1 

Filed 8/26/14 P. v. Sanders CA3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

(Sacramento) 

---- 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

LADELL LAMONT SANDERS, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

C073358 

(Super. Ct. No. 11F08401) 

 A jury convicted defendant Ladell Lamont Sanders of three counts of forcible rape 

(Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2))1 and three counts of forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, 

subd. (c)(2)) with multiple victim findings (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4)) as to all counts. The 

trial court sentenced defendant to 90 years to life. 

 On appeal, defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support one of the 

oral copulation convictions and the trial court’s finding that all of the counts involving 

 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2 

one victim were committed on separate occasions is not supported by the record. We 

vacate the consecutive terms on counts one through three, remand for the trial court to 

determine whether sentence on those terms should be consecutive pursuant to section 

667.6, subdivision (c), and affirm the judgment in all other respects. 

FACTS 

D.S.

 In December 2011, 18-year-old D.S. was five months’ pregnant. She had been a 

prostitute since she was 15, but stopped seeing her regular customers after learning she 

was pregnant. 

 On December 10, 2011, at approximately 1:00 a.m., D.S. left her residence after 

fighting with her boyfriend and walked to a nearby bus stop to “take a break.” She 

wanted to visit her grandmother’s house, but could not get a ride there. A car pulled up 

to the bus stop and the driver, defendant, offered her a ride. D.S. agreed when defendant 

offered to take her to her home first so she could get her cell phone. She got into the car 

and defendant drove her to her residence, where she retrieved the phone and returned to 

defendant’s car. 

 Defendant started driving, but D.S. soon realized he was not driving to her 

grandmother’s house. She told defendant he was driving in the wrong direction, but he 

kept driving, even after she asked him to take her back home. When D.S. told defendant 

she would call the police, he grabbed her phone, took out the battery, and continued 

driving. D.S. panicked and moved to the backseat. 

 Defendant parked next to a FedEx building near a deserted warehouse. D.S. asked 

for her phone again; defendant threw the phone outside the car and prevented her from 

escaping. Defendant asked D.S. if she wanted money, which she thought would be in 

exchange for sex. He offered $30, but D.S. told defendant she wanted to go home and 

was not working as a prostitute. After she declined to have sex with him, defendant said 

he had a gun and threatened to use it. 
3 

 Defendant left the car and went to the passenger door. D.S. asked him to at least 

use a condom, but defendant said he did not have one. He then entered the backseat, 

pushed her down onto the seat, and had intercourse with her. As defendant raped her, 

D.S. kept asking defendant why he was doing this to her, told him she was pregnant, and 

tried to resist him. Defendant continued raping D.S. until he ejaculated, after which he 

pushed her out of the car and drove off. 

 D.S. reassembled her phone and called 911. She later showed officers where the 

rape took place and positively identified a photo of defendant’s car. 

L.M. 

 L.M. was a 21-year-old prostitute who gave all of her earnings to her physically 

abusive pimp. She always received payment before engaging in the sex act. L.M. was 

working as a prostitute on December 13, 2011, around midnight when defendant 

approached her in his car asked if she needed a ride. She got into defendant’s car and 

agreed to $40 for intercourse and oral sex. 

 L.M. directed defendant to a familiar location, an AM/PM on Stockton Boulevard 

in Sacramento. She texted her pimp that she had a customer; after finishing the text, she 

noticed defendant was not driving towards the AM/PM. When L.M. asked him to drive 

to the AM/PM, defendant told her he was driving to another spot he knew and that they 

would get there quickly. 

 Defendant drove into a deserted, industrial area, parking so close to a warehouse 

that L.M. could not open her door to get out. L.M. and defendant got into the backseat, 

where she asked defendant for the money. He refused to pay, telling L.M. he had a gun 

but she would not be hurt if she did everything he said. A scared L.M. pleaded with 

defendant not to hurt her as she had children at home. 

 Defendant ordered L.M., who was naked from the waist down, to pull up her shirt 

and bra. He put on a condom as she requested, and then demanded oral sex. Feeling she 

had no choice, L.M. complied. She stopped three or four times because she was afraid. 
4 

Each time she stopped, defendant demanded she continue performing oral sex on him and 

she would reinitiate the oral sex. Defendant next ordered L.M. to lay back, after which 

he had intercourse with her. Feeling she had no choice, L.M. complied against her will. 

After finishing, defendant put on his clothes and got out of the car. 

 L.M. grabbed her clothes and ran out of the car. She eventually flagged down a 

tow truck. The driver let her in the truck to clothe herself while he called 911. The 

police responded to the call and took her statement. She later identified defendant’s car 

and identified defendant in a photographic lineup. 

 DNA from a swab taken from L.M.’s vagina after the attacks matched defendant, 

with a random chance of about 1 in 2 quintillion. 

J.H.

 17-year-old J.H. was working the Sacramento streets as a prostitute in November 

2011. She was working on Stockton Boulevard one night when defendant approached 

her in his car and said he was “looking for business.” After determining he was not a 

police officer, J.H. got into his car, whereupon they agreed to $100 for oral sex and 

intercourse. 

