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EXAMINING TSA’S GLOBAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT 

THE HOMELAND FROM AVIATION THREATS 

AND ENHANCE SECURITY AT LAST-POINT-OFDEPARTURE AIRPORTS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 8, 2015 

Serial No. 114–47 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

JOAN V. O’HARA, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

JOHN KATKO, New York, Chairman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

KRISTA P. HARVEY, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DENNIS TERRY, Subcommittee Clerk 

VACANCY, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security ....... 1 

The Honorable Kathleen M. Rice, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

WITNESS

Mr. Joseph P. Terrell, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Global Strategies, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

APPENDIX

Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Joseph P. 

Terrell ................................................................................................................... 21 

(1) 

EXAMINING TSA’S GLOBAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT THE HOMELAND FROM AVIATION 

THREATS AND ENHANCE SECURITY AT 

LAST-POINT-OF-DEPARTURE AIRPORTS 

Tuesday, December 8, 2015 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:12 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. John Katko [Chairman of 

the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Katko, Rogers, Rice, and Keating. 

Mr. KATKO. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security, will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to have its 10th hearing, I 

believe it is, our 10th hearing of the season to examine TSA’s global efforts to protect the homeland from aviation threats and enhance security at last-point-of-departure airports. 

Now, according to media reports, our allies in the United Kingdom believe that the Metrojet flight—I am sorry—I now recognize 

myself for an opening statement. 

The recent Metrojet crash over the Sinai peninsula is tragically 

reminiscent of the 1988 Lockerbie bombing, which took down 

PanAm Flight 103, killing all aboard, including 35 Syracuse University students traveling home for the holidays. It also claimed 

the lives of one of my best friend’s sisters who went to Oswego 

State University. 

Now, according to the media reports, our allies in the United 

Kingdom believe that the Metrojet flight was brought down by the 

very same type of device used in the Lockerbie bombing. It is deeply disturbing to me that innocent people from my district in Syracuse, as well as all of the traveling public, may still be threatened 

today by the same type of bomb used over 27 years ago. 

Even though this most recent attack was not targeted at American citizens or an American aircraft, we cannot and should not 

hesitate to learn from this tragedy and identify ways in which we 

can mitigate such threats from becoming successful again in the future. 

The international aviation system represents our modern 

globalized world. However, with interconnected transportation systems come interconnected risk. Much like the Lockerbie bombing 

affected my community in Syracuse all those years ago, the 
2 

Metrojet tragedy affects our security as well. We cannot afford to 

ignore potential security lessons from this incident. 

Today, the Subcommittee on Transportation Security is holding 

this hearing to better understand the size and scope of TSA’s global 

programs aimed at securing international aviation, as well as recent efforts to enhance security at overseas airports with direct 

flights to the United States. 

The recent tragic bombing of the Metrojet flight, which killed all 

224 people on board, reminds us once again of the attractive target 

aviation is for terror groups. Additionally, if this attack was indeed 

carried out by the ISIS, as has been claimed, it represents a shift 

in the threat landscape against aviation and a newfound capability 

for ISIS in carrying out attacks. 

Because of this, TSA’s overseas mission is now more important 

than ever. It is critical that this subcommittee understands the extent of TSA’s global reach, as well as how the U.S. Government is 

working with its foreign partners and aviation stakeholders to enhance security at overseas airports. 

Moreover, efforts by other entities such as the International Civil 

Aviation Organization, which plays a vital role in setting aviation 

security standards world-wide, are an essential component in proliferating security best practices and building capacity at high-risk 

airports around the world. 

Since the Lockerbie terror attack, we have seen a number of attempted attacks against U.S. aviation targets. These plots, such as 

9/11, the Christmas day bomber, the printer-cartridge bombs, and 

the shoe bomber, have each caused massive reevaluations in the 

way passengers are screened and security is maintained. 

I am very happy to see that TSA has taken steps to increase security at overseas airports in recent weeks and I applaud their 

swift efforts in doing so. I hope these efforts will be successful. 

However, there remain gaps in security which need to be addressed. Specifically, this subcommittee has worked intensely 

throughout the 114th Congress to shed light on the serious lapses 

in security vetting among aviation workers with access to secure 

and sensitive areas of airports. 

Additionally, I remain very concerned at the overall state of airport access controls. We cannot solely focus on shuffling passengers 

through security screening, while ignoring open back doors at airports. 

This subcommittee understands these vulnerabilities, which is 

why we have passed a number of bills, including two of my own, 

to close gaps in aviation worker vetting and enhance the security 

of airport access controls across the United States. 

These bills, together with our other oversight efforts, are bringing critical attention to a very important issue. These recent terrorist attacks in Egypt, Paris, Mali, and Lebanon reminded all of 

us in Congress of the important responsibility we have to the 

American people to ensure that their Government is working to 

keep them safe from a wide array of determined and focused adversaries who are hell-bent on threatening our lives and way of life 

by terrorizing our cities and skies. 

It is with this sober understanding that we meet today to discuss 

efforts to secure overseas airports and international aviation. 
3 

The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of the 

subcommittee, the gentlewoman from New York, Miss Rice, for any 

statement she may have. 

Miss RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for convening 

this hearing. 

I also want to thank Deputy Assistant Administrator Terrell for 

coming to talk with us about TSA’s efforts to secure international 

flights traveling to the United States from last-point-of-departure 

airports abroad. 

As we all know, on October 31 of this year, Metrojet Flight 9268 

crashed over Sinai, Egypt after departing from Sharm el-Sheikh 

International Airport en route to Russia. Multiple sources have 

confirmed that a bomb smuggled on-board the aircraft caused the 

crash, killing 224 people. 

Although Sharm el-Sheikh is not a last-point-of-departure airport 

in which U.S. carriers and TSA work, there have been reports that 

security within the airport was weak and those security concerns 

contributed to Britain’s decision to suspend all flights to and from 

Sharm el-Sheikh in the immediate aftermath of the crash. 

The attacks in Paris and the shootings last week in California 

are the latest tragedies to remind us that the threat of terrorist attacks is very real and the risk is very high right now. The Metrojet 

bombing is a reminder that commercial flights are still a major target for terrorism. 

We have to be going above and beyond right now in our efforts 

to protect the American people. Part of that effort includes making 

sure that international airports with flights bound for the United 

States are fully complying with all aviation security standards and 

that TSA and all relevant parties share all information about terrorist threats and security concerns. 

There are currently 308 last-point-of-departure airports in the 

world, and every day more than 2,000 flights travel from foreign 

countries to the United States. TSA’s Office of Global Strategies operates throughout Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and 

TSA representatives operate in countries with airports deemed critical to our National security. 

OGS recurrently certifies these airports by conducting security 

assessments and has deemed them low-risk for out-bound flights to 

travel directly to the United States. They are on the ground annually conducting more than 120 foreign airport assessments, 1,800 

air carrier inspections, and 700 foreign repair station audits. 

It seems that OGS’s methods are working efficiently, but we cannot afford to get comfortable or complacent right now because, 

again, the Metrojet bombing is all the indication we need to know 

that there are terrorist groups and radical individuals targeting 

commercial aviation. 

Mr. Terrell, in your written testimony, you mentioned the security directives and the emergency amendments that were coordinated at 8 last-point-of-departure airports in response to the 

Metrojet crash. I am eager to hear more about the measures taken 

in response to this crash, although I know we will have to have 

that discussion in a secure setting. 
4 

I appreciate Administrator Neffenger acting quickly to issue 

needed directive amendments that will help eliminate any perceived vulnerabilities at last-point-of-departure airports. 

