

In sending the revised "Policy for Processing of Returned U.S. Prisoners

of War and Other Detained Military Personnel" to the secretary of defense

the committee unanimously recommended approval. 8 Deputy Secretary

Paul H. Nitze issued it on 8 June 1968 as a memorandum directive to the

secretaries of the military departments and the chairman, Joint Chiefs of

Staff. The full text follows:

In the interest of facilitating uniformity, U.S. prisoners of war

and other military personnel detained against their will by a

foreign power will be processed upon their return to U.S. control

in accordance with the precepts prescribed herein.

The commander of the unified command in the area in which

personnel of these two categories are returned will exercise initial

control pending delivery of such personnel to their parent Services.

The respective Services have the inherent responsibility for processing their returned Prisoners of War and other detained military

personnel and will assume control of these individuals as soon as

feasible. Each Service will process its own members. Maximum

cooperation and mutual exchange of information by rhe Services

with each other and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff is expected. All

efforts will be directed toward the goal of assuring uniformity of

treatment of returned personnel. The Chairman of the DOD PW

Policy Committee will exercise over-all supervision within DOD

and will ensure timely and proper coordination among those

DOD components concerned. He will also act as the point of

contact for DOD with the Department of State.
170 THE LONG ROAD HOME

All returned personnel will be placed under medical auspices as

soon as possible and evacuated to an appropriate facility, normally

in CONUS, when medically and operationally feasible. Medical

evacuation channels will normally be utilized for this purpose and

suitable escorts will be provided to accompany such movements.

Intelligence/counterintelligence debriefing is essential and will be

conducted concurrently with medical treatment and evacuation

whenever possible. Medical personnel will provide optimum btiefing conditions consistent with treatment. The Director, Defense

Intelligence Agency, will provide technical direction and coordination of the Services' debriefing programs.

Factual information will be made available to the public through

the news media subject to approptiate consideration of (l) security tequirements, (2) the welfare of the returned personnel and

their families and (3) the safety and interests of other personnel

who may still be detained. After medical evaluation of returned

personnel, initial intelligence/counterintelligence debriefing,

public affairs counseling and legal counseling have been completed, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) will, in

accordance with existing directives, authorize individual returnees

who desire to do so to grant interviews to representatives of the

news media.

The welfare and morale of returned personnel shall be of prime

importance. All reasonable efforts will be made at all stages to

provide for their personal, psychological and spiritual needs.

Full cooperation will be extended to the International Committee

of the Red Cross if representatives of this organization desire to

observe initial processing of returned personnel. Likewise, cooperation will be accorded to the American Red Cross to the end that

assistance may be made available to the returnees or their families.

Returnees will be accorded all of the legal rights and privileges to

which they are entitled as military personnel at every stage of

processing, including intelligence debriefings. In view of the

physical and/or psychological pressures to which they may have

been subject, particular care must be taken to ensure that their

rights and privileges are in no way compromised or diluted.

Inter-service cooperation should be pursued to ensure uniform

interpretation of laws and regulations governing the conduct of

returnees. In the event there is evidence of misconduct on the parr

of a returnee it will be referred to the Service concerned, and any

cases of suspected misconduct will be disposed of in accordance

with normal practices.')
Early Repatriation Planning 171

The last paragraph contained a less explicit delineation of rights and

privileges than might have been expected from the preliminary comments

within the policy committee. Its wording was appropriate to a statement confined to general precepts, however, and the phrase, "including intelligence

debriefings," did call attention to the area in which safeguards against

abuse of returnee rights had their most important application. The memorandum made no direct reference to the Vance principle, but perhaps the

phrase "in accordance with normal practices" and the provision for interservice coordination to achieve uniform interpretation were meant to cover

it. Surprisingly, one aptly turned sentence in the JCS draft had not been

retained; it read, "Captivity is not a state of culpability and returned US

prisoners ... will be treated accordingly."lo

The policy committee had also withheld one section of the JCS draft

for separate consideration. Out of concern for the personal and psychological needs of the returnees, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had included a paragraph authorizing the services to offer military transportation and travel

expenses to the next of kin to permit visits to the men in the hospitals to

which they would be evacuated. After a committee member objected that

no law authorized expenditure of appropriated funds for this putpose, the

question was referred to the general counsel's office in the hope that proposed legislation might be drafted that would receive prompt approval in

the Congress. I I In early June, however, Assistant General Counsel Frank A.

Bartimo recommended that no submission be made during the current

session. He believed that proposals for extension of the travel privilege to

the families of other, non-PW, wounded or seriously ill patients in service

hospitals would undoubtedly arise to complicate and lengthen the consideration of the bill. Bartimo's draft legislation sought to provide for these

cases in addition to returned prisoners of war, but the resulting larger and

more open-ended commitment presented "significant problems." Bartimo concluded that "the legislation would have very little chance of passage," but

his further advice to Secretary Warnke pointed the way to resolution of the

matter on a less formal basis: "As you know, the Services have been able to

provide visits by next of kin to returned POW's in spite of the absence of

legal authority therefor." 12

When allowed for the benefit of PW families, some additional latitude

in the use of service transportation facilities was not likely to be questioned

on the Hill. Since the issue of utilization of appropriated funds had arisen

from the provision for per diem expense money in the original proposal,

the policy committee dropped that feature and devised a draft instruction

that represented only a modest extension of customary practice, one that

seemed suitable for issuance under the existing authority of the secretary

of defense. Nitze signed it on 30 November 1968 as an addendum to his
172 THE LONG ROAD HOME

basic directive of 8 June on repatriation process109. The operative paragraph read as follows:

Service Secretaries will normally authorize either reimbursement

for commercial or private transportation or use of appropriate

military transportation for appropriate persons living beyond

commuting distance to make one round trip to visit returned

prisoners of war and other detained US personnel hospitalized

in the United States, its territories or possessions. Such authority

shall, with certain exceptions to best serve the interests of the returnee and the Service, be limited to returnees' children and two

other persons.1.1

Further Refinement: The Directive of18January 1969

Meanwhile, the policy committee had been receiving progress reports

on repatriation planning by the military departments. In this connection,

the committee readily agreed to a clarifying interpretation advanced by

the Navy in August 1968: Each service's responsibility for processing its

own returned prisoners of war included civilian employees as well as military personnel. 14

By November the emergence of questions of greater consequence turned

the committee's attention to the progress of repatriation planning in the

field and led to another supplementary directive issued by the deputy secretary of defense. A pair of queries by Vice Adm. Charles Duncan framed

the discussion:

a. Where and when can the parent Service expect to receive

control of returned PWs from the Unified Commander or anyone else?

b. Recognizing that in the interest of the returnee's welfare,

his personal and psychological needs shall be considered in determining when and how he is evacuated to CONUS, should there

be a fixed minimum overseas processing period, such as seven

days, established for uniformity of treatment if large groups of

PWs are repatriated at the same time?

Discussion at two successive meetings produced no consensus and pointed

up the need for fuller information on how these matters were being treated

in the operational planning of the Pacific Command.))

At the behest of the policy committee the Joint Chiefs of Staff called

on CINCPAC for a report. The detailed response of Admiral John S.
Early Repatriation Planning 173

McCain, Jr.,1 on 4 January 1969 indicated that much thought had

already been given the subject by his headquarters and in subordinate

echelons. The planning assumed the release of a substantial number of

prisoners of war within mainland Southeast Asia, probably in Vietnam

in the vicinity of the DMZ. Accordingly, the subordinate unified commander in the area, COMUSMACV, would accept initial custody of the

returnees and remain responsible for them until they left Vietnam.

Thereafter, CINCPAC would continue to exercise overall control until the

returnees were evacuated from his Pacific Command area. Within this

scheme of overall responsibility, however, the plan contemplated the

handling of individuals on the basis of their service affiliation almost from

the beginning. The planners had indeed taken literally the provision that

each military service would assume control of its own returnees "as soon

as feasible."16

McCain's message stated that at the release point the men would be

met by a team from MACV Headquarters, which would escort them toward

the waiting helicopters and, "using the least possible amount oftime," identify

and segregate the returnees by service and determine those who needed

immediate medical treatment or quarantining during travel. The returnees

would then board the helicopters (separated by service where practicable)

and proceed to the staging point. There they would be transferred to

medevac aircraft, and separation into Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine

Corps groups would become complete, with the service elements of

COMUSMACV's command-U.S. Army, Vietnam; U.S. Naval Forces,

Vietnam; 7th Air Force; and III Marine Amphibious Force-assuming

custody of their own people. The medevac flights would depart for the

separate processing points chosen by the services: Long Binh, Da Nang,

Cam Ranh Bay, and, for the Navy, one or more hospital ships.

Instructions for the processing that would follow had been prepared,

at least in draft, by CINCPAC's component commands: U.S. Army,

Pacific; the Pacific Fleet; Pacific Air Forces; and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

The plans showed a common pattern of medical evaluation and treatment, with concurrent intelligence debriefing depending on the returnee's

health. Both processes would continue as necessary and feasible during the

aeromedical evacuation to the continental United States. The Army scheduled evacuation from Vietnam to occur within 72 hours after assuming

custody of its returnees, with any extension requiring the approval of

CINCUSARPAC. The Marine Corps plan also stipulated 72 hours as the

objective; processing time beyond five days had to be approved in Washington by the commandant, U.S. Marine Corps. The Air Force set no limit

but used phraseology implying that considerably less than 72 hours would

be spent on processing in Vietnam.
174 THE LONG ROAD HOME

The plan produced in Pacific Fleet Headquarters differed from the

others owing to the Navy's intention of performing all processing aboard

a hospital ship while steaming to an intermediate point in the Pacific

Command, such as Guam or Subic Bay in the Philippines. The Navy

thought as much as 7 to 10 days should be allotted to restorative medical

and nutritional treatment and debriefing and counseling procedures, to

ensure that returnees were "ready for evacuation, family reunion, and

exposure to press and public." It attached particular importance to psychological adjustment during this period. Air evacuation would be deferred

until returnees reached Guam or Subic Bay.

The plans of all CINCPAC components provided for protection of

the legal rights of returnees, but with variations in the procedures that

could affect the atmosphere in which the intelligence debriefings were

conducted. At the beginning of the debriefing the Army intended to

advise each man of his rights under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of

Military Justice, that is, the right to remain silent to avoid self-incrimination,

together with the warning that statements given might be used as evidence in a trial by court-martial, plus the associated right to obtain

legal counsel before proceeding. The other services would resort to this

notification only if the need became apparent-whenever a response

under questioning "leads the debriefer to reasonably believe that the

individual committed an offense," as the Navy phrased it, or "on the first

occasion when suspicion from any source indicates the possibility of an

offense," in the Air Force version.

Admiral McCain asked Washington for guidance, "in the interest of

greater uniformity," regarding 1) minimum and maximum processing times

following delivery of the returnees by MACV to their service components,

and 2) procedural criteria with respect to the individual returnee's legal

rights. He expected to issue additional instructions to subordinates on

"receipt of such guidance and to deal at the same time with other concerns,

such as the need for "an on-call reaction force in case of enemy perfidy."!?

Impressed with the need for further guidance to insure the requisite

degree of uniformity, the policy committee took up the matter at once.

A discussion on 9 January 1969 revealed continuing differences among the

service representatives on the processing duration question, however, which

Warnke concluded were unlikely to be quickly resolved. He therefore undertook to prepare a set of recommendations himself, drawing on the views

expressed during the meeting, and to circulate his draft to the committee's

principals before submission to Deputy Secretary Nitze. Choice of this

abbreviated procedure probably reflected a desire to see the action completed before the end of the Johnson administration rather than have the

reply to CINCPAC delayed until new appointees took their place on the
Early Repatriation Planning 175

committee and became familiar with the problem. Also, settling the matter

would add to the credit that Warnke and his colleagues might justly claim

for having passed on a well-considered repatriation plan to their successors. 18

Warnke recommended setting a minimum processing time of 36 hours

before evacuation, with 72 hours as the normal maximum. While his minimum figure did strike a compromise among the several times advanced by

the services and DIA, it owed more to Warnke's own assessment of the

time the initial medical and intelligence processing of a large group of

men might reasonably require. In his advice to the deputy secretary Warnke

stressed to Nitze the desirability of establishing an obligatory minimum stay

at the processing point in Vietnam before any ex-prisoner was evacuated.

Besides ensuring uniformity of treatment of the returnees, it would "dissipate any pressure toward a processing race among the Services to get the

men home."19

Nitze signed the recommended memorandum on 18 January 1969,

issuing it as a further supplement to the directive of 8 June 1968. Again,

the full text deserves attention:

This guidance is premised on the assumptions that it will apply

to the repatriation or return of a relatively large group of US

PW/Detainees who are returned on the SEA land mass and that

COMUSMACV would be the subordinate unified command.

Repatriation planning by the Services should be consistent with

this guidance.

1. With proper regard for the returnees' needs immediately following their initial release and return to the Unified Commander's

control, they will be evacuated regardless of Service affiliation

from this release point by the most expeditious mode of transport

consistent with medical considerations to a single central

processing location in Vietnam or elsewhere in WESTPAC if

circumstances require.

2. The returnees' immediate needs and the requirements of the

Services will be fulfilled. Time required to accomplish this phase,

with proper regard for the health and welfare of the men, security

and other administrative matters, should involve a minimum of

36 hours at the central processing location, but not more than

72 hours unless exceptional circumstances require variance from

these norms.

3. All returnees will return by aeromedical evacuation to CONUS

accompanied by appropriate parent Service escorts.
176 THE LONG ROAD HOME

4. Upon arrival in CONUS the returnees, under the control of their

parent Service, will proceed to their designated Service hospitals

closest to their families in the absence of other clearly overriding

considerations.

5. Debriefing tasks will be accomplished consistent with the significance and perishability of the information. The nature ofthe intelligence gain will determine the priority and kind of action necessary.

6. Intelligence debriefings shall be conducted so as to afford

full protection to the rights of the individuals. To provide the proper

environment for the return of these men and to maximize the

intelligence obtained, a returnee will be given the warning specified in Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and

advised of his right to counsel only when the individual has been

charged with having committed an offense punishable under the

Uniform Code of Military Justice, or when previously acquired

reliable information clearly indicates that he has committed such

an offense, or when his responses lead the debriefer reasonably to

believe that he has committed such an offense and that an investigation of his conduct should be made. 20

The first of the numbered paragraphs had the most immediate impact

on the planning by the Pacific Command. The decision to use a single

central processing site and to transport the returnees there without regard

to service affiliation greatly simplified the undertaking and gave assurance

of efficiency and uniformity. The same provision for central processing,

leading in a relatively brief time to aeromedical evacuation, also quietly

overrode the Navy's original intention of utilizing hospital ships. In addition, the guidance for the first time stated explicitly that the service hospital

closest to the man's family would normally be his assigned destination.

Nitze's directive, issued two days before the new president's inauguration, marked the culmination of repatriation planning by the Johnson

administration. The work was far from finished, as attested by the four

years of detailed planning that followed, but the subsequent planning and

actions underscored repeatedly the enduring and comprehensive nature of

the decisions made in the period through 20 January 1969. Without discounting either the importance or the resourcefulness of the subsequent

effort, all the further work may be viewed as serving only to fulfill and

extend a plan whose basic precepts had been defined in the preceding

years. The homecoming plan ultimately implemented in February 1973

clearly derived from-and, indeed, cited as basic references-the two Nitze

directives of 8 June 1968 and 18 January 1969, which in turn were a

product of the effective collaborative efforts of the 000 PW Policy Committee during the period of Paul Warnke's chairmanship.
10

Emergence of the PW/MIA

Task Group/Task Force

W hen Richard M. Nixon became president on 20 January 1969 his

choice of Representative Melvin R. Laird to serve as secretary of

defense had far-reaching consequences for DoD's conduct of PW affairs.

It was not merely that Laird, as an experienced politician, readily comprehended the political dimensions of the PW issue, both foreign and domestic;

he joined this with an intense personal interest in the fate of the captives,

which gave an untiring fervor to his actions. Very soon after taking office

he made known his intention to give the PW problem a higher priority

among the secretary's concerns than he believed it had received in the past.

Throughout his four-year tenure Laird provided constant support to his

subordinates working on PW matters. He also kept an unrelenting pressure

on them to do everything possible, consistent with national policy, to help

the prisoners of war and their families and to win the eventual release of

the captives. He himself fought the top-level battles with the State Department, pushed his policies at the White House, and asserted, successfully, the

primacy of the Department of Defense in the field of PW affairs.

New Leadership fOr the PWPolicy Committee

At the time of the Nixon inauguration the DoD PW Policy Committee had an 18-month history of activity behind it. The committee readily

weathered the change of administration, even though the assistant secretary's post in ISA remained vacant until March. The outgoing chairman,

Paul Warnke, had presided for the last time at the policy committee meeting on 9 January 1969 and shortly afterward submitted a final report of

177
178 THE LONG ROAD HOME

his stewardship of PW affairs. Ralph Earle II, principal deputy assistant

secretary (lSA) , took over as interim chairman, and Charles W Havens III

continued to serve as the ISA official concerned with coordination and

agenda preparation.!

The policy committee held its regular monthly meetings in February

and March, with some new attendees. One notable change involved Daniel

Henkin, who as deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs

had represented that office from the policy committee's beginning. Henkin

became assistant secretary of defense (PA) in the new administration, and

his deputy, Richard G. Capen, Jr., appeared as the Public Affairs representative at the February meeting. Among the actions demonstrating the

policy committee's vitality during this period was revival of the Public

Affairs Working Group, with Capen as its chairman. 2

Dr. G. Warren Nutter, a professor of economics at the University of

Virginia and specialist on the Soviet-bloc economy, became the assistant

secretary of defense for international security affairs on 4 March 1969 and

succeeded to the chairmanship of the 000 PW Policy Committee at the end

of April. When briefing Nutter for his duties Havens stressed the importance

of the chairman's position as "top Department of Defense policy coordinator on PW matters," both in the overall effort of the U.S. government,

including the Paris negotiations, and in more immediate fulfillment of

Secretary Laird's insistence that PW affairs receive priority attention. He

made a particular point of the fact that, with Harriman's departure, the

comparable authority and responsibility within the State Department had

been elevated to the level of the under secretary, a position held by Elliot L.

Richardson. Havens also recommended that the policy committee make

greater use of working groups and that ISA increase its staff devoted to

the PW function. The proposed staff enlargement consisted of two clerical

personnel and a second officer to join Capt. John W. Thornton, USN,

already assigned. Advised that "the Air Force is anxious to fill this second

position," Nutter approved, and the assignment went to Col. Robert E. Work,

who had gained extensive experience in both intelligence and Code of

Conduct aspects of the PW problem within the Air Force.'

Nutter also approved the increased use of working groups, at his first

policy committee meeting on 23 May. Besides the Public Affairs Working

Group, already functioning, two more were established at that meeting and

others on later occasions. Since much of the work was subsequently accomplished by these groups and by the enlarged staff, monthly meetings of the

full committee were no longer required. After May 1969 it met much less

frequently, at the call of the chairman. These developments reflected Nutter's

preference for working through his staff rather than holding meetings or
Emergence of the PW/MIA Task Group/Task Force 179

dealing personally with other agencies. To facilitate the conduct of business

in the absence of formal meetings, he asked each agency represented on

the committee to name a single point of contact for coordinating all

matters affecting prisoners of war. 4 Thus the PW function in ISA developed over the next two years into more a staff than a committee activity.

The final step came with the establishment, in February 1971, of the

Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Task Group and its action-level staff,

the PW/MIA Task Force.

It seems probable that the PW problem was not among the interests

that had led Nutter to accept the post of assistant secretary and that he felt

his knowledge and experience better equipped him to make a significant

contribution in other areas of important concern to ISA. He tended to rely

on his assistants to take the lead on the PW program-first Havens and

then his successor, in January 1970, Ralph H. Jefferson, in addition to

the deputy assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs, Dennis J.

Doolin. Nutter retained responsibility for "the fundamental direction of

the POW effort," as he acknowledged in a memorandum for Laird late in

1969, but he was not so jealous of this prerogative as to show bureaucratic resentment of the increasing prominence of Richard Capen as the

originator of ideas for new initiatives. Capen often served as a direct adviser

to Secretary Laird while deputy assistant secretary of defense (PA) and, after

January 1970, as assistant to the secretary of defense for legislative affairs.

The announcement of his appointment to the latter post stated that

"Mr. Capen will continue to serve as a member of the Department of

Defense Prisoner of War Policy Committee."5

The PWIMIA Task Group and Task Force

The DoD organization for dealing with the PW/MIA issue underwent refinements that reflected Nutter's organizational style, but the changes

reflected, too, the increasing magnitude of the problem. By February 1971

the number of men listed as missing had risen to over a thousand; the

number thought or known to be captured, to 462. Although these figures did

not seem high in terms of the total forces committed in Vietnam, or by

comparison with the experience of World War II and the Korean War, the

extent and variety of the problems associated with the mounting casualties

were sufficient to strain the capacities of the small PW staff group in ISA.

The result was a rising pressure for reconsideration of the manning and

structure for handling PW affairs.
180 THE LONG ROAD HOME

More broadly, changes in organization responded also to political

forces and public opinion, including a fundamental reevaluation of public

affairs strategy. In the spring of 1969, largely at Laird's instigation, the

Nixon administration decided to "go public" on the PW question, to use an

aroused U.S. and world opinion in a campaign to pressure the North Vietnamese government into greater compliance with its pledges under the

Geneva Convention. While some successes ultimately came from this policy,

it loosed forces that often could not be directed or controlled as its originators might have wished. The press, the Congress, and the public turned

more searching eyes not only on Hanoi but also on Washington. Demands

that the administration "do more" became common, and the families of

the missing and captured, whose suffering was often described in the government's press releases, became less content to rely unquestioningly on that

same government's assurances that everything possible was being done.

One of the strongest voices calling for a more discernible effort was that

of Mrs. James B. Stockdale, wife of a Navy pilot imprisoned in North Vietnam since 9 September 1965. In 1966, on the West Coast, Sybil Stockdale

had begun to organize the wives and families of prisoners of war with the

object of securing humane treatment of the prisoners, stimulating world

concern, improving dissemination of information, and, of course, gaining

the earliest possible release of the captives. With informal encouragement

from U.S. government sources after the decision to "go public," her National

League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia

grew and became more tightly organized as time went on. In a letter to

President Nixon on 12 December 1969, Mrs. Stockdale urged the formation of a federal task force with the mission of "helping our men as soon as

possible." She visualized this as a group of governmen t officials and private

citizens to focus efforts on behalf of the prisoners and to insure coordination of PW considerations with the program for withdrawal of U.S. forces

from Vietnam. 6

When forwarding her letter to 000 for comment, Special Assistant

to the President Alexander P. Butterfield asked that "some considerable

thought ... be given to this or similar proposals in light of the President's

recent directive that we move ahead on a more massive scale to seek

humane treatment, and hopefully an early release, of our POWs." With this

endorsement the proposal received rather more attention than is normally

accorded to unsolicited suggestions from the public. Although the draft

reply prepared in ISA in large part merely recapitulated the establishment

of the 000 PW Policy Committee and the State Department organization

for PW matters, citing a task force "capability in being," it also indicated
Emergence of the PW/MIA Task Group/Task Force 181

that Mrs. Stockdale's suggestion was being studied and that she might

receive further correspondence.?

No further correspondence appears in the record until 27 July 1970,

when Mrs. Stockdale, whose organization had recently incorporated and

opened a national headquarters in Washington, wrote to Laird urging the

establishment of a special assistant to the secretary of defense for PW/MIA

to coordinate all PW matters within the department. She understood that

some changes might result from the forthcoming report of the Blue Ribbon

Defense Panel on 000 organization (appointed by President Nixon and

Secretary Laird) and thought this would offer a favorable occasion for adoption of her proposal. 8

Nutter took this opportunity to try to relieve ISA of the responsibility

for PW affairs. He informed Secretary Laird in early August that he saw

merit in Mrs. Stockdale's proposal "or any related one that would relocate

the function within DOD." He considered that "the primary emphasis of

our effort will have to be in the arena of public affairs" and that whoever

was chosen to head that effort should be a "hard charger" who understood

public affairs and held a position of substantial authority in the department. Nutter believed ISA was ill-suited to recruit such a person, to supervise his public affairs efforts, or to coordinate similar activities throughout

the executive branch. He recommended that Laird seriously consider transferring responsibility for PW affairs, including the chairmanship of the

policy committee, to a special assistant directly under the secretary, or to the

assistant secretary of defense for public affairs or the assistant to the secretary of defense for legislative affairs. Nutter undertook to discuss the matter

with the heads of those offices, Henkin and Capen, and to make specific

recommendations later.')

On 8 August 1970 Nutter informed Mrs. Stockdale that her proposal

was "now under active consideration." Taking up her reference to the Blue

Ribbon Defense Panel, he noted that the study group had made no recommendation regarding PW affairs, and it had criticized the number and

diversity of activities already reporting directly to the secretary of defense.

She would be advised, he concluded, when a decision on her recommendation had been reached. III

In the last week of September Laird received another letter from Mrs.

Stockdale. Reflecting the growing size and confidence of her organization,

its tone was hardly that of supplication. "We have had no reply," she wrote,

"to our letter" of 27 July. "We would hope that you would give this matter

some additional thought and that we might hear from you prior to our

annual meeting here during the period October 2-5 at which time we will,

no doubt, have to report to our membership concerning this problem." II
182 THE LONG ROAD HOME

It appears that no reply was dispatched immediately, possibly because

Capen was scheduled to speak at the convention or because Nutter hoped

his discussions with Henkin and Capen would soon resolve the organizational question. Nutter did write to Mrs. Stockdale on 27 October, enclosing

a copy of his letter of 8 August. He assumed it had somehow failed to be

delivered, but it is more likely that Mrs. Stockdale had not regarded it as

a substantive reply. The idea of a central office, he said, was still under

consideration, but a number of factors militated against its acceptance.

She would be kept informed of further developments. 12

Nothing definitive occurred during the next three months except that

the workload facing the small administrative staff increased and threatened

to burgeon beyond control. When Roger E. Shields reported to ISA on

11 January 1971 as Jefferson's successor in the post of assistant to the

assistant secretary of defense he found a backlog of more than 100 letters

awaiting answer. Most came from family members and other citizens, but

a number were congressional inquiries on which the suspense date for

reply, normally treated as sacrosanct in Defense offices, had been "slipped"

for some time. A larger, more effective staff organization was imperative;

only the form it would take was in question, and Nutter had begun to

examine instances in which task forces had dealt successfully with specialized areas of Defense or government-wide concern. 13

Perhaps providing the final impetus toward a decision, on 30 January

1971 Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor filed a strong complaint with

the secretary of defense that the Army did not share equally with the other

services in the management of PW affairs at the OSD level, and he recommended that Army officer positions be added in ISA and Public Affairs. In

this connection Resor voiced the Army's concern that DoD releases seemed

always to focus on conditions of captivity in North Vietnam to the virtual

exclusion of comment on the plight of the men missing as the result of

ground actions in the South and elsewhere. This aspect of the government's

publicity, he said, had led to complaints from next of kin that Army men

were forgotten. 14

Two days later Secretary Laird received an ISA paper outlining the

scheme that Nutter now favored. Contrary to his position of the previous

year, Nutter now agreed that ISA should retain responsibility for overseeing

PW matters in Defense. The paper explained that lack of adequate formal

staff assistance made it difficult to accomplish the comprehensive planning and integrated action the DoD PW Policy Committee needed if it

was to act as the central body for development of policy. The fact that the

"situation concerning PW/MIAs and their families is becoming increasingly
Emergence of the PW/MIA Task Group/Task Force 183

complex and sensitive" underscored the need for improved performance.

The paper concluded that "a more viable DOD program can be obtained

by establishing an organizational structure under a task group concept with

an ISA task force responsible for administering the functions, activities and

programs of this task group."15

With some of the further details worked out, Laird announced the

reorganization on 13 February 1971. Couched in language chosen as much

for its effect on the public as for accomplishment of the stated purpose,

his directive ran as follows:

The extended duration of the conflict in Southeast Asia and the

enemy's refusal to comply with reasonable standards of treatment

of our men who are missing or captured and their families have

created a situation of increasing concern to the United States. Also,

worldwide interest has been aroused in the plight of these men

and their families.

I continue to attach the highest resolve to a satisfactory and an

early solution to the problem of our missing and captured men.

Our goal remains the release of all prisoners of war in Southeast

Asia and the complete and official accounting for all those missing in action, or who have died in captivity ....

We have achieved a gteat deal since we initiated public discussion

of the PW question in May 1969, but an extra effort is required.

To prepare for that extra effort, I want to strengthen staff assistance and guidance available in the Department.

I believe that we can benefit from our experience in organizing

similar efforts in other areas such as Vietnamization. In those

cases, the formation of Task Groups and augmented staffs as

Task Forces has proven to be most successful.

Therefore, I consider it useful to create a similar organizational

structure. To this end, I would like to have a Prisoner of War!

Missing in Action Task Group and Task Force formed under the

Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).

The DOD PW Policy Committee will continue to assist the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) in providing direction and broad

policy determinations for Task Group activities.
184 THE LONG ROAD HOME

The primary function of the Task Group will be to provide close

and continuing coordination of all activities in DOD in the

PW/MIA area. In accord with policy guidance, it will ensure that

responsible offices and agencies work together in planning, programming, assessing, and carrying out all required actions.

The Task Force will serve as staff to the Task Group and to the

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) in fulfillment of their

respective responsibilities. The Assistant Secretary of Defense

(ISA) will determine manpower and office space needs to staff

this Task Force adequately ....

Laird concluded with a request that all addressees "assign appropriate representatives ro the DOD PW Policy Committee and the Prisoner of Warl

Missing in Action Task Group, in accordance with guidelines established

by and upon request of the ASD(lSA)."I(,

While authorization of the Task Group/Task Force was the main object

of the directive, it also marked a renewal of the 000 PW Policy Committee, though with no change in its composition. The committee's formal

membership consisted of the officials originally appointed in 1967* plus

the assistant to the secretary of defense for legislative affairs, added in

January 1970. In the weeks following the Laird directive these principal

members reviewed and updated their designations of the high-level subordinates who normally represented them at policy committee meetings. 17

Meanwhile groundwork for organizing the task group and task force

proceeded, with priority given to the latter. Nutter wanted to activate the

supporting staff first because guiding the task group through the problems

at hand would require considerable preparation, including backup for

himself and for Shields, who was slated to head the group. To head the

task force, officials in ISA sought the assignment of Rear Adm. Horace H.

Epes, Jr., an officer already well known to them through his service in

the Joint Staff as chief of the Far East division during 1968-70. Although

claiming no particular expertise in PW/MIA matters, he would bring

to the job a comprehensive knowledge of the major problems of the Vietnam war. IS

Admiral Epes reported for duty as director, 000 PW/MIA Task Force,

on 15 March, and three days later Shields described the organization as

* See Chapter 2. The original members were the assistant secretaries of defense for international security affairs (chairman), manpower and reserve affairs, and public affairs, and

the OSD general counsel; the secretaries of the military departments; the chairman, Joint

Chiefs of Staff; and the director, DIA.
Emergence of the PW/MIA Task Group/Task Force 185

well on the way to full operation. Lt. Col. William Gregerson, USA, and

Cdr. Richard A. Mauldin, USN, filled two staff positions, joining two Air

Force lieutenant colonels, Gordon M. Haggard and Vincent A. DiMauro,

who had earlier succeeded Thornton and Work as ISA's military advisers

on PW affairs. With the task force manned, Shields and the new staff spent

the following month catching up on the backlog of letters and preparing

for the formation and first meeting of the task group.19

Nutter formally established the entire new organization by a memorandum to the members of the DoD PW Policy Committee on 15 April

1971. Forgoing grand declarations of purpose in favor of a systematic

description of the key agencies and their interrelationships, Nutter clearly

defined the organization that was to remain in place through the return of

the prisoners in 1973:

The DOD PW Policy Committee will consider major policy

marrers relaring to all aspecrs of PW/MIA Affairs. The Chairman

of rhis Committee is rhe Assistanr Secretary of Defense (ISA)

who is assigned primary staff responsibility for the Department

of Defense PW/MIA program. He exercises overall supervision

within the DOD for the totality of the program and is responsible

directly to the Secretary of Defense to recommend policy plans,

major programs/actions, and to keep him advised on significant

issues. The DOD PW Policy Committee serves to advise and

assist the Chairman in his responsibilities ....

The PWIMIA Task Group will be organized under the overall direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA). It will serve as an

augmenred staff to consider all issues which will be brought before

the DOD PW Policy Committee and will take action on routine

matters not requiring consideration by the Policy Committee.

The Task Group will serve as the coordinating body for all DOD

PW/MIA matters and will function to:

- provide close and continuing coordination of all DOD

PW/MIA activities

- recommend policy

- direct requirements for planning, programming, studies

and courses of action

- ensure in tegrated DOD action by all Departmen ts/offices.

Dr. Roger E. Shields, Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(ISA), is assigned as Chairman of the PWIMIA Task Group with

responsibility for managing its activities. Rear Admiral H. H. Epes, Jr.,

USN, is designated Alternate Task Group Chairman and Director of
186 THE LONG ROAD HOME

the PWIMIA Task Force. The Task Force consists of an assigned

staff within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA).

This staff assists the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) in his

responsibility for the overall DOD PW/MIA program and will

provide staff support for the DOD PW Policy Committee and the

PW/MIA Task Group.

PW/MIA Task Group membership will include representation at

the Flag/General Officer level from each action addressee. Representatives will be expected to speak authoritatively for their principals and should have the authority to commit staff assistance for

study/working groups to address specific problem areas.

The memorandum called on the policy committee members to designate

their representatives to serve on the PW/MIA Task Group, whose first

meeting would occur on 22 Apri1. 20

Usually the appointees to the task group were deputies of the officers

or officials who attended policy committee meetings. For the military departments, represented on the policy committee by their assistant secretaries

for manpower and reserve affairs, the appointees to the task group came

mostly from the personnel area, where the responsibility for casualty administration and assistance to families lay, as in the case of the adjutant general of

the Army. The Air Force departed from the pattern, appointing an officer

from its Directorate of Plans. The OSD general counsel originally named

Harry H. Arnold, but Frank Bartimo soon became involved as the general

counsel's spokesman in all matters relating to repatriation planning, the

chief concern of the task group during most of its existence. 21

The most important appointee to the task group was, of course, its

chairman, Roger Shields. A young and energetic economist, he had first met

Nutter while a graduate student at the University of Virginia. A closer

acquaintance developed when Shields, as a member of a private contract

agency, worked on various projects for ISA relating to the Vietnam warY

Because of this association and his demonstrated ability Shields was offered

the position of assistant to Nutter. During the next two years he became

identified, in the eyes of Congress, PW/MIA families and organizations,

and the press as the principal Defense expert and spokesman on prisoners

of war and the missing.

In August 1971, four months after establishment of the task group,

Nutter's principal deputy asked the assistant secretary of defense for health

and environment, Dr. Richard S. Wilbur, M.D., to designate a representative, since the task group was increasingly concerned with medical aspects

of the PW problem. This action acknowledged that the office of assistant
Emergence of the PW/MIA Task Group/Task Force 187

secretary (health and environment), in existence only since mid-1970,* had

attained the stature and operational maturity to make a significant contribution. At the time of creation of the DoD PW Policy Committee in 1967

the functions later assigned to OASD(H&E) had been among the responsibilities of the assistant secretary of defense (manpower and reserve affairs).

Accordingly, medical interest in PW matters had been represented through

that official's membership in the policy committee as well as through the

secretaries of the military departments, as advised by service medical officers.

From August 1971 onward, Dr. Wilbur or his principal deputy attended

the PW/MIA Task Group meetings. Unlike the others taking part in the

group's deliberations, however, the H&E office did not have a member

representing it at the senior level of the DoD PW Policy Committee. 23

Nutter had stated in his 15 April memorandum that the policy committee was now to operate in the realm of "broad policy guidance," but,

in fact, most of the issues that could be so labeled had already been

settled. The reorganization had the effect of lowering the decision level for

current problems to that of the task group, to officials able to speak with

authority although of lesser rank than the policy committee members. In

practice, the decision level went even lower, in a manner that underscored

the central importance of the full-time task force. Shields and Nutter

normally made policy decisions on the basis of papers prepared by the task

force and coordinated informally with points of contact representing the

task group members. Under this system of staffing, the task group held few

meetings-only five in 1971 and four in 1972. The policy committee met

even less frequently, only three times in each of the two years. When the

task group or the policy committee did meet, it was usually to confirm

decisions already made or to inform principals of the progress of PW/

MIA activities. Only once was a meeting of both bodies required to resolve

a major dispute, over a policy question concerning repatriation. t

The task force, though a relatively small organization, became the

"professional" center of PW activities in DoD. Its working principle of

informal coordination kept active a close and continuing association with

the concerned offices of the services and OSD and allowed for accommodation of all viewpoints before proposals reached the stage of formal presentation. Soon the effective staff work of the task force largely preempted the

* The commitment of an assistant secretary's post to the medical and environmental field

responded to pressures in the Congress, expressed through legislation that had not been

requested by DoD. The first definition of the position's responsibilities and functions

appeared as DoD Directive 5136.1, 23 June 70. Earlier there had been an assistant secretary of defense (health and medical), from 1953 to 1961.

t See Chapter 14.
188 THE LONG ROAD HOME

informal coordination that had long been a principal justification for the

meetings of the OSD Conference on Prisoners and Missing in Vietnam,

and meetings of that body ceased after June 1971.*

Similarly, subordinate panels that the task group had originally set

up for such matters as next of kin relations appeared less useful as the task

force took hold with growing energy and expertise. A public affairs panel

remained active for some time but gradually was absorbed into the coordination process. Only an intelligence panel, the longstanding Interagency

Prisoner of War Intelligence Ad Hoc Committee (IPWIC), continued

in existence.*

Impact ofthe Sexton Release

The Task Group/Task Force system had been in operation for less

than six months when events in Vietnam prompted a further tightening

of the organization, a development from which Roger Shields emerged

with the stature and authority of his position notably enhanced. In South

Vietnam on 8 October 1971, Army Staff Sgt. John Sexton, Jr., arrived on

foot at an ARVN outpost near the Cambodian border. A captive of the

Viet Cong since August 1969, he was the first American released in the

South in nearly two years; moreover, his return was unheralded by enemy

propaganda. In responding to this surprise event, U.S. military authorities

on the scene handled the reception and debriefing of Sexton in a manner

that won them no special commendations. The debriefing, performed disjointedly at successive levels and delayed by the sergeant's need for medical

care, was regrettably slow in determining the significance of the documents

that Sexton carried. 24 They contained notice of the enemy's expectation that

a reciprocal release of two of their compatriots-named Vu Hong and

Tu Trong-would occur at a specified place and hour on the morning of

11 October, Saigon time.

Barely 36 hours remained before the deadline when the embassy in

Saigon flashed the first notification of the documents' content to Washington together with word that initial search of enemy PW records had

revealed no trace of Tu Trong and the existence of four possible Vu Hongs.

In the Pentagon the National Military Command Center distributed this

and subsequent messages to the appropriate offices and alerted key officials that decisions were needed. Shields was among those kept informed

of the actions taken but apparently had little opportunity to contribute to

their development. Despite the time constraints, two messages regarding

* See Chapter 2.
Emergence of the PW/MIA Task Group/Task Force 189

the handling of the prisoner exchange went to Saigon through State

Department channels-one of them a State-Defense message. In Saigon the

decision had been made (by President Nguyen Van Thieu, according to

later information) to "reciprocate in kind" by turning two North Vietnamese military prisoners over to the enemy. Within the time available

for screening, however, only one could be found who was willing to be

repatriated. Helicopter forces deposited this North Vietnamese first lieutenant at the designated spot without incident. In the Pentagon it was

understood that the man released was one of those requested, ptobably

one of the four prospective Vu Hongs. 2)

Among State and Defense officials, satisfaction over the apparently

successful outcome of the affair soon gave way to embarrassment and

recrimination. They had acted on information that suggested the transaction involved a straightforward exchange of military prisoners, complicated only by the difficulty in identifying the requested men. But more

pertinent information, only indirectly brought to their attention, had been

coursing through CIA channels. The regular cable traffic had given them no

hint of the major role the CIA's station chief in Saigon played in managing the exchange. His intervention followed from early realization that the

two individuals mentioned in the Sexton documents were not enemy

prisoners of war-they were high-level Communist cadre members, held

as political prisoners after apprehension by the Saigon government. The

CIA official took charge on the assumption that the enemy was once more

bidding to reopen the clandestine BUTTERCUP channel* in hope of

retrieving two valued agents. When released, the North Vietnamese lieutenant carried a message that invited further covert negotiations to achieve

the enemy's desired outcome. 26

When they learned of CIA's part in the exchange, ISA officials were

convinced that "inadequate, tardy and inaccurate information was made

available to responsible officials in Washington (State and Defense)," and as

a result, "action [was] taken in Saigon without proper coordination and

approval here." Moreover, they suspected that actions had not even been

fully coordinated in Saigon. The somewhat delicate task of discussing with

Ambassador Bunker how such lapses in performance might be avoided in

the future was left to Secretary Laird during his forthcoming visit to Saigon.

Meanwhile, Nutter had been discussing with the secretary instances

of inadequate coordination and unavailability of pertinent information "inhouse" that had come to light "in the aftermath of Sexton's release."27 As a

result, on 20 October 1971, Nutter issued a memorandum to the task

* See Chapter 5.
190 THE LONG ROAD HOME

group calling for a tightening of the lines of authority so that the capability

to make and implement decisions quickly would be enhanced:

Secretary Laird views the DOD PW/MIA Task Group with its

representatives from all relevant DOD components as the vehicle

for policy coordination in prisoner of war releases/exchanges.

Since the Task Group Chairman is responsible through me, directly

to the Secretary, he is the DOD single point of contact on all

matters involving the release of PWs.

For the Chairman to carry out his responsibilities effectively, each

Task Group representative of a Service or an ASD must likewise

be the single point of contact within his organization for all

aspects of PW affairs, and all related activity must be coordinated with that representative. This arrangement will provide a

clear, rapid channel for policy coordination, up to the Secretary

of Defense if required.

Nutter went on to reemphasize the critical importance of the point of contact function, and he charged the task group members with making sure

their designees had the requisite authority to perform it. 28

On the same date Nutter informed the chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, of Laird's desire that Shields and

his staff have direct access to the facilities of the National Military Command Center during fast-moving situations, both to be immediately apprised

of incoming information and to utilize the NMCC's worldwide communications net to reach the secretary of defense and other officials as

necessary. In addition, Secretary Laird believed that a single coordinator

for PW matters should be designated by COMUSMACV in Saigon and at

CINCPAC headquarters, with whom the task group chairman might communicate directly. Laird wished Admiral Moorer to pursue this matter

with the two commanders. 29

Moorer responded in mid-November that all details of the NMCC

arrangement had been worked out and coordinated with the task force director, Admiral Epes. In his discussions with CINCPAC and COMUSMACV

Moorer had found them insistent that PW matters were too important and

too closely integrated with their other command responsibilities to be treated

separately. "It is the assessment of CINCPAC and COMUSMACV," he wrote,

"that the designation of an individual below their command level as a single

coordinator for PW matters is not feasible. Therefore, Admiral McCain has

been designated as the PW Coordinator for PACOM and General Abrams

as the PW Coordinator for MACy''''O
Emergence of the PW/MIA Task Group/Task Force 191

Nutter's memorandums had stressed particularly the importance of the

task group chairman's role as coordinator of the responses to release incidents. Laird now took a more definitive action, wider in its application. On

3 December 1971 he addressed a memorandum to all elements of the Department of Defense:

Our experiences in connection with the release and repatriation

of SSGT Sexton, USA, have served to emphasize the difficult,

complex, wide-ranging, and time-sensitive problems we can anticipate in the repatriation of our prisoners of war and the resolution

of rhe status of our missing men.

The best interests of the Defense Department, the men, and their

families require the closest and most thorough coordination of

every aspect of the conduct of prisoner of war/missing in action

affairs. To this end, Dr. Roger Shields, of the office of the Assistant

Secretary (ISA), has been tasked with overall Department of

Defense coordinating responsibility for all PW/MIA matters. I ask

that you direct all elements of your organization to coordinate

with Dr. Shields, or his staff (PW Task Force), all actions related to

prisoners of war or missing in action.

I consider this to be the only way in which we can satisfactorily

handle this difficult problem, and I earnestly solicit your cooperation to this purpose. 51

This memorandum firmly established the preeminent posItIOn of

Shields as the coordinator of PW affairs. Nutter retained a formal overall

responsibility for the PW program within the Department of Defense, but it

was Shields who fulfilled that responsibility on a full-time, day-to-day

basis. During 1972 the leading role Shields played in PW affairs was

repeatedly made evident, by his chairmanship of the successive worldwide

conferences of U.S. officials that were a feature of repatriation planning, his

field trips to the prospective repatriation processing sites in Europe and the

Pacific Command, his frequent speaking engagements before conventions

of family organizations and other groups, and his testimony at congressional hearings.

A further dimension of Shields's activity involved relations with the

State Department. Early in his service, in 1971, he had moved to establish a

close working association with Frank Sieverts, the chief PW action officer

in State. As the year progressed their relationship grew in intimacy and

mutual trust. Besides aiding and insuring interdepartmental coordination

in large matters, the connection proved particularly effective in forestalling
192 THE LONG ROAD HOME

petty conflicts and misunderstandings of the sort that had sometimes

afflicted State-Defense relations in the past.

A Further lest: The Elias-Gartley-Charles Release

After Sexton's return nearly a year elapsed before a similar incident

occurred to test the organizational arrangement in Washington. On 2 September 1972 the Hanoi radio announced the impending release of three

U.S. prisoners. Chosen for this first repatriation from North Vietnam since

mid-1969 were two naval officers, Lts. Markham L. Gartley and Norris A.

Charles, and Air Force Maj. Edward K. Elias. The Hanoi broadcast, after

the usual references to "humane and lenient policy," concluded with a declaration that, "to express solidarity with the American people who are struggling

against the U.S. 'dirty war' in Vietnam, the Government of the Democratic

Republic of Vietnam will hand over said pilots to a U.S. social organization

animated with goodwill and a desire to bring about an early end to the US

war in Vietnam ....",2

Cora Weiss and David Dellinger, co-chairmen of the Committee of Liaison with Families of Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam (COLIAFAM),

soon made it known that theirs was the organization selected. The two antiwar activists announced their intention of escorting the men home via

commercial airline and delivering them directly to their next of kin. "We

hope the men will not be kidnapped by the military en route," Dellinger

said, and Mrs. Weiss indicated that earlier "interference" of this nature by

U.S. authorities was partly responsible for the lapse in North Vietnamese

releases since 1969. Other contributing factors, Weiss contended, were the

government's use of returnee statements in its publicity attacks on Hanoi

and use of some of the released pilots "to train additional personnel to

attack North Vietnam."))

The latter charge had slight justification but lent itself readily to propaganda exploitation. Such substance as could be provided for it lay in the fact

that one Air Force and one Navy returnee had been assigned to flight instructor duties. When some members of Congress joined with antiwar figures in

questioning these assignments, 000 officials maintained that since the officers were engaged in basic flying training rather than advanced preparation

of pilots for combat their activities were not prohibited by the Geneva Convention, as interpreted in a commentary endorsed by the International

Committee of the Red Cross. Moreover, the convention's bar against further

participation in the hostilities (Article 117) applied only to prisoners

exchanged by mutual agreement or returned under the particular circumstances described in Articles 109 or 110-not to men released unilaterally
Emergence of the PW/MIA Task Group/Task Force 193

by North Vietnam without reference to the Geneva Convention. In replying

to a congressional query an ISA official stated that "our policy is to not

return these men to Southeast Asia in any capacity and to select assignments

for them which do not contribute to combat operations in that area." He

held that the department's actions complied fully with the convention.,4

The Elias-Gartley-Charles release of 1972 differed from the Sexton incident

in that the Communists provided advance notice in this instance, affording

officials in Washington time to consider how to respond. Indeed, the North

Vietnamese practice of staging a number of events between an announced

release and the final departure ceremony, a period during which handlers

led the prospective returnees on tours of bomb-damaged areas and subjected

them to press conferences, in the past had delayed the actual release for as

long as four weeks beyond the announcement. U.S. authorities thus had

ample time to react and were determined not to give the North Vietnamese

any more propaganda leverage than they already had. In a memorandum

for Laird on 6 September, Nutter declared that management of the affair

as Weiss and Dellinger intended "would result in serious hazards for the

returned men and adverse implications for the US Government and

remaining PW/MIAs and their families." He believed that U.S. government

representatives should assume control of the returnees at the earliest possible

occasion during their flight.

Left to their own devices, Weiss/Dellinger will travel to the US

with the released prisoners by commercial aircraft; the men's

medical needs will be left unattended; every opportunity will

be taken to hold press conferences and the men will be subjected to extreme pressures to comment on political issues; the

position of Weiss/Dellinger and their associated anti-war groups

will be enhanced; and, US Government efforts will be further

undermined ....

. . . In Vientiane or at the earliest opportunity thereafter, I suggest an appropriate US official advise the men of our desires and

preparations in a manner that encourages their acceptance of return to US control and travel under medical auspices aboard medical evacuation aircraft. Such action would permit us to implement

normal repatriation plans, would be in the best interest of the men

and would avoid all disadvantages of travel with Weiss/Dellinger.

In the event it is not possible to secure control of the men overseas, I suggest we adopt a policy of assuming control immediately

upon their arrival in the US. We have the plans and means, in coordination with New York Port Authorities, to control the situation

and events at Kennedy International Airport.\'
194 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Official perturbation over COLIAFAM's role in the release mounted

when it was learned that Weiss and Dellinger had persuaded the mother

of one of the men and the wife of another to accompany them to Hanoi.

Their arrival there appeared to be scheduled for 16 September. Accordingly, on that date the PW/MIA Task Force activated its watch group in

the NMCC, augmented by representatives of the military services, ]CS,

DIA, and OSD Public Affairs and backed by points of contact available on

a 24-hour basis. With immediate access to the incoming message traffic, the

command post in the NMCC would track the as-yet-unknown itinerary of

the exit flight, coordinating with U.S. diplomatic posts at expected stopping

points on the route and starting action to obtain any new decisions required

at the Washington level. As Shields wrote, the activity would continue "until

the USG has assumed control of the released prisoners, or until such time

as a high state of readiness is no longer indicated."16

State and Defense had been in consultation about procedures during the

first contact between U.S. representatives and the released prisoners, but the

White House intervened to dictate the policy, in terms that came close to

what Nutter had recommended. The invitation to accept transfer to medevac flight under official auspices would be presented to the men "in positive

terms" but without force or threat. If pressed on the matter, the spokesman

would characterize it as a recommendation but not a military order. Nevertheless, he should remind them of their status as officers in the armed

services of the United States "and should leave no doubt in the minds of

these men that the USC prefers that they return via military channels. At

the same time, care must be taken to avoid any sort of public confrontation

with the men or their escorts." Although the Harriman policy of allowing the

men to choose still stood,* this formulation removed previous restraints on

the U.S. spokesman when advising them of the government's preference.)7

Arrangements for interception at a Vientiane stop came to naught

since the flight that departed Hanoi on 25 September proceeded via Peking

instead. Officials of the embassy in Moscow were the first to have the

opportunity to speak to Gartley, Elias, and Charles on their arrival there on

27 September. In response to the offer of further travel by medevac flight

the men said they had concluded they should continue with their escorts

to avoid jeopardizing the possible release of other prisoners. At a stop in

Copenhagen, U.S. officials were at least able to provide uniforms, which

the three officers willingly donned shortly before landing in New York on

28 September.'R

Shields and Sieverts headed the official party awaiting the arrival at

Kennedy International Airport. On boarding the plane, Shields explained to

* For earlier development of this policy, see Chapters 5 and 12.
Emergence of the PW/MIA Task Group/Task Force 195

the returnees the arrangements made for their immediate reunion with

family members who had been transported there. Evacuation to service

hospitals near their homes would quickly follow, all in accordance with the

Defense Department's standing repatriation plan. After some discussion,

Gartley, Elias, and Charles freely accepted the prompt return to official

control. At a press conference in the Pentagon the following day Shields

said the released men were already undergoing medical examinations and

other procedures at military hospitals. News accounts gave considerable

play to charges by the COLIAFAM escort group that there had been a

confrontation-by one account, "a 25-minute shouting match"-and that

the men had been "recaptured" by the U.S. military with inconsiderate

haste. Some early reports implied that they were being held incommunicado,

but when leaving the naval hospital on 1 October Gartley assured newsmen

he had not been held against his will; he and his parents were satisfied with

the arrangements. 39

An after-action assessment prepared in ISA concluded that "the Task

Group/Task Force organizational structure proved highly effective. It permitted a well coordinated operation with clearly defined central authority."

In particular, the command post established in the NMCC had proved its

worth, and further refinement of the arrangement was in progress in anticipation of future use. 40

Indeed, by October 1972, after 18 months of operation, the Task Group/

Task Force had become a fully seasoned organization. During those months

the full-time task force had undergone no enlargement, but changes in

personnel had occurred. Its director, Admiral Epes, completed his tour in

June 1972 and was succeeded by Brig. Gen. Russell G. Ogan, USAF,41

Colonel DiMauro continued in one of the positions filled by the Air

Force, as did Commander Mauldin in the Navy's billet. Maj. Thomas R.

Schornak, USAF, had replaced Colonel Haggard earlier in the year. The

addition of Army Lt. Col. Charles F, Kraak as successor to Gregerson in

July completed the roster of the officers who were to serve on the task force

through the return of the prisoners in the spring of 1973.

In July 1972 the task force had adopted the practice of holding a weekly

meeting of the action officers who served as points of contact for the task

group members. The arrangement promoted efficiency by reducing somewhat the number of matters that had to be referred individually to each

contributing office, and it insured that all kept equally abreast of current

activities. In September Ogan expanded participation at one weekly meeting each month to include representatives of the American Red Cross and

the State Department. In effect, these sessions were a revival of the OSD

Conference meetings, suspended since June 1971 Y
196 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Staffed by experienced and highly competent officers, the task force

stood at the center of the PW planning and decision process. Throughout

repatriation and homecoming, it was to become the core of the operations

staff that directed the return of the prisoners on an hour-by-hour basis.

Prepared to generate decisions as the need arose, the organization had

achieved a proficiency in planning and a flexibility in meeting unexpected

problems that enabled it to maintain an assured control over the highly

complex homecoming operation and manage it in a way that reflected well

on the Department of Defense and the U.S. government.
11

The Go Public Campaign

I n the years before 1969 U.S. government news releases and public

utterances about the war in Southeast Asia generally avoided prominent

mention of prisoners of war and missing personnel. Policymakers judged

that wider public attention and possible agitation about the PWs would

complicate rather than assist the attainment of the government's objectives.

They preferred that next of kin of the missing be cautioned that it was in

their man's best interest not to advertise the family's situation or call attention to him as an individual.

The United States relied primarily on what was termed "quiet diplomacy"

in its efforts to insure humane treatment of the American prisoners and to

gain their early release. As the principal agency and designated single spokesman for the U.S. government in these matters the Department of State

gave high priority to the plight of the captives, employing all the resources

of diplomacy in the attempt to relieve their suffering. Since for most of

the period the North Vietnamese enemy refused to engage in direct negotiations, State officials endeavored to open some channel of communication

through various third parties and the International Committee of the Red

Cross. Most of these efforts required confidentiality and were undertaken

without publicity, and the sensitivity of some of State's behind-the-scenes

activities strengthened its inclination to keep public discussion of prisoner

of war issues at a low key. When the threat of war crimes trials or other

egregious actions by the enemy had to be resisted with a more outspoken

response, State abandoned the low-key stance temporarily, but on the whole

the department maintained its commitment to the unpublicized ways of

diplomacy throughout President Johnson's term of office.

On taking office in January 1969 the Nixon administration began a

reassessment of all policies relating to hostilities in Southeast Asia. The new

197
198 THE LONG ROAD HOME

secretary of defense, Melvin Laird, came to the review process with a

number of well-formed opinions and attitudes, including a deep concern

for the welfare of the captured or missing servicemen and their families.

On 1 March 1969, speaking for himself and Deputy Secretary of Defense

David Packard, Laird expressed that concern to the leading officials of his

department and declared that "we must strengthen our efforts on behalf

of these Americans and their families." In this memorandum, released to

the press, Laird spoke of his concern with more directness than had been

customary: "The enemy in Southeast Asia continues to disregard the humanitarian protections guaranteed by the Geneva Convention Relative to the

Treatment of Prisoners of War. Our men are being denied basic rights,

including the right of their families to know that they are captured, the

right to correspond freely with their families and the right of impartial

inspection of prisoner of war compounds."]

This brief statement gave a foretaste of the policy of open, unhesitating

advocacy ofthe prisoners' rights that Laird would soon induce the new administration to adopt. It had taken form during the secretary's first month of

consultations with his senior advisers and particularly through the urging

of such officials as Daniel Henkin, Charles Havens, and Paul Warnke, all

of whom had served with the DoD PW Policy Committee from its inception. That body had begun life petitioning for reconsideration of the

"single spokesman" policy. Though rebuffed in that effort, the committee's

members worked effectively thereafter to push Defense initiatives to the

forefront of discussion, but they were not always satisfied with the outcome. Defense officials found that being required to regard the State

Department as senior partner sometimes meant accepting the scaling down

of their proposals for more assertive action, particularly publicity and

counterpropaganda initiatives. 2

The same background of experience influenced the recommendations

coming from the military services in response to Laird's March memorandum. The services were virtually unanimous in urging a more vigorous

public affairs and counterpropaganda effort. The Air Force invited renewed

attention to the information program it had put forward late in 1967, which

was discussed at the time but not implemented.* The program contemplated

the use of all the resources of the U.S. government in a campaign designed

to "influence world opinion to the point that Hanoi will feel compelled to

afford proper treatment to U.S. PW's." The Navy suggested that benefits

would accrue on the domestic front also if high officials used every public

occasion to speak of the government's concern for the Americans imprisoned

in Southeast Asia. Such pronouncements would help allay the anxieties of

* See Chapter 6.
The Go Public Campaign 199

the families and reassure them that the government was making determined efforts on behalf of their men. 3

These recommendations and the opinions of his intimate advisers

reinforced Laird's determination to rid 000 of the restraints on criticism

of Hanoi's practices with regard to prisoners. He thought the existing

policy conceded too much when it allowed the enemy's claims of humane

treatment to pass without immediate and continuing challenge. It prevented the enormity of North Vietnam's violations of the Geneva Convention

from being impressed on the consciousness of the world and sacrificed

the opportunity to exploit what Laird saw as a major vulnerability in

Hanoi's position. Laird thought the evidence at hand gave reason enough

for anger over the mistreatment of U.S. servicemen in captivity. Rather

than avoiding controversy and preserving an atmosphere of calm, he

wanted to hold the Communist authorities publicly to account for their

disregard of humanitarian principles. Therefore, discussion of prisoner of

war matters should no longer be confined to the privacy of the government's inner councils. Laird believed it necessary to "go public"-to bring

the humanitarian issue of prisoners of war to the center of public attention and talk about it "openly, candidly, forcefully, and repeatedly." In that

way North Vietnam's leaders would be subjected to a rising tide of U.S.

and world opinion that might influence them to conform to the Geneva

Convention and negotiate seriously about the return of prisoners of war,

apart from their political objectives in a peace settlement. 4

During April 1969 OSD staff members in Public Affairs and ISA set to

work to carry out the intention of the secretary of defense. They developed

themes and gathered materials for the sustained publicity program that

was soon being called "the Go Public campaign." As preparations continued,

further evidence accumulated that the decision to launch such a drive was

sound and timely. Defense officials who dealt with congressional correspondence became particularly aware of a rising impatience and disillusionment

among next of kin over the government's efforts to date, and the favorable

impact the campaign would have on PW/MIA families helped drive the

proposed program. One letter received by California Senator Alan Cranston

from the parents of a known prisoner of war seemed almost a direct plea

for something like the impending Go Public campaign: "We, as next of kin,

are told at the beginning of this experience, to keep still. This we have done.

There is no mention of prisoners in press releases or on radio or TV coverage.

It is as if they did not exist. We have a strong feeling that very few citizens

are aware of the vast number of Americans who are spending the best

years of their lives behind prison walls with no contact with loved ones at

all .... Can anyone stir up this nation so that something will be done?"5
200 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Also, news accounts of Laird's 1 March memorandum had inspired a

letter to the new secretary of defense from Mrs. Sybil Stockdale, the recognized leader among PW/MIA wives and parents on the West Coast. She

wrote that "the families of all the men feel very strongly that a primary

concern of our government should be to help secure the rights and humane

treatment North Vietnam guaranteed when they signed the Geneva Conventions." Hence she was elated to read "that you too, want more public

exposure of Hanoi's denial to our men of their basic rights." Her letter

may have served to reinforce OSD perception of the possibility that the

families could have a role in the publicity campaign and might be of real

assistance in assuring that it took hold with the American people. Mrs.

Stockdale closed with the simple query, "Can I do anything to help?"G

Finally, the planners could have no doubt that the North Vietnamese

propaganda mill continued in operation, turning out material extolling the

humane and forbearing treatment being accorded the prisoners. At the

beginning of May the news services provided extracts from a Havana publication in which a Cuban reporter told of his visit with 11 U.S. airmen. He

described them as "living a quiet country life in a North Vietnamese prison

village," where "watering fruit trees, pruning plants, and feeding pigeons"

were among their occupations. They received letters, medicines, and photographs from home, it was said, and periodic medical checkups were provided. The Havana article attributed remarks to Air Force Lt. Col. Robinson

Risner to the effect that the men were well treated, Risner himself quoted

as saying, "at no moment was I treated badly by anyone."*7

Some consultation took place within the administration before launching the Go Public campaign, but Laird sought no formal approval for it.

The men whose lives were at hazard belonged to the U.S. armed forces.

It was necessary to speak our in defense of their interests and well-being

and to safeguard their reputations as well, by cautioning against the presumption that their broadcast statements were freely volunteered. Laird

believed it incontestably the prerogative and responsibility of the secretary of defense to perform this service. He appealed to other elements of

the executive branch to join him in doing SO.8

Laird's intention of highlighting the prisoner of war issue probably

had at least the tacit approval of the White House. Although a marked

departure from the policy followed theretofore under the State Department's guidance, it did not meet significant opposition from that department either. Senior staff members in State had not been immune to the

* The reporter had witnessed a staged production at the Plantation camp. See Rochester

and Kiley, Honor Bound, 353, 374n.
The Go Public Campaign 201

urge to go on the offensive regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, but

they necessarily yielded to the dominance of Harriman, who throughout

the final year of the Johnson administration continued to hope that a breakthrough might be achieved by traditional diplomatic means. In the new

administration Elliot L. Richardson became under secretary of state,

with duties that included "overall coordination and responsibility for

State Department actions concerning prisoners of war in Southeast Asia."

Named as his special assistant, Frank Sieverts continued to serve as the

department's principal expert on PW/MIA affairs. It soon became evident

that under its new leadership State would no longer require a major provocation from Hanoi before publicly condemning actions of the enemy.

On 26 April 1969 the department advised the press that during the last

six months the flow of mail from Americans imprisoned in North Vietnam

had virtually ceased and that no evidence had reached Washington that

the Christmas packages addressed to the captives had been delivered. In

a brief accompanying statement Richardson charged Hanoi with "denying

the prisoners the basic right to communicate with their families."9

A few days later, at Laird's request, Richardson reviewed the materials

being readied for the Go Public campaign, in particular hearing a rehearsal

of the oral briefing for newsmen, presented by Richard Capen, principal

deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs. Thereafter Richardson approved successive requests for Sieverts to accompany Capen on a

mission to Geneva and Paris, one purpose being to give the U.S. peace

negotiators a preview of the publicity campaign, and for Sieverts to take

part in the Pentagon's 19 May news conference. lo

The Go Public Campaign Begins

For the inauguration of the Go Public campaign on 19 May 1969,

OSD Public Affairs had scheduled what appeared a normal and possibly

routine news briefing on the status of Americans captured in Southeast

Asia, but the appearance of Secretary Laird as introductory speaker immediately lifted it out of the ordinary. After referring briefly to his previous

expressions of concern for the welfare of the American prisoners of war

and missing in action, Laird proceeded in a series of succinct and pointed

comments to catalog the Communists' transgressions, beginning with the

declaration: "The North Vietnamese have claimed that they are treating

our men humanely. I am distressed by the fact that there is clear evidence

that this is not the case."
202 THE LONG ROAD HOME

The United States Government has urged that the enemy

respect the requirements of the Geneva Convention. This they

have refused to do.

The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong have never identified the names of all the U.S. prisoners whom they hold. For the

most part, information on some of these Americans has come in

the form of scattered, and often distorted, propaganda films and

photographs which the North Vietnamese have chosen to sell

or release.

We know that at least several U.S. prisoners were injured at

the time of their capture and we are concerned about the medical

care they are receiving.

The Geneva Convention requires a free exchange of mail

between the prisoners and their families and yet very little mail

has been received from only a few prisoners in the past five years.

As of next month, more than 200 American servicemen will

have been listed either as prisoners of war or as missing in action

for more than three and one-half years. This period of time is

longer than any U.S. serviceman was held prisoner during World

War II.

The Department of Defense continues to hope for meaningful progress on the matter of prisoner release in the Paris

discussions. In the meantime, we appeal to North Vietnam and

the Viet Cong to respect the humane rights of those whom they

hold prisoners of war.

Specifically, we call for adherence to the Geneva Convention

which requires:

1. Release of names of prisoners held.

2. Immediate release of sick and wounded prisoners.

3. Impartial inspections of prisoner of war facilities.

4. Proper treatment of all prisoners.

5. Regular flow of mail.

Most importantly, we seek the prompt release of all American prisoners. 11

Capen then conducted a briefing for the media representatives-one

that went beyond previous presentations in providing details and specific

instances. To illustrate Laird's claims, he cited 10 captive Americans by name

and identified others in a packet of supporting materials that included

46 photographs, many of them sold or released by North Vietnam. Capen

noted that recent pictures of Risner and two other men showed unmistakable evidence of significant weight loss, despite other released films in

which "an elaborate spread of food" was pictured as the normal prison fare.

He declared that some of the films also raised doubts that the men were
The Go Public Campaign 203

recelvlllg proper medical care. "Recent photographs show that some pnsoners are continuing to suffer from injuries incurred at the time they

were downed," such as those still using crutches after many months of

captivity. "LCDR H. A. Stafford* injured his left arm and shoulder when

shot down in August 1967. Today, his left arm appears to be noticeably

smaller, raising questions as to what medical treatment was offered."12

The briefing text spoke of "indications that American prisoners in

North Vietnam have been mistreated physically," as when they were paraded

through the streets of Hanoi, bur it made no reference to torture. It did

condemn the subjection of u.s. prisoners to solitary confinement as something that could have a lasting adverse effect on their physical and

psychological well-being. Several of the enemy's photographs showed

Americans in solitary confinement, and all six pilots released by North

Vietnam during 1968 had confirmed that they were held in isolation for

varying periods of time.

When charging inhumane treatment Capen attacked particularly the

enemy's practice of withholding information about the prisoners and denying them regular communication with their families. The unreliability of

the captions the North Vietnamese attached to their photo releases and the

obvious staging of some of the pictured events provided additional ammunition. For instance, a recent film "suggested that u.S. prisoners had received

Christmas mail and were permitted to celebrate the Christmas season. In

the first place, the film shows only a handful of prisoners. Secondly, the

film purports to show prisoners opening Christmas mail when, in fact, they

are reading letters dated in March, April and July of 1968," as was revealed

when the photos were enlarged. "In two cases, the film indicated that the

prisoners were opening Christmas cards when in fact, the mail shown were

[sic] Easter cards sent months before."

The briefing closed with reiteration of Laird's appeal to the North Vietnamese to take a number of specific humanitarian actions that would signify

their intention to comply with the Geneva Convention. Sieverts had a

prominent role in the question and answer session that followed. He prefaced

his initial response with the remark that Under Secretary of State Richardson

"fully shares and echoes the thoughts that the Secretary of Defense and

Mr. Capen have set forth here today."ll

Though by no means the foremost news item of the day, articles featuring Laird's remarks did appear on the front pages of the nation's

newspapers on 20 May 1969. Many of the dailies used one of the DoD

* Navy pilot Hugh Allen Stafford.
204 THE LONG ROAD HOME

pictures, but the details of the supporting briefing generally received less

attention than its authors had hoped. Both the New York Times and the

Washington Post highlighted the secretary's call for the prompt return of

all American prisoners and tended to view his performance as a follow-up

to President Nixon's recent mention of "the earliest possible release of

prisoners of war on both sides" as one of the essential elements of the

peace to be negotiated in Paris. 14 Almost immediately, however, the enemy

handed Laird the opportunity to speak again, with renewed emphasis on

the other items in his indictment and with greater chance of attracting

international attention.

On 20 May the chief North Vietnamese negotiator in Paris, Xuan

Thuy, declared that his government would never give out the identities of

the American prisoners "as long as the United States does not cease its

war of aggression and withdraw its troops from Vietnam." In a statement

the following morning Secretary Laird said he was "deeply shocked and disappointed by this cruel response of Hanoi's representative to such a basic

request for humanitarian action."

Hundreds of American wives, children and parents continue

to live in a tragic state of uncertainty caused by the lack of information concerning the fate of their loved ones. This needless

anxiety is caused by the persistent refusal by North Vietnam to

release the names of u.s. prisoners of war.

I want to reaffirm the continuing hope that Hanoi will provide

a list of American prisoners and permit a free flow of mail between

U.S. prisoners of war and their families.

We continue to urge the immediate release ofsick and wounded

prisoners, the neutral inspection of prisoner of war facilities and

the prompt release of all American prisoners. I'

In the Paris negotiating session on 22 May Ambassador Henry Cabot

Lodge also took this line, deploring the inhumanity of Xuan Thuy's refusal

to release the names and protesting most of the other enemy practices that

Laird had mentioned. Lodge's stance was the latest manifestation that the

Department of State had become a partner in the Go Public campaign. I(,

State had already cabled the texts of Laird's two statements to its

major posts overseas, and the remarks of Ambassador Lodge followed in

another dispatch. On 24 Maya joint State-Defense-USIA message reviewed

all the exchanges, observing that Xuan Thuy's words, with later backing

from a foreign ministry spokesman in Hanoi, "publicly confirm what has

been North Vietnam's practice since start of conflict of refusing to provide

list of names of PW's to families, to ICRC, or to any other impartial body."
The Go Public Campaign 205

Posts in Brussels, Stockholm, Melbourne, and elsewhere were asked to act

behind the scenes in the host country to stimulate public statements critical of North Vietnam's inhumane attitude, thus bringing "public pressure

on DRV to change its policy, specifically by providing names of prisoners,

allowing mail exchanges, and allowing visits by International Red Cross

or other impartial reps." Meanwhile, the officials in Washington stated, "we

are pursuing similar effort here, with press, private groups, and members

of Congress." They appeared to take credit for a recent Washington Post

editorial commending Laird's statements and chiding the enemy's leaders

for lack of compassion. I?

Secretary of State William P. Rogers opened his news conference on

5 June with an admonition on the enemy's troubling policies regarding

the treatment of American prisoners. Reaffirming the readiness of the

United States for meaningful discussion of the subject, he observed that

"any sign of good faith by the other side in this matter would provide

encouragement for our negotiations in Paris." So far, however, Hanoi's

principal reaction to the Go Public campaign had been a stepped-up propaganda effort, in which it broadcast almost daily the taped statements of

prisoners expressing appreciation to the North Vietnamese government

and people for the good care provided them. The announcer called on the

world to note that "U.S. pilots give the lie to Defense Secretary Melvin

Laird's slander."18

Laird denounced these enemy moves in his next formal statement, on

6 June. "Hanoi has chosen to respond to our plea for humane treatment

of our prisoners of war with a series of contrived broadcasts," he began.

Terming this "a feeble gesture and no substitute for the humanitarian

guarantees that we are seeking," he then set forth once again what the

enemy must do to demonsrrate to the world that the men were being treated

humanely and receiving proper medical care. 19

On more informal occasions, too, Laird was quick to bring up the prisoner of war situation. In May he raised the subject when talking to

newsmen in London following a NATO defense ministers' meeting; in

June he spoke with equal fervor before a cabinet wives' luncheon in

Washington. When appearing on the television program "Face the Nation"

in July he launched into yet another discourse on the prisoner concerns. 20

By midyear the government's efforts to give prominence to the

prisoner of war issue and fix it permanently in the public's awareness had

met with some success. In June, u.s. News & World Report was the first of

the weekly news magazines to devote space to it as a story of continuing

significance. Its three-page article also made more extensive use of the
206 THE LONG ROAD HOME

material in the original 000 briefing than had occurred previously. A

Defense Intelligence Agency summary of the public response took particular note of this, after observing that the press in all major U.S. cities had

carried some account of Laird's kickoff of the publicity campaign and

that "within a matter of a few days editorials were included as follow-up

in many papers." The report also presented nearly a dozen instances of

sympathetic treatment in the free world press, mainly in Western Europe. 21

In addition the DIA spokesman called attention to "Mrs. James Bond

Stockdale, wife of a long term PW in North Vietnam, who provided two

press interviews primarily concerned with the lack of regular mail to and

from the PWs." In fact, combining a sure instinct for personalizing the

prisoner of war issue with a willingness to sacrifice her own privacy if need

be, Sybil Stockdale had offered the 59-word text of her husband's latest

letter for printing in a local San Diego paper. The poignancy of the letter's

content, the fact that it was the first to arrive in more than a year, and the

internal evidence indicating that Stockdale had seen none of the letters

she had sent over the last 18 months all underscored her point. The resulting

story received wider exposure from the Associated Press. 22

DIA may have known less about other activities that represented the

first stirrings of an emerging national association of wives and parents of

the missing men. What DIA saw as a timely and unhesitating response

from the country's editorial writers probably owed something to the

consciousness-raising campaign these family members had already

undertaken. Instigated by Mrs. Stockdale as early as March 1969, their

letter-writing effort targeted prominent editorial writers in the United

States and abroad, as identified in a somewhat out-oF-date copy of the

Editor and Publisher rear Book. This and other efforts of the next of kin

intensified in the favorable climate of the Go Public campaign. By late

July a first printing of 5,000 bumper stickers had occurred, reading "Don't

let them be forgotten-POWs, MIAs," and the family members' organized

movement had itself become the subject of occasional newspaper articles. 23

The Frishman-Hegdahl Press Confirence

Beginning in July 1969 another sequence of events gave impetus to

the campaign. Early in the month Radio Hanoi announced that "three US

aggressors captured in North Vietnam" would be released in recognition

of America's Independence Day, and leaders in 000 prepared to seize

every opportunity the event offered for increasing pressure on North Vietnam to abide by the Geneva Convention. At the least, ISA officials noted
The Go Public Campaign 207

it could be pointed out that "over 1300 other servicemen are still missing

or captured and NVN still refuses to provide a list, permit inspection or

return sick and wounded. "24

Hanoi withheld the identity of the three men until the eve of their

release, which did not occur until 5 August. While they were still en route

home, Secretary Laird issued a statement welcoming the return of Capt.

Wesley L. Rumble, USAF, Lt. Robert F. Frishman, USN, and Seaman

Douglas B. Hegdahl and noting that the provision of medical care would

have first priority. Specific comment would await a thorough assessment

of their prison experience, but he did express concern that "these men lost

from 20 to 60 pounds during their captivity." Laird also pointed out that

following Hanoi's announcement on 3 July, "hundreds of families lived

in hopes that their loved ones would be among the three U.S. servicemen returned." He deplored the fact that "their anxieties were needlessly

prolonged for 32 days," saying that "such heartless actions compound

the already difficult circumstances under which the wives, parents and

children have lived for up to five years."25

Another news release on 12 August helped to keep the matter before

the public by giving an account of Laird's meeting with Frishman and

Hegdahl at Bethesda Naval Hospital. It again mentioned the loss of

weight and revealed that Frishman had a seriously injured right arm.

Captain Rumble, reported to have a back injury, was undergoing treatment

at an Air Force hospital in California. 26

The debriefing of the returnees established that they had led the same

everyday existence as other inmates and had credible knowledge of the

treatment received. In addition, both Rumble and Hegdahl unburdened

themselves of an extensive memory bank of prisoners' names. Accordingly,

planning went forward in the Pentagon for a news conference at which

they would give a public account of their captivity experience. By late August the president's assistant for national security affairs, Henry A. Kissinger,

had received a briefing on DoD's intention and had given oral assurance

of White House concurrence. In a memorandum to Kissinger for the main

purpose of putting the matter on record, Laird reemphasized the conviction that underlay the project. As a result of the three men's return,

he wrote, "we now have additional details regarding Hanoi's treatment of

our servicemen. North Vietnam must assume that the United States

Government is aware of these facts. If the Department of Defense does

not publicly deplore North Vietnam's treatment of prisoners, we in effect

would be condoning their actions." DoD officials were prepared to go

ahead with the press conference during the coming week, Laird apprised
208 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Kissinger. "It is our firm belief that this approach is in the best interest of

the men still held prisoners," he concluded. 27

While still under treatment at the Bethesda Naval Hospital, Frishman

and Hegdahl appeared for a joint press conference on 2 September, introduced by the reading of a statement from Secretary Laird. Frishman led

off by saying that the North Vietnamese expected him to testify in support of their claims that American prisoners were well treated. In making

this clear his captors had warned him "not to forget that they still have

hundreds of my buddies in their hands." But fellow prisoners had urged

him to divulge the truth on his return, without regard for any reprisals

they might suffer as a result. According to Frishman, one of the men who

had instructed him to speak out was Lt. Cdr. Richard A. Stratton, the

officer whose puppet-like movements had aroused suspicions of torture and

possible brainwashing when he was displayed before newsmen in 1967.

Frishman related that when prisoners wrote or broadcast that their

treatment was humane, those statements were extorted by the enemy and

were the opposite of the truth. Prisoner appearances before visiting delegations were also coerced and usually followed a well-rehearsed script.

"If they don't have statements of humane treatment, they have ways of

getting them."

The two returnees then described their own harsh treatment and

the more severe tortures others had undergone. Hegdahl had been kept

in solitary confinement for seven months. Frishman said that Lt. Cdr.

John S. McCain III, though suffering from multiple fractures at the time

of capture, had endured in an isolation cell for more than a year. On the

basis of the care given his own shattered elbow and his observation of

other cases, Frishman concluded that the enemy's medical treatment was

meant to keep the prisoners alive bur not to bring about their full recovery.

Speaking again of Stratton, Frishman said he had been "tied up with

ropes to such a degree that he still has large scars on his arms from rope

burns which became infected. He was deprived of sleep, beaten, had his

finger nails removed" and was put in a dark cell alone for 38 days. In

attempting to sum up, Frishman said: "All I'm interested in is for Hanoi to

live up to their claims of humane and lenient treatment of prisoners of

war. I don't think solitary confinement, forced statements, living in a cage

for three years, being put in straps, not being allowed to sleep or eat,

removal of finger nails, being hung from a ceiling, having an infected

arm which was almost lost, not receiving medical care, being dragged

along the ground with a broken leg, or not allowing an exchange of mail

to prisoners of war are humane .... I feel it is time people are aware of

the facts." 28
The Go Public Campaign 209

DoD officials considered the press conference an outstanding success.

Beyond doubt it gave increased credibility to the charge of inhumane treatment of prisoners of war and thus contributed to the mounting public

concern for the captive Americans. Acting Secretary of State Richardson

wrote that "it provides convincing new information," and he advised

Laird that State inrended to make full use of the Frishman-Hegdahl

material in the Paris talks and other international forums. Subsequently,

the two returnees testified before a committee of Congress and dedicated

much of their time in the next two years to carrying their "message from

Hanoi" around the country (Hegdahl even traveled to Paris) to meetings

of PW/MIA families, civic and patriotic organizations, and anyon~ that

would listen. 29

Widening ofthe Go Public Campaign

The Go Public campaign advanced with sustained support from each

of the military services and from other elements of DoD, particularly the

office of the assistant secretary for public affairs, which under Daniel

Henkin insured that every statement by Secretary Laird received appropriate press coverage and that other materials continually reached news

agencies and television outlets. Henkin and his staff scheduled press conferences and speaking engagements for several of the returned or escaped

prisoners (in addition to Frishman and Hegdahl) and encouraged civic

organizations, professional societies, and PW/MIA family members to

participate in activities that generated publicity. They succeeded, for

instance, in arranging for the plight of the prisoners to be given recognition during the halftime ceremonies at several sports events with national

television coverage. 50

In March 1970 Laird personally selected Air Force Brig. Gen. Daniel

"Chappie" James, Jr., to be Henkin's deputy, with particular responsibility

for focusing public attention on the central issues of the Go Public

campaign. An imposing figure with exceptional ability as an inspirational

speaker, James was a highly effective spokesman, whether talking to young

people, veterans groups, or business associations, and he also established

a strong rapport with leading members of the National League of Families.

In two typical months of 1971 a Public Affairs activities calendar showed

him delivering 13 speeches in February and 18 in March, with a television interview in Chicago, brief remarks at the Gridiron Club dinner in

Washington, and an appearance before the Texas legislature also penciled

in during that period. He served as grand marshal of the parade during
210 THE LONG ROAD HOME

the PW-MIA Week of Concern in Clovis, New Mexico, one of many

events at which an Air Force precision team flew the symbolic "missing

man" formation ..'!

General James and other 000 officials never doubted that Secretary

Laird stood behind their efforts on behalf of the prisoners of war and

would applaud if they undertook even wider endeavors. They had before

them his own example of returning frequently to the subject during speaking engagements around the country and of finding time for informal

meetings with PW/MIA wives and parents along the way. Other reminders

reached them periodically. In June 1970 Deputy Secretary Packard noted

completion of the first year of the department's effort to make the

American public aware of the inhumane policies of North Vietnam and its

allies toward captured U.S. military personnel, and he renewed the request

that senior civilians and general and flag officers discuss the PW/MIA

problem during their public appearances. In early November Laird declared

that there was "no more appropriate occasion for highlighting the PWI

MIA issue" than the upcoming Veterans Day observances, in which many

Defense officials would take part..'2

The Go Public campaign had been well under way by the time of the

Frishman-Hegdahl press conference in September 1969. Laird and Defense

agencies had taken the lead, with assistance from the State Department,

but other supporters soon appeared. Members of Congress quickly adopted

the main themes of the campaign as their own. They gave welcome confirmation that obtaining fair treatment for the captive Americans and their

safe return were purposes that transcended ordinary partisan considerations and could be pursued without becoming embroiled in the broader

debate over the course of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia.

Action in the Go Public campaign soon began to build on other fronts

as information about the plight of the prisoners caught the attention and

engaged the emotions of persons beyond official Washington. Americans

took up the suggestion that a groundswell of concern and support for the

prisoners, the missing, and their families could influence North Vietnam

to comply with the Geneva Convention and move toward resolution of the

PW/MIA issue as a humanitarian matter separate from the other questions

under negotiation. In the years from 1969 through 1972 the appeal of this

idea motivated thousands of individuals and scores of public and private

organizations to devote time and resources to the campaign. The resulting massive and sustained outpouring of sympathetic concern, protest, and

entreaty took many forms. Even a small sampling of the more significant

efforts on behalf of the prisoners and missing is impressive.
The Go Public Campaign 211

Congressional Effirts

In the years before 1969 members of Congress had not been silent

about the fate of the men missing or captured in Southeast Asia, but for

the most part the comments were those of individual members, speaking

about the problems of PW/MIA families among their constituencies or

reacting to an isolated event in the current news. As the Go Public campaign

evolved, Congress began responding on an institutional level, with resolutions, committee hearings, and a chorus of speeches on the floor and

with additional material inserted in the record. As public concern over

the prisoners and their families grew and became more vocal, congressional

activity kept pace.

The first scattered reactions within the halls of Congress came mainly

from members with a particular interest in military affairs. One week

after Secretary Laird's initial statement on 19 May 1969, Rep. Bob Wilson

of California introduced the subject of "Inhumane Treatment of U.S.

Prisoners" and placed both the statement and the text of the 000 briefing in the Congressional Record. Soon afterward Texas Senator John Tower

offered his colleagues a lengthier commentary on the matter and included

the briefing text as an extension of his remarks. Then on 9 June a leading

figure among those who questioned the wisdom of U.S. policy in Vietnam, Arkansas Senator J. William Fulbright, made a short speech on the

floor of the chamber. Without mentioning the recent efforts of Defense

spokesmen he nevertheless took their part, pointing out that "the North

Vietnamese Government could perform a humanitarian service to the prisoners and their families, and also help to create a more favorable negotiating atmosphere by providing the names of the American prisoners

of war; releasing sick and wounded prisoners on a reciprocal basis; permitting the regular delivery of mail; and allowing visits to the remaining

prisoners by neutral representatives."33

Laird sent notes to both Tower and Wilson thanking them for their

assistance in bringing the plight of the prisoners to the attention of the

American public. His aide for legislative affairs, Jack L. Stempler, hastened

to suggest that Fulbright receive the same courtesy. "It might not be a

bad idea if we show the good Senator that we appreciate 'some' of his

statements." Laird sent a note without delay.34

Congressional interest and response picked up noticeably following

Hanoi's 3 July announcement of the impending release of Rumble,

Frishman, and Hegdahl. On 13 August, shortly after the returnees' arrival

in the United States but well before their revelations about the conditions

of captivity, 40 senators of both parties and of diverse attitudes toward the
212 THE LONG ROAD HOME

war joined in protesting North Vietnam's "inhumane and inexcusable"

refusal to identify other prisoners and missing. "Along with Americans

everywhere, we too rejoiced with the families of the three servicemen freed

from North Vietnamese captivity," their statement began. But their joy

was "clouded by the knowledge that 1,365 other American families are

still waiting-some for the release of a husband or son, some even for definite word whether a loved one is dead or alive." The senators pledged

full support to the administration's efforts to bring Hanoi to comply with

the Geneva Convention, and they urged other governments and "ordinary

men and women around the world" to make their voices heard as well. 35

In the Capitol's other chamber a high point in the expression of

such sentiments occurred on 17 September 1969, during a Special Order

of the House of Representatives sponsored by Congressman William L.

Dickinson of Alabama. As a parliamentary means of designating in

advance a period of absolute priority for consideration of a specific subject,

this procedure allowed members to come prepared to speak on the treatment of American prisoners by North Vietnam. They did so, in proceedings that filled 68 pages of the Congressional Record and that included

many affecting passages read from letters received from relatives of the

missing servicemen. 16

By October more than 275 House members had lent their names

to resolutions relating to the American prisoners in Vietnam. Following

hearings under the chairmanship of Rep. Clement ]. Zablocki (Wis.), a

subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs produced a resolution

encompassing the main thrust of the proposals under study. House members

approved Concurrent Resolution 454 by a vote of 405-0 on 15 December

1969. After a bill of particulars that began with the enemy's refusal to

identify the captives, the resolution declared that "the Congress strongly

protests the treatment of United States servicemen held prisoner by

North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, calls

on them to comply with the requirements of the Geneva Convention, and

approves and endorses efforts by the United States Government, the United

Nations, the International Red Cross, and other leaders and peoples of

the world to obtain humane treatment and release of American prisoners

of war." The Senate gave its concurring approval, also by unanimous vote,

in February 1970.\7

In March occurred the first announcement of a forthcoming event

that was to stand among all actions of congressional origin as the single

most striking contribution to the Go Public campaign. The instigator

and driving spirit was Kansas Senator Robert ]. Dole, whose commitment

stemmed from his own personal sacrifice during World War II, when he
The Go Public Campaign 213

suffered a crippling injury that nearly cost him his life, and, more immediately, an experience the previous month that left him deeply affected.

Scheduled as the principal Republican representative on the bipartisan list

of speakers at a rally in support of the prisoners of war in Constitution

Hall on the eve of Washington's birthday, Dole arrived to find that of rhe

great hall's 3,811 seats, not even 300 were filled. His feelings became more

deeply engaged as he observed the evident distress of the wives and parents

present. The thought seized him that they must not be left believing that

the evening's turnout was a true gauge of their fellow Americans' concern.

He vowed to fill Constitution Hall within 90 days for a tribute to the

prisoners and missing.'R

Dole made his first formal announcement of the planned Constitution

Hall rally on the floor of the Senate on 20 March 1970. To assist in organizing the affair he had assembled a bipartisan committee composed of six of

his Senate colleagues and six members of the House. Arrangements were

being coordinated with Mrs. Stockdale and other family representatives and

with major veterans and civic groups in the Washington area. The date set

was 1 May, which Dole noted was already designated "Law Day, U.S.A."

"We chose to declare our support for these missing Americans and POW's

within the context of Law Day to emphasize our belief in the rule of law,

especially the law of nations, which is embodied in the 1949 Geneva Conventions on prisoners of war," which "both North Vietnam and the NLF

have persistently and callously violated."'~

As the program took form it acquired the title "Appeal for International

Justice," and by late April Dole expected that more than 600 PW/MIA

wives, parents, and children from all parts of the country would attend.

Both chambers of Congress quickly approved a resolution dedicating

Friday, 1 May 1970, to "an appeal for international justice for all American

prisoners of war and servicemen missing in action in Southeast Asia." The

resolution also called on President Nixon to designate the Sunday of that

weekend as a national day of prayer. 40

The Constitution Hall rally did not disappoint Dole's expectations.

Speakers appearing before what the press described as "a near-capacity

audience" included Vice President Spiro Agnew, 10 members of Congress,

6 wives of the missing men, Lt. Robert Frishman, a movie star, an astronaut, and Texas business and civic leader H. Ross Perot. In a brief message

that occupied the first page of the printed program President Nixon paid

tribute to "the inspirational qualities of courage and endurance ...

demonstrated by the families of our men who are missing in action or

known to be imprisoned in Southeast Asia." He declared that "this Administration has no more urgent goal than to secure information about
214 THE LONG ROAD HOME

and eventual freedom for these Americans who have done so much for

their country. "41

The high level of congressional attention to the prisoner of war

problem continued thereafter until the PWs' return. Further resolutions

passed, rarely with a dissenting vote. Committees in one or both houses

convened hearings each year, receiving the views and appeals of PW/

MIA family organizations as well as others, such as the peace activists

who claimed to provide the most assured channel for mail delivery to

and from the prisoners. Scores of witnesses appeared before the committees,

including former prisoners, next of kin and representatives of the National

League of Families, officials of the Red Cross and the Defense and State

Departments, spokesmen for private organizations, and other concerned

individuals. The reprinting of speeches, feature articles, columnists' commentaries, and other relevant materials further swelled the record. By the

time of Operation Homecoming in early 1973 the hearings and reports

numbered many thousands of pages. This torrent conveyed a simple

message: the American people and their representatives were deeply concerned about the fate of the prisoners and the missing and wished to do

everything possible on their behalf.

Finally, a continuing stream of congressmen and senators journeyed

to Paris, where some succeeded in personally pleading the case of the

prisoners and missing with representatives of North Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. Members prominent

enough to feel assured their communications would not be ignored, such as

Senators Fulbright and Edward M. Kennedy, corresponded intermittently

with the highest officials in Hanoi and on a few occasions received significant information in reply.

The Department afState

The State Department remained a committed partner 10 the Go

Public campaign. At a House Committee hearing in November 1969 the

deputy assistant secretary for East Asia and Pacific affairs, William H.

Sullivan, delivered an eloquent statement of the campaign's main themes.

In the Paris negotiations Ambassador Lodge had continued to raise the

subject of prisoners of war. At the session on 25 September he rejected

a North Vietnamese charge that in doing so he sought to "sidestep the

central issues" of the conflict. "The fate of those prisoners is not a peripheral question," Lodge declared. "The whole world is watching to see what

you do to improve the treatment of the men you hold and whether you
The Go Public Campaign 215

will make it possible for their next of kin-who have assuredly harmed no

one-at least to know whether their relations are alive or dead. This is

not much to ask." His successor as chief U.S. negotiator, Ambassador

Philip C. Habib, was equally persistent. At the final meeting of 1969 he

again reviewed the enemy's record and announced that the U.S. government was releasing to the press and to Hanoi's delegation a full list of

its military personnel who were missing and possibly prisoners in Southeast Asia. Habib said the action was taken "in the hope that your side, even

at this late date, will indicate which men are prisoners and those whom you

know to be dead, as a matter of humanitarian concern for their families. "42

State pressed strongly in other international forums for endorsement

of the U.S. stand on prisoner of war treatment. Addressing the representatives of 77 governments and 91 Red Cross societies at the 21st International Conference of the Red Cross in Istanbul in September 1969,

Ambassador Graham Martin described the "savage and inhuman treatment" of the U.S. prisoners. He quoted some of the harrowing details from

Lieutenant Frishman's account and used the word "torture" more freely

than any U.S. spokesman up to that time. In charging nine distinct violations of the Geneva Convention Martin also pointed to North Vietnam's

repeated rejection of overtures from the International Committee of the

Red Cross. The results were all that the U.S. delegation could have

wished: a resolution, approved 114-0 and bearing the respected name of

the Red Cross, that would be cited frequently in subsequent reports, statements, and diplomatic exchanges. 43

One State Department official commended the way the Istanbul conference resolution "cut through any possible quibbles that could be made

by a party to the Vietnam conflict." For one thing, the language chosen

gave few openings for Hanoi's claim that absence of a declaration of war

by the United States placed its soldiers and airmen outside the shelter of

the Geneva Convention. The resolution called on all parties to "abide by

the obligations set forth in the Convention and upon all authorities involved in an armed conflict to ensure that all uniformed members of the

regular armed forces of another party to the conflict ... are treated

humanely and given the fullest measure of protection prescribed by the

Convention." It went further, declaring that "even apart from the Convention, the international community has consistently demanded humane

treatment for prisoners of war," including a list of specifics that extended

from provision of an adequate diet and medical care through a requirement that "at all times prisoners be protected from physical and mental

torture, abuse and reprisals. "44
216 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Soon afterward diplomatic representatives of the United States

began working toward a similar success in the larger arena of the United

Nations. They intended to put Hanoi on notice that its treatment of

prisoners had the concerned attention of most of the sovereign nations of

the world and thereby to intensify the pressure on North Vietnam to

comply with the Geneva Convention. U.S. Alternate Representative to the

General Assembly Rita E. Hauser took the initial step on 11 November in

an address before Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) of

the world body. Directing attention to "a most fundamental violation of

human decency," her long and impassioned speech reviewed the provisions

of the Geneva Convention and set out in full North Vietnam's record of

prisoner mistreatment and denial of the convention's applicability. The

United States broached this subject before the United Nations as a humanitarian rather than a political matter, Hauser said, and she quoted the central

passages of the Istanbul resolution as a document conceived in that same

spirit and "reflecting the conscience of the international community."

The U.S. representative called for immediate action, limited for the

present, however, to obtaining one fundamental improvement endorsed by

UN Secretary-General U Thant, who on 30 October 1969 had stated that

the government in Hanoi "ought to give an international humanitarian

organization such as the League of Red Cross Socieries access to the Americans detained in North Vietnam." While the matter was obviously of vital

importance to the United States, she said, it was also of paramount interest

to all nations. "The failure to treat any prisoner of war, wherever he may

be, in accordance with common standards of decency, is an affront to all

who claim the mantle of civilization. "4'

A fuller accomplishment of the U.S. purpose occurred late in the

following year, 1970, thanks to an intensified effort that followed President Nixon's address to the General Assembly on 23 October. He declared

that "the United Nations should register its concern about the treatment of

prisoners of war and press all adversaries in this conflict, indeed in every

conflict, to honor the Geneva Convention." A resolution to that effect

came under consideration in Committee III during November, and Senator Claiborne Pel!, U.S. Representative to the UN General Assembly,

championed it in an address to the committee. The committee endorsed

the resolution by a large majority, and on 9 December the General

Assembly adopted it by a vote of 67 to 30 with 20 abstentions. 46

UN Resolution 2676 called on "all parties to any armed conflict"

to comply with the terms of the Geneva Convention on treatment of

prisoners of war, with particular reference to permitting regular inspection
The Go Public Campaign 217

of the camps by a humanitarian organization or protecting power. It also

called specifically for compliance with the article that required repatriation

of seriously ill or wounded prisoners of war and that allowed for agreements transferring other long-term prisoners to internment in a neutral

country. The resolution endorsed the continuing attempts of the ICRC

to secure the effective application of the convention, and it also requested

the UN secretary-general "to exert all efforts to obtain humane treatment

for prisoners of war." The document contained no direct reference to the

Southeast Asia hostilities, but in publicizing it U.S. spokesmen had no

difficulty in relating its general pronouncements to the particular instance

of Hanoi's treatment of American servicemen."?

The American Red Cross

The American Red Cross was among the most active participants in

the campaign to induce North Vietnam to honor the Geneva Convention.

Although always compatible with the intentions of the U.S. government,

the ARC's endeavors followed primarily from dedication to the traditional

humanitarian purposes of the society rather than from doing the government's bidding. The ARC and U.S. government delegations co-sponsored

the prisoner of war resolution adopted by the International Conference of

the Red Cross at Istanbul in September 1969, but the society's later efforts

to spread awareness of the resolution and to focus public attention on the

prisoner issue resulted from an independent decision by the ARC's leaders

to "go public" on their own.

In October the ARC launched a "Write Hanoi" campaign that urged

Americans to send letters calling on North Vietnam's president to insure

that the treatment of U.S. captives followed the tenets of the Geneva

Convention. Inviting editorial comment, the ARC dispatched campaign

literature and a copy of the Istanbul resolution to hundreds of daily

newspapers and to some 7,000 weekly publications as well. Another

version of the material went to 450 college radio and television stations

and nearly 2,000 campus newspapers."S

The Red Cross appeal for letter writing happened to coincide with

a similar effort by the Reader's Digest, whose November issue carried a

stirring article about the prisoners and their families by Louis R. Stockstill.

Its keynote proclaimed that "nothing less than a worldwide cry of outrage is

likely to bring a halt to the grossly inhuman treatment our men are

receiving in the enemy's prison camps." At its close the article instructed
218 THE LONG ROAD HOME

readers on how to participate in the effort, naming Hanoi's chief delegate

in the Paris negotiations, Xuan Thuy, as the preferred target for letter

wtiters. Meanwhile, as a contribution to the ARC's campaign, several

advertising agencies had turned their talents to the production of spot

announcements and newspaper and magazine advertisements, which the

media displayed as a public service. 49

After reviewing the program's progress in February 1970 the ARC's

board of governors resolved to "pursue without interruption or abatement

every effort to bring about the humane treatment of prisoners of war to

which they are entitled under the statutes of international law and the

dictates of moral decency." As a step toward fulfilling this purpose the

ARC communicated with 112 Red Cross societies around the world,

reminding them anew of the Istanbul resolution and urging that more

than lip service be paid to its principles, by actively interceding with North

Vietnamese authorities on behalf of the American captives. Concurrently,

on the home front, Red Cross leaders sought to keep the Write Hanoi

campaign at a high pitch. 50

An ARC news release in October 1970 srressed that "there is no

intention of letting the letter-writing protest die out. The Red Cross daily

is urging Americans: 'Send a letter to North Vietnam. It'll cost you a

quarter. But it may save a life.'" During the bowl games ending the year's

football season copies of a leaflet titled "5 Minutes and 25 Cents" were distribured by the hundreds of thousands. In all, 6.5 million copies were

printed, with many being disseminated through the ARC's 3,500 local

chapters and affiliates, at military installations, and by telephone companies

in their billing envelopes. 51

What Red Cross officials considered an outstanding success in reinvigorating the Write Hanoi campaign took place in the spring of 1971.

It involved a direct association with the Reader's Digest, whose April

issue again carried a piece written by Stockstill, "Inside the Prisons of

Hanoi." As before, its closing exhorted readers to express their views to

North Vietnam's leaders, but this time it offered a prepared statement

for signature, with space for an additional personal message if desired.

The statement appeared on a detachable postcard, addressed for mailing

to "Help Our POWs," at the box number of the American Red Cross in

Washington. The Digest advised its readers that Red Cross headquarters

would tabulate their responses and see that the messages got to the government of North Vietnam. Over the following months more than 679,000 of

the postcards were forwarded to Hanoi. 52
The Go Public Campaign 219

Private Groups and Individuals

More remarkable than the response of institutions such as Congress

and the ARC was the widespread involvement of individual citizens and

private organizations in the Go Public campaign. The Americans who

became engaged in the effort to aid the PW/MIAs and their families

probably numbered in the millions. Enumerating the private and public

entities through which their efforts were channeled yields an extensive list:

veterans groups, professional societies, service clubs, civic federations,

chambers of commerce, state governors and legislatures, municipalities,

schools, labor unions, business associations, individual corporations, and

numerous volunteer organizations newly formed for the purpose.

From these many sources came a commitment of time, energy, and

material means that sustained the effort to publicize the issue, rally massive

sympathy and support for the PW/MIAs, and find effective ways of making

these sentiments known to world organizations and opinion makers in

other nations, and particularly to the leaders of North Vietnam and its

supporters. The outpouring of sympathetic concern found expression in

petition drives and letter-writing campaigns, billboard advertising and

street-corner appeals, speeches and radio and television discussions, and

numerous public observances, from parades to silent vigils. There were also

community fund drives to underwrite the travel of family members to Paris

and other points abroad where they might plead the case for the captured

and missing Americans or elicit information about them.

The successive Write Hanoi campaigns probably best typified the

entire undertaking. Although never matching the scope and prominence of

the letter-writing appeals launched by the Red Cross and the Reader's Digest

in October and November 1969, others had started even earlier to sponsor

this means of expressing the concern felt by Americans for the prisoners,

the missing, and their families. One of the first, the Fairchild Hiller

Corporation, acknowledged being moved to act by the Defense Department's initial disclosures in the Go Public campaign. In July 1969 the firm

prepared a special supplement to the company newspaper that would

inaugurate the letter-writing drive among its employees. The instructions

designated North Vietnam's president as the addressee and supplied

several sample texts for brief letters that "should not be abusive" but

nevertheless should condemn specific failures to honor the Geneva Convention. The management undertook to provide the international airmail

postage for each letter written. Company president Edward G. Uhl advised Secretary Laird that if the project proved as successful as expected,

"Fairchild Hiller Corporation will urge and assist other organizations to
220 THE LONG ROAD HOME

follow our lead." Other corporations, such as North American Rockwell,

did subsequently establish programs along the same lines. j]

For most participants the one-time gesture of registering a protest

against the enemy's practices gave satisfaction enough, but others became

caught up in the campaign to assure an ever-mounting tally of letters. To

cite but one instance of the work of these more devoted adherents, in

Paris in January 1971 representatives of a San Diego group joined with

others from Tennessee in stacking an estimated six tons of letters in front

of the North Vietnamese legation. The California contingent also went to

the villa in a Paris suburb that housed the Viet Cong delegation to the

peace negotiations. Wearing prisoners' outfits, they began unrolling a halfmile-long petition scroll, with the avowed intention of carpeting the entire

street leading to the delegation's headquarters. Objections interposed by

the police curtailed this activity bur helped assure that the event received

attention in the press. News accounts quoted a Californian as saying, "We

have no quarrel with the French police, only with the Vietcong. We have

accomplished our mission, which was to let them know that 26 million

Americans care about those prisoners. "j4

The National League ofFamilies

The wives, parents, and other relatives of the absent men had a central

role in the Go Public campaign. Their principal organization, the National

League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia,

emerged during the campaign's first year. Incorporation of the League

and the opening of its national headquarters in Washington occurred in

June 1970.* In testimony before a congressional subcommittee a few

weeks earlier Mrs. Sybil Stockdale described her organization's purposes

in terms that virtually duplicated those of the Go Public campaign.

Our aims are to inform fellow Americans and world cirizens

of the codes for treatment of combatant prisoners, as established

by the Geneva Convention for the dignity and protection of

mankind. We want to make known the true and desperate plight

of the American prisoners of war and the men listed as missing

in action and to make known that their desperate plight is due to

the refusal of the North Vietnamese Government to abide by any

of the simple humane requirements for the treatment of combatant prisoners ....

• See Chapter 19.
The Go Public Campaign 221

We believe that the cumulative voices of the indignation

from people all over the world will have a profound influence on

the North Vietnamese Government if they want to be recognized

as a respectable government in the world community. j)

League members and officials engaged in a wide variety of activities,

with some of the most newsworthy occurring overseas. Pursuing the hope

of opening an effective discourse with the peace delegations of North Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government in the South, a party

of League members first visited Paris in September 1969. Besides frequent

revisits to the site of the peace negotiations, trips to many other capital

cities followed. Whether in Oslo or Vientiane, family members sought

appointments with officials of the nation's foreign ministry and its Red

Cross society and with any diplomatic representatives stationed there by

North Vietnam, the PRG, or the Communist insurgents in Laos, the Pathet

Lao. Attempts to open discussions or make inquiries were usually rebuffed

by the officials. Nevertheless, wire service photographs of American wives

being turned away from the barred gates of a Communist legation had

their publicity value. 56

During 1971 overseas journeys staged by the League became more

sophisticated and effectively organized. In Maya group of more than 160

members flew to Geneva to be present during a conference of governmental

experts on international humanitarian law applicable to armed conflicts,

convened under the auspices of the ICRe. The PW/MIA relatives hoped to

impress the delegates with the need for more effective enforcement of existing law and custom, drawing their attention particularly to the current

violations in Southeast Asia. The U.S. mission in Geneva advised Washington authorities that the group had moved on to undertake further

representations in Paris, "following what they believe was a fruitful visit.

Group handled themselves extremely well. Their quiet, dignified presence

left good impression on ICRC delegates and reps of various foreign missions on whom they called. "57

The PW/MIA relatives made their greatest contribution back home in

the United States, however, by their untiring, day-by-day involvement in

the effort to rally popular support and spur official action on behalf of the

captured and missing. Sometimes they played no more than a symbolic

role, as when appearing in the gallery during the Special Order session of

the House of Representatives in September 1969 and during Rita Hauser's

UN address two months later. More commonly, members of the League

and of smaller next of kin groups such as Reunite Our Families dispatched

letters to the editor, issued bulletins, held press conferences, and participated in television interviews. They supported virtually every petition
222 THE LONG ROAD HOME

drive and letter-writing campaign and spread their message by speaking at

innumerable gatherings and luncheon meetings.

H. Ross Perot

Of the thousands of Americans who involved themselves in publicizing the PW/MIA issue, none cut as wide a swath as H. Ross Perot, a

wealthy Dallas entrepreneur. Perot organized and led a well-advertised

campaign aimed both at providing direct assistance to the American

prisoners and at uniting his fellow citizens in support of President Nixon's

efforts to obtain a peace settlement in Vietnam. He said more than once

that he aimed to get his countrymen to stand together behind their president as the one official on whom hopes rested for the negotiation of an

acceptable conclusion to the Vietnam conflict. To those who thought they

detected a partisan political motive in his actions Perot declared that he

would have mounted the same campaign if Nixon's opponent, Hubert H.

Humphrey, had been the victor in the 1968 election.')8

Using his own resources, on 3 November 1969 Perot established

United We Stand, Inc. (UWS), staffing it initially with 36 people drawn

primarily from the executive ranks of his own company, Electronic Data

Systems, Inc. Immediately UWS launched a media blitz. On 5 November it

placed a full-page advertisement in 117 newspapers calling for support of

President Nixon's efforts. Another full-page display expressing concern for

the prisoners appeared the following Sunday, and a second printing of the

first ad occurred on 16 November. Later in the month Perot's organization

distributed a half-hour television documentary on the Vietnam conflict,

featuring a returned prisoner of war, the wife of a pilot missing in action,

and the parents of a son posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. In

the following weeks United We Stand purchased time on 53 stations for

showings of the film. Meanwhile UWS staff members faced the problem

of handling the "phenomenal" return of coupons from the newspaper ads

and of postcards from a total printing of 10 million that had been distributed mainly through the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars,

Boy Scouts, and Junior Chamber of Commerce. Both forms called for

the senders to affix their signatures to a statement of support for the

president in his efforts to secure a just and lasting peace. It was said that

by the end of November the cost of Perot's campaign already exceeded

one million dollars. ')9

In mid-December United We Stand announced plans for an attempt

to deliver 60,000 pounds of Christmas dinners, gifts, clothing, and medical
The Go Public Campaign 223

supplies directly to the prisoners in North Vietnam and to send a large

contingent of PW/MIA wives and children to Paris to seek an audience

with the North Vietnamese peace delegation. If denied that privilege the

family group intended to stage a four-hour silent vigil before the delegation's headquarters.

Perot had already requested permission from authorities in North

Vietnam for the flights to Hanoi, and his organization leased three large jet

aircraft-two, given the names "Peace on Earth" and "Goodwill Toward

Men," for the prospective delivery to North Vietnam, and "The Spirit of

Christmas," for the Paris trip. The dinners and other supplies were assembled

in Los Angeles, and family members from 21 states prepared to rendezvous

in New York. As part of the scheme four wives of men missing in action

met with mid-level officials at the embassies of Poland, Sweden, India, and

the Soviet Union in Washington and pleaded for assistance in inducing

Hanoi to allow delivery of the shipments. 6o

With suitable publicity "Peace on Earth" took off from Dallas for

Southeast Asia on 20 December, carrying Perot and UWS staff members,

a coterie of newsmen, and Red Cross officials experienced in the mass

distribution of emergency supplies. During stops in Bangkok and Vientiane

Perot renewed the appeal for permission to fly on to Hanoi, or to come as an

advance agent himself and explain the project to North Vietnam's leaders.

Meeting with no success, Perot redirected all efforts toward qualifying

for what appeared to be the only remaining means of getting the food,

clothing, and medicines to the captive Americans. He would comply with

the terms of the answer given to one of his earlier cables by Premier Pham

Van Dong, which specified that no shipments would be accepted unless

they conformed to the regulations already announced for Christmas parcels mailed by the men's next of kin. Packages, individually addressed, must

weigh no more than 3 kilograms (6.6 lbs.) and be mailed through Moscow

not later than 31 December, rather than being transported by Perot's aircraft directly to Hanoi.

Having initiated a request for Soviet permission to land in Moscow,

Perot sent "Peace on Earth" through Tokyo to Anchorage, Alaska. There his

assistants broadcast a call for volunteers and organized them to undertake

a production-line repackaging of the plane's cargo. The hundreds who

came to help-Red Cross volunteers, members of the armed forces, Girl

Scouts, Boy Scouts, and others-completed the task in 10 hours. The reloaded "Peace on Earth" then flew over the top of the globe to Copenhagen,

where Perot awaited Soviet flight clearance. The Moscow authorities

finally gave a negative response shortly before the deadline. A Washington
224 THE LONG ROAD HOME

newspaper called the entire performance "one of the classic runarounds"

of all time. 61

On returning to the United States with his party and the plane's

cargo, Ross Perot pointed to a positive aspect of the venture: one of the

goals had been to produce a concentration of events during December

that would draw attention repeatedly to the problem of the prisoners and

missing, and the daily news accounts of his 35,000-mile odyssey had gone

far toward accomplishing that. The main conclusion Perot drew from his

experience gave direct reinforcement to the Go Public campaign. "I learned

that 1 can't bring relief to these men," he said during a New Year's Day

appearance on television, "but the American people without any question

can bring relief to these men if this becomes a matter of intense national

concern." He immediately announced his sponsorship of a new letterwriting campaign, besides sketching other projects he intended to pursue. 62

The excursion to Paris could claim somewhat greater success. The

party of 58 wives and 94 children left New York aboard "The Spirit of

Christmas" at 7:00 p.m. on 24 December. They had wired a request to the

North Vietnamese delegation in Paris for a meeting on Christmas Day,

and on arrival at Orly airport that morning the family members proceeded

directly to the DRV mission's headquarters by bus. There they found the

street cordoned off by French police, who prevented a closer approach

but stated that officials of Hanoi's delegation had agreed to meet with

three wives on the following afternoon.

After discussion, family members and their United We Stand escorts

agreed that the three designated wives would stay in Paris for the next

day's appointment while the others reembarked on "The Spirit of Christmas" for the trip home. To satisfy a widely held desire, however, the

entire party first proceeded to Notre Dame Cathedral to spend some

moments in prayer. While they were thus engaged a police messenger

hurried in with word that the North Vietnamese now wished to receive

the three wives immediately. All returned to the buses and retraced the

course to the DRV mission. Only the three women were admitted, without

children or their own interpreter, while the main party proceeded to Orly

to wait for them.

The meeting between the American women and four North Vietnamese officials who never revealed their identity lasted a little over an hour.

For the first 30 minutes or so the wives were subjected to a lecture on

North Vietnam's history, ending with a tirade about the Nixon administration's war of aggression, the atrocities the captured airmen were said

to have committed, and Ross Perot's "dark scheme" to support President

Nixon's purposes. The wives responded by pressing for release of a list of
The Go Public Campaign 225

all the prisoners held by North Vietnam, information on the status of the

husbands and fathers represented by the group that had come to Paris,

and assistance in gaining permission for the flight of "Peace on Earth"

to Hanoi. The North Vietnamese officials denied these requests but

did consent to receive a list of the men represented by the visiting party.

They stated that their government would "eventually and gradually" release the names of the prisoners, directly to the families rather than to the

U.S. government or through Red Cross channels.

The wives emerged too emotionally shaken to face an immediate

press conference. They reported being treated with outward courtesy, but

the impact of the answers received was often brutal. One woman had

asked, "What should I tell my son, age 9, when he asks where is my father

and when is he coming home?" The reply: "Tell him his father is a murderer

of North Vietnamese children, and that he is being punished."

On reaching Orly the women did meet with the press. Then, still on

Christmas Day, the 152 wives and children took off for home, reaching

New York in the late afternoon, less than 22 hours after their original

departure. The three wives then held a second press conference. 63

The publicity garnered clearly constituted the chief benefit from

Perot's two enterprises in December. The events were pictured, spoken of,

or written about in news media throughout the world, with little of the

content reflecting favorably on North Vietnam's image. The managers of

United We Stand took note that the estimated value of this outpouring of

publicity far exceeded that generated by their paid advertising campaign in

November. Accordingly they were not disposed to lessen the emphasis on

spectacular stunts and seemingly quixotic ventures. In April 1970 Perot

transported 63 newsmen to South Vietnam to tour the camps where

captured North Vietnamese were held and to film a record of prison conditions. Perot also gathered letters written by the prisoners to their

families in the North. He began bombarding DRV officials with new

requests for authorization to fly to Hanoi in order to deliver both the

film and the letters, but without success. 6i

In testimony before a House subcommittee in May Perot told of

contacts with North Vietnamese representatives who refused to believe

that the people of the United States could be seriously aroused over "just

1,500 men." To aid in proving them wrong and to provide a constant

reminder of the men's suffering, he asked permission to construct replicas

of the Hanoi prison cell and the Viet Cong bamboo cage that typically

housed the captured Americans and put them on display in the Capitol.

A suitable location was found in the crypt, immediately below the Capitol's

rotunda, and ceremonies marking the unveiling of the exhibits occurred
226 THE LONG ROAD HOME

on 4 June 1970. Both Rep. Clement Zablocki and Speaker of the House

John McCormack expressed the hope that the thousands of visitors

from all parts of the country who streamed through the building each

day would view the display and read the accompanying text. "The result

must certainly be to banish any ignorance or indifference about the

plight of U.S. prisoners and to swell the chorus of Americans who are

protesting Hanoi's inhumane conduct toward our men," Zablocki concluded. Ross Perot and Assistant Secretary of Defense Warren Nutter also

took part in the ceremony.G)

Over the following years Perot continued to involve himself and the

UWS organization in an unremitting effort to galvanize public opinion

on behalf of the "forgotten men" and to build up irresistible pressure on

North Vietnam to improve its treatment of the prisoners. United We

Stand offered to supply specifications and photographs to assist other

groups wishing to build replicas of the cells and detention cages. It also

provided experienced counsel on how to structure and direct a letterwriting campaign. Perot commissioned a Gallup poll to track the rising

public awareness of the PW/MIA problem, and he continued to finance

trips abroad for family members, religious leaders, his own representatives,

and sundry others. GG

In the United States Perot's efforts received wide if not universal

acclaim. The Philadelphia Inquirer observed that "even though Perot may

have the best of intentions he magnifies the popular image abroad of

America as a land of ostentatious millionaires and billionaires who believe

that money can buy anything." Perot saw it differently, believing that his

wealth had allowed him to take actions that heightened awareness of the

PW/MIA issue while both puzzling and disconcerting the North Vietnamese. "They just couldn't conceive that an individual would, number one,

have the freedom to do this, and number two, have the resources, and then

maybe three, if he had the freedom and the resources, would have the desire

to do it." He felt that by such moves as offering to rebuild the hospitals

allegedly destroyed by U.S. airmen or to come to Hanoi to distribute relief

supplies to North Vietnamese war orphans he had discredited the Communists and confounded some of their propaganda themesY

The Campaign's Results

Within the United States the Go Public campaign brought awareness

of the prisoner issue to millions of citizens and called forth a national outpouring of compassion for the PW/MIA families, concern for the captive
The Go Public Campaign 227

Americans, and resentment of their treatment by the enemy. Finding effective means of expressing these feelings gave an added purpose to the lives of

many Americans and drew from them a major commitment of time,

talent, and resources. The government and people of the United States

directed their message to North Vietnam's leaders through every available

channel-at the conference table, by the efforts of private, official, or

third-country emissaries, by radio, TV, and other news media, through the

mail and by hand-delivered petitions-and, apparently, with some effect.

North Vietnam did progressively moderate its practices affecting

PWs beginning in 1969, the year the Go Public campaign was launched.

The leaders in Hanoi immediately revealed their sensitivity to the charges

of mistreatment when they stepped up the release of prisoner statements

and photographs designed to prove the men were living under humane conditions. Thereafter, prison conditions gradually improved, mail written by

prisoners and parcels delivered to them both increased, references to war

crimes charges became infrequent, and Hanoi finally provided a substantially accurate list of its captives. The criticisms leveled during the Go

Public campaign unquestionably contributed to the atmosphere in which

these changes occurred. Whether particular modifications of the enemy's

behavior can be directly attributed to the campaign is less certain,* except

perhaps in the instance of Hanoi's decision to provide the names of most

of its captives. Hanoi's giving way on this point appears to have been solely

for the purpose of ending the constant criticism for withholding the

men's identity.

In mid-December 1970 the North Vietnamese government invited

Senators Fulbright and Edward Kennedy to Paris to receive a listing titled

"U.S. Pilots Captured in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (from

August 5, 1964 to November 15, 1970)," in response to requests each

senator had made in letters to high-ranking DRV officials earlier in the

year. Each senator sent a representative who accepted the document from

the DRV 's Delegate General in France, Mai Van Bo, on 22 December. It

gave the name, rank, and serial number of 368 U.S. personnel, correctly

noting that 9 of these had subsequently been released and stating that 20

others had died after capture (15 "from grievous wounds when shot down";

5 "from serious diseases"). It acknowledged 339 men alive in captivity.68

To U.S. authorities only the date of death given for the 20 fatalities

was entirely new information. Earlier North Vietnamese statements that

these deaths had occurred were on record. Everyone of the remaining 339

was already a known prisoner of war. In fact, all but eight of them had

* See Rochester and Kiley, Honor Bound, 489-91.
228 THE LONG ROAD HOME

written letters home. "Furthermore," read one Defense Department statement, "we have ample reason to believe that the North Vietnamese hold

more men than the 339 listed."('')

Thus release of the list was no great concession, but it did remove

the basis for categorical charges that Hanoi refused to identify its prisoners.

To insure the desired impact on international opinion, North Vietnam also

passed copies to four governments-France, Sweden, India, and Algeriaand to Cora Weiss of the Committee of Liaison with Families of Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam. 7o

North Vietnam's actions did nothing to satisfy two of the Go Public

campaign's avowed purposes. By staying in informal channels when providing the prisoner list Hanoi avoided any acknowledgment of obligations

under the Geneva Convention. Premier Pham Van Dong's covering letter to

Fulbright declared that it was "not incumbent upon the Government of

the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam to hand the list ... to the U.S.

Government." The still more appropriate course of giving it to the International Committee of the Red Cross went unmentioned. 71 Similarly the

increase in the flow of mail and packages took place without reference to the

Geneva Convention and involved no pledge to observe that agreement's

minimum standards. Finally, the enemy remained entirely unresponsive to

the hope expressed in the United States that the campaign would induce

North Vietnam to negotiate about the repatriation of prisoners as a humanitarian matter separate from the political issues to be settled. Not until

October 1972, and entirely for reasons of their own, did North Vietnam's

negotiators make a gesture in that direction.
12

Other Defense Actions and Initiatives

By initiating the Go Public campaign in May 1969 Sectetary of

Defense Melvin Laird profoundly changed the U.S. government

approach to the prisoner of war issue. No longer reserved for confidential consultations, important aspects of the problem entered the public

domain and were openly discussed. In his dedication to the interests of

the captured and missing servicemen and their families Laird continued to

initiate actions, some as adjuncts to the Go Public campaign, others internally within the Nixon administration to insure that the PW issue remain

a central concern of top officials. A note passed to Laird on 9 July 1969

by one of his confidential advisers typified this latter activity. Would it

not be well, it asked, "to raise the POW question-in its broadest generic

sense-at the NSC meeting today (after the Latin American discussion)?

The idea would be to elicit appropriate Administration-wide attention,

direction, and cooperation on the host of tough issues involving POWs."!

Many of Laird's subsequent efforts were devoted to obtaining this kind

of deserved attention for the prisoner question at the highest levels of the

government. His initiatives followed also from a conviction that rightfully

Defense should take the lead in devising measures and guiding activities in

this field. At that moment in early July 1969, however, events were compelling

members of the new administration, in office only since January, to focus on

a legacy from the period ofState Department dominance-the policy regarding

the intrusion of peace advocates on the process of prisoner repatriation.

The Role ofAntiwar Activists in Prisoner Return

Throughout the Vietnam conflict, from 1961 until January 1973, enemy

releases of captured Americans were infrequent, sporadic, and limited to no

229
230 THE LONG ROAD HOME

more than three prisoners at a time. In the early years only servicemen

held by insurgent forces in South Vietnam or Laos were set free, but in

February 1968 North Vietnam for the first time released three captured

airmen, followed by three more in August. In both instances, rather than

releasing them to a representative of the U.S. government or the International Committee of the Red Cross, the North Vietnamese arranged for

the men to be escorted home by Americans prominent in the antiwar

movement, using commercial airlines.

As developed under Ambassador Harriman's direction, the policy

governing how the United States should respond took account of clear

indications that Hanoi would resent any U.S. interference with the arrangement, such as placing the men under military orders and transferring them

to the government's medical evacuation aircraft.*

Since Hanoi might vent its displeasure by cutting off further releases,

the Harriman policy called for the United States to acquiesce in most of

what the enemy required and to forgo strict application of the principle

that the men were at all times members of the U.S. armed forces and subject to military orders. The first U.S. embassy able to make contact with the

men during their homeward journey would offer them the choice between

continuing with their civilian escorts or returning to U.S. government control and shifting to a military medevac flight, with the advantages of shorter

travel time and constant medical supervision. Their decision was to be freely

made, with assurances, as Harriman originally phrased it, that the "U.S. Government does not in any way object to their returning commercial."2 Thus

if the men had been warned by their captors that departing from the

escort arrangement would jeopardize future releases, they could in good

conscience reject the normal course of returning to military control at the

first opportunity.

The State Department acted under this standing guidance in the summer of 1969, following Radio Hanoi's announcement on 3 July that three

more U.S. prisoners would soon be repatriated. Repeating the procedure used

in the two 1968 releases, the North Vietnamese representatives at the Paris

peace talks had already cabled David Dellinger, chairman of the National

Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, asking him to come

for consultations about dispatching a delegation of American peace activists to Hanoi to receive the released men and escort them home. At the

time, however, Dellinger's movements were under restraint since he had

been indicted in a federal court in Chicago for actions during the period of

the Democratic National Convention in 1968. Ordinarily defendants in

federal criminal cases were not permitted to travel beyond their home

* See Chapter 5.
Other Defense Actions and Initiatives 231

districts, but the court authorized Dellinger to go abroad after both the

State and Justice Departments signified they did not oppose his petition. 3

During his consultations in Paris Dellinger also met with the chief

U.S. peace negotiator, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, on 10 July. They

agreed that the procedures followed in the previous release still applied.

As Lodge reported it, "The United States would not put pressure on the

released prisoners to return to the United States by military aircraft and ...

the free choice of the prisoners in this regard would be respected."4

For some members of the Nixon administration this first experience

with peace activists playing a central role in the recovery of American prisoners was deeply offensive. Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, in particular,

found it difficult to accept that the most vocal opponents of the government's war policy should serve as intermediaries, in effect representing the

United States. To Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson he expressed

concern over the way the matter was being handled, including the unusual

measures taken to facilitate Dellinger's participation. 5

Richardson replied in a long memorandum describing the background

and timing of the current release, detailing the matters at issue, and supporting State's conclusion that, "in a nutshell, we have no alternative if

we want our men back now." "It hardly needs saying that Dellinger and

Co. are not our choice of intermediaries," he wrote, but the North Vietnamese remained firm in their intention to release prisoners only to representatives of the American peace movement, and they had asked specifically

for Dellinger, a man they had dealt with before, to make the arrangements.

Wanting to place no obstacle in the way of the prisoners' return, State had

joined Justice in not objecting to lifting Dellinger's travel restriction. To

have opposed it, Richardson said, "would have caused fruitless public

controversy in which the Administration would have been charged with

insensitivity on the 'humanitarian' question of the release of prisoners." As for

the party of antiwar escorts, State had no authority to prevent their going

abroad, and, in accordance with recent court rulings, they would suffer "no

legal consequences" for traveling to Hanoi without validated passports. 6

Four designated peace advocates left New York for Hanoi on 15 July

1969 to participate in the release of the three U.S. prisoners, as yet unnamed. Leading the party was Rennard C. (Rennie) Davis, like Dellinger

an official of the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in

Vietnam and the beneficiary of a temporary exemption from the Chicago

court's travel restrictions. Asked by the press during a stop in Vientiane if

he felt he was "being used as an instrument of propaganda," Davis replied,

"there is no propaganda here." He saw the exercise he was engaged in as

"an expression of North Vietnam's attitude of sympathy and humanity

toward prisoners."7
232 THE LONG ROAD HOME

A few days later Secretary Laird received a memorandum from Agnew.

It indicated that Richardson's explanation of State's policy had placated

the vice president to some degree, for he wrote that "humanitarian considerations probably outweigh the obvious propaganda advantages conceded

to the enemy by our acceptance of their terms for release and the use of

their chosen intermediaries." But he had other misgivings about accommodating to the periodic release of a few prisoners selected by the enemy:

"What is apt to be the effect of selective release upon the morale of the

remaining prisoners?"

Given the circumstances of release, and specifically the use of

intermediaries from our own far left wing, do we not strike most

directly at the morale of those who have been strongest in their

refusal to violate the code of conduct? Surely, the criteria for release under such circumstances must include tacit if not overt

"cooperation" with their captors .... It seems clear that it should

be our purpose to place a premium on continued steadfast opposition to the enemy by our POW's. Exactly the opposite may

well seem to be the case to the many loyal men who will remain

in captivity. If release comes to be viewed by the prisoners themselves as a "reward" for tractability or docility, they may become

demoralized.

Agnew wrote that he had "come to question whether hoped for results

justify the risks and probable costs," and he asked for comment from the

secretary of defense. R

Laird replied on 28 July that he was in complete agreement with the

views Agnew set forth, but most of his comments actually pertained to

the earlier question of the desirability of allowing representatives of the

antiwar movement to play a central role. He observed that "in the past

five years, North Vietnam has freed only nine of our men"-if the three

now promised but not yet delivered by Hanoi were counted. "Clearly, we

cannot be satisfied with either the procedures or the results," or with the

fact that "the 'peace activists' involved in the latest release continue to

parrot the Hanoi line and to undermine confidence in the strength and

will of the government and people of the United States." Therefore Laird

believed it was "vital that we cease giving official sanction to negotiations

by people such as Davis and Dellinger, act decisively to place the subject

of prisoners of war on the proper government-to-government basis in the

Paris negotiations, and increase the pressure on Hanoi to honor its signed

pledge to adhere to the standards of the 1949 Geneva Convention."9

Laird recommended taking up this strong line immediately after completion of the current repatriation, and he forwarded to Agnew the drafts
Other Defense Actions and Initiatives 233

of two statements, one to welcome the return of the three prisoners when

it occurred, the other to be used by Ambassador Lodge at the next peace

conference session thereafter. Once past the words of welcome, the first statement turned to denunciation of "the circumstances of this release," saying

they reflected Hanoi's determination to ignore the humanitarian standards affecting prisoner treatment. "North Vietnam selected escorts identified with dissident elements in an attempt to embarrass the United States.

Accompanying the escorts was a handpicked film crew, demonstrating that

the return of these men was motivated by propaganda objectives."lo

Elliot Richardson, as acting secretary of state, advised Laird that after

reading the memorandum for the vice president and its attachments he was

confident their two departments were in full agreement on the basic aim of

putting the strongest possible pressure on Hanoi to comply with all requirements of the Geneva Convention. Such differences as might exist came down

to a question of tactics and timing, Richardson said, and he noted that consultations had already occurred between his senior assistants and Laird's

on the first of the draft statements. II

In fact, State Department representatives Frank Sieverts and William

Sullivan had persuaded their Defense counterparts to delete the passage

condemning the peace activists' role in the return. "Fruitless public controversy" may have been mentioned again; in reporting to his superior Sieverts

said the guiding thought had been that "there is nothing to be gained by

aiming our fire at the peaceniks when the real target is Hanoi."12

By 7 August 1969 there was confirmation that Capt. Wesley Rumble,

Lt. Robert Frishman, and Seaman Douglas Hegdahl were en route home, and

Laird issued his statement welcoming their release. For the most part it reiterated the charges of failure to comply with the Geneva Convention that

the secretary had been making since the opening of the Go Public campaign in May, without breaking new ground or heightening the intensity.

One distinctive line had survived from the original draft: "While we are

pleased that these men have been reunited with their families, the United

States Government cannot be content with propaganda-planned releases

of a few prisoners at infrequent intervals."ll

State had stronger reservations about the text proposed for use by

Ambassador Lodge. Politely but unmistakably setting it aside, Richardson

referred to "certain moves with respect to prisoners being currently pursued with Hanoi. We wish to see how these develop before we take a position on using this statement at Paris or elsewhere." Seven pages long, Laird's

proposed text showed little restraint in attacking the entire catalogue of

enemy departures from the standards of the Geneva Convention. State

could not lightly assent to having the chief U.S. negotiator proclaim such
234 THE LONG ROAD HOME

inflexible positions as the following: "You must understand that no agreement concerning withdrawal of foreign forces, a political settlement, or

termination of hostilities can be reached until you, first, demonstrate

adherence to the Geneva Convention and, second, arrange to release and

repatriate those prisoners held by your side." 14

A Policy on Early Release

Another aspect of the recovery of American prisoners came under consideration as a result of the Rumble-Frishman-Hegdahl return. During his

debriefing, Lieutenant Frishman said that some of the men still in Hanoi

wished to be informed of the U.S. government's attitude toward further

releases of small numbers of prisoners. With them he had worked out a

coded means of providing the answer, by indicating the choice among four

prearranged statements of policy. In November 1969 Assistant Secretary

of Defense Warren Nutter listed these for the members of the DoD PW

Policy Committee:

a. The government does not approve of any futute early releases.

b. The government approves of the early telease of sick and

wounded only.

c. The government approves of the early release of sick and

wounded and longtime prisoners only.

d. Anyone is free to accept early release if offered.