 Defendant drove to area around Fruitridge Road and parked in an alley by a 

church. J.H. asked for the money up front; defendant replied that he would pay her when 

he was done. When she insisted on payment first, defendant said he had a gun. J.H. 

expressed disbelief to defendant, who produced the gun from between the seat and door. 

 Shaking with fear, J.H. asked, “Do you really have to rape a prostitute?” 

Defendant told J.H. to get in the backseat. Feeling she had no choice, J.H. went onto the 

backseat, pulled up her dress, and took off her panties. Defendant did not allow her to 

put a condom on him. He forced J.H. to orally copulate him for around two minutes, got 

on top of her, and had intercourse with her until he ejaculated. Defendant left the car and 

told J.H. to get out of the car; as she put on her panties he slammed the car door, threw 
5 

her a dollar bill, and drove off. J.H. called her pimp, who directed her not to call the 

police and had her working the streets within 15 minutes. 

 J.H. saw defendant and his car several times in the next few weeks as she worked 

on the streets. One time, she recorded his car’s license plate number. She also warned 

other prostitutes working the Stockton Boulevard area about defendant. She was 

contacted by an undercover detective with the Sacramento Police Department on 

December 14, 2011. She eventually reported the sexual assault and gave the license plate 

number to the detective. She later identified defendant in a photographic lineup. 

DISCUSSION 

I 

 Defendant was convicted of two counts of forcible oral copulation against L.M.2 

He contends there is sufficient evidence to support only one count. We disagree. 

 In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, our role is limited. Under the state 

and federal constitutional due process clauses, “the test of whether evidence is sufficient 

to support a conviction is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 

667, original italics.) 

 “Oral copulation is the act of copulating the mouth of one person with the sexual 

organ or anus of another person.” (§ 288a, subd. (a).) Our Supreme Court has held that 

“ ‘[a]ny contact, however slight, between the mouth of one person and the sexual organ 

of another person constitutes oral copulation. Penetration of the mouth or sexual organ is 

 

2 Defendant was originally charged with four counts of oral copulation against 

L.M., but the trial court dismissed one of the counts for insufficient evidence on the 

People’s motion during the trial. The jury convicted defendant on two of the remaining 

counts, and acquitted him on the third. 
6 

not required. Proof of ejaculation is not required.’ ” (People v. Dement (2011) 

53 Cal.4th 1, 41, fn. omitted.) 

 Defendant recognizes L.M. testified that defendant’s penis came out of her mouth 

every time she stopped performing oral sex on him. Nonetheless, he claims there is no 

evidence L.M.’s mouth had no contact with his penis the times she stopped, or for how 

long she stopped. From this, defendant concludes there is no evidence of a necessary 

break in contact between L.M. and defendant to establish more than one count of oral 

copulation. 

 Defendant’s argument misconstrues the standard of appellate review. By far the 

most reasonable inference to draw from L.M.’s testimony that defendant’s penis came out 

of her mouth is that this broke off all contact between her mouth and his penis. For us to 

accept defendant’s contention, we would have to view the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the defense and thereby accept the less reasonable interpretation of the 

evidence. That we cannot and will not do. 

 Asserting that no more than an incidental break in contact could be found, albeit 

incorrectly, defendant additionally claims that “a brief interruption of contact should not 

justify breaking the otherwise continuous conduct into separate offenses.” He supports 

this contention by referring to the crime of battery, which is completed when there is a 

single offensive or harmful touching. (People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 961; 

disapproved on other grounds in People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 458-459.) 

According to defendant, “[t]reating each time [L.M.’s] mouth touched [defendant’s] 

penis as a separate crime would be equivalent to treating each punch in a fistfight as a 

separate battery because a single punch completes the crime.” 

 This fallback position is likewise unfounded. “[T]he gravamen of the offense of 

oral copulation ‘is the revulsion and harm suffered by one who is forced to unwillingly 

touch his or her mouth to the genitals of another.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Dement, supra, 

53 Cal.4th at p. 43.) By withdrawing her mouth from defendant, L.M. sought to 
7 

terminate the revulsion and harm he was inflicting on her by forcing her to orally 

copulate him. Each time defendant compelled her to reinitiate the oral copulation by 

threat of force, L.M. suffered additional revulsion and harm. Defendant’s analogy to 

battery is inapt. In battery, the criminal is committing the necessary touching while in 

forcible oral copulation, the victim is forced to commit the touching by defendant’s force 

or threat of force. When the victim of oral copulation ends the offense by breaking off 

contact with the defendant, a new crime is committed when the defendant forces the 

victim to orally copulate him again. 

 Since the evidence supports a finding that L.M. broke off contact with defendant 

at least once and was then forced to orally copulate him again, substantial evidence 

supports convicting defendant of two counts of forcible oral copulation. 

II 

 Defendant contends the trial court’s finding that the three counts involving L.M., 

counts one through three,3 were committed on separate occasions and thus warranted 

consecutive terms (§ 667.6, subd. (d)) is not supported by the record. 