I am pleased to know that OGS participates in multilateral forums with the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Asia 

Pacific Economic Cooperation, and many others. I think this collaboration is a testament to the fact that international aviation security is an on-going, inclusive effort, and that your office is being 

proactive with your approach to enhancing security on international flights. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for convening this hearing. I 

look forward to a productive conversation today, and I yield back 

the balance of my time. 

[The statement of Miss Rice follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER KATHLEEN RICE

DECEMBER 8, 2015 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for convening this hearing. 

I also want to thank Deputy Assistant Administrator Terrell for coming to talk 

with us about TSA’s efforts to secure international flights traveling to the United 

States from last-point-of-departure (LPD) airports abroad. 

As we all know, on October 31 of this year, Metrojet Flight 9268 crashed over 

Sinai, Egypt after departing from Sharm el-Sheikh International Airport en route 

to Russia. Multiple sources have confirmed that a bomb smuggled on-board the aircraft caused the crash—killing 224 people. 

Although Sharm el-Sheikh is not a last-point-of-departure airport in which U.S. 

carriers and TSA work, there have been reports that security within the airport was 

weak. And those security concerns contributed to Britain’s decision to suspend all 

flights to and from Sharm el-Sheikh in the immediate aftermath of the crash. 

The attacks in Paris and the shootings last week in California are the latest tragedies to remind us that the threat of terrorist attacks is very real and the risk is 

very high right now—and the Metrojet bombing is a reminder that commercial flight 

are still a major target for terrorism. 

We have to be going above and beyond right now in our efforts to protect the 

American people—and part of that effort includes making sure that international 

airports with flights bound for the United States are fully complying with all aviation security standards, and that TSA and all relevant parties share all information 

about terrorist threats and security concerns. 

There are currently 308 last-point-of-departure airports in the world, and every 

day more than 2,000 flights travel from foreign countries to the United States. 

TSA’s Office of Global Strategies (OGS) operates throughout Europe, Asia, Africa, 

and Latin America. And TSA representatives operate in countries with airports 

deemed critical to our National security. 

OGS recurrently certifies these airports by conducting security assessments, and 

has deemed them low-risk for out-bound flights to travel directly to the United 

States. They are on the ground annually conducting more than 120 foreign airport 

assessments, 1,800 air carrier inspections, and 700 foreign repair station audits. 

It seems that OGS’s methods are working efficiently, but we cannot afford to get 

comfortable or complacent right now—because again, the Metrojet bombing is all 

the indication we need to know that there are terrorist groups and radical individuals targeting commercial aviation. 

Mr. Terrell, in your testimony you mentioned the security directives and the 

emergency amendments that were coordinated at 8 LPD airports in response to the 

Metrojet crash. I’m eager to hear more about the measures taken in response to this 

crash, although I know we’ll have to have that discussion in a secure setting. 

I appreciate Administrator Neffenger acting quickly to issue needed directives and 

amendments that will help eliminate any perceived vulnerabilities at last-point-ofdeparture airports. I am pleased to know that OGS participates in multilateral forums with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Asia-Pacific 

Economic Cooperation (APEC), and many others. 

I think this collaboration is a testament to the fact that international aviation security is an on-going, inclusive effort and that your office is being proactive with 

your approach to enhancing security on international flights. 
5 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for convening this hearing. I look forward to a 

productive conversation today, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Miss Rice. 

Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

DECEMBER 8, 2015 

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you for convening this important hearing 

today. 

I would like to say that our thoughts and prayers remain with the individuals 

who perished aboard Metrojet Flight 9268 in Egypt. 

This terrible act, which multiple sources have now confirmed was indeed a bombing, renews concerns regarding international aviation cooperation, specifically at 

last-point-of-departure airports. 

These airports are those in which a flight originates from a foreign country, bound 

for the United States. 

Although Sharm el-Sheikh is not a last-point-of-departure, it is alarming that 

someone was able to board this plane with an explosive device—and successfully 

detonate it to destroy the aircraft—is alarming. 

There have been other international aviation incidents that were also cause for 

concern. 

On Christmas day 2009, Abdul Muttalab successfully smuggled an explosive device on-board a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit but failed to 

detonate it properly before being detained by passengers. 

In October 2010, packages mailed from Yemen containing explosives hidden inside 

of printer cartridges were successfully intercepted, but not before traveling in cargo 

holds, and in one instance, aboard two passenger planes. 

This latest incident is a stern reminder of how important coordination with foreign governments, international aviation organizations, and air carriers is to securing aircraft bound for the United States from Foreign Airports. 

With that being said, I thank Deputy Assistant Administrator Joseph Terrell from 

TSA’s Office of Global Strategies for being here today to talk about the important 

role they plan in international aviation security. 

I am interested in learning how TSA shares threat information with all parties 

involved to ensure that responses are appropriate and thorough by all parties. 

The Office of Global Strategies works to secure last-point-of-departure airports 

and foreign repair stations by working with international entities such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, as well as through foreign airport assessments 

and foreign air carrier inspections. 

I look forward to your testimony, and yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. KATKO. We are pleased to have a distinguished witness before us today on this important topic. 

This witness is Mr. Joseph Terrell—did I pronounce that right? 

Joseph Terrell, who currently serves as deputy assistant administrator in the Office of Global Strategies at the Transportation Security Administration. Previously, Mr. Terrell served as TSA’s Federal security director at the Pittsburgh International Airport. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Terrell to testify. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH P. TERRELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF GLOBAL STRATEGIES, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. TERRELL. Thank you. 

Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, and Members of the 

subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss 

the Transportation Security Administration’s Office of Global Strat-
6 

egies and our efforts to mitigate the international aviation security 

risk to the United States. 

TSA’s mission is to protect the Nation’s transportation systems 

to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce. Within 

TSA, OGS works with international and domestic partners to reduce security risks to international transportation modes. OGS coordinates with foreign governments, air carriers, and international 

organizations to implement responses that effectively mitigate the 

likelihood of a successful attack. 

This involves a spectrum of activities to identify risk in terms of 

threat, vulnerability, and consequence and develop mitigation 

plans. 

TSA assesses security at foreign airports served by U.S. aircraft 

operators and at foreign airports serving as a last point of departure for foreign air carriers. Under this authority, OGS identifies 

vulnerabilities at foreign locations through assessments of airports 

and inspections of air carriers from those airports to ensure they 

are operating at a minimum consistent with the security standards 

adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization. 

In fiscal year 2015, our transportation security specialists performed hundreds of air carrier inspections and 146 foreign airport 

assessments touching down in over 125 countries. We have a range 

of tools available to compel compliance with both agency and international requirements. 

OGS gathers data through foreign airport assessments, air carrier inspections, and other operational activities and feeds it into 

our risk methodology framework. We then analyze each area of 

concern to identify high-risk locations, possible attack methods, 

and key risk factors. Locations deemed problematic are evaluated 

with a focus on identifying vulnerabilities and root causes, and 

then to determine an appropriate mitigation strategy. 

OGS relies on a variety of tools to mitigate issues identified during airport assessments, inspections, and other visits. In the event 

of a specific threat or vulnerability, TSA may issue security directives to U.S. air carriers and emergency amendments to foreign air 

carriers for implementation at select last-points-of-departure locations. 