He asked the committee members to indicate which of the alternatives

expressed the national policy, keeping in mind that "the language given

above cannot be altered in responding by the sensitive means that have

been established." 15

No one supported position a or b during the subsequent discussions. More of the respondents favored d than c, but with various

qualifications and additional comments. The JCS representative was

troubled by "the inability to rephrase the listed alternatives in order to provide more specific and meaningful guidance." The Army concluded that

"no single alternative adequately reflecrs current national policy," but if

a reply must be made, it would accept choice c. The Marine Corps entered

a similar reservation but would use statement d if necessary.IG

The Air Force argued more strongly for the view that it was inadvisable to deal with this policy matter by the means currently offered: "The
Other Defense Actions and Initiatives 235

arrangements to convey one of the alternative statements to our prisoners

are highly tenuous. Communication between prisoners and between camps

is restricted and if managed is cryptic and precludes explanation. There is

a high probability that the meaning of any transmitted message would

be distorted and at the same time be received by only a minority of all

prisoners." Also, uncertainty had arisen abour the prearranged statements,

since the three returnees were not in entire agreement about their wording and meaning. On one occasion Frishman himself had listed them

without using "only" in band c, but he later insisted that the word was

essential to the meaning. l

?

By late January 1970 the committee members had decided not to

utilize Frishman's arrangement for choosing and transmitting the guidance. They were determined to reach agreement on the wording of a policy

statement, however, and to use other, more reliable means of passing it to as

many prisoners as possible. The proposal currently under discussion stated

that "the US approves the return of sick and wounded and then others in

order of longest time in captivity." 18

The exercise was something more than a quibble over words. To obtain

a sense of the quality of thought expended on this subject the comments

submitted by the Air Force are worth following in detail:

The Air Force does not concur that "the US approves the return

of sick and wounded and then others in order of longest time in

captivity" is adequate guidance for US prisoners. In our view, it

erroneously presumes an ability to influence the order in which

prisoners are released; and, it is inconsistent with the national

objective of securing the release of all US prisoners at the earliest

possible time.

Neither the US Government nor the prisoners are being given an

option on who may be released. A prisoner's rejection of an offer

of release does not influence the enemy to comply with priorities

we may establish. The proposed policy might well result in the continued detention of a number of prisoners who might otherwise

accept release.

The proposed policy assumes a clearly distinguishable group of

PWs as sick or wounded. This is a direct contradiction of a basic

presumption of established DoD policy. Current policy guidance requires that all returned personnel be placed under medical

auspices as soon as they are released. The USAF Surgeon General

believes that all PWs are ill to some extent due to nutritional

deprivation, the prevalence of parasitic diseases and the debilitating effects of isolation, interrogation, etc.
236 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Promulgating the proposed policy would present an impossible

dilemma for US prisoners. It is unlikely that each prisoner is

aware of his relative state of health and length of captivity compared to that of all other PWs.

Reluctance to agree on a policy which encourages acceptance by

any PW offered release has been based on the specter that PWs

will vie with each other for release. All Air Force personnel held

captive have been trained and provided guidance under the motto

"Survival with Honor." Personnel of the other Services have been

given similar training. The Air Force view is that, without the

specific priorities provided by the proposed statement, these men

can be relied upon, to the utmost of their ability, to make decisions

and act consistently with principles of honor. If, on the other

hand, we are to focus on the hazard of pi rring prisoner against

prisoner, then the proposed policy provides no less an incentive

than any other guidance to compete for release.

A more acceptable statement of policy, phrased in terms suitable

to be conveyed to US prisoners verbatim, is "Accept release with

honor." This statement provides guidance consistent with the objective of securing the release of the greatest number of prisoners at

the earliest possible time. To the extent that conditions permit, it

also requires that prisoners faced with possible release consider

the prevailing circumstances, as well as the terms of release.

An Army comment paralleled the thought in the last sentence. To fit a

captivity situation in which an effective chain of command was operating among the prisoners, the policy statement must be sufficiently flexible

to allow for "decisions by senior camp members based upon existing

situations."l')

After further consultation the committee agreed on a declaration

that "the US approves any honorable release and prefers sick and wounded

and long term prisoners first." Thus the authorities in Washington largely

deferred to the prisoners' judgment of whether early release should be

accepted in any given instance. Nutter took steps to insure that this policy

statement of 26 May 1970 was incorporated in training programs and

passed by various means to the men in the camps.*21J

* Because the determination of what constituted an "honorable" and hence acceptable

early release remained ambiguous and debatable under the 26 May definition, the issue

continued to cause considerable fricrion among rhe PWs and ro undermine morale and

cohesion. Rochester and Kiley, Honor Bound, 365-71, deals wirh rhe "early release" debate

and impacr from rhe captives' perspecrive.
Other Defense Actions and Initiatives 237

A Round ofOrganizational Proposals

Laird had welcomed Vice President Agnew's interest in PW/MIA

affairs and now counted him among the strongest supporters of the effort

to obtain full observance of the Geneva Convention's requirements and to

speed the return of the prisoners either through negotiation or by other

means. His appreciation of Agnew became evident to a wider circle when

Laird submitted recommendations for changes in the administration's

PW organization to Henty Kissinger, assistant ro the president for national

security affairs, in late August 1969.

Laird briefly traced the evolution of organizations and assignments of

responsibility for prisoner of war matters, starting with the appointment

of Ambassador Harriman in 1966 as the U.S. government's principal spokesman in that area. From the beginning of the Nixon administration in 1969

a more equal division of authority between State and Defense had obtained,

with roughly parallel internal organizations in the two departments. Under

Secretary of State Richardson was charged with "overall coordination and

responsibility for State Department actions concerning prisoners of war in

Southeast Asia"; Nutter carried comparable responsibilities for 000.

"From a Defense standpoint," Laird continued, "prisoner-oE-war matters

are properly a Defense responsibility because the men involved are servicemen. The State Department has responsibility in this area because our

international relations are obviously involved in consideration of prisonerof-war issues." As between the two he now claimed primacy for his own

department-not as a recommendation but simply as a declaration. Unless

challenged, it would stand:

Since taking office I have acted with the strong conviction that

our responsibility to the servicemen who are prisoners of war

morally obligates us [the Department of Defense] to pursue and

initiate all programs that might improve the welfare of our men

in captivity and secure their release. The Defense Department's

overriding obligations to its men who have risked their lives for

their country require that we devote a high priority to prisonerof-war matters.

In present practice, if the working levels at State and Defense could

not reach agreement on a PW policy matter the question was referred upward to the departmental secretaries. Laird was not greatly concerned

that there was "no formalized interdepartmental structure" for deciding

policy questions. More bothersome was the fact that "basic prisoner issues

have at times been decided at various levels by State/Defense groups that
238 THE LONG ROAD HOME

are preparing for the Paris talks without clear approval of the highest officials with responsibility for prisoner matters." The greatest need,

however, was for means by which State and Defense could be "certain of

the support of the highest levels of our executive branch of government

before policies affecting prisoners of war are implemented." Laird recommended that the existing working organizations within the two departments

be preserved, "but that the Vice President serve as the principal authority on

all issues of policy," beginning with a review of all policies currently recommended or in force. 21

Kissinger acknowledged Laird's submission on 29 August, saying "1

truly appreciate the importance and complexity of the prisoner-of-war issue

and intend to put it before the President"; "Warm regards" preceded his

signature. The final response did not come until 22 October 1969, in a

more impersonal communication bearing only Kissinger's initials. President

Nixon had reviewed the proposal for employment of the vice president, but

he preferred to leave the present arrangements in effect for the time being.

"If important differences which cannot be resolved through existing

machinery again arise, they should be submitted to the White House for

consideration." The president did request that Laird seek ways and means

of closer liaison between the entities dealing with PW policy in State and

Defense, but the implication was strong that the White House wished to

hear no more in the way of organizational proposals. 22

Laird may well have been surprised five months later when an organizational directive arrived from Kissinger, addressed also to the secretary of

state, the director of central intelligence, and the director, u.S. information

agency. Certainly he found the content of this memorandum of 24 March

1970 disturbing. It could easily be read as an attempt to shunt the PW

issue into a backwater:

The President has decided that efforts on behalf of our prisoners

of war in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Laos might be

made more effective if an interagency committee is set up to

exercise guidance and control over all activities, both overt and

covert, which are undertaken in connection with the POW issue.

He has therefore directed that a Special Prisoner of War Committee be established under the chairmanship of a member of

the National Security Council Staff, which will meet regularly

for the purposes just described.

The directive gave the four addressees three days in which to nominate representatives to serve on the Special POW Committee as follows:

Department of Defense, one representative from SACSA [the Joint Staff's
Other Defense Actions and Initiatives 239

Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities] and one

from ISA; Department of State, one officer with experience in POW affairs;

CIA, one person familiar with Southeast Asian operations; and USIA, one

person with psychological warfare background.

Both the level of the officials likely to be appointed and designation

of an NSC staff member as chairman raised doubts that this committee

would have the stature to guide and control major activities. Yet the directive called on it to supervise a wide range of undertakings, including efforts

to obtain release of sick and wounded prisoners, gain inspection of PW

facilities, and achieve normal traffic in mail and packages, while insuring

that effective statements were prepared for use at the Paris talks. "On the

clandestine side," the committee was to propose and regulate psychological

operations and "exercise jurisdiction over" CIA and military attempts to

free captive Americans. 23

In short order Laird expressed his opposition to creating "such a mechanism." His memorandum for Kissinger skipped point-by-point criticism

and returned immediately to the main conclusion of his own proposal of

the previous August: existing Defense and State working organizations and

relationships on prisoner matters were generally adequate and should continue, but policy attention and direction at the highest level were lacking.

"The pressing need, in my opinion, is for continuing policy direction on

crucial major issues, which could not be supplied by the interagency

group contemplated in your memorandum." Laird had in mind "such

difficult questions as the relationship of our PW efforts to the over-all

Vietnamization program, to future U.S. force levels in Vietnam, and to the

priorities of the South Vietnamese Governmenr." In particular, Laird

reiterated, initiatives designed to bring real movement on the prisoner of

war issue would need to have behind them the authority and influence

that only the highest levels of government could supply.24

A Defense official advising Deputy Secretary David Packard had remarked that possibly "it was not Dr. Kissinger's intention to give such a

broad charter to a low level group." Surely he did not intend to introduce

procedures that appeared to disregard presidential orders of much higher

precedence governing the review of clandestine activities. 25 In any event,

even before all the objections to it could be heard, the Special Prisoner of

War Committee passed from consideration.

Although this action taken in the president's name had emerged in a

form unacceptable to Defense, the other statements and directions given by

President Nixon since December 1969 testified to his increasing engagement with the PW issue and understanding of its potential importance.

The credit for bringing Nixon to this level of awareness must be shared,
240 THE LONG ROAD HOME

with the secretary of state and the next of kin of the prisoners and missing

also contributing, but Laird could claim a large portion of it.

Gaining the President's Attention

In their desire for assurance that Richard Nixon and his administration were taking up their duties with full awareness of the plight of the

Americans captured or missing in Southeast Asia, wives and parents of the

men began bidding for the president's attention even before Inauguration

Day. The group of wives organized under Sybil Stockdale's leadership in

the San Diego area put on a drive that generated more than 2,000 telegrams to the White House on the new administration's first day in office.

A few days later notice reached the White House of a letter written on

18 January 1969 by the wife of Capt. Jeremiah A. Denton, Jr., USN, and

addressed to the congressman from the family's original home district in

Alabama, Rep. Jack Edwards. Nearly three years earlier Edwards had spoken

on the House floor of Denton's defiant reaffirmation of his allegiance to

the U.S. government when subjected to a TV interview in his Hanoi prison,

and Jane Denton now asked the congressman's help in requesting a meeting with the president for her and five other Navy or Air Force wives, all

from the tidewater Virginia area around Norfolk. 2(,

In a reply to Representative Edwards late in January one of Nixon's

aides cited "the overbearing workload" and "the unbelievable demands

on the President's time" when explaining Nixon's inability to meet with

Mrs. Denton and the other wives. He suggested an appointment with

Secretary Laird instead and offered assistance in arranging it. Meanwhile

a request that Mrs. Stockdale had made directly to the White House to

meet with the president was turned down on similar grounds. In the

process a Defense spokesman advised the White House, with State Department concurrence, that it appeared "more appropriate that a representative

group, rather than one individual, meet with the President, that is to say

wives of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine personnel, all of whom are • ")7

now pnsoners..

Thereafter, Rep. Bob Wilson of California followed up on Mrs. Stockdale's request, while Edwards sought an appointment for the wives with

Laird or his senior subordinates most concerned with PW/MIA affairs.

The latter effort came to fruition on 23 May when seven Navy and Air

Force wives from the Norfolk area met in the Pentagon with Nutter, his

special assistant, Charles Havens, and Richard Capen, deputy assistant

secretary of defense for public affairs. The timing was propitious, for they
Other Defense Actions and Initiatives 241

gathered on Friday of the week that had begun with Laird's statement and

the major press briefing that kicked off the Go Public campaign. "Meeting

went very well," according to one participant's notes. "Wives endorsed new

public affairs initiative and were appreciative of visit. "28

Earlier in May Laird had responded to Wilson's request for assistance in

designating a nationally representative group of wives and parents to meet

with President Nixon, rather than one drawn from Wilson's San Diego constituency. "As you can well imagine, the President's schedule is very tight,"

Laird wrote, but beyond that he was "somewhat apprehensive" about moving directly to a White House appointment for a few wives of prisoners

of war when next of kin meetings with other senior officials of the new

administration had not yet occurred. 2')

Laird said he wished to look more deeply into the matter before proceeding, and in fact he had just received an ISA staff study of the experience to

date with next of kin consultations with government officials and of the

arguments for and against extending them to more senior members of the

administration. Virtually the only disadvantage cited in the study was "the

bad publicity that would result if a scene should occur or, if subsequent to

the meeting, the wife criticizes the official. These ptoblems probably could

be avoided by careful selection of the groups that will have the visits." On

the other hand, the nearly universal concern among the families was "the

fear that they and their husbands or sons are 'forgotten Americans.' ... If

audiences with senior Government officials will help convince the families

that they and their men are not forgotten by the United States, such visits

will have served a worthwhile purpose."

In any event, the ISA study suggested, denial of the meeting requests

could hardly be maintained indefinitely. "Most of the wives of captured

American servicemen are mature and responsible women," who readily

appreciated that "if the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of

Defense take an active interest in prisoners of war ... this message will get

across to all levels of Government and to the people." They understood

that many important responsibilities other than prisoners of war occupied

the senior officials, but they also knew that "the President's advisers make

time on his schedule for the first baseball game, birthday parties for

celebrities, and other social activities. They will not accept indefinitely a

response that busy schedules do not permit visits with wives of Americans

who have risked their lives for our country."30

As early as 23 April 1969 Richardson had indicated his willingness to

join Laird in recommending that President Nixon meet with a representative group of PW/MIA relatives,31 but Laird did not settle his mind on

the matter until after experiencing his own meeting with such a group, in
242 THE LONG ROAD HOME

his Pentagon office on 24 July. The seven wives and six parents attending represented men of all four services, some captured, others missing in

action. Mrs. Stockdale, in particular, "made an excellent impression on all

concerned," according to one observer. Although "there was some discussion of alleged shortcomings in the way the military services handle family

relations, and other awkward questions," the meeting went all right. Laird

had succeeded in reassuring his visitors of the administration's commitment to the interests of the prisoners and the missing. 32

Laird's meeting with PW/MIA relatives and several held by Ambassador Lodge in both Paris and Washington did little to lessen the desire

among next of kin for direct access to the president, and the same was true

of the family briefing tours in mid-I969 that brought State and Defense

officials to 20 locations around the country where they spoke before more

than 1,400 relatives of the captured or missing servicemen.* Requests for

an appointment at the White House continued to be received, and they

became more numerous after the September press conference at which

returnees Frishman and Hegdahl described the harsh conditions the men

were living under in North Vietnam. 33

The need for a more forthcoming response to these bids for White

House attention merged with another consideration. Both Laird and

Richardson were conscious of the lack of any significant public declaration

by the president, either endorsing the statements condemning Hanoi's violations of the Geneva Convention that they had issued in the Go Public

campaign or directly addressing the plight of the prisoners and the concerns of PW/MIA families. In a major address to the nation on 15 May the

president had set forth the U.S. objectives in the Vietnam conflict and the

measures by which he hoped to obtain a satisfactory settlement. The speech

contained a single sentence referring to prisoners of war. OSD officials involved in answering queries from Congress and the public had to look

elsewhere for words to cite when giving assurance that Nixon was fully

apprised of the problem and recognized its importance. The letters dispatched from OSD commonly quoted "his statement to an interested

citizen"-actually the same reply that had been sent to all the 2,000 or

more telegrams received at the White House on Inauguration Day.

Serviceable but hardly a ringing declaration, its three sentences began with

"I fully share your heartful concern for our prisoners," then paid a brief

tribute to the PWs' dedication and devotion to duty and closed with assurance that "their release and welfare will have an urgent priority in our talks

in Paris."34

* See Chapter 18.
Other Defense Actions and Initiatives 243

On 25 September Laird wrote to Nixon, reviewing developments

since his own instigation of the policy of speaking openly about the

inhumane practices of the enemy and the government's concern for the

welfare of the captured or missing Americans. One result had been "an increasing number of contacts by the relatives of these men with various

government officials, members of Congress and the news media," including

Laird's own meeting with a group of wives and parents. "We believe these

contacts have been beneficial," he emphasized, intending to give assurance

that the discussions had generally been well-mannered and devoid of protest incidents or other embarrassments. He then spoke of the numerous

requests by family members for a meeting with the president. Laird recommended that Nixon invite to the White House a representative group of

approximately 20 wives and parents of missing and captured servicemen.

He gave two primary reasons for doing so. "This opportunity for you personally to express your concern for the welfare of these men to such a group

would offer encouragement to the many families affected." It would also

demonstrate that commitment on this subject reached to the highest level

of the u.s. government. 35

Word came from the White House that Laird's proposal had "received a

favorable reception and it appears that it will be worked out in the near

future," but as time lengthened into November and another presidential

address on Vietnam went by without significant mention of the prisoners,

OSD officials who kept abreast of opinion among the families urged Laird

to renew his appeal for a White House meeting. Citing the "ever increasing frequency" of next of kin requests for an appointment, Havens stressed

the importance of having the president openly and personally involved in

the PW/MIA problem. Several family members had offered the view that

"the President does not know or care about the plight of their loved ones,"

and Havens intimated that it might not be long before someone made that

assertion publicly. A follow-up memorandum for the president was awaiting Laird's signature when, just after Thanksgiving, the White House advised

that the date had been set. 36

Twenty-six wives or mothers received the president's telegram of invitation: "Mrs. Nixon and I would be very pleased if you would come to see us

at the White House at ten o'clock next Friday, December 12, 1969, to discuss the distressing situation of our captured and missing servicemen, a

matter in which both of us share fully your deep and constant concern."

Service casualty assistance officers would advise them of the further arrangements, including the government-funded transportation that would bring

them ro Washington on 11 December in time for the evening's reception

and dinner. Held at the Bolling Air Force Base Officers' Club, these events
244 THE LONG ROAD HOME

were attended by the secretaries of state and defense, various OSD

officials, the secretaries of the three military departments, and the service chiefs. 37

The following morning the 26 wives and mothers were received by

Mrs. Nixon in the White House library, then joined by the president.

After their discussion he led five of the participants to a meeting with

the White House press corps, where he introduced them as "five of the

most courageous women I have had the privilege to meet in my life." He

spoke of his 26 guests as representative of approximately 1,500 wives and

mothers of American servicemen missing or captured in Vietnam and reminded the press that some of the men had been in that status "for as

long as 5 years, most of them 2 to 3 years." Nixon's further remarks constituted the first presidential statement recorded during his administration

that directly addressed the PW/MIA problem:

Insofar as the treatment of prisoners is concerned, it would

probably not be inaccurate to say that the record in this war is

one of the most unconscionable in the history of warfare. And

there have been, of course, some very bad examples in past wars,

as we know.

What I have assured these very courageous women is that, first,

in reaching a settlement of the war, that an integral part of any

settlement that is agreed to must be a settlement which is satisfactory on the prisoner issue and, second, that clearly apart from

reaching an overall settlement of the war that this Government

will do everything that it possibly can to separate out the prisoner

issue and have it handled as it should be, as a separate issue on a

humane basis.

Finally, I would simply add that while we all know that there is

disagreement in this country about the war in Vietnam and while

there is dissent about it on several points, that on this issue, the

treatment of prisoners of war, that there can be and there should

be no disagreement.

The American people, I am sure, are unanimous in expressing

their sympathy to these women, to their children, and also in supporting their Government's attempt to get the Government of

North Vietnam and the VC to respond to the many initiatives

which we have undertaken to get this issue separated out and

progress made on it prior to the time that we reach a complete

settlement of the war. 3B
Other Defense Actions and Initiatives 245

It appears that President Nixon was genuinely affected by the meeting, that his reading of the briefing materials followed by personal discussion with the women named in them had imparted a human dimension

to the problem he had not felt before. Two years later he recalled the

occasion, "in the White House Library, at Chrisrmastime 1969," saying

that "from that time ... I have considered the problem of obtaining the

release of our POW's and missing in action as being one that has Presidential priority."''>

Responding to the President's Call

"The President has now indicated publicly that the highest priority

has been assigned to the prisoner of war problem," Capen wrote Nutter,

in light of the White House action of immediately releasing the full text

of Nixon's remarks on 12 December to the press. Presidential assistant

Alexander P. Butterfield spoke of it as a "directive that we move ahead on

a far more massive scale to seek humane treatment, and hopefully an

early release, of our POWs," and soon afterward Laird called it "an excellent statement of our commitment to these men and their families."40

Also, Laird moved quickly to propose specific actions to attain the goals

Nixon had set.

In his memorandum for the president on 20 December Laird recommended that he "designate a special presidential emissary (perhaps Arthur

Goldberg or Ralph Bunche)* who could visit the capitals of selected

countries which previously have expressed a concern for our prisoners of

war" and confer with officials of their governments. "Such meetings would

confirm the high priority you have assigned to this matter." Further, "our

Delegation in Paris should develop a series of hard-hitting statements" for

use in the negotiations, giving emphasis both to the enemy's disregard

for humane standards generally and to specific violations of the Geneva

Convention that raised doubts about the reliability of any future international agreement Hanoi might sign. Besides recommending that presidential speeches and statements continue to include references to prisoners

of war, Laird suggested that Nixon "might wish to reconsider" the earlier

idea of defining a major role for Vice President Agnew. 41

When Kissinger asked Richardson to comment on Laird's proposals,

he replied on 30 December that the idea of a special presidential emissary

"could have merit." Care would have to be exercised in selecting the person

* Goldberg was a former Supreme Court justice and U.S. ambassador to the United

Nations and Bunche was a former State Department and UN official.
246 THE LONG ROAD HOME

and 10 preventing his mission from becoming "enmeshed in other aspects

of Vietnam diplomacy," but if the right man could be found, "this could be

a dramatic way of highlighting our country's concern about our men and

our determination to explore all avenues that could lead to their release."

Richardson opposed the idea of "putting the vice president in overall

charge of prisoner matters," as he had when Laird first offered it in August.

Then he had objected that the subject was too intimately related to both

the Paris negotiations and the conduct of the war to be detached from the

coordination and policymaking processes already in place. An attempt to

deal with PW/MIA considerations through a separate channel overseen by

the vice president would be disruptive, leading to delay rather than expedition in decisionmaking. Richardson now gave the argument an additional

turn that furthered the objective both he and Laird were currently pursuing. While he welcomed Agnew's advice and involvement, "the President's

own demonstrated personal interest in the subject seems ... the best way

of showing the families of our men, and the world generally, that this is a

matter of the highest importance to this Administration." Accordingly he

joined in Laird's hope that the president would continue to speak out on

prisoners of war. 42

Kissinger forwarded Nixon's decision on 22 January 1970, in a memorandum addressed jointly to the secretaries of state and defense. Except

for ignoring the suggested assignment of a role to the vice president, it constituted a point-by-point acceptance of Laird's original recommendations:

In keeping with the President's desire to assign the highest priority

to the issue of the prisoners of war held by North Vietnam, he has

directed you to take the following joint actions:

(a) Nominate a suitable individual to be designated a

special Presidential emissary on prisoners of war who

would travel to foreign capitals to transmit the President's

personal concern on the prisoners issue ....

* * * * *

(c) Instruct our delegation in Paris to continue to press

the North Vietnamese on the prisoner issue, and to prepare a series of hard-hitting statements for this purpose.

(d) Provide materials for the President's use in dealing with

the prisoner issue in speeches and public statements.4'
Other Defense Actions and Initiatives 247

The Borman Mission

Over the following months Laird and his senior subordinates led

the search for a suitable presidential emissary on prisoners of wat. In midFebruary Laird informed Kissinger of his considered opinion regarding

possible candidates. He nominated with equal enthusiasm either Thomas E.

Dewey, former New York governor and two-time presidential candidate, or

veteran diplomat Robert D. Murphy, now retired after a career that included

unusually wide experience as a presidential representative in critical situations. Evangelist Billy Graham was another possible choice. On this and

several later occasions Laird pressed his opinion that "it is essential that

such an emissary be designated as soon as possible." He let his own staff

know that he intended that Defense take a leading role in providing guidance and assistance to the person chosen. 44

While awaiting the White House decision on a candidate, Laird sent

Kissinger a memorandum detailing his views on the forthcoming announcement of the appointment and the itinerary, team composition, preparation,

and objectives of the mission. He recommended that President Nixon

personally introduce the selected person to the White House press corps,

with the secretaries of state and defense in attendance. Laird's adaptation of

an itinerary suggested earlier by State included stops at the United Nations,

Geneva, and the capital cities of seven countries where the emissary might

talk with high government officials, heads of Red Cross societies, church

and business leaders, and others who could be helpful. He thought the

emissary should be accompanied by at least one State Department representative and two or three from Defense.

Laird gave "tell the PW story" as one of the mission's objectives, suggesting that the emissary discuss the main features of the prisoner of war

situation with the country's chief of state or prime minister and offer a

full briefing for the latter's principal assistants. Here the team could draw

heavily on materials developed by Defense during the Go Public campaign.

Further, "he should lose no opportunity to ask foreign leaders what they

believe is needed to solve the problem, and to solicit specific offers of assistance." At all times the president's representative should seek high visibility

and maximum exposure to the press, but in responding to newsmen's questions he must avoid being drawn into political discussions and maintain a

"strictly humanitarian emphasis. "45

At length the White House chose to approach Governor Dewey, and

on 22 April a party of officials headed by Nutter, Capen, and Sieverts

visited his New York law office with the hope of persuading him to undertake the mission. Though resistant at first, pointing out that he had no
248 THE LONG ROAD HOME

background on prisoner of war matters beyond that of the ordinary reader

of the New York Times, Dewey agreed to consider the assignment. Laird

followed up with a telephone appeal and some further consultations with

White House officials occurred, but in early May Dewey decided to decline

the offer. He had concluded that the mission was "almost exclusively a

public relations undertaking, valuable, important-perhaps critically

important-bur still essentially public relations. This is not an area where

I have any special expertise and for that reason it does not seem to me that

I should undertake ir."4G

Laird immediately recommended that the other principal nominee,

Robert Murphy, be approached to determine his availability. Very willing

to serve, Murphy entered energetically on a course of study, briefings, and

renewal of contacts in preparation for undertaking the assignment. Planning

had begun for the president's formal announcement of his appointment

when, in mid-July, Murphy found it necessary to withdraw because of his

wife's ill health. 47

When writing to Kissinger on 23 July Laird offered a new nominee,

already interviewed and found to be "most anxious to do whatever he can

to assist in resolving the prisoner problem." His new choice was Frank

Borman, a former astronaut and commander of Apollo 8 on America's

first manned lunar orbit, now a recently retired Air Force colonel serving

as an Eastern Airlines vice president. The statement that President Nixon

released on 7 August announced Borman's appointment as "my Special

Representative on Prisoners of War" and outlined his forthcoming visit

to countties around the world to seek the help of third parties. Elsewhere

in the statement Nixon reiterated themes whose appearance in speeches and

proclamations during the preceding seven months of 1970 had exemplified

his increased attention to the PW issue. "No goal is more important to my

administration than securing the humane treatment and earliest possible

release of all Americans held by the enemy forces in Southeast Asia. "48

Borman departed on his mission early in the second week of August,

accompanied by Col. Milton K. Kegley, USAF, detailed from his post as

Capen's special assistant. Well informed on the prisoner question and

experienced in public relations and dealing with the press, Kegley gave

able support throughout the journey, while U.S. embassy in-country staffs

provided advice and made local arrangements. Borman went first to Moscow, then Warsaw, Stockholm, Paris, Geneva, Belgrade, and Algiers, on

through Iran, India, and several Southeast Asian nations to Tokyo and

Hong Kong. He was on the first leg of his journey when North Vietnam

made its opinion known. Calling the mission "Nixon's contemptible trick,"

Radio Hanoi predicted that it would end in "ignominious failure."4<!
Other Defense Actions and Initiatives 249

Colonel Borman reached California on 1 September and the next day

reported personally to the president at the Western White House in San

Clemente. Emerging for a press conference, he said that while he could

not point to any major breakthroughs or significant changes in North

Vietnam's position, there had been a sympathetic reaction to his mission

at each of the 12 stops where he talked to government leaders, all of

whom had indicated that they would make new approaches to Hanoi on

behalf of the prisoners. Similarly, when assessing the results for Secretary

Laird, Borman stated that "while the trip did not produce any immediate results, it is my sincerest hope that it may have created a climate that

will produce some movement toward resolution of this difficult issue."

This was also the tenor of his address before a joint session of Congress

on 22 September, which Borman concluded with a personal appeal for

congressional and countrywide support for the prisoners' cause and for

considerate and unfailing care for the PWIMIA families. 50

Though certainly not an ignominious failure, the Borman mission did

have less impact than a fully realized implementation of Laird's original

concept would probably have achieved. The mission was launched with a

less ceremonious send-off and a less imposing entourage than Laird had

recommended. The accomplishments that distinguished Colonel Borman's

career commanded respect but did not add as much weight to his authority

as a presidential representative as the longer political experience of some of

the nominees initially sought would have given it.

Beyond that, whoever undertook the mission had to cope with an international atmosphere somewhat changed by Nixon's announcement on

30 April 1970 of a major military incursion into Cambodia. The move

met with criticism in some quarters at home as a betrayal of the president's

pledge to wind down the hostilities and was followed by widening antiwar

demonstrations after the tragic encounter between Ohio National Guardsmen and student protesters at Kent State University on 4 May. Abroad,

many opinion leaders viewed both the Cambodian operation and the

demonstrations as diminishing the moral stature of the United States.

Writing to the secretary of state on 19 September, Laird accepted that

there had been "no immediate positive developments" from the mission

but expressed the hope that Borman had "created a climate that will facilitate future progress." He thought the United States should move ahead

promptly with follow-up activity and not let the Borman mission appear

to be a one-time effort. Laird suggested that State communicate with each

of the governments the emissary had visited to urge their continuing attention to the PW/MIA problem. He also believed that American diplomatic

representatives around the globe "should receive frequent updates on the
250 THE LONG ROAD HOME

status of our efforts, and be reminded continually to place a high priority

on this subject," adding that "my staff would be pleased to provide information and assistance to your people in this regard. "51

State's response came from an official not yet jaded by the Defense

Department's constant importuning on the PW subject and comfortable

in dealing with the Pentagon as well. In fact, John N. Irwin II had served

as assistant secretary of defense (ISA) for more than two years during the

Eisenhower administration. Now recently installed as under secretary of

state, he noted that this meant he had "inherited Elliot Richardson's

responsibilities for prisoner of war matters." Irwin wrote that as soon as

Borman's address to Congress became available he had instructed U.S.

diplomats to call it to the attention of officials in the nations the colonel

had visited and to renew the request for assistance. Reports were already

coming in from the embassies on the latest efforts of these countries "to

secure humane treatment for our men and to speed their release," and

Irwin pledged the fullest utilization of the diplomatic resources of the

United States to achieve that goal. 52 It was evident, however, that the current entreaties to Hanoi broke no new ground. The enemy would probably

remain as unresponsive as before to third-country pleas.

The PWIssue's Place in the Negotiating Scheme

Midway in 1970 Laird launched an effort to have the PW issue integrated more effectively with both the negotiations for peace and the

scheduling of U.S. troop redeployment under the Vietnamization plan.

Submitting his 17-page analysis and recommendations to both Kissinger

and Secretary of State William Rogers on 18 July, he declared that there

was "no other policy paper available in the Washington community which

deals with this relationship; yet these matters go to the heart of our involvement in Vietnam."53

"The return of all US prisoners of war is a US objective second only

to our overriding objective of a political solution that reflects the will of

the South Vietnamese people and allows them to determine their future

without outside interference," the paper began. "Present US policy calls

for treating the prisoner issue separately on a humanitarian basis until the

final settlement." What must be confronted, however, "is the plain fact that

our current policy on the prisoner issue just is not working well enough."

The separate-issue approach, for all the energy and effort it consumed

working through diplomatic channels, international bodies, and thirdcountry intermediaries, had proved unavailing.
Other Defense Actions and Initiatives 251

Laird's frank analysis continued with a reference to "the demonstrated inability of world opinion alone to force the other side to negotiate

the prisoner issue." There was also an unblinking acceptance that the Vietnamization process was irreversible, because "domestic considerations will

preclude any slowdown or halt in the current rate of US redeployments."

Thus the time available for using direct military leverage to speed negotiations was "definitely limited"; "we will be forced by about mid-1972 to rely

more on non-military than military means of leverage."

"Beyond doubt," the secretary's argument continued, "heavy suasion on

our part will be required to force the other side to negotiate meaningfully

on the prisoner issue." The current policy, based mainly on bringing world

opinion to bear on Hanoi, must give way to one that took advantage of

all available leverage and negotiating collateral. Those available meansmilitary, political, psychological, and economic-were the same ones already

being used in negotiating for such objectives as a cease-fire, pull-back of

forces, and a political settlement. Therefore, "some linkage is essential."

Laird wished to "make consideration of the prisoner of war issue an

integral part of our planning" and thereby "ensure that every action taken

has some positive impact, either direct or indirect, on prisoner return." He

suggested that any negotiating or redeployment proposal not meeting that

test be required to include specific justification for its failure to do so. To

illustrate the linkage approach, Laird offered four alternative scenarios,

ranging in tone from conciliatory to threatening; in each of them the

president was to use some variant of the statement that "without progress

on the prisoner issue, there could be no progress on anything."

Laird recommended that the policy paper with its package of scenarios

be sent on to the National Security Council for consideration. He even

sought a place on the agenda of the next NSC meeting, only three days

away, but the deliberations on his 18 July submission proceeded at a much

slower pace than this. On 31 August Kissinger referred it to the interagency

Ad Hoc Group on Viernam, chaired by Ambassador William Sullivan, who

reported the group's findings in late October. All agencies represented there

agreed that "the need to secure the release of our men must be an integral

part of our future negotiations planning, and an integral, albeit subsidiary, consideration in all redeployment planning"-an adoption of Laird's

own wording, but without the further enforcing provision he had offered.

Kissinger specifically concurred in this conclusion while endorsing the

other main finding, namely, that the object of "linking the POW issue

more closely to our negotiating strategy" had largely been achieved by

President Nixon in his peace initiative of 7 October 1970, inasmuch as a

proposal for the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of
252 THE LONG ROAD HOME

war had been one of the five points in his address. There was no direct

comment on Laird's four scenarios since, as Kissinger indicated, "the best

course in Paris at this time is to con tin ue pursui t of the President's farreaching proposals. "54

Laird gave wholehearted support to this follow-up effort,* but he

could hardly fail to notice that inclusion in the same speech was still

virtually the full extent of the PW issue's integration with the other issues

under negotiation. Nixon's presenta.tion of the prisoner release proposal

had actually been the strongest appeal he was ever to make for resolution

of the prisoner question on a humanitarian basis, separate from the mam

negotiations. t

Laird brought the subject up again the following spring in an eyesonly memorandum for the president. Dated 17 May 1971, the communication noted the increasing conviction, especially among relatives of the

prisoners, that the PW issue "is not separable on a humanitarian basis so

long as the other side chooses to use the men to gain their political ends." In

the current negotiations the enemy was demanding that Washington set a

date for total withdrawal of U.S. forces in return for discussion of

prisoner release. The publicly stated position of the Nixon administration

was that some U.S. troops would remain in Vietnam as long as the enemy

held American prisoners, so to that extent the U.S. government also linked

prisoner release to the main negotiations.

"Without further clarification, our policy incurs certain potential

disadvantages," Laird wrote. "While we may insist that the issue should

be treated separately, the other side has established it as a political/military

bargaining issue" and "we run the risk of maneuvers both at home and by

the enemy that could create serious problems for us."

For example, the enemy might conclude that a clear offer to

"release" US prisoners at a specified time would exert sufficient

pressure on this Administration to force it to accept already

established demands. Or, even worse, the North Vietnamese might

go beyond their present demands and propose a specific date for

the return of all our men held prisoner in North Vietnam, Laos,

and South Vietnam providing we agree to terminate all Military

Assistance to South Vietnam and providing we agree to contribute

Economic Aid to all the countries of Southeast Asia, including

North Vietnam. Under current political and public pressures, I

believe it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to reject

* See Chapter 13.

, See Chapter 21.
Other Defense Actions and Initiatives 253

a forthright offer to release US prisoners in exchange for setting

a date certain for our total withdrawal. I also believe that an

enemy proposal linking Military Assistance and Economic Aid

to a specific release date for our captured men might well gain

the support of a Congress that is already lukewarm to our continued efforts in South Vietnam ....

In my view, it is therefore urgent that we review again the question of linking release of prisoners to troop withdrawal and the

setting of a date certain for US withdrawal. I believe our only

hope for avoiding damaging concessions is to pre-empt enemy

moves on this issue. II

A U.S. move compatible with what Laird apparently had in mind

did occur exactly two weeks later. At the 3 I May session of Kissinger's

long-running secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese he offered to

set a terminal date for withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces from South

Vietnam in exchange for the release of all prisoners of war and an internationally supervised cease-fire throughout Indochina. The North Vietnamese representative rejected the proposal, mainly because it did not

also satisfy Hanoi's demands regarding the future form and control of

the South Vietnamese governmen t. S(, Occurring in the secret negotiations

rather than the openly conducted Paris talks, the Kissinger offer and its

rejection remained unknown to the American public until early 1972

and hence had no impact on the attitudes developing during the current

debate over the nation's Vietnam policy.

The Son Yay Raid

The Department of Defense had succeeded in keeping one of its

major initiatives secret during an extended preparatory stage and through

its implementation. When officially released late in 1970, news of a daring

rescue operation deep in the enemy's territory dominated the headlines and

lifted the spirits of many readers, including the families of the prisoners

and missing.

Appearing before the Pentagon press corps on 23 November, Laird revealed that some months earlier, under a contingency plan approved by the

president, a commando force had been assembled composed of volunteers

from the special forces units of the Army and Air Force. In preparation for

the mission of recovering American prisoners from a compound in North

Vietnam they then underwent three months of training that was "meticulous, intensive, often around-the-clock." The targeted prison camp, thought
254 THE LONG ROAD HOME

to have a capacity of from 70 to 100 inmates, was at Son Tay, about 23

miles west of Hanoi.

After a full briefing Nixon approved Laird's recommendation that the

mission be undertaken during the short period in November when probable

dry weather and the desired level of moonlight would be available. The

president acted with awareness "that we would be forced to operate on necessarily limited intelligence and recognizing also the hazards of the mission,"

Laird said. A key factor in the final decision was "the new information we

received this month that some of our men were dying in prisoner of war

camps." He described the attempt to rescue prisoners as something the

United States had found necessary "in the face of the continued and adamant refusal of the other side either to abide by the provisions of the

Geneva Convention or to participate in meaningful negotiations on the

exchange of prisoners of war."

Laird introduced the two officers standing beside him at the press

conference: Brig. Gen. Leroy J. Manor, USAF, in overall command of

the operation, and Col. Arthur D. Simons, USA, leader of the search and

rescue (SAR) team. He then recounted how at about 0200 (early morning

in North Vietnam, midafternoon Washington time) on 21 November the

team crash-landed one helicopter within the Son Tay compound while

others descended outside. Quickly overwhelming the surprised guards,

the intruders raced to complete their mission. "Regrettably, the rescue team

discovered that the camp recently had been vacated. No prisoners were

located. The SAR team, according to its well-rehearsed plan, searched every

building and broke the locks on doors of rooms which had been used as

detention cells. They successfully returned to safety without suffering a

single serious casualty. "57

In fact, Son Tay had been in continuous use as a prison camp since

May 1968, but on 14 July 1970 all the captive Americans were withdrawn. The aerial reconnaissance photography taken thereafter showed no

pronounced change; evidence of activity and some level of occupancy continued to be seen. 58

The day following his announcement to the press Laird testified for

more than two hours at a televised hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, and under the questioning of Chairman J. William Fulbright

and others the secretary's reasons for sponsoring the Son Tay raid were set

forth more fully. Asked the source of the reports of fatalities among the

prisoners, he stated that early in November Mrs. Cora Weiss, antiwar activist

and co-chairman of the Committee of Liaison with Families of Servicemen

Detained in North Vietnam, had made public a list of six men the North

Vietnamese government said were dead. Then, just after the execute order
Other Defense Actions and Initiatives 255

for the operation was given, U.S. authorities learned that Mrs. Weiss had

received another list of 11 from Hanoi, not yet publicized. Admittedly the

sketchy information released did not establish that all 17 had lost their

lives as the result of neglect or mistreatment by their captors, or even that

all deaths had occurred while in enemy hands. However, at least 11 of the

men had been positively identified as prisoners of war well before the

announcement of their death; it was legitimate to say that Americans were

dying in North Vietnamese prisons. 59

Several of the considerations already mentioned came together in

one passage of Laird's testimony. He had heard it claimed by some that the

rescue attempt might have jeopardized the lives of American prisoners,

but he thought it should be remembered that the lives of U.S. servicemen were "in danger every day that Hanoi holds them" under conditions

that disregarded the Geneva Convention and allowed no impartial inspection. Laird said he could not ignore the fact that men were dying in captivity,

at a time when the Paris talks offered no hope of speedy progress toward an

end to their imprisonment. "I concluded that there was no other acceptable

alternative than to recommend that the volunteer force ... should be authorized to make a valiant attempt to save their fellow Americans. "60

Further, the secretary said the one thing that convinced him more than

anything else to sponsor the operation "was my discussions with several of

the prisoners who were released, the last three that came out [Rumble,

Frishman, and Hegdahl]," who told him of their concern "that we in the

United States had forgotten them." Clearly, "in order to maintain oneself

for 5, 4, 3 years, there must be hope, and according to these men many of

our prisoners of war were losing their hope and their faith. I felt that this

was important to their survival." By mounting the raid "we have not only

shown North Vietnam, but we have also shown the prisoners of war that

we do care, that we do have the capability to go forward with their rescue."

In fact, in various forms Laird cited this justification most frequently for

the rescue operation, both to the senatorial committee and to newsmen

outside the hearing room. 61

Laird objected to having the raid termed an intelligence failure, pointing out that all information was correct regarding the buildings and

layout of the compound, the location of antiaircraft and surface-to-air

missile defenses, and the pattern of gaps in the enemy's radar coverage that

permitted the force to penetrate nearly to the capital of North Vietnam

without detection. "The intelligence for this mission was excellent, except

for our not having a camera that would see through the rooftop of buildings" and reveal whether prisoners were present. Under close questioning

he did state that no photography had been available showing men in
256 THE LONG ROAD HOME

the open who were presumed to be prisoners, but then inmates were rarely

allowed outside their buildings, according to the recent returnees. Belief

that there were American captives in the camp rested both on aerial surveillance and on other intelligence information, which he preferred not

to discuss in detail. "I felt the risk was worth it, and 1 recommended this

mission, and 1 take the responsibility. "(,2

Even in the face of some later charges and revelations, Laird's reasons

for going ahead with the rescue mission remained defensible and probably

sufficient. G3 And though the raid was unsuccessful in its primary purpose,

the secondary objective of giving assurance that the U.S. government had

not forgotten and would, in Laird's words, "take rather unusual means to

see that these men are returned as free Americans" had been attained.

An incident at an Air Force luncheon during the annual meeting of the

National League of Families in September 1971 attested to this. Despite

having lived through 10 more months of separation and uncertainty over

the fate of their husbands and sons since the raid, wives and parents rose

to their feet and delivered the longest and most emotional ovation of the

afternoon when General Manor was introduced.!>4

The raid's most important favorable result was unanticipated. While

there had been predictions that the enemy would respond to the rescue

attempt with tighter guard measures, harsher treatment, and possibly direct

reprisals against American prisoners of war, the steps taken by North Vietnamese authorities actually improved the living conditions and chances

of survival of nearly all prisoners. To reduce vulnerability to further raids

the enemy abandoned various smaller outlying camps and moved all the

inmates to downtown Hanoi. There many men who had been kept in

isolation for three years or more gained roommates for the first time-as

many as 57 companions in some rooms of the "Hanoi Hilton," as the main

downtown prison had been dubbed by the PWs. The concentration of

the prisoners greatly enhanced the effectiveness of their internal organization and chain of command, their solidarity, and their leaders' potential

bargaining power with the prison authorities. As proclaimed again and

again in the memoirs of the Americans who returned home, the Son Tay

raid led to the greatest increase in morale and improvement in well-being

experienced during their entire imprisonment. ('0
13

A Bitter Lesson

D uring 1970-71 the United States aggressively pursued new efforts

to secure release of the American and allied prisoners held by the

enemy. Like their predecessors in the Johnson administration, State and

Defense officials serving under President Nixon began developing plans for

freeing some enemy prisoners in the hope that this might induce the other

side to respond with a reciprocal release. The difficulties and frustrations

they would experience in this endeavor were already familiar. Since the

government of South Vietnam (GVN) had custody of all prisoners of war,

whether captured by U.S. forces or its own, the leaders in Saigon had to be

persuaded to participate in any plan for the exchange or unilateral release of

prisoners, or for their internment in a neutral country. Like earlier South

Vietnamese heads of state, President Nguyen Van Thieu was understandably

reluctant to give back any prisoner who might resume his role as a North

Vietnamese or Viet Cong combatant.

On the other side, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) had

steadily refused to be a party to any exchange arrangement, and its response

when the GVN undertook a unilateral return of detainees rarely went beyond

observing an informal cease-fire at the scene of the release. North Vietnam

and the Viet Cong did occasionally turn loose some captured Americans,

though never more than three at a time. These releases were unrelated to

those made by South Vietnam and the United States, however, and the

propaganda purposes that inspired them were usually self-evident. Attempts

to gain the enemy's assent to exchange proposals were further complicated

by Hanoi's commitment to maintaining the fiction that there were no

units of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA)* operating in South Vietnam;

* In earlier years these forces were more commonly referred to as PAVN, for People's

Army of [North] Vietnam.

257
258 THE LONG ROAD HOME

hence the DRV's spokesmen declared that there could not be any captured

NVA soldiers to exchange.

The atmosphere in which Nixon administration officials operated differed in one important respect from the past. They acted within the context

of the Go Public campaign, courting rather than avoiding full publicity

and seeking to enlist world opinion as a force to influence North Vietnam to modify its stand on prisoner exchange. As the prime exponent of

that campaign, constantly aware of his responsibility for the u.s. servicemen missing or captured, Secretary of Defense Laird played a leading role

in these endeavors.

Building on South Vietnam's Unilateral Release Effirt

In the closing weeks of 1969 a proposal by the GVN to return 62

sick or wounded members of the North Vietnamese Army to their homeland was under discussion at the Paris peace talks. The chief of South

Vietnam's delegation, Ambassador Pham Dang Lam, had made the offer

in November in accordance with Article 109 of the Geneva Convention,

which required such action. "Parties to the conflict are bound to send

back to their own country, regardless of number or rank, seriously wounded

and seriously sick prisoners of war, after having cared for them until they

are fit to travel," the article read, but with the proviso that "no sick or

wounded prisoner of war . . . may be repatriated against his will during

hostilities." When North Vietnam's representatives scornfully rejected

Lam's proposal, the South Vietnamese government appealed to the International Committee of the Red Cross. If Article 109 bound Saigon to

return prisoners who qualified as sick or wounded, surely it must require

Hanoi to accept them, the GVN argued when calling on the ICRC to assist

in obtaining a more favorable response. 1 The matter remained at issue as

the new year began.

Laird had welcomed the GVN's initiative in offering 62 disabled

soldiers, but he was already contemplating the gains that might be scored

by a more aggressive program of sending NVA prisoners homeward. In

a memorandum for Secretary of State Rogers on 31 January 1970 he

spoke of the period of the Tet holiday in February as affording "a unique

opportunity to continue the momentum." Laird suggested urging President Thieu to announce that in honor ofTet a substantial number of North

Vietnamese prisoners of war would be released for return to their homes.

"The release would be unconditional, but the announcement could imply

additional releases ... if any sign of reciprocity were shown by the North
A Bitter Lesson 259

Vietnamese." Although wounded prisoners would receive first priority,

Laird expected to draw from the entire body of NVA captives, currently

numbering about 7,000 and increasing monthly. He was convinced that

the release of an unusually large number, coupled with the "conciliatory

nature" of the proposal, would have a significant impact. "The public

relations gains alone would probably make the effort worthwhile."2

Laird reviewed the alternatives open to the enemy if faced with such

a move:

1. Refuse to accept the prisoners. In this case, they would appear

quite inhuman both in this country and abroad ....

2. The North Vietnamese could accept the prisoners without

releasing any of our men. Although President Thieu would not

ask for reciprocity, the public naturally will expect some reciprocal action and the enemy's failure to respond should help solidify

opinion behind our effort in Vietnam ....

3. The North Vietnamese could accept the prisoners and release

some American prisoners in exchange, or at least allow communication with them. In addition to the humanitarian aspects,

this could serve as a clear signal of willingness to hold informal

secret negotiations ....J

Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson immediately cabled the

text of Laird's memorandum to Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in Saigon

with his own comments. He recognized that Laird's proposed release differed in both nature and scale from what Thieu's government had theretofore been willing to undertake. With rare exceptions all previous instances

had involved only sick and wounded prisoners or native South Vietnamese

who had renounced insurgency and pledged to take up civilian pursuits.

"Nevertheless," Richardson wrote, "I am sympathetic to the proposal as

a dramatic way of highlighting our humanitarian concern about PW's

on both sides, and of putting pressure on Hanoi to release some of our men

in response."4

Less than two weeks later Laird himself was in Saigon to assess the

progress of Vietnamization and survey other matters on behalf of President Nixon. During an extended consultation with President Thieu on

12 February he pressed the point that Hanoi's leaders deserved to be

exposed and placed on the defensive for disregarding their obligations

under the Geneva Convention and that an effective means of accomplishing this would be to offer a large release of North Vietnamese prisoners.
260 THE LONG ROAD HOME

"The initial number might be 500 or 1,000 or even more." According to the

conference record Thieu indicated "general assent to the Secretary's remarks.")

Both State and Defense officials considered that the South Vietnamese

leader had agreed in principle, but as yet no implementing plan had been

formulated. Following Laird's return to Washington and submission of a

report to President Nixon, a clear signal of White House interest gave

impetus to the matter. Henry Kissinger passed the word, for transmission

to Bunker, that the president "wishes greater efforts to be made to persuade

President Thieu to release some enemy prisoners unilaterally."(, By 5 March

State officials were exulting over the amhassador's report that Thieu had

directed that an offer of a major release of NVA prisoners be prepared. They

considered this the most promising initiative currently available-one that

could "generate such pressures in world opinion that Hanoi may feel compelled to adopt a more moderate position." Calling on Bunker to press the

matter in Saigon, they declared that the "potential of a well-publicized offer

to return 500 or more prisoners to NVN is such that it should be made at

earliest possible moment, without waiting until details of turnover, route,

identity of men, and the like have been worked out." Thereafter the undertaking appeared to be progressing well, and presentation of the proposal

at the Paris peace talks on 26 March was expected.?

On 24 March, on becoming aware of an impending holdup in the

action, Bunker obtained an audience with Thieu and "went over the ground

with him again, pointing out the many reasons why it would be advantageous to make a major offer now." Thieu replied that after discussion with

his advisers he had concluded that approximately 323 sick and wounded

NVA prisoners could be offered for repatriation, subject of course to their

expressing willingness to be sent home. He could not agree to return of

able-bodied prisoners because "this would not be acceptable to the soldiers

whose comrades had given their lives in capturing the prisoners, and it

would create unacceptable political problems for the government." When

Bunker suggested it was unlikely the enemy would assent to receiving such

prisoners and therefore the risk of their returning to fight again was quite

small, "Thieu agreed but said the offer itself, if able-bodied men are involved, would not be understood in South Viet-Nam."8

State officials informed the U.S. delegation in Paris that they were

"extremely disappointed" with Thieu's decision not to follow through on

the agreement in principle by repatriating 500 or more men. Accepting that

the offer to return more than 300 sick and wounded NVA prisoners was the

best that could be achieved at present, State instructed the delegation to go

forward with that initiative, in coordination with the GVN's representatives

and "with as much publicity and favorable attention as possible."')
A Bitter Lesson 261

Supported by U.S. Ambassador Philip C. Habib, the South Vietnamese spokesman made the presentation on 26 March, now giving 343 as the

number of sick and wounded available for repatriation-a figure that

included the 62 previously offered. Attempts at this and subsequent meetings to get the North Vietnamese to discuss practical arrangements for

receiving the releasees brought only vilification in reply. By June, however,

the GVN with U.S. encouragement had developed a plan for transporting disabled NVA servicemen by sea to a point off the North Vietnamese

coast and then sending them ashore in boats. In Paris, Ambassador Lam

announced that this return would occur on 11 July 1970 and would

include both the original 62 sick or wounded NVA prisoners of war and

24 non-military detainees who were North Vietnamese fishermen taken

into custody when driven into South Vietnamese waters by a typhoon. to

The North Vietnamese delegation, and later the Hanoi radio, responded

with a statement along lines used on a few occasions in the past,* acquiescing in the return while condemning as false and deceitful the claim that

the returnees were NVA soldiers. Those resisting aggression in the South

were simply Vietnamese patriots; if set free, any who wished to live in the

North would not be turned away. "Specifically, the Americans and the

Saigon Puppet Administration must release them at the 17th parallel or

at a place adjacent to DRV territorial waters, and must make known in

advance the place of release." Also, the DRV spokesman rejected a proposal that ICRC observers accompany the releasees up to the point on

shore where North Vietnamese authorities would take charge of them.]]

The repatriation occurred on the scheduled date, with the 24 fisherman returnees operating the two motorized junks used for the final lap of

the journey. North Vietnamese insistence that no one but the released

men intrude upon the DRV's territorial waters meant the vessels could not

be returned for lack of a crew, and they were beached on the shore. As

had been common in earlier releases of North Vietnamese personnel, once

freed the returnees demonstrated their disdain for the South and their

true allegiance to the North by throwing overboard all clothing and other

personal articles supplied by their former captors.] 2

Pressingfor Inclusion ofAble-Bodied Prisoners

Once again Laird concentrated on possible follow-up actions, particularly the release of a large number of prisoners to North Vietnam, spaced

* See Chapter 5.
262 THE LONG ROAD HOME

over a period of six months or longer. As before, the goal was "to generate

sufficient momentum behind the notion of 'prisoner release' to bring irresistible pressure to bear on NVN to return our PWs." Such a large-scale

release would undoubtedly require "dipping into able-bodied ranks," and

the draft State/Defense message of 7 July that Laird sponsored asked for

Bunker's comments on how Thieu's opposition to giving up able-bodied

NVA prisoners might be overcome. Senior State officials withheld approval

of the message, deferring to Bunker's strongly voiced opposition to receiving

any instruction for the present that would stir up this sensitive area of

U.S.-GVN relations. They suggested keeping Laird's proposal for discussion during Bunker's scheduled visit to Washington later in July. i.l

Laird's consultation with Bunker occurred in the Pentagon on 20 July

1970, with both Habib and his designated successor as the chief negotiator

in the Paris talks, Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, also participating. The

conference record prepared by a senior military officer contained the following relatively brief section relating to the return of prisoners:

The Secretary then questioned President Thieu's apparent reluctance on the PW question. Ambassador Bunker responded that

politically this was a most sensitive issue. The eVN has about

33,000 able-bodied NVAIVC PWs who, if released, could be again

potential enemies in the field. However, he sees no problem with

the sick and disabled prisoners. The Secretary said he was thinking

of a figure of 500 to 1,000 prisoners. Ambassador Bunker stated

there should be no problem on such small numbers. The Secretary

indicated that the political benefits ofsuch a release in this country

would be very great, and felt strongly that 500-1,000 prisoners

could be released without any adverse affect upon the eVN.

Ambassador Habib stated there should be no problem regarding

the return of small numbers of NVA; the major problem concerns

latger numbers of Vc. 14

Laird's recollection of the meeting and his interpretation of the

minutes-both perhaps somewhat colored by his own enthusiasm for the

idea-led him to assume there was agreement that Thieu's consent could

be obtained to the repatriation of as many as 1,000 NVA prisoners, a total

that would necessarily include a large number of able-bodied returnees.

Eager to move ahead, he directed the preparation of a State/Defense message

that would ask Bunker to seek an early meeting with Thieu in order to "nail

down GVN agreement" to proceeding with a 1,OOO-man release. State

officials objected that this draft message did not accurately reflect Bunker's
A Bitter Lesson 263

posmon; they asserted that the memorandum of conversation it relied on

had jumbled the sequence of the ambassador's remarks. IS

In early August the State Department proposed a revised draft with the

following main paragraphs:

1. During Secretary Laird's recent discussions with Ambassadors

Bunker, Bruce, and Habib, Secretary indicated his interest in proposing further and larger releases of NVA prisoners of war

to NVN. Ambassador Bunker explained President Thieu's

opposition to releases of able-bodied POW's who might return

to SVN battlefield.

2. Ambassador nevertheless thought Thieu would probably agree

to release of significant number of sick and wounded prisoners.

In ensuing discussion, Secretary Laird mentioned possibility of

500 or 1,000 such releases.

3. As follow-up to this discussion we would like to see GVN move

ahead as soon as possible with release maximum number NVA

who desire repatriation to North.

4. Request you seek early occasion to raise this matter with Thieu

and determine how many releases we could expect obtain in this

sort of program. Please stress our desire for both early action and

significant numbers. l

('

As Assistant Secretary of Defense Nutter pointed out to Laird, State's

counterdraft focused on further sick and wounded releases; "by implication,

it gives up on able-bodied releases of North Vietnamese prisoners." Nutter

thought there was "no point in further debate over what Ambassador

Bunker said on this matter when he was here. The real issue is whether we

wish to press Thieu vigorously to agree on an early release of 1,000, or at

least 500, North Vietnamese prisoners." Believing that this should be

done, he advised Laird to intervene personally with Secretary Rogers, and,

if necessary, the president. I? Laird chose a less confrontational course. On

11 August he approved State's draft for transmission to Saigon as a joint

State/Defense message, accepting it as an interim position while readying

further proposals. IS

During a longer than normal delay in dispatching the message two

short but significant additions were made to the text-by "Dr. Kissinger

(or his staff with his approval)," according to a well-placed source. The
264 THE LONG ROAD HOME

final version no longer left anything to implication. It instructed Bunker

to work for the return of the "maximum number sick and wounded NVA

who desire repatriation to North." He should stress the U.S. desire "for

both early action and significant numbers, recognizing President Thieus

unwillingness to release able-bodied personnel."I<i

Meanwhile, however, the prospect of finding any considerable number

of sick or wounded willing to be repatriated had dimmed appreciably, and

further public reference to the original figure of 343 potential releasees was

being avoided. From Saigon in late August, U.S. Embassy staff members

reported on a consultation with GVN officials who explained that "the

difficulty of identifying disabled prisoners who want to return to the

North is great."

Most have made a commitment to the DRV not to leave the

south until, as the Foreign Minisrer put it, "the last American

has been driven out." They are, therefore, afraid to return before

the war ends. Another difficulty has been that of overcoming PW

insistence on some specific prior indication from the DRV

that they would be welcome. In addition, from the moment a

PW indicates his desire to be repatriated, he is vulnerable to

retribution from disciplined communists in cells within PW camps.

In such circumstances, it has been found necessary to discuss

repatriation with each PW separately; those who choose repatriation must be instantly isolated. This isolation process normally

requires, as in the case of the 62 repatriated in July, removal to a

separate prison.

The Foreign Minister said there are 275 or so disabled PWs from

the North currently in camps .... [He] believed that most of

them will not want to return, and the problem of identifying

and isolating those who do will be greater than previously.20

After further investigation Bunker reported more definitively on 7 September that there were few enemy PWs available "who are (a) NVA,

(b) certifiable as 'sick and wounded' by ICRC, and (c) are willing to accept

repatriation to NVN prior to close of hostilities." South Vietnam's president

continued to oppose releasing able-bodied NVA prisoners to their homeland, but Bunker suggested another possible course that might gain

Thieu's cooperation "without forcing him to face the military or political

consequences he fears from PW repatriation." It was the internment of prisoners in a neutral third country, as sanctioned by the Geneva Convention.

Bunker believed this alternative had never been discussed with the South
A Bitter Lesson 265

Vietnamese government, at least during his service as ambassador, and he

recommended that it be explored. 21

On 17 September, responding to an earlier request from Laird for their

views, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also recommended consideration of neutral

internment, mentioning that CINCPAC, Admiral John S. McCain, Jr.,

and COMUSMACV, General Creighton W. Abrams, had endorsed it as

well. This approach "could negate a majority of the GVN objections," and

they believed it might lead to a significant breakthrough. Laird's

main request had been for ways of inducing President Thieu to undertake large-scale releases of NVA prisoners., including the able-bodied. The

Joint Chiefs offered the thought that Thieu might be led to accept the

return of able-bodied prisoners if limited to the oldest men or those

imprisoned for the longest time. Records indicated that there were at least

409 enemy PWs over 40 years of age, while roughly 1,000 men had been

detained for more than four years. 22

In advising Laird, Nutter observed that the neutral internment possibility had been considered at an earlier stage of the war.* At this point,

however, he was reluctant to recommend pushing for internment because

it would remove most of the pressure on South Vietnam to release large

numbers of able-bodied prisoners. Since he judged State to be "plainly

unwilling" to press Thieu to agree to a unilateral release of able-bodied NVA

prisoners, Nutter considered that only two courses remained open: Laird

might attempt a personal appeal to Thieu or he could "send a memorandum

to the President pointing out that limiting ourselves to release of sick and

wounded is a dead end, and that we should press Thieu hard now on a

release of at least 500 North Vietnamese prisoners (including the remaining sick and wounded willing to return). "2\

The President's Peace Proposal of7 October 1970

Laird's decision took account of a significant new factor that had

entered the picture but a few days before-the five-point peace proposal

offered by President Nixon in his address to the nation on 7 October

1970. The secretary scribbled a response beside Nutter's recommendation

that called for a delay of two or three weeks until Hanoi's reaction to the

president's initiative became known. Then, "if nothing happens go with

memo to Pres."24

* See Chapter 5 for consideration of the option during 1966.
266 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Nixon had proposed a cease-fire-in-place throughout Indochina; immediate negotiations on an agreed timetable for the complete withdrawal of U.S.

forces as part of an overall settlement; a renewed effort to reach a political

agreement that fairly reflected the will of the South Vietnamese people regarding the future form of their government; and the convening of a broader

international conference on arrangements to insure the peace and stability of

the Indochina area as a whole. Then as his fifth point Nixon called for "the

immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war held by both

sides ... to return to the place of their choice." This should be done "without exception, without condition."25

In Paris the following day Ambassador Bruce formally presented the

president's five-point program to the North Vietnamese delegation, which

soon rejected the first four proposals outright and said that a general release

of prisoners could only occur after Hanoi's demands regarding the political future of South Vietnam and a unilateral U.S. military withdrawal had

been satisfied. The enemy repeated charges of American aggression and

neocolonialism and accused the United States of making unacceptable proposals in a deliberate attempt to prolong the war. 26

Accordingly, ISA began drafting the memorandum that Laird wished

to send to the White House. Concurrently the State Department prepared

a message to Saigon, ultimately dispatching it on 14 November with White

House approval. State advised Bunker that with the approach of Thanksgiving and Christmas, PW/MIA families as well as members of Congress

and civic, business, and veterans groups concerned with the issue were

"making known their strong hope" that the enemy might release American

prisoners during the holiday season. In response to this mood, State considered it "most important and timely that GVN with US support release

sizeable numbers of PW's between now and Christmas." While unlikely

to elicit a reciprocal response from Hanoi, the action would keep up the

pressure on the PW questionY

State's message offered few specifics beyond its references to "sizeable

numbers" or "numerous enemy PW's," but at the insistence of ISA officials

it did include a brief paragraph alerting Bunker to the possibility that

DoD would soon sponsor a proposal for large-scale release of able-bodied

NVA prisoners. 28 State made only passing mention of Nixon's 7 October

peace initiative, saying it had "further kindled" the hopes of the families,

despite their awareness of the subsequent rejection by Hanoi.

"State clearly prefers a less ambitious approach," Nutter wrote when submitting the draft memorandum for the president to Laird for signature. In

his opinion "the time for limited, partial steps is well past"-a sentiment

concurred in by others among Laird's senior advisers. 2')
A Bitter Lesson 267

In its opening sentence, and repeatedly thereafter, the memorandum

Laird sent the president on 18 November tied the Defense recommendations to Nixon's recent peace initiative:

I believe it is essential to keep your October 7 proposals before

the enemy and before the world. Wherever possible, we should

continue to take steps that will underline the reasonableness of

the proposals as a fair basis for settling the conflict.

The prisoner of war situation presents a good opportunity for

further aggressive action along these lines. I strongly believe that

we should take, as soon as possible, a dramatic step looking

toward the release and repatriation to North Vietnam of North

Vietnamese prisoners of war ....

Noting that the number of sick and wounded PWs willing to return

was "probably minimal," Laird said it was clearly necessary to include ablebodied prisoners in any substantial release. He then recommended the

following scenario:

First. GVN and US in Paris propose to release all North Vietnamese PWs desiring to return to the North in exchange for the

release of all US and Free World PWs held in Indo-China and

all GVN PWs held in North Vietnam ....

Second. The other side would in all likelihood reject the proposal. The US and GVN would thereupon propose to release

unilaterally all of the 8,200 NVA PWs who desired to return to

the North ....

Third. Concurrently, the International Committee of the Red

Cross (ICRC) would be asked to poll all NVA prisoners to determine their willingness to return North at this time. There may

be relatively few willing to do so (we believe most or all of them

signed a pledge not to return to NVN until the war was over).

Fourth. We would carry out the repatriation of all those willing

to return ....

Laird saw great advantages in this course. First of all, it would

"maintain the momentum of your 5-point proposal, and keep the other

side on the defensive." It would also reinforce other U.S. initiatives, in

the United Nations and elsewhere, and reassure families of their government's determination to resolve the PW issue at the earliest possible
268 THE LONG ROAD HOME

moment. It might even help offset recent adverse publicity about the My

Lai incident* and bad conditions at some of South Vietnam's prisons.

Admittedly, "considerable persuasion will be required to gain President

Thieu's cooperation in this endeavor," but Laird believed that his opposition could be overcome. 50

At Laird's request, State had supplied a paragraph for the text: J1

The State Department agrees that the steps I have outlined

would in principle be desirable. But in view of Thieu's repeatedly

expressed reluctance to release able-bodied North Vietnamese

prisoners,State believes it would be more productive to press

for other kinds of releases, including sick and wounded North

Vietnamese, Viet Cong prisoners in South Vietnam, and battlefield exchange proposals, if possible between now and Christmas, and not excluding able-bodied North Vietnamese if

Thieu can be convinced to do this. State further bel ieves this

question should be discussed with Ambassador Bunker when he

comes to Washington this weekend or next week.

Laird assured the president of his agreement that Bunker should be consulted before a final decision was made, but "given the urgent plight of

our own men and the need to build as expeditiously as possible on your

October 7 exchange proposal, I wanted you to have my recommendation

without delay."

Nixon decided to take at least the first step outlined in Laird's scenario.

By 7 December Bunker had obtained Thieu's agreement to proposing a

broad prisoner of war exchange in which the 8,200 NVA soldiers held in

South Vietnam would be given up, as a humanitarian action appropriate

to the Christmas season. Further instructions from Washington set out

Nixon's desires more explicitly, overriding Thieu's remaining reservations

and enabling the U.S. and GVN delegations to put forward the proposal at

the 10 December session in Paris. 52 It asked for the immediate release of

all NVA prisoners in exchange for all GVN personnel "held outside South

Viet-Nam" and all American and allied personnel held anywhere in

Indochina. In round numbers, Hanoi would regain 10 of its own men

for everyone given up. This was an offer advanced "in all seriousness and

sincerity," Ambassador Bruce told the opposing delegations: "Our side is

* On 16 March 1968 u.s. Army forces had destroyed the village of My Lai in Quang

Nai Province of South Vietnam and killed perhaps as many as 400 civilians-men,

women, and children. When revealed late in 1969 the incident provoked shock and

condemnation and set off a continuing controversy over the assessment of blame and

responsibility. Laird's memorandum and the beginning of coun-manial proceedings against

Lt. William L. Calley, Jr., occurred in the same month, November 1970.
A Bitter Lesson 269

ready to meet with you on a daily basis, starting tomorrow, in order that

immediate progress can be made on this question."33

While vainly awaiting a constructive response from the Communist

side, President Thieu's government launched two other initiatives in the

following weeks. On 22 December the GVN's foreign minister, Tran

Van Lam,* announced the impending release of a further contingent of

NVA prisoners of war who were incapacitated by wounds or sickness and

who volunteered for repatriation. The Saigon government undertook this

unilaterally and for purely humanitarian reasons, he said, to enable

these soldiers to return home in time for the traditional celebration of the

Vietnamese new year, but he would welcome a corresponding gesture by

the enemy. Setting a date of 24 January 1971-one month away and on

the eve of Tet-the foreign minister said the men would be sent across the

Ben-Hai River in the DMZ, just above the 17th parallel, using inflated

rubber motorboats. H

Following presentation of the proposal in Paris the next day, North

Vietnamese representatives responded as on earlier occasions. The men

involved were Vietnamese patriots imprisoned by the Americans and their

puppet regime in the South. When released, any who desired to go and live

in the North "would be received and assisted by the DRV government."35

As 24 January approached the GVN assembled 40 NVA prisoners

classified as sick or wounded for interviews overseen by the ICRC representatives stationed in Saigon. The embassy reported to Washington that

"after lengthy suasion in some cases," 38 had indicated their willingness to

go. "Two unwilling candidates for repatriation will be taken to DMZ but

will not be embarked against their will."J(,

On the appointed day another man withdrew his assent. Thirtyseven crossed the river, casting off clothing on the way, and were met by

uniformed North Vietnamese. Several mortar rounds and scattered small

arms fire pursued the South Vietnamese party as it withdrew from the

embarkation pointY

In Saigon two days later, on 26 January 1971, the GVN foreign minister announced the second initiative-one that appeared less likely to elicit

even the grudging acceptance the just-completed repatriation had received.

South Vietnam was prepared to release all sick and wounded prisoners

who wished to go to the North, Lam declared, proposing that the Hanoi

authorities similarly release all sick and wounded South Vietnamese and

allied prisoners of war. Lam expressed the hope the DRV leaders would

"clearly manifest their agreement to warmly welcome and treat well" the

men turned over to them. There were about 800 NVA prisoners and more

* As distinct from GVN Paris representative Ambassador Pham Dang Lam.
270 THE LONG ROAD HOME

than 1,200 Viet Cong categorized as sick or wounded. Many of the latter

were native Southerners, but under this proposal only those willing to be

transported to North Vietnam would be released. The North Vietnamese

government neither accepted nor rejected the offer. Although the Saigon

representative reaffirmed it in Paris on 4 February, North Vietnam made

no useful comment about arrangements for reception of those who might

be released. 38

Release or Neutral Internment ofLong- Term Prisoners

Midway in this sequence of events, on 11 January, Laird had another

opportunity to consult with Thieu in Saigon. He sought to impress Thieu

with the importance of the PW issue in the United States, saying it had

been a key factor in rallying the American people to support the Nixon

administration's programs in Southeast Asia. Therefore, actions that would

keep the PW issue in the forefront should be seen as vitally important to

South Vietnam as well. Renewing the discussion of a possible large-scale

release of enemy prisoners, he suggested a return of "all sick and wounded,

plus long-term POW's," such as those held over three years. Laird ended by

urging the South Vietnamese president "to take whatever aggressive actions

he could on the POW issues." Thieu replied that he had several proposals

under consideration. 39

As part of his attempt to ease Thieu's acceptance of the idea of releasing able-bodied prisoners Laird had expounded more fully than before

on a point mentioned in earlier discussions: that the men returned would

not add significantly to North Vietnam's strength and might actually hinder

the enemy's war effort. In this endeavor he relied in part on a commentary produced by a State Department expert and circulated at high levels

of the U.S. government during December 1970. Nutter had provided a

copy to Laird, pointing specifically to its usefulness in forthcoming discussions with Thieu. 40

The paper's author saw little prospect for any sort of prisoner exchange. North Vietnam was unlikely to agree because it regarded American PWs as "an important trump card for exacting substantial US

concessions." Also, the release of NVA prisoners to North Vietnam, either

by exchange or unilaterally, could pose a number of problems for the

enemy. The return of 9,000 prisoners would add little to North Vietnam's

manpower, even if fully utilized, but, in fact, their utility would probably

be outweighed by the disadvantages of having them back in the fold.

Since NVA soldiers had been indoctrinated to believe that if captured
A Bitter Lesson 271

they would be tortured or executed, the return of prisoners in relatively

good health would give the lie to their government. This knowledge would

spread to the Communist troops in the South and might diminish their

reluctance to surrender. Moreover, Hanoi would regard these men who

had surrendered as ideologically weak and fear that some of them had

been recruited as agents while in captivity. Thus it could be assumed

that Hanoi would subject returnees to extensive security screening, investigation, and reindoctrination. They would probably be isolated from the

population and kept out of the army, but under surveillance. Thus it

was deemed "highly unlikely that many if any at all would be returned

to the South or very effectively employed in the North."41

On other occasions Laird approached the matter from another angle,

arguing that the NVA prisoners constituted a liability from Washington's

and Saigon's standpoint "in that we must feed, clothe, shelter, and safeguard them, and they may become the excuse for serious difficulties in

reaching a final settlement of the war. Given the other side's apparent total

indifference to these men, the PWs do not constitute an asset, and do not

give us any negotiating leverage." Moreover, their continued detention

in large numbers "provides the other side with opportunities to provoke

riots and incidents in camp, which will inevitably tarnish the GVN's

generally good record regarding the conditions of captivity." Laird had

long been convinced that the NVA prisoners "will do us more good

released than held. "42

During the first week following Laird's return to Washington his reading of cables from the embassy in Saigon caused him increasing concern.

They reported actions and statements of the GVN's Ministry of Foreign

Affairs that indicated a continuing emphasis on the sick and wounded

while stressing reasons for postponing a shift to able-bodied releases. On

21 January he sent a personal message to Bunker citing particular passages

and saying the foreign ministry's positions appeared inconsistent with

Thieu's remarks at the meeting only 10 days before. "In those discussions,

I gained the impression that Thieu understood the near-term benefits and

long-term importance of pressing forward with some dramatic release initiatives; that he was considering initiatives such as a sizeable unilateral release

of able-bodied NVA prisoners; and that he believed the political problems

in SVN in so doing were manageable." Laird recalled that during his visit

to Saigon he had done everything he could to underscore the urgent need

to develop dramatic initiatives of this type. He hoped his other major point

had also registered: "POW initiatives are consistent with and important to

the furtherance of US support for the RVN. "43
272 THE LONG ROAD HOME

After reviewing the record Bunker replied that he believed the foreign

ministry actions Laird cited were not necessarily inconsistent with earlier

reports of the Saigon government's positions, or with, "as I recall them, observations President Thieu made on this subject during your recent visit here."

On the whole, the government had responded favorably to u.S. suggestions,

and "over a period of months the GVN has become increasingly convinced

of the merit of keeping pressure on the other side by new PW initiatives," such as the one just announced that day, 26 January, by the foreign

minister. In fact, he continued, "the evolution of GVN attitude toward

PW releases is such that I do not preclude the possibility of convincing

them to release some of the able-bodied, especially those who have been

long in prison" -as Laird himself had recommended. So far, however,

Thieu had not withdrawn his objections, and Bunker, in a frank appraisal

of the Defense Department's Memorandum of Conversation, said it contained nothing that showed Thieu committing himself to a unilateral

release of able-bodied prisoners. The ambassador thought Laird had

presented a useful argument discounting the likelihood that NVA returnees would ever be trusted to serve again as regular soldiers, and he expected

to press this point with Thieu in further consultations. 44

By mid-March instructions from Washington to the embassy in Saigon

had taken on a somewhat firmer tone. A message on 18 March noted the

adoption of a congressional resolution declaring the period 21-26 March

a National Week of Concern for PW/MIAs, to be backed up shortly by a

presidential proclamation. State officials believed it was important "for

US/GVN to put forward significant POW release proposal in Paris meeting

that week, in order to focus attention on our side's efforts to make progress

in this area, and other side's continued intransigence."45

The action contemplated would also provide evidence that the government was giving attention to the recommendations advanced by the

National League of Families and by several members of Congress for whom

Illinois Rep. Paul Findley was the chief spokesman. Since December 1970

both groups had been championing the idea of an immediate unconditional repatriation of 1,610 NVA prisoners of war, matching the number

of Americans currently listed as imprisoned or missing. Believing that the

proposal "would unquestionably capture the imagination of the world,"

Findley had sketched some of its details:

Those to be repatriated should be selected at random without

regard to age or physical condition. All should be released simultaneously from the same location on the demilitarized zone at the

conclusion of a ceremony during which officials of allied governments would issue a supply of rations to each prisoner released
A Bitter Lesson 273

and make an appropriate public appeal to Hanoi and National

Liberation Front leaders for similar humane treatment of American prisoners. Prisoners would then be permitted to proceed on

foot toward North Vietnam ....46

The provisions outlined by Findley departed widely from the requirements of the Geneva Convention, and the tractable behavior expected of

the NVA prisoners was hardly assured, but Defense officials saw the spirit,

intent, and publicity value of the proposal as compatible with the government's aims. At a news conference Laird made a favorable reference to

one variant of the congressional plan, and Deputy Secretary Packard

assured Findley that "your proposal and thoughtful supporting analysis

will receive full consideration in our deliberations."47

While giving general encouragement to the endeavors of the congressmen and League of Families, Defense officials recognized the need to move

away from precisely matching the number of returnees to the total of

U.S. PW/MIAs, which baldly disregarded the interests of America's South

Vietnamese ally. They settled on 2,000 as a desirable minimum for any proposed release of prisoners to North Vietnam-a figure large enough to

allow for return of South Vietnamese as well as American captives, if

Hanoi decided to reciprocate, and large enough also to insure that some

able-bodied NVA prisoners would have to be included. 48

Following receipt of State's instructions of 18 March 1971, Bunker

had immediately set to work to obtain South Vietnamese agreement to a

PW release proposal sizable enough to have a significant impact, for

presentation at the Paris session occurring within the U.S. national

week of concern, on 25 March. Consultations ran on beyond the desired

date, however, taking a turn toward more serious consideration of the

neutral internment alternative and leading ultimately to President

Thieu's acceptance of that concept and of applying it to long-term

able-bodied prisoners. 49

In Paris on 8 April the South Vietnamese representative offered the

proposal, with immediate support from Ambassador Bruce. It called for

agreement by both sides to either direct repatriation or internment in

a neutral country of able-bodied prisoners of war who had undergone a

long period of captivity, as envisaged by Article 109 of the Geneva Convention. Soon afterward President Nixon publicly endorsed the idea of neutral

internment and hoped the other side would give a positive response.)O

The proposal did represent a modification of Thieu's stand on returning able-bodied prisoners to the enemy but not a change sufficient to

open the way to the dramatic large-scale release Laird continued to hope

for. At present there seemed no prospect of moving on to the second step
274 THE LONG ROAD HOME

of the scenario he had provided to President Nixon in November 1970,

the unilateral release of all NVA soldiers desiring to return to the North.

Laird remained convinced, however, that release initiatives on that scale

were necessary "to build momentum in the minds of people and of

governments throughout the world behind the idea that it is time for

all the prisoners to go home." The secretary sought to understand why

the arguments he considered soundly based had not convinced Thieu

and given him the resolve to face down internal political opposition to

the proposal. He turned to General Abrams, asking him to assess how

serious the obstacles were to obtaining a favorable response from Thieu. 51

Replying on 19 April, Abrams said the GVN was well aware of the

U.S. government's interest in generating PW initiatives, and it had

responded by originating or joining in a number of ventures dating back

to the unilateral release of 62 sick or wounded NVA prisoners on 11 July

1970. Resentment lingered in some quarters over the sacrifice of two

valuable vessels in that operation and the hostile fire encountered in

January 1971, and it had to be recognized that the GVN's experience

with PW initiatives had been largely unrewarding in terms both of

Hanoi's response and the political reaction within South Vietnam. Thieu

maintained that he could not justify a one-sided return of able-bodied

enemy prisoners-either to his soldiers or to a South Vietnamese public

that included political opponents who would be unsparing in their

criticism. Abrams commented that these objections were probably more

valid at present than at any time in the past, given the substantial losses

suffered by South Vietnamese forces during the recent incursion into Laos

and the fact that the October date on which Thieu must seek reelection

was now less than six months away. Abrams considered it "unlikely that

President Thieu's assessment of the political risks will change, and consequently he will probably continue to oppose release of able-bodied PW

without reciprocation at least until after the election. "52

The "510 Release" Proposal

Further proposals from Washington did not attempt to overcome

Thieu's aversion to unilateral release of the able-bodied but did urge

immediate follow-up and elaboration of existing positions. On 27 April

State advised the American peace negotiators and the embassy in Saigon

that "highest authority requests that significant POW release proposal

be advanced in Paris," at the 29 April session, only two days away. State

wanted to enhance the appeal and attest to the seriousness of recent
A Bitter Lesson 275

U.S./GVN offers by reiterating them with specific numbers attached.

Despite the time constraints Bunker succeeded in obtaining Thieu's

consent to the initiative, subject to the adjustment of a few details still

under discussion. 51

At the Paris talks on 29 April Ambassador Lam recalled his government's proposal of 26 January for the release of all sick or wounded

prisoners who desired to go North and the GVN's further proposal of

8 April for the transfer of long-term prisoners of war to internment in a

neutral country.

We are prepared to repatriate to North Viet-Nam 570 sick and

wounded North Vietnamese prisoners of war. We ask the Hanoi

authorities to propose adequate measures designed to insure the

best possible conditions for their safe repatriation.

We are also ready, within the framework of our proposal of

April 8, 1971, to facilitate the transfer of 1200 North Vietnamese

prisoners of war (who) have been detained over four years to a

neutral country for temporary internment. We ask the Hanoi

authorities to make suggestions on the choice of a neutral

government for that purpose.'4

The figure of 1,200 for prisoners held more than four years had been

reached during last-minute consultations in Saigon, following receipt by

the embassy of a message from Washington saying "we strongly hope that

figures will total to 1700 or more, to exceed number of US PW/MIA's in

Southeast Asia." The sick and wounded figure of 570 remained fixed;

the long-term prisoner number, originally 940, grew further thanks to a redefinition of the standards and then was rounded off at 1,200. 55

Accordingly, in his supporting remarks Ambassador Bruce spoke of a

total of 1,770 NVA prisoners who were eligible for internment or repatriation under the proposal if they signified their willingness to go. He emphasized that the opposing side's cooperation was necessary when arranging a

safe and convenient transfer of repatriates and choosing a mutually acceptable neutral country. Otherwise the offer was unilateral and did not

depend on Hanoi's making similar provision for the release of long-held

or sick and wounded American prisoners, but Bruce did of course call

on North Vietnam's representatives to do so. "These men, too, should have

the chance to return home or to be interned in a neutral country," he said.

"Such action on your part would be a welcome way to refute the charge

that you hold our men as hostages; your silence on this would serve further

to confirm it. "5('
276 THE LONG ROAD HOME

A few hours later at a White House press conference President Nixon

called attention to the event, giving a rather free-ranging description of

the day's proceedings that omitted such details as the fact that each

prisoner would have to consent before being included in a move. Also,

when published, his statement contained two corrections, for the president

had misremembered the numbers:

Today in Paris, as you may note, we, along with the South Vietnamese, offered to repatriate-as a matter of fact, we are going

unilaterally to repatriate, without regard to what the North Vietnamese do, 540 [570] North Vietnamese sick and wounded.

And, in addition to that, we offered to send to a neutral country

1,600 [1,200] North Vietnamese prisoners who have been prisoners for 4 years or longer. We trust that the North Vietnamese

will respond. \7

At the Paris sessions during the next two weeks Bruce probed repeatedly for some response to the proposals from the Communist side. In

addition he was able to point to a recent action of the government of

Sweden, which had announced on 30 April its willingness to have its

vessels and territory used for transporting and interning prisoners from

the conflict in Vietnam, assuming agreement was reached by the two sides.

President Nixon noted this development "with great satisfaction," and

Bruce repeated the president's call for Hanoi to move promptly "to take

advantage of this humanitarian offer on the part of the Swedish Government." The Stockholm communique had stressed that Sweden was acting

on its own initiative, having had no previous contact with the U.S. government on the subject. By 6 May, however, the State Department was actively

soliciting bids from other countries also to serve as the interning power.

In a number of foreign capitals U.S. diplomats acknowledged that internment for American prisoners was their government's primary interest but

emphasized that "our offer applies both ways." Moreover, the United States

was prepared to underwrite the costS.)H

Hanoi's Encouraging Response

A response from the enemy came at last in the announcement broadcast by Radio Hanoi on 13 May 1971. It dealt only with the offer to release

sick and wounded NVA prisoners. The North Vietnamese did not reply,
A Bitter Lesson 277

then or later, to the internment proposal. The announcement began in

a familiar style, deploring the fact that the Saigon administration, "on US

orders," had once again proposed "the release of a number of Vietnamese

illegally arrested in South Viet-Nam whom they called 'North Vietnamese

prisoners of war'. This is an old trick of the Nixon Administration aimed

at misleading public opinion, concealing their stubborn prolongation,

intensification, and expansion of the war of aggression in Indochina and

their odious crimes against the peoples of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia,

and evading the public demands for a rapid and complete withdrawal of

all US troops from South Viet-Nam."

Radio Hanoi quoted the statement used on earlier occasions to the

effect that any of these patriots who were released and wished to settle in

North Vietnam would be welcomed. It then set out several stipulations

regarding the time, place, and manner of the GVN's proposed repatriation

of the sick and wounded:

1. Those persons must be transported by unarmed US puppet

civil ships flying a Red Cross flag to a spot three to five km.

southeast of Cua Tung, at the 17th parallel, 107.08 degrees

latitude, at 10:30 o'clock (Hanoi time) on June 4, 1971. Those

persons will be transferred to unarmed civil ships of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam flying a Red Cross flag.

2. In an area with a 30 kilometer radius around the spot for release

and reception, every military activity in the air, at sea and on the

mainland must be ceased from 0000 hr to 2400 hrs (Hanoi time)

on June 4, 1971.

As further evidence of what seemed a businesslike approach, the North Vietnamese required advance notice of the number and identifying characteristics of the ships being used and made provision for postponement if

bad weather was encountered.)')

Both Ambassador Bunker and a State Department spokesman in

Washington termed the reply encouraging-perhaps even a first step leading to the release of American and allied prisoners. Laird also was heartened

by the enemy's offer to receive prisoners "in a formal, orderly transfer,"

and another senior official observed that the prescribed arrangements for

the repatriation were "considerably less difficult to meet than in the past."

This time officially designated representatives of the North Vietnamese

government would actually come forward to accept the returnees, for the

first time making use of the Red Cross flag as the conventional symbol of
278 THE LONG ROAD HOME

peaceful, humanitarian intent. So far the South Vietnamese government's

screening of sick and wounded NVA prisoners had not identified many

willing to be repatriated, but the authorities now began a resurvey,

believing that more would agree to return when informed of Hanoi's

preparations to receive them. w

The embassy's reference to the meager results so far from the screening brought a joint State/Defense reply quoting President Nixon's public

declaration that "we are going to unilaterally repatriate without regard to

what the North Vietnamese do" more than 500 NVA sick and wounded.

That constituted "a clear statement of US/GVN intention to follow through

on sizeable repatriation and underlines importance we attach to making

this proposal become reality. "1>1

In a further display of firmness the Washington authorities reacted

strongly when informed on 20 May that the Saigon government had concluded it would be impossible to complete all preparations in time for the

4 June date. The GVN planned to make counterproposals at the next

Paris session, suggesting a postponement to 25 June as well as a major

reduction in the cease-fire zone surrounding the meeting point. Secretary of

State Rogers quickly replied, advising Bunker of the serious concern this

caused in Washington and declaring that the reasons for delay cited by

the South Vietnamese government were "basically without substance." The

United States wished preparations to commence at once, keyed to the

agreed date of 4 June. Bunker could inform the GVN that the United

States was prepared to give full support, including finding and equipping

the necessary non-military vessels and airlifting the PWs to the embarkation port. On 27 May the Saigon government publicly accepted the date

and particular arrangements Hanoi had stipulated.I'2

Nevertheless, some of Saigon's apprehension about meeting the 4 June

deadline had been warranted, particularly as it related to working with the

International Committee of the Red Cross to produce the list of prisoners

willing to be repatriated. Initially the ICRC representatives stationed in

South Vietnam had indicated that discharge of their responsibilities would

require an interview lasting approximately 15 minutes with each potential

returnee and that those desiring repatriation would then sign a statement

to that effect. The prospect that the eligible NVA prisoners would be processed at no more than four per hour per interviewing team was unacceptable,

and on 20 May the GVN formally requested the State Department's assistance in obtaining more favorable instructions from the IeRe's governing

authority in Geneva. I

"

State had already reacted negatively to the idea of requiring NVA soldiers

to sign a document, believing this would strongly influence them to refuse
A Bitter Lesson 279

repatriation. In commenting to its posts in Saigon and Geneva, State

speculated that "PWs want to be able to tell NVN after return that they

had no choice but to go back. Signature on paper, they may fear, could be

used to refute this." The United States was irrevocably committed to nonforcible repatriation, but "this does not mean we have to invite NVA PW's to

decline repatriation by requiring that they sign a statement of consent. "(,4

Frank Sieverts, the department's expert and principal operating officer

for PW affairs, was already scheduled to visit Geneva on other business

beginning 24 May, and State suggested that the U.S. mission there make

the initial approach to the ICRC on this subject and arrange for further

discussions to occur after his arrival. Even so, the introductory consultation with Delegate-General Jean Ott, the ICRC official responsible for

Southeast Asia, did ease concern about one point. Ott disavowed any

intention of conducting IS-minute interviews. The importance of getting

this and other up-to-date instructions to Saigon was reemphasized, however, when the ICRC representatives there indicated that, even with four

interviewers assigned, each with an interpreter, they did not expect to

process more than about 100 prisoners each day.('5

At his first meeting with Ott on 24 May Sieverts obtained agreement

that no signature or written statement would be required from prisoners

willing to be repatriated. Also, "Ott reaffirmed that, far from 15 minute

interviews, something closer to 15-30 seconds would be sufficient to

establish PWs' readiness to accept repatriation." The ICRC official agreed

that the procedures followed and the general tone of the exercise should

be conducive to acceptance, and he endorsed the U.S. intention of making

sure all prisoners had heard a tape recording of the Radio Hanoi broadcast

before being interviewed. Showing familiarity with the experience in

previous repatriations, Ott said it would be just as well not to give Red

Cross packages or new clothing to the returning prisoners.(,(,

During a subsequent consultation in Geneva Ott described in more

detail the screening procedures the ICRe's instructions were intended to

produce. Each NVA prisoner would pass before one of the interviewing

teams and be asked, "Are you willing to be released to North Vietnam?"-

a question needing only a yes or no answer and meeting Article 109's

requirements by clearly establishing whether the man objected to being

returned. Each prisoner would hear the question in private, ideally in "a

screened-off area from which there are two doors: one for yes, one for no."

Thus he would be segregated immediately on the basis of his answer. If

carried on under these terms the interviewing should be a "very simple

matter," Ott said. It was scheduled for 29 May and ought to be completed

that day or, at most, the following oneY
280 THE LONG ROAD HOME

In Saigon, however, the senior ICRC representative still believed there

was an obligation to conduct a further interrogation of each man who

chose repatriation to insure that he had not been coerced into giving this

positive reply. Although the South Vietnamese government hoped the

screening would be completed on 29 May in view of other scheduling

requirements, the ICRe's representative indicated the processing might

take up to four days. Ott sent off a terse further instruction, through both

his own and U.S. channels. The four interviewing teams were to make every

effort to finish on 29 May, requesting a second day only if that failed. "You

should interview without break, skipping lunch and going into the night

if necessary. "I,R

Accordingly the screening of 660 NVA prisoners identified as disabled

by wounds or sickness began on 29 May. Observers from General Abrams's

headquarters reported that by noon 210 had been processed, with the

ICRe's interviewers devoting from one to two minutes to each man. They

completed the task by the evening of that day. Ii)

The Outcome

The result? After intensive diplomatic activity 10 Paris, Saigon, and

Geneva and scores of thoughtfully composed messages detailing its progress, thousands of hours spent in planning and coordinated preparation, and

President Nixon's public commitment to an expansive vision of the outcome, only 13 of the 660 prisoners agreed to accept repatriation. All were

permanently disabled, including six amputees and one who was blind. 70

Adding to the bitter taste of failure was recognition of the probability

that North Vietnam had capitalized on the importance given the PW issue

by the U.S. government to play out a charade designed to mislead the

United States and South Vietnam and expose them to humiliation on the

world stage.

It remained for the Uni ted States to put the best possible face on this

mortifying failure. Instructions went out to make the case in a "dignified

and sober way" that the United States and GVN had, as a humanitarian act,

offered to return the sick and wounded enemy prisoners to their homes.

The United States regretted that the NVA prisoners had not availed themselves of the opportunity, but there was, of course, no thought of forcing

them to return. On 2 June the South Vietnamese government formally

reported the results of the ICRC screening, adding that in fulfillment of

the original plan the 13 returnees would depart the following day aboard

an unarmed civilian ship, in order to reach the transfer point at the agreed
A Bitter Lesson 281

time on 4 June. Although counseled by the U.S. embassy to let the facts

speak for themselves, without embellishment, Saigon's spokesman stated

that "98 per cent of the disabled and incurably sick Northern POWs are

worried about their return to the North because they dread the oppressive

and avenging acts of the Northern administration"; they chose to remain

in the South "where they enjoy a better destiny and safety. "71

As expected, Radio Hanoi took full advantage of the situation. On

3 June it broadcast that "after much clamor about the sending to North

Viet-Nam of 570 Vietnamese patriots illegally detained by them," the

other side now said that "only 13 persons would be allowed to go to the

North. This is a very ugly, deceptive trick of the United States and the

Saigon administration." A trustful Hanoi, the broadcast continued, had

agreed to transfer ptocedures designed for the reception of a large number,

but "now that the U.S. puppets have trickily canceled the sending of 570

persons" these arrangements no longer applied, and Hanoi declared the

agreement annulled. South Vietnamese and U.S. authorities moved quickly

to prevent the ship from heading into an area that was no longer a ceasefire zone. With the concurrence of the ICRe's observers, the GVN then

terminated the operation. 72

Thus ended the best-publicized and seemingly most promising attempt

at unilateral release of enemy prisoners. Depression and disappointment

showed clearly in the comments penned by OSD officials immediately

following the failure: "Questionable whether further release offers can be

gainfully made," and "may be basis for DRV/PRG attack on our negotiating credibility across the board," followed by "at the least has probably

damaged our ability to take initiative in PW area."7\

But how could it be that only 2 percent of the disabled NVA prisoners

were willing to accept repatriation? What explained the remarkable unanimity of the other 98 percent? The presumption was strong that Hanoi,

even while taking the lead in defining the practical arrangements for the

return, had sent word by clandestine means that the prisoners should

refuse repatriation, knowing that a cadre of dedicated Communists in the

camps would enforce the order. Investigations undertaken after the event

failed to discover specific evidence of external influence but did reconfirm

earlier intelligence showing internal discipline among the prisoners to be

highly effective. The diligence of cadre members probably explained

instances of evident orchestration, such as the denial by some of the

men surveyed that they had ever heard a rebroadcast of the Radio Hanoi

announcement, despite definite information that camp commanders had

played the tape repeatedly. A further finding underscored the difficulty of
282 THE LONG ROAD HOME

making any appeal to the captured NVA soldiers, sick or able-bodied: their

distrust of any statement coming from the Americans, the South Vietnamese, or even an ICRC delegate was genuine and profound.74

In the end, North Vietnam seemed the clear winner. The United States

and South Vietnam were embarrassed by their inability to deliver a respectable number of NVA prisoners, the credibility of the two allies suffered,

and North Vietnam did not receive an influx of prisoner returnees it

apparently did not want or need. The main objective of U.S. policy remained unfulfilled, for Hanoi's leaders had avoided becoming obligated,

in the eyes of the world, to make some move toward reciprocal release of

American and allied prisoners of war.
14

Repatriation Planning:

A Central Issue Resolved

The new officials of the Department of Defense in the Nixon administration confronted the same aggregation of PW/MIA problems and

attendant frustrations as their predecessors. Compared with the period of

the Johnson administration, however, a somewhat different division of

labor could be discerned. On a number of salient matters the secretary of

defense himself usually originated action and retained control. These included 000 contributions to the negotiating process and to the initiatives

launched by the president, as well as reciprocal release proposals and publicity highlighting the enemy's noncompliance with the Geneva Convention.

The assistant secretary of defense (ISA) and others involved in the work of

the DoD PW Policy Committee more commonly concerned themselves

with continuing aspects of the PW problem, often largely administrative in

nature, such as the mail and package arrangements, prisoner lists and other

forms of recordkeeping in support of the Paris negotiations, and requirements arising from Secretary Laird's strong emphasis on assistance to the

next of kin. But above all, the officials at this level were occupied with repatriation planning.

Within 000, preparation for the day when the U.S. prisoners would

be released ran as a major theme through the first four years of the Nixon

administration. The effort involved the development of a set of compatible

and interlocking plans, ranging from overall policy and public affairs guidance, through individual service plans, downward through operational levels

as far as the subordinate echelons of the Pacific Command, and ultimately

to the U.S. European Command as well. The plans emerged as substantial

documents, often as bound publications. On 17 December 1969 the Joint

Chiefs of Staff assigned an unclassified nickname to designate all plans,

283
284 THE LONG ROAD HOME

instructions, message traffic, and operational actIvity pertalOlOg to the

processing of recovered U.S. military personnel. Thereafter the guiding

documents commonly bore the title Egress Recap. *1

As previously remarked, the plans written and refined during the Nixon

years followed from a basic concept formulated by officials of the previous

administration. The guiding precepts and assignments of responsibility

were those already set down in the directives issued by Deputy Secretary

Paul H. Nitze on 8 June 1968 and 18 January 1969, plus his memorandum of 30 November 1968 regarding transportation of family members

to hospital reunions with the returned men. t In the course of the planning

effort various parts of the original scheme were reconsidered, most notably

the time to be allotted for overseas processing of the returnees. The alterations that resulted did not change the overall design.

Designation ofCentral Processing Sites

One of the most important decisions announced in Nitze's directive of

18 January 1969 was never seriously questioned thereafter. It countermanded some of the initial planning done within the Pacific Command

by prescribing that upon release the returnees would be transported

without regard to service affiliation "to a single central processing location

in Vietnam or elsewhere in WESTPAC [Western Pacific] if circumstances

require." By 21 March 1969, COMUSMACV had conformed his plan to

the directive by designating the U.S. installation at Cam Ranh Bay as the

central processing site. In accordance with CINCPAC's implementing

instructions, it was to be a "unified facility" under the direct operational

control of COMUSMACV. The organization chart showed no breakdown

into Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps subdivisions. The existing

USAF hospital and supporting Air Force units at Cam Ranh Bay would

be augmented with Army, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel from other

MACV elements to the extent necessary to insure efficient processing and

to carry out inherent service functions. Those functions included all personnel, personal affairs, and records matters, the intelligence debriefings,

and the assignment of escorts for the homeward flight. 2

The designation of Cam Ranh Bay as a central processing site remained

in effect for almost three years, until 1 February 1972, along with the

* RECAP, already an established term in the military lexicon, stood for "Returned,

Exchanged, or Captured American Personnel."

t See Chapter 9.
A Central Issue Resolved 285

basic assumption that the release of a large number of U.S. prisoners was

most likely to occur within COMUSMACV's area of responsibility. Nevertheless, throughout the period, Admiral McCain as CINCPAC kept in

force a requirement on four other subordinate commanders-in Korea,

Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines-to maintain plans for the establishment and operation of a central processing facility for large-scale Egress

Recap actions. The later elimination of Cam Ranh Bay as a processing site

was a consequence of the U.S. redeployment from South Vietnam that

had been in progress since the first year of the Nixon administration. As

the departure of combat forces and support units continued into the

fall of 1971, the projections made by CINCPAC's planners showed that

COMUSMACV soon would no longer be capable of conducting a largescale processing operation. In advising the secretary of defense and the

JCS of this assessment on 3 November 1971, CINCPAC said he was

instituting surveys and staff visits to the other potential processing locations with a view to designating one or more of them as primary sites.\

If Admiral McCain's intention in this regard needed any strengthening, it could be drawn from the recommendations submitted by

COMUSMACV on 27 November, based on the findings of a committee

convened by the MACV Command Surgeon. The group's report surveyed

the declining medical resources of the command, covering both the growing deficiencies of staff and equipment in the specialties needed for the

proper evaluation and care of returnee patients and the ongoing reduction

in facilities. The 483d USAF Hospital at Cam Ranh Bay-once a fully

staffed installation with a 400-bed capacity-was now rated at 200 beds

and scheduled for further reduction. Moreover, the withdrawal of U.S.

combat forces rendered the security of support areas more uncertain than

in the past. Citing as an example the recent sapper attacks that had destroyed 6,000 tons of munitions stored at Cam Ranh Bay, the command

surgeon's committee thought that retention of released prisoners in South

Vietnam for any more than a short staging period would not be "conducive

to proper psychosocial readjustment and certainly not in the best interest

of the morale of the returnees." Except for those needing immediate hospitalization, returnees should be airlifted with little delay to hospitals elsewhere in PACOM that were not subject to cutbacks, there to begin their

processing and medical treatment "in pleasant and secure surroundings."

The closing words of COMUSMACV's covering letter were more a finding of fact than a recommendation: "One or more out-country military

hospitals in PACOM should be designated as the central processing facility

for large scale repatriations.""
286 THE LONG ROAD HOME

With the staff surveys completed, Admiral McCain took the contemplated action on 31 December 1971. He designated three installations as

sites "primarily and equally responsible to be ready to conduct centralized

and unified processing of US personnel returned from captured status," to

be effective 1 February 1972. The three hospitals were at Clark Air Base in

the Philippines, U.S. Naval Station, Guam, and Camp Kue, Okinawa. In

charge, respectively, were the Commander, 13th Air Force; Commander, U.S.

Naval Forces, Marianas; and Commanding General, U.S. Army, Ryukyus.

On the same effective date the obligation of both COMUSMACV and

COMUSKOREA to plan and prepare for full-scale centralized processing

would end. The two commanders remained charged with the lesser responsibility of "conducting initial unified processing," that is, the reception, medical sorting, and onward medical evacuation of the returnees to one of the

primary sites, plus immediate hospitalization and care of patients incapable

of undergoing the flight. For the commanders in Japan and Thailand, the

CINCPAC directive of 31 December 1971 terminated immediately any

responsibility for detailed planning for Egress Recap operations. 5

Thus was abandoned the expectation that central processing of returnees prior to their evacuation to the continental United States (CONUS)

would most likely occur within COMUSMACV's command. Though an

important development, it marked no real departure from the original

concept. The Nitze directive of 18 January 1969 had spoken of "a single

central processing location in Vietnam or elsewhere in WESTPAC if circumstances require."

The new arrangement did involve a different provision for discharging service responsibilities in the repatriation exercise. Had the operation

occurred in MACV, service requirements would have been fulfilled through

the normal relationships within a single subordinate unified command. At

the three installations newly designated by CINCPAC the responsible commander normally did not direct unified forces, but the directive authorized

each of them to act as the "unified agent of CINCPAC for EGRESS RECAP."

In the message of 31 December 1971, Admiral McCain also addressed his

service component commanders, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and

CINCPACAF:

Request you designate a senior officer to act as your Service component representative for EGRESS RECAP. Such representative

should be prepared to report to the designated primary or initial

processing site to coordinate, under the overall direction and control of the CINCPAC agent for EGRESS RECAP ... all processing

actions pertaining to returned personnel of your Service. Service
A Central Issue Resolved 287

processing teams (to include escorts, debriefers, medical personnel and admin personnel) will function under supervision and

control of the PACOM Service EGRESS RECAP representative.

Protocol required CINCPAC to use slightly different language when

addressing CINCPACFLT on a further point. The designation of a separate

representative of the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, he

wrote, "is considered desirable and is encouraged."!'

Processing Time Overseas

Planning, tralOlOg, and other preparations to fulfill the CINCPAC

directive went forward during the early months of 1972. At PACOM Headquarters, however, staff officers were already aware that further changes

might become necessary. Through various channels they had received word

of deliberations going on in Washington that could lead to a radical revision

of the part of the basic directive that set a normal overseas processing time

of from 36 to 72 hours. The discussion there had begun in November 1971

and was destined to continue until the following May. At issue was a question of fundamental importance to the ordering of the entire repatriation

processing system: the extent and purpose of the medical evaluation and

treatment that the returnees would receive at the overseas cen ter before their

evacuation to the continental United States.

Even earlier, service medical officers had begun to show concern over

the effect of the 36-72 hour provision on the fulfillment of their professional responsibilities. Perhaps the first fully reasoned expression of this

view occurred in July 1971, during a seminar convened at the Naval Air

Station, Miramar, California, to review the Navy's Egress Recap plan. The

Medical Working Group report of that conference focused on the problem

of "restrictive processing time under Phase II." The writers pointed out

that the releasees would have endured a period of Oriental captivity far

longer than any previously experienced. Already their average time of

imprisonment exceeded three years. Accordingly, "there will undoubtedly

be many more and more severe personality disorders, psychiatric, physical

and emotional problems to cope with in EGRESS RECAP personnel." These

would have to be evaluated and treated on an individual basis. Hence the

plan should not presume "stabilization or emotional adjustment sufficient

to medically qualify the repatriate for hasty return to CONUS within a

72 hour period." Besides recommending deletion of the 72-hour guideline, the panel revived a proposal that had figured in some of the earliest

Navy planning. "Consideration should be given to a period of stabilization
288 THE LONG ROAD HOME

of the repatriates at a mid-transit medical facility," such as the Naval Hospital on Guam.!

An indication that the medical officers had perhaps been even more

vehement on the point than they let on in their written report could be

found in the notes taken by the observer from the PW/MIA Task Force,

Cdr. R. A. Mauldin. His trip report summarized their view as follows:

"36-72 hour parameter is criminal. Command pressures will tend to

override therapeutic considerations." Nor was the criticism an isolated one.

The MACV Command Surgeon's committee reviewed many of the same

considerations in November 1971. Its members concluded that a processing time of about 10 days should be the norm, "to be reduced or extended

on an individual basis dependent on the physical and mental condition of

the patient and the professional judgment of medical authorities. "R

By the early autumn of 1971 a more eminent spokesman for the professional medical viewpoint had appeared in the person of Dr. Richard S.

Wilbur, M.D., since 27 July the assistant secretary of defense for health

and environment. He returned from a September visit to U.S. installations

in the Pacific and Southeast Asia with his interest in the medical aspects

of the repatriation plan fully aroused. He had a growing concern that the

existing guidelines might be interpreted in a manner that would result in

premature evacuation of the returnee patients.

Wilbur prepared a memorandum to emphasize that the 36 to 72 hour

processing provision was "not intended to take precedence over the proper

health care of any individual." Accordingly, the time limitation should

be waived whenever, in the opinion of medical officers, adherence to the

schedule would not be in the best interest of the health of the returnee

patient. The intent of the memorandum was to ask the secretaries of the

military departments and the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to review the

repatriation plans to insure that the instructions were consistent with this

interpretation. In apparent acknowledgment of the coordinating responsibility of the assistant secretary of defense (ISA) in all matters relating to

prisoners of war, Wilbur submitted his proposed memorandum to Assistant Secretary Nutter on 8 October 1971.')

The proposal was unexceptionable. Though the concept advanced in

the memorandum was probably already well understood, its reiteration

would have given added assurance that this was so. Nevertheless, the action

was destined not to be completed. Wilbur's submission happened to occur

just as the Sexton case was unfolding. The unexpected release of Army

Staff Sgt. John Sexton, Jr., by the Viet Cong preempted the attention of

ISA officials' and then engaged them in reviews of the instances of faulty
A Central Issue Resolved 289

coordination and inept handling of the returnee's debriefing that subsequently came to light." Also, some of the more public aspects of the case

gave an appearance of mismanagement that was enhanced by a series of

troublesome public affairs incidents after Sexton was hospitalized in the

United States, prompting two members of Congress to make persistent inquiries. It could be argued that some of these difficulties might have been

avoided if Sexton had undergone a longer period of debriefing, medical

treatment, and psychological stabilization in Vietnam before exposure to

his family and the attentions of the press. III This line of thought coincided

with the view that Wilbur had by now adopted on purely professional

grounds. He had advanced from cautionary statements to a more outspoken advocacy of retaining PW returnees at the overseas site for a longer

course of medical evaluation, observation, and treatment.

Within 000 the postmortems of the Sexton case continued into

November, with Secretary Laird taking part in some of the discussions.

Certain comments of the secretary registered with Wilbur as an authorization to undertake revision of the overseas processing provisions of

the repatriation directive, and to do so unilaterally, from the standpoint

of his responsibilities as assistant secretary of defense (health and environment). He soon produced a memorandum to this purpose, referencing

"the direction given by the secretary of defense at his staff meeting on

15 November 1971." Other officials understood that Laird's unrecorded

remark had been something to the effect that "next time we'll do it

Dr. Wilbur's way." II

Wilbur's memorandum did not argue the case for the change that in his

professional opinion was necessary. He felt justified in advancing immediately to the implementing step. The memorandum was a draft directive, to

be issued over his own signature, to the secretaries of the military departments, the assistant secretary of defense (lSA), and the chairman, Joint

Chiefs of Staff. 12 It would remove the 36-72 hour provision and substitute

the following guidance on what should occur at the overseas processing center:

2. The repatriated petsonnel will be retained for a minimum of

14 days and undergo medical, administrative and debriefing

processing at the medical facility.

3. Medical evaluation and treatment will have priority over

administrative and debriefing procedures. The medical processing will include a thorough evaluation and the initiation of

* For the Sexton release incident, see Chapter 10.
290 THE LONG ROAD HOME

treatment of any disease discovered. Particular medical attention

will be given to:

(a) Infections such as tuberculosis, malaria, and parasitic

infections;

(b) the stress of captivity;

(c) the results of trauma;

(d) dietary deficiencies;

(e) dental diseases; and

(f) protection from undue exposure during medical evaluation that might result in the returnee's contracting acute

respiratory infectious disease. This medical evaluation will

in some aspects resemble the procedures used for the astronauts: Protection of the returnees from infections of other

people and protection of other people from infections that

the returnees may harbor. u

As Wilbur conceived it, the medical attention given overseas should

be designed to achieve "the maximum health and welfare for the returnee."

The 14 days would permit a complete medical assessment to be performed, including a range of tests and follow-up procedures. Under the

existing policy, in contrast, medical testing and evaluation of this scope

would not occur until the returnee reached his destination hospital in

the United States.

The degree of coordination that Wilbur expected his memorandum

to undergo before issuance is unclear. Others saw his proposal as a challenge to the jurisdictional prerogatives of the PW/MIA Task Group and

its parent body, the 000 PW Policy Committee. The initial reaction of

representatives of the military services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other

officials was that his intended directive should receive thorough study,

with consideration of its impact on all aspects of the repatriation process,

including the morale of returnees and their next of kin. Moreover, they

insisted that the discussion should proceed, and the matter reach its

conclusion, through the Task Group/Policy Committee channel. A meeting

of the task group was quickly scheduled for 23 November 1971, at which

time Wilbur was to make a more detailed presentation.]4

The discussion proved inconclusive. Those supporting the imposition

of a specific retention period considered that it would permit a more complete medical evaluation prior to exposure to press and family; allow a

more complete physical and psychological adjustment; make it easier to

keep the men isolated from the press; and still permit fewer than 14 days

if justified in some cases. Opponents argued that pressure for rapid return

to CONUS from the public, press, family, and Congress "will probably be
A Central Issue Resolved 291

almost irresistible at time of repatriation"; the specific retention period

was inconsistent with the policy calling for attention to needs on an

individual basis; the logistics and communications problem would be

exacerbated by hospitalization overseas for an extended period; and familyreturnee contact during the hospitalization period would be considerably

eased in the United States. Also, it was observed with some truth, that

the press was "just as aggressive overseas, particularly in SEA." On these

grounds the spokesmen for the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Joint

Chiefs of Staff firmly opposed Wilbur's concept. They held that "the present policy, properly interpreted," gave adequate assurance that the judgment

of medical authorities would govern the length of each man's stay at the

overseas processing site. IS

Roger Shields had come to a similar conclusion. He gave his view of

the Wilbur proposal when informing Nutter of the results of the task

group's deliberations:

Unrealistic policy which probably will be impossible to implement at the time of repatriation; i.e., pressures at all levels for

early reunion with families. Announcement, at this time, of such

a policy will cause great controversy among families and their

supporters. Much effort will be spent on this meaningless controversy. Best policy is current one; let medical condition control

repatriation progress of individual. Institute controlled access to

PW as dictated by individual's condition and situation. IG

The issue was of too great importance to be allowed to remain as the

task group had left it. Its resolution had to be pursued at a higher level

of authority. Nutter had already scheduled a meeting of the DoD PW

Policy Committee for 2 December, where Wilbur would again explain

his proposal.1 7

Once more the discussion was inconclusive. In addition to vOICIng

the objections from an operational standpoint, some members apparently

questioned whether there was a sufficient medical basis for 14-day isolation of the men overseas. Wilbur responded early in the new year with an

expanded version of the proposal.1 8

The revision contained a seven-point listing of the purposes the period

of medical evaluation was to serve and a detailed index of the medical procedures and laboratory tests to be performed. The latter included numerous blood studies and urine analyses, X-rays, and electrocardiograms,

plus more specialized procedures to be performed if clinically indicated.

The examination should be "particularly thorough and detailed regarding
292 THE LONG ROAD HOME

infectious and parasitic diseases, deficiency diseases, visual pathology and

dysfunction, and mental stresses incurred." Psychiatric assessment, followed by therapeutic counseling if indicated, would also be provided.

Besides maintaining "thorough and detailed medical documentation of

diagnoses, treatment, and progress," the doctors were to gather the information for a complete medical history of each patient, keyed to a chronology

of his imprisonment. It would cover illnesses or injuries incurred and care

received from the enemy, including "any use of acupuncture, cupping, medications, immunizations, hallucinatory-inducing substances, and hypnoticinducing methods." Moreover, the medical examination would be "planned

and organized so that it will not be hurried, less than thorough, or tiring

to the patient. The medical evaluation, along with necessary administrative

and initial debriefing procedures, should be coordinated and accomplished

over a 14-day period."

Wilbur attached a day-by-day schedule of the medical activities. It ran

from the triage and immediate treatment of emergency conditions on Day 1

to Day 14's "preparation of patient for aeromedical evacuation to CONUS

... [and] completion of medical records so that they may accompany

patient." Notably, there was no indication that the period might be "flexible

downward," as earl ier suggested. All men would undergo the 14-day schedule

of assessment, testing, treatment, and observation. Those whose condition

did not require the full course of medical procedures would presumably

benefit nonetheless from the allowance for "a non-stressful period of time

to begin the readjustment of repatriation."

It could be seen that Wilbur's proposal more than fulfilled the

accepted principle that the health and mental well-being of the returnees

were the first concern and that medical aspects of the repatriation processing must not be subordinated to any other consideration. It came close to

setting a goal of achieving, at the overseas site, the best and most comprehensive results that medical science could produce.

In the comments returned by Policy Committee members there was

a noticeable lessening of the deference accorded Dr. Wilbur's professional

opinion. By setting forth the specifics of his proposal Wilbur had opened

them to the scrutiny of other medical men. Indeed, there were features of

the day-by-day schedule that even the layman felt little reticence in criticizing. A Navy official pointed out that "those who have no contagious

diseases, are sufficiently adjusted and who are physically able to proceed

would have no compelling reason to remain isolated longer than the proposed 'day seven,' dental work notwithstanding." He noted that men

recently taken into captivity might easily meet these qualifications. I'!
A Central Issue Resolved 293

The spokesmen for the Army and Air Force submitted stronger dissents, based in part on consultations with their service medical authorities.

The Army surgeon general termed the 14-day period an arbitrary construction, having "no medical basis of explanation." He found one of the

suggested medical procedures "contraindicated"; some of those listed as

required should be elective, in his judgment, and still others might better

be postponed until the men reached their permanent hospital assignments

in the United States. A number of Air Force medical specialists had also

expressed serious reservations. According to Assistant Secretary of the Air

Force Richard J. Borda, "their analysis of the proposed medical schedule

indicates an arbitrary arrangement of procedures on various days with no

discernible medical logic."20

Borda's further objections to "the unnecessarily protracted and leisurely

medical schedule" were partly duplicated in the memorandum by the

JCS spokesman, Lr. Gen. John W. Vogr. Both officials cited the demands

its adoption would place on the overseas center in terms of staffing,

facilities, communications, and other support. Besides receiving a large augmentation of medical staff, the site would have to accommodate other

contingents not called for in the existing plan. Some personnel would be

needed to perform tasks currently scheduled to be accomplished in the

United States, others to meet the cumulative support requirements of the

expansion. For instance, it had been expected that the overseas intelligence interview would concentrate on what the returnees knew of the fate

or whereabouts of men still missing, without moving on to detailed recording of their own experiences. But the commentators thought the further

questioning could hardly be postponed for as much as two weeks; some of

it might have to begin at the overseas site, with a larger intelligence staff

in place. Also, before their two-week stay was out, many of the returnees

would undoubtedly become concerned with career, financial, legal, and

family problems, posing a demand for information and counseling that

could only be met by a further augmentation of specialists in personnel

and family assistance matters. In all, Borda wrote, these requirements

would severely tax the capacity of any overseas installation, and they might

create conditions so crowded as to "degrade the content and quality of

the assistance that we intend to provide our returnees and their families,

including medical evaluation and care."

It fell to General Vogt to give the most pointed expression to the other

prime objection to the scheme. He believed that no one's interests would

be well served by delaying the reunion of the men with their families,

"simply to meet an arbitrary schedule in an overseas area for an evaluation
294 THE LONG ROAD HOME

which can as effectively be conducted 10 a CONUS hospital where controlled family visits can take place."21

Still, opinion within the Policy Committee had not yet resolved into a

single view. The OSD general counsel found nothing in the Wilbur proposal

requiring comment, pro or con, by his office. The DIA spokesman did not

oppose it, as long as the schedule allotted sufficient time for intelligence

debriefings. The assistant secretary for public affairs saw a possible need

for greater flexibility than the plan allowed, but he declared that "if the

top medical authorities determine that 14 days is generally required,

then this could be handled from a public affairs point of view." Assistant

Secretary of Defense (Manpower) Roger T. Kelley seemed to feel less assurance on that score. He was willing to have it stated that the estimated time

to complete all medical procedures would be two weeks in the majority

of cases, but he stressed the "absolute necessity" of thoroughly publicizing

the new policy:

It must be fully explained and justified to the news media as well

as to the PW families why the same treatment could not be

administered in CONUS. They must be convinced that the proposed delay is, in fact, in the best interest of all concerned. Unless

this can be accomplished we will be exposed to unrelenting

criticism in the press along with problems such as the families

traveling at government expense (or their own) to the overseas

processing locations. Once there, contact with the returnee could

not reasonably be denied, and the isolation aspect would be

negated in the minds of other next of kin waiting in CONUS. 22

Within ISA, Roger Shields had been seeking to devise a policy statement satisfactory to all-one that would meet Dr. Wilbur's essential

concerns but avoid the difficulties foreseen as arising from the imposition

of a fixed time period. Shields provided his draft to Nutter as the basis for

discussion at a second Policy Committee meeting, on 4 February 1972, and

there it won tentative acceptance. 21

The statement omitted the existing provision that overseas processing would normally be completed within 36 to 72 hours. It set no time

limits and made explicit what had been implied before, that "the physicianin-charge will decide when the individual returnee is ready medically for

aeromedical evacuation." Also, it adopted Wilbur's wording about the medical procedures not being hurried, less than thorough, or tiring to the

patient. Even so, two further changes were made in deference to Wilbur's

position before the statement reached final form, in early March, as the

formal recommendation of the Policy Committee. To remove the least hint
Secrerary of Defense Roben S. McNamara ar press conference, January 1967.
State Department Ambassadot

W. Averell Harriman, the

U.S. government's chief

spokesman and coordinator

for PW matters during the

Johnson administration.

Paul H. Nitze, deputy secretary

of defense, 1967-69.
Top left: Anhur Sylvesrer, assisranr secrerary of defense for public affairs, 1961-67.

Top right: Frank A. Banimo, assisranr OSD general counsel for manpower during

rhe 19605. Below: Assisranr Secrerary of Defense Paul C. Warnke (ar head of rable

on righl) wirh ISA depuries and special assisranrs, December 1968.
Clockwise from top left:

Roger E. Shields, chairman

of rhe 000 PW/MIA Task

Group; Frank A. Sieverrs, rhe

Srare Deparrmenr's leading

experr and special assisranr

for PW maners, shown here

welcoming civilian prisoner

Richard Urechr on his arrival

ar Clark Air Base, February 1973;

G. Warren Nuner, assisranr secrerary

of defense for inrernarional securiry

affairs, 1969-73.
Above: Return of undelivered parcels addressed to U.S. prisoners in orth Vietnam.

Below: Anxious wives seeking answers and information on captive and missing

husbands, at 1969 Penragon reception and briefing.
c:

r r.an"0 Dc ene leh-in R. uird.
/iUOlie: Secreeary Laird presiding over key "Go Public" press conference, 19 May] 969.

Below: Pentagon's rW/MIA Task Force ae work (Shields on telephone, Maj. Gen. Daniel

James, Jr., to his left).
Clockwise from top left: Daniel Z. Henkin,

assisranr secrerary of defense for public

affairs, 1969-73; Jerry W. Friedheim,

Henkin successor in 1973; Richard G.

Capen, J L, depury assisranr secrerary

of defense for public affairs, 1969-70,

and assisranr ro rhe secrerary of defense

for legislarive affairs, 1970-71.
,·-Jboue: Former asrronaur and presidential PW emissary Frank Borman (center),

wi rh House leaders (lefr to right) Hale Boggs, L. Mendel Rivers, John McCormack,

.lnd Gerald Ford. Below: Secrerary of Defense Laird lunches wirh Narional Sccuriry

Adviser Henry Kissinger.
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Pre. idenr ! ixon meering wjrh relarives of captured and missing servicemen ar

Annual Com'enrion of League of Families, October 1972.

S\·bil rockdale, founding member of rhe

l':arional League of Families.

H. Ross Peror, Dallas businessman and

Un ired We 5rand organizer.
Abo/le: Operarion Homecoming Task Force receives prisoner lists from Paris,

2 Januan' 1973. Below: Secretary of Defense Ellior L. Richardson ar Pentagon

news briefing, 31 January 1973, a day afrer his swearing-in.
,-jbol'e: larch Viernamese and American representatives at table in Gia Lam

airporc release area (Col. James Dennetr in center, Brig. Gen. Russell Ogan on far right).

Below: Ex-PW I avy Lr. Cdr. Collins Haines gets farewell hug from one of many well

wishers as he departs Clark Air Base for the United States.
P \V-~lIA flag.
A Central Issue Resolved 295

of time pressures on the medical authorities, "when" was substituted for

"as soon as possible," so that the sentence read "released prisoners will be

returned to the CONUS when consistent with their medical and welfare

needs." Words were added to the next sentence: "Medical evaluation at

the overseas processing location should be designed to diagnose and

where medically advisable begin treatment of health problems and to

make a medical determination of the individual's suitability for aeromedical evacuation. "24

Although Nutter might well have submitted the policy statement to

Secretary Laird for approval at this point, he decided to take a further step

before doing so. The final sentence of the statement read: "On the basis of

this policy guidance, the Services will jointly develop uniform procedures and guidelines for medical diagnosis and treatment of returnees over

both the short and the long term." Nutter considered it desirable to incorporate this sentence in the statement before making the submission. He

therefore called on the secretaries of the military departments to designate

medical representatives to meet under Wilbur's chairmanship and develop

guidelines consistent with the proposed basic policy.25

The task assigned fell squarely in the realm of professional medical

opinion, and Wilbur's actions as the group's chairman showed his professional judgment to be unvarying and unaffected by lay majorities. He

believed full-scale evaluation and treatment at the overseas site to be the

only proper course from the medical point of view. He therefore reopened

the main question by proposing substitute language for the Policy Committee's statement that would, once again, prescribe a thorough medical

and psychiatric examination, requiring approximately 14 days. Despite the

critical views recently expressed by some of the senior medical authorities

of the military services Wilbur was able to carry the service representatives

with him in making this the unanimous recommendation that the joint

medical group submitted on 17 March.

The attached description of medical objectives and procedures to be

performed overseas retained much of the text of Wilbur's earlier submission,

though the day-by-day schedule was omitted. In this "Medical Appendix" a

few of the more advanced procedures were now reserved to the CONUS

hospitals, but a full outline of topics to be covered in the psychiatric assessment had been added, to be accomplished "in several, separate interviews."

An element of flexibility had been reintroduced through the statement that

"the period of medical processing may be shortened in appropriate instances,

such as those returnees recently captured. "2('

Wilbur had circulated the document to the military departments for

comment or concurrence. All nonconcurred. Each of the three respondents
296 THE LONG ROAD HOME

condemned the 14-day provision as inconsistent with the decision already

reached by the Policy Committee. In taking this line, they charged, the joint

medical group had gone beyond its purview. When reporting to Nutter

on 7 April Wilbur noted the nonconcurrences but did not withdraw his

14-day recommendation. He spoke more positively of the Medical Appendix, which was "discussed by the medical representatives of the Army,

Navy and Air Force and myself" and agreed to "as medically sound and

proper. I recommend it to yoU."27

Already, however, by means not indicated in the written record, it had

been arranged that the joint medical group would reconvene "to consider

alternative action." At a meeting on 14 April 1972 the group produced

a revised recommendation, in which the only significant change was in

the sentence containing the time allotment: "It is expected that approximately seven (7) to fourteen (14) days ... will be required in most instances

to properly accomplish this medical and psychiatric evaluation and treatment." The Air Force held a minority view, calling for 4 to 12 days. Wilbur

had not participated, his place as chairman having been assumed by his

principal deputy, also an M.D., Brig. Gen. George J. Hayes, USA.

Wilbur remained convinced that a 14-day minimum was required, and

he was understood to be readying a personal appeal to Laird to gain

its acceptance. 28

Nutter had so far resisted the urgings of several Policy Committee

members that the statement their body had endorsed be formally presented

to Laird for approval. In late April, Admiral McCain requested a prompt

resolution of the uncertainties that currently affected repatriation planning

at his headquarters. The Pacific commander recommended reaffirmation

of the existing 36 to 72 hour provision, subject to waiver on a case-bycase basis for medical reasons. He reviewed all the objections to a longer

retention period overseas, and he noted another consideration, in the

public affairs area: "There would be charges that we were 'brainwashing' the

returnees in isolation."2<}

Meanwhile the Air Force had renewed the attempt to press the matter

to the highest level of decision. On 21 April its officials provided a draft

of the memorandum they believed Nutter should transmit to the secretary

of defense. It set forth the basis for the Policy Committee's opinion that

no time period should be specified, while also doing justice to Wilbur's

opposing view. Laird should be informed that the parties were "at an impasse"; despite intensive discussion over a span of five months, the issue

was unresolved. "A policy decision is essential to EGRESS RECAP planning, with implications throughout the repatriation and rehabilitation spectrum. "JO
A Central Issue Resolved 297

Nutter may have felt that Laird would be ill-served by having irreconcilable views so starkly presented to him. Also, Nutter seems to have been

more inclined toward accommodation of Wilbur's position than were most

of his advisers within ISA. It appears that further consultations occurred,

with the aim of persuading Wilbur to ease the situation by endorsing the

less rigid position (7 to 14 days) recommended by the joint medical gtoup's

majority. Possibly McCain's message of 27 April arrived in time to playa

part. In any event, Wilbur, in a handwritten note to Nutter, did signify

his acceptance of the majority position in the group's report, "which we

hope you will cause to be implemented."3]

Laird's Directive

Nutter now submitted the issue to Laird for decision. His memorandum of 4 May 1972 led off with a full exposition of Wilbur's views:

Dr. Wilbur believes that early medical evacuation to CONUS

would be injurious to the health and welfare of the men. He

believes that they would not be ready, physically and mentally,

for the pressures to which they would be subjected, that there

would be serious risk of their contracting diseases, and that

treatment to return them to good health should not be delayed.

He further believes that the returned men will require an unpressured, controlled period of readjustment. In his opinion, we

must set up the necessary facilities and earmark the additional

personnel required for thorough evaluation, treatment, and readjustment overseas. Otherwise, the men will be hastily and

prematurely returned to CONUS.

Based on his beliefs and with the concurrence of the majority

of an ad hoc panel of medical representatives of the Services,

Dr. Wilbur recommends that the following be included in a

proposed statement of medical policy:

"Medical processing at the overseas processing location(s) will

consist of a thorough medical and psychiatric evaluation to

include medical procedures jointly agreed upon by the medical

departments. This agreed upon evaluation will consist of the

items detailed in the Medical Appendix. It is expected that

approximately one (1) to two (2) weeks will be required in most

instances to properly accomplish this medical and psychiatric

evaluation and treatment. The period of medical processing
298 THE LONG ROAD HOME

may be shortened in appropriate instances, such as those returnees recently captured."

