1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 

v. 

DONNELL CREWS, 

 Defendant. 

Crim. Action No. 11-00372-1 

(EGS) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Background 

Defendant Donnell Crews (“Mr. Crews”), age 39, is serving a 

225-month prison sentence for an attempted Hobbs Act Robbery. 

See Minute Order (Dec. 16, 2014); J., ECF No. 266 at 2.1 The 

Court’s previous Memorandum Opinions set forth the facts of this 

case in detail. See United States v. Crews, No. 11-372-1 (EGS), 

2021 WL 5798033, at *1–4 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021); Mem. Op. (Dec. 

12, 2022), ECF No. 371 at 2–10. Accordingly, the Court 

summarizes only the facts necessary to provide context for Mr. 

Crews’s current pro se motion seeking compassionate release. See

Def.’s Mot. for Compassionate Release (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 

375. 

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the 

Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the 

filed document. 
2 

On March 12, 2014, a jury found Mr. Crews guilty of 

attempted interference with commerce by robbery and aiding and 

abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951. See Minute Order 

(Mar. 12, 2014); J., ECF No. 266. During sentencing, the United 

States Probation Office determined that Mr. Crews was a career 

offender under § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. See 

Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI Report”), ECF No. 252 at 

6–11. Consequently, the Probation Office calculated Mr. Crews’s 

guidelines range as 210 to 240 months imprisonment. See 

Sentencing Recommendation (Crews), ECF No. 253 at 1. Without 

making a finding on whether Mr. Crews was a career offender 

under the Sentencing Guidelines, the Court sentenced him to 225 

months of incarceration, followed by three years of supervised 

release. See Tr. of Sentencing Proceedings, ECF No. 315 at 29–

30; J., ECF No. 266 at 2, 4. 

After the D.C. Circuit affirmed Mr. Crews’s conviction on 

appeal, United States v. Crews, 856 F.3d 91, 101 (D.C. Cir. 

2017), Mr. Crews filed a pro se motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2255, asserting five claims for relief. See Def.’s Mot. to 

Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (“Def.’s § 2255 Mot.”), 

ECF No. 301. Relevant here, Mr. Crews argued ineffective 

assistance of counsel for failure to challenge the careeroffender classification on appeal. See Def.’s Suppl. Mot. to 
3 

Correct Sentence (“Def.’s Supp. § 2255 Mot.”), ECF No. 304 at 4.2

Mr. Crews contended that his two prior convictions and his 

conviction in this case are not “crimes of violence” under § 

4B1.2(a), and therefore, he is not a career offender and was not 

eligible for enhanced sentencing. See Def.’s § 2255 Mot., ECF 

No. 301 at 4–6. 

In addressing Mr. Crews’s career offender arguments, the 

Court thoroughly analyzed Mr. Crews’s attempted Hobbs Act 

robbery conviction and his two prior convictions to determine 

whether they were crimes of violence supporting a classification 

of career offender. See Mem. Op., ECF No. 360 at 38–63. The 

Court noted, “[a]t the time of Mr. Crews’s sentencing, to be a 

career offender, a defendant had to have at least two prior 

felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled 

substance offense.” Id. at 39 (citing U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a)). 

Therefore, to show ineffective counsel, Mr. Crews needed to show 

that there was a “reasonable probability” that at least one of 

his prior convictions was not a crime of violence. Id. at 63–64. 

After examining each conviction under the “elements” clause, the 

“enumerated offense” clause, and the “residual clause,” the 

2 The Court appointed new counsel to represent Mr. Crews, Minute 

Order (Jan. 2, 2019), and with his newly appointed counsel, Mr. 

Crews filed an additional supplemental brief in support of his § 

2255 claims, see Supp. to Mot. for New Trial Based Upon 

Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel, (Def.’s Second Supp. § 

2255 Mot.”), ECF No. 331. 
4 

Court concluded that “each of [Mr. Crews’s] three convictions 

[met] the requirements for a ‘crime of violence’ under § 

4B1.2(a).” Id. at 38–64. Thus, the Court rejected Mr. Crews’s 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 

challenge his sentencing based on the career offender 

guidelines. Id. at 63–64. 