Last month, TSA coordinated a global response with internal and 

external partners to develop SDs and EAs related to the crash of 

the Metrojet Flight 9268 in the Sinai peninsula. OGS scheduled 

visits and coordinated inspections to the regulated air carriers to 

verify compliance with the additional measures. 

TSA also focuses on capacity development as a mitigation tool. 

We provide aviation security training to foreign partners through 

a variety of courses in screener supervisory skills, preventive security measures, crisis management, basic security, cargo security inspections, and train-the-trainer programs, among others. 

Additionally, TSA has provided equipment loans valued at 

around $3 million to 12 countries that do not have the allocated resources to procure their own equipment. 

Because mitigation measures overseas are implemented by each 

country’s own personnel, consistent with their own requirements, 

OGS relies on its internationally-deployed workforce to influence 

key decision makers in foreign locations and industry partners to 
7 

understand the threat, maintain awareness of vulnerabilities to the 

aviation security system and encourage the implementation of mitigation strategies. 

Our talented international experts are highly respected and have 

helped establish and elevate globally consistent standards internationally. We also conduct extensive outreach and engagement at 

the global, regional, and bilateral levels with our international 

partners, and Administrator Neffenger has made these engagements a priority with 3 international trips during his first 5 

months at TSA. 

OGS works regularly with ICAO to establish and enhance baseline international standards for aviation security. TSA’s engagement is continuous, conducted at the highest organizational levels, 

to discuss on-going security vulnerabilities and to promote and 

share best practices with our international partners. 

As Administrator Neffenger commented to the international partners at the IATA Aviation Security World Conference in Dublin 

last month, achieving common goals calls for a shared approach; 

one that begins with a serious commitment to understanding security threats and then collaborating with one another to reduce 

vulnerabilities across many discrete elements of aviation system. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss TSA’s work mitigating in-bound risk to the United States from 

overseas, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Terrell follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH P. TERRELL

DECEMBER 8, 2015 

Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, and Members of the subcommittee, I am 

pleased to appear before you today to discuss the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Office of Global Strategies (OGS) and our efforts to mitigate the 

international aviation security risk to the United States. 

TSA’s mission is to protect the Nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom 

of movement for people and commerce. Within TSA, OGS works proactively with 

international and domestic partners to reduce security risks to international transportation modes. When a new or potential threat or vulnerability emerges, OGS coordinates with foreign governments, air carriers, and international organizations to 

implement responses that will effectively mitigate the likelihood of a successful attack. This involves a spectrum of activities to identify risk in terms of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Once a threat is identified, OGS analyzes the underlying factors and develops mitigation plans. 

IDENTIFYING THE IN-BOUND RISK

Under Title 49 of Chapter 449, United States Code, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security is required to assess security at all foreign airports served by U.S. aircraft 

operators and at those foreign airports serving as last-point-of-departure locations 

for foreign air carriers using, at a minimum, the security standards adopted by the 

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The Secretary’s authority to do so 

has been delegated to OGS on behalf of TSA. Under this authority, as well as under 

regulations at 49 C.F.R. §§ 1544.3 and 1546.3, OGS identifies vulnerabilities at foreign locations through assessments of foreign airports and inspections of air carriers 

that fly from those airports. 

To determine the appropriate frequency of the assessment and inspection visits, 

OGS developed a methodology, using the threat, vulnerability, and consequence 

model, to define the risk associated with each airport under its jurisdiction. This 

methodology ensures the allocation of OGS assets is based on the likelihood of a location being targeted (threat), the protective measures in place (vulnerability), and 

the impact of the loss of that airport’s services (consequence). Once this is determined, assessments are coordinated by the applicable TSA representatives (TSARs) 
8 

and completed by a team of Transportation Security Specialists (TSSs) from 1 of our 

6 Regional Operation Centers (ROCs) located world-wide. 

In addition, OGS engages in recognition of international programs commensurate 

with TSA’s own requirements in the United States, as well as interagency initiatives, and screening pilots. These DHS programs—such as the recognition of National Cargo and National Explosive Detection Canine Security Programs, the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C–TPAT), and the Air Cargo Advance 

Screening Pilot—provide TSA with opportunities to identify vulnerabilities at lastpoint-of-departure (LPD) airports overseas while also engaging closely with domestic 

and international partners to promote information sharing. 

In fiscal year 2015, our TSSs performed 289 air carrier inspections and 146 foreign airport assessments. Our commensurability programs also continued to thrive, 

with the recognition of now 40 National Cargo and 3 National Explosives Detection 

Canine Security Programs with foreign governments, to include the 28 Member 

States of the European Union. 

ANALYZING THE IN-BOUND RISK

OGS works to fully gauge the in-bound risk from LPD airports based on specific 

attack methods. This analysis provides valuable insight into what mitigation actions 

would have the greatest impact to reduce in-bound risk. 

OGS gathers data through foreign airport assessments, air carrier inspections, 

and other operational activities and feeds it into its risk methodology framework. 

OGS then analyzes each area of concern to identify high-risk locations, possible attack methods, and key risk factors. LPD locations deemed to be highly vulnerable 

or high-risk are further analyzed through a review process that involves subjectmatter experts within OGS. This entire process enables OGS to evaluate the key 

risk drivers with a focus on identifying vulnerabilities at that LPD location and 

their associated root causes to determine the appropriate mitigation strategy. 

MITIGATING THE IN-BOUND RISK

OGS has a variety of tools available to mitigate issues identified during airport 

assessments, air carrier inspections, or other visits. Options range from providing 

on-the-spot correction recommendations, conducting formal training, and recommending enacting a Public Notice stating that the airport does not implement adequate security measures, or suspending service entirely. These last two responses 

are usually considered when all other attempts have failed in assisting the airport 

or host government to improve security. When a specific threat is identified or significant vulnerabilities warrant additional and immediate mitigation actions, TSA 

may issue Security Directives (SDs) and Emergency Amendments (EAs) for implementation by air carriers at selected LPD locations. TSA works diligently to develop 

appropriate regulatory language for the SDs and EAs to address identified 

vulnerabilities and also communicate new policy requirements with foreign and domestic partners. 

SDs are regulations issued to mitigate threats posed to transportation for U.S. 

airport and aircraft operators, and EAs are issued to foreign air carriers. These regulations apply to all U.S. air carriers operating anywhere, foreign air carriers operating to or from the United States and U.S. airport operators. SDs and EAs are intended to mitigate security-related risks against civil aviation. Additionally, TSA 

may issue information circulars to regulated parties to share security concerns. 

Last month, OGS coordinated with internal and external partners to develop SDs 

and EAs related to the crash of Metrojet Flight 9268 in the Sinai Peninsula at 8 

LPDs in the region. Following issuance of these SDs and EAs, OGS conducted visits 

or inspections to the regulated air carriers at the applicable last-point-of-departure 

airports to verify compliance with the additional measures. Follow-up inspections 

will allow TSA to continue to assess continued compliance and whether any additional or modified measures are necessary in light of evolving threats. As with other 

vulnerability-driven SDs and EAs, the results of these visits will enable TSA to determine if the mitigation actions were successful. 