Nutter then described the extended consideration Dr. Wilbur's

proposal had received within the Policy Committee and the numerous

arguments raised against it. He said the committee members accepted

the main text of the proposed revision, deeming it adequate to ensure

proper consideration for the health and welfare of returned prisoners. But

they believed the overseas processing should be limited to medical evaluation of the returnee's suitability for evacuation to CONUS and to such

treatment as might be required to make a man fit for the journey. "The

period of time that returnees remain at an overseas processing site would

therefore be determined by medical evaluation on an individual basis." It

was here, however, that Nutter detached himself from the committee

opinion: "For the foregoing reasons, all members of the DoD PW Policy

Committee except ISA are opposed to including the paragraph suggested

by Dr. Wilbur." Nutter recommended that the secretary of defense sign the

full version, with the paragraph included.\2

Laird issued the directive on 16 May 1972. It contained the Wilbur

paragraph, somewhat revised:

Medical processing at the overseas processing location(s) will

consist of a thorough medical and psychiatric evaluation to

include medical procedures jointly agreed upon by the medical

departments. This agreed upon evaluation will consist of the

items detailed in the Medical Appendix. Approximately one (I) to

two (2) weeks may be required to properly accomplish this

medical and psychiatric evaluation and treatment. The period

of medical processing will be based on the judgment of the

physician-in -charge.

Thus were the two positions melded together, with the appearance, on first

reading, that the larger concession had been in the direction of Wilbur's

stance. Included was his requirement for a thorough overseas medical and

psychiatric evaluation, as outlined in some detail in the attachment. But the

sentence containing the time indication had undergone a change, with

"will" giving way to "may." Approximately one to two weeks was mentioned

without making it a strict standard. 53

Admiral McCain, awaiting the outcome in Hawaii, received a message

from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that showed clearly enough

what balance had been struck. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer wrote that the

essence of the policy lay in its reliance on the judgment of the physician
A Central Issue Resolved 299

in charge. The professional determination of the medical and psychiatric

needs of each man would govern the length of his overseas medical

processing. Specifically, the policy "does not preclude the prompt return

to CONUS of those judged to be fit for the trip." Moorer's reference to

the time period in the directive seemed to make it more the exception

than the rule: "The policy change does require, however, that CINCPAC

EGRESS RECAP planning include provision for the contingency that

approximately 1 to 2 weeks may be required to properly evaluate and treat

many released individuals." The implication that "as soon as possible" was

still the watchword could hardly be missed. 34

Adjustments during Implementation

Revision of CINCPAC's repatriation plan to conform with the newly

enunciated policy began immediately, and by 2 June McCain was able

to provide a preliminary assessment to his superiors in Washington, at

the same time posing several questions. For a large group of returnees,

he wrote, application of the new medical guidance plus administrative and

debriefing procedures was "estimated to require a median of about six days

processing time at a PACOM Joint Central Processing Center (JCPC)."

The planning projection being used assumed that on "arrival (A) at JCPC

plus 4 days, 7 percent of returnees will be ready for evacuation to the

USA." On A plus 5 days there would be another 13 percent, and another

30 percent on A plus 6, so that after 6 days a cumulative total of 50 percent of the group would then be en route by air or already delivered to

the United States. A further 30 percent on the seventh day and 13 percent

on the eighth would leave only 7 percent of the men still in processing or

under medical treatment. (This expected distribution appeared unchanged

in the finished plan when published two months later, though with the

emphatic direction that the schedule was projected for planning purposes

and was not to be viewed as mandatory.)

Though well short of the 14 days that had once been in contention, an

average stay of 6 days more than doubled the overseas processing time of

the original 36 to 72 hour provision. One result, McCain said, was to reduce the maximum number of returnees who could be accommodated at

anyone JCPC, from 400 to about 200 (later set at 250). At this time he

had three installations designated as "primarily and equally responsible"

to be ready to conduct unified processing. The Pacific commander said

he intended to operate a single center. If it became clear that the returnee
300 THE LONG ROAD HOME

flow would result in a population exceeding the rated capacity, an additional site would then be activated.))

McCain's questions sought mainly to learn whether the authorities in

Washington saw the extended processing time as requiring an enlargement

of the personnel and i nrelligence debriefing activities to be performed

overseas. When challenging the 14-day proposal, some had argued that

this was all but inevitable. In view of the shorter average time of six daysand, rather clearly, as a reflection of the way thought was tending toward

the avoidance of any delay-there was now no disposition in Washington

to add requirements. The reply McCain received from the JCS on 15 July

prescribed no change in the personnel processing goals and no transfer

of the main intelligence debriefing sessions from the United States to the

overseas site, except possibly for the few men who might be retained there

for lengthy treatment.)G

Other decisions that followed usually inclined in the direction of

limiting the required procedures and shortening the prospective time of

processing. Within a week, McCain returned with a request for Washington concurrence in his planners' interpretation of the way the psychiatric

examination should be handled. They proposed that the doctor performing the initial physical examination should make an assessment of each

returnee's psychiatric and emotional state. "The attending physician will

request further evaluation by a qualified psychiatrist only if indicated as

a result of the above assessment." Approved in Washington, this provision

appeared in the CINCPAC plan when issued on 3 August 1972, along with

manning guidance that called for one physician for every 10 returnees, one

psychiatrist for every 40. It was a marked downgrading of the psychiatric

component of the processing. v

In other respects as well, the CINCPAC instruction of 3 August served

to curtail the processing requirements. "Medical procedures and laboratory

examinations will be performed as clinically indicated," it read. But it

then introduced the list of X-rays, blood studies, and other tests with

the words "these procedures and examinations may include," rather than

"should include at least," as in Secretary Laird's directive of 16 May. This

type of reinforcement of the physician's discretionary role might be claimed

to be in consonance with the spirit, if not the letter, of that directive. What

the changes did more surely, however, was ease the way to fulfillment of

another objective that military officers at the command level held to be

of particular importance.

The objective, cherished as a matter of principle within the professional hierarchy of the armed forces, was to return each man as soon as
A Central Issue Resolved 301

possible to the control of his parent service. It had been proclaimed in the

earliest of the repatriation directives, the one of 8 June 1968, originally

drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "The respective Services have the

inherent responsibility for processing their returned Prisoners of War ...

and will assume control of these individuals as soon as feasible. Each Service

will process its own members." This, in turn, had been modified by the

second directive of 18 January 1969, which established that all men, without regard to service affiliation, would be processed at a single center

overseas. The procedures there would satisfy some service requirements, but

the men would not pass fully to the control of the individual services until

their arrival in the continental United States.* Neither of these directives

had been superseded by Laird's May 1972 memorandum on medical

processing, the sole effect of which was to delete the paragraph in the

second directive that contained the 36-72 hour provision and substitute

the longer text that had resulted from the discussion of Wilbur's proposal.

The CINCPAC instruction, while conforming broadly to the recent

guidance on medical processing, harked back to the two earlier directives

for its central theme: "In order to transfer returnees to full Service control

as early as possible, emphasis will be placed upon the individual needs of

each returnee with priority on his early return to the U.S.A." And the same

point was stressed again in the medical annex: "As a general rule, treatment

..., unless required, will not be the objective during Phase II processing

because of the requirement to return the patient to Service control near

his family in the USA without undue deIay."18

The importance of reestablishing service control had doubtless been

in the minds of representatives of the military departments during their

participation in the months-long discussion of Wilbur's proposal, though so

far as the written records reveal, it never appeared as a consideration. The

language used in the CINCPAC instruction underscores an obvious point,

that speedy reunion with families in the United States and prompt return

to service control were one and the same. The latter could be gained by

arguing for the former.

The planning done in the Pacific Command, despite its shadings away

from the strict letter of the guidance, soon proved to be well in accordance

with the thinking in Washington. At a DoD-CINCPAC Repatriation Planning Conference, held at Admiral McCain's headquarters on 9-11 August

1972 and presided over by Roger Shields, no one challenged the concept

and projected schedule in the CINCPAC instruction. The discussions did

* See Chapter 9.
302 THE LONG ROAD HOME

give impetus to a number of subsidiary planning actlvltles, one of which

was the preparation, in Washington, of a standardized medical processing

form for use both overseas and in later stages of treatment at hospitals in

the United States.'9

Development of the medical form followed a course that repeated

some features of the longer discussion of the Wilbur proposal. The form,

produced by a panel of service medical specialists under the chairmanship

of the assistant secretary of defense (health and environment), promptly

encountered opposition from officials at the policy level in the military

departments. They objected that it contained excessive requirements for

overseas medical evaluation and departed from the terms of the established

policy. They also held that the form imposed administrative requirements

that would cause unnecessary delay and that it contained questions on

matters not essential to the medical evaluation, such as conduct in captivity.

After reworking by a specially appointed committee and successive reviews

by the PW/MIA Task Group and the DoD PW Policy Committee, the

revised standard medical form received approval on 27 November 1972.

To explain its use, a joint team soon departed on a tour of hospitals at the

prospective repatriation sites overseas.40

Thus, by the end of November Wilbur's ideal of a thorough and unhurried medical and psychiatric evaluation overseas was not strongly

represented in the plans or the preparatory measures at the operational

level. Statements were sometimes made that seemed to contravene it entirely.

When, in December, PACOM officers drafted the briefing for accredited

newsmen at the repatriation site, it began as follows: "The objective of the

EGRESS RECAP operation here is to provide returnees with the necessary

medical attention in an absolute minimum of time so that they may return

to the United States and be reunited with their families."4!

In the background throughout the long policy discussion had been

the fact that it simply could not be known what physical condition the

men would display when released by the enemy. This consideration must

have been prominent in Laird's thoughts when reaching the final decision

on the wording of the medical directive. He chose to place the emphasis

on individual medical assessment, with a suggested rather than a predetermined time frame. The subsequent planning did set the goal of prompt

return to the United States, upon determination of suitability for air evacuation by the medical authorities, but the arrangements were not lacking in

flexibility and reserve capacity. If some men arrived in an advanced state

of debility, malnutrition, disorientation, or untreated injury, the system

was capable of the adjustment to meet their needs.
A Central Issue Resolved 303

Policy on Next-ofKin Travel

In one further respect the extended processing time overseas had an

impact on basic directives and plans. The possibility that in their eagerness

for reunion some family members would elect to travel to the processing

site had been mentioned during the policy discussion, and McCain raised

it again in his message of 4 June 1972. He stressed the inconvenience of

such journeys for all concerned, the fact that family members would have

to expect extremely austere accommodations overseas, and the "distinct

possibility" of their arriving too late to intercept the serviceman before his

onward evacuation. In reply, the Joint Chiefs accepted CINCPAC's recommendation that the services discourage such travel except in unusual circumstances. They also advised him that revision of the existing policy was

already under way.42

The policy on next-of-kin travel dated from 30 November 1968,

when the deputy secretary of defense had authorized the service secretaries

to provide family members with military transportation, or reimbursement

for commercial or private transportation, to make one round trip to visit

returned prisoners of war, "hospitalized in the United States, its territories

or possessions." In the directive's original version, this applied to the

returnee's children "and two other persons." Later, on 27 October 1970,

Laird amended the final provision to read "limited to returnee's children,

wife, and parents. "43

The further revision undertaken by the PW/MIA Task Group in mid1972 followed from the May directive on medical processing. Its main

intent was to differentiate between visits to hospitals in the United States

and those to the repatriation center overseas. In passing, the revision also

provided guidance on travel beyond the initial visit. Laird issued the new

directive on 26 August 1972, with the following text:

Service Secretaries will normally authorize either reimbursement

for commercial or private transportation or use of appropriate

military transportation for appropriate persons living beyond

commuting distance to make one round trip to visit returned

prisoners of war or other detained US personnel hospitalized

subsequent to their return to the United States. Service Secretaries may authorize additional trips at their discretion when

the period of hospitalization extends beyond a two-week period.

Travel to overseas locations serving as central processing centers

will only be authorized in individual cases where the returnee

will be retained at the central processing site for an extended
304 THE LONG ROAD HOME

period beyond the normal processing period or in exceptional cases, when the physician-in-charge deems the immediate

presence of the family to be essential to the welfare of the returnee.

Authorization for the above travel at Government expense shall,

with certain exceptions to best serve the interests of the returnee and the Services, be limited to returnee's children, wife,

and parents. 44

When recommending that Laird issue this directive, OSD General

Counsel J. Fred Buzhardt had commented on the legal basis for the

action. Although no law or departmental regulation sanctioned the

payment for such travel, he indicated that there were several precedents

for the practice. It had been followed with respect to hospital visits to

the prisoners returned after the Korean War. At the close of World War

II, next of kin meeting ships returning the bodies of their servicemen

had their meals and lodging paid for by the government when ships

were delayed beyond schedule. But Buzhardt's final point was probably

most persuasive: "It would appear unlikely that any Senator or Congressman or the GAO [General Accounting Office], on its own initiative, would

get very excited about the authority for payment for such family travel

in connection with return of POWS."45

Feeling reasonably assured of immunity to challenge in this area,

Defense officials soon added a further point to the policy on next-ofkin travel. OASD (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) received from Nutter

the assignment of drafting and coordinating a directive to cover the

lodging of PW families when visiting hospitals in the United States.

Nutter had found that some of the services already intended to provide

quarters for the visitors within the military installation containing the

hospital. It would not be sufficient merely to declare this the policy for

all services, however, since suitable accommodations for family lodging

might not exist at every facility designated for medical processing. To

achieve uniformity of treatment, all authorized visitors would have to be

offered housing, either in government quarters or in commercial facilities

at government expense.4('

The directive that emerged from the coordination process was issued

by Deputy Secretary of Defense Kenneth Rush on 4 December 1972:

Service Secretaries will provide available temporary lodging

facilities, guest houses, bachelor quarters, and family housing

under Department of Defense control, without charge, to personnel visiting hospitalized returnees. Where such facilities are
A Central Issue Resolved 305

not available, arrangements will be made to lodge authorized

individuals at suitable nearby commercial establishments which

offer the most reasonable rates and expenses incident thereto

charged to appropriate Operation and Maintenance funds ....

It applied, of course, to the same family members who qualified for travel

expenses under the previous directive. 47

Selection ofthe Primary Joint Processing Center

That final month of 1972 also saw an important advance in the

readiness of the Pacific Command to receive the repatriated prisoners. On

6 December, CINCPAC-now Admiral Noel Gayler-designated Clark

Air Base in the Philippines as the primary Joint Central Processing

Center. The other two sites, the Navy facilities at Guam and the Army

base on Okinawa, became alternate JCPCs. They were to be "activated in

the sequence listed if unforeseen developments rule out Clark AB or if

the number of returnees to be processed at anyone time exceeds 250."48

In informing Laird of the selection, Nutter said it had resulted from

a survey conducted by Brig. Gen. Russell G. Ogan of the PW/MIA Task

Force and a CINCPAC team. They had found each of the three installations in readiness and clearly capable of doing "an exemplary job," but

the desirability of naming one as primary during the final period of preparation was manifest. In recommendations to Admiral Gayler the survey

group gave unanimous support to Clark Air Base as the optimum location.

It was by far the closest to the probable release point in Southeast Asia,

and Clark's normal operations already included aeromedical evacuation.

In addition, it offered all the necessary facilities in a self-contained installation, with a top-rated hospital, good security arrangements, and "excellent

facilities for and control of the Press." Nutter was confident the designation would allow the primary site "to hone further its facilities and insure

optimum joint operations."4<)

Thus, at the end of 1972, at a time when the Paris negotiations seemed

to hold real promise of the release of the prisoners in the near future, the

U.S. preparations to receive them were at a high pitch of readiness. But

those preparations had involved much more than the central repatriation

directives and CINCPAC's implementing plans that have so far been described. During the years 1969-72, 000 officials had been equally concerned with defining objectives, assigning responsibilities, and setting

guidelines for a whole range of related and supporting activities. Refinement
306 THE LONG ROAD HOME

of the public affairs guidance engaged their thought, as did perfection of

the air evacuation arrangements, the service escort system, and the precepts

to be followed in the intelligence debriefings. Also in place by the end of

1972 were completed plans for the longer term rehabilitation and readjustment the men would undergo following their safe return. To understand

the full extent of the preparations for the prisoners' homecoming, attention

must be given to these other ancillary but still critical aspects of repatriation planning.
15

Repatriation Planning:

Rehabilitation and Readjustment

The responsible officials of the Department of Defense in the first

Nixon administration were constantly occupied with prisoner of war

matters, particularly repatriation planning. Lacking foreknowledge that the

event for which they were preparing would not occur until February 1973,

they worked steadily and with some sense of urgency to perfect the central

directives and to insure that subsidiary plans reflected a full understanding

of the policy. Yet, for all their thought and effort, preparations were in less

than a finished state at the end of 1971. A feeling of confidence that all was

in readiness to handle a large-scale repatriation did not appear until late in

1972, after a year of particularly intensive activity by the military planners

and OSD officials. By then the protracted course of the Paris negotiations

had permitted them to fill in all particulars of the basic plan and look to

the selection and training of the personnel who would process the returnees.

Only the consideration of a few additional refinements and a steady round

of field inspection trips remained to occupy them as their planning effort

approached its end.

At times the Washington authorities had allowed lesser details to

engage their attention, as when reviewing the system of color-coded

badges to be displayed at the overseas repatriation site by medical personnel, intelligence debriefers, members of the press, and itinerant VIPs. More

impressive was the exceptional breadth of their planning, particularly the

thought given to the longer term needs of the men and their families.

307
308 THE LONG ROAD HOME

The Rehabilitation/Readjustment Study

As early as October 1970 Assistant Secretary Nutter posed the question

"whether enough has been done to prepare for the psychological aspects

of readjustment." Discussion within the DoD PW Policy Committee broadened the scope of the inquiry and led to a decision in February 1971 to

go ahead with a full-scale rehabilitation study. In June, after the PW/MIA

Task Group had further defined the objective, Nutter called on the four

services and Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

Roger Kelley to furnish representatives for a special study panel. He asked

the panel to "prepare a definitive, comprehensive analysis of the nature of

the problem and make recommendations ... to meet the rehabilitation

and readjustment needs of returnees and the families of PW/MIA."I

The panel and its subgroups worked through the latter months of

1971, fulfilling Nutter's prediction that the study would require "considerable man-hours and some direct expenditure of funds." The inquiry did

not focus solely on the post-repatriation period. Both the adjustment

problems currently being experienced by PW/MIA families and the impact

of the repatriation process itself on rehabilitation of the men had been

made part of the field of study. Thus, when the report of the Rehabilitationl

Readjustment Study Panel appeared in January 1972, it encompassed a

review of nearly all aspects of the current Defense effort, including some

proposals already on the agenda of the PW/MIA Task Group. The panel

had been aided by testimony from family members and returned prisoners

of both the Pueblo incident and Vietnam conflict, besides having the counsel of psychiatrists and psychologists. 2

The study's conceptual starting point was simply stated:

Thete is sufficient evidence to conclude that those who return

from captivity will experience significant problems of readjustment .... The severity of the adjustment problems will vary

in a highly individualized manner depending upon personal

experience and psychological factors. The former captive's return

to health, reality, and normality can be enhanced, however, if

the environment to which he returns is properly constructed.

This can best be accomplished by ensuring that policies and plans

are based on a sensitivity to the returnee's needs. It is equally

essential that resources and personnel, associated with the care of

returnees, are managed and guided by the precept that all actions,

from initial reception and processing onward, will have a dynamic

impact on the readjustment process.
Rehabilitation and Readjustment 309

The panel returned to the last of these propositions again and again, emphasizing the importance of carefully selecting and training personnel. Since

"every individual and event rhat confronts a returnee will, in one

way or anothet, affect his rehabilitation and readj ustmen t," all medical

and administrative personnel, debriefers, escorts, public affairs officers, and

hospital staffs had to be indoctrinated in the need for individualized

treatment at the man's own pace and made aware of the physical and emotional problems likely to be encountered.

No detail was left to chance. The panel favored periodic checks of the

completeness and currency of the information brochures held in readiness

for each man's release, which contained data on his promotions and pay

status, family situation, and personal affairs. It noted that returnees should

not be witness to any open criticism or other evidence of conflict between

members of their processing team and that the processing schedule should

be so ordered as to "prevent the returnee from needlessly repeating his

story, or parts of it, to several different sources"-a matter that some of

the previously recovered prisoners had stressed in their testimony. That

testimony had also emphasized the importance of debriefing to the mental and emotional well-being of the returnees: "For some, it will represent

'mission completion.' For others it will present an opportunity to 'unload'

experiences that have been building for years."

Underlying these recommendations were the panel's findings about

the physical and psychological aspects of captivity and their lasting effects

on prisoners. Experts had advised that the results of protracted mistreatment, isolation, inadequate diet, and limited medical care were readily

predictable. Like those returned from the Korean War, the Vietnam prisoners would probably display a high incidence of malnutrition, dysentery,

tuberculosis, arthritis, and dental and vision problems, as well as exacerbation of any preexisting medical condition. Beyond the general loss of body

weight owing to malnutrition, the combined effects of limited protein

intake and enforced inactivity would be evident in a marked muscular

atrophy and slowed reaction time, with anemia a frequent complication. It

was accepted that the service medical establishments were capable of providing excellent treatment of these conditions when the men returned,

but other effects of injury Ot nutritional deficiency might lie deeper and

escape detection until they began to impair vital organs at a later age. Still

lacking, the panel found, was a definite plan for systematic, long-term medical follow-up of the returnees and their families.

The psychological component was a key element of the long-term

follow-up. Personnel would have to be aware of the ex-PWs' need for

"decompression" and "reacculturation." The panel considered that for some
310 THE LONG ROAD HOME

returnees, recovery and readjustment "may well be a life-long process." Again,

expert witnesses had described what to expect:

Studies of ex-prisoners of war in other countries have resulted

in consistent findings characterized by the label, "Concentration

Camp Syndrome" (or KZ Syndrome). The symptoms ofthis syndrome

include increased fatigue, dysphoria (mental anxiety, impatience,

restlessness), impairment of memory, emotional instability, impairment of sleep, decreased self-esteem, loss of initiative, irritability

and difficulty concentrating, vertigo, various somatic symptoms

(gastrointestinal most common) and headache.

Studies in the United States had yielded similar results. In the immediate

post-release period, depression and withdrawal were the most common

manifestations, stemming primarily, it was believed, from guilt feelings,

acknowledged or suppressed. "Even consciously," the report said, "practically

no ex-PW feels satisfied with his own conduct in captivity."

Studies of repatriates from Japanese captivity in World War II and from

the Korean War had revealed a higher than normal death rate for as long as

10 years following their return. Though partly attributable to tuberculosis

and injuries received in captivity, the excessive fatality rate owed much

more to the high incidence of accidental death, particularly in automobile

crashes. Suicides and violent deaths at the hands of others were also more

frequent than in the age group generally. The presumption was strong that

recurrent emotional instability among former prisoners had contributed

to this record. 3

There were also the tests of family reunion and resumption of domestic

responsibilities. Here the psychological difficulties could be severe, because

waiting family members had also been living abnormal lives, conditioned

by another set of strains and anxieties. Panel members experienced in providing family assistance described some of the trials faced by one category

of next of kin, the lone wife:

It is a tremendous burden today for a mother to raise a family

single-handed. The wife of a PW has the feeling that she will be

held accountable to her husband, when he is released, for whatever happens to the children. The wife has a continuous struggle

with problems of self-esteem. She receives no satisfactory feedback from her environment. There are few acceptable ways for her

to enhance that self-esteem.

She suffers from boredom with the same romine day in and

day om, with no end in sight .... Any satisfactory social activity

may at the same time engender troublesome guilt feelings. There

is of course no acceptable outlet for normal sexual drives. Whatever the wife does, she is burdened with a sense of guilt.
Rehabilitation and Readjustment 311

The absent father has a deleterious effect upon the children.

There are stages of development in both boys and girls that require a father figure in order to proceed satisfactorily. The father's

absence causes problems with the children and thus gives the

wife even more of a burden.*

"The wife idealizes her husband's return," the report continued. "She believes that once he is released, her problems will be resolved and everything will be perfect. In actuality she is due for a tremendous letdown,

since a new series of problems will arise at that time"-all the more so, it

was believed, because in captivity the husband had also constructed an

idealized fantasy of the home situation to which he would return.

The PW/MIA families had other, more practical problems, but the

panel thought these were being handled effectively by the casualty assistance system or were on the way to solution through legislation pending in

the Congress. It was the psychological worries that became the focus of

their recommendations:

Each Service should initiate a program to educate the PWI

MIA families regarding the psychological aspects of captivity,

repatriation and readjustment. The educational program should

be implemented in a manner which will not unduly alarm the

families and which will maintain knowledge in these areas by

repetition and updating of information.

Each Service should coordinate plans for repatriation and

readjustment with a well-qualified, experienced psychiatrist in

order to insure that all psychological aspects of repatriation

are explored.

ASD/PA should publicize information to educate the

press and the public regarding the psychological problems of

readjustment of repatriates so that there will be a better general understanding of the necessary insulation from excessive

sensory stimulation and the time necessary to allow for "decompression" and reacculturation.

Each Service should insure that, at the time of release, the

repatriate and his responsible NOK [next of kin] understand the

high risk of traumatic injuries and possible death among repatriates, especially from automobile accidents. This includes

imparting an understanding of the propensity towards depression and problems with motor skills following lengthy periods

of captivity.

* A statistical profile, annexed to the report, indicated that 64 percent of all PWI

MIA personnel were married and that slightly more than 1,000 children were awaiting

their return.
312 THE LONG ROAD HOME

DoD should insure that adequate funding and personnel are

provided for long-term availability of professional psychological

counseling for the repatriates and their families.

The last point was reemphasized in a separate specific recommendation citing a need for the immediate institution of a family counseling

program: "At present the families receive a spotty and generally inadequate

degree ... of psychiatric or psychological counseling. Rather than a formal

program, counseling is provided only when requested by NOK, and received only when locally available." A new program, the panel suggested,

should be devised that made effective use both of service medical facilities

and those of the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed

Services (CHAMPUS). Further, the program should be made known to

the next of kin in a manner that overcame any hesitation to seek its benefits. Any success in alleviating the psychological strains on the families would

be an immediate gain and would ease the readjustment for all parties when

the men returned.

Finally, the panel took up the obvious requirement for career counseling, retraining, and special education opportunities. For returnees who chose

to remain on active duty, the panel wanted the services both to fulfill and to

improve on career management provisions already in their plans. It also

recognized that arrangements had not yet been made to provide comparable

assistance to those who elected to return to civilian life. The panel recommended a coordinated undertaking, enlisting the resources of the Veterans

Administration, Departmen t of Labor, and other concerned agencies. 4

After review by the PW/MIA Task Group, the study panel submitted

its report to the secretary of defense late in May. Laird issued a general

approval of its recommendations on 7 June 1972, placing implementation

authority within the existing organizational system. The assistant secretary

of defense (ISA) , "consistent with his responsibilities as my principal assistant for PW/MIA matters," the secretary instructed the military departments,

was to direct appropriate action "as approved by the PW/MIA Task Group."

Characteristically, the final paragraph of Laird's guidance to senior officials represented on the task group called for their highest endeavor in

support of the objective:

I cannot emphasize too strongly the necessity to make every

possible effort within our capability to help these men readjust

to healthy, normal, productive lives when they return. Similarly,

their families and the families of those men who are missing and

do not return are entitled to every possible assistance we can

provide. I will appreciate your help in promptly acting on those

matters which come under your jurisdiction.'
Rehabilitation and Readjustment 313

Many of the study's recommendations endorsed projects already under

consideration by the task group.* Career counseling and the connected subjects of medical follow-up and more immediate psychiatric counseling for

the families were important new programs that now received priority.

Career Counseling

Nutter assigned overall responsibility for development and implementation of the career counseling program to the assistant secretary of defense

for manpower and reserve affairs (M&RA) on 24 July. Fast action resulted

in a memorandum from the office in early October that required the

services to incorpotate career counseling into the processing of returnees

during their stay at hospitals in the United States. After the men completed

their convalescent leave, attention would turn to careful selection of a duty

assignment or to assistance for those who were entering civilian life. Each

service should also designate a staff element that would be "accountable over

the active military career of returnees for monitoring problems related to

captivity that emerge in the future." Countenancing no delay in the selection

of personnel for these tasks, the memorandum scheduled a three-day training conference for them to attend in mid-November, barely a month away.6

To ease the conversion to civilian life the military departments normally

provided information and counseling to men and women nearing the end

of their terms of service, but it was apparent that former prisoners making

this transition would require special consideration and individualized assistance over a longer period. As the study panel had pointed out, many would

be seeking civilian employment after a lapse of five years or more in their

work experience and normal development, and possibly with limiting

physical disabilities as well. It was important, therefore, the Manpower

office noted in a November memorandum, that the services provide such

men with full information on employment prospects and assistance available to them from the Veterans Administration and other agencies. When

they left the armed forces, a reliable arrangement must be in place for

smooth transfer of the responsibility for servicing their needs. Looking

beyond the separation date, Defense officials sought to insure that the

procedures followed thereafter would preserve the identity of the former

prisoners and recognize their requirement for specialized vocational counseling and educational and training guidance. With the Veterans Administration as coordinator, the agencies providing benefits should keep a close

eye on the men after they became settled in their home commUOlties.

* Some are discussed later in this chapter, others in Chapters 14 and 19.
314 THE LONG ROAD HOME

"No POW/MIA," the memorandum declared, "should ever become lost in

the system."7

The main effort of M&RA in furtherance of the career counseling

program went toward drawing the appropriate government agencies inro

consultation, heightening their awareness of the problem, and encouraging them ro organize their resources for concerted action. The Veterans

Administration, the U.S. Employment Service and other elements of the

Department of Labor, the Civil Service Commission, the Small Business

Administration, and the U.S. Office of Education all gave willing support.

Each contributed a section to the "Guidelines for Career Planning and

Other Assistance for Returned POW/MIA Personnel," published as a

pamphlet late in November 1972. 8

Through the representatives of 16 major companies serving on an

employment planning committee, 000 also established liaison with the

business community. Among other things, this group designed a resume

form tailored to the particular circumstances of a returned prisoner of war.

Reporting to the PW/MIA Task Force on 19 January 1973, M&RA's Frank

McKernan described the progress that had been made in both the public

and private sectors, apprising General Ogan that arrangements for career

counseling and other assistance to repatriated men who by reason of retirement, disability, or choice would be returning to civilian life were "now

ready to go operational."9

Family Counseling and Long-Term Medical Monitoring

Concurrently, Nutter made sure the study panel's recommendations

on medical follow-up and family counseling received appropriate attention.

In fact, planning for long-term medical monitoring and treatment of returnees and their families had begun before the study report was published,

owing to proposals put forward independently by the assistant secretary of

defense for health and environment, Dr. Richard Wilbur. His recommendation in November 1971 that the services initiate a long-term, coordinated

program of study and treatment of the medical problems of returnees gained

immediate approval within the PW/MIA Task Group. On 2 December,

Nutter asked Wilbur to develop an overall 000 plan, with the assistance of

a committee of service medical representatives. Thus the study panel's

recommendations on this subject in January 1972 endorsed an effort

already under way. \0

Laird reaffirmed DoD's commitment to providing long-term health

care in his directive of 16 May 1972 on medical processing of returnees.

Moreover, service medical circles had a lively professional interest in
Rehabilitation and Readjustment 315

tracking the lifetime effects of extended captivity. Periodic medical examinations could detect the delayed emergence of disabilities, assess the

effectiveness of earlier diagnoses and treatment, and aid the development

of improved medical procedures for handling repatriated personnel. The

availability of base-line data for these exercises seemed assured by the

emphasis in the Laird directive on careful recording of examination and

test results during the initial repatriation processing.*

There was no great difficulty in establishing procedures for long-term

medical monitoring and treatment of men who continued on active duty

or who retired. They and their dependents remained within the military

medical system. This would not be true, however, for men who left the

armed forces without being qualified for either regular or disability retirement. This category of returnee caused more concern and generated far

more discussion.

The concern was not primarily that separated men would be deprived

of competent treatment, even though it did seem clearly preferable that

they receive attention from military physicians experienced in dealing

with post-captivity problems. As Dr. Wilbur's deputy, Maj. Gen. George ].

Hayes, put it:

If the Department of Defense were to discontinue medical benefits to those returned POWs who are separated, it is unlikely that

there would be any adverse effect on the health of the individuals concerned. They would be enritled to use the very fine health

services of the Veterans Administration which could adequately

meet their health needs. The greater loss under those circumstances would be to the Department of Defense. We believe it is

in the best interests of the Department to continue to monitor

the health of all returned POWs and rheir dependents until their

readjustment/rehabilitation is completed.

Under existing rules, the subsequent medical history of former servicemen

who were not retirees would not be documented, and the data base for

analysis of the prisoner experience would be degraded to that degree. If a

way could be found to retain them in military medical channels, however,

the validity and comprehensiveness of the conclusions drawn would be

enhanced. Also, Hayes noted, the arrangement might sometimes work to

the advantage of the individual. "Should any latent disabilities surface we

would have all necessary information to process a 'corrections board' case,"

which might establish the man's right to disability retirement. j j

* The directive of 16 May 1972 and subsequent development of a standard medical form

for returnee patients are described in Chapter 14.
316 THE LONG ROAD HOME

The search for means of accomplishing this objective occupied OSD

officials for some months. For a time during November 1972 the alternative

of placing the men on the Temporary Duty Retired List (TDRL) seemed

promising, since individuals in that category were entitled to treatment

at military medical facilities for up to five years after discharge. In light

of legal advice, however, OSD concluded that "the possibility of latent

disability that exists in the case of returned prisoners of war is not sufficient

to satisfy the statutory requirements for TDRL," and officials in OASD

(H&E) suggested another course. They now held that service secretaries

had "sufficient broad authority to continue the health care and other assistance required by separatees for an appropriate period." In mid-December

they proposed that discharged returnees, not otherwise qualified for access

to military medical services, be individually designated by their departmental secretaries to receive this benefit. 12

The PW/MIA Task Group accepted the proposal but expressed a strong

preference for elevating the procedure to the level of the secretary of

defense. Making the men "Secretary of Defense designees," it was said,

would remove uncertainty over their right to be treated at all Defense

medical installations rather than only those of their former service. I.J

This stage of the discussion had been reached by mid-January 1973.

The further delay in bringing it to a conclusion may have owed something to the principal officials being engrossed with the imminent Paris

settlement and thereafter with the management of the homecoming

operation itself. It was not until 22 May 1973 that Wilbur directed that

"returned military prisoners of war of the Vietnam conflict leaving the

military other than by retirement will be eligible to receive health care in

military medical facilities for a period of five years. Similar health care

will be provided to dependents of these men." For this purpose they would

have the same status as retired military members and their dependents.

The secretaries of the military departments were instructed to submit the

names of the designees for certification at the OSD level. 14

Shields had spelled out the grounds for extending the benefit to dependents when submitting the final draft of the directive to higher authority

on 3 May 1973. By that date the PWs had come home, and he could speak

with some knowledge of the actual circumstances of the repatriated men:

Inclusion of the returnee's dependents in the proposed medical

progtam is recommended since experience and the current status

of some returnees indicate the importance of treating the family

as a unit. Various factors associated with the SE Asia captivity

environment, especially the prolonged separation, have created

an extraordinary family readjustment problem for some. It seems
Rehabilitation and Readjustment 317

apparent that long term problems facing the men will involve

family relations to a substantial degree. Allowing the military physician access to the dependents may help unearth or clarify physical

and psychological problems bothering the returnees. At the same

time, it will provide the opportunity for evaluation and treatment

of dependent problems, especially psychological, which may be

affecting the returnee's overall readjustment process. I \

The Rehabilitation/Readjustment Study Panel had discussed substantially the same considerations in its report more than a year earlier, in

January 1972. The panel had recommended psychiatric and psychological

counseling for the men and their dependents for as long as needed during

the post-repatriation years and also the immediate institution of such counseling for PW/MIA families in their current circumstances. By the beginning of 1973, fulfillment of the first of these objectives was in prospect

through the program for long-term medical monitoring. The second

objective had not been fully realized, and the time during which it would

be of benefit to the families was nearing an end.

Nutter had passed the family counseling recommendation to the

services and OASD(H&E) for implementation in mid-June 1972. He

noted that the panel report had identified the basic elements for a family

counseling program, but considerable planning and the identification of

qualified personnel and funding sources would be necessary, as well as

development of operating procedures and an organizational structure. Since

the program focused on psychological and psychiatric problems, most of

these activities, Nutter said, should proceed under medical auspices, and he

asked that "the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health and Environment

assume responsibility for coordinating and supervising organization and

implementation of the program," with the military services providing assistance and qualified personnel as required. To preserve the integrity of the

existing family assistance system, however, he deemed it "essential" that the

service casualty assistance offices have the key role in advising family members of the program and facilitating their participation in its benefits. 16

General Ogan of the PW/MIA Task Force checked on progress during

August 1972 and found in OASD(H&E) a tendency to minimize the requirement, with officials having "essentially 'hung their hat' on the view

that existing support to families constitutes a family counseling program."

He believed he had succeeded in impressing that office with the broader

vision of a counseling program held by ISA and with the high priority

that should be given to its accomplishment. I?

Though OASD(H&E) apparently committed itself to a more thoroughgoing effort, the passage of another five weeks did not yield any achievement
318 THE LONG ROAD HOME

that Shields could cite in reply to a set of recommendations submitted

by the National League of Families, which included a plea for expanded

family counseling services. On that point Shields made as much as he could

of the current program, while promising improvement in the future. In

explaining why the acknowledged need was not already met he fell back

rather lamely on language that had appeared in Nutter's original implementing memorandum of 13 June:

Each of the Services has existing programs which are elements of

an overall family counseling program. These include the casualty

assistance officet system, family newslettets, special family briefings, individual counseling as required and standard military

medical (psychiatric) services where necessary. However, considering the extended period during which our men have been

missing or captured we have recognized the need for a level of

counseling that goes beyond existing programs and is essentially

psychiatrically/psychologically oriented. Therefore, in June of this

year we directed organization of a special family counseling program under medical auspices. The development of such a program

requires considerable planning, identification of resources, funding and qualified personnel, training and development of an organizational structure, and operating procedures. Until such time as a

definitive program is instituted, interim counseling includes such

measures as the current series of Service meetings with families. IH

The series of service briefings for families at various locations throughout the country did deserve mention. Each service provided these briefings

during the latter half of 1972, with emphasis on explaining the repatriation plan and informing next of kin about the psychological aspects of

captivity to better prepare them for the post-reunion period. The traveling

briefing teams usually included a psychiatrist, and all services made use of

a highly regarded film presentation developed by William Miller, a government psychologist. It dealt with the captivity environment in Southeast

Asia and the mental and emotional mechanisms that prisoners used to

withstand and adjust to its demands. 19

Helpful and well-received though these sessions were, they constituted

only a one-time effort at each location and served more to highlight the

family counseling need than to dispose of it. One trip report, submitted

in late August by the chief of an Air Force briefing team that had toured

20 installations, closed with the following observation: "It was apparent in

discussions with family members that the Services must move out as

quickly as possible on a specialized family counseling program," such as

Secretary Nutter had directed in June. 20
Rehabilitation and Readjustment 319

The Air Force had developed a concept for a family counseling program

and expected approval by its surgeon general in time for implementation

during October 1972. It provided "a monitoring and referral service for

the PW/MIAs and their families before, during and after the release of

the PWs." Also, to focus particularly on current family problems, the Air

Force was establishing a family assistance council at each installation that

dealt regularly with PW/MIA dependents. It was designed to coordinate

the legal, medical and psychological, financial, chaplain, and public affairs

resources of the base in a sustained effort to alleviate the difficulties these

families were experiencing. 21

Both the Navy and the Marine Corps, in August 1972, cited progress

being made in developing a family counseling program at the Center for

Prisoner of War Studies of the Navy Medical Neuropsychiatric Research

Unit in San Diego. The center had conducted "structures interviews" with

PW/MIA dependents and former returnees. The Army was also participating in the center's work by assigning a specialist to the staff and

contributing $80,000 toward current fiscal year costs. In addition, its

spokesman said, "the Army Medical Department has established a Family

Counseling Program. Families and NOK of PW/MIA's have been advised

that family counseling services, by trained social workers, are available if

they so desire. "22

This activity by the services evidenced a sincere commitment thtough

the summer and fall of 1972 to improve family counseling. However, during

the few months remaining before the return of the prisoners, performance

fell noticeably short of the goal proclaimed by ISA-"a level of counseling that goes beyond existing programs and is essentially psychiatricallyl

psychologically oriented," to be provided uniformly by the services under

guidance from the OSD level. In the time remaining before homecoming,

OASD(H&E) did not succeed in preparing an overall plan for task group

approval. Perhaps it was simply that the professional resources for a program of the scope envisioned were not readily at hand. In any event, as

time ran out at the end of 1972 emphasis shifted wholly to basic longterm counseling for repatriates and their dependents and to meeting the

special readjustment needs of the families of missing men whose return

seemed increasingly unlikely.

The General Progress ofPlanning: The Washington Confirence

Implementing actions stemming specifically from the report of

the Rehabilitation/Readjustment Study Panel were important but occupied
320 THE LONG ROAD HOME

only a modest place in repatriation planning during 1972. The main thrust

continued to lie in the further development of overall policy and in the

operational planning of the services and the unified commands. New policy

determinations-most notably deciding the length of time the men would

remain in overseas processing-led to changes and revisions in the plans at

all levels, even as work continued toward filling out and refining the several

annexes in each plan. The accumulation of changes and additions caused

nearly all commands and services to consolidate and reissue their basic

Egress Recap documents at least once during 1972. 23

The year 1972 also saw a more pronounced exercise of overall coordinating authority by ISA, particularly as projected to u.s. commands and

installations around the world. The effort was a conscious one, launched

by Nutter in December 1971 when he announced the convening of a

000 PW Repatriation Planning Conference in Washington the following month. He called for representation from CINCPAC's headquarters

and component commands, COMUSMACV, USCINCEUR, and the Military Airlift Command (MAC), and from the services, DIA, JCS, and various

OSD offices. 24

When the 102 attendees gathered on 19 January 1972 for the three-day

conference they heard opening presentations by Nutter, Shields, who served

as chairman, and Rear Admiral H. H. Epes, Jr., director of the PW/MIA

Task Force. All three mentioned Secretary Laird's dedication to the cause

of the prisoners and missing and his special concern for the success of the

repatriation planning effort. Laird himself made his interest and backing known personally during an unscheduled appearance at the afternoon

session. The opening speakers sought to insure that officers from the distant

commands appreciated the sensitivity and public importance of the PWI

MIA issue at the national and international levels, which in turn made it

imperative that the highest levels in 000 directly supervise planning and

execution. Beyond that, Shields said, the purpose of the conference was

"to examine in detail the plans for implementation of 000 policies ... and

to insure that the intent behind the policy wording is clearly understood."25

The conference sessions of 19-21 January revealed procedures and

relationships that still required definition; details still to be tied down came

to light. Command representatives gave Washington officials their comments

on changes or extensions of policy being considered. The conference, reinforced by the concurrent publication of the rehabilitationlreadjustment

report, gave marked impetus to the planning effort at all levels.

Within a week, each of the services had initiated a review of the currency and completeness of the information in the brochures on individual

PW/MIA personnel that had been prepared in anticipation of the prisoners'

return. This responded to a need cited both at the conference and in the
Rehabilitation and Readjustment 321

study panel's report, and in early March the Joint Chiefs of Staff followed

up by establishing a required, standardized format for the brochures. They

would include a personal section, to be given to the returnee, and other personnel data, to be used by the staff at the processing site. For the personal

section the JCS prescribed: (l) a cover memorandum, prepared by each

service for its own returnees, providing general processing information to

the returnee, including possible CONUS hospitals to which he could be

sent from the processing site; (2) a summary of information concerning his

family since he was captured or missing, including secondary next of kin

and others close to the individual, and giving current addresses and phone

numbers as well as messages and recent pictures that the family might provide; (3) a summary of pay and allowance data; (4) information on awards

and decorations; and (5) any promotion or appointment orders. Held

separately in the personnel folder would be:

Sensitive information concerning changes in family status which

occurred during the individual's absence, i.e., deaths, divorces,

serious illness/injury. The information will be sealed in an envelope which will be prominently marked as follows: "AttentionThis envelope contains sensitive family information which will

be discussed with the returnee by a chaplain or senior officer as

soon as the returnee has been medically cleared to receive distressing news."

The personnel folder would also contain a pay form for an initial amount

of $250 and provision for further disbursements from his pay account if

the returnee desired. 26

A few days earlier the PW/MIA Task Force had called on the OSD comptroller to assemble an ad hoc interservice group to work out cross-service

funding arrangements for a repatriation in which all returned prisoners

would be processed together. For instance, the military service whose installation housed the joint central processing center would initially bear the

full expense of pay disbursements to returnees and of providing clothing

and other personal items beyond the uniform, for which it would expect

to be reimbursed. The accommodation and transportation of escorts might

also give rise to claims for compensationY

Meanwhile, activity also increased among PACOM's planners in the

wake of the Washington conference. Admiral McCain proposed, and the

JCS approved with minor changes, a standardized format for the initial

Bash-precedence message reporting the recovery of captured or missing

U.S. personnel. Longer and more technical exchanges occurred between

PACOM and the JCS in July regarding CINCPAC's communications

requirements for processing a large volume of returnees, including provision
322 THE LONG ROAD HOME

for dedicared use of major trunk lines for the telephone calls home to next

of kin. 28

Earlier in the year CINCPAC had sent his component commanders

and the three prospective central processing sites a message announcing additional policy measures, which he related specifically to problem

areas revealed during the Washington meeting. 29 One section covered the

issuance of uniforms and health and comfort items-a list that began with

"complete lightweight uniform (blouse type) to include two shirts, raincoat

and all necessary accessories and decorations" and ran on ro "letter writing

kit to include stamps" and "canvas handbag for carrying issued and other

personal items enroute to CONUS." Then followed a 13-point outline of

the role and demanding duties of the personal affairs escort/sponsor, the

officer or NCO to be assigned to each returnee. Having custody of the

returnee's file and being completely familiar with its contents, the sponsor

would schedule the man's processing and guide him through such important stages as the telephone call home and the appointments for medical

examination, intelligence debriefing, uniform fitting, and receiving pay, at

the same time assuring that the "returnee is not overwhelmed or harassed

with processing requirements" and "is given personal attention as an individual." Besides being on call on a 24-hour basis to respond to any personal

needs of the former PW the escort/sponsor would fulfill a commitment to

"talk personally to returnee at least twice each day," the subjects to include

news of his family, national and world developments during his absence,

and "events leading to his return (if he exhibits interest)."

While one escort for each returnee was preferred, CINCPAC's guidance recognized that it might have to go as high as one to five during a

large influx of former prisoners. Only when dealing with a release of

moderate size would it be possible for the same sponsor to accompany one

man throughout the central processing, homeward flight, and final delivery

to the CONUS hospital. "If a continuing flow of returnees is expected at

the processing site, or large numbers of returnees are to be evacuated to

CONUS within a narrow time frame (75 or more within 24 hours)," instructions allowed for an adjustment of 1 escort for up to 10 returnees of

the same service on the homeward flight. This would provide aircraft space

for more returnees while ensuring that sufficient sponsor/escorts remained

at the processing site to sustain its operations. 30

The January conference in Washington had included the first exposition of plans for aeromedical evacuation by the Military Airlift Command.

The MAC representatives spoke mainly of the initial movement of returnees

from the prisoner retrieval points to the PACOM central processing site.

They had plotted the aircraft cycle times for prospective release or pickup

at Hanoi, Saigon, Bien Hoa, Danang, Vientiane, Hong Kong and, as a
Rehabilitation and Readjustment 323

remote possibility, Kimpo, near Seoul, Korea. Soon afterward MAC distributed worldwide the latest version of the inch-thick Egress Recap Plan.

It contained airlift flow patterns and scheduling, loading, and manning

data for the C-141 s that would perform the first two stages of evacuation,

from release point to central processing site and home from there, via

Hawaii. Once in the United States, C-9 aircraft would transport returnees

to military hospitals throughout the country.31

Involvement ofthe European Command

Understandably, the January conference had emphasized the status

of CINCPAC's preparations, but the less extensive planning currently

required of USCINCEUR had also been reviewed. The idea that contingencies might arise that would give the European Command (EUCOM) the

major role in repatriation was beginning to receive attention. In releasing

U.S. prisoners from North Vietnam in the past-nine men in all, in groups

of three during 1968 and 1969-Hanoi's leaders had pursued their own

purposes, without predictable pattern. For the final repatriation they might

conclude it was advantageous to send their captives westward, through

Peking, Moscow, and other Communist capitals to some release point in

Europe. The commander in chief, Atlantic, looking to his own potential

responsibilities under Egress Recap, even thought it conceivable that U.S.

prisoners might be offered for release in Havana, "for propaganda or negotiation purposes."32

The need for EUCOM repatriation planning to be on the same scale

as in the Pacific came into sharper relief following Secretary Laird's directive of 16 May 1972, which extended both the time and the procedures to

be accomplished in overseas processing. On 22 June the Joint Chiefs of

Staff notified General Andrew J. Goodpaster that higher authority would

soon require his European Command to undertake full preparations for

repatriation, including operation of a joint processing center, and that he

should begin the planning immediately.]]

On 15 July Laird issued the memorandum calling for EUCOM planning. The JCS followed with a formal directive to USCINCEUR to prepare

plans for the accomplishment of all tasks associated with Egress Recap, paralleling the effort in the Pacific Command. 34

Early in the planning Ramstein Air Base and the U.S. Army General

Hospital at Landsruhl, West Germany, were designated as the elements of a

single EUCOM Joint Central Processing Center (JCPe), headed by an Air

Force general with deputies from each of the services. In mid-November,

Shields led a team from Washington in two days of conferences at EUCOM
324 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Headquarters and a one-day tour of the Ramstein-Landstuhl complex. The

visit coincided with publication of USCINCEUR's Egress Recap plan. 15

Another Major Planning Conference

Earlier, USCINCEUR had sent an observer to the second 000 PW

Repatriation Planning Conference of the year, held in Hawaii from 9 to

11 August 1972, with Shields again as chairman. Long contemplated as a

follow-up to the January meetings, it was intended to focus exclusively on

CINCPAC's plans and preparations. The only topic that arose with direct

implications for USCINCEUR's planning was the matter of arranging

for speedy airlift to Europe of the individual record folders and stock of

uniforms stored in the Pacific Command, should the prisoner release occur

in General Goodpaster's area of responsibility.1!>

The conferees discussed means of keeping the content of the personnel folders up to date, and they examined the provision for Quick Reaction

Teams (QRTs). On 18 June 1972 McCain had directed 13th Air Force at

Clark and the Army command on Okinawa to keep QRTs in readiness for

dispatch to points of anticipated recovery on four-hour notice. At a minimum the team would have a chief, flight surgeon, one escort per service

represented among the returnees (if possible), a public affairs officer, an

aeromedical evacuation operations officer, and, if available from PACAF/

MAC resources, a small airlift control element. The directive called for augmentation of the team within eight hours to support its function of assisting the responsible military commander or other U.S. government official

in receiving the men and evacuating them promptly, with escorts, to the

CINCPAC-designated Joint Central Processing Center. J7

The planners also addressed the ratio of debriefers to returnees at the

JCPc. Army and Marine Corps arrangements for manning the debriefing

activity they judged adequate; those of the Air Force and Navy appeared

less so, since personnel were being trained primarily as escorts on the

assumption that they could also conduct intelligence debriefings as an

additional duty. Air Force and Navy representatives of PACOM responded

to this assessment by proposing to assign more men to their training

programs. The Navy would still train individuals as both escorts and

debriefers but now expected to assign them exclusively to one role or the

other at the JCPc. The Air Force would continue to use combined escorts/

debriefers, but in sufficient numbers to maintain a ratio of one to one, or

at worst, one to three.

The aeromedical evacuation plan emphasized the requirement that

each C-141 carry no more than 24 returnees for the long flight to the
Rehabilitation and Readjustment 325

United States. Their comfort was the controlling consideration. The loading limitation would assure that each man had both a seat and a bed, with

ample seating for escorts and other attending personnel.

CINCPAC representatives during the conference pressed particularly

for information about the turnover of escort responsibilities and the

delivery of records in the United States. Only if the number of returnees

was small and evenly spaced could PACOM supply escorts on a one-to-one

basis to accompany a man throughout the homeward flight and on to his

hospital. More likely, one PACOM escort would look after several men, and

a transfer of records and duties would have to occur at the point where

the returnees transferred to C-9 aircraft for flights to separate destinations.

The same consideration applied to a lesser extent to the couriers entrusted

with debriefing data.

The port of entry for repatriation flights originating in the Pacific would

be Travis Air Force Base, in California. The conferees agreed on the need for

a single office there to arrange the exchange between incoming PACOM

escorts and the service escorts who would take over for the rest of the journey, allowing PACOM personnel to return promptly to the JCPC to repeat

the cycle. Soon after the conference the director of the PW/MIA Task Force

assigned responsibility for the arrangements to the Air Force, broadening

it to include both Travis and Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington, the

designated port of entry for flights from Europe. General Ogan asked that

these escort coordination offices, under Air Force control, be staffed jointly

by the services and have communications links with the National Military

Command Center in the Pentagon and other headquarters. J8

Some of the discussions at the August conference helped to hasten completion of actions already under study in Washington, for example taking

steps to standardize the recording of the information gained from debriefing the returnees at the JCPC, where the goal would be to gather knowledge

of men still unaccounted for. This meshed with a proposal, already well

advanced within the PW/MIA Task Group, for a single Defense-wide automated data processing (ADP) system to speed the correlation of returnee

input with other intelligence information. Discussions had begun in March

1972 and had resulted by 1 June in a task group request that DIA work with

service representatives to develop the computerization proposal in detail,

using the ADP system already employed by the Air Force.3~

On 11 October Nutter established the requirement for the feeding of

all information from the initial returnee debriefings into an expanded Air

Force ADP system. His directive reaffirmed DIA's responsibility to provide

technical direction and coordination for the debriefings and appointed

the Air Force executive agent, under DIA management, to develop and

operate the ADP reporting system and produce training materials. Nutter
326 THE LONG ROAD HOME

emphasized the prominence that the MIA problem would receive at the

time of repatriation. "Intense interest and concern will be focused on the

Department of Defense and the individual services to resolve these MIA

cases in a timely and efficient manner," and numerous requests and queries

from press and public should be anticipated. Activation of the new system,

Nutter said, should therefore receive the highest priority. DIA advised

potential users of the ADP system on 21 November that an interim operational capability now existed and that they would soon receive an instruction

guide and standardized forms for the recording of debriefing information. 40

The conferees in Hawaii had also pondered how to avoid any hitch or

unnecessary inconvenience during the homeward journey of the returnees.

One potentially irksome minor obstacle had already been dealt withsecuring from the Center for Disease Control of the U.S. Public Health

Service a waiver of the normal requirement for proof of currency of immunizations when reentering the United States. At the conference the desirability

of some similar arrangement with the Bureau of Customs was pointed out.

OSD officials followed up on the suggestion, and early in 1973 reached

an arrangement whereby returnees, escorts, and air crews and their baggage

would be cleared by military inspectors before departure from the overseas

site, under the monitorship of U.S. Customs agents. As stated in the agreement, this would "preclude reinspection by Bureau of Customs inspectors

at intermediate stops on the night to CONUS or upon entry into the

United States unless there are indications of irregularities. "41

Though not clearly indicated in the conference record, it is probable

that PACOM officers pursued a matter that McCain had raised several

weeks earlier when he asked for copies of the background material developed

by the services to bring prisoners up to date on world events. Such reorientation would not be a primary objective during overseas processing, he said,

but JCPC personnel might have to deal with a range of questions from the

returnees about international relations and social, political, and economic

changes in the United StatesY

000 elements had long recognized the need for special measures to

fill in missing information and assist the returnee in reestablishing his

national and global frame of reference. As early as November 1968 Navy

officials had explored with a leading newsreel company the possibility of

producing a year-by-year film of news highlights, perhaps narrated by entertainer Bob Hope. The cost estimates they received led the Navy's representatives to recommend sponsorship of the film production by 000 rather

than a single service, and the matter was not further pursued. By the time

of McCain's request in 1972, however, the plans of all services provided for

current events orientation for the returnees during their hospital stay in the
Rehabilitation and Readjustment 327

United States. The Navy, for instance, had produced a briefing outline and

audio tapes covering significant news items for the period 1965-71. A Navy

spokesman noted that "in order to avoid the possibility of biased reporting,

we utilized the talents of Naval Reserve Officers who as civilians are newspaper and TV correspondents."43

The task of providing an objective account of political events during

the turbulent era that had included the traumatic deaths of Martin Luther

King, Jr., and Senator Robert F. Kennedy, the rise of the antiwar demonstrations, and the 1970 Kent State incident in which several students were

shot by National Guard troops was a formidable one. In addition, the

returnees would need to be brought up to date on the achievements of the

space program, and it would be well to inform them of the extension of the

voting privilege to 18-year-olds and of changes in speech, clothing, and

hair styles among the young. Other less important information could also

help in overcoming what one former prisoner had described as the feeling

of being a "modern version of Rip Van Winkle." The returnees might appreciate being reminded that such figures as Spencer Tracy, Judy Garland,

J. Edgar Hoover, and former President Eisenhower no longer filled their

familiar place on the American scene.*

Agreement on Repatriation ofCivilians

The August conference was attended by Frank Sieverts from the State

Department and representatives from the American embassies in Manila,

Saigon, and Vientiane. Their participation was desired because planning for

processing returned U.S. civilians through the Egress Recap system, on a

voluntary basis, was then reaching an advanced stage. Discussions extending back to the previous November lay behind the State-Defense agreement,

concluded in June 1972, on handling of the 50 American citizens listed

as captured or missing in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Among

the civilian captives who might be released along with the military were

newsmen, tourists, and other private individuals, but more than half were

U.S. government personnel or employees of firms under contract to government agencies. 44

Subject always to their consent, civilians would pass through the same

facilities, from release point to arrival in the United States, as the military

* By 1971 many of the prisoners were already learning of the culture shock that awaited

them, getting a sneak preview from the inc teased flow of letters and photographs

from home and an influx of new arrivals into the camps. Sec Rochester and Kiley,

Honor Bound, 541-43.
328 THE LONG ROAD HOME

returnees. The State Department informed affected diplomatic posts that

the arrangement was entered into "for primary purposes of ensuring safe,

fast transportation, providing needed medical check-ups and care, and

debriefing all returnees, particularly on information they may have on other

missing or captured personnel, civilian or military." The assurance of systematic inclusion of these debriefing results in the ADP data base was deemed

particularly important by Defense officials. They were conscious, too, that

"the statements a civilian repatriate might make could adversely affect the

welfare of military men still held." They hoped that few civilian returnees

would elect to withdraw from the Egress Recap channel and the controlled

environment of the JCPe, where contact with the news media would be

carefully regulated. 4

'

Discussion at the conference in Hawaii insured general awareness of the

civilian returnee provisions and fostered contacts between State Department

personnel and PACOM staff officers. Further interdepartmental planning

in Washington focused on such details as the allocation of funding responsibilities and extension of the arrangement to any third-country nationals

who might be released. At the year's end, Sieverts and Shields formalized

the agreement in an exchange of correspondence. if,

DoD was prepared to accommodate civilians through all stages of the

repatriation sequence, including completion of medical treatment at U.S.

military hospitals near their homes. The terms of the State-Defense compact

made clear, however, that civilian returnees were not to be simply remanded

to the military for processing. State Department officials would be in attendance at all times and would have certain specific responsibilities, including

the initial verification G: the returnee's free consent. The agreement provided

that if civilians "do not elect the use of DoD facilities, or discontinue such

use at any time, care and assistance for them will then become the responsibility of the Department of State." Third-country nationals (TCN) released

with U.S. civilians would be handled in the same manner, subject to the

desires of their own governments, as ascertained by the State Department.

DoD expected to be able to offer military transportation to assist TCN in

returning to their home countries.

The agreement specified that:

State Department officers should be provided to act as escorts

for U.S. civilian returnees from the point of return to U.S. control

until the returnee is no longer utilizing 000 facilities. During

transportation phases, at least one State Department escort

should be provided for each aeromedevac aircraft carrying U.S.

civilians. Additionally, State Department officers should be provided to act as debriefers at overseas and CONUS military medical

facilities being utilized by U.S. civilian returnees.
Rehabilitation and Readjustment 329

Defense officials attached particular importance to the provision that:

State Department liaison officers should be stationed at the JCPC

where DoD facilities are in use by civilians/TCN's, at the airport

of entry (Travis or Andrews AFB) being transited by aeromedevac

aircraft carrying civilians and at any U.S. military hospital in

the United States where U.S. civilians are receiving medical care

and treatment. These officers ... should remain on station for as

long as these stated DoD facilities are being transited or utilized

by civilians.

Further, the Department of State would be responsible for arranging the

travel and lodging of family members who desired to visit a civilian

returnee at the hospital. In such manner the government insured that

civilians among the ex-prisoners received essentially the same level of care

and attention as military returnees. 47
16

Repatriation Planning: Public Affairs

and Conduct in Captivity

As repatriation planning entered a final stage late in 1972, there temained two important loose ends of a sensitive nature that required

close attention and occasioned considerable discussion. One was the management of public affairs during and following the prisoners' homecoming.

The other was the matter of the principles and procedures governing debriefing of returned prisoners and for reaching judgment on their conduct

in captivity.

The Public Affairs Challenge

There could be no doubt that the rerum of the captive Americans

would be a news event commanding national and international attention.

Planning for the management of its public affairs aspects was accordingly

a prime concern and the subject of continuous effort. At the Washington

level the effort went toward the working out in increasing detail and refinement of a basic public affairs guidance document, in which lines of

responsibility were drawn, anticipated problems described, and instructions

for dealing with various circumstances set down. The process was notably

devoid of false starts and major reconsiderations, since the central operating

principle was uncontested from the beginning: This aspect of the repatriation would be controlled in all respects and with minimum delegation by

the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

330
Public Affairs and Conduct in Captivity 331

To be sure, it was not a method of operation freshly conceived to apply

to the prisoner repatriation. An existing DoD directive already said that "information in any form concerning plans, policies, programs or operations" of

the department must be submitted to the assistant secretary for public

affairs for clearance before release if it met any of several criteria. J The prospective return of the prisoners qualified on more than one count as an

event affecting the national interest of the United States in ways that ran

well beyond the ordinary bounds of public relations. It was not merely that

reporting of the repatriation activities by radio, television, and the print

media would shape the American people's perception of the competence,

compassion, and conceptual soundness of the actions taken by the Department of Defense. Unguarded statements or ill-timed revelations could affect

the enemy's attitude as well, with impact on the further course of repatriation and on negotiations to obtain an accounting for the missing, permission

for crash-site investigations, and other measures to recover the dead. How

the United States would appear before the larger audience of the world community was a further consideration. But first of all, close and centralized

control of press contacts and information release was dictated by concern

for the welfare of the returned men and the need to protect their processing

from disruption.

Preparation ofa Central Public Ajftirs Directive

Some of these considerations appeared in the single paragraph on

public affairs in the first repatriation directive, issued by Deputy Secretary

Nitze on 8 June 1968:

Factual information will be made available to the public through

the news media subject to appropriate consideration of (I) security requirements, (2) the welfare of the returned personnel and

their families and (3) the safety and interests of other personnel

who may still be detained. After medical evaluation of returned

personnel, initial intelligence/counterintelligence debriefing,

public affairs counseling and legal counseling have been completed, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) will, in

accordance with existing directives, authorize individual returnees

who desire to do so to grant interviews to representatives of the

news media.
332 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Unstated but well understood was the assumption that the men would

be protected from the intrusions and importunities of the press from the

moment of their return to U.S. control. The CINCPAC planners properly

translated this into a precept appearing in the implementing guidance

issued by Admiral McCain in 1969, to apply from the men's initial reception

through their stay at the overseas central processing site:

Returnees will not be exposed to direct contact with the news

media ... or the public until:

(1) Military doctors state that they are emotionally (psychologically) and medically able to adapt to the rigors of such

exposure, and

(2) Military authorities concerned decide that the returnee

processing, to include debriefing, has reached a stage where the

interruption for such exposure will not prejudice US national

interests or ultimate completion of processing and evacuation.

With regard to press interviews, the two additional conditions in the Nitze

directive would apply. Interviews would take place only with the assent of the

men themselves and with case-by-case approval from the assistant secretary.2

Detailed development of the overall public affairs guidance began during

1971, with an early goal to insure Defense-wide uniformity. As a preliminary, the public affairs panel of the PW/MIA Task Group reviewed the

Egress Recap plans of the military departments and the unified commands

to detect any variations in interpretation and other potential sources of

difficulty in the handling of press relations. OSD Public Affairs then used

the panel's findings in preparing an initial draft of the overall guidance.

Representatives of the overseas commands had the opportunity to make

suggestions during the DoD PW Repatriation Planning Conference in January 1972. After further work by his subordinates in OASD(PA), Assistant

Secretary Daniel Henkin circulated the draft to the task group members

for final comment on 15 May 1972.'

The comments were mainly editorial and of minor import except on

one feature of the guidance, having to do with public affairs activity at the

earliest stage of a mass repatriation. The draft assumed that enemy behavior

would be the same as in the previous instances of the release of small groups.

The Hanoi authorities would inform the world press of the names of the

men to be returned, in advance and with all possible propaganda exploitation. Hence it was further assumed that news accounts would give the

first notice of the impending release and would be a sufficient means of

getting the word to the next of kin. The draft guidance contemplated that

in a large repatriation the public affairs officer (PAO) at the overseas
Public Affairs and Conduct in Captivity 333

processing site would confirm the names to the press as soon as the men

had been recovered and positively identified, adding such information as

their home of record. A different procedure would apply only if, contrary

to expectation, the enemy had not already listed the returnees publicly.

In that event there would be at least a limited opportunity for notice to

the families through the official channel of the service casualty assistance

system. The draft stated that "the PAO will release names of returnees to

news media six hours after dispatch of the Initial Report of Recovery...,

or sooner when notification is received that next of kin have been notified."

The task group members who replied were nearly unanimous in objecting to the short time allowed for notification. More than that, they were

disturbed by the apparent unconcern of PA officials for preserving the

integrity of the service information channel at the moment when news of

the highest significance to next of kin was to be imparted. The representative of the assistant secretary for manpower and reserve affairs thought

notification delay should be extended to 12 hours. Speaking for ISA,

Armistead Selden backed him up. He said the service procedures for communicating with the families were well in hand, but allowance had to be

made for unsuccessful calls owing to busy signals and absences from home.

In the atmosphere of anticipation likely to exist at the time, notification

could be impeded by a high volume of other calls to the family, from

relatives, well-wishers, and newsmen. Selden also pointed to the "distinct

possibility" of errors in the transmission and publication of names by the

media; it could cause anxiety and uncertainty among the next of kin if they

had not already received official word through the established channel. 4

Two weeks later Roger Shields reemphasized these points in a memorandum for Assistant Secretary Henkin. "Great potential for undue anguish

to families lies in the possibility for name garbles as a result of expected

energetic efforts by the media," he wrote. There were numerous cases of

similar or identical surnames in the PW/MIA roster. Taking the obvious

example, he noted that 6 men named Smith were known prisoners of war

and 18 more were listed as missing in action. Of the latter, six had first

names beginning with H. At best, the media could provide the families

only with "unofficial tentative notification"; at worst, the information might

be erroneous. Even if the names were publicized in advance by the enemy,

Shields believed, the system should allow the service casualty branches

sufficient time for a reasonable effort to reach the families with confirmed, official information. In his opinion, assured and timely handling

of the notification step was an inescapable part of the Defense Department's responsibility fot the welfare of the families and the returning men.

It must be given precedence over the release of information to the media.'
334 THE LONG ROAD HOME

The DoD Public Affiirs Guidance

When Henkin formally issued the public affairs guidance on 3 August

1972 it had been modified in substantial accord with the comments:

Families of returned servicemen may receive initial information about the servicemen's release through the news media

or through the Service Casualty Officers. In either event, the

overseas PAO will not confirm the names of released prisoners

to the media until he has been notified that the next of kin have

been officially contacted or that a reasonable attempt has been

made to contact them. When these conditions are met, the PAG is

authorized to release the returnee's name, grade, date of departure,

branch of service and home of record.!'

The DoD guidance document opened with the following statement of

objectives:

a. To provide maximum information to the public about returned prisoners of war (PWs) subject to consideration of: (l) the

health and welfare of the returnees and their families, (2) national

security, and (3) the safety and interests of other personnel who

may still be held in captivity or who are missing in action.

b. To insure that returned PWs have the assistance of public

affairs briefings.

c. To brief returnees and to protect individuals against

inadvertent disclosure of classified security information in connection with our public affairs activity, such as a news conference

or interview.

d. To provide public affairs guidance and assistance, as

desired, to the families of returned PWs.

The listing of general policies started with the familiar declaration

that "medical needs and personal welfare of returnees have the highest

priority." In response to the intense national and international interest in

the event, public affairs activities were to be carried out "promptly, truthfully and candidly," but under constant and centralized control. "The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) has sole responsibility for overall coordination and direction of public affairs activities and will provide

guidance and instructions to all Public Affairs Officers (PAOs)." Questions

arising at any level that were not specifically covered by the published

guidance were to be referred directly to Henkin. Indeed, his authority in

public affairs matters was virtually absolute, subject only to the ultimate

control of the secretary of defense and (0 the obligation to maintain
Public Affairs and Conduct in Captivity 335

continuous liaison with the assistant secretary (ISA), the PW/MIA Task

Force, and the 000 PW Policy Committee. It will be recalled that the

means of effecting this liaison were already largely in place. The assistant

secretary of defense for public affairs was a charter member of the PW

Policy Committee, with representation on the PW/MIA Task Group. More

to the point, his representatives were scheduled to join with the PWI

MIA Task Force and other agencies in manning the Homecoming Operations Center when activated in the National Military Command Center.

Another general policy stated that "the news media have a right and

a responsibility to gather information related to returned prisoners. This

must be respected at all times. Prompt and accurate responses to news queries

and requests will be forthcoming whenever possible, consistent at all times

with the paramount need for consideration of the health and welfare of returnees and of national security requirements." Also, "equal access to the

story is a basic principle of Department of Defense public affairs policy."

Therefore, news media representatives would be afforded equal treatment.

In the statement on the rights and responsibilities of the press there

might perhaps be detected a wry recognition that the media representatives

would be active and persistent in seeking out information at the processing

site. Moreover, they might display less interest in equality than in gaining

any special advantage their resourcefulness could obtain. A further passage

in the guidance-one strongly endorsed by ISA officials in their earlier

comments-attempted to insure that enterprising journalists did not turn

up additional sources who were more talkative than the authorized U.S.

spokesman: "All personnel who will have direct contact with returnees at

processing sites overseas and in the CONUS must have understanding of

possible PA problems and a thorough familiarization with PA guidance

contained herein. Accordingly, the Military Services shall initiate procedures for briefing such personnel."

In overseas areas, "news media may observe and photograph the turnover, arrival and departure of returnees in a manner which precludes direct

contact. Photographs of seriously wounded and ill personnel will not be

permitted." If "non-U.S. Government escorts" were involved, such as antiwar

activists or third-country officials, "no action will be taken to prevent contact between such escorts and the news media." With regard to the returnees

themselves, however, the restrictions on access were more positively stated

in the guidance of 3 August 1972, which now said that no interviews would

be authorized in the overseas area or at any stop during the evacuation to

CONUS. This prohibition would stand, however fervently the press representatives might inveigh against it. Exception would occur only "if a

returnee specifically requests to he allowed to speak with the news media"
336 THE LONG ROAD HOME

and the assistant secretary for public affairs gave assent. It was clear, however, that special instances of this sort were expected to be rare. The main

provision regarding interviews treated them strictly as a possible occurrence

during later stages of processing, after the men had reached the service

hospitals near their homes:

Returned U.S. personnel may be interviewed by news media

representatives after evacuation to the United States when the following criteria have been met and approval has been given

by ASD(PA):

(1) The returnee's physical and mental condition must permit.

This can be determined only by medical authorities. The individual's health has first priority. There can be no compromise on

this requirement.

(2) National security requirements must be satisfied. This can

be determined only by the intelligence specialists. Debriefing is

not a shorr procedure. Normally, debriefing sessions are for shorr

periods of time from day to day. Intelligence data requires some

time and study for evaluation.

(3) Personal consent ofthe returnee must be received prior to any

interview or press conference. The returnee, as is the case for any

other serviceman or woman, has a right not to be interviewed

if he so chooses. The reason for his refusal is his personal right

and need not be divulged. The returnee will be provided appropriate counseling, including legal.

To accomplish the public affairs objectives the plan called for an organization of officers, facilities, and communications systems that constituted

something of a special overlay on the main pattern of the repatriation

arrangements. CINCPAC implementing instruction of August 1972 termed

it "a significant exception" to the normal command and control procedures.

Henkin's guidance stated that, subject always to supervision from Washington, responsibility for public affairs activities during the overseas stage

of the repatriation rested with the commander of the unified command in

whose area the return occurred. The CINCPAC instruction added that this

responsibility was not to be delegated further. When activated, the Joint

Central Processing Center would include a Joint Information Bureau to

be manned by public affairs officers from all service components of

CINCPAC's command and headed by a senior officer from CINCPAC

Headquarters. The bureau would be under the JCPC commander only for

administrative purposes, however; it remained in a separate, direct command

line from CINCPAC. The bureau chief would report through this channel,

with his messages addressed to both CINCPAC and ASD(PA).-
Public Affairs and Conduct in Captivity 337

Besides handling all relations with media representatives at the overseas site, the Joint Information Bureau would assign a public affairs escort

officer to each evacuation aircraft departing for the United States. Henkin's

guidance of 3 August 1972 described the escort's duties as including press

relations at stops en route and counseling of the returnees as necessary.

Arrival in the continental United States would bring the public affairs

effort into still closer linkage with OASD(PA) in Washington. From Travis

Air Force Base in California, the normal West Coast port of entry, the

returnees would continue by air to their individual hospital destinations.

At Travis, a senior officer designated by Henkin and acting in his name

would have overall responsibility for public affairs, including the assignment of incoming PAG escorts to duty on the onward flights.

The system of control from above, through channels apart from the

normal chain of command, would continue at the service hospitals, since it

was here that the most critical public affairs considerations were expected

to arise. According to the plan, virtually all questions relating to returnee

interviews and press conferences would have been postponed until this

stage of the repatriation. Family reunions would occur and next of kin

would be present, perhaps for extended periods, as hospital visitors. The

number of hospital staff and processing personnel who must be impressed

with the need for strict adherence to the public affairs guidelines would

widen significantly, and representatives of hometown papers would swell

the press corps in attendance.

To meet this situation, each service hospital scheduled to receive returnee patients would have a Defense PAO, chosen by Public Affairs from

among officers nominated by the services. As sole spokesman, "responsible

for all PA activi ties concerning returnees and their families while at that

facility," the Defense PAO would communicate directly with OASD(PA)

and receive guidance and instruction thtough the same channel.

Thus the returned prisoners would have a public affairs officer attending them throughout the sequence. The PAG's instructions, set forth in

some detail in the guidance, called for frequent reminders to the men of

his availabiliry for counseling, beyond rhe more formal public affairs

briefings to be provided. The first of these would occur at the overseas site

before the returnees made the telephone calls to their families. The PAO

would caution against disclosure of classified information or any comment

on the status of other prisoners or missing personnel. Then a senior PAO

would brief all returnees before their evacuation from the overseas area,

mainly on the duties of their escort officer and the ground rules under

which the press would be operating. The sample remarks supplied for this

exercise included the following:
338 THE LONG ROAD HOME

The media at enroute stops will have been briefed in advance that you will not talk with them or hold interviews. They

have a job to do, so they may, nevertheless, attempt to get you to

answer their questions. Because your debriefings have not yet

been completed and to insure the fullest protection to any other

U.S. Serviceman srill held by the enemy or still listed as missing

in action, answers to news media questions should be limited to

very brief statements about such things as feelings about being

on the way home and your anticipated reunion with your family

and friends at home.

At the hospital in the United States the men would receive individual

counseling from the Defense PAG, primarily in anticipation of the interviews that they might soon be cleared to engage in, if desired. A suggested

text was again provided:

If you decide to talk with news media, you have every right

to speak as you wish. However, you may wish to give special consideration to certain areas which could have an impact on you,

other family members, prisoners still detained, and national

security.

Let me make the following suggestions for your consideration and discussion:

1. Be careful to avoid disclosure of classified information concerning your imprisonment, such as resistance techniques and any

covert activities that you or your fellow prisoners may have

devised.

2. Stick to your own personal experiences rather than to information which you heard from other sources. For your own credibility and accuracy, avoid using hearsay.

3. Consider carefully the possible ramifications of your statements before you speak. You may be quoted around the world.

4. You should be aware that what you say may be used by

the enemy for propaganda purposes. Also you should consider

the possible effect of your statement on others not yet released.

Press clippings will undoubtedly reach foreign governments

for their use in whatever manner they may desire.

5. Since other families may not know what you know about

othet prisoners, especially those not returned, it would be better

not to discuss this subject until our casualty personnel can study

your information and notify the families involved. We have tried

to protect your families by providing them with all information

before it is given to the public media. I know you will want to

do the same for other prisoners.
Public Affairs and Conduct in Captivity 339

When press interviews did occur, the Defense PAG or his representative would be present "to provide protection against inadvertent disclosure

of classified information."

Public affairs guidelines would be reviewed once more in a briefing

just before the man departed on convalescent leave. He would be provided

the home and office telephone numbers· of public affairs officers at the

headquarters of his own service in Washington, to be called collect at any

time with any question or request for assistance.

Throughout the repatriation process the military authorities would

direct a similar effort toward the families, beginning with the initial notification of the impending return and alerting them to the virtual certainty

of calls and visits from representatives of the local and national media,

once the names and home addresses were released. The guidance cited no

forbidden topics and touched only lightly on what to say:

You, of course, have a right to talk with the media. You also

have the right not to talk at this time, if you so desire. Because

our information on your husband's (son's, etc.) release is not yet

complete and because other Americans are still held by the

enemy or are still missing in action, you may want to confine

your initial comments to the information that your husband

(son) will provide in the telephone call you will receive from him.

The emphasis was on the availability of official advice and assistance in

dealing with the press, if desired, both at home and during the visitation

period at the hospital.

The Public Affairs Conference

Three months after issuance of the 000 public affairs guidance of

3 August 1972, Henkin served as host at a worldwide Egress Recap conference on its implementation. Attendance at the one-day meeting on

9 November at the Pentagon included officials of all the Washington

agencies concerned, plus representatives of the Pacific and European commands and of each of the hospitals scheduled to receive returnee patients.

Besides discussion of possible problem areas, the program listed presentations

on the lessons learned during previous repatriations. The one on the

Sexton release probably included some account of the embarrassment that

had been experienced when a newsman, disguised in a hospital patient's

gown, succeeded in visiting Sergeant Sexton's room and obtaining an exclusive interview. R
340 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Instructions given out at the conference by Public Affairs underscored again how closely that office intended to monitor the activity. It

was already established that Defense PAOs would record the daily briefings

they gave to the press, transmitting summaries to PA. Returnee press conferences or interviews would also be recorded and transcripts forwarded

to that office as soon as possible. "In addition, all CONUS processing

sites will be prepared to transmit live to OASD(PA) those conferences/

interviews which are specifically requested by OASD(PA)." Therefore,

arrangements should be made with local telephone companies to install

the necessary equipment.'!

At one conference session Shields discussed several potential problems.

If citizens generally were not properly informed of the Defense Department's objectives, he said, they might attribute the withholding of the men

from press and public contact to official heavy-handedness or even to

some more reprehensible cause. Therefore the public affairs effort must

strive to "convey some understanding of the needs of these men" and of the

procedures, primarily medical, that were deemed in the best interest of the

men's health and mental well-being. Shields observed that other problems

could arise from the inevitable press interest and speculation about the

conduct of the men while in captivity. He stressed the official position that

there should be no prejudgment of the returnees on the basis of statements made while in enemy hands. 000 officials were hopeful, he said,

that there would be few if any cases where a prisoner's conduct was questionable ro an extent that would require legal proceedings by the services.

For those concerned with public affairs his point was that "this is a sensitive

area that should not be allowed to develop into a major debate."11)

Conduct in Captivity

When Shields spoke on prisoner of war conduct at the public affairs

conference in November 1972 he addressed a subject prominent among

his concerns at the time. Since August, largely at his instigation, consultations on the matter had been in progress among the services, ISA, and

the OSD general counsel. They dealt with procedures for achieving uniformity of treatment in cases of alleged misconduct in captivity and with

the bearing of that goal on the way the returnee debriefings should be

handled. By early November these discussions were nearing an end, though

hardly an agreed conclusion. Still at issue was whether or not there was

need-or even legal sanction-for a central board within 000 to review

each instance in which a service contemplated charges against a returnee.
Public Affairs and Conduct in Captivity 341

The discussions in 1972 amounted to a reconsideration of provisions

dating from the earliest of the repatriation directives, the two issued by the

deputy secretary of defense in June 1968 and January 1969. To understand

how policy pronouncements of such long standing came to be under question as the moment of homecoming approached it will be useful to trace

some of the intervening developments.

Agreed Principles

Assistant Secretary of Defense Nutter described the official positIOn

on conduct in captivity as it had evolved by 12 October 1970, in a report

to Secretary Laird:

1. Appraising Conduct of Returnees. The following principles have

been established:

a. Each Service is responsible for dealing with legal aspects of

its returnees' conduct while in enemy hands.

b. The Code of Conduct is a personal guide to conduct, but

not a criminal code. No violations of the Code as such can

be prosecuted; any prosecutions must be based on violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ].

c. Particular care will be taken to ensure that rights and

privileges of returnees are in no way compromised or

diluted. Interservice cooperation will be pursued to ensure

uniform interpretation of laws and regulations governing

the conduct of returnees while in captivity.

d. Charges will not be preferred against any individual without approval of his Service Headquarters (in effect, Chief

of Staff). Informally, there will be coordination among the

Service Chiefs to maximize uniformity of treatment.

e. To provide the proper environment for the return of the

men, a returnee is to be given the warning specified in

Article 31 of the UCMJ not at the outset of debriefing

(which was the previous practice, and tended to brand every

man as automatically suspect), but only when there is reason

to suspect the individual of an offense under the UCM],

because of his own statements, the statements of another,

or evidence received prior to return.

f. The PW Policy Committee minutes of the 18 February

1969 meeting reHect the Committee's consensus that

"captivity is not a state of culpability, and returned US

PWs shall be treated accordingly," and that "the polygraph

should be utilized only in exceptional circumstances."
342 THE LONG ROAD HOME

In his accompanying comments to Laird, Nutter said he believed

these principles were sound and need not be changed.

My office has explored with the Services whether additional

principles could usefully be established, or whether further study

of certain areas is required, e.g.,

(a) would it be desirable to establish in advance a prima facie

culpability for conduct or activity of a specified type while

in captivity; or

(b) on the other hand, would we wish to decide in advance

that certain conduct or activity should under no circumstances be considered a basis for criminal prosecution.

The consensus at staff level, with which I concur, is that exploration of such questions would not be productive; that roo much

depends on the particular circumstances (including the degree of

coercion) of each individual case; and that to attempt to establish

any general judgmental rules of this nature would encroach

upon each Service's basic responsibility for dealing with cases of

misconduct by its personnel under the UeM].11

Thus, in October 1970, Nutter was satisfied that coordination among

the chiefs of staff would produce reasonable uniformity of treatment in the

matter of legal charges. Only later did officials begin to question whether

or not this informal mechanism was sufficient and whether it was capable

of inspiring confidence in the public at large. In the intervening months

Defense had become better aware of public attitudes in this area-especially

the widespread doubt that judgments rendered by the military authorities

would square with notions of equity and justice held by most citizens.

The National Coordinator of the League of Families wrote to Secretary

Laird in this vein in August 1971. Joan Vinson noted that letters received

from the prisoners by their families often contained propaganda statements, whose inclusion was probably a necessary condition to being allowed

to write. Other men had made propaganda broadcasts, and there was reason

to believe that "some may have had to sign various documents, as did the

Pueblo crew, to survive .... We are concerned about the way the military

services may handle these actions once the men are home .... Will the

Marine Corps court-martial when the Air Force would not, etc? Should

the men be punished for statements which may be no worse than those

being made by U.S. Senators or former Defense secretaries? Will there be

two standards-one for POW's, the other for free citizens?" She asked that

the men's actions in captivity be evaluated in the light of changing attitudes within the United States regarding the Vietnam war, and she entered

a plea that Secretary Laird take a personal interest in the problem. "We
Public Affairs and Conduct in Captivity 343

trust your ability to judge the situation objectively, and frankly, better

than the military services may be able to," she said. 12

Nutter replied in September 1971, stressing the responsibility Laird

had assigned to him as chairman of the 000 PW Policy Committee for

developing overall repatriation policy and for overseeing the processing of

returned men to assure uniformity among the services. He said that the

matters about which the League expressed concern had been taken into

account during the extended consideration of repatriation policy. Specifically, "we give no credence to enemy propaganda material except as examples

of the enemy's callous exploitation of the men held captive. We make no

prejudgments regarding the men who may be involved in such material.

We are well aware that under duress men can be compelled to comply with

a captor's demands. In the final analysis each individual's conduct can

be considered only on an individual basis and when all the circumstances

of his captivity experience are known." Though matters involving the

conduct of returnees were the responsibility of the individual services, he

continued, Defense policies required interservice cooperation to ensure

uniform interpretation of the laws and were designed to prevent dissimilarity of treatment. Mrs. Vinson could be assured, also, that "Secretary Laird

is personally interested and involved in the en tire process" and that the

objective was the one she had proclaimed: to accord equal and fair treatment to all men who returned. J.l

Similar assurances were given frequently thereafter, in response to

citizen inquiries received directly or forwarded by members of Congress.

The sentence about making no prejudgments on the basis of statements in

captivity appeared regularly in the Defense Department's letters of reply.

The Article 31 Warning and Possible Privileged StatusfOr Returnee Debriefings

The official position was that assessment of prisoner conduct must

await full knowledge of the circumstances of captivity-knowledge that

would be gained primarily from the intelligence debriefing of the men

when they returned. Within each service, by late 1971, the officers responsible for readiness to perform the debriefings were preparing to train

personnel for the task. Questions of interpretation and practical application

of the basic directives arose during this activity, and some of them came to

wider attention at the 000 PW Repatriation Planning Conference in Washington in January 1972. The officers in charge of training said they expected

little difficulty in preparing personnel to achieve the intelligence objectives

of the debriefing: early collecrion of all information the returnees could
344 THE LONG ROAD HOME

provide about other men still missing and later recording of a full account

of each returned prisoner's experiences. The aspects of the debriefing that

appeared more troublesome were generally of a legal nature, such as the

responsibility for recognizing when application of Article 31 of the Uniform

Code of Military Justice might be required.

In enacting the UCMJ Congress had sought to devise a system of justice

that fit the special circumstances of military service but at the same time

did not deprive members of the armed forces of the basic rights guaranteed

to all citizens. The constitutional safeguard against heing compelled to incriminate oneself appeared in Article 31. If accused or suspected of an offense

punishable under the Uniform Code a serviceman was not to be questioned

without first being informed of the nature of the charge or suspicion. He

must further be advised that he did not have to answer questions or make

any statement regarding the offense and that anything he did say might

be used as evidence against him. If the interrogators failed to issue the

Article 31 warning, no statement they obtained from the serviceman could

be received in evidence against him in a trial by court-martial. 14

According to DoD's repatriation directive, the warning would be given

only when there was reason to suspect a returned prisoner of a transgression owing to his own statements, the statements of another returnee, or

evidence already in hand ftom other sources. The basic policy paper did

not stress detection of wrongdoing as an objective; the debriefings should

be approached with a presumption that the men had conducted themselves

properly in captivity. The questioning should proceed "along the lines of a

cordial interview rather than an interrogation," as a Marine Corps order

put it. Still, the moment might come when there was evidence or suspicion

of misconduct.

Obviously, the issuance of an Article 31 warning would work at crosspurposes with the primary aim of the debriefing, the gathering of information. When advised of potential charges and of his right to remain silent

the m~n was likely to turn uncommunicative on all subjects. The flow

of intelligence data might be turned off unnecessarily if an overcautious

debriefer was too quick to give the warning. But there were also risks in

being insufficiently alert to the issue, and these were emphasized in the

dis~ussion at the January planning conference. Some participants thought

that a debriefer dedicated to the fullest possible recovery of information

might easily lead the returnee into self-incrimination without intending

it. Pursuing his checklist of intelligence questions, he might fail to catch

the implications of the man's responses until incriminating statements

were fully on record. In that event the debriefing officer would be open to

criticism if the offense was one that required further investigation in the
Public Affairs and Conduct in Captivity 345

interest of justice and sound discipline. Unable to use the information

obtained under flawed procedures, his service would be hampered in

developing additional evidence and preferring charges.

The conference panel on legal aspects of repatriation also noted the

uncertainty about the kind or degree of misconduct that would justify a

warning under Article 31. The panel members found that no firm guidelines had been laid down in this area of the debriefer's responsibility. It

appeared to them that evidence of such crimes as the murder of a fellow

prisoner would undoubtedly set off legal proceedings, but the seriousness

of some other offenses would probably have to be judged in the light of

public opinion "regarding this particular war." In searching for a way to

aid the debriefers in making such judgments the panel members returned

to an idea that Nutter had rejected some months earlier: Perhaps the types

of behavior in captivity that were accepted as not requiring disciplinary

action could be listed and officially endorsed.

In another contribution to the conference report the legal panel took

up a more promising line of thought: if the debriefers could be relieved of

the responsibility for making the key decision, they would not need to

be intensively instructed in applying Article 31. The panel had formulated

the following procedure:

... when a returnee begins to imparr information which might

constitute self-incrimination, the debriefer should excuse himself

and immediately consult a judge advocate for guidance. If the

judge advocate concluded that an Article 31 warning should

be given, the question would then be referred to Departmental

Headquarters in Washington.

The debriefing officer would still be charged with maintammg the alert

for statements that verged on self-incrimination, but when an instance

arose, higher authority would tell him whether or not to issue the warning before continuing.!)

At the time of these recommendations in January 1972 the repatriation

directive of the Marine Corps already required substantially the above

procedure; no Marine returnee was to be warned under Article 31 without

prior submission of the matter to the commandant. Though less fully

spelled out, something similar could be traced in the internal directive of

the Air Force. As the services revised their Egress Recap plans over the

following months of 1972 the Air Force made its provision more explicit

and the Army and Navy each added a requirement for upward referral of

the warning decision. 16
346 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Officials made these changes as they came to recognize that leaving the

Article 31 responsibility in the hands of the local debriefer could endanger

some of the broader interests of their service. The need to maintain centralized control was apparent, since only by such control could considerations

of higher policy be taken into account and service-wide consistency of

action be assured. Adoption of the referral procedure placed the decision

to give an Article 31 warning on the same footing as the weightier decisions

it might lead to: whether or not to prefer formal charges and, finally, to

convene a court-martial to try the accused. Approval for these latter actions

was already reserved to the level of the chief of staff in the repatriation

plan of every service.

At the January conference in Washington one further idea had been

introduced that bore on the debriefing procedure. An Air Force representative suggested that the record of each returnee's statements might be held

as privileged intelligence information, not to be made available for any

investigation or legal inquiry. On one count the proposal had immediate

appeal. Its adoption would largely do away with the concern about selfincrimination and the correct application of Article 31. There was not

time to explore its other implications, however, and the idea of according

privileged status to the debriefing received only passing mention in the

conference report. Apparently it gained supporters during the following

months, for by late July, when writing to Assistant General Counsel Frank

Bartimo, Shields indicated that "for a variety of reasons some PW/MIA

Task Group members advocate such a proposal." Accordingly, the feasibility of privileged debriefings of returned prisoners of war was one of

the matters Bartimo was called upon to investigare, in coordination with

the legal staffs of the services. 17

Bartimo convened a working group of service judge advocates,

which produced a report in mid-September. It actually gave less attention

to privileged debriefings than to certain alternative proposals, but few

of the latter proved to be enduring contributions. One that did survive

further discussion was the suggestion that Article 31 warnings be ruled out

during the initial debriefing, the one devoted to maximum rerrieval of

information about men missing or still held by the enemy. At that stage

the intelligence objective was clearly paramount, it was argued, and anything that might inhibit the free flow of the returnee's responses should

be avoided. Given its limited purpose, the interview would not ordinarily

touch on conduct and conditions of captivity, but "if returnees attempt

to discuss such matters, debriefers should stop them from going into those

areas," the report of the judge advocates said.] H
Public Affairs and Conduct in Captivity 347

The services expressed reservations about the proposal when it reached

the PW/MIA Task Group level. The Army spokesman observed that "to

refuse to allow a returnee to get off his chest information which may have

been fermenting for years" could have a damaging effect on the man that

was out of proportion to the potential harm from letting him speak freely.

There was a similar concern in the Air Force about the psychological impact

of some of the suggested procedures, but it was coupled with a doubt that

debriefers would really be able to prevent returnees from discussing other

subjects 'if they adamantly choose to do so." The Marine Corps objected to

an absolute ban on invoking Article 31. It favored amending the statement

to read, "normally Article 31 warnings will not be given . . . during the

initial debrief."]')

Nevertheless, by late October 1972 both the Army and Navy had

adopted substantially the original proposal of the judge advocates working

group, writing it into their latest revisions of the repatriation plan. The other

two services were tending toward tacir acceptance of the idea that warnings should be ruled out during the initial debrief. The original reservations

were no longer being pressed, apparently because their significance had

paled considerably in the light of the other issues under discussion during

the same period, particularly the desirability of privileged debriefings.

After being slighted in the report of the judge advocates working

group, the question of privileged debriefs returned to prominence when

Shields called for a further round of consideratlon by a more broadly based

committee. As reconstituted in early November, the group included service

representatives from the intelligence and plans and policy areas in addition

to legal experts. One participant noted that the committee's single meeting,

"though informative, did not produce any semblance of agreement," and

the services then turned to fulfilling the chairman's request for written

positions on the matters at issue. 2o

The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps all opposed the use of privileged

debriefings, it being understood that the concept applied mainly to the

interviews where each returnee's entire captivity experience would be recorded. While avowing that they had no predisposition to prosecute anyone, the three services believed that their ability to pursue that course when

necessary would be seriously impaired if the debriefing transcripts were

privileged. "A man by baring his soul during a 'privileged' debriefing can,

as a practical matter, insulate himself from disciplinary action," read the

Marine Corps submission. The information so furnished could not be used

in a criminal proceeding, nor could any other information obtained as a product thereof. Also the complications could extend beyond the disciplinary
348 THE LONG ROAD HOME

realm to the area of administrative action. For a variety of reasons the

Marine Corps might not wish to co un-martial a returnee. "It may, however, desire to take administrative steps to separate him from active service,

not to further promote him, not to assign him to particular kinds of jobs."

Information obtained during his debriefing might indicate that such was

in the best interest of the service; if privileged, however, it could not be

used as che basis for an administrative ruling unfavorable to the returnee.

The resulc would be a lack of flexibility that was declared "unacceptable

to the Marine Corps in the proper administration of law and discipline."II

The response of the Air Force, received on 5 December 1972, took

a different line on che advisabilicy of privileged debriefings. Two considerations in particular had shaped che Air Force conclusion. The first was

the intense and growing interest within that service in the substantive

information the returnees could provide. The expected scope of the detailed

debriefing had expanded steadily as requests came from various elements of

the Air Force for inclusion of questions in cheir areas of specialization. The

interest extended from air cactics before shootdown to reaction to the repatriation process itself. The ejection experience, survival gear and escape and

evasion techniques, mechods of resisting interrogacion, and organization

and camp discipline among the prisoners were only a few of the topics. In

nearly all these areas the questioning would disclose informacion on which

an evaluation of conduct might be based; therefore it would seem to the

returned prisoner to be "fraught with many legal dangers." Air Force

leaders were convinced that full and reliable recovery of the desired data

could not be expected if the men felt compelled to guard their statements.

Offering a privileged debrief should remove that constraint.

The second consideration had emerged when the same decisionmakers

weighed what would be lost by adopting the privileged debriefing concept.

Little of real evidentiary importance would be sacrificed, the Air Force

leaders concluded. In their view the thought being expended on insuring

that a man's debriefing stacements would be usable in later court proceedings was to no great purpose. It was pointed out that a conviction could

not be based solely on a self-incriminating statement, whether uttered

after proper warning or not. Other evidence was required, and almost of

necessity it would come from the testimony of fellow prisoners. Since in

most cases their evidence alone would be sufficient to justify a trial and

sustain a conviction, it appeared that dispensing with the Article 31 warning would not greatly affect the ability of a service ro prefer criminal

charges when that was indicated.

[n the Air Force view the balance to be struck was clear. Debriefings

freed of anxiety about possible legal entanglements would best serve the
Public Affairs and Conduct in Captivity 349

needs of the Air Force, the intelligence community, and the returned

prisoner and his family. "These collective needs far outstrip the secondary

consideration of preserving statements of questionable value for possible

introduction before a military tribunal." Moreover, by the indicated course

"the Article 31 dilemma is removed in its entirety." 22

The Air Force announced that it was preparing to amend its Egress

Recap plan to incorporate these conclusions. As produced by the judge advocate general of the Air Force, the draft for the new instructions contained

the following:

At the outset of the intelligence debriefing the debriefing officer

will inform the returnee:

(a) This is an intelligence debriefing which will cover all aspects

of your shootdown, captivity experience and repatriation.

(b) The current classification of this debriefing is SECRET; said

classification is subject to the normal rules of declassification.

(c) No information provided by you during this debriefing can

be used adversely against you in either a criminal or administrative proceeding.

The returnee will be advised when the debriefing process is

considered terminated and that the normal rules concerning

self-incrimination are again applicable ....

It could be seen that the draft set forth the essentials of a privileged debriefing, though without using that title. The judge advocate general had

indicated that adjectives such as "privileged" or "confidential" were purposely omitted to avoid any unintended connotations those words might

carry. Instead, the status of the debriefing was described in terms of its practical legal effect. Notably, that effect did not go beyond immunity for the

particular returnee being interviewed. No corollary was given or implied

that material from one man's debriefing would not be used when preparing

charges against another prisoner. On 15 January 1973 the Air Force completed its action by publishing Change 1 to the USAF Egress Recap Plan. 23

A Proposed High-Level Board ofReview

Thus one service had adopted a version of the privileged debrief while

the others continued to reject the concept. But even this well-argued issue

was not the most fundamental one under discussion during the latter

months of 1972. Assistant General Counsel Bartimo had received an additional assignment at the beginning of August, from Nutter's principal

deputy, Armistead Selden. Pointing to the particular sensitivity of questions
350 THE LONG ROAD HOME

relating to conduct in captivity, Selden noted that the subject had been a

source of controversy and criticism of the Department of Defense in the past.

He believed that additional measures might be needed if the department

were to avoid "a repetition of the situation which occurred after Korea,"

and he asked Bartimo to develop recommendations. Specifically, what

could be done to assure "uniformity of orientation and action" by the

services when dealing with conduct cases?2;'

By defining the objective in those words Selden intended something

of greater consequence than the uniform interpretation of laws and regulations. To speak of action was to speak of the ultimate results, of the

judgments reached by the services in the final stages of the process. "Orientation" was a shorr term for the outlook and rationale that each service

brought to its determinations in this area. The existing policy relied on

informal coordination among the service chiefs "to maximize uniformity"

in these judgmental decisions.

Bartimo was known to have a longstanding interest in the subject.

Early in his government cateet he had observed the repatriation of

prisoners from the Korean War and the varying ways the services dealt with

potential charges of misconduct against them. The impression those events

made was lasting, and Bartimo drew on it in 1972 when commenting on

the reference to avoiding what had happened after Korea. He believed

the earlier controversy had arisen because "the Army applied an objective

standard in the interest of institutional integrity, whereas other Services

elected to sweep under the rug equally serious instances of misconduct." He

recalled it as an unfair and unfortunate experience-unfair both in rhat

men suspected of similar offenses were treated differently and in the fact

that one service, left conspicuously out on a limb, became the chief object

of public and congressional criticism. I

)

In its original form, Bartimo's recommendation was simply that the

services be directed to obtain OSD clearance before referring a case to trial.

"This will assure uniformity of treatment among the services and bring to

bear top management judgment in an area of great sensitivity and national

concern," he concluded.2(,

The several services dissented strongly when Shields circulated the

proposal for comment in late September. As one respondent put it, adding

a requirement for OSD approval would be "an unwarranted and possibly

unlawful interference in the military judicial system." It would contravene

the jurisdictional relationships established by act of Congress in the

Uniform Code of Military Justice. That enactment had reaffirmed, as law,

what was already enshrined in tradition: that both the responsibility and

the requisite authority to maintain discipline in the respective service
Public Affairs and Conduct in Captivity 351

resided in the service commander. By the terms of the UCM], court-martial

jurisdiction and the "power to proceed" within the military justice system

were vested in each of the armed forces, leaving the secretary of defense

and others at the OSD level without a designated role in the process. To

quote the most plain-spoken of the service submissions on this point, "the

commandet, not the Secretary of Defense, ot any member of the Secretary's staff, or any administrative entity created by the Secretary, is given

the discretion to make judicial decisions, e.g. whether to try or not to try

a case" and what the charges should beY

It is generally conceded that in making these protestations the service

spokesmen stood on sound legal ground. 28 In fact, they were resisting a

potential incursion into one of the few preserves of autonomy remaining to

the individual armed forces, and this may have heightened the vehemence

of their comments. Thus the services took a stand against "unwarranted

usurpation" of their prerogatives with respect to internal discipline. At the

same time, however, they recognized that the secretary of defense had a

legitimate interest in how they handled cases of alleged misconduct in

captivity, given his ultimate responsibility for all that occurred within

the department and his need to answer to Congress and the chief executive. There was an obligation to keep the secretary informed, not merely

of actions taken but of actions being contemplated in response to the

developing situation.

The spare wording of Bartimo's original proposal had implied that a

service would submit its intended disposition of a conduct case to OSD

officials for approval or veto. By the first days of December 1972 this had

been considerably modified to propose a special review board, "advisory

in nature," composed of representatives of the services and the OSD general

counsel. It would make a recommendation on the action to be taken in

every instance of alleged misconduct. Since the services objected on

principle to introduction of any agency not sanctioned by the UCMj,

their opposition continued, but Shields and Bartimo pressed for consideration of the modified proposal at a higher level. The two officials wanted

the secretary of defense to be fully apprised of a hazard they saw ahead in

the post-homecoming period and of a suggested means of dealing with it. 29

The documents Shields and Bartimo had drafted to place the matter

before Secretary Laird stated that the repatriation plans were in good order

as they pertained to legal procedures and the protection of returnee rights

during the debriefing period. In that area there was reasonable expectation

of a uniform result. Laird's advisers were concerned about the lack of a

similar assurance of uniformity when the individual services came to

decide what conduct the men should be held accountable for and what
352 THE LONG ROAD HOME

level of disciplinary action should be pursued against them. Recent consultations had demonstrated anew the ingrained differences of outlook among

the services. Shields and Bartimo believed that significant disparities would

appear in the service actions on conduct cases unless something more was

done to provide a common basis for making the decisions. They recommended setting up a central review board, as already described. The opinions

it expressed would be termed advisory, in deference to the exclusive

jurisdiction of each service over determinations affecting its personnel, but

the board's operations could be expected to establish a single context of

consideration that would be conducive to uniformity of action.

Though acknowledging the unanimous opposition of the services,

Laird's two advisers contended that a mechanism for central review should

be in place and functioning from the beginning. Without it, they were

convinced, unequal treatment or apparent lack of compassion in judging

conduct would occur frequently enough to attract comment and probably

set off a public outcry. Then such a board would have to be created "under

unfavorable circumstances of public and Congressional pressures." By

taking the recommended step now, Secretary Laird might avoid "undesirable controversy and investigative activities by agencies outside of the

Department of Defense."

Any consultations that followed were unrecorded, and the papers went

to file bearing the notation "Action killed by SECDEF," without further explanation. Thus Laird's exact reasoning and intention remain unknown,'1J

but the practical effect was to leave things as they were, subject perhaps to

the modest improvements recently suggested by the Marine Corps. The

latter's proposal built upon the existing working relationships within

000 and avoided any appearance that OSD officials were intervening in

the military judicial system.

To meet the legitimate need of the secretary of defense and his staff

to be informed, the repatriation plan of the Marine Corps required that its

officials advise the assistant secretary of defense (ISA) of the action taken

at each significant step in the disciplinary process. The Marine Corps hoped

that the other services would similarly give notice of their decisions and

that, "with 000 acting as a clearing house," the information would then be

disseminated to all. The Marine spokesman noted that this would enable

each service to take into account the decisions made elsewhere when

reaching its own determinations, and a reasonable degree of uniformity

would result. In effect, the arrangement would continue the reliance on

coordination among the service chiefs but with a somewhat more systematic procedure for activating it."
Public Affairs and Conduct in Captivity 353

The idea of a high-level review board was never revived, nor was the

clearinghouse proposal ever pressed to a formal decision. Separate action

on the latter concept was probably unnecessary, since the role it sketched

for the assistant secretary of defense (ISA) was already implicit in the responsibilities his office had been carrying since 1967, when the 000 PW

Policy Committee was first established.

Laird and the Broader Context ofPublic Opinion

During these discussions of late 1972 the Marine Corps had maintained that a reasonable degree of uniformity was as much as should be

aspired to. Complete uniformity was held to be "neither desirable nor possible under the extant fundamental philosophical differences of approach

to discipline among the four services." The differences were real and must

be accommodated, but no claim was made that individual service preferences should be given absolute sway. Much as Marines might cherish the

distinctive outlook of their corps, its dictates could not be followed exclusively and without regard for other factors. For one thing, those passing

judgment on prisoner misconduct would have to consider "the tenor of

public opinion (both within and without the armed forces)." For the

moment the Marine spokesman dwelt only on the special case of opinion

among the prisoners themselves: "The Marine Corps has no detailed understanding of what offenses, if any, the returned POWs will consider seriousserious enough to prefer charges against a fellow returnee. The POWs'

accepted norms of conduct are not known-did most cooperate to some

degree? Or did the majority hew to the line established by the Code of

Conduct? The return of a significant number of POWs must be awaited

to discover these facts. "52

As for public opinion in the more general sense, there was little doubt

of its potential for emotionally charging the atmosphere in which the

services would have to reach their judgments. That effect had recently

been demonstrated, at least on a small scale, during the repatriation of

Elias, Gartley, and Charles* after their release from North Vietnam in late

September 1972. The occasion involved the secretary of defense, and his

public remarks were revealing of the direction of his thought on the conduct issue at the time.

* See Chapter 10.
354 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Wherever Secretary Laird went, newsmen raised questions about the

possibility that the three officers would face charges upon their return. He

first encountered this when interviewed on a national radio network on

27 September. Laird began with a rather matter-of-fact response to the

effect that the Uniform Code of Military Justice, enacted by the Congress

and applicable to all members of the armed forces, would of course be followed. The tone of the further questions-did this mean that the men

might be arrested or otherwise held incommunicado?-led him to stress

the protections afforded by the UCMJ's procedures and to reiterate that

under his oath of office the secretary of defense could not do otherwise

than fulfill the requirements of the law. But he went on to pledge that by

this means "justice will be done. I can assure you that justice, as far as

I'm concerned, as long as I'm here, will be tempered with a great, great

deal of mercy. "jj

Laird's closing words give more than a hint that his practiced skill

in gauging public reactions was already at work, that even in the course of

answering these first queries he sensed that his listeners were equating

adherence to the Uniform Code with unfeeling rigidity and taking it as

evidence of a punitive intent. If so, his instiners were sound, as the letters

subsequently received from the radio audience were to prove. J1

By the time of his second encounter with newsmen, later the same day

in Oklahoma City, Laird had modified his response. He had moved beyond

assurances of merciful consideration to a virtual guarantee that no proceedings leading to court-martial would occur:

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there a possibility that these prisoners will

face any sort of charges upon their return?

A. They will face no charges as far as the Department of

Defense is concerned, I can assure you of that .... We will

recommend, of course, that the men return to military control; they are military officers.

In response to another question, he elaborated:

The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides that any member of a military Service can level charges against another

member .... We in the Department of Defense have no

charges. Should charges be made, they will be looked at under

the procedures that are outlined in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I would hope that no such charges would be made

by any individuals. . .. I want to make it very clear that there
Public Affairs and Conduct in Captivity 355

are no charges pending and will nor be as far as the Department

of Defense is concerned. I would hope that there would be no

charges as far as any individuals are concerned.

The secretary continued on this note during stops in Fort Worth and elsewhere the next day. Soon afterward the following exchange occurred

between the Pentagon press corps and Jerry Friedheim, the deputy assistant

secretary of defense for public affairs:

Q. Did Secretary Laird say something about charges against

these men? .... Are you going to bring charges

against them?

A. No. The Secretary's words were very clear; that DoD

plans no charges and would bring no charges. The Secretary's words are better and we'll pull those words out

for yoU. 11

Though it might be asserted that these pronouncements were not

legally binding on the services, their moral force was undeniable, particularly since it was soon evident that Laird's statements truly expressed the

spirit in which the public, press, and Congress thought the three prisoners

should be received. In the current instance the secretary had effectively forestalled discussion of other options, and it would now be a difficult matter

for anyone in 000 to depart from the course he had publicly endorsed.

Laird had an appreciation of the ways in which influence could be

wielded beyond the bounds of formal authority, and that may have played

a part in his later decision to set aside the proposal for a board to review

conduct cases. Without dissenting from his advisers' assessment of the atmosphere in which the final return of prisoners would occur, he may well

have had a more confident vision than they of the opportunities to promote uniformity and prevent immoderate action. With the support of

key subordinates in Public Affairs, ISA, and the General Counsel's office,

a secretary of defense might hope to impose certain limits without formally

ordering them.
17

Mail and Packages

Of the things that U.S. policymakers might hope to accomplish, fewwould more greatly benefit the servicemen imprisoned in Southeast Asia and their families at home than the establishment of reliable

arrangements for the exchange of mail. The comfort and assurance that

regular correspondence would bring, however slight or censored its content, could hardly be calculated. If relief parcels could be sent as well, the

lonely waiting of wives and parents would be eased by the opportunity

for purposeful activity, therapeutic in itself and of probable direct aid to

their husbands and sons.

State and Defense Department officials concerned with PW affairs and

relations with the families had worked unceasingly to attain these goals.

The principal obstacles had been the intractability of the enemy and the

difficulty of dealing effectively with a North Vietnamese government with

whom no diplomatic relations existed, or with the even more inaccessible

National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. In 1968, however, one of

these hurdles was removed. The opening of the peace negotiations in Paris

in May brought U.S. representatives into direct contact with the delegations

of these adversaries, and thereafter there was more substance and continuity to the discussion of mail with the enemy. The exchange of mail did

increase, though whether as a direct result of U.S. efforts in Paris or for

reasons known only to the Communist leaders in Hanoi and in the

hidden headquarters of the NLF remained uncertain. One result was also

to be observed in the United States. Even more than in former years,

mailing instructions, advice on package content, and notice of changes in

the conditions imposed by the enemy were leading topics in the correspondence maintained by the military services with the next of kin.

356
Mail and Packages 357

To review briefly,* since the beginning of 1967 most of the mail that

came to the families from the prison camps was carried out by American

antiwar activists and other visitors to the North Vietnamese capital, rather

than passing through the international postal system. Travelers returning

from Hanoi carried nearly all the 167 pieces of mail that were known to

have reached the families during 1967. (The statistical accounting was

never complete, since it depended on reporting of each instance by the next

of kin.) All the letters came from prisoners in the North. No mail had

been received from any man held in Laos or Cambodia; none had come

from captives of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam since 1965.

As for the mail the families directed to their men in captivity, several

routes and methods were in use in early 1968. From time to time the State

Department entrusted letters to American newsmen and other individuals

bound for Hanoi. More common was the arrangement for placing nextof-kin letters in the hands of the American Red Cross. The ARC normally

forwarded those for prisoners in North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to

the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva for transmission

through whatever channel its officials thought most promising. The ARC

itself exercised discretion over the onward routing of mail for men believed to be prisoners of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.

In earlier years the ARC-ICRC channel had been the one endorsed

in official instructions to the next of kin, but during the first months of

1966 several families received letters in which the prisoners said that

mail should be addressed to them at "Camp of Detention of US Pilots

Captured in the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam, C/O Hanoi Post

Office, D.R.V." After a cautious beginning, use of the Hanoi address for

all men thought to be in North Vietnamese prisons was fully authorized

by mid-1967. The U.S. Post Office Department had given immediate support, making arrangements in 1966 for international transit of this mail

through San Francisco to Hong Kong, from which it passed to mainland

China and on to Hanoi. Only letter mail could be transmitted by this route,

however; the Hong Kong authorities had no agreement with Hanoi covering parcels.

With increasing use of the international postal system the volume

of mail handled by the ARC began to decline, though it remained substantial. In 1968 the society forwarded 4,157 letters to the ICRC or other

destinations. The following year the number dropped to 3,681, and it fell

off more sharply thereafter, despite the increasing number of prisoners.

Nevertheless, many families continued to try every channel available to

them, and the volume handled by the ARC was still above 1,000 letters

• Chapter 6 contains a fuller account.
358 THE LONG ROAD HOME

in 1972. Also, the ICRC still pursued its attempts to arrange a more

reliable system for mail transmission. These continuing services of the

ARC and ICRC must not be lost sight of, but from 1968 onward the main

developments regarding mail occurred elsewhere.]

Package Mailing at Christmas 1968

The principal effort in 1968 involved the prospective Christmas

package mailing, undertaken with the hope of improving on the experience

of the two preceding years, when virtually all the parcels had been refused

by the enemy and returned to the senders. U.S. authorities launched the

drive to gain acceptance of Christmas packages for the prisoners somewhat earlier than in the past, using the opportunity offered by the

Universal Postal Union meeting in Moscow, which began on 20 September. The American delegation, headed by Walter F. Sheble, special assistant

to the postmaster general for international postal affairs, received State and

Defense Department counsel and went fully prepared to raise the matter

in any quarter that might be useful. Probably no North Vietnamese representatives would be present, but it was hoped that something could be

gained from discussions with the Soviet postal authorities, who had been

involved in the forwarding and return of the holiday parcels in 1967. 2

In two meetings at the Ministry of Communications, Sheble found

his Soviet counterpart friendly and forthcoming when discussing mail

procedures at the technical level. At present, however, the Soviet postal

authorities considered that the instructions they had received the previous

year from Hanoi were still binding. Therefore, if the United States once

again forwarded parcels to Moscow for transshipment to North Vietnam,

they would necessarily be returned. Nor were the Soviets prepared to assume

a role as intermediaries in negotiations between Washington and Hanoi.

Sheble received repeated advice that if the Americans hoped to get a different answer from Hanoi, they should approach the North Vietnamese

directly, through the diplomatic contact that now existed in Paris.'

State's principal specialist on PW/MIA affairs, Frank Sieverts, immediately put the matter to Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, head of the

U.S. delegation at the Paris peace negotiations. He suggested that "Hanoi

might just be inclined at present to make such 'humanitarian' gestures," and

he noted the interest of the military departments in obtaining an early

answer, for use when preparing Christmas mailing instructions for the

families. Following the accepted practice of using the tea break in the daily

negotiating session for less formal exploratory discussions, Harriman

spoke with North Vietnamese delegate Xuan Thuy on 9 October 1968.
Mail and Packages 359

He presented a memorandum that began by referring to the desirability of

"steps which could help to improve the general atmosphere between us."

Harriman then described the special significance that the Christmas exchange of gifts and greetings had long held in American family life.

"Permitting the prisoners to receive Christmas packages from their families surely could not adversely affect any interest or position of your

government," he wrote, "but such a humanitarian gesture would be greatly

appreciated by the families and indeed by all the American people." He

asked that Thuy transmit the request to Hanoi, with hope for a favorable

reply that would include timely advice on how the packages should be

sent. The proposal applied only to prisoners in North Vietnam."

Washington authorities viewed it as highly encouraging that Thuy

had agreed to receive and consider the memorandum. Preparations for a

Christmas package mailing were also progressing elsewhere, owing particularly to discussions in Bern between U.S. and Swiss postal officials. If

a favorable response came from Hanoi, the Swiss would be willing to serve

as the receiving point in Wesrern Europe and to forward the U.S. parcels

through their well established service, via Moscow, to North Vietnam.

But weeks went by without any reply from Xuan Thuy, until the point in

November when Defense officials could no longer delay getting out the

instructions to the families. The letters, dispatched on 20 November, listed

suggested and prohibited items and set a maximum weight of five pounds.

The text also described in general terms the efforts to establish a route for

the packages that would be acceptable to the North Vietnamese, ending

with acknowledgment that the U.S. government's inquiries "have remained

unanswered to date." As the Navy's letter put it, "under these circumstances

there is no assurance that the packages will reach their destination but

we consider it again worth trying."5

The Department of Defense issued a press release on 26 November

that placed somewhat greater stress on the uncertainty of delivery, possibly

because it dealt with the Pueblo crew in North Korea as well as the prisoners

in North Vietnam. The Associated Press said Pentagon officials were "not

optimistic the packages will get through," and the Chicago Tribune offered

the item to its readers with the heading "Giftless Yule Feared for GIs Held

by Reds." Nevertheless, a final attempt to get around the lack of North Vietnamese response was in progress. The Swiss government had agreed to

inform Hanoi that unless other advice was received, its postal officials

would proceed with the forwarding of Christmas parcels. On 2 December

1968 the Swiss received a telegram from the North Vietnamese postal

authorities refusing to accept packages "because of war which has been

occasioned by US.,,(,
360 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Yet this was not the final word, after all. In Paris, on 12 December,

Harriman received the following brief note from Xuan Thuy:

On the occasion of the Christmas holiday 1968, the Government

of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, in keeping with its

humane policy, has authorized the U.S. pilots captured in North

Vietnam to receive from their families post cards and Christmas

gifts (non-perishable food products, articles of personal use,

medicines) the weight of which shall not exceed three kilograms

[6.6 lbs] per person. The transmittal of these gifts shall be

effected by the normal postal channels directly to Hanoi.

The news was gratifying, but it also occasioned some hurried consultations

in Washington because the enemy's specifications were more liberal than

those in the instructions the families had already received. The latter, besides setting a five-pound limit, had barred food items except hard

candy and chewing gum and had ruled out medications and vitamins.

But time was pressing and over 400 parcels had already reached the Post

Office, prepared under the old rules. Officials in OSD decided that these

should be forwarded as received, while the services concentrated on spreading the word of Hanoi's more generous terms to those next of kin who

were authorized to send packages but had not yet done so.

In tandem with efforts the State Department was making to insure

that postal authorities in Moscow accepted the arrangement and were prepared to play their part in forwarding the packages, Walter Sheble renewed

the contact with his Soviet counterpart by telegram and air mail. The

record of amicable dealings at the technical level continued. In midJanuary 1969, Sheble received a letter from the Ministry of Communications official that gave a detailed accounting of the 714 parcels transshipped to Hanoi from Moscow by that date. All had reached the Soviet

capital through Geneva, as previously arranged. A few days later the North

Vietnamese government announced that U.S. prisoners under its control

had received gifts from home. It gave no indication of the number actually

delivered, but news accounts noted that this was the first confirmation of

receipt ever released by Hanoi.~

Hanoi's "New Policy" on Packages

During a conference with postal officials early in January 1969, Defense representatives displayed their eagerness to follow up on the apparent

success of the Christmas package venture. They proposed immediate
Mail and Packages 361

planning for a further mailing the second week of January, recommended that "the State Department should be informed of this time table,"

and suggested that State might induce the enemy to accept the shipments

as a celebration of the Tet holiday in Vietnam. The postal authorities shied

away from initiating such an action, believing that directions must first

come from State, but they did say that they would develop "revised procedures for any further shipments (post-Xmas) that may become possible.''')

State thereafter did counsel the U.S. negotiators in Paris to be alert

for any opportunity to discuss additional package mailings with the North

Vietnamese. Even so, the next favorable turn appears to have resulted from

a unilateral decision in Hanoi and to have taken U.S. officials somewhat

by surprise. Again the North Vietnamese willingness to receive package

shipments was on a one-time basis and connected with a major holidaythis time the 4th of July. The American Independence Day was cited as

the occasion in the broadcast from Hanoi on 3 July 1969, which said that

gifts could be sent to U.S. prisoners under the same provisions as had

applied at Christmas. III

There was one new feature, not fully clarified until confirmation was

sought in Paris by the U.S. delegation, now headed by Ambassador Henty

Cabot Lodge. In some of their statements, though not in the initial broadcast, the North Vietnamese had set a time limit: Packages would be

accepted only during the period 4-25 July 1969. It was already 18 July

before Lodge was able to reach Xuan Thuy with an explanation of the

unlikelihood that Washington agencies and the families could complete

all procedures before the deadline. His appeal for an extension was successful. Soon afterward the North Vietnamese announced a new closing

date of 15 August. J I

"I called Casualty Assistance officers involved and said 'hustle,'" wrote

an ISA official on one of the messages from Paris. Getting the information

out to the families on short notice involved major exertions by the services.

Besides the content, wrapping, and address instructions, each family had

to be supplied with the blue authorization card, the yellow parcel post

sticker, the customs declaration, and the dispatch note. The Air Force's

advisory concluded with the following:

Take the completed package, filled in customs forms, and the

blue authorization card to the civilian postmaster of your city,

together with this letter of instructions. The postmaster will not

accept packages without the blue authorization card, which he

will take from you. No postage will be required from you. The

package will be forwarded by the postmaster to a central

point from which the packages will be transmitted by air to

North Vietnam.
362 THE LONG ROAD HOME

As during the previous Christmas mailing, families of airmen downed

in Laos were included among the authorized senders, on the chance that

the men might have been captured and transported to North Vietnam. On

20 August the Post Office Department reported that 702 packages had

been dispatched, via Switzerland, to Moscow. The North Vietnamese made

no public acknowledgment of receipt. 12

It being well established by now that addressing Xuan Thuy in Paris

was the most effective approach, Ambassador Lodge passed a letter to

him early in November regarding Christmas parcel mailings for 1969. He

asked if the 6.6-pound weight limitation and other provisions still

applied. Accepting that a time limit was probable, Lodge also inquired

about the dates during which cards and packages could be sent. This time

the reply was not long delayed. On 17 November 1969 Hanoi radio

announced that gift packages for U.S. servicemen held prisoner in North

Vietnam would be accepted throughout the month of December, subject

to the same terms and procedures as before. U

Defense officials were convinced that by consenting to package mailings at two successive Christmas seasons and the 4th of July the North

Vietnamese had committed themselves and would find it difficult to revert

to a more restrictive policy in the future. There was no longer any need to

hail Hanoi's moves as "humanitarian gestures," and the department issued a

statement that was devoid of any expression of gratitude for the enemy's

concession. Limiting the receipt of parcels to "a few selected occasions" was

a far cry from the regular communication required by the Geneva Convention, the press release declared. "We are certain that the families will

welcome the opportunity to take advantage of this Christmas mailing

proposal. However, the Department of Defense continues to believe that

the most humane Christmas gift for the men would be the assurance to

their families that they are alive and well .... Because North Vietnam

has repeatedly refused to identify the men whom they hold, hundreds of

wives, children and parents must mail gifts, not knowing whether their

loved ones are alive to receive them."14

Undoubtedly these strictures were offered more in the hope of influencing press treatment of the matter at home than of swaying the

Communist leaders in Hanoi. Those leaders, in fact, may already have

reached the decision that was to be revealed in late December 1969, when

the last of the more than 700 Christmas parcels were still in transit. As

part of a larger development in the mail situation, yet to be described, the

North Vietnamese first hinted at, then openly disclosed their liberalized

"New Policy." One of its provisions was that henceforward the men imprisoned in the North might receive one package every other month from

their immediate next of kin, with the same stipulations as before. I)
Mail and Packages 363

During January the services busied themselves with preparations to

begin the new mailing schedule on 1 February 1970. Once instituted, the

procedures fell into a steady routine, regulated by the bimonthly issuance

of the mailing authorization cards.

With regard to allowable items to be included by the families, the

North Vietnamese had not gone beyond their initial prescription of "nonperishable food products, personal articles, and medication." The services

made more extensive suggestions in their instructions to next of kin, based

in part on information about life in the North Vietnamese prison camps

that the six men released during 1968 were able to supply. Better still,

when Captain Rumble, Lieutenant Frishman, and Seaman Hegdahl were

released in August 1969, they had some knowledge of the way their captors

had handled the incoming packages at Christmas 1968 and thereafter.

One set of instructions prepared late in 1969, following debriefing of the

trio, read as follows:

]. When considering items for packages, the following should

be kept in mind for each individual item:

a. Items must be non-breakable or be in non-breakable containers such as cardboard, plastic bottles or bags, or metal

containers not requiring use of a can opener.

b. Regardless of the time of year mailed, items must be able

to withstand extremes of heat and cold and not be susceptible to deterioration due to high humidity.

c. Books, games, etc., which are useful in passing the time,

have been removed by the North Vietnamese; however, it

may be advisable to inclose some small, light items,

anyway. This would give them something to pull out and

could make them more prone to deliver the remainder of

the package, intact.

2. Contrary to expectations, food is not the item most desired by

the prisoners. Without exception, all releasees have stated that

quantity-wise, sufficient food is provided, even though it

may lack quality. The following suggestions are arranged in

what we believe is the order of their importance to a prisoner:

a. All other recommendations notwithstanding, if you

know of some item the prisoner would really want, no

matter how silly it may seem-send it. Medical officers

and others familiar with the reactions of men in captivity

feel that the morale lift derived from knowing that you are

thinking of him as a person is of far more value than any

temporary improvement to be derived from the equivalent

weight in medicines or food.

b. Heat rash medication and thermal underwear.
364 THE LONG ROAD HOME

c. Health items, such as ringworm, diarrhea, and headache

medications, cold tablets or capsules, and multivitamin tablets.

Also, throat lozenges, cough drops, and eye drops may be

included in this category.

d. Dietary supplements, such as bouillon cubes, all instant

foods not requiring additives (e.g., milk, sugar) which are not

available to the prisoner, candy, gum, raisins, etc.

e. Incidentals, including socks with heavy soles, handkerchiefs, gloves, photographs with no writing, soap, toothpaste, toothbrush, towels, and undershorts.

Other service letters to the families sometimes included lists of suggested

brand-name, non-prescription drugs, under such headings as "Headache

Medications," "Throat Lozenges," and "High Protein Supplements."]!>

The schedule of bimonthly parcel mailings, begun in February 1970,

remained in effect throughout the three years that were yet to pass before

the prisoners' homecoming in 1973. The packages followed the customary

air route to Switzerland and on to Moscow. Beyond the Soviet capital

the routing was originally via Peking, but this ended later in 1970 when

Soviet Aeroflot instituted direct flights between Moscow and Hanoi.]7

As the regular traffic in parcels continued, the volume was occasionally

boosted by the special provisions the North Vietnamese applied at Christmastime, as when in 1970 Hanoi announced that the families of

U.S. airmen imprisoned in the North would be allowed to send yearend parcels of 5 kilograms (11 pounds) rather than the usual 3 kilograms

(6.6 pounds).

A hitch developed in 1971 that appeared to interrupt the flow of

parcels and to represent backtracking on the North Vietnamese commitment. By mid-March that year, of 835 packages sent the previous Christmas, 530 had been returned, stamped with the Vietnamese equivalent of

"Addressee Unknown." Officials in Washington immediately saw the

probable connection with another recent action of the enemy. In December 1970 the North Vietnamese government had at last provided a list of

339 acknowledged prisoners, plus identification of several more said to

have died after capture.* Analysis of the returned packages showed that

none had been rejected when addressed to an acknowledged prisoner.

Those not accepted had all been intended for other men who Hanoi maintained had either died in captivity or it never had in custody, though the

U.S. government had good reason to believe a number had been captured

in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, or Laos. Members of the 000 PW/

MIA Task Force concluded that "North Vietnam is attempting to reinforce

* See Chapter II.
Mail and Packages 365

its contention that the list referred to above is a 'complete and final' list of

men held. Past experience with package programs has been that all packages sent are returned or that none is returned. We believe NVN has now

seized upon normal postal procedures in order to re-emphasize their

contention that they hold no more than 339 men in NVN."J8

There was no disposition in Washington, then or later, to bend to

the enemy's purpose and issue the authorization cards only to next of kin

of the 339 men. Both in Paris and at home, U.S. spokesmen had already

condemned the North Vietnamese list of December 1970 as demonstrably

incomplete and only a token compliance with the Geneva Convention's

requirement for prisoner identification. Also, knowing how important the

package mailings were to the families as an activity that might bring comfort to them and their absent kin, whether or not the latter were on a

confirmed list of captives, officials were evidently unwilling to deny the

privilege by their own action or to face the protests that would probably

follow. Denial might better be left to the enemy. State, Defense, and Post

Office representatives at a meeting in early April 1971 decided to await

the full accounting of the fate of the February mailings before considering

any change in procedures. 19

The record thereafter showed a continuing return of parcels addressed

to servicemen not among the prisoners acknowledged by North Vietnam.

The scope of the problem might be said to be diminishing, but this was

probably owing to abandonment of the mailing effort by familin who

had suffered the rejection:

Packages Forwarded

Feb 1971 -752

Apr 1971 - 535

Jun 1971 - 518

Approximate Number Returned

426

250

187

By early December, however, it was becoming clear that the North Vietnamese had turned back parcels mailed in August and October on some

new and more sweeping basis. The first batch of returned packages contained 182 that were addressed to men on the "339 list," and more of

this category came in later. The figures as ultimately recorded were: August 1971-545 sent, 410 returned; October 1971-541 sent, all returned. 20

A preliminary assessment of this development reached the secretary

of defense on 10 December. Laird was told that consideration was being

given to whether to publicize and condemn the enemy action at home and

in the Paris negotiations, with timing governed by the desire not to
366 THE LONG ROAD HOME

jeopardize the current Christmas package mailing. In November, in a wordfor-word repetition of the previous year's announcement, Hanoi had again

allowed the exceptional II-pound weight for the holiday parcelsY

Jerry Friedheim, deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs,

released a statement on 29 December that scored Hanoi's behavior as inhumane and uncivilized. "In an unannounced and indefensible action

that violates its own established policy, North Vietnam has refused to

accept more than 900 gift packages mailed by families to American prisoners of war and missing in action personnel in the months of August

and October, 1971." He pointed out that a large number of the returned

packages were addressed to servicemen previously acknowledged as

prisoners by the Hanoi authorities, whereas none so addressed had been

refused before during the two years of bimonthly mailings, except for a

scatrering of parcels claimed to be overweight. Photographs showing the

returned parcels, heaped on post office tables and handcarts, were made

available to the press. 22

A few days later Col. William E. Gregerson of the PW/MIA Task

Force departed for Paris with 10 of the rejected items in his charge. It

had been expected that Ambassador William J. Porter would display these

packages during a negotiating session early in January 1972, but Gregerson

found the ambassador more inclined toward delay. As a later summary put

it: "Ambassador Porter expressed concern that other side could embarrass

us by producing unauthorized items allegedly inserted by families and

others." Porter judged the risk to the negotiations "roo high at this time"

and wanted to "wait and see what happened to Christmas packages," bringing up the subject if the Christmas packages were refused. 23

As if privy to the U.S. thought process, North Vietnam's leaders took

just the action that would reinforce Porter's reluctance to open the matter

to contention in Paris. In handling the Christmas mailing they resumed the

orderly differentiation between acknowledged prisoners and others, and

moreover they announced the results themselves, before any of the rejected

packages had reached the United States. According to their communique of

22 January, "the Hanoi Post Office received over 300 parcels weighing

nearly 2 tons, which American families had sent by post via Moscow to

the U.S. pilots whose names are on the list ... made public on December 23rd, 1970." Then followed, for the first time, a flat statement that

"all these parcels were delivered to the above-mentioned Americans." Continuing, the North Vietnamese stated that another 407 Christmas packages

had been received, addressed to men not on the list; these were in process

of being returned. 21
Mail and Packages 367

On 31 January Cora Weiss, an antiwar activist who was co-chair of

the Committee of Liaison with Families of Servicemen Detained in

North Vietnam (COLIAFAM), declared that Defense Department officials

must bear the responsibility for the mass return of the August and October

parcels. The fault lay in their refusal to accept the North Vietnam list as

controlling. The wide distribution of authorization cards to families other

than the 339 had had a tragic result, she said. "Rather than sort through

hundreds of boxes for whom there is no recipient the Vietnamese simply

rejected the whole lot. "25

It was true that U.S. authorities had never restricted the authorized

mailings in the manner Weiss suggested. The Friedheim press release in

December had made no attempt to disguise the fact that packages had

been sent to missing-in-action personnel as well as known or suspected

prisoners of war, and to men other than pilots downed in North Vietnam.