While awaiting the Court’s decision on his § 2255 Motion, 

in July 2020, Mr. Crews filed a motion seeking compassionate 

release from custody due to particularized susceptibility to 

COVID-19. See Def.’s Mot. for Release from Custody Due to COVID19, ECF No. 347. The Court denied Mr. Crews’s motion, finding 

that his cancer in remission, asthma, and “possible diagnosis” 

of tachycardia did not “fall within the CDC’s guidelines as 

conditions placing him at increased risk of developing severe 

COVID-19 symptoms.” Mem. Op., ECF No. 350 at 5–6. Thus, the 

Court held that Mr. Crews failed to establish any “extraordinary 

and compelling reasons” for release. Id. at 11. 

Pending before the Court is a second Motion for 

Compassionate Release filed pro se by Mr. Crews on December 26, 

2023. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 375. In support of his motion, Mr. 

Crews filed a memorandum, Attach. A, ECF No. 375-1; a letter to 

the warden of United States Penitentiary, Lee (“USP Lee”), Ltr 

from Def. to Warden, ECF No. 375-2; and 520 pages of medical 

records, Sealed Attach. C, ECF No. 376. The government opposes 
5 

Mr. Crews’s motion. See Gov. Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for Reduction 

in Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (“Gov.’s Opp.”), ECF 

No. 380. Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, 

the applicable law, and the entire record herein, Mr. Crews’s 

motion is DENIED.

I. Standard of Review 

The First Step Act of 2018 (“First Step Act”), Pub. L. 115- 

391, § 603, 132 Stat. 5194, 5238-5240 (2018), amended 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) to provide the Court with the authority to 

modify the sentence of a defendant after its imposition upon a 

motion by the defendant. To be considered for a sentence 

modification, the defendant must have either fully exhausted all 

administrative rights to appeal the Bureau of Prison’s (“BOP”) 

failure to bring a motion for release on his behalf or allowed a 

lapse of thirty days from the time the BOP received his request, 

whichever is earlier. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). After 

receiving a properly filed motion, the Court must first 

determine whether there are “extraordinary and compelling 

reasons [that] warrant . . . a reduction” in sentence and that 

“such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy 

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. 

To be in line with the Sentencing Commission’s policy 

statement, beyond finding that there are “extraordinary and 

compelling reasons” that warrant a reduction, the Court must 
6 

also find that the “defendant is not a danger to the safety of 

any other person or to the community.” See U.S.S.G. § 

1B1.13(a)(2). Finally, if the Court finds that there are 

“extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a reduction and that 

the reduction aligns with the Sentencing Commission’s policy 

statement, then the Court must consider the factors set forth in 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id.

II. Analysis 

Although the government does not contest that Mr. Crews 

exhausted all his administrative remedies, the Court begins by 

examining § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s mandatory exhaustion requirement. 

Mr. Crews sent a request for compassionate release to the warden 

of USP Lee on September 29, 2023 requesting release “because 

[his] sentencing [ ] was enhanced by old convictions that [do] 

not qualify under new guidelines and also because of [his] 

mental health.” Attach. A, ECF No. 375-1. Mr. Crews filed the 

current motion with the Court on December 26, 2023, more than 

thirty days after the warden received his letter. See Ltr from 

Def. to Warden, ECF No. 375-2. Thus, the Court concludes that 

Mr. Crews satisfied the exhaustion requirement and properly 

filed the pending motion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 

The Court now turns to whether Mr. Crews has established an 

“extraordinary and compelling reason[]” warranting release. Id. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Mr. Crews argues that he is entitled to 
7 

release for two reasons: (1) a medical condition; and (2) a 

disparity in his sentence. Def.’s Mot. ECF No. 375 at 4–5; 

Attach. A, ECF No. 375-1. 

The Court first analyzes whether Mr. Crews has established 

that he is suffering from a medical condition amounting to 

extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. Mr. Crews 

asserts that he is suffering from “a serious physical or medical 

condition; a serious functional or cognitive impairment; or 

deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging 

process that substantially diminishes [his] ability to provide 

self-care within the environment of a correctional facility.” 

Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 375 at 4. Mr. Crews’s current motion does 

not specify what medical condition he is suffering from that 

constitutes “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for release; 

however, from Mr. Crews’s previous Motion for Compassionate 

Release during COVID-19, the Court understands that Mr. Crews 

has a history of non-Hodgkin lymphoma, possible tachycardia, and 

asthma. See Mem. Op., ECF No. 350 at 2. To the extent Mr. Crews 

is asserting these medical conditions as a basis for 

compassionate release, the Court has already held that these 

conditions do not present extraordinary and compelling reasons 

for relief, and Mr. Crews has not indicated that these 

conditions have worsened. Id. at 5–11. 
8 

To the extent Mr. Crews is asserting a new medical 

condition, he has failed to identify the condition and how it 

prevents him from providing self-care in prison, and after a 

review of the substantial medical records provided by Mr. Crews, 

the Court fails to see any medical condition that would satisfy 

extraordinary or compelling reasons for release. The records 

appear to indicate that Mr. Crews suffered an injury in 2021 

after falling from his top bunk in prison. See Sealed Attach. C, 

ECF No. 376 at 147, 182. Mr. Crews had surgery to repair the 

injury, which left him with weakness in his right hand and arm. 

Id. at 191, 229. It appears he underwent occupational and/or 

physical therapy for a short amount of time after surgery. Id.

at 172, 197–98, 466–67. The most recent records submitted are 

from late 2022 and 2023, which continue to recommend physical 

therapy “to help [Mr. Crews] regain his strength.” Id. at 259. 

Assuming this injury is the condition to which Mr. Crews is 

referring,3 Mr. Crews has provided no evidence nor argued that 

this injury is so severe as to make him unable to provide selfcare while imprisoned. As the government points out, Mr. Crews’s 

BOP Inmate Profile lists his medical care level as Care Level 1, 

3 Even though Mr. Crews’s motion was unclear as to the medical 

condition, the Court analyzes the most obvious condition from 

the available medical records. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 

89, 94 (2007) (finding pro se filings are to be “liberally 

construed”). 
9 

suggesting that he has “limited medical needs that can be easily 

managed by clinician evaluations every 6-12 months.” Gov. Exs., 

ECF No. 380-1 at 2. Furthermore, it appears that Mr. Crews was 

added to the carpentry waitlist in August 2023, prior to filing 

this motion, suggesting that his mobility is not severely 

limited. Id. Other than the continued lower bunk requirement, 

nothing in Mr. Crews’s Inmate Profile, id., or Medical Duty 

Status Report, Attach. C, ECF No. 376 at 127, indicates that Mr. 

Crews has physical restrictions or other required assistance. 

See United States v. Morris, No. 12-154, 2020 WL 2735651, at *7 

(D.D.C. May 24, 2020) (emphasizing the requirement that 

“physical condition[s] qualifying for compassionate release [ ] 

are chronic and compromise a defendant’s ability to provide 

‘self-care,’ which typically refers to a defendant’s ability to 

provide for his own activities of daily living, such as eating 

and drinking, toileting, washing and dressing, and 

mobilization”). Pursuant to the evidence provided, Mr. Crews’s 

2021 injury does not reach the level of an extraordinary and 

compelling reason for release. 

Next, Mr. Crews argues that if the Court were to sentence 

him under today’s statutory scheme, his sentence would be much 

lower than the sentence he received. See Attach. A, ECF No. 375-

1 at 1–2. As amended in November 2023, the policy statement in 

the Sentencing Guidelines provides that a change in the law “may 
10 

be considered in determining whether the defendant presents an 

extraordinary and compelling reason, but only where such change 

would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being 

served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the 

motion is filed.” § 1B1.13(b)(6). Prior to this amendment, the 

Sentencing Commission also amended § 4B1.2 to include a 

definition of robbery. See Amends. to the Sent’g Guidelines 

(U.S. Sent’g Comm’n Apr. 27, 2023). Robbery is now defined as: 

the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal 

property from the person or in the presence of 

another, against his will, by means of actual 

or threatened force, or violence, or fear of 

injury, immediate or future, to his person or 

property, or property in his custody or 

possession, or the person or property of a 

relative or member of his family or of anyone 

in his company at the time of the taking or 

obtaining. The phrase “actual or threatened 

force” refers to force that is sufficient to 

overcome a victim’s resistance. 