Another important part of OGS’s mitigation efforts is capacity development. OGS 

provides aviation security training to foreign partners through a variety of courses 

in screener supervisory skills, preventative security measures, crisis management, 

basic security, cargo security inspections, and train-the-trainer programs, among 

others. In addition, TSA provides equipment loans to those countries that do not 

have the allocated resources to procure their own equipment. Often, OGS works in 

conjunction with its international partners, such as Australia or the United Kingdom, to provide training or equipment to countries where we have mutual operations. 
9 

Because mitigation measures overseas are implemented by each country’s own 

personnel, OGS relies on its internationally-deployed workforce to influence key decision makers in foreign locations and industry partners to understand the threat, 

maintain awareness of vulnerabilities to the aviation security system, and encourage the implementation of mitigation strategies. Our TSARs provide on-site representation at U.S. Embassies and Consulates around the globe. TSARs are based 

in Abu Dhabi, Amman, Bangkok, Beijing, Berlin, Brasilia, Brussels, Buenos Aires, 

Dakar, Johannesburg, London, Madrid, Manila, Mexico City, Miami, Nairobi, Nassau, Ottawa, Panama City, Paris, Rabat, Rome, Singapore, Sydney, The Hague, 

Tokyo, and Warsaw. The TSARs all have regional responsibilities in addition to 

their duty post assignment. International Industry Representatives, also located in 

Embassies and Consulates around the world, serve as TSA’s primary representatives to regulated non-U.S. air carriers and U.S. aircraft operators that serve international airports. 

OGS also conducts extensive outreach and engagement at the global, regional, 

and bilateral levels with our international counterparts. OGS collaborates on mitigation measures to counter existing threats as well as new and emerging threats. Specifically, OGS works with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to 

establish and enhance baseline international standards for aviation security. As the 

U.S. Government’s representative to the ICAO Aviation Security Panel of Experts, 

TSA works with other international representatives to shape international aviation 

security standards on important issues such as cargo security and the coordination 

of capacity development. TSA also engages international air carriers and aviation 

stakeholders, such as the International Air Transport Association, Airlines for 

America, the American Association of Airport Executives, and Airports Council 

International, or in forums like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the 

North American Aviation Trilateral. TSA’s engagement is continuous, and includes 

the highest organizational levels: For example, Administrator Neffenger recently 

visited his counterparts in London, Amsterdam, and Tel Aviv to discuss on-going security vulnerabilities and to share best practices with our international partners. 

CONCLUSION

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss TSA’s work 

mitigating in-bound risk to the United States from overseas. We are constantly looking at more effective ways to improve and enhance the international aviation security arena to ensure the freedom of movement for people and commerce in an everevolving threat environment. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Mr. Terrell, and I very much appreciate 

your testimony here today. We are in the midst of voting hell, I 

think, today, from it looks like, a bunch of procedural votes are 

being called repeatedly. So we are probably going to be interrupted. 

We are going to be interrupted in about 10 minutes to have to 

go and vote. But we are going to get through a couple rounds of 

questioning first, if we can. 

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Terrell, 

I just want to—I will jump right into it, I was going to have you 

give me more of a background, but given the time constraints, I 

want to jump right into it. 

The security assessments, if I understood your testimony correctly, and the mitigation decisions are done by each country where 

their airport is located, correct? 

Mr. TERRELL. Each country has an obligation under international 

agreement to ensure the security measures in their countries are 

consistent with international standards. 

Mr. KATKO. So basically, there are minimum international standards by which these countries are supposed to meet them, correct? 

Mr. TERRELL. That is correct. 

Mr. KATKO. Did that includes Sharm el-Sheikh, just by curiosity? 

Mr. TERRELL. It does. 

Mr. KATKO. Okay. It is clear that they were not meeting those 

standards in retrospect? 
10 

Mr. TERRELL. It is easy to draw that conclusion. 

Mr. KATKO. What happens when an airport is not meeting the 

standards? What punitive measures, if any, can be taken? 

Mr. TERRELL. There are a number of things, and I think it is important to draw a distinction of the types of vulnerabilities and 

threats that we address. 

First is when the threat is such that there aren’t existing countermeasures in existence to deal with it. What we do then is work 

with our international partners to craft countermeasures, often reflected in SDs and EAs, to address that. 

The second are instances in which there are countermeasures 

that we believe are sufficient to address existing threat, if indeed 

they are implemented to the degree they are supposed to. I think, 

based on what we understand in the Sharm el-Sheikh case, that, 

had the procedures been properly implemented, that there may 

have been a different outcome. 

So that shapes our response to try to work with foreign partners 

to assist Egyptians, or in other cases provide opportunities for 

them to be able to actually implement appropriately the countermeasures. 

Mr. KATKO. One of the concerns I have is that we shouldn’t—and 

I am not impugning TSA at all, but I don’t think we should be in 

a position of waiting until something happens, then we realize 

there is a vulnerability, and then we act accordingly. 

Mr. TERRELL. Yes, and most certainly, if I may, we do not do 

that, and, again, as I pointed out, in the past year alone, we visited 

125 airports, and we are indeed in the vulnerability assessment 

business. 

We do have a very robust means to compel compliance to the 

international standards. Technically, given the authority that is 

presented to us by statute, with the concurrence of the State Department and the Secretary of Homeland Security, if we are concerned to the degree that conditions at a particular airport represent a risk to the traveling public, we could—or the U.S. Government has the ability to go to prohibit operations between that country and the United States. 

Mr. KATKO. Have they ever done that in the past? 

Mr. TERRELL. It has happened a couple times in the past. Not recently. 

Mr. KATKO. Is there something that we can do legislatively that 

could help you—give you more freedom to do that more easily? 

Mr. TERRELL. I think, actually, I would trumpet this as a success 

story, that there are a lot of instances in which we have been close, 

but given the resources, the focus, the attention that we present to 

these areas that have proven to be problematic, that we have negated the need to actually—to go to that degree. 

That is a last-case scenario, and in many instances, we would be 

able to mitigate it through a various number of means. 

Mr. KATKO. Now, as I understand it, TSA does have some authority to do assessments of airports internationally, correct? 

Mr. TERRELL. We have—yes. We—well, yes. We have a requirement under statute to conduct assessments anywhere there is a 

U.S. civil aviation interest, and we do do that. 
11 

Mr. KATKO. Now, when—and if I understand it correctly, you 

have to give notice of these assessments. Is that right? 

Mr. TERRELL. Yes, we do. 

Mr. KATKO. All right. So that is part of my concern. Is there any 

way we can fix that so you don’t give them so much notice? 

Kind of like—I am thinking of internally—when GAO goes 

around, or some of the other ones go around to TSA domestically, 

they don’t give them notice that they are doing it, and so that— 

I think that gives you a more genuine feel for the security preparedness at the airports and security vulnerabilities. 

From that we can craft proper legislation, and patch up the 

holes. But when you go overseas, and you have the—you give them 

notice of—maybe it is a month ahead of time or whatever, it gives 

them opportunity to be on their best behavior when you are there, 

and that concerns me, because that doesn’t give you an accurate 

snapshot of the day-to-day activities at the airport. 

So is there something we can do to fix that so we can give you 

more—increased ability to do with the randomization that I think 

is really important? 

Mr. TERRELL. Yes. I certainly appreciate that question. 

Two things: First and foremost is that, while we have a statutory 

authority to conduct these assessments, our statutory authority 

does not extend into these other states, as—of course, as you 

know—and quite often, there is a bit of resistance to what is being 

perceived as extraterritoriality of our requirements. 

But I will point out that—you know, it is almost a sixth sense— 

and I could speak with some authority here, as a former—I started 

off as inspector, many, many years ago, and I think inspectors have 

a sixth sense about what they are seeing is actually legitimate, or 

a horse-and-pony show, as they say, or if it is something that we 

believe is a sustainable practice. 