The practice accorded with the desires of next of kin and with the official U.S. stand that North Vietnam's 339 list was incomplete. A meeting

of service representatives, convened by the PW/MIA Task Force early in

February 1972, developed a summary of the procedures being followed.

It showed the distribution of package authorization cards in past months

to have been on a very liberal basis, but not an indiscriminate one:

- All Services send cards to NOK of men carried as PW

by the Services throughout Southeast Asia (approximately

480 personnel).

- Army and Marine Corps send cards to NOK of MIA only

on request basis. (Estimated 20-40 per mailing period.)

- Air Force and Navy send cards to NOK of MIA lost over

NVN and Laos. (Approximately 600 and 100, respectively.)

These NOK are generally discouraged from mailing packages and,

in fact, except at Christmas, the majority do not send packages.

- Air Force sends cards to NOK of MIA lost in SVN only on

request basis. (Very few of these are involved.)

Approximately 1,100 authorization cards had been distributed for each bimonthly mailing during 1971, including about 20 for missing civilian

personnel. The average number of packages actually mailed was 535. 26

Further discussion at the February meeting related specifically to

COLIAFAM's "alleged reason" for North Vietnamese refusal of the August

and October packages. "All Service representatives were strongly opposed
368 THE LONG ROAD HOME

to changing any of our past practices in this regard without some official

word from NVN or Moscow. They all felt that we will just have to take

our chances that at least those addressed to PW held in NVN will be

accepted." Rather than curtail the opportunity of families to participate, the

service representatives were willing to accept the risk that Hanoi might

again reject all the packages. 27

So it was that the bimonthly package mailings continued under the

same system through 1972. The issuance of authorization cards increased

as the number of captured and missing mounted. By the October mailing

period, just short of 1,400 cards were being distributed by the services.

Hanoi acknowledged further prisoners during 1972 but continued to

reject packages for others as before. The returns amounted to more than

40 percent of those sent for the year as a whole. 2R

When preparations for the Christmas mailing began in November

there was a new but more heartening reason for concern that the parcels

might not reach their addressees, for the prospect of a settlement at Paris

appeared so strong that there was speculation the men might be on their

way home before the shipments arrived. The chairman of the PW/MIA

Task Group, Roger Shields, thought the families should receive assurance

that the scheduling of a December mailing "'in no way implies a stalemate in negotiations." On the other hand, they should be advised that

even if an agreement occurred in the near future, it was expected to provide for a phased release of the prisoners over a 60-day period. Rather late

but in routine fashion, Hanoi gave notice that the special expanded weight

limit again applied. 29

Authorization cards issued for the Christmas mailing in 1972 reached

a new high of 1,704. 30 The figure represented total coverage-one card

for every U.S. serviceman listed as captured or missing in Southeast Asiaand it indicated an abandonment of even the limited restraints that had

been applied to the distribution in the past. Yet the action was entirely

in keeping with the policy the government had followed ftom the first.

Whether in organizing the Christmas package mailings in 1966 and 1967,

when the enemy had given no sign of willingness to accept them, or in disregarding the bounds that Hanoi sought to enforce in the later years, the

U.S. authorities putsued what amounted to an all-out frontal assault.

Despite the fact that many of the parcels never reached their destination,

the sheer physical volume of the packages and the care and expense they

represented served at least to dramatize the issue and provide occasion for

a further drumfire of protest and condemnation. Despite its cost, the

package program was sustained by the eagerness of the families to do anything possible to succor their men and by the fact that most next of kin
Mail and Packages 369

focused their resentment over the wasted effort on the enemy rather than

their own government.

One might claim that the United States had scored a substantial success in the campaign to induce the North Vietnamese to let the prisoners

receive relief parcels-a right they were entitled to under the Geneva Convention. Credit for the outcome can be assigned only generally, however,

to the U.S. effort as a whole. With the possible exception of the first acceptance of Christmas packages, following Harriman's diplomatic approach

in October 1968, it is difficult to trace any direct connection between

the U.S. agitation and the decisions reached in Hanoi. The Communist

leaders may have hoped that their concessions would still the criticism,

bur the timing appears always to have been their own, and deeper purposes

than accommodation of U.S. desires were easy to discern.

Currency Transmittal

The opening of the opportunity to mail packages to the captive

Americans brought an end to another arrangement for providing reliefthe sending of money to prisoners in North Vietnam. From its beginning

in 1968 this currency transmittal program had barely progressed beyond

the trial stage, but it required extensive consultation and administrative

effort, beginning with the debate over the advisability of the project.

Further steps included complying with legal opinions regarding the proper

procedures and gaining entree to the international banking system through

a confidential relationship with a Washington bank.

The program's origin could be traced to August 1967, when three Air

Force prisoners of war in North Vietnam wrote their wives that the camp

authorities would permit them to receive money to purchase fruit, candy,

cigarettes, medical lotions, and "additional necessities." The detailed instructions and similar phrasing of the letters indicated that all three

were copying from a text supplied by their captors. They advised that

U.S. dollars could not be sent directly. The funds must be converted to

a foreign currency and passed through one of several listed banks in

Tokyo, Hong Kong, London, or Switzerland as a remittance to Messrs.

Bank for Foreign Trade-Hanoi. The prisoners mentioned various

amounts between $20 and $50 when estimating their monthly needs. One

stated specifically that "the money is allowed in lieu of packages from home."J!

A similar letter from another Air Force pilot arrived in early October,

just as Washington authorities began to study the possibility of currency

transmittal. Their investigation quickly established that such activity was
370 THE LONG ROAD HOME

sanctioned by the Geneva Convention, whose Article 63 proclaimed that

"prisoners of war shall be permitted to receive remittances of money addressed to them individually or collectively." Further, Article 28 decreed

that "canteens shall be installed in all camps, where prisoners of war may

procure foodstuffs, soap and tobacco and ordinary articles in daily use.

The tariff shall never be in excess of local market prices." However,

experience offered scant grounds for believing that North Vietnam's action

was a dutiful response to the Geneva Convention provision. Analysts suspected that Hanoi's need for hard-currency foreign exchange was one motivating factor, and they noted that if enemy leaders actually hoped to

accumulate foreign exchange by this means they would have to permit increasing numbers of PWs to write home. But they also recognized that

"Hanoi can argue, perhaps with some validity, that it is reasonable" to

invite the sending of money rather than packages "because of the strain

wartime conditions have placed on North Vietnam's postal and transportation systems. ",2

Although an accepted practice under international law, currency transmittal was subject to legal restraints in the United States. The Trading with

rhe Enemy Act, as implemented by the Foreign Assets Control Regulations,

prohibited the sending of money from the United States to North Vietnam,

except as licensed by the secretary of the treasury. It was understood that

in deciding such cases Treasury officials invariably followed the advice of

the Department of State.

In December 1967 the Air Force recommended that the wives be

allowed to send modest sums of money, once the Defense Department had

cleared a way through the legal and procedural obstacles. For the present,

however, the government's decision to permit currency transmittal, the

Air Force's deputy general counsel wrote ISA, should be made known only

to the few wives who had received requests rather than to the families

generally. The Air Force spokesman thought it important to avoid "an

overwhelming US response which could negate the entire effort. "3,

The DoD PW Policy Committee considered the proposal in the light

of further comments from the OSD general counsel and a strong endorsement from Capt. John W. Thornton, USN, enlivened with anecdotes from

his experience as a prisoner during the Korean War. Early in the new year

the committee decided to proceed, without publicity, the first step being

to obtain the necessary license. 14 A letter to the director of the Treasury's

Office of Foreign Assets Control on 30 January 1968 described the messages received by four families and explained that the money asked for

"would allow the prisoners to purchase various comfort items which could

not otherwise be obtained since North Vietnam normally does not permit
Mail and Packages 371

prisoners to receive packages." The Department of Defense believed that

making it possible for the next of kin to respond to these requests would

be in the national interest. The State Department's concurrence in the following particulars had already been obtained:

We propose to inform the relatives of these prisoners and the

relatives of any others who receive requests that if they so desire,

the Department of Defense will send a relatively nominal sum

(not more than $20 for the initial remittance) to each prisoner

who requests it. The relatives would transfer the money to the

Department of Defense which would make the necessary arrangements for transmittal of the funds to the prisoners.

If we receive evidence that the money reaches the prisoners, we

would plan to continue remittances to prisoners who request

money and perhaps eventually inform all next-of-kin of the procedures .... All financial arrangements would continue to be

made through the Department of Defense. 1

\

The Treasury office granted the license for a test period running to

31 May 1968-later extended to 30 September and then to the end of

1968. Remittances of $26 had gone forward from each of the four original families, with expectation that bank charges would leave an effective amount of about $20. By September the arrival of all four had

been acknowledged, either signed for by the "Administration Chief of the

Camp of Detention" or mentioned with thanks in a letter from a prisoner.

Recently one more Air Force pilot had written requesting money, and his

family had answered the call, but it was becoming clear that the enemy

was neither intensively pursuing a program of encouraging currency transmittals nor applying it universally. The three prisoners just released from

North Vietnam in August 1968-Low, Carpenter, and Thompson-said

they had never heard of the possibility of getting funds from home and

would not have known what to do with the money if received. 36

Nevertheless, as the expiration date of the current license approached,

the Washington authorities sought to build on the positive results of the

1968 test period: the proof that remittances did get through to the intended recipient and the clear evidence of benefit to the morale of the

participating families. Prepared with State's concurrence, the request for

renewal of the Treasury license through December 1969 set out the intention of opening the program to the next of kin of all servicemen captured

or missing in North Vietnam. They would be encouraged to write to their

family member offering to send him modest sums of money. Next of kin

of those prisoners who replied by requesting funds would be authorized
372 THE LONG ROAD HOME

to send up to $50 per quarter through the banking connections maintained

by DoD.J7

Each of the original four families had already dispatched a second remittance, in varying amounts below $50. Under the renewed license, the only

Navy wife ever to take part in the program sent money to her husband in

May 1969. Meanwhile 000 had postponed bringing the currency transmittal arrangements to the attention of all next of kin. In fact, even though

renewal of the license was again sought and received in 1970, 000 officials

never did follow through on the intended expansion of the program.j~ On

several counts, giving comfort to the prisoners by sending home-prepared

parcels was more desirable than currency transmittal, and the prospect for

reliable delivery of packages had grown steadily more favorable, beginning with the confirmation that those mailed at Christmas 1968 had not

been rejected by Hanoi. The fact that by mid-1970 the enemy's new

policy of allowing one package every two months appeared firmly in

place further weakened the justification for sending money. When the

term of the Treasury license ran out in 1971, DoD's decision not to renew

required no recorded discussion.

Despite Defense officials' long-running engagement with the subject and its repeated appearance on the agenda of the 000 PW Policy

Committee, currency transmittal had been a very limited activity. The

available records indicate that it involved the families of only six prisoners of war and that the total amount remitted, including the portion for

bank charges, did not exceed $400.

Marked Progress on Letter Mail

North Vietnam's acceptance of Christmas packages in 1968 was a breakthrough that gave encouragement to all further U.S. efforts relating to

both letters and parcels. Thereafter the letter mail situation did show

improvement, including the opening of very limited exchanges with men

held in the South.

Some channels for the dispatch of mail to the prisoners and missing

existed from the first, and the families maintained the volume of letters at

. a consistently high level. There was of course no assurance of actual

delivery to. the intended recipient, though from 1967 onward there was

little doubt that letters sent to the Camp of Detention address at least

reached the Hanoi Post Office. Of more critical interest was the receipt

of cards or letters from the prisoners. The number of men permitted to

write had risen very slowly during the early years. The list of those whose

letters had made known their survival in captivity did not reach 100 until
Mail and Packages 373

late in 1968, but a marked improvement followed. The most prominent

features of the record were the signal increase in the number of new writers

during 1969 and the surge in the volume of letters the following year: 39

Number New Number of

Year of Letters Writers Writers (Cumulative)

1964 8 1 1

1965 35 18 19

1966 156 28 47

1967 167 33 80

1968 257 23 103

1969 942 192 295

1970 2,646 39 334

In 1969 most of the mail from prisoners continued to be carried out

of North Vietnam by American antiwar activists and other visitors. It

may be assumed that the leaders in Hanoi had chosen this means of

transmission in preference to the international postal system as a matter of

calculated policy. Within the United States it could be expected to enhance

the prestige of the peace advocates who provided the courier service, guaranteeing press coverage of their activities and assuring them access to the

families, who otherwise might not have deigned to read their communications. There had been no system or regularity to the mail transmissions

during 1969, but at the end of the year a move within the antiwar faction

toward placing the courier activity on a more organized basis received

publicity. This development coincided with the first intimations from

North Vietnamese spokesmen that a freer and more regular flow of mail

from the prisoners was in prospect.

Commenting in Paris on 23 December on the repeated U.S. demands

that the prisoners be identified, North Vietnamese Minister Xuan Thuy

confined himself to saying "one refuses to communicate the list of names

to the Nixon administration. Certain families already have been informed

and little by little others will be informed." State Department officials,

taking note of the statements of Cora Weiss at a press conference the same

day in San Francisco, concluded that Thuy's remark was meant to convey

that more prisoners would soon be permitted to write. Weiss, recently

returned from Hanoi, was confident of her information that the North

Viernamese government intended henceforward to allow regular correspondence between the prisoners it held and their families, on a schedule of

one letter per month in each direction, and also to liberalize the arrangements for packages. She had brought with her a total of 138 letters, written
374 THE LONG ROAD HOME

by 132 prisoners, whose names she released to the press. The list included

49 men never heard from before. 40

State pressed for confirmation in Paris, and by early January 1970

both the Hanoi radio and the DRV's diplomatic representatives were speaking more openly of the "New Policy." They claimed that all prisoners held

in North Vietnam now enjoyed the privilege of writing once a month;

next of kin might send mail at the same rate, as well as one package every

other month. Three members of an Air Force family whose persistence

won them an interview at the D RV delegation's office in Paris were given

a further glimpse of what might be expected under the new policy. They

should not take as final, they were told, that nothing had been heard from

the officer since his loss over North Vietnam nearly two years before. The

English-speaking member of the delegation staff advised them to write

again. "If he is in one of our camps, you will hear from him."41

The volume of letters carried out by Weiss in December 1969 encouraged hope for enhanced contacts with the prisoners, as did her other

activities and the publicity surrounding them. Cora Weiss and several other

leaders of Women's Strike for Peace had responded to an invitation from

the Vietnam Women's Union to visit North Vietnam in order to meet the

country's people, understand its culture, and observe the effect of the U.S.

bombing. While there she toured a PW detention camp and spoke with

several of its inmates. According to a later press release:

Mrs. Weiss offered the North Vietnamese the facilities of

the anti-war movement in the U.S. as a channel to guarantee

improved communication between detained U.S. servicemen

and their families. She proposed on behalf of the antiwar movement the establishment of a committee which would both enable

regular and frequent letter writing between POWs and their

families and would provide information to the families of the

missing regarding their status. The North Vietnamese welcomed

this initiative and agreed to the proposals. 42

Formation of the Committee of Liaison with Families of Servicemen

Detained in North Vietnam (COLIAFAM) was announced on 15 January

1970, with David Dellinger and Cora Weiss named as its co-chairmen.

The new group's office on West 42nd Street in New York was to be the

recelvlllg point for prisoner letters brought from Hanoi by COLIAFAM

members or others involved in the antiwar movement and for bundles

of letters mailed to the committee by North Vietnamese authorities. The

Committee of Liaison would forward the letters to next of kin, accompanied by an invitation to send their monthly return letters to COLIAFAM
Mail and Packages 375

for transmiSSIOn to Hanoi. The announcement promised that the organization's more general correspondence with PW/MIA families would include instructions on acceptable letter format and on placing inquiries

about the missingY

Weiss, whose role as COLIAFAM's principal spokesman kept her frequently in the news, was most often characterized in the press as a Bronx

housewife and mother of three. The Committee of Liaison's own handouts

also detailed her educational background, earlier career as a psychiatric

social worker, and long participation in civil rights, disarmament, and

pacifist causes. Though some of the military families continued to find it

distasteful to look to an antiwar group for aid and information, Weiss and

her organization offered what seemed the readiest means of mail transmission, given the unwillingness of the North Vietnamese to send prisoner

letters through the regular postal system.

Frank Sieverts once described the committee's relationship with the

U.S. government as "arms-length." Weiss telephoned him periodically to

announce the arrival of more letters or to pass on other information, such

as the names of men rhe North Vietnamese said were dead or of others

they simply listed as "not captured in NVN." About the incoming letters

she was usually more reticent, preferring to pass them directly to the families and leave it to the Defense Department to obtain identification of

the writers through the subsequent next-of-kin reports to the services.

COLIAFAM professed to be operating in the interest of the PW/MIA

families, often expressing a sympathetic concern for their plight, but it

also missed no opportunity to advocate the antiwar sentiments of its

leadership. The latter element in Weiss's frequent dispatches to the famili~s

ranged from the low-key ("We thought you might be interested in the

two enclosed reactions to the President's recent speech") to less restrained

denunciation of actions of the Nixon administration that were held to be

prolonging the war and pointlessly delaying the return of the prisoners." 4

Understandably, U.S. officials were not disposed to seek a closer relationship, and they could hardly be expected to accept the information

relayed by COLIAFAM from its contacts in Hanoi as necessarily valid,

much less as a fulfillment of the North Vietnamese government's obligations under international law. Within the Defense Department, guidance

regarding the organization and other similar groups had come from the

PW Policy Committee early in 1970. During a discussion of "the role of

dissident groups in POW affairs," the committee members "confirmed our

present policy that no official change of status (KIA-MIA-POW) will be

made as a result of information provided by these groups until such information is confirmed on an official government-to-government basis"-
376 THE LONG ROAD HOME

with the exception, of course, of transfers from MIA to PW status when

letters were received from men previously unaccounted for. In addition, the

committee's chairman, Assistant Secretary Nutter, stated that "we cannot

take any public stand concerning correspondence with these dissident

groups." Thus, the official position was that use of the Committee of

Liaison's services by the families would be neither encouraged nor prohibited. Information received from COLIAFAM would be subjected to the

same validation procedures as data that entered the intelligence bank from

other sources. 45

In the Paris negotiating session on 26 February 1970, Ambassador

Philip C. Habib confronted the North Vietnamese delegation with a charge

that letters from the prisoners on a monthly basis, "as promised," had so far

not materialized. The response this drew exceeded expectations. In early

March a North Vietnamese official declared that, on the contrary, some

320 U.S. pilots had written to their families. Within the State Department

the announcement was. celebrated as the "first NVN admission of minimum number of prisoners they hold" and as an opening for renewed

demands in Paris that the North Vietnamese identify them by name. To

be sure, 320 fell short of the number the services had on record as captured. Also, the number of men listed as writers did not stand that high at

the time, but the addition of 39 new correspondents during the remainder

of 1970 brought the record into substantial conformity with Hanoi's

claim. In all, 2,646 pieces of mail were received that year from North

Vietnamese prison camps-nearly a threefold increase over the volume

in 1969. 46 U.S. spokesmen still pointed to the discrepancy between one

letter a month and the minimum of two letters and four cards called for

by the Geneva Convention, but the marked improvement in the volume

of mail was gratifying, nevertheless.

u.s. BidsfOr Further Improvement

A public event in the capital city in October 1970 set in motion a

long-continuing effort to ameliorate other aspects of the mail situation. The

occasion, attended by high State and Defense officials, PW/MIA families,

and representatives of veterans organizations, was the unveiling by Postmaster General Winton M. Blount of two commemorative stamps, one in

observance of the 50th anniversary of the Disabled American Veterans,

the other honoring U.S. servicemen missing in action, killed, or held in

captivity. To conclude the ceremony Blount read a statement from

President Nixon, which ended on the following note:
Mail and Packages 377

At this time, we must have special concern for the prisoners

of war. To assure that every conceivable step is taken to see

that our captured servicemen in North Vietnam receive their

letters and packages, ... I have instructed the Postmaster General to make every effort to see that our prisoners of war receive

their mail. And by every effort, I mean, if possible, even going to

Hanoi to accomplish that objective.

While the implication that Blount might be welcomed in Hanoi was somewhat overblown, he did launch an energetic and thoughtfully conducted

campaign to carry out rhe president's mandate. Over the next 10 months it

took him frequently to Paris for consultations with the U.S. delegation,

with stops in Bern, Geneva, Bucharest, and other capitalsY

With advice from the Defense Department, Blount pursued two avenues. One was to gain an audience with North Vietnamese representatives

in Paris, and through them to arrange for discussions with a ranking

official of the Hanoi Post Office, at any place deemed convenient. With

the U.S. delegation's assistance he did succeed in making the proposal to

the DRV's delegate general in December 1970. But though Ambassador

Porter was still exploring the matter on Blount's behalf as late as Ocrober

1971, no satisfactory response was ever received. 48

The other avenue appeared more promising. It was the attempt, carried

on mainly by the postmaster general's special assistant for international

postal affairs, Peter M. Sussman, to obtain approval for shifting the letter

mail to the same route through Moscow that had long been used for

packages. Dissatisfaction had been growing with the slowness and occasional uncertainty of the normal international mail channel to Hanoi,

through Hong Kong. Now that Aeroflot flights from Moscow to Hanoi

occurred on a weekly schedule, [etters from the United States could complete the passage by that route in from 10 days to two weeks. Moreover,

there was reason to believe that Hanoi would not oppose the change and

perhaps even favored it. North Vietnamese spokesmen in Paris had met

family inquiries with the advice that mail should be sent either through

the Committee of Liaison or "via Moscow," and similar instructions

appeared occasionally in [etters from the prisoners. Cora Weiss had been

emphatic on this point, and she returned to it in her testimony before a

congressional committee in March I 971. She said that the difficulties in

delivery arose, first, from rhe government's refusal to endorse the service

provided by COLIAFAM, and second, from the Defense Department's

willful disregard of repeated advice that "via Moscow" should be part of

the address given to the next of kin. 49
378 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Post Office and State Department officials had been ready to open

discussion of the routing change with the Soviets in February 1971, but

the American embassy in Moscow counseled delay until the unfavorable

atmosphere created by the U.S.-backed incursion into Laos had cleared. By

early April both the embassy and Sussman, by letter to his Soviet counterpart, had advanced the proposal for sending letter mail by the Moscow route,

stressing both the evidence that it would be acceptable to Hanoi and the

"purely technical" and non-ideological nature of the service requested. 50

Officials in the Soviet Union interposed no difficulties, and implementation of the arrangement appeared to await only their obtaining the

go-ahead from Hanoi. Accordingly, Defense and Post Office authorities

moved toward agreement on the procedures that would apply in the United

States-procedures that might help counter another emerging problem

as well. For some time there had been concern that the mounting volume

of mail to Hanoi from U.S. citizens and groups, inspired by the government's Go Public campaign, might interfere with the regular passage of

letters between the prisoners and their next of kin or at least be seized on

by the enemy as an excuse for delays.5 1

There was of course no desire to choke off the flow of letters and resolutions from the U.S. public protesting North Vietnam's noncompliance

with the Geneva Convention, but the government did attempt to dissuade citizens from writing or sending gifts to individual prisoners by

name. In any event, the prospective new routing through Moscow would

require segregation of the authentic next-of-kin letters for separate treatment. The Soviets had been promised that the channel would be used

only for letters from the families at the approved rate of one a month, to

be dispatched once weekly by special pouch. To keep this class of mail separate, a double-envelope procedure would be used, with an authorization

card similar to the one for package mailings as the control device. Each

month the services would provide their client families with a card and outer

envelope, preaddressed to the postal facility at the John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. Instructions would cover the addressing of

an inner envelope to the prisoner at the Camp of Detention, Hanoi, via

Moscow, to be placed, along with the authorization card, in the outer envelope. As legitimate PW mail, neither envelope would require postage. Postal

authorities at the New York destination would remove the outer cover, verify

the sender's next-of-kin status, and assemble the letters for forwarding in

the weekly pouch to Moscow. 52

Still there was no word from North Vietnam, and both Sussman and

the Moscow embassy pressed inquiries on the matter during July. The
Mail and Packages 379

answer came at last, to Sussman in a letter from his Soviet counterpart dated

12 August 1971. The authorities in Hanoi had concluded that "existing

prescriptions concerning formalities for delivery of letters and gifts to

the American servicemen detained in the Democratic Republic of VietNam should as before remain valid." Some of the statement's felicity of

expression may have been lost in translation, but the message was clear.

There would be no change in the routing of mail to Hanoi. 53

A Relapse in Letter Mail

No great notice was taken of this disappointment, for by August 1971

another problem dominated the attention of PW affairs offices in Washington. During the first months of the year, mail from the prisoners in

North Vietnam had continued to arrive at about the rate that had produced the record total of 2,646 items in 1970. As the always-lagging statistics accumulated, however, a new pattern began to emerge. By midyear it was

evident that a severe reduction of the flow had set in and was continuing.

Intimately aware of the anguish being visited on the families, particularly those who had previously received mail with fair regularity, Sybil

Stockdale urged that Secretary Laird "grab the microphone and make a

strong statement." At that time, in late July 1971, the secretary's advisers

still considered that "public complaints by th,' wives are the most effective since they can only be viewed as humanitarian in motivation," but

Defense officials grew more willing to act as the implications of the unfolding record became ever more unmistakable. Figures compiled in late

August showed that mail received during the first seven months of 1971

did not reach 30 percent of the volume in the same period of 1970:

Letters Received

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

1970

119

90

120

207

177

209

226

1,148

1971

115

105

71

21

3

7

2

324
380 THE LONG ROAD HOME

By early September the PW/MIA Task Force was laying plans for

extensive publicity on the mail reduction, in a new surge of the Go

Public campaign. 54

The National League of Families issued a news release that condemned

Hanoi's constriction of the flow of mail as an unconscionable act and an

.. affront to "every civilized natio'n's code of human decency." State and

Defense Department press officers also found opportunities for comment,

but the main thrust was to occur at the Paris negotiations in the fall. By

then the case had become still stronger, and Ambassador Porter presented

it at the session of 4 November 1971:

In the past half year (May-October 1971) a total of only

170 letters have been received from U.S. prisoners in North

Viet-Nam. In the same period last year (May-October 1970)

some 1,300 letters were received, almost eight times as many

as this year.

North Vietnamese officials have said all prisoners may

write monthly. By this standard the acknowledged 339 prisoners

in North Viet-Nam should have sent over 2,000 letters in these

half-year periods.

The Geneva Convention minimum requirement (two letters

and four cards per month) calls for over 4,000 letters and 8,000

cards from this number of prisoners per half year.

In the past 6 months letters have been received from fewer

than 50.

I demand that you provide the families of these men with

an explanation, and quickly, through this or any other convenient channel .... I tell you that it will harm you in every

way if you maintain this unbelievable standard of conduct. 51

According to news accounts, the North Vietnamese delegation made

no reply. As Ambassador Porter continued to dwell on the subject into

December, Xuan Thuy charged that the U.S. insistence on "repeating allegations on the so-called prisoner of war issue" merely had the aim of

"masking the policy of the Nixon Administration to prolong and extend

the war and of masking their intention not to reply to the seven-point

plan" his side had offered. In between attempts to turn attention to the

intensification of U.S. air strikes and use of toxic chemicals, DRV spokesmen unwearyingly reiterated that Hanoi's humane policy permitted each

prisoner to write one letter per monthY'

None of this gave support to any of the current lines of speculation

about Hanoi's reasons for closing down the mail. The most frequent
Mail and Packages 381

suggestion was that the Communist leaders had enforced sterner measures

against the prisoners as a result of the Son Tay raid of 20 November 1970,

or perhaps in response to the later Laos operation. That some sort of decision had been taken in Hanoi, probably early in 1971, seemed additionally

borne out by the decline in the number of American journalists and

other visitors welcomed to the North Vietnamese capital thereafter. State

Department officials had been fully aware of this trend by midyear; in

December Cora Weiss revealed that even COLIAFAM's monthly couriers

had not been admitted since August. Still, when Frank Sieverts was asked

specifically if he thought the Son Tay rescue mission had caused the

change in the enemy's mail policy, he pointed out to newsmen that the

North Vietnamese themselves had not drawn that connection and in fact

had offered no explanationY

At a press briefing in Paris on 2 December 1971 the North Vietnamese spokesman still held to the standard responses, despite persistent

questioning from newsmen about the contrast between the low volume

of mail and his government's promise of one letter per month from every

prisoner. According to the New York Times, "Mr. Le did not explain the

discrepancy, but other North Vietnamese said that perhaps the prisoners

were not writing." A commentary prepared in the PW/MIA Task Force

scoffed that it was "ridiculous to maintain that men held for years would

not want to contact their families; would not want to write and receive

mail from their wives and children. "58 Yet that, substantially, was what had

happened. No hardening of North Vietnamese policy lay behind the sharp

decline in outgoing mail during 1971. It wa.s the result of a letter moratorium imposed by the u.S. prisoners themselves.

The suspension of letter writing had been approved by the prisoners'

leadership as one ofseveral ways ofstrengthening their resistance and demonstrating the effectiveness and cohesion of their internal organization. The

broader purpose of the high-resistance techniques employed in early 1971

was to force the Vietnamese to recognize and deal with the senior officers

of that organization and to win such concessions as the right ro hold

religious services. Additionally, the letter moratorium appealed to some

prisoners as a protest over mail restrictions and the enemy's use of the

writing privilege as a means of keeping them in line. Some of the originators had yet a larger aim: to embarrass the North Vietnamese by creating

the impression that the Communists had ceased to honor their agreement

to allow the writing of one letter a month and had quite possibly regressed

in their treatment of the American prisoners in other respects.
382 THE LONG ROAD HOME

The moratorium was declared to be voluntary, but many prisoners

took it up so wholeheartedly as to generate a strong communal pressure for

universal compliance. The camp leadets excused some of their fellows who

had family difficulties at home; otherwise, there were few who knew of

the order who did not participate. While some prisoners simply refused to

write, others followed the approved tactic of composing truthful accounts

of their treatment, forcing their captors to censor the letters out of existence. The moratorium came into nearly full effect by March 1971. Most

prisoners held themselves to it until early September, lasting out the six

months prescribed by the leadership. There seemed no doubt that prison

commandants were under stern pressures from their own superiors to get

the inmates to resume writing and thus bring appearance back into conformity with the professed North Vietnamese policy on mail. And for

the PWs' part, many were anxious to get back in touch with relatives with

the approach of the holiday season. 59

Although the American prisoners had no clue as to the impact of

their action abroad, the moratorium posed great difficulties for Hanoi's

spokesmen, particularly in the well-publicized Paris arena. Xuan Thuy had

to endure Ambassador Porter's denunciations while offering unconvincing

refutations in reply. The North Vietnamese could hardly admit that U.S.

prisoners were successfully mounting an organized resistance, or that the

Americans had grievances weighty enough to sustain them in such a selfdenying exercise as the refusal to communicate with their families. What

is more, Hanoi could not reveal the true explanation even after the moratorium ended and the flow of letters resumed.

Washington suggested to Ambassador Porter that he "plan to make

POW question major focus of Dec. 23 meeting, linking this humanitarian question to the eve of Christmas" and using additional material yet

to be supplied. But shortly before that date the situation was dramatically

transformed. On 21 December 1971 a member of the Committee of Liaison, the Rev. Richard Fernandez, arrived in New York bearing 1,00 1 letters

from U.S. prisoners. They came not directly from Hanoi but from the Communist delegations in Paris. While COLIAFAM publicized the event as the

largest single delivery ever received and described its own efforts to dispatch the letters promptly to next of kin, State and Defense Department

spokesmen scored the Vietnamese Communists for "playing with the

emotions" of the families by first withholding the letters and then releasing them in bulk at Christmastime. Cora Weiss denounced this accusation
Mail and Packages 383

as "incredible"; the delay in delivery had been caused, she said, by U.S.

bombing and recent heavy floods in North Vietnam. *60

The Fitful Flow ofLettersfrom the South

The 1,001 letters in December, added to 499 already received, brought

the total for 1971 to 1,500-a more presentable figure but still less than

60 percent of the volume the previous year. But more momentous than

the unblocking of the mail channel was the fact that 18 of the letters

came from prisoners of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, in contrast to the

nearly total absence of communication from U.S. servicemen held outside

North Vietnam in years past. One of the new writers was Cpl. Alfonso

Riate, a Marine officially listed as KIA. 6J

It will be recalled that a bare half-dozen letters had been received

from the South during 1965, mostly carried out by men released by the

Viet Congo Since then there had been but one more, under circumstances

that could not be related to any of the efforts of the U.S. government, the

American Red Cross, or the ICRC to arrange for regular prisoner correspondence. Dropped in a Seattle mailbox by an unknown hand, the single

letter had reached the family of Marine Sgt. Leonard Budd in Massachusetts on 14 August 1970.62

Earlier that year, in the Paris talks, the NLF's Mme. Nguyen Thi

Binh had answered Ambassador Habib's questions with a renewed declaration that the humane policy being followed by the Viet Cong included

* Neirher, of course, was rhe case. The morarorium had simply run irs course. The

available evidence does nor esrablish when it was that U.S. officials became aware of

the moratorium. The earliest mention to be found is in a memorandum dated

30 July 1971: "We ate not Sure of rhe reasons, i.e., reaction to the Son Tay raid, a no

write campaign by the PWs (as has been suggested by some wives), or an attempt by

Hanoi to eX?Cerbate our situation with the families, using the protective reaction air

strikes dnd the Son Tay raid as excuses for delivery problems; this excuse being Cora

Weiss's line." In any event, even upon learning rhat the stoppage of letters was an action

of the prisoners rather rhan the enemy, the rules of the game did not require the United

States to give up the propaganda advantage it had gained. A high State Department

official, in testimony before a congressional committee on 3 February 1972, still gave

a full account of "North Vietnam's violation of its own announced standards fOt correspondence." As for the mail received at the end of 1971, "we welcome these letters but

must question the motives that lead the other side to handle m~";i on this on-again,

off-again, basis." See memo Epes for Pursley, 30 Jul 71, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam

Oun-Jul 71); Dept State Bulletin, 6 Mar 72,305-06.
384 THE LONG ROAD HOME

permission for the captured Americans to exchange letters with their

families. "But in this matter, the NLF does not recognize the International

Red Cross as an intermediary," she said, claiming that wartime conditions and U.S. bombing in particular made it difficult to effect the

exchange by any means. Still earlier, however, evidence had come to hand

that indicated these difficulties were not the sole or even the primary

reason for the absence of any word from men held by the Viet Congo In

1969, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces had overrun an abandoned PW

site where they picked up three letters written by captive Marines. Both

the letters and other captured documents contained clear indications that

the prisoners had been encouraged to write and had been supplied with an

address through which their next of kin "could try to answer" their letters.

Yet the letters, in the 10 months since their composition, had not left the

campsite. A deliberate policy of not forwarding the prisoners' mail, or plain

inattention, must be suspected. 63

Officials in Washington had come to suspect that the enemy practice of

giving out addresses was likewise an empty gesture. Since the beginning

of 1966 spokesmen for the Viet Cong had been saying that mail could

be dispatched to prisoners in the South in care of NLF representatives

stationed abroad, with the NLF office in Algiers indicated as the primary

receiving point. By 1968 the address of the NLF representative in

Phnom Penh, Cambodia, was also being used. After the NLF established

the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG, or

PRGSVN) in the following year, the PRG spoke of the Phnom Penh office

as its "Embassy" in Cambodia. Some next of kin sent letters to these

points by direct mail; others continued to rely on the American Red

Cross. The ARC at first forwarded mail to the Algiers address, then

shifted to a channel through the Cambodian Red Cross, which had

undertaken to pass the letters to the NLF representative in Phnom Penh. (>4

There was scant evidence that any of these Dti.sives were getting

through to the prisoners. A definite instance of mall TPaching its

destination through the Phnom Penh route did not come to light until

October 1971, when Sgt. John Sexton was debriefed following his release

by the Viet Congo During captivity he had received three letters from his

parents and sister, the first in December 1969. According to a summary of

the debriefing:

Sexton w,,, allowed to take the lettcr to his dctcntion bunker

with him. The letter was taken away from him after lunch and

he never saw it agai'l. The black US POW whose detention cage

was near Scxton's saw Lim with the letter. He began hollering at
Mail and Packages 385

the guards about how come Sexton was allowed to receive mail,

that he had been here all this time (much longer than Sexton),

and he had nevet received a letter. The interpreter came out and

the guards finally silenced him.

Thereafter Sexton was called to the camp office to read his letters in private.

The last was received in March 1970, and his captors told him there would

be no more. Analysts in Washington noted that this was consistent with

the fact that the PRG had closed its embassy in Phnom Penh at that time,

during the U.S. operation into Cambodia. 05

In the spring of 1970 the services issued revised mailing instructions

to the families of men captured or missing in the South, with Phnom Penh

deleted and a new address for the relocated PRG office in Algiers. In

October a fuller list of nine possible addresses was circulated, covering the

embassies or information offices of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam in Hanoi, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Budapest, Cairo,

Algiers, Paris, and Stockholm. 06

Despite the care of next of kin in following these instructions and

protests by U.S. representatives in Paris over the lack of regular mail

exchange with prisoners in the South, the 18 letters among the 1,001 received in December 1971 had been the only response. Late in January 1972

Cora Weiss informed Sieverts rhat 541 more letters had been received by

her organization. Though this was a welcomf indication that the flow of

mail from Hanoi's prisoners was continuing, none of the new letters came

from a captive of the Viet Cong in the South. 67

Nevertheless, a development earlier in the month had again raised

hopes that leaders of the PRG might now be in earnest about improving

the mail exchange. In Paris on 6 January a PRG press spokesman had

given out explicit instructions on addresses and letter formats to be used

when attempting to correspond with men captured in South Vietnam.

Letters should be on 18 x 24 em paper, with a 2 em flap for sealing when

the sheet was folded in half. Letters should be addressed to "Detention

Camp for U.S. Military Personnel Captured in SVN," in care of any of

the following: Embassy of PRGSVN, Moscow, USSR; Embassy of

PRGSVN, Peking, Peoples Republic of China; or Special Representative

of PRGSVN, Hanoi, Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

State Department analysts noted that "in the past VC spokesmen have

been more general in their mail comments, stating that letters could be sent

to 'any' NLF/PRG mission abroad." The limitation to three specific addresses might be a favorable sign, though Peking had never been mentioned

before. At a meeting convened by the PW/MIA Task Force, representatives of
386 THE LONG ROAD HOME

the service casualty offices quickly agreed that the new information should

be used in preparing a letter form for distribution to the families, taking

account also of statements by the 18 prisoners writing from the South

that letters to them should be limited to 10 lines. 68

Late in the previous year a joint State-Defense-U.S. Postal Service

effort had produced three forms for mailings to men in Laos, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam. The single sheets had a preprinted address

block, with the standard elements given in both English and Vietnamese,

and 15 lines for the message. The form with the appropriate mailing

destination had been given out to families with notice that its use was not

mandatory and that there could be no guarantee of its acceptability to

the Communists. As yet there were no clear indications of enemy reaction

to its use. 6<)

The newer, IO-line form designed in January 1972 also displayed a

preprinted address, return address spaces, and folding instructions, all in

English. When the services submitted their comments they were nearly

unanimous in noting the danger that uniformity and preprinting might

be objectionable to the PRG as clear evidence of official participation.

As the Marine Corps put it, these well-intentioned refinements "could

be construed as U.S. Government intervention in a private mail channel.

This channel is precarious at best and no acrions should be taken that

could be rejected by the enemy and thus cause a delay or cessation of mail

flow." Accordingly, when distributed in March, the form was a blank sheet in

the prescribed size, with a gummed flap for sealing. Precise directions regarding the address and number of lines appeared in the separate instructions. 70

The question of the proper length of next-of-kin letters arose again

later in the year, with respect to the I5-line format being used for correspondence with the men in the North. Syndicated columnist Joseph Kraft

returned from Hanoi in July 1972 with a taped interview in which

the prisoner said the North Vietnamese would accept only messages not

exceeding seven lines. Information brought out by Ramsey Clark* a month

later was to the same effect. He said that the North Vietnamese were

rejecting letters written on the Defense Department's I5-line form; 7 lines

should be the standard. Cora Weiss had been insisting for some months

that the shorter air mail form offered by COLIAFAM was the only

proper stationery to use. Though Defense authorities had been reluctant

at first to accept the limitation without some pronouncement from

Hanoi through a more official channel, they capitulated in the face of

reports from families that letters on the I5-line form were being returned

* Antiwar activist and former U.S. arrorney general.
Mail and Packages 387

to the sender. On 24 August 1972, Shields put out the word to cease

distribution of the form; next of kin writing to prisoners in North Vietnam should be advised to confine the body of their message to seven

lines. The 10-line standard for letters to captives of the Viet Cong remained

in effect, and its acceptability was later confirmed by men writing from

detention in South Vietnam. 71

Following Weiss's announcement of the receipt of 541 letters in January 1972, mail continued to flow steadily from the North Vietnamese

prison camps. To mention but a few instances, journalist Seymour Hersh

returned with 259 letters in March, representatives of the National Student Association brought out 306 letters in May, and actress Jane

Fonda delivered 241 in July, most of which passed to the Committee of

Liaison for distribution. The Hanoi authorities allowed other visitors to

accept letters from prisoners they had spoken with, including journalists

Arnaud de Borchgrave and Joseph Kraft and a prominent opponent of

the u.S. involvement, Mrs. Jane Hart, whose husband was the senior

senator from Michigan. 72

Deemed more newsworthy were the efforts of Senator Edward

Kennedy, who had been corresponding with North Vietnamese officials

about various aspects of the prisoner question since 1966. The texts of

the notes most recently exchanged between him and President Ton Duc

Thang were released to the press on 25 July 1972, along with notice that

the senator had received 24 letters from North Vietnamese representatives

in Paris, all written by airmen captured since Hanoi's acknowledgment of

339 prisoners in December 1970. Though only partially satisfying Kennedy's request for an up-to-date accounting of the men held in North

Vietnam, President Thang's reply was more open and obliging than might

be expected. Perhaps for that reason, his response to the senator's further

request for help in obtaining identification of the Americans captured

by other Communist forces in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam was

reported with an optimism as to the outcome that State officials were

unable to share. "About the intimation ofthe names ofthe Americans captured

in South Vietnam," the North Vietnamese president wrote, "we will exchange

views with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of

South Vietnam, which will take an appropriate decision on this subject";

Laos and Cambodia received no mention. How fully Thang followed

through on this undertaking is not known, but no list of prisoners was

forthcoming from the PRG. In mid-September Senator Kennedy received

10 more letters, all from men detained in the North.7\

As for mail from prisoners of the Viet Cong, there had been none

since the 18 letters in December 1971, until Ramsey Clark returned to
388 THE LONG ROAD HOME

the United States in mid-August. The 131 letters he carried included 17

from the South, with three new writers. Though encouraging, the delivery

did little to redress the balance between the relatively free flow of mail

from the North and the dearth of letters from the South, or to ease the

longing of the hundred-odd families who still had had no word from

men believed captured in South Vietnam. 74

At the annual convention of the National League of Families in

October 1972 a resolution was passed committing the League to a renewed drive to obtain mail and package delivery for Americans held

elsewhere than in North Vietnam. Instances of Hanoi's improved treatment of prisoners with respect to mail tended to dominate the news, and

the League recognized a need for "publicity to assure that the world is

made aware that all POWs do not receive packages, are not permitted to

write to their families and, indeed, in the majority of cases have not even

been identified as captives, despite the long passage of time." Also, according to the Associated Press, the delegates at one point "appeared on the

verge of passing the resolution condemning the Committee of Liaison

headed by New York peace advocate Cora Weiss" and urging League

members to boycott the COLIAFAM mail channel. The action was not

pressed to a vote, but a month earlier the national office of the League of

Families had instituted its own service for hand-delivered mail to Hanoi.

The October newsletter announced that the first shipment had been dispatched, in the care of an American journalist. 7)

Possibly as a means of showing support for the League's campaign,

Shields addressed a memorandum to Sieverts formally reiterating the

Defense Department's concern over the lack of regular channels for exchange of mail between the men held in South Vietnam, Laos, and

Cambodia and their families. Although he was "aware of numerous

attempts having been made by the ICRC, next of kin, and USG officials

to resolve this problem," Shields recommended a further effort. Officials

in OSD were indeed aware of the frustrations their State Department

colleagues had encountered in this matter, most notably with respect to

packages. Each year, from 1969 onward, when North Vietnamese authorities issued their routine announcement regarding Christmas parcel mailings, U.S. diplomats in Paris had sought a similar concession from Mme.

Binh and other members of the PRG's delegation. The approaches were

pressed despite the attempts of the other side to claim these instances of

direct communication as evidence of U.S. recognition of the Provisional

Revolutionary Government. No statement inviting the sending of Christmas packages to men in the South was ever obtained. 7

(,
Mail and Packages 389

On the last day of the year folk singer Joan Baez, law professor and

author Telford Taylor, and others of a group that had spent two weeks

in Hanoi returned to New York. They carried 630 letters, 30 of them

from prisoners of the Viet Cong, with four new writers. This contribution

raised the total for 1972 to a new yearly high of 3,020. The cumulative

number of correspondents had reached 402. So far as could be ascertained, less than 30 of these were current captives in the South. No mail

had ever been received from any man missing in Laos or Cambodia. 77

In sum, since late 1968, when the North Vietnamese first signified

their willingness to accept packages for their prisoners, the mail situation

had improved profoundly. It was true, however, that nearly all the gains

had been made in the exchange of mail with men held in the North.

The Communists operating in Laos and Cambodia were beyond reach of

any influence or appeal from the United States. The PRG delegates, representing the Viet Cong at the political level, could be spoken to in Paris

but proved to be largely immune to either humanitarian considerations

or concern for their world image. Such gestures as they made toward improvement of the exchange of mail with men in the South led to no notable

increase in the actual number of letters that reached their destination, in

either direction.

Progress there had been, but its course had been far from steady. State

and Defense officials, with support from the U.S. Postal Service, had had

to contend with a series of unexpected turns and regressions, such as the

mass rejection of packages during 1971 and the appearance that the North

Vietnamese had closed down the outgoing mail in the same year. After

the arrival of 1,001 letters at the end of 1971 heralded the resumption of

mail from the North, some officials in Washington believed that the

public outcry at home and the pressures applied in Paris had had an

impact in Hanoi, that there were indications of "some sensitivity by the

other [side] on the mail issue" that might be further exploited. 7R The mail

did flow without interruption from the Northern prison camps throughout 1972, but rather than gaining further concessions, U.s. authorities had

to accept the arbitrary limitation of family letters to seven lines, imposed

by the North Vietnamese at midyear.

Those who directed PW affairs for the government also had to live

with the fact that, by Hanoi's decision, letters from prisoners in the North

moved almost entirely through the unofficial channel presided over by

Cora Weiss and her antiwar associates. Little credit redounded to u.s.
390 THE LONG ROAD HOME

authorities for the receipt of this mail, and the fact that information given

out by COLIAFAM was sometimes more accurate or more timely than

their own deepened the appearance that U.S. agencies had no important

role in the matter. Officials had to be concerned that disaffection might

spread among the families as a result both of this appearance of government ineffectiveness and of their exposure to the frequent communiques

from Weiss. Much that the government wished to accomplish depended

on the trust and cooperation of the next of kin, as in reporting the receipt

of PW letters and submitting them for intelligence analysis. In the letters

and statements of Cora Weiss, charges of government insensitivity to the

true interests of the families went along with reminders that President

Nixon had but to accept the settlement offered by the other side at Paris

in order to gain an immediate release of the prisoners. State and Defense

Department officials had limited opportunities to answer such charges

and were inhibited by various constraints when doing so.

In 1972, as in all earlier years, the traffic in mail and packages proceeded under conditions set by the enemy. For the most part, the efforts

of U.S. representatives were more effective in holding the opposing side to

fulfillment of its own announced conditions than in obtaining any expansion of the mail exchange. Though U.S. officials continued to declaim on

the discrepancies in Hanoi's performance when held against the standards

of international law, they had put aside any thought that the enemy could

be brought to observe the more liberal mail and package provisions of the

Geneva Convention.
18

Information and Assistance

for PW/MIA Families

M elvin Laird had held the post of secretary of defense for little more

than a month when he issued what amounted to a manifesto on

"Defense Department Relations with Servicemen Listed as MIA/PW and

Their Families." Addressed to the secretaries of the military departments

and other high officials, the memorandum of 1 March 1969 proclaimed the

personal concern of both Laird and his deputy secretary, David Packard,

for the welfare of the captured and missing and the families who awaited

their return. It stated in part:

I am aware that many persons and agencies within the Government have been working diligently to improve the welfare of our

captured servicemen and to obtain their release. Nevertheless, I

believe that we must strengthen our efforts on behalf of these

Americans and their families.

I want to be assured that the Military Services and the Office of

the Secretary of Defense are doing all that we possibly can for

the next of kin. If our present legal authority to assist these

families is inadequate, please advise me immediately.

I have directed the Chairman of the Department of Defense

Prisoner of War Policy Committee to coordinate a new review of

policies and practices to ensure that these families are receiving

all assistance to which they are entitled, and to recommend any

courses of action which will better serve the interests of our

captured and missing servicemen and their families.

Immediate release of the memorandum to the press gave early public

notice of Laird's deep commitment to the cause of the missing men and

391
392 THE LONG ROAD HOME

their families. The goal of "doing all that we possibly can for the next of

kin" was thereby openly avowed, and Laird was willing that he and his

staff be held accountable for its attainment. \

The secretary's requirement for a review of current policies and practices brought responses from the services and OSD offices during the next

few weeks. All agreed that the procedures for family assistance codified

in DoD Instruction 1300.9 of 6 April 1967 were sound.* Each service had

long since met the requirement for notification of next of kin by personal

visit rather than by telegram when a serviceman first became missing or

captured. Each was committed to maintaining regular contact thereafter

through a casualty assistance officer assigned to the family and through

newsletters and other information issued from the service headquarters by

its military personnel authorities. Beyond that, the replies tended to fall

into a pattern that was to become familiar. In March 1969, as in later

reviews, each military department reported its family assistance program to

be operating satisfactorily; carefully drawn directives prescribing that next

of kin would receive all benefits to which they were entitled were being

carried out. Accompanying this common refrain there would often be

a counterpoint of doubt, usually voiced by OSD officials. They were less

confident that no case had been overlooked and less willing to assume that

no human or institutional errors occurred in the performance of the family

assistance task.

OASD(Manpower and Reserve Affairs) briefly expressed such reservations in its March reply, and Assistant Secretary for International Security

Affairs Warren Nutter expanded on the point when summarizing the results

for Laird in May. That the services reported an absence of serious complaints might not be entirely conclusive, Nutter noted. There was reason

to suspect that "the next of kin of personnel in lower ranks or rates may be

having problems unknown to us," either because of their "natural reticence"

or because they did not know where to turn and how to proceed. Also,

Nutter saw a need to investigate how well the services were providing for

families that lived at a distance from any major military installation. 2

Briefing Tours

Charles Havens had advised Nutter of an area of dissatisfaction among

the families in April, when the assistant secretary was preparing to assume

the chairmanship of the DoD PW Policy Committee. The mail received

* See Chapter 7 for earlier development of the family assistance system and the genesis

of Instruction 1300.9.
Information and Assistance for PW/MIA Families 393

in OSD offices indicated that "the most prevalent complaints by the

families are that they are not kept regularly informed by the Services of

relevant information." Often enough, Havens said, the condition simply reflected the frustrating circumstance that there was no new information to

offer about the missing servicemen, but some complaints appeared justified.

Among the letters he might have cited was one from four service wives in

Colorado, written in early March. They had taken note of Secretary Laird's

published memorandum and were seeking to influence the policy review

it announced was under way.

We ask that you consider periodic and informative briefings

to us concerning efforts and resulrs of these efforts being made

to secure release of prisoners. We are uninformed on the subject.

Knowing the problems involved may help us to understand.

We do live an anxious fearful life. Complete silence from

Washington contributes to our anxiety. Please consider the problem during your study.'

Somewhat earlier the Defense Department had received an explicit

request to send knowledgeable officials to speak to a gathering of PWI

MIA relatives. It came from the San Diego area, where Sybil Stockdale

had taken the lead in organizing the wives of servicemen lost to the enemy

in Vietnam. During March 1969 she followed up this invitation with

letters to Secretary Laird and the secretary of the Navy. The attached lists

of questions made it clear that Stockdale and her group would not be

satisfied merely to hear once again that a high-level policy body was in

existence and was actively engaged with the prisoner of war problem. She

asked directly what the DoD PW Policy Committee had accomplished in

the past year. What did the government plan to do toward publicizing the

discrepancies in an enemy film that purported to show Christmas celebrations in the prison camps? Were antiwar delegations returning from North

Vietnam being interviewed systematically for information? "Has any effort

been made to get any u.S. government sympathizers into any of these

groups going into Hanoi?" One of her submissions ended with the following: "SUPER QUESTION: HOW MUCH LONGER? How I would

love to see the answers to these questions written down, 1, 2, 3, 4, a, b, c;

just the way I have asked them.";'

Some of these queries were satisfied by the "Go Public" campaign that

Laird launched a few weeks later, in May, but meanwhile, acceptance of

the Stockdale invitation proved to be the first step toward a wider responsiveness to the requests for periodic briefings of the PWIMIA families.

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) Richard
394 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Capen and Frank Sieverts of the State Department traveled to San Diego

for the meeting on 26 March 1969, held under Navy auspices. Assisted

by other officials from Washington, they discussed the government's

programs and policies before an invited audience of PW/MIA wives and

parents representing all services. One member of the Defense group, Capt.

John Thornton, also stopped at the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs

for a two-hour meeting with a smaller group; it included the four wives who

had written ro the policy committee a few weeks before. 5

Thereafter the Air Force sponsored a series of family briefings in

which most of the same officials rook part. The rour brought them to 20

Air Force bases throughout the country for sessions that were open to

relatives of men from all the services. Taking the San Diego and Air Force

meetings together, a total of 1,472 family members representing 839

captured or missing servicemen had heard the presentation by the late

summer of 1969. The Air Force had also prepared a 45-minute film featuring the opening statements of Capen, Havens, Sieverts, and Thornton. ISA

made it available to all service casualty assistance offices, urging them to

show it widely as a means of reaching next of kin who had been unable

to attend the scheduled briefings."

Noting the high level of interest and favorable audience reactions,

officers of the State and Defense Departments were convinced of the value

of the briefings. The families had benefited both from receiving authentic,

up-to-date information on the actions of the U.S. government and from

having the opportunity to meet and question the officials with primary

responsibility for PW affairs. Through this undertaking, PW/MIA relatives

far from Washington received a direct assurance of the interest of their government. It could be hoped that they had been impressed, also, with the

evidence that officials of stature and competence were working on behalf

of their men.

Endorsed by higher authority, the briefing rours continued, but from

the fall of 1969 through much of 1970 the presentations had a different emphasis, arising from reversal of the policy on public appearances by

servicemen released by the enemy.

The North Vietnamese had made their first prisoner release in February 1968, choosing Maj. Norris Overly, Capt. Jon Black, and Lt. David

Matheny to be escorted homeward by two prominent peace activists,

Father Daniel Berrigan and Boston University history professor Howard

Zinno In August of that year three Air Force officers-Maj. Fred Thompson, Maj. James Low, and Capt. Joe Carpenter-were turned over to a

group of American pacifists in Hanoi. The State Department, committed

at that time to pursuing U.S. objectives by quiet diplomacy, wished to
Information and Assistance for PW/MIA Families 395

avoid activities that might arouse strong emotions within the American

public on the PW issue. Accordingly, the six former prisoners had been

received without fanfare and had not told the story of their captivity

in any public forum. Similarly, no extensive publicity had been given to

the return of several men who escaped from or were released by the Viet

Cong in South Vietnam prior to 1969.*

The Go Public campaign, waged with increasing intensity after

Laird's initial statement on 16 May 1969, brought about a major policy

change. On 6 August, when it was known that Hanoi had just released

another contingent of three-Capt. Wesley Rumble, Lt. Robert Frishman,

and Seaman Douglas Hegdahl-the 000 PW Policy Committee began

consideration of how the returned prisoners might help in applying pressure on North Vietnam to comply with the Geneva Convention. As Havens

indicated, "we are already certain that we will proceed to condemn NVN

publicly for its treatment of our men." At the least, government spokesmen were prepared to expose clear-cut abuses, using material from the

debriefings of the three returnees. The policy committee moved to find out

whether the men themselves were willing to appear before press and public

to give an account of their experience. Success of the venture also required

that the men have credible knowledge of inhumane practices of the enemy,

fully understood the intelligence and other restrictions they must observe,

and accepted the degree of control that would be necessary.8

While under treatment at the Bethesda Naval Hospital, returnees Frishman and Hegdahl held a joint press conference on 2 September 1969,

introduced by a statement from Secretary Laird. Their accounts of their

ordeal and that of their fellow prisoners gave powerful reinforcement to the

charges of inhumane treatment against North Vietnam. t As for the details

of their everyday existence, the two returnees said their prison compound

in Hanoi consisted mainly of one-story brick buildings with galvanized

iron roofs. The rooms were airless and oven-like in summer, when bodywide heat rash was a common affliction of the prisoners. The daily routine

included two meals, described by Frishman as "pumpkin soup with pig fat

in it and some bread." The returnees also reported instances of torture. 9

Besides occupying an important place in the scheme of the Go Public

campaign, the Frishman-Hegdahl press conference opened up a subject

of intense interest to the families. To meet their desire for information on

the conditions of captivity in North Vietnam, Nutter's office directed the

services to provide copies of the 17-page transcript to all next of kin. The

* On the pre-1969 releases ftom the North and South, see Chapter 5.

f Sec Chaptcr II for a fuller account of this press conference.
396 THE LONG ROAD HOME

same ISA communication noted with approval that the Navy would soon

send Ftishman and Hegdahl on a nationwide round of appearances. 10

After the Navy returnees had completed their meetings with PW/MIA

families at 14 locations, the Air Force sponsored a similar tour by Overly,

Thompson, and Rumble in December and the early months of 1970. The

Army, sensitive to the plea often heard from its own families for more attention to the men missing or captured in South Vietnam, staged a trip with

15 stops during May. All of the principal speakers-Maj. James N. Rowe

and two enlisted men, Willie Watkins and Thomas Van Putten-had

either escaped or been released from Viet Cong captivity. Whatever the

sponsorship, next of kin of all services residing within commuting distance

of the host military installation were invited. Approximately 1,000 family

members and a number of casualty assistance officers attended each series

of briefings. I I

No further organized tours occurred during 1970, but some of the returnees continued to fill speaking engagements. By May 1971, however,

the PW/MIA Task Group was planning a new briefing effort and also considering the advisability of "effecting a lower profile regarding the public

activities of returned US prisoners." Agenda material prepared for the task

group meeting on 20 May acknowledged that these appearances had been

useful in generating a high level of public awareness of the PW problem,

but it was suggested that by now they had largely served their purpose.

Some disadvantages had become apparent beyond the obvious one that

had been accepted from the first, namely, that having returnees speak out

on Hanoi's treatment of American prisoners would very probably inhibit

further releases by the enemy. Their high visibility had subjected the

speakers to personal attacks "from the enemy, antiwar groups, and some

elements of the press." Also, some of the returnees had proved difficult

to control. 12

Though the task group reached no formal decision on deemphasizing

returnee appearances, returned prisoners were not scheduled to participate

in the next series of family briefings, approved at the same meeting. The

plan called for a tour of 21 military installations to begin in mid-1971,

and it departed from the one-service sponsorship of the past by making

the tour an OSD project, to be coordinated by the PW/MIA Task Force.

The joint team traveling from Washington would include casualty and

policy officers from each service in addition to ISA and State Department

representatives. At meeting sites ranging from Pensacola, Florida, to Ft.

Lewis, Washington, the role of host would rotate among the services. The

acting assistant secretary of defense (ISA) explained the overall purpose as

he outlined the scenario to be followed by the military departments: "The
Information and Assistance for PW/MIA Families 397

inordinately long period during which the men missing or captured in

Southeast Asia have been gone has caused their families to become increasingly and understandably distraught and impatient. It is essential that we

provide these families every comfort and assistance possible. In this regard,

there is a continuing need to meet with them, advise them on the current

situation and our efforts, answer prevailing questions and determine their

current needs." The services were instructed to treat the tour as a normal

activity and not play it up as a special event. To avoid raising false hopes,

the ISA guidance stated, the notice sent to the families must carry no implication that some important new development would be discussed.1.1

Thus by mid-1971 the emphasis in family briefings had shifted back

to the original intent of providing authoritative information on current U.S.

government plans and efforts directed at the PW/MIA problem. Because of

the mounting public opposition to the war, there was also an interest in

gauging the degree of support among the families for the administration's

overall policy in Vietnam and in the peace negotiations. From the first stop

on the tour Rear Adm. H. H. Epes, Jr., reported that "with exception of

one or two heated exchanges, tone of meeting was friendly." Still, he and

other observers found a widespread unease among the families over the

effect that graduated U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam might have on the

prospects for prisoner release. By the final session, on 3 July 1971, a total

of 1,076 persons had attended. Nutter's principal assistant for PW affairs,

Roger Shields, estimated that the briefings had reached apptoximately half

of the PW/MIA families. 14

More than a year elapsed before the next briefing tour took place, in

the late summer of 1972. By then the repatriation plan had reached final

form and the report of the Rehabilitation IReadjustment Study Panel had

led DoD to take up several new commitments. Citing Laird's insistence that

all family members be fully informed on these matters, Nutter, in a directive to the secretaries of the military departments on 13 July, called on each

service to stage a briefing tour for its own families during the next 60 days.

Each would maintain a broad uniformity of approach, agenda, and format

by adhering to the outline Nutter enclosed. The focus would be on detailed explanation of the repatriation plan and on the programs by which

DoD intended to assist family readjustment and oversee the longer term

rehabilitation of the returnees. I)

Most of the service briefings on repatriation procedures took place

during August 1972. A member of the PW/MIA Task Force was sometimes

detailed to attend, to monitor both the content of the presentation and

the family reactions. Concurrently, 000 prepared a publication that would

give next of kin the information for permanent reference. It included a
398 THE LONG ROAD HOME

question-and-answer section that probably drew on the briefing tour experience for its identification of the concerns of PW/MIA relatives. For

instance, questions a wife might ask trying to picture the first meeting with her husband went beyond "Should I bring the children?" and

"Should I bring some of his clothes?" to include "How should I behave?

What topics should I discuss or avoid? Should I appear cheerful or sympathetic?" The information pamphlet went out to all families during October. 16

Those responsible for PW affairs within DoD considered the briefing

tours a success, though admittedly at some cost in time and effort. The tours

allowed service and ISA officials to make themselves known in a personal

way to the families while explaining the department's program and answering questions face-to-face. For the most part the impact on family attitudes

and morale was clearly salutary, and government officials benefited from

gaining a more intimate knowledge of the concerns and opinions prevailing

among next of kin. Still, use of the briefing tour device actually declined in

1971 and 1972. By those years the same ends were being served to a considerable extent by the relationship that had developed between DoD and

the organized associations of PW/MIA next of kin, particularly the National

League of Families.

The Family Assistance Program

Occurring intermittently, the family briefing tours were superimposed

on the continuing information and assistance efforts of the services. The

briefings had an effect on family morale, but it was the ongoing assistance

activities that had a more direct tangible impact in dealings with next of

kin. Here each military department's reputation for effectiveness depended

largely on the competence and industry of its casualty assistance officers

and the day-to-day proficiency of its central military personnel agency. If

the confidence of the families was to be retained, it was important that the

personnel center keep records without loss or mix-up and that every communication show a clear awareness of what previous service representatives

had said or written. In supplying the promised counsel and support to

dependents, the performance of the contact officer assigned to each PWI

MIA family was the crucial factor. Next of kin usually got their impression of how well the system functioned from observing whether or not

the officer approached his task in an assured manner, was prompt and

knowledgeable in answering questions, and worked effectively to bring

the resources of the parent service to bear on any problems the family

was experiencing. A serious lack of enterprise on his part could make it
Information and Assistance for PW/MIA Families 399

appear that this front-line duty in the family assistance campaign was

being shirked entirely.

In 1969 next of kin criticized the assistance arrangements, disapproving of contact personnel as sometimes laggard or incompetent, or pointing

to a system that looked impressive on paper but didn't work well in

practice. Some family members complained that their assistance officer

lacked both the background knowledge and the up-to-date information

that would make him effective, or that progress toward a good working

relationship with the family was too often interrupted by turnover in

the assignment. Other comments indicated that many assistance officers

had a greater number of cases than they could handle properly, especially

since the duty was usually a collateral one rather than a full-time assignment. Yet other next of kin were unreserved in their praise of the assistance

system, saying that aid had been provided in a considerate manner and

had been indispensable to their well-being. 17

The same division of opinion and many of the same complaints were

still in evidence in 1972 when the National League of Families began

providing critical comments on a more systematic basis, through the work

of its Repatriation, Rehabilitation, and Readjustment Committee. Usually

spoken of as the Triple R Committee, this body consisted of more than 30

family members from all parts of the country who met under the chairmanship of Iris R. Powers, a former national coordinator of the League. The

results of the committee's deliberations reached 000 after endorsement

by the League's board of directors. 18

When forwarded to Secretary Laird on 20 May 1972, the Triple R

Committee's first set of recommendations concentrated on the family assistance system, leading off with the comment that the Air Force's program

in particular was "woefully inadequate" and that the other services, too,

needed to do better. "It is imperative that the Air Force adopt a program

of assigning Assistance Officers on the basis of one family per Assistance

Officer as is now the practice of the other Services," the committee admonished. Next came a declaration that "all Services should select Assistance

Officers on the basis of maturity, ability, and willingness to perform the

duties," instead of the usual practice where "names have been pulled from

duty rosters with little or no thought given to qualifications for this assignment." The committee recommended that, when taking up his task, the

assistance officer should receive full information about the resources

available to him, particularly regarding military and civilian experts in

the medical, psychological, legal, and financial areas who could be called

upon to help relieve a family's problems. The committee commended the

many officers who had turned in outstanding performances "despite being
400 THE LONG ROAD HOME

handicapped by the lack of resource information and guidance," but it

also spoke of numerous instances where next of kin had had no contact

with the assigned officer for an extended period of time. It suggested that

casualty assistance officers be required to visit or telephone the families

at least once a month.

The committee alleged that many families were dissatisfied with the

person detailed to help them but did not know how to register their

complaints. All next of kin should be advised of the proper channels, but

beyond that the League's committee thought that each service should

institute its own review to learn if its assistance officers were fulfilling their

responsibilities to the satisfaction of the families in their charge. When the

end of an officer's tour approached, his replacement should be scheduled

to report for a period of overlapping assignment ("contact-relief") in order

to assure continuity. The committee declared that "instances of families

having to 'break-in' a new Assistance Officer and to review their history

with him from the beginning" were all too common-"usually the rule and

not the exception."

The Triple R Committee reported antipathy among the families toward

the use of civilians and enlisted personnel as assistance officers and stated

that the practice "must be discontinued." It commented that "while persons

in these categories may be well-intentioned, in the military hierarchy

they cannot be the 'problem solvers.' In reality, the Assistance Officer is

the next-of-kin's link to the Service, and as such, in many instances will

be privy to information of a personal and sensitive nature. Wives of officers, especially, strongly felt that a lack of foresight and consideration

was shown not only to them but to their husbands in the utilization of

civilians and enlisted personnel." 1')

Taken at face value, this set of recommendations amounted to a serious

indictment, particularly of the Air Force. In early June 1972 an Air Force

spokesman advised OSD officials that his service intended to correct the

shortcomings cited in the League's report, since "we will not condone an

assistance program that is not responsive to the needs and desires of our

PW/MIA families." To find out just how widespread the dissatisfaction

was among the families and to aid in devising an acceptable remedy, the Air

Force had mailed a copy of the Triple R Committee's report to each primary next of kin. Asking for a prompt reply, it enclosed a simple form

for indicating concurrence or nonconcurrence with each of the League's

numbered recommendations and for further comment. 20

Even before the League's committee highlighted the matter in May

1972, Air Force officials had been investigating the possibility of achieving

a "one-on-one" relationship between assistance officers and families. The
Information and Assistance for PW/MIA Families 401

first step had been to inquire about the experience of the other military departments. Pursuing the question informally with his counterparts in the

casualty offices of the other services in Washington, Capt. Edward E.

Lindquist obtained answers somewhat more revealing than the formal

submissions the services made later when the Defense response to the

League's report was being prepared. Lindquist found all the services

acknowledging that "they have had some problems in the casualty area"

and that it was their practice to replace an assistance officer if complaints

accumulated against him. On the other hand, they had not been honoring family requests that a well-regarded officer be continued beyond his

normal rotation date. One service mentioned that it had had to withdraw

an officer from the assignment "because of abuses by the family (calling

every night at 0300, asking him to do major house and auto repairs, etc.)."21

In its later submission the Department of the Army said it "practices

the 'one family per assistance officer' concept wherever sufficient qualified

officer personnel are reasonably available for duty as Family Services and

Assistance Officers (FSAO)." It admitted, however, that some FSAOs were

handling three to five cases. Something further was hinted at in the Army's

formal response and made clearer in Lindquist's findings: the most the

Army hoped to achieve for the present was that no FSAO have responsibility for more than one family of a known prisoner of war. Others assigned

to him would be MIA families, in roughly the same proportion as in the

Army's overall casualty statistics-about three Army men in missing status

for everyone believed to be a prisoner. The Army summed up its attitude

toward one-on-one assignment by saying that it agreed in principle "but

must remain cognizant of personnel resources." The same thought was

implicit in the shorter response of the Navy Department: "The Navy is,

whenever possible, assigning one family per CACO [Casualty Assistance

Calls Officer)."22

The Marine Corps said more directly that the League erred in supposing that one-on-one assignment was already the standard. Like the Army

and Navy, the Marine Corps did not invariably match an assistance officer

with a single family; often this was not feasible, but it was not necessarily a

desirable goal in any event. Where there existed a concentration of Marine

dependents (as in the vicinity of the El Taro air station in California), it

had been found that the families received better care when several were

assigned to one officer, thereby justifying his commitment to the assistance task as a primary duty. "In all cases, however, individual case by

case attention is provided and the number of NOK [next of kin] assigned

is not detrimental to their needs," the Marine Corps response concluded. Lindquist had been told that officers at El Toro sometimes had
402 THE LONG ROAD HOME

responsibility for as many as six PW/MIA families. Otherwise, however,

he judged the Marine Corps to be nearer than any other service to achieving a one-on-one system, largely because its relatively few PW/MIA

dependents were scattered throughout the country.2'

When the family responses to the Air Force questionnaire were tallied,

the Triple R Committee's belief that assignments should be strictly on the

basis of one family to each assistance officer proved to be a minority view.

Nevertheless it was held by nearly 1 in 5 of the more than 900 families surveyed, and Air Force leaders dedicated to removing objections to their

program could not disregard it. They pledged that "a personal assistance

officer" would be designated for any family that requested one. At the

same time, however, they took encouragement from the many next of kin

who rejected the charge that the Air Force program was inadequate. The

wife of one of the airmen commented further in a separate letter to Secretary Laird: "The Air Force has bent over backwards to help us and do

what's best for us. I personally have never run into a casualty assistance

office that has been uncooperative or incompetent. I sometimes get the feeling some of us demand dedication and action from our casualty assistance

officers that we would never ask of our own husbands!"24

The League's rather emphatic recommendation that use of civilians

and enlisted men as assistance officers be discontinued did not receive wide

support. An impressive majority of the Air Force families who responded

did not concur, and their comments in praise of specific individuals were

later cited by Defense officials when declaring that the civilians and enlisted men engaged in the work "include some of our most capable

personnel." Some family members whose favorable experience led them

to contest the League's position asserted that there were sergeants who

knew more about how to get results from the military system than most

officers; others pointed out that use of civilian employees gave greater

assurance of continuity. In any event, the newly announced Air Force

policy of providing a commissioned officer in a one-on-one assignment to

any family that made the request promised to dispose of the problem. The

assignment of civilian or enlisted personnel to the positions rarely occurred

in the other services. 25

In responding to the League's recommendations that assistance officers

be in touch with the families at least monthly and that the contact-relief

system be followed in reassignments, 000 was able to say that these procedures were already established policy. The regulations were being observed,

it was claimed, although unavoidable exceptions might occur. On the criteria for selection of the liaison personnel, 000 replied that the services

chose officers "on the basis of their ability to handle problems associated
Information and Assistance for PW/MIA Families 403

with a wide variety of personal matters." Such additional instruction as

they received was directed mainly at sensitizing them to the unique family

situation faced by the PW/MIA relatives. Thus no attempt was made to

picture them as specially trained counselors, equipped to perform some of

the functions of the psychologist or social worker.

The candid comments gathered by Captain Lindquist had been to the

same effect. Those selected as assistance officers, usually an additional duty,

were drawn from the existing resources of a command or naval district and

might be from any branch or specialty. Rarely would the officer have had

any previous experience in casualty assistance or counseling, or any detailed

familiarity with survivor benefits, life insurance, or the laws governing status

changes and presumptive findings of death. On being chosen, he received

information packets and other materials but no intensive training for the

role, since he was not expected to become an expert in the pertinent fields

of knowledge. The services intended the assistance officer to function as the

listening post and point of contact for the families, providing the channel

for communication in both directions. In the absence of set requirements

for previous training or experience, the selection of men as assistance officers turned primarily on their availability for additional duty assignments

and their location in reasonable proximity to the affected families.2(,

More consistently than the other services, the Marine Corps utilized

men in particular basic assignments as assistance officers. It regularly assigned this additional duty to officers posted to Marine reserve units as

inspector-instructors. The distribution of reserve units throughout the

country was an obvious advantage. In addition, Marine Corps leaders

believed that the standards for choosing inspector-instructors gave assurance that the family assistance responsibility would be in capable hands.

These men, Brig. Gen. Robert Carney told the PW/MIA Task Force, had

already been screened for "the maturity and ability necessary for successful performance on independent duty." Carney gave only passing notice

to another qualification the League had mentioned; he intimated that an

officer's willingness to perform the duties was not considered an open question in the Marine Corps.27

The members of the Triple R Committee undoubtedly had unrealistic

expectations for the kind of sustained and consistent attention that would

lead to an intimate understanding of each family's special circumstances.

They wanted assistance officers who had stronger rapport with the families than the one described by a committee member from Florida: "Our

casualty officer is very nice, I'll say that for him-but that's all I say for

him! . . . I don't feel, personally, that I could go in to him and discuss

any problem whatsoever."28 And they were not beyond overstating their
404 THE LONG ROAD HOME

case for emphasis. But there was no want of high purpose at DoD management levels, and by 1971 the official descriptions of the assistance officer's

role were in terms that the National League could hardly hope to improve

upon. Next of kin would have been well satisfied to find the assignment

going to an officer who might justly be told, "You have been selected

because of your maturity, compassion, empathy, and demonstrated ability

to communicate effectively." That characterization appeared in the handbook for Family Services and Assistance Officers published by the Army

in August 1971. Written with unusual sensitivity, the text described the

extraordinary emotional strain that PW/MIA dependents lived under

and its impliations for anyone charged with helping them. For the newly

appointed assistance officer it set out both the schedule and the rationale

for the actions he must pursue in discharging his responsibilities, along

with certain cautions and down-to-earth suggestions on how to proceed. 2~

The Army's handbook attested to the high ideals and intentions the

family assistance system was meant to fulfill. Chief of Naval Operations

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., and Air Force Vice Chief of Staff General

John D. Ryan set similar goals when exhorting commanders to be responsive to family needs. 30 It was in the nature of things, however, that performance could never equal intention. Various deficiencies and human failings

would come into play at lower levels to diminish the system's accomplishments.

There was no realistic possibility that the assistance program would

be manned throughout by model officers, however sincerely leaders might

avow the importance of the assistance function. Each service had to give

regard to the whole range of its commitments and requirements when deploying its manpower resources. A first claim on top-flight personnel could

hardly be expected for what was usually a part-time, collateral duty in the

temporarily expanded field of family assistance. Effectiveness in providing

aid to the PW/MIA families depended ultimately on individual performance, on an officer's exercise of initiative, judgment, and follow-through in

circumstances beyond the reach of close supervision. The assistance officers

supplied by the assignment process would quite likely include a number

who by temperament or other disability were unsuited for the task.

Overall performance suffered also from the ordinary inefficiencies of

the passage of guidance and information downward through an organization. The criticism that the local casualty assistance officers were often

insufficiently informed or not kept up to date had some validity. OSD

more than once marked this problem for attention by the services. The

time lag in supplying information was most glaringly exposed when wives

active in the family movement sought to follow up, through their local

assistance officers, on statements by high government officials that had

reached them through the League's newsletter. 31
Information and Assistance for PW/MIA Families 405

The critique supplied by the National League of Families did cause

DoD to undertake corrective action where warranted, and some heightening of consciousness regarding the potential for improvement in the family

assistance program undoubtedly occurred. Nevertheless it remains difficult

to make a definitive judgment on the quality of family assistance in mid1972. Whatever the overall balance may have been between successes and

deficiences, the survey responses of next of kin made it clear that the record

varied widely. With untried assistance officers constantly entering into an

expanding system, unevenness of performance persisted right up to homecoming but not for lack of high-level commitment.
19

The National League and

Other Family Organizations

Until the reorientation of policy signaled by the "Go Public" campaign

of 1969, Defense Department leaders had not encouraged any organized association of PW/MIA relatives. Each family received individual

attention from the casualty assistance office of its own military service, as a

separate case. According to the later testimony of family members, official

spokesmen advised them that it was in the best interest of their serviceman not to publicize the fact that he was a prisoner and that they should

refrain from public crusading about the fate of the captives since this might

interfere with the State Department's negotiations to obtain the men's

release. On the principle that the privacy of all parties should be respected,

casualty officers generally did not inform a new PW/MIA family of others

nearby who had suffered the same misfortune.

Rise ofthe National League ofFamilies

It was natural, however, that as wives with husbands missing in Vietnam learned the identity of other spouses in like circumstance, they would

seek common company and begin to associate. Understandably, this occurred

mainly in centers where there existed concentrations of military dependents, particularly those of the career officers who manned many of the

aircraft brought down over North Vietnam. In the San Diego area, for

instance, Sybil Stockdale identified 33 other Navy wives of prisoners of

Hanoi. They came together at first simply for mutual support and relief

from their loneliness, but the San Diego group took on a more formal

organization during 1967 as the "League of Wives of American Prisoners

406
The National League and Other Family Organizations 407

of War." Sybil Stockdale was their acknowledged leader, and her example

pointed them toward more purposeful activity.l

Sybil Stockdale's own search for better understanding of the U.S. government's policy and for assurance that the authorities were aware of

the concerns of PW/MIA relatives had begun early in 1966. She pressed

it through letters and visits to various officials, including W. Averell

Harriman at the State Department. Usually she encountered the view that

patient pursuit of negotiations offered the main hope of resolving the

prisoner problem and that an atmosphere favorable to success could best

be maintained by abstaining from public condemnation of the enemy.

There were limits to how long Mrs. Stockdale could defer to counsel

that conflicted strongly with her natural instincts, which disposed her

toward more forceful action than the government seemed prepared to

adopt. Further, she was powerfully motivated by what she read or deduced

from her husband's letters. Cdr. James B. Stockdale had been shot down

over North Vietnam in September 1965 but not confirmed as a prisoner

until his first letter was received half a year later. Three more letters arrived

during 1966 and others at longer intervals thereafter. The picture they gave

included significant weight loss, medical neglect, and non-delivery of

letters she had sent him. More deeply troubling were the declining quality

of her husband's writing and the indications that he had been kept in

solitary confinement from the first. He wrote that he had worked out

methods of keeping his mind occupied, but she had to wonder how long

any man could withstand the effects of isolation, physical privation, and,

very likely, torture, whatever his spiritual and intellectual resources.

Stockdale later testified that by 1968 she felt compelled to follow her

own judgment rather than official guidance. She had concluded that the best

interests of the men would be served by speaking openly about the rights

guaranteed to prisoners of war and the wholesale disregard of those rights

by the North Vietnamese. To demonstrate one clear violation of the Geneva

Convention, Stockdale surveyed the experience of the 33 wives in her area

and compiled the meager tally of mail received from their loved ones. She

released the findings to the press, along with some details of her own situation. The resulting article appeared in the San Diego Union on 28 October

1968. "I hoped that by telling the truth publicly myself, I might be able to

encourage others to do the same."2 In that endeavor she had the immediate

support of the San Diego League of Wives, and each member's network

of service friendships became a means of reaching out to other individuals

and localities.

In February 1969 Stockdale cabled an inquiry about her husband's

welfare to the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris. Using the mailing list
408 THE LONG ROAD HOME

that her group had compiled, she invited other families to join in an effort

along this line, with a degree of centralized direction to schedule the message flow. The response came in scores of letters from wives and parents

who wanted to participate; some of them asked for guidance on other ways

to work together for the benefit of their men. Clearly the constituency

existed for a countrywide organization of PW/MIA relatives. Moreover,

official policy was about to turn in a direction favorable to the purposes

such an organization might pursue.

In May 1969 Secretary Laird issued his first statements in the "Go

Public" campaign. The National League of Families of American Prisoners

of War in Southeast Asia was established the following month, with Sybil

Stockdale as national coordinator. The League drew many of its early adherents from centers where local organizations were already active, such as

the Norfolk-Virginia Beach area where Louise Mulligan and Jane Denton

were among the leaders. Soon other next of kin were responding who had

hesitated to take an active role before, when the official cautions against

publicity were in effect.

For some months the National League of Families remained a loosely

knit association, with its volunteer leaders operating from their homes and

personally absorbing most of the expenses. Sybil Stockdale later remarked

that in April 1970 "we finally acknowledged to ourselves that if we were ever

to become a truly effective organization, we should have a formally incorporated group, headquartered in Washington and manned by a permanent

staff." In moving toward that goal Stockdale and her associates also

advanced the idea of unified effort in a single national organization. 3

The League incorporated in the District of Columbia on 28 May,

under a more inclusive title than before: The National League of Families

of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia.* The group's charter

designated it as a humanitarian, nonprofit, nonpartisan organization, whose

objectives were to secure for the prisoners the humane treatment required

by the Geneva Convention, to stimulate world concern about that issue, to

improve the dissemination of information on PW/MIA matters generally,

and to gain the earliest possible release of the captives and an accounting

of the missing. The League of Families qualified as a tax-exempt institution,

and contributions made to it could be claimed as income tax deductions. 4

Sybil Stockdale chaired the board of directors in the new structure,

and Iris R. Powers became the first full-time national coordinator. They

* On, group that relinquished its identity at this point and merged with the League

was the Association of Wi v,s and Families of Captured and Missing American Military

Men. Its principal officer, Mrs. Arthur S. Mearns, became a member of the first board of

directors of the newly chartered organization.
The National League and Other Family Organizations 409

began operations in space donated by the Reserve Officers Association in

its building on Capitol Hill. There, on 30 June 1970, the League held an

open house and press conference to mark the establishment of its national

headquarters. Both President Nixon and Secretary Laird sent welcoming

messages, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Warren Nutter attended the

ceremonies as Laird's personal representative. In his telegram the secretary

of defense said the new office had "the important and necessary function

of helping to focus public attention on the treatment of American prisoners," thus highlighting a service that the family organization had already

been performing with considerable effect. Its members had directed the

attention of editors and broadcasters to the prisoner issue, enlisted the

support of members of Congress, veterans organizations, chambers of commerce, and other groups, and traveled abroad in well-publicized attempts

to gain an audience with the North Vietnamese representatives in Paris.

As Secretary Laird had anticipated, the next of kin were proving to be a

major resource in the "Go Public" campaign.)

By the time of its move to Washington in mid-1970 the League had

already become the largest and most widely representative of the family

organizations, and government officials concerned with PW/MIA affairs

welcomed its rise to prominence. 000 officials realized that initiatives by

the next of kin were more effective in involving community organizations,

generating petitions and letter-writing campaigns, and attracting favorable

media attention than any publicity originating in the Pentagon could be.

Wishing to see these League activities continue, they gave support and

encouragement to the organization. Already predisposed to give such help

because of the obligation they felt toward all PWIMIA dependents, they

could not escape being influenced as well by the appealing quality of the

leadership that had emerged in the League's early days. To a large extent it

consisted of the wives of relatively senior career officers, women who had

soon established a record of mature consideration and responsible action.

Thanks to their years of membership in the military community, they

were likely to be at ease in the official environment and aware of the channels, both formal and informal, through which the highest authorities

might be approached.

The early leaders set an overall tone for the League's endeavors that

was generally sustained thereafter. As national coordinator, Sybil Stockdale

had sounded the keynote in October 1969 in a letter to the members at

large: "I am so proud of you all ... for you are doing with dignity that

which others find impossible to do without demonstration. The quality

of dignity with which you proceed reflects the quality of dignity which

we seek for our loved ones." In testimony before a congressional committee
410 THE LONG ROAD HOME

a few months later she declared that "the support we are asking of you is

not related to any particular view on the war in Vietnam." Further, the

effort expended by her group was intended to "supplement that which our

Government is doing to insure humane treatment for our men and in no

ways reflects any discredit on the efforts made by our own Government."6

DoD Assistance to the League

Defense authorities gave as much assistance and encouragement to

the League of Families as they judged proper for a government agency. An

early instance occurred in July 1970, when they responded to a suggestion

from the new national headquarters that the services include an application form for League membership in their regular mailings to PWI

MIA relatives. Officials refrained from an action that would amount to a

direct governmental endorsement of a private organization, but they chose

an alternative that was still helpful in bringing the National League to the

attention of next of kin who were not already on its mailing list. Service

casualty offices received instructions to provide the address of the League

to the families, leaving it to them to write for further information if

they desired. In practical effect, the difference between official mention

and official endorsement did not prove very great.

As the League and other private groups increasingly participated during the latter half of 1970 in public appeals and presentations designed to

arouse protests against the enemy's treatment of prisoners of war, military

commanders and other service personnel were unsure how to respond. To

what extent was it proper to make government facilities available for such

activities? Could poster displays and the circulation of petitions be allowed

at U.S. military installations? Was it appropriate for the base newspaper

to print materials supplied by the League, especially appeals for letters to

be written to members of Congress or officials of foreign governments?

Individual servicemen were not always sure of the limits a person on active

duty must observe. Some wondered if taking up the invitation to "Write

Hanoi" would amount to communicating with the enemy, a possible offense

under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

By September 1970 Pentagon officials knew that PW/M1A observances

proposed by outside groups were welcomed at some military bases and rejected at others. One negative response caused the Tennessee Valley chapter

of the Air Force Association to write to Washington in protest. Chapter

members had been disappointed when they appealed to a nearby military

installation for help in bUilding and displaying a typical Viet Cong prisoner
The National League and Other Family Organizations 411

cage. The local commander had concluded that the PW/MIA issue was

"political," and therefore he was unwilling to allow his personnel to participate in any project of that nature or to sign petitions or write letters

to Hanoi. According to complaints, the commander questioned even the

distribution of bumper stickers. 8

This and other reports indicated that some commanding officers were

still not aware that their civilian and military superiors looked favorably on

the campaigns being mounted by private groups. Without specific instructions, some commanders apparently viewed the proposed PW/MIA events

as similar to the "On-Post Demonstrations" covered by DoD Directive

1325.6. In effect since 12 September 1969, that directive gave "Guidelines

for Handling Dissident and Protest Activities among Members of the

Armed Forces."

The DoD PW Policy Committee moved to correct the situation, producing a recommended statement by the end of the year. Deputy Secretary

Packard issued it on 8 January 1971 for dissemination throughout the

military departments and commands. The memorandum set forth "DOD

Policy Regarding Private Efforts to Assist PW/MIAs" in the following terms:

The Department of Defense fully supports legitimate private

initiatives that advocate humane treatment and release of US

PW/MIA personnel and enemy compliance with the Geneva

Conventions of 1949. Commanders are authorized to assist such

efforts, including those of PW/MIA family groups, provided the

assistance is within the bounds of existing directives. Petitions on

the PW/MIA issue may be circulated on military installations if

deemed appropriate by the installation commander. It should be

considered inappropriate to combine with a petition for the

humane treatment and release ofPW/MIA personnel other comments

or petitions regarding United States policy, foreign or domestic.

A military person may express his opinion to a foreign government on the PW/MIA issue even using his military rank or title.

Military individuals should restrict the content of their letters to

the humane treatment and release of PWs by the enemy, and compliance with other provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,

and avoid political comment.')

By the time this instruction appeared, officials in Washington had themselves confronted a series of decisions about the level of practical assistance

to be given the League of Families. The occasion was the first annual convention of the League, scheduled for 3-5 October 1970 in Washington.

During September, requests from the national headquarters for help in
412 THE LONG ROAD HOME

staging the event led to agreement within the DoD PW Policy Committee

on an array of administrative and logistical supporting measures. Accompanying the decision was a declaration that it was not to be regarded as

a binding precedent, but in fact the support given by the Department of

Defense at later national conventions followed exactly the same lines.]O

The most important assistance afforded the League was the provision

of space-available transportation in military aircraft. Under a DoD policy

established in 1968 the dependent wives of men in missing status were

already eligible for this privilege,* but by using the term "primary next of

kin" the travel authorization also encompassed the parents of unmarried

PW/MIA personnel, whether they were dependents or not. By the third

annual convention, in 1972, the benefit of space-available air travel had

been extended to "other next of kin in exceptional circumstances" and to

the families of U.S. civilians missing or captured in Southeast Asia. Each

year, to insure the availability of sufficient transport, officials called on the

Air National Guard to supplement the normal night schedules. In the

Washington area the Army had responsibility for bus service between the

airfields and the convention hotel and for providing transportation to

some events during the period. Managers learned to anticipate an attendance of up to 800 family members. II

DoD provided speakers and seminar participants for the convention

program and designated a number of returnees and escapees to attend on

temporary duty assignment. The department also subsidized the attendance of some nongovernmental experts taking part in the program through

the issuance of invitational travel orders. Every year, each of the military

services held a luncheon and briefing session for its own family members.

Practical assistance to the League of Families reached a high point at the

annual meetings, but a more sustaining form of support came from the

ready access to DoD officials that the League's representatives enjoyed

throughout the year. After establishment of the PW/MIA Task Group

and Task Force in early 1971, the Task Force carried the chief responsibility

for maintaining awareness of the League's activities and for coordinating

the department's response to questions and proposals received from the

family organization. Meanwhile, the League had moved its national office

to larger quarters provided by the American Legion at 1608 K Street,

N.W., in Washington. 12

By early 1971 the National League of Families was the only organization with membership limited to the relatives of men missing or

* The space-availahle (ravel privilege for P\V/MIA dependenrs is discussed more fully in

Chap(er 20.
The National League and Other Family Organizations 413

captured that was truly national in scope and that held itself to objectives

that were humanitarian, nonprofit, and nonpartisan.* By December 1972

the League's membership rose above the 3,000 mark, but well before that it

had enrolled a majority of the families. This majority status tended to ease

concerns within the Defense Department that measures in support of

the League might appear to overstep proper bounds. It became common

practice to respond to letters in which citizens expressed eagerness to aid

the cause of the prisoners and missing by suggesting that they "may find it

helpful to communicate with the National League of Families" at its headquarters address, which was then given. Also, the thought behind the

earlier hold on mailing the League's membership application to PW/

MIA families no longer seemed compelling, and by 1972 officials did

this routinely. U

However close and continuous the relationship between the League

and Pentagon officials concerned with PW/MIA affairs, one thing must

not be lost sight of, and those in authority at the OSD level issued several

reminders of it: Support of the National League of Families could not be

a substitute for support of the individual families. The duty owed to each

individual dependent and next of kin could not be fulfilled solely by providing information and assistance to the League. 14

Family Opinion as a Political Factor

Within 000 a sincerely felt obligation toward the families of the

missing and captured went far toward explaining the support and attention

given to the next of kin and to the National League as an organization

broadly representative of the PW/MIA relatives. But there were further

reasons, of a political nature. Secretary Laird and his immediate advisers

recognized that the families, though only a tiny segment of American

society, could have a substantial effect in public discussion of the U.S. role

in Southeast Asia.

* By 1971 several new groups of PW/MIA relatives were coming into existence, but

with aims that were avowedly political. Other organizations working on behalf of the

prisoners and missing were not composed primarily of the men's relatives and usually

were not national in scope, such as Colorado Cares About POWs & MIAs, Forgotten

Americans Committee, and Concern for Prisoners of War, Inc. Voices in Vital America,

or VIVA, was begun by college srudents as a patriotic organization and later became

prominent as the purveyor of bracelets engraved with the name of a captured or missing

serviceman and the date of his loss.
414 THE LONG ROAD HOME

The potential influence of the families had become more apparent

during the "Go Public" campaign as it unfolded from May 1969 onward.

Laird brought the PW/MIA issue into open discussion by his point-bypoint condemnation of the enemy's refusal to identify the prisoners,

permit neutral inspection of their living conditions, consider any form of

exchange, even of the sick and wounded, or allow mail and other privileges

prescribed by the Geneva Convention. When summing up the experience

for President Nixon some months later, Laird noted that "the families of

these men were encouraged ro pursue a similar public approach," and

they had done so, with impressive results. "Throughout, the families have

provided the catalyst of most private activity."15 The wives and parents

had presented the plight of the missing men in a way that engaged the

sympathies of civic, business, and patriotic groups throughout the country,

with a resulting commitment of their energies to petition drives, letterwriting programs, and public observances of many kinds. As military

dependents the PW/MIA relatives had obvious ties with the government,

but it was hardly possible to suspect that these family members were merely

speaking on cue in a role the administration had assigned them. Few

hearers could be insensitive to the depths of private anguish that motivated them to appear in public.

In the "Go Public" campaign the contribution of the PW/MIA families had probably been indispensable to fulfillment of the government's

aims. The next of kin had provided an authentic voice in support of the

official pronouncements that raised them above other more easily discounted publicity efforts of the government. The campaign had gained in

legitimacy from the part taken by the next of kin, and the outcome was

the one hoped for in the Pentagon's highest offices.

While the PW/MIA family constituency had won recognition as a

group whose special character gave it an undeniable claim to be heard, there

remained the question of what the impact would be if an organization

speaking for the families should take a stand-say on the terms of settlement to be sought at Paris-that departed from the official policy. Clearly

such a move would be damaging to the administration's purposes. Involving dissent by those usually thought of as loyal supporters of the governing

authorities, it would encourage both political opponents and foreign adversaries to believe that U.S. positions declared to be immutable might soon

give way. Accordingly, Laird and his immediate advisers consciously aimed

to prevent major disaffection among the next of kin. Besides reinforcing

DoD's dedication to meeting the needs of PW/MIA dependents in a

manner that would leave no room for complaint, this gave added point to
The National League and Other Family Organizations 415

the regular contact maintained with the families. Top Defense officials

needed to be continually alert to developing changes in the attitude of

next of kin toward the administration's overall policy in Vietnam and in

the peace negotiations.

At times, at least in 1969, OSD could exercise some influence over

impending activities that appeared undesirable. In September, when a

group of family members intent on winning presidential attention for

the PW/MIA issue had planned demonstrations before the White House

and at the Nixon residence in San Clemente, California, Nutter was able to

advise the secretary that "both of these were averted by telephonic counseling with some of the individuals involved."16 In later years, however,

awareness of shifting attitudes among the next of kin often shaped the

policy recommendations advanced by Defense officials and others within

the executive branch.

The Vietnamization plan constituted the principal policy innovation of

the first months of the Nixon administration. It called for progressive withdrawal of U.S. personnel from the hostilities as South Vietnamese forces

took over the fighting. During 1969 the families focused attention increasingly on this plan as they sought to gauge its bearing on their hopes

for return of prisoners and definite information about the missing.

In a nationally televised address on 3 November 1969, President Nixon

reviewed the progress of the Vietnamization program, noting that withdrawal of the first 60,000 men was to be completed by mid-December.

He declared that the United States would persist in its search for a just

peace through negotiation, but if that failed, disengagement would still

proceed under the Vietnamization plan. Its implementation would lead

ultimately to the departure of all U.S. forces, leaving in place a South Vietnamese government and people who had become strong enough to defend

their own freedom. In sketching this prospect the president made no

mention of the Americans who were prisoners of war. l?

"Many families of missing and captured servicemen will consider the

President's Vietnam speech last evening as holding no promise of an early

resolution of the prisoner problem," wrote Charles Havens in an internal

000 memorandum. He saw this as added reason to press for final word

from the White House on a prospective meeting between President Nixon

and a group of family members, which Secretary Laird had recommended.

To Havens it seemed that such personal involvement of the president was

even more necessary than before if PWIMIA relatives were to be reassured

that their men were not forgotren. IX

A few weeks later, on 12 December, 26 wives and mothers of men

missing or captured in Southeast Asia gathered in the White House as
416 THE LONG ROAD HOME

guests of President and Mrs. Nixon.* Sybil Stockdale was among them,

and she presented a letter to the president that was all the more eloquent

for its restraint, particularly when expressing the reaction of next of kin to

the Vietnamization plan: "Many of us are concerned that the gradual deescalation of the war in Vietnam may leave the future of our prisoners in

limbo simply because there may be no specific end to the war through

armistice or treaty. We must insure that the prisoner situation is carefully

considered at each step in your program for the withdrawal of American

forces from Vietnam." 19

By early April 1970 Stockdale had reverted to her usual plain-spokenness

when writing to Secretary Laird. She and her associates were asking the

secretary to meet with them shortly before a scheduled gathering of representatives of various next-of-kin groups, who were to discuss merging into

a single, incorporated National League of Families. Stockdale wanted "some

very straight answers" so that she might enter the gathering "with confidence

that the administration is not going to abandon our men because our numbers are relatively small and it will be more expedient politically to withdraw from Vietnam and leave our men at the mercy of the Communists."

She came back to this point later in her text: "We need reassurance that the

administration's program is not just designed to keep us pacified beyond a

point of no return when the prisoners will be abandoned and the administration will say, 'We did everything we could but regretfully, it did not work

out the way we hoped it would."'20

Also in early April Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson informed

the president's assistant for national security affairs, Henry Kissinger, that

some of the PW/MIA wives were "starting to make an issue of the lack

of direct link between withdrawal of U. S. forces and release of our prisoners."

This was understandable, Richardson thought, since "from the wives' viewpoint, what we are now doing amounts to withdrawals without assurance

that our men will be released." He suggested that President Nixon deal with

the emerging issue by making a specific reference to prisoners of war in a

forthcoming speech, in terms that would relate it to his previous statements on the Vietnamization program. The president had stated that the

rate of U.S. force withdrawal would be governed by the level of North Vietnamese military action, the progress of the training to improve South

Vietnamese forces, and the pace at which advances were made in the Paris

talks. With reference to the last of these points, Richardson believed it

time to declare that the United States regarded movement toward an agreement on prisoner release as a measure of progress in the peace negotiations.

* See Chapter 12.
The National League and Other Family Organizations 417

"On balance, I think it would be useful for the President to identify prisoner

release as a specific negotiating aim, progress towards which would be taken

into account in the timing of our withdrawals. For him not to say something along these lines soon could lead to deterioration in our relations

with the next of kin of the prisoners, who as you know have waited many

years already with great patience and dignity."21

In his next major address, on 20 April, President Nixon celebrated the

growing success of the Viernamization program and announced the planned

withdrawal of an additional 150,000 men by the following spring. Near

the end of the speech was a short passage on the prisoners and missing,

which drew from one wife the reproach that it was only "a brief passing

reference ... almost an afterthought." Nixon said nothing that would connect the rate of U.S. withdrawal to progress on the prisoner question in

the peace talks. 22

Frank Sieverts advised Richardson that the White House rejection of

his recommendation owed something to concern within Kissinger's staff

that a negotiating disadvantage would be incurred that might enable Hanoi

to "squeeze a timetable out of us." Also, as both Sieverts and Richardson

were well aware, to begin speaking of prisoner release and the timing of

U.s. withdrawal as paired subjects would be to abandon a longstanding

guideline. So far the United States had been striving to have the treatment

and disposition of prisoners of war dealt with as a separate, humanitarian question, apart from the political and military issues involved in a

peace settlement.2>

Some months earlier, however, Laird had begun making a stipulation

of a different sort. In remarks before a gathering of PW/MIA relatives in

Washington in September 1969 he backed up the familiar assurance that

their men would not be forgotten with something more explicit. Laird

said that the Vietnamization program would not be carried to the point of

complete U.S. withdrawal until the prisoners were released and the missing accounted for. His statement was little noted at the time except

within the circle of next of kin, but Nutter put the policy on official record

in early May 1970, when he told a congressional committee that "we will

not draw our troop strength down below an effective size as long as those

prisoners are still in Vietnam." By July, citizens who addressed questions

to the White House were receiving replies that included an assurance there

would be no total withdrawal of U.S. forces while Americans remained

in enemy hands. 2"

To some next of kin the statements from official sources gave the reassurance that was intended. Others found no comfort in them. Sybil

Stockdale wrote to Laird in April 1970 that the pledge not to withdraw
418 THE LONG ROAD HOME

"only indicates to us that our men may look forward to the rest of their

lives rotting in hell." A third type of reaction began to be heard about a

year later. Some of the more disaffected family members asserted that when

the administration claimed a residual force must be kept in South Vietnam for the sake of the prisoners and missing it was merely using them as

its excuse for continuing the war. 25

Following the first annual convention of the National League of

Families in October 1970 Carol O. North succeeded Stockdale as chairman of the board. Early in the new year she dispatched a telegram to

the secretary of defense in which she stated that "members of the National

League of Families view with alarm the rapid withdrawal of American

troops from Southeast Asia while no provision has been made for the safe

return of our United States men held prisoner in South Vietnam, Laos, and

North Vietnam. We strongly urge you to view this alarm with the concern

it deserves and follow with action that would assure a complete accounting

of all men and a safe return of all prisoners." 2G The message echoed past positions and was couched in language that approached the limits of what

the League could say on public questions. As a nonpartisan, nonprofit, taxexempt organization it was barred from endorsing or opposing any individual political candidate or particular legislative measure, and spokesmen

for the National League of Families usually had to confine themselves to

general statements of goal and principle. When formally addressing government officials and congressional bodies they could call for action and

urge that the problem receive careful consideration, but they had to avoid

championing a specific solution.

Drafting of a reply to Carol North's telegram was soon set aside owing

to action taken in the White House-action that signified a new level of

attentiveness to the state of opinion among next of kin. Arrangements

had been made for North and the other members of the League's board of

directors to meet with Henry Kissinger on 23 January 1971 Y

The opportunity to hold discussions with the president's assistant

for national security affairs, under rules of confidentiality, was the highest

mark of favor yet bestowed on the League-the more so because the January meeting inaugurated a continuing relationship. Thereafter, throughout

1971 and the early months of 1972, further conferences were scheduled with

Kissinger in conjunction with the bimonthly sessions of the League's board

of directors. Other claims on his attention sometimes caused last-minute

cancellations, but the meetings occurred with enough regularity to sustain

a feeling of privileged access to information from the negotiating front

and to give the League's representatives the assurance that their concerns

were registering with the president's foremost adviser. 2R
The National League and Other Family Organizations 419

It does not appear that DoD leaders viewed Kissinger's discussions

with the PW/MIA families as an encroachment on their domain. Rather,

knowing both the impression that Kissinger was capable of making and

the latitude his position allowed him in deciding what information to

release, they welcomed his activities as the most effective means available

for retaining the allegiance of the next of kin to the policies of the administration. Early in May 1971, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard

wrote Kissinger urging him to make every effort to appear at the scheduled

bimonthly meetings with the League's representatives.

I have the highest tegard for these families who have borne their

anguish with admirable strength and in a manner supportive of

US interests. Of late, these families are increasingly experiencing

understandable impatience and exasperation. They could easily,

as they are urged by many, join with dissenting groups to make a

satisfactory resolution of the conflict more difficult. It is important that these families continue to support US efforts. 2

'J

In a memorandum for President Nixon later in May, Laird addressed

some of the fundamental considerations affecting the U.S. withdrawal

from Vietnam and the handling of the prisoner issue in the peace negotiations. He gave particular attention to the attitude of the PW/MIA families

as a major consideration. Laird noted that with few exceptions the next of

kin had so far supported the administration's efforts to achieve a just

peace, but he said that family members were becoming "increasingly

impatient, frustrated, and susceptible to any scheme that holds promise of

securing the release of their men." After citing examples of their growing

restiveness, he offered the following observation: "If the families should

turn against the Administration on the PW/MIA issue, we believe that

general public support would also."lO

Laird wrote in a month when the varying viewpoints among next of

kin were being expressed more insistently. One letter to President Nixon

appeared as a paid advertisement in the Washington Post, endorsed by more

than 100 family members and friends of the prisoners and missing in

Southeast Asia. Overall, the tone of the communication was not hostile. Irs

signers applauded the president's commitment to total withdrawal from

South Vietnam and an end to the war, but they were deeply critical of

a projection, made by DoD spokesmen in recent congressional testimony,

for a force of roughly 50,000 men to remain in the country through

December 1972 and possibly beyond. "Mr. President, this promises

at least an additional two years of death and destruction. To be specific,

this sentences 400 or 500 POW's to another two years or more of hell in
420 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Communist prison camps and condemns 1,100 to 1,200 mlssmg men to

a limbo of oblivion. For many, it will mean certain death. THIS IS NOT

ACCEPTABLE." The sponsors of the letter proposed the removal of all

U.S. forces from South Vietnam on a timetable of 150 days duration, to

begin when North Vietnam, the National Liberation Front, and the Pathet

Lao committed themselves to identification and release of all MIAs and

prisoners of war by both sides, with supervision by a neutral third poweL'l

Next of kin more plainly alienated from the Nixon administration

tended to affiliate with another organization that was just making itself

known in May 1971. POWIMIA Families for Immediate Release soon

claimed to have the support of more than 300 families. Some of its leaders

were women who had left the National League of Families-"in disgust,"

one of them said, since she had concluded that the League's members were

simply being used by the government "to drum up war sentiment." Unlike

the League, Families for Immediate Release engaged in political action and

made no pretense of being nonpartisan. During 1971 the group endorsed

proposals in Congress that set a date six months in the future for the termination of all U.S. military operations in Indochina, enforced by a cutoff of

appropriated funds and contingent only on the release of all the prisoners

and an accounting for the missing. The administration based its opposition

to such measures partly on the claim that the resulting withdrawal would be

so precipitous as to deny the South Vietnamese the opportunity to defend

themselves and to determine their own future. The Statement of Purpose

of the Families for Immediate Release had already announced the principle

its members believed should apply: "We feel our government's obligation

to the American prisoners now should take precedence over its obligation

to the government of South Vietnam.",2

Other next of kin thought that the course being followed by the president accorded with the national interest. They believed his policy would

be more likely to secure the return of all the men in captivity than would

the ideas being advanced in Congress for a quick and virtually unconditional end to the U.S. involvement. A number of PWIMIA relatives in

California held this view strongly enough to want to lobby for the defeat

of the congressional measures. They constituted themselves as POWI

MIA International, Inc. In a letter to members of Congress in June 1971

the group charged that the proponents of quick withdrawal by a set date

had no grounds for their assumption that the enemy would respond by

promptly releasing the captive Americans. And if a unilateral withdrawal

did at least bring the leaders in Hanoi to the point of discussing return of

prisoners, what leverage would remain to induce them to talk about any

of the men beyond the 339 they admitted holding in North Vietnam?"
The National League and Other Family Organizations 421

These expressions of varying opinion occurred as 000 began its

principal family briefing effort of 1971, to run from mid-June to 3 July.

From its earliest planning the tour had received strong support from some

officials in the White House, with intimations that the president himself

was interested. 34 Presumably they looked to the briefings for an up-todate reading on attitudes among the next of kin and on the likelihood

of defections to the side of the vocal opposition. At any rate, these were

the matters covered in the report that Nutter's assistant, Roger Shields,

supplied to the White House after the tour ended.

Noting that 1,076 relatives of the prisoners and missing had attended

meetings at 21 locations across the country, Shields thought a reliable

sampling of family sentimenrs had been obtained.

A very small minority of the families present at the briefingsprobably less than five per cent-expressed the belief that our

entire involvement in Vietnam is misconceived, and that the

U.S. government should pay whatever price the other side

demands for the release of the prisoners. At the other extreme,

about the same number expressed their opposition to current

policy because they favor a much harder line. A larger group,

perhaps twenty per cent of attending families, supports completely Administration policy with regard to the entire conflict

in Southeast Asia. These families accept the fact that the PWI

MIA issue is only one facet of the over-all problem, and express

confidence in those handling the PW/MIA affairs. The remainder

of the families, a great majority, supports the Administration,

but are discouraged because of the duration of the problem and

are confused because of conflicting reports they receive concerning U.S. initiatives in Paris and positions taken by the other side.

He concluded that "only a very small minority appears ready to openly dissociate themselves from the Administration and to associate with dissident

groups."35

Shields gave no assurance that this relatively favorable distribution of

family opinion would continue. In fact, the remainder of his report dwelt

on the potential for changes in attitude owing to a recent development in

the Paris negotiations. On 1 July 1971 the Viet Cong's principal delegate,

Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, had put forward a seven-point peace proposal.*

As summarized in news reports, it seemed to turn primarily on the U.S.

government giving a pledge to withdraw totally by the end of 1971 in exchange for the release of all prisoners of war. The Viet Cong proposal had

* See Chapter 21.
422 THE LONG ROAD HOME

appeared in time to influence only the last three sessions of the briefing

tour, where it quickly became the chief subject of questions from next of

kin. "Most of the families view this proposal as new, significant, and the

product of past behind-the-scenes discussions at Paris," Shields wrote.

"They have great hopes, and are even optimistic, that this proposal provides the basis for negotiations and bargaining that will shortly result

in the return of our men." A telegram sent by the National League of

Families at the time actually thanked the president and his subordinates

for their efforts, "which apparently have borne fruit in the new offer by the

other side in Paris. "36

Shields was concerned that families who normally supported the administration's policies were continually subjected to pressures and misinformation from a variety of sources. He observed that this had "inevitably created

some doubts in the minds of the families, especially as to whether or not

the prisoners and missing are being used as reasons for prolonging U.S.

military involvement in Southeast Asia. Anything we do that might confirm

these doubts in the minds of the families could lead to a rapid withdrawal of

their support." Accordingly, it was particularly important to give the families assurance, as far as possible, that the United States would take a positive

attitude toward examining the 1 July proposal in depth as a "real foundation

for meaningful negotiations."17

What Shields recommended proved exceedingly difficult to achieve. When

studied in full rather than in newspaper accounts, the Binh proposal was

found to differ only marginally from what the enemy had been saying since

September 1970: Discussion of the release of prisoners could start once the

United States committed itself to a firm wirhdrawal date. It was equally difficult to find any modification of previous positions in the rest of rhe

seven points. The future form of government in Sourh Vietnam would be

determined under a ser of procedures whose purpose, clearly enough, was

to assure that only the Communist side had any say in the outcome.

In Paris, Ambassador David K. E. Bruce sought to open a discussion

and to obtain clarification of a number of passages. For instance, when it

was said rhat the parties would "agree on rhe modalities of the release,"

Bruce asked what parties and just what prisoners were involved. The Communisr representatives repeated their original terms but refused to explain

or elaborate. By the end of July they were charging thar the United States

had prevented progress by failing to give a "positive" response. In the face

of these tactics the U.S. negotiators were hard put to build a record of

"probing deeply," as Shields had hoped, to find a basis for agreement. Meanwhile, when talking to American political figures not connected with the

Nixon administrarion, Communist officials in Paris encouraged the visitors
The National League and Other Family Organizations 423

to believe that they were eager to bargain seriously if only the United States

would cease its obstructionism.'s

As preparations went forward for the second annual convention of

the National League of Families, set for late September 1971, it became

known that some members wanted the League to make its influence felt

by taking a stand in favor of the Mansfield Amendment* and related proposals that were pending in Congress for ending the U.S. involvement in

Southeast Asia. This would require a vote to remove the charter provision

dedicating the League to humanitarian and nonpartisan purposes, which

prevented it from taking political action. The 050 officials responsible

for PW/MIA affairs anticipated that there would be heated debate on this

issue during the annual meeting and that press reports would tend to play

up any opposition to administration policies. Nevertheless, officials were reasonably confident of the outcome. The preconference assessment was that

most League members preferred to continue with the present orientation,

pursuing humanitarian goals on which all could agree, rather than endanger

their unity by addressing more controversial matters. 59

Another consideration-well understood but not often mentionedwas the probable impact of a change on the League's finances. The organization drew its material support mainly from contriburions, which donors

could claim as income tax deductions. That additional incentive to their

generosity would be lost if the League renounced its humanitarian and nonpartisan status to become politically active.

The customary arrangements had been made for 000 support and

participation at the convention, with Secretary Laird listed as the principal

speaker at the annual dinner. Thought had been given to the possibility that

some strongly dissenting members might stage demonstrations or otherwise

attempt to disrupt the League's business, but this was considered unlikely.

Admiral Epes did pass on a friendly warning that apparently had come

from within the League's hierarchy: Rude noises might be heard from some

corners of the banquet hall if the secretary's remarks contained nothing

more than "the usual bland assurances of concern and that everything that

can be done is being done. "40

Laird did not fail the test. In particular he did not duck the question

of the enemy's I July peace plan. He pointed out that while a number of

Americans had claimed on the basis of some direct or indirect contact

with the North Vietnamese that Hanoi was ready to negotiate, the official

U.S. delegation to the Paris talks had not even been able to obtain a clear

statement of the meaning of the seven-point proposal. Did it in fact cover

* See Chapter 21.
424 THE LONG ROAD HOME

all prisoners wherever held in Indochina, and what provIsIOn would be

made for accounting for the missing? Whenever they had pressed Hanoi's

representatives for an explanation, the U.S. delegates had received "no

response or a response veiled in ambiguity." In fact, Laird continued, "Hanoi

has never said to anyone authorized to negotiate for the United States that

the prisoners will be released if American troops withdraw, and of course,

there are other conditions which they wane fulfilled. "41

Laird spoke to an audience already excited by the surprise appearance

of President Nixon, whose unscheduled arrival had brought the diners to

their feet. Another standing ovation followed his informal remarks, pitched

mainly at the inspirational level, which left a more systematic account of

the government's activities in the PW/MIA area to Laird, whose address he

said he had read and endorsed. Nixon recalled his meeting with the group

of wives and mothers in the White House in December 1969 and avowed

that from that date it had been known throughout the executive branch

that the task of obtaining the release of the prisoners and information on

the missing had presidential priority. He repeated the assurance that every

available means of negotiating with the enemy was being pursued, putting

more than the usual emphasis on the point that this included many private channels not yet disclosed. In parting, the president told the PW/

MIA relatives he was "just so proud of how great you have been and I am

not going to let you down."42

Both Laird and the president had appealed effectively to the sensibilities of the next of kin in a bid to renew their faith that the nation's leaders

had a comprehensive grasp and awareness of the PW/MIA problem. Neither

man's performance had any impact on the resolution of the cardinal question before the convention, however. The proposition that the National

League of Families should remain a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization

devoted to humanitarian purposes had already been endorsed overwhelmingly. Of nearly 700 members present, plus 63 voting by proxy, only 15

opposed the resolution. The election of the board of directors had been conducted by a mail ballot of the entire membership, with a similar result. Of

the 54 candidates, only 12 favored removing the provisions that prohibited

the League from taking political action, and none of these won a seat on

the board. 43

Though the election results were gratifying to observers in the White

House and Pentagon, it could not be supposed that the League of Families would henceforth give unquestioning support to Nixon administration

policies. At the September 1971 convention the League had passed one resolution conveying to the president "its extreme distress at the continuing

failure to resolve the prisoner of war/missing in action tragedy" and another
The National League and Other Family Organizations 425

expressing alarm that the U.S. withdrawal was proceeding without prior

agreement on release of the prisoners and identification of the missing.

Besides calling on the executive branch for "strong, new initiatives," it

had passed another measure whose effects the White House might

find unwelcome:

RESOLVED that the National League of Families of American

Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia do now beseech the

Congress of the United States with the deepest urgency to undertake immediate and vigorous action to resolve the conflict in

Southeast Asia and to assure the prompt return of all prisoners

and an accounting of the missing in all areas in Southeast Asia.

It is the League's strong fear that the ability of our men to survive their confinement may now be measured in hours and days,

not weeks or months.

Further, the League had given an unmistakable signal that circumstances

might still arise in which "going political" would have to be considered

again. Unwilling to allow another full year to pass before reviewing their

position, the League members scheduled a special meeting for May 1972

to reassess the situation and determine a future course of action. A final

sentence not added to any other resolution adopted at the convention specified that "Copies of this RESOLUTION shall be distributed to officials of

the Nixon Administration, to the leaders of both political parties, and to

members of the press."44

The remaining months of 1971 saw no diminution of the domestic

political controversy over the proper course for the nation to take in Southeast Asia. Restiveness continued among the PW/MIA families, as indicated

by the questions submitted through the League's regular channel to

Kissinger. Some played on a frequently recurring theme: "Would President

Nixon be willing to set a date for the total withdrawal of troops if that

would bring total resolution of this problem? Why not make this offer?"

A deeper disquiet underlay another query: "'If the POW's are to be sacrificed for the Vietnamization program, why not tell us now?"45

Public controversy intensified during the final week of the year, when

President Nixon ordered a five-day resumption of the bombing of North

Vietnamese military targets and supply depots. Convinced that the enemy

had stepped up infiltration and had violated the 1968 understanding on

which the bombing halt was based, he considered the air operations necessary to protect the U.S. forces remaining in South Vietnam. Opponents

immediately condemned the move, with the New York Times declaring

editorially that it "shattered the Administration-fostered myth that President Nixon is effectively winding down the war in Indochina." Senator
426 THE LONG ROAD HOME

George S. McGovern said the aerial assault on North Vietnam "makes it

certain that none of our prisoners will be released. Ir purs anorher padlock

on their cells. "46

Early in 1972 the secretary of defense received a memorandum prepared by Roger Shields and Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Daniel

Henkin. They saw evidence of an accelerating change of attitude among

wives and parents and wrote that "we face a potential crisis here." It now

appeared probable that the National League of Families would advance the

special May meeting to March and that sentiment for engaging in political

action would be much stronger than before. Laird's two advisers thought a

major factor was the way the North Vietnamese had been using ambiguous or deceitful statements about their own position to foster uncertainties

about the sincerity of the Nixon administration's commitment to ending

the war. The line of action that Shields and Henkin recommended to counter this was substantially the one President Nixon adopted two weeks later

in his address to the nation on 25 January 1972. 47

The president revealed the existence and much of the substance of

the secret negotiations that had been in progress since August 1969 and

had involved Henry Kissinger in unpublicized journeys on 12 occasions. The

record of the secret talks showed that many of the steps currently being

urged on the Nixon administration had already been raken via this private

channel. As early as 31 May 1971 the United States had offered to name a

deadline for total withdrawal in exchange for the release of all prisoners of

war and a general cease-fire. Both that and a later U.S. offer involving a

nine-month deadline had been turned down by the North Vietnamese

representatives. Then in October 1971 the United States advanced a proposal

that at least partly accommodated both the latest enemy position in the

private negotiations and the seven-point plan that Mme. Binh had set

forth publicly at the Paris peace talks. The president said that three months

had elapsed without an answer from the North Vietnamese, while the Communist delegates in the open sessions in Paris continued to berate the

United States for failing to respond to the seven-point plan. North Vietnamese spokesmen intimated to unofficial American visitors that agreement could easily be attained on terms that in fact had already been rejected

by Hanoi's representative in the secret talks.

President Nixon declared that the other side could no longer be allowed

to exploit the good faith with which the United States had entered into

the private negotiations. The peace plan that Kissinger had advanced in

the secret talks on 11 October 1971 remained the U.S. position and would

now be open to discussion in either the public or private channel. This

plan provided that upon reaching an agreement that included a cease-
The National League and Other Family Organizations 427

fire throughout Indochina, all U.S. and allied forces would be withdrawn

from South Vietnam within six months and an exchange of all prisoners

of war would take place. The political futute of South Vietnam would

be determined in a new presidential election, conducted under international supervision and with safeguards for the free participation of all

political factions. 48

Less than 48 hours later the president was informed of the results of a

poll of the leadership of the National League of Families, plus the views

of other outside observers. "In essence, from the standpoint of retaining

the bulk of the families in support of the Administration, your speech was

a great success." "You scored a ten-strike" was another of the enthusiastic

comments. By demonstrating that there was substance to the secret negotiating effort and that it had been pursued untiringly and with frequent

U.S. initiatives, Nixon had even won back some leading figures in the

League who had lately been counted as members of the opposition.

His aides were preparing to mail copies of the president's speech to all

PW/MIA families. 49

In the improved atmosphere created by the president's January address

no more was heard of the possibility that the National League of Families

might move up its special meeting to March. As the originally scheduled

dates of 5-7 May 1972 approached, officials in OSD still anticipated that

the League might gravitate toward a more militant political stance, especially with likely "heavy attendance of politically-minded family members."

But journalists who covered the event predicted more fireworks than

actually ensued. Reporting afterward to the League's members as their

national coordinator, Evelyn Grubb remarked that "the news media, for

the most part, portrayed actions taken at the meeting as constituting 'a

break with the Nixon Administration.'" She considered this to be as far

off the mark as earlier instances when the press "depicted us as being

'captives' of the Administration." The League, she affirmed, had never

actively supported either the Nixon administration or its critics. As for redirecting the organization toward political ends, no resolution either for

or against had been offered at the meeting. The League's humanitarian

charter and goals remained unchanged. 50

Nonetheless, at the May meeting the National League of Families again

voiced "its extreme distress at the failure of this administration's policy to

resolve the MIA-POW issue." It called for action to insure an accounting

of the missing and the release of the prisoners of war-"not just the withdrawal of combat troops." And those present were not content merely to

publish a resolution. They designated three of their most trusted leaders

to seek an audience with President Nixon. 51
428 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Any expectation that the White House meeting would develop into a

serious confrontation receded with the events of the following day, 8 May.

President Nixon announced the additional measures he found necessary

in the face of the massive invasion of South Vietnam launched five weeks

earlier by the North Vietnamese. In order to deny Hanoi the weapons and

supplies it needed to continue these military operations, he had directed

the mining of North Vietnamese ports, plus action by U.S. forces to

interdict deliveries by sea, rail, and land routes. Other air and naval strikes

against military targets, begun at an earlier stage of the enemy assault,

would continue. "These actions 1 have ordered will cease when the following

conditions are met: First, all American prisoners of war must be returned.

Second, there must be an internationally supervised cease-fire throughout Indochina." The president pledged that once those two objectives

were achieved, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam would be

completed within four months-the shortest time period yet mentioned. j2

The League of Families delegation to the White House on 15 May consisted of three wives: Sybil Stockdale, Maureen Dunn, and Phyllis Galanti.

At a press conference on emerging from their meeting with the president

they gave a wholehearted endorsement to his recent policy pronouncement.

While making clear that this expressed only their personal opinion, they

were confident they could communicate the feeling of reassurance they

had received to the League's membership at large. This feeling stemmed

mainly from the mining of Haiphong and other ports and from President

Nixon's pledge that there would be no relaxarion of these measures until

the captives were freed and the missing accounted for. Mrs. Galanti told

newsmen that the president had "put ir very well when he said rhat at last

we may have some leverage to get the men home. We had none before."j3

From the delegation's favorable response to the president's moves and

the avoidance of a showdown at the May convention it was evident that

pressures for the League to undertake more aggressive political activity had

eased. In part the explanation lay in the fact that the board of directors

had already found a role for the League to play in the political process, one

that would not violate rhe charter provisions and yet could serve to keep

the question of the prisoners and missing before the country throughout

the 1972 election campaign. In late January the board had announced

the establishment of a Non-Partisan Political Action Committee, and the

League's national meeting in May reaffirmed this decision. Members of

the Political Action Commitree throughout the counrry had the mission

of eliciting from all candidates a clear declaration of their stand on imporram aspects of the PW/MIA problem. The League's committee would
The National League and Other Family Organizations 429

issue no statements either endorsing or opposing any candidate or party,

but it would publicize their positions. 54

Individual PW/MIA relatives could operate more freely, of course, and

the political action committee's leadership was not reticent in suggesting

that they do so. In a letter to League members late in February, co-chairman

Joan Vinson urged the families to become involved at the local level in the

process by which delegates and alternates to the state and national nominating conventions were selected. In particular, any League members who

were thinking of running for delegate in either political party were encouraged to do so. If elected, they would be able to press more effectively

for fulfillment of the League's objective, which was to see that no political party wrote its platform and no candidate came before the voters

without taking a position on how to recover the prisoners and gain an

accounting of the missing. 55

Unquestionably, family members were active in politics in larger

numbers in 1972 than before. Several PW/MIA relatives won places as

delegates or alternates to the Democratic National Convention, including

Valerie Kushner, who had been prominent in the League's affairs. She

delivered one of the seconding speeches when Senator McGovern's name

was placed in nomination in July. Later in the campaign, at a press conference marking the completion of her term as chairman of the board

of the League of Families, Carole Hanson endorsed President Nixon's bid

for reelection. 56

The election year offered many channels for personal commitment

and expression, all of them easier to pursue and more likely to bring satisfying results than an attempt to wheel the National League of Families into

line as a unified political force. As the one widely recognized organization of PW/MIA relatives, counting most of them in its membership, the

League encompassed too wide a spectrum of interests and opinion to be

turned to a single political purpose. Yet those same broad ranks continued

to give it a moral authority and indeed a political influence the administration could not afford to ignore.
20

PW/MIA Legislation and Benefits

By early 1973 the U.S. government had in place an extensive system

of benefits and special arrangements for the captive and missing servicemen in Southeast Asia and their families. The cumulative result of

decisions and administrative rulings made over several years, the system

continued to grow more extensive as the day of homecoming approached.

Defense officials had found sufficient authority in existing regulations for

the introduction of some of these beneficial provisions. More commonly,

however, congressional action had been required to amend the statutes that

set the pay and other conditions of service in the armed forces. DoD had

requested and supported a majority of the measures enacted, usually by

including them in the legislative program that the department submitted

each year to Congress.

Other proposals were advanced by members of the House or Senate

who had become sensitive to the problems of the missing servicemen and

their dependents. The work of certain of the congressional committees contributed to their awareness, along with what they heard more directly

from the National League of Families and from individual constituents.

Often DoD supported a member's bill or at least endorsed its purpose

while suggesting improvements. At times Defense officials found it

necessary to speak against proposed legislation, pointing out its undesirability as a precedent or detailing some of the unintended consequences that

could be foreseen. It is notable that as the system of benefits evolved in

the period from 1967 through early 1973, Congress enacted no measure

that DoD directly opposed. Admittedly, a few benefit proposals had been

allowed to pass unchallenged despite misgivings entertained in the Pentagon. One of these-the privilege of space-available travel on military

aircraft within the continental United States, granted to PW/MIA wives

430
PW/MIA Legislation and Benefits 431

in 1968-had in its favor the personal endorsement of the chairman of

the House Armed Services Committee.!

Underlying the entire program was the conviction that the mISSIng

men and their families deserved special consideration. They were "a group

of Americans who are undergoing extreme hardship as a direct result of

having faithfully served our country," as a Defense official put it when

testifying before a Senate committee in September 1972. 2 Their plight won

immediate sympathy, and it is not surprising that some of the proposals

offered on Capitol Hill seemed to spring simply from the impulse to compensate the men somehow for their hard fate. Other bills, more thoughtfully conceived, aimed to overcome particular problems. The purpose might

be to remove some of the legal hindrances families encountered because

their military head-oE-household was not present, or to insure that rights

the men would ordinarily be entitled to were not forfeited or allowed to

expire during their absence. There was general agreement that the captured or missing should not have to suffet any additional setbacks owing

to their status. They should not be disadvantaged financially or in career

advancement, and their dependents should not have to forgo any of the

opportunities normally available to military families.

Benefits affecting the next of kin usually attempted to ease their lot

in some way that contributed to making their lives as tolerable as possible

under the circumstances. In most cases these measures and the family allotment from the servicemen's pay were effective in insuring that material

needs could be met, but it had to be recognized that no benefit provision

could do much to alleviate the private anguish of wives and parents over

the fate of their loved ones. Defense officials and interested members of

Congress did give thought to relieving some of the secondary anxieties of

the next of kin, such as fear that another male member of the family

might be drafted for military service or concern about the cost of further

education when children finished high school.

Laws dealing with the management of a serviceman's affairs when he

became a casualty had generally been written with the killed and wounded

more in mind than the captured or missing and with no particular attention to the possibility of a prolonged absence. When applied to men entering their third or fourth year as missing persons these laws were found to

operate in ways that were sometimes inconsistent and occasionally unjust.

Several of the earliest legislative actions sought to correct discrepancies of

this kind. Considerations of equity and fair dealing also seemed to demand

an extension of the War Claims Act to the current hostilities. Under that

law, following both World War II and the Korean conflict, returned U.S.
432 THE LONG ROAD HOME

prisoners of war and civilian detainees had been able to claim a set

remuneration for each day of inhumane treatment while in enemy hands.

Bills to extend this right to the Americans who were suffering similar privations in Southeast Asia came before Congress as early as 1968, and the

legislation was approved in mid-1970.

Thus some of the earlier legislative acts had the obvious justification of

rectifying oversights and preventing existing laws from operating to the disadvantage of PW/MIAs. Other purposes came to the fore in later years. By

1972, benefit actions sometimes had the appearance of reaching rather far

to attain a ruling or interpretation exceptionally favorable to the interests

of the men and their families.

The scope of the benefits emerges more clearly from the listing below,

beginning with the provision that a serviceman continued to have credited

to his account the pay and allowances to which he was entitled when he

became missing, a basic necessity for PW/MIA dependents. The assurance

of uninterrupted pay was not newly introduced for their benefit, however.