Id.

To the extent Mr. Crews is arguing that the newly added 

definition of robbery changes the classification of his Maryland 

robbery as a crime of violence, see Attach. A, ECF No. 375-1 at 

1–2, the Court disagrees. As the Court emphasized in its 

December 7, 2021 Memorandum Opinion, “Maryland robbery entails 

the carrying away of another’s property ‘from his person or in 

his presence . . . by violence or putting in fear.’” Mem. Op., 

ECF No. 360 at 57 (quoting Coles v. Maryland, 821 A.2d 389, 394 
11 

(Md. 2003)). Although the Maryland robbery has no specific 

element of physical force, Mr. Crews’s Maryland robbery 

conviction fits squarely within the “robbery” definition in § 

4B1.2. This conclusion is precisely the conclusion the Court 

came to when it examined Mr. Crews’s Maryland robbery conviction 

in its prior Memorandum Opinion. See id. at 57–58.4 Moreover, the 

Court’s sentence was imposed without regard to whether Mr. Crews 

was a career offender. See Tr. of Sentencing Proceedings, ECF 

No. 315 at 29–30. Therefore, the Court concludes that Mr. Crews 

has failed to raise any change in law that creates a gross 

disparity in his sentence that amounts to extraordinary and 

compelling reasons for release. See United States v. Jenkins, 

No. 16-213, 2021 WL 9563332, at *5 (D.D.C. Nov. 23, 2021)

(“[T]he compassionate release statute was not intended to serve 

as a second chance to address a defendant’s sentence; it was 

created to address new and often unforeseen circumstances that 

raise unique concerns about the defendant’s continued 

incarceration.”).5

4 To the extent Mr. Crews is seeking the Court to reconsider its 

decision in the December 7, 2021 opinion, the request is denied. 

Mr. Crews has not raised any “intervening change of controlling 

law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a 

clear error.” United States v. Bagcho, 227 F. Supp. 3d 28, 31 

(D.D.C. 2017). 

5 The government argues that the Sentencing Commission’s 

interpretation of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) permitting changes in the 

law to establish “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a 

sentence reduction “is contrary to the statute’s text, 
12 

Since Mr. Crews does not raise any further changes to the 

sentencing guidelines that would amount to a significantly lower 

sentence than he received, the Court concludes that Mr. Crews 

has failed to establish a change in law amounting to 

extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release. Because 

Mr. Crews has failed to provide such a reason, the Court need 

not address the Section 3553(a) factors, including Mr. Crews’s 

dangerousness under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2). See United States v. 

Schlifstein, No. 18-cr-217, 2020 WL 2575633, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 

21, 2020) (declining to “reach other issues raised in the 

parties’ submissions, including consideration of the Section 

3553(a) sentencing factors” after finding no extraordinary and 

compelling reason warranted compassionate release). Even so, the 

Court notes that Mr. Crews made no attempts in his motion to 

address whether a sentence reduction would be consistent with 

the applicable Sentencing Guidelines provisions or Section 

3553(a) factors. See United States v. Anguiera, No. 11-cr-116S 

(1), 2020 WL 3424530, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. June 23, 2020) (“The 

defendant carries the burden of showing that he or she is 

entitled to a sentence reduction under the statute.”). After 

structure, and purpose, and therefore is invalid.” Gov. Opp., 

ECF No. 380 at 12. The Court does not need to reach the issue of 

whether the interpretation is valid, given that Mr. Crews has 

failed show a disparity in his sentence for compassionate 

release.
13 

carefully considering Mr. Crews’s motion and the entire record, 

the Court cannot grant Mr. Crews’s requested relief. 

V. Conclusion 

 For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Crews’s motion for 

compassionate release is DENIED. An appropriate Order 

accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 

 United States District Judge 

 October 7, 2024