One of the things we do in those cases where we believe that 

what we are seeing is not sustainable and, indeed, just a show for 

us, is we do work—we gain a lot of significance from working with 

the host government in ensuring that, given a—by an understanding of the government’s—their own oversight program, their 

own training programs, their own regulatory requirements—all 

these things that give us some confidence of whether or not what 

we are seeing operational during these periodic visits is indeed sustainable. 

Mr. KATKO. Okay. Briefly, then I will—I might—my time is up 

here. But I want to—just one quick follow-up question. 

It would—even if we don’t have the ability, legislatively, to legislate what other countries do, we do have the ability to legislate 

what our airlines can do. 

So if our airlines are at foreign airports, and foreign countries 

want to do business with us, isn’t it fair to say that, if we tell that 

airline, ‘‘if you can’t get an agreement from their government to 

allow random security checks at your airports by TSA, then you 

can’t do business there,’’ I think—couldn’t that solve the problem? 

Mr. TERRELL. I would—I am not quite sure I am prepared to answer that. I am not—to be perfectly honest. You know, and again, 

I want—I would like to reiterate that I don’t think—part of the 

reason we have been successful over these—a number of years is 
12 

by operating collaboratively with a lot of these—our foreign partners. 

You know, I would mention that—25 years ago, that—you know, 

we were the only state conducting these—this activity. One of the 

things that we were often told is that the only reason that you are 

here—being us—is that there is a risk to these particular countries, because the United States has a civil aviation interest involved. 

In the past 25 years since then, you know, after all the incidents 

you just referred to, but including Australia and Bangkok and London and Madrid, we have a lot of partners that are emerging that 

have realized that the path that we chose 25 years ago is indeed 

the way to go. 

We have leveraged our leadership and experience—this, in seeking collaboration with like-minded partners to join us in promoting 

international standards globally. 

We have been able to create communications and share information with a lot of our partners that we were unable to do, you 

know, 10 or 15 years ago. 

So I think we are making a lot of progress in trying to garner 

a coalition of like-minded partners to promote aviation security 

standards internationally. I think we have been very much the 

beneficiaries of that. 

Mr. KATKO. Okay. I have more questions, but I am going to go 

for another—we will do another round, most likely. But the Chair 

now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member, Miss Rice, for 5 

minutes of questions, and then at the conclusion of her questions, 

we will break, we will vote real quick and we will come right back 

and get right at it again. 

Mr. TERRELL. Thank you. 

Miss RICE. I think that we can all agree—and I am sure you 

would agree, Mr. Terrell—— 

Mr. TERRELL. Yes, please. 

Miss RICE [continuing]. That it is in every country, every airline, 

every security agency’s best interest to ensure that an incident like 

what happened with the Russian jet does not happen in your country, because that could affect your economy, it can affect—you 

know, obviously issues of National security. 

So I think it is probably fair to assume that everyone starts from 

a point of wanting to have a level of inspection that they believe 

is going to be effective to prevent things like this from happening. 

I have a question about—I understand, in the aftermath of the 

Metrojet bombing, the last-point-of-departure airport security was 

increased at the last-point-of-departure airport. Is that correct? 

Mr. TERRELL. Yes. 

Miss RICE. Based on the directive by the—I believe it was Secretary Johnson? 

Mr. TERRELL. Yes, ma’am. 

Miss RICE. Yes. Now, just out of curiosity, what about the airports that fly to last-point-of-departure airports? Are the people as 

in a directing—you know, as a stop along the way, not a direct 

flight, obviously—are the bags, are the passengers on that plane rescreened when they get to the last-point-of-departure airport? 
13 

Mr. TERRELL. Yes, they are. Most States—and I say most States 

because there are some geographic locations where that isn’t the 

case, but by and large, any airport—any operation to the United 

States that operates through a transit point, we require them to be 

treated as an originating flight. Their bags will be screened and 

passengers will be screened before continuing on 

Miss RICE. Where do you—how is the—how are the lines of the 

communication between your agency and agencies of your type and 

other countries vis-a ́-vis threat levels, country-specific issues that 

are going on, information sharing—how is that all done? 

Mr. TERRELL. Of course it certainly depends on the State, but by 

and large our community is a relatively small one, and to your 

point that you made earlier, we all have the same interest. Any security event, as the Egyptians are aware of right now, is incredibly 

damaging to their economies. 

We have—we are very active in multilateral organizations. We 

have 28 transportation security representatives. They are around 

the world, whose sole job is to foster these relationships with our 

counterparts globally. 

We have a number of sort-of ad hoc groups and so we are incredibly engaged with our counterparts. There is a great thirst within 

our community also to share and participate collaboratively to the 

extent that we can. You know, there are a great many nations who 

are in the exact same boat as we are. 

Miss RICE. The Chairman asked you a question about doing covert inspections. I, you know, think it is probably a tough thing to 

legislate, but are—do you have—do we have agreements with any 

country on doing things like that? Like what was done with TSA 

recently? 

Mr. TERRELL. No, there—it is frowned upon and—if we were to 

conduct any it would be contrary to a lot of States’ laws for us to 

do that. 

Miss RICE. No, no, no. I understand that, but I am talking about 

that—that is one of the things that we do here in this country to 

ensure that our aviation system is as safe as possible. Do we have 

conversations with other countries where we encourage them to do 

the same thing? 

Mr. TERRELL. I am sorry, I misunderstood. Yes, yes indeed. We 

are aware and, actually, it is not unusual for other states to have 

their own covert programs in place. You know, we find it beneficial 

to the extent that laws permit to be able to share and have these 

discussions. But yes. 

I misunderstood your question, I am sorry. 

Miss RICE. So obviously, it is not just your agency that is responsible for inspections and security. I mean, you have ICAO, you 

have got the air carriers, you have got foreign governments. Just 

how is all that coordinated? I mean, all you have to do is look back 

at 9/11 and we see that there was certain information that was 

siloed within various Government agencies that probably should 

not have what we know should not have been—well, we know 

should not have been. 

I think that 9/11 woke us up to the need for more open, liberal 

information sharing between agencies. 
14 

So how—I mean, these are—throw in different countries and different procedures and how is—how do you feel about the information that you get from other countries that may be something that 

we need to know? 

Mr. TERRELL. I am encouraged by the increase, you know, just 

in terms of how all these different entities relate. ICAO, I think it 

is probably fair to say the requirements that they have established 

sort of set the context within which each member state operates. 

States that have like-minded concerns and approaches towards 

aviation security, it is beneficial to both parties to share information. 

We, in turn, regulate each of our respective air carriers and airport operators consistent with international standards, and the regulations—requirements, rather, that each state imposes on its regulated entities. 

So it is a logical exchange, but again, the key is to open up communication, share information to the degree practicable. Most certainly since the threat landscape has changed over the past 10 or 

15 years. 

Miss RICE. I yield back. 

Mr. KATKO. We are going to take a brief recess at this time, subject to the call of the Chair. I anticipate it will be about 15 minutes. Okay. 

Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. KATKO. The subcommittee is reconvened, and we just were 

awarded with another motion to adjourn—the third one in the last 

hour that has been filed by someone in Congress trying to be obstreperous, it appears. 

But in—nevertheless, we have about another 15 minutes of questioning we can do, and we will get to as much as we can. Seeing 

no other colleagues here, I am going to go for another round of 

questioning, between myself and Miss Rice and anyone else who 

may appear. 