Of much longer standing, it had a statutory basis in the laws governing

the armed forces. Most of the other benefits and special provisions listed

below applied exclusively to the men missing or captured in Southeast Asia

and their families. A few were permanent changes in the laws, occasioned

by the Vietnam experience but not limited to it. Benefit measures began to

enter the record as early as 1967, but most appeared during the later years

of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Usually they were applied retroactively

to 28 February 1961 to permit coverage of the early years of U.S. activity

in Indochina.

Benefit Provisions in Effect as ofJanuary 1973

Pertaining mainly to the men in missing status

Members of the armed forces in missing status, including

prisoners of war, continued to receive the pay and allowances

to which they were entitled upon entering that status, with subsequent adjustments for promotions, longevity increases, general

pay raises, and other entitlements that might be enacted. In addition to basic pay raises, and the other allowances for quarters and

subsistence, the continuation applied to flight pay and other

forms of incentive or hazardous duty pay and to family separation

allowances, the special pay received by medical and dental officers,

and the foreign duty or sea duty pay earned by enlisted men.
PW/MIA Legislation and Benefits 433

In July 1972 a ruling by the comptroller general of the United

States established that servicemen without dependents who were

not receiving quarters or subsistence allowances at the time they

became missing were nevertheless entitled to such payments

while in missing status.'

Both officer and enlisted personnel were considered for

advancement and promoted in step with their contemporaries,

except for promotion to general or flag officer rank.* 4

PL 90-122, 3 November 1967, authorized each secretary of

a military department, acting in the interest of a missing serviceman or his dependents, to initiate, change, or stop an allotment

from the man's pay to the Uniformed Services Savings Deposit

Program (USSDP). Available only to military personnel on duty

outside the United States, the USSDP paid 10 percent interest

on deposits up to a maximum of $10,000. Later, PL 91-200,

26 February 1970, exempted servicemen in missing status during

the Vietnam conflict from the $10,000 limit on deposits.

PL 91-289, 24 June 1970, extended the War Claims Act of

1948 to cover members of the armed forces held as prisoners of

war at any time during the Vietnam conflict. It qualified them for

the same types of payment that returned captives of World War

II and the Korean War had received, but with an adjustment for

intervening economic changes that doubled the earlier rates. The

law authorized $2.00 for each day the prisoner of war was not

furnished the quality or quantity of food specified by the Geneva

Convention and $3.00 per day of captivity for forced labor or

inhumane treatment contrary to the Geneva Convention.

PL 91-534,7 December 1970, extended the family separation

allowance of $30 a month to any serviceman not otherwise

entitled to it if he had dependents and was in missing status

during the Vietnam conflict. Recipients of this benefit were

enlisted men in grades below E-4 (Army corporal and equivalent)

and those in E-4 with less than four years of service.

PL 92-279, 26 April 1972, amended the Internal Revenue

Code to exclude from gross income for federal income tax purposes the entire compensation received by a member of the armed

forces duri ng any month he was in missing status incident to the

* Although no missing or captured personnel were actually promoted to brigadier general

or rear admiral prior to homecoming, several known prisoners were chosen for such

advancement, with one instance occurring in the Air Force as early as January 1968.

The names of these individuals did not appear on the selection lists to avoid marking them

for enemy exploitation, and the president's further step of nominating them to the Senate

for confirmation was withheld until after the men's return. See memo l.aird for Pres,

20 Jan 73, sub: Air Force General Officer Nominations, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jan 73).
434 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Vietnam conflict. (The missing men were already covered by an

exclusion for military personnel serving in a combat zone, which

applied to all compensation of enlisted men and $500 a month of

officers' pay. Hence the main practical effect of the amendment

was to give tax-free status to all of an officer's pay, rather than

part. Since the legislation was retroactive to 28 February 1961, it

also provided the basis for submission of amended returns for

prior years, so that an income tax refund could result.)

PL 92-482, 12 October 1972, permitted the continuation of

flight pay and other forms of incentive pay for up to one year

during hospitalization and rehabilitation following the man's

return from missing status, without regard to his ability to meet

the qual ification standards.

While missing or captured, military personnel continued to

earn annual leave at the usual rate of 30 days per year. PL 92-596,

27 October 1972, permitted them to accumulate credit for annual

leave without limit, disregarding the restriction on carry-over to

a following year (normally 60 days, but 90 days when serving in

a combat zone). Further, the leave accruing while in missing status

was to be kept in a separate account and must be paid for by the

government rather than taken as leave. (Under the repatriation

plan, returnees would receive ample convalescent leave on a nonchargeable basis.) For men who died while in missing status, the

cash payments would go to next of kin.

Bearing primarily on PW/MIA dependents

PL 90-236, 2 January 1968, authorized storage at government expense on a "nontemporary" basis (beyond the standard

one year) of the household and personal effects of a member of

the armed forces in missing status.

PL 92-477, 9 October 1972, authorized additional movements

of dependents and household goods of a missing serviceman,

beyond the one-time move at government expense to which he

was already entitled. The law also added mobile homes and house

trailers to the possessions that could be transported, in either an

original or later move, and it stipulated that for these items the

usual limit on cost to the government would be waived.

Under a 000 policy incorporated in service regulations in

April 1968, dependent wives of the missing or captured were

permitted to travel within the continental United States on a

space available basis on military transport type aircraft with

appropriate comfort facilities. Such travel was authorized

"for humanitarian purposes." Later decisions expanded the

eligibility for this benefit to include dependent children
PW/MIA Legislation and Benefits 435

accompanying the wife (January 1969), and dependent parents

(October 1970).5

The Social Security Administration amended its regulations

in June 1970 to protect survivors from loss of benefits due them

following the death of a serviceman while in missing status.

Difficulties had arisen because -social security benefits could not

be paid retroactively for more than one year, figuring backward

from the month in which survivors either filed the application

or made a statement of intent to claim benefits (a "protective

writing statement"). Since dependents ordinarily did not take

such steps until there was a conclusive official finding that their

family member had died, the application date could be several

years later than the date of death recognized by the Social

Security Administration, with resulting loss of benefits for all

but one of the years that had elapsed. Under the amended regulation the Social Security Administration accepted the service's

initial report of casualty (DD Form 1300) as a notice reserving

the right of next of kin to claim benefits. The protection also

extended to certain rights of prisoners of war who survived. Upon

repatriation they were eligible to claim insurance benefits for

any period of physical disability during their captivity.{'

PL 91-584, 24 December 1970, qualified the wives and

children of servicemen in missing status to receive certain Veterans

Administration (VA) benefits. It allowed these dependents to use

the educational assistance grants to which the husband or father

was entided. The law also made the wife eligible for the VA home

loan guarantee that her husband might have claimed.

Beginning in August 1971, dependent wives and children of

PW/MIA servicemen became eligible to visit Hawaii under

arrangements similar to those made for service wives who went

there to join husbands on Rest and Recuperation (R&R) leave

from duty in Vietnam. Thanks to a DoD initiative, the PW/MIA

dependents qualified for reduced round-trip fares on commercial

flights from the West Coast. During stays of up to two weeks in

Hawaii they also received discounts on hotel accommodations

and other expenditures. Participation was limited to once in

12 months.

PL 92-129, 28 September 1971, prohibited the induction of

a person under the Selective Service System during any period

when his father or brother was captured or missing. In an administrative ruling in January 1973 the Director of Selective

Service stated that upon the return of the father or brother from

missing status the draft deferment of other eligible family

member.> would continue, since they would rhen be reclassified

3-A (Family Hardship).K
436 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Another provision of PL 92-129 granted draft exemption to

the sons or brothers of any person who died in line of duty while

serving in the armed forces after 31 December 1959. Though

applying more commonly to killed-in-action cases, it would also

come into effect whenever an official determination of death was

made with respect to a servicemen in missing status.

PL 92-169, 24 November 1971, made the promotion of a

serviceman while in missing status "fully effective for all purposes," including most federal benefits to survivors. Even though

his death might subsequently be determined to have occurred

on an earlier date than the promotion, the higher grade he had

attained would be used when computing such payments as

the Dependency and Indemnity Compensation that the man's

survivors received from the Veterans Administration.

PL 92-365, 7 August 1972, opened the way for sons of

military personnel in missing status to obtain appointments to

the service academies. It allowed them to compete in a special

category for a number of presidential appointments.

To relieve problems experienced by PW/MIA families when

the power of attorney executed by a serviceman reached its

expiration date while he was in missing status, PL 92-540,

24 October 1972, provided an automatic extension for so long

as he remained in that status. The law applied only to powers

of attorney granted to a wife or other relative and was limited to

"the Vietnam era."

For men later determined to have died while in missing

status, PL 92-596, 27 October 1972, prescribed a method of computing annual leave credits that tended to maximize the cash

payments to survivors. The missing man continued to earn

annual leave through the date on which the secretary of his

military department received conclusive evidence of his death or

determined that a presumptive finding of death should be made.

The law placed a limit of 150 days on the leave for which cash

settlement could be made, unless the actual date of death justified

a greater credi t.

The Veterans Administration took a similar approach when

determining the payments to be made to beneficiaries from the

Servicemen's Group Life Insurance (SGLl) of a missing man who

was later found to have died. Under a VA ruling published in

November 1972, SGLl coverage remained in force until the day

the secretary of the military department officially terminated

the man's missing status, notwithstanding any earlier date of

death that might be established. Since the government had

progressively increased the face value of SGLl policies over the

years, the effeer of the ruling was to give survivors the benefit of
PW/MIA Legislation and Benefits 437

the highest insurance amount that had been in effect during the

period of missing status.')

Several of the listed benefits stand out as exceptionally favorable, the

foremost being the pay that was entirely free of federal income tax. The

beneficial effects of the promotion policy and the savings deposit arrangement are also noteworthy.

Administering the policy on the promotion of captured and missing

personnel remained the responsibility of the individual services. Each

adhered to the general proposition that officers were to be considered by

selection boards along with their contemporaries and promoted at a rate

that would maintain their relative position. Similarly, enlisted men should

be advanced subject to the same time-in-grade standards as other personnel

of their service but with a waiver of the qualifying examinations for promotion to the upper grades. 10 For the most part the record on promotion did

not differ greatly from one military department to another, but one clear

instance of varying performance among the services occurred late in 1970.

It did not escape the notice of the National League of Families and certain

members of Congress.

Writing to the secretary of the Air Force in December 1970, Joan Vinson

of the National League drew attention to the decisions made on missing

personnel by a recent promotion board. Of 31 Air Force lieutenant

colonels eligible for promotion to colonel, only 2 had been selected. She

contrasted this with what she understood to be the Navy's policy, under

which every commander in the primary zone of eligibility was advanced

to captain. Vinson noted in passing that the Army had only one eligible

officer at that level, whose case was still pending. "This seems to be an

Air Force problem," she continued. "Why only two? Why not all of them?"

"All of these men probably would not have been promoted if they had

not been Missing or Prisoners," Vinson conceded, "but it seems to me that

persons who have done so much to help preserve our freedom should be

given special consideration. They are serving their country in a very unique

way and they can't control the destiny of their careers. This contribution of

theirs is worthy of separate and distinct recognition." II

In answering a query from Rep. Olin E. Teague the following month,

OSD confirmed that all Navy and Marine Corps officers in missing status

had been selected for promotion each time they were eligible. All enlisted

men, whatever the service, had received at least one promotion and those

missing for longer periods had had several. The reply described in some

detail how Air Force selection boards processed promotions to the grades
438 THE LONG ROAD HOME

of major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel under guidance that had apparently been made more explicit after the recent protest. The procedures

insured that the identity of those who were missing or captured was known

to the board when it began its deliberations, so that any apparent weakness

of their records would not be misinterpreted. When faced with an absence

of current Officer Effectiveness Reports, Air Force board members were to

"presume that the manner of performance and promotion potential of these

officers would have continued at least at the level indicated on evaluations

at the time they entered a MIA or captured status."12

Inquiries continued to be received, including one from the White House

that was answered early in February 1971 by Roger Shields. Noting that

all services had set aside the normal requirements for tests and fitness

reports when considering the missing men for advancement, he characterized their policies as "extremely liberal." At the lower enlisted levels (E-5

and below), promotions were taking place routinely upon completion of

the minimum time in grade. "In all candor, promotion to grades lower

than 0-6 [colonel] for officers and E-8/9 for enlisted men has been virtually

automatic," Shields observed. The statistics gathered for a report to the secretary of defense later in the month bore this out. Apart from the nontypical

results turned in by the recent Air Force board, in only a dozen or so instances had PW/MIA officers or enlisted men not been promoted when

eligible, the assistant secretary of defense for manpower advised Secretary

Laird, adding that the promotion figures for missing and captured personnel indicated "a considerably higher selection rate than is normal for

their active duty contemporaries."!\

The PW/MIA personnel and their families found participation in the

Uniformed Services Savings Deposit Program quite advantageous, owing

both to the favorable terms of the USSDP itself and to the extended length

of time that many of the captured and missing were locked in as depositors.

Established by legislation proposed by 000 and enacted in 1966, the

savings program for members of the armed forces serving outside the

United States and its possessions had a dual purpose. By providing a

government-backed investment at an attractive rate of interest it offered

servicemen the means and incentive to set money aside for the future. At

the same time, by drawing its deposits from the pay of forces stationed

abroad the program tended to reduce the spending of U.S. military personnel in other countries, thereby improving the balance of payments.

Money on deposit in a USSDP account ceased to earn interest 90 days after

the serviceman returned to the United States or its possessions. i'I

President Johnson set the interest rate at the highest level allowed in

the legislation-10 percen t per annum, compounded quarterly, effective
PW/MIA Legislation and Benefits 439

1 September 1966. 15 Thus the rate of return appreciably exceeded that

generally available on savings instruments. In fact, the Federal Reserve Board

had only recently permitted banks to raise the interest paid on certificates

of deposit to 5.5 percent. In the entire period from September 1966 until

Operation Homecoming in early 1973 the yield on 3- to 5-year Treasury

issues averaged less than 7 percent in all years except 1970, while mortgage

rates remained generally in the 7- to 8-percent range.

The USSDP was designed to be recognized as a good deal. Even so,

the response of servicemen overseas surpassed expectation. During the first

10 months of operation more than 149,000 accounts were established

worldwide, with total deposits in excess of $126 million. More than 60,000

of these accounts belonged to men involved in the Southeast Asian hostilities, but few of the owners were among the downed airmen and other

missing personnel. The 350 men missing or captured at the time the

program went into effect had had no opportunity to subscribe to it, and

many of those lost at later dates had not yet made the election or had

decided not to participate. In their current circumstances, however,

assignment to the USSDP of any portion of their pay not allotted to family

support seemed clearly in their best interest, but there was no ready way

to effect the change. By statute the secretaries of the military departments

had broad authority to administer the pay accounts of servicemen in missing status, including the power to adjust allotments to meet the needs

of dependents, but in October 1966 the comptroller general had ruled

that this did not extend to the initiation of an allotment to the voluntary

savings program. 16

The denial of access to the savings program struck some family members as a prime example of insensitivity to the plight of the missing men,

suggesting a disposition to view them as no longer within the military

community. Expressions of family resentment reached the authorities in

Washington. As one wife later put it, "we had to fight to be included in

a Savings Deposit Program in which we had every right to be included automatically." During the next session of Congress DoD presented the case

for removal of the inequity, and the necessary legislation, with a retroactive

provision, was approved in November 1967. Acting in the interest of a

man in missing status "or his dependents," the secretary of a military department was empowered to initiate or change allotments to the USSDP and

to authorize emergency withdrawals from it, even though the serviceman

might earlier have elected not to join the program. Before the year ended,

information went out from the service casualty assistance offices to next

of kin on how to assign some or all of the unallotted portion of their

serviceman's pay to the USSDP. 17
440 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Before long it appeared that another aspect of the savings program

might require adjustment to accommodate the special circumstances of

the captured and missing. By law, USSDP interest could not be paid on

amounts over $10,000; any deposit that raised the balance above that level

remained in the account without bearing interest. For depositors serving

an overseas tour of normal duration the $10,000 limit rarely mattered, but

men with ever-lengthening time in missing status did build up balances

that approached the ceiling. In October 1968 the 000 PW Policy Committee considered addressing the situation by approaching Congress for

authority to make allotments from the missing men's pay for the purchase

of U.S. savings bonds. This would at least allow the surplus funds to earn

interest, though not at the exceptional USSDP rate. During further consultations in 1969 Defense officials agreed to seek a more direct remedy.

In February 1970, at the behest of 000, Congress approved removal of

the $10,000 limit from the USSDP accounts of captured or missing men. IS

Each of the services encouraged its PW/MIA families to participate in

the savings program, but during 1971 the Air Force took a further step.

Believing that proper management of a missing man's affairs all but

demanded that some portion of his pay be invested under the very favorable terms offered by the government, Air Force officials began requiring

that at least 10 percent of the absent member's pay be deposited in the

USSDP. This would occur automatically unless the next of kin could

show that some other systematic savings program was being pursued or

that the mandatory deposit would impose undue hardship on the family. I')

By July 1972 roughly 95 percent of all PW/MIA personnel had funds

on deposit in the USSDP, for a total that exceeded $30 million. The average balance was just under $20,000 while the largest individual account

stood at $120,000. Further growth of the balances was assured, given the

regular monthly allotments from pay and the quarterly compounding of

interest. From mid-1972 that growth continued for nearly a year for the

men who returned at homecoming and ran even longer for the missing. 20

The special provisions relating to the pay and career status of the missing men were under the direct control of the federal government and could

be placed in effect with relative ease. Benefits that aimed at improving the

circumstances of the families had to deal with a wider range of problems,

some of which were less open to influence from Washington. The most

notable examples involved the sale or purchase of real estate, where state

laws and the realities of the marketplace were dominant factors. When

seeking to buy a house with her husband as joint owner, the wife of a

man in missing status usually found it difficult to obtain a mortgage. It

was not merely that loan officers at most institutions were put off by
PW/MIA Legislation and Benefits 441

the uncertain future of the family unit and the wife's lack of an independent credit record. There were other obstacles, as an Air Force official

explained early in 1970:

Some wives of missing in action and captured personnel cannot

obtain commercial loans even when they have a valid power of

attorney because the seller will not accept the power of attorney

or because the use of powers of attorney in real estate transactions is prohibited by state law. Further, when no valid power

of attorney exists, neither commercial loans nor a VA guaranteed

loan is available. If they were united with their husbands, VA

guaranteed loans would be available. If the fate of their husbands

were known, the wives may be entitled to VA guaranteed loans as

widows. In their particular circumstances, they have neither. 2]

Legislation in December 1970 eased the difficulties surrounding the purchase of real estate by extending eligibility for the VA home loan guarantee

to the dependent wife of a captured or missing member of the armed

forces. Another law, nearly two years later, provided for automatic extension of a serviceman's power of attorney beyond its original expiration

date if he continued in missing status. 22

Neither measure had much impact on a more fundamental problem

that wives encountered when attempting to sell the family home-the

question of their ability to convey a clear and marketable title for jointly

owned property. A wife could not do so unless she held a valid power of

attorney and resided in a state whose laws permitted the use of such powers

in real estate transfers. Even when she possessed the proper papers, her

action would be clouded with uncertainties arising from the common law

principle that death revokes an agency. Thus, if it should later be established that the husband had died before the transaction took place, her

authority to represent him could be challenged. In light of these disabilities, title insurance companies were unwilling to issue a policy unless the

risks associated with the wife's use of the power of attorney were excluded

from the coverage. With that limitation the property became unattractive

to prospective buyers and lending institutions. 2.\

The number of PW/MIA families affected by the difficulty of disposing of real property inevitably increased. Housing arrangements that had

been acceptable while waiting out a normal overseas tour became unsatisfactory as time ran on, children grew older, and other conditions changed.

The desire for more fitting accommodations or for return to the family's

original home area could meet with frustration, however, if it depended

on the sale of an existing residence.
442 THE LONG ROAD HOME

One possible remedy received attention at the level of the PW/MIA

Task Group during 1971. It was proposed that legislation be sought to

empower the Department of Defense to acquire the houses of next of kin

as a purchaser of last resort. The suggested model was the Department of

Defense Homeowners Assistance Program, which implemented a law passed

in 1966. In order to protect service personnel from major losses when the

closing down of a military installation forced them to sell in a depressed

housing market, the 1966 law authorized the secretary of defense to buy

their homes at not more than 90 percent of what the property's fair market value was before announcement of the base closing. For current use

the idea was soon abandoned, however, since it offered no way around

the fact that the PW/MIA wife could no more convey a valid title to the

government than to a private purchaser. 24

000 officials had already made attempts to heighten the awareness

of state governments regarding the difficulties encountered by PW/MIA

families and to encourage state legislative action to ease their situation.

The matter found a place in the recommendations that went annually

from 000 to the Council of State Governments, and those forwarded in

1968 focused particularly on the administration and disposition of

property by the next of kin of missing servicemen. During the next two

years a few states took measures to meet the growing problem in that area,

but overall the response was not impressive. 2'i

On 9 May 1972 Deputy Secretary of Defense Kenneth Rush gave

new impetus to the undertaking by writing directly to each of the state

governors. His letter highlighted the legal and practical problems that had

arisen from the extended absence of missing and captured servicemen. Citing the beneficial statutes already enacted by some states, Rush invited the

leaders in other state capitals to sponsor similar legislation to assist the PWI

MIA families. In particular, he wrote, there was need to consider modifying

state laws in order to facilitate real estate transactions, with suitable safeguards for all parties when powers of attorney were involved. Noting the

work being done in this area by a committee of the Young Lawyers Section of the American Bar Association, Rush suggested that the governors

seek the advice of the Florida attorney who headed the effort, Walter S.

McLin III. His group had been active in identifying areas where remedial

legislation by the states could relieve family problems, and its members

were eager to assist in the process.u'

The expectation was that states seeking to facilitate the sale of property

in which a missing serviceman had an interest would adopt some version of

the conservatorship procedures commonly used in transactions involving
PW/MIA Legislation and Benefits 443

persons unable to conduct their own affairs. Typically a spouse or other

relative was appointed conservator by a state court and then completed the

transaction under court supervision. Reviewing the matter in May 1972,

Assistant General Counsel Frank Bartimo concluded that even if states

installed this procedure, difficulties over the marketability of titles would

not cease. The problem lay in the way most title companies and lawyers

specializing in real estate interpreted certain provisions of the Soldiers' and

Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940. The main purpose of the statute was to

protect an individual against court judgments adverse to his interests when

his active duty status in the armed forces materially impaired his ability

to take part in the proceedings. Among other things it provided that

an attorney appointed by a court to represent his interests could not bind

the absent serviceman. Moreover, upon his return the serviceman could

reopen the proceedings and challenge the court's original disposition

of the case. Since it was widely believed that the acts of court-appointed

conservators could be ruled to fall under these provisions, title insurance companies were reluctant to perform their vital role in the consummation of real estate transactionsY

Bartimo proposed that DoD sponsor legislation to set up special procedures for transactions affecting a missing member of the armed forces.

His draft amendment to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act provided

for a court-appointed guardian with authority to make binding commitments in the serviceman's name, and it barred the relitigation of cases

after the man's return. It also provided for intervention by DoD in some

circumstances. The secretary of a military department could designate a

legal officer to "appear in the role of guardian" if he considered it desirable that the missing man's interests be represented "as if they were adverse

to those of the wife who initiated the proceeding." After receiving preliminary approval from the PW/MIA Task Force, Bartimo's proposal

entered on the further steps of coordination that could make it a formal

Defense Department recommendation to Congress, but no conclusive

action took place prior to homecoming. 28

The officials concerned with PW/MIA affairs in the military departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense had given thought to the

development of the benefit system from the beginning. From 1 March 1969

onward they had pursued this course with assurance of the unwavering support of Secretary Laird, whose memorandum of that date set the goals of

"doing all that we possibly can for the next of kin" and of searching our

ways ro further the interests and welfare of the missing men.n The known

attitude of the secretary, frequently referred to in the department's internal
444 THE LONG ROAD HOME

correspondence, gave continuing encouragement to the initiation of

measures beneficial to the men and their families. It helped to insure that

ideas coming from the National League of Families and other sources

would receive conscientious study and would stand a chance of adoption

far above that usually accorded to outside suggestions. Nevertheless, the

manner in which officials proceeded made clear that none supposed the

secretary's dictum was meant to override all other considerations. Besides

being concerned for the existence of appropriate legal authority, members

of the PW/MIA Task Group continued to weigh each proposal carefully

and with reference to its desirability as a precedent for the future. Accordingly, 000 opposed some of the suggested benefits.

One proposal debated during most of 1970 that ultimately failed to

gain approval related to the privilege of space-available travel on military

aircraft within the continental United States, previously granted to wives

of the missing and captured in April 1968 and later extended to dependent children on the same flight. Military dependents generally were

authorized to travel space-available overseas in the company of their military head-of-household, but use of the prerogative within the United States

was a right held exclusively by PW/MIA dependents, one not shared even

by the widows of men killed in the Southeast Asian hostilities. The travel

was to be authorized "for humanitarian purposes," which Defense officials interpreted as including journeys that might give wives a respite

from their responsibilities and "a renewal of strength to continue in their

difficult situations. ",0

When the question of extending the travel privilege to overseas destinations arose, the Navy's assistant secretary for manpower and reserve

affairs, James D. Hittle, became the chief proponent of the extension

within the 000 PW Policy Committee. In April 1970 he wrote that in

meetings around the country the wives of missing Navy and Marine

personnel had repeatedly confronted him with the question, "Why can I

travel inside CONUS via Government air and yet cannot be trusted to travel

Government air outside CONUS?" In arguing the matter the wives often

pointed out that they were prevented from qualifying for vacancies on

trips abroad solely by the unavoidable absence of their husbands and

thus were being denied a privilege commonly available to members of the

military community. The encounters had left Hittle in no doubt that for

these wives space-available travel overseas was "a right they believe they

deserve." They sought it despite their awareness of the rigors of such

travel, he said, and granting the right would have a very favorable effect

on their morale. 11
PW/MIA Legislation and Benefits 445

Because of the limited and highly unpredictable availability of unassigned space on Military Airlift Command flights overseas, opponents

of the extension argued that the supposed "benefit" would be illusory.

Wives and children who might make their way abroad would frequently

find it difficult to complete their journey within any reasonable period

of time. The wait for space on a return flight had been known to run

beyond three weeks, and the expense of families maintaining themselves

would continue during any such period. Furthermore, if wives desired

the travel privilege for purposes of rest and relaxation, numerous resort

areas in the continental United States were available to them under their

existing authorization. If they sought it for trips to Paris and other capitals on behalf of the prisoners and missing, further considerations had to

be weighed. Subsidizing the travel of family members so that they might

petition foreign governments would undoubtedly arouse opposition at

home if their activities were seen as supportive of the Nixon administration's war policy. A greater concern was that the appearance of direct

U.S. government sponsorship would weaken the humanitarian appeal of

the wives' efforts. J2

Accepting that no unanimity of opinion had developed within the

policy committee, Assistant Secretary Nutter as chairman issued a decision

on 22 December 1970. He had concluded that to grant the request for

overseas space-available travel was not in the best interest of the families.

"It would constitute a disservice to our PW/MIA next of kin to authorize

an ostensible privilege which would in facr result in hardship, unanticipated expense and dissatisfaction on the part of family members. While

we have a responsibility to extend every possible support to these families

during a very difficult ordeal, we must also assure that our well intentioned

actions do not cause even greater hardship. "J3

Extension of the travel privilege was turned down largely on practical

grounds, but it was more common for DoD to oppose a benefit on principle, from the viewpoint of the overall good of the military service. An

instance had occurred more than a year earlier, when a congressional committee considered a bill to establish a payment of $16 for each day a

member of the armed forces was in missing status. When the general counsel transmitted the department's views in August 1969 he reminded the

committee that each missing man continued to be credited with all his

regular pay and allowances. Therefore the proposed new payment "would

in effect constitute a bonus," given to anyone missing or captured simply

by virtue of his status. "Although the lot of the prisoner of war is never

a happy one and has recently proved to be particularly deplorable, the
446 THE LONG ROAD HOME

payment of a premium solely on the basis of prisoner-of-war status is not

considered desirable in view of the prevailing policy which prohibits any

voluntary surrender to the enemy." The compensation of prisoners of war

under the War Claims Act should not be regarded as a precedent for the

proposed allowance, the general counsel said. To obtain an award under

that act the serviceman had ro apply to the Foreign Claims Settlement

Commission upon returning from captivity, and favorable action required

a finding that he had been denied adequate food or had endured inhumane treatment. In contrast, the proposed allowance would be paid as a

matter of course to every person in missing status regardless of the treatment received..l4

In May 1972 the department had its first brush with another issue that

would prove to be long-lived. The recommendations that the Repatriation,

Rehabilitation, and Readjustment Committee of the National League of

Families sent to Secretary Laird included one concerning the Uniformed

Services Savings Deposit Program. As prescribed in the law establishing

the program, a serviceman's USSDP account ceased to earn interest 90 days

after his return to the United States. The National League recommended

that DoD petition Congress for authority to extend that period to at least

one year. The brief supporting comment suggested that returnees might

wish to obtain counseling before withdrawing USSDP funds. "Extension

of time may avoid unwise decisions.".l)

The recommendation was couched in noticeably less urgent language

than some others in the League's submission, and officials in the Pentagon

apparently thought that a few reasonable objections and a pronouncement

that the extension was "neither necessary nor advisable" would suffice to

dispose of it. While recognizing that time might be needed to make long-term

investment decisions, they pointed out that there was no requirement to

close the USSDP account within 90 days. The money could remain on deposit indefinitely, though without benefit of the 10 percent interest rate, or

it could easily be transferred to an ordinary savings account for safekeeping. 16

Subsequently, as the result of circulating a questionnaire about these

recommendations, the Air Force found its PW/MIA families nearly

unanimous in supporting extension of the USSDP's interest-bearing period

to one year. Air Force leaders felt obliged to give attention to an opinion

held so widely among next of kin, and in December 1972 they attempted

to have the PW/MIA Task Group reconsider the Defense position. v The

proposal found a place in what was already a widening discussion of

PW/MIA benefits and their underlying justification. It had been building
PW/MIA Legislation and Benefits 447

since October, following the release of Elias, Gartley, and Charles by the

North Vietnamese.*

Gartley's Proposals

Two of the returnees had been captives for less than a year, but Navy

Lt. Markham L. Gartley had been in enemy hands since 1968, and the

information to be gleaned from his four-year prison experience was awaited

with particular interest. During the debriefing Gartley reported that the

men he had known in captivity had discussed repatriation procedures and

the benefits and special considerations they believed were their due.

According to the debriefing officer's paraphrase, "the general feeling of the

PWs is that their personal losses, as a result of imprisonment-to wit career,

health, prime years of life and family separations, are irretrievable and that

the benefits should be commensurate with these sacrifices." The proposal

most widely favored, Gartley said, was the "two for one plan," under which

every day of captivity would count as two days toward retirement (but not

for promotion or other purposes). He illustrated it with the example of

an airman shot down after five years of active duty, who then endured

five years in the prison camps. When repatriated he would have accrued

15 years credit and would need an additional 5 to attain the goal of 20

years and eligibility for retirement. Gartley suggested that a man in that

situation could be placed in less demanding assignments to compensate

for the handicap of prolonged incarceration, and he said the prisoners

believed the returnee should be permitted to pursue a chosen career program, with assurances from the parent service that his subsequent assignments would adhere to it. "Pipeline orders" was the term used. Gartley

indicated that one reason his prison mates attached such importance to

qualifying for retirement before leaving the service was that it would

make them eligible for medical treatment at 000 facilities anywhere

in the country, rather than being subject to the procedures of the Veterans

Administration.'H

Lieutenant Gartley also said the men anticipated that the manner of

their repatriation would deprive them of a privilege normally enjoyed by

service personnel returning from an overseas assignment-the right to

ship home items purchased while abroad in a duty-free status, as part

* See Chapter 10.
448 THE LONG ROAD HOME

of the individual's household effects. He spoke of the men's desire for a

special arrangement permitting them to exercise this privilege by returning to overseas shopping areas during a period of a year or more following repatriation.

One of the main passages in Gartley's debriefing statement had to do

with the USSDP, but the proposals were based on incomplete information

and were too flawed for serious consideration. The passage recorded his

view that "the ten thousand dollar maximum limit on the ten percent

savings plan should never have applied to PWs, and since the limit has

been abolished, it should be made retroactive for all PWs to date of

capture." In fact, the military services had already interpreted the law in

this way. Gartley thought that "the per diem money accrued" should be

automatically deposited in the savings program, but he was actually

speaking of the $S-a-day payment under the War Claims Act, which was

not part of military pay and therefore could not legally be allotted to the

USSDP. Also, war claims payments did not "accrue"; they were awarded

after the prisoner's return to the United States. However, a further sentence in the record did express his underlying thought, foreshadowing

the revised proposal Gartley later offered: "The five dollars per day per

diem is mentioned as a 'sore spot' due to the arduous conditions when

compared to per diem paid to other active duty personnel, stateside

and overseas. "-)9

When the Gartley proposals came to the PW/MIA Task Group for

comment in November 1972, one ISA official began his reply as follows:

I have reviewed Lt. Gartley's recommendations and find them a

"bit much." The point that troubles me most is the underlying

tone that the PW should be a privileged person. Whatever the

misfortune and sacrifice of the PWs, the war in Vietnam has

produced at least two larger groups whose sacrifices were far

greater, those who were killed and those who were maimed. I

know of no privileged treatment for them-their treatment

closely parallels that of World War II and Korea. As we wind

down this conflict, we should not set precedents which are unjustified and could prove excessively hindersome in the future.

In brief compass he had expressed the main themes that ran through nearly

all the replies. Like most of the other respondents, the writer did not categorically reject all the recommendations, but he felt unease over the level

of privilege being claimed and particular concern over the question of

equity. From time to time voices within DoD had cautioned that the
PW/MIA Legislation and Benefits 449

benefits devised for the missing and captured were in danger of becoming excessive when compared with the provision made for the war's

other casualties. Never before, however, had that thought dominated the

discussion as it did now. 40

Some of the comments of the Marine Corps spokesman were especially

pointed. Gartley's proposals appeared to constitute an "unwarranted proliferation" of privileges for a group whose benefits had already "mushroomed into unprecedented proportions." The provision made for men

with disabling injuries and for the families of those killed in action had

not kept pace. On the retirement question, the Marine Corps considered

that the two-for-one plan was "without intrinsic merit as a service

'incentive' or as a desirable morale/discipline factor in future conflicts."

The other three services opposed the plan as well, each of them calling it

unfair to others who served and especially to the surviving prisoners of

war of World War II and Korea, who had received no such consideration.

Opinion divided on the proposed return to shopping areas such as Hong

Kong to purchase duty-free goods. The Army commented that "once

again, the question of equity arises. Should personnel who were wounded

and evacuated, or dependents of those who were killed before they could

go on R&R also be given this entitlement?"41

After completing his debriefing, Gartley had a number of discussions with Iris Powers and other representatives of the National League of

Families, during which his ideas continued to evolve. At one appearance he

spoke again of resentment among the men over the $5-a-day payment to

prisoners of war, a feeling aroused "when we think of our counterparts in

the same rank, et cetera, who are in Saigon, under-and I quote-'hardship

conditions,' and drawing per diems of over $20 a day, and we are in

Hanoi sleeping on cement slabs." His well-informed listeners from the

League immediately took up the task of instructing him on the distinction

between military per diem and the awards made under the War Claims Act,

and Gartley's proposal assumed a more presentable form as a result. By

December 1972 the desired increase in compensation was sometimes

described as a combination of the two kinds of payments, sometimes

simply as an increase in the War Claims stipend from $5 per day to $25.

Gartley had also arrived at a position similar to that of the National League

(and, more recently, the Air Force) on extending the interest-bearing period

of USSDP accounts to allow returnees more time to consider disposition

of the money.42

In January 1973, consistent with the vow he had made "to somehow ... get these benefit programs started for the prisoners," Gartley sent
450 THE LONG ROAD HOME

his proposals to members of the congressional delegation from his home

state of Maine, to Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy, and to Rep.

F. Edward Hebert (La.), chairman of the House Committee on Armed

Services. The two-for-one plan, he wrote, "will enable the men to retire

from active duty earlier than usual and begin a second career or try to

make up the years of family life and enjoyment they were denied while

in prison." He supported the proposal on compensation with the following

comment: "Since US Government quarters were not available in Hanoi or

in the jungle prison camps in Laos and South Vietnam, then the same per

diem rate as Saigon should apply. POW's will receive $5 per day from

the foreign claims settlement commission. This should be augmented by

military per diem pay to make the rates for the POW's equal to men of

the same rank on duty in Saigon when government quarters and messing

were not available." Before the month was out Senator Kennedy and his

Maine colleagues, Edmund S. Muskie and William D. Hathaway, had

introduced a bill incorporating both the per diem idea and the two-forone retirement schemeY

A letter from Roger Kelley, assistant secretary for manpower and

reserve affairs, to Representative Hebert offered DoD's views on the Gartley

proposals. It affirmed the positions established during earlier consideration

by the PW/MIA Task Group. "Recognizing that it is virtually impossible to

repay in benefits commensurate with the sacrifices made by our prisoners

of war and their families," Kelley wrote, "the Department of Defense has

worked toward providing all feasible compensations and entitlements."

Indeed, MIAs had been accorded benefits greatly exceeding those granted

during or after World War II or the Korean War. "This is understandable in

view of current public sentiment, and justifiable in view of the prolonged

periods that many have been maintained in such status ...." The

letter strongly implied, however, that the legitimate bounds of that

endeavor had already been reached. Kelley attached a four-page fact sheet

detailing what Congress, Defense, and other government agencies had so

far provided, to be considered when weighing Gartley's recommendations

for additional benefits. And there was a further point, a finding emerging

from Operarion Homecoming, which was rhen in progress: "We have learned

that Lieutenant Gartley's proposals by no means represent the consensus

of the returnees. "*4 /1

DoD was unwilling to endorse four of Gartley's five proposals. It

favored only a largely noncontroversial one insuring that the health needs

• In fact, Gartley would be criticized by several of the prisoners for the circumstances

of his early release and for his association with a group thought to have cooperated with

the enemy. See Rochester and Kilev, Honor Bound. 553. 567.
PW/MIA Legislation and Benefits 451

of returnees and their families be met on a continuing basis. In opposition

to the two-for-one retirement proposal, Kelley observed that "the military

retirement system which currently authorizes retirement after 20 years of

service without regard to age is a liberal system under any criterion." Kelley

stressed the importance of maintaining the integrity of that retirement

system. It was true that prior to 1912, in a U.S. military establishment

bearing little resemblance to that of 1973, an enlisted man's service in

certain overseas areas was counted as double time toward the 30 years

then necessary for retirement.

Since that date, however, two-for-one credit had not been authorized

for any type of service, and Defense did not wish to see it reintroduced.

Also, the proposal could not be considered "without weighing the impact

against the past, particularly World War II and Korea, and the fact that

many of the prisoners of war of these two experiences are still with us.

Future implications also must be taken into consideration."

DoD did not endorse the idea of paying a per diem rate to PWs.

This proposal compares prisoner of war status to that of a

man on temporary duty in Vietnam and, thereby, entitled

to per diem pay by virtue of temporary duty orders. Such

a person was not a true counterpart of the prisoner of

war; servicemen on an official tour of duty in Vietnam, their

true counterparts, were not entitled to per diem pay.

The status of the prisoner of war is recognized under the

War Claims Act. Therefore, the appropriate direction of this

proposal should be to raise the War Claims payments from

$5.00 to $25.00, if any action is to be taken. However,

DoD would not support the raise from $5.00 to $25.00.

DoD opposed any departure from the principle that had so far been controlling, namely, that payments under the War Claims Act of 1948 "have

never represented more than a token gesture of a grateful government for

the sacrifices, hardships and indignities endured by our prisoners of war."

An excerpted quotation from President Nixon's statement upon signing the

Vietnam-era amendment to the act in June 1970 served to clinch the point.

Kelley spent some time in analyzing the proposal for a one-year waiver

of import duties and considered possible alternatives, such as allowing the

returnees to order items from the PX catalog duty-free that they might

otherwise have been able to include in their household goods shipment.

"However," he concluded, "this alternative, as well as Lieutenant Gartley's

proposal, raises the question of equity. The family of the man who was

killed in action has received no benefit from an 'end of tour' shipment of
452 THE LONG ROAD HOME

household goods nor has the man who was wounded in combat, subsequently medically evacuated, and now is physically disabled for the rest of

his life. There seems to be no feasible way to pursue this proposal so that

all concerned can benefit equitably."*

As for the proposal to permit retention of deposits in the USSDP for

six months after repatriation rather than 90 days, Kelley reaffirmed the

position taken earlier on a similar recommendation from the National

League of Families. Its thrust had been that special consideration was really

not justified when the available alternatives included so simple a transaction

as moving the USSDP deposit to a private savings account. Once again, "the

matter of equity" had to be considered. "For example, previously returned

POWs would not stand to benefit, nor would those who elect to be

separated from the service after repatriation." Further, if the rationale

offered for the proposal was that returned prisoners would not be ready

to make major financial decisions for some time after repatriation, he

suggested that "primary next-of-kin of missing members declared dead

might likewise not be prepared to make such decisions. The same argument could be extended to those wounded or killed in action." Finally,

Kelley reminded Hebert that "in authorizing the Uniformed Service Savings Deposit Program, the Congress sought first to provide an attractive

savings program for our troops serving overseas and secondly, to reduce

expenditures by U.S. military personnel in overseas communities, and

thus lessen the net adverse balance of payments associated with DoD

activities. The subject proposal in no way appears to conform with these

legislative intents. "4)

The position stated in Kelley's February 1973 letter remained DoD's

essential response to subsequent congressional inquiries or proposed bills

that sought to expand PW/MIA benefits even after homecoming. As late

as 1977, DoD's standard reply continued to be, with slight variations:

"The Department of Defense believes that to the extent that material benefits can compensate for the hardships and privations suffered by prisoners

of war and their families, those benefits have already been provided. "4(,

* Later, in May 1973, DoD queried the Treasury Department's Bureau of Customs about a

more limited eligibility for the duty-free privilege for former prisoners "traveling abroad

during convalescent leave (approximately 90-120 days)." Replying on 1 June, the commissioner of customs cited a provision in the regulations that allowed a waiver when strict

application of the law would "cause undue hardship to the person through no fault of his

own but because of the nature of his assignment." Accordingly, until 30 September 1973,

the personal and household effects of former u.s. prisoners of war "now traveling or convalescing abroad" would be granted free entry, and the Bureau of Customs would consider

requests for extension beyond that date on a case-by-case basis. Sec Itr Vernon D. Acree to

David O. Cooke, 1 Jun 73, and routing slip, 18 Jan 73, TF files.
21

Negotiations for Peace

I n January 1968 President Lyndon Johnson gave first place in his State

of the Union message to reaffirmation of a proposal he had made some

months earlier in San Antonio: The United States was willing to stop all air

and naval bombardment of North Vietnam if that would lead promptly

to productive discussions, but with the proviso that "the other side must

not take advantage of our restraint as they have in the past."] His words

elicited no response beyond Hanoi's previous position: Talks might be possible once the United States pledged a complete cessation of the bombing,

without conditions. The enemy's Tet Offensive, begun on 31 January 1968,

put off any further exchanges on the subject until spring.

As security was being testored in South Vietnam following repulse of

the Communist attacks, Johnson resumed the search for peace. In an address

to the nation on 31 March he announced a major step to de-escalate the

conflict in the hope of inducing an immediate move toward negotiations.

The president had ordered U.S. air and naval forces to make no attacks on

North Vietnam except in the region adjacent to the Demilitarized Zone,

where the movement of enemy troops and supplies directly threatened allied

forward positions in South Vietnam. He noted that this restriction ended

the bombing in an area that included almost 90 percent of North Vietnam's

population. Backing up previous declarations that the United States stood

ready to appear in any forum at any time to discuss means ofbringing the

war to an end, the president named Ambassador W. Averell Harriman to be

the principal representative in the talks he hoped would ensue. 2

Three days later the government of North Vietnam declared its readiness to begin discussions, but with its own uncompromising definition of

their purpose. The DRV reptesentatives would contact Harriman to arrange

for the unconditional cessation of U.S. bombing raids and other acts of

453
454 THE LONG ROAD HOME

war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. With that accomplished,

actual peace talks might begin.'

After more than a month of contention over choice of a meeting

place, the two sides agreed on Paris; the first session occurred on 13 May

1968. Harriman and his deputy, Cyrus R. Vance, were the principal U.S.

negotiators. A veteran spokesman for the Hanoi government, Xuan Thuy,

headed the North Vietnamese delegation.

Deadlock and delay characterized the next five months of the Paris proceedings, as Hanoi's representatives staunchly maintained that a total end

to the U.S. bombing, without conditions, was the indispensable first step.

They rejected all U.S. proposals that their government also contribute to

scaling down the hostilities. The U.S. delegation fared no better when

attempting to look ahead to some of the issues that would ultimately be

under negotiation, such as mutual withdrawal of U.S. and North Vietnamese troops from the territory of South Vietnam. Despite the "unassailable

evidence" offered by Harriman, Xuan Thuy would not acknowledge the

presence of regular North Vietnamese army units in the South. One of

his colleagues told newsmen that Harriman's statement on the matter was

a "perfidious calumny."4

The North Vietnamese held to their demand for termination of all

U.S. bombing, with no matching concession or commitment on the part of

Hanoi. At length, in order to move on to actual peace negotiations, President Johnson decided to institute unilaterally a total bombing halt and to

state the terms he expected to see observed in the form of "assumptions,"

clearly and repeatedly communicated to the enemy. First of all, "setious

talks" must follow without delay. Also, leaders in Hanoi must recognize

that the United States could not sustain the bombing pause if they launched

attacks against South Vietnam's major cities or violated the demilitarized

zone by sending troops through it to the South in unusual numbers. The

president repeated these conditions in his address on 31 October 1968

that announced the cessation of all air, naval, and artillery bombardment

of North Vietnam's territory, effective the following day.

Virtually the only concession Hanoi's spokesmen had made was to

abandon their vow never to engage in talks with representatives of the

existing South Vietnamese government, headed by President Nguyen Van

Thieu. The North Vietnamese commonly spoke of Thieu and the other

leaders in Saigon as "lackeys" or "puppets" of the Americans who had forfeited the right to speak for the South Vietnamese people and must give

way to the superior claims of the National Liberation Front. Hanoi's concession on this point enabled Johnson to announce that a delegation of

the government of South Vietnam would be free to participate in the next
Negotiations for Peace 455

negotiating session in Paris, it being accepted that representatives of the

National Liberation Front would also be present. "But what we now

expect-what we have the right to expect," the president continued, "are

prompt, productive, serious, and intensive negotiations in an atmosphere

that is conducive to progress."5

Johnson's hopes went unfulfilled, owing mainly to difficulties raised by

President Thieu. Although he had appeared earlier to concur in the bombing halt, Thieu now expressed reservations and listed further conditions to

be met before a delegation from the Saigon government would participate

in the Paris talks. In particular, the South Vietnamese leader objected to

any arrangement that implied the National Liberation Front was a legitimate political entity, separate from North Vietnam, with which his own government would be expected to negotiate on an equal footing. His insistence

precipitated a debate over seating arrangements and the symbolically important shape of the conference table, one that ran on beyond the date in

early December when Thieu finally dispatched a delegation to Paris. 6

Not until 16 January 1969 did the conferees agree on seating and other

procedural matters, thereby clearing the way for substantive negotiations to

begin. The date fell within the final week of President Johnson's term, and

his chosen representatives could do no more. Harriman and Vance returned

to Washington, profoundly disappointed that circumstances had given them

no opportunity to move beyond the preliminary stage and come to grips

with the central issues.?

The main course of the search for a settlement still lay ahead, running

through the entire first four years of the Nixon administration and encompassing the wearying repetitions of 174 plenary sessions at Paris as well as

other consultations, usually more consequential, that occurred in private.

The records of these meetings allow no doubt that the prisoner issue was

a matter of large and inescapable importance in the peace negotiations,

even though the return of the captive Americans was not often the central

matter being discussed.

In campaigning for the presidency during 1968 Richard Nixon had

repeatedly pledged the kind of new leadership that would "end the war

and win the peace in the Pacific."8 To accomplish this, the new president

would rely on his assistant for national security affairs, Henry A. Kissinger,

a man who brought unfailing energy and a remarkable array of talents to

the task of extricating the United States from the struggle in Vietnam and

who would in the end succeed in negotiating a peace settlement.

Guiding Kissinger in his approach to the Vietnam problem was a

conviction that the United States should avoid negotiating about the

future governmental structure of South Vietnam. Leaving that complex
456 THE LONG ROAD HOME

of political issues to be dealt with by the two South Vietnamese antagonists, the United States, Kissinget believed, should negotiate primarily

with Hanoi's tepresentatives. This would allow it to concentrate on such

military questions as the withdrawal of external forces from South Vietnam

and termination of the fighting through a cease-fire or other arrangement.

In comments supplied to Kissinger during the transition period, Harriman and Vance indicated that they, too, had hoped to follow this "twotrack" approach. 9

Officials of the new administration launched immediately into a reexamination of all aspects of the nation's Vietnam policy. Some of the

results were embodied in the decisions made by President Nixon following the National Security Council meeting of 18 March 1969, which

included approval of a paper on overall negotiating strategy. When it came

to defining broad objectives, the statement devised by the new policymakers differed hardly at all from the previous declarations of the Johnson

administration. "Our general objective in Viet-Nam is the achievement of a

set of circumstances and conditions ... that give the South Vietnamese

people the opportunity to determine their own political future without

external interference." The longer term goal was "a situation in which

North Viet-Nam will live in peace with its neighbors in Southeast Asia."

The return of the U.S. servicemen held by the enemy appeared as one

of seven specific objectives listed as of first importance. In the negotiations, "release of U.S. and third country prisoners should be sought on a

continuing basis to as great an extent as possible and must eventually be

achieved in toto." The strategy paper acknowledged that "we must expect

Hanoi to be tough, and to seek to use the issue and our human concerns

as a lever on other issues. This we must resist."

The paper gave considerably more prominence to another of the seven

objectives on the list, mutual withdrawal, calling it "the key foundation

stone of any ultimate agreement." The U.S. negotiators should strive for

a situation in which all North Vietnamese military forces introduced into

South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were withdrawn "all the way to North

Viet-Nam." With supervision and verification procedures in place to ensure

Hanoi's compliance, the United States could then withdraw all its combat

forces from South Vietnam. lo

President Nixon expanded on these ideas in his first nationally televised address devoted solely to Vietnam on 14 May 1969. He reviewed the

objectives to which the United States was committed, particularly a settlement under which the South Vietnamese people would determine freely

their political future. "Such a settlement will require the wirhdrawal of

all non-South Vietnamese forces, including our own, from South Vietnam,"
Negotiations for Peace 457

Nixon declared. Also needed were "procedures for political choice that

give each significant group in South Vietnam a real opportunity to participate," including the Communists, assuming that they were prepared to do

so without the use of force or intimidation. He proposed a settlement that

featured mutual withdrawal on a 12-month schedule. It would provide for

an international supervisory body to verify the force withdrawals and also

to oversee a general election in South Vietnam. "Arrangements would be

made for the release of prisoners of war on both sides at the earliest possible time," the president said, but without further elaboration. J J

Less than a week earlier, on 8 May, the Communist side at the Paris

peace negotiations had advanced a 10-point proposal. Mutuality was not

its keynote. The spokesman for the National Liberation Front demanded

a unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces that would be total and unconditional. He demanded further that the existing South Vietnamese

government give way to a provisional coalition government drawn from

groups that "stand for peace, independence and neutrality." It soon became

clear that the Communists claimed the exclusive right to decide which

groups met this description.

A reference to prisoners appeared in the NLF's Point 9, which said

that "to resolve the aftermath of the war: A. The parties will negotiate the

release of soldiers captured in war. B. The United States government must

bear full responsibility for the losses and devastations it has caused to the

Vietnamese people in both zones." The wording suggested that discussion of

the men's release would not begin until most other issues were settled and

that some form of U.S. reparations payment might be part of the price. 12

Little common ground was apparent in the positions of the two sides.

As starting points for a new round of negotiations in Paris they seemed to

promise nothing but continued stalemate. Nixon and Kissinger, however,

believed that Hanoi might be more forthcoming once it recognized that

the United States was sincerely committed to ending the war. Furthermore,

the new leaders in Washington had postulated from the first that the real

advances toward an agreement would occur in private consultations. Freed

of concern for press and public reaction to every move in the negotiations,

high-level emissaries might work out a compromise that could then be ratified in the formal Paris sessions. 13

The Nixon administration made several attempts to schedule private

talks, and just after midyear one of its feelers drew a favorable response.

Henry Kissinger and Xuan Thuy met in secret on 4 August 1969 at the

Paris apartment of the French citizen who had acted as intermediary.

Kissinger later wrote that in approaching these negotiations with the

North Vietnamese he "still half believed that rapid progress would be
458 THE LONG ROAD HOME

made if we could convince them of our sincerity." His opening remarks

at the meeting took note of the courage and suffering of the Vietnamese

people and stressed that the United States earnestly sought "a settlement

compatible with the self-respect of both sides." Inviting further discussion, Kissinger went somewhat beyond the position the president had

set forth on 14 May; as its part of a mutual force withdrawal the United

States was prepared to remove not only all combat troops but all forces,

without exception. '4

Xuan Thuy's response gave no support to the notion that Communist representatives would show a greater willingness to explore alternatives

and reach accommodations when dealing in private. What he expounded

in the secret talks did not vary from the 10-point program the National

Liberation Front had offered publicly in early May, and his tone was

peremptory. In the military realm no course could be considered except

the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces. To resolve the South Vietnamese

political problem the only logical and realistic approach would be to

remove President Thieu and his vice president and prime minister from

office and then merge what remained of the Saigon administration with

the Communist Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG), the new

form recently assumed by the NLF. Still more unsettling to Kissinger's

negotiating scheme, Xuan Thuy insisted that the political and military

aspects of the problem were inseparable and must be solved together.

As their sole positive accomplishment the conferees on 4 August agreed

on the channel to be used whenever one party or the other wished to propose another secret meeting. Later in the month a letter to the president

from Ho Chi Minh dealt a further disappointment to hopes for expanded

discussions. Answering Nixon's earlier plea for mutual rededication to the

cause of peace, the North Vietnamese head of state merely reiterated the

points that Xuan Thuy had made. Taken together they constituted "the

correct manner of solving the Vietnamese problem."I)

President Nixon released the exchange of correspondence with Ho on

3 November, at the same time advising the American people that there

had been no progress whatever toward a peace settlement, despite various

U.S. initiatives through both public and private channels. "Hanoi has

refused even to discuss our proposals," he said; no improvement could

be expected until the Communist representatives dropped the demand for

unconditional acceptance of their own terms and engaged in serious negotiations. Nevertheless, he declared, the United States would persist in its

search for a just peace, through a negotiated settlement if possible, or

through another set of measures that he now described for the first time as

"the Vietnamization plan."
Negotiations for Peace 459

Nixon said that whereas previous policy had "Americanized" the war,

with the United States assuming primary responsibility for the fighting,

the new administration had set the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese armed forces so that they could progressively relieve U.S. units

and take over full responsibility for the security of their country. Shortly

after Secretary Laird's survey trip to Saigon in March 1969 the president

had ordered a substantial increase in resources committed to training and

equipping the South Vietnamese. As transfer of combat responsibility

began to occur, the president announced first a token recall, then a more

significant withdrawal of U.S. personnel from Southeast Asia. Review of

the current status provided one of the high spots in his address on 3 November 1969: "After 5 years of Americans going into Vietnam, we are finally

bringing American men home. By December 15, over 60,000 men will

have been withdrawn from South Vietnam-including 20 percent of all of

our combat forces."

The president then described the future course of the Vietnamization

program, which had been worked out in cooperation with President

Thieu's government. It looked to "the complete withdrawal of all U.S.

combat ground forces, and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces

on an orderly scheduled timetable." The rate of withdrawal would depend

on periodic assessments of three factors; the progress made in the Paris

talks, the level of enemy activity, and the success of the South Vietnamese

training program. IG

As actually played out in the following years the withdrawal portion

of the Vietnamization scenario moved at an unbroken pace. The redeployment proceeded through successive reductions of the overall troop

ceiling for South Vietnam, each level to be achieved within a specific time

period, with President Nixon announcing each new one as the end of the

current period approached. Understandably enough, he usually began with

a reminder that when his administration took office there had been some

540,000 Americans in Vietnam. Nixon's declaration on 20 April 1970 that

an additional 150,000 troops would be removed by spring of the following year meant a ceiling reduction to about 275,000. Other reductions

followed, until his announcement in January 1972 that 70,000 more would

return home by 1 May brought the troop ceiling down to 69,000. 17

As early as September 1969 Kissinger had advised the president that,

once started, "withdrawal of U.S. troops will become like salted peanuts to

the American public: the more U.S. troops come home, the more will be

demanded." A recognized need for unfaltering progress toward disengagement drove the program, and it was never seriously impeded by the

periodic reassessments. At each decision point the status of the Paris talks
460 THE LONG ROAD HOME

appeared neither worse nor better than before. Even though infiltration

and hostile action by the North Vietnamese continued, there were enough

encouraging reports of progress in the training of South Vietnamese units

and of their holding their own in engagements with the enemy to justify

continuing the U.S. withdrawal. 18

In one passage of his address on 3 November 1969 the president

had spoken of Vietnamization as "a plan which will bring the war to an

end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front." In fact, however,

the need to recover the prisoners of war made it unlikely that Vietnamization could be pursued to its end without some recourse to negotiations.

At his meeting with 26 PW/MIA wives and mothers at the White House

several weeks later Nixon pledged that no peace agreement would be

accepted that did not include a satisfactory disposition of the prisoner

issue. Thus he enunciated one of the fixed requirements of U.S. policy,

but his statement also seemed to underscore the importance of reaching

some sort of formal compact with the enemy. A more direct expression

of the thought soon appeared in a 000 policy paper: "If Vietnamization

and US troop redeployment are completed without negotiations, and

especially if the war winds down to low activity levels, we could find ourselves effectively out of Southeast Asia without our prisoners."19

By mid-1970, however, a change had occurred in the public portrayal

of the Vietnamization plan. First Laird and then other official spokesmen

gave assurances that they would not pursue it to the point of complete U.S.

withdrawal until the prisoners were released and arrangements were made

for accounting for the missing.* The president himself took up this line

early in 1971 and used it frequently thereafter. He told a press conference

on 17 February that so long as the North Vietnamese held U.S. servicemen "there will be Americans in South Vietnam and enough Americans

to give them an incentive to release the prisoners." Nixon offered a fuller

exposition during a television interview on 2 January 1972:

Can the President of the United States, sitting in this office,

with the responsibility for 400 POW's and 1,500 missing in

action throughout Southeast Asia, because they are also potential

POW's, can he withdraw all of our forces as long as the enemy

holds one American as a prisoner of war? The answer is no ....

Our preference is to end it by negotiations. If that does not

work we will do it by withdrawal through Vietnamization. But

if POW's are still retained by North Vietnam, in order to have

any bargaining position at all ... , we will have to continue to

* See Chapter 19.
Negotiations for Peace 461

retain a residual force in Vietnam, and we will have to continue

the possibility of air strikes on the North Vietnamese.

Nearly eight months later, on 29 August, Nixon reaffirmed Laird's onglnal pledge in its purest form: The United States would maintain a force

in South Vietnam "as long as there is one POW in North Vietnam, or

one missing in action, not accounted for. "20

All these pronouncements followed from the bedrock principle that

whatever form the U.S. disengagement took, there could be no abandonment of the captive Americans. Satisfactory disposition of the prisoner

issue must be "an integral part of any settlement," the president had told

family members at the White House on 12 December 1969. On that occasion Nixon also pledged that the U.S. government would do everything

it could to single out the prisoner question and "have it handled as it

should be, as a separate issue on a humane basis." In this endeavor he had

the unswerving support and encouragement of his secretary of defense. 21

Laird believed strongly, and stated repeatedly, that the prisoner question was fundamentally a humanitarian issue, one on which the North

Vietnamese were uniquely vulnerable because of their failure to observe

humane practices in the treatment, identification, and release of their

captives. In particular, Hanoi's performance deserved condemnation when

judged against the formal requirements of the Geneva Convention. This

conviction underlay the "Go Public" campaign that Laird had been instrumental in starting, and it also conditioned his view of the negotiations.

Laird did not doubt that the enemy saw the captive Americans as hostages

and expected to extract major concessions for their return. He urged that

the United States refuse to acknowledge the hostage status of the prisoners

and keep discussion of the issue "on the humanitarian track," where Hanoi's

vulnerability could be exploited. "If we agree our paws are hostages,

then only the price is left to negotiations," read the comment added to a

JCS memorandum as it passed through Laird's office in September 1971.

It was a line he had already pursued in advice to the president and

Kissinger, and one he still followed in comments to Secretary of State

Rogers in March 1972. Laird favored "staying on humanitarianism," since

he believed that "to allow Hanoi to put the POW issue in the political

arena (a) lets them off the hook where they are vitally sensitive to criticism,

(b) sets up a situation where we are almost certain to have to give increasingly in other vital areas just to keep alive the prospect for POW return."22

In practice it proved impossible to keep the fate of the prisoners separate from the other military and political issues under negotiation, but

exposure of Hanoi's disregard for humanitarian standards did become
462 THE LONG ROAD HOME

one of the fotemost activities of the U.S. delegation to the Paris talks. In

December 1969 Laird had recommended that the U.S. representatives

make use of a series of hard-hitting statements on violations of the Geneva

Convention and other instances of inhumane treatment of prisoners. In

the same spirit, early in 1970 Kissinger passed on the president's direction that for the time being Ambassador Philip C. Habib in Paris "should

speak only about prisoners." Emphasis on the subject continued under the

two delegation heads who succeeded him, David K. E. Bruce (1970-71)

and William]. Porter (1971-73).2\

In the Paris sessions the U.S. spokesmen scored the enemy's failure

to provide full and timely identification of the captives and refusal to

allow impartial inspection of the prison camps. They turned frequently to

the mail and package situation when reviewing Hanoi's other unfulfilled

obligations under the Geneva Convention, and they found occasion to

work in a theme that Laird keenly wanted pursued. Until the North Vietnamese brought their practices into compliance with existing agreements,

the secretary asked, what confidence could the world community have in

their adherence to any treaty they might sign now?24

Still maintaining that captive Americans were well treated, the North

Vietnamese advanced countercharges regarding the inhumanity of the

U.S. bombing campaign, the use of napalm, and the conditions in South

Vietnamese detention centers. These exchanges occurred at the plenary

sessions in Paris, held with some regularity on a weekly basis. On the eve

of the 93rd session in early December 1970 Ambassador Bruce observed at

a press conference that the PRG and North Vietnamese delegates had presented certain demands and had endlessly repeated them, but that nothing

properly termed a negotiation had taken place in nearly two years of meetings. "A propaganda field day" was his characterization of the other side's

performance, but his own role was similarly criticized by Xuan Thuy and

the PRG's chief delegate, Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh. In fact, the presentations

themselves often followed a similar format, with each delegation's spokesman lecturing the other side on what it should do to prove it was really

interested in negotiating seriously. Both sides spoke more for the record

and the world press than with any real hope of swaying their adversaries. 25

From time to time something of greater significance did take place at

the Paris meetings, as when Mme. Binh addressed the plenary session on

17 September 1970. Speaking with North Vietnamese concurrence, she

offered an 8-point proposal that modified some features of the NLF's 10

points of May 1969 and expanded on others. The elaborations had to do

mainly with procedures for working out South Vietnam's political future,

once the demand for removal of President Thieu, Vice President Nguyen
Negotiations for Peace 463

Cao Ky, and Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem from the existing government had been satisfied. Designed to make it doubly certain that absolute

Communist dominance would be the outcome, these measures contributed

nothing to the attractiveness of Mme. Binh's proposals. It was the modifications that captured immediate attention, since on first reading they

seemed to introduce the element of "movement" that had long been missing

from the negotiations. 26

Mme. Binh's first point signaled an abandonment of the previous unwillingness to talk about prisoners of war. It directly linked the question of

their return to a pledged U.S. departure from South Vietnam. If the U.S.

government declared that it would withdraw all its troops by 30 June 1971,

then "the parties will engage at once in discussions on ... the question of

releasing captured military men." Probing by American diplomats and

newsmen soon established that this did not mean return of the prisoners had

been divorced from the political issues and might be pressed to a separate

resolution. The Communists still maintained as a precondition to any

agreement that the United States must terminate its support for "the U.S.

puppet administration in Saigon." Moreover, it seemed clear that in exchange for a commitment merely to begin discussions on prisoner return

the United States was being asked to make an absolute promise of withdrawal by mid-1971, to be fulfilled whether progress occurred on the other

matters under negotiation or not. To analysts in ISA experience suggested

strongly that "North Vietnam would refuse any real progress (release) on

PWs not only until all US troops had in fact been withdrawn, but also

until it had achieved a solution satisfactory to itself on the Thieu-KyKhiem issue, and very possibly on other questions as we11."27

At the next plenary session, on 24 September 1970, Ambassador Bruce

essentially rejected the proposals, though inviting further clarification.

"It would appear that your fundamental demands remain unchanged,"

he declared. Among other evidence, he could have cited Mme. Binh's

Point 2, which used a single sentence to dismiss the notion that a mutual

withdrawal might be considered. 2R

Meanwhile, within the U.S. government a major new peace Illltlative had been in preparation. President Nixon set forth his five points

on 7 October. In a statesmanlike address he summoned the other parties

to focus more broadly than before on Indochina as a whole. The principal new concept came at the outset: "First, I propose that all armed

forces throughout Indochina cease firing their weapons and remain in

the positions they now hold. This would be a 'cease-fire-in-place.'" In

effect, it would amount to a renunciation of the goal of military victory

by both sides. The president urged that the parties undertake immediate
464 THE LONG ROAD HOME

discussion of the cease-fire proposal, including provIsIOn for effective

supervision by international observers. He hoped that a success here would

"break the logjam in all the negotiations."

Nixon also called for an international conference to work out a settlement for the entire Indochina area. Until the idea of a broader Indochina

peace conference could be fully implemented, however, the United States

would continue its participation in the Paris negotiations.

After a brief review of the progress in reducing the U.S. forces in

South Vietnam, the president advanced his third point: "We are ready now

to negotiate an agreed timetable for complete withdrawals as part of an

overall settlement. We are prepared to withdraw all our forces as part of

a settlement based on the principles I spelled out previously and the proposals I am making tonight." He made no direct mention of a corresponding removal of North Vietnamese forces, but the reference to announced

principles, along with several unequivocal statements made later by the

president, allowed no doubt that the United States still required the withdrawal to be mutua1. 29

Next, the president once again asked the other side to "join us in a

search for a political settlement that truly meets the aspirations of all

South Vietnamese." To be fair it must reflect the existing balance of political elements in the country rather than being imposed by force. In that

connection Nixon denounced the enemy's insistence that President Thieu

and others be removed before even a preliminary agreement on the political future could be concluded. "Let there be no mistake about one essential

point," he said. "The other side is not merely objecting to a few personalities in the South Vietnamese Government. They want to dismantle the

organized non-Communist parties and insure the takeover by their party.

They demand the right to exclude whomever they wish from government." He termed this "patently unreasonable" and "totally unacceptable."

Point five represented the president's most conspicuous attempt to

date to remove the prisoner issue from the main negotiations and have it

treated solely on a humanitarian basis. Proposing "the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war held by both sides," Nixon declared

that "war and imprisonment should be over for all these prisoners. They

and their families have already suffered too much." He proposed that "all

prisoners of war, without exception, without condition, be released now to

return to the place of their choice," including journalists and other innocent civilian victims. "The immediate release of all prisoners of war would

be a simple act of humanity," he said. "But it could be even more. It could

serve to establish good faith, the intent to make progress, and thus improve the prospects for negotiation. "\0
Negotiations for Peace 465

The call for immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of

war was to stand for well over a year as the publicly declared position of

the United States. Like most of the other points advanced by the president

on 7 October 1970, however, it had faint chance of acceptance by the

opposing side. No one who had followed the peace talks closely could readily

imagine the Communists giving up their prisoners without gaining some

substantial advantage in return. Nixon and Kissinger most of all were not

likely to be deluded about the prospect, given their intimate knowledge

of both the open negotiations and the secret talks, which had resumed

earlier in the year.\!

Three meetings occurred in the environs of Paris between 20 February

and 4 April 1970, and for Kissinger each occasion involved covert journeys or clandestine departures from his announced itinerary in order to

reach the meeting site without discovery by the press. Each time he came

in hopeful anticipation that the sessions would be more productive than

before, since his counterpart in the secret parley was now Le Duc Tho,

a senior official and member of the North Vietnamese Politburo whose

authority as a negotiator far exceeded that of Xuan Thuy. In Tho he

encountered a redoubtable opponent, a man whose absolute commitment

to fulfillment of the Vietnamese nation's destiny under the guidance of

Marxist-Leninist doctrine spanned a lifetime, including 10 years spent in

the jails of the French colonial administration.

Le Duc Tho entered the negotiating sessions fully prepared to confront

the American emissary with his awareness of the trend of public opinion

in the United States. He cited a Gallup Poll showing that 35 percent of

the respondents now favored an immediate U.S. withdrawal-a 14-point

surge since the previous reading. He quoted leading critics of the Nixon

administration who demanded speedy withdrawal or endorsed some form

of transitional coalition government for South Vietnam. Tho also delivered

a penetrating analysis of the Vietnamization program. While accepting

that the progressive withdrawal of troops and reduction of U.S. casualties

might succeed for a time in making continued engagement in Southeast

Asia tolerable to the American people, he questioned the assumption that

the forces of the Saigon government could meanwhile be brought to a

level of effectiveness that matched the tasks they must assume. He touched

only indirectly on another concern that was already well developed in

Kissinger's mind, that by deciding on unilateral withdrawal under Vietnamization the United States had already surrendered a prime bargaining

counter without compensating gain. 32

Throughout the three secret sessions Le Due Tho rejected all of

Kissinger's proposals and remained unshakeable in his insistence that the
466 THE LONG ROAD HOME

military and political aspects must be dealt with simultaneously. He held

that the only thing to be settled on the military side was the unconditional

departure of the U.S. forces, with a short deadline. The political solution

could be reached only by first purging the Saigon government of its

leaders by some process, the chief feature of which must be the U.S. government's repudiation of President Thieu and his principal colleagues

together with a cessation of material support. No change was discernible

later when Kissinger met secretly with Xuan Thuy on two occasions in

September 1970. It was the same month in which Mme. Binh publicly

presented her eight-point proposal in the Paris talks, including a more

detailed account of how the remnants of Thieu's administration were to

be accepted as a minority element in a government dominated by the disciplined representatives of the Communist side.-'"

Although President Nixon had called the enemy's proposal for a political

settlement unacceptable, Kissinger's experience with Hanoi's spokesmen in

the secret talks convinced him it was not just an outrageous demand from

which they expected to be bought off at some future date. They actually

looked to the United States for the indispensable moves leading to Thieu's

overthrow, making this abandonment of an ally part of the price that

must be paid for release from the Southeast Asian entanglement. "Our

unilateral exit was not enough," Kissinger later wrote; "we had to engineer

a political turnover before we left, or else the war could not end, we would

have no assurance of a safe withdrawal of our remaining forces, and we

would not regain our prisoners." Writing from a postwar perspective, he

summarized the next two years in two sentences: "Our dilemma was that

Hanoi maintained this position until October 1972. As long as it did

so, no negotiated settlement was available. "34

Evidently the North Vietnamese leadership believed that the situation could be made to yield something more than the withdrawal of U.S.

forces. By playing skillfully on the U.S. government's growing need to get

out of Vietnam it should be possible to bring the men in Washington

to accept the necessity of cuning their ties with Thieu's administration.

From that would follow such a degree of demoralization and disarray in

Saigon that the final Communist takeover of the country's government

would be little more than a walk-in operation.

In single-minded pursuit of their goal Hanoi's representatives in

the secret negotiations never wavered in their insistence that the military

and political questions were inseparable, as Xuan Thuy demonstrated at

a meeting on 31 May 1971 when Kissinger tried once more to confine

discussion to the military track. In this session the United States for

the first time offered to set a terminal date for withdrawal of U.S. and
Negotiations for Peace 467

allied forces from South Vietnam in exchange for the release of all prisoners of war and an internationally supervised cease-fire throughout Indochina. In accompanying comments Kissinger made clear that the United

States had now dropped the demand for a mutual withdrawal. Any withdrawal of forces other than U.S. and allied would be a matter that

"the Vietnamese and the other peoples of Indochina should discuss

among themselves. "35

At the next secret session, on 16 June 1971, Le Due Tho presented a

nine-point reformulation of his side's proposals. It called for a U.S. force

withdrawal to be completed in six months, by 31 December 1971. The

accompanying political requirements included the familiar demand that

the United States stop supporting Thieu, thus clearing the way for "a new

administration standing for peace, independence, neutrality and democracy." Once again, Hanoi's senior negotiator emphasized that the proposals constituted an integrated whole. No simple swap of withdrawal for

prisoners could be contemplated. 36

At further secret meetings in July and August neither side yielded on

the outstanding political issue-the insistence by Hanoi that the United

States arrange the overthrow of Thieu's government. In contrast, however,

the question of how the prisoner return would occur appeared unlikely to

be a sticking point. In the course of the discussions the main features of

an acceptable agreement on this matter began to emerge.

Earlier, at the initial meeting on 31 May 1971, Kissinger had reaffirmed the president's call for immediate release of all prisoners of war

on humanitarian grounds. Failing that, however, Kissinger stipulated that

"the men must be released as an integral part of the settlement we are proposing in our final offer." The United States, he said, expected to receive

on the day an agreement was reached, a complete list of all prisoners held

throughout Indochina, with the release of the prisoners beginning on the

same day as U.S. withdrawals under the agreed timetable and completed

at least two months before the completion of the final withdrawals. 37

In his nine-point proposal of 26 June Le Due Tho also accepted that

the withdrawal of U.S. forces and release of the captured Americans

would occur simultaneously. Later in the sequence Kissinger withdrew

the requirement that prisoner release be completed well before the departure

of the last U.S. troops; Hanoi's spokesman gave up the claim that only

the prisoners in North and South Vietnam were under consideration, indicating that return of all Americans held in Indochina could be expected.

There was no occasion to press on with the drafting of this portion of the

final settlement, however, given the absence of agreement on the central

political issue. 38
468 THE LONG ROAD HOME

During the negotiations of mid-1971 Hanoi's representatives more

than once suggested that the political action they required of the United

States need not appear in the written compact. Any means of removing

Thieu and the other anti-Communist leaders in Saigon was acceptable,

and the current season offered unusual opportunities. Thieu's four-year

presidential term was nearing an end and a new election had to be held

in October. Both Xuan Thuy and Le Duc Tho presumed that it was

within the power of the United States to get rid of Thieu by one maneuver or another. If, owing to some quirk of the capitalist mind or conscience,

the U.S. leadership fouod tampering with an election unacceptable, Le Duc

Tho saw other possibilities. As this future winner of the Nobel Peace Prize

once suggested, according to Kissinger, a simple assassination would do. 39

As it turned out, the United States was not able even to preserve the

election's appearance as a meaningful contest and a showcase of democracy. Hobbled by restrictive legislation passed at Thieu's behest, rival candidates for the presidency could not be induced to stay in the race, leaving the

incumbent as the only entry. Accordingly, the 94.3 percent approval registered in the October balloting could not be claimed either to have enhanced

Thieu's standing or enlarged his mandate. 40

Meanwhile the secret negotiations appeared to be making some progress.

Accepting the necessity of dealing with the political as well as the military

aspects, Kissinger had attempted to narrow the differences between the

U.S. position and Le Duc Tho's nine points. After the next round of rejection and critical comment from the other side, he produced a revised version that received the approval of both Nixon and Thieu. On 11 October

1971 Kissinger passed the text to the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris,

along with a request for a meeting with Le Duc Tho early in November.

Nixon and his national security adviser felt that this proposal went

as far as they could go in meeting Hanoi's objections to the election

procedures being proposed for South Vietnam. It called for a new presidential election, to occur following the signing of the final agreement

and after the parallel withdrawal of U.S. troops and release of all prisoners

of war. As before, there would be international supervision, but the election would actually be organized and run by a body independent of the

existing Saigon government, composed of representatives of all political

forces in South Vietnam, including the Communists. To further insulate the

election from undue influence, President Thieu and his vice president were

pledged to resign one month before election day, leaving the government in

the hands of a caretaker administration. According to the proposal's text, the

United States would support no candidate and remain completely neutral in

the election and would "abide by the outcome of this election and any other

political processes shaped by the South Vietnamese people themselves. "41
Negotiations for Peace 469

During November the North Vietnamese avoided holding the secret

meeting at which they would be expected to respond to the latest U.S.

proposal. First they made known that Le Due Tho could not come because

of engagements in Hanoi, then that he had suddenly become ill. The

U.S. government expressed regret and asked to be advised of the next

suitable date. There was no replyY

Later events indicated that the leaders of the North Vietnamese government were already committed to launching a spring offensive in 1972.

They placed their hopes in an all-out attack that would overwhelm the

South Vietnamese army and make a mockery of official pronouncements

that the Vietnamization program was destined to succeed. Their highest

expectation must have been something approaching an unconditional surrender, but they might not have chosen the military alternative if they had

seen greater promise of gaining what they wanted through further negotiation in November 1971. Remarkable as were the concessions the United

States had offered by that date, they did not amount to U.S. collusion in

the overthrow of Thieu's government. The United States still declined to

create the conditions for a virtually effortless takeover by the Communists.

Nixon and his advisers had remained firm despite the evident decline

of public support in the United States. They faced rising agitation in

Congress for an end to the war, though no bill that aimed to accomplish

this simply by requiring the removal of all U.S. forces by a certain date had

yet won approval. Senator Mike Mansfield offered a less extreme measure

as an amendment to legislation renewing the Selective Service Act; it was

adopted by the Senate on 22 June 1971 by 57 votes to 42. The Mansfield

Amendment declared it to be the policy of the United States to terminate

all military operations in Indochina at the earliest practicable date and to

provide for the prompt and orderly withdrawal of all U.S. forces within

nine months after enactment, "subject to the release of all American

prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam and forces

allied with such Government." It called on the president to implement

the policy by establishing a terminal date for withdrawal within the ninemonth period and to negotiate with North Vietnam both for an immediate

cease-fire and for a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops in exchange for a

phased release of all American prisoners of warY

The course charted by the Mansfield Amendment was the one Kissinger had wished to follow-a negotiation confined to the military track. In

fact, the proposal he had presented in the secret talks on 31 May 1971

anticipated the amendment's terms in most of its details. Kissinger's

initiatives had been rebuffed; the enemy refused any negotiation that did

not also meet Hanoi's demands in the political realm.
470 THE LONG ROAD HOME

In mid-1971 members of Congress and other participants in the public

debate had no knowledge of the secret meetings and were growing impatient

with the perpetual deadlock in the Paris talks. They found it difficult

to understand why the Nixon administration could not capitalize on the

obvious potential for an exchange of U.S. withdrawal for return of

prisoners. Remarks delivered by former Secretary of Defense Clark M.

Clifford on 8 June 1971 further deepened the suspicions of those already

distrustful of the president's motives in the matter. In a well publicized

address before a convention of groups favoring legislative action to end

the war, Clifford outlined a "short and simple agreement" that he thought

could be reached in immediate negotiations. If the United States offered

complete withdrawal and a halt to all its military activities in Indochina

by 31 December 1971, there was "reason to believe" that North Vietnam and

the PRG would pledge to release all American prisoners within 30 days of

the day the accord was announced. Clifford said he had reached this conviction during recent meetings and conversations with a number of people,

"some of them Americans and some of them not. "44

The growth of dissent and antiwar sentiment in the United States was

skillfully promoted by members of the North Vietnamese and PRG delegations in Paris. They found frequent opportunities in their regular contacts

with the press and particularly in interviews granted to visiting American

political figures. By ambiguous restatement or outright misrepresentation

of their official stand in the negotiations, Xuan Thuy and other spokesmen encouraged the belief that only the willful failure of the United States

to announce an irrevocable date for withdrawal stood in the way of the

release of prisoners of war. During 1971 such activities reached an unusual pitch shortly after the Clifford speech and the Senate's action on the

Mansfield Amendment.

On 1 July, at the 119th public negotiating session in Paris, Mme. Binh

presented a new seven-point plan, but the first point merely restated the

demand that the U.S. government "put an end to its war of aggression in

Vietnam," withdraw all troops and weapons, and dismantle all U.S. bases

"without posing any condition whatsoever." More arresting was the declaration that followed. If the United States set a terminal date in 1971 for the

withdrawal, "the parties will at the same time agree on the modalities ... of

the release of the totality of military men of all parties and the civilians captured in the war (including American pilots captured in North Vietnam),

so that they may all rapidly return to their homes." Further, "these two

operations will begin on the same date and will end on the same date. "45

Ably crafted not only to be compatible with the Mansfield Amendment but to appear as almost a direct fulfillment of the expectations voiced
Negotiations for Peace 471

by Clark Clifford, the proposal replaced the provision for "discussion" of

the return of prisoners with the more reassuring statement that the parties

would "agree." It linked the prisoner release unmistakably with U.S. acceptance of a December 1971 deadline, avoiding mention of any other prior

condition so that the exchange appeared to stand on its own. The proposition became even more definite and unqualified when reduced to a newspaper headline. According to the New York Times, "Vietcong Offer to Trade

P.O.W.'s for Pullout in '71."46

When talking to newsmen in Paris, members of the North Vietnamese and PRG delegations sought to deepen the impression that a fair and

unqualified offer had been made. An American journalist writing on 1 July

reported that Communist spokesmen were emphasizing that "the military

aspects of a Vietnam settlement-withdrawal of U.S. forces and prisoner

release-could be negotiated before, and separately from, the political questions concerning the future makeup of a South Vietnam government." Yet

when the next plenary session occurred on 8 July analysts in the Pentagon

could detect no evidence of this kind of flexibility. Mme. Binh did not

even hint at the possibility that the military and political questions might

be separable, but her remarks did suggest that the United States would

have to announce its irrevocable withdrawal date first. Only then could

meaningful negotiations on the rest of the package proceedY

For many in the United States Binh's seven-point plan had aroused expectations of an imminent breakthrough in the Paris talks. In the ensuing

weeks, however, Ambassador Bruce could make little progress even in

establishing the precise meaning of some elements of the enemy's proposal. Communist negotiators alternated between blank refusal to clarify or

expand on the original terms and denunciation of the United States for

failure to provide a "positive response."48 Outside the formal meetings they

continued to offer beguiling misrepresentations of their official position,

implying that agreement was possible on terms that in fact the Communist side had already rejected. When accepted at face value, their statements

provided a rallying point for opponents of the Nixon administration's policy.

One such statement was cited by Senator George S. McGovern during

a television appearance on 12 September: "I have, for example, been assured

by Mr. Xuan Thuy and by representatives of the Provisional Revolutionary

Government that if we agree to a withdrawal date of December 31 st and then

proceed to withdraw, let us say, 15 percent of our troops during the next 30

days, 15 percent of our prisoners would automatically be released .... In

a very real sense President Nixon holds the key to the jail cells of Hanoi.

That key is setting the December 31 st date for the withdrawal of American forces," In Paris both the U.S. delegation and the corps of American
472 THE LONG ROAD HOME

correspondents pressed for confirmation. At the 129th plenary session in

mid-September Xuan Thuy gave a rather roundabout reply, which major

news organizations and such leading television commentators as Walter

Cronkite and John Chancellor took as a contradiction of the McGovern

statement. The main burden appeared to be that the seven points must be

accepted in their entirety; accordingly, U.S. prisoners would only be released

under an agreement that included removal of President Thieu from office. 4'J

Uncertainties remained in the public mind, as evidenced during CBS

News reporter Dan Rather's televised interview with President Nixon on

2 January 1972. A question had come to Rather from the mother of a

known prisoner of war, and he posed it on her behalf: "Have we ever asked

the North Vietnamese and the Provisional Revolurionary Government if

they will release the POW's and guarantee the safety of our withdrawing

troops if we set a date for withdrawal of all u.S. forces from South Vietnam?" The president replied that this had been under discussion at various

times but the enemy had rejected it. "The North Vietnamese said deadline

for prisoners was no deal. That was publicly stated." A controversy arose

over the truth of Nixon's remark, owing largely to the fact that proof of its

accuracy was more clear-cut in the still-secret record of Kissinger's negotiations than in the published accounts of the Paris talks. On 6 January,

however, Xuan Thuy did make an unequivocal statement of the North Vietnamese position in a plenary session. As ISA analysts summarized it the next

day, "Xuan Thuy's statement showed that real price for prisoners is entire

seven points, i.e.: total withdrawal, end Vietnamization, topple Thieu."50

President Nixon's next move was calculated to disarm his critics, give

the public a sounder basis for judging which side had been truly forthcoming in the negotiations, and put an end to the deceit practiced by Communist spokesmen when they made assertions publicly that they knew did

not square with the position taken by Hanoi's representative in the secret

talks. Addressing the nation on 25 January, the president revealed the existence of the secret negotiations and Kissinger's role in carrying them forward

since August 1969. For almost 30 months the United States had guarded

the security of this private channel, he said, only to see its good faith in

the matter exploited by an enemy bent on spreading misinformation and

sowing discontent. He would not keep silent any longer about the private

talks when doing so had misled some Americans into accusing their own

government of failing to negotiate intensively and with serious purpose.

As now set forth by the president the record of the secret talks showed

that many of the initiatives being urged on his administration by its domestic critics had already been undertaken through this private channel.

Those who clamored for the president to announce a deadline for total
Negotiations for Peace 473

withdrawal had to understand that as early as 31 May 1971 Kissinger had

made such an offer in exchange for the release of all prisoners of war

and a general cease-fire. It had not proved to be the one indispensable concession that would bring peace, as some had pictured it. Hanoi's representative had rejected this proposal and later versions of the same proposition.

Continuing his account of the secret negotiations, Nixon spoke of the

peace plan put forward by the United States on 11 October 1971, the one

to which Le Due Tho and his colleagues had never replied. He said that

Ambassador Porter would introduce it at the next session of the Paris talks

so that it would henceforth be open to discussion in either the public or

the private channel. It provided that, upon reaching an agreement that

included a cease-fire throughout Indochina, all U.S. and allied forces

would be withdrawn from South Vietnam within six months while concurrently an exchange of all prisoners of war took place. The political future

of South Vietnam would be determined in a new presidential election, conducted under international supervision and with various safeguards for the

free participation of all political factions, including the arrangement for

President Thieu to relinquish his office prior to the balloting. 51

Nixon's bold stroke of disclosing the secret negotiations brought a

marked upsurge of public confidence in his handling of the search for

peace even as it removed some of the disabilities under which the United

States had been operating. The year 1972 witnessed further instances of

presidential decisiveness and sure-handed action. In February the Nixon

visit to Peking sealed the success of his effort to open up relations with

the People's Republic of China, with the president and Premier Chou

En-lai pledging to work toward a new era of peaceful coexistence. The final

communique contained an acknowledgement of opposing purposes in

Southeast Asia, with Communist China stressing its support for the proposals advanced by North Vietnam and the PRG while the United States

declared its interest in "self-determination for each country of Indochina."

Notably, these differences were not viewed as hindering the prospects for

increased trade and scientific, sports, and cultural exchanges touched on

elsewhere in the document. 52

President Nixon scored a further success in his consultations with

Soviet leader Leonid 1. Brezhnev at the Moscow Summit in late May,

made the more significant by the circumstances that had developed in

Southeast Asia. The North Vietnamese had launched their spring offensive on 30 March 1972. Though aware that preparations had been in

progress for months, American military authorities were startled by the size

and staying power of the onslaught against South Vietnam. The invasion

force that swept across the Demilitarized Zone and pushed through other
474 THE LONG ROAD HOME

border areas comprised at least six regular North Vietnamese divisions, well

equipped with tanks and long-range artillery of Soviet origin. In support

of the defending South Vietnamese troops Nixon ordered U.S. air and

naval forces to attack enemy military targets in both North and South

Vietnam, later extended to include the oil depots at Hanoi and Haiphong.

For several weeks the outcome remained in the balance, and on 8 May 1972

he adopted stronger measures to deny Hanoi the weapons and supplies it

needed to continue the invasion. The president directed the mining of

the approaches to North Vietnamese ports as well as expanded air action to

interdict deliveries by road and rail. He announced that these operations

would cease when the following conditions were met: "First, all American

prisoners of war must be returned. Second, there must be an internationally supervised cease-fire throughout Indochina." With these terms met,

he said, total withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam would follow

within four months. 53

The intensification of U.S. actions against a "fraternal ally" of the Soviet

Union drew occasional expressions of displeasure from the men in the

Kremlin, but they made no move to cancel the scheduled summit meeting.

President Nixon was welcomed in Moscow on 22 May for consultations that

culminated in the signing of a historic arms limitation agreement (SALT I)

and the announcement of accords on a number of lesser matters. Southeast

Asia had been a subject of discussion, but the communique of 29 May presented the opposing views of the two signatories with notable restraint.

The Soviets stressed their "solidarity with the just struggle of the peoples of

Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia" and "firmly" supported the North Vietnamese and PRG demands in the peace negotiations. 54

Clearly the leaders of the Soviet Union did not propose to allow Vietnam to threaten the pattern of detente evolving between their country and

the United States. Limiting the arms race was only one of the desirable

goals whose realization depended on improved relations. Obtaining relief

from the effects of recent crop failures was another of more immediate concern; permission to make large purchases of American grain would help

meet the need. For some time the United States had been engaging the

Soviet Union in discussion of a broad range of issues with the hope that

just such a compelling recognition of mutual interests would emerge. The

president's steadiness of purpose and the skillful work of Henry Kissinger

had now brought that policy to fruition. Their success extended even to

persuading the Soviet leaders that they had a stake in seeing that the United

States was not denied an acceptable way to withdraw from Vietnam. Otherwise an expanding detente and its further benefits might be beyond reach.
Negotiations for Peace 475

Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny arrived in Hanoi barely two weeks

after the Moscow summit ended. It is likely that he counseled the North

Vietnamese to modify their negotiating terms so that a settlement could

be reached. He could have argued that even if the demand for Thieu's

ouster had to be dropped, the resulting agreement would bring a definite

end to the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam. Such a concession

might delay the triumphal outcome Hanoi was seeking, but the assurance

that it would occur eventually would be increased. Acceptance of the

cease-fire-in-place that was a feature of recent U.S. proposals would allow

North Vietnamese forces to solidify their control of the areas currently

held, in preparation for the ultimate showdown and certain victory. 55

Counsel on the virtues of patience brought little solace to the leaders

in Hanoi. Since January they had seen their two patrons, Communist China

and the Soviet Union, draw closer to the United States and become so

accommodating to Washington as to forgo any serious protest of the bombing and mine blockade of North Vietnam. In August resentment found

an outlet in Nhan Dan, the official North Vietnamese journal. Although it

named no names, the editorial condemned states within the Communist

brotherhood who forgot that detente was a stratagem to be used only to

advance the world revolution, and then only in rare instances when no

other means would suffice. Anyone who entered such arrangements with

imperialistic countries merely to serve narrow national interests was shielding the reactionary forces from the just fate to which history had consigned

them. It amounted to "throwing a life-buoy to a drowning pirate. "56

The fact remained that Nixon's diplomacy had achieved its aims in

Moscow and Peking. An American journalist who interviewed Le Duc Tho

passed word to the State Department that despite a brave front and some

attempt to discount the Moscow communique, "Tho's feelings of isolation

could not be concealed."57 Other elements of the situation were also conducive to a reconsideration of policy in Hanoi. Although strikingly successful in the northern provinces, the invasion of South Vietnam had

failed in its ultimate purpose of shattering the organized resistance of the

Saigon government. Battered but no longer prone to panicky retreats, the

South Vietnamese ground forces were holding their own by mid-May.

The support given by U.S. air attacks and naval gunfire had been a critical factor, and North Vietnam's rulers were aware of this as they considered

the argument that some adjustment of aims might be acceptable to speed

the final departure of the Americans.

The private meetings of Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho continued, and here the breakthrough occurred, on 8 October 1972: Le Duc
476 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Tho presented a nine-point plan that for the first time made no demand

for Thieu's ouster and the dismantling of his administration. It was essentially the two-track approach long advocated by Kissinger, with the military aspects to be dealt with through an agreement between the United

States and North Vietnam. Their agreement would also broadly define

the procedures under which the political aspects were to be left for settlement by the South Vietnamese parties-the Saigon government and

the PRG.

The military provisions as initially proposed by Le Duc Tho included

the establishment of a cease-fire in South Vietnam, following which all

U.S. troops would withdraw within 60 days and "all captured and detained

personnel" would be released during the same period. Kissinger spotted

important omissions and unresolved details. The cease-fire did not extend

to Laos and Cambodia and presumably did not cover prisoner return from

those areas. The description of the machinery for international supervision

was incomplete, and there were some passages in which the very wording

would be offensive to President Thieu. Nevertheless, the outlines of a potential agreement were discernible. Kissinger immediately accepted Tho's draft

as the basis for discussion. 58

The next three days of intensive negotiation engaged the principals in

sessions that lasted up to 16 hours and their staffs in uncounted hours of

additional work. By 12 October 1972 this fast-paced activity produced a

draft settlement that needed agreement on only a few additional matters.

Confident ofsurmounting these last obstacles, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho had

set up a timetable for implementation. On 21 October the United States

would halt the bombing and mining of North Vietnam; on 22 October

the two negotiators would initial the agreement in Hanoi, after Kissinger had obtained the concurrence of President Thieu; on 30 October the

formal signing of the agreement would take place in Paris, bringing the

cease-fire in South Vietnam into effect the following day. 59

When he subscribed to the timetable Kissinger had been confident of

procuring Thieu's assent to the agreement in short order. Instead, the discussions he began in Saigon on Thursday morning, 19 October, continued

through the entire weekend and concluded with acceptance of Thieu's

refusal to be a party to the settlement in its current form. The South Vietnamese president listed 23 changes he wanted made in the text, some of

them of fundamental significance. At this stage President Nixon preferred

not to apply the degree of pressure that might force Thieu to drop his

objections. Instructions received from the White House midway in the consultations reminded Kissinger that "we must have Thieu as a willing partner

in making any agreement. It cannot be a shotgun marriage." Accordingly
Negotiations for Peace 477

the talks ended on Monday morning with the United States committed

to making a good-faith effort to obtain the changes the South Vietnamese

leader desired. 60

As his stay in Saigon lengthened, Kissinger had been forced to seek

North Vietnam's approval for a slippage of the timetable, postponing the

initialing ceremony in Hanoi by two days and rescheduling the signing

in Paris for 31 October. In the next message, sent in the president's name,

Kissinger skirted the timetable question while advising Hanoi that difficulties encountered in Saigon "have proved somewhat more complex than

originally anticipated. Some of them concern matters which the U.S. side

is honor-bound to put before the DRV side." Within 24 hours a further

presidential message formally proposed that Le Duc Tho and Kissinger

meet in Paris as soon as possible to resolve the remaining issues; naturally

Kissinger's appearance in Hanoi to initial the agreement must await completion of these additional discussions. 61

The North Vietnamese responded with a public disclosure of what had

happened in the private negotiations sir.:e their own proposal of 8 October first opened the way for significant progress. In broadcasts that became

known in Washington in the early hours of 26 October Radio Hanoi

quoted the draft settlement's terms as agreed to by 22 October and cited a

message in which President Nixon had "confirmed that the formulation of

the agreement could be considered complete." It revealed as well the U.S.

request that the final signing be delayed until 31 October, to which Hanoi

had consented while giving notice that no further postponements would

be considered. Now, however, the United States was calling for a reopening

of the negotiations, using objections supplied by the Saigon government as

an excuse. "The so-called difficulties in Saigon represent a mere pretext

to delay the implementation of the U.S. commitments," the broadcast

charged. It went on to suggest that the deeper purpose was "to sabotage all

peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem. "62

At the president's direction Kissinger appeared at a televised news conference later on 26 October. The accusation that the United States had

reneged on a firm commitment to sign the peace settlement by a certain

date could not be allowed to stand. Kissinger maintained that fulfillment

of the schedule had been accepted as a goal, but not one that the United

States had pledged to achieve irrespective of how acceptable the agreement

was when the deadline arrived. On the contrary, he said, U.S. representatives had made clear from the first that the negotiated terms would have

to undergo review in Washington and then in Saigon before conclusive

action could be taken. The review had now identified some matters that

still needed to be settled and others to be spelled out more fully or recast in
478 THE LONG ROAD HOME

clearer language. In describing them Kissinger strove to assure Hanoi that

the United States intended no fundamental departure from what had

been negotiated so far and was eager to press forward. He stressed that what

remained to be done was as nothing compared to what had already been

accomplished. "We are talking here about six or seven very concrete issues

that, with anything like the goodwill that has already been shown, can

easily be settled." He estimated thJt this could be accomplished in one

more negotiating session lasting three or four days.63

In this context, and with the assumption that North Vietnam would

accept the invitation to return to the bargaining table, Kissinger made the

pronouncement that fixed the news conference of 26 October in the

public memory. His belief that "peace is at hand" excited the hopes of

millions of Americans. For some, however, it aroused suspicions that the

entire performance was an election ploy, designed to insure the victory

of President Nixon on 7 November. No visible progress occurred in the

time remaining before election day. The parties finally arranged for the

negotiations to resume on 20 November.

The return of prisoners and resolution of the MIA problem were not

leading issues at this point. In fact, in the draft settlement that had been

agreed to by 22 October the section covering these matters was already

worded substantially as it appeared in the final treaty three months later.

The draft article had three subparagraphs, the first two of which had been

put in place with little difficulty. Article 8(a) covered the return of captured military personnel and foreign (non-Vietnamese) civilians, which

was to occur simultaneously with and be completed not later than the

60-day U.S. troop withdrawal. Article 8(b) pledged the parties to help each

other get information about military men and foreign civilians who were

unaccounted for.

The exchanges leading to adoption of Article 8(c) had been more protracted. It addressed the question of the return ofVietnamese civilian personnel captured or detained in South Vietnam, many of whom were members

of the Viet Congo The Provisional Revolutionary Government was passionately committed to gaining the release of its people, and Le Duc Tho's

initial proposal on 8 October had implied that all returns, whether of

military captives, foreign civilians, or Vietnamese political detainees, would

occur as a single operation within the GO-day withdrawal period. Kissinger

had immediately demanded that the release of U.S. military men not be

connected in any way with that of the political prisoners. Yielding on that

point, Hanoi's negotiators continued to press for language that committed

the Saigon government to handing over the political prisoners within a

specified time. On 19 October they gave way here too, in one of the final
Negotiations for Peace 479

concessions leading to Nixon's acknowledgement that the agreement was

now complete. The approved wording went no further than to obligate

the PRG and the South Vietnamese government to "do their utmost" to

resolve this matter within 90 days after the cease-fire came into effect. 64

Several protocols to the treaty still had to be drafted, including one

that would set out more fully the procedures for implementing Article 8.

Both this protocol and some additional contention over Article 8(c) did

figure in the final negotiations, but less as the subjects of substantive

argument than as counters maneuvered on the board.

When the private meetings of Kissinger and Le Duc Tho resumed in

Paris on 20 November the Communist spokesmen bared their frustration

over the way the U.S. negotiators had evaded the attempt to hold the

Americans to an October signing date. In talking to an American reporter

Le Duc Tho had once been candid enough to say that his side believed

the "only time to negotiate with US Presidents was just before an election."

That timing advantage the North Vietnamese had now lost, and they

already sensed that President Nixon's negotiating terms had stiffened since

his election victory. Hanoi also had reason to resent the massive shipments

of munitions, aircraft, and other equipment being rushed to South Vietnam from the United States, obviously in anticipation of the cutoff date to

be named in the peace settlement. Operations Enhance and Enhance Plus,

which entailed (he accelerated delivery of a full year's supply of military

assistance, reached their peak during November. Moreover, by making

quick work of transferring legal title to its military installations to the

Saigon government the United States was seeking to circumvent the treaty

requirement that all U.S. bases in South Vietnam be dismantled. 65

When confronted with Kissinger's list of amendments desired by the

South Vietnamese government Hanoi's representatives entered on a course

of obstructionism and delay. Le Due Tho first withdrew from agreements

recently concluded, then began cancelling others that dated from the October negotiations, giving a strong signal that the U.S. side must not expect

to obtain the changes being sought on Thieu's behalf or to impose new

requirements of its own. By retracting concessions previously made, he

created an instant bank of bargaining chips that Kissinger could be compelled to buy back by abandoning U.S. positions. At first it appeared that

the North Vietnamese intended to use these tradeoffs to prevent changes

in the draft text of 22 October, which in Hanoi's view was the version that

the president and Kissinger had once obligated themselves to sign. Later,

however, Kissinger interpreted moves by the opposing side as indicating

an unwillingness to reach a settlement even on that chosen basis. The Communist leaders appeared to be operating on the assumption that the Nixon
480 THE LONG ROAD HOME

administration would come under stronger pressures at home as a result

of further delay, making a settlement on Hanoi's terms more likely.66

If he desired delay, Le Duc Tho was ideally positioned to create it.

When selecting points of previous agreement to declare no longer valid

he had a free choice among those known to be of greatest importance to

the Americans. One of the first to be withdrawn was the consent he had

given in October to a definite separation of the release of political detainees from the return of prisoners of war. By 4 December Tho was demanding that the peace settlement provide for immediate release of the political

prisoners held by the South Vietnamese government, with a clear implication that the GO-day timetable for the military repatriation might be

held up until this was accomplished. By argument and timely concession

Kissinger first had to coax Tho away from this extreme position, then

edge him back to a reaffirmation of the previously agreed text on civilian

prisoners that recognized no connection between their return and that

of the prisoners of war. But with that agreement seemingly in place

again, U.S. negotiators found that the North Vietnamese had reintroduced linkage between the detainee and prisoner-of-war releases in their

recommended text for the protocol on the subject. 67

Having returned to Washington, Kissinger denounced the enemy's negotiating practices during a news conference on 16 December. At Paris the

situation had been such that "a settlement was always just within our

reach and was always pulled just beyond our reach when we attempted

to grasp it." He warned that this could not continue; "it cannot do that

every day an issue is settled a new one is raised" or that the same one reappeared again and again. The United States was prepared to continue the

negotiations in the productive spirit that had marked them in October,

he said, bur there could be no progress unless the opposing side was ready

to deal in good faith and with good will. Kissinger made no reference to

a more pointed warning from the president that he had conveyed to Le

Due Tho more than two weeks earlier, reminding him that the United

States had the option of discontinuing the talks and stepping up its military activities until its enemy showed a willingness to negotiate seriously.

By IG December Nixon had already issued the order directing the use of

massed B-52s in a bombing campaign against military targets in the HanoiHaiphong corridor. Scheduled to begin on 17 December, the planned operations also included increased aerial reconnaissance and reseeding of the

mines in Haiphong harbor. 68

A message from Washington reached the North Vietnamese on 18 December, coinciding with their first awareness of the unprecedented intensity

of the bombing raids launched against them. It charged that Hanoi's
Negotiations for Peace 481

representatives had been "deliberately and frivolously delaying the talks."

To clear the slate for a fresh start the United States proposed a return

to the treaty draft as it read on 23 November 1972, before Le Duc Tho

began cancelling previous concessions and agreements. On that basis,

Kissinger would be prepared to reopen the negotiations anytime after

26 December. 69

The first direct response from Hanoi came on 26 December, just as the

B-52s were renewing their daily raids following a Christmas suspension of

36 hours. The message indicated a willingness to resume negotiations on

the terms proposed in the U.S. note of 18 December. Technical experts, concerned mainly with the protocols, could start their talks 'as soon as the

bombing ceased, but for reasons of health Le Duc Tho would be unable

to appear until 8 January 1973. In reply the United States required specifically that the technical discussions get under way on 2 January. It

accepted the 8 January date for beginning the Tho-Kissinger negotiations

but stressed that they would need to move rapidly toward a settlement,

since Kissinger would be unable to remain in Paris beyond four days. In

this and following messages the United States drove home the point that

there must be no recurrence of the stalling tactics that had prevented an

agreement before.

Hanoi returned an affirmative reply in less than 24 hours, with accompanying protestations of its "constantly serious negotiating attitude."

Announcements from the White House on 30 December 1972 gave the

two January dates on which negotiations would resume and stated that

"all bombing will be discontinued above the 20th parallel as long as serious negotiations are under way." In fact, the B-52 operations had ended on

the evening of 29 December, Washington time.7°

The discussions of the technical experts had already disposed of several points of contention by the time Kissinger journeyed to Paris for the

8 January meeting. Despite some show of defiance by the North Vietnamese for public consumption, the main negotiations also took on a

businesslike tone by the second day. On 13 January Kissinger and Le Duc

Tho brought the draft agreement to completed form, with all supporting

protocols and understandings attached.?l

President Nixon had already decided that henceforth no objection

raised by his South Vietnamese ally would be allowed to deter the United

States from signing an agreement that the president regarded as satisfactory. He had begun communicating this to President Thieu in the plainest terms, even before the bombing offensive ended and negotiations

resumed. Nixon's personal emissary, Maj. Gen. Alexander Haig, Kissinger's

deputy, delivered a letter on 19 December 1972 that advised Thieu of
482 THE LONG ROAD HOME

my irrevocable intention to proceed, preferably with your cooperation

but, if necessary, alone." Further communications, couched in still stronger

language, pressured the Saigon government until Thieu gave up his last

effort to obtain changes in the treaty's text. The South Vietnamese leader

signified his willingness to be a party to the settlement on 21 January 1973,

the day following President Nixon's inauguration for a second term.n

President Nixon addressed the nation on the evening of 23 January,

leading off with the statement that was also being issued in Hanoi at

that hour:

At 12:30 Paris time today, January 23, 1973, the Agreement

on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam was inirialed

by Dr. Henry Kissinger on behalf of the United States, and Special Advisor Le Due Tho on behalf of the Democratic Republic

of Vietnam.

The agreement will be formally signed by the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam on January 27, 1973,

at the Intetnational Conference Center in Paris.

The cease-fire will rake effect at 2400 Greenwich Mean

Time, January 27, 1973. The United States and the Democratic

Republic of Vietnam express the hope that this agteement will

insure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the preservation

of lasting peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia.

In his remarks the president referred to occasions during the previous

year when he had "set forth the goals that we considered essential for peace

with honor."

In the settlement rhar has now been agreed to, all the conditions that I laid down then have been met.

A cease-fire, internationally supervised, will begin at 7 p.m.

this Saturday, January 27, Washington time.

Within 60 days from this Saturday, all Americans held

prisoners of war throughout Indochina will be released. There

will be the fullest possible accounting for all of those who are

missing in action.

During the same GO-day period, all American forces will be

withdrawn from South Vietnam.

The people of South Vietnam have been guaranteed the right

to determine their own future, without outside interference.?3

In the full text of the agreement, made public the following day, the

section dealing with captured and missing petsonnel was relatively brief:
Negotiations for Peace 483

Chapter III

THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL

AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS, AND CAPTURED AND

DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Article 8

(a) The return of captuted military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with and

completed not later than the same day as the troop withdrawal

mentioned in Article 5. The patties shall exchange complete lists

of the above-mentioned captured military petsonnel and foreign

civilians on the day of the signing of this Agteement.

(b) The parties shall help each other to get information

about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the

parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care

of the gtaves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and

repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures

as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action.

(c) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam will be resolved

by the two South Vietnamese parties on the basis of the principles of Article 21 (b) of the Agreement on the Cessation of

Hostilities in Vietnam of July 20, 1954. The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation and

concord, with a view to ending hatred and enmity, in order to

ease suffering and to reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to resolve this question within

ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect. 74

Article 8(a) made the return of captured military men and foreign civilians

dependent on the troop withdrawal and not on any other event. Also, the

question of Vietnamese civilians detained in South Vietnam was treated

separately in Article 8(c), with a different timetable and set of obligations,

intended to insure that delays in their release would have no effect on the

repatriation of military personnel and foreign civilians.

The protocol concerning the implementation of Article 8 was also

published on 24 January 1973. One of its early paragraphs declared that

"all captured military personnel of the United States and those of the

other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a) of the Agreement shall
484 THE LONG ROAD HOME

be returned to United States authorities." The same applied to captured

civilians who were nationals of the countries mentioned. Article 3(a) of

the main agreement did not specifically list the nations involved, merely

referring to "the other foreign countries allied with the United States and

the Republic of Vietnam." The U.S. negotiators believed there was no

question it meant the countries that had contributed troops to the conflict in South Vietnam-Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines,

and the Republic of Korea. They attached much more importance to the

simple statement that captured personnel "shall be returned to United

States authorities." They were relying on this wording to guarantee that

the exercise would proceed in official channels, with no recurrence of the

Communist tactic of handing over releasees to antiwar groups.75

Other passages of the protocol filled in the meaning of the basic agreement more explicitly, and at a news conference on 24 January Kissinger

supplied further details, based in part on understandings he had reached

with Le Duc Tho that did not appear in the formal documents. For instance, the protocol added an important requirement to the basic provision

for return of all captured persons during the GO-day period of the troop

withdrawal. The return should proceed "at a rate no slower than the rate of

withdrawal from South Vietnam of United States forces and those of the

other foreign countries." Kissinger went a bit further, saying, "We expect

that American prisoners will be released at intervals of two weeks or 15

days in roughly equal installments." Whereas the protocol said the transfer

of prisoners would occur at places convenient to the concerned parties,

Kissinger spoke confidently of their being "returned to us in Hanoi.

They will be received by American medical evacuation teams and flown

on American airplanes from Hanoi to places of our own choice. "76

The cease-fire provision of the agreement applied only to South Vietnam and not to all the Indochinese states as President Nixon had once

proposed. The peace settlement did contain pledges by all parties to respect

the independence, neutrality, and territorial integrity of Laos and Cambodia and to cease all military activities there, but it did not treat the

question of return of prisoners of war from those two countries. Such satisfaction as Kissinger had been able to obtain on this matter depended on

assurances given him by Le Duc Tho. As early as 21 October 1972 Tho

had stated that there were no Americans held captive in Cambodia but

that the prisoners in Laos would be released at the same time as those

from North and South Vietnam. This promise survived the suspension of

negotiations and the December bombing that followed, and there was

nothing tentative about its terms as presented in the post-agreement summary prepared in the State Departmenr: "The DRY has assured us that,
Negotiations for Peace 485

although not covered by the Agreement, 'all U.S. military and civilian

prisoners detained in Laos shall be released no later than 60 days following the signature of the Agreement.' The DRY has also assured us that it

would be responsible for making the necessary arrangements with the

Pathet Lao."77

As for the order in which captured persons would be selected for release, the protocol prescribed the following: "Persons who are seriously ill,

wounded or maimed, old persons and women shall be returned first. The

remainder shall be returned either by returning all from one detention

place after another or in order of their dates of capture, beginning with

those who have been held the longest." To insure that this and other provisions were made known to prison camp inmates, the protocol required

the parties to publish its text within five days of signature and communicate it to all persons in custody. Prisoners might be heartened when

they read that "each party shall return all captured persons mentioned in

Articles 1 and 2 of this Protocol without delay and shall facilitate their

return and reception." Moreover, "the detaining parties shall not deny or

delay their return for any reason, including the fact that captured persons

may, on any grounds, have been prosecuted or sentenced." From the U.S.

viewpoint that final passage gave protection against revival of war

crimes charges or the last-minute appearance of claims that the men had

been convicted of other offenses. The protocol accomplished this by introducing an exception to the Geneva Convention. With regard to certain

crimes and under various safeguards the Convention did provide for the

trial and conviction of a captured military man, stipulating further that

he would serve the sentence imposed before qualifying for return to his

homeland. The protocol's provision set the latter requirement aside. 78

The protocol also had a section on "Treatment of Captured Persons

During Detention" that .restated most of the protections of the Geneva

Convention. Although for the military prisoners it would presumably

be operative only for the next 60 days, the main article proclaimed that

captured personnel "shall be treated humanely at all times, and in accordance with international practice." It went on to enumerate their rights:

protection against torture and cruel treatment, murder, mutilation, or

outrages against personal dignity; provision of adequate food, clothing,

shelter, and medical attention; permission to receive packages and exchangemail with their families; and prohibition of forced enlistment in

the armed forces of their captor. Further, the parties were called upon to

agree within 15 days on "the designation of two or more national Red

Cross societies to visit all places where captured military personnel

and foreign civilians are held." In American eyes it was virtually a catalog
486 THE LONG ROAD HOME

of the obligations the Communist enemy had refused to honor during

the hostilities. 79

The protocol left further details of implementation to be worked out

by the several bodies provided for in the main agreement. Arrangements

for the return of prisoners of war and foreign civilians fell to the FourParty Joint Military Commission (FPJMC), with representation from the

United States, North and South Vietnam, and the PRG. The FPJMC also

had responsibility for carrying out the cease-fire, the 60-day troop withdrawal, and the dismantling of U.S. military bases. It was to operate by

"consultations and unanimity." In addition, the Saigon government and

the PRG were to form a Two-Party Joint Military Commission (TPJMC)

to deal with matters that the agreement left exclusively to the two South

Vietnamese parties, such as enforcing the cease-fire in South Vietnam and

reaching an accord on the release of Vietnamese civilian detainees. MO

The Paris agreement also provided for an International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS), composed of representatives of

Canada, Hungary, Poland, and Indonesia. The protocol on captured

military personnel and foreign civilians described the commission's responsibility for overseeing the return of the captives. Members of the

ICCS were to participate in the ceremony at each location where a release

occurred, monitoring the proceedings, examining the prisoner lists, and

visiting "the last detention places" from which the returnees had been transported. Similarly, the protocol required the FPJMC to send joint military

teams to observe each return of personnel and inspect their last place of

detention. This provision for inspection visits had had firm backing from

Defense officials, who thought of it less as an opportunity to assess the conditions of captivity than as a check to see that no men were left behind. S]

In hailing the agreement President Nixon had indicated that a full

accounting for the missing was now assured, but the subsidiary documents contained remarb.bly little to back up this assessment. The main

agreement's pledge of mutual assistance in establishing what had happened

to missing persons still stood, but the protocols added nothing in the way

of guidance for its implementation. Understandably, the pledge itself was

in general terms and barely touched on the particulars of the task, as a rereading of Article 8(b) shows: "The parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties

missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of

the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains,

and ro take any such other measures as may be required to get information

about those still considered missing in action." The agreement did make
Negotiations for Peace 487

the Four-Party Joint Military Commission responsible for ensuring joint

action in implementing the missing persons provision, but the FPJMC

had been granted only a 60-day lifespan. The single additional detail

supplied by the protocol on captured military personnel dealt with this:

"When the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities,

a Four-Party Joint Military team shall be maintained to carryon this task."82

The sketchy organizational arrangement hardly suggested that a resourceful and persevering effort to resolve the MIA problem was in the

making. One unfavorable aspect of the agreement was that none of what

was set out in Article 8(b) or the protocol applied to Laos. Also, Article 8(b)

was one of the few for which the International Commission of Control and

Supervision had no responsibility; the entire matter of searches for the

missing lay outside its purview. 83

DoD officials had been the chief advocates of making accounting for

the missing a primary element of the negotiations, and they had cause to

be dissatisfied with an agreement that left so much to future decision and

contained so few of the specific requirements for which they had pressed.

The documents lacked the sort of commitments that Secretary Laird had

described in a memorandum for Kissinger on 26 July 1972. Laird expressed

his conviction that arrangements permitting the fullest possible accounting for the missing servicemen must be obtained during the negotiations.

He observed that resolving the status of these men was a major problem

that would confront the Department of Defense "and several thousand

family members" once the prisoners of war were recovered. It could be

hoped that some men previously unaccounted for would turn up during

the release and that returnees would be able to fill in information about

others. "However," he continued, "many missing cases will remain unresolved, and I do not believe we should accept, nor will families be satisfied

with, the enemy's word as to the fate of our missing men without some

form of independent verification or substantial evidence .... Such a form

of verification could include agreements to return located remains and to

permit examination of known grave and crash sites by the US, a third

country or an impartial humanitarian organization."84

The secretary had spoken of "on-the-ground examination of loss

areas" as a definite requirement, and officials throughout Defense held

the same view. Their devotion to attaining this objective caused them to react worriedly to one passage in Kissinger's "peace is at hand" statement of

26 October. In assessing the negotiations Kissinger noted as a positive

accomplishment that "North Vietnam has made itself responsible for accounting of our prisoners and missing-in-actions throughout Indochina."
488 THE LONG ROAD HOME

DoD representatives immediately raised the question of whether Hanoi

"itself" assuming responsibility meant there could be no outside efforts to

account for the missing in action. H5

Soon afterward, on 10 November, Laird sent Kissinger a list of

points whose inclusion in the agreement he considered essential. Laird

clearly intended the additional measures to augment the agreement's

generalized references to obtaining information about the missing and

its vague allusion to the possible repatriation of remains. He wanted a

definite promise that all parties would "cooperate with the United States

Government in arranging for the return of remains of US personnel who

died during the conflict, including those who died after capture." He asked

for other explicit commitments that would permit teams including U.S.

personnel to inspect crash sites or last-known locations and search for

remains in the country of loss. "Subject to coordination with host government," Laird wrote Kissinger, "US aircraft will be authorized overflight

of areas throughout Indo-China for the purpose of identifying crash sites,

recovering remains and personal effects, and supporting search and recovery teams." In Laird's conception, both the FPJMC and the International Commission of Control and Supervision would continue to

function after U.S. forces had withdrawn and would have a degree of

coordinating responsibility, yet to be defined, in the effort to account for

the missingY'

The secretary's "essential negotiating points" relating to the MIA

problem found no place in the final agreement or its protocols, bur

Defense officials viewed the settlement favorably in most other respects,

noting particularly the fact that U.S. authorities were slated to receive

most of the released prisoners by direct transfer in Hanoi. This arrangement permitted placing the men under U.S. medical care immediately,

and it avoided the added exertions and uncertainties that more roundabout

routes and use of intermediaries would entail. In the months leading up

to conclusion of the agreement Defense officials had entertained little

hope of so favorable an outcome. Whenever they had the opportunity

to suggest what the negotiators should aim for they indicated a definite

preference for the dispatch of U.S. personnel and medical evacuation

aircraft to Hanoi to collect the releasees. Doubt that the North Vietnamese would allow U.S. military aircraft to enter remained so strong that

the listing always included several alternatives, judged less desirable

but more likely to be accepted. A position paper that reached Laird in

November 1972 outlined these other choices. Next most acceptable was a

pickup in Hanoi by aircraft of some nation not directly involved ("Swiss,

French, Scandinavian, etc.") or aircraft operating under ICCS auspices.
Negotiations for Peace 489

If the Communists ruled out the North Vietnamese capital as the site, the

United States could agree to delivery of the prisoners to the airport at

Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Hong Kong, or in some other third

country, where they would be received by U.S. officials. Finally, "although

not desirable," the United States might assent to having the prisoners

brought to a designated point in South Vietnam, probably by transit

through the DMZ. A further option mentioned in earlier versions of the

paper involved sending ships of U.S. or other registry to Haiphong to effect

the transfer. 87

The papers produced by Defense officials and staff agencies in the final

months of 1972 refined and updated previous attempts to say what the

peace settlement should include. Earlier in the year, for instance, DoD

staff had participated in the work of the Interdepartmental Study Panel

on Prisoner Release and Repatriation in Indochina that drafted recommendations for consideration within the NSC system. By means such as

this DoD made an important contribution to the materials from which

the U.S. negotiators were working. The actual conduct of the more significant negotiations, however, remained securely in the hands of the president,

Kissinger, and the latter's immediate staff. At this level the views and influence of the. Department of Defense could be brought to bear only by

Secretary Laird himself. RR

Laird wrote to the president or Kissinger on numerous occasions to

comment on negotiating strategy or to suggest new initiatives relating to the

prisoners of war. Undoubtedly some of his memorandums placed proposals

on the record that he had already presented in person. Other exchanges of

more closely held information occurred between Kissinger and Laird at

their private breakfast or luncheon meetings, held weekly when other commitments allowed. Each of the principals brought a single confidential

adviser. During 1972 Haig normally accompanied Kissinger; Laird was

attended by his senior military assistant, Rear Adm. Daniel J. Murphy. In

these sessions Laird expressed the views and championed the proposals of

his department, and he received as much information about the negotiations as Kissinger felt it prudent to divulge.S')

Laird and his closest associates in Defense at least knew that their preferences and concerns had been directly conveyed to the chief U.S.

negotiator, but they harbored no illusion that they had full knowledge

of Kissinger's purposes and endeavors. "Unless Henty has something up

his sleeve we do not know about" was a necessary reservation that sometimes appeared in their internal communications. 90

As the president's plenipotentiary in the negotiations, Kissinger exercised exclusive control. The fate of measures tabbed as important by DoD
490 THE LONG ROAD HOME

depended ultimately on the judgments Kissinger made during the bargaining sessions, on his evolving sense of how far matters could be pressed

without endangering the primary objectives of the United States in the

negotiations. Presumably Kissinger could have mounted a stronger effort

to bind all parties to a detailed commitment regarding searches for the

missing in action and might well have questioned Le Due Tho more

closely about his claim that no Americans were being held in Cambodia.

Kissinger chose not to pursue those lines, perhaps believing that to do so

would unacceptably delay the concluding of the peace agreement or upset

some narrowly achieved balancing of interests. In any event, his reasoning

in the matter was largely beyond challenge so long as the president was

satisfied with the overall result.

Whatever its flaws, the agreement Kissinger had obtained was of

great consequence. It opened the way for complete disengagement of

U.S. forces from the hostilities in Vietnam, and it provided for prompt

repatriation of the American prisoners of war. Thus it set the stage for

Operation Homecoming.
22

Operation Homecoming

The signing in Paris on 27 January 1973 of the Agreement on Ending

the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam marked the start of the

GO-day period during which the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the return

of captured military personnel and civilians were to occur. The Four-Party

Joint Military Commission, charged with working out detailed arrangements for the prisoner exchange and other features of the agreement, was

to begin operations in Saigon 24 hours after the cease-fire took effect.

The U.S. delegation to that body, activated immediately upon the signing, had Maj. Gen. Gilbert H. Woodward, USA, as its chief and Brig. Gen.

John A. Wickham, Jr., USA, as his deputy.

Public announcement of General Woodward's appointment came as

Melvin Laird prepared to leave office on 29 January; Elliot L. Richardson

was to be sworn in as secretary of defense on the following day. Earlier

in the month Laird had made one final, characteristic contribution to his

prisoner of war crusade. He sensed that the long-awaited repatriation of

the Americans captured in Southeast Asia deserved a more meaningful,

more humanly engaging title than the one assigned it several years earlier

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Egress Recap. On 8 January 1973 he decreed

that the operation should thereafter be known as Homecoming. 1

Final PreparationsfOr Repatriation

Since Richardson had dealt with PW/MIA affairs while under secretary of state earlier in the Nixon administration, the briefing given him by

Roger Shields, DoD's leading expert in the field, spent little time on the

general background. Shields concentrated on the repatriation plans developed by OSD, the military services, and the unified commands that were

491
492 THE LONG ROAD HOME

about to be im plemented. He described the organizational arrangements

for overseeing the tepatriation and insuring coordination at all stages of

the process. Upon receiving word that release of the prisoners was imminent,

the Homecoming command post would commence operations from the

National Military Comnnnd Center. The staff would consist of the director

and officers of the PW/MIA Task Force plus representatives of the four

services, JCS, DIA, the Military Airlift Command, and the ASD(Public

Affairs). Direct links to the command posts of the services and the worldwide communications facilities of the NMCC would be at their disposal. 2

A partial test of the NMCC command post arrangement had already

taken place during more than 40 hours of continuous operation that

began on 27 January 1973. On that day the North Vietnamese and Viet

Cong representatives in Paris had turned over their prisoner lists to the

U.S. delegation. Transmitted to Washington by borh nash message and

voice communication, the lists contained the names of 555 U.S. military

personnel, 22 U.S. civilians, and 8 foreign nationals slated for repatriation. Officers in the NMCC passed information to Defense agencies, the

State Department, and the White House and tracked the progress made by

the services in notifying the men's families. Besides informing the next of

kin of those to be returned, the mission included advising the relatives of

more than 1,300 missing servicemen that their names did not appear on

the enemy's list. The Department of State had responsibility for reaching

the families of the U.S. civilians and informing foreign governments of

the impending release of their nationals.'

Shields's briefing sought to insure that Secretary Richardson received a

broad picture of the repatriation process and an introduction to the terminology involved. The activities of Phase I, for instance, were those occurring at the point where actual transfer of custody took place. By the end

of January it appeared definite that Hanoi's Cia Lam Airport would be

the principal release site. There the U.S. reception team would confirm the

numbers and identity of the released men, perform a quick medical check

to establish their suitability for air evacuation, and assist them in boarding the medevac aircraft for night to Clark Air Base in the Philippines.

In Phase II more thorough medical examinations and the associated

recordkeeping would take place at the joint processing center at Clark.

Doctors would deal with any condition that required immediate attention;

and prolonged medical treatment would be undertaken at this overseas

site only if deemed necessary by the physician in charge. Other Phase II

processing steps included the returnee's telephone call to next of kin and

the initial intelligence debriefing, directed solely at obtaining information

about men still unaccounted for. Returnees would be paid, issued uniforms,
Operation Homecoming 493

and advised of their career status and the state of their personal and financial affairs. Once cleared for travel by the medical staff, they would board

the specially configured C-141 aircraft of the aeromedical evacuation system for the one-stop flight via Hawaii to the continental United States.

Phase II terminated with their arrival, normally at Travis AFB in California.

A third and more lengthy phase of repatriation processing would await

returnees at one of the 31 military hospitals scheduled to receive them. The

plan as it stood in late January 1973 intended that the men's reunions

with their families would occur as soon as possible after arrival at the

hospital and in private. Each man would enter a course of medical care

designed to meet his particular needs and would undergo a second round

of intelligence debriefing, providing a detailed account of his captivity

experience. Counseling regarding his personal affairs and the career decisions available to him would precede the man's departure on convalescent

leave, along with public affairs counseling, should he desire to grant press

interviews or write for publication.

In closing his presentation for Secretary Richardson, Shields reviewed

several considerations that would assume increasing importance during

the repatriation. Arrival of the returnees in the United States would set in

motion the various programs for rehabilitation, readjustment, and longerterm medical monitoring that 000 had pledged to provide. At the same

time, the stark contrast between their return and the absence of the many

whose fate was still unknown would raise public concern for the MIA servicemen to a new pitch. Intense pressures could be anticipated from families, members of Congress, news commentators, and editorial writers for

fulfillment of the government's assurances that the fullest possible accounting would be obtained. Questions regarding the men's conduct while in

captivity would certainly claim public attention, and the issue could become highly controversial. For the most part, the Americans in the prison

camps had conducted themselves extremely well under most difficult circumstances, Shields said. There were known cases of less defensible behavior,

however, and accusations might be made by some of the returned men

against others.

Finally, the very breadth and intensity of interest in the homecoming

operation could create difficulties. Many private organizations were eager to

assist in the welcome or to make some gesture of appreciation to the men.

Congressmen wanted to greet returnees from their districts; governors

planned celebrations in their honor. Television networks and the press were

committing massive resources to news coverage at Clark Air Base and the

destination hospitals. In the face of all this, a principle that had guided repatriation planning from the beginning had to be reaffirmed: the men were
494 THE LONG ROAD HOME

to be shielded to the fullest extent possible from fanfare and confusion,

from pleas for interviews and pressures for public appearances. 4

President Nixon expressed similar sentiments during his press conference on 31 January. Taking note of speculation that he planned to appear

at Travis Air Force Base to welcome the first returning flight, the president dismissed the idea. It would not be a time for grandstanding, he said.

"These are men who have been away sometimes for years. They have a

right to have privacy, they have a right to be home with their families just

as quickly as they possibly can. And I am going to respect that right."5

In suggesting that the imperatives driving the news media might play

havoc with planned procedures, Shields raised a valid concern. At a Pentagon press briefing a few days earlier, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Public Affairs Jerry W. Friedheim also had made the point that "this is

not a ceremonial or fanfare operation." The object, he explained, was to

place the released men immediately in medical channels and to return

them as soon as possible to their families and to the destination hospitals

where comprehensive treatment could begin. Friedheim predicted that the

pace would be rapid, with the returnees' departure for home occurring as

soon as the physicians determined that they could withstand the transPacific journey. Accordingly, repatriation planners had assumed that returnees would not be ready for press conferences and other public exposure

until well into their stay at the stateside hospital. Immediately he came

under insistent questioning about opportunities for newsmen to have direct

access to the returnees at Clark Air Base, and in the end Friedheim said that

such contact with the press was "not ruled out. We will do the best we

can for you .... In keeping with the medical needs of the men, we might

be able to do that."6

In a bid to capitalize on this tentative opening, United Press International cabled Secretary Richardson on his first day in office, urging him

to insure wider opportunities for the press representatives covering the

release of the American prisoners of war. "Without wanting in any way

to jeopardize the health of these men or their adjustment to freedom, we

believe this is a matter of such overriding public interest that at the minimum a pool of reporters and photographers should be selected to go to

Hanoi with the U.S. planes and that reasonable access should be arranged

at Clark Field to at least some of those prisoners who are fit and willing

to talk to the press."7

Replying promptly on 31 January, Richardson welcomed the initial disclaimer in the UPI statement as being in accord with the longstanding

DoD position that the medical needs and health of the returned men

came first. He acknowledged an obligation to see that the homecoming

story was available to reporters as fully and promptly as possible, and he
Operation Homecoming 495

understood the UPI's hope that American newsmen might go on a pool

basis into Hanoi. Stating that "at the moment the U.S. government is

unable to do that," he held out a slight chance that it might be arranged

later. As to interviews, however, the secretary cast his reply in more positive terms than Friedheim had used earlier:

While we anticipate that men will be coming home so

swiftly that in most cases medical considerations will not be completely satisfied until the men reach the military hospitals near

their homes, we are fully prepared in our flexible planning to

provide, as possible, news access at such earlier points as Clark

and Travis Air Force Bases. I have given instructions that this

siruation is ro be monirored daily with concern ro each individual

rerurnee, so that whenever the men are medically fit, have completed those intelligence debriefings by which we hope to learn

about our missing men, and personally wish to do so they may

meet with newsmen.

Public Affairs Guidance No. 13, issued on 3 February and contaInIng the

text of Richardson's letter, notified Clark and other installations involved

in the repatriation that DoD stood committed to flexible procedures that

would accommodate to the extent possible the journalists' desire to talk

directly to the men.s

The commander of the 13th Air Force had activated the Joint Homecoming Reception Center (JHRC)* at Clark Air Base on 28 January, in view

of official statements that return of up to one quarter of the prisoners

could occur at any time during the first 15 days after the Paris agreement

came into effect. Activation of the JHRC was timed to provide immediate

readiness in the event that the North Vietnamese might make a symbolic

release within hours of the signing. Preparations, in progress since the

designation of Clark as the primary reception site in December, included

acquiring a stock of uniforms of all services and readying the individual

personnel folders of the men who might be released. Some JHRC staff

members had arrived early, but now full activation of the center required

major additions-Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs) in readiness for deployment to the Phase I reception site, escorts, debriefers, public affairs officers, communications specialists, the expanded hospital staff, and

numerous others in supporting functions. Final figures showed that

Operation Homecoming had involved 1,579 personnel from Clark pi us

1,307 more, most of them brought in from other U.S. military installations

throughout the Pacific Command. 9

* As noted in Chapters 14, 15, and elsewhere, during development of the repatriation

plans this facility had been called the Joint Central Processing Center (JCPe).
496 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Although the JHRC was fully manned and antiCIpating action at any

time, the wait for the first returnees dragged on until 12 February. Orientation of the recently added personnel proceeded during the interval, bur

one observer noted that "at times it was difficult to channel augmentee

energy into productive pursuits." Also, a few last-minute problems had to

be solved, as when it was discovered that no red carpet of appropriate size

and luster was available at Clark for the flight-line welcoming ceremony.

