This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 PATRICK D. TAYS, 2 Plaintiff-Appellant, 3

v. NO. 35,843 4 S. CRAIG TAYS and MELVIN E. TAYS, 5 Defendants-Appellees, 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY 7 Angie K. Schneider, District Judge 8 Patrick D. Tays 9 Ruidoso, NM 10 Pro Se Appellant 11 John R. Hakanson 12 Alamogordo, NM 13 for Appellees 14 MEMORANDUM OPINION 15 ZAMORA, Judge. 16
{1} Patrick D. Tays (“Plaintiff”) appeals fro m the district court’s order granting 17 Defendant Craig Tays’ (“Defendant”) motion to settle the trust, in accordance with a 18 settlement agreement entered into by the parties in a different matter, and awarding 192 attorney and accountant fees to be paid fro m the trust property that is the subject of 1 this litigation. We previously issued a notice of proposed summary disposition in 2 which we proposed to affirm. Plaintiff has filed a memorandum in opposition thereto. 3 After due consideration, we remain unpersuaded. 4
{2} In his memorandum in opposition, Plainti ff reiterates his pos ition that he was 5 denied due process and proper notice in c onnection with the subj ect of the April 6, 6 2015 hearing, namely, Defendant’s motion to settle the trust in accordance with the 7 settlement agreement. [MIO 1-5] Plaintiff a sserts that he “notified the court below that 8 he was ‘surprised’ and had not received fair notice of the April 2015 hearing[,]” and 9 we acknowledged as much in our calendar notice. [MIO 5; CN 2] Plaintiff does not 10 challenge our observation that he did not cl aim to be unprepared to address the motion 11 and did not ask the district court for additional time to allow him to prepare a 12 response. [MIO 5] See State v. Barazza , 1990-NMCA-026, ¶ 13, 110 N.M. 45, 791 13 P.2d 799 (“Failure to request a continuance undermines [a] defendant’s claim of unfair 14 surprise.”). Likewise, Plaintiff does not ch allenge our assumption that he received, 15 in advance, a copy of Defe ndant’s motion and the simultaneously filed request for a 16 hearing asking that the motion be heard during the previously scheduled April 6, 2015 17 hearing. [CN 3] As such, we hold thatPlaintiff received reasonable notice that 18 Defendant’s motion could be addressed during the April 6, 2015 hearing, as well as 193 a fair opportunity to be heard. See Rutherford v. City of Albuquerque , 1992-NMSC1 027, ¶ 7, 113 N.M. 573, 829 P.2d 652 (“The essence of procedural due process is that 2 the parties be given notice and an opportunity for a hearing.”); Sandoval v. Baker 3 Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. , 2009-NMCA-095, ¶ 65, 146 N.M. 853, 215 P.3d 4 791 (stating that if the record is doubtfu l or deficient, we will indulge every 5 presumption in support of the district court’s judgment). 6
{3} With regard to Plaintiff’s second challenge on appeal—that the district court 7 erred in dismissing this case based on a settlement agreement reached in a prior matter 8 and without ordering an accounting of the trust property at issue—Plaintiff argues in 9 the memorandum in opposition that he “did not agree to [the settlement agreement] 10 and never signed it.” [M IO 5] We construe Plaintiff’s position as a challenge to the 11 district court’s decision not to allow Pl aintiff to relitigate the existence of the 12 settlement agreement and its terms. [RP 256-57] See Hyden v. Law Firm of 13 McCormick, Forbes, Caraway & Tabor , 1993-NMCA-008, ¶ 15, 115 N.M. 159, 848 14 P.2d 1086 (“[C]ollateral estoppel . . . may beapplied to preclude a plaintiff from 15 relitigating an issue the plaintiff has previously litigated and lost, regardless of 16 whether the defendant was privy to the prior suit.” (citation omitte d)). Our review of 17 the record proper reveals that Defendant presented evidence that (1) in 2005, Plaintiff 18 and Defendant were parties to a different litigation; (2) during mediation in that 194 matter, a settlement agreement was reachedproviding for the division of the trust 1 property that is the subject of the present litigation; (3) Plaintiff subsequently refused 2 to sign the agreement; (4) the district court in the prior matter held an evidentiary 3 hearing during which the mediator and Plai ntiff testified; and (5) on February 19, 4 2007, the latter court entered an order holdi ng that, with certain modifications, the 5 unsigned settlement agreement presented by Defendant accurately reflected the 6 agreement of the parties (“2007 Order” ). [RP 199-211, 244-45] Plaintiff’s only 7 challenge below to the 2007 Or der was that it was entered in a different matter. [RP 8 256] Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err in applying the doctrine of 9 collateral estoppel to this issue. Hyden , 1993-NMCA-008, ¶ 14 (stating that 10 application of defensive collateral estoppe l requires a showing that (1) the causes of 11 action in the two suits are different; (2) the ultimate issue was actually litigated; (3) 12 the ultimate issue was necessarily determined; and (4) the party to be bound by 13 collateral estoppel had full and fair opportunity to litigate th e issue in the prior suit). 14