I wanted to kind of touch on employees at foreign airports, before 

I go back, and if there is time to give you more of an overarching 

analysis of what we can do better over there and how we can help 

you get—make—have better security over there. 

It is my understanding that, at a lot of these foreign airports, 

there are a lot of employees—just like in the United States—that 

are contract employees. 

Correct me if I am wrong, is it fair to say that these contract employees are subject to screening standards that are implemented by 

the individual countries—is that correct? 

Mr. TERRELL. That is correct. 

Mr. KATKO. Okay. Do you—does TSA or the United States have 

any influence whatsoever over those screening procedures? 

Mr. TERRELL. We do to a certain degree. It is a requirement 

under ICAO that each state provides background checks to each 

employee at airports and working for air carriers, to the extent 

that is practicable under each state’s laws, recognizing privacy laws 

and that type of thing vary from state to state. 

But to the degree that we can influence and leverage partnerships with other—our relations with other states to encourage 
15 

states that—to create a robust vetting scheme for their employees, 

we do indeed do that. That is a routine part of our assessment activity. 

Mr. KATKO. So by the very definition of the standard you enunciated, it appears that there are divergent standards based on the 

countries involved. 

I know there is, with respect the United States and our Western 

European allies, because I was over there with a CODEL, as was 

Miss Rice, and we saw first-hand that there was differences, part 

of which, I think, contributed to what happened in Paris. 

Their standards—their security standards just aren’t as high as 

ours. So that has caused some of the concern we have with 

vulnerabilities at last-point-of-departure airports is—No. 1 is—you 

know, you have limited oversight capabilities—at least currently— 

for TSA over there. 

You have, overlaid with that, varying degrees of oversight of employees in general, and contract employees in particular. The airlines I know—the U.S. carriers—do a great job, I think, of taking 

security seriously. That is obvious. 

But when you have the contract employees—the caterers, the 

people working on the engines, the people—you know, doing the 

things that you should be concerned about—my concern is, how do 

we plug the gap, or can we do anything to try and require them 

to—under the ICAO or anything else to do a better job? Because 

I know some just aren’t doing a good job screening their employees. 

Mr. TERRELL. Yes. There are a number of ways that we can, and 

that we do, do that. One, as I mentioned earlier—I just want to restate that, if we do believe the state has a deficient or inadequate 

system of background checks, we remind them of their obligation 

under ICAO, and provide recommendations that we believe would 

help them. 

Second, in terms of bridging gaps when there are deficiencies, 

you know, we do indeed require flight crew, cabin crew who fly to 

the United States to be vetted to our standards before they are allowed to fly aircraft or participate in aircraft activities to the 

United States, and we also—as I am sure you know—through our 

secure flight program, vet each and every person who flies as a 

passenger to the United States. 

So I think those—and I will mention one other thing, too—that 

if we do not have luck with a host government in trying to provide—you know, a more vigorous vetting process, then we can define other—levy other requirements on our carriers to put a bubble 

around the operations to the United States, such as make sure that 

there are aircraft guards to ensure there is no unauthorized approaching, to make sure that the catering that you mentioned is indeed screened and checked before it boards aircraft destined to the 

United States. 

We can—we do require—make those requirements to compensate 

for instances in which were not happy with what those governments provides. 

Mr. KATKO. Right. I understand. But, for example, mechanics. I 

mean, if a mechanic breaks bad, they could do something on an airplane that—a problem that could only manifest itself once they are 

in the air. 
16 

Those are the types of things I am concerned about, is finding 

the needle in the haystack, that lone wolf which is so vexing here 

in the United States, with our higher standards, and I worry about 

it doubly so in foreign countries where their standards may not be 

as high as ours, right? 

So, because of that, it seems to me that we’ve got to do more. I 

know this is a concern that was enunciated by the airline industry. 

We had a roundtable with them last week, and they were certainly 

concerned about that, amongst other things. 

But that is one thing that they are very concerned about, is—you 

know, different countries have different standards for screening, 

and—you know, you have limited ability to be a watchdog internationally, and it seems to me that it really is a gaping vulnerability. 

I understand when you say that there are some things that are 

good and you are doing all right with, but it seems to me we have 

got to find ways of not just saying what is okay, but how to fix the 

things that aren’t okay, and to me, this is one of those things that 

is not okay. 

So I would be interested in hearing from you, briefly, of the concerns you have with the vetting of employees and the screening of 

employees internationally. What can we do to stop it, other than 

what you described—putting a bubble around an airplane, type of 

thing? 

Let’s face it, some airports you go to, internationally, you have 

nothing but foreigners—foreign contract carriers—to work on the 

engines. So you can’t put a bubble around the individual that is 

working on your engine. 

So how do we try and fix what I see as a security vulnerability? 

Mr. TERRELL. We can—what we can control are the requirements 

that are in place for aircraft that operate to the United States. We 

have—it is within the FAA purview, but—yes, I do believe, for example, using mechanics as an example, that they have—that any 

type of maintenance is done at a FAA-certified location. There are 

a number of measures in place. 

I think one of the things that we have had—we were starting to 

really—— 

Mr. KATKO. I don’t mean to interrupt you, Mr. Terrell, but I 

am—it is getting a little frustrating, because you are not telling me 

things that need to be fixed, and I am hearing from the airline industry, things need to be fixed. 

So instead of just telling us the good things, tell us about the bad 

things, because that is what we are really here to do, is try and 

help you guys, give you the tools to fix the things that need to be 

fixed. 

Mr. TERRELL. Yes. What I was hoping to clarify is that there are, 

you know, just by virtue of the fact that we are trying to promote 

change in locations in which we do not have expressed authority, 

that there are a number of ways that we—by leveraging partnerships, by working—trying to raise standards with international organizations—you know, by leveraging partners that may be more 

influential in other parts of the world than we are to try to promote 

standards. 
17 

We have had—I think we have had a lot of success in—you 

know, again, as I mentioned, by virtue of—you know, our leadership internationally, we are resourced, you know, we provide—we 

have been recently providing training to states on conducting their 

own assessment programs. 

So we have a number of different ways, I think, in which we 

have been very creative and very aggressive in trying to promote 

standards internationally. 

Mr. KATKO. All right, so according to you, then there is nothing 

else we need to do. Is that right? 

Mr. TERRELL. When you say ‘‘we’’—— 

Mr. KATKO. The United States, to help shore up security internationally. You have not told us one thing, in all the testimony 

today, of anything that needs to be shored up internationally—that 

we can help you with. 

Is there—if that is the case, there is nothing, just tell us that. 

Mr. TERRELL. Well, with all due respect, I think what we have, 

really, is just a continuum, on our part, of trying to continuously 

elevate standards. 

Mr. KATKO. I understand that. Is there something we can do to 

help you, or do you not need our help? 

Mr. TERRELL. I am an operational guy, sir. As far as what the 

Congress can do for us, I would probably best leave to others. I 

mean, I am not—I don’t really quite—I haven’t thought that one 

through. 

Perhaps I need some time to think about it and get back to you. 

Mr. KATKO. The Chair now recognizes Miss Rice for questions. 

Miss RICE. Sir, in your testimony, you said that your office conducted 146 foreign airport assessments—— 

Mr. TERRELL. Yes. 

Miss RICE [continuing]. In fiscal year 2015. What were the outcomes, in general? Were they all satisfactory? Were they all passing? Were they—some failing? Did some have to be taken out of— 

you know—— 

Mr. TERRELL. In almost every instance, there are opportunities 

that—there are—the way we characterize is, discrepancies noted. 

Miss RICE. Okay. So give me the top 5 discrepancies that you 

noted in these foreign airport assessments in fiscal year 2015. 

Mr. TERRELL. I would—just off the top of my head, I would think 

that access ID is the—— 

Miss RICE. So, people not having it? Losing it and it not being 

reported? 

Mr. TERRELL. Just not wearing them. Just not wearing them. 

Miss RICE. Not wearing them? 

Mr. TERRELL. Yes. You know, I would think, and if we were 

going to summarize, that there are probably more issues associated 

with access control, more than anything else, which is problematic. 

I am not sure that isn’t necessarily related to the fact that, because of the importance of that in the security airport regime, that 

we pay very close attention to that, too. 

Miss RICE. Okay. Anything deficient about the background 

checks they do for their contract employees in the airports? 

Mr. TERRELL. Again, there—we do—there are states that are— 

they would probably, consistent with international standards, do 
18 

employment checks and background checks, and are not permitted 

by their own privacy laws to conduct criminal background checks. 

This is something that we work constantly with certain key 

states to try to ensure the importance of them having a keener picture on the criminal background of folks that they are providing access to secured areas. 

Miss RICE. Do you do a summary of the foreign airport assessments you do for every fiscal year? 

Mr. TERRELL. We—yes, in terms of results? 

Miss RICE. Yes, yes. 

Mr. TERRELL. We most definitely use them for our purposes to 

identify trends. 

Miss RICE. So, what I would like to do is see if you could provide 

the committee with those reports, because the Chairman’s questions before had to do with what are ways that you think that we 

can help you. It seems to me that the key to that is for us to see 

what your assessment is of foreign airports with whom we do business, from an economic standpoint, but certainly from a National 

security standpoint, and a public safety standpoint. 

Why don’t we take a look at that and see if we can come up with 

ways that, maybe not necessarily through legislation, but ways 

that we might be able to take these assessments that are—the purpose of which is to ensure that every foreign country with whom 

we do business is actually maintaining a level of—a standard of 

care, if you will, right—that gives us the confidence that we can 

tell our airlines flying to those countries, ‘‘You are okay to fly 

there, and everyone is safe, and you should continue, Americans, 

to travel wherever you want to go.’’ 

Maybe if we could take a look at that report, that would be a 

good starting point. So if you could provide us that, that would be 

great. 

Mr. TERRELL. Yes, ma’am. 

Miss RICE. Okay. 

Now, are there currently, as you sit here, any regions or countries that you believe require more of a presence from OGS? If so, 

why? 

Mr. TERRELL. Yes, I would say absolutely there are. You know, 

part of our—how we allocate resources and ensure that the limited 

number of people that we have are used most efficiently is, you 

know, we definitely have a risk methodology in which we gauge 

vulnerabilities, in particular, specific locations. 

Miss RICE. So do you have specific countries that you have concerns about or regions? 

Mr. TERRELL. Yes, we do. 

Miss RICE. You do. Are you not able to say that in an open setting? 

Mr. TERRELL. I would prefer not to. 

Miss RICE. Okay. Great. So let me just ask you this, you did 146 

assessments. How many foreign airports are there? 

Mr. TERRELL. Three-hundred-and-something, I think. 

Miss RICE. So is it every other year they can expect to be inspected? 

Mr. TERRELL. It depends. 

Miss RICE. Or is there a requirement? 
19 

Mr. TERRELL. No. What—again, some airports we visit quarterly. 

Some airports we don’t visit for a few years. 

Miss RICE. You make the risk assessment? 

Mr. TERRELL. Oh, absolutely, yes. 

Miss RICE. Is that a question of—if you had more resources, you 

would do 300-plus assessments a year? 

Mr. TERRELL. Not necessarily. I mean, to be perfectly honest, 

there are a number of airports that we have full confidence not 

only in the counter-measures that are in place at that location, but 

also the thoroughness and effectiveness of the oversight and the seriousness with which the particular government takes these matters. We have a lot of partners that view things the exact same 

way that we do. 

Miss RICE. Okay. I yield back. 

Mr. KATKO. Briefly, and then I think we are going to have to 

wrap up here. We can submit the rest of our questions, if you 

agree, Miss Rice, on paper, and we will submit them to TSA and 

ask them to answer them. 

One refrain that I have heard from the airline industry is that 

information sharing subsequent to an incident is good at first, and 

then it seems to tail off. I think that bears itself out with respect 

to the Metrojet incident. 

The airlines learn from the information you give them whether 

or not they think it is important. So I asked them to go back to 

TSA, let them know that—encourage them to continue the lines of 

communication even if they think the information they have has 

nothing to offer. I kind of liken it to the days when I was talking 

to witnesses as a prosecutor. They would not tell me some things, 

and they said, ‘‘Well, I didn’t think that was important.’’ I said, 

‘‘Let us decide what is important.’’ 

So let the airlines decide what is important, and just—any information, any tidbits you have either helping or hurting an investigation, let them know as soon as you can because they can build upon 

that. I ask that you that, and they asked me to convey that message to you as well. 

Mr. TERRELL. Will do. 

Mr. KATKO. The rest of the information I think we will submit 

in writing. We appreciate your time here today, sir. We are sorry 

for the breaks, but some people are deciding to have fun today in 

Congress by calling these motions to adjourn repeatedly, so we are 

going to have to deal with them. 

Thank you very much. 

The hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(21) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR JOSEPH P. TERRELL

Question 1. What is the Office of Global Strategies involvement in assessing risks 

and creating Emergency Amendments? 

Does OGS have any input for this process? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Office of Global 

Strategies (OGS) provides significant input in the Emergency Amendment (EA) 

process. TSA issues EAs in response to either threat or vulnerability concerns. In 

instances of threat-based EAs, OGS leverages its risk analysis to target the application of new requirements. Vulnerability-based EAs are derived from OGS’ Foreign 

Airport Assessment program. During an airport assessment, OGS inspectors note 

vulnerabilities and provide their observations from the assessments to TSA’s Office 

of Security Policy and Industry Engagement to draft and issue EAs as warranted. 

The EAs provide security requirements on the air carriers above and beyond what 

is required in the air carrier’s current TSA-accepted security program in order to 

address the vulnerabilities and mitigate the risks. 

Question 2. When TSA learns of new vulnerabilities and issues emergency amendments and security directives, it is important that the relevant entities comply to 

ensure that airports and aircraft are not at risk. 

What is the Office of Global Strategies’ role in relaying these new measures to 

last-point-of-departure airports? 

Answer. When Emergency Amendments/Security Directives (EAs/SDs) are issued 

by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), they are relayed to the affected air carriers by TSA’s Office of Global Strategies’ International Industry Representatives (IIRs). The IIRs serve as TSA’s principal liaisons with air carriers. The 

IIRs share EAs/SDs through direct communications with their industry counterparts. Additionally, TSA posts the EAs/SDs on the Homeland Security Information 

Network, an internet portal that allows air carriers to access applicable TSA security programs and directives. While EAs/SDs are specifically issued to regulated entities, the air carriers, TSA understands the importance of information sharing with 

its foreign government partners. The Transportation Security Administration representatives (TSARs), which are part of the Office of Global Strategies, serve as the 

principle liaisons with foreign government transportation security experts, including 

those responsible for security at international airports. The TSARs are TSA’s primary interlocutors for threat information, intelligence, vulnerabilities, best practices, and other pertinent security issues with foreign governments and airports. 

When TSA issues a threat specific SD or EA, the TSARs who cover the applicable 

region provide their transportation security counterparts with the enhanced security 

measures for awareness. 

Question 3. Can you detail for us the process in place to disseminate threat information from TSA to air carriers and foreign governments that fly out of or operate 

last-point-of-departure airports? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) shares threat information with domestic aircraft operators, foreign air carriers, and foreign governments, collaborating closely amongst TSA program offices to ensure the information 

is provided in the most efficient and secure means possible. 

• TSA’s Transportation Security Administration representatives (TSARs), which 

are part of the Office of Global Strategies (OGS), serve as the principle liaisons 

with foreign government transportation security counterparts. The TSARs are 

TSA’s primary interlocutors for threat information, intelligence, vulnerabilities, 

best practices, and other pertinent security issues with foreign governments. 

When TSA issues a threat-specific Security Directives (SDs) or Emergency 

Amendments (EAs), the TSARs who cover the applicable region provide their 

transportation security counterparts with the enhanced security measures for 

awareness. 
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• TSA’s International Industry Representatives (IIRs), which are part of the OGS, 

serve as the principal liaisons to U.S. and foreign air carriers conducting international operations. IIRs provide alerts of new threats, address air carrier 

vulnerabilities, report intelligence and share threat information through direct 

one-on-one communications with their industry counterparts on both a regular 

and ad hoc basis. Additionally, IIRs provide their carriers with TSA-issued SDs 

and EAs, which add supplemental security measures in response to specific and 

emergent threats. • TSA’s Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement (OSPIE) Industry Engagement Managers provide unclassified teleconference calls and meetings to 

share information on new and evolving threats with domestic industry stakeholders. Additionally, OSPIE solicits feedback and discusses aviation security 

matters with domestic industry stakeholders at Aviation Security Advisory 

Committee (ASAC) and Airlines for America (A4A) Committee meetings. Both 

committees meet at least 4 times a year, but may meet more often according 

to the agenda. • TSA’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis, in coordination with OSPIE and OGS, 

works directly with cleared security representatives within the aviation industry in passing Classified or Sensitive, proprietary industry information on new 

or evolving threats to aviation equities. There are multiple communication 

methods in which the information is passed, to include a Classified computer 

system, secure telecommunications, and directly via meetings with aviation industry representatives. This information is passed through routine bi-weekly 

Classified and Unclassified teleconferences, quarterly Classified meetings and 

ad hoc as needed. 

Threat information is often part of a routine dissemination to the various stakeholders for the relevant TSA program offices. As appropriate, however, when the 

threat warrants, the applicable program offices coordinate efforts to release information concurrently. 

Question 4. Mr. Terrell, in your testimony, you stated that the Office of Global 

Strategies analyses multiple areas of concern to identify high-risk locations and possible attack methods. 

Once an area is deemed as high-risk, what steps are taken to mitigate potential 

risks in that area? 

Answer. Leveraging its risk analysis, the Transportation Security Administration’s Office of Global Strategies (OGS) continually identifies foreign airports where 

the vulnerability (in particular) and risk (in general) are deemed to be high. For 

each location, a Cross-Directorate Review (CDR) is conducted that involves the Regional Operations Center personnel, including the inspectors who identified the 

vulnerabilities, the TSA representative for that country, the International Industry 

Representatives for each carrier operating between the airport and the United 

States, the Risk Analysis team, the Capacity Development team, and OGS senior 

leadership. Each site is discussed in detail and potential courses of action are identified. OGS then conducts follow-up assessments and inspections to determine if the 

CDR actions were successful. 

When OGS identifies significant vulnerabilities that warrant additional mitigation 

actions, OGS may issue Security Directives (SDs) and Emergency Amendments 

(EAs) for air carriers to implement at selected locations. Following issuance of the 

SD/EA, OGS uses a number of methods—including ad hoc visits or air carrier inspections—to verify compliance with these additional measures. This information 

enables OGS to determine whether the SD/EA measures are sufficient and whether 

other tools will be necessary to ensure compliance such as a secretarial action which 

includes: A 90-day action, to give the host country time to improve security measures; public notification; imposition of operating authority conditions; or suspension 

of service for applicable air carriers operating to/from that location. 

Question 5. Mr. Terrell, in your testimony you stated that when a specific threat 

is identified or significant vulnerabilities warrant additional mitigation actions, Security Directives (SDs) and Emergency Amendments (EAs) are implemented. How 

often are these implementations made? 

Answer. Some Security Directives (SDs) and Emergency Amendments (EAs) are 

issued immediately due to a potential threat (such as the SDs and EAs issued after 

the crash of MetroJet Flight 9268), while others are issued due to a deficiency discovered during an airport assessment or other significant concerns discovered that 

require immediate correction. TSA continually solicits feedback from the aircraft operators and foreign air carriers—through their assigned International Industry Representatives (IIRs) and Principal Security Inspectors—and considers any issues 

raised. Furthermore, TSA’s Office of Global Strategies and the Office of Security 

Policy and Industry Engagement participate in industry working groups to discuss 
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and develop future policy as part of a regular schedule for considering changes to 

required security programs. Below is a breakdown of the EAs and SDs issued to foreign air carriers and domestic aircraft operators respectively with international 

flights. 

Total 

Number of 

Current 

SDs/EAs 

Newly 

Issued in 

2015 

Renewed 

in 2015 

Security Directives .................................................. 28 7 13 

Emergency Amendments ........................................ 25 7 14 

Question 6. What entity within your office is responsible for follow-up inspections 

to ensure these directives and amendments are being followed? 

How often are the follow-up inspections performed? 

Answer. Initial and follow-up inspections are conducted by the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) international inspector cadre out of the 6 TSA Regional Operations Centers. Follow-up inspections are conducted shortly after implementation of emergency measures to ensure the regulated entities are fully compliant. As appropriate, TSA’s Office of Global Strategies (OGS) will deploy its inspectors again to conduct further follow-up. As part of OGS’ regular compliance schedule, inspections are conducted in accordance with the risk-based methodology established by the Office of Global Strategies, which determines frequency of visits based 

on various factors, to include: Frequency of flights out of a particular location, security concerns at the last point of departure or other intelligence-driven factors. 

Question 7. Mr.Terrell, if an LPD airport fails an assessment and neither the airport or host government can absorb the cost associated with correcting the cause 

of failure, what happens to the airport? 

Is the air carrier responsible for the costs? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Office of Global 

Strategies (OGS) will work with the appropriate authorities in the host country to 

address and properly mitigate any identified security deficiencies through training, 

instruction, or capacity development where resources and political partnership will 

allow. If the assessment of the last-point-of-departure airport results in significant 

findings which indicate that a condition exists that threatens the safety and security 

of aviation transportation to or from that airport, the Secretary of Homeland Security in coordination with the Secretary of State have the ability to determine whether further Secretarial action is warranted. Secretarial action may include: 90-day action to give the host country time to improve security measures; public notification; 

imposition of operating authority conditions; or suspension of service for applicable 

air carriers operating to/from that location. In locations where resources do not facilitate the ability of the host country to absorb the cost of improving security measures, it may be incumbent upon air carriers operating from that location to absorb 

costs associated with meeting TSA-issued security directives and emergency amendments. 

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