Authorities appealed to the U.S. embassy, which succeeded in obtaining

one from the Intercontinental Hotel in Manila.]O

Problems of finding useful employment during the waiting period

had set in even earlier for members of the press, who had converged on

the Clark base in such numbers that one element of the JHRC, the

Joint Information Bureau (JIB), was activated in advance to deal with

them. Soon after its opening on 25 January 1973 the JIB had accredited

to it S8 reporters, photographers, and cameramen of the working press

and 80 supporting technicians. From that total of 138 the number rose

steadily to at least 400 on the day the first returnees were welcomed. 1 ]

The chief of JIB was Col. Alfred J. Lynn, USAF, a seasoned public

affairs officer assigned from CINCPAC headquarters. His messages to that

headquarters and to Washington described the effort to keep the media representatives occupied with handouts of background information and tours

of the C-9 and C-141 aircraft, the base hospital, and other Homecomingrelated facilities. Lynn also reported the same dissatisfactions with the

ground rules for the press as were being heard in Washington. They included

the desire to cover the release ceremonies in Hanoi and a protest of the

official line that returnees were unlikely to be made available for interviews at Clark (which was soon given a more hopeful cast by Secretary

Richardson's reference to a flexible policy). During the current waiting

period newsmen objected particularly to the restrictions on interviewing

personnel involved in the processing, from the air crewmembers who were

to make the pickup in Hanoi, through the escort officers, the hospital commander, and the doctors, including the psychiatric specialists. 12

On 29 January a reporter filed a story on the Associated Press wire

that appears to have been instrumental in relaxing those restrictions.

"Skits, Skirts, and Fun in Store as Nurses Prepare for POWs," read the

item's caption in the Chicago Tribune of 30 January 1973. The Omaha

World-Herald preferred "'Bunnies' Await the POWs." "If the nurses at

Clark Air Force Base Hospital have their way, the American prisoners of

war scheduled to stop here on their journey home from Hanoi will get

a sweet taste of femininity and fun," the article began. The nursessometimes identified as "blonde" or "attractive"-hinted at the welcome
Operation Homecoming 497

they had prepared. '''Heaven knows what a good French perfume will do

to a man who has been in prison for six years,' one of the nurses said

with a laugh." They had asked that their names not be used, it was reported, because hospital authorities had told them not to talk with

newsmen. Doctors were said to be "collecting stacks of Playboy magazine

and other male literature for the men to read as they relax" and were

planning a series of skits depicting such social and historical developments

as the hippie phenomenon, the marijuana craze, and the reelection of

President Nixon.l.l

From the viewpoint of public affairs officials in Washington, the Associated Press dispatch sounded entirely the wrong note. Sketching a picture

of frivolity and sexual preoccupation on the part of medical personnel, it

departed sharply from the desired image of professional dedication to providing the finest health care. Letters protesting the reported activities of

the hospital staff soon arrived at the Pentagon from readers of the New

Orleans Times-Picayune and the Milwaukee Sentinel, among others. Already,

however, on 1 February 1973, CINCPAC had cabled new guidance concurred in by Washington: "Interviews with personnel associated with

HOMECOMING activities at Clark AB are authorized upon approval

Chief JIB." Undoubtedly the new directive reflected a concl usion that

there was less to be feared from on-the-record interviews than from dispatches based on gleanings from unnamed informants that might be spiced

up or distorted as the reporter saw fit. 14

By 9 February under the new policy contacts between the press and

members of the reception center staff were a common occurrence. Time

interviewed a nurse while ABC-TV met with a dietician. The San Francisco

Examiner's man played the hometown angle by interviewing a C-141

navigator who hailed from California. Lunch at the hospital offered 15

newsmen a taste of the bland diet prescribed for the first stage of the

returning men's reentry into American life. Lynn notified DoD that international media representation had reached 365 and that members of

the press corps now expressed greater satisfaction with the arrangements,

particularly the improved flight-line position assigned them for the reception ceremony. Ways had been found to reduce the newsmen's distance

from the arriving aircraft by roughly one half while also providing forward camera positions that did not obstruct their view. From a location

under the wing of a parked C-141 the photographers would be no more

than 30 feet from the deplaning ramp and would be able to track the returnees to the point where they boarded the medical bus for transfer to

the hospital. Lynn assured officials at home that the JIB was "maintaining position of rigid flexibility."ls
498 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Release ofthe Prisoners

Roger Shields and Frank Sieverts had reached Clark Air Base on

7 February, ready to take their places as the senior Defense and State

Department representatives in the first party going into Hanoi. At a joint

appearance before the press the following day their responses gave newsmen somewhat more substance than earlier interviewees had provided,

bur neither Shields nor Sieverts could answer the cardinal question of the

day: When would the first prisoner release occur? It depended, they said,

on the negotiations being pursued within the Four-Party Joint Military

Commission in Saigon. 16

The FPJMC consisted of the delegations of the United States, the

Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam), the Democratic Republic of

Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam), and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Sourh Vietnam (PRG, the Viet Cong leadership).

After five days of procedural wrangles and other preliminaries, the first

meeting of the chiefs of delegation convened on 2 February 1973. General

Woodward presented his government's plan for withdrawal of the U.S.

forces in four 15-day increments. It was generally understood that this

also set the broad schedule for the return of the captive Americans, since

the protocol called for that transfer to be completed at a rate no slower

than the rate of the U.S. military's withdrawal from South Vietnam. A

related principle, held firmly in mind by all officials representing the

United States, maintained that release of the prisoners depended solely on

the troop withdrawal, with no linkage to the implementation of any other

article of the agreement. Its progress could not justly be delayed, for instance, because of some hitch in the return of captive North Vietnamese

to their homeland. Though implicit in the wording of the Paris accord

and an avowed part of the accompanying Kissinger-Le Duc Tho understandings, this principle required staunch defense on several occasions. I?

The Prisoner-of-War Subcommission of the FPJMC, charged with

working our the detailed arrangements, made notable progress at its first

session on 3 February 1973. The DRV and PRG representatives agreed to

give 48-hour notice of the place and date of each return of U.S. prisoners.

Hanoi's Gia Lam Airport had already been designated as the transfer and

evacuation point in North Vietnam. The PRG now indicated that there

would be a single release site for men held in South Vietnam, probably an

airfield in Military Region III. Further, the Viet Cong's representative said

that the first release might occur on 10 or 11 February. The DRV spokesman had not yet named a date within the first 15-day period, but he did

declare that during that first phase the North Vietnamese government
Operation Homecoming 499

would probably surrender a larger proportion of its captives than the one

quarter required. IS

Despite daily sessions of the PW Subcommission, no further commitments were recorded until 9 February, when the DRV signified its

intention of making the first release on 12 February. On 10 February,

observing the two-day notice provision, the North Vietnamese supplied a

roster of the 115 military personnel to be returned to U.S. control, 29 of

them sick or wounded. The PRG shifted to 12 February also, and it

now provided the names of 27 Americans, including 7 sick or injured, to

be released on that day. Some would be civilians. 19

Under the agreement 12 February counted as the final date in the

first IS-day period. Thus the other side could be said to have fulfilled its

obligation, but the experience of the U.S. authorities so far had done little

to lessen their wariness of Communist intentions. Could they accept the

DRV delegation's claim that it was having difficulty in communicating

with Hanoi, or was this a handy excuse for inaction-one that later might

be used to delay the prisoner return at some critical juncture?20

The two initial prisoner releases were scheduled to occur at very

nearly the same time during the morning hours of 12 February. At the

designated site in the South-an airfield at Loc Ninh, about 75 miles north

of Saigon-27 persons would be handed over by the PRG and moved by

helicopter within South Vietnam to Tan Son Nhut, then transferred to a

C-9 medevac aircraft for flight to Clark. In the North, all clearances had

been arranged for arrival at Gia Lam Airport of a C-130 bearing the

Reception Support Team (RST, an expanded version of the earlier QRT),

to be followed, beginning two hours later, by a succession of three C-141 s,

whose combined capacity would easily accommodate the men to be repatriated. Their number now came to 116, since the DRV had acceded to a

U.S. request that Cdr. Brian D. Woods be added ahead of schedule so that

he could hasten to the bedside of his critically ill mother in California. 21

Heading the reception team going into Hanoi on this and all subsequent occasions but one was Col. James R. Dennett, USAF. Including

the aircraft commander and his crew, the C-130 making the initial run

would carry 34 persons-Shields and Sieverts, a flight surgeon and other

medical specialists and technicians, Colonel Lynn and another public

affairs officer, three documentary photographers, airlift ground control and

maintenance personnel, and two English-Vietnamese interpreters, supplied

by the Army. Further, the C-130 could deploy and support an AN/MRC108 mobile radio system with its operating and maintenance crew. This

assured command and control communications for the recovery party

on the ground at Hanoi, since the mobile unit provided a direct link to
500 THE LONG ROAD HOME

facilities at Clark and the conference loop that included CINCPAC and

the NMCC in WashingtonY

The mission of going to the enemy's capital to accept the prisoners was

necessarily approached with caution, though this owed nothing to concern over the flight itself. During the previous two weeks U.S. C-130s had

made a number of trips to Hanoi when ferrying elements of the FPJMC or

the International Commission of Control and Supervision, thus familiarizing the crews with Cia Lam Airport and its approaches and with the bombdamaged terminal building where the ceremonies would occur. 23 Still unknown, however, were the condition of the men and the atmosphere in

which their return would take place. Members of the party were anxious

to discover what attitudes their North Vietnamese counterparts would display and to gauge how close a watch must be maintained against trickery

or excessive plays for propaganda advantage. Any elation felt on the U.S.

side was to be held in check, reserved for the moment when the transfer

of custody was complete and beyond recall.

Suspicion mounted when the DRV delegation to the FPJMC postponed the first flight into Hanoi for two hours, claiming adverse weather

conditions. No additional delay was imposed, however, and signs that

unfavorable weather had recently covered the area were still visible when

Colonel Dennet's C-130 touched down at Cia Lam. The DRV's spokesman, Lt. Col. Nguyen Phuong, explained the intention of handing over

the 116 Americans in five groups of 20, plus one of 16. The names appeared on duplicate rosters, one group of 20 to a page, each page to be

certified by Phuong and Dennett as the returnees were checked off. Some

in the U.S. party were suspicious of this arrangement as well. Why the

increments of 20? Why string out the exchange? Would this permit it to

be broken off at will? Twenty, it soon became apparent, was the capacity

of the buses being used to transport the Americans to the release point at

the terminal. 24

The first bus drew up just before the first C-141 came in for its landing. The 20 men emerged, formed a column of twos, and marched forward

at the order of their own leader. Their captors had supplied a common issue

of clothing consisting of a light zippered jacket, dark civilian trousers and

shoes, and a handbag for personal articles. Flanked by photographers and

newsmen of many nationalities, the column reached the forward line in

the enclosed area before the terminal, where the supervising officials of

the ICCS and observer teams from the FPJMC awaited them. The actual

transfer was a simple exercise. As a North Vietnamese official read off

each prisoner's name the man stepped forward and was joined by an

escort from the U.S. reception team, who guided the returnee through the
Operation Homecoming 501

enveloping crowd to the C-141. A few minutes later the second busload of

20 men began the process. Three in the group were litter cases. Trailed by

the persistent photographers, they were carried part of the way by North

Vietnamese attendants, then taken over by reception team members. All

others were able to walk, as in the first group, though some were limping.

The total of 40 returnees constituted the passenger load for the first C-141. 25

By this time it was early afternoon of 12 February in Hanoi. Thanks to

the mobile radio unit, the plane's loading and progress toward takeoff were

being followed on a minute-by-minute basis at every participating headquarters. The actual moment was recorded with evident relief and exhilaration in both Hawaii and Washington. At the Homecoming command

post in the Pentagon, where the first hour of 12 February had just begun,

the log book entry was boldly inscribed in red with black reinforcement:

"0036-First C-141 take-offfrom Hanoi." The North Vietnamese agreed to

an earlier arrival of the two further evacuation aircraft than had originally

been indicated. The men of the four remaining busloads moved through

the procedure with dispatch; less than 90 minutes sufficed for the loading

and departure of the second and third C-141 s. The final one, with 36 returnees aboard, also carried Shields, Sieverts, and several others originally

in Colonel Dennett's party.26

The operation went well. Colonel Dennett thought he detected in

Colonel Phuong an attitude mirroring his own-a desire to conduct the

exchange expeditiously and according to plan, without complicating

changes or extraneous controversies. The only time-consuming disagreement came over interpretation of the protocol's requirement that ICCS

members visit the last place of detention. Could the release site itself be

claimed as the last place or was it some earlier locale, and must the inspection necessarily precede the handing over of the prisoners? The United

States gave way on the second question, the DRV on the firstY

In his closing remarks to the ICCS representatives Phuong had not

neglected to cite the release of the 116th man, Commander Woods, as evidence of North Vietnam's good will and humanitarian spirit, but he did

not move on to more egregious propaganda themes. Instead he brought

up a matter that could well have served as a legitimate pretext for delay.

Though the protocol required that RVN observers be present, the South

Vietnamese government had sent none. Phuong indicated that his own

country's leaders had magnanimously decided to go ahead with the

exchange despite this slight. 28

In contrast, contention and delay marked the other prisoner release

on 12 February, in the South. 29 The u.S. reception team, headed by Brig.

Gen. Stan L. McClellan, USA, had reached the Loc Ninh site in good
502 THE LONG ROAD HOME

time for the scheduled repatriation of 27 American prisoners. The U.S.

party encountered PRG officials who insisted on connecting the event

to the release of Viet Cong personnel captured by the South Vietnamese,

occurring the same day. They said that no transfer of the Americans could

be expected until the Viet Cong soldiers being liberated arrived at Loc

Ninh, the point where they would pass to PRG custody. In fact, their

movement had not yet begun since the Communist prisoners at the Saigon government's camp at Bien Hoa were engaged in a sitdown strike

and refusing to leave. They professed to believe that the DRV and PRG

representatives who advised them to board the trucks were actually

South Vietnamese officials in disguise. An American observer considered

the delay a "put-up job by the hard-core North Vietnamese" in the camp.

Other reports attributed the inmates' balkiness to genuine distrust of

the assurances given about their destination and reluctance to disregard

earlier indoctrination on resisting repatriation.

At Loc Ninh General McClellan rejected the PRG claims and reaffirmed the principle that return of the U.S. prisoners was linked solely to

U.S. ttoop withdrawal, but he had no ready means of forcing a resolution.

General Woodward, at the headquarters of the FPJMC in Saigon, could

and did bring pressure to bear. After forcefully protesting the delay to the

chiefs of delegation at their morning session, he declared that unless he

received assurances of positive action he would withdraw from the FourParty Commission's proceedings and seek instructions from Washington.

Soon afterward, lacking the assurances, Woodward formally announced

his withdrawal, leaving the other parties to contemplate the possibility of

a serious disruption to implementation of the peace agreement.

By afternoon, high-level PRG officials signified their acceptance of

the no-linkage principle and dispatched liaison officers to Loc Ninh,

ostensibly to instruct the local commander that repatriation of the captured Americans should proceed without reference to the release of Viet

Cong prisoners. Other officials had already been sent to persuade the resisters at Bien Hoa that the call for them to move to an exchange site was

authentic. This mission was successful, while the one to Loc Ninh at

least induced the local commander to begin talking about procedures for

the release. The next stumbling block was soon revealed.

In drafting the receipt that General McClellan would sign for the

prisoners, the PRG side insisted on including a statement that assigned

blame for the delay to the South Vietnamese. McClellan refused, principally

on grounds that it was contrary to the guideline already accepted by senior

PRG officials that no connection existed between repatriation of the

Americans and that of the Viet Congo The local commander did not give
Operation Homecoming 503

way on this matter until 150 prisoners from Bien Hoa arrived at Loc Ninh

and were turned over to their Viet Cong compatriots. Thus, although U.S.

representatives had held firm and had extracted a high-level PRG endorsement of the principle they stood on, the practical outcome followed the

PRG's original intent that no Americans be released until exchange of the

Viet Cong prisoners was well advanced.

In all, the delay had consumed 11 hours, and it was early evening

before the 27 Americans boarded the helicopters for transfer to Tan Son

Nhut. Of the 19 military, all were Army servicemen except for one officer

each of the Air Force and the Marine Corps. The eight civilians included

one State Department employee and two from the Agency for International Development, four men employed by firms working on U.S.

contracts, and Richard G. Waldhaus, who had been in South Vietnam on

personal business when captured. On arriving at Tan Son Nhut, Waldhaus

elected to leave the government's repatriation system and stay in Saigon.

During all of Operation Homecoming he was the only U.S. civilian

returnee to exercise the option of withdrawing. JO

The remaining 26 men did not reach Clark until shortly before midnight, but their welcome differed little from that given the first 116 returnees earlier in the day. Awaiting them at the deplaning ramp were the same

red carpet, color guard, and receiving line headed by the commander in

chief, Pacific, Admiral Noel Gaylor, and the ]HRC commander, Lt. Gen.

William G. Moore, ] r., USAF.* Well-wishers crowded the flight line and

surrounding area, in a scene decked with flags and banners, welcoming

slogans, and the hand-lettered greetings of schoolchildren. A microphone

relayed the brief remarks of the senior ranking officer of the returnee

group before their departure for the hospital, along a route flanked by

more banners and waving members of the American community.51

The scene and spirit at the hospital were captured in a message sent

to Washington before the group of 26 from Loc Ninh had arrived: "All 116

returnees have now been assigned beds, and physicians are making their

initial medical evaluations. The returnees are generally euphoric and have

been allowed to conduct reunions on each ward. They also have been permitted to arrange their own room assignments based on personal desires of

returnees. The discipline and morale of the men is very good .... Televisions

in every room of the hospital are on."52

There was reason to hope that no hitches would develop in the next

transfer of prisoners to U.S. control since it was to be a special release of 20

* On most later occasions U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Henry A. Byroade joined

the receiving line.
504 THE LONG ROAD HOME

men, not previously scheduled, that North Vietnamese leaders themselves

had initiated. They described it as an expression of good will on the occasion of the visit of Henty Kissinger to Hanoi. Discussions within the PW

Subcommission of the FPJMC established 18 February as the date, Gia

Lam Airport as the site. Once again the United States requested an expedited release, for humanitarian reasons, of a naval officer whose father was

in critical condition following a heart attack. The DRV delegation agreed

to place Lt. James W. Bailey on the list, but this time as a substitution.

The total remained at 20. n

Colonel Dennett, Shields, and the others preparing for the 18 February journey to Gia Lam were not aware that an unexpected difficulty had

arisen, this time on the American side. Prison authorities had chosen the

20 Americans for repatriation as early as 14 February, bur suspicion of

the setup mounted quickly among the PWs and passed upward to their

own leadership within the compound. The timing of the impending release bore no relation to the agreed schedule as the prisoners understood

it. None of the men could be classified as sick or wounded, and their

selection bore little relation to order of capture. Some with later shootdown dates worried about being duped into accepting favored treatment;

others suspected some sort of propaganda stunt in which they might be

handed over to an escort of peace activists. With approval received through

the PW organization's internal chain of command, the 20 men refused to

be repatriated.

Having rejected more than one entreaty from DRV officials, rhe prisoners still refused to leave when the scheduled time came on 18 February.

Resolution of the standoff occurred only after arrival at the prison of

the FPJMC observer group, whose U.S. element was headed by Lt. Col.

Lawrence Robson, USAF. Communicating through a representative of the

prisoners, he persuaded the senior ranking officer that the release was

genuine and officially sanctioned. Even then, some uncertainty remained

among the designated prisoners as to where their duty lay. A later DrA

account described the outcome: "To insure there was no stigma attached

to the release, the PWs were ordered to leave by the senior officer in the

camp, Col. Norman C. Gaddis, USAF. The PWs then shaved, put on

their release clothes, cleaned their rooms, and departed Hanoi 'as officers

and gentlemen should.'" Their transfer to U.S. control at Gia Lam took

place with no further delays.l4

New difficulties emerged with the approach of 27 February 1973, the

last day of the second incremental period. At meetings of the FPJMC and

its PW Subcommission on 26 February the U.S. representatives pointed

out that it was already too late for the DRV and PRG to give the promised
Operation Homecoming 505

48-hour notice of the expected release. When they pressed for a list and

other details the opposing side claimed to have no information, citing

the familiar difficulty in communicating with Hanoi and with Viet

Cong authorities in the field. Later in the day a member of the North

Vietnamese delegation attempted to tie his government's observance of

the release agreement to a hitherto unrelated request that regular liaison

flights be established between Hanoi and Saigon. By the next morning,

outside the formal negotiating channel, another DRV spokesman advised

several newsmen of additional conditions to be fulfilled, such as the lifting

of restrictions on the movement and press contacts of the DRV and PRG

delegations and something described as "simultaneous return" of prisoners

of war and civilian detainees held by the South Vietnamese government.'s

Counseled by Ambassador Bunker and General Woodward, the White

House reacted strongly to these new attempts to alter arrangements and

particularly to the gross imbalance that had developed in fulfillment of

the agreement. The United States had already passed the halfway point

in withdrawal of its forces, but the men returned so far by the DRV and

PRG amounted to little more than one quarter of those listed for release.

At a news conference late on the morning of 27 February, White House

spokesman Ronald Ziegler declared that there should be no misunderstanding on the part of the DRV about the U.S. position. "We expect our

prisoners of war to be released on schedule." Ziegler followed with a formal

statement, making points that he said "are being made clear to the North

Vietnamese" regarding the unconditional obligations of the cease-fire

agreement and referring to the president's instruction to the secretary of

state "this morning" to demand clarification from the North Vietnamese

delegation in Paris "as a matter of highest priority before other business

is conducted at the conference.">!' The reference was to the International

Conference on Vietnam, then meeting in Paris, which had the task of

affixing a final endorsement and "guarantee" to the peace arrangements

in Southeast Asia. Those represented included the Soviet Union, the

People's Republic of China, France, the United Kingdom, and several other

countries, plus the parties that had signed the Paris agreement itself one

month earlier, on 27 January 1973.

"Move Jars Parley in Paris" was the Washington Posts heading of its

reporter's dispatch from the scene. He wrote that the conferees had been

advancing smoothly toward a formal endorsement of the Vietnam agreement, with no disposition to look into charges from both sides that it was

being seriously violated. "Most delegations were stunned by the sudden

turnabout" when President Nixon's instruction to Secretary Rogers effectively suspended the proceedings until the 0 RV's foreign minister gave a
506 THE LONG ROAD HOME

satisfactory reply. It appeared that the redeployment of U.S. forces from

South Vietnam was at a standstill. In addition, though Defense spokesman

Friedheim refused to comment, international news agencies had no difficulty in interpreting the withdrawal of the U.S. Navy's minesweeping

force from its task of clearing the approaches to Haiphong. To step up the

pressure the United States had suspended implementation of the peace

agreement on all ftonts. 37

Firm measures brought quick results. At the Pentagon's morning

briefing for correspondents on 1 March Friedheim announced the receipt

of a list of 106 American servicemen and 2 Thais that the North Vietnamese had designated for the next release, to occur within 48 hours.

Notification of next of kin was already in progress, he said, and a list of

men captured in rhe South was expected shortly from the PRG. Meanwhile, General Woodward was pursuing the matter of an exact release

time within the FPJMC. At the White House later in the day Ziegler reviewed these same developments and confirmed that the secretary of

state had been authorized to resume participation in the business of the

Paris Conference. 38

A few more attempts at delay had to be overcome before the detailed

arrangements were completed. The 106 Americans and 2 sergeants from

Thailand's armed forces would be handed over by the North Vietnamese

at Gia Lam on 4 March. The next day's group, returning from Viet Cong

captivity, would include 27 American servicemen and 3 civilians, plus 2

West German nationals and 2 Filipinos-a total of 34; although captured

in the South, they had been moved to prisons in the North, most recently

to Hoa Lo in Hanoi, and they, too, would exit through Gia Lam. On the

U.S. reception team Brig. Gen. Russell G. Ogan replaced Roger Shields

as the principal DoD representative. Since U.S. civilians and third-country

nationals were involved, the State Department was also represented by an

official from Washington, James P. Murphy, a deputy of Frank Sieverts. 39

Exchanges between Colonel Phuong and Colonel Dennett having become an established routine, the release procedures on 4 March were

readily completed. On the following day, however, Dennett had to begin

a new relationship with the civilian official who represented the PRG;

also, the transfer of foreign nationals added a different element. The two

Germans, Bernhard J. Diehl and Monika Schwinn, a nurse who was the

only surviving female prisoner of the Viet Cong, were turned over to a

representative of the Federal Republic of Germany in downtown Hanoi

and barely reached the airport in time for the C-141 's departure. Representatives of the international press were converging on Diehl and his

escort as they left the terminal building when Diehl suddenly rhrew his
Operation Homecoming 507

arms above his head and shouted "God bless America!" The newsmen

were so startled that Diehl reached the aircraft without any questioning.

Schwinn was already there, wearing a corsage that was part of her special

welcome from the American nurses aboard. 40

For the next release, scheduled for 14 March, the DRV presented a list

of 107 U.S. military men and one civilian, Bobby J. Keesee. At Gia Lam

members of the U.S. team found their movements more restricted than

previously and the number of guards increased. The North Vietnamese

explained that the date for this next installment fell within a week officially devoted to anti-American demonstrations that would culminate in

"National Hate America Day" on 19 March. However, no disturbance marred

the airport ceremony on 14 March, and the 108 prisoners passed to U.S.

control without incident. 41

As in the previous instance, the release of a smaller increment of Americans originally captured in the South but now in Hanoi-in this case 5

civilians and 27 servicemen-followed soon after, on 16 March. From all

appearances this transfer entailed nothing unusual, but Colonel Dennett

later recalled that the situation was more tense than any previously encountered, for the military contingent included several individuals who had

written or broadcast statements condemning the U.S. role in Southeast

Asia or expressing their personal alienation from the U.S. military establishment. Since the circumstances indicated that these actions had been

voluntary, it seemed possible that the men might give further aid to the

enemy's propaganda by renewing their antiwar declarations during the

release ceremony. Besides planning for this contingency, officials at Clark

and in Washington had given consideration to the possibility that some

of the men might refuse repatriation.

Dennett went to Gia Lam on 16 March equipped with instructions for

countering a serious defection, the general strategy being ro use persuasion,

procedural delay, or any other device to prevent an irrevocable break in a

serviceman's ties with his country. Uncertainty about how things would

go continued through various delays before the returnees reached the

flight line, but the tension subsided as each man stepped forward to

salute General Ogan and proceed to the C-141. Colonel Dennett was able

to flash the code word "Sunshine" to the NMCC, rather than the "Toothache" that had been chosen for a less favorable outcome. 42

During that same week in mid-March another prisoner return was

being played out at another location. Shortly after the signing of the Vietnam peace agreement on 27 January 1973 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended an approach to the People's Republic of China about the possible

release of two U.S. airmen known to be detained there-Maj. Philip E.
508 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Smith and Lt. Cdr. Robert J. Flynn, whose planes had been downed

after straying over Communist China while engaged in Vietnam operations in 1965 and 1967, respectively. The Joint Chiefs suggested to the

secretary of defense that the time was propitious; such a move would offer

the Chinese government "an opportunity to demonstrate its interest in contributing to an overall peaceful settlement of the conflict in Indochina. "43

In Secretary Richardson's office the JCS memorandum received a terse

annotation: "Dr. Kissinger fully aware and working on this." Kissinger's

efforts bore fruit when on 12 March John Downey, a CIA agent who had

been incarcerated in China for more than 20 years on spy charges, was released into the custody of American Red Cross official Eugene D. Guy.

Accompanied by a British medical officer, Guy received Downey on the

Chinese side of the Louw Bridge connecting mainland China with the

British colony of Hong Kong. Barely 30 minutes after crossing to freedom, Downey was en route to Clark Air Base aboard a U.S. medevac plane.

On 15 March the same Red Cross representative went through the same

procedure to obtain custody of pilots Flynn and Smith. Halfway across

the bridge Flynn paused to savor the moment and light the cigar his

escort had provided. 44

With recovery of the prisoners from mainland China and the 32 men

released on 16 March, the prisoner release figures finally matched the

force withdrawal figures. According to the official tally, by 16 March the

number of Americans returned had reached 441, which was exactly threefourths of the total number currently listed for release, 588. 45 The same

proportion applied when it came to the evacuation of U.S. forces. Only

the fourth incremental withdrawal remained to be accomplished; it would

remove the approximately 5,300 troops still in Vietnam. The target date

for completing both the prisoner exchange and force withdrawal was

28 March 1973, the sixtieth day following the signing of the agreement.

Return ofthe Laotian PWs and the Rest ofthe Prisoners

During the negotiation of the Paris agreement DRV officials had

pledged that U.S. servicemen and civilians seized in Laos would be released during the 60-day repatriation period. Mainly for reasons relating

to the sovereign identity of Laos, this undertaking was not included in

the formal document, but it was buttressed by Le Duc Tho's assurances

to Kissinger that the North Vietnamese government accepted responsibility for making the necessary arrangements with the Pathet Lao. On that

basis Kissinger had publicly announced that the Laotian prisoners would
Operation Homecoming 509

be returned, and no contradiction had come from Hanoi. But no names

of persons held in Laos appeared on the prisoner list turned over by the

North Vietnamese on 27 January 1973. Only after the United States protested did Hanoi, on 1 February, submit a list for Laos, a disappointingly

short one showing only seven U.S. servicemen and two civilians, plus

one Canadian citizen. 46

When the U.S. spokesman at the PW Subcommission meeting on

19 March asked where the Laotian prisoners would fit into the return

schedule for the final increment, Hanoi's delegates claimed they had no

authority to discuss the subject since it fell outside the Paris agreement.

The U.S. government would have to negotiate with the Pathet Lao for the

men's release, they said. During the next 48 hours the North Vietnamese

offered to return the remaining prisoners held by them and the Viet Cong

on 25 March, subject to the withdrawal of all U.S. forces by that date.

Moreover, they would, after all, handle the negotiations with the Pathet

Lao for release of the 10 persons captured in Laos. 47

Washington instructed the U.S. delegation late on 22 March that

nothing should be accepted on faith and no attempts to alter agreements

would be allowed. The United States would complete the withdrawal of

its military forces from South Vietnam in accordance with the agreement

"and coincident with the release of all, repeat all American prisoners

held throughout Indochina." Redeployment of forces in the fourth increment would begin only when two further conditions were met: (l) receipt

by the United States of a complete list of all American PWs, including those held by the Pathet Lao, as well as the time and place of release,

and (2) actual transfer of the next group of prisoners to U.S. custody.

If these conditions were satisfied by 25 March there would still be

time for withdrawal of the remaining 5,300 troops by the target date of

28 March. Washington's message contained one further direction: "If

difficulties arise during the process of release, then cease all withdrawals

until otherwise instructed. "4H

The DRV and PRG delegations were indignant. They repeatedly

protested the new U.S. position, charging that it violated several articles

of the agreement, maintaining that disposition of the Laotian captives fell

outside the purview of the FPJMC and that withdrawal of U.S. forces

could be linked only to the return of persons captured in Vietnamnot all of Indochina. They suspended the provision of lists for the next

return, declaring that the United States must bear full responsibility for

any delay in the release schedule. The U.S. side remained firm, though

doing what it could in private to encourage a change in the opponent's

stand. Policymakers were banking on their assessment that a final and
510 THE LONG ROAD HOME

definite termination of the American military presence meant more to

the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong than any concession they might

expect to extract by holding up return of the last prisoners. Besides, there

were intimations that the North Vietnamese were now negotiating with

the Pathet Lao. 49

On 24 March the PRG submitted a list of 32 Americans held by the

Viet Cong-27 military and 5 civilian-whom they proposed to return at

the Hanoi airport on 26 March, plus 1 Korean soldier to be released at a

point in South Vietnam. (As with the 5 March and 16 March returnees,

the 32 Americans were counted as Viet Cong prisoners even though

housed in the North at the time they were let go.) The next day the North

Vietnamese listed a final increment of 107 U.S. servicemen they intended

to release at Gia Lam over two days beginning 27 March. At a private meeting with General Woodward on 26 March the head of the DRV delegation

urged that these transfers take place, along with a parallel withdrawal of

U.S. forces. Leaders of his government fully accepted the responsibility

to fulfill the pledge made by Le Duc Tho, he said, and the United States

could proceed on the basis of Hanoi's assurance that negotiations with

the Pathet Lao would reach a favorable conclusion within a few days.

General Woodward reiterated the U.S. position without change: No further

withdrawal of U.S. forces would occur until firm information on the date,

time, and place of release of prisoners held in Laos had been furnished. 50

By evening of 26 March Hanoi's delegates had requested a second meeting. They announced that the Pathet Lao had agreed to hand over the 10

captives on the morning of 28 March. The Canadian citizen would be released to a Canadian diplomat in Hanoi and the nine Americans would

be returned at Gia Lam. In deference to North Vietnamese sensitivities, the

United States did accept a few procedural adjustments to distinguish this

transaction from those pursuant to the Paris agreement-the usual formalities involving representatives of the FPJMC and ICCS would be

omitted and only U.S. and Pathet Lao officials would participate.* With

the Laotian matter resolved, all elements of the final delivery fell into

place, and General Woodward indicated that the U.S. redeployment

schedule for 27 through 29 March would be made available to the

FPJMC and ICCS immediately. The PRG and North Vietnamese representatives now committed to the following release sequence: the afternoon of 27 March, PRG return of the remaining 32 U.S. captives of the

Viet Cong; the morning of 28 March, Pathet Lao return of the 9 Americans and 1 Canadian; the afternoon of 28 March, DRV return of 40 U.S.

* The U.S. party was smaller than the standard reception support team and was headed

by Lieutenant Colonel Robson rather than Colonel Dennett.
Operation Homecoming 511

military; and 29 March (time not specified), DRV return of 67 U.S.

military. All of the repatriation transfers were to occur at Gia Lam with

the exception of the Canadian released in Hanoi. The single Republic

of Korea soldier had already been freed by the PRG in South Vietnam on

25 March. He did not enter the Homecoming system. 51

The series of releases took place as scheduled and without notable

incident. As the United States had originally stipulated, the final phase

of its troop withdrawal did not begin until the 32 Americans listed for

release on 27 March were safely in U.S. custody. The redeployment was

completed on 29 March, after the last captives of the North Vietnamese

had been released. 52

But the repatriation was not finished after all. On 28 March PRG

authorities had given notice that one more American serviceman, never

before reported, was being held in a Viet Cong area of South Vietnam.

Capt. Robert T. White, USA, had been missing in action since November

1969. White was picked up by helicopter at a point about 65 miles southwest of Saigon and flown to Tan Son Nhut, where he was transferred to

a medevac aircraft bound for the Philippines, reaching Clark in the late

afternoon of 1 ApriLS3

As may be seen in the table below, a total of 600 prisoners had emerged

from captivity. Besides those named in the lists provided by the DRV

and PRG in Paris on 27 January 1973 and the 10 on the supplemental

Pathet Lao list of 1 February there were the 3 men released by the

People's Republic of China and 3 late additions to the PRG list-Captain

White, the ROK soldier, and Lt. Cdr. Phillip A. Kientzler, a Navy airman

shot down even as the lists were being exchanged in Paris on 27 January. 54

Captives Returned During Operation Homecoming

12 February - 1 April 1973

Army

Navy

Air Force

Marines

U.S. civilians

Third-country nationals

Total

DRY

o

135

312

9

1

2

459

PRG

77

1

6

17

21

6

128

Laos

o

1

6

o

2

1

10

China

o

1

1

o

1

o

3

Total

77

138

325

26

25

9

600

Of the 600 returnees, all but 3 were evacuated to the Philippines in the

aircraft committed by the United States to Operation Homecoming. The

non-participants were the Korean soldier, U.S. civilian Richard Waldhaus,

and a Canadian citizen, Marc Cayer, turned over to the Canadian delegation
512 THE LONG ROAD HOME

serving on the ICCS. Assuming control of Cayer in Hanoi on 14 February,

the Canadian government arranged his travel home, including a stop for

intelligence debriefing in Saigon. *))

At the reception center at Clark Air Base the ex-PWs' medical processing took first priority. Following the welcoming ceremonies at the flight

line, returnees went immediately to the hospital, typically arriving in

late afternoon or early evening. According to one account, as soon as the

"pandemonium" settled down, they were briefed by the hospital commander

and given a preview of the schedule leading to their flight home. Doctors

then examined each patient briefly to detect conditions that would preclude any of the planned activities, such as debriefing or receipt of

depressing news about family situations that awaited some of the men.

After hot showers and a change into hospital garb the men proceeded to the

dining room for their first mealY'

The diet story had been a favorite of the reporters at Clark when

seeking something to write about during the early February waiting

period. Their stories described the determination of officials to avoid the

hot dog binges that were said to have produced more distress than contentment for surviving prisoners of the Korean War. Special menus awaited

the returnees, "including lots of liquids and easily digested soft foods to

replace their prison fare." The stock of food and drink carried on the medevac flights leaving Hanoi was purposely bland, though highly nutritious.

On encountering it, the senior ranking officer of the second planeload

of returnees, Col. Robinson Risner, USAF, began a campaign to persuade

the doctors that the planned dietary restrictions should be eased. He

maintained that men who had been living on "a lot of pig fat and grease"

would have no trouble digesting standard American items like steak.)7

When the 116 men who came out of North Vietnamese captivity on

12 February approached the dining hall, nearly all had been certified for

the regular diet-in practice, virtually unrestricted as to choice and

quantity, though no alcohol was to be consumed. The memoirs of returnees give a colorful account of what followed, mentioning beef and piles

of fried chicken, the bountiful ice cream bar, and enjoyment of vegetables

and salad items long denied them. Risner himself passed up the bread

and concentrated on cake. There was only one reported stomach upset,

and it is officially recorded that the returnees "adjusted promptly to eating

the normal American diet." They did so with such universal enthusiasm

that the medical authorities gave up obtaining blood samples from

* This was not the Canadian civilian released in Hanoi by the rathet Lao on 28 March,

who went on to Clark (see p. 514).
Operation Homecoming 513

patients in a fasting condition while at Clark; tests with that requirement

would have to wait. 58

The exuberant state of the ex-prisoners led to changes in the limited

program planned for the first evening. Keyed up to a pitch that put sleep

out of the question and eager to make progress toward their ultimate departure, some of the men moved on to the intelligence debriefing, several

made their telephone calls to wives or parents, and a few, attended by chaplains as required under the sensitive information procedure, received news

of family deaths or pending divorces. Tailors from the clothing shop succeeded in measuring nearly all the returnees for their uniform fittings. By

the day's end most men had received the physician's clearance to meet their

individual escorts, who would guide them through a schedule of appointments that worked in the required administrative processing at times not

preempted for medical and dental treatment. 5<)

Usually the second day saw the completion of next-of-kin calls and a

first round of debriefings, which at this point confined the interview to

what the released prisoner knew of the whereabouts or circumstances of

loss of other men still missing. Returnees obtained information about

their career status, finances, and other personal affairs, and all received

an initial pay allotment of $250, with further disbursements available on

request-the average amount withdrawn was just under $600 per man.

The former prisoners needed funds for the scheduled visit to the base exchange, which was kept open during the evening for their exclusive use.

This provided a welcome opportunity to buy clothing and replace watches

and other lost personal items, and to select gifts for family members and

patronize the flowers-by-wire service.(,Q

By the third day nearly all men had completed the medical and dental

procedures and could devote some time to their choice of activities. A visit

with the children and staff at an elementary school on the base quickly became established as the favorite outing. Some watched the movies shown in

the Red Cross lounge; others sought to catch up on the current American

scene through magazines and other materials. The final fitting of their

uniforms generally occurred on the third day, as did the special dinner,

offered in a more formal setting, with soft lighting and gourmet food items,

including a somewhat wider selection of beverages than theretofore.!>l

Given the role that religious faith had played in their survival, it was

not surprising that many of the ex-prisoners found their way to the base

chapel. On reaching Clark they welcomed the attentions of the 18 chaplains, and many sought the earliest opportunity to take communion or

have confessions heard. Chaplains offered individual counseling as well as

formal religious rites, particularly to those called on to reconcile themselves
514 THE LONG ROAD HOME

to tragic news from home. On three different occasions as successive

groups passed through the center a senior ranking officer requested space

and a scheduled time to hold a general service of thanksgiving, conducted

entirely by the former prisoners. 62

The u.s. civilian returnees, attended by escorts from the embassy in

Manila, followed the same regimen as military personnel, and their reactions were remarkably similar. A report to Washington about the seven

civilians who arrived on the late-night flight into Clark on 12 February

noted that they were so keyed up despite the long wearing day that they

talked with escorts until 4:30 a.m., six of the seven completing the nextof-kin call before going to bed.63

The course followed by the released prisoners of other nationalities

varied, depending on the wishes of their governments. For the return of

the group on 5 March that included the two Filipinos, President Ferdinand

Marcos of the Philippines took an honored place on the flight-line reception stand. Following their welcome the two passed immediately into

Philippine government control and were transported to a Quezon City

hospital. The two West German citizens also arrived on that day, accompanied by a member of their country's diplomatic corps. Diehl and

Schwinn received full but expedited medical processing at Clark in order

to catch the Lufthansa flight to Germany on 7 March from Manila.

Earlier the two Thai sergeants had received medical examinations at the

u.S. facility but soon left for Thailand on a routine military flight, in

accordance with their government's wish to avoid publicity. Canadian

citizen Lloyd Oppel reached Clark with the nine Americans released by

the Pathet Lao on 28 March. Oppel was found to have an active case of

malaria, and Canadian officials agreed that he should stay in the system

and have the benefit of medevac facilities on the trans-Pacific flight. He

was to remain under American care until delivered to representatives of

the Canadian government in Bremerton, Washington. 64

With few exceptions, men departed on homebound flights sometime

on the day following their third night at the Clark center; the typical stay

was around 72 hours. Three men seriously ill or mentally disturbed were

kept at the Clark hospital longer than the average, but even they were not

retained beyond the fifth day. The emphasis was on stabilizing their condition at a level that permitted air evacuation to the United States rather

than beginning what might be a long course of treatment at Clark. 65

Four of the returnees departed quickly, with processing held to a minimum, to hasten their reunion with relatives believed to be near death. Two

were the naval officers Woods and Bailey, whose expedited release had

been requested for that purpose. The others were John Downey, returned
Operation Homecoming 515

from China, and Air Force Maj. Glenden W. Perkins. Each man reached

home in time either to provide comfort to a terminally ill parent or in

one instance to be credited with bringing about a remarkable improvement

in the patient.66

One problem anticipated during the Homecoming planning did not

materialize. That most of the early arrivals at Clark remained no more

than 72 hours in the Philippines strongly reinforced the advice to next of

kin on the undesirability of traveling there to meet their returning serviceman. The three persons who did make the trip were all family members

already residing in Southeast Asia, and each enjoyed some degree of official

approval. A U.S. government employee stationed in Saigon flew to Clark

for reunion with his Air Force son. No objection was raised to a similar

journey by a naval officer's wife currently living in Hong Kong. Had she

asked to accompany her husband on the medevac flight to the United

States, however, she would have been advised to travel by commercial air.

James Smith, a U.S. business representative in Hong Kong, had a joyful

reunion with his Air Force brother after the latter crossed the bridge

from Communist China. Permission had already been given for him to

accompany the returnee as far as Clark. 67

Relations between the government's public affairs officers and the news

media continued to undergo strains both on the eve of and during homecoming. Even before any return of prisoners occurred the journalists on

assignment at the Clark reception center made plain their frustration and

impatience over the limited role planned for them. As early as 4 February

CBS representatives were importuning the JIB chief, Colonel Lynn, for

more details on how he intended to implement the flexible policy on

returnee interviews that Secretary Richardson had recently outlined. A

week later a Newsweek correspondent passed a comment back to the Pentagon criticizing the acting assistant secretary of defense for public affairs,

saying that "Mr. Friedheim's name is mud with the media."68

Although TV and radio correspondents won plaudits for their live

coverage of the first arrivals at Clark on 12 February, the beginning of processing there did not immediately improve the press situation. The foreign

editor of the New York Times telegraphed a protest to the secretary of

defense that "the first group of POWs has now taken off for the United

States with press at Clark unable to get anywhere near them even though

they were healthy enough to eat anything, ... horse around in the hospital, go shopping, see movies and talk to virtually everyone else who

runs into them." All information, "except from scared informants," had

come "third hand and censored" through military public affairs officers.69
516 THE LONG ROAD HOME

The editor's telegram had not yet been delivered when the first relaxation of restrictions occurred at Clark, bringing the avowed policy of

flexibility closer to fulfillment. Just after noon on 15 February newsmen

had the opportunity, during a IS-minute press conference, to question

Colonel Risner and Lt. Col. John H. Dunn, USMC, both senior officers

and recognized leaders among the prisoners. Their responses were crisp,

candid, and notable for the evident sincerity with which they cited possible impact on the return of comrades still in Hanoi as the reason for

not answering some of the queries. 70

On 19 February six men from the group released at the time of the

Kissinger visit to Hanoi were interviewed at Clark, each by a single reporter, with the information to be pooled for use by the entire press

contingent. "Controversial" questions were prohibited, and public affairs

officers monitored each interview. On 6 and 7 March more returned

prisoners held interviews on a one-on-one basis, with television coverage

in some instances. 71

These arrangements had been approved by the Pentagon, and media

representatives were observing the ground rules with reasonable fidelity. It

was the quasi-official Stars and Stripes (Pacific edition) that overstepped the

line on 8 March when reporting an interview with an Air Force colonel.

Under the headline "Returnee Charges Protesters with Treason," the item

mentioned the public affairs officer's objections to the colonel's comments

on the antiwar movement and particularly to his references to named individuals, "one of them a former attorney general of the United States." Later

investigation indicated that some of the returnee's more acerbic remarks

had been made to the reporter after the interview's end, in the absence of

the public affairs officer. In any event, Friedheim's office withdrew the

authorization for interviews at Clark. By this time returnee interviews

were no longer a novelty, since a number of men had already reached

the United States, completed their hospital stay, and held press conferences when departing on convalescent leave. C2

From the time of the arrival of the Kissinger release group at Clark on

18 February, media representatives had been allowed to observe the first

meal in the dining hall; later they accompanied returnees on the visits to

schools, the base exchange, and the bowling alley. Newsmen still complained that they were kept isolated from the men and had no opportunity "to chat" with them. The New York Times carried a report that all

information released on the former prisoners was being filtered through

"a team of nearly 80 military public-relations men."73

The desire of members of the press for a place on the Operation

Homecoming aircraft going into Hanoi had never been satisfied, but a
Operation Homecoming 517

contingent of 28 American newsmen did reach the North Vietnamese

capital in time for the final turnover of prisoners on 29 March. They

had won permission from the authorities there to fly to Gia Lam from

Vientiane in a chartered plane. At rhe close of the ceremonies General

Ogan and Colonel Dennett held a short press conference for the American correspondents. 74

The number of media representatives at Clark declined after the first

returns in February, but on 31 March there were 73 working press and

156 technicians still accredited to the JIB. They were expected to depart

after covering the farewell ceremonies for the last group of returnees on

1 April, though CBS and UPI were committed to remaining until the last

man, Captain White, also left for home. 7)

As successive planeloads of former prisoners moved through the departure formalities, their spokesmen had groped for something better than

"No words can ever express ..." when trying to convey how much the

warm welcome, expert care, and constant solicitude for their well-being

had meant to them. The tribute they paid was well deserved. From first to

last, high military and political officials and the members of the American community associated with the Clark base had never failed to turn

out in impressive numbers for each welcome or departure, whatever the

hour. Equally unflagging in their efforts were the personnel more directly

involved in the processing, from the Red Cross volunteers who managed

the scheduling of the overseas telephone calls, through the X-ray and lab

technicians, those who plied the needles in the tailor shop, and many

more. The final accounting showed a remarkable number of voluntarily

worked overtime hours throughout the organization.

Staff members could maintain the intensive processing schedule in

part because of the episodic nature of the releases. Since new batches of

men arrived at roughly two-week intervals, there were extended periods

when the reception center was cleared of its charges and relaxation and

restocking were in order. For the escorts, however, rest proved to be more

elusive. Besides being responsible for keeping detailed records of the

individual's progress in processing and for insuring that he missed no

appointments, the escort had to be on call to assist the returnee 24 hours

a day. In the Navy and Air Force the officer had the added responsibility

of conducting and writing up the man's debriefing. These extremely demanding duties brought some escorts close to exhaustion by the time the

moment of departure arrived. Since they normally continued in the assignment at least as far as Travis Air Force Base in California, a IS-hour flight

still awaited them. 7

(,
518 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Return Home and Final Processing

In all, C-141 aircraft made 38 flights carrying the men home to the

United States. In a few special instances, such as the expedited return of

Woods and Perkins on 13 February, the number aboard was far below

capacity. The usual loading included 20 returnees, their escorts, a public

affairs officer, medical personnel, and other attendants. The route ran

from Clark to Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii, where the stop was

usually short and generally disappointing to the waiting newsmen. The

original plan called for all flights to enter the continental United States

at Travis, northeast of San Francisco. Some men deplaning there entered

service hospitals nearby. Others boarded C-9 aircraft whose routes fanned

out to their various home areas. Usually the C-141 also continued the journey, transporting some portion of its original passengers to such further

destinations as Kelly AFB, San Antonio, or Scott AFB, in southern Illinois

neat St. Louis. All 11 U.S.-bound flights during February conformed

generally to this pattern.

The Military Airlift Command (MAC) soon suggested a more efficient

operation. Only through very close scheduling and quick turnarounds had

the available C-9 resources succeeded in meeting Homecoming's requirements. Also, a C-141 had no need to make a West Coast stop unless its

passengers were bound there. After refueling in Hawaii, the aircraft could

fly nonstop to Scott or to Andrews AFB near Washington, D.C., or

McGuire AFB in New Jersey. Accordingly, MAC recommended that aircraft loads at Clark be made up with the final destination as a controlling

factor. If all men on the passenger list were bound for the East Coast, for

example, they could be flown directly to a dispersal point in that area. They

would reach home more quickly, and the total miles flown by the C-9s

would be reduced.

The new system started in time for the first flights home in March.

Given the concentration of waiting families in California, roughly one

third of the C-141 s still landed at Travis or its bad-weather alternates,

but others flew directly to Maxwell AFB in Alabama for the southeast, to

Kelly for the southwest, or to Scott, Andrews or elsewhere. From these

points the men were delivered to the Great Lakes or Bethesda Naval Hospitals, Valley Forge Cen tral in Pennsylvania, Sheppard AFB Hospital at

Wichita Falls, Texas, or another of the 31 facilities awaiting them. n

Each planeload of returnees arriving stateside received a welcome

similar to the spirited reception at Clark. The red carpet, color guard, and

presence of the highest ranking officials available to head the greeting line

were standard features. Normally the Defense public affairs officer at the

scene had been speaking to the gathered well-wishers over the public
Operation Homecoming 519

address system to inform them of the aircraft's time of arrival, identity of

the men on board, and the arrival procedures. Those responsible for order

and the avoidance of spectator forays onto the flight line soon recognized

the need for a further announcement, directed to people in the audience

who wore one of the PW/MIA bracelets obtained from the VIVA organization. Inscribed with a serviceman's name and date of loss, it signified

an emotional commitment to his survival, backed up by a vow to wear it

until his return. The announcement invited such persons to turn their

bracelets in, with a note if desired, and be assured that their offerings

would reach the particular returnee before he came down the ramp.78

The presence and participation of the men's families proved to be

the event's most distinctive feature. Plans drawn up ahead of time had

envisioned the returnee's reunion with wife and children or other relatives

as occurring in the privacy of the hospital, and next of kin who were

consulted had endorsed this arrangement. But after experiencing the

emotional impact of the early TV coverage at Clark and the quickening

anticipation that attended the men's progress toward home, many

wives felt compelled to be on the flight line, yielding place to no one as

first-hand witnesses of the arrival.

Friedheim's deputy, Maj. Gen. Daniel James, Jr., was on hand at

Travis when the first contingent of returnees landed on 14 February. Back

in the Pentagon in time for the next morning's press briefing, he told how

the program had been altered by common agreement of wives and officials and with the enthusiastic approval of the news media. Indeed, public

affairs guidance issued from Washington shortly before the event had

anticipated this possible turn. It provided that "any efforts to shield

meeting of returnees and dependents from photographers, if this occurs

at planeside, would be inappropriate."7') So it was that a scene repeatedly

captured by the TV cameras remained as the enduring image of the PWs'

homecoming in the minds of many Americans-the sequence of approach

and enveloping embrace by which the man in uniform was restored to

his family. Staff cars transported the reunited couples or family groups to

the hospital.

Throughout the arrivals some families continued to prefer a private

reunion, as originally intended, but once established in the hospital, all

returnees followed the same program. They spent the first night in the

quarters supplied by the government for their families, with dinner and

breakfast delivered at their call. They then entered Phase III of the processing, which included the full-scale intelligence briefing. The main

commitment, however, was to conducting a comprehensive assessment of

the men's health needs and starting the indicated medical treatment.
520 THE LONG ROAD HOME

The bearing and appearance of the returnees when first seen at Clark

Air Base suggested a much better state of health than had been anticipated.

Few men showed evidence of the extreme debilitation and psychological

withdrawal that had sometimes been predicted. Though most were well

under their pre-capture weight, they did not display the skeletal gauntness

of the concentration camp survivor, and outwardly they were clearly not

bowed or broken men. Their pride had played a part in sustaining the

impression of general physical well-being. One observer noted that some

of the returning prisoners were classified as litter patients, but "most of

these appeared ambulatory to the public" as they managed to move erectly

through the welcoming ceremonies. The positive tone of early hospital

reports reinforced the notion of the PWs' being in surprisingly good

health. At one press conference at the Clark hospital newsman Bernard

Kalb remarked that "you're talking today about their condition being

excellent, better than the good used before .... We were given a much

gloomier picture of the condition that these men might be in."Ho

Data on the overall health status of returnees became available only

some weeks later. Dr. Richard Wilbur, assistant secretary of defense (health

and environment), gave the earliest assessment at a press conference on

1 June 1973, confirming that the men were in worse condition than

their ourward appearance had suggested. Dr. Wilbur described some of

the more serious medical problems encountered, such as malaria. Though

airmen downed in the North rarely contracted it, nearly two-thirds of the

men captured and held in the South had been infected with a virulent

strain of the disease, resistant to available treatment and producing recurring fevers and other symptoms. The main hope for its eradication lay

in new medications still being developed. Doctors were more confident of

getting rid of the intestinal parasites, whose incidence varied little whether

the individual had been incarcerated in the North or South. More than

50 percent of all the men harbored hookworms, pinworms, whipworms,

and other parasites, including a significant number of cases involving the

roundworm, which Wilbur described as larger and more serious. HI

Nearly one-third of the Navy and Air Force pilots had suffered major

fractures when shot down, usually at the time of ejection but sometimes

from hard landings following the parachute drop. At least half were

vertebral fractures, often with the additional complication of disc injuries

and various forms of partial paralysis. Army helicopter crewmen also suffered the consequences of violent compression of the spine when involved

in crash landings, but of course enemy fire had been the main danger in

ground combat. About half the soldiers and Marines had one or more significant wounds at the time of capture. The men who returned suffered
Operation Homecoming 521

from various impairments as a result of these injuries or of healing that

had occurred under unfavorable circumstances.

Closer analysis of the experience of 60 Navy airmen underscored the

hazards they encountered. "All 60," Wilbur said, "were ejected from planes

as their method of arriving in North Vietnam," with 20 of them receiving

wounds or other injuries at the moment their aircraft was hit. In addition,

37 sustained a serious injury during ejection, 17 during the parachute

descent or landing, 16 in the course of being captured, and 1 while attempting to escape. Sixty percent of them had also suffered one or more "oralfacial injuries" at some time, but whether during shootdown, capture, or

later interrogation was not indicated. More definitely related to the captivity experience was the "peripheral neuropathy" found in approximately

10 percent of the Navy and Air Force prisoners from the North. This was

the nerve damage caused by having their arms or legs tightly bound or

shackled for long periods. 82

During the men's Phase III processing service medical authorities

continued the treatment of malaria, nutritional deficiencies, and other

conditions. They made decisions about corrective surgery and prescribed

courses of physical therapy, some of which could be pursued on an outpatient basis. Length of stay in the hospital varied considerably. The first

returnee groups, because they consisted of the earliest captures and those

given priority because of wounds or illness, tended to be in the worst

shape and so required the longest hospital stays. Of the 142 Americans

who reached the continental United States between 14 and 17 February,

only 34 had completed Phase III processing by 1 March. By 8 March

the figure had risen to 101. In contrast, the 66 Americans who arrived

at hospitals on 31 March had all been lost to the enemy during 1972-

36 of them during the December bombing campaign-and so had only

spent a few months in captivity. Except for a number who had suffered

serious wounds or injuries, these short-term prisoners had few ailments

and relatively little to recount during the debriefing sessions. For them a stay

of two days was more common than the two weeks or more seen earlier. 81

Public affairs considerations came to the fore again as men approached

the end of their hospital stays. DoD guidance indicated that former prisoners should make themselves available to media representatives generally

before granting any exclusive interviews or contracting to write for publication. To satisfy this requirement a press conference was usually scheduled

when men were ready to leave the hospital. Occasionally real or apparent

breaches of the rules occurred, one as early as 18 February. A San Antonio

daily devoted part of its front page to self-congratulation over an exclusive

interview its reporter had obtained with a returnee at the Lackland AFB
522 THE LONG ROAD HOME

hospital. The Defense public affairs officer (DPAO) at Lackland advised

Friedheim that nothing justifying such a claim had taken place. The story,

he said, had been spun out of just two sentences uttered by the returnee,

only one of them addressed to the reporter. In another case, "unknown

to anyone" and reportedly on the same day he had shell fragments removed from his leg, a returnee appeared on the "Sonny & Cher" show.

The taped program aired at a later date but the impromptu appearance

raised eyebrows. R4

Whether in a press conference or an interview, the ex-prisoners

soon learned to be discreet. At Scott AFB an AP correspondent queried

one of the long-term prisoners, Capt. Thomas Barrett, who wisely minded

the 000 instructions.

Question: Captain, I have a tather involved question-about

the ground rules. We understand that you can't or

would rather not speak about conditions of your

captivity because of a possible threat to the release

of more prisoners. Is that right?

Answer: We would not want to do anything rhat would conceivably jeopardize the release of the other prisoners.

Question: Government officials were quoted this week as saying

that the American rows have suffered the most

barbaric handling of any persons of any nation in

history. Would you consider that remark incautious

in view of what you just told us-or as inappropriate?

Answer: Well, I would prefer not to comment on it at all.

Question: Would you make that kind of remark under the rules

of this news conference?

Answer: I will make no remarks concerning the captive situation at all.

Barrett's circumspection may have saved him some embarrassment, for

the statement he was invited to criticize came from President Nixon, as

the reporter confided in a later conversation with the DPAG. What the

reporter did not mention was that it had been made nearly two years

earlier, on 16 April 1971. 85

As long as conditions in the prisoner camps and the treatment received from the enemy remained closed subjects, the returnee interviews
Operation Homecoming 523

generated few major news items. Friedheim told the press corps that the

restrictions expressed the shared conviction of policy officials and returnees that the topics should not be discussed "until the last man is

OUt."86 At the same time, Friedheim was arguing in-house that it would

be unwise and probably futile to attempt to continue the ban on personal

accounts of prison experience once the last group of men had been recovered. Though some counselors objected that letting the men speak

could blight the hopes for enemy cooperation in resolving the MIA question, his view prevailed.

Friedheim's accompanying recommendations were less successful, however. He had suggested that "it is in our interest, and the interest of the

returnees, to have this story told in a manner which will place it in proper

perspective and provide a responsible basis for future public discussion."

Friedheim proposed to begin with a Pentagon news conference at which

Roger Shields would present an overview of the information on conditions

of captivity. He noted for Secretary Richardson that "Dr. Shields is your

personal representative, was in Hanoi and at Clark, and is more expert

than anybody else," and hence was the recommended spokesman rather

than General James or Friedheim himself. During such a presentation

Shields would announce that a representative group of returnees, including

several senior camp commanders, would meet the press at the Pentagon

two or three days later. Following that presentation all returned prisoners

would be free to discuss their experiences, subject to normal security and

other considerations. 87

The desirability of staging this carefully managed sequence was questioned by Lawrence S. Eagleburger, who had become acting assistant secretary of defense (ISA) following Nutter's departure at the end of January.

Referring to the strongly patriotic arrival statements made by returnees

at Clark, with frequent expressions of gratitude for President Nixon's

actions as commander in chief, he noted that "we have already been

subjected to charges of orchestration." Proceeding as Friedheim suggested

"would tend to lend credence to the charge" that government officials were

dictating what was said. It would also involve the U.S. government more

directly than was necessary in publicizing the returnees' accusations, if

such allegations were made in the formal setting of a Pentagon press conference, which could increase still more the difficulty of enlisting North

Vietnamese help in other efforts important to the United States. Accordingly, Eagleburger thought the initial disclosures about mistreatment at

the hands of the enemy should not be made by an official 000 spokesman. He favored letting the individual returnees speak for themselves

without Defense officials appearing prominently in a sponsor's role. 88
524 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Eagleburger's notions here generally won out, the outcome possibly

influenced by consultations with senior officers among the former prisoners, which he had recommended. Both the inclination to break the story

in Washington and the urge to shape its reception with official commentary

were held in check, and the resulting directive simply defined the freedom

individual returnees would have to speak publicly of the details of their captivity once 000 declared the subject open for discussion. The directive

was issued on 28 March, accompanied by an order to public affairs officers

at all Homecoming installations to see that a copy reached every returnee,

whether still a hospital patient or on convalescent leave. The text advised a

number of precautions:

a. Returnees should limit their discussions to their own experiences and should not attempt to discuss subjects or actions they

did not observe.

b. Any statements of a speculative nature concerning past or

future events in Southeast Asia should be avoided.

c. Subjects which are classified will not be discussed.

d. General comments on the suspected fate of men still carried

as MIA should be avoided and specific knowledge concerning

resolution of individual MIA cases should not be discussed in a

news conference forum. This is a matter for the various service

casualty officers and next-of-kin considerations are paramount.

e. In general, discussions of the actions or experiences of others

should be avoided.

f. Discussions of alleged misconduct of other returnees and

possible legal actions involving these people must be avoided.

Any such charges would, of course, have to be legally investigated and proven, and statements concerning alleged misconduct

of others could prejudice possible UeM] procedures. WJ

Friedheim's message placing the directive in effect went out the following day, 29 March. By then the only remaining hint of centralized

management was in the notice that transcripts of the first day's press conferences would be circulated to indicate "the types of questions that all

returnees may anticipate.'''!11

Former prisoners talked with newsmen at various locations on 29 March

1973, and their accounts appeared on front pages across the country the

following day. "POWs' Nightmarish Ordeal: Tales of Torture, Beating,
Operation Homecoming 525

Months in Solitary," read a typical headline. One participant, Colonel

Risner, now had the opportunity to insure that remarks he had made under

the previous restraints were properly understood. During the 15 February

press conference at Clark he had been asked about broadcasts attributed

to American prisoners in Hanoi that condemned U.S. policy and called

for withdrawal from the hostilities. News reports at the time showed

him confining his response to the suggestion that "we should consider

the source of those statements; they were made from a prison in North

Vietnam." Now at liberty to remove any doubt of his meaning, Risner gave

a graphic description of the enemy's torture techniques. "I myself have

screamed all night," he said in explaining how he and others were forced

to provide the propaganda statements demanded of them. He readily

acknowledged being reduced to a state where "I wrote what they told me

to write .... If they told me the war was wrong, I said it was wrong."91

The matter arose again in an exchange between newsmen and General

James at the next Pentagon press briefing.

Question: One of the guys yesterday estimated 95 percent of

the prisoners had been tortured and that 80 percen t

of them finally gave in and made statements. Does

that prerty much square with what you've heard?

Answer: I think the prisoners' statements speak for themselves.

I have no reason to doubt any of them and they were

told simultaneously in practically all sections of the

country yesterday, and were remarkable for their

consistence. The detailed description of the types of

torture and this sort of thing, ... I don't think

there's anything I can add that would highlight that

any more.'>2

His remarks could be read as a tribute to the wisdom of the decision to

forgo official staging of the event and allow the authentic voices of the

returnees to be heard.
23

Conclusion

Throughout the negotiations over ending U.S. particIpation in the

fighting in Vietnam, the release of the American prisoners of war

stood as an absolute condition for U.S. withdrawal. Washington's representatives held to this position both in the open sessions of the Paris

peace talks and in secret conversations with the North Vietnamese. When

opponents of the Nixon administration's policy called for speedier termination of the involvement they also commonly made it contingent on

the return of all American prisoners of war and some form of accounting

for the servicemen listed as missing in action. As public sentiment shifted

decisively toward demanding an end to the war, some commentators spoke

of assuring the recovery of the captive Americans as the only remaining

legitimate reason for continuing the hostilities.

From 1968 onward the United States had sought an honorable way

out of the Southeast Asian conflict. The difficult and protracted negotiations with a rigid, aggrieved, abusive, and deceitful yet maddeningly

self-righteous foe finally ended with the signing of an agreement between

the United States and North Vietnam in January 1973. At its heart lay

the provision for simultaneous release of the prisoners and withdrawal

of U.S. forces from Vietnam over a 60-day period. With the signing of

the Paris agreement there began an intense emotional experience for

the nation as it witnessed the homecoming of the prisoners.

Perceptions ofHomecoming

Exhaustive press, radio, and television coverage allowed the public

to follow each step of the progress of the released captives-from arrival at

Clark Air Base in the Philippines through some aspects of the processing

526
Conclusion 527

leading to their departure on the trans-Pacific flight, then to the welcome

marking their return to American soil, reunion with families, and dispersal to military hospitals near their homes. Unlike much else that had

occurred during the Vietnam War, this unfolding story seemed unambiguously worthy of celebration, and most Americans viewing it found themselves caught up in a nationwide feeling of pride in the unbowed spirit

and upright bearing of the former prisoners.

The New York Times passed on the observations of a veteran journalist who had covered the repatriation following the Korean War: "That war

was not so divisive as the Vietnam war. That war had heroes and a somewhat sympathetic press. The Vietnam war has had neither until now."

Newsweek said the country was experiencing "a rare moment of unity and

joy." Indeed, for many the homecoming of the prisoners symbolized above

any other event or pronouncement the ending of the war, bringing with it

a sense of completion, of relief and possible release from the divisions of

the past. "The nation begins again to feel itself whole," wrote the editor

of the New Orleans Times-Picayune. 1

The virtually flawless execution of the Homecoming plan by the Department of Defense helped to sustain the elation surrounding the prisoners'

return. The absence of heavy-handed actions or embarrassing breakdowns

attested to DoD's forethought and effective management. Time remarked

that "the U.S. military's planning for the operation had been meticulous

and even loving, in an official way."2 In addition, the planning had been

carefully coordinated, with oversight from a central authority, thanks to

a decision in 1967 that placed the primary responsibility for prisoner of

war matters at the OSD level. Beginning in late January 1973, the Homecoming Operations Center in the Pentagon's National Military Command

Center monitored and directed the repatriation on a 24-hour basis. 3

Occasional hitches did occur, but none of major import and none that

attracted wide public attention. The flexibility and contingency planning built into the arrangements proved sufficient for dealing with the

few complications that arose. When completed, Homecoming took its place

as a remarkable instance of a major operation carried out as planned.

Although by any objective measure Homecoming was a resounding

success, it did not escape the criticism of those who had long registered

disenchantment with the war and the U.S. role in Southeast Asia and

were accustomed to viewing government actions with suspicion and

distrust and the military with disdain. Reflecting the cynicism ingrained

among liberal academics and intelligentsia, in January 1973 the American

Psychological Association asked the Pentagon "what precautions are being

taken that the psychological briefing or treatment given to each returnee
528 THE LONG ROAD HOME

be aimed only at his own rehabilitation, and that no attempt will be made

to manipulate the political opinions of the returnees." The director of the

PW/MIA Task Force, Brig. Gen. Russell Ogan, thanked the association for

"your interest in the welfare of our men," then expressed "disappointment

that a group as prestigious as yours would conclude by inference that the

Department of Defense could conceivably have plans 'to manipulate the

political opinions of returnees.''' He closed with an offer to send a task

force member to discuss the department's objectives, plans, and policies

for the reception and care of returned prisoners of war. 4

The cynics found reinforcement in the first statements made by the

PWs on deplaning at Clark, usually by the senior officer in each arriving

group. Of these the most memorable and most frequently quoted in

later years were the remarks of the first returnee to stand before the microphone, Navy Capt. Jeremiah Denton: "We are honored to have had the

opportunity to serve our country under difficult circumstances. We are

profoundly grateful to our Commander in Chief and to our nation for

this day." According to one account, "he paused for a second, then added

in a voice quavering with emotion, 'God bless America.''') Subsequent

spokesmen expressed much the same sentiment in arrival statements

both at Clark and in the United States. Voicing the conviction that they

had returned home with honor and almost always including an expression

of gratitude for President Nixon's actions as commander in chief, they

spoke of service, faith, loyalty, and patriotism in a sincere and unselfconscious manner that had been our of fashion in some circles in recent years.

Some listeners took the nature and sameness of the statements as evidence

of coaching or direct dictation by government officials. In a piece headed

"Script by the Military," a columnist in the Washington Post concluded that

"the return of the prisoners of war was a militarily-managed event down

to the last 'God bless America. "'6

Stronger charges that the returning prisoners had not only been rehearsed bur were being exploited came from some individuals long prominent in the antiwar movement. As journalist Steven Roberts put it, they

felt that "the Nixon Administration has 'manipulated' the nation's 'hunger

for heroes' into a commercial for its own record, and the glorification of

war itself." He quoted a Yale professor who found disturbing "the image

being created of simple, old-fashioned American military virtue, as

though ... the understandable emotion around these men can wipe away

10 years of an ugly, unjust war." Roberts cited another leading activist,

the Rev. Philip F. Berrigan, who spoke of "over-publicizing the war criminals who are coming home," the priest adding, "bur what else would you

expect from the Government, but to distort the true nature of the men?"?
Conclusion 529

Responding to a query from the White House, the Department of

Defense reported that its own senior officials on the scene at Clark and

other reception centers "could not be more emphatic on the point that no

guidance or suggestions were given on the substance of arrival statements."

Also, the returnee spokesmen were "frankly outraged at the suggestion of

manipulation and would welcome the opportunity to address the question publicly." During meetings with the press at their respective service

hospitals in late February, Denton and several others denied being coached

on what to say. In the words of Navy Capt. Howard Rutledge, "This thing

all came from the heart."8

Denied as well by Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson,9 the orchestration charge was heard less frequently after the repatriation of the last

man freed the returnees to tell the full story of their captivity. Their

accounts of the tortures many had endured when attempting to resist

exploitation by the enemy suggested that these were not men who would

readily submit to thought control during their first days of freedom. That

did not quell implacable opponents of the war such as activist Jane Fonda,

who disputed the reports of brutality and mistreatment. Fonda charged

that the men who said they had been tortured were "hypocrites and liars."

When Secretary Richardson condemned her remark as "an egregious insult

to all of our returning prisoners" and several state legislatures gave consideration to resolutions of censure, Fonda modified her stand to the extent

of conceding that instances of torture may have occurred, probably

brought on by defiance of the prison rules, "but the pilots who are saying

it was the policy of the Vietnamese and that it was systematic, I believe

that that's a lie."lo

In fact, such influence as was exerted on homecoming utterances

came mainly from the PWs themselves. The senior spokesmen were confident they expressed the generally held sentiments of their fellow

prisoners because, as Col. Robinson Risner explained, they had discussed

their beliefs "over the months and years" and "we knew what we felr."

From those discussions, under the watchword "Return with Honor," a

widely accepted view had emerged regarding how they should represent

themselves upon reaching home. The returnees' press interviews commonly pictured the aviator-officers held by the North Vietnamese as a

tightly knit and disciplined group, united by their shared experience, and

at one in aspiring to high ideals of military conduct. There is no reason to

doubt that the accompanying patriotic declarations and evocations of the

flag, family, and God's blessing, even if in some cases pre-scripted, were

authentic expressions of thought and feelings. A further feature of their

remarks proved to be of continuing interest to the White House: the men's
530 THE LONG ROAD HOME

acknowledgment of President Nixon's leadership. Pursuant to a White

House request, 050 forwarded a succession of reports giving names

and addresses of returnees "who have made favorable references to the

Commander-in-Chief." The first report, on 17 February 1973, listed

26 names. 11

There was criticism, too, from those who wondered if 000 had

been equally concerned for the return of all servicemen, regardless of race

or rank. Both citizens and members of Congress questioned Richardson

repeatedly about the small proportion of enlisted men among the returnees and the apparent under-representation of minorities. In reply,

000 gave the final figures for Operation Homecoming, in which the

enemy had returned 566 U.S. servicemen of whom 497 were officers and

69 enlisted; 55 were said to have died in captivity-30 officers and 25

enlisted men. DoD's accompanying explanation pointed out that "in

Vietnam, unlike earlier wars, there were few major land actions in which

large numbers of foot soldiers were captured. On the other hand, the

extensive air war placed large numbers of officer air crewmen in positions

where, if their aircraft was lost, they faced high probability of capture."

In fact, about 85 percent of the men returned had been downed airmen

held in North Vietnam. As for the seemingly disproportionately high

fatality rate among the enlisted prisoners, most of these had been seized

in the South, where an itinerant captivity and frequently harsher conditions contributed to a higher incidence of disease and death. 12

Judging the matter against his own experience as an infantryman in

Korea, New York Congressman Charles Rangel continued to find it

incredible that the enemy had only 69 enlisted prisoners to give up,

and further, that only 16 black servicemen (9 officers and 7 enlisted) had

been returned during Homecoming, along with notice that 2 had died

in captivity. Considering that 5,662 blacks had been killed in action, he

thought DoD's figure of 53 remaining in the MIA category was also

disproportionately low. 1.1

It seems safe to say that the comments of the critics and detractors

left little imprint on the image of Homecoming as it passed into the

nation's collective memory. The debunkers were no match for the millions

of Americans eager to salvage some joy and satisfaction from the prisoners'

safe return, an operation impressively executed, and a redemption of sorts

of America's strength and honor.
Conclusion 531

Effects ofthe Go Public Campaign

Perhaps more remarkable than the homecoming celebration in 1973

had been the outpouring of public concern for the well-being and survival of the Americans in enemy hands and for the fate of those missing in action that occurred in the preceding years. Viewed in the context

of the nation's overall commitment in Southeast Asia, the intense and

continuing attention given the cause of these men seems extraordinary,

particularly as ir focused primarily on the relatively small numberfewer than a thousand-known or believed to be captured. It was decidedly unusual for prisoners of war to be the subjects of unceasing anxious

concern at a time when hostilities continued with little prospect of a settlement. The men's fate had gained a place in the forefront of the country's

consciousness because the government and especially the military services

maintained an unshakable awareness of the obligation to obtain their

freedom and because their families and friends would not let the government and the American public forget them.

The second of these reasons-more dramatic and with stronger

elements of human interest-has received the greater recognition. There

is much to admire in the story of how wives, parents, and other relatives

drew together and organized themselves to insure that the men's status

as prisoners of war and the denial of their rights to humane treatment

were known to their fellow citizens and the world. What became the

National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in

Southeast Asia arose from small beginnings at the local level, but it was

headed from the first by women who possessed or soon developed the

organizing abilities, talent for public relations, and capability of providing

inspiring leadership that brought the League to a position of national

prominence signified by its incorporation in the District of Columbia

and the establishment of its headquarters within sight of the Capitol in

June 1970. Thereafter the League grew steadily in size and influence, ultimately enrolling well over half of all PW/MIA families and maintaining

its place as the only organization with membership limited to the relatives of men missing or captured that was truly national in scope and that

held itself to humanitarian, nonprofit, and nonpartisan purposes.

The objectives of the League of Families coincided at most points

with those of the government's Go Public campaign, and the personal

testimony and constant publicity efforts of League members gave it

major support. Credit for the May 1969 launching of that campaign,

however, belongs almost exclusively to 000 officials and Secretary of

Defense Melvin Laird. Fulfilling their deeply felt obligation to the missing
532 THE LONG ROAD HOME

men, it represented a breakthrough for ideas advocated within the 000

PW Policy Committee almost from its inception in July 1967.

Dissatisfied with the results from the State Department's reliance on

"quiet diplomacy" as the means of winning the full protection of the

Geneva Convention for the captive Americans, the committee favored

mounting a counterpropaganda campaign that would openly and continually challenge Hanoi's claims that the U.S. prisoners were receiving humane and lenient treatment. When arguing for this in the fall of

1967, committee members pointed to the success scored a year earlier

when State's officials had set aside their usual restraint in order to speak

out against Hanoi's intention of subjecting prisoners to war crimes trials.

Making use of the power of adverse publicity, State had rallied world

opinion in a protest that gained the support of Pope Paul VI and UN

Secretary General U Thant and undoubtedly contributed to the outcome:

an indefinite postponement of the trials.

Nevertheless, in interdepartmental consultations in which State's

opinion had the greater weight, the more aggressive publicity campaign

recommended by the 000 PW Policy Committee had failed to gain

approval by early 1968. Soon afterward the Communist side gave its first

signs of willingness to enter into direct negotiations, opening the way to

the convening of the Paris peace talks in May. In these circumstances the

primacy of the diplomatic efforts directed by Ambassador at Large W.

Averell Harriman continued, and with it the supposition that an atmosphere conducive to success could best be maintained by refraining from

public condemnation of the enemy's practices regarding prisoners. During

the remainder of 1968 conviction grew within 000 that Harriman had

held too long to the course of quiet diplomacy, given the accumulating

evidence of mistreatment of captives on the one hand and of the futility

of appeals to humanitarian feelings in Hanoi on the other.

When Melvin Laird took office as the Nixon administration's first

secretary of defense on 22 January 1969 he heard from experienced 000

officials about the pent up urge to go on the offensive regarding the

treatment of American prisoners. This coincided with his own thought

and inclination and by late February his decision to move along that line

had firmed. Laird believed it imperative to bring Hanoi's rejection of obligations under the Geneva Convention to the world's attention and to

talk "openly, candidly, forcefully, and repeatedly" about the enemy's refusal to grant the fundamental rights of prisoners of war to the captive

Americans. The previous restraints on doing so ran counter to Laird's

concept of his responsibility as secretary of defense. He felt that the time

had come to speak out in defense of the well-being and ultimate survival
Conclusion 533

of the prisoners. Certainly the Department of State had an important role,

Laird said, because international relations were obviously involved, but

"the Defense Department's overriding obligations to its men" required it

to take the lead in devising programs that might improve their welfare

and secure their release. 14

At Laird's direction preparations began for what came to be called

the "Go Public" campaign. The materials at hand in March 1969 included

a counterpropaganda plan that had received favorable consideration from

the policy committee as early as November 1967. Now resubmitted, it

was designed to "influence world opinion to the point that Hanoi will

feel compelled to afford proper treatment to U.S. PW's." This required

plain speaking about the deficiencies in the enemy's treatment, backed

by specific examples and driven home by sustained public exposure. On

19 May 1969 Laird committed the U.S. government to such a program by

his statement opening the Go Public campaign and by the extensive DoD

press briefing that followed. His action had at least the tacit approval of

the White House and support now from the Department of State. Under

new leadership, State had already shown less reticence than before in condemning the practices of the enemy. I)

Laird had acted from conviction that Hanoi's disregard for humanitarian standards was a major vulnerability that should be exploited to

induce the enemy to comply with the Geneva Convention and perhaps

to negotiate seriously about the return of prisoners of war. There were

additional considerations, of course-ones that Laird with his wellpracticed skill at gauging political realities was unlikely to miss. He was

aware of the rising impatience and unease among PW/MIA family members regarding the government's policy of restraint, which seemed to give

so little notice to the central concern of their lives. Without some change

their dissatisfaction would continue to grow and could find expression

in unpredictable ways. Thus the Go Public campaign's aggressive and

unhesitating advocacy of the prisoners' rights had the additional advantage

of tending to allay the anxieties of the next of kin and to reassure them

that the government was making determined efforts on behalf of their

men. Also, family members could have a role in the campaign and might

find comfort in feeling that their volunteer efforts might help to safeguard

the well-being of their relatives.

The government's decision to abandon the close hold of confidentiality regarding major aspects of the PW/MIA issue and take the lead in

discussing them openly has sometimes been pictured as a capitulation

forced by growing agitation and incipient revolt among the next of kin.

But the clear antecedents of the change, stretching back some 18 months
534 THE LONG ROAD HOME

in the work of the DoD PW Policy Committee, belie this. Also, it does

not appear that family organizations had yet attained the size or displayed the assertive temper that would have allowed them such a degree

of influence in the first months of 1969.

In informing and arousing the American people the Go Public

campaign was a phenomenal success. Once opened to discussion, the plight

of the American prisoners and missing engaged the thought and emotions

of hundreds of thousands-all told, probably millions-of their fellow

citizens. With regard to men killed in action, the response of most people

did not go beyond honoring their sacrifice and viewing their survivors

with sympathy, but for the prisoners of war and their waiting families a

deeper feeling of empathy often developed. Undoubtedly, displaying

concern for the treatment and recovery of the missing men provided an

outlet for the patriotic feelings of citizens whose support for the other

declared purposes of their country's involvement in Southeast Asia had

often been ambivalent at best. Had the war been one in which the

nation's survival was at stake, as in World War II, it is unlikely that the

cause of the prisoners and missing would have overshadowed feelings

toward those who gave their lives.

The degree to which the Go Public campaign succeeded in bringing

an aroused world opinion to bear on the North Vietnamese government

is more difficult to judge. To be sure, at the United Nations and in other

international bodies U.S. delegations obtained impressive majorities for

resolutions endorsing the humanitarian treatment of prisoners of war

and calling for universal observance of the Geneva Convention. Countries

friendly or beholden to the United States, as well as a few others, did

make representations to Hanoi about bringing its treatment of prisoners,

release of information about them, and acceptance of impartial inspection closer to the internationally accepted norm. But unless given

definition by deep revulsion or other truly strong emotion, "world

opinion," then as now, was too amorphous an element to harness and

exploit as an active force. Even if faced with widespread condemnation,

a government with such determined leadership as that of North Vietnam can usually ignore outside disapprobation with relative impunity. It

may be remembered that during the years of the Go Public campaign rhe

U.S. government likewise remained largely unmoved by a high level

of international disapproval, reflecring opinion in much of the world

that the American intervention in Southeast Asia was an unworthy or

mistaken endeavor that should be abandoned.

Whatever the level of Hanoi's concern for its world image, during the

last quarter of 1969 a definite change for the better did occur in the
Conclusion 535

enemy's treatment of the prisoners, most notably the abandonment of

systematic and unhesitating resort to torture. The general supervisor of the

prison system was demoted and apparently made the scapegoat for certain "errors," and he soon passed from the scene. However, the Hanoi

government made no announcement of this and offered no confession

or apology to the world at large. Its spokesmen maintained that now as in

the past, and despite their crimes against the country and people of North

Vietnam, the prisoners were receiving lenient and forbearing treatment.

When writing their memoirs some returned prisoners attributed

Hanoi's change of policy in 1969 to pressures generated by the protests

and publicity efforts of the PW/MIA wives and relatives. Other commentators cite a number of possible contributing factors, with some believing

that the move resulted from the interplay between a growing concern among

North Vietnamese authorities over the deteriorating condition of the tortured captives and their awareness that the committed resistance of most

of the prisoners was likely to continue.* The precise role played by the

Go Public activities is impossible to determine but they almost certainly

influenced the shifting dynamic.

Prisoner ofWar Benefits

Laird again played the key role in another major DoD undertakingthe provision of information and assistance to the PW/MIA families and

seeing that the men captured or missing suffered no disadvantage with

respect to financial security, promotions, future career opportunities, and

assured long-term health care. One of his earliest pronouncements, on

1 March 1969, set the goal of "doing all that we possibly can for the next

of kin" and called on the military services and OSD officials to recommend courses of action and any added legal authority that would "better

serve the interests of our captured and missing servicemen and their

families." Thereafter the benefits legislated or administratively established

for the men and their relatives and the individual attention given to each

of the affected families both reached levels far exceeding that provided

in previous conflicts. This owed much to the frequent reiteration of the

secretary's interest in the matter and the well-nigh universal support from

members of Congress. It also reflected the increasing scope and severity

of the need. The ever-lengthening duration of the men's captivity or

missing status magnified all the existing social, economic, and emotional

* See Rochester and Kiley, Honor Bound, ch 22, which cites the death of Ho Chi Minh

in September 1969 as a pivotal event and notes other factors.
536 THE LONG ROAD HOME

problems of their waiting kinfolk and expanded the PWs' own readjustment and rehabilitation needs. I!>

By the end of 1972 an impressive number of benefits had been enacted

and several regulations had been interpreted to permit bestowal of some

additional favor on the men who would return or on the survivors of

those who did not. By then Pentagon officials had reached the conclusion

that the benefits devised for the missing or captured and their families

were in danger of becoming excessive when compared with the provision

made for the war's other casualties, the men killed in action or disabled

by wounds. The further entitlements currently proposed by some members

of Congress, such as crediting time in captivity at double value for retirement purposes, were particularly open to cogent objection, and DoD's

negative comments discouraged their enactment. 17

In response to Laird's urging and in the tradition of "taking care of

their own" each military service had aspired to provide comprehensive

assistance to its PW/MIA families, seeking to do everything feasible to

relieve the burdens and anxieties of their special situation. Ideally, the

assigned casualty assistance officer, usually serving several families, would

develop an intimate understanding of their expert medical, psychological,

legal, or financial counseling as appropriate. He would also keep the next

of kin informed on such subjects as new legislation or rulings affecting

them, the proper letter and package mailing procedures, and details of

the repatriation plan.

When for a number of reasons performance often fell short of the

intention, the National League of Families proposed making "one-an-one"

the standard-a system in which each assistance officer would have a

single family of a captured or missing serviceman as his only responsibility.

That this arrangement received serious consideration, with the Air Force

going so far as to offer it as an option families might choose, underscores

again the relatively small and manageable size of the PW/MIA problem

during the Vietnam War, which may limit its usefulness as a model for

procedures in future conflicts. Under other circumstances it could prove

impossible to sustain the manpower commitment and supervisory effort

of a one-an-one system, or even to duplicate the less extensive arrangements for family assistance that developed during the Vietnam era.

Similarly, it would appear undesirable to view the benefits and special

provisions of that era as a standard precedent-a list of entitlements that

future prisoners of war and their families might expect to see reinstated

as an established right. A review conducted at an unpressured time could

establish which benefit provisions have enduring validity, keeping in

mind that a number were introduced to alleviate unique problems growing
Conclusion 537

out of the unprecedented length of the men's captive or mIss109 status,

which ran on in some instances for the better part of a decade.

In December 1972 OSD officials were already contemplating what

would be involved in winding down the extensive effort devoted to "the

issues of repatriation, accounting for the missing, and all of the special

arrangements for PW/MIAs and the families." They identified a need to

guard against "the tendency to overreact and make this category of personnel a special privileged group out of all proportion when compared to

other categories of veterans and our citizenry in general." "The challenge,"

according to an internal ISA memo, "will be to do what is required without making these men and their families 'wards of the State.' ... Such

dependence for the rest of their lives is not in their interest nor is it

equitable when considering the needs of other categories such as killed

in action or wounded and disabled veterans."IH

Role ofthe Families

Though never viewed by OSD officials as the sole representative of

the PW/MIA next of kin, the National League of Families had an

important role as adviser and critic of the department's actions and

programs. The fact that its membership included a majority of the affected

families did add weight to its opinions, and some of the League's suggestions for improving the performance of the casualty assistance officers,

identifying needs that the benefits system should address, and insuting

that the repatriation plan did not lack in human warmth had a self-evident

value. With so many of their hopes dependent on the soundness of the government's policies and the effectiveness of its actions, League members

soon overcame any hesitancy about offering plain-spoken criticism of shortcomings. The officials involved in DoD's continuing relationship with the

League also found that the latter's representatives sometimes raised inconvenient questions or persisted in wanting to know the particulars behind

the department's generalized assurances. They may be credited with spurring

government authorities to clarify their thoughts and improve their programs.

Perhaps inevitably, a difference of perception marked the relationship.

What OSD officials saw as an exceptionally high level of consultation with

this outside group appeared to some League leaders as insufficient to

realize fully the contribution their members could make. By 1972 the

League was urging that one of its officers be invited to attend meetings

of the PW/MIA Task Force "on a regular basis." DoD's rejection of this

recommendation noted that the agenda of the task force encompassed a
538 THE LONG ROAD HOME

wide variety of subjects and issues, some involving classified information

and many more falling outside the expertise of the proposed family representative. Further, "the free exchange of ideas and proposals necessary to

arrive at the best possible answer to many problems would be inhibited by

the presence of a family member." There are indications that word from

a higher authority had reinforced the normal disposition to deny such bids

for direct participation in the government's deliberations, but in any event,

family representation was held to be unnecessary in view of the lengthy list

of occasions when responsible officials had met with the League's leaders,!'!

Speaking for the National League, Iris Powers advised a congressional

committee in October 1972 that "we think the Defense Department has

produced what may be the most detailed and conscientious repatriation,

rehabilitation and readjustment program ever put together by any nation

at any time in the history of warfare, but that is not to say that it is

perfect." She acknowledged that frequent consultations had occurred but

could not shake the feeling that "our deliberations and recommendations

have, in general, been accepted with an air of benevolent paternalism." Some

DoD officials, sensitive to the need to avoid appearing condescending,

recognized that they had to deal warily with the issue.2o

In their relations with the National League, other family groups, and

individual next of kin, Defense leaders had a further concern, never more

plainly set forth than in Laird's advice to President Nixon in May 1971:

"If the families should turn against the Administration on the PW/MIA

issue, we believe that general public support would also." The political contentiousness that gripped the country over how to end the war and what

would constitute an acceptable peace could not be ignored, and taking it

into account gave yet another dimension to the endeavors of OSD officials. They had to remain alert for evidence of intensifying feelings or

shifts of opinion among the family members, but legitimate opportunities

to head off or argue against waning support for the administration's goals

lay primarily in the political area, a realm that knew few practitioners

more adept than Richard Nixon. 21

Yielding to the urgings of Laird and Under Secretary of State

Richardson, Nixon had first become actively engaged with the PW/MIA

issue at his White House meeting with a representative group of wives

and parents in December 1969. On that occasion, in the first significant

statement of his presidency on the subject, he declared that any agreement

ending the war must include a satisfactory settlement of the prisoner issue

and that the U.S. government would "do everything that it possibly can

to separate out the prisoner issue and have it handled as it should be, as a

separate issue on a humane basis." Thereafter, with well-turned references to
Conclusion 539

the prisoners and mlsslng in his public addresses and with other timely

moves, the president gave PW/MIA relatives reason to believe that he

understood their concerns and was working behind the scenes as well as

publicly to attain the kind of peace settlement they desired. 22

Even at a time when realistically the coming months offered scant

hope of progress toward bringing the men home Nixon undertook to

champion their cause. Though perhaps more as a holding position than

as the bold new initiative for peace it was claimed to be, in an address on

7 October 1970 he took a stand on the highest moral ground with his

call for "the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of

war held by both sides ... to return to the place of their choice ... as a

simple act of humanity." The Christmas letter he sent to all the affected

families aimed to give them a feeling of being taken into his confidence.

It included a tribute to "the strength, the loyalty and the dignity with

which you have borne your burden" and closed with the pledge that "we

will not rest until every prisoner has returned to his family and the missing have been accounted for." The following year, sounding these same

themes and displaying a sure feel for the dramatic gesture, Nixon made a

surprise appearance at the National League's annual convention. 23

Both the president's address on 25 January 1972, revealing Henry Kissinger's secret negotiations and the enemy's record of intransigence and

deceit, and his ordering of the mining of harbors and other stepped-up

military action in response to North Vietnam's Easter offensive of that

year had appeal for PW/MIA families. Again appearing unannounced at

the National League's annual meeting that October, Nixon gave a masterful performance. He vowed that "we shall, under no circumstances, abandon

our POW's and MIA's," at the same time (in what could be recognized as

a deft thrust at his opponent in the upcoming election) rejecting any

course that would "leave their fate to the good will of the enemy." The

president also contrasted the steadfast approval of his recent decisions

by League members with the almost universal lack of support from "the

so-called opinion leaders of this country." His appreciation of the families'

burden bound most of his hearers to him, as did the renewed pledge that

"I will never let you down."24

The durability of the president's hold on the allegiance of PW/MIA

families soon underwent further tests when the promise of Kissinger's

avowal that "Peace is at hand" went unfulfilled and when the president's

overwhelming election victory was followed by a breakdown of the Paris

talks rather than accelerated progress toward a peace agreement. Nixon

then unleashed the intensive B-52 raids on targets in the Haiphong-Hanoi

corridor-"the Christmas bombing"-that won him severe condemnation
540 THE LONG ROAD HOME

from many sources both at home and abroad but the applause of the

PWs in Hanoi. Though importuned by the media for a statement, the

officers of the National League of Families refrained from public comment. Privately some leading members advised OSD officials of their

anguished objections to a policy that was swelling the roster of prisoners

and missing and seemed likely to extend the hostilities, but they had no

assurance that the majority of theit membership held this view. Just after

Hanoi's assent to resumption of the negotiations brought the raids to an

end the League's headquarters sent a mail ballot to all members urgently

seeking their guidance on how to react should the peace talks break down

again and the bombing be resumed. Since signing of the peace agreement

followed on 27 January 1973, no tabulation of the results was made public.

Conduct in Captivity

A senslt!ve and unwelcome problem with strong negative overtones

persisted well beyond the PWs' homecoming-how to judge the men's

conduct in captivity and what implications this might have for the Code

of Conduct. During the planning period a great deal of thought had been

expended on the precepts and procedures to be followed when debriefing

the returned prisoners, including how to respond if evidence of misconduct came to light. In that connection planners and officials all had in

mind a goal often expressed as "avoiding the situation that occurred after

Korea," when the Department of Defense had come under public and congressional criticism because of the differing standards used by the services

when deciding what behavior in captivity warranted the preferral of charges

and convening of a court-martial.

The debriefing guidelines did not stress detection of wrongdoing as

an objective. The cardinal purpose was to collect information, first to

gather all that the returnee knew about the fate of men still unaccounted

for and in later sessions to record all aspects of his captivity experience.

Several principles had been clearly enunciated as early as October 1970,

including the statement that "the Code of Conduct is a personal guide

to conduct, but not a criminal code," which meant that failure to live

up to its requirements would not be a chargeable offense. Charges and

prosecutions could be based only on violations of the Uniform Code of

Military Justice (UCMJ), established by act of Congress and applicable

to all members of the armed forces. Especially pertinent to the debriefing

exercise was the UCM],s Article 31, setting forth the military equivalent of

the familiar "You have the right to remain silent" and further statements
Conclusion 541

by which civilians suspected of crimes were advised that anything said

might be used as evidence against them. "To provide the proper environment for the return of the men," the guidance read, "a returnee is to be

given the warning specified in Article 31 ... not at the outset of debriefing (which was the previous practice, and tended to brand every man

as automatically suspect), but only when there is reason to suspect the

individual of an offense under the UCMJ, because of his own statements,

the statements of another, or evidence received prior to return."25

The repatriation plans contained further indications that a cautious

approach to questions of conduct and culpability was desired and no rush

to judgment was intended. By late 1972 these governing documents

required that no returnee be warned under Article 31 without prior submission of the matter to the highest headquarters of his service. Other

provisions sought means of avoiding the need to issue the warning, mainly

because its use would be at cross-purposes with the desire for maximum

retrieval of information. The authorities wished to reserve the debriefing

as a purely intelligence exercise, it being understood that when deemed

necessary, criminal investigators would question returnees at a later time,

under conditions that fully protected their legal rights. 26

For the initial interview, the debriefing officer's diligence in keeping

the focus on information about men unaccounted for seemed a sufficient

safeguard against needing to invoke Article 31. For the further stage of

debriefing, the interviewer was instructed not to elicit comment about

misconduct in the prison camp, but if the returnee wanted to talk about

the misbehavior of others, he would be permitted to do so, though without follow-up questions that encouraged him to continue. The possibility

that a returnee might launch into a description of his own actions that

tended toward self-incrimination was viewed more seriously. In that event

the debriefer was to steer him away from the subject or, if necessary,

suspend the interview, submit the particulars to service headquarters in

Washington, and await instructions. As described by a responsible senior

officer, the Navy's guideline for an extreme instance was that "if the

POW insisted on unburdening his soul about what he felt were acts of

misconduct on his own part, then the debriefer was to segregate that

portion of the debrief, lock it up, ... not to access it to anyone," in addition to advising higher headquarters of the occurrence. 27

These provisions that gave no priority to aggressive probing for

wrongdoing accorded with the broad construction that Secretary Laird

had already placed on the matter of judging conduct in captivity. In responding to the queries of newsmen and radio interviewers following

the release of Elias, Gartley, and Charles in September 1972 he sought to
542 THE LONG ROAD HOME

"make it very clear that there are no charges pending and will not be as

far as the Department of Defense is concerned." His hearers should realize that the Uniform Code of Military Justice provided that any member

of the armed forces could level charges against another member, but he

hoped that "no such charges would be made by any individuals. "28

Laird's remarks were in line with the compassionate spirit with which

most citizens, as evidenced in the press and in letters to the secretary, believed the returning prisoners of war should be received. His avoidance of

any appearance of applying some absolute, by-the-book standard to the

judgment of the men's conduct also correctly read the public mood.

Another of his pronouncements would probably have received favorable

notice as well, had it been issued to the press. At some point during the

final months of his term of office, which ended on 29 January 1973,

Laird let it be known within the department that he believed no charges

should be leveled against any returning serviceman for statements made

while in captivity. In public discussions the point had often been raised

that the propaganda statements attributed to individual prisoners, possibly

made under extreme duress, did not condemn U.s. official policy any more

severely than other statements freely made by political figures at home,

including some who held high office in the government.

At a Pentagon press briefing on 15 February 1973, just after arrival

in the continental United States of the first contingents of returning

prisoners, a journalist asked for a precise statement of the policy concerning possible prosecution of the men for actions while in the prison

camps. He was aware of Laird's statements in September and a later one

by Jerry Friedheim, acting assistant secretary of defense for public affairs,

but considered that the matter was "a little fuzzy." Friedheim's deputy,

Maj. Gen. Daniel James, Jr., replied: "It's not fuzzy to me. I've heard both

of them say on several occasions that the Government of the United States

has no plans to bring any action against any of the prisoners for things

that they might have said or done while in captivity. However, as has

been pointed out to you, the Uniform Code of Military Justice has a provision that allows the bringing of charges by any member of the military,

regardless of rank, against any other member. We cannot presume to ...

speculate at this point on what may be forthcoming from the men

themselves. "29

In fact, something sounder than speculation would soon be in hand.

Roger Shields was serving as the senior DoD representative at the Homecoming reception center at Clark Air Base, and he was a member of the

party that flew to Hanoi on the first two occasions when imprisoned

Americans were handed over. Part of his mission was to make a quick
Conclusion 543

survey of the attitudes and experience of the returnees to see if the

assumptions on which Washington officials were operating were correct.

He soon became aware of strong feelings within the prisoner group that

some few of their number deserved to be called to account for antiwar

broadcasts and other collaborative acts not coerced by the enemy or for

refusing to acknowledge and obey orders from the senior ranking officer

of the prisoners' own command organization.* One of the longest-held

officers had written out the particulars on which charges against a number

of men might be based, and he entrusted it to Shields on first encounter

after takeoff from Hanoi.

Shields found also that most of the returnees freely admitted succumbing to coercion at some point. Nearly all had been forced to sign

or broadcast statements of propaganda value or perform other acts that

verged on collaboration. The enemy's use of prolonged and merciless

torture, long-term solitary confinement, starvation diets, unsanitary conditions, and denial of medical care amounted to a physical and psychological

onslaught that even the hardest-line resisters could not withstand.

On the morning of 21 February, barely seven hours after arrival of

his return flight from the Philippines, Shields attended a meeting in the

office of OSD General Counsel J. Fred Buzhardt, Jr., where his findings

were reviewed. Soon afterward it was announced that Secretary Richardson had determined there would be "no prosecution of returned POWs

based solely on propaganda statements made by returnees while in captive

status"-in effect, a more formal version of Laird's earlier pronouncement. 30

Subsequently, service legal officers concluded that, if subjected to litigation, the secretary's words would have to be interpreted as granting

immunity to returnees for virtually any statement and as extending to

conduct involving the planning, preparation, and issuance of the statements. Meanwhile the original declaration that the Department of Defense

would not prefer charges had been recast: To be accepted, any charge against

a returned PW must be initiated and signed by a fellow prisoner. Further

instruction, conveyed on 5 April at meetings presided over by Shields

and Buzhardt, may have been influenced by the White House. It expressed

the desires of the secretary of defense, "who had received guidance in

the matter," according to an Army participant. General Counsel Buzhardt

strongly advised against advancing any charges that would not stand up

in court, but the secretary's main request was that any PW investigations in progress be concluded as quietly as possible, in a generally "low

profile" treatment of the conduct question, with no charges to be preferred for the time being. 5l

* See Rochester and Kiley, Honor Bound, ch 25.
544 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Accordingly, government authorities succeeded in handling the

conduct in captivity issue in a manner that largely avoided public controversy and criticism. A number of the leaders and long-term members of

the prisoner group were outraged, expressing the feeling that the Department of Defense had shirked its responsibility when it decreed that only

returnees, as individual service members, might be the accusers filing

charges. The military departments investigated such charges in the prescribed manner, and Shields and the PW/MIA Task Force acted as a

clearinghouse for information on the actions of all of the services. There

are strong indications that the ultimate disposition was dictated from

above, possibly via instructions from the White House transmitted through

Buzhardt. No case was pressed to the point of trial by court-martial; commonly the service secretary involved dismissed the charges. The only officers charged, Navy Capt. Walter E. Wilber and Marine Lt. Col. Edison W.

Miller, received letters of censure from Secretary of the Navy John W.

Warner before retiring. l2

The MIAs

Still another issue, much longer-lasting and certainly the most

emotional legacy of the Vietnam War, has been the question of the fate of

the unaccounted for prisoners of war and the missing in action in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. For more than a quarter of a century families

of the PWs and MIAs and their well-wishers continued to hope that their

men had survived while still enduring captivity. Their efforts to focus

and keep government attention on pursuing the quest for conclusive evidence of the fate of the unaccounted for received sympathetic support

from much of the public, press, and Congress.

As the war entered the final stage, in December 1972, Defense

officials expressed the belief that DoD would have to "resolve the MIA

problem in a manner which projects finality and satisfaction with the

results .... There must be sufficient efforts to secure the fullest possible accounting after which the results of these efforts must be presented

publicly in terms that are acceptable to the families, the public, the press

and the Congress." This high purpose could not be realized, owing to

the frailty of many of the peace agreement's provisions and more broadly

to the circumstance that the United States had not emerged as the decisive victor in the war, with freedom to examine the former enemy's

archives and to conduct searches and investigations at will throughout a

conquered territory. The article of the peace agreement that obligated
Conclusion 545

all parties to assist in determining the fate of missing servicemen and

civilians and in locating graves and facilitating the repatriation of remains

went unhonored. Other matters marked for settlement by further discussion among the Vietnamese parties "in a spirit of national reconciliation

and concord, with a view to ending hatred and enmity," were ultimately

resolved by military conquest. In fact, except for the withdrawal of u.s.

forces and the release of the captive Americans it is difficult to find any

provision of the Paris agreement that was carried out as written.

In early 1973 U.S. authorities entered on what would prove to be a

decades-long endeavor to resolve the MIA issue. They dealt with a set of

ever-changing statistics as well as an evolving definition of the task.

During a news briefing on 12 April covering the results of the Homecoming operation, Roger Shields said that with the return of the

acknowledged prisoners of war the total number of Americans unaccounted for was] ,359. This computation included the men still carried

as captured or missing in action-a status in which they were regarded

as continuing on active duty. The figure had fallen to 1,284 when Shields

testified before a congressional committee seven weeks later, but during

that late May appearance he revealed that "there are about 1,000 others

who have been declared dead by the services but whose remains have not

been recovered," categorized as killed in action, body not recovered (KIA/

BNR). He mentioned them again when reaffirming that the Department

of Defense would continue to seek the fullest possible accounting for those

listed as missing: "In addition, we will seek to recover the remains of

the missing who have died and those who are already listed as killed in

action but whose remains have not been recovered."l1

In following years the military departments continued to review the

status of the servicemen originally classed as captured or missing, and the

issuance of presumptive findings of death steadily reduced the number

in those categories. By 1982 only a single Air Force officer was listed as

a prisoner of war, and that as a symbolic gesture attesting to the u.S. government's commitment to obtaining an accounting. All others, now legally

dead but usually with body not recovered, could hardly be differentiated

from the KIA/BNRs. In fact, several years earlier the Department of

Defense had decided to include the KIA/BNR cases under the heading of

"Americans Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia," thus producing a dramatic increase in the total number. As noted in a Senate committee report

published in January 1993, when the figure stood at 2,264, "this created

the anomalous situation of having more Americans considered unaccounted for today than we had immediately after the war." It also increased the

proportion of cases for which there was slight hope of further resolution. 14
546 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Throughout, U.S. officials experienced continuing pressure for fulfillment of the government's pledge to obtain the fullest possible accounting. It

emanated most notably from the National League of Families, whose officers and board members, beginning with those elected in October 1972,

were drawn almost exclusively from the relatives of the men still missing.

This public question took on a further emotional charge from the not insubstantial number of citizens who came to believe, often passionately,

that American servicemen were still being held somewhere in Vietnam,

Laos, or Cambodia, or even in the Soviet Union. For many subscribing to

this belief, the very limited success in accounting for the missing and the

claim that the government had no convincing evidence of the existence

of living prisoners aroused suspicions that government officials were

pursuing some secret policy objective that limited their commitment to

the task. The strongest critics charged that the U.S. government had

abandoned promising lines of inquiry, suppressed information about the

known location of specific individuals, and perpetrated other actions contrary to the purposes it publicly avowed.

Succeeding years saw a number of congressional hearings and select

committee investigations as well as inquiries by presidentially appointed

commissions, all devoted to surveying the dimensions of the problem

and assessing the adequacy and effectiveness of the government's effortsmainly those of officials and agencies of the Department of Defense. The

reports resulting from these proceedings sometimes spawned further controversies, as did the surfacing from time to time of pictures of individuals

alleged to be Americans surviving somewhere in Southeast Asia. The high

volume of "live sighting reports" and other information received from

refugees helped to sustain rumors that some Americans still endured in

remote work camps or underground installations and that the North Vietnamese were keeping the remains of unnumbered U.S. servicemen in

storage, awaiting a favorable opportunity for barter. Citizens seized with

the conviction that living prisoners existed might well respond to the

fund-raising appeals of the sponsors of various private efforts to ransom

or rescue the men.

Aspects of these long-running activities and the accompanying agitation were often in the news. The subject received recurring attention

from popular magazines, talk shows, and journals of opinion, and Hollywood and TV scriptwriters exercised their imaginations to produce stirring

treatments of the possibility of rescue. Even after nearly a quarter of a

century had passed it could truly be said that the men were not forgotten.

U.S. negotiations for the recovery of remains continued with what was

now the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
Conclusion 547

The pressures for intensified government investigation became

stronger as the Vietnamese government, seeking to establish normal relations with the United States, became more cooperative in tracking down

records and remains of the missing. Vietnam agreed to joint investigation

with the United States in 1988, and Cambodia and Laos followed suit in

1991 and 1992 respectively. The Reagan and Bush administrations paid

heed to the demands of the families and gave priority to the search. In

1991 the Department of Defense established the position of deputy assistant secretary of defense for POW/MIA affairs to oversee the vigorous,

large-scale, and good-faith search effort. Two additional new organizations-the Joint Task Force Full Accounting and the Central Identification Laboratory-were established in Hawaii. The former undertook

the enormously complex task of performing the many hundreds of prolonged, painstaking, on-the-spot searches in Vietnam. The laboratory

performed the lengthy and difficult forensic procedures required to identify remains, often with baffling and disappointing results. Other Defense

elements, particularly the Defense Intelligence Agency and the military

services, participated actively in the overall effort.

The many hundreds of searchers in the documents and in the countries

involved faced a daunting task. Their activities included in-country investigations, detailed loss-site surveys, full-scale site excavations, witness

interviews, and joint archival research. The wide-ranging circumstances

under which losses occurred vastly complicated the difficulties of the

search. These circumstances included over-water losses with no or fragmentary knowledge of the location; topographical changes; losses in remote

areas with no witnesses; remains lost while in U.S. custody; remains falling off of a helicopter under enemy fire; mistaken burials by allied forces.

The existence of frequent unresolvable discrepancies made the task all the

more frustrating and inconclusive.

Of the approximately 2,400 men originally counted as missing

after Homecoming about half had been presumed to be dead on the basis

of compelling evidence-their planes were seen to crash on land or in water

with no indication of survivors. Incontrovertible evidence of the status of

the missing, other than identifiable remains (unlikely to amount to more

than a fraction of the total), is difficult if not impossible to come by. The

cost of this near-exhaustive search has been considerable-the Defense

Department estimated that for a five-year period, fiscal years 1996-2000,

it spent almost $500 million on the effort. J5 Still, as long as theoretical possibility of survival exists, it is likely that the search will go on.

In the eyes of many, it is the last measure of national atonement to the

families of the missing.
548 THE LONG ROAD HOME

Although technology may change the nature of war in ways that will

make the taking of Americans as prisoners of war less likely, it is probable

that for the foreseeable future there will continue to be conflicts that will

hold a substantial risk of capture of combatants. Localized conflicts in

highly volatile areas of the world may require the employment of forces

engaging in close-quarters combat, as occurred in Vietnam. Moreover, as

in Vietnam, the United States may be confronted again with an adversary

who denies the plain meaning of international agreements, who first

enters into negotiations and then presents a list of absolute and unyielding demands, meanwhile remaining unswayed by humanitarian appeals

and but slightly moved by international exposure and disapproval of

his practices. Under such circumstances, the experience of coping with

the prisoner of war dilemma during the Vietnam War will not provide an

all-purpose formula but it may yield useful guidance in the way that

knowledge of the past gives us a better grasp of the present. At the very

least, it should increase our capacity to anticipate some of the problems

and difficulties we may encounter in future hostilities and, to the extent

possible, help prepare us to deal with them.
Notes

Records of the 000 PW/MIA Task Force, in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (ISA), are

cited as TF files. Citations to 79-0317 refer to records of the Department of

State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, lot 79-0317.

This collection comprises 37 boxes organized by subject and titled folders

and contains material on PW/MIA affairs, 1966-76, from the office files

of Frank A. Sieverts. Documents with the citation "PW coIl, OSD Hist"

are located, mostly in copy form, in the Historical Office in the Office of

the Secretary of Defense.

1. PRISONER OF WAR POLICY BEFORE VIETNAM

J. Richard 1. Miller. ed. The raw of War. 3-8.

2. House Cte on For Affs. Tht Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War

(hereafter cited as 'fhe Geneva Convention). Cte Print. 91 Cong, 2 sess. May 70. iii. The committee

ptint includes an authenticated text of the convention, prepared by the Department of

State. All quotations of articles of the Geneva Convention appearing hereafter are taken from

this source.

3. for texts of the "London Agreement of 8 August 1945" and its annex. "Charter of the International

Military Tribunal." sec Benjamin B. ferencz, Half a Century of Hope, vol 1 of An international

Criminal Court: A Step Toward World Peace: A Documentary History iwd Analysis, 454-64

(quote, 457).

4. Robert K. Woetzel. The Nuremberg Trials in intemational Law. 232-33.

5. This sentence follows closely a statement by Thomas H. Sponsler in "The Universality Principle of Jurisdiction and the Threatened Trials of American Airmen," royola l.tlW Review, 15

(1 %8-69), 56.

6. Miller, Law of War. 228-29.

7. House Cte on For AfTs, 'file Gene1!a Convention, 81.

8. Miller. l.aw o(War. J 10-1 J; Dept State Bulletin. 1 J Jul 55. 75-77.

9. Board of Editors Note, "Misconduct in the Ptison Camp; A Survey of the Law and an Analysis

of the Kotean Cases," Columbitl rtlW Rtview. 56 (1956). 730-31.

10. Dept State, United Stiltes Tretlties tlnd Other interntltional Agreements, 6, pt 3 (1955). 3514-15.

J]. US Defense Advisory Cte on Prisoners of War, POW, The Fight Continues After the Battle:

ihe Reporl of Ihe Seereltlry of Defense; Advisory Commiltee on Prisoners of War (hereafter cited as

POW), Aug 55, .J 1. The following account of the measures used by the Communists against the

captive Americans relies primarily on this report and Albert D. Biderman, March 10 Calumny.

549
550 Notes to Pages 9-27

12. Biderman, March to Calumny, 41-48.

13. Intcrv with Maj William E. Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In'," U.S. News & World

Report, 24 Feb 56, 5Mf.

14. New York Times, 25 Sep 53; U.S. News & World Report, 16 Oct 53, 52 (text).

15. In a letter to Secretaty of Defense Charles E. Wilson on 27 July 1955 a membet of the Maryland legislature, John M. Whitmore, wtote that he had "heard it said with increasing frequency"

that the officers accused of misconduct "have all been acquitted and the enlisted men have

generally been convicted. If this is true, it is certainly a sorry travesty on justice." Wilson

had received other letters on the subject, from Rep Frank M. Karsten, 15 Mar 55, and Sen

Sam J. Ervin, Jr., 28 Mar 55, SecDef .383.6 (1955).

16. New York limes, 2 May 54, 10 Jul 55. The caption of the latter article read, in part, "Some

Who Gave In to Communists Are Punished and Some Are Nor." The number of Army

returnees given in the text is a later official figure, rather than the 3,322 used by the Times.

17. New York limes, 5 May 54, 8 Mar, 15 Jun 55. Letters addressed to the secretaty of defense by

two successive AMVETS national commanders, dated 8 September 1954 and 24 January and

14 June 1955, plus some of the replies, fotm a single packet within SecDef 383.6 (1955). See

also Itt Wilbur M. Brucker (OSD GenCoun) to Herbert Monte Levy, ACLU, 11 May 55, ibid,

and William Lowe, "What is Justice for a Tortured CI?," Look, 28 Jun 55, 28-32.

18. Ltt Wilson to Pres, 17 May 55, SecDef 334 POW, Defense Advisoty Cte on (1955).

19. See note I I.

20. Daniel V. Callery, "We Can Baffle the Brainwashers'," Saturday Evening Post (22 Jan 55),

20-21ff (quote, 94).

21. Def Advisory Cte, POW, 18.

22. Ibid, 22.

2.3. E.O. 106.31, 17 Aug 55.

24. Merna Wilson for SecsMilDepts, 18 Aug 55, TF files.

25. Def Advisoty Cte rpt ("Committee Recommendation for Action"), II Jul 55, SecDef 334 POW,

Defense Advisory Cte on (1955). The degree of OSD supetvision and its rationale ate

desctibed in a letter from the OSD General Counsel to Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, 25 Mat 55,

SecDef 383.6 (1955). Two Army court-martial cases had gone to ttial before the tequirement

for OSD clearance was imposed on 25 January 1954.

26. DoD Dir 5120.22, 18 Aug 55: memo Carter L. Burgess for ASD(ISA), 6 Sep 55, reproduced

in Classified Supplement to DoD, Code of Conduct Program: Annual Report to the Advisory

Committee, Jun 56, TF files.

27. "Marine Corps Training in the Code of Conduct," attach to memo (JCSM-461-64) JCS for

SeeDef. 28 May 64, PW call, OSD Hist; Senate Cte on Armed Svcs, Special Preparedness

Subcte, Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies: Hearings, 87 Cong, 2 sess (1962),

pt 1, 211-12, 228 (test of Cen David M. Shoup, CmdtUSMC).

28. Memo CSAF for All Major Commands, 12 Ocr 55, TF files.

29. Msg AFOPD-SP-SA 40481 for CINCUSAFE, 16 Jan 56, ibid.

30. Msg AFOPD-SP-SA 55379 for CINCUSAFE, 31 Jan 56, ibid.

31. DoD Pam 1-16/DA Pam 21-71/NAVPERS 92638/AFP 34-10-I1NAVMC 2512, "The U.S.

Fighting Man's Code," 6 Aug 59.

32. Msg CINCPACFLT for CNO, 25000.3Z Jan 63, PW (oil, OSD Hisr.

33. Merna (JCSM-747-6.3) JCS for SeeDef, 3 Oct 6.3, ibid.

34. Memo McNamara for C]CS, 3 Jan 64, ibid.

35. Msg CSAF for USAFE and ATC, AFXPDO 99067, 3 May 6.3, PW call, OSD Hisr.

36. Report of the ,4ir Force Adl/isory Committei' on Prisoners of War, 25 Nov 63 (45, quote), TF files.

37. Merna Zuckert for ASD(M), 27 Nov 6.3, ibid; memo Zuckert for SecDef, 22 Jan 64, JCS file

1410 (1.3 Mar (3) sec 2, Documenrs Div, Jt Secretariat, Jt Staff.

38. Merna McNamara for SecAI', 7 Feb 64, Tf files.

39. Memo (JCSM-461-64) JCS for SecDef, 2R May 64, PW coli, OSD Hist.

40. DoD Dir 1300.7, R Jul 64.
Notes to Pages 28-40 551

41. Lrr MajGen Albert M. Kuhfe1d (JAG AF) co Victor A. Sachse (Ch, AF Advisory Cte on

POWs), 13 Apr 64, PW call, OSD Hist. Kuhfe1d described the instructions given to Air Force

staff representatives within O]CS. Apparently subparagraphs (3)(b) and (5) of rhe rraining guidance owed something to their effort ro preserve "this important aspect of resistance training."

42. Memo (JCSM-461-64) JCS for SecDef, 28 May 64, PW call, OSD Hist.

43. 000 Directives Sysrem Transmittal No 63-30, 26 Jun 63.

2. ORGANIZING FOR POLICY DECISION AND PLANNING

1. Memo Vance for SecsMilDepts et al, 26 Jul 66, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (1966).

2. Memo (JCSM-158-64) JCS for McNamara, 26 Feb 64, ISA 383.6 (1964).

3. Memo (DJSM-7J 8-64) RAdm ]. W. Davis (DepDir]S) for DepASD(lSA) (Henry S. Rowen),

24 Apr 64, ibid.

4. Ltr Vance to Rusk, 4 Apr 64, ibid.

5. Memo Rowen for DirDIA, 27 Mar 64, ISA 383.6 (1964).

6. Memo (DJSM-718-64) Davis for DepASD(ISA), 24 Apr 64, ibid.

7. Ltr Solbert to Kirchen, 5 May 64, ibid.

8. Memo Solbert for DirJS (LtGen David A. Burchina!), 8 Jun 64, [SA 383.6 (1964).

9. Memo Col Marshall Sanders for Solbert, 28 Aug 64, memo BrigGen John W. Vogt for Solbert,

8 Sep 64: ISA 383.6 (1964). For one of rhe more fully developed responses, see msg MAC]21

6257 COMUSMACV for ]CS and CINCPAC, 171 155Z ]ul 64, TF files.

10. New York Times, 16 May 64.

I!. Ltr Kitchen to Solben, 22 May 64, ISA 383.6 (1964).

12. Memo Solbert for Horwitz, 29 Dec 64, ibid.

13. Memo Horwitz for ASD(lSA), II Jan 65, sub: U.S. Military Prisoners of the Communists, PW

call, OSD Hist. During preliminary investigarion an OASD (Admin) staff member heard

again from officials in OASD (Manpower) rhat they were strongly disinclined CO "interpose

ourselves berween the Services and Stare in the flow of information." See OASD(M) route

slip notation Col James T. Kisgen USMC, 5 Jan 65, sub: POW Functions, ibid.

14. Ltr Vogr CO Kirchen, 3 Feb 65, ISA 383.6 (I 965). No parallel communication from Srate bas

been discovered in the files of either department.

15. Memo (JCSM-514-65) JCS for SecDef~ I ]ul 65, memo McNamara for C]CS, 7 ]ul 65, sub:

Response to Significanr Incidents in Vietnam: PW coli, OSD Hisr.

16. Memo (JCSM-744-65) JCS for SeeDef, 9 Ocr 65, SeeDef 371-399 Viernam (1965).

17. Memo McNamara for CjCS, 3 Nov 65, SecDd' 383.6 Vietnam (1965).

18. Hoare intcrv with Robert C, Lewis (VPresARC), 22 Mar 74, PW coli, OSD Hisr.

19. Memrec LtCol W. C. Ford USA, 2 Sep 65, sub: Detainees in Viernam, TF files. The favorable vote

was 14 to 1, plus one "no objection." TF files contain minutes or other evidence of all subsequent

meerings, usually in the form of memoranda for record.

20. Na, "Memorandum of Understanding Arising out of Meeting of November 9, 1965 on the

Assignment of Responsibilities for Americans Held Caprive in Sourh Easr Asia," nd, TF files.

The provisions regarding casualty reporting, notification of next of kin, and ARC and JCRC

responsibilities are described more fully in Chapter 7: those concerned with PW mail are

treated in Chapter 6.

21. Memrec Maj J. R. Sleeper USA, 1 Dec 65, sub: Detainees in Vietnam, memo Col G. D. Overbey

(Afro-AsianDiv ISA) for BrigGen G. M. Seignious II USA (DirPolPlngStaff ISA), 25 Feb 66:

TF files.

22. Mcmree Sleeper, 4 Feb 66, sub: Derainees for [sic) Viernam, ibid.

23. Memo Overbey for Seignious, 25 Fcb 66, ibid.

24. Memo Col M. r. DiFusco for LtC;en J. B. Lampert (DcpASD(M)), 21 Feb 66, memo DiFusco

for Lampert, 2 Mar 66: PW call, OSD Hist.
552 Notes to Pages 40-54

25. Memrec Sleeper. 17 Mar 66, sub: Conference on Detainees and Prisonets in Vietnam, TF files.

26. Ltt Kennedy to Rusk, 19 Apr 66, ibid.

27. Memrec William c:. Hamilton (DepDirI'E(lSA)), 2 May 66, sub: Action on US pOWs in

Victnam, ibid.

28. Dept State Buffetin, 6 Jun 66, 888.

29. Memo Vance for SecsMilDepts et al, 26 Jul 66, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (196(,); msg DEE 7585

for ClNCAL et al, 26 Jul 66, PW coil, OSD Hist.

30. Memo Harrison M. Holland (DepDirEA&P(lSA» for John !'>. Rhinelander (SpecAsst to SecNav),

15 Aug 67, TF files. The meeting of 15 June 1%7 is the last for which a record exists in TF flies.

31. Memo luckert for McConnell, 16 Jul 65, memo McConnell for SecAE, 11 Aug 65, sub: Escape,

Evasion and Related Matters: PW coli, OSD Hisr.

32. Memrec Lampert, 16 Aug 66, sub: Meeting to Discuss POW Matters, ibid.

33. Ibid.

34, Memo Monroe for Brown, 30 Jun (,7, PW coll, OSD Hisr.

35. Memo Gunderson for !'>rown, 6 Jul 67, ibid.

36. HQ USAF !'>ackground Paper, nd [Sep 67'], sub: Prisoner of War (PW) Marters, ibid.

37. Memo Brown ftn Niue, 18 Jul 67, SecDcf 383.6 Vietnam (1 %7).

38. Memo Niue for SeesMilDeprs cr al, 26 Jui 67, memo Horwitz for DepSecDef, 24 Jul 67:

SecDef 383.6 Viernam (Jan-Jtd (7).

39. Memo !'>aldwin for DepSecDef. 28 Jul 67, ihid.

40, Memo Warnke lelf SecsMilDepts et ai, 27 Jul 67, ihid.

41. The numerous memoranda announcing appointments of representatives to the 000 PW

Policy Committee arc collected in TI' files, which also contain the summary minutes from

which information on attendance is derived.

42. Memo Warnke for SecsMiiDepts et al, 7 Nov 67, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Aug-Dec (7).

43. Memo Col G. L. p,Jack, Jr. USA for DirMPP DCS/PER, 17 Oct 67, and memo Capt E. R. Williams

USN for distribution. nd [Oct 67], sub: Monthly Conference on Captured and Missing

Personnel: TE files.

44. Memrec l.tCol Julian R. Sleeper, 15 Dec 67, sub: Minutes of Monthly Meeting of OSD

Sponsored Committee on Captured and Missing Personnel, ibid.

45. Memo MajGen R. H. Ellis USAF for LtGen Glen W. Marrin USAf', 18 Aug 67, PW coll,

OSD Hisr; memo Warnke ftn SeesMilDepts et ai, 16 Aug 67, TF files.

46. Memo Warnke ftlf SecsMilDepts et ai, 5 Oct 67, Tf' files; memo VAdm V. L. Lowrance for

Ch Interagency PW Intel Ad Hoc Cte (lPWIC), 23 Oct 67, PW coll, OSD Hist; memo

Warnke ftn DepSecDef, 7 Mar 68, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (1968).

47. Memos Warnke for SecsMilDeprs et al, 16 Aug, 11 Oct, 7 Nov. 28 Nov 67, memo Capt J. G.

Andrews USN and William W. Hancock USAf' Itn Ch DoD PW Policy Cte, 1 Nov 67: 1"1' files.

48. Data detived ftom the collection of summary minutes in TF files.

49. Memo Nitze fot SecsMilDepts et ai, 26 Jul 67. memo Warnke for SecsMilDepts et a!,

27 Jul 67: SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jan-Jul (7).

50. Memo Rhinelander lelf Warnke, 10 Aug 67. memo Harrison M. Holland for R. C. Steadman

(DepASD/FEA(lSA)) and RAdm William E. Lemos (DirFE(lSA)), nd [Aug 67]: TF files.

51. Memo Warnke Itlf SecsMilDeprs cr al, 16 Aug 67, memo Henkin fot ASD(lSA), 16 Aug 67: ibid.

52. Memo Warnke for SecsMiiDepts cr al, 29 Aug (,7. 1"1' flies. The announcement appeared as

OASD(pA) News Release No 847-67, 8 SCI' 67, ibid.

53. Memo William W. Hancock (ActgGenCoun AF) for ASD(lSA), 4 Aug 67, memo Phil G.

Goulding (ASD(pA)) for Warnke, 5 Aug 67. memo Arthut W. Allen, Jr. (DepUSecArmy(M)) for

OSD CenCoun, 7 Aug 67, memo Henkin for ASD(ISA), 16 Aug 67: TF files.

54. Memo Warnke ftlf DepSecDef. 14 Jan 6<), SecDef 383.6 (1%9).
Notes to Pages 55-70 553

3. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND PRISONER

OF WAR POLlCY, JANUARY 1964 TO MAY 1966

I. PL 88-428, 14 Aug 64, amended the Missing Persons Act. See Chapter 7 for a fuller account of

the successive decisions regarding terminology.

2. Def Advisory Cte, POW, vii; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D.

Eisenhower, 1955, 798.

3. Memo (DJSM-500-66) LtGen David A. Burchinal (DirJS) for ASD (JSA), 19 Apr 66, memo

Blouin for DirJS, 23 Apr 66: TF files. The description given hereafter of the functions of

State's Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs is drawn from National Archives and Records

Service, United States Government Organization Manual: 1966-67, 89-90.

4. l.tr J. P. Maunoir (JCRC) to Robert C. Lewis (VPresARC), 2 May 67, box 25 (Christmas Packages), 79-D317; Itt Maunoir to Samuel Krakow (DirIntlServsARC), 27 Dec 67, box IS

(lCRC 68), 79-D31 7. Sec also Everetr Alvarez, Jr., and Anthony S. Pitch, Chained Eagle, 108, 114.

5. HQ USAF, ACSI Evasion & Escape Memo No I, 30 Dec 65, teproduced in DA/TAG,

Operations Report: Lessom Learned: Report 4-66, 24 May 66, TF files.

6. Dept State Bulletin, 12 Jul 65,55, 18 Oct 65, 635; msg Saigon 1054,26 Sep 65, msg State

488 fot Geneva, 28 Sep 65: PW coli, OSD Hist; msg Saigon 1109, 30 Sep 65, TF files.

7. Memo McGeorge Bundy for Pres, 17 Dec 65, msg Saigon 2401, 4 feb 65: box 8 (Prisoners

of Viet Cong (Hertz)), 79-D317.

8. Msg Saigon 11305, 17 Nov 67, msg State 71460 for Saigon, 18 Nov 67: TF files.

9. Dept State Bulletin, 1 Nov 65, 725-26; memo William P. Bundy for SecState, 8 Jan 66, PW

coli, OSD Hist.

10. Dept State Bulletin, 18 Oct 65, 635.

II. Ltr Freymond to SecState, II Jun 65, reproduced in msg State 142090 for Canberra and

CINCPAC, 17 Aug 72, box .'34 (Red Cross, [CRC), 79-0317.

12. l.tr Rusk to Samuel A. Gonard (PresICRC ), 10 Aug 65, Dept State Bulletin, 13 Sep 65, 447.

13. Ltt GVN MinForAff to ICRC Saigon Deleg, II Aug 65, reproduced in msg State 142090

for Saigon and Canberra, 4 Aug 72, TF files.

14. Jt State/Oef msg 863 for Saigon and CINCPAC, 25 Sep 65, msg Geneva 943, 30 Nov 65, msg

State 2369 for Saigon, 12 Feb 66: PW coli, OSD Hist. The progress in constructing prison

camp facilities is bricf1y recounted in Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years,

1965-1973, 167-69,227-28,320,376-77.

15. M. Barde, [CRC, "Steps Taken with the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,"

26 Sep 70, enel to Itt Ramone S. Eaton (SrVPresARC) to Sieverts, 12 Oct 70, TF files.

16. Ltr Bui Taen l.inh (Minl'orAff DRV) to Freymond, 31 Aug 65, ibid.

17. Barde, "Steps Taken."

18. Msg Geneva 650, 13 Oct 65, PW coil, OSD Hist.

19. Memo Abba P. Schwartz for Chester Cooper (Whire House) et ai, 24 Oct 65, box 15 (lCRC

through 1966), 79-D.l17.

20. Msg London 2166, 12 Nov 65, Irr Nguyen Van Dong (ChNl.FRep to USSR) to [CRC, 16 Oet 65:

PW coil, OSD Hist.

