Th e Ho no ra ble John R. Gib so n, Se nio r Un ite d Stat e s Circ uit Judg e fo r t he Ei g hth Cir c uit , * sitti ng by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0542n.06 F iled: Septem ber 4, 2008 No. 07-6089 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

DO NN A M UL L I

NS, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,

v. GOODY EAR TI RE & RUB BER CO., Def endant- Appellee

.

__________________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E WE STE RN DI STRI CT OF TEN

NESSEE

B EF OR E: KE I TH , G RI F F I N, and GI B SON , Ci rc uit

Judg e s. * GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg e. Plaintiff sued her f

ormer e mploy er a lleg ing se x ual har assment base d on the ac tions of two

c ow or ke rs . T he dis tr ic t c ourt

ru le d th a t th e se xua l ha

ra ssm e nt c re a te d a

ho sti le wo rk

e nv ir on me nt, but gr anted summary

judgme nt in favor of

defe ndant on the b as i s t h at i ts response to plaintiff’ s complaint was re asonable . Be cause we hold that def endant’ s reme dial action to plaintiff’s

c omp la int s o f se xua l ha

ra ssm e nt d id n ot c on sti tut e “ ind if fe re nc e or un re a so na

ble ne ss, ” we a ff

ir m. I. Plaintiff Donna Mullins was employ ed by defe ndant Goody ear Tire & Rubber Company as

a “bea d operator,” responsible for operating machiner y that produce s tire beads. (JA 56-57.) HerNo. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

- 2 - lawsuit ag ainst Goody ear

conce rns the ac tions of two of her former cowor kers, Bill J ones and Autry

“ Re d” Park er. J on es was the un ion -e le c te d “ le a d h and ” fo r t he sh if t, m e anin g that he ha d s ome

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d

u t i e s b u td i d

n o th a v e s u

p e r v i s o r y a u t h o r i t y o v e r M u l l i n s an d

h e r c o w o r k e r s . ( JA 68, 80.) Parke r wa s the “ba lance cre w” e mploy ee whose job w as to c over for e mploy ees w ho wer e on brea k or otherw ise absent. ( J A 63.) Althoug h Mullins m entions both J ones and Par ker in he r complaint, on ap p ea l Mulli ns does not argue that def endant’ s remedia l measure s taken re g arding J ones were lega lly insufficient. Rather, in her appellee brief and at oral a rg ument, she conc edes that her appea l is limit ed to de fenda nt’s response to Par

ker’ s actions. (B lue Br

. 24 n.13.) There fore , we focus solely

on defe ndant’s re medial ac tions reg ardingParker

. Mullins claimed that Parker made threatening rema rks and eng ag ed in a g g ressive be havior. Park e r a lle g e dly

sa id t o h e r that be c a

us e he ha d se rv e d in Vi e tna m, “ it wo uld be no thi ng fo r me to kill som eone.” (JA 256.) Parker a lso sabotag ed plaintiff’s machine on sever al occa sions. He place d ha lf -e mpt y sp oo ls o f w ir e on the ma c hin e , c a us ingMu lli ns to h a ve to c ha ng e sp oo ls m or e tha

n u su a l, and tig htened a

bolt on her machine to the point whe re the machine was inopera ble until a cowor

ker repa ired it. She also alleg ed that Parke r told her that “ if y ou wer en’t marrie d, y ou’re a g ood looking woman, I ’d g ive it a try .” (JA 391.) Mullins complained to Human Resource s, who then met with Parker. Par ker w as told not to bother plaintiff a

nd to be in the bead are a only when he had wor

k to do there. Plaintiff a dmits t hat

a ft e r t he me e tin g , Pa

rk e r d id n ot s ay any

thi ng ina pp ro pr ia te to he r dur ing the tim e s th a t he c a me int oNo. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

T h e T H RA i s a s t a t e l aw an a l o g u e t o T i t l e V II a n d t h e s t a tu t e s ar e an a l y z e d i d e n t i c a l l y. 1 Bailey v. USF Holland, Inc. , 5 2 6 F. 3 d 8 8 0 , 8 8 5 n . 1 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp. , 919 S.W .2d 26, 31 (Tenn. 1996) ). - 3 - the bea d are a. (JA 107-08.) Howeve r, pl aintiff reported that Parker was in her area more than he neede d to be. (JA 390.) On her final day of work, plaintiff allege s that Parker drove his forklift within inches of the

c artw h e r e s h e p l a c e d h e r b e a d s , an d s t o o d o u t s i d e t h e b r e a k r o o m , p art i a l l y

b l o c k i n g h e r

e xi t
. ( JA 390.) Ther eaf

ter, Mullins did not return to work, took medical lea ve the ne x t day , and ter

minated her e mploy

ment. Mullins s ued Goody earin the United States District Court for the Wester n District of Tenne ssee, a lleg ing se x ual har assment in v io la ti o n o f th e T e nnessee Human Rig hts Act, T EN N . C ODE ANN . § 4-21-101, et seq., and Title VI I of t he C ivil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. 1 The district cour

t g rante d defe ndant’s mot ion on the basis t hat its remedial a ctions were rea sonable. (JA 404.) Mulli ns timely appea led. II. On appe al, Mullins asserts that instead of a p p ly ing the “indiffe renc e standa rd” f rom Blan k e ns hip v. ParkeCare Centers, Inc. , 123 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 1997) , the district c ourt should have applied the “ neg lige nce sta ndard” of Fenton v. H

iSAN, Inc. , 174 F.3d 827 ( 6th Cir. 1999). Mullins argues fur ther that, reg ardle ss of whether the court uses a neg lige nce or an indiffe renc e standa

rd, she has pre sented suff

icient evidenc e to submit the case to a jury

.No. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

- 4 - We reviewa district cour t’s g rant of a

motion for summary judgme nt de novo. W illiamson v. Ae tna Li

f e In s . Co. , 481 F.3d 369, 374 ( 6th Cir. 2007). Summ ary judgme nt is proper “ if the pleading s, depositions, answers to interr og atories, a nd admissions on file, toge th er wi th the

a ff ida vit s, if any , sho w that the re is n o g e nu ine iss ue a s to any ma te ri a l f a c t and that th e mov ingpa

rt y is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(c) . The moving party has the burde n of provingthe abse nce of g enuine issues of materia l f act and its e ntitlement to judg ment as a matter of law. Ce lot ex Cor

p. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When deter mining whe ther the nonmovant has met this burden, we vi ew the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the nonmoving party
. Sm ith W

ho le sa le Co. , In c . v . R .J

. R e y no lds Tob ac c o Co ., 477 F.3d 854, 861 (6th Cir. 2007). I n grant ingde fe nd ant’ s mo tio n f or su mma ry jud g me nt, the dis tr ic t c ourt a pp lie d th e te st

enumer ated in Blan k

e ns hip for e mploy er liability for c oworke r sexual hara ssment. ( See J A 386.) To pr e va il o n s uc h a

c la im, a pla int if f m us t pro ve that: “ (1 ) s he is a me mbe r o f a

pr ote c te d c la ss; (2) she was subjec t to unwe lcomed sexual harassment; (3) the hara ssment was base d on her se x ; (4) the h ar a s s me n t u n r e a s o n a b ly in te r f e r e d w it h h e r w o r

k p e r f o r ma n c e an d c r e a te d a h o s ti le work environment; and ( 5) [defenda nt] knew or

should have known of

the cha rg ed sexual hara ssment and failed to implement prompt and a ppropriate corr ectiv e ac t i o n . ” Id . (quotation marks a nd citation omi tte d) ; se e als o Title VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964, § 704(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2( a)( 1). The sexual hara ssment in Blan k e ns hip invo l v ed a co worke r, and w e noted that hostile work environment c ases make a distinction betwee n sexual hara ssment cause d by supervisors a

nd sexualNo. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

The c laim in Blan k

e ns hip was ag ainst a cowor ker w ho “had no supe rvisory power ” over

the 2 plaintiff. Blan k

e ns hip , 123 F.3d at 872. Sim ilarly , in the prese nt case , it is undisputed that Parke r had no super

visory authority over Mullins. (J A 395 n.2.) Goody ear also moved for

summary judgme nt on the fourth ele ment, asser ting that plaintiff 3 did not demonstrate that the a ctions were sufficie ntly sever e or pe rvasive so a s to alter the ter ms and conditions o f h er empl oy ment. (JA 391.) Howeve r, the district cour t refuse d to gr ant summary jud g me nt o n th is g ro un d, ru lin g tha t “ Pla int iff has point e d to e vid e nc e in t he re c or d w hic h w ou ld a llo w the tr ier of f

a c t to fi nd

that ‘ the c ha

rg e d s e xua l ha

ra ssm e nt h a d th e e ff

e c t of un re a so na

bly interfe ring with [ plaintiff’s] work per formanc e and c reating a n i n t i m i dating , hostile, or offe nsive en v i ro n m en t
. . . . ” ( J A 3 9 2 (q u o t i n g Rabidue v. O sceola Re fining Co. , 8 05 F .2 d 6 11 , 6 19 -2 0 ( 6th Cir . 1 98 6) .) On a

pp e a l, Go od

y e ar do e s no t c on te st thi s r uli ng , a nd the re fo re the iss ue of

the fo ur th element of

plaintiff’s ca

use of a ction is not before us.

- 5 - ha ra ssm e nt c a

us e d b y c ow or ke rs . Blan k

e ns hip , 1 2 3 F. 3 d

at 8 7 2 (c i t i n g Pi e rc e v . Co mm on we alt h 2 Life Ins. Co. , 40 F.3d 796, 803-04 (6th Cir. 1994) ). When de aling with a lleg ations o f c o worker

se xua l ha ra ssm e nt, the “ a c t of

dis c ri min a tio n b y

the e mpl oy e r i n s uc h a

c a se is n ot t

he ha ra ssm e nt, but r ather the inappropriate response to the char g es of ha rassment.” Blan k

e ns hip , 123 F.3d at 873. Goody ear moved for summary judgme nt on the final element, arguing that Mulli ns did not 3 show that it w as liable for Par ker’ s actions. I n order

for a n employ er to be liable for a cowor ker’ s sexual harassment, a pla intiff must prove that the employ er both (1) knew or should ha ve known of the har assment, and ( 2) fa iled to take prompt and appropriate correc tive action. Ha ffo rd , 183 F.3d at 5 1 3 (c i t i n g Pierce , 4 0 F .3 d at 80 4) ; EEOC v. Harbe rt-Y eargin, Inc. , 266 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2001). Thus, in Blan k

e ns hip , we he ld the employ er a ccounta ble for its own re spon s e t o t h e co mplaint of

se xua l ha ra ssm e nt: Once an employ er is a

war e of and responds to c harg es of se x ual har assment, thoug h, mere n egl i gen ce a s to the content of the r esponse c annot be e noug h to make the employ er liable . When an employ er r esponds with g ood-fa ith rem ed ial action, weNo. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

- 6 - cannot say

that the employ er ha s itself committed an ac t of discrimination . . . . When an employ er impl ements a reme dy , it can be l iable for sex di scrimination in violation of Title VI I only if that reme dy exhibi ts such i ndiffer ence as t o indicate a n attitude of per missiveness that amounts to discrimination. Blan k e ns hip , 123 F.3d at 873. On appe al, plaintiff ar g ues t hat the district cour t applied the wr ong test in analy zing the sufficie nc y

o f G o o dy e ar ’ s c o r

r e c ti v e a c ti o n . T h e h e art o f th e c o n tr o v e r s y

s u r r o u n d s th e d is tr ict court’s use of the “ indiffer ence standard” as desc ribed in Blan k e ns hip . I n Blan k

e ns hip , we he ld that

an e mpl oy e r i s li a

ble fo r cow or

ke r h ara ssm e nt i f “ its re sp on se ma nif e sts indifference or

unrea sonablene ss in light of the fa cts the employ er kne w or sh o uld have known.” Id . at 873 (empha sis added). Mullins argues that, subseque nt to Blan k e ns hip , we a dopted a ne g lige nce standard in Fenton v. H

iSAN, Inc. , 174 F.3d 827 ( 6th Cir. 1999). After a c are ful compar ison of the tw o case s, we c on c lud e that Fenton did not overrule the Blan k e ns hip te st; it m e re ly

re state d it

. I ndeed, the holdings of published decisions of this court are pr ece dentially binding on subseque nt panels and may be overr

uled only by the cour

t en banc . 6 TH C IR . R. 20 6( c ); see also United States v. Y oon , 3 98 F .3 d 8 02 , 8 06 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) ; Da rra h v . City of Oa k Pa rk, 255 F.3d 301, 309 ( 6th Cir. 2001). Fenton , like Blan k e ns hip , involved alleg ations of cow orker sexual harassment. The Fenton court reiter ated the notion that an employ er’ s liability in instanc es of cowor ker hara ssment is based on its response to the re ported sexual hara ssment: an employ er is liable if it does not respond in a “re asonable ” manne r. Fenton , 174 F.3d at 829-30. I n Fenton , we summarized a pla intiff’s burde n in coworke r har assment ca ses by stating that a “victim of coworke r har assment must theref ore pr oveNo. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

- 7 - neg lige nce by

the employ er.” Id. at 82 9

. T he Fenton panel pur portedly applied the Blan k

e ns hip rule: Th is s tand ard

is c on sis te nt w iththe ne g lig e nce s tandard we have pr e vio us ly employ ed in cow o rk er h ara ssment case s. I n [ Blan k e ns hip ], w e state d th a t in cowor ker ha rassment c ases the sta

ndard is base d on a “r easona bleness” st an d ard: “whe n an employ er r esponds to char g es of c o w o r k e r s e xu a l hara ssment, the employ er can be liable only

if its re sponse manifests indiffer ence or unre asonable ness in light of the fa cts the employ er kne w or should have known.” Id

. at 8 2 9 (c i t i n g Blan k

e ns hip , 123 F.3d at 872-73). Be cause the Blan k

e ns hip court phra sed “indiff erence or unre asonable ness” in the

c on jun c tiv e , w e vie w it as a unit ary sta nd ard

. I f an e mpl oy e r ac ts “unr e a so na bly ,” it fit s the c la ssi c

common law definition of neg lige nce. See R E S TA TE ME NT (S EC OND ) O F T OR TS § 282 (obser ving that “neg lige nce is c onduct which f alls below the standa

rd established by

law for the protec tion of others

a g a ins t un re as on ab le ri sk of ha rm .” (e mph a sis add ed)) . Si mil arl y , if an e mpl oy e r’ s r e sp on se to repor ted cowor ker ha rassment is “indiffe renc e,” the n the employ er has not rea cted r easona bly and h as t h u s comm itted an ac t for which liability may attach unde r Title VI I

. See F u ll e r v . City of Oakland , 47 F.3d 1522, 1529 (9th Cir. 1995) (“T itle VI Idoes not permit employ ers to stand idly by once the y lear n that sexual ha

rassment has occur

red. To do so amounts to a ratification of the prior hara ssment.”). Th e Sup re me Court

ha s n ot d ir e c tly

a dd re sse d th e sta

nd ard ne e ded to est ablishlia

bil ity in

c ow or ke r s e xua l ha

ra ssm e nt c a se s. Ho we ve r, it ha s re pe a te dly a dd re sse d the sta

nd ard fo r l ia

bil ity in case s involving sexual hara ssment by supervisors. Althoug h these c ases a re disting uishable and require a diffe rent a

naly sis, see Pie rce , 4 0 F .3 d at 87 2, tw o p os t- Blan k e ns hip c a se s h a ve c a

us e d s omeNo. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

Unpublished opinions of this court are not prec edentially binding under t he doctrine of stare 4 decisis. United States v. Lancaster , 50 1 F .3 d 67 3, 67 7 (6 th Cir . 2 00 7) ; Un ite d S tat es v . S an for d , 476 F.3d 391, 396 ( 6th Cir. 2007). - 8 - confusion re g ardingthe continued viability of the Blan k

e ns hip standard. I

n Faragher v. City of Boc a Raton , 524 U.S. 775 (1998), the Supreme Court held t hat employ ers may be vicariously liable for the sexual harassment c ommitt ed by supervisors. Faragher , 52 4 U. S

. at 807. I n Burlington In du str ie s, In c . v . E lle rth , 524 U. S. 742 (1 99 8) , re le a se d th e same da y a s Faragher , th e Cou

rt he ld that an employ er ma

y be liable f or sexual hara ssment by

supervisory

employe es whe n the employ er’ s own neg lige nce c ontributed to the hara ssment. El le rth , 524 U.S. at 758-59. Al tho ug h the se c a se s d id n ot a dd re ss c ow or

ke r s e xua l ha

ra ssm e nt, a

pa ne l of thi s c ourt , in dic ta in a n unp ub lis he d o pin ion , su g g e ste d th a t F a r a g h e r and E l l ert h may

have ove rruled 4 Blan k e ns hip insofar a s they

held that an e mploy er is not liable for “mer e n egl i gen ce.” Collette v. Stein-Mart, Inc

. , 126 F. App’ x 678 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished). To r eso l v e any confusion, we

rec ently aff irmed the c ontinued viability of Blan k e ns hip in a p u

b li s h e d d e c ision. I n Ha wkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc

. , 5 1 7 F

. 3 d 3 2 1 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 8 ) , w e a d dr e s s e d t h i s i s s u e d i r e c t l y: For the s ake of

clar ity , we note that although this cour t’s decision in Blankenship has been modifie d by

the Supreme Court’s decisions in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton , 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998), and Bu rli ng ton In du str ie s, In c . v . E lle rth , 524 U.S. 742, 758-59 (19 9 8), Blan k

e ns hip rema ins good la

w for the proposition that a company may be held liable f

or c o worke r har assment if its “re sponse manife sts indiffere nce or unre asonable ness in light of the fac ts the employ er kne w or should have known.” Blan k e ns hip , 123 F.3d at 873. Hawkins , 517 F.3d at 339.No. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

- 9 - Thus, Hawkins remove d any doubt that the Blan k

e ns hip standard survives, and the district

co u rt wa s co rr ec ti nap p l y i n g Blan k e ns hip to a

naly ze pla intiff’s alleg ations of cowork er sexual ha ra ssm e nt. Ha

vin g de te rm ine d tha t the dis tr ic t court a pp lie d th e c or

re c t st and ard , w e no w a dd re ss plaintiff’s ar g ument that the district court’s a naly sis reac hed the wr ong result. III

. Plai n ti f f c o n te n d s th a t th e d is tr ic t c o u rt e r r e d b y g r an ti n g s u mm ar

y ju d g me n t in

favor of de fe nd ant b e c a

us e sh e pr e se nte d e vid e nc e tha t “ is s uf fi c ie nt f or a jur y ” to f ind he r em plo y e r l ia ble for the c oworke r sexual hara ssment. (Blue Br . 24.) We disag ree . L ike t he lower court, we view the

e vi d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t m o s t f av o r a b l e t o p l a i n t i f

f t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r a r e a s o n a

b l e jur or c ou ld

conc l u d e that Goody ear rea cted with “indiff

ere nce or unrea sonablene ss” towar ds plaintiff’s complaint of cow orker

sexual harassment. Pla int if f a rgue s th e fo llo wi ng : (A) D efe ndant knew Plaintiff ha d g ood rea son to f e a r Parker ; (B) Def

endant ther efor e promised Plaintiff that she would be c om ple te ly se pa ra te d f ro m Pa rk e r; (C ) Def endant br eaks this promi se and fails to follow throug h on its remedial mea sures b y d el i v er i n g n o d i s ci p l i n e t o P ar k er , n o s ep ar at i o n , an d n o m ea n i n gfu l m o n i t o ri n g; (D) to no avail, Plaintiff c omplains of continued stalking and har assment by Parker wi th a fo rk tr uc k; a nd (E ) P la int if

f f ina lly su c c umb s to a

ne rv ou s b re a kd ow n d

ue to Park e r’ s c on tin

uin g sta lki ngand

ha ra ssm e nt. (B lue B r. 24.) We addr ess ea ch in turn. Fi rst, plaintiff claims that Goody ear knew that she had “g ood rea son” to fea r Parke r. The

rec ord shows that the only actions that Mullins reported to mana g ement initially wer e the thre e incidents of alleg ed sabota g e of p l aint iff’s mac hine (incide nts that she attributes to Parker ), plusNo. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

- 10 - Park e r’ s c omm e nt a

bo ut s e rv ingin V ie tna

m. ( JA 30 3. ) Mo st i mpo rt antl y , n on e of the se inc ide nts involved sexual harassment. More over, G oody ear re ac t ed im mediately , launche d a two-w eek inv e sti g a tio n, int e rv ie we d th e pa rt ie s in vo lve d, a

nd ins tr uc te d Park e r no t to bo the r M ull ins a nd to avoid the bea d are a whe n it was not nece ssary for him to be there

. (JA 182.) When re viewing an

e mpl oy e r’ s r e sp on se to d e te rm ine if it e xpre sse s “ ind if

fe re nc e or un re a so na

ble ne ss, ” we have he ld that it is gene rally

adequate if it is “re asonably calc ulated to end the har assment.” Jack son v. Quane

x Corp. , 1 91 F .3 d 6 47 , 6 63 -6 4 ( 6t h Cir . 1 99 9) ; Hawkins , 517 F.3d at 340. Plainti ff c omplained of Parker tamperingwith her mac hine and making a comment that frig htened he r. We ag ree with the district cou rt that by

instructing Par

ker not to bother Mullins, and to avoid spendingunnece ssary time in the bead a

rea , Goody ear

acte d in a re asonable manner . Se c on d, pla int if

f c la ims that G oo dy e ar b re a c he d a pr omi se that sh e wou ld be c omp le te ly separ ated f

rom Parker . (B lue B r. 26.) The re cord shows that Parker r eturne d to the bead a rea from time to tim e. Althoug h Mullins stated t hat P arke r’s “ prese nce bothe red me ,” she a dmitted that he did not eng ag e in any sexually hara ssing or inappropriate conduct. (J A 108.) Abse nt evidence of continued sex ual harassment, we are unwilli ng to impose liability on Goody ear for failing to ke ep Parker and Mullins separated . See M artin v. Boeing-Oak

Ridge Co. , 244 F. Supp. 2d 863, 875 (E.D. Tenn. 2002) ( “The issue is not whether plaintiff f inds the response by

defe ndant satisfac tory

but whether defe ndant’s response was appropr iate.”) . I n the instant case , Goody ear ’s re sponse appe ars not only rea sonable but ef

fec tive in ending the sexual harassment.No. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

- 11 - Pla int if f’ s th ir d a rgume nt f a ils fo r simi lar re a so ns . She argue s tha t Goo dy e ar br e a c he d a du ty by not disciplini ng Parker . Howeve r, as we explained above, Goody ear responde d rea sonably

to end the sexual harassment, thus mee ting its obligations under Title VI I

. Se e Blan k e ns hip , 123 F.3d at 8 7 4 ( “ a h ar a s s m e n tv i c t i m m ay

n o td i c t a t e ane mp l o y e r ’ s a c t i o na g a i n s ta c o - w o r k e r. ” ); see a lso A n der s o n v. Me mphis City Schools Bd. of Ed. , 7 5 F

. Su p p . 2 d 7 8 6 , 7 9 2 ( W. D

. T e n n . 1 999) (“ a plaintiff will not prevail simply beca use the re m ed y

offe red by

defe ndant was not what plaintiff wanted.” (citing Bell v. Chesape ake & Ohio Ry. , 929 F.2d 220, 225 ( 6th Cir. 1991))). Next, Mul lins takes issue with the district court’s c onclusion that she di d not complain about

c on tin ue d h ara ssm e nt. Al tho ug h Mull ins argue s tha t she c omp la ine d af te r h e r i nit ia l me e tin g wi th Human R esourc es, t he only incidents mentioned i n her brief involve Parke r’s pre sence in the bead

are a, not his conduct. Goody ear had a duty

to take re asonable measure s to prevent c ontinuing sexually hara ssing c onduct, but T itle V I I did not require it to ensure that Mullins and Parker wer e separ ated at all times. Se e Blan k e ns hip , 123 F.3d at 871-74. Fur thermore , even if

Parker intentionally

enter ed the be ad ar ea, or drove his for

klif t near Mu lli ns , th e re is n o e vid e nc e tha t he did so be c a us e of pla int if f’ s se x. In th is r e g ard , “ Ti tle VI Iis not a g ener ic anti-ha

rassment statute.” Ha rb e rt- Y e ar gin , 2 6 6 F

. 3 d

a t5 2 0 ( G u y , J

. c o n c u r

r i n g )

. In order to be actionable under Title VI I , the hara ssment must be “base d on sex.” Hawkins , 517 F.3d at 332. I f Parke r ente red the bead a rea to annoy Mullins, s u ch ac t i on might have been r ude and inappropriate, but it doe s not g ive rise to a Title VI I claim unless Parker did so be cause of plaintiff’s g ender . We find nothing in the re cord to support such a conclusion.No. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

- 12 - F ina lly , p la int if

f a lle g e s th a t on

he r l a st d ay

on the job , Park e r dr ov e his fo rk lif t da ng e ro us ly

c los e to h e r a

nd blo c ke d h er i n th e br e a k r oo m. ( JA 26 8- 71 .) Mu lli ns c la ims that th e se inc ide nts

cause d her to suf

fer a ner vous brea kdown and pr omptly

terminated he r employ

ment. (B lue B r. 36- 38.) “[E] mploy er liability in case s of cowor

ker hara ssment is not de rivative, but instead de pends on the employ er’ s ‘own acts or omissions.’” Hawkins , 5 1 7 F. 3 d at 3 4 0 (q u o t i n g Blan k

e ns hip , 123 F .3 d at 87 3) . A s st a te d ab ov e , an e mpl oy e r may be lia ble fo r the se xua lly

ha ra ssi ngc on du c t of

its

n o n - s u p e r v is o r y e mp lo y e e s if it s r e s p o n s e to a c o mp la in t “ ma n if e s ts in d if

f e r e n c e or

unrea sonablene ss in light of t he facts t he employ er kne w or should have known.” Blan k e ns hip , 123 F .3 d at 87 3; Hawkins , 5 17 F .3 d at 339

. Ho we ve r, Go od y e ar did no t hav e the op po rt un ity to a dd re ss pla int if f’ s f ina l w or kin g -d ay c on c e rn s. Ac c or din g ly , we c ann ot c on c lud e that G oo dy e ar a c te d w ith

“ ind if fe re nc e or un re a so na

ble ne ss” in r e sp on se to e ve nts to w hic h it wa s n ot g ive n a

n o pp or tun ity to respond. I V. For the re asons desc ribed a

bove, we aff

irm the judg ment of the district cour t.No. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

Be ad oper ators set up a

nd operate machine ry

that produce tire bea ds. (J .A. 56-58.) 5 - 13 - DA M ON J. KEITH , C ir c uitJudg e , di sse nt ing . Istrong ly disag ree with the majority ’s decision to aff

irm the district court’s dismissal of this s ex u al harassment claim on summary judgme nt. I t is u nclea

r whe ther the ma

jority , deter

mined to allow Def

endant Goody ear

Tire & Rubber Co. to esca

pe liability for the eg reg ious a nd fra nkly disgusting sexual harassment suff ere d by Plaintiff Donna Mullins, ever r ead the rec ord in this case. Whil e the majority corr ectly states the standard of

revie w for summar

y judgme nt, in its rea s o n i n g, the majority ignor es key

fac ts and incorre ctly

views the e vidence in the light most fa vorable to the moving

party . Be cause Ibelieve that t h e r e ar e m a t e r i a l f

a c t s s u f f i c i e n tt o r a i s e a

qu e s t i o nf

o r t h e j u r y , I diss e nt

. I. The district judg e in this case ma de a spe cific f inding that “Plaintiff [ Donna Mullins] has pointed to evidence in the rec ord which w ould allow the t rier of fac t to find that ‘the cha rg ed sexual hara ssment had the ef

fec t of unrea sonably

interfe ring with [ the plaintiff’s] work performa nce a nd

cr ea t i n g an i n t i m i d at i n g, h o s t i l e, o r of fe n s i v e w o rk i n g en v i ro n m en t
. ’” (J

. A. 3 9 2 ) ( qu o t i n g Rabidue v. Osc eola Refining Co. , 805 F.3d 611, 619- 20 (6th Cir. 1986)). B eca use th e majority

omits and g l o s s e s o v e r

t h e h ar a s s m e n tt h a tM u l l i n s e n d u r e d , i ti s n e c e s s ar

y t o r e c o u n tt h e f

a c t s s e p ar a t e l y. Mu lli ns wa s th e on ly

wo man wo rk ingon

he r s hif t a t G oo dy e ar’ s ti re manu fa c tur ingpla nt i n Union City , Tenne ssee, whic h employ s over 2,200 individuals. (J.A. 62, 211.) Fro m ab o ut 1999 to October

27, 2005, Mullins worked primarily as a be ad oper ator. (J.A. 54-58.) 5No. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

Mullins t estified that she w as par ticularly fea rful of Parker be cause he would bra g to her 6 a bo ut k ill ingpe op le in V ie tna m. ( Mu lli ns De po ., J.A. 25 6. ) I n h e r a ff ida vit , s he re c ounte d th a t: Re d P ar k e r t o l d m e o n n u m e r o u s o c c a s i o n s t h a t h e s e r v e d i n V i e t n a m an d

tha t it would be “nothingfor me [Parker ] t o kill som eone.” This frig htened me be cause I did not know what he wa s insinuating. I did not know whether

to b elieve he was cra zy or if he was purposef ully trying to scare or intimidate me. He is about 6' 3" a nd Iestimate he w eig hs about 350 lbs or more. (J.A. 303.) Mulli ns also told Ray Stevenson, a Goody ear human re source s officia l, that Parker w as the ty pe of man wh o mig ht op e n fi re in a pu bli c pla c e lik e Mc Do na ld’ s. (J.A . 2 56 .) Ac c or din g to Mullins, S tevenson re sponded, “She is telling the truth. That is exactly the ty pe of m an t h is is.” (J.A

. 256-57.) Ha

rris, anothe r Goody ear

officia l who was pre sent at the mee ting, testified that he did not remember

Mullins reporting Par

ker’ s statements about killing pe ople. (J.A. 208.) - 14 - The Goody ear employ ees who alleg edly hara ssed M ullins are Autry L ee D ale “ Red” Parke r

and Willi a m “ B ill ” Jone s. P arke r a nd Jone s w e re no ns up e rv iso ry e mpl oy e e s w ho wo rk e d w ith Mullins. J ones was elec ted as a “lea d hand,” (J.A. 70) whose specia l duties included administrative tasks, such as a dminist eringvacation and overtime a nd order ing supplies. ( J .A. 68-69, 212.) Over the year s, J ones enga gedi ns ex u al l y i n ap p ro p ri at e b eh av i o r t o wa rd s M u l l i n s . (J

. A. 392- 93.) J ones’s treatment of Mullins, howeve r, worsene d afte r Jones was elec ted lead ha nd. (J.A. 78- 88.) In addition, Parker a lleg edly eng ag ed in hostile behavior towa rds Mullins, including

6 sabotag ing he r mac hine on seve ral oc casions. (J .A. 89-90, 93-99.) The district court, finding that Mu lli ns pr e se nte d s uf

fi c ie nt e vid e nc e to c on vin c e a jur y that the se xua l ha

ra ssm e nt w a s su ff

ic ie ntl y

“ se ve re and

pe rv a siv e ,” su mma

ri zed the a lle g e d f

a c ts a s f oll ow s: Bill J ones re fused [Mullins ] vacation day s, schedule d male worke rs ahea d of her , and wo u l d wr i t e h i m s el f a h ea d o f h er ev en t h o u gh h e w as n o to nt h e b o o k s ; al t h o u gh J ones wa s a re lief man who was supposed to relieve the bea d unit operators, suc h as [Mul lins] , when they

neede d a bre ak, he purp o s ef u lly relieve d [Mul lins] late for brea ks and, whe n [ M u l l i ns] was on a brea k, he would leave ea

rly ; J ones timed [Mul lin s ’] b at hroom brea ks, but not the bathroom brea ks of male wor

kers; JonesNo. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

- 15 - ma de se xua l r e fe re nc e s a

bo ut [M ull ins ’] b re a sts “ hund re ds of tim e s” on a da ily

ba sis and , o n o ne oc c a sio n, pu lle d h e r s hir t ou t; he a lso hu g g e d he r o n a we e kly ba sis un til she strug g led out of i t; J ones “lurched” at [ Mullins] in an “attack fashion” and ha d to be res tr a ine d b y

ano the r m an; Jon e s la

ug he d, sta

re d, and po int e d at [Mu lli ns ] w h il e s h e w a s w o r

k in g ; Jo n e s c u r s e d a t [M u ll in s ] an d c a ll e d h e r n a me s s u c h a s “ la zy bitch”; J ones complaine d to the male wor kers a bout [ Mullins’] job perfor mance ; J ones purpose fully

shut down [M ullins’] machine a nd submitt ed a false work orde r so that he would not have to cha n ge a wire on [Mul lins’] machine; Jones gr abbed [Mul lins] on one occ asion and kissed he r on the c heek a s she tried to g et awa y ; when [Mul lins] neede d tools for a job and had to ask Jones, who was the lea d hand, Jones wo uld g ive he r t he “ thi rd de g re e ” —a sk ing he r q ue sti on s a bo ut w hy sh e ne e de d it , in contra st to how he treated the men; whe n J ones left [Mullins ’] machine ea rly when he re lieved her , he did not advise he r of the status of her ma chine, if a ny thing wa s wrong , and would not assist her in fixing thing s that went wrong ; instead of ha nding [Mul lin s] he r p ay c he c k, Jone s p ut i t on the e dg e of

a bo ok ne ar f our fa ns wh ile handing the men their chec ks by normal distribution; when [M ullins’] schedule was chang ed by

Bone , J ones did not inform h er of the c hang e; Parke r cha ng ed out [Mul lins’] spools to cause h er m o re w ork and tampere d with [ Mullins’] g aug es which he did not do to the male w orker s ; Parker tig htened a bolt on [ Mullins’] machine so tig ht that neither she, Ricky Davis, or Jackie B one could loosen it; Parker told [ Mullins] on numerous occasions t hat he serve d in Vietnam and that it would be “nothing for me to kill someone” ; during the investig ation, Parker came to [ Mullins’] depar tment ever

y day even thoug h he wa s sup p o s ed to be staying a way ; after

the investigation, Parker dr ove a f ork truck within a

n inch of [Mulli ns] whil e she w orked her be ad unit, thus scar ing her; P arke r and J ones, tog ether , came into the break room wh ile [ Mu ll ins] wa s th e re and pa rt ia lly blo c ke d th e do or , f

or c ing[Mul lin s] to squeeze by

them. (J.A. 392-94.) I n addition, Parker ma de stateme nts to Mull in s , s u ch as “if y ou wer en’t mar ried, y ou’re a good looki ng woman, I ’d g ive it a try ,” (J.A. 91), and Jones told her, “[W ]hy don’t y ou show me y our boobs.” ( J .A. 75.) On September

19, 20 0 5 , M ullins t old Bone that she wa nted a mee ting with Human Re source s t o d i s cu s s t h e a l l ege d

h ar as s m en tb y

P ar k er an d J o n es . M u l l i n s re p o rt ed t h e m o s tre ce n ts ab o t age of her machine a

nd other wor

kplace incidents to J ames Ha rris, a G oody ear

manag er. ( J .A. 78-79,No. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

I n his deposition, Davis testified that Parker “wa s just laughing at how–that he pulled the 7 almost-empty

rolls and put on her ma chine, so she’ d have to c hang e them.” ( J .A. 350.) - 16 - 104, 190-93.) Althoug h she tried to repor t J ones’s sexual behavior , beg inning by saying that she and J ones “ha d issues for y ear s,” (J.A. 78, 116), Har ris abruptly

cut her off, saying, “ L et’s just take c are of the issue at hand.” Id. Mullins i denti fi ed t wo p o t ential witnesses to Parke r’s sabota g e of he r machine. ( J .A. 193.) Goody ear initiated an investig atio n an d temporar ily separ ated Par

ker f rom Mullins. (J .A. 182.) As part of Goody ear ’s investigation, Parker, Jones, and the two witnesses w ere int e rv ie we d. (J.A . 1 66 -6 7, 19 3- 20 3. ) A lth ou g h Park er a nd Jone s d e nie d mo st o f t

he a lle g a tio ns , P ar k er ad m i t t edt o p u t t i n g p ar t i al ro l l s o f w i re o nh er b ea d u n i t , t h er eb y

fo rc i n g M u l l i n s t o ch an ge roll s mo re fr e qu e ntl y . ( J.A. 19 4. ) P ark e r’ s a lle g e d r e a so n f or do ingthi s w a s “ be c a

us e [the ro lls ]

wer e dirty , h ad ru s t, and they neede d to be used up.” (J.A. 195.) Eddie Holland, a wor ker in the bead unit, confirme d that Parker had replace d the roll s on Mullins’ machine. (J.A. 199.) I n addition, Ricky Davis, anothe r co-wo rk er , contra dicted Parke r’s a lleg ed business purpose for c hang ing the rolls, telling Goody ear that “Parke r t old [Davis] that he wa s taking the par tial rolls and putting them on [Mul lins’] machine on pur pose, so that she would have to do more chang eover s.” (J.A. 200-01.) 7 When Goody ear

interviewe d J ones, he a dmitted to leaving Mullins’ mac hine ea rly when r elieving Mullins on break, but claimed “ that the re ason why he lef t is beca use she wa s stay ing on br eak f or so long.” (J.A. 167.) J ones also “a dmitted that he .

. . was moni toring her break time.” (J.A. 197.) De sp ite Park e r’ s and

Jone s’ s a dmi ssi on s and

the fa c t th a t tw o c o- wo rk e rs cor ro bo ra te d M ull ins ’No. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

Gr if fi th t e sti fi e d a s to his po st- inv e sti g a tio n me e tin g wi th P ark e r a s f oll ow s: 8 Q. . . . did y ou tell [ Parker ] that Goody ear had found that he eng ag ed in any kind of inappropr iate beha

vior? A. No. Q. Di d H arr is t e ll [Pa rk e r] that G oo dy e ar h a d f ound that? A. No. Q. Had Goody ear

made a ny finding s in that reg ard? - 17 - repor t, Goody ear

conclude d that the conflict about which Mullins complained wa s simply a norma l

co-w orker

conflict a nd not ge nder- based ha

rassment. (J.A. 157-61.) Go od y e ar me t wi th Mu lli ns to inf or m he r of the ir fi nd ing s and

to s c rutin ize he r w or

k h a bit s, advising her not to take so long w hen using the bathroom. (J.A. 160.) Summarizing the r esults of his investigation, Ha

rris told Mullins that “ther e was [si c] no substantial f indings,” (J.A. 158), a

nd t h at “[ h ] e f

o u n d n o e v i d e n c e t h at t h e m ac h i n e h adb ee nt am p er ed

. ” ( J

. A. 1 5 9

. ) E v en t h o u gh Go od y e ar a dmi tte d th a t Mu lli ns ’ w or k w a s “ a ve ra g e ,” Go od

y e ar d e te rm ine d that he r c on fl ic t w ith other c oworke rs might ha

ve bee n beca

use she wa s not “ busy ” enoug h and her mind might have be en

“ wa nd e r[i ng ].” (J.A . 1 61 .) Ra the r t ha n c on du c tin g a me e tin g that w ou ld a dd re ss M ull ins ’ c on c e rn s,

“ it tur ne d int o a [Mul lin s] de fe nd ing [he rs e lf ] m e e tin g .” (M ull ins De po ., J.A. 26 6. ) “ I t turn e d in to a why are y ou not ge tting enoug h beads, a nd we have someone tell us that y ou do take longbathroom brea ks” mee ting. ( Mullins Depo., J .A. 265-66.) Neither J ones nor Parker

wer e eve r disciplined. (J.A. 328.) Even thoug h Goody ear found tw o w itn e sse s w

h o c o r r o b o r a t e d M u l l i n s ’ a c c ount o f P ark e r d e lib e ra te ly c ha ng ingsp oo ls o n M ull ins ’

ma c hin e in o rd e r to m a ke he r w or k mo re dif

fi c ult , G oo dy e ar n e ve r t old Park e r t hat he e ng a g e d in ina pp ro pr iate beh avi or. (J.A . 1 74 .) Whe re a s G ri ff ith , a Go od y e ar m ana g e r, c la ime d in his 8No. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

A. Any

inappropriate? No. Q. Rig ht. Any in app ropr ia te be havio r, su c h a s ta mpe ri ngwi th h e r g a

ug e s, sabotag ing he r mac hine, try ing to m ak e he r wo rk

pu rp os e ly

mo re dif fic ult ? A. No. (J.A. 174) (emphasis adde d). B on e wa s the Ar e a

Mana g e r f

or the be a d unit , a s w e ll a s tw o o the r d e pa rtme nts , ma

kin g him 9 the direc t supervisor of Mullins, Parker , and Jones. (J .A. 55.) - 18 - deposition that the separ ation betwee n Parker and Mullins was lifted af ter the inve stigation (J .A.175, stating that the “re strict i o n h ad been lifted”) , J ames Ha rris, anothe r mana g er, te stified that the separ ation had neve r bee n lifted. (J.A. 206.) L ikewise, Mull ins testified i n her de position t hat Ray Stevenson, a Goody ear human resource officia l, told Mull ins that Parker w ould be kept aw ay from Mullins’ work are a. (J.A. 259.) Griffith, howeve r, instructed Par ker tha t it “was okay

to go ba ck in that are a and w ork, but he ne eded to limit his dealings with [Mulli ns].” (J .A. 327.) Two supervisors, Griff

ith a nd J ackie Bone , spent more time in the bea d are a monitoring the 9 situation. (J .A. 170-71.) A ccor ding to Gr iffith, he followe d up with M u llins on num erous

occa sions, and Mullins told him that “it was better.” (J.A. 170-72.) I n contra st, Mullins claims t hat things we re not better beca use Parker continued to lur k in her wor

k are a, “c onstantly

walking back

and fo rt h b e hin d [ her] .” (J.A .1 17 .) B on e a dmi tte d th a t Mu lli ns c omp la ine d to him e ve ry tim e Parker came into the bead a

rea , but said that he dec ided not to report he r complaints to any one else

. (J.A. 183.) Park e r c on tin

ue d to sp e nd

tim e in Mu lli ns ’ wo rk are a de sp ite Mu lli ns ’ r e pe a te d c omp la int s about the lac k of sepa

ration. (J.A. 183.) I n ad d i t i on, Parker beg an driving his equipmentNo. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

- 19 - dang erously

close to her , and Mullins complained about this practice to Bone . (J.A. 185.) Howeve r, Bone decide d not to inform Human Resour ces. Id. Parker continued to “c onstantly

walk[] back a

nd forth behind [her].” (J.A. 140, 267

. ) Finally , on October 27, 2005, Mullins s uffe red a sever e nervous br eakdow n followingtwo incidents. First, Parker drove his f orktruck “within about an inch of [Mull ins’] bugg y ,” causing her to fea r for her sa fety . (J.A. 267-68.) Second, Parke r followed he r

even a s she “trie d to ge t away from him.” (J.A. 271.) Eventually , he followe d her to the br eak r oom wher e he a

nd J ones phy sically

blocked he r exit from the break are a. Id. Mullins “completely

fell apa rt at work” that day , and her husband took he r to a phy sician who

a dv ise d h e r h

us ba nd to “ g e t he r o ut o f t

he re .” (J.A . 2 73 -7 4. ) S inc e the n, Mu lli ns ha s b e e n una ble to work and w as diagn o s ed with Post -Tra umatic Stress Disorder . (J.A. 330.) She cannot sleep, clea n, or cook. ( J .A. 278) She has b ec o me fixated on the hara ssment “[b] eca use [she] can’t stop th i n k i n g ab o u t this. Ever. Ever . I t’s all [she] think[ s] about.” (J .A. 278, 280-81, 302-03.) She takes Xa nax, an anti-anxiety

drug , (J.A. 282), and say s that she wa nts to “lay

down and g o to sleep and neve r wake up.” ( J .A. 283.) II. Th is C ourt

re vie ws a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra

nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt de novo

. W

ill iam s v . M

e hr a , 186 F.3d 685, 689 ( 6th Cir. 1999). Su mmary judgme nt is appropriate wher e “the pleading s, the discovery and disclosure materia ls on file, and any aff idavits show that there is no g enuine issue of

ma te ri a l f a c t and that th e mov ingpa

rt y is e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a ma tte r of law. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 56(c) . I n considering“whe ther the e vidence prese nts a sufficie nt disag r e e me nt to require submissionNo. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

- 20 - to a jury or whe ther it is so one-sided that one par ty must prevail as a

matter of la

w,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 4 77 U. S. 2 42 , 2 51 -5 2, 10 6 S. Ct. 25 05 , 2 51 2, 91 L . E d. 2d 20 2 ( 1986 ), thi s Court must co n s t ru e al l ev idence in the light most favor able to the nonmoving party
. Ma tsu sh ita Elec. I ndus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Cor p. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. C t. 1348, 1356, 89 L . Ed. 2d 538 (1986). III

. The district cour

t dismi ssed Mull i n s ’ T i tle VI Iclaim on summary judgme nt, finding that

a lth ou g h th e fa c ts a lle g e d cr e a te d a jur y qu e sti on a s to whe the r t

he a lle g e d a c tio ns we re su ff ic ie ntl y

se ve re or pe rv a siv e to a lte r t

he te rm s and c on dit ion s of he r e mpl oy me nt, Mu lli ns fa ile d to e sta bli sh employ er liability

for c oworke r har assment. (J.A. 383-405.) On appea l, Mullins contends that the district court er

red be cause it (1) applied the inc orre ct leg al standar d for e stablishing em p loy er liability and (2) ignor ed key

fac tual disputes that cre ated a g enuine mate rial issue to be de cided by the jury

. An employ er is liable f

or cow orke r h arassment only if it (1) “kne w or should have known of the c harg ed sexual hara ssment” and ( 2) “f ailed to implement pr ompt and appropr iate cor rec tive action.” Hafford v. Seidner , 1 8 3 F. 3 d 5 0 6 , 5 1 3 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Pi e rc e v . Co mm on we alt h Life Ins. Co. , 40 F.3d 796, 804 ( 6th Cir. 1994)). I n deter mining employ er liability for c owor ker h ar as s m en t , I ag ree with the majority that the appr opriate standa rd is indiffer ence . Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc

. , 517 F.3d 321, 338 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that “whe n cowor ker ha rassmentNo. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

- 21 - is at is su e , a

n emp loy e r i s n ot l ia

ble fo r ‘ me re ne g lig e nc e ,’ bu t is lia ble ‘i f i ts r e sp on se manif e sts indiffer ence or unre asonable ness i n light of the facts the employ er knew or should have known.’” ). The district court g rante d summary judgme nt for Goody ear beca use i t found that (1) Mullins did not put Goody ear

on notice of the sexual harassment (J .A. 404) a nd (2) Goody ear

acte d

rea sonably

to end the har assment. (J.A. 404-05.) On appe al, Mullins arg ues that the district cour t ignor ed key

fac tual disputes a

nd err oneously viewed the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the moving p art y. A. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt fo un d that Go od y e ar did no t have the re qu isi te kn owled ge of M ull ins ’

c omp la int s o f s e xua l ha

ra ssm e nt b e c a

us e “ [Mul lin s’ ] state me nt t hat sh e and Jone s had

ha d ‘ iss ue s’ was not suffic ient to pu t [ Go o d y ear] on noti ce that J ones had a lleg edly been se x ually

hara ssing [Mul lins] for y ear s, and i t i s also not evidenc e of [Goody ear ’s] indi ffe renc e towar d the alleg ed hara ssment.” (J.A. 404.) As mentioned ab ove, in orde r to establish employ er liability for c oworke r har assment, the pla int if f m us t f ir st s ho w that th e e mpl oy e r k ne w o r s ho uld

have kn ow n o f the a lle g e d h ara ssm e nt. Hawkins , 5 1 7 F. 3 d

at 3 3 8

. I n d et er m i n i n g wh et h er an em p l o y er p o s s es s edt h e r eq u i s i t e k n o wl ed ge of harassment, constructive knowledg e is sufficie nt, id. at 340, and “the plaintiff need not report the offe nsive conduc t of co-w orker s to prevail.” W anchik v. Great Lakes He alth Plan, Inc. , 6 F. App’ x 252, 264-65 (6th C ir. 2001) (unpublis hed) (finding that even though plaintiff did not report the c o-No. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

Another f emale e mploy ee, L ee O ’De ll, previously worke d on Mullins’ shift, but tr a n s f e rre d 10 specific ally

“to g et awa

y from [J ones and Par

ker]” bec ause “ it was horrible.” (J.A. 262.) Fa ragh e r was later r ever sed on other g rounds. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton , 5 24 U. S. 11 775 (1998). - 22 - wo rk e r h ara ssm e nt t o h e r e mpl oy e r, the re we re e no ug h o ther repor ts o f h ara ssm e nt a s to “ imp ute constructive notice to [ the] employ er” ). The district cour

t and Goody ear

claim that ther e was no knowle dg e, or e ven construc tive k n o w l e d ge, b ec au s e M u l l i n s n ev er co mp l ai n edo f t h e s ex u al h ar as s m en tt o Go o dy ea r. Al t h o u gh Mu lli ns ne ve r t old

Go od y ear that Jone s h a d ma de re mark s a bo ut h e r b re a sts hund

re ds of tim e s, g rabbe d and for cibly

hug g ed her , forc ibly

kissed her, a

nd called he r a “ stupid bit ch,” ( J .A.116, 392- 93 ), Mu lli ns a tte mpt e d to re po rt he r p re vio us iss ue s, bu t H arr is, a Go od y e ar m ana g e r, e xpre ssl y

tol d her not to talk about other issues. (J.A. 116.) W ith Harris’s e x plicit direc tion not to talk about the

10 issues that she had “ been ha ving f or y ear s,” it was not unre asonable for Mullins to b eli eve that G o o dy e ar d i d n o t w an t t o h e ar a b o u tt h e p r e v i o u s h ar a s s m e n t
. “ A ne mp l o y e r c an n o ta v o i d

T i t l e V II liability fo r co wo rk er ha

rassment by

adopting a ‘se e no evil, hea r no evil’ strateg y .” Oche ltree v. Scollon Prod., Inc. , 335 F.3d 325, 334 ( 4th Cir. 2003) (imputing employ er know ledg e whe r e p la in ti ff attempted to inform her

employ er of

sexual harassment on seve ral oc casions , b u t the employ er ref used to listen). When an employ er “ knew, or upon rea sonably

diligent inquiry

should have known, of the ha

rassment a

nd failed to take immediate and a ppropriate corr ective a ction,” the plaintiff has satisfied the knowledg e re quirement. Fleming v. Boeing Co. , 1 20 F .3 d 2 42 , 2 46 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton , 111 F.3d 1530, 1535 ( 11th Cir. 1997)). 11No. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

- 23 - Her e, a r easona

ble jury could find that (1) Goody ear , knowing that Mullins was be ing tr eate d differ ently , that she wa s the only woman on he r s h i ft , an d that she and Jones had “ha d issues for y ear s,” shoul d h av e m ade a n inquiry as to sexual harassment a nd (2) Goody ear

should not have sto pp e d M ull ins fr om r e po rt ingpa st s e x ual hara ss ment . I f H arr is h a d b e e n at a ll d ili g e nt i n discharg ing his duties as r equire d by Title VI I , i t wo u l d be re asonable to expect that Harr is, who admitted that he considere d Mullins’ c omplaint to be “ce ntere d around employ ee- reta liation issues,” (J.A . 1 90 ), wo uld

have a llo we d M ull ins to r e po rt pa st pr ob le ms wi th Park e r and Jone s in or de r t o deter mine the ca

use of that e mploy ee r etaliation. I n short, a rea sonable jury could find that Goody ear knew or should have known about t he harassment. Wherea s an employ ee has a duty to report se x ual hara ssment, an emplo y er s h o u l d not be allowed to e vade liability by silencing an employ ee f

rom disclosing pa st incidents, espec ially g iven her repor ts of workplac e har assment. B e c a us e “ [ s] ummary

jud g me nt r e qu ir e s th e c ourt to v ie w a ll e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t favor able to the nonmoving party and is appropr iate only if the evide nce in the r ecor d is so one-sided that no rea sonable jury could find for that party ,” Hawkins , 5 1 7 F. 3 d at 3 3 9 (q u o t i n g Anderson v. Li b e r ty Lo b b

y, Inc

. , 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S. Ct. at 2512), we must view the e vidence of Goody ear ’s knowledg e in the lig ht most favorable to Mullins . A r ea s o n ab l e j u ry could find that Goody ear was at least indiffer ent to the exis tence of hara ssment. The district court discre dited the fac t that Mullins stated t hat s he and J ones “had had is sues for y ear s” because “ [Mul lins] made no eff ort to expl ain what the pr ior ‘issues’ we re.” (J.A. 403.) Dra wing all rea sonable infe renc es in the light most favor able to Mullins, howeve r, it is reasona ble to assume that Goody ear ’s discoura g ingNo. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

- 24 - Mullins from ex plaining w hy she and Jones had issues for y ear s was not the action of an employ er who was r easona

ble and dili g ent in preve nting a nd addre ssing se x ual har assment, espe cially g iven he r c omp la int s th a t sh e wa s ta rg e te d b y Jone s a nd Park e r a nd be c a us e the y kn e w s he wa s th e on ly woman on her

shift. Thus, contrar

y to what the majority g libly conclude d, there is a g enuine issue of ma te ri a l f a c t a s to wh e the r Go od

y e ar kn e w or sh ou ld have kn ow n th a t it s e mpl oy e e s w e re se xua lly ha ra ssi ngMu lli ns . B. Given at lea st a jury question as t o whether knowledg e of sex ual har assment ca n be imputed to Goody ear , the next element require d to establ i s h em p l o y er liability is determining whether

the

“ e mpl oy e r’ s re sp on se is un re a so na ble ” su c h that it “ manif

e sts ind if fe re nc e or un re a so na

ble ne ss i n light of the fac t s the employ er kne w or should have known.” Hawkins , 517 F.3d at 340 (citing Blan k e ns hip , 123 F.3d at 873). “A response is g ener ally adequate . . . if it is ‘rea sonably calc ulated to end the har assment.’” Id. (q u o t i n g Jack son v. Quane

x Corp. , 191 F. 3 d 647, 663-64 (6th Cir. 1999)). “I f t he employ er responds i n g ood faith, i t cannot be held liable.” Ru dd v . S he lby Cou nty , 1 6 6 F. Ap p ’x 7 7 7 , 7 7 8 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( u np u b l i s h ed ) ( ci t i n g Blan k

e ns hip , 123 F.3d at 873). “[T]he appropr iateness of

a re sponse depe nds on the s ever ity of t he allege d hara ssment.” Blan k e ns hip , 123 F.3d at 872. The district cour

t determined that Go o dy ear was not indiffe rent towa rds the alleg ed hara ssment based on the f ollowing alleg ed fac ts: (1) Goody ear tried to minimi ze Parker’ s contac t with Mulli ns; (2) Grif

fith and Bone wer e instructed to incre ase the ir supervision of the be ad ar ea;No. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

- 25 - (3) Gr iffith followed up with [ Mullins] afte r t he investi g ation; and (4) Mullins did not give G oody ear an opportunity

to respond to furthe r har assment bec ause she did not return to work a fter Par ker dr ove his forklift close to her

and Jones a

nd Parker phy sically blocked her exit from the bre ak room. (J.A. 404.) The c entra l f

la w in th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s an d th e ma jo r it y ’ s an a ly s is is th a t th e y ig n o r e d key fa c ts an d f

a i l e d t o v i e w t h e e v i d e n c e , a s t h e y w e r e r e qu i r e d t o d o , i n t h e l i g h t m o s t fa vo ra ble to Mullins. First, although the district c ourt stated that Goody ear t ri ed to minimiz e Parke r’s c ontact with Mullins, it is not clea r fr om the rec ord that Goody ear actua lly did so. Supervisors Griffith and Bone stated that they imposed a temporar y separ ation during the course of the investig ation, (J.A. 151, 182), but acc ounts diff er as to w hat happene d afte r the investigation. Where as Grif fith stated in h is d e po sit ion

tha t a ft e r t he inv e sti g a tio n, the “ re str ic tio n h a d b een li ft e d, ” (J.A . 1 75 ), Ha rr is tes t ified that the sepa

ration “w as not lifted.” ( J .A. 206.) De spite Harr is’s understandingthat the separ ation was ne ver lifted, G riffith told Parker that it “ was okay to go ba ck in that ar ea a nd work, but he nee ded to l i m i t h i s dealing s with [ Mullins] .” (J.A. 327.) Wherea s Griffith testified that Mullins repeate dly

told him t hat “thing s were better,” (J.A. 172), Bone t es t i fied that Mullins complained e very time Par ker came into he r are a, but that he decide d not to do any thing a bout her complaints and consc iously decide d not to repor

t them to his supervisor. (J.A. 183.) Thus, g iven the inconsistencies in G oody ear ’s testimony , there is a g enuine issue of mater ial fac t as to whether Go od y e ar e xhibi te d in dif

fe re nc e by

fa ili ngto m ini mize Park e r’ s c on ta c t w ithMu lli ns .No. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

Al tho ug h G oo dy e ar c la ime d th a t ju st c omp la ini nga bo ut s ome on e ’s pres ence is n ot a 12 c omp la int of a c tio na

ble ha ra ssm e nt, it is sig nif

ic ant that Park e r c on tin

ue d to ha ngaro un d M ull ins ’ work are a even though, in taking the fac ts in the light most favora ble to Mullins, t hat sepa

ration wa s - 26 - Second, ther e is rea son to q u es t i o n whether Goody ear

responde d to Mulli ns’ initial complaints in good f

aith. During the cour se of the inve stigation, both of Mulli ns’ witnesses

corr oborate d her r eport that Parke r had sabotag ed her machine. (J .A. 199-201.) Mulli ns’ cowor ker, Da vis , s ta te d th a t Park e r a c tua lly la ug he d a nd br a g g e d to him

a bo ut d e lib e rate ly

pla c ingha lf

-r oll s of wire onto Mullins’ machine in order to make her

chang e her

wire spools more f

reque ntly . (J.A. 350.) Ye t Goody ear

still conclude d that the allega t i o n s of mac hine tamper ing c ould not be

corr oborate d. (J.A. 159.) Goody e a r d isc iplined neither Parke r nor Jones. I nstead, Goody ear decide d to t ur n th e ta ble s and su bje c t Mu lli ns ’

wo rk re co rd to close scr utiny , questioning her

about her bathroom bre aks and pr oductivity

. (J.A. 161, 265-66.) This scrutiny arose even thoug h Goody ear admitted that Mullins’ work rec ord wa s “ave rag e.” ( J .A. 161. ) Goody ear ’s alleg ed re ason for questioning he r work ha

bits was that they

thought her complaints might have arisen beca use wa s not “busy ” enoug h and her

mind was “wa

nder[ing].” Id. Goody ear ’s dism i s s i ng Mullins’ reports as those of a w orker

with a “wa

ndering ” mind sug g ests indiffer ence sufficie nt to cre ate a jury question

a s t o e mp l o ye r

l i a b i l i t y. Third, although t he dis trict court claims that Goody ear never had an oppor

tunity to respond to Mulli ns’ complaints prior to her final day of work, it is not clea

r fr om the rec ord th at t h is was actua lly true. As state d above, Goody ear had notice, based on her continual complaints that Parker was in her

are a, that its “sepa

ration” w as not workingand wa s bothering her. (J.A. 183.) Bone 12No. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

not lifted. Parker ’s continued pr esence, ther efor e, wa s evidenc e of ope n disobedience , and Go od y e ar’ s f a ilure to ad dr e ss his re fu sa l to ma int a in a se pa ra tio n fr om M ull ins su g g e sts de lib e rate ind if fe re nc e to M ull ins ’ u

nd e rl y ing c omp la int s o f h ara ssm e nt. Mo re ov e r, Mu lli ns did no t me re ly complain about Parke r’s pre sence . As discussed below, Mullins also complained to her supe rvisor, Bo n e, t h at Parker

was drivinghis vehicle too close to Mullins, making he r fe ar f or her phy sical s a f e t y. - 27 - himself stated in his deposition testim ony that Mullins complained a bout Parker’ s prese nce, stating that “[e]ve ry t i m e t h at R ed wa s moved bac k over, [Mullins] said, ‘He ain’t supposed to be ove r here .’” ( J .A. 183.) Mu lli ns a lso tol d h e r s up e rv iso r, B on e , th a t Pa rk e r w a s d

ri vin g his fo rk lif

t to o c los e to Mu lli ns and sc ari ng he r. (J.A . 185 .) Al tho ug h Goo dy e ar ar g ue s th a t it ha d n o n oti c e of

Park e r’ s u se of driving equipment to intimi date Mullins, Bone , h er supervisor, plainly testified that Mullins specific ally complained about this problem, but that he dec ided not to inform any other Goody ear

su pe rv iso rs of

the pr ob le m. Q. Did she eve r comp l ai n t o y ou that [P arke r] was driving or oper ating any equipment too close to her ? A. Ye s, sh e me nti on e d th a t. Q. An d d id you

te nd e r t hat to Human Re so ur c e s? A. No. (B on e De po ., J.A. 18 5. ) B on e , r a the r t ha n ta lki ngto P ark e r o r r e po rtin g the c omp la int s to his

su pe rv iso r, c ho se to r e ma in s ile nt o n th e iss ue un til Mu lli ns wa s a lmo st hi t by P arker ’s fo rk lif t. Be cause Goody ear

did no t h i n g to preve nt Parker f rom eng ag ing in phy sical intimidation, Mul lins

wa s co n s t an t l y

fe ar fu l , s t at i n g t h at s h e “h ad t o k ee p an ey e on [ h er ] m ac h i n e wh i l e i twa s ru n n i n g,No. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

Th e ma jor ity ’s ina c c ur a te state me nt that “ Go od y e ar d id n ot h a ve the op po rt un ity to a dd re ss 13 [Mul lins’] final working -day conce rns” is thus direc tly and irreconc ilably contra dicted by the fa ct that Mullins had complained about P arke r driving dange rously close to her pe rson well bef ore he r final day at work. - 28 - and then, [Mullins ] had to ke ep a constant vigil on wher ever Red Parker was be cause [Mul lins] was terrif ied of Red Par

ker.” (Mullins Depo., J .A. 269.) Thus, the district court mischar acte rized the fac ts when it found: Although [Mullins] now say s that Parker and Jones continued hara ssing her [afte r the investigation] , she did not make a ny complaints to Griffith or H ar ri s . When [Mul lins] told Bone that she t houg ht Parker was in her are a more than he should be and that Jone s wa s not re lie vin g he r fo r br e aks a s he sho uld , Bo ne a dd re sse d th os e issu e s w it h [M u ll in s ], Pa

r k e r , an d Jo n e s . Pl a in ti f

f b e g an h e r me d ic a l le a ve on the same date that she say s that Parker drove a forklift close to he r and th at J o n es and Parker stood outside t h e bre ak room a nd partially

blocked he r exit, wit hout giving De fe nd ant a

n o pp or tun ity to a dd re ss t he inc ide nts
. (J.A. 402-03.) I n fac t, Mullins complained not only about Parke r’s c ontinued prese nce in he r work

are a, but also about P arke r purposely driving his fork lift close to Mul lins so as to put her in phy sical dang er prior to her last day at Goodyear . G oo dy e ar n e ve r r e sp on de d to Park e r’ s c omp la int s w ith any meaning ful ac tion. 13 Although a

n employ er’ s response doe s not have to be pe rf ect in orde r to be suff

icient, (1) ignor ing w itness corrobor ation of Mullins’ alleg ations, (2) subjec ting Mullins’ own work r ecor d, which wa s not even a

n issue, to intense scrutiny , and (3) ignor ing Mulli ns’ continued complaints of Park e r’ s v iol a tio ns of

the po st- inv e sti g a tio n s e pa ra tio n an d his dr ivi ng the fo rk lif t da ng e ro us ly c los e to Mulli ns demonstrates that ther e is at lea st a jury question as t o whether Goody ear ’s re sponse was

a pp ro pr ia te and

in g oo d f

a ith . In s hort , a reas on able jur y c ou ld f ind that G oo dy e ar’ s r e sp on seNo. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

Al tho ug h G o o d

ye ar a nd the ma jor ity arg ue that G oo dy e ar’ s r e me dia l a c tio ns we re a de qu a te 14 be c a us e Mu lli ns fo c us e d on Go od y e ar’ s f a ilure to s top Park e r, no t Jone s, fr om c on tin uin g his hara ssment, Appellee br . p.29, this argument is not particula rly cog ent. Mullins complained a bout both Parker a

nd J ones, and both Parke r and Jones were involved in the final incident that led to he r brea kdown. - 29 - “ e xhibi te d s uc h in dif

fe re nc e a s to ind ic a te a n atti tud e of p erm is sive ne ss t hat amou

nts to discrimination.” McCombs v . Meijer, I nc. , 395 F.3d 346, 353 ( 6th Cir. 2005). Given the a bove fac tual alleg ations sugg esting that Goody ear ref used t o hear repor

ts of sex ual har assment, neve r took Mullins’ ini tial complaints seriously , knew about the ong oing hara ssment a fter the ir investigation, and consc iously

decide d not to do any

thing a bou t i t , t h ere are g enuine issues of material fa ct for which a r easonab l e j ury

could find that Goody ear exercised de liberate indiffer ence on cowor ker ha ra ssm e nt. 14 I V. Reg ardle ss of whethe r or not indi vidual judge s on this panel persona lly object to sexual ha ra ssm e nt c la ims in g e ne ra l, t he dis tr ic t c ourt

ma de a sp e c if ic fa c tua l f

in di ng that

wa s f ull y supported by

the re cord on summar

y judgme nt: “[Mul lins] has pointed t o ev i d ence in the re cord which would allow the tr i er o f fa ct t o find that the cha rg ed sexual hara ssment had the ef fec t of

unrea sonably

interfe ring with [ Mullins’] work perf ormanc e and cre ating an intimidating, hostile, or offe nsive workingenvironment.” (J.A. 392) ( internal quotations omitted). Viewing the fa cts alleg ed in the l ight most favor able to the nonmoving , not the moving, party , the rec ord cre ates a jury question as to whethe r def

endant Goody ear

is liable for the sex ual har assment that its employ ees inflicte d on Mullins. The majority , by eff ectively immuniz ing e mploy ers that are indiffer ent to such ser ious andNo. 07-6089

Mullins v. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co.

- 30 - appalling patterns of

sexual harassment fr om Title VI Icomplaints, has score d a substantial victory f o r a l l t h o s e w h o b e l i e v e t h atw o m e nd o n o tb e l o n g i nt h e w o r k p l a c e . I diss e nt

.