{4} In the memorandum in opposition, Plaintiff adds a citation to the Mediation 15 Procedures Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, §§ 44-7B-1 to -6 (2007), which states that 16 “[i]f the mediation parties reach a settleme nt agreement evidenced by a record signed 17 by the mediation parties, the agreement is en forceable in the same manner as any other 18 written contract.” Section 44-7B-6(A). Th e Act became effective on July 1, 2007, or 195 almost five months after the 2007 Order wa s entered, and Plaintiff makes no argument 1 that the Act should apply retroactively. [MIO 5-8] See Warner v. Calvert , 2011- 2 NMCA-028, ¶ 1, 150 N.M. 333, 258 P.3d 1125 (“[T]he Mediation Procedures Act . 3 . . became effective on July 1, 2007.”). As such, we hold that the Act had no effect 4 on the 2007 Order. 5
{5} With regard to Plaintiff’s third challenge on appeal—that the district court 6 violated Rule 1-054.1 NMRA in relation to the order filed on September 1, 2015—the 7 memorandum in opposition asserts that the fact that the district court issued a written 8 order is inconsistent with our conclusion th at the district court ruled orally on the 9 matter during the April 6, 2015 hearing. [M IO 1, 9] We remain unpersuaded. Our 10 review of the record on appeal reveals that the district court reached a decision on all 11 issues before it at the conclusion of the hearing and merely asked the parties to prepare 12 an order memorializing its rulings. [RP 256, 360, 330-31] As such, we hold that Rule 13 1-054.1 was not violated. 14
{6} As to Plaintiff’s fourth argument on appeal—that the district court erred in 15 accepting verbatim an order drafted by De fendant—Plaintiff mere ly reiterates his 16 previous position that the district court thereby abdicated its responsibility to make 17 findings of fact and conclusions of law. [MIO 10-11] We remain unpersuaded. As 18 stated in our calendar notice, our review of the record proper reveals that the language 196 of the order accurately reflects the districtcourt’s oral rulings from the bench. [RP 1 256-57, 270] As such, we hold that the district court did not abdicate its responsibility 2 to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in adopting Defendant’s draft order. 3
{7} To Plaintiff’s fifth challenge on appeal—that the district court clerk improperly 4 failed to file several petiti ons—the memorandum in opposition adds that Plaintiff was 5 denied due process of law because these pe titions were never rule d on. [MIO 12] Our 6 review of the record on appeal reveals thaton April 6, 2015, the district court disposed 7 of all issues pending at that time, and that on August 17, 2015 and May 9, 2016, the 8 district court denied all pleadings that had been filed by Plaintiff subsequently to the 9 April 6, 2015 hearing. [RP 311, 319- 20, 329-32, 331-32, 360-61] Given that 10 Plaintiff’s sole additional argument is that his petitions were not ruled upon, we 11 affirm. 12
{8} As to Plaintiff’s final contention on a ppeal—that the district court erred in 13 awarding attorney and accountant fees—the memorandum in opposition states that 14 “they were not authorized” and that the trustees “mismanaged the trust by not paying 15 them.” [MIO 12] Our review of the record on appeal rev eals that the latter argument 16 was not raised below. As such, we decline to address it. See Wolfley v. Real Estate 17 Comm’n , 1983-NMSC-064, ¶ 5, 100 N.M. 187, 668 P.2d 303 (“It is well established 18 in this state that theories, defenses, or other objections will not be considered when 197 raised for the first time on appeal.”). As to Plaintiff’s remaining contention, we reject 1 it for the reasons stated in our calendar notice. 2
{9} For the foregoing reasons, as well as thos e expressed in our calendar notice, we 3 affirm the district court’s judgment belo w and the award of attorney and accountant 4 fees. 5
{10} IT IS SO ORDERED. 6

7 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 8 WE CONCUR: 9

10 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 11

12 STEPHEN G. FRENCH, Judge 13