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PAKISTAN: FRIEND OR FOE IN THE FIGHT

AGAINST TERRORISM?

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 12, 2016

Serial No. 114–173

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

MATT SALMON, Arizona Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

GRACE MENG, New York 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Zalmay Khalilzad, counselor, Center for Strategic and International Studies ................................................................................................... 5

Mr. Bill Roggio, senior editor, Long War Journal, Foundation for Defense 

of Democracies ...................................................................................................... 16

Tricia Bacon, Ph.D., assistant professor, American University ........................... 29

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Zalmay Khalilzad: Prepared statement ....................................... 9

Mr. Bill Roggio: Prepared statement ..................................................................... 18

Tricia Bacon, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .............................................................. 31

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 46

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 47

The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 48

Written response from Tricia Bacon, Ph.D., to question submitted for the 

record by the Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of California ................................................................................ 50

(1)

PAKISTAN: FRIEND OR FOE IN THE FIGHT 

AGAINST TERRORISM? 

TUESDAY, JULY 12, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt Salmon 

(chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific) presiding. 

Mr. SALMON. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Good afternoon. I would like to thank my colleagues for joining 

me in convening this important joint subcommittee hearing. Unfortunately, Chairman Poe couldn’t join us today, but I know he is 

very interested and engaged on the many challenges presented to 

the U.S. policymakers in Pakistan. 

I would like to ask unanimous consent that his opening statement be inserted for the record. And, without objection, the hearing 

record will remain open for 5 business days to allow for further 

statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record, 

subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

As we all know, the United States has spent tens of billions in 

taxpayer dollars in the form of aid to Pakistan since 9/11, all in the 

hope that Pakistan would become a partner in the fight against 

terrorism. Unfortunately, despite this significant investment, Pakistani military and intelligence services are still linked to terrorist 

groups. 

While the administration and the Pakistanis argue that there 

have been some successes in the fight against terrorist elements, 

particularly in Shawal Valley, terrorist organizations with close 

ties to Pakistan’s military elite have been left untouched to the 

point of thriving while Pakistan’s governing elite turns a blind eye. 

Today we will discuss the administration’s policy toward Pakistan and take a closer look at U.S. goals and expectations and options with Pakistan. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship has always 

been complicated. Pakistan is an important country of over 200 

million people. It has nuclear capabilities and is strategically located with important neighbors, including China, India, and Afghanistan. But this country poses challenges that have plagued the 

United States for decades. 

2

Given its significance, we can’t afford to be spontaneous with our 

policy toward Pakistan as there could be far-reaching consequences. At the same time, many of us in Congress are unwilling 

to continue down this same failed path that consists of stacks of 

U.S. aid dollars without much support in the fight against terrorists to show for it. To be frank, Pakistan likes the United States 

because for decades we have given them a substantial amount of 

aid, especially to the Pakistani military, while they hope that they 

can prevent us from getting too close with India. 

The United States tolerates Pakistan because it claims to be in 

the fight with us on the global war on terror. Recent history shows 

us that while Pakistan is getting money and weapons, U.S. goals 

in the war on terror are sadly lacking, and Pakistan may in fact 

be using the assets we provide them to undermine some of our 

strategic diplomatic efforts in the region. 

Pakistan claims to be fighting terrorism, but they refuse to fight 

some groups who we know to be terrorists. Many observers see 

Pakistani forces as selective in the terrorist groups it fights, leaving others to continue to wreak havoc, especially when those 

groups target India. 

Let us not forget that Pakistan was less than helpful in the hunt 

and ultimately demise of Osama bin Laden. And, to this day, they 

are holding Dr. Shakil Afridi under arrest, a hero to our country, 

for aiding in bin Laden’s capture. Patience is growing very thin. 

The recent failure to get consensus on the proposed F-16 sale is 

evidence of the newly endemic weariness where Pakistan is concerned. If our current efforts in Pakistan are not producing the results we seek, then what are our options? We could simply turn the 

money off, saving taxpayers billions of dollars. We could enforce 

sanctions or designate Pakistan as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. 

Sanctions were used in the ’90s but without much effect. 

I hope to hear from our witnesses as to what sort of stick and 

carrot approach might actually work with Pakistan, so we can have 

a strategic partnership on issues of mutual interest. 

Fifteen years have passed since 9/11. Billions of dollars have 

been spent, and far too little change has occurred in Pakistan. 

Should we continue our failed policy and attempt to convince ourselves that Pakistan will one day see eye to eye with the United 

States, or should we look at the U.S.-Pakistan relationship through 

a new lens? 

I look forward to today’s constructive discussion to guide our policy efforts with Pakistan, and I turn to the ranking member, Mr. 

Sherman, for any comments that he might have. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. We have relations with I think close 

to 200 countries. The default position is we don’t give them money. 

So those who suggest aid to Pakistan have got to show that there 

is a strong justification for doing so. The evidence is not encouraging. 

General Musharraf spoke on television in February about how 

Pakistan supported—provided support for Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, also 

known as LeT, and to the JeM, and essentially said terrorism was 

fine as long as it is directed at India. His remarks didn’t provoke 

much of a reaction because much of the power structure in Pakistan agrees with him. 

3

The Pakistani Government, as our chairman just pointed out, 

continues to hold Dr. Afridi. So not only do they shelter bin Laden, 

they punish those who helped us unshelter bin Laden. And the 

military establishment in Pakistan stokes paranoia about India, 

meddles in Afghanistan, and seems to be trying to weaken Afghanistan, so as to have a divided Pashtun population. 