21. Ltr Maunoir to Nguyen Van Dong, 26 Nov 65, box 15 (JCRC through 1966), 79-0317.

22. Msg London 2166, 12 Nov 65, PW coli, OSD Hist.

23. New York Times, 12 Feb 66.

24. Memo Heymann for Schwartz, 9 Feb 66, box 14 (Red Cross Memos-Vietnam), 79-D317.

25. Ltr Schwartz to James F. Collins (PresARC), 24 Sep 65, box 17 (Prisoners-Manila Conference/

Negotiations), 79-D.'317.

26. Msg Geneva 311, 19 Jul 66, box 15 (JCRC and UN), 79-D317.

27. Memo Heymann for Schwartz, 9 Feb 66, box 14 (Red Cross Memos-Vietnam), 79-D317.

Heymann looked backward over "rhe events of the last six monrhs" when analyzing the

underlying assumptions of U.S. and JCRC policy.

28. Ltr Ball to Gonard, 2 Oct 65, hox 15 (JCRC through 1966), 79-D317.
554 Notes to Pages 70-80

29. Msgs Vienna 536, 9 Oct 65, Vienna 545, 10 Oct 65: PW coli, OSO Hisr.

30. Memo Schwartz for Cooper et al, 24 Oct 65, box 15 (JCRC through 19(6), 79-03\7.

31. Ibid; msgs Vienna 536, 9 Oct 65, Vienna 545, 19 Oct 65: PW coli, OSO Hist; msg Geneva

1707, 15 Mar 66, TF files.

32. Memo Schwartz for Cooper et al, 24 Oct 65, box 15 (ICRC through 1966), 79-0317.

33. Memo (JCSM-744-65) JCS for SecDcf; 9 Oct 65, Sec Oef 371-399 Vietnam (1965); Jt State!

Oef msg, circular 951 for Ottawa, 18 Nov 65, TF files.

34. Jt State!Oefmsg, circular 951 for Ottawa, 18 Nov 65, mernrecs Maj J. R. Sleeper USA, I Dec 65,

4 Jan 66: TF files; msg State 1484 for Geneva, 23 feb 66, box 15 (JCRC through 19(6),79-0317.

35. Msg State 1484 for Geneva, 23 Feb 66, box 15 (JCRC through 19(6), 79-0.317.

36. New York Times, 7 Mar 66.

37. Memo Sieverts for Heymann, 30 Mar 66, memo Heymann and Sieverts for Leonard Unger (ASec

StatefE) et ai, 5 Apt 66: box 14 (Red Cross Memos-Vietnam), 79-0.317; memo Leonard C.

Meeker (Legal Adviser) and Heymann for USecState, 15 Apr 66, box 14 (JCRC Relief

Assistance Program), 79-0317.

38. Memo Heymann for USecState, 5 Apr 66, memo Sieverts for USecState, 18 Apr 66: box 14

(ICRe Relief Assistance Program), 79-0317. Harriman went to Geneva bearing a letter from

Rusk to Gonard; msg State 2045 for Geneva, 3 May 66, box 28 (Press), 79-0317.

39. Dept State Bulletin, 6 Jun 66, 888.

40. Harriman did not adopt the suggestion that he regularize the status of the interdepartmental

committee as an entity subord.inate to him, as recommended in memo Sieverts for Harriman,

10 Aug 67, box 12 (PW Summaries for the Secretary), 79-D.>17; Hoare interv with Sieverts,

15 Jan 75, informal notes in PW coli, OSD Hisr.

41. Msg Geneva 2196,6 May 66, box 15 (JCRC through 1966),79-0317.

42. Ibid; msg Geneva 285, 18 Jul 66, PW coIl, OSD Hist; Dept State Bulletin, 22 Dec 69, 598.

4. CLIMAX AND DECLINE OF THE WAR CRIMES TRIALS ISSUE

I. Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (fBIS) 69, I Nov 65, msg State 1016 for Geneva,

17 Dec 65: TF files.

2. Memo William P. Bundy (ASecStateFE) for SecState, 8 Jan 66, PW coil, OSD Hist.

3. Memo William C. Hamilton (DepDirfE(ISA)) for John T. McNaughton (ASO(ISA)), 16 Dec 65,

memo Robert H. Miller (FE/VN State) for Leonard Unget (ASecStateFE), 20 Dec 65: Tf files.

4. Msg Cairo 2042, II Feb 66, PW coli, OSO Hist; msg State 4547 for Cairo, 12 feb 66, TF files.

5. Press&lnfoOept, MinforAff ORV, U.S. War Crimes in North Viet Nam (Hanoi, feb 66), box 2,

(Vietnam-Misc), msg Geneva 2545, 22 Jun 66, box 15 (JCRC through 1966), memo Sieverrs

for USecState, 27 Jun 66, USIA News Policy Note No 24-66, 14 Jul 66, box 27 (War Crimes

Trials and Mistreatment of PWs): all in 79-0317.

6. Msg State 3307 for Saigon, 4 May 66, box 15 (JCRC and UN), 79-0317.

7. Msg Geneva 2196, 6 May 66, box 15 (JCRC and UN), msg State 1219 for Ottawa, 15 May 66,

box 24 (Channels to NVN), State Intelligence Note 391,17 Jun 66, box 27 (War Crimes Trials

and Mistreatment of PWs): 79-D317.

8. Memrec Hamilron, 28 May 66, ISA 383.6 (1966); memo Sievetts for USecState, 27 Jun 66,

box 27 (War Crimes Trials and Mistreatment of PWs), 79-D317; memo RAdm E J. Blouin (DirFE

(JSA)) for OirJS, 29 Jun 66, SecOef 383.6 Vietnam (1966).

9. Msg Saigon 69.3, 11 Jul 66, PW coli, OSO Hisr.

10. Msg State eire 6239 for Warsaw et al, 12 Jul 66, box 27 (War Ctimes Trials and Mistreatment

of PWs), 79-0.> 17.

II. Memo W. Averell Harriman for SecState, 16 Jul 66, box 27 ("War Crimes" Trial), 79-0317;

msg State 6229 for Moscow and New Delhi, 12 Jul 66, msg State 62,)0 fot London, 12 Jul 66,

msg State 7147 for USUN New York, 14 Jul 66, msg State 9289 fot Geneva, 17 Jul 66: PW

coil, OSD Hist.
Notes to Pages 80-88 555

12. Hoare interv with Sieverts, 15 Jan 75, PW coil, OSD Hist; New York Times, 15, 16 Jul 66.

13. Press Conf, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, 2:744,

745; New York Times, 21 Ju166.

14. New York Times, 17, 20, 21 Jul 66; memo Harriman for SecState, 19 Jul 66, TF files; msg

Tokyo 440, 18 Jui 66, box 23 (Circulars), msg Rome 364, 20 Jul 66, box 2 (Misc 1966), memo

Benjamin H. Read (ExecSec State) for Walt W. Rostow (SpecAsst to Pres), 24 Jul 66, box 13

(lnter- and Intra-Deparrmental Memos): 79-D317.

15. New York Times, 13, 16, 17 Jul 66; Time, 29 Ju166, 20-21; msg Saigon 1883,25 Jul 66, box 13

(Saigon),79-D317.

16. Memo Harriman for SecState, 16 Jul 66, box 27 ("War Crimes" Trial), msg State circ 10092,

18 Jul 66, box 23 (Circulars), msg DEF 7115 for CSA et ai, 20 Jul 66, box 2 (Misc 1966):

79-0317; memo Vance for SecsMilDepts et aI, 26 Jul 66, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (1966).

17. Msg CINCPAC for C]CS, 150411Z Jul 66, TF files.

18. Memo Heymann for Bundy, 18 Jul 66, box 27 ("War Crimes" Trial), 79-D317.

19. Memo Harriman for SecState, 16 Jul 66, ibid.

20. Memtec James B. Devine (OASD(lSA)), 14 Jul 66, and na, "Resume of Agency Remarks and

Open Discussion: Conference on Vietnam Detainees: July 14, 1966": TF files.

21. Msg State circ 17503, 28 Jul 66, PW coll, OSD Hist; New York Times, 25 Jul 66; FBIS 84,

23 Jul 66, FBIS 57, 25 Jul 66, box 28 (Press), 79-0317.

22. Msg Saigon 1883, 25 Jul 66, box 13 (Saigon), 79-D317.

23. Msg State circ 17503, 28 Jul 66, PW coil, OSD His!.

24. Sieverts, Paper No 13,6 May 68, box 18 (Negotiations 1968),79-0317; New York Times, 10,

II Jun 69. During his debriefing, one of the three U.S. airmen released from Norrh Vietnam

in September 1972 remarked that the enemy camp commander had caused a flurry of excitement when reading that year's Fourth of July message to the prisoners; it referred to them as

"detainees." "This reference really 'shook up' all the 'old shootdowns' as they had never

heard themselves called anything but 'criminals'." Msg COMNAVINTCOM for A1G 47,

111420Z Oct 72, PW coll, OSD Hist.

5. ACTION ON OTHER FRONTS:

EFFORTS TO OBTAIN RELEASE OF PRISONERS

I. Memo Chester L. Cooper (NSC Staff) for McGeorge Bundy (SpecAsst to Pres), 6 Aug 65, box

8 (Prisoners of Viet Cong (Hertz)), 79-D317. This account of the Hertz case also relies in part

on Richard B. Stolley, "The Secret Fight for Gus Hertz," Life, 21 Jul 67, nff. For another

account of Senator Kennedy's involvement in the Hertz-Hai negotiations, see Washington Post,

27 Mar 66.

2. Memo Bundy for Pres, 17 Dec 65, box 8 (Prisoners of Viet Cong (Hertz)), 79-D317; Arthur

M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times, 731-32; Stolley, "The Secret Fight for Gus

Hertz," 26.

3. Msg Vienna 486, 5 Oct 65, msg Saigon 21 101, 12 Dec 65, msg Geneva 1161, 6 Jan 66, msg

Paris 3998, 13 Jan 66: PW coll, OSD Hist; memo Sieverrs for John D. Jernegan (US Amb to

Algeria), 31 May 66, box 13 (lnter- and Intta-Departmental Memos), 79-0317.

4. Msg State 1963 for Saigon, 10 Jan 66, msg State 2002 for Saigon, 12 Jan 66: PW coll, OSD His!.

5. Msg State 1196 for Geneva, 15 Jan 66, PW coll, OSD Hist; New York Times, 12, 16, and 17 Jan

66; memo Sieverts for Jernegan, 31 May 66, hox 13 (lnter- and Intra-Departmental Memos),

79-D317. State hastened to advise Gottlieb not to mention prisoner exchange again; "however,"

Sieverts wrote, "the damage may have been done by the single utterance."

6. Memo Benjamin H. Read (ExecSec State) for Bundy, 21 Jan 66, Itt Tam to Callopin, 21 Jan 66:

PW coll, OSD His!.

7. Memtelcon Schwartz and Callopin, 26 Jan 66, draft msg (Sieverts) State for Saigon, 27 Sep [661.

memcon Heymann with Kmnedy, 14 Apt 66: PW coll, OSD Hist; Stolley, "The Secret Fight
556 Notes to Pages 88-97

for Gus Herrz," 26; Irr Kennedy ro Rusk, 19 Apr 66, 1'1' files. For evidence of Kennedy's

continuing interest in the Hertz case, see Itr Kennedy and Sen William B. Spong, Jr., to Rusk,

28 Feb 67, box 26 (Correspondence with Families), 79-D317.

8. Ltr Nguyen Huu Tho (Pres Presidium of NLF Cenrral Cre) to Sihanouk, 19 Jul 67, box 15

(JCRC 1%7), 79-0317; Washington Post, 8 Nov 67; New York Times, 8 Nov 67. George J.

Veirh, Code-Name Bright Light: The Untold Story of u.s. pow Rescue Efforts During the

Vietnam War, chs 7-9, provides additional detail on the Hertz case as well as other prisoner

release efforts discussed elsewhere in this chapter.

9. Msg Berlin 603, 7 Jan 66, memo McNaughton for DirJS, 8 Jan 66: SecDef 383.6 Vietnam

(I 9(6).

10. Memo (JCSM-18-66) JCS for SecDef, II Jan 66, ibid.

11. Msg State 3929 for London, 8 Jan 66, msg London 3259, 15 Jan 66, msgs State 367, 368 for

Berlin, 15 Jan 66: PW coil, OSD Hist.

12. Msg Berlin 632, 16 Jan 66, ibid.

13. Msg Berlin 673, 31 Jan 66, ibid; msg Berlin 65, 17 Jul 66, box 2.) (Berlin), 79-0317; msg

State 10122 for Berlin, 18 Jul 66, PW colI, OSD Hist.

14. Msg Berlin 956, 26 Jan 67, msg State 138146 for London, 15 Feb 67: box 18 (Prisoners:

Exchange), 79-0317; msg London 7299, 10 Mar 67, PW coli, OSD Hist; msg London 7553,

J7 Mar 67, box 18 (Prisoners: Exchange), 79-D317.

15. Jt State/Def msg 1672 for Saigon, 15 Dec 65, PW coil, OSD Hist.

16. Msg State 2066 for Saigon, 18 Jan 66, ibid; New York Times, 31 Jan 66. Disparaging references ro the GVN's "propaganda stunt" of January 1966 still appeared in State's cable traffic

half a year later; msg State 82.\2 for Saigon, 15 Jul 66, box 10 (Captured 1'1' Boat Personnel),

79-D317.

17. For a comment on the Westmoreland-Co Agreement provided for the Senate Committee on

foreign Relations, see msg Saigon 1.\685, 18 Dec 67, box 27 (US/Allied Treatment of Prisoners),

79-0.\ 17.

18. Memo Sieverts for Harriman, 4 Apr 67, box 15 (JCRC-GVN Relations), ibid.

19. Msg Saigon 700,11 Jul 66, PW coil, OSD Hist; msg Saigon 1211, 17 Jul 66, box 10 (Captured

1'1' Boat Personnel), 79-D317; New York Times, 21 Jul 66.

20. Memo George H. Aldrich (Legal Adviser} for Harriman, 2 Mar 67, box 18 (Prisoners: Exchange),

79-0.\ 17.

21. AI' ricker irem 24 feb 67, PW coli, OSD Hisr; msg Srare 151541 for Saigon, 8 Mar 67, msg

Saigon 1')938, 9 Mar 67, Jr State/Def msg 168291 for Saigon, 4 Apr 67, msg State 188928

for Saigon, 5 May 67, msg Saigon 25253, 10 May 67: box 18 (Prisoners: Exchange), 79-0317.

22. Msg State 19373.\ for Saigon, 12 May 67, box 18 (Prisoners: Exchange), 79-D.)17; msg

Saigon 28130, 14 Jun 67, PW call, OSD Hist.

23. Msg State 1140 for Saigon, 2 Jul 66, msg Saigon 192,3 Jul 66: PW call, OSD Hist; Jt Stare/

Def msg 12804 for Saigon and JCS, 21 Jul 66, box 13 (Saigon), 79-D.\ 17; msg Saigon 732,

11 Jul 66, msg Saigon 10265, 7 Nov 66: PW coil, OSD Hist.

24. Msg State 9564 for Vientiane and Geneva, 17 Jul 66, msgs Vientiane 353, 562, 20 Jul 66: PW

colI, OSD Hist.

25. Msg State 11298 for Saigon et al, 21 Jul 66, ibid; memo Sieverts fe>r Harriman, 4 Apr 67,

box 15 (JCRC-GVN Relations), 79-D.) 17; msg CINCPAC for Saigon, 192351Z Jul 66,

box 36 (Vienriane), ibid.

26. Ltr Sieverts to Robert A. Hurwitch (USEmbVientiane), 9 May 68, box 19 (Prisoner Release

to NVN-I9(8), 79-D317; msg Geneva \657,22 Nov 66: PW coli, OSD Hist; memo Sieverts

for Harriman, 4 Apr 67, box 15 (JCRC-GVN Relations), 79-D317.

27. Dept State press conf briefing paper, 21 Ocr 68, box 28 (Temporary 21), ibid.

28. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. (ExecSec State) for Henry A. Kissinger (Asst to Pres for NatSccAfE),

23 Nov 70, PW colI, OSD Hist.

29. Memo UCSM-387-(6) JCS for SeeDef, I() Jun 66, SecDef 3836 Vietnam (1966); Dept Stare

Bulletin, 14 Nov 66, 7.30-31; New York limes, II Oct 66.
Notes to Pages 97-106 557

30. Sieverts draft msg State for London for Harriman, 30 Nov 66, PW call, OSD Hisr. The New

York Times, 11 Dec 66, reported that rhe Algerian foreign minister had given "a full report

of his extensive ralks with Mr. Harriman" to North Vietnam's ambassador, Nguyen Van Phat.

31. Msg State 96998 for Saigon and Geneva, 6 Dec 66, msg Saigon 13168, 12 Dec 66, msg

Geneva 1886, 19 Dec 66, msg Geneva 2272, 6 Feb 67: PW coli, OSD Hist; New York Times,

4 Feb 67; msg Geneva 2481, 24 Feb 67, msg State 171221 for Saigon and Geneva, 7 Apr 67:

box 18 (Prisoners: Exchange), 79-D317.

32. Msg State 149404 for Vientiane and Saigon, 6 Mar 67, msg State 173695 for Vientiane,

12 Apr 67: box 18 (Prisoners: Exchange), 79-D317.

33. Msg Saigon 22259, 6 Apr 67, msg Geneva 3171, 7 Apr 67: ibid.

34. Msg Saigon 25550, 12 May 67, msg State 205529 for Saigon and Geneva, 31 May 67, msg

Stare 208641 for Saigon and Geneva, 6 Jun 67, msg Geneva 4156, 10 Jun 67, msg Saigon

27941, 12 Jun 67: ibid; msg Saigon 427485, 3 Jun 67, box 13 (69 Bundy Memorandum),

79-D317; memrec LtCol Richard O. Rowland USA, 19 Jun 67, TF files.

35. Memo (JCSM-387-66) JCS for SeeDef, 10 Jun 66, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (1966).

36. Memrec William C. Hamilton (DepDirFE(lSA)), 9 Jul 66, TF files; memo Vance for CjCS,

17 Aug 66, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (1966); New York Times, 25 Apr 67; msg Geneva 4101,

6 Jun 67, box 13 (69 Bundy Memorandum), 79-D317.

37. Memree Hamilton, 2 May 66, Itr Kennedy to Rusk, 19 Apr 66: TF files.

38. Msg State 770 for Vientiane, 2 Jun 66, box 18 (Prisoners: Exchange), 79-D317; msg Vientiane

1319,13 Jun 66, box 19 (Prisoners: Direct Approach), ibid.

39. Harriman draft msg responding to Vientiane 1319, 22 Jun 66 [date and number as sent not

indicated], box 27 (War Crimes Trials & Mistreatment of PWs), 79-D317; msg State 9364 for

Vientiane and Geneva, 17 Jul 66, msgs Vientiane 353, 362, 20 Jul 66: PW coli, OSD Hist.

40. Memrec Hamilton, 2 May 66, TF files; Dept State, "Report on the Meeting of the InterAgency Committee on Prisoners of War in Viet-Nam," 29 Apr 66, box 13 (lnter- and IntraDepartmental Memos), 79-D317; msg State 6825 for London and 3437 for Saigon, 13 May 66:

PW call, OSD Hist; memcon Harriman with Shaplen, 20 Jun 66, box 11 (Shaplen), 79-D317;

memo Benjamin H. Read (ExecSec State) for Walt W. Rostow (SpecAsst to Pres), 24 Jun 66,

box 2 (Vietnam-Mise), ibid.

41. Msgs Australian Emb Phnom Penh 415 and 416 for Canberra, 15 Jul 66, box 11 (Shaplen),

79-D317.

42. Msg London 2113, Ll SCI' 66, msg State 92007 for Bangkok and Saigon, 28 Nov 66, msg

State 137895 fot London, 1 Feb 67, msg London 6323, 7 Feb 67: box 11 (Burchett), 79-D317.

43. Msg State 833 for Saigon, 3 Jul 67, box 18 (Prisoners: Exchange), ibid.

44, Documentation in box 24 (Envelope-BUTTERCUP), ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Msg Saigon 12351, 1 Dec 67, msg Saigon 12791, 6 Dec 67: PW coil, OSD Hist.

47. Ltt Sieverts to John A. Calhoun (USEmbSaigon), 2 Jan 67 [68], msg Saigon 16678, 23 Jan 68,

memo Sievcrts for Governor [Harriman], 23 Jan 68: box 24 (BUTTERCUP), 79-D317; memo

NK [Nicholas Katzenhach, USccState] no addressee, nd [30 Jan 68'], hox 24 (BUTTERCUP

II), ibid.

48. Msg Saigon 433, 22 Mar 68, msg Saigon 22968, 25 Mar 68: box 24 (BUTTERCUP II), ibid;

msg Saigon 559, 28 Mar 68, memo Sieverts for Governor [Harriman], 28 Mar 68: box 24

(BUTTERCUP), ibid.

49. Memo (JCSM-683-66) JCS for SecDef, 22 Oct 66, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (1966). The Joint

Chiefs noted that they were responding to "an oral request by Ambassador W. Averell Harriman."

50. Ibid.

51. Tom Hayden, Reunion: A Memoir, 175-77, 181-82, 191-93,206,208,220-21. Hayden's account

includes the text of " numher of State Department cahles ohtained under the Freedom of

Information Acr. For [he 1965 visit to North Vietnam, sec also Staughton Lynd and Thomas

Hayden, The Other Side; Rochester and Kiley, Honor Bound, 192.

52. Hayden, Reunion, 210, 220-26; New York Times, 18 Nov 67.
558 Notes to Pages 106-16

53. Hayden, Reunion, 227-28; New York limes, 4 Nov 67; msg Saigon 10333, 3 Nov 67, Jt State/

Oef msg 65000 fat Saigon, 4 Nov 67: TF files.

54. Hayden, Reunion, 229-36; New York Times, 11, 12 Nov 67; msg Saigon 10791, 9 Nov 67, TF files;

memrec BrigGen M. B. Garth USA (DOO(NMCC) JCS), 12 Nov 67, OSO Hist.

55. Hayden, Reunion, 237-39; New York Times, 18 Nov 67.

56. Howard Zinn, "The Petty Route Home," Nation, 1 Apr 68,431-37.

57. Ibid; msg Vientiane 4534,16 Feb 68, box 12 (3 Pilots), 79-0317; New York Times, 17 Feb 68;

Naval Intell Cmd OCNO, Summary Report of LTJG David P Matheny's Experiences in North

Vietnam, nd [Apr 68], 18-20, PW call, OSD Hist.

58. New York Times, 19 Feb, 3 Jul 68; msg Vientiane 4542, 17 Feb 68, box 12 (.3 Pilots), 79-0317;

briefing paper Sieverts, 9 Apr 68, box 12 (PW Summaries for the Secretary)' ibid. Sieverts noted

that Berrigan's and Zinn's commercial flight reached the United States almost two full days

after the military jet with the three pilots had landed.

59. Msg Paris 17901, 12 Jul 68, PW call, OSD Hist; msgs Paris 18435, 18461, 24 Jul 68, box

12 (Release of 3 Pilots-July 19(8), 79-D317; memrec Col Elton L. Hall USAF (OASO(pA)),

7 Sep 72, TF files.

60. Msg Paris 18442, 24 Jul 68, msg Paris 18523, 25 Jul 68: box 12 (Release of 3 Pilots-July 19(8),

79-0317.

61. Jt StatelDef msg 208587 for Vientiane, 25 Jul 68, ibid.

62. Jt State/Def msg 208588 for Vienriane, 25 Jul 68, msg Vientiane 8011, 25 Jul 68: ibid; msg

Paris 18488, 25 Jul 68, PW call, OSO Hist.

63. New York Times, 18,23 Jul 68; Rochester and Kiley, Honor Bound, 369-70.

64. Msg Vientiane 8240, 2 Aug 68, as repeated in msg State 214627 for Cairo, 3 Aug 68, box 12

(Release of 3 Pilots-July 19(8),79-0317; Maj Joe V. Carpenter, "My Experiences as a POW

in North Vietnam," Air Command and Staff College, Air Univ, Maxwell AFB, Jan 70, 37-38,

PW call, OSD Hist; New York limes, 5 Aug 68.

65. Memo Paul C. Warnke (ASD(JSA)) for SecsMilDepts et ai, 29 Aug 68, TF files; msg Vientiane

5283, 5 Aug 69, PW coli, OSD Hist.

66. Dept State Bulletin, 8 Jan 68, '53-55; New York Times, 28 Mar 68. For an instance of passport revocation, see ibid, 25 Apr 67.

67. Memrec LtCol Richard O. Rowland USA, 9 Aug 68, TF flies. Instances of consultarion with

antiwar representatives include memcon Sieverts with David Dellinger, 20 Jul 67, ibid, and

memcon Harriman and Sieverts with Dellinger and Hayden, 5 Apr 68, PW call, OSD Hist.

68. New York Times, 17 Feb 68.

69. Memo Theodore I.. Eliot, Jr. (ExecSec State) for Kissinger, 23 Nov 70, PW call, OSO Hist.

6. EFFORTS TO AMELIORATE THE CONDITIONS OF CAPTIVITY

1. Ltr J. P. Maunoir (CRC) to Robert C. Lewis (VPresARC), 2 May 67, box 25 (Christmas Packages), 79-0317; lrr Maunoir to Samuel Krakow (DirlnrlServsARC), 27 Dec 67, box 15

(JCRC 19(8), ibid; HQ USAF, ACSI Evasion & Escape Memo No 1, 30 Dec 65, PW coli,

OSD Hist; memrec Maj J. R. Sleeper USA, 4 Feb 66, TF files. After the one-time receipt of

letters from American captives of the Viet Cong in July 1965 one prisoner was permitted to

send another letter out with Sergeanr Smith upon the latter's release on '5 December 19(,5

(see Chapter '5). About the same time a released South Vietnamese brought out a letter from a

U.S. Marine Corps PW. These were the last letters received from PWs in South Vietnam

until 1970.

2. Memrec LtCol W. C. Ford USA, 2 Sep (,'), TF files.

3. "Memorandum of Understanding Arising out of Meeting of November 9, 1965 on the

Assignment of Responsibilities fiH Americans Held Captive in South East Asia," ibid.

4. Lrr NLF Rep in Czechoslovakia to JCRC, 4 Jan 66, ibid.
Notes to Pages 116-24 559

5. Ltr Maunoir to NLF Rep in Czechoslovakia, 11 Jan 66, memrec Sleeper, 4 Feb 66, T1' files;

Itt Johnson to Collins, 4 Apr 66, box 14 (JCRC Relief Assistance Program), 79-0317.

6. Memo Phillip B. Heymann for Johnson, 1 Apr 66, box 14 (Red Cross Memos Vietnam), 79-0317;

msg State 1887 for Geneva, 16 Apr 66, msg State 961 for Prague, 16 Apr 66: box 14 (PrisonersARC), ibid.

7. Msg State 3307 for Saigon, 4 May 66, box 14 (Prisoners-ARC), ibid.

8. Memrec Sleeper, 17 Mar 66, T1' fIles; msg State 2640 for Saigon, 2 Mar 66, ibid; msg State

12620 for Ottawa, 21 Jul 66, box 25 (Prisoners: Letters to Relatives), 79-0317.

9. Memsrec Sleeper, 17 Mar, 8 Dec 66, TF files.

10. Memo Heymann for [Laverne D.] Miller (BuNavPers) et al, 25 Feb 66, msg State 2640 for

Saigon, 2 Mar 66: TF files.

11. Msg State 12620 for Ottawa, 21 Jul 66, box 25 (Prisoners: Letters to Relatives), 79-0317.

12. Na, "Minutes of OSD Meeting on Detainees and Prisoners in Southeast Asia," 9 Jun 66,

memrec Sleeper, 8 Dec 66: TF files.

13. Msg Geneva 1540, 28 Feb 66, PW coil, OSD Hist; memrec Sleeper, 15 Aug 66, na, "Minutes

of OSD Meeting on Missing and Captured Personnel in Southeast Asia," 9 Nov 66: TF files.

14. Ltr Maunoir to Krakow, 27 Dec 67, box 15 (JCRC 1968), 79-0317; Itt Heymann to Brig

Gen William W. Berg (OASD(M», 23 Mar 67, box 25 (Prisoners: Mail Delivery), ibid.

15. Memrec Maj Gordon M. Haggard USAF, 31 May 67, memo Col G. L. Black, ]r. USA for

DirMMP DCS/pER, 17 Oct 67, memrcc Sleeper, 24 Apr 68: TF files.

16. Memrec Capt E. R. Williams USN (BuNavPers), 4 Mar 68, ibid.

17. Msg State 74719 for Belgrade and Bucharest, 25 Nov 67, box 14 (Prisoners-ARC), 79-0317;

memrec Sleeper, 15 Dec 67, T1' files.

18. Memrec Haggard, 31 May 67, TF files; memrec na, 11 Feb 69, box 25 (Prisoners: Lerters to

Relatives)' 79-0317. This early tally of 157 letters received during 1968 was incomplete;

latet reporting raised it to 257.

19. Na, "Resume of Agency Remarks and Open Discussion: Conference on Vietnam Detainees:

July 14, 1966," '1'1' files.

20. Ltr Maunoir to Lewis, 2 May 67, box 25 (Christmas Packages), Itr Maunoir to Krakow,

27 Dec 67, box 15 (ICRC 1968): 79-0317; Alvarez and Pitch, Chained Eagle, 108-09, 114;

na, "Minutes of OSD Meeting on Detainees and Prisoners in Southeast Asia," 9 Jun 66,

memrec Sleeper, 8 Dec 66: '1'1' files.

21. Msg State 85007 for Vienna, 15 Nov 66, TF files; msg Vienna 2086, 22 Nov 66, msg Stare

89435 for Vienna, 22 Nov 66, msg Vienna 2370, 13 Dec 66: box 25 (Prisoners: Mail Delivery),

79-D317; Itr DirGen DRV Postal&TelecomServ to DirGen ApTA, 25 Jan 67, '1'1' files.

22. For rhe substance of Schoenbrun's report, see msg State 74719 for Belgrade and Bucharest,

25 Nov 67, box 14 (Prisoners-ARC), 79-0317; for text of ARC cable, see msg Stare 51938

for Hong Kong, 11 Oct 67, TF files; Itt DRV RC to ARC, 21 Oct 67, ene! to Itt R. C. Lewis

to Col W. A. Temple (OSO), 24 Nov 67, ibid.

23. Memo Hartison M. Holland (OepDirEA&P(JSA» for Paul Warnke, 13 Oct 67, memo J. W.

Doolittle (GenCoun AI') for ASD(JSA), nd rca 17 Oct 67], msg State 60090 for Vienna,

16 Oct 67: TF fIles.

24. Msg Postmaster Gen Vienna for US Postmaster Gen, 15 Nov 67, msg Vienna 1837, 17 Nov 67,

memo Warnke for OepSecDef, 5 Feb 68, Itr Sieverts to Walter F. Sheble (SpecAsst to Postmaster Gen for Inti Postal Affairs), 20 Sep 68: '1'1' files.

25. Captured VC documents, one dtd .30 Apr 65, enels to memn LtCol R. C. Yowell USA for Ch

1'&0 Div, OpMG OA, 13 Nov 67, TF files.

26. Press ConI', Public Papers o/the Presidents o/the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966,2:744;

msg Geneva 922, 31 Aug 66, box 14 (ICRC Relief Assistance Vietnam), 79-0317; msg

Geneva 987, 9 Sep 66, PW coil, OSD Hist; Itt Roger Gallopin (JeRC) to ORV ForM in,

IS Sep 66, box IS (JCRC through 1966),79-0317.

27. Msg Geneva 2292,8 Feb 67, box 18 (Prisoners: Exchange), 79-0317.

28. Memo Richard Gookin (SeA State) for Dufour Woolflcy (SpecAsst to Harriman), 14 Apr 67,

box 27 (POW: Treatment), ibid.
560 Notes to Pages 125-37

29. L.tr W. McKenzie Wood, Canadian Delegation, ICC, Saigon to USecState for External Affairs,

Ottawa, 10 Mar 67, Reuters newswire items relating to Tanner, 20 Feb 67: box 28 (Press)'

ibid; Rnchester and Kiley, Honor Bound, 344, 300.

30. Msg State 160211 for Geneva, 24 Mar 67, PW coli, OSD Hisr.

31. Msg State circular 171555, 8 Apr 67, Itr Barbara M. Watson (ActgAdminSCA State) to Brig

Gen William W. Berg (DepASD(M)), 28 Apr 67: box 27 (POW: Treatment), 79-D317;

associated research notes, PW coli, OSD Hisr.

32. New York Times, 4 Apr 67: Lzfe, 7 Apr 67, 44; Itt Warson to Berg, 28 Apr 67, box 27 (POW:

Treatment), 79-D317; Itr Watson to Berg, 31 Jul 67, box 28 (Press), ibid.

33. New York Times, 7, 9 May 67; Itr Watson to Berg, 31 Jul 67, box 28 (Press), 79-D317;

Rochester and Kiley, Honor Bound, 344-45.

34. Dept State Bulletin, 7 Aug 67, 170.

35. Memcon Harriman wirh Felix Schnyder, Swiss Amb, 6 Jul 67, box 27 (POW: Treatment),

79-D317; msg Geneva 620, 25 Aug 67, box 15 (JCRC 19(7), ibid.

36. Msg Geneva 1045, 17 Dec 65, msg Geneva 379,21 Jul 66, msg State 12814 for Geneva,

21 Jul 66: PW coli, OSD Hisr.

37. Msg State 213222 for Geneva, 20 Jun 67, msg Geneva 4485, 28 Jun 67: ibid; memrec

Sieverts, 30 Jun 67, box 15 (JCRC 19(7), 79-D317.

38. Msg State 203491 for Geneva, 26 May 67, box 15 (JCRC, UN and Geneva Agreement), 79-D317.

39. Dept State Bulletin, 22 Aug 66, 263.

40. Dept State BuPubAff, Viet-Nam Info Notes, No 9, Aug 67, TF files.

41. Memo LtGen H. W. Buse, Jr., CS HQ USMC, for SecNav, 30 Sep 67, Sec Def 383.6 Vietnam

(Aug-Dec (7).

42. New York Times, 27 SCI' 67; note by Sieverts, 29 SCI' 67, memo Dixon Donnelley (ASecState

(PA)) for SecState, 2 Ocr 67: box 28 (EGer PW films), 79-D317.

43. Memo R. E. P. [Col R. E. Pursley USAF] (MilAm to SecDef) f(lf McNam,lfa, 13 Oct 67,

SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Aug-Dec (7); OASD(PA) News Release No 985-67, 14 Oct 67, PW

coil, OSD Hisr.

44. Life, 20 Oct 67, 21ff; New York Times, 15, 16 Ocr 67.

45. Memo Eva Smetacek (SCA Srate) for distribution list, 11 Aug 67, box 24 (Channels to NVN),

79-D317.

46. Memeon Rusk and W. P. Bundy with Salisbury, 1.) Jan 67, ibid.

47. Memo Warnke for SeesMilDepts et al, 27 Oct 67, TF files.

48. Memo Buse for SeeNav, 30 Sep 67, memo Baird for ASD(lSA), 10 Oct 67: SecDef 383.6

Vietnam (Aug-Dec (7).

49. Memo C. Owen Smith (SpeeAsst to SeeArmy) for ASD(ISA), 10 Oct 67, ibid.

50. Memo Doolittle for ASD(lSA), 14 Nov 67, w/attaeh, SeeDef ,183.6 Vietnam (Aug-Dec (7).

51. Memo Warnke for SecsMilDepts et al, 28 Nov 67, ibid.

52. Jt USIA-State-Def msg INFOGUlDE No 68-16 for all USIS principal posts, 10 Jan 68, ISA

383.6 North Vietnam 0%8).

53. Davis interv with Charles W. Havens IlL. 5 Nov 82, PW coil, OSD Hisr.

7. CASUALTY REPORTING, NOTIFICATION, AND ASSISTANCE TO NEXT OF KIN

1. DoD Instr 7760.5, 4 May 60; DoD Insrr 7730.22, 2 Dec 63.

2. Memo Foster Adams (Dir for Stat Servs OASD(C)) for USecArmy et ai, 30 Sep 64, SeeDef

383.6 Vietnam (966).

3. Na, "Minutes of OSD Meeting on Detainees and Prisoners in Southeast Asia," 9 Jun 66, TF

files; memo VAdm B. J. Semmes, Jr. (ChNavPers) for SecNav, 14 Jul 66, ibid; memo Morris

for DepSecDef, 19 Jul 66, SeeDef 383.6 Vietnam (1966).

4. Memo Vance for ASD(C), 19 Jul 66, SeeDef 383.6 Vietnam (1966).
Notes to Pages 137-50 561

5. Na, "Memorandum of Understanding Arising out of Meeting of November 9, 1965, on

Assignment of Responsibilities for Americans Held Captive in South East Asia," nd, TF files.

6. Ibid.

7. 000 Instr 1342 ..>, 24 May 57; memrec LtCol W. C. Ford (DCS/PER-PSD), 2 Sep 65, sub:

Detainees in Vietnam, TF files.

8. Ltr Russell to McNamara, 11 Feb 66, memo Arthur Sylvester (ASD(PA)) for DepSecDef,

22 Mar 66: SecDef 704 Vietnam: NOK (1966).

9. Memo Vance for SecArmy and SecAF, 25 Feb 66, ibid.

10. Memo USecArmy for DepSecDef, 28 Feb 66, memo Brown for SecDef, 4 Mar 66: ibid.

11. Memrec Maj J. R. Sleeper (DCS/PER-PSD), 15 Aug 66, TF files.

12. 000 [nstr ].J00.9, 6 Apr 67.

13. 000, Commanders Digest, 21 Sep 72.

14. Memo (JCSM-262-66) JCS for SecDef, 26 Apr 66, memo McNamara for ClCS, 16 May 66:

SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (1966).

15. Memo Rhinelander for Warnke, 10 Aug 67, TF files.

16. Memo William W. Hancock (ActgGenCoun AF) for ASD(ISA), 4 Aug 67, ibid.

17. Na, "Resume of Agency Remarks and Open Discussion: Conference on Vietnam Detainees:

July 14,1966," memrec James B. Devine (OASD(ISA)), 14 Jul 66: ibid.

18. Ltr Morris to Heymann, 28 Oct 66, In Heymann to Morris, 14 Nov 66: PW coli, OSD His!.

19. Memrec Col W. E. Abblitt USMC, nd Ica 15 Mar 68], TF files.

20. Ltr Maj Dean E. Roberts to Mrs. Evelyn F. Grubb, 11 Dec 67, ibid.

2 J. Memrec itCol Y. G. Johnson, 10 Oct 64, TF fIles.

22. Ltr LtCol ). G. Luthet to Gtubb, 9 Feb 66, PW colI, OSD Hisr.

23. Msg DEF 1901, ASD(PA) for UNCAL et al, 12 May 65, TF flies.

24. itt BrigGen William W. Berg (DepASD(M)) to Rep Robert B. Duncan, .> 1 Oct 66, PW coli,

OSD Hisr.

25. Ibid; memo McNamara for ASD(M), 25 Aug 66, memo Vance for Pres, 26 Aug 66: SecDef

704 Vietnam: NOK (1966); memo Norman S. Paul (USecAF) for SecAF, 26 Aug 66, OASD(PA)

News Release No 731-66, 26 Aug 66: PW coli, OSD Hisr.

26. Memo Morris for USecsMilDepts, 29 Aug 66, PW coli, OSD Hisr.

27. Memo Vance for SecsMilDepts, 8 May 67, SecDef 704 Vietnam: Alpha (1967).

28. Memo Warnke for SecsMilDepts et ai, 29 Aug 67, memo Harrison M. Holland (OASD(ISA))

for R. C. Steadman (DepASD(ISA)), nd [Aug 671, memo Warnke for SecsMilDepts et al,

II Oct 67: TF flies; OASD(PA) News Release No 847-67, 8 Sep 67, PW colI, OSD Hisr.

29. OASD(PA) News Release No 985-67, 14 OCt 67, PW coli, OSD Hist; memos Warnke for

SecsMilDepts et ai, 11 Oct 67, 16 Apr 68, TF flies; memo Warnke for SecsMilDerts, .> May 68,

!SA '>8'>.6 (Jan-)un (8).

'>0. Memo Warnke for SecsMilDepts et aI, 29 Oct 68, TF files.

31. Memo Warnke for SecsMilDepts et ai, 10 Aug 67, sub: First Meeting of 000 POW Policy Committee, w/Tab A, "DoD Position on Ttavel of Relatives of POWs to North Vietnam," ibid.

'>2. Ltr Warnke to Hartiman, 26 Aug 67, SecDef 38.>.6 Vietnam (Aug-Dec (7); memo Warnke fot

SecsMilDepts et ai, 29 Aug 67, TF files.

33. itr Barbara M. Watson (AetgAdminSCA Srate) to Karen Butler, 13 ScI' 67, box 29 (US Statements on PWs), 79-0317; memrec Charles W. Havens III (OASD(ISA)), 11 ScI' 67, TF files.

34. Memo Arthur W. Allen, )r. (DepUSecArmy(M)) for OSD GenCoun and ASD(lSA)-

Designate [Warnke), 7 Aug 67, TF files.

35 Memo Nitze for SecsMilDepts, 3 May 68, memo SecAF fot DepSecDef, 29 May 68, memo

AetgDepASecArmy for DepSecDef, I )un 68, memo SecNav for DepSecDef, 6 )un 68: SecDef

704 Vietnam (Jan-Sep 68).

36. Memo Morris for USecsMilDepts, .> Aug 66, PW coli, OSD His!.

'>7. Memtec Sleeper, 15 Aug 66, TF fIles; memo Richard A. Beaumont (DepUSecNav(M)) for ASD(M),

10 Nov 66, memo Allen for ASD(M), J7 Nov 66, memo Eugene 1'. Ferraro (DepUSecAF(M))

for ASD(M), 22 Nov 66: PW coli, OSD Hisr.
562 Notes to Pages 151-65

8. CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CODE OF CONDUCT

1. Def Advisory Cre, POw, 2, 28-29.

2. Memo Nitze for SecsMilDepts and ClCS, 8 Jun 68, SecDef 383.6 (1968).

3. EO 10631, 17 Aug 55.

4. DoD Dir 1300.7,8 Jul 64.

5. Memo (JCSM-150-66) JCS for SecDef, 9 Mar 66, msg JCS 5720 for CSA et al, 9 Mar 66:

SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (1966). Even as late as August 1967, an investigator noted an Army

discovery "that some POWs considered that the Code prohibited letter-writing to their next of

kin and that training in the Code has ovet-shadowed visions of the Geneva Conventions";

sec memo Rhinelander for Warnke, 10 Aug 67, TF files.

6. Ltr Harriman to McNamara, 13 Jun 66, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (1966).

7. Ltr Vance to Harriman, 25 Jul 66, ibid.

8. Memo Vance for SecsMilDepts, 25 Jul 66, ibid.

9. Memo Brown for SecDef, 27 Jun 66, ibid.

10. Memo Berg for DepUSecs(M)of MilDepts, 14 Mar 67, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jan-Jul 67).

II. Memo Nitze for SecsMilDepts et ai, 26 Jul 67, ibid.

12. Memo MajGen Thomas N. Wilson for GenCoun AF, 7 Nov 67, PW call, OSD Hist; Wilson

participated regularly in the policy committee's deliberations. The accepted status of the proposition that "the Code of Conduct should not be changed" is evident in memo Warnke for

SecsMilDepts et ai, 12 Dec 67, TF flies.

13. Na, "Agenda for DOD PW Policy Committee Meeting: 15 September 1967," nd, memo C. Owen

Smith (SpecAsst to SecArmy) for DoD PW Policy Cte, \4 Sep 67: TF files.

14. Memo J. William Doolittle (GenCoun AF) for ASD(lSA), 14 Sep 67, ibid.

15. Memo Warnke for SecsMilDepts et al, 5 Oct 67, ibid.

16. Memo Henkin for Warnke, 22 Sep 67, ibid.

17. Memo Doolittle for ASD(lSA), 6 Oct 67, ibid.

18. Memo C. O. Smith for ASD(lSA), 13 Nov 67, ibid.

19. AR 350-30, 8 Jul 68.

20. AR 350-30, 12 Nov 64.

21. Dept State Bulletin, 12 Feb 68, 189-90.

22. Ibid, 189-95. For accounts by the ship's officers, see Lloyd M. Bucher, Bucher: My Story;

Edward R. Murphy, Jr., Second in Command; F Carl Schumacher, Jr., and George C. Wilson,

Bridge ofNo Return.

23. Depr Srare Bulletin, 6 Jan 69, 1-3.

24. Time, 31 Jan 69, 16-17; US. News & World Report, 20 Jan 69, 17; Crosby S. Noyes, "Spartan

Code for POWs Yielding ro Realities," Washington Star, 9 Jan 69.

25. House Cte on Armed Svcs, Inquiry into the US.S. Pueblo and £C-121 Plane Incidents: Report of

the Special Subcommittee on the US.5. Pueblo (HASC No 91-12), 91 Cong, 1 sess, 28 Jul 69,

1691-93; Bucher, Bucher: My Story, 374-75, 381-82; New York Times, 7 May 69.

26. House Cte on Armed Svcs, Inquiry into the U S.5. Pueblo and £C-121 Plane Incidents: Hearings,

91 Cong, I sess, 4 Mar 69, 629.

27. Ibid, 28 Apr 69,933-34,945,1077.

28. Ibid, 936-37.

29. House Cte on Armed Svcs, Report of the Special Subcommittee on the US.S. Pueblo, 1626,

1691-94.

30. Ltr Gen John D. Ryan (VCSAF) to ACrC et al, 12 Feb 69, PW call, OSD Hist.

31. Ltr BrigGen Leo E. Benade (DepASD(M&RA)) to Sen J. William Fulbright, 10 Feb 69,

SecDef 383.6 (1969).

32. Memo Benade for ClCS et al, 8 May 69, memo (JCSM-289-69) JCS for SecDef, 2 Jun 69,

memo Arthur W. Allen, Jr. (DepASecArmy(M&RA)) for DepASD((MPP)M&RA), 5 Jun 69,

memo James P. Goode (ActgASecAF) for ASD(M&RA), 2 Jun 69: PW call, OSD Hist. When

it concurred in the Navy statement the Air Force noted that it "provides a perspective of the
Notes to Pages 165-75 563

Code of Conduct which is not reflected in applicable DOD documents"; therefore it recommended revision of DoD Dir 1300.7.

33. Memo Warnke for SecsMilDepts et al, 17 Jan 69, TF files; memo Benade for Alfred B. Fin (ASD

(M&RA)), 17 Jan 69, PW call, OSD Hist.

9. EARLY REPATRIATION PLANNING

1. Joint Staff Briefing Sheet for CJCS on JCS 2478/141 for JCS meeting on 27 Mar 68, nd, JCS

file 170 (30 Mar 68), Docs Div, Jt Secretariat, JS.

2. Memo John B. Rhinelander (SpecAsst to SecNav) for Paul C. Warnke (ASD(lSA)), I0 Aug 67,

TF files. When describing existing "primary responsibilities," Rhinelander listed repatriation

planning under JCS. ASD(M) Thomas Morris had just submitted a draft 000 directive titled

"Functions and Responsibilities Related to U.S. Prisoners of War" that would make a formal

assignment of this JCS responsibility (see memo Morris for Warnke, 7 Aug 67, ibid). The 000

PW Policy Committee received progress reports on the JCS paper at its meetings of 3, 22 Nov,

8 Dec 67 and 8 Feb, 1 Mar 68.

3. Memo (JCSM-198-68) JCS for SecDef, 30 Mar 68, SeeDef 383.6 (1968); Public Papers of

the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, 1:469-76; Dept State Bulletin,

22 Apr 68,513,29 Apr 68,551, 6 May 68,577-78,20 May 68, 629; New York Times, 14 Apr 68.

4. Memo Warnke for SecsMilDepts et al, 16 Apr 68, TF files.

5. Memo Murtay 1. l.itmans (OffGenCoun) for Capt John W. Thornton USN (OASD(lSA)),

10 Apr 68, ISA 585.6 (Jan-Jun 68).

6. Memo Fitt for ASD(lSA), 29 Apr 68, ibid. Fitt had succeeded Morris as ASD(M) in October

1967; effective 1 January 1968 the duties of the office were broadened and the title became

"Manpower and Reserve Affairs" (M&RA).

7. Memo Warnke for SecsMilDepts et al, 4 Jun 68, TF files. For an intermediate draft directive

and the subsequent appointment of a working group to bring it to final form, see memo

Warnke for SccsMilDepts et al, 15 May 68, ISA 383.6 (Jan-Jun 68), and memo Warnke for

SecsMilDepts et al, 25 May 68, TF files.

8. Memo Warnke for SecDef, 6 Jun 68, SecDef 585.6 (J 968).

9. Memo Nitze for SecsMilDepts and ClCS, 8 Jun 68, ibid.

10. The omissions seem the more puzzling in light of evidence that inclusion was defInitely contemplated at one stage. An intermediate draft produced in the OSD General Counsel office used

the JCS sentence, coupled with a direct paraphrase of the Vance memorandum; see memo

Frank A. Bartimo (OffGenCoun) for Charles W. Havens III (OASD(ISA)), 13 May 68, TF files.

The reference to captivity not being a state of culpability (first seen in the Air Force regulation

of December 1965) soon reappeared and became a standard feature of later repatriation

planning documents.

11. Memo Fitt for ASD(ISA), 29 Apr 68, ISA 585.6 (Jan-Jun 68); memo Warnke for SecsMilDepts

et ai, 4 Jun 68, Tf files.

12. Memo Bartimo for Warnke, 4 Jun 68, ISA 585.6 (Jan-Jun 68).

1,). Memo Warnke for DepSecDef, 27 Nov 68, memo Nitze fot SecsMiIDepts and CJCS,

50 Nov 68: SecDef 385.6 (J 968).

14. Memo ViceAdm Charles K. Duncan (ChBuNavPers) for Warnke, 5 Aug 68, memo Warnke

for SecsMiIDepts et al, 29 Aug 68: TF files.

15. Memo Warnke for SecsMilDepts et ai, 25 Nov 68, memo Warnke for SecsMilDepts et al, 12 Dec

68: ibid.

16. Msg JCS 7%4 for CINCPAC, 10 Dec 68, msg CINCPAC for JCS, 0421,)0Z Jan 69, Fact

Sheet, "Summary of CINCPACs Plans and Concepts to Exercise the Unified Commanders'

Initial Control 01 Returned US PWs," nd: SeeDef .3S3.6 Vietnam (Jan-May 6'»).

17. Msg CINCPAC fi)r JCS. 042130Z Jan 69, ihid.

18. Memo Warnke I;)r SecsMilDepts et ai, 17 Jan 69, TF liles.
564 Notes to Pages 175-88

19. Memo Warnke for DepSecDef, 17 Jan 69, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jan-May (9).

20. Memo Nitze for SecsMilDepts and ClCS, 18 Jan 69, ibid.

10. EMERGENCE OF THE PW/MIA TASK GROUP/TASK FORCE

1. Memo Warnke for SecsMilDepts et al, 17 Jan 69, TF files; memo Warnke for DepSecDef,

14 Jan 69, sub: Prisoner of War Policy Committee Report, SecDef 383.6 (1969).

2. Memo Henkin for ASD(lSA), 5 l'eb 69, memo Ralph Earle II (ActgASD(lSA)) for SecsMil

Depts et al, 10 Mar 69: TF files.

3. Memos [two with same subject and date] Havens for Nutter, 30 Apr 69, sub: Department of

Defense Prisoner of War Policy Committee, memo Havens for Nutter, 30 Apr 69, sub: Reorganization of ISA to Discharge EfTectively Responsibilities for the DOD PW Policy Committee,

memo Havens for Nutter, 20 May 69: ibid.

4. Memo Nutter for SecsMilDepts et al, 3 Jun 69, ibid. The policy committee met only once more

during 1969, on 6 Augus!.

5. Memo Nutter for Laird, nd Ica 22 Nov 69J, SeeDef 383.6 Vietnam (Oct-Dec (9); OASD(PA)

News Release No 1039-69, 2 Dec 69, TF files.

6. Lrr Mrs. Stockdale to Pres, 12 Dec 69, Sec Del' 383.6 Vietnam (Oct-Dec (9). The League's title is

given in its ultimate form; "and Missing" was added at the rime of incorporation in May 1970.

7. Memo Butterfield for Col James D. Hughes USAF (MilAm to Pres), 12 Dec 69, memo Hughes

for Carl Wallace (SpecAsst to SecDef), 15 Dec 69, memo Col James S. Murphy USAF (MilAm

to SecDef) for Hughes, 23 Dec 69: SeeDef 38.3.6 Vietnam (Oct-Dec (9).

8. Lrr Mrs. Stockdale ro Laird, 27 Jul 70, ibid (Jul 70).

9. Merna Nutter for SecDef, 3 Aug 70, ibid.

10. I.rr Nutter to Mrs. Stockdale, 8 Aug 70, ibid.

11. Lrr Mrs. Stockdale ro Laird, 24 SCI' 70, ibid (Aug-Ocr 70).

12. Program, National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia:

Annual Meeting: October 2-5, 1910, TF flies; memo Nutter for SecDef, 12 Oct 70, Sec Del'

383.6 Vietnam (1970); Itr Nurrer to Mrs. Stockdale, 27 Oct 70, ibid (Aug-Oct 70).

13. Hoare interv with Shields, 4 Jun 74, PW call, OSD His!.

14. Memo Resor for SecDef, 30 Jan 71, SeeDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jan 71).

15. ISA paper, nd (stamped "Sec Def Has Seen" on I feb 71], sub: Establishment of Prisoner of

War/Missing in Action (PW/MIA) Task Group and Task Force, Sec Del' 383.6 Vietnam

(Feb 71); memo Col H. J. Dalton, Jr. (OASD(PA)) for I3rigGen Daniel James, Jr. (DepASD(PA)),

27 Jan 71 [misdated 1970J, PW coil, OSD His!.

16. Memo Laird for SecsMilDepts et ai, 13 Feb 71, sub: Establishment of Prisoner of War/Missing

in Action (PW/MIA) Task Group, TF files.

17. Ibid; a typical submission naming the representatives was memo James for ASD(lSA),

22 Apr 71, TF files.

18. Memo Nutter for SeesMilDepts, 22 Feb 71, ISA 383.6 North Viernam (20-28 Feb 71);

Shields interv, 4 Jun 74, PW call, OSD His!.

19. Memo Shields for Armistead I. Selden, Jr. (PrinDepASD(ISA)) and Nutter, 18 Mar 71,

memo Edward 13. Finnegan (OASD(lSA)) fin Col George F. Harringron (MilAm to Selden),

L3 Mar 71, memo RAdm H. H. Epes, Jr. (Dir PW/MIA Task Force) for Shields, 28 Apr 71:

TF files. Commander Mauldin's tour of duty began in late April 1971,

20. Memo Nutter for SecsMilDepts et ai, 15 Apr 71, ISA 383.6 (Jan-Sep 71).

21. For responses to Nutter's call for appointments to tbe task group, sec memo John H. ChaFeo

(SecNav) fin ASD(lSA), 29 Apr 71, and others in TF files,

22. Shields interv, 4 Jun 74, PW call, OSD HisL

23, Memo Selden fur PrinDepASD(H&E), 17 Aug 71, memo BrigCen Ceorge J. Hayes USA

(PrinDepASD(H&E)) for PrinDcpASD(lSA), 15 SCI' 71: TF flies.

24, Memo MajCen Verne L. Bowers (TAG) for CSA, 8 Oct 71, ISA Talking Paper, 10 Nov 71,

sub: Debrief of SSG Sexton: SecDef 38.3.6 Viernam (Oct-Nov 71); msg Saigon 16206, 090456Z
Notes to Pages 189-93 565

Oct 71, TF files. "Inept performance," with "no continuity at all," was the characterization used

in ISA Talking Paper, I Nov 7 I, sub: Sexton Debriefing Problems, ibid.

25. Msg Saigon 16223, 091130Z Oct 71, msg State 186334 for Saigon, 100 114Z Oct 71: TF

files: State-Def msg 186356 for Saigon, 101814Z Oct 71, memo (DJSM-1891-71) LtGen

John W. Vogt (DirJS) for CjCS Adm Thomas H. Moorer), 12 Oct 71: SecDef 383.6 Vietnam

(Oct-Nov 71); msg Saigon 16371, 131120Z Oct 71, msg COMUSMACV for CINCPAC, 110344Z

Oct 71: TF files; memrec BrigGen Robert C. Hixon USA (DDO NMCC, Jt Staff), II Oct 71,

PW call, OSD Hist.

26. Memo Richard Helms (DirCIA) for Henry A. Kissinger (Asst to Pres for NatSecAffs)"

27 Oct 7 I, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Oct-Nov 71). Apparently OSD's first certain knowledge

of CIA's intervention came from "a summary of fIeld reporting on the Sexton Affair" that

Helms provided on 13 October 1971. On that date Brig. Gen. Robert E. Pursley, mili tary

assistant to the secretary of defense, advised Laird that "the basic information being fed into

'tbe system' was in error." See memo R. E. P. IPursley] for Laird, 13 Oct 71, sub: POW Exercise Last Weekend, ibid; ISA Point Paper, nd Ica 18 Oct 71], sub: PW Release/Exchanges,

msg Saigon 16371, 131] 20Z Oct 7 I, which rcsponded to queries in State-Def~ClA msg 187153

for Saigon, 1300] OZ Oct 71: TF flies.

27. ISA Point Paper, nd Ica 18 Oct 71], sub: PW Release/Exchanges, TF files; memo Nutter for

SecDef, 22 Oct 71, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Oct-Nov 71).

28. Memo Nutter for SecsMilDepts et a\, 20 Oct 71, ISA 383.6 (Oct-Dec 71).

29. Memo Nutter for CjCS, 20 Oct 71, ibid.

30. Memo (CM-I312-71) Moorer for ASD(lSA), 19 Nov 71, ibid.

31. Memo Laird for SecsMilDepts et a\, 3 Dec 71, sub: Prisoners of War/Missing in Action

Matters; Coordination within tbe Departmcnt of Defense, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Dec 71).

The only indication of the origin of this action is in the two-sentence memo by wbich Selden

submitted the draft for Laird's signature. Dated 20 November 1971, it began: "You recently

directed that Rogcr Shields, of my office, be the overall coordinator of Department activities

regarding PW/MIA matters" (ibid).

32. Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (H~IS) 13, 2 Sep 72, TF files.

33. Msg USDEL France 16646, 2 Sep 72, AI' ticker item, 2 Sep 72: TF files.

34. ISA Point Paper, 5 Feb 71, sub: Alleged US Violation of Article 117 of 1949 Geneva Convention,

ISA 383.6 (Jan-Sep 71); memo Harry H. Almond, Jr. (OffGenCoun) for Shields, 23 Feb 71,

Irr Selden ro Rep Ogden R. Reid, 8 Mar 71: TF fIles. On 15 Feb 71 a TV newscast had

focused on one of the flight instructor returnees, Navy Lt. David P. Matbeny, and raised the

issue of whether his duries violated Article 117. Laird directed that Matheny be reassigned,

in order, Shields wrote, "to demonstrate good will and to avoid any inference that the U.S. is

in conflict with even the spirit of the Geneva Convention." During further consultations,

however, the course recommended by ASD(PA) was adopted: give only the explanation of tbe

legal correctness of DoD actions wben replying ro queries, leaving Matheny's transfer to the

Naval Postgraduate School to occur routinely at a later date. See Illemo Shields for Nutter,

24 Feb 71, memo LtCol W. M. Taylor (ExecAssr ro ASD(PA)) for Col Clyde Clark (ExecAsst

to ASD(lSA)), 3 Mar 71, ISA Point Paper, nd Ica 4 Mar 71], sub: Proposed Action Regarding

Lieutenant Matheny (Navy PW Returnee) and Reply to Inquiry by Congressman Reid: TF

files. When tbe question reappeared during congressional hearings 18 months later, DoD

again cited the authoritative interpretation of the Geneva Convention that showed Article 117

to be inapplicable and declared that the United States, by its own decision, "docs not return

any men to the rheatre of combat or to active military service associated with the combat

activities in Southeast Asia once they have been repatriated or returned to the United States

from enemy prisoner of war camps." See Senate Cte on Judiciary, Suhcte to Investigate

Problems Connected wirh Refugees and E.scapecs, Problems 0/ War Victims in Indochina, Part

IV: North Vietnam: Hearing, 92 Cong, 2 sess, 28 Sep 72, 5-6; memo LtCol Charles F. Kraak

(I'W/MIA Task Force) for Jim Murphy (SpecAssr to USecState), 10 Oct 72, Tf files.

35. lSA Point Paper, 2 Sep 72, sub: Pending Release of US PWs by Hanoi, memo Nutter for

SeeDef, 6 Sep 72: SeeDef 383.6 Vietnam (Sep 72).
566 Notes to Pages 194-201

36. ISA Point Paper, II Sep 72, sub: Current Status-Actions Regarding Release of Tbree PWs,

TF files; the paper characterized "this scheme of having the families go to Hanoi" as "a vicious

and callous exploitation of the families." Sec also memo BrigGen Russell G. Ogan (Dir PWI

MIA Task Fotce) for RAdm J. M. James (DDO, J-3, Jt Staff), 1'5 Sep 72, memo Shields for

Bowers et ai, 14 Sep 72: ibid.

37. Memo MajGen Alexander M. Haig, Jr. (DepAsst to Pres for NatSecAffs) for Roberr T Curran

(ExecSec State), 9 Sep 72, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Sep 72). Haig's "revisions which reflect the

desires of the President" provided the text for State-Def msg 165003 for Vientiane, 10 Sep 72,

State-Def msg 171526 for Vientiane, 20 Sep 72: TF files. Msg State 174414 for Vientiane,

24 Sep 72, PW coli, 050 Hist, contains the most firmly worded guidance in the series and

lists the originator as ''text received from the White House."

38. Msgs Moscow 9837,9841, and 9842,27 Sep 72, and 9864, 28 Sep 72, msg State 177194

for Copenhagen, 28 Sep 72, msg Copenbagen 443'5, 28 Sep 72: TF files; House Cte on Armed

Svcs, Full Committee Briefing on Project Egress Recap, HASC: No 92-76, 92 Cong, 2 sess,

10 Oct 72, 16698-99.

39. OASD(PA) transc, Shields press conf, 29 Sep 72, TF files; Time, 9 Ocr 72, 13; New York Times,

29 Sep 72; Wttshington Post, 30 Sep 72; msg COMTHREE (Cmdt, Third Naval District, New

York, NY) for JCS/SecDef et al, 032253Z Oct 72, PW coli, OSD Hisr.

40. Memo OASD(lSA) for SecDef, 11 Oct 72, sub: Recent Release of Three US PrisonersLessons l.earned, TF files.

41. Memo Shields for distribution, 16 Jun 72, sub: Director, PW/MIA Task Force, ibid.

42. OASD(lSA) paper, nd, suh: Chairman's Agenda for PW/MIA Task Group Meeting, 4 August 1972,

ibid; Davis interv with Col Vincent A. DiMauro USAF (Ret), Verona, NJ, 1 Apr 83, PW

coil, OSD Hisr.

II. THE GO PUBLIC CAMPAIGN

I. Memo Laird for SecArmy et ai, 1 Mar 69, sub: Defense Deparrment Relations with Setvicemen Listed as MIA/PW and Their Families, OASD(PA) News Release No 149-69, 3 Mar 69:

SecDef 383.6 (1969).

2. Davis intetv with Havens, 5 Nov 82, PW coil, OSD Hisr. Warnke's setvice in OSD continued

until 15 February 1969.

3. Memo J. William Doolittle (ASecAF(M&RA)) fat ASD(lSA), 17 Mar 69, memo James D.

Hittle (ASecNavy(M&RA)) fot ASD(ISA), 17 Mar 69: SecDef 383.6 (1969); quotation is ftom

the Air Fotce program as originally submitted by memo Doolittle (GenCoun AF) for ASD

(ISA), 14 Nov 67, SecDef 383.6 (Aug-Dec (7).

4. The quoted words arc from Laird's address at the annual dinner of the National League of

Families in 1971, OASD(PA) News Release No 828-71,28 Sep 71, TF files. For an earliet occasion

when Laird spoke publicly of the decision to launch the Go Public campaign, see Senate Cte

on For Rels, Bombing Operations and the Prisoner-of War Rescue Mission in North Vietnam:

Hearing, 91 Cong, 2 sess, 24 Nov 70, 30-31.

'5. Ltr Mr. and Mrs. E. D. Pyle to Sen Alan Cranston, 28 Apr 69, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam

(Jan-May (9).

6. Ltr Sybil Stockdale to Laird, 9 Mar 69, ibid.

7. New York Times, 3 May 69; the contemporary ISA records include a copy of this news item.

8. Giusti interv with Laird, Washington, D.C., 6 Apr 81, PW coil, OSD Hist.

9. DeptState Press Release No 22, 4 Feb 69, TF Illes; New York 11mes, 5 Feb, 27 Apr 69. For evidence

nf earlier concern at senior staff level over Hanoi's use of "ugly techniques to wting 'confessions' and other statements" from captured American pilots and the absence of counteraction

"to invitc public attention to what is going on," sec memo Sieverts for Harriman, 15 Mar 67,

box 27 (POW: Treatment), 79-0317.
Notes to Pages 201-12 567

10. Memo Laird for USecState, 30 Apr 69, SeeDef 383.6 (1969); memo Sieverts for USeeState,

2 May 69, sub: Briefing on PWs, box 3 (Miscellaneous Papers), memo Sieverts for USecState,

5 May 69, box 14 (LICROSS/Beer/Hanoi), memo Sieverts for USecState, 16 May 69, box 28

(Prisoners: Press): 79-D317.

II. OASD(PA) News Release No 406-69, 19 May 69, TF files.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid; transc, "Question and Answer Session: May 19, 1969," box 28 (Press Campaign, May 68

[sic!), 79-D317.

J 4. New York Times, 20 May 69; Washington Post, 20 May 69; Public Papers of the Presidents of

the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969, 373.

IS. Washington Post, 21 May 69; OASD(PA) News Release No 425-69,21 May 69, SecDef 383.6

Vietnam (Jan-May 69).

16. Dept State Bulletin, 9 Jun 69, 485, 487.

17. State/Def msg 79524 for Bangkok, 19 May 69, State/Def msg 81498 for Paris, 21 May 69,

msg State 83919 for Paris, 24 May 69: TF files; State/Def/USIA msg 83914 for Paris, 24 May 69,

PW coil, OSD Hist; Washington Post, 23 May 69.

18. Dept State Bulletin, 23 Jun 69, 529; memo Capt John S. Harris USN (DIA) for ASD(lSA),

20 Jun 69, msg FBIS Okinawa to RHA1'AA/A1'G et a!, 271653Z May 69: 1'1' files.

19. OASD(PA) News Release [unnumbered], 6 Jun 69, TF files.

20. Public Statements of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, 1969, 1206, 1310-11, 1993-94.

21. U.S. News 6' World Report, 23 Jun 69, 47-49; memo Harris for ASD(lSA), 20 Jun 69,1'1' files.

22. Memo Harris for ASD(lSA), 20 Jun 69, 1'1' files; James B. Stockdale and Sybil Stockdale,

In LOl'e and War, 307-09; AI' ticker item, "Navy Prisoner," 14 Jun 69, 1'1' files.

23. Stockdale, In Love and War, 305-06, 310-15; New York Times, 31 .lui 69.

24. Msg State 109962 for Paris and Saigon, 030718Z Jun [should read .luI] 69, PW call, OSD

Hist; ISA paper, 9 .lui 69, sub: Unresolved PW Issues [stamped "SecDef has seen"], SecDef

383.6 Vietnam (Jun-Jul 69).

25. OASD(PA) News Release No 660-69, 7 Aug 69, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Aug-ScI' 69).

26. OASD(PA) News Release No. 671-69, 12 Aug 69, ibid.

27. Memo Laird for Kissinger, 28 Aug 69, msg OUSAIRA (US Air Attache) Vientiane Laos for

JCS/SecDef/DIA, 071041 Z Aug 69: SeeDef 383.6 Vietnam (Aug-ScI' (9); Scott Blakey,

Prisoner at War: The Survival of Commander Richard A. Stratton, 240-41.

28. 1'ransc, News Briefing, Bethesda Naval Hospital, 2 Sep 69, 1'1' files.

29. Ltr Richardson to Laird,S Sep 69, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Aug-Sep (9).

30. Memo Shields for Selden, 12 Dec 72, sub: Stewardship Report, 1'1' files; memo Selden for

SeeDef, 31 Oct 70, sub: PW Activities at Army-Navy Game, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (AugOct 70).

31. Memo Jerry W. Friedheim (ActgASD(PA)) for SecDef, 14 Mar 73, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam

(1-15 Mar 73); OASD(PA) listing, "PW/MIA Activities, Speaking Engagements and Special

Events," 18 Feb 71,1'1' files.

32. Memo Packard for SecsMilDepts et ai, 8 Jun 70, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (May-Jun 70); memo

Laird for SecsMilDepts et al, 10 Nov 70, ibid (Nov 70).

33. Congressional Record, 91 Cong, I sess, I 15, pt 10, 26 May 69, 13846-48, pt 11, 2 lun 69, 14500-

02,9 Jun 69,15127.

34. Ltr Laird to Rep Bob Wilson,S Jun 69, Itr Laird to Sen John G. Tower, 6 lun 69, memo StempIer

for Laird, 10 Jun 69, ltr Laird to Fulbright, 12 Jun 69: SecDef 38.3.6 Vietnam (lun-lul (9).

35. Ltr Sen Alan Cranston and Sen Charles E. Goodell to Laird, 13 Aug 69, SecDef 38.3.6

Vietnam (Aug-Sep 69); Congressional Record, 91 Cong, 1 sess, liS, pt 18, 13 Aug 69, 23692-94 .

.36. Congressional Record, 91 Cong, 1 sess, 115, pt 19, 17 Sep 69,25851-25919; ltrs Dickinson to

Laird,S, 25 Sep 69, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Aug-ScI' (9).

.37. House Cte on For Affs, 91 Cong, 1 sess, H Rept No 91-739, 10 Dec 69, 1-5; House Cte on

For Affs, Subcte on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, American Prisoners

of War in Southeast Asia, 1970: Hearings (hereafter cited as House Cte on For Affs, American

POWs, 1970: HearingJ), 91 Cong, 2 Sf55, 29 Apr 70, 1-.3.
568 Notes to Pages 213-23

38. Of the occasions when Dole spoke of the poorly attended February meering in Constitution

Hall, the most revealing was his appearance before a House subcommittee on 29 April 1970;

see House Cte on For Affs, American POWs, 1970: Hearings, 16-18.

39. Congressional Record, 91 Cong, 2 sess, 116, pt 6, 20 Mar 70, 8331-32.

40. Ltr Dole to Laird, 21 Apr 70, SecDef 38.'3.6 Vietnam (Jan-Apr 70); White House release,

I May 70, Presidential Proclamation: Day of Prayer, ibid (May-Jun 70).

41. Washington Post. 2 May 70; DoD. Commanders Digest, 23 May 70. 1-3; Program, Appeal

for International Justice: DAR Constitution Hall-Washington, D.C., May 1, 1970, SecDef

383.6 Vietnam (May-Jun 70).

42. Dept State Bulletin, 22 Dec 69, 596-99, 13 Oct 69, 317, 19 Jan 70, 58-60 (59, quote).

43. Dept State Bulletin, 13 Ocr 69, 323-25.

44. Ibid, 325 (text of resolution); Senate Cte on For Rels, 91 Cong, 2 sess, S Rept No 91-705,

16 Feb 70, 16.

45. Dept State Bulletin, 1 Dec 69 (472, 475, U Thant and Hauser quotations).

46. Nixon Public Papers, 1970, 930; Dept State Bulletin, 4 Jan 71, 8-11.

47. Dept State Bulletin, 4 Jan 71, 12-13 (text of resolution). Noting that "the Soviet Union and

its allies birterly opposed this resolution from the time it was inttoduced," Laird commended

the "determination and ability" of the State Department officia!.s who had obtained its passage;

see Itr Laird to William P. Rogers (SecState), 30 Dec 70, ISA 383.6 North Vietnam (1970).

48. "Report on Activities on Behalf of American Prisoners of War-Norrh Vietnam." nd, artach

to agenda for meeting of ARC Cte on Public and Personnel Relations, 15 Feb 70, 1'1' files.

49. Ltr Kenneth O. Gilmore (Washington Editor, RMder:,. Digest) to Capt John Thornton USN (OASD

([SA)), 23 Oct 69, forwarding an advance copy of the November arricle, Stockstill, "What You

Can Do for American Prisoners in Vietnam," TF files; the flies also contain a copy of the

reprint version issued by Retlders Digest.

50. Memo Ralph H. Jefferson (SpecAdvisor for PW Affairs to ASD([SA)) for LtCol Harold B.

Long, .It. USA et al. 20 Feb 70, sub: Red Cross Resolution on Prisoners of War, msg State 30](,7

for all diplomatic posts, 28 Feb 70: 1'1' files.

51. ARC News Service, "Revised Background Statement on U.S. Prisoners of War in Vietnam,"

Oct 70, ARC, "Summary of Red Cross Action on Behalf of U.S. Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia," I 1 Sep 72: 1'1' files.

52. ARC, "Summary of Red Cross Action ..," II ScI' 72, TF flies; Stockstill, "Inside the Prisons

of Hanoi," Retlders Digest, Apr 71, 67-72.

53. Ltr Uhl to Laird, 22 .lui 69, SecDcf 383.6 Vietnam (Jun-Jed 69); Itr W. F. Rockwell, .It. (Ch

and CEO, Norrh American Rockwell) to Packard, .'30 Dec 70, ibid (Dec 70).

54. Clipping from The Arizontl Republic (Phoenix), 1 Feb 71, artach to Itr Laird to Mrs. Martin

Berger, Litchfield P"rk, Ariz, 25 reb 71, SecDef .'383.6 Vietnam (Feb 71).

55. House Cte on For Affs, American POWs, J970: Hetuings, 1 M"y 70, (, 1.

56. Stockdale, In Love and War, 317-23 (September I%9 Paris visit); New York Times, 22 Jan 70;

msg USDEL France 5994, 29 Mar 72, National League of families, "Special Report ... trip

to several Western European capitals and to Roumania, by a special delegation from the

National League of Families,. . 20 May 1972 through 4 June 1972": TF flies.

57. National League of Families News Release, "POW-MIA Relatives Plan Special Geneva-Paris

Missions," nd [May 71], msg Geneva 179 for ASD(PA) and DepASD(PA), 27 May 71 (quote),

msg USDEL France 9145,1 Jun 71, msg Brussels 1815, 3 Jun 7\: Tr files.

58. Transc, H. Ross Perot appearance on the "'I()day Show," 1 Jan 70, PW coil, OSD Hist; Newsweek, 8 Dec 69, 57-58.

59. The following account of Perot's campaign relies primarily on materials produced by United

We Stand, Inc. (UWS), including UWS staff report, "Formation and Activities of United

We Stand," nd [1970J, and copies of the newspaper advertisements published in November

1969: PW coli, OSD Hist; Washington I'ost, 23 Nov 69.

60. UWS staff report (draft). "Operation Understanding." nd 11970], and UWS report of

"Washington Visitation to Foreign Fmbassies, 17 December 1969": PW coil, OSD Hisr.
Notes to Pages 224-35 569

61. UWS, "Operation Understanding," cable, Perot for Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, DRV,

24 Dec 69, tcleg, General Department of Paste, DRV, for Perot, 20 Dec 69: PW call, OSD

Hist; msg Tokyo 10241, 30 Dec 69, msg Moscow 7062, 31 Dec 69: box 31 (Ross Perot),

79-0317; editotial, "Innocent Abroad," Washington Star, 6 Jan 70, reprinted in House Cte

on Armed Svcs, Hearing on Problems of Prisoners of War and Their Families, 91 Cong, 2 sess,

6 Mar 70, 6026.

62. Ttansc, "Today Show," 1 Jan 70, PW coli, OSD Hist.

63. Memo Metvin L. Stauffet (UWS staff) fat Perot, 2 Jan 70, PW call, OSD Hist; msg Paris

19275, 25 Dec 69, box 17 (Travel on Behalf of POWs), 79-0317.

64. Untitled UWS staff document, nd [19731], PW coil, OSD Hist; msg State 43267 for Saigon,

25 Mar 70, box 31 (Ross Peror), 79-0317; New York Times, 6 Apr 70; Washington Post, 7 Apr 70.

65. House Cte on For Affs, American POWs, 1970: Hearings, 1 May 70, 68-70, 73-74; Congressional Record, 91 Cong, 2 sess, 116, pt 14,4 Jun 70, 18420-21; DoD, Commanders Digest,

13 Jun 70, 1-3.

66. Lrr United We Stand, Inc., to "Dear Concerned American," nd [1970], TF files; untitled UWS

staff document, nd [1973'], PW call, OSD Hisr.

67. Editorial, "Putting a Price on War Prisonets," Philadelphia Inquirer, 16 Jan 70, reptinted in

House Cte on Atmed Svcs, Hearing on Problems of Prisoners of war and Their Families, 6023-24;

rransc, "Today Show," 1 Jan 70, PW call, OSD Hisr.

68. New York Times, 23 Dec 70; msg USDEL France 17871, 23 Dec 70, DRV Ministty of

National Defense, "U.S. Pilots Captured in the Democtatic Republic of Vietnam (from

August 5, 1964, to November 15, 1970)": TF files.

69. Msg State 207417 for Paris, 22 Dec 70, "Guidance for Use in Response to Queries by PW/

MIA families," nd, attach to memo Selden for SecsMiIDepts et al, 11 Aug 71, sub: PW List

Released by North Vietnam on December 22, 1970: ibid.

70. Lrr Sieverrs to Shields, 11 Mar 71, ibid.

71. Lrr (translation) Pham Van Dong (Premier DRV) to Fulbright, 14 Dec 70, ibid.

12. OTHER DEFENSE ACTIONS AND INITIATIVES

1. Annotation by Col Robert E. Pursley USAF (MilAsst to SecDef), 9 Jul 69, on memo Havens

for Nurrer, 8 Jul 69, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jun-Jul 69).

2. Msg Paris 18442,24 Ju168, box 12 (Release of 3 Pilots-JuI68), 79-0317.

3. Msg State 109962 for Paris and Saigon, 030718Z Jun [should read Jul] 69, PW coIl, OSD

Hist; memo Elliot L. Richardson (USecState) for Vice Pres Spiro T. Agnew, 10 Jul 69, SecDef

383.6 Vietnam (Jun-Jul 69); New YrJrk Times, 9 Jul 69.

4. Msg Paris 10516, 10 Ju169, box 19 (4th July Release 69), 79-0317.

5. Memo Richatdson for Agnew, 10 Jul 69, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jun-Jul 69).

6. Ibid.

7. Msg State 118 I 55 for Vientiane, 17 Jul 69, box 19 (4th July Release 69), 79-0317; msg Vientiane

4827, 18 Jul 69, PW call, OSD Hisr.

8. Memo Agnew for Laird, 23 Jul 69, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (1969).

9. Memo Laird for Vice Pres, 28 Jul 69, ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ltt Richatdson to Laird, 13 Aug 69, ibid.

12. Memo Sieverts for ActgSecState, 6 Aug 69, TF files.

13. OASD(PA) News Release No 660-69, 7 Aug 69, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Aug-Sep 69).

14. Ltr Richardson to Laird, 13 Aug 69, merna Laird for Vice Pres, 28 Jul 69: SecDef 383.6

Vietnam (1969).

15. Memo Nurrer for SecsMilDepts et al, 22 Nov 69, ISA 383.6 North Vietnam (J 969).

16. Memo Havens for Nutter, 1 Dec 69, w/attach, TF files.

17. Memo Curtis W. Tarr (AsstSecAF) for ASD(lSA), 1 Dec 69, memo Col Robert E. Work

USAF (MilAdvisor for PW Affairs OASD(lSA») for Nutter, 23 Jan 70: ibid.
570 Notes to Pages 235-44

18. Memo Nutter for SeesMilDepts et aI, 29 Jan 70, ibid.

19. Memo Tarr for ASD(ISAl, 16 Feb 70, memo Arthur W. Allen, Jr. (AsstSeeArmy) for ASD

(ISAl, 11 Feb 70: TF fIles.

20. Memo Nutter for SeesMilDepts et al, 26 May 70, memo Nutter for SeeArmy et al, 3 Jul 70,

memo Ralph H. Jefferson (SpeeAdvisor for PW Affairs to ASD(lSA)) for Capt John S. Harris

USN (DIA), 27 Aug 70: ibid.

21. Memo I.aird for Vice Pres, 7 Aug 69, memo Laird for Kissinger, 23 Aug 69, SeeDef 383,(,

Vietnam (Aug-Sep (9).

22. Ltr Kissinger to Laird, 29 Aug 69, ibid; memo Kissinger for SeeDef. 22 Oct 69, ibid

(Oct-Dec (9).

23. Memo Kissinger for SeeState, SeeDef, Dir CIA, and Dir USIA, 24 Mar 70, ibid (Jan-Apr 70).

24. Memo Laird for Kissinger, 31 Mar 70, ibid.

25. Memo RBF (Col Ray B. Furlong, MilAm to DepSecDef) for Packard, 25 Mar 70, ibid.

26. Stockdale, In Love and Wru, .303-04; Itt Jane Maury Denton to Rep Jack Edwards, 18 Jan 69,

end to Itr Edwards to William Timmons (DepAsst to Pres), 22 Jan 69, SecDef 383.6

Vietnam (Jan-May (9). Another member of Mrs. Denton's group made tbe same request

through her own congressman; sec Itt Dorothy H. McDaniel (Mrs. Eugene Barker McDaniel)

to Rep Thomas N. Downing, 23 Jan 69, ibid.

27. Ltr Timmons to Edwards, 30 Jan 69, memo Carl S. Wallace (SpecAsst to SecDef) for Col

James D. Hughes (MilAsst to Pres), 29 Jan 69: SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jan-May (9).

28. Ltt Edwards to Wallace, 5 Mar 69, Itr Ralph Earle 11 (AetgASD(lSA)) to Edwards, 11 Mar 69:

ibid; memo Havens for Nutter, nd [22 May 69'J, sub: Meeting with Group of Wives of PWsf

MIAs ftom Norfolk Area-Friday, 23 May, 1000 Hours (quote from marginal annotation),

ISA 383.6 Vietnam (Jan-Jul (9).

29. Ltr Wilson to Laird, 11 Apr 69, Itr Laird to Wilson, 12 May 69: SeeDef 383.6 Vietnam

(Jan-May (9).

30. ISA staff memo, 2 May 69, encl to memo Nutter for SecDef, 8 May 69, ibid.

31. Memo Sieverts for USecState, 23 Apr 69 ("Approve" line initialed "ELR"), box 26 (Wivesl

families (9), 79-0317.

32. Memo Daniel Z. Henkin (ASD(PA)) for SeeDef, 23 Jun 69, memo Nutter for SeeDef, 23 Jul 69:

SeeDef 38.3.6 Vietnam (Jun-Jul (9); memo Sieverts for AetgSeeState, 25 Jul 69, box 21

(Chron file (9), 79-0317 (quote).

33. Memo Nutter for SecDef, 2.3 Sep 69, SeeDef 383.6 Vietnam (Aug-Sep (9).

34. Task force Files contain a memorandum for the president, prepared at State for Richardson's

signature but annotated "6/27/69 Apparently did not go forward"; it presented a welldeveloped argument for the recommendation "that you issue a written statement, or speak

publicly, to express your concern about missing and captured Americans in Southeast Asia."

Origin and purpose of the only Nixon statement available during most of 1969 are explained

in Itr Sieverrs to BrigGen I.eo E. Benade (OASD(M)), 6 Feb 69, Tf files. For typical use in

OSD correspondence see Itr Richard A. Ware (PrinDepASD(lSA)) to Rep B. F. Sisk, 18 Apr 69,

SeeDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jan-May (9); later in 1969 OSD letters achieved a sttonger effect by

quoting only the tWO words "utgent ptiority" from Nixon's last sentence, as in Itt Nuttet to

Rep Clark MacGtegot, 22 Jul 69, ibid (Jun-Jul (9).

35. Memo Laird fat Ptes, 25 Sep 69, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Aug-Sep (9).

36. Memo Hughes for Wallace, 1 Oct 69, ibid (Oct-Dec (9); memo Havens for Nutter, 4 Nov 69,

TF files; memo Havens for Nutter, 20 Nov 69, ibid (quote); memo Nutter for SeeDef,

22 Nov 69, w/annotation, 29 Nov 69, showing the White House action, SecDef 383.6

Vietnam (Oct-Dec (9).

37. Text of Nixon telegram, 5 Dec 69, encl to memo MajGcn Russell E. Dougherty USAf for

CSAF, nd [8 Dec 69?J, TF files; memo Capen for SecDcf, 6 Dec 69, SeeDef .383.6 Vietnam

(Oct-Dec (9); Stockdale, In Love and War, 365.

38. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United Slates: Richard Nixon, 1969, 1021; New York Times,

13 Dec 69.
Notes to Pages 245-56 571

39. Nixon Public Papers, 1971,1010.

40. Memo Capen for Nutter, 15 Dec 69, TF files; memo Butterfield for Hughes, 12 Dec 69,

memo Laird for Vice Pres, 22 Dec 69: SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Oct-Dec 69).

41. Memo Laird for Pres, 20 Dec 69, memo Pursley for ASD(ISA), 29 Dec 69: SeeDd 383.6

Vietnam (Ocr-Dec 69).

42. Memo Richardson for Kissinger, 30 Dec 69, ibid. TF files contain an undated copy of Richardson's

earlier comments; see memo AcrgSecState for Kissinger, nd lca 29 Aug 69].

43. Memo Kissinger for SeeS tate and SecDef, 22 Jan 70, SeeDef 383.6 (Jan-Apr 70). Both

Laird's recommendations and the president's direcrive included a course (0 be followed if

effons to find an individual emissary failed: assemble a high-level briefing team (0 go abroad

in his stead. This less favored alternative was never actively pursued.

44. Memo Laird for Kissinger, 17 feb 70, memo Laird for ASD(ISA), ::I Apr 70: ibid.

45. Memo Laird for Kissinger, 7 Apr 70, ibid.

46. Memo Laird for Pres, 23 Apr 70, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jan-Apr 70); memo Nutter for

SecDef, 7 May 70, Itr Thomas E. Dewey to Nutter, 12 May 70: ibid (May-Jun 70).

47. Memo Laird for Kissinger, 9 May 70, memo Nutter for DepSecDef, 15 Jun 70: SecDef 383.6

Vietnam (May-Jun 70); memo Laird for Kissinger, 18 Jul 70, memo Richard A. Ware (ActgASD

(ISA)) for SecDef, 22 Jul 70: ibid (Jul 70).

48. Memo Laird for Kissinger, 23 Jul 70, SecDd 383.6 Vietnam (Jul 70); Nixon Public Papers,

1970, 649-50.

49. Kegley was a member of the delegation that interviewed Dewey and had been tabbed for

service with the mission from the first, as strongly recommended in memo Henkin (ASD(PA))

for ASD(ISAJ, 7 Apt 70, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jan-Apr 70); Itt Borman to Laird, 31 Aug 70,

ibid (Aug-Oct 70); Washington Post, 14 Aug 70.

50. White House ptess release, 2 Sep 70, ltr Borman to Laird, 21 Sep 70: SecDef 383.6 Vietnam

(Aug-Oct 70); Dept State Bulletin, 12 Oct 70, 405-08.

51. Memo Laird for SecState, 19 Scp 70, SeeDef 383.6 Vietnam (Aug-Oct 70).

52. Ltr Irwin to Laird, 2 Oct 70, ibid.

53. Memo Laird for Kissinger, 18 Jul 70, and substantially identicalltr Laird to Rogers, 18 Jul 70, ibid.

54. Memo Kissinger for SeeDef, 31 Aug 70, memo Sullivan for Kissinger, 23 Oct 70, memo

Kissinger for SecDef, 2 Nov 70: ibid.

55. Memo Laird for Pres, 17 May 71, ibid (1971).

56. Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years, 1018-19, 1488-89.

57. OASD(PA) News Release No 949-70, and news conf, 23 Nov 70, Public Statements of Secretary

of Defense Melvin R. Laird, 1970, 2274-81; msg BrigGen Leroy J. Manor for CJCS and

C1NCPAC, 210215Z Nov 70, SecDef 38.3.6 Vietnam (Nov 70).

58. Benjamin F. Schemmer, The Raid, 18-19, 80. Schemmer provides a detailed and largely

unchallenged account of the rescue operation, with frequent reference to the photo reconnaissance findings.

59. Senate Cte on For Rels, Bombing Operations and the Prisoner-of IVar Rescue Mission in North

Vietnam: Hearing, 91 Cong, 2 sess, 24 Nov 70, 1-2, 8, 35, 47.

60. Ibid, 3.

61. Ibid, 23; news conf, 24 Nov 70, Public Statements, Laird, 1970, 2334.

62. Senate Cte on For ReIs, Bombing Operations and the Prisoner-of War Rescue Mission in North

Vietnam: Hearing, 7, 9-10, 12-13 (7, 10, quote).

63. Allegations included that Defense planned and undertook the operation without consulting

CIA and thar Laird recommended that it proceed despite having clear evidence that the prison

cells were empty. These items evoked sharp criticism when considered in the form in which

the news media first reported them; see Congressional Record, 91 Cong, 2 sess, 116, pt 30,

4 Dec 70, 39958-61. Schemmer's The Raid provides fuller information and a more balanced

assessment; see particularly 263-67.

64. Memo Maj Ludwig J. Spolyer for AFNIFPC, 5 Oct 71, Tf files.

65. Schemmer, The Raid, 282-84.
572 Notes to Pages 257-69

13. A BITTER LESSON

1. Msg Geneva 4388, I I Dec 69, TF files.

2. Ltr Laird to Rogers, 31 Jan 70, SeeDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jan-Apr 70).

3. Ibid.

4. Msg State 16109 for Saigon, 2 Feb 70, TF files.

5. Memeon Laird with Nguyen Van Thieu (Pres RVN), 12 Feb 70, dtd 17 Feb 70, SeeDef

333 Vietnam: Laird (1970).

6. Memo Laird for Pres, 17 Feb 70, ibid; memo Kissinger for SeeS tate, 3 Mar 70, msg State

31590 for Paris and Saigon, 3 Mar 70: TF files.

7. Msg State 32266 for Saigon,S Mar 70, msg State 38735 for Saigon, 17 Mar 70: TF files.

8. Msg Saigon 4383, 24 Mar 70, ibid.

9. Msg State 43278 for USDEL France, 24 Mar 70, ibid.

10. Msg Saigon 4457, 25 Mat 70, msg USDEL France 3926, 2 Apr 70: ibid; memo Sieverrs for

USeeState, 4 Jun 70, PW coil, 050 Hist; msg Saigon 9015, 9 Jun 70, msg USDEL France 7625,

11 Jun 70, msg USDEL France 8854, 2 Jul 70: TF files.

II. Msg USDEL France 7625, 11 Jun 70, msg State 99421 for Saigon et aI, 23 Jun 70: TF files.

12. Msg Saigon 11116, 12 ]ul 70, msg COMUSMACV for CINCPAC, 150415Z Jul 70: ibid.

13. Draft State/Def msg for Saigon, encl to memo Nutter for SeeDef, 7 luI 70, memo Nutter for

SeeDef, 17 Jul 70: SeeDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jul 70); memo Ralph H. Jefferson (SpeeAdvisor for

PW Affairs to ASD(JSA)) for Nutter, 10 Jul 70, TF files.

14. ISA memeon Laird with Ambs Ellsworth Bunker, David K. E. Bruce, and Philip C. Habib,

20 Jul 70, dtd 24 Jul 70, SeeDef 091.112 Vietnam (1970).

IS. Memo Nutter for SeeDef, 8 Aug 70, SeeDef 383.6 Vietnam (Aug-Oct 70).

16. Ibid, Tab B, State draft State/Del' msg for Saigon.

17. Memo Nutter for SeeDef, 8 Aug 70, SeeDef 38.3.6 Vietnam (Aug-Ocr 70).

18. Memo Laird for ASD(JSA), 11 Aug 70, ibid.

19. State/Def msg 138075 for Saigon, 24 Aug 70, memo Jefferson for Nutter, 25 Aug 70: ibid.

When submitted to and seen by Laird rhe document did not bear two handwritten

additions. Jefferson wrote thar he was "not aware of any elTort to clear these additions with

SeeDef, who had approved cable without them."

20. Memcon William K. Hitchcock (Minister-Counselor for PolAfl USEmb Saigon) with GVN

MinForAff et aI, 25 Aug 70, TF files.

21. Msg Saigon 14605,7 Sep 70, ibid.

22. Memo Laird for C]CS, 2 Sep 70, memo (JCSM-449-70) JCS for SeeDef, 18 Sep 70: SeeDef

383.6 Vietnam (Aug-Oct 70).

23. Memo Nutter for SeeDef, 12 Oct 70, ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Nixon Public Papers, /970, 825-28 (quote, 827).

26. Dept State Bulletin, 26 Oct 70, 468, 2 Nov 70, 554-56.

27. Msg State 187074 for Saigon, COMUSMACV, and Vientiane, 14 Nov 70, SeeDef 091.112

Vietnam (1970).

28. Ibid; memo Nutter for SeeDef, 14 Nov 70, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Nov 70).

29. Ibid.

30. Memo Laird for Pres, \8 Nov 70, SeeDef 383.6 Vietnam (Nov 70).

31. Ibid; memo REP (BrigGen Robert E. Pursley, MiiAssr to SeeDef) for ASD(JSA), 10 Nov 70, ibid.

32. Msg Saigon 19270, 7 Dec 70, TF files; Stare/Def msg ]')9387 for Saigon, 7 Dec 70, SeeDef

383.6 Vietnam (Dec 70).

33. Dept Srate Bulletin, 28 Dee 70, 77.3.

34. Msg Saigon 20080, 22 Dec 70, Tf files.

35. New York limes, 23 Dec 70; Washington Post, 24 Dec 70; msg Saigon 1093, 23 Jan 71, TF files.

36. Msg Saigon 977, 21 Jan 71, Tf files.

37. Msg Saigon 1169, 25 Jan 71, msg COMUSMACV for JCS and CINCPAC, 241223Z Jan 71: ibid.
Notes to Pages 270-81 573

38. Msg Saigon 1223, 26 Jan 71, ISA paper, nd, sub; Significant Public Statements Regarding the

4 June 1971 Repatriation Effort: ibid; Dept State Bulletin, 22 Feb 71, 235.

39. Memcon Laird (accompanied by Bunker and Abrams) with Thieu, 11 Jan 71, end to memo

Laitd for Pres, 16 Jan 71, msg JCS 1693 (for Laird) fot CINCPAC and COMUSMACV

(for Bunker), 212241Z Jan 71: SecDef 333 Viernam; Laird (I971).

40. Memo Nurrer for SecDef, 22 Dec 70, SecDef 383.6 Viernam (Dec 70).

41. Ibid. Nurrer identified the arrached documenr titled "Hanoi's Views of Prisoner of War

Exchanges" as an "informal paper" prepared by William L. Stearman, State Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). One month later State issued INR Intelligence Note 4, "North!

South Vietnam; Release of North Vietnamese Prisoners," covering the same material; see msg

State 11065 for Saigon et a!' 21 Jan 71, TF files.

42. Msg JCS 9981 for CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, 151422Z Apr 71, SecDef 333 Vietnam:

Laird (I971).

43. Msg JCS 1693 (for Laird) for CINCPAC and COMUSMACV (for Bunker), 212241 Z Jan 71, ibid.

44. Msg COMUSMACV (for Bunker) for JCS (for Laird), 261215Z Jan 71, ibid.

45. Msg State 45511 for Saigon, 18 Mar 71, TF files.

46. Ibid; Itr Findley to Pres, II Dec 70, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jan 71).

47. Public Statements of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, 1970, 2614; Itr Packard to Findley,

8 Jan 71, SecDef 383.(, Vietnam (Jan 71).

48. ISA Talking Paper, 25 Mar 71, TF files.

49. Ibid; msg Saigon 4109, 20 Mar 71, State!Def msg 57194 for Saigon, 5 Apr 71: ibid.

50. Dept State Bulletin, 2(, Apr 71, 540-41, 3 May 71, 568.

51. Msg JCS 9981 (for I.aird) for CINCPAC and COMUSMACV (for Abrams), 151422Z

Apr 71, SecDef 333 Viernam: I.aird (1971).

52. Msg COMUSMACV for C]CS, 191016Z Apr 71, ibid.

53. Msg State 72095 for Saigon and USDEL France, 27 Apr 71, msg Saigon 6456, 28 Apr 71: TF files.

54. Significant Public Statements ... 4 June 1971 Repatriation Effort, ibid.

55. Msg Saigon 645(" 28 Apr 71, msg State 73348 for Saigon and USDEL France, 28 Apr 71,

msgs Saigon 6495 and (,496, 29 Apr 71: ibid.

56. Dept State Bulletin, 17 May 71, (,34-35.

57. Nixon Public Papers, 1971, 595-96.

58. FBIS 42, 30 Apr 71, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Apr-May 71); Dept State Bulletin, 24 May 71,

666-68, 31 May 71, 704-05; State Dept paper, na [Sieverts?], nd, sub; Significanr Developmenrs, April 26-May 9. 1971: Prisoner-orWat Initiatives: TF files.

59. Significant Public Statements ... 4 June 1971 Repatriation Effort, ibid.

60. New York Times, 14 May 71; msg JCS 6575 for CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, 221722Z

May 71 (Laird quote), msg Saigon 7506, 14 May 71: TF files.

61. State!Def msg 84898 for Saigon, USDEL France, and Geneva, 15 May 71, TF files.

62. Msg Saigon 7890, 20 May 71, msg State 88711 for Saigon and Geneva, 20 May 71, Significant

Public Statemenrs ... 4 June 1971 Repatriation Effort; ibid.

63. Msg Saigon 7651, 17 May 71, msg Saigon 7890, 20 May 71; ibid.

64. State!Def msg 84898 for Saigon, USDEL France, and Geneva, 15 May 71, ibid.

(,5. Msg Srate 88711 for Saigon and Geneva, 20 May 71, msg Geneva 1950, 21 May 71, msg

Saigon 8075, 24 May 71: ibid.

66. Msg Geneva 1983, 24 May 71, TF files.

67. Msg Geneva 2046 [corrected copy], 27 May 71, ibid.

68. Msg Saigon 8408, 28 May 71, msg Geneva 2066, 28 May 71: ibid.

69. Msg COMUSMACV for JCS and ClNCPAC, 290730Z May 71, memrec R. S. Barrett

(USEmb Saigon), 31 May 71; ibid.

70. Msg Saigon 8466, 29 May 71, memcon John M. Reid (USEmb Saigon) with Pierre du Pasquier

and 3 other ICRC delegates, 9 Aug 71, dtd 12 Aug 71: TF files.

71. Msg State 95%5 for Saigon, 29 May 71, Significant Public Statements.. 4 June 1971

Repatriation Effort, Illsg Saigon 8482, 31 May 71: ibid.
574 Notes to Pages 281-91

72. Msg State 97447 for Saigon and Lisbon, 3 Jun 71, msg Saigon 8716, 4 Jun 71, msg Saigor

8742,4 Jun 71, msg COMUSMACV fat CINCPAC et ai, 040445Z Jun 71: ibid.

73. ISA Point Paper, nd Uun 71), sub: The Prisoner of War Situation [marked "For Laird breakfast

for Kissinger"], ibid.

74. Memrec Barrett, 31 May 71, memo Col J. D. Foulk for ACSI, 7 Jun 71, memcon Reid

with du Pasquier et al, 9 Aug 71, msg Saigon 14034, 31 Aug 71, airgram Saigon A-I58,

22 Sep 71, memo Reid for Stephen Winship (USEmb Saigon), 4 Oct 71, airgram Saigon

A-205, 23 Nov 71: TF files.

14. REPATRIATION PLANNING: A CENTRAL ISSUE RESOLVED

1. Msg JCS 6463 for Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands et al, 17 Dec 69,

memo (MJCS-564-69) JCS for Ch 000 PW Policy Cte, 17 Dec 69: 1'1' files.

2. Ltt COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 21 Mar 69, ibid.

3. Msg CINCPAC for JCS/SecDef et ai, 032321Z Nov 71, ibid.

4. Ltt COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 27 Nov 71, ibid.

5. Msg CINCPAC for CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF et ai, 312235Z Dec 71, ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Memo Cdr Richard A. Mauldin for RAdm H. H. Epes, Jr. (Dir PW/MIA Task Force), 30 Jul 71,

ibid.

8. Ibid; Itt COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 27 Nov 71, 1'1' files.

9. Memo BrigGen George J. Hayes (PrinDepASD(H&E)) for ASD(lSA), 8 Oct 71, w/attchd

memo [signed but undtd] Wilbur for SecsMilDepts and C)CS, ibid.

10. While "it could be argued"-and was-officials closely involved in the case remain convinced

that Sexton's most pressing problems were physical rather rhan psychological, making prompt

transfer to a CONUS hospital desirable; Davis interv with Shields, New York, NY, 24 and

25 Jun 87, OSD Hist.

II. Draft memo Wilbur for SecsMilDepts, C)CS, and ASD(lSA), undtd, enel to memo Shields for

BrigGen Paul C. Watson et al [Task Group members), 19 Nov 71, memo Shields for Nutter,

1 Dec 71: 1'1' files.

12. The basic definition of Wilbur's duties as ASD(H&E) made him "the principal staff adviser and

coordinator for the Secretary of Defense for health and sanitation matters, including care

and treatment of patients. .." Like the other assistant secretaries, Wilbur had been delegated authority to issue "one-time directive-type memoranda ... appropriate for carrying out

policies approved by the Secretary of Defense for his assigned fields." See DoD Dir 5126.1,

26 Aug 71.

13. Draft memo Wilbur for SecsMilDepts et al, undtd, enel to memo Sbields for Watson et ai,

19 Nov 71, 1'1' files.

14. Memo Epes fot PW/MIA Task Group, 18 Nov 71, memo Armistead I. Selden, Jr. (PrinDepASD

(ISA)) for ASD(H&E), 20 Nov 71: ibid. The reaction to Wilbur's memo from two Air Force

offices was particularly pointed; see memo Richard J. Borda (ASecAF(M&RA)) for ASD(lSA),

19 Nov 71, and memo BrigCen James R. Allen (DepDit for Plans & Policy, DCS/P&O AI')

for Ch PW/MIA Task Group, 19 Nov 71: ibid.

15. PW/MIA Task Force Issue Paper, undtd, enel to memo Nutter for SecsMilDepts et ai,

30 Nov 71, ibid.

16. Memo Shields for Nutter, 1 Dec 71, ibid.

17. Memo Nutter for SecsMiiDepts et al, 30 Nov 71, ibid. As mentioned in Chapter 10, Wilbur,

as ASD(H&E), was a member of the task group but not of the Policy Committee.

18. Memo Wilbur for ASD(ISA), 7 Jan 72, circulated by memo Selden for SecsMilDepts et al,

11 Jan 72, 1'1' files. In referring to the December Policy Committee meeting Selden wrote, "As

you arc aware, the Committee's deliberarions were inconclusive." No minutes of the nleeting

have been discovered.
Notes to Pages 292-303 575

19. Memo James E. Johnson (ASecNav) for ASD(lSA), 26 Jan 72, memo Borda for ASD(ISA),

22 Jan 72: ibid.

20. Memo Arthur W. Allen, Jr. (DepASecArmy) for ASD(lSA), 26 Jan 72, memo Borda for ASD

(ISA), 22 Jan 72: ibid.

21. Memo (DJSM-137-72) Vogr for ASD(lSA), 25 Jan 72, ibid.

22. Memo Benjamin forman (AsstGenCoun) for PrinDepASD(lSA), 13 Jan 72, memo LtGen

Jammie M. Philpotr (DepDirDlA) for ASD(lSA), 24 Jan 72, memo Daniel Z. Henkin (ASD

(PA)) for ASD(lSA), 2 Feb 72, memo Kelley for ASD(lSA), 25 Jan 72: TF files.

23. Memo Shields for Nutter, 3 Feb 72, ibid.

24. The successive versions appear as attachments to memos Nutter for SecsMilDepts et a!' 11 Feb,

14 Mar 72, ibid.

25. Memo Nutter for SecsMilDepts er a!' 14 Mar 72, ibid.

26. Memo Wilbur for SecsMilDepts, 17 Mar 72, ibid.

27. Memo Arthur W. Allen, Jr., for ASD(H&E), 22 Mar 72, memo Johnson for ASD(H&E),

22 Mar 72, memo Borda for ASD(H&E), 24 Mar 72, memo Wilbur for ASD(lSA), 7 Apr 72:

TF files.

28. PW/MIA Task Force, Point Paper on Status of Proposed Policy for Medical Processing of

Rerurnees, nd rca 29 Mar 72], memo Hayes for ASD(H&E), 14 Apr 72, memo Epes for Nutter,

nd lea 3 Apr 72], ibid.

29. Msg CINCPAC for CjCS, 270259Z Apr 72, ibid.

30. Memo BrigGen William M. Schoning USAF for Dir PW/MIA Task Force, 21 Apr 72, ibid.

31. Handwritten memo Wilbur for Nutter, nd, filed with memo Hayes for ASD(H&E), 14 Apr 72,

in Shields collection, TF files. Admittedly speculative, this account rests almost entirely on

the Wilbur note, there being no other documentary evidence. Addressed to "Warren" and

signed "Dick W.," the note continued, "Let me know if I can help more." The tone seems to

be that of a writer who has made a concession to facilitate agreemenr. A date between 22 and

28 April appears probable, since the Air Force memo of 21 April described Wilbur as still

advocating "an inflexible detention period overseas" of 14 days.

32. Memo Nutter for SecDef, 4 May 72, TF files.

33. Memo Laird for SecsMilDepts et ai, 16 May 72, SecDd 383.6 Vietnam (Apr-May 72).

Available records do not reveal the process by which the significant changes in the latter part

of the Wilbur paragraph came into place.

34. Msg JCS 5607 for CINCPAC, 31 May 72, TF files.

35. Msg CINCPAC for JCS, 042200Z Jun 72, ibid.

36. Msg JCS 4794 I(H CINCPAC, 15 Jul 72, ibid.

37. Msg CINCPAC for JCS/SecDef, 212336Z Jul 72, CINCPAC 1nsrr C3461 IC, 3 Aug 72: ibid.

38. CINCPAC Instr C3461.1C, 3 Aug 72, ibid.

39. The Air Force record of conference participation is contained in a memo dated 29 August 1972

in TF files. Regarding medical processing it noted with evident approval that "medical procedures will be accomplished only as clinically indicated to prevent unnecessary delay overseas."

for the fuller record maintained by the conference recorder see memo ACofS Personnel,

CINCPAC Hq, for Ch PW/MIA Task Force, 25 Aug 72, ibid.

40. Memo Shields for Nurrer, nd, sub: DoD PW Policy Commirree Meeting, 27 November 1972,

1500 hours, ibid; memo Nutter for SecsMilDepts cr a!' 29 Nov 72, ISA 383.6 (Nov-Dec 72). In

addition to announcing approval of the medical form, Nurrer imposed a strict confidentiality

on the information that would be recorded on it regarding individual rerurnees. The data "will

not be utilized in any manner except for internal official use."

41. Msg CINCPAC for SecDef, 080319Z Dec 72, TF files.

42. Msg CINCPAC for JCS, 042200Z Jun 72, ibid.

43. Memo Paul H. Nitze (DepSecDeO for SecsMilDepts and CjCS, 30 Nov 68, SeeDef 383.6 (1968);

memo Laird for SecsMilDepts and CjCS, 27 Oct 70, ISA 383.6 (1970). When recommending

this change on behalf of the Policy Commirree, Nurrer had written that "it would, among

other things, help to relieve the feeling of many parents that they are the 'forgorren' next of

kin"; memo Nutter for SeeDef, 23 Oct 70, ibid.
576 Notes to Pages 304-16

44. Memo Laird for SecsMilDepts and C]CS, 26 Aug 72, ISA 383.6 (Aug 72).

45. Memo for ASD(ISA), 7 Aug 72, ibid. As recounted in Chapter 9, the absence of clear legal

authority had been similarly raised, discussed, and discounted wben the first directive on nextof-kin travel was being prepared in 1968.

46. Memo Nutter for ASD(M&RA), 28 Jul 72, ISA .383.6 (Jun-Jul 72).

47. Memo Rush for SecsMilDepts and C)CS, 4 Dec 72, ibid (Nov-Dec 72).

48. Msg CINCpAC for CINCUSARpAC et al, 06044 IZ Dec 72, Tf files.

49. Memo Nutter for SecDef, 13 Dec 72, SecDcf .383.6 Vietnam (Nov-Dec 72).

15. REPATRIATION PLANNING: REHABILITATION AND READJUSTMENT

1. Memo Nutter for SecDef, 12 Oct 70, ISA 383.6 N. Vietnam (Oct 70); memo Armistead I. Selden,

Jr. (PrinDepASD(ISA)) for SecsMilDepts et al, 27 Feb 71, memo Nutter for SecsMilDepts

and ASD(M&RA), 3 Jun 71: TF tiles. A representative of OASD(H&E) later joined the panel.

2. Report of the 000 PW/MIA Rehabilitation/Readjustment Study Panel, Jan 72, SecDef 383.6

Vietnam (7 Jun 72).

3. Ibid. The report stated rhat rhe record of American survivors of the German and Italian PW

camps of World War II differed notably from that of captives of the Japanese. "Pacific

prisoners from World War II averaged an initial 50 percent excess of deaths as compared with

the expected U.S. rate, and the death rate did not decline to the usual range for ten years

following release. .. On the other hand, the mortality rate compiled in the case of European

prisoners was lower than the ordinary rate for U.S. males." Accordingly, the panel members

felt justified in using the captivity experience at the hands of the Japanese, North Koreans,

and Chinese Communists as their guide when attempting to gauge the effects of imprisonment

by the Vietnamese enemy.

4. Ibid.

5. !I;1emo Nutter for SecDef, 27 May 72, memo Laird for SecsMilDepts et ai, 7 Jun 72: ibid.

6. Memo Nutter for ASD(M&RA), 24 Jul 72, memo M. Richard Rose (DepASD(M&RA)) for

AsstSecsMilDepts, 6 Oct 72: TF files. For an account of the Air force experience in providing

career counseling to returnees and aiding their selection of active duty assignments, see Air

Force Military Personnel Center, Special History of Project HOMECOMING: Ojjicer Career

Development Division: 1 November 1912-31 October 191.3, PW colI, OSD Hist.

7. Memo Frank M. McKernan (OASD(M&RA)) for "Conference Participants," 9 Nov 72, TF tiles.

8. OASD(M&RA) pampblet, "Guidelines for Career Planning and Otber Assistance for Returned

POW/MIA Personnel," Nov 72, revised the following month to add a section on assistance

available from the OHlce of Minority Business Enterprise, Department of Commerce, TF files.

During the same period the Department of Labor produced its own "Resource Handbook for

Implementation of Program for POW/MIA Returnees," 6 Dec 72, and tbe Veterans Administration's Department of Veterans Benefits published DVB Circular 20-72-94, "Prisoner of

War/Missing in Action (POW/M1A) Rerurnee Program," 8 Dec 72, ihid. Sec memo Shields

for MajGen V. L. Bowers et al [Task Group members], 8 Jan 73, ISA 383.6 (Jan 73).

9. Memo McKernan for BrigGen Russell G. Ogan (Dir pW/MIA Task Force), 29 Jan 73, TF files.

Another OASD(M&RA) publication was the "Directory: Federal Agency and Industry Contacts

for Assistance to Rerurned POW/MIA," rev cd, Jan 7.), ibid.

10. Mcmo Shields for BrigGen Paul C. Watson et al, 19 Nov 71, memo Nutter for ASD(H&E),

2 Dec 71: ibid.

11. Mcmo Hayes for ASD(lSA), 14 Dec 72, ibid.

12. Memo Nutter for ASD(H&E) and ASD(M&RA), 10 Nov 72, memo Hayes for ASD(ISA),

14 Dec 72: ibid.

1.3. Memo Shields for Hayes, 16 Jan 73, ibid.

14. Memo Wilbur for ASD(ISA), ASD(M&RA), and AssrSecsMilDcpts (M&RA), 22 May 73, TF files.

Most of the returnees chose to continue in active duty status; others were retired with various

degrees of disability. Thus the category covered by the ahove policy was relatively small. By
Notes to Pages 317-24 577

November 1973 the "Roster of Designated Prisoners of War" contained 51 names; see memo

Hayes for Asst ro ASD(ISA), 5 Nov 73, ibid.

15. Memo Shields for Lawrence Eagleburger (ActgASD(lSA)), 3 May 7.3, ibid.

16. Memo Nurrer for SecsMilDepts and ASD(H&E), 13 Jun 72, ISA 383.6 (Jun-Jul 72).

17. Memo Ogan for Shields, IS Aug 72, TF files.

18. ltr Shields ro Iris Powers, Ch Cte on Repatriarion, Rehabilitation and Readjusrment, NLOF,

22 Sep 72, ibid.

19. Ibid. The family briefing rours were conducred pursuant to memo Nutter for SecsMilDepts,

13 Jul 72, ISA 383.6 (Jun-Jul 72). The otigin of rhis ditective is discussed in Chapter 18.

20. Memo BrigGen K. L. Tallman (AsstDCS/Pers AF) for AF/XOX, 29 Aug 72, TF files.

21. Memo BrigGen William M. Schoning (DepDir for Plans & Policy, DCS/P&O AF) for Dir

PW/MIA Task Force, 21 Aug 72, ibid.

22. Memo DepChNavPers fot Dir PW/MIA Task Force, 16 Aug 72, memo MajGen E. B. Wheeler

(ACS USMC) for Dir PW/MIA Task Force, 7 Aug 72, memo MajGen Verne L. Bowers (TAG)

for Dir PW/MIA Task Force, 31 Aug 72: ibid.

23. The revised versions published during 1972, with subsequent changes, were the plans in effect

at the rime of Operation Homecoming in early 1973. They included the following, all ro be

found in TF files: HQDA OPLAN EGRESS-RECAP-ARMY, 19 Oct 72; CNO EGRESS

RECAP OPlAN, 26 Oct 72; USAF EGRESS RECAP, IS Apr 72; CINCpAC Instr C3461.1C,

3 Aug 72; COMUSMACV OPlAN J 190, 3 Nov 72; L3th Air Force OplAN EGRESS RECAP,

I Dec 72; MAC EGRESS RECAP, 25 Feb 72. During 1972 the Marine Corps continued

issuing changes to irs basic Marine Corps Order 03461.1, 19 Feb 70.

24. Memo Nutrer for SecsMilDepts et ai, 1 Dec 71, ISA 383.6 (Oct-Dec 71).

25. Texts or outlines of the Nutter, Epes, and Shields presentations ate in TF files, as is the full Report,

Department of Defense U.S. Prisoner of War Repatriation Planning Conference, 19-21 Jan 72.

26. Msg JCS 6711 for CINCpAC et al, 7 Mar 72, TF files.

27. Memo RAdm H. H. Epes, Jr. (Dir PW/MIA Task Force) for OSD(C), 22 Feb 72, ISA 383.6

(Jan-Mar 72).

28. Msg ClNCPAC for JCS, 122118Z Mar 72, msg JCS 3928 for CINCPAC, 22 Mar 72: TF files.

No attempt will be made to treat the complexities of the communications support question,

which apparently was resolved satisfactorily. Two key messages in the exchange were msg

CINCPAC for JCS, 112234Z Jul 72, and msg JCS 5733 for CINCPAC, 7 Aug 72, ibid.

29. Msg CINCPAC for ONCUSARPAC et al, 052109Z Feb 72, ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. HQ USAF Military Airlift Command, MAC Egress Recap, 25 Feb 72, OASD(lSA) Report, Department of Defense U.S. Prisoner of War Repatriation Planning Conference, 19-21 Jan 72: ibid.

32. Msg CINCLANT for JCS, I 8223.3Z Jan 72, msg JCS 5558 for ClNCLANT, 28 Jan 72: ibid.

33. Msg JCS 1610 for USCINCEUR, 22 Jun 72, ibid .

.34. Memo laird for SecsMilDepts and C]CS, 15 Jul 72, msg JCS 3933 for USCINCEUR,

5 Aug 72: ISA 38.).(, (Jun-Jld 72).

35. Memo Shields fi,r PW/MIA Task Group, 7 Sep 72, ISA 383.6 (Sep-Oct 72); OASD(lSA),

EGRESS RECAP Visit Agenda, 15, 16 and 17 Nov 72, USEUCOM EGRESS RECAP

European Directive ED 35-5, Nov 72: TF files.

36. Documents revealing preparations for the conference include memo Epes for PW/MIA

Task Group Members, 17 May 72, msg CINCPAC for JCS, 262305Z May 72, msg JCS 2015

for USCINCEUR et ai, 12 Jul 72, Agenda, DoD/PAC EGRESS RECAP Conference, 9, 10

and I 1 Aug 72: TF files. The conference recordet's report was forwatded by memo ACS/Pers

CINCPAC fot Ch [Dit] PW/MIA Task Force, 25 Aug 72, and an Air Force summary of rhe

proceedings is contained in memo Col Ray A. Dunn, Jr. (Ch Global Plans and Pol Div, Dir Plans,

DCS/P&O AF) for AF/XOXX, 29 Aug 72: ibid. Unless orherwise indicated, discussions and

actions of the August conference described in the following account arc based on these

two sources.

37. Msg CINCPAC for CMDR 13th AF, CC; USARBCO Okinawa, and CINCPACREPGUAM/

TTPI, 182219Z Jun 72, ibid.
578 Notes to Pages 325-46

38. Memo Ogan for Schoning, 23 Aug 72, ISA 383.6 (Aug 72).

39. lrr Epes fa Col George !les (Cdr 1126rh USAF FAG), 8 Mar 72, TF files; memo Shields for

RAdm D. B. Whirmire (DIAl, 8 Jun 72, ISA 383.6 (Jan-Jun 72).

40. Memo Nutter for SecsMilDeprs, qcs, and Dir DIA, 11 Ocr 72, ISA 383.6 (Sep-Oct 72);

msg DIA 4186 for CINCPAC er al, 211432Z Nov 72, TF files.

41. Memo Hayes for Dir PW/MIA Task Force, 3 Aug 72, ISA 383.6 (Aug 72); memo Nutter

for DepASD(A) (D. O. Cooke), 4 Ocr 72, ibid (Sep-Ocr 72); memo Cooke for AcrgASD(ISA),

8 Feb 73, TF files.

42. Msg CINCPAC for JCS, 201925Z Jun 72, TF flies.

43. Memo Capr K. W. Wade (Acrg CHINFO, Navy) for Dir Office of Informarion for the Armed

Forces, 19 Nov 68, memo RAdm L. R. Geis (CHINFO, Navy) for DepASD(PA), 7 Ocr 69, memo

Capt James H. Scott (SpecAssr for POW/MIA Matters, OCNO) for Shields, 26 Apr 72: ibid.

44. PW/MIA Task Force, Weekly Acriviries Reports, 19 Nov 71, 23 Jun 72, memo Shields for

Whirmire, 23 Jun 72, Srate Airgram A-2884 for US Mission Geneva et al, 22 Mar 72, msg

State 128111 for Manila, Saigon, and Vientiane, 14 Jul 72: TF files.

45. Msg Srare 122602 for Manila, 7 Jul 72, PW/MIA Task Force, Weekly Activities Report,

19 Nov 71: ibid.

46. ltr Sievem fa Ogan, 1 Nov 72, ibid; memo Shields for Sieverrs, 24 Jan 7.), ISA 383.6 (Jan 73).

47. Memo Shields for Sieverrs, 24 Jan 73, ISA 383.6 (Jan 73).

16. REPATRIATION PLANNING: PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND CONDUCT IN CAPTIVITY

I. DoD Dir 5230.9, 24 Dec 66.

2. Memo Nitze for SeesMilDepts and CJCS, 8 Jun 68, SeeDef 383.6 (J 968); CINCPAC Instr

03461.lA, 13 Jun 69, TF files.

3. Report of the Public Affairs Work Group, 21 Jan 72, Tab C ro Report, Department of

Defense U.S. Prisoner of War Reparriation Planning Conference, 19-21 Jan 72, memo Henkin

for ASD(ISA) er al, 15 May 72: TF files.

4. Memo MajGen leo D. Benade (DepASD(M&RA)) for ASD(PAl, 23 May 72, memo Selden for

ASD(PA), 31 May 72: ibid.

5. Memo Shields for ASD(PA), 16 Jun 72, ISA 383.6 Ouo-Jul 72).

6. Memo Henkin for SecArmy et ai, 3 Aug 72, TF files; the following discussion contains

numerous extracts from rhis 18-page guidance direcrive.

7. CINCPAC Instr C3461.1 C, 3 Aug 72, ibid.

8. ASD(PA) EGRESS RECAP Conference Agenda and lisr of Attendees, 9 Nov 72, ibid.

9. OASD(PA), "EGRESS RECAP Poinrs of Conract for Defense Public Affairs Officers," nd

[9 Nov 72], ibid.

10. Shields, "Commenrs before PA EGRESS RECAP Conference," 9 Nov 72, ibid.

II. Memo Nutter for SecDef, 12 Ocr 70, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Aug-Ocr 70).

12. ltr Vinson to laird, 23 Aug 71, ibid (Aug-Sep 71).

13. ltt Nutter to Vinson, 1 Sep 71, ibid.

14. For the Uniform Code of Military Justice see \0 U.S.c. 801-940. The text also appears in U.S.

Dept of Defense, Manual jar Courts-Martial, 1969 (rev ed). The mosr recenr revision had been

effecred by rhe Milirary Jusrice Acr of 1968, Pl 90-632, 24 Oct 68.

15. Report, Departmenr of Defense U.S. Prisoncr of War Reparriarion Planning Conference,

19-21 Jan 72, TF files.

16. Marine Corps Order 03461.1, 19 Feb 70. HQ USAF Plan EGRESS RECAP/AIR FORCE

[formerly SENTINEL ECHO], I Jul 68, was superseded by USAF EGRESS RECAP, 15 Apr 72;

rhe revisioos issued by rbe Army and Navy were HQDA OPlAN ECRESS-RECAP-ARMY,

19 Ocr 72, and CNO EGRESS RECAP OPlAN, 26 Ocr 72. All in TF files.

17. Memo Shields for Barrimo, 25 Jul 72, ISA 383.6 Oun-Jtd 72).

18. Memo Cdr J. H. Baum (Ch Ad Hoc Working Group) for AssrGenCoun, 15 Sep 72, ibid

(Sep-Ocr 72).
Notes to Pages 347-58 579

19. Memo Shields for MajGen V. L. Bowers USA et al, 22 SCI' 72. ibid; memo Bowers for Shields.

6 OCt 72, memo BrigGen William M. Schoning USAF for Ch PW/MIA Task Group, 11 Oct 72:

TF files. The ad hoc working group had submitted its report without the concurrence of its

Marine Corps member, who provided a written dissent three days later. No copy of the latter

document has been discovered, but Bowers quoted some of its provisions when signifying

the Army's agreement with them.

20. Memo Shields for Bowers et aI, 25 Oct 72, memo MajGen James S. Cheney (JAG, AF) for

AF/XO, 10 Nov 72: ibid.

21. Memo RAdm Robert B. Baldwin (DepChNavPers) for Ch POW Special Cte (Col Vincent

A. DiMauro, PW/MIA Task Force), 17 Nov 72, memo Col Donald S. Aines (Ch Casualty

Div, TAGO) for DiMauro, 30 Nov 72, memo Col E. A. Parnell USMC for Ch PW/MIA

Task Group, 1 Dec 72: ibid.

22. Memo Schoning for PWIMIA Task force, 5 Dec 72, w/attach memo Cheney for AF/XO,

10 Nov 72, ibid.

23. Ibid; Change 1, 15 Jan 73, to USAF EGRESS RECAP, 15 Apr 72, Tf files. The published

change was an edited and somewhat expanded version of the draft quoted above.

24. Memo Selden for AsstGenCaun, 2 Aug 72, ibid.

25. Memo Bartima for DiMauro, 13 Nov 72, ibid; Davis interv with Barrimo, 13 Feb 80, PW call,

OSD His!. Nearly five years earlier Barrimo had recommended that "in view of the disparate

tteatment of returning Korean POWs," OSD officials "should make every efforr to obtain a

uniform approach now to obviate inconsisteot practices of the Services in the past"; see memo

Bartimo for Havens. 13 May 68, TF files.

26. Memo Bartimo for Shields, 16 Sep 72, ISA 38.3.6 (Sep-Oct 72).

27. Memo Shields for Bowers et aI, 22 Sep 72, ibid; memo Schoning for Ch PW/MIA Task

Group, 11 Oct 72, memo Parnell for Ch PW/MIA Task Group, 1 Dec 72: TF files.

28. Memrec, Davis interv with Forrest Holmes (DepAsstGenCoun), 19 Dec 79, PW coIl, OSD His!.

29. The account in this and following paragraphs is based on documents that were discussed

with Laird but never formally transmitted. Though prepared in final form, after coordination

completed on 8 December 1972, they bear no date or signature. The ribbon copies found in

TF files consist of memo Shields for Nutter, forwarding the recommended memo Nutter

for SecDef.

.30. When interviewed some years later Laird believed it had not been his intention to reject the

review board proposal but rarher to postpone announcing his decision until return of the

prisoners was a certainty. Sioce that condition was just coming to fulfillment when he left

office on 29 January J973, the matter passed to his successor, Elliot Richardson. Davis interv

with l.aird, 6 Apr 81, PW coli, OSD His!.

31. Memo Parnell for Ch PW/MIA Task Group, 1 Dec 72, TF files.

.32. Ibid .

.3.3. Public Statements of Secretary of Defeme MeltJin R. Laird, /972, .3256-57.

34. One listenet wrote that even to raise the possibility of court-martial action against the returnees

was an "appalling and insensitive suggestion"; less elegantly, another called on l.aird to "shut

your mourh." A dozen or so letters in this vein are to be found in ISA 383.6 North Vietnam

(16-30 Sep), (21-31 Oct), and (1-9 Nov) 72.

35. Laird Public St{Jtements, 1972, .3268, 3271-72, 3283, 3291-92, 5.302; transc, ASD(PA)

Morning Press Briefing, 2 Oct 72, TF files.

17. MAIL AND PACKAGES

I. Ltr Robert C. Lewis (VPresARC) to LtCol Charles F. Kraak (PW/MIA Task Force, OASD

(ISA)), 11 Oct 72, msg Geneva 49.3, 19 Feb 69, msg Geneva 3866, 12 Nov 70: TF files. The

final total of letters forwarded by ARC in 1972 is nor available. Since Lewis certified that it

had reached 995 during September, with only a slight downward trend in the monrh-tomonth fIgures, it seems safe to say the volume was "above 1,000 letters in 1972."
580 Notes to Pages 358-69

2. Ltr Sieverrs to Sheble, 20 Sep 68, TF files.

3. Msg Moscow 5833, 3 Oct 68, ibid.

4. Lrr Sieverrs to Harriman, 4 Oct 68, msg Paris 22111 (DELTO 808), 9 Oct 68: ihid.

5. Na [US Post Office Dept], "Debriefing Session: Negotiations on Prisoner of War MailOctober 1968," nd, Itr VAdm Charles K. Duncan (ChNavPers) to "Dear Wives and Parents,"

20 Nov 68: ibid.

6. AI' ticker item 68, 26 Nov 68, msg Bern 4984, 20 Nov 68, msg Bern 5094, 2 Dec 68: ibid.

7. Msg Paris 25258 (DEITO 1049), 12 Dec 68, msg State 286468 (TODEL 1775) for Paris et ai,

13 Dec 68, memo Capt John W. Thornton USN for Charles W. Havens III, 13 Dec 68,

memreC Thornron, 13 Dec 68: ihid. Thornron was convinced that "Hanoi purposely cut the

time short by holding off their answer ... just to throw a monkey wrench into our plans."

8. Msg State 287247 for Moscow, 14 Dec 68, msg State 287507 for Moscow, 15 Dec 68, In

F.. A. Motin to Sheble, 9 Jan 69: TF files; Wmhiny,ton POSI, 18 Jan 69.

9. US Post Office Dept, "Meeting on POW Parcels," 3 Jan 69, TF files.

10. Memrec Havens, 19 Feb 69, ibid; Washington Post, 4 Jul 6').

11. Msg State 122169 (TO DEl..3(10) for Paris and Moscow, 23 Jul 69, box 25 (Christmas Packages-1970), 79-D317; msg Paris 10947 (DELTO 1952), 18 Jul 69, msg Saigon 14895,

24 Jul 69: TF files; Washington Post, 25 Jul 69.

12. Ltr Col J. G. Luther (Directorate of Personnel Services, AF) to "Dear Air Force Next of Kin,"

22 Jul 69, msg State 140936 (T()DEL 3133) for Paris, 20 Aug 69: TF files.

13. Msg Paris 17095 (DELTO 2275), 5 Nov 69, msg Srate 187547 crODEL .3459) for Paris,

5 Nov 69, msg State 200260 (TODEL 35(7) f(H Moscow, I Dec 69: ibid.

14. Text of DoD statement, 17 Nov 69, ibid; New York Times, 18 Nov 69.

15. Msg State 3395 (TODEL 3736),9 Jan 70, box 25 (Christmas Packages-I 970), 79-D317;

msg Paris 1939R (DELTO 24(3), 30 Dec 69, msg Moscow 568, 2 Feb 70: TF files; Washington

Post, 15 Jan 70.

16. Memo Col Franklin Rose, Jr. (AmDepDir f'H Plans & Policy, DCS/P&O AF) for distribution,

23 Jan 70, Itr Luther to "Dear Air Force Next of Kin," I') Sep 69: TF files; documents,

na, "Suggested Items for Packages" and "Suggested Health Items and Dietary Supplements,"

attach to "Instructions for the Preparation and Mailing of Christmas Parcels to North Vietnam," nd [Nov 69], ibid.

17. New York li"mes, 2 Apr 70; msg Vientiane 8323, 28 Dec 70, box 25 (Prisoners: Mail Delivery),

79-D317.

18. Msg FBIS Okinawa for COMUSMACV et a/, 090552Z Nov 70, msg State 190952 for

Moscow, 21 Nov 70: TF files; memO Epes for Nurrer, 8 Apr 71, ISA 383.6 North Vietnam

(8-13 Apr 71) (quore).

19. Memrec LtCol William E. Gregerson (PW/MIA -LlSk Force), 7 Apr 71, TF files.

20. pW/MIA Task Force, "PW Package Statistics," 7 Feb 72, ibid.

21. PW/MIA Task Force Poinr Paper, 10 Dec 71 [stamped "SecDef has seen"], SecDef 383.6

Vietnam (Dec 71); msg FBIS Okinawa for }OBIS Washington et al. II0254Z Nov 71, TF files;

New York limes, II Nov 71.

22. OASD(PA) News Release No 1080-71,29 Dec 71, TF files.

23. Msg State 233069 for USDEL France, 30 Dec 71, PW/MIA Task Force Talking Paper, 1 hb 72

(quote), rnemrec Col Charles W. Hayward (USDEL France), 5 Jan 72: ibid.

24. Msg FBIS Okinawa for COMUSMACV et al. 221617Z Jan 72, ibid.

25. Ltr Weiss to "Dear friends," 31 Jan 72, ibid.

26. PW/MIA Task Force, "DoD Package Program-Past Pracrices," nd [7 feb 72], ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Statements developed from data in folder "US pW/MIA Mail Statisrics," TF files.

29. Memo Shields f(" PW/MIA Task Croup Members, 22 Nov 72, msg FBIS Okinawa for FBIS

Washington et ai, 280752Z Nov 72: ibid.

30. "US PW/MIA Mail Statistics," ibid.

31. Extracts from letters of four PWs, dated 16, 21, 22 Aug and 4 Oct 67, ibid.
Notes to Pages 370-80 581

32. Memo Benjamin Forman (AsstGenCoun) for Paul C. Warnke (ASD(ISA)), 2 Jan 68, memo

Thornton for Warnke, 2 Jan 68: ISA 383.6 North Vietnam (1968); memo William W. Hancock

(DepGenCoun AF) for ASD(ISA), 20 Dec 67, TF files.

33. Memo Hancock for ASD(ISA), 20 Dec 67, ibid.

34. Memo Warnke for SecsMilDepts et al, 17 Jan 68, ISA 383.6 (Jan-Jun (8): memo Forman for

Warnke, 2 Jan 68, memo Thornton for Warnke, 2 Jan 68: 383.6 North Vietnam (19G8).

35. Ltt Warnke to Margaret W. Schwartz (TreasDept), 30 Jan 68, TF files.

36. Ltrs Schwartz to Warnke, 6 Feb, 21 Jun 68, ISA .383.6 North Vietnam (1968); Itt Schwartz

to Warnke, 10 Oct 68, memo). William Doolittle (ASecAF) for ASD(ISA), 30 Apr 68, memo

Warnke for SecsMilDepts et ai, 19 ScI' 68: ibid.

37. Ltt Warnke to Schwartz, 20 Dec 68, TF files.

38. Ibid; Itr Schwartz to Warnke, 6 Jan 69, Itt Nutter to Schwartz, 7 Apr 70, Itr Schwartz to

Nuttet, 17 Apr 70, Itt Edmund C. Ursin (Of'fGenCoun AI') to Petet A. Knowles (Riggs National

Bank), 6 May 69, Itt Knowles to Ursin, 5 Aug 69: ibid.

.)9. PW/MIA Task Force, "PW/MIA Letter Mail Statisrics," .)l Dec 72, ibid.

40. Msg State 211955 (TODEL 3(77) for Paris, 24 Dec 69, memo Col Robert E. Work fat Dennis

J. Doolin (DepASD(ISA)), 24 Dec 69: TF files.

41. Msg State 4395 ('rODEL 3747) for Paris, 9 Jan 70, msg Paris 1270 (DEITO 25(0), 3 Feb 70

(quote): ibid; Washington Post, 19 Jan 70.

42. COLIAFAM press release, "Profiles and Background Information on Peace Escott Delegation

to Hanoi and the Committee of Liaison ...," 13 SCI' 72, TF files.

43. New Yrirk Times, 1(, Jan 70.

44. Msg State 231495 !'H USDEL Ftance, 28 Dec 71, msg State 211995 (TODEL 3(77) fot Paris,

24 Dec 6'), msg Srate 191993 f'if USDEL France, 24 Nov 70, Itr Weiss ro "Dear ftiends,"

31 Jan 72: TF files.

45. Memo Nutter for SecsMilDepts et ai, 18 Feb 70, ibid.

46. Dept State Bulletin, 16 Mar 70,347-48; msg State .31603 (TODEL 3955) f,)[ Patis, 4 Mar 70,

TF flles.

47. Memo Nutter for SecDef, 20 Oct 70, msg State 17.3766 for USDEL hance, 21 OCt 70: ibid.

Blount earned high marks with the U.S. mission staff in Geneva for the effectiveness of

his presentation bel,)[e the governing body of the JeRc, which was reported as having

"cemented a fitm relationship of mutual confidence between USC; and ICRC"; see msg

Geneva 3866, 12 Nov 70, ibid.

48. Ltt Selden to Blount, 29 Oct 70, ISA 383.6 North Vietnam (1970); Itt Blount to Amb William

). Porter (USDEL hance), 20 Sep 71, msg USDEL hance 17422, 15 Oct 71: ibid.

49. Msg State 22065 f'H Moscow, 9 Feb 71, TF files; House Cte on For AfTs, Subcte on National

Security Policy and Scientific Developments, American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia,

1971: Hearings, 92 Cong, 1 sess, 31 Mar 71, 232-.13.

50. Msg Moscow 831, 10 Feb 71, msg State 24103 !'H Moscow, 12 Feb 71, msg Moscow 1980,

31 Mar 71, Itr Sussman to E. A. Motin, 8 Apr 71: TF flies.

51. Memrec Maj Dannie M. Jackson, II Jan 71, memrec LtCol Gregerson (PW/M1A Task Force),

7 Apr 71: ibid.

52. PW/MIA Task Group Briefing Paper, 19 May 71, sub: New PW/MIA Letter Mail Route

Via Moscow, dtaft memo [ASD(lSA))] for AsstSecsMilDepts (M&RA), nd [May 71 j: ibid.

53. Msg State 132349 fOt Moscow, 21 Jul 71, msg Moscow 5218,2.3 .lui 71, Itr Sussman to

Motin, 28 Jul 71, Itt Motin to Sussman, 12 Aug 71: ibid.

54. Memo Fpes for BrigGen Robert E. Pursley (MilAsst to SecDef'), .30 Jul 71, SeeDef 38.3.6

Vietnam Oun-Jul 71); PW/MIA Task Force fact Sheet, nd Ica 1 ScI' 71], sub: Reduction In

PW Mail from Norrh Vietnam in 1971, TF files.

55. National League of Families News Release, nd [ca I Oct 71], sub: Mail from Prisoners of

War Shatply Reduced, msg State 200538 for USDEL hance, 3 Nov 71: ibid; Dept State

Bulletin, 22 Nov 71, 587.

56. New York Times,S Nov 71; Dept State Bulll'till, 20 Dec 71, 704, 27 Dec 71, 7.30; Img US DEL

France 20544, 2 Dec 71, TF flies.
582 Notes to Pages 381-90

57. Msg State 130592 for Vientiane, 20 Jul 71, msg State 231495 for USDEL France, 28 Dec 71:

TF flies; New York Times, 23 Dec 71.

58. New Ytlrk Times, 3 Dec 71; PW/MIA Task Force, "Comments on December 2 Meering and

Press Briefing," nd [3 Dec 7I?], TF flies.

59. A number of former prisoners mentioned the letter moratorium during debriefing or in

their published memoirs; see for example, John A. Dramesi, Code of Honor, 220, 240, and

Armand J. Myers et ai, Vietnam POW Camp Histories and Studies (Air War College srudy,

1974), vol I, 398-400, PW call, OSD Hist. See also Rochester and Kiley, Honor Bound, 537.

60. Msg State 221031 for USDEL France, 8 Dec 71, msg Srate 2.31495 for US DEL France,

28 Dec 71: TF flies; New York Times, 2.) Dec 71.

61. New York Times, 23 Dec 71; memo Nutter for SecDef, 2.3 Dec 71, memo LtGen J. M.

Philpott (ActgDirDlA) for SecDef, nd [ca 24 Dec 71]: SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Dec 71).

62. Ltt Amb Henry Cabot Lodge to Sievens, 21 Aug 70, msg State 2.31495 for USDEI. France,

28 Dec 71: TF flies.

63. Msg Paris 1415 (DELTO 2577), 6 feb 70, ibid; Itt Havens to Sieverts, 15 Feb 69, ISA

.38.3.6 Vietnam (Jan-Jul (9).

64. Msg State 41648 for Algiers, 21 Mar 70, msg State 267409 (TODEI. 1491) for Paris, 6 Nov 68,

msg State 34057 (TODEL 3979) for Paris, 7 Mar 70: 1'1' flies; msg Geneva 49.3, 19 Feb 69,

box 25 (Prisoners: Letters to Relatives), 79-0317.

65. Msg Stare 191570 for USDEL France, I') Ocr 71, filed with exttacts from Sexton debriefing, 1'1' files.

66. Msg State 4055 for USDEI. France, 8 Jan 72, PW/MIA Task Force document, "Addressees

of Embassy of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam," nd [annotated

"Sent to Casualty offices on 10/13170"]: ibid.

67. Memo Shields for Nutter, 1 Feb 72, msg State 18241 for USDEL France, 2 Feb 72: ibid;

WrlShington Post, I Feb 72. In news reports and some internal government correspondence the

541 figure appeared as "451."

68. Msg State 4055 for USDEL France, 8 Jan 72, memo Epes for MajGen V. L. Bowers et a!'

20 Jan 72: 1'1' files.

69. Memo Selden for SecsMilDepts, 1 Dec 71, ISA .383.6 (Oct-Dec 71).

70. Memo BrigGen R. B. Carney, Jr. USMC for ASD(ISA), 31 Jan 72, memo Epes for Bowers et ai,

24 Mar 72: TF files.

71. PW/MIA Task force Point Paper, 17 Aug 72, sub: Letter Mail for PW in Nortb Vietnam,

ibid; memo Shields for Task Group Members, 24 Aug 72, ISA 383.6 (Aug 72); memo Shields

for PW/MIA Task Group Members, 22 Sep 72, ibid (Sep-Oct 72).

72. Statements developed from log entries in TF file "US PW/MIA Mail Statistics"; memos

Sieverts for Marshall Green (ASecState), 23 Mar, 14 Nov 72, box 21 [loose papers], 79-0317.

73. New York Times, 26 Jul 72; Washington Post, 16 Sep 72; msg State 134787 for Saigon, 25 Jul 72,

TF files. Spokesmen for Kennedy took care to publicize the Jusrice Department's opinion

rhat his correspondence was not a violation of the Logan Act, which forbids private citizens

to conduct foreign policy.

74. Log entries in TF file "US pW/MIA Mail Sratistics," 1'1' flies.

75. National League of families newsletter, Oct 72, w/attach "Resolutions Approved during

rhe Third Annual Meeting, 14-17 October, 1972," news item clipping, Philadelphia Inquirer,

18 Oct 72: TF files.

76. Memo Shields for Sieverrs, 16 Oct 72, msg Paris 17830 (DEI.TO 2317), 18 Nov 69, msg

State 194280 for Saigon, 19 Nov 69, msg Paris 18074 (DELTO 2341), 21 Nov 69, msg

USDEL France 22832, 29 Nov 72: ibid.

77. New York Times, 2 Jan 7.); PWIMIA Task Force Point Paper, 5 Jan 73, sub: Recent Mail From

Prisoners of War, TF files.

7S. Memo Epes For BrigGen Daniel James, Jr. (DepASD(PA)), \ feb 72, ISA 383.6 North

Vietnam (1-4 Feb 72).
Notes to Pages 391-401 583

18. INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE FOR PW/MIA FAMILIES

1. Memo Laird for SecArmy et al, I Mat 69, OASD(PA) News Release No 149-69, 3 Mar 69:

SeeDef 383.6 (1969).

2. Memo Nutter for SecDef, 19 May 69, memo BtigGen Leo E. Benade (DepASD(M&RA» for

ASD(lSA), 13 Mar 69: ibid.

3. Memo Havens for Nurrer, 30 Apr 69, Itr Anne M. Wolfkeil et al to 000 PW Policy Cte,

8 Mar 69: ISA 383.6 (1969).

4. Ltr Sybil Stockdale to SecDef, 18 Mar 69, SecDef 383.6 Viernam (Jan-May 69); Stockdale,

"Questions I Wish Someone Would Answer," nd [18 Mar 69] (quote), arrach memo Capt

Stansfield Turner (ExecAsst to SecNav) for Capen and Havens, 21 Mar 69, ISA 383.6 (1969).

5. Memrec Havens, 5 Apr 69, PW call, OSD Hisr; memrec LtCol Richard O. Rowland, 10 Apr 69,

TF files; annotation by Capr John W. Thornton on Irr Wolfkeil et al to 000 PW Policy Cte,

8 Mat 69, ISA 383.6 (1969).

6. OASD(lSA) Fact Sheet, "Btiefings for PW/MIA Families," nd [Jun 70'], TF files; memo

Havens for 000 PW Policy Cte Points of Contact, 21 JuJ 69, ISA 383.6 Viernam (Jan-Jul 69).

7. The teaction of a wife in Puyallup, Wash., was typical of the sentiments expressed: "It is good

to know-at long last-that someone in government really does care"; see Itr Mrs. R. W.

Hagerman to Laird, 10 Jul 69, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jun-Jul 69).

8. Memo Havens for Nutter, 6 Aug 69, memrec Thornton, 20 Aug 69: TF files.

9. Transc, News Briefing, Bethesda Naval Hospital, 2 Sep 69, ibid.

10. Memo Havens for 000 PW Policy Cte Points of Contact, 4 Sep 69, ibid.

11. OASD(lSA) Fact Sheet, "Briefings for PW/MIA Families," nd [Jun 70?], DA Staff Action Summary Sheet, MajGen Karl W. Gustafson for DCS/PER and CofS, nd [Jan 70]: ibid. Van Purren

is spelled on some official lists as Vanpurren.

12. Memos Epes for PW/MIA Task Group, 13, 18 May 71 (quotes): ibid.

13. Memo Epes for PW/MIA Task Group, 21 May 71, ibid; memo Selden for SecsMilDeprs,

27 May 71, ISA 383.6 (Jan-Sep 71).

14. Memo Epes for Nutter, 2 I Jun 71, memo Shields for MilAsst to Pres (BrigGen James D.

Hughes), 13 Jul 71: TF files.

15. Memo Nurrer for SecsMilDepts, 13 Jul 72, ISA 383.6 (Jun-Jul 72).

16. PW/MIA Task Force Weekly Activities Reports, 30 Jun, 25 Aug, and 13 Oct 72, 000, "Information Pamphlet for Families of Un ired States Servicemen Who Are Prisoners of War or

Are Missing in Action in Southeast Asia," nd [Sep 721: TF files. Though contemplated since

January 1972, production of a pamphlet on repatriation procedures had to await Laird's

decision in Mayan rhe length of rime returnees would be held overseas. During the next

three months the drafr prepared in ISA passed through several stages of revision and service

coordination. Laird signified final approval of rhe text on 22 Seprember 1972 by signing a

lerrer to rhe families to be reproduced in rhe pamphlet.

17. Lrr Sybil Stockdale to Laird, 9 Mar 69, SecDef .383.6 Vietnam (Jan-May 69): nares arrach to

memrec Rowland, 10 Apr 69, TF files.

18. Speaking for the Narional League of Families, Powers described rhe work of its Repatriation,

Rehabilitation, and Readjustmenr Commirree during testimony given in Ocrober 1972. See

House Cte on Armed Svcs, Full Committee Briefing on Project Egress Recap, HASC No 92-76,

92 Cong, 2 sess, 10 Oct 72, 16676-80.

19. Ltr Carole Hanson (ChBoard, NLOF) to Laird, 20 May 72, TF files; also reproduced in

House Cte on Armed Svcs, Full Committee Briefing on Project Egress Recap, 16680-85.

20. Memo BrigGen William M. Schoning (DepDir for Plans & Policy, DCS/P&O AF) for

Dir PW/MIA Task Force, 6 Jun 72, TF files.

21. Memrec Lindquist, 4 Apr 72, sub: Army, Navy and Marine Corps Assistance to PW/MIA

Families, ibid.

22. Memo MajGen Vcrne L. Bowers (TAG) for Dir PW/MIA Task Force, 9 Jun 72, memo

RAdm Douglas C. PLm (DepChNavPers) for Dir PW/MIA Task I'orce, 2 Jun 72: ibid.
584 Notes to Pages 402-07

23. Memo BrigGen R. B. Carney, Jr. USMC for Dir PW/MIA Task Force, 5 Jun 72, memrec

Lindquist, 4 Apr 72: ibid.

24. Ltr Mrs. William Butler to Laird, 9 Jun 72, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jun-Aug 72). Some of

the information in this and subsequent paragraphs is drawn from the coordinated 000

response to the Triple R Committee's May report, as reproduced in House Cte on Armed Svcs,

Fuff Committee Briefing on Project Egress Recap, 16692-97. At a Triple R Committee meeting on

23 June 1972, service representatives and PW/MIA Task Force members had responded orally

to the recommendations in the May report. One officer recorded that the replies wete received

favorably for the most parr and sometimes generated applause; see memo Lindquist for

AFMpC/DpMSC, 29 Jun 72, TF files. The written version of DoD's response is undated but

prepared some time after the meeting just cited; it includes final results from circulation of the

Air Force questionnaire, which had not been completed in June.

25. Ltr Maerose J. Evans to Laird, 21 Jun 72, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jun-Aug 72); Itr Phyllis S.

Corbitt to Col J. G. Luther, 5 Sep 72, TF files. On this matter the Army, Navy, and Marine

Corps had each responded that all, or substantially all, of their assistance officers were commissioned personnel; however, next of kin might sometimes find themselves dealing with

civilian or enlisted staff members who operated under the assistance officer's direction.

26. Memrec Lindquist, 4 Apr 72, ibid.

27. Memo Carney for Dir PW/MIA Task Force, 5 Jun 72, ibid.

28. Transc of proceedings, NLOF Repatriation, Rehabilitation, and Readjustment Cte, 25 Mar 72,

pt 2, 98-99, ibid.

29. DA Pamphlet No 608-33, Survivor Assistance Officer and Family Services and Assistance Officer

Handbook, Aug 71, 7, reproduced in House Select Cte on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia,

Americans Milsing in Southeast Asia: Hearings, 94 Cong, 2 sess, pt 5, 238-52. During 1971 Iris

Powers had served as a consultant to the Department of the Army on PW/MIA family affairs,

and DA Pamphlet 608-33 consolidated a number of advances in the Army's thinking aod

procedures that are generally credited to her influence. Perhaps the most basic was the distinction made, by separate title and description of duries, between the Survivor Assistance Officer,

serving relatives of the killed and wounded, and the Family Services and Assistance Officer,

who dealr with PWiMIA families. Sec Powers, "The National League of Families and the

Development of Family Services," in Hamilton I. McCubbin et al, eds, Family Separation and

Reunion: Families of Prisonen of War and S'ervicemen A1iHi!lg in Action; OASD(PA) News

Release No 264-71, 26 Mar 71, TF files.

30. Memo Zumwalt, "Personal for All Flag Officers, Commanders, Commanding Officers and

Officers in Charge," 22 Jun 72, ISA 383.6 Vietnam (Jun 72); memo Ryan for distribution list,

3 Jul 69, sub: Assistance to the Families of USAF Personnel Missing or Captured, TF files.

3 I. Davis interv with Havens, 5 Nov 82, PW call, OSD Hist.

19. THE NATIONAL LEAGUE AND OTHER FAMILY ORGANIZATIONS

I. Primary sources for this account of the origin and early activities of the National League of

Families are the testimony given by Sybil Stockdale on I May 1970, recorded in House Cte

on For Affs, Subcte on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, American Prisoners

of WrIr in Southeast Asia, 1970: Hearings, 91 Cong, 2 sess, I May 70 (hereafter cited as House

Cte on For Affs, American POWs, /970: Hearings), 58-62, and Iris R. Powers, "The National

League of families and the Development of Family Services," in McCubhin et ai, eds, f'innily

Separtltion and Reunion, I -4. Sec also Emma M. Hagerman's description of her early participation in Mrs. Stockdale's group, in House Select Cte on Missing Persons in Southeast

Asia, Amerimr!S Mi.uing in SoutheilSt Asia: Hedrings, ')4 Cong, 2 sess, 25 Jun 76, pt 5, 20-22,

'll1d the part taken hy two other wives, recounted in Jeremiah Denwn, Jroo When Hell WrIS In

Session, ')7-98,210-11, and Blakey, Prisoner Ilt War, 222-25. All except Hagerman comment on

the government's pre-I ')69 policv of quiet diplomacy and its advice to PWiMIA families not to
Notes to Pages 407-13 585

publicize their status. The early tecords contain few direct expressions of the official attitude

toward next-of-kin conracts with the news media, but with the opening of the "Go Public" campaign spokesmen felt free to acknowledge that "such interviews were discouraged in the pasr"; see

Itt Col J. G. Luther to "Dear Air Force Next of Kin," 25 Jul 69, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam

(Aug-Sep 69).

2. House Cte on For AfTs, American POWs, 1970: Hearings, 60.

3. Powers, "The National League of Families," 4-5. Stockdale's statement is from her remarks at

the formal opening of the NLOF headquarrers on 30 June 1970, in LtCol Charles F. Kraak,

"Family Efforts on Behalf of United States Prisoners of War and Missing in Action in

Southeast Asia," USAWC Military Reseatch Program Paper (23 May 75), 12, PW colI, OSD Hist.

4. "Arricles of Incorporarion of Narional League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing

in Southeast Asia," 28 May 70, "Bylaws of National League ... ," nd: PW coll, OSD Hist. Charles

Havens, former special assistant (POW Affairs) to ASD(lSA), oversaw the incorporation

process. Soon after resuming the private practice of law in February J970 he had volunteered

to serve as general counsel of the National League. His testimony regarding rhe organization's

purposes and legal status appears in House Cte on For Affs, Subcte on National Securiry Policy

and Scientific Developments, American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1971: Hearings,

92 Cong, I sess, 23 Mar 71 (hereafter cited as House Cte on For Affs, American POWs, 1971:

Hearings), 48-49. See also Davis interv wirh Havens, 5 Nov 82, PW coll, OSD Hisr.

5. Kraak, "Family Efforts ... ," 12-13, PW coll, OSD Hist; NLOF, newsletter, nd [JulU) 70],

TF files; msg Laird fi)[ Iris R. Powers, 30 Jun 70, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (May-Jun 70). State's

principal PW/MIA affairs expert advised his superiors a few days after incorporation of the

League that "the wives have pressed their cause with considerable adroitness and have won

a measure of useful publicity for the cause"; see memo Frank A. Sieverts for USecSrate

(Elliot 1.. Richardson), 4 Jun 70. sub: PW's-where do we go from here', box 12 (Summaries,

for Secretary, President), 79-D317.

6. Lrr Stockdale to "Dear Wives and Families of rhe MIA and POW." 25 Oct 69, TF files;

House Cte on For AfTs, American POWs, 1970: Hearings, 61-62.

7. Memrec Maj Barclay Hastings USMC, 22 Jul 70, sub: Minutes of Monthly OSD Committee

Meering on Missing and Captured Personnel, TF files.

8. Memo Jefferson for Nutter, 16 Sep 70, ibid; supporting docs include Itr M. K. Choo to

Maurice Lien, 16 Aug 70, enc! to Itt Lien to Col Robert E. Work (MilAdvisor for PW Affairs

OASD(lSA)), 19 Aug 70: ibid.

9. Memo Jefferson for MajGen Leo E. Benade (OASD(M&RA)), BrigGen Daniel James, Jr.

(OASD(PA)), and Benjamin Forman (AssrGenCoun), 5 Oct 70, Tf files; memo Armistead 1.

Selden. Jr. (ActgAS D(ISA)) for SecDef~ 6 Jan 71, ISA .383.6 (Jan-Sep 71); memo Packard for

SecsMilDeprs and ClCS. 8 Jan 71, Tf files.

10. Memo Jefferson for Nutter, 16 Sep 70, memo Nutter for SecsMilDeprs er al, I Oct 70.

sub: Meeting of DoD PW Policy Committee on 17 Sep 70: TF files.

II. Memos Selden for SccsMilDepts. 13 Aug 71, II SCI' 72, ibid. Space-available travel f(,r next of

kin of the nearly 50 U.S. civilians lisred as captured or missing had been proposed by State

in Irr Sieverts to Shields, 24 Jul 72, box 25 (Travel on Behalf of PW's), 79-D317.

12. NLOF newsletter, 22 feb 71, TF fIles.

13. NLOF newsletter, Dec 72, ibid. The standardized language used to refer citizen correspondents

to the League appeared as early as May 1971: see Irr Selden to Sen Strom Thurmond, 25 May 71,

ISA 383.6 (Jan-ScI' 7 J). For an instance of a League official forwarding the latest version of

rhe membership application to OASD(lSA) with a well-founded expectation that it would reach

all next of kin through service channels. see In Evelyn F. Grubb (Natl Coord NLOF) to Brig

Gen Russell G. Ogan USAF (Dir PW/MIA Task force), 15 Aug 72, TF files; see also memo

Ogan fot MajGen V. 1.. Bowers (TAG) er ai, 24 Aug 72, ihid. Under this system the address of

a PW/MIA relative would be received at [he NLOF office only if that individual chose to fill

out and return rhe form. Accordingly, when questioned, DoD spokesmen maintained that

family mailing lists had never been supplied to the League.
586 Notes to Pages 413-20

14. See Tab B "Scenario and Suggested Remarks," Chairman's Agenda for PW/MIA Task Group

Meetings, 15 Jun, 4 Aug 72, TF files; Davis interv with Col Vincent A. DiMauro, USAF (Ret),

29 Mar 83, PW coli, OSD Hist.

15. Memo Laird for Pres, 17 May 71, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (1971).

16. Memo Nutter for SecDef, 23 Sep 69, ibid (Aug-Sep 69).

17. Nixon Public Papers, 1969, 901-09.

18. Memo Havens for Nutter, 4 Nov 69, TF files; memo Laird for Pres, 25 Sep 69, SecDef 383.6

Vietnam (Aug-ScI' 69).

19. Lrr Stockdale to Pres, 12 Dec 69, ibid (Oct-Dec 69); Dept State Bulletin, 5 Jan 70, 3-4.

20. Ltr Stockdale to Laird, II Apr 70, memo Nutter for Laird, 28 Apr 70: SecDef 383.6 Vietnam

(Jan-Apr 70). Laird received rhe five-woman delegation, all prominent in the National League,

in his office on 29 April 1970 and apparently was successful in providing the "straight" answers

demanded. In expressing appreciarion for rhe meeting Iris Powers wrote, "we have been much

more effective in putting points across with other next-of-kin since then"; see Itr Powers to

Laird, 9 May 70, ibid (May-Jun 70).

21. Memo Richardson for Kissinger, 10 Apr 70, TF files.

22. Nixon Public Papers, 1970,373-77 (376, quote); House Ctc on For Affs, American POWs, 1970:

Hearings, 1 May 70, 53 (quote). On 30 April 1970 Nixon announced the attacks against enemy

sanctuaries in Cambodia, saying the operation was designed to "prorecr our men who are in Vietnam and to guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal and Yietnamization programs";

again the families heard nothing that linked the government's endeavor directly to their concern

for the missing and prisoners of war; see Nixon Public Papers, 1970, 405-10 (quote, 406).

23. Memo Sieverts for USecState, 4 Jun 70, box 12 (Summaries, for Secretary, President), 79-0317.

Nixon often reaffirmed the objective of keeping the prisoner question separate from other considerations. Besides being among the assurances he gave to rhe wives and mothers visiting the

White House in Decemher 1969, it appeared in his letter to PW/MIA next of kin at Christmas

1970 (drafted by Sieverts). See Nixon Public Papers, 1969, 1021, and 1970, 1157-59; memo

Sieverts for SecState, 28 Dec 70, box 12 (Summaries, for Secretary, President), 79-D317.

24. Washington Post, 18 Sep 69; memo BrigGen James D. Hughes (MilAm to Pres) for Richard G.

Capen, Jr. (ASD(LA)), 15 Jul 70, memo Capen for Hughes, 20 Jul 70: SecDef 383.6

Vietnam (Jul 70); House Cte on For Affs, American POw,·, 1970: Hearings, 6 May 70, 88.

25. Ltr Srockdale to Laird, 11 Apr 70, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jan-Apr 70); Wall Street Journal,

30 ScI' 71, reproduced in House Cte on For Affs, American POWs, 1971: Hearings, pt 2,

169-73.

26. Msg North for SecDef, 18 Jan 71, SecDel' 383.6 Vietnam (Jan 71).

27. Ibid; attchd OSD routing sheet read "No action required-questions were discussed by Mrs.

North with Dr. Kissinger at White House meeting"; NLOF, "Meeting with Dr. Kissinger:

January 23,1971 [attendance list]''' box 23 (National League of Families), 79-0317.

28. Meetings of NLOF representatives with Kissinger occurred in January, May, July, August, and

November 1971, and in January and April 1972. Next of kin besides the League's board

members often attended, and State and Defense representatives were normally present. For

procedural details, including the acknowledged hazard of postponement or cancellation,

see NLOF newsletters, 22 Feb 71 and 27 Mar 72, PW/MIA Task Force Weekly Activities

Report, 27 Aug 71, Itr Carole Hanson to Kissinger, 28 Nov 71: TF files.

29. Memo Packard for Kissinger, 3 May 71, PW call, OSD Hist.

30. Memo Laird for Pres, 17 May 71, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (1971).

31. Washington Post, 27 May 71.

32. Kraak, "Family Efforts ... ," 25-26, PW colI, OSD Hist. For the opinions of several next of

kin critical of administration policy, including Louise Jones, co-founder of Families For

Immediate Release (FFIR), see House Cte on For Affs, American POWs, 1971: Hearings, pt 2,

17\-73 (172, "in disgust"); a presentarion of FF1R's position, including quotation of its

statement of purpose, appears in Congressional Record, 92 Cong, I sess, 17 Nov 71, 41808-09.

33. Ltr Mrs. Stephen Hanson (POW-MIA International, Inc.) to Members of Congress, 11 ]un 71,

reproduced in House Ctc on For Affs, American POWs, 1971: Hearings, 140-41. Both FFIR
Notes to Pages 420-33 587

and POW/MIA International ate characterized briefly in J. L. [Joseph Lelyveld], "P.O.W.

Politics," New York Times, 3 Oct 71.

34. Memo Nutter for SeeDef, 5 Jun 71, SeeDef 383.6 Vietnam (lun-Jul 71).

35. Memo Shields fot MilAsst to Pres (Hughes), 13 Jul 71, PW coli, OSD Hist. Army participants

in the tour reached a similar assessment of family opinion; see memo MajGen Verne L. Bowers

fat CSA, 13 Jul 71, TF files.

36. New York Times, 2 Jul 71; text of teleg NLOF to Pres, Kissinger, and Amb David K. E. Bruce, attaeh

to Itt Joan M. Vinson (Natl Cootd NLOF) to League Members, 14 Jun 71 [date later corrected

to 14 Jul 71], TF files.

37. Memo Shields for MilAsst to Pres, 13 Jul 71, PW call, OSD Hist.

38. For the remarks of Ambassador Bruce ar successive plenary sessions during July, see Dept Srate

Bulletin, 26 Jul 71, 97-98, 2 Aug 71, 136-38, 9 Aug 71, 151, 16 Aug 71, 178-79; Washington Post,

13 Sep 71.

39. Memrec RAdm H. H. Epes, Jr. (Dir PW/MIA Task Force), 9 Sep 71, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam

(Aug-Sep 71).

40. Ibid.

41. Dept State Bulletin, 25 OCt 71, 448-50.

42. Ibid, 447-48; New York Times, 29 Sep 71.

43. NLOF candidate information and instructions for voting in Board of Directots election, nd

[22 Sep 71 deadline for returning ballots]' ltr Vinson to Family Members, 13 Ocr 71: TF files.

44. Ltr Vinson to Family Members, 13 Oct 71, TF files.

45. Memo Sven Kraemer (NSC Staff) for Sieverrs and Shields, 21 Dec 72, w/NLOF questions, ibid.

46. Dept State Bulletin, 24 Jan 72, 77; New York Times, 28, 29 (editorial) Dec 71.

47. Memo D.Z.H. and R.E.S. (Henkin and Shields) [no addressee or date but clearly for SecDef,

stamped "Sec Def has seen: 12 Jan 1972"], SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jan 72).

48. Nixon Public Papers, 1972, 100-06.

49. Memo Hughes for Pres, 27 Jan 72, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Feb 72).

50. PW/MIA Task Force, Point Paper, 28 Apr 72, sub: League of Families May Meeting, Itt Grubb

to "Dear League Members and Concerned Citizens," nd rca 15 May 72]: TF files.

51. Ltt Grubb to Laird, 15 May 72, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Apr-May 72). Balloting for the three

positions was designed to select "members in whom the great majority has complete confidence."

52. Nixon Public Papers, 1972, 583-87.

53. White House ptess release, 15 May 72, TF files; Washington Post, 16 May 72.

54. NLOF newsletter, nd [Jan 72], TF files. Also in late January 1972 the POW/MIA Families for

Immediate Release opened a political headquarters in Washington. It sought to generate support

for the election of candidates who favored imposing a cutoff date for U.S. withdrawal from South

Vietnam, subject only to the return of all prisoners and an accounting of the missing; see Kraak,

"Family Efforts ... ," 26-27, PW coli, OSD Hist.

55. Ltt Vinson to League Members, 24 Feb 72, TF files.

56. Washington Post, 4, 12, 13 Jul, 19 OCt 72.

20. PW/MIA LEGISLATION AND BENEFITS

1. Ltt Rep L. Mendel Rivers (Ch House Cte on Armed Svcs) to Paul H. Nitze (DepSecDef),

19 Feb 68, Itr Nitze to Rivers, 13 Mar 68: SecDef 580 (J 968).

2. Senate Cte on Atmed Svcs, Subcte on General Legislation, Miscellaneous Bills: Hearing, 92 Cong,

2 sess, 7 Sep 72, 5-.32 (quote, 21). In his testimony Lt. Gen. Leo E. Benade, deputy assistant

secretary of defense for military personnel policy, expressed DoD's support for four measures

to enhance rhe benefits avaibble to PW/M lAs and rheir families, rho ugh favoring an alternative

version in one instance.

3. 37 U.S.c. 552 contains the provision for continuation of pay; ltr R. F. Keller (DepCompGen

US) (() SecDef, 17 Jul 72, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (lun-Aug 72); NLOF newsletter, Aug 72,
588 Notes to Pages 433-42

TF files, described the effects of the ruling. The comptroller general's decision brought 000

practice into compliance with a provision of PL 90-207, 16 Dec 67, theretofore thought not

ro apply.

4. The promotion policy followed with virtual unanimity by the military services had been arrived

at by common agreement rather than formal directive; authoritative statements regarding it

were given to congressional committees from time to time, in such communications as Itr

Benade to Rep F. Edward Hebert (Ch House Cte on Armed Svcs), 22 Feh 72, SecDef 383.6

Vietnam (Jan 72).

5. Dir of Traosp, DCS/S&L, AF, document summary, "Space Availahle Travel for Wives of MIA

or Captured Personnel," nd [received 16 Sep 85], PW colI, OSD Hisr. The policy fIrst appeared

as Change 2,28 Apr 68, ro AR 96-20/0PNAV Instr 4630.10/AFR 76-6, TF files. Memo Nirze

for SecsMilDepts, 18 Jan 69, SecDef 383.6 (1969), directed the addition of dependent

children, which appeared in AFR 76-6/AR 59-20/0PNAV Instr 4630.1 OA/MCO 4630.5,

20 May 69, while Change 1 rherero, 4 Jan 71, extended the privilege to dependent parents,

pursuant to a decision of 15 Oct 70.

6. Memrec Capt Dean E. Webster USN (Spec Asst for PW Matters, BuPers), 12 Jun 70, sub: Minutes

of rhe June meeting of the OSD Committee on Missing and Captured Personnel, memree Capt H.

D. Mills, Jr. USN (OASD(M&RA)), 22 Jun 70, sub: Social Security Benefits for Servicemen

Missing-in-Action: TF flies. The problem had been defined and the solurion FlfSt proposed in

memo Curtis W. Tarr (ASecAF) for ASD(M&RA), 25 Feb 70, ibid.

7. Memo Armistead l. Selden, Jr. (PrinDepASD(1SA)) for CJCS et aI, 17 Aug 71, memo RAdm H.

H. Epes, Jr. (Dir PW/MIA Task Force) for distribution list, 19 Aug 71: TF flies.

8. Lrr BrigGen Russell G. Ogan (Dir PW/MIA Task Force) ro Helene Knapp (Narl Cootd NLOF),

18 Jan 73, ISA 383.6 (Jan 73).

9. 38 C.F.R. 9.5(0), 22 Nov 72; 000 published a derailed explanation of the ruling's effeer in

Commanders Digest, I Mar 73, 12-13.

10. For a description of the Army's promotion policy and its results see HQDA, Operation

HOMECOMING (formerly EGRESS-RECAP) After Action Report, nd [Aug 75], 36-38, PW coll,

OSD Hisr.

11. Ltr Vinson (Narl Coord NLOF) ro Robert C. Seamans, Jr. (SecAF), 2 Dec 70, SecDef 383.6

Vietnam (Dec 70).

12. Ltr Benade to Teague, 25 Jan 71, ibid (Jan 71).

13. Memo Shields for John Holdridge (NSC Staff), 8 Feb 71, TF files; memo Roger T. Kelley (ASD

(M&RA)) for SecDef, 26 Feb 71, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Feb 71).

14. pL 89-538, 14 Aug 66; Senate Cte on Armed Svcs, 89 Cong, 2 sess, S Rept No 1422, 29 Jul 66,

1-4.

15. EO 11298, 14 Aug 66.

16. House Cte on Armed Svcs, 90 Cong, I se55, H Rept No 707, 27 Sep 67, 1-3; Itr Frank H.

Weirzel (ACompGen US) ro SecDef, 19 Ocr 66, TF files.

17. Lrr Louise M. Mulligan ro Rep 1.. Mendel Rivers, 20 Dec 68, ISA 383.6 (1969) (quote);

Stockdale, In Love and War, 144-45, 226; H Rept No 707, 4-5; PL 90-122, 3 Nov 67; Itr

Maj Dean E. Roberts (USAF Accounting & Finance Ctr) to Evelyn F. Grubb, 11 Dec 67,

TF files.

18. Memo VAdm Charles K. Duncan (ChBuPets) fat Paul C. Warnke (ASD(ISA)), 5 Aug 68, memo

Warnke for SecsMilDepts et al, 29 Oct 68: TF files; memo G. Warren Nutter (ASD(1SA)) for

SeeDef, 19 May 6(), SeeDef 383.6 (1969); PL 91-200,26 f'eb 70.

19. Memo James 1'. Goode (DepASecAF) for ASD(lSA), 14 Jun 71, TF files.

20. Memo Shields for Nutter, 21 Jul 72. ibid. The further accumulation "for nearly a year" includes

tbe 90-day continuation of interest following the account holder's return to U.S. terriLOty.

21. Memo Tarr for ASD(M&RA), 25 Feh 70, ibid.

22. PL 91-584, 24 Dec 70; PL 92-540, 24 Ocr 72.

23. Lrr David O. Maxwell (GenCoun HUD) ro Rep Sam M. Gibbons, 15 Apr 71, TF files.

24. PL 89-754, 3 Nov 66; 000 information bulletin on Homeowners Assistance Program, nd, TF

files; Itr Benade to Gibbons, 16 Apr 71. SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Apr-May 71); memo Edward J.
Notes to Pages 442-52 589

Sheridan (DepASD(I&L)) for DepASD(M&RA) (Benade), I J May 71, memo Epes for DepASD

(M&RA), 1 Jul 71: n files.

25. Dir Personnel Services, HQ USAF, "Benefits and Entitlements for Families of Missing in

Action and Captured Personnel," nd ["for presentation during March J970"], PW colI, OSD Hist.

26. Ltr Rush to Gov George C. Wallace (Alabama), 9 May 72, TF files, which also contain the

replies of 30 state governors. ISA had recommended this action and supplied the draft by

memo Nutter for DepSecDef, 25 Apr 72, ISA 383.6 (Apr-May 72). See also Itr Walter S.

McLin III to Gov William T. Cahill (New Jersey), 26 Jul 72, TF files.

27. Memo Battimo for Benade, 9 May 72, TF files; see also J. Robert Nelson, "The Legal Plight of

the PW/MIA Family," in McCubbin et aI, eds, Family Separation and Reunion, 58-60.

28. Memo Bartimo for DepASD(M&RA), 9 May 72, TF f;les; memo Benade for Dir PW/MIA Task

Force (Epes), 16 May 72, memo Epes for DepASD(M&RA)' 30 May 72: ISA 383.6 (Apr-May 72).

29. Memo Laird for SecArmy et aI, 1 Mar 69, SecDef 383.6 (1969).

30. Ltr Col Harold H. Maness (OASD(M&RA)) to Jeanette Connell, League of Wives of

American Vietnam Prisoners of War, 6 Jan 70, TF files.

31. Memo James D. Hittle (ASecNav) for ASD(lSA), 23 Apr 70, ibid.

32. Memo Ralph H. Jefferson (SpecAdvisor for PW Affairs to ASD(lSA)) for Nutter, 16 Sep 70,

memo Nutter for SecsMilDepts et a1, 9 Oct 70: ibid.

33. Memo Nuttet for SecsMilDepts et aI, 22 Dec 70, ISA 383.6 North Viernam (1970).

34. Ltr L. Niederlehner (AetgGenCoun) to Rep L. Mendel Rivers, 27 Aug 69, TF files.

35. Ltr Carole Hanson (ChBoard, NLOF) to Laird, 20 May 72, ibid.

36. The DoD response to the NLOF recommendations, fIrst given in an oral presentation on

23 June 1972, was put in writing and is reproduced in House Cte on Armed Svcs, full Committee Briefing on Project Egress Recap, HASC No 92-76,92 Cong, 2 sess, 10 Oct 72, 16695.

37. Memo BrigGen William M. Schoning (DepDir for Plans & Policy, DCS/P&O AF) for Dir

PW/MIA Task Force, 20 Dec 72, TF files.

38. Msg FICEUR (NAS Jacksonville, Fla) for COMNAVINTCOM, 1I0021Z Oct 72, ibid; text

repeated verbatim in encl ro memo Ogan for PW/MIA Task Group, 16 Nov 72, lSA 383.6

(Nov-Dec 72).

39. Ogan memo cired in note 38 (quotes). On the retroactive deposit of excess funds in USSDP

accounts, see memo Benade fot AsstSecsMiIDepts(M&RA), 7 Apr 70, sub: Policy Guidance

for Implementation of Public Law 91-200, TF files.

40. Memo MajGen David E. On USA (Dir Vietnam Task Force, OASD(lSA)) for Ogan, 27 Nov 72,

ibid; for an early example of the cautionary note, see memo Arthur W. Allen, Jr. (DepASecAtmy)

for Ch DoD PW Policy Cte, 1.3 Mar 69, ISA 383.6 (1969).

41. Memo Col E. A. Parnell (Exec G-1, HQ USMC) fat Ch PW/MIA Task Group, 29 Nov 72,

memo MajGen Verne L. Bowers (TAG) for Alternate Ch PW/MIA Task Group, 2 Jan 73,

memo RAdm Robert B. Baldwin (DepChNavPers) for Ogan, 28 Nov 72, memo Col Ray A.

Dunn, Jr. (Ch Global Plans & Policy Div, DCS/P&O AF) for Dir PW/MIA Task Force,

28 Nov 72: TF files.

42. NLOF transc, "Discussion with Lt. Matk Gartley re RRR Committee," nd rca 15 Oct 72],

2 (quote), 6-8 [all in second series of page numbers], memo Robert C. Seamans, Jr. (SecAF)

for ASD(lSA), 18 Dec 72: ibid.

43. NLOF transc, "Discussion with Lt. Mark Gartley ...," 30-31 Iflrst series of page numhers]

("to somehow ..."), ibid; In Rep Peter N. Kytos to Laird, 24 Jan 73, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam

(Jan 73), and In Hebert to Roger T. Kelley, 2 Feb 73, TF files. Both the Kytos and Hebert

letters forwarded a lener received from Gartley, enclosing his listed proposals (quotes); see also

Congressional Record, 93 Cong, I sess, 119, pt 2, 29 Jan 73, 2420-21.

44. Ltr Kelley to Hebert, 23 Feb 73, TF files.

45. Jbid.

46. See, for example, memo Frank J. Sherlock (Dit LegisIRefServ, OffGenCoun) for SecArmy et aI,

8 Mar 73, ibid; ltr William P. Clements, Jr. (DepSecDe£") to Sen Edmund S. Muskie, I Oct 73,

SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jul-Dec 73); and, regarding the 1977 instance, memo Werner Windus

(Dir LegislRefServ, OffGenCoun) for SecArmy et a1, 10 Mar 77, TF files.
590 Notes to Pages 453-62

21. NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE

I. Johnson Public Papers, 1968-69, 1:25-26.

2. Ibid, 469-70.

3. Ibid, 492; New York Times, 4 Apr 68.

4. Harriman's statemenrs in rhe Patis meetings of 13, IS, and 18 May 1968 appear in Depr State

Bulletin, 3 Jun 68, 701-09; see particularly 707-09 for his marshaling of "massive and

unassailable evidence" in response to the "perfidious calumny" charge.

5. Johnson Public Papers, 1968-69,2:1099-1103 (quore, 1100).

6. See Chesrer L. Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam, 402-07; George C. Herring,

Americas Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1915 (2d ed), 216-19; Dept State

Bulletin, 2 Dec 68, 563-64.

7. New York Times, 17, 20 Jan 69.

8. Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs ofRichard Nixon (hereafter cited as Nixon Memoirs), 298.

Alrhough news accounts tended to give the opposite impression, Nixon denied ever saying that

"I had a 'plan,' much less a 'secret plan,' to end the war."

9. Kissinger, White House Years, 234, 257-58. Unusual insight into Kissinger's thought was

provided by an article he wrote before his selection as a presidential assistant bur not

published until the month his service began; sec Kissinger, "The Viet Nam Negotiations," Foreign

Affairs, 47 (Jan 69), 211-34 (it contains no reference to prisoners of war).

10. NSDM 9, I Apr 69, and "A General Strategy and Plan of Action for Viet-Nam Negotiations"

(quores), ene! to memo Jeanne W. Davis (NSC Secrerariar) for Office of the Vice Pres er aI,

14 Apr 69, SecDef 092 Vietnam (1969).

11. Nixon Public Papers, 1969,369-75 (quotes, 372, .F3).

12. Text of ptoposal submitted at the Paris conference by the chief NLF delegare, 8 May 69, in

Senate Cte on For Rels, Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam (7th

rev ed), Cte Print, 93d Cong, 2d sess (hereafter cited as Background Information), 628-30.

13. Nixon Memoirs, 390-92. After srating at a news conference on 14 March 1969 thar it would be his

policy not to comment on press speculation about negotiations in private channels or otherwise

discuss the subject, Nixon continued: "I trust there will be private talks .... I think that is where

this war will be settled-in private rather than in public"; see Nixon Public Papers, 1969,210.

14. Kissinger, White House Years, 277-80 (quotes, 279, 280).

15. Ibid, 281-83 (quote, 283); Nixon Memoirs, 393-94, 397.

16. Nixon Public Papers, 1969,901-09 (quotes, 903, 906); also see 910-11 for texts of the Nixon

letter to Ho Chi Minh, 15 Jul 69, and Ho's reply, 15 Aug 69.

17. Ibid, 1970,374; 1972,30.

18. Memo Kissinger for Pres, 10 Sep 69, in White House Years, 1480-82.

19. Nixon Public Papers, 1969,905, 1021; 000 (ISAIJtStaff) Policy Paper, 29 Apr 70, sub: US

Prisoners of War, attach to memo G. Warren Nutter (ASD(ISA)) for SecDef, 1 May 70,

SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (1970).

20. Nixon Public Papers, 1911, 162; 1912,4,830.

21. Ibid, 1969, 1021.

22. Memo Laird for Pres, 16 Jan 71, SeeDef Vietnam 333 Laird (1971); memo RAdm Daniel J.

Murphy (MilAm to SecDef) f'H DepAsst to Pres for NatSecAffs, 12 Jul 71, SeeDef 092.2

Vietnam (1971); annotation by BrigGen Robert E. Pursley (MilAsst to SeeDef) on memo

(CM-1197 -71) Adm T. H. Moorer (CJCS) for SeeDef, 10 Sep 71, SeeDef 383.6 Viernam

(1971); mcrno Laird for Kissinger, 16 Nov 71, ibid (16-30 Nov 71); Itr Laird ro Rogers, 8 Mar 72,

SeeDef 092.2 Vietnam (Mar 72).

23. Memo Laird for Pres, 20 Dec 69, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Oct-Dec 69); msg State 31590 for

Paris and Saigon (TODEL 3953), 3 Mar 70, TF files.

24. Memo Pursley for ASD(ISAJ, 29 Dec 69, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Oct-Dec 69); Itr Nutter to

Elliot L. Richardson (USecState), 19 Jan 70, ibid (Jan-Apr 70).

25. Dept State Bulletin, 21 Dec 70,737-45 (quote or paraphrase from 740, 744-45).
Notes to Pages 463-73 591

26. Mme. Binh's 8-point ptoposal of 17 Septembet 1970 appears in Background Information, 638-40.

27. OASD(ISA) Fact Sheet, "DRV/PRG Position on Prisoners of War," nd rca 25 Feb 71], TF files.

28. Dept State Bulletin, 12 Oct 70, 408-10 (quote, 408). Binh's Point 2 declared that "the question

of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be resolved by the Vietnamese parries

among themselves"; see Background Information, 638.

29. Nixon Public Papers, 1970, 825-26 (as printed there, a number of key sentences are italicized).

When responding the following day to newsmen's questions about the international reaction to

his speech, the president said, "we offered a total withdrawal of all of our forces, something we

have never offered before, if we had murual withdrawal on the other side"; see ibid, 830. A news

conference on 17 February 1971 was the first of several occasions during that year when Nixon

made the linkage even more explicit (ibid, 1971, 162).

30. Ibid, 1970, 826-27 (italics omitted).

31. William Safire, Before the Fall, 284-85.

32. Kissinger, White House Years, 439-44; for the Gallup Poll referred to by Le Due Tho, see New

York Times, 15 Feb 70.

33. Kissinger, White House Years, 44-46, 975-79.

34. Ibid, 979.

35. Ibid, 1017-19; for text of the U.S. proposal of 31 May 1971 see 1488-89 (quote, 1488).

36. Kissinger, White House Years, 1021-23 (quote, 1023).

37. Ibid, 1489.

38. Ibid, 1023, 1035.

39. Ibid, 1019, 1028, 1030.

40. Thieu's margin of victory has been variously computed. The figure given is drawn from the

detailed account of the election campaign in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1971, 24945-48A.

41. Kissinger, White House Years, 1039-40, 1489-90 (quote, 1490). Text of the U.S. proposal of

11 October 1971 also appears in Nixon Public Papers, 1972, 105-06.

42. Kissinger, White House Years, 1040-41. For summaries of the messages exchanged during

October and November 1971 regarding a possible Kissinger-Le Due Tho meeting, see msg

USDEL Paris 1893, 31 Jan 72, TF files.

43. New York Times, 23 Jun 71; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1972, 25167. The New York

Times noted that the Senate's action "represented the first major victory of critics of the

Vietnam War in months of attempting to find some legislative formula to end the war." In

its original form the Mansfield Amendment never received the approval of both houses of

Congress, but in November a comptomise version was enacted as an attachment to the Military

Procurement Act of 1971. It still urged the president to establish a "final date" for the withdrawal

of U.S. forces but with the nine-month time limit deleted. When signing the act Nixon

declared that the amendment "expresses a judgment about the manner in which the American

involvement in the war should be ended. However, it is without binding force or effect" (Nixon

Public Papers, 1971, 1114).

44. New York Times, 9 Jun 71; Washington Post, 9 Jun 71.

45. New York Times, 2 Jul 71.

46. Ibid; memo Thomas M. Constant (DepDir Vietnam Task Force, OASD(lSA)) for Nutter,

2 Jul 71, SecDef 092.2 Vietnam (1971).

47. Washington Post, 2 Jul 71; OASD(lSA) Vietnam Task Force, "Talker for MG Karhohs,"

9 Jul 71, SecDef 092.2 Vietnam (1971).

48. For a plenary session statement by Ambassador Bruce on 29 July 1971, including COmment on

the "positive response" charge, see Dept State Bulletin, 16 Aug 71, 178-79.

49. OASD(lSA) Talking Paper, nd [7 Jan 72], sub: The Enemy's Terms for Release of the PW's,

and artchd resume ["prepared at Secretary Laird's request"]' 7 Jan 72, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam

(Jan 72); Washington Post, 17 Sep 71; msg USDEL France 600, 11 Jan 72, PW coIl, OSD Hisr.

50. Nixon Public Papers, 1972, 5; New York Times, 7, 21 Jan 72; OASD(lSA) Talking Paper, nd

[7 Jan 72], SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jan 72).

51. Nixon Public Papm, /972, 100-06.

52. Ibid, 376-79.
592 Notes to Pages 474-84

53. Nixon described rhe invasion and his inirial orders for counreraction in an address on

26 April 1972 (Nixon Public Papers, 1972, 550-54); his speech of 8 May 1972 appears on

583-87 (quote, 585). For a front-line account of the part played by U.S. advisers and the

support received from U.S. naval gunfire, see Col. G. H. Turley, USMCR (Ret), The Easter

Offensive: Vietnam, 1912.

54. Nixon Public Papers, 1912, 640-41 (quote, (41). A few weeks later Pravda revealed that the

decision to receive the American president had encountered some opposition within the

upper levels of Soviet officialdom, but the meetings had gone forward "despite obstructionist

actions by rightist and leftist foes of relaxation." Western observers read other portions of

the Pravda article as an artempt to discount speculation that a secret deal had been struck

over Vietnam; see New York Times, 16 Jun 72.

55. Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger, 336-37; see also Hedrick Smith's dispatch, New York

Times, 17 Jun 72. However, Kissinger's references to the Podgorny mission are more tentative in

crediting the Soviet emissary with a major role; Kissinger, White House Years, 1251, 1253, 1303.

56. Editorial, Nhan Dan, 17 Aug 72, in Gareth Porter, ed, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation

of Human Decisions, vol 2, 569-70 (570, quote).

57. Msg USDEL France 10568, 2 Jun 72, TF files.

58. Kissinger, White House Years, 1343-49; Kalb and Kalb, Kissinger, 353-54. A summary of Le

Duc Tho's proposal of 8 October 1972 as broadcast later by Radio Hanoi appears In Background Information, 484-85.

59. Kissinger, White House Years, 1350-55, 1357; Kalb and Kalb, Kissinger, 356-58.

60. Kalb and Kalb, Kissinger, 357-58; Kissinger, White House Years, 1358, 1378-79, 1390-91;

Nixon Memoirs, 697 (quote),

61. Background Information, 486; Kissinger, White House Years, 1388-89, 1391-92 (quote, 1388).

62. Statement by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 26 Oct 72, Background Information, 484-87

(quotes, 485, 487).

6.3. Dept State Bulletin, 13 Nov 72, 549-58 (quote, 552; also 549: "We believe that peace is at hand").

64. Kissinger, White House Years, 1354-55, 1371; Background Information, 486 (quote); see also Gareth

Porter, A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and the Paris Agreement, 122-23, 128-29.

65. Kissinger, White House Years, 1415-17; msg USDEL France 10568, 2 Jun 72 (quote), Foreign

Broadcasting Information Service, "FBIS Trends: Indochina," 8 Nov 72: TF files. For Operations

Enhance and Enhance Plus, see William E. Le Gro, Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation, 17;

Kalb and Kalb, Kissinger, 388-89; Porter, ed, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation, vol 2, 583-

84. In the work last cited, see also 603-04 for official acknowledgement of rhe U.S. purpose in

rransferring ownership of the bases.

66. Kissinger, White House Years, 1417-18, 1444-45.

67. Ibid, 1418, 1434-36, 1442-44, 1449-50; Porter, A Peace Denied, 153-55; Kalb and Kalb,

Kissinger, 406-07, 409-10.

68. Depr Srare Bulletin, 8 Jan 73, 33-41 (quotes, 36, 37); Nixon Mmioirs, 720-22, 734.

69. Kissinger, White House Years, 1457.

70. Ibid, 1457-59 (quote, 1459); Nixon Public Papers, 1972, ApI' B, 21 (quore); transc, White House

news conference, 30 Dec 72, SecDef 092.2 Vietnam (Nov-Dec 72).

71. Kissinger, White House Years, 1461-66. For Le Duc Tho's statement on arriving in Paris,

which Kissinger describes as "bloodcurdling," see msg USDEI. France 370, 7 Jan 73, TF files.

72. Nixon Memoirs, 736-37, 749-51 (quote, 737); Kissinger, White House Years, 1470.

73. Nixon Public Papers, 1913, 18-20.

74. Text and Protocols, "Agreement Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam," 27 Jan 73,

Dept State Bulletin, 12 Feb 73,169-88 (quote, 170).

75. Ibid, 174-77 (quote, 175); "Briefing Papet on Intetptetations of the Patis Peace Agteement by

State Department Legal Adviser George Aldrich, February 1973," in Porter, ed, Vietnam: The

Definitive Documentation, vol 2, 601-08 (quote, (03). The "foreign countries mentioned" were

also the ones whose military personnel and war materials were to be withdrawn within 60

days. For this purpose the U.S. interpretation also included "countries such as the Republic

of China and the United Kingdom which provided advisory units to military, para-military or
Notes to Pages 484-95 593

police activities," and certain elements of the Cambodian armed forces that were being trained

in South Vietnam.

76. Dept State Bulletin, 12 Feb 73, 155-69 (Kissinger quotes, 156), and 175 (quote).

77. Dept State Bulletin, 12 Feb 73, 169-70, 173-74; Kissinger, White House Years, 1380; Porter, ed,

Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation, vol 2, 604 (quote).

78. Dept Srate Bulletin, 12 Feb 73, 175-76 (quotes, 175); Porter, ed, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation, vol 2, 607-08.

79. Dept State Bulletin, 12 Feb 73, 175-76.

80. Ibid, 172.

81. Ibid, 172-73, 176 (quote); memrec Davis, 1 Jul 87, interv with Roger E. Shields, 25 Jun 87,

PW call, OSD Hist.

82. Dept State Bulletin, 12 Feb 73, 170 (quote), 172, 176 (quote).

8.3. Porter, ed, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation, vol 2, 604-05. The agreement's delineation

of 1CCS responsibilities listed Article 8(a) and (c), but not 8(b); see Dept State Bulletin,

12 Feb 73, 172-73.

84. Memo Laird for Kissinger, 26 Jul 72, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jun-Aug 72).

85. Ibid (Laird quote); memo Sieverts for Amb [U. Alexis] Johnson (USecState for PolAffs) and

Arnb [William H.] Sullivan (Ch Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam), 2 Nov 72, PW coil, OSD Hist.

86. Memo Laird for Kissinger, 10 Nov 72, SecDef 092.2 Vietnam (I 972).

87. OASD(lSA) Position Paper, nd ["Sec Def has seen, 7 Nov 1972"], sub: Modalities for Release

of Prisoners of War, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Nov-Dec 72); PW/MIA Task Force Position Paper,

2 Nov 72, same sub, TF files.

88. Interdepartmental Study Panel, "Prisoner Release and Repatriation in Indochina," Apr 72,

TF files; memo Shields for Nutter, 1 Nov 72, ISA 383.6 (Nov-Dec 72).

89. Memrec Davis, 26 Mar 82, interv with Murphy, 25 Mar 82, PW call, OSD Hist.

90. Memo Murphy for Laird, 13 Sep 71, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (1971) (quote); memrec Davis,

I Jul 87, interv with Shields, PW call, OSD Hist. See also Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch:

A Memoir, 396-97.

22. OPERATION HOMECOMING

1. Memo Laird for SecsMilDepts et al, 8 Jan 73, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jan 73). Laird commented

on the Woodward appointment and preparations for Homecoming during a televised interview

on 26 January 1973; see Public Statements of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, 1973, 259-62.

2. Outline, "Briefing on PW/MIA Situation," nd rca 25 Jan 73], and PW/MIA Task Force

Weekly Activities Report, 26 Jan 73, which descrihes it as "prepared ... for Chairman of the

PW/MIA Task Group [Roger E. Shields] to brief Secretary Richardson": TF files.

3. Memo Cdr R. A. Mauldin for Dir PW/MIA Task Force, 29 Jan 73, suh: PW/MIA Activities

Report (270530 Jan 73 - 282200 Jan 73), msg USDEL France 2075 for JCS, SecState, and

AFMPC, 27185JZ Jan 73: TF files; memo Sieverts For Amb [U. Alexis] Johnson (USecState For

PoIAffs), 26 Jan 73, sub: Informing families of U.S. civilians missing or captured in Indochina,

box 31 (Operation Homecoming-Lists 1973), 79-0317.

4. Outline, "Briefing on PW/MIA Situation," nd, TF files.

5. Nixon Public Papers, 1973, 54. The Department of State extracted this portion of the Nixon

press conference for immediate dispatch to the embassy in the Philippines; see msg State 18646

fot Manila, 31 Jan 73, box 31 (Operation Homecoming-Lists 1973),79-0317.

6. Transc, News Briefing by Friedheim and MajGen Daniel James, Jr., DepASD(PA), 26 Jan 73,

TF files.

7. Teleg, Roderick W. Beaton, Pres UpI, to Richardson, .30 Jan 73, SecDeF 383.6 Vietnam (Jan 73).

8. Ltr Richardson to Beaton, 3 I Jan 73, msg SecDef8483 For AIG 8797 and COMUSMACV, 032359Z

Jan 73 [sic; actually 3 Feb 73; also, document is filed by its erroneous date]: ibid. The secretary

used most of the same text when replying to a more heated communication from the
594 Notes to Pages 495-503

managing editor of the New York Times, who objected to "the Department's total dampdown on

covering both civilian and military prisoners of war processed through Clark Field"; see teleg

A. M. Rosenthal to Richardson, 30 Jan 73, and Itt Richardson to Rosenthal, 31 Jan 73, ibid.

The National League of Families reacted strongly to news accounts of the UPl's requests,

advising Richardson that "neirher the news media nor any other outside influence should be

allowed to delay" or disrupt the orderly processing of the returnees; see Itr Phyllis E. Galanti

(ChBoard, NLOF) ro Richardson,S Feb 73, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (I-IS Feb 73).

9. 13th Air Force JHRC After Action Rpt, 6 Jun 73, 1-2 and 10-12, TF files. The account of

the center's operations given here relies heavily on this source, hereafter cited as 13AF JHRC

AARpt. For the change of name to JHRC (formerly JCPe), see msg SecDef 7465 for AIG 8797,

022158Z Feb 73, and msg CINCPAC for CINCUSARPAC et ai, 052234Z Feb 73, ibid.

10. 13AF JHRC AARpr, 12 (quote) and End 13,20, ibid.

II. Ibid, End 13, 1, ibid.

12. Msg 13AF/JIB/Clark AB for CINCPAC, 281016Z Jan 73, TF files.

13. Chicago Tribune, 30 Jan 73; Omaha World-Herald, 30 Jan 73.

14. Msg CINCPAC for 13AF Clark AB, 010420Z Feb 73, TF meso For examples of correspondence

on the subject, see Itr Ogan to Mrs. C. G. Cherney, DePere, Wis., 13 Feb 73, ISA 383.6 (1-13

Feb 73); Itr Sen Carl T. Curtis to LrCol Charles Arquette USAF, Senate Liaison Officer, 6 Feb 73,

and text of reply prepared in OASD(PA) HOMECOMING Information Center, ibid.

IS. Msg 13AF/JIB/CIark AB for JCS/SecDef, 091040Z Feb 73, ibid.

16. Msg CINCPAC for COMUSMACV and 13AF, 060016Z Feb 73, msg 13AF/JIB/CIark AB

for JCS/SecDef, 071504Z Feb 73, "Highlights of 8 Feb 2PM Clark Press Conference [Shields

and Sieverrs]," nd [8 Feb 73]: TF files.

17. Msg Chief USDEL FPJMC (MajGen Gilbert H. Woodward USA) for COMUSMACV, 021850Z

Feb 73, PW coli, OSD Hist; Walter Scott Dillard, Sixty Days to Peace, 57-59, 71-72. Written

with intimate knowledge of both the events and the records of the U.S. delegation, Dillard's

account serves as a main source for activities of the FPJMC and negotiations to resolve delays

in the prisoner release.

18. Msg Chief USDEL FPJMC for COMUSMACV, 031510Z Feb 73, memo Ogan for Dir

Vietnam Task Force, OASD(lSA), 3 Feb 73: TF files.

19. Memos Ogan for Dir Vietnam Task Force, 9, 10 Feb 73, ibid.

20. Dillard, Sixty Days to Peace, 72-73.

21. Ibid, 73, 74; memo Lawrence S. Eagleburger (ActgASD(lSA)) for RAdm Daniel J. Murphy

(MiiAssr to SecDef), nd [10 Feb 73], 13AF JHRC AARpt, 15-16: TF files.

22. Msg CINCPAC for JCS/NMCC et al, 102329Z Feb 73, JIB press release, "Reception Support

Team," 10 Feb 73, 13AF JHRC AARpt, End II, 1-2, and End 15, 5-6: ibid. Endosure IS is

the 63-page report of Colonel Dennett, which indudes a 23-page oral history statement he

made on 15 February 1973.

23. 13AF JHRC AARpt, End 15, 6, ibid.

24. 13AF JHRC AARpt, 16, and End 15,7,14-16,20, ibid; Dillard, Sixty Days to Peace, 73-74.

25. Dillard, Sixty Days to Peace, 75; 13AF JHRC AARpt, End IS, 20-22, TF files.

26. OASD(ISA) HOMECOMING Command Center Log Book entty, 12 Feb 73 (quote), TF files;

Dillard, Sixty Days to Peace, 75; 13AF JHRC AARpt, End 3, 8-9, and End IS, 23, TF files.

27. 13AF JHRC AARpt, End IS, 15-19, 21-22, TF files. For more detailed tteatment of the

inspection issue, see Dillard, Sixty Days to Peace, 75-76, and, especially, msg Saigon 2346,

IS Feb 73, box I() (Red Cross-Visits 1973), 79-D317.

28. 13AF JHRC AARpt, End IS, 23, TF files; Dillard, Sixty Days to Peace, 74.

29. The following account of this release, induding Woodward's acrions in Saigon, is drawn from

msg Chief US DEL FPJMC for COMUSMACV, 121725Z Feb 73, PW coli, OSD Hist; New

York Times, 13 Feb 73; Washington Post, 13 Feb 73; and Dillard, Sixty Days to Peace, 77-81

(quote, 77).

30. Dept State, "Eight U.S. Civilians Released at Loc Ninh, SVN, Feb 12," nd, box 31 (Operation

Homecoming 1973), 79-D317; memo LtCol Lawrence Robson USAF (DepChief USDEL

FPJMT) for FPJMT Staff, 10 Apr 73, 13AF JHRC AARpt, 16: TF files.
Notes to Pages 503-12 595

31. New York Times, 13 Feb 73; Washington Post, 13 Feb 73; AP ticker items 37 and 40, 12 Feb 73.

32. Msg 13AF/JHRC/Clark for AIG 7942 and JCS/DIA, 121300Z Feb 73, TF files.

33. Memo Murphy for Richardson, 13 Feb 73, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (1-15 Feb 73); memos Ogan

for Dir Vietnam Task Force, 15, 16 Feb 73, 13AF JHRC AARpt, 17: TF files. For Kissinger's

account of his consultations in Hanoi beginning 10 February 1973, see Years of Upheaval,

24-43, induding brief mention of PW/MIA cases and the 20-man release, 33-34.

34. Memo VAdm V. P. de Poix (Dir DIA) for SecDef, 9 Mar 73 (quote), SecDef 383.6

Vietnam (1-15 Mar 73); 13AF JHRC AARpt, End 15,27-30, TF files.

35. Dillard, Sixty Days to Peace, 83-86; msg Saigon 3109, 270935Z Feb 73, PW coli, OSD Hist;

memo BrigGen Paul Krause USAF (DepDir for Opns, NMCC) for SecDef, 27 Feb 73, SecDef

383.6 Vietnam (20-28 Feb 73).

36. Transc, "News Conference at the White House with Ron Ziegler, ... February 27, 1973," TF files.

37. Washington Post, 28 Feb 73; OASD(PA) release "For Correspondents," 28 Feb 73, and AP

ticker items forwarded by memo Murphy for Richardson, 28 Feb 73, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam

(20-28 Feb 73).

38. OASD(PA) transc, Morning Briefing, I Mar 73, transc, "News Conference at the White House

wirh Ron Ziegler at 12:53 P.M. EST, March I, 1973": TF files.

39. Dillard, Sixty Days to Peace, 88-89; 13AF JHRC AARpt, 17-18 and End 15,31-34, TF files.

40. 13AF JHRC AARpt, End 15, 39-42 (Diehl quote, 42), TF files. Prior ro takeoff Schwinn

had also received a rose plucked from their tiny prison garden by the ranking U.S. civilian

PW, Philip Manhard; see Monika Schwinn and Bernhard Diehl, IVe Came to Help, 250, 255

(the nurses' corsage is not mentioned here).

41. 13AF JHRC AARpt, End 19 and End 15,43-44; Dillard, Sixty Days to Peace, 91.

42. 13AF JHRC AARpt, End 15,45-47, TF files.

43. Memo (JCSM-41-73) JCS for SecDef, 31 Jan 73, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (Jan 73).

44. Ibid; msg Hong Kong 2395 for CINCPAC et al, 120640Z Mar 73, msg Hong Kong 2547 for

CINCPAC et ai, 150715Z Mar 73: box 31 (Returnees/U.S.-General 1973), 79-D317.

45. Memo Col V. A. DiMauro (ActgDir PW/MIA Task Force) for Dir Vietnam Task Force, 16 Mar 73,

TF files. Actually 442 Americans had come back, but at this time the official accounting

omitted Downey, whose captivity was unrelated ro the Southeast Asian hostilities. However, in

later statistical summaries (such as the table on p. 511) Downey was induded in the rotal figure

for U.S. civilians returned.

46. Dillatd, Sixty Days to Peace, 91-92; msg USDEL France 2551 for JCS/NMCC et al, 011612Z

Feb 73, TF files.

47. Dillard, Sixty Days to Peace, 92-93; msg COMUSMACV for ChJCS, 200425Z Mar 73, memo

DiMauro for Dir Vietnam Task Force, 22 Mar 73: TF files.

48. Msg JCS 43419 for CINCPAC, 220036Z Mar 73, memo DiMauro for Dir Vietnam Task

Force, 22 Mar 73: TF files.

49. Memo DiMauro for Dir Vietnam Task Force, 23 Mar 73, ibid; msg CJCS for Ch USDEL

FPJMC et al, 230459Z Mar 73, PW call, OSD Hist.

50. Memos DiMauro for Dir Vietnam Task Force, 24, 25, 26 Mar 73, TF files; Dillard, Sixty Days

to Peace, 94-97.

51. Dillard, Sixty Days to Peace, 98; memo DiMauro for Dir Vietnam Task Force, 26 Mar 73, TF files.

For the ROK soldier, see msgs Saigon 4903 for Seoul, 241101Z Mar 73, Saigon 4918 for

Seoul, 2511 05Z Mar 73: ibid.

52. Msg Chief USDEL FPJMC for CINCPAC, 310600Z Mar 73, PW coil, OSD Hisr.

53. Msg Chief US DEL FPJMC for COMUSMACV, 281520Z Mar 73, ibid; memo DiMauro for

Dir Vietnam Task Force, I Apr 73, TF files.

54. Memo Robson fot FPJMT Staff, 10 Apr 73, TF files.

55. Ihid; New York Times, 14 Feh 73; msgs Saigon 2333, 1509007 Feh 73. Saigon 2522, 181.3307

Feb 73: TF files.

56. 13AF JHRC AARpt, End 12, 2, TF files.

57. Peter Arnett (AP) news item, "No Hot Dogs," 28 Jan 73; UPI ticker item 213A, 5 Feb 73

("lots of liquids"); Risner, Passing of the Night, 246-47 (quote, 246).
596 Notes to Pages 513-22

58. Transc, JIB Press ConI', Dr. John W. Ord (Clark Hospital commanding officer), 16 Feb 73,

TF files; Risner, Passing ofthe Night, 249; 13AF JHRC AARpt, 38 and 41 ("adjusted promptly"),

TF files.

59. 13AF JHRC AARpt, Encl 12, 2-3, TF files.

60. Ibid, Encl 9, 3-4, and Encl 14,6-7.

61. Ibid, Encl 12,3.

62. Ibid, Encl 14,44-47.

63. Msg Manila 1680, 130756Z Feb 73, box 31 (Operation Homecoming 1973), 79-0317.

64. Msg 13AF JIB Clark AB for JCS/SecDef and CINCPAC, 051234Z Mar 73, msg Manila 2638,

080104Z Mar 73, msg Bangkok 3420 for JHRC Clark AB, 021150Z Mar 73, msgs 13AF Clark

AB for AIG 7942, SecState and JCS/DIA, 061000Z Mar 73, 291100Z Mar 73, and 311100Z

Mar 73: TF files.

65. Based on survey of the Operation HOMECOMING Processing Summaries, Nos 1-53, TF files.

Except during intervals when the Clark base had been cleared of all returnees, the JHRC commanding officer dispatched these reports to Washington twice daily.

66. New York Times, 14, 15 Feb, 13 Mar 73; AP ticker item 60, 25 Feb 73.

67. 13AF JHRC AARpt, 19-20, 23, OASD(lSA) HOMECOMING Command Center Log Book

entries, 0140 and 1815,13 Mar 73,0730,0739, and 0805,14 Mar 73: TF files; msg Hong Kong

2547, 1507152 Mar 73, box 31 (Returnees/U.S.-General 1973), 79-D317.

68. Msg 13AF Clark AB for JCS/SecDef, 041353Z Feb 73, TF files; memrec Capt Mike Burch

USAF, 12 Feb 73 (quote), PW coli, OSD Hisr.

69. Teleg, James L. Greenfield to Richardson, 14 Feb 73, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (1-15 Feb 73).

70. Msg 13AF/JIB/Clark AB for CINCPAC, 190240Z Feb 7.3, TF files.

71. 13AF JHRC AARpt, Encl 13,2, ibid; New York Times, 20 Feb 73 ('''controversial' questions").

72. Stars and Stripes (Pacific cd), 8 Mar 7.3; msg DPAO Wright-Patterson AFB for JHRC Clark

AB, 092034Z Mar 73, 13 AF JHRC AA Rpt, Encl l.3, 2: TF fIles.

73. New York Times, 15 Feb 73 ("to chat"), 19, 20 Feb 73 (quote). According to a Homecoming

Command Center note on data received from the Clark JIB, there were 80 personnel of all

types engaged in the 24-hour operations of the JIB, 28 of them public affairs officers; the note

is dated 21 February 1973 (TF files).

74. l.3AF JHRC AARpt, End 13, 2, End 15, 55, 57, TF files. CINCPAC had been advised of "DOD

concern that all go smoothly on last return, especially since major news media may be involved,

i.e., CRONKITE"; OASD(lSA) HOMECOMING Command Center l.og Book entry, 1815,

26 Mar 7.3. ibid.

75. Msgs 13AF Clark AB for AIG 7942, SecState, and JCSIDIA, 311100Z Mar 7.3 and 0111002

Apr 73, ibid.

76. 13AF JHRC AARpt, 44 and Encl 9, 1-2,6, ibid.

77. Military Airlift Command HOMECOMING After Action Rpt, Jul 7.3, 7-8 and Tab 0, 18-28,

which gives mission data for all C-141 and C-9 flights, ibid.

78. Ibid, 56-58; New York Times, 15 Feb 73.

79. OASD(PA) transc, Morning Briefing, 15 Feb 73, msg SecDel' 7044 for AIG 8797, 121732Z

Feb 73: TF files.

80. MAC HOMECOMING After Action Rpt, 40-41 ("appeared ambulatory"), transc, JIB Press

Conf, Dr. John W. Ord, 16 Feb 73: ibid.

81. Transc, Press ConI', Dr. Richard S. Wilbur (ASD(H&E)), "On Medical Aspects of Operation

Homecoming," 1 Jun 73, 2-3, ibid.

82. Ibid, passim (quote, 3).

83. Data derived from the J HRC Operation HOMECOMING Processing Summaries and the

OASD(lSA) HOMECOMING Command Center's "Daily HOMECOMING Summary:

Returnee Tabulation," TF files.

84. OASD(PA) transc, Morning Briefing, 6 Mar 7.3, msg AFMTCIDPAO Lackland AFB for JCS/

OASD(PA), 180525Z Feb 73, OASD(PA) memrec, 3 Mar 73, sub: Update on Capt Nasmyth

Appearance on Sonny & Cher Show: ibid.
Notes to Pages 522-30 597

85. Transc extract and commentary, nd (ca 2 Mar 73), ibid. The AI' correspondent may have felt

justified in claiming that "Government officials were quoted this week" because the 1971 volume

of presidential papers had just been published by the Government Printing Office. Nixon's

remark (he said "in modern history"), during an interview at the annual convention of the

American Society of Newspaper Editors, may be found in Nixon Public Papers, 1971, 540.

86. OASD(PA) transc, Morning Briefing, 6 Mar 73, TF files.

87. Memo Friedheim for SecDef, 20 Mar 73, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam {16-21 Mar 73).

88. Memo Eagleburger for SecDef, 21 Mar 73, ibid.

89. Msg SecDef 1771 for AIG 8797, 281615Z Mar 73, TF files. Richardson had approved the

directive by annotation on memo, Friedheim for SecDef, 27 Mar 73, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam

(22-31 Mar 73).

90. Msg SecDef for AIG 8797, 29 Mar 73, TF flb.

91. New York Times, 15 Feb 73; W'1shington Post, 30 Mar 73.

92. OASD(PA) transc, Morning Briefing, 30 Mar 73, TF files.

23. CONCLUSION

I. New York Times, 20 Feb 73; Newsweek, 26 Feb 73, 16; New Orleans Times-Picayune, 14 Feb 73.

2. Time, 19 reb 73, 13.

3. Memo Shields for PWIMIA Task Group Members, 30 Nov 72, lSA 383.6 (Nov-Dec 72).

Shields attached a copy of Laird's memo of 3 December 1971 that defined his responsibility.

4 Ltr Fred Strassburger, Americar. Psychological Assn, to Shields, 22 Jan 73, and Itr Ogan to

Strassburger, 9 Feb 73, TF files.

5. Newsweek, 26 Feb 73, 19.

6. Washington Post, 21 Feb 73. Three days later a New York Times editorial suggested that something

more than sincerity was involved. It declared that "the military authorities evidently imposed

an invidious form of censorship, not in the interest of the P.O.W.'s or of national security but

for obscure and self-serving political reasons."

7. Steven V. Roberts, New York Times, 3 Mar 73, 16.

8. Memo RAdm Daniel J. Murphy (MiiAssr to SecDef) for BrigGen Brent Scowcroft (DepAsst to

Pres for NatSecAffs), 26 Feb 73, w/attch 22 Feb 73 Friedheim for SecDef, SecDef 383.6

Vietnam (20-28 Feb 73); Washington Post, 24 Feb 73.

9. Public Statements of Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson, 1973,207-08,250.

10. New York Times, 7 Apr 7.'3; Washington Post, 5 Apr 73, where the news item quotes from

R;,-hardson's fuller statement in House Cte on Approps, Subcte on DoD, Department ofDeji:nse

Appropriations .Ii" 1974: Hearings, 93 Cong, 1 sess, 158.

II. Risner, Passin!!, ofthe Night, 747 , 248 (quote); Risner "My Turn" column in Newsweek, 18 Jun 73;

memo Col J _'ph R. Ulatosk' USA (MilAsst to SecDef) for Scowcroft, J7 Feb 73, SeeDef

383.6 Vietnam (16-19 Feb 73). Later expanded to include quotations, the reporring of

favorable statements continued into April.

12. Among the numerous examples of such inquiries, most were letters from constituents, referred

to DoD by members of Congress asking for material on which to base a reply. Mayor Charles

Evers of byette, Mississippi, addressed Richardson directly by telegram on 15 february 1973;

noting that "thus far I have seen only high ranking officers being released," he wondered "what

happeneci to the foot soldiers, the Marines, and especially the black and Mexican-American

GIs." Sec SecDef 383.6 Vietnam {1-15 Feb 73). See also questioning of Richardson in House,

Department of Defense Appropriations for 1974: Hearings, 515, and PW/MIA Task Force Fact

Sheet, L'l Apr 7.'3, sub: Officer and Enlisted PW/MIA Statistics, prepared in response to a further

query from the House committee, TF flies. DoD responses include Itr MajGen Daniel James, Jr.

(, ,ASD(F ,\) [0 Evers, 2 Mar 73, SecDcf 383.6 Viernam (1-15 Feb 73), and In William E.

0, >In (OAS,J(PA)) to Rep Wendell Wyatt (Ore), 19 Apr 73 (quote), ibid {1-10 Apr 73). On tbe
598 Notes to Pages 530-48

relatively high fatality rate among enlisted in the Sourh, see Rochester and Kiley, Honor Bound,

67,228-31.

13. Lrrs Rangel to Richardson, 4 Apr, 24 May 73, and Itt Shields to Rangel, 1 May 73, SecDef

383.6 Vietnam (1-10 Apr 73). The statistics provided by Shields covered the entire period

1 January 1961 through 7 April 1973, thereby including all men released by the enemy prior to

Homecoming plus a number who had escaped and successfully evaded. This raised the number of

enlisted men returned ftom missing or captured status to 194, of whom 26 were blacks.

14. OASD(PA) News Release No 828-71, 28 Sep 71; memo Laird for Kissinger, 23 Aug 69, SecDef

383.6 Vietnam (Aug-Sep 69).

15. Memo J. William Doolitde (GenCoun AF) for ASD(lSA), 14 Nov 67, w/attach, SecDef

383.6 (Aug-Dec 67); OASD(PA) News Release No 406-69, 19 May 69.

16. Memo Laird for SecAtmy et ai, 1 Mar 69, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam (1969); OASD(PA) News

Release No 149-69, 3 Mar 69.

17. See Chapter 20, n 46.

18. See Chapter 20; ISA memo, nd, ISA 383.6 (Dec 72).

19. Memo National League of Families to Laird, attach ltr Carole Hanson to Laird, 20 May 72,

with DoD responses to recommendation, in TF files; see also House Cte on Armed Svcs,

Full Committee Briefing on Project Egress Recap, HASC No 92-76, 92 Cong, 2 sess, 10 Oct 72,

16684, 16696-97.

20. Iris R. Powers testimony before House Cte on Armed Svcs, 10 Oct 72, ibid, 16677-78.

21. Memo Laird for Pres, 17 May 71, SecDef383.6 Vietnam (1971).

22. Nixon Public Papers, 1969, 1021.

23. Ibid, 1970,827,1159.

24. Ibid, 1972, 986-88.

25. Memo G. Warren Nurter (ASD(ISA)) for SecDef, 12 Oct 70, SecDef 383.6 Vietnam

(Aug-Oct 70).

26. See Chapter 16.

27. Ibid.

28. Laird Public Statements, 1972, 3271-72.

29. Ttansc, ASD(PA) Morning Press Briefing, 15 Feb 73, PW coll, OSD Hisr.

30. Dept of Army, "After Action Report-Operation HOMECOMING," 29 Aug 75, 42-43.

Shields's recollection of the significance of Richardson's pronouncement differs substantially.

31. Talking Paper, attach to memo MajGen Verne L. Bowers to Army Chief of Staff, 9 Apr 73,

sub: Whether Court-Martial Charges Should be Pressed Against Former PW for Alleged

Misconduct, PW coil, OSD Hisr.

32. See Rochestet and Kiley, Honor Bound, 563n, 568; memrec Davis, 1 Jul 87, interv with

Shields, PW coll, OSD Hisr.

33. Press Briefing by Shields, 12 Apr 73, Washington, D.C., PW coll, OSD Hist; House Cte on

For Affs, Subcte on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, American Prisoners

of War and Missing in Action in Southeast Asia, 1973: Hearings, 93 Cong, 1 sess, pt 4,

31 May 73, 59.

34. Senate Select Cte on POW/MIA Affairs, POW/MfA'S, 103 Cong, 1 sess, 13 Jan 93, 164.

35. Telephone conversation Alfred Goldberg (OSD Historian) with Alan Liotta (DepDir Defense

POW/MP Office), 27 Apr 2000.
Selected Bibliography

BOOKS AND STUDIES

Alvarez, Everett, Jr., with Anthony S. Pitch. Chained Eagle. New York: Donald 1. Fine, 1989.

Biderman, Albert D. March to Calumny. New Yotk: Macmillan, 1963.

Blakey, Scott. Prisoner at War: The Survival ofCommander Richard A. Stratton. Garden City,

N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978.

Buchet, Lloyd M. Bucher: My Story. Gatden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970.

Clarke, Jeffrey J. Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973. The United States Army in

Vietnam Series. Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988.

Cooper, Chester L. The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1970.

Crowe, William J., Jr. The Line ofFire. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993.

Denton, Jeremiah, Jr. When Hell Was In Session. New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1976.

Dillard, Walter Scott. Sixty Days to Peace. Washington: National Defense University, 1982.

Dramesi, John A. Code ofHonor. New York: Norton, 1975.

Ferencz, Benjamin B. Half a Century of Hope, vol. 1 of An International Criminal Court:

A Step Toward World Peace: A Documentary History and Analysis. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.:

Oceana, 1980.

Hayden, Tom. Reunion: A Memoir. New York: Random House, 1988.

Herring, George C. America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975.

New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979.

Kalb, Marvin and Bernard Kalb. Kissinger. Boston: Little, Brown, 1974.

Kinkead, Eugene. In Every War But One. New York: Norton, 1959.

Kissinger, Henry A. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979.

_____. Years of Upheaval. Boston: Little, Brown, 1982.

Le Gra, William E. Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation. Washington: U.S. Army

Center of Military History, 1980.

Lynd, Staughton and Thomas Hayden. The Other Side. New York: New American

Library, 1966.

McCubbin, Hamilton I. et ai, eds. Family Separation and Reunion: Families of Prisoners

of War and Servicemen Missing in Action. San Diego: Naval Health Research

Center, 1974.

Miller, Richard I., ed. The Law ofWar. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1975.

Murphy, Edward R., Jr. Second in Command: The Uncensored Account of the Capture of the

Spy Ship Pueblo. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971.

Myers, Armand J. et al. Vietnam POW Camp Histories and Studies, 2 vols. Maxwell AFB,

Ala.: Air War College, 1974, 1975.

Nixon, Richard M. RN: The Memoirs ofRichard Nixon. New York: Grosset & Dunlop, 1978.

599
600 Bibliography

Porter, Gareth. A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and the Paris Agreement.

Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975.

______, ed. Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions.

Stanfordville, N.¥.: E. M. Coleman, J979.

Risner, Robinson. The Passing ofthe Night. New York: Random House, 1973.

Rochester, Stuart 1. and Frederick Kiley. Honor Bound: American Prisoners of War in

Southeast Asia, 1961-1973. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1999.

Safire, William. Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre- Watergate White House. Garden

City, N.¥.: Doubleday, 1975.

Schemmer, Benjamin F. The Raid. New York: Harper & Row, 1976.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. Robert Kennedy and His Times. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978.

Schumacher, F. Carl, Jr., and George C. Wilson. Bridge of No Return: The Ordeal of the

U.S.s. Pueblo. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1970.

Schwinn, Monika and Bernhard Diehl. We Came to Help. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1973.

Stockdale, James B. and Sybil Stockdale. In Love Iwd War: The Story of a Family's Ordeal

and Sacrifice During the Vietnam Years. New York: Harper & Row, 1984.

Turley, Col. G. H., USMCR (Ret). The Easter Offensive: Vietnam, 1972. Novato, Calif.:

Presidio Press, 1985.

Veith, George J. Code-Name Bright Light: The Untold Story of U. s. pow Rescue Efforts

During the Vietnam War. New York: Free Press, 1998.

Woetzel, Robert K. The Nuremberg Trials in International Law. New York: Praeger, 1962.

Zumwalt, Elmo R., Jr. On Watch: A Memoir. New York: Quadrangle, 1976.

CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS AND REPORTS

American Prisoners of War and Missing in Action in Southeast Asia, 1973. Hearings before

House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific

Developments. 92 Cong., I sess., 1973.

American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1970. Hearings before House Foreign

Affairs Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments.

91 Cong., 2 sess., 1970.

American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1971. Hearings before House t:oreign

Affairs Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments.

92 Cong., 1 sess., 1971.

American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1972. Hearings before rbuse Foreign

Affairs Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments.

92 Cong., 2 sess., 1972.

Americans Missing in SoutheaJ·t Asia. Final Report of the House Select Committee on

Missing Persons in Southeast Asia. 94 Cong., 2 sess., 13 December 1976.

Americans Missing in Southeast Asia. Hearings before House Select Committee on

Missing Persons in Southeast Asia. 94 Cong., I sess., 1975.

Americans Missing in Southeast Asia. Hearings before House Select Committee on

Missing Persons in Southeast Asia. 94 Cong., 2 sess., 1976.

"An Examination of U.S. Policy Toward POW/MIAs." Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority (Republican) Staff Repott, 23 May 1991.

Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam. Committee Print (7th

rev. ed.). Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 93 Cong., 2 sess., 1974.

Bombing Operations and the Prisoner-of War Rescue Mission in North Vietnam. Helling

before Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 91 Cong., 2 sess., 24 November 19711,

Full Committee Briefing on Project fgress Recap. Report of the House Armed Services

Committee. 92 Cong., 2 sess., 10 October 1972.
Bibliography 601

The Geneva COnllention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Committee Print.

House Foreign Affairs Committee. 91 Cong., 2 sess., 1970.

Inquiry into the U.S.s. Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents. Hearings before House Armed

Services Committee. 91 Cong., 1 sess., 1969.

Inquiry into the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents. Report of the House Armed

Services Committee, Special Subcommittee on the U.S.S. Pueblo. 91 Cong., 1 sess.,

28 July 1969.

Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies. Hearings before Senate Armed

Services Committee, Special Preparedness Subcommittee. 87 Cong., 2 sess., 1962.

Miscellaneous Bills. Hearing before Senate Armed Services Committee, General Legislation

Subcommittee. 92 Cong., 2 sess., 7 September 1972.

POW/MIA'S. Report of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. 103 Cong.,

I sess., 13 January 1993.

Problems of Prisoners of War and Their Families. Hearing before House Armed Services

Committee. 91 Cong., 2 sess., 6 March 1970.

Problems of War Victims in Indochina, Part IV North Vietnam. Hearing before Senate

Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees

and Escapees. 92 Cong., 2 sess., 28 September 1972.

INTERVIEWS (all by author except where indicated otherwise)

Bartimo, Frank A., 13 February 1980.

DiMauro, Col. Vincent A., 29 March, I April 1983.

Fer, Col. John, 14 June 1984.

Havens, Charles W., III, 5 November 1982.

Holmes, Forrest, 19 December 1979.

Kraak, Col. Charles E, 13 May 1983, 18 April 1984.

Laird, Melvin R., 6 April 1981 (interviewed by Davis and Ernest H. Giusti).

Lewis, Robert C, 22 March 1974 (interviewed by Wilber W. Hoare, Jr.).

Mauldin, Capt. R. A., 28 January, 19 February 1980.

Murphy, Admiral Daniel J., 25 March 1982.

Shields, Roger E., 4 June 1974 (Hoare), 24-25 June 1987.

Sieverts, Frank A., 15 January 1975 (Hoare), 15 February 1980.

Trowbridge, Charles E and Carol Bates, 24 January 1985.

Index

Abrams, General Creighron W., 190,265,

274, 280

Ad Hoc Group on Viernam, 251

administration, assistant secretary of

defense for, 36

Agency for International Development,

60, 503

Agnew, Vice President Spiro, 213, 231,

232, 237, 245, 246

Agosro-Sanros, Lance Cpl. Jose, 103

Air Force Advanced Survival School

(Stead AFB), 20, 22, 24, 26

Air Force Advisory Committee on

Prisoners of War, 16n, 25-26, 29, 43

Air Force, U.S., 28, 39-40, 43-47, 133,

150, 186,234-35,240,253,256,342,

433n, 437-38, 545; and assistance ro

families, 318- I 9, 394, 396, 400-02,

404; and casualty reporting, 138-40,

144-45; and Code of Conduct, 10-11,

17,20,22-26,28, 155-59, 164-65; and

"Go Public" campaign, 198, 209-10;

and Homecoming, Operation, 499-501,

503,511,517,518,520-21; and

prisoner of war benefits, 440, 446, 536;

and prisoner of war mail, 114, 118,

121, 367, 370; and repatriation

planning, 173, 284, 291, 293, 296,

322-23, 324-25, 345-49

Algeria, 78, 86, 87, 228, 248, 384

Alvarez, Lt. (j.g.) Everett, Jr., 60,113,

119, 121

American Friends Service Committee, 110

American Legion, 222, 412

American Psychological Association, 527-28

Andrews Air Force Base, Md., 325, 518

Army, U.S., 32, 37, 39-40, 114, 133,

151, 182, 186, 234, 236, 253, 268n,

288, 367, 396, 437; and assistance to

families, 144, 149-51, 319, 401, 404;

and casualty reporting, 138-40; and

Code of Conduct, 10-11, 22-23, 156,

159, 165,350; and Homecoming,

Operation, 499, 503, 511, 520; and

repattiation planning, 173, 174, 284,

291, 293, 295-96, 324, 345-49

Arnold, Harry H., 186

Article 31 warning, 174, 343-49, 541.

See also misconduct charges

Association of Wives and Families of

Captured and Missing American

Military Men, 408n

Australia, 484

Austrian Post and Telegraph Adminisrration (APTA), 121-22

Baez, Joan, 389

Bailey, Lt. James W., 504, 514

Baird, Charles F., 133

Baldwin, Robert H. B., 48

Ball, George W., 59, 70, 72, 73, 80

Barrett, Capt. Thomas, 522

Bartimo, Frank A., 49, 171, 186, 346,

349-52, 443

Belgium, 80

Bennett, Sgt. Harold G., 60

Berg, Brig. Gen. W. W., 44, 49, 157

Berrigan, Father Daniel, S. J., 107-08,

111, 394, 528

Binh, Mme. Nguyen Thi, 105,383,

388,421, 426, 462-63, 470-71

603
604 Index

Black, Capt. John D., 107,394

black servicemen captured and missing,

106,530

Blouin, Rear Adm. E J., 57, 58

Blount, Winton M., 376-77

Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, 181

Bo, Mai Van, 227

Borda, Richard J., 293

Borman, Frank, 248-50

Brazil, 80

Brezhnev, Leonid I., 473

Brown, Harold, 45-48, 139, 156

Bruce, David K. E., 262, 266, 273,

275-76, 422, 462-63, 471

Bucher, Cdr. Lloyd M., 160-61

Budd, Sgt. Leonard, 383

Bunche, Ralph, 245

Bundy, William P., 82, 128

Bunker, Ellswonh, 93, 102, 189, 259-60,

262-64, 268, 271-72, 273, 275,

277-78, 505

Burchetr, Wilfred, 100-01

Bureau of Customs, 326, 452n

Burgess, Caner L., 11, 16n

Bush, Presidenr George, 547

Burler, Phillip N., Mrs., 148-49

BUTTERCUP channel, 101-04, 189

Butrerfield, Alexander P., 180, 245

Buzhardr, J. Fred, 304, 543-44

Byroade, Henry A., 503n

Calley, Lt. William L., Jr., 268n

Cam Ranh Bay, 173, 284-85

Camacho, Sgt. Issac, 60, 100, 114

Cambodia, 88, 99, 106, 249, 384, 385;

U.S. prisoners or missing in, 389,

490, 547

Canada, 71, 76, 78, 80, 486; citizens of

released in Operation Homecoming,

510,511-12,514

Capen, Richard G., Jr., 178, 179, 181-82,

201-03,240,245,247,248,394

Carney, Brig. Gen. Raben, 403

Carpenter, Capt. Joe v., 110, 394

casualty reponing, 45, 136-38, 150

Cayer, Marc, 511-12

Center for Disease Control, 326

Center for Prisoner of War Studies of

the Navy Medical Neuropsychiatric

Research Unit, 319

Central Identification Laboratory, 547

Central Intelligence Agency, 35, 42, 45,

50, 189,238-39,508

central processing site for returning

prisoners, 284-87, 299, 30 I, 305,

321-23,324,492,495. See also Joint

Central Processing Center (JCPC)

Chaffee, John H., 161

Chancellor, John, 472

Charles, Lt. Norris A., 192-95, 353,

447,541

China, People's Republic of, 6, 7, 32,

473, 475, 505; release of U.S.

prisoners from, 507-08, 514- 15

Choung, Pham Van, 117

Church, Sen. Frank, 80, 81

Civilian Health and Medical Program

of the Uniformed Services

(CHAMPUS),312

civilians, repatriation of, 327-29, 492,

503,506-11, 514

Clark Air Base, 305, 324, 492-517

passim, 528

Clark, Ramsey, 386, 387-88

Clifford, Clark M., 470, 471

Code of Conduct, 13-30,53,105,151-66,

340-55, 540-44. See also misconduct

charges

Collins, James E, 116

Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC),

94,153,172-74,176,190-91,265,

283-87, 299-30 I, 303, 305, 320-26,

328, 332, 336, 495-96, 500

Commitree of Liaison with Families of

Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam

(COLIAFAM), 192, 194-95, 228, 254,

367,374-77,381-82,385-88,390

comptroller, OSD, 36, 136, 321

Congress, U.S., 210-14, 219, 242, 430-32,

437,439-41,443,450,452,469,530,

540, 544

counseling: career, 313-14, 493; family,

308,310-13,314-19; psychological,

174,308-13,317,318-19,326-27

Crafts, PFC Charles E., 93

Cranston, Sen. Alan, 199

Cronkite, Walter, 472

Crowe, Admiral William J., Jr., 160n

Cuba, 200

currency transmittal, 369-72

Czechoslovakia, 105, 116-17
Dang, Tran Bach, 102-04

Davis, Rennard C (Rennie), 231, 232

de Borchgrave, Arnaud, 387

de Heller, Jacques, 86-87, 98

debriefing of returnees, 168, 170, 174,

176, 300, 306, 324, 325-26, 343-49,

492,493,513,519,540-41

Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners

of War, 11-20, 22-23, 30, 56, 163

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 34,

39-40,47,50, 141-42, 150, 168,

170, 175, 184, 194, 205, 294, 320,

325-26, 492, 504, 547

Defense-State relations, 31-38, 43, 46,

52-53,56,57,135,19]-92,198,200-

01,214-17,237-38,327-29,532,533

Dellinger, David, 107, 108, 192-94,

230-32, 374

Dennett, Col. James R., 499,500,501,

504, 506, 507, 51 On, 517

Denton, Capt. Jeremiah A., Jr., 240,

528

Denton, Mrs. Jeremiah A., Jr. (Jane),

240, 408

Department of Defense Homeowners

Assistance Program, 442

Dewey, Thomas E., 247-48

Dickinson, Rep. William L., 212

Diehl, Bernhard J., 506-07, 514

DiFusco, Col. M. P., 40

DiMauro, Lt. Col. Vincent A., 185, 195

DoD PW Repatriation Planning

Conference, 320-23, 324-26, 327-28,

332, 343, 346

Dole, Sen. Robert J., 2]2-13

Dong, Premier Pham Van, 97, 105,

223, 228

Donovan, James, 41

Doolin, Dennis J., 179

Downey, John, 508, 5]4

Duncan, Vice Adm. Charles K., 162-63,

172

Dunn, Lt. Col. John H., 516

Dunn, Maureen, 428

Eagleburger, Lawrence S., 523-24

Earle, Ralph, II, 178

East Germany, 33, 78, 79, 88-90, 131

Eaton, Ramone S., 116-17

Edwards, Rep. Jack, 240

Index 605

Egress Recap, 284, 286, 323, 339, 349,

491. See also Homecoming, Operation;

repatriation planning

Eisenhower, President Dwight D., 29,

56, 152, 161, 250, 327

Elias, Maj. Edward K., 192-95, 353,

447,541

Employment Service, U.S., 314

En-lai, Chou, 473

Epes, Rear Adm. Horace II., Jr., 184,

185-86, 190, 195, 320, 397, 423

escorts, 306, 322, 324-25, 517

European Command (EUCOM), 283,

320, 323-24

exchange of prisoners, 86-90, 94-95,

101-04,257-58,268. See also release,

early; release, reciprocal

execution of prisoners, 37-38, 59-61

Fairchild Hiller Corporation, 219-20

Fall, Bernard, 100

Family Services and Assistance Officers

(FSAO), 401. See also next of kin,

assistance to

Federal Bureau of Investigation, 46, 145

Fernandez, Rev. Richard, 382

Ferraro, Dr. E. T., 44

Findley, Rep. Paul, 272-73

Fitt, Alfred B., 168

Flynn, Lt. Cdr. Robert J., 508

Fonda, Jane, 387, 529

Foreign Claims Settlement Commission,

446

Foreman, Benjamin, 49

Four-Party Joint Military Commission

(FPJMC), 486-88, 491, 498,500,

502, 504, 506, 509-10

France, 3, 71, 76, 80, 224-25, 228,

248, 505

Freymond, Jacques, 63, 66, 70, 128

Friedheim, Jerry W., 355, 366, 494-95,

506,515,516,519,522-24,542

Frishman, Lt. Robert E, 206-09, 211, 213,

215,233-35,242,255,363,395-96

Fulbright, Sen. J. William, 165, 211,

214,227,228,254

Gaddis, Col. Norman C, 504

Galanti, Phyllis, 428
606 Index

Gallery, Rear Adm. Daniel v., 15

Gallopin, Roger, 69, 87-88

Gartley, Lt. Markham L., 192-95, 353,

447-51,541

Gayler, Admiral Noel, 305, 503

general counsel, OSD, 19,47,49,

168, 171, 184, 186,294,304,

340, 346, 349-52, 355, 370, 443,

445-46, 543

Geneva Convention on prisoners of

war (1929), 2

Geneva Convention Relative to the

Protection of Civilian Persons in

Time of War (1949), 2

Geneva Convention Relative to the

Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949),

2,105,433; and Code of Conduct,

14-17, 153-54; Communist violation

or rejection of, 66-68, 113-14, 123-29;

and currency transmittal, 369-70; and

early release of sick and wounded,

56-57, 96-99, 258, 273; and further

participation in hostilities by returned

prisoners, 192-93; and GVN/U.S.

treatment of Communist prisoners,

63-64,70-71,94; and inspection of

Communist PW facilities, 113, 127;

and prisoner identification, 113,

128-29; and prisoner mail and packages, 113-14, 120, 121-23,376,380;

and role of Red Cross, 61-67, 72-74;

and war crimes, 3-6, 64-65, 68-69,

79 (see also war crimes issue)

"Go Public" campaign, 180, 197-228,

229,258,393,395,406,409,414,

531-35

Goldberg, Arthur J., 127-28,245

Gonard, Samuel A., 70, 74, 77, 117,

123-24, 125, 127-28

Goodpaster, General Andrew J., 323

Gottlieb, Sanford, 87

Graham, Billy, 247

Great Britain, 3, 35, 71, 76, 79, 88-90,

505

Gregerson, Lt. Col. William, 185, 195,

366

Grubb, Evelyn, 427

Guam, U.S. Naval Station Hospital, 174,

286, 288, 305

Gunderson, Col. Brian S., 46

Guy, Eugene D., 508

Ha, Sau, 102-03

Habib, Philip c., 215, 261-63, 376, 462

Haggard, Lt. Col. Gordon M., 185, 195

Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907),2

Hai, Nguyen Van, 61, 86, 88

Haig, Maj. Gen. Alexander, 481, 489

Hanson, Carole, 429

Harriman, W. Averell, 42-43, 48, 51-53,

57,59,73-74,78, 194,201, 230, 237,

407; and casualty reporting, 142-43,

148-49; and Code ofConducr, 154-55;

and conditions of captivity, 123, 125,

127, 130, 134-35; and efforts to obtain

release of prisoners, 94, 97,100, 104-

11; and peace negotiations, 453-56,

532; and prisoner of war mail, 358-60;

and war crimes trials issue, 77, 80-83

Hart, Mrs. Jane, 387

Hathaway, Sen. William D., 450

Hauser, Rita E., 216, 221

Havens, Charles W., III, 49, 142, 178,

179, 198, 240, 243, 392-93, 394,

395,415

Hayden, Tom, 105-07, 110

Hayes, Brig. Gen. George J., 296, 315

health and environment, assistant secretary

of defense for, 186-87, 288-90, 302,

316-17,319,520

Hebert, Rep. F. Edward, 450, 452

Hegdahl, Seaman Douglas B., 206-09,

211, 233, 242, 255, 363, 395-96

Henkin, Daniel Z., 49, 52-53, 158,

178,181, 198,209,332-34,336-37,

339, 426

Hersh, Seymour, 387

Hertz, Gustav, 42, 60-61, 85-88

Heymann, Philip B., 41-42, 68, 72-73,

82, 143

Hitch, Charles J., 136

Hitrle, James D., 444

Ho Chi Minh, 78, 84, 123, 458, 535n

Homecoming, Operation, 31, 491-525,

527-30. See also Egress Recap

Homecoming Operations Center, 335, 527

Hong Kong, 121,248,357

Hoover, J. Edgar, 327

Hope, Bob, 326

Horwitz, Solis, 36, 47

House Armed Services Committee,

161-65,450

Hull, General John E., 11, 16n
Humphrey, Vice President Hubert, 80,

222

Hungary, 486

India, 79, 80, 228, 248

Indonesia, 486

inspecrion of North Vietnamese prison

facilities, 113, 123, 127-28,486,501

Intelligence Board, 141

intelligence collection, 45, 50, 53, 141-42

Interagency Prisoner of War Intelligence

Ad Hoc Committee (IPWIC), 50,

142, 188

Interagency Prisoner of War Intelligence

Group (lPWIG), 50

Interdepartmental Prisoner of War

Committee, 42-43, 59, 72, 78, 99

Interdepartmental Study Panel on

Prisoner Release and Repatriation

in Indochina, 489

International Commission of Control

and Supervision (ICCS), 486-88,

500-01, 510, 512

International Control Commission, 71,

76,78,107,110

international security affairs (lSA),

assistant secretary of defense for, 19,

36-37, 40, 45, 239, 523-24, 537;

and assistance to families and next

of kin, 392, 396-98; and Code of

Conduct, 333, 335, 352-53, 355;

and "Go Public" campaign, 199;

and Homecoming, Operation, 31;

and Prisoner of War Policy Committee,

47, 51; and repatriation planning, 169,

177-86,191,288-89,298,312,320

internment in neutral country, 56-57,

98-99, 257, 265, 273, 275-76

Iran, 248

Irwin, John N., II, 250

Istanbul Conference, 215

Italy, 80

Jackson, Sgt. James E., Jr., 106

James, Brig. Gen. Daniel "Chappie," Jr.,

209-10,519,523,542

Japan, 248

Jefferson, Ralph H., 179, 182

Johnson, Alexis, 116

Index 607

Johnson, Sgt. Edward R., 106

Johnson, General Harold K., 144

Johnson, President Lyndon, 76, 80, 83,

96, 113, 123, 130, 135, ISO, 160,

168,174,176,197,201, 257, 283,

438, 453, 454-55

Joint Central Processing Center (JCPC),

299, 305, 323-26, 328-29, 336, 495n

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 32-35, 37-38,

44,46-48,71, 184n, 190, 194,461;

and casualty reporting, 141; and Code

of Conduct, 23-28,152-53,159,165;

and efforts to obtain release of prisoners,

96,99, 104-05,234,265; and Homecoming, Operation, 491-92, 507-08;

and repatriation planning, 167-69,

171-72,283,285,288-91,298,301,

303,320-21,323; and war crimes

trials issue, 82, 86

Joint Homecoming Reception Center

(JHRC), 495-96, 503

Joint Information Bureau, 336-37, 496-97,

515,517

Joint Staff, 34, 39-40, 42,57-58, 167,

184, 238-39

Joint Task Force Full Accounting, 547

journalist travel to North Vietnam, 131-32

Justice Department, 231

Kalb, Bernard, 520

Kegley, Col. Milton K., 248

Kelley, Roger T., 294, 308, 450-52

Kennedy, Sen. Edward M., 214, 227,

387, 450

Kennedy, Sen. Robert E, 41-42, 72-73,

86, 88, 100, 327

Khiem, Tran Thien, 463

Kiem, Tran Buu, 101, 102

King, Martin Luther, Jr., 327

Kinkead, Eugene, 13n

Kissinger, Henry A., 207-08, 237-39,

245-53,260,263,416-19,425-26,

455-62,465-69,472-84,487-90,

498, 504, 508, 516, 539

Kitchen, Jeffrey c., 34-35

Klusmann, Lt. Cdr. [Charles], 154

Korean War, 1,5-13,18,31,151,

179,304,309,310,350,431,

433,448-51,512

Kraak, Lt. Col. Charles E, 195
608 Index

Kraft, Joseph, 386, 387

Kroger, Mr. and Mrs., 88-90

Kushner, Valerie, 429

Ky, Nguyen Cao, 63-64, 86, 89, 92-93,

102-03, 463

Labor Department, 312, 314

Laird, Melvin R., 177, 229, 438, 459;

and appointment of presidential

emissary, 245-50; and assistance to

next of kin, 283, 391-92, 397, 399,

402, 443, 535-36; and Code of

Conduct, 341-43, 351-55,541-43;

and "Go Public" campaign, 180,

198-210, 395, 408, 531-32; and

organization of PW(MIA affairs, 18 I,

182, 183-84, 189-91,237-40; and

prisoner of war mail, 365, 379; and

prisoner of war release initiatives,

232-33,258-74,277; and the PW

issue in peace negotiations, 250-53,

4 I9, 423-24, 460-62, 487-89; relations with next of kin and family

organizations, 241-44, 399, 409,

413-17,419,423-24,426,538; and

repatriation planning, 289, 295-98,

300-05,312,314-15,320,323;

and Son Tay raid, 253-56

Lam, Pham Dang, 258, 261, 269n

Lam, Tran Van, 269, 275

Lampert, Lt. Gen. J. B., 44

Landstuhl, West Germany, U.S. Army

Hospital at, 323-24

Laos, 78, 136,378,389,547; release

of prisoners from, 485,508-11,514.

See also Pathet Lao

Le May, Gen. Curtis E., 23-24

League of Wives of American Prisoners

of War, 406-08

legislation relating to PWs, 143-44,

430-36,439,440,441,442,443,

450-52, 536

legislative affairs, assistant to the secretary

of defense for, 19,36-37,179,181,184

Lewis, Robert c., 39

Lindquist, Capt. Edward E., 401,403

Loan, General Nguyen Ngoc, 102, 103,

104

Lockwood, Lee, 124-25

Lodge, Henry Cabot, 37, 84, 93, 204,

214,231,233,242,361-62

Low, Maj. James E, 110,394

Lowrance, Vice Adm. Vernon L., 50

Lynd, Staughton, 105, III

Lynn, Col. Alfred J., 496, 497, 499, 515

mail and packages, 39, 46, 48, 60, 113-22,

141,153,201, 203, 206, 223, 356-90

Manila Conference, 96-97

Manor, Brig. Gen. Leroy J., 254, 256

manpower, assistanr secretary of defense

for, 19,36-37,40-41,44-45,47,49,

5 I, 184n; and assistance to families

and next of kin, 392, 438, 450; and

casualty reporting, 137, 140, 143;

and Code of Conduct, 27, 29-30,

156-57, 165, 333

Mansfield, Sen. Mike (Mansfield

Amendment), 423, 469, 470

Marcos, Presidenr Ferdinand, 514

Marine Corps, U.S., 39-40, 50, 133,

234, 240, 244, 353, 356, 386, 437,

439, 503, 535, 544, 547; and assistance to families, 304, 313, 318-19,

391-93,397,401-03; and casualty

reporting, 136-38, 140, 147, 149-50;

and Code of Conduct, 10, 19, 22-23,

156, 158, 340-42, 344-48, 350, 544;

and Homecoming, Operation, 51 I,

520; and repatriarion planning, 168-

73,175,284,287,290-91,295,301,

324, 335, 345-49

Marshall, Brig. Gen. (Ret.) S. L. A., 16n

Marshall, Thurgood, 83

Martin, Graham, 215

Matheny, Lt. (j.g.) David p., 107, 394

Mauldin, Cdr. Richard A., 185, 195,288

Maunoir, Jean Pierre, 66-67, 70

McCain, Admiral John S., Jr., 172-73,

174,190,265,285-86,296-301,

303, 321, 324, 326, 332

McCain, Lt. Cdr. John S., III, 208

McClellan, Brig. Gen. Stan L., 50 I-02

McCloskey, Robert J., 130

McClure, Sgt. Claude D., 90-91,95,

100,106,154

McConnell, General John P., 43-44, 46

McCormack, Rep. John, 226
McDevitt, Rear Adm. Joseph B., 163

McGovern, Sen. George 5., 426, 429,

471-72

McKernan, Frank, 314

McLin, Walter 5., III, 442

McNamara, Robert 5., 23, 24-26, 28,

33, 37-38, 44, 52, 134, 139, 146,

152,154,156,163,165

McNaughton, John T., 89

Meacham, Stewart, 110, 111

Mearns, Mrs. Arthur 5., 408n

medical examination of returning PWs,

168,170,174,175,285-302,308-13,

314-19,492-93,512-13,519-21

MIAs, 136, 138, 141-42, 144-45,326,

408, 432-34, 483, 486-88, 490, 492,

493, 544-47

Military Airlift Command (MAC), 320,

322-24, 445, 492, 518

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

(MACV), 92, 94,103,173-75,190,

265, 284-86, 288, 320

Miller, Lt. Col. Edison W., 544

Miller, William, 318

misconduct charges, 154-57, 168,

170-71, 174,340-55,493,540-44;

in Korean War, 10-]3, 540; in

Pueblo incident, 161

mistreatment of prisoners, 60-61, 64,

78-79,113,124-26,199,202-03,

207-08,211-12,215-18,225-26,

227, 395, 407

Monroe, Col. James L., 43-46

Moore, Lt. Gen. William G., Jr., 503

Moorer, Admiral Thomas H., 190, 298-99

Morris, Thomas D., 137, 143, 146, 150

Mulligan, Mrs. Louise, 408

Murphy, Rear Adm. Daniel J., 489, 506

Murphy, Robert D., 247, 248

Muskie, Sen. Edmund S., 450

My Lai incident, 268

National League of Families of American

Prisoners and Missing in Southeast

Asia, 180-81,209,214,220-22,256,

272-73, 318, 342-43, 379-80, 388,

398-430, 437, 444, 446, 452, 531,

536-40, 546

Index 609

National Liberation Front (NLF), 33, 60-

68,70,75,77,86-87,96-97,99-106,

114-20,123,126,135,212-13,273,

356, 383-85,420, 454-58, 462. See also

Provisional Revolutionary Government

of South Vietnam (PRG); Viet Cong

National Military Command Center,

188,190,194-95,325,335,492,

500, 507, 527

National Mobilization Committee to

End rhe War in Vietnam, 107,230-31

National Security Council, 33, 229, 238-

39, 251, 456, 489

National Student Association, 387

Navy, U.S., 39-40, 48, 50, 83, 114, 118,

121, 125, 133, 184n, 198, 240, 244,

353, 356, 359, 404, 437, 439, 535,

545, 547; and assistance to families,

318-19,391-93,396-97,401-03;

and casualty reporting, 136-38, 140,

146-50; and Code of Conduct, 10-11,

17, 22-23, 155-59, 161-65, 340-42,

345-47,350-51, 541; and Homecoming, Operation, 511, 517, 520-21;

and repatriation planning, 168-76,

284, 287-90, 292, 295-96, 301, 303-

05, 313, 324, 326-27, 335, 345-49

Navy-Air Force Air Crew Working Group,

50-51

New Zealand, 484

next of kin: assistance to, 143-49, 150n,

391-405,536-37; benefits, 430-32,

434-37,438-45,535-37; information

to, 52, 53, 142-43, 147,353,391-98;

notification of, 39, 45, 138-43, 149,

353, 392. See also travel by family

members

Nitze directives: of 26 July 1967,47-48;

of 8 June 1968, 167-72,284,331;

of 18 January 1969,172-76,284,286

Nitze, Paul, 46-48,51-52,53,131,147,

149,157,169,171,174-76,284,

286,331-32

Nixon, President Richard M., 177,231,

528, 530; and appointment of presidential emissary, 245-49; and assistance

to next of kin, 445, 451; and "Go

Public" campaign, 197, 204, 213, 216,

222, 224, 258, 532; and Homecoming,
610 Index

Operation, 491, 499,505,522-23,526;

and organization of PW/MIA affairs,

180-81, 237-39; and prisoner of war

mail, 373, 375-77, 380, 390; and

prisoner of war release initiatives, 259-

60, 265-68, 270, 274, 276, 278, 280;

and the PW issue in peace negotiations,

251-52, 455-82, 484, 486; relations

with next of kin and family organizations, 240-45, 409, 414-17, 419-20,

422, 424-29, 538-39; and repatriation

planning, 283-85, 307; and Son Tay

raid, 254

Nixon, Mrs. Richard M. (Patricia),

243-44,416

North American Rockwell, 220

North, Carol 0., 418

North Korea, 6-9, 32-33, 35,55,56, 160

North Vietnamese People's Army (PAVN),

or NorthVietnamese Army (NVA), 88,

90-93,96-98, 100,257-82

Nuremberg trials, 3-4, 79, 84

Nutter, G. Warren, 376, 409, 415, 417,

523; and assistance to families and

next of kin, 304-05, 392, 397, 445;

and Code of Conduct, 341-43; and

efforts to obtain release of prisoners,

234, 236-37, 240, 247, 263, 265-66,

270; and "Go Public" campaign, 226;

and PW/MIA Task Group/Task Force,

178-93; and repatriation planning,

288,291,295-98,308,313-14,

317-18,320,325-26

Office of Education, 314

Ogan, Brig. Gen. Russell G., 195, 305,

314,317,325,506,517,528

Okinawa, Camp Kue, 286, 305

Oppel, Lloyd, 514

Ortiz-Rivera, PFC Luis A., 103

OSD Conference on Prisoners and

Missing in Vietnam, 41, 44, 49,

58,114, 118, 188

Ott, Jean, 279

Overly, Maj. Norris M., 107,394,396

pacifist intermediaries, 105-12, 192-95,

229-34,373-76,386,387-88, 389-

90, 394

Packard, David, 198, 210, 239, 273,

391,411,419

Pakistan, 99

Paris Peace Conference, 454-91, 526. See

also peace negotiations and PW issue

Pathet Lao, 154,221,420,508-10,514

pay, 321, 432-34, 438-40, 445-46, 447-52

peace negotiations and PW issue, 250-53,

265-66,416-28 passim, 455-57, 460-

73, 476, 478, 480, 482-90, 526

Pell, Sen. Claiborne, 216

Perkins, Maj. Glendon W., 515, 518

Perot, H. Ross, 213, 222-26

Philippines, 484, 514. See also Clark

Air Base

Phuong, Lt. Col. Nguyen, 500, 501, 506

Pike, Rep. Otis G. (Pike Committee),

162-65

Pitzer, Sgt. Daniel L., 106

Plantation, 131 n, 200n

Podgorny, President Nikolai, 475

Poland, 76, 248, 486

Pope Paul VI, 79, 532

Porter, William ].,366,377,380,382,

462

Post Office Department, 357, 360, 362,

365,376-78,386,389

POW/MIA affairs, deputy assistant

secretary of defense for, 547

POW/MIA Families for Immediate

Release, 420

POW/MIA International, Inc., 420

Powers, Iris R., 399, 408, 449, 538

prisoner lists and identification, by

Vietnamese Communists, 113, 123,

128-29,204,224-25,227-28,373-

74,376,387,492

"prisoner of war" designation, 55, 136-37

promotion in captivity, 433, 437-38

Provisional Revolutionary Government

of South Vietnam (PRG), 214, 221,

458,462,470-74,476,478-79,483,

486, 498-99, 502-06, 509-11. See also

National Liberation Front

public affairs, 52-53, 129-34, 142-43,

147, 197-210,226-27,229; and

repatriation planning, 170, 330-40,

493-95,496-97,515-17,519,521-25.

See also "Go Public" campaign

public affairs, assistant secretary of defense

for, 37, 39-40, 47, 49,51,145,170,
366; and assistance to families, 393,

426; and Code of Conduct, 158, 330-40,

355; and "Go Public" campaign, 199,

201, 209; and Homecoming, Operation,

492,494-95, SIS, 523-24, 542; and

PW/MIA Task Group/Task Force,

178-79,181-82,184,194; and

repatriation planning, 294, 311

Pueblo incident, 16n, 159-63, 165,308,

359

PW/MIA Task Group/Task Force, 177,

179,183-91,194-96,290,302-03,

305,308,312-14,316-17,321,325,

332,335,346-47,364,366-68,381,

385,396-97,403,412,442-44,446,

448, 450, 492, 528, 544

PW Policy Committee (Defense Department), 43, 47-54, 132, 134, 142,

147-49, 157-58, 165, 167-69, 171,

174-78,179-87,198,234,236,283,

290-92, 294-96, 298, 302, 308, 335,

341,343,353,370,372, 375, 391-93,

395,411-12,440,444-45,532,534

Quarles, Donald, 163

Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs), 324,

495, 499

Ramstein Air Base, 323-24

Rangel, Rep. Charles, 530

ransom, 104-05

Rather, Dan, 472

Reader's Digest, 217-18

Reagan, President Ronald, 547

Reception Support Team (RST), 499.

See also Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs)

Red Cross, American (ARC), 39-41, 50,

58-59,68-69,73,77,99-100, 114-22,

126,137-38,170,195,214,217-19,

223,357-58,383-84,508,513,515

Red Cross, International Committee

of the (ICRC), 5-6, 32, 34-35, 39,

137-38,170,192; and conditions of

captivity, 113-19, 121, 123-31; and

efforts to release prisoners, 83, 86-87,

90-91,94-99,258,267,277-82; and

"Go Public" campaign, 215-18, 221;

and prisoner of war mail, 357-58, 383-

84, 388; and treatment of prisoners,

Index 611

58-74; and war ctimes trials issue,

77, 79-80, 83

Rehabilitation/Readjustment Study Panel,

308-13,317,319-20,397

release: early, 33-35, 56-57, 89, 90, 93,

103,106,107,110,188-95,206-07,

234-36 (Defense Department policy

toward), 257-82, 394-95; at homecoming, 498-517; reciprocal, 90-96,

188-89, 257 (see also exchange of

prisoners)

repatriation planning, 53, 167-76,

283-355. See also Egress Recap;

Homecoming, Operation

Repatriation, Rehabilitation, and

Readjustment Committee (Triple R

Committee), 399-400, 402-03, 446

Resor, Stanley R., 182

Reunite Our Families, 221

Rhinelander, John, 142

Riate, Cpl. Alfonso 383

Richardson, Elliot L., as secretary of

defense, 491-96, 508, 515, 523, 529,

530, 543; as under secretary of state,

178,201,203,209,231-32,233,237,

241-42,245-46,250,259,416-17,538

Risner, Lt. Col. Robinson, 200, 202, 512,

516, 525, 529

Roberts, Steven, 528

Robson, Lt. Col. Lawrence, 504, 510n

Rogers, William P., 205, 250, 258, 263,

278,461

Roraback, Sgt. Kenneth M., 60-61, 62,

66, 100

Rowe, Maj. James N., 396

Rumble, Capt. Wesley L., 207, 211,233,

255, 263, 395-96

Rush, Kenneth, 304, 442

Rusk, Dean, 33-34, 41, 42, 63, 80, 81,

82,100,117,130

Russell, Sen. Richard B., 138-39

Rutledge, Capt. Howard, 529

Ryan, James D., 404

Sachse, Victor A., 25

Salisbury, Harrison E., 132

Schoenbrun, David, 122, 132

Schornak, Maj. Thomas R., 195

Schwartz, Abba P., 59, 66, 68, 69, 70-71,

72, 74, 86, 88
612 Index

Schwinn, Monika, 506, 514

Selden, Armistead, 333, 349-50

Sexton, Sgt. John, Jr., 188-92, 288-89,

339, 384-85

Shaplen, Robert, 101

Shatp, Admiral Grant, 82

Sheble, Walter E, 358, 360

Shields, Roger E., 182, 542-45; and

assistance to families, 397,421-22,

426, 438; and Code of Conduct,

333, 340, 346-47, 350-52; and

Homecoming, Operation, 491-94,

498-99, 501, 506, 523; and prisoner

of war mail, 368, 387-88; and PW/

MIA Task Group/Task Force, 184-88,

190-91,194-95; and rehabilitation

planning, 316, 318, 320, 323-24,

328; and repatriation planning, 291,

294,301

sick and wounded, repatriation of, 56,

96-98, 258-65, 269-71, 275-82,

485,499,501

Sieverts, Frank A., 51,72-74,92, 110,

111,135,191,194,201,203,233,

247,279,327-28,358,375,381,385,

388, 394, 417, 498, 499, 50 I, 506

Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, 88, 99

Simons, Col. Arthur D., 254

Small Business Administration, 314

Smith, Sgt. George E., 90-91, 95, 100,

106, 154

Smith, James, 515

Smith, Maj. Philip E., 507-08

Social Security Administration, 435

Sol bert, Peter, 34-36

Son Tay raid, 253-56, 381

South Korea, 6, 484, 511

South Vietnam: GVN treatment of Communist prisoners, 63-64, 76, 104,225;

release of Communist prisoners from,

76,90-94,96-98, 102-03,257-82;

release of U.S. prisoners from, 90,

93, 103, 106-07, 188,230,395,396,

498-99, 501-03, 506, 507, 511 (lee

also release, early); U.S. prisoners in,

32-33,35,37,55,57,59-61,77,

85 -88, 114, 116- 17, I 19, 12 1, 357,

383-85, 387-89. See also National

Liberation Front, Viet Cong

Soviet Union, 3, 5, 32, 33, 76, 79, 223, 248,

358,360,377-79,473,474,475,505

special operations, assistant to the secretary

of defense for, 19

Special Prisoner of War Committee, 238-39

Stafford, Lt. Cdr. Hugh Allen, 203

Stange, Jurgen, 88, 90

State Department. See Defense-State

relations

Stempler, Jack L., 211

Stockdale, Cdr. James B., 407

Stockdale, Mrs. James B. (Sybil), 180-82,

200,206,21.3,220,240,242,379,

393,406-10,416,417-18,428

Stockstill, Louis R., 217, 218

Stratton, Lt. Cdr. Richard A., 124-26,

130, 142, 208

Sullivan, William H., 107-10,214,

233, 251

Supreme Court, U.S., III

Sussman, Peter M., 377-79

Swank, Emory c., 100

Sweden, 228, 248, 276

Switzerland, 99, 359

Sylvester, Arthut, 145

Tam, Huynh Van, 86-88, 91, 116

Tanner, Lt. Cdr. Charles N., 125

Taylor, General Maxwell D., 23

Taylor, Telford, 389

Teague, Rep. Olin E., 437

Thailand, 136, 484, 514

Thang, President Ton Due, 387

Thant, U, 216, 532

Thieu, President Nguyen Van, 102-03,

189,257-75 passim, 454-55, 458,

462.464,466-68,473,475-76,

479,481-82

third-country nationals, 328-29, 492,

506-07,509,510-12,514

Tho, Le Due, 465, 467-69, 473, 475-82,

484,490,498,508,510

Thompson, Maj. Fred N., 110,394,396

Thornton, Capt. John W., 49,178,185,

370, 394

Thuy, Xuan, 108,204,218,358-62,

373,380,382,454,457-58,462,

465, 466, 468, 470, 472

Tong, Truong Binh, 102-03

Tonkin Gulf incidents, 59

Tower, Sen. John, 211
travel by family members: to hospiral

reunions with releasees, 171-72, 284,

303-05, 329, 515; to North Vietnam,

148-49; on space-available basis in

military aircraft, 412, 430-31, 434-

35, 444-45

Travis Air Force Base, Calif., 325, 337,

493, 494, 517

Treasury Department, 370-72, 452n

Triple R Committee. See Repatriation,

Rehabilitation, and Readjustment

Committee

Tu Trong, 188

Tubby, Roger w., 123, 127

Turkey, 80, 215

Two-Party Joint Military Commission

(TPJMC), 486

Uhl, Edward G., 219

Uniformed Services Savings Deposit

Program (USSDP), 144, 433, 438-40,

446, 448-49, 452

United Arab Republic, 72, 80

United Nations, 3-4, 6-7, 32, 83, 127,

160,212,216-17,221, 247, 267, 534

United States Information Agency (USIA),

134,204,238-39

United States Information Service (USIS),

134

United We Stand, Inc., 222-26

Universal Postal Union, 118, 358

Van Putten, Thomas, 396

Vance, Cyrus, 32, 34, 42, 44, 52, 81,

108,137, 139, 146, 147, 155-56,

168,171, 454-56

Versace, Capt. Humbert R., 60-61, 62, 66

Veterans Administration, 312, 313-14, 315,

435-36,441,447

Veterans of Foreign Wars, 222

Viet Cong, 55-56, 76-77, 154, 188,

202, 220, 244, 396; and execution

of prisoners, 37, 59, 144; and prisoner

of war mail, 357, 383-87; and release

of prisoners, 32-33, 35, 41-42, 85-86,

90-94, 421, 492, 502-03, 505-06,

509-10; and treatment of prisoners,

63-64, 71, 121. See also National

Liberation Front

Index 613

Vietnamization, 259, 416-17, 425,

458-60, 465, 469

Vinson, Joan, 342-43, 429, 437

Vogel, Wolfgang, 88-90, 91

Vogt, Brig. Gen. John W., 37, 293

Voices in Vital America (VIVA), 413n, 519

Vu Hong, 188-89

Waldhaus, Richard, 503, 511

war crimes issue, 3-6, 38, 52, 64-65,

68-84

Warner, John W., 544

Warnke, Paul c., 47-53, 133, 142, 147,

148-49, 161, 171, 175, 176, 177, 198

Watkins, Willie, 396

Weiss, Cora, 192-94,228,254-55,367,

373-75,377,381, 382-83, 385, 386,

389-90

West German citizens released in Operation Homecoming, 506, 514

Westmoreland-Co Agreement, 92, 94

White, Capt. Robert T., 511, 517

Wickham, Brig. Gen. John A., 491

Wilber, Capt. Walter E., 544

Wilbur, Dr. Richard S., 186-87, 288-92,

294-98, 301-02, 314, 316, 520-21

Wilson, Rep. Bob, 211, 240-41

Wilson, Charles E., 10, 11-12, 17-19,

23-24,27,29,30n

Womack, Sgt. Sammie N., 93

Women's Strike for Peace, 374

Woods, Cdr. Brian D., 499,501, 514, 518

Woodward, Maj. Gen. Gilbert H., 491,

498, 502, 505, 506, 510

Woodward, Robert F., 61

Work, Col. Robert E., 178, 185

World Council of Churches, 79, 81

World War II, 1, 2, 3, 179, 304, 310,

431, 433, 448-51, 534

"Write Hanoi" campaign, 217-18, 219

Yugoslavia, 248

Zablocki, Rep. Clement J., 212, 226

Ziegler, Ronald, 505, 506

Zinn, Howard, 107-08, 111, 394

Zuckert, Eugene M., 25-26, 43

Zumwalt, Admiral Elmo R., Jr., 404