 Section 667.6, subdivision (d) provides in pertinent part: “A full, separate, and 

consecutive term shall be imposed for each violation of an offense specified in 

subdivision (e) if the crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on 

separate occasions. [¶] In determining whether crimes against a single victim were 

committed on separate occasions under this subdivision, the court shall consider whether, 

between the commission of one sex crime and another, the defendant had a reasonable 

opportunity to reflect upon his or her actions and nevertheless resumed sexually 

 

3 Defendant was originally charged with five crimes involving L.M., counts one 

through five. One of the counts, count three, was dismissed for insufficient evidence on 

the prosecutions motion at the end of trial, and the remaining counts renumbered as 

counts one through seven. 
8 

assaultive behavior. Neither the duration of time between crimes, nor whether or not the 

defendant lost or abandoned his or her opportunity to attack, shall be, in and of itself, 

determinative on the issue of whether the crimes in question occurred on separate 

occasions.” 

 “Our Supreme Court has recently summarized case law construing the ‘separate 

occasions’ requirement of section 667.6, subdivision (d) as follows: ‘Under the broad 

standard established by . . . section 667.6, subdivision (d), the Courts of Appeal have not 

required a break of any specific duration or any change in physical location. Thus, the 

Court of Appeal herein cited People v. Irvin (199[6]) 43 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1071, for the 

principle that a finding of “separate occasions” under . . . section 667.6 does not require a 

change in location or an obvious break in the perpetrator’s behavior: “[A] forcible 

violent sexual assault made up of varied types of sex acts committed over time against a 

victim, is not necessarily one sexual encounter.” Similarly, the Court of Appeal in 

People v. Plaza (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 377, 385, affirmed the trial court’s finding that 

sexual assaults occurred on “separate occasions” although all of the acts took place in the 

victim's apartment, with no break in the defendant’s control over the victim. (But see 

People v. Pena (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1316 [defendant’s change of positions 

between different sexual acts was insufficient by itself to provide him with a reasonable 

opportunity to reflect upon his actions, “especially where the change is accomplished 

within a matter of seconds”]; People v. Corona (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 13, 18 [holding, 

after the respondent implicitly conceded the point, that the trial court erred in imposing 

consecutive sentences for different sexual acts when there was no cessation of sexually 

assaultive behavior “between” acts].)’ (People v. Jones [(2001)] 25 Cal.4th 98, 104-105.) 

 “Once a trial judge has found under section 667.6, subdivision (d), that a 

defendant committed offenses on separate occasions, we may reverse only if no 

reasonable trier of fact could have decided the defendant had a reasonable opportunity for 
9 

reflection after completing an offense before resuming his assaultive behavior. 

[Citations.]” (People v. Garza (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1091-1092.) 

 We agree with defendant that Pena and Corona are controlling here. As in Pena, 

defendant “simply did not cease his sexually assaultive behavior, and, therefore, could 

not have ‘resumed’ sexually assaultive behavior.” (People v. Pena, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1316.) Accordingly, “the case at bar is strongly analogous to Corona, in which 

separate sexual acts occurring one after the other were held to be committed on one 

‘occasion.’ ” (People v. Pena, supra, at p. 1316.) The fact that defendant forced L.M. to 

change positions is not dispositive. “[A] change in positions, alone, is insufficient to 

provide a perpetrator with a reasonable opportunity to reflect upon his actions, especially 

where the change is accomplished within a matter of seconds.” (Ibid.) Where, as here, 

“there was no cessation of sexually assaultive behavior . . . , the trial court erred in 

imposing sentence for those offenses under [] section 667.6, subdivision (d).” (People v. 

Corona, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 18.) 

 Since counts one through three were committed against L.M. on the same 

occasion, the court in its discretion could impose full-term consecutive sentences under 

section 667.6, subdivision (c).4 However, the court did not indicate it was exercising its 

discretion in sentencing defendant to consecutive terms on those counts. In invoking its 

 

4 667.6, subdivision (c) states: “In lieu of the term provided in Section 1170.1, a 

full, separate, and consecutive term may be imposed for each violation of an offense 

specified in subdivision (e) if the crimes involve the same victim on the same occasion. 

A term may be imposed consecutively pursuant to this subdivision if a person is 

convicted of at least one offense specified in subdivision (e). If the term is imposed 

consecutively pursuant to this subdivision, it shall be served consecutively to any other 

term of imprisonment, and shall commence from the time the person otherwise would 

have been released from imprisonment. The term shall not be included in any 

determination pursuant to Section 1170.1. Any other term imposed subsequent to that 

term shall not be merged therein but shall commence at the time the person otherwise 

would have been released from prison.” 
10 

discretion during sentencing, the court must indicate it is making a discretionary choice 

and provide and explain its reasoning. (People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 347.) 

Therefore, we remand to the trial court to determine whether, in its discretion, full-term 

consecutive sentences were warranted under section 667.6, subdivision (c). 

DISPOSITION 

 The sentences on counts one, two, and three are vacated and the matter is 

remanded to the trial court to consider its discretion to impose consecutive sentences on 

those counts pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (c). In all other respects, the 

judgment is affirmed. 

 NICHOLSON , J. 

We concur: 

 RAYE , P. J. 

 ROBIE , J.