Regardless of how we answer the friend or foe question, our relationship with Pakistan is important. But keep in mind, you would 

think we would only provide aid to those countries where we don’t 

have to ask the question: Friend or foe? But Pakistan is a nation 

of 180 billion people with a history of terrorist activities, 100 nuclear weapons, very confused body politic. The administration is requesting money for Pakistan in a number of different accounts, including 740 million of assistance on the civilian side, 265 million 

on the military side, and aid in other categories as well. 

You would think that we would at least condition a large portion 

of this aid on the release of Dr. Afridi and his family. Providing 

more assistance to a government that has supported terrorists and 

has shown itself not very capable or serious about combatting terrorism may not be the very best use of taxpayer money. 

We should be looking to reorient the money we do spend. I would 

like to focus on three things: Human rights, education, and public 

diplomacy. First, the Pakistani Government has a regrettable 

record of oppressing some of the major components of its country, 

large minorities, including the Sindh and the Baloch. Free speech 

and political dialogue are restricted. 

Extrajudicial killings are common. For example, Anwar Leghari, 

the brother of a dear friend of mine, was assassinated in Sindh just 

last year, and the Pakistani Government has closed the file. I want 

to thank our State Department for at least raising a question. They 

have reopened the file, but that doesn’t mean they will actually do 

anything. 

A country with blasphemy laws is just begging individuals to 

claim that minorities have said this or that, unprovable, and them 

impose terrible penalties on someone they happen to dislike. It is 

no surprise that extremism flourishes in this environment. 

Second, education. Pakistan must reform its education system. 

Many textbooks contain content that perpetuates minority stereotypes and feeds support for Islamic extremism. A lack of government-funded schools has led to an increase in the number of extremist madrassas in Sindh and other places in Pakistan. Girls are 

often denied education. 

As I proposed I think at our last hearing, if we do provide aid, 

we ought to provide free textbooks, so that parents don’t have that 

burden, aren’t tempted to send their kids to a madrassa, and so 

that the textbooks, while they may not reflect all red, white, and 

blue values, will at least not contain material that would be an 

anathema to the American people. 

And, finally, it is very hard for corrupt people to steal textbooks, 

especially in a country where the textbooks are made free by the 

American people. 

I co-chair the Sindh Caucus, and so I focused on southern Pakistan in particular. And I have worked to make sure that we communicate to Sindh and other parts of Pakistan through Voice of 

4

America in the language people speak in their homes. The importance of Pakistan seems to be so overwhelming that we spend billions of dollars giving it to a government that supports terrorism, 

but we don’t spend $1.5 broadcasting in the Sindhi language. What 

a bizarre approach. What a pro-Islamabad approach. What an approach that does not match America’s interest. 

Finally, if we are going to win over the Muslim world, we need 

to have the State Department maybe hire one or a few people—

fewer people that are experts in the 1800s European diplomacy and 

hire at least one person whose job description says ‘‘understand the 

Quran, the hadith,’’ you don’t have to write a fatwa but you should 

have read 1,000 of them. 

To think that we are waging a war for the minds of Muslims 

around the world and haven’t hired a single person because of their 

understanding of that religion and how it is used and how it is misused shows an insular thinking in a bureaucracy that prizes an understanding of the machinations of metronic in European diplomacy two centuries ago. 

I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. In the interest of time—I know we have 

got other vote series coming up on the floor very soon—I will just 

yield one more slot before we go to the witnesses to the ranking 

member of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade, Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Chairman 

Salmon, for conducting this hearing. I also would like to thank Mr. 

Rohrabacher and—who is here—I guess Mr. Poe as well, Ranking 

Member Sherman, and I would like to thank all the members that 

took the time to be here in this important hearing. 

Of course, I would like to thank our panel for being here to discuss the topic at hand—Pakistan. Since 9/11, the United States’ relationship with Pakistan has ebbed and flowed. Over the last decade and a half, several missteps have taken both sides into controversy, including instances of miscommunication, competing national interest, and fundamental failure to broaden and deepen the 

relationship as a whole. 

Indeed, it seems that the two countries trend toward a one-dimensional transactional relationship centered along security concerns, instead of a broad partnership that includes trade and cultural linkages, is something that is problematic. However, over the 

last few years, even the security concerns have not equated to a 

smooth relationship. While Islamabad has helped the United States 

capture and kill numerous al-Qaeda members, including several 

senior leaders in its support for groups like Taliban, the Haqqani 

Network, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, these things undermine critical U.S. 

national security interest. 

Further complicating the issue is the fact that both leaders of the 

Taliban were killed or died within Pakistani borders, and the 

former head of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, was also killed in Pakistan, only miles from the country’s capital. There is little reason to 

suggest that Pakistan is going to change its strategic calculus. 

It is critical that we vigorously consider our relationship with 

Pakistan and recognize that Islamabad is a willing and able partner in certain areas, while hostile in others. To be sure, accepting 

5

this paradigm does not mean abandoning Pakistan altogether. At 

stake in the region are some of America’s most vital national security interests, including ensuring that neither Afghanistan nor 

Pakistan serves as a safe haven for global terrorists, keeping Pakistan’s nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists and preventing war between India and Pakistan that could potentially go 

nuclear. 

These interests warrant continued outreach and cooperation with 

Islamabad. To that end, the United States should consider a more 

balanced approach when supplying aid, an approach that favors 

education and economic aid over military assistance. The provision 

of U.S. weapons cannot reshape Pakistan’s will to maintain its militant proxies on its western border, but those weapons do equip 

Pakistan to challenge India on its eastern border. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and seeing 

how we can shape this relationship to the benefit of both countries. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. We are grateful to be joined today by 

Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. Appreciate you being here, Ambassador. And Mr. Bill Roggio, appreciate you being here. And Tricia 

Bacon. 

And, Ambassador, we will yield the first time to you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ZALMAY KHALILZAD, COUNSELOR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL 

STUDIES 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you very much, Chairman. I 

want to thank the ranking member, the chairman of the Terrorism 

Subcommittee, and all the distinguished members who are here. I 

appreciate the opportunity to appear and to make a few comments 

on a very important and difficult subject, the issue of Pakistan. 

As you said, Chairman, it requires a deliberate but frank discussion and analysis of where we are and where we need to go. I have 

prepared a testimony, which I will submit for the record. 

Mr. SALMON. Without objection, your formal testimony will be injected into the record. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I would like to summarize that testimony by making a few points and look forward to the discussion. 

While Pakistan, in the aftermath of 9/11, did provide significant 

help in the overthrow of the Taliban and in the capture of quite 

a number of al-Qaeda members, I think it fair to say that if one 

focuses on Afghanistan, which would be the burden of my comments today, looking at Pakistan, one can conclude now the following. 

First, Pakistan is now a State Sponsor of Terror. There is no 

question that the Pakistani military and the Pakistani intelligence 

agency, the ISI, the Inter-Service Agency, supports the Haqqani 

Network, which we regard—the United States has regarded as a 

terrorist organization. One of our former chairmen of the Joint 

Chiefs called the Haqqani Network a virtual arm of the ISI. 

Point two, it is also clear that the Pakistani military and Pakistani intelligence provide sanctuary and support for the Taliban, 

which is an extremist organization that provided sanctuary for alQaeda in the early period, and even recently the leader of alVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:10 Aug 02, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\071216\20742 SHIRL
6

Qaeda, Zawahiri, pledged allegiance to the new leader of the 

Taliban. So the relationship continues. 

And these two steps that Pakistan clearly has taken—it used to 

deny that there were any Taliban in Pakistan. When I was Ambassador to Afghanistan, when I went to see President Musharraf, and 

after a long discussion when I raised the issue of the Taliban with 

him, he asked me, ‘‘They are not here. Give me their phone number. Give me their address.’’ I had to remind him that the leadership of the Taliban was called the Quetta Shura, which, you know, 

is a big Pakistani city, and there is also—there was Peshawar 

Shura, which is another big city in Pakistan, and the media regularly went and interviewed some of these people. 

But, in any case, as you know, more recently he has boasted, Mr. 

Musharraf, that he did obviously help the Taliban and the Haqqani 

Network. But the Pakistani support for these two groups has been 

a critical factor in my judgment in the longevity and successes that 

these two groups have had against the United States, against our 

forces. 

We have lost quite a lot of people, as you know, military in particular, but also non-military folks, and they have imposed huge financial costs by making the war prolonged and significant, requiring us to invest not only life but also resources, and it has imposed 

huge costs also, both military and civilian, on the Afghans. 

Those of us who have studied insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, if there is a sanctuary, it makes it much harder, it 

takes longer, becomes more protracted to defeat that insurgency. I 

am not saying other factors are not important; they are. I mean, 

the question of governance, policies of the government in charge, 

but sanctuaries make it much harder to defeat insurgencies. 

So it seems to me that our policy, if I would characterize it, as 

one of engagement, providing support, sometimes withholding some 

assistance, but one of assistance, has not produced what we had 

hoped would be the result in Pakistan, which is that they would 

change policy to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table and 

move against those Taliban that are not reconcilable or would not 

reconcile and then also to move against the Haqqani Network. This 

has not happened. 

So, as a nation, in my view, it is important that we debate what 

to do next. And I believe that we need to consider a different policy 

among our options, and the policy that I think is worthy of consideration is one of increasing the cost of this policy to Pakistan. 

You know, typically, when you want to discourage bad behavior, 

you have to do things that look like punishment or imposing costs 

to shape a response. And Pakistan has believed so far correctly 

that they can get aid, billions, and get support and continue to do 

these things, and that we would not confront them with the choice 

of either you take our assistance or—and you can stop what you 

are doing or there will be no assistance. 

And I think unless we effect fundamentally that calculus, that 

they confront the choice, it is unlikely that they would adjust the 

policy that we require, that the Afghans require, and indeed the 

world requires. I welcome some of the recent announcement by the 

administration and some of the actions, such as the drone attack 

7

against Mullah Mansour in Pakistan, I think that sent a strong 

message. 

I believe that the administration’s effort to isolate Pakistan, to 

pressure it more, is welcome, but I think it is insufficient. We need 

to do more. And more, in my judgment, is, one, we need to do additional drone attacks against targets that are Haqqani and Taliban 

related. 

If Pakistan does not move against the Haqqani Network and the 

irreconcilable Taliban, we need to have, in my judgment, very 

sharply focused sanctions against people in these two institutions, 

the military, especially the Army, and the intelligence network, 

were involved in support of the Haqqani Network and the Taliban, 

and that would mean financial sanctions and, in my view, also it 

means travel to the United States. 

I think we ought to suspend all non-humanitarian and non-education assistance to Pakistan. I agree with the ranking member 

that education is very important, and we ought to continue with 

educational assistance, humanitarian assistance, but non-education, not only our own, but in IMF I think we need to use our 

influence there to make sure that the next package that is likely 

to come up later this summer or early fall does not go through 

without Pakistan taking the necessary measures with regard to 

these two groups. 

I also think we ought to consider, deliberate, debate whether 

Pakistan should not be put on the list, State Department list of 

sponsors of terrorism. Factually, it is. Now, the question is, what 

are the pros and cons? And I think there are costs for us not doing 

this, because the whole less than problem becomes—loses its legitimacy when a state clearly is doing something and we are not calling a spade a spade, and that has its own cost. 

And I also believe that calling Pakistan a major non-NATO ally, 

given what it is doing, also raises questions of the legitimacy of 

such a designation. We ought to signal that without a change on 

these two issues we would recalibrate, reconsider that designation. 

And I would think that we ought to also, as we do with regard 

to North Korea, a country that has nuclear weapons but has many 

hostile and negative domestic and external policies, consider as to 

when we might take the whole issue to the Security Council, in collaboration with the Afghans, to expose—we have not done as much 

as we could, in my view, to expose the details of how this policy 

of support for Haqqani and for the Taliban are actually conducted 

by Pakistan and the implications, the ramifications of that in terms 

of the amount of damage it has done to fellow Muslims in Afghanistan, besides the killings that have taken place of the coalition 

forces who are there. 

I think also, as we think down the road, given that Pakistan may 

choose not to respond favorably to this, we need to look at the 

strengthening cooperation with India on terrorism and counterterrorism and on strengthening Afghanistan, that it can be hardened 

as—my judgment is that if we do the steps that I have described, 

it is not out of the question that Pakistan might reconsider, because I think if we can shake this belief that they have that they 

can continue to be both the beneficiary of U.S. assistance and continue to do what they are doing with regard to the Taliban and the 

8

Haqqani Network, with the view that eventually we will tire out—

we will get tired, we will leave, and then they can go back to imposing a Taliban government on Afghanistan, and the good days 

will be here again from their perspective regionally, we will have 

to look at other ways with others who share our perspective on terrorism, particularly India. And I just was there last week, very serious discussions, I think we will need to take a look at this. 

I understand, Mr. Chairman, as a final point, that this is not an 

easy issue. The administration that I was a part of, we tried engagement, too, and assistance in the golden hour after 9/11 when 

our credibility was high, we didn’t push as hard Pakistan at that 

time, as we should have. 

I think another golden hour may have become available after the 

killing of Mullah Mansour, but by itself I think it is insufficient. 

We need to get Pakistan’s attention, and that things are different, 

that they do need to make a choice, and I recommended the steps 

that I did for your consideration. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Khalilzad follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you very much, Ambassador. 

On the clocks, please look at the amber light and the red lights. 

I am not going to hold you to—this is too important an issue, and 

we want to hear everything that you have to say, but I know we 

have a lot of questions up here, too. 

Mr. Roggio. 

STATEMENT OF MR. BILL ROGGIO, SENIOR EDITOR, LONG 

WAR JOURNAL, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. ROGGIO. Thank you, sir. Chairman Salmon, Ranking Members Sherman and Keating, and the rest of the committees, thank 

you very much for having us here today to talk about this extremely important issue. 

You properly asked the question of whether Pakistan is a friend 

or a foe, and unequivocally the answer is a foe. Pakistan may combat some groups that threaten it—movement of the Taliban in 

Pakistan, Islamic movement in Uzbekistan, groups like that that 

are fighting the Pakistani State. However, they support numerous 

terrorist organizations, organizations that are listed by the U.S. 

Government as foreign terrorist organizations. 

In my testimony, I list six and give a brief description of the activities, but we can list dozens or scores of groups that Pakistan 

supports in India, in Afghanistan, groups that are designated terrorist organizations, groups that provide aid and support for alQaeda, groups whose leaders serve as the deep bench for al-Qaeda 

and other terrorist groups when their leadership is winnowed down 

via drone strikes by the U.S. and Pakistan’s tribal areas. 

Again, the evidence is indisputable. Just this weekend, the Indians killed a Kashmiri terrorist who is a member of Hizb-ulMujahideen. This is a nasty terrorist organization. And, Pakistan, 

did they welcome this killing? No. In fact, they denounced it and 

referred to him as a Kashmiri separatist. This is an individual who 

recruits online for holy war and is recruiting youth and poisoning 

the youth to conduct terrorist attacks. 

And lest we pretend that, well, this has just been in Pakistan an 

issue with Pakistan and Kashmir, it is not. These Kashmiri terrorist groups that have been aided by the Pakistani State base 

themselves in Afghanistan. I could list groups—Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, 

Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, who the State Department said as recently 

as 2014 is running training camps inside Afghanistan. 

These groups are attacking and killing U.S. soldiers, and I 

haven’t even touched on groups like the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, or the Mullah Nazir Group. These are just small groups. I 

concur—and for the interest of brevity and time—Ambassador 

Khalilzad’s statements on the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network, 

I concur with 100 percent. 

What the Pakistanis are doing, they are playing a fantastic shell 

game. They have this narrative called good Taliban versus bad 

Taliban. The good Taliban is any group that the Pakistani likes, 

and those are groups that don’t attack the Pakistani State. These 

are groups that carry out Pakistan’s foreign policy—Haqqani Network, Afghan Taliban, Mullah Nazir Group. 

17

And then, even the Pakistan press referred to this, groups like 

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Harakat-ul-Mujahideen—

again, I could go down the list. They are considered ‘‘good Taliban’’ 

as well. And the bad Taliban, they are the ones that fight the Pakistani State. They are the ones being targeted in the Shawal Valley, 

in North Waziristan. When the Pakistanis go after these groups, 

they pretend that they are going after the Haqqani Network or the 

Mullah Nazir Group or the Afghan Taliban, but they are not. 

The Pakistanis haven’t named a single high, mid-level, or lowlevel leader killed in one of these operations, because they haven’t 

killed any of them. They haven’t captured any of them, although 

they are selectively targeting in the interest of the Pakistani State. 

As a matter of fact, this narrative of the good Taliban versus bad 

Taliban, my Web site, Long War Journal, has been banned in Pakistan for 4 years because we have reported on this narrative, and 

it has been an issue that I have not let go of, and we are banned 

because Pakistan has a history of killing individuals that expose 

these types of situations. 

Syed Shahzad was brutally executed by the ISI for his reporting 

on links between Pakistan’s Intelligence Service and al-Qaeda, and 

attacks that were occurring within Pakistan. You know, Pakistan 

is not going to change its calculus. These groups that they support, 

they are doing this because they feel it is their best chance in countering India, and that is why they support them. 

I also believe there is an ideological aspect within large elements 

within the military and intelligence services as well, and this is 

being reported on. So you have this confluence of it helps their policy in India, as well as they get the ideological, you know, radical 

jihadist support as well. 

These groups are strategic depth for Afghanistan in case it has 

to go to war, and it uses them in Afghanistan—I am sorry, strategic depth within Pakistan against India, and it uses these groups 

also to conduct its policy inside of Afghanistan to target and kill 

U.S. forces and allied forces. 

We have to change our calculus if Pakistan won’t change theirs, 

and I concur with Ambassador Khalilzad’s statements we need to—

I believe all funding should stop. We should put a brake on the situation until we can really get a handle on it. Money is fungible. 

If we are funding Pakistani education, they can fund Pakistani 

militants with the money they are saving. 

We have to consider sanctions. We have to consider the possibility of state sponsorship of terrorism. Do we limit or cut off trade 

with Pakistan? Do we restrict Pakistani’s travel to the United 

States, cut off visas, student visas? All of these options should be 

on the table, unless Pakistan changes its habits and its—we have 

been enabling the Pakistani State for 15 years now, nothing has 

changed, and it has only gotten worse. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Roggio follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Dr. Bacon. 

STATEMENT OF TRICIA BACON, PH.D., ASSISTANT 

PROFESSOR, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 

Ms. BACON. Good afternoon. It is an honor to appear before you 

today to discuss Pakistan’s policies toward militant groups. Thank 

you very much for this opportunity. 

After the terrorist attack on Easter Sunday in Lahore that killed 

70 people, Pakistani leaders reiterated their pledge to cease their 

dual track policy of treating some groups as having utility and 

going after only those that opposed the Pakistani State. However, 

unfortunately, the opposite has occurred. These distinctions have 

grown hardened, and the Pakistani State is not willing to reevaluate them. 

Most importantly, the calculus of the Pakistani Army, the primary institution in Pakistan that wields power over these policies, 

remains unwavering. It is evident that no terrorist attack in Pakistan is large enough to cause them to reevaluate their position visa-vis their militant proxies. Instead, relations with the four major 

proxy groups—Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohamed, the Haqqani 

Network, and the Afghan Taliban—will remain a deeply entrenched component of Pakistan’s national security policies. 

Today I would like to outline the Pakistani security establishment’s three-prong calculus vis-a-vis these organizations, in part 

because in order to get Pakistan to truly change its behavior, the 

United States will have to effect all three of these aspects of its calculus. 

First and foremost, as is well-known, Pakistan’s security establishment judges groups based on their utility vis-a-vis India. This 

is not simply about Kashmir. This is also about deep-seated fears 

that India is inherently aggressive toward Pakistan. This extends 

to Pakistan’s support to the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network, which stems from fears of Indian encirclement and a desire 

to prevent India from expanding its influence on Pakistan’s western border. 

As the military’s efforts to achieve conventional parity with India 

grows increasingly futile, and the security situation in Afghanistan 

continues to deteriorate, Pakistan will remain committed to these 

policies. 

Second, the security establishment evaluates militant groups 

based on how they affect the threat within Pakistan. Though there 

is extensive cross-fertilization between groups hostile to Pakistan 

and those seen as having utility, the so-called good militants not 

only largely abstain from violence within Pakistan, some also discourage other groups from engaging in violence in Pakistan. Breaking ties with the proxy groups runs the risk that they will turn 

their guns inward, dangerously compounding the terrorist threat 

within Pakistan. 

Third, the Army raised its capability to dismantle and defeat militant groups. Because the civilian institutions are still not capable 

of truly dealing with terrorism, this task will fall to the Pakistani 

Army. Unfortunately, a military approach alone will be insufficient 

30

to tackle these four groups, and possibly could be counterproductive 

in efforts to do so. 

It is worth briefly noting that relationships have evolved, especially since the 1990s when the Army provided extensive active assistance to a number of proxy organizations. This included resources, weapons, training, and even cover fire to enable cross-border infiltrations. In essence, it operated in the trenches with militant groups. U.S. and international pressure has shifted the way 

these relationships function. 

By far, the most important asset that the Pakistani State continues to provide is safe haven and protection. The amount of active assistance has decreased. However, in this current environment, safe haven is also the most important asset that Pakistan 

could provide for these groups. All four organizations are highly capable and almost entirely self-sufficient other than their need for 

safe haven. 

They have other sources of funding and weapons and equipment, 

as well as a sizeable cadre of capable and experienced operatives. 

They no longer rely on the Pakistani State for these things. The 

Pakistani Army did its job well. The remaining asset that they 

need and that they receive is safe haven. Yet the Army’s relationship with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohamed, the Haqqani Network, and the Afghan Taliban have proven resilient. These are the 

relationships that survived the tremendous fallout from 9/11 and 

the aftermath. 

While we have been deeply dissatisfied with Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts, once-friendly militants saw Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States as a betrayal, and they turned their 

guns against their patron. For Pakistan, it has been the worst of 

both worlds. 

While the first rationale still dominates, all three reasons—the 

proxy group’s utility against India and Afghanistan, their mitigation of the domestic threat and ability to worsen it, and the Pakistani State’s limited ability to confront them—mutually reinforced 

the security establishment’s ongoing relationship with militant 

proxies and ensure that these ties will remain intact for the foreseeable future. 

I admit that I am skeptical of Pakistani pledges that they will 

deal with the ‘‘good militants’’ once they have taken care of the hostile ones. The bad militants, in their view, are not going away, in 

part because they work closely with the good militants. In the 

meantime, the so-called good militants will grow stronger, and the 

Pakistani State will be even more—will have an even more difficult 

task confronting them in the future. 

I hope that by shedding light on the situation it will help the 

United States to better respond and manage the challenges ahead. 

With that, I thank you for your attention and look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bacon follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you very much. 

This has been very, very enlightening. You know, when I have 

done town hall meetings back in my district, this probably gets 

more people’s dander up than anything else. And I know when we 

have had votes on the floor to either defund or significantly reduce 

the funding to Pakistan, it has always done very well. 

Most of the voters that I come into contact with wonder why in 

the heck we give people money that actually aid and abet those 

that commit terrorist acts across the globe. The other thing that I 

have got to wonder, the other countries that we try to influence, 

don’t they think we are a bunch of chumps? I mean, that is the 

other thing that I have got to wonder is, you know, they see us as 

being so stupid. 

And it kind of reminds me—you know, I wasn’t there, but in 

some of the movies I have seen about how the old Mafia used to 

deal with businesses, come take money from them to protect them, 

so to speak, it kind of seems reminiscent of that to me. It is like 

paying the Mafia off, but no good is going to come of it in the end. 

So, Mr. Roggio, you suggested that we just cut off all funding 

completely to Pakistan and go ahead and move with whatever is 

required to declare them a State Sponsor of Terrorism, and then 

also, you know, look at limiting travel for those from Pakistan or 

the United States and possibly even look at trade. 

I am a believer that if we just cut off the funding, it is not going 

to be enough. If we just cut off the funding, I don’t think it is going 

to be significant enough to them, to the other resources they get 

from the bad guys, and so I am wondering, why in the world have 

we continued to pursue this policy of, you know, I don’t know, giving them money when we know all the bad things that they are 

doing. Why have we done this policy in the first place? 

I guess I could understand in the first place why we did it, because there was some assistance in the war with terrorism with Afghanistan. But now I don’t understand the rationale. Could you or 

Ambassador—any of you—give me the rationale, why we are still 

doing it, do you—and what other options do we have right now? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, I believe that part of the reason 

for continuing to pursue this approach has been the belief—and 

Pakistanis are very clever in manipulating us, I have to say that, 

number one—the belief that they are about to change. You cannot 

believe, Chairman, that so many times that they notice that things 

are moving possibly toward a change in our policy, then at that 

time they take an initiative to make it hard for us to then actually 

go through with it. So they know how to——

Mr. SALMON. Work us. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. And you have noticed recently 

when there has been, again, pressure on them to—isolating them, 

they reach out to distinguished Members of Congress, and they invite them for visits, they charm them, they promise, once again, 

and even exact statement from ourselves that are surprising in the 

face of facts as they are because we are a polite people and we 

don’t want to insult our hosts. 

So I think the Pakistani ability to manipulate by their actions in 

part has been a factor, but——

39

Mr. SALMON. We have been manipulated by a lot of countries. 

North Korea is an example. And, I mean, I will go back to there 

is a word for that. They are making chumps out of us. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, they are playing—if I might use 

an undiplomatic term, but we have been patsies. 

Mr. SALMON. Patsy, chump. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yeah, right. 

Mr. SALMON. Idiot. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well——

Mr. SALMON. Well, most Americans out there see through all of 

this, and yet, you know, our so-called leaders don’t really get it. I 

can’t even contemplate why on God’s green earth we even thought 

for a nanosecond about the F-16 sale. I am glad that it has been 

scuttled, but none of it makes any sense at all. 

Mr. Roggio, you had a comment. 

Mr. ROGGIO. Yes, just quickly. I mean, I think with the F-16 

sales, I mean, obviously, someone is going to make money off of 

that, and there is a lobby in Congress, of course, to push sales 

through like that. No secret. 

But I also think that a lot of people in the case of the aid that 

is going to Pakistan do think that it is going to do good. But the 

reality is is the Pakistani madrassas are still cranking out thousands upon thousands of potential jihadists, who are going to join 

the Taliban or any of these other so-called good militant groups, 

good Taliban groups. 

So whatever we are providing, it is not working. It is not changing Pakistani society. It is not changing Pakistani education. So I 

think there certainly is—I understand that we think we are doing 

good, but in the end, as you said, they are treating us like chumps. 

They recognize it, and we are more than willing to keep handing 

out money to Pakistan, so why wouldn’t they take it? 

Mr. SALMON. I just have one other quick question, because we 

have all asked questions from the State Department when they 

have come about Dr. Afridi and what they have done to try to secure his release. And every time it is the same, you know, mantra, 

‘‘Oh, we talked to them about that.’’ Are they doing enough? 

Mr. ROGGIO. Absolutely not. Look, he is being held in order to 

punish the United States for what we did to kill Osama bin Laden. 

By all rights, he should be a hero in Pakistan, as he is here, and 

he is being held to punish us, to punish him, and to send a message to any other Pakistani willing to help us that, if you go ahead 

and do this, this is your fate. Honestly, I am surprised he is alive. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I will pick up right there. Ambassador, what if we 

cut half of all aid to Pakistan until Dr. Afridi and his family is here 

in the United States, what would be the reaction of the Pakistani 

Government? And do you expect the Pakistani people are going to 

riot in favor of imprisoning Dr. Afridi? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, I think that making a lot of aid, 

you said half, conditional I think will have more of an impact. I 

don’t anticipate——

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, obviously, it has more of an impact on the 

feckless policy we have had so far, but——

40

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. What will be the reaction in Pakistan 

to that? Are they—first of all, at minimum, maybe they take us up 

on it, we save almost $1 billion. That would be a good thing to a 

lot of——

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Even if they don’t take us up, we would 

have saved some money. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Right. That is the point I am making. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Right. But I think that my experience 

in dealing with Pakistan is that they would only give you something when they know that you are——

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. Their counterargument on all this is they 

can’t give us Dr. Afridi, because, oh my God, it will be some terrible circumstance in their country. If the Pakistani Government 

were to put Dr. Afridi and his family on a plane for the United 

States today, what harm would that Pakistani leader have tomorrow? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. No harm whatsoever, in my judgment, 

because some of these groups that rise on the street, all the groups 

that—based on long experience I can tell you that——

Mr. SHERMAN. They were told to riot, yes. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD [continuing]. When they raised these——

Mr. SHERMAN. I want to go on to Mr. Roggio. The F-16s, they are 

going to be back, they are going to be asking for them. The argument is that these are the planes best suited to going after the terrorists in the frontier territories. Is there a weapon system that is 

less expensive, just as good as being a platform to survey, and to 

lob a missile at terrorists, and that poses less of a—and would not 

be useful in going after India? Something a lot less sophisticated. 

Mr. ROGGIO. Yes, absolutely. As a matter of fact, I would say F16s or high advanced fighter planes are overkill in conducting 

counterinsurgency operations, low-tech planes that could loiter over 

the battlefield and deliver munitions. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So if they are trying to get a plane to go over the 

Haqqani Network, the F-16 is not the right choice. 

Mr. ROGGIO. It is not the right choice. We use aircraft like this 

in Iraq and Afghanistan because it is what we have and what we 

know. But there is certainly a lot better options available. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Sorry. If I might add, if they would arrest first Jalaluddin Haqqani, that would be an indication that 

they are serious about going after the Haqqani Network. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well——

Ambassador KHALILZAD. They move them around themselves to 

meetings and provide them with first-class housing. Made it a little 

hard to believe that they are going to move militarily against the 

Haqqani Network. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Let me ask Dr. Bacon. Okay. Even a second year 

law student has read 1,000 cases, could recognize when the judge 

is citing a precedent correctly or incorrectly. Let’s say there is a 

fatwa that comes out relevant to your work at the State Department. Do you have a State Department office that can evaluate 

whether that fatwa was based on a strong hadith or a weak 

hadith? Who do you go to? Who knows? 

41

Ms. BACON. When I was at the State Department—I left in 

2013—there were a number of experts on political Islam. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Political Islam. But were these people who had 

read 1,000 fatwas and who knew the difference between a strong 

and a weak hadith? Or were these Princeton graduates who had 

studied the history of the Ottoman Empire? 

Ms. BACON. There were both. And within the intelligence community, there certainly are a number of people who are experts on 

it. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, let’s go like to State Department. Is there 

a single person whose job description says they have got to be as 

knowledgeable about Islamic law and Islamic jurisprudence and Islamic theology as a graduate of the chief school, institute in Cairo, 

for example? 

Ms. BACON. Especially when it comes to the countering violent 

extremism efforts, there has been a number of people who have 

been brought on to focus on——

Mr. SHERMAN. Can you name somebody who would know——

Ms. BACON. I am no longer at the State Department, so I would 

defer to——

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. Who was there 2 years ago, 3 years ago? 

Ms. BACON. There were several people in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research who were brought on for their expertise in 

Islam, but I don’t know who is currently there. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Their expertise in Islam. So they have read 

English books on the history of the Ottoman Empire. 

Ambassador, is there anybody who is employed by the State Department who could pass the final exams at—I forget the name. I 

will——

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Al-Azhar. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. Do we have—I know we have got a bunch 

that can pass the final exams at the highest levels at Princeton. 

Do we have a single person there that could pass medium to low 

grades, the institute I just——

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I have been out of the State Department 

now for 7 years, ago——

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. Seven years ago, did we have anybody? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I don’t remember that—that we did. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. Dr. Bacon, if you could provide for the 

record that there is somebody at the State Department who isn’t 

just an Ottoman history buff, but who has read thousands of fatwa, 

who was hired because they know the difference between a strong 

hadith and a weak hadith, either today or in 2013, that would be 

helpful. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. And before I get to Mr. Rohrabacher, we have 

just been pinged for a vote on the floor. And we have 10 votes, and 

I don’t think we will be coming back afterwards. So if I could 

maybe get both you and Mr. Keating in. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will try. 

Mr. SALMON. Try. Thanks. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. I will go quick. I will say for the 

record that the Pakistani Government, the ISI, created the 

42

Taliban, along with the Saudis, after we left when the Soviets 

withdrew from Afghanistan. Since that—at that time, the Pakistani Government was deeply involved with creating that regime 

that ended up offering safe haven to Osama bin Laden, and the 

murder of 3,000 Americans. 

Let us note, when we went to drive out the Taliban that the 

Northern Alliance, with our help and our support, drove the 

Taliban out. Where did they drive them to? Pakistan. Where did 

Osama bin Laden go? Osama bin Laden, the murder of 3,000 

Americans, was given safe haven for almost a decade in Pakistan. 

I don’t know anyone who believes that the leadership of Pakistan 

did not know Osama bin Laden was there, right there in their 

country, in an urban area. 

Let us note that when our troops—when our brave special forces 

went to bring justice to Osama bin Laden, that they had to fly very 

specialized helicopters, so that they wouldn’t be shot down. By 

whom? By Pakistan. With airplanes that we had given them. This 

is insane. 

Let us note that Pakistan still holds Dr. Afridi, the man who 

made it possible for us to identify Osama bin Laden, the murderer 

of 3,000 Americans, and they hold him in a dungeon today, which 

is nothing more than rubbing our face in the fact that they can do 

that and how much they really hate us. This is ridiculous that we 

give any aid whatsoever to a power like that. 

For the record, the people of Balochistan are being slaughtered 

by this corrupt, oppressive regime. The people of Balochistan have 

to understand—should understand the United States is on their 

side because they are struggling for independence and self-determination from a corrupt, vicious, terrorist-supporting regime. 

Same with the Sindhis. Same with other groups in Afghanistan. 

So we have a regime that murders and represses and is corrupt 

with their own people, and yet we still continue to give them some 

type of support. It is absolutely absurd. 

And, Ambassador Khalilzad, we have worked together many 

years, I am going to ask you a tough question. When the Taliban 

were driven out of Afghanistan and our friends in the Northern Alliance came in and took Kabul, there was a decision made in 

Bonn—and I think we were both at Bonn, Germany. 

The decision was, who was then going to be the leader of the new 

Afghanistan? Or at least in transition. I, of course, was pushing for 

King Zahir Shah, as were a group of us who had supported the 

Northern Alliance. It is my memory that you and the administration were supporting Karzai. Was that due to undue influence by 

the Pakistani Government on that administration, the Bush administration, as they have had undue influence on all of these administrations? 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you for the statement with which 

I associate myself. Eloquently stated, Congressman. On this question of Karzai’s choice, why Karzai was selected, the name of 

Karzai was first brought up by Abdullah Abdullah who was a key 

figure in the Northern Alliance at that time. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. He argued that for the next phase of Afghanistan, Afghanistan needed a Pashtun leader that the Northern 

43

Alliance could work with, and he thought that Karzai was such a 

Pashtun. And this was the first time that we had heard of Karzai 

for such a role. And Jim Dobbins, my colleague who represented us 

at that time—and I was in the White House then—reported that. 

So, but then when we checked with others in the region and beyond, Pakistan did not object to President Karzai’s choice, as well 

as quite a number of others. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me note for the record that that was a 

pivotal decision that has led to problems. The problems that we are 

discussing today, the King of Afghanistan would have been much 

more independent, he was beloved by his people, he was a Pashtun, 

and we turned him down. And I honestly believe, like you said, we 

asked Pakistan for their opinions on it. Pakistan, of course, pushed 

for someone they could control, someone who would be consistent 

with their corrupt, repressive regime, and that was Karzai. 

Unfortunately, now we face this challenge today. Thank you for 

your service. Thank all of you for your opinions. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Keating. And we have 4 minutes now before the votes. Sorry. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Because of the time, I 

am going to just ask one question I think. And it is one that confuses the public to an extent, so it is confusion or it is downright 

obfuscation on the part of Pakistan. 

What is the role of the ISI? You know, the assassinated former 

Prime Minister Bhutto called the ISI a state within a state. So if 

you could, just in that timeframe that we have left, quickly comment on what you think that is. Are they a rogue element there 

that is not answerable to Prime Minister Sharif? How far does it 

go, in your opinion? You will have to be brief. I apologize. 

Ms. BACON. I will be very brief. It is by no means a rogue institution within Pakistan, and it is not operating independently or on 

its own. It is an instrument and an arm of the Pakistani Army, and 

it is implementing the policies of the Pakistani Army. So it is not 

just a few officers, and it is not making policy up. It is implementing on behalf of the Pakistani Army. 

Mr. ROGGIO. Yes. I concur. It is an arm of the Pakistani military. 

It is executing the will of the Pakistani military, which is indeed 

the Pakistani State. The government is really just the face of the 

Pakistani military. 

Ambassador KHALILZAD. I concur with my colleagues. 

Mr. KEATING. That is great. We can all make our rollcall. Thank 

you very much for your very clear and frank testimony, and I yield 

back. 

Mr. SALMON. I thank the panel. We could go on several hours. 

You are amazing, and I really appreciate it. 

For the record, I personally believe that we should completely cut 

off all funding to Pakistan. I think that would be the right first 

step, and give that a chance to work. And then, if we don’t see any 

changes, we move to some of the other suggestions, Mr. Roggio, a 

State Sponsor of Terrorism declaration, possible economic sanctions. 

And I personally believe that right now we have the worst policy 

that we could possibly have, and all we are doing is rewarding 

thugs. 

44

So I thank the panel very, very much. I thank the gentleman. 

And this committee is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:01 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

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