CHAPTER III

ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL

The whole decade of the 1930s was a period

that tested the American Republic as America

underwent the hardships of the Great Depres.

sion during the administrations of Presidents

Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The Republican era ended with the defeat of

Hoover for reelection in 1932 and the start of

the Roosevelt Democratic era in March 1933.

The Great Depression was caused in part by

the market crash that began after Labor Day

1929 with the heaviest selling on "Black

Thursday," October 24th. Two weeks after

Black Thursday the average price of all common stocks was off 40 percent. Between 1929

Major General Ben H. Fuller, 15th Commandant of

the Marine Corps, 9 July 1930 to 28 February 1934. (USMC Photo #308343).

and 1932, General Motors dropped in price

from $73 to $8 per share and United States Steel from $262 to $22; the general average

was down 90 percent. The Gross National

Product dropped from $104 billion in 1929 to

$59 billion in 1932.

A historian of the era, Professor William E.

Leuchtenburg, stated that:

by 1932, the unemployed numbered upward of thirteen million. Many lived in the primitive

conditions of a preindustrial society stricken by

famine. In the coal fields of West Virginia and

Kentucky, evicted families shivered in tents in

midwinter; children went barefoot. In Los Angeles,

people whose gas and electricity had been turned

Major General John H. Russell, Jr., 16th Commandant

of the Marine Corps, i March 1934 to 30 November

1936. (USMC Photo #H—6252).

41
42 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

off were reduced to cooking over wood fires in

back lots . At least a million, perhaps as many

as two millions were wandering the country in a

fruitless quest for work or adventure or just a sense of movement.1

The unemployed in America during a 10-

year period ranged from 1.6 million or 3 percent of the labor force in 1929 to 12.8 million

or 25 percent of the labor force in 1933. By

1939, unemployment dropped by 3 million to

9.5 million or 17 percent of the labor force. To

add to the economic woes, labor unrest produced in 1937 the worst strike year in the period between the stock market crash and the

end of World War II. The depression hung

like a pall over the entire country and the

world.

When Franklin D. Roosevelt became President in 1933, his energies were concentrated on

domestic economic issues. On the international

scene, however, the picture was equally confused and threatening and, of course, he had to

conduct the foreign relations of the United

States along with the domestic policies of the

"New Deal." Fast moving events in Europe

and Asia became the stepping stones to World

War II. Adolph Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany a month or so before Roosevelt became President. The militarists had

tightened their hold upon Japan and the

Japanese war lords began to encroach upon North China. In a hope of new RussianAmerican trade and the promise from the Soviets not to interfere in the domestic affairs

of the United States, Roosevelt granted diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union in November of 1933.

Americans in the meantime had become disillusioned and resentful of the European

powers who had reneged on the World War I

debts. "Isolationists were convinced that the

United States should have little traffic with

those faithless foreigners; the experience with

the debts strengthened the tendencies toward

economic nationalism and isolationism." 2

America's fear of becoming involved in another European war was reflected in the legislation of the middle 1930s. Strong isolationist

sentiment was apparent in the Johnson Debt

Default Act of April 1934, which prohibited

loans to foreign governments that had de- faulted on their obligations to the United

States. The passage of the Neutrality Acts of

1935, 1936, and 1937 were designed to prevent

incidents that might lead to war.

The historian Charles A. Beard possibly

summed up American sentiment in 1935 when

he wrote:

We tried once to right European wrongs, to

make the world safe for democracy. Even in the

rosiest view the experiment was not a great suc

cess . . . [Isolation] may be no better, for aught anyone actually knows. But we nearly burnt our

house down with one experiment; so it seems not

wholly irrational to try another line.'

In view of the international uncertainties of

the 1930s the Beardian logic was difficult to

refute.

President Roosevelt continued the withdrawal policy even in Latin America. He did

so not because we were disillusioned with the

South Americans, but because he dedicated the

nation to "the policy of the good neighbor."

The American historian George Harmon

Knoles said that "Americans werç not in an

imperialistic, aggressive mood in the 1920s and

1930s. The United States henceforth expected

to treat the nations of the world and particularly of the Western Hemisphere as good

neighbors; that is to say, a policy of noninterference in the private affairs of those states, yet

standing ready to be helpful." Secretary of

State Cordell Hull at a meeting of the Seventh

Pan-American Conference at Montevideo, Uruguay in December 1933, proposed in the

Convention on the Rights and Duties of

States, under Article 8, that "no state has the

right to intervene in the internal or external

affairs of another." In effect, America was renouncing the right of intervention in the

Western Hemisphere. The United States soon

had an opportunity to match words with deeds.

In May 1934, the United States abrogated the

Platt Amendment, which had granted America

the right to intervene in Cuba since the early

part of the century. By 15 August 1934, the

826-man 1st Marine Brigade in Haiti under

the command of Brigadier General Louis McC.

Little sailed for home thus ending the long

period of American intervention in Latin

America.6

With the end of intervention abroad and

the problem of domestic unemployment reaching its peak at 12.8 million persons, the middle

part of the decade of the thirties became most

trying for all of the armed services. The Navy

Department had received an appropriation

of only $309 million for fiscal year 1935. Out

of this figure, the Marine Corps of 17,248

officers and men, received a little over $21
ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL 43

million.1 The Marine Corps figure included

everything, from pay to general expenditures,

which meant clothing, fuel, and the like. A

low budget for the armed forces, who were

after all preparing for future wars, seemed

reasonable enough to the average person. The

war fought in the thirties by Americans against

starvation and unemployment was by far more

real to the average American than any future enemy.

All service budgets were scrutinized again

and again. The Navy Department had already

undergone an agonizing time because of Cut

backs resulting from the naval disarmanent

treaties of the 1920s. The Marine Corps' turn

came during 1931 and 1932 in the form of an

examination of its organization and establishment. The General Board of the Navy undertook a year-long study to determine the need

for, and size of, the Marine Corps in war and

peace. The board examined every aspect of

the Marine Corps, reviewing its history, missions, aviation, and its place in the war plans

of the nation. The CMC, Major General Ben

H. Fuller, answered fully all questions of the

General Board. The pivotal question basically

was to show the necessity for an appropriated

strength of 21,000 men. It had been feared by

the Marine Corps that the statutory peacetime

strength of 27,400 would be reduced. This

reduction was opposed by the Chief of Naval

Operations (CNO)* in his review of the General Board report to the Secretary of the

Navy. He stated that the "present authorized

strength of 27,400 should be continued as the

legally authorized peacetime strength in order

to allow expansion to this number without

the necessity of legislation during a period of

strained relations." 8

The Marine Corps survived the examination

and the Secretary of Navy, Charles F. Adams,

approved the report of the General Board and

the CNO's comment on 2 March 1933, which

kept the statutory peace strength of the Marine

Corps at 27,400. While the appropriated

strength of the Marine Corps remained at

21,000 during the decade, the actual average

yearly strength was approximately 17,700

men .°

*The CNO office was created in May 1915. It was a

Continuation of the office of Aide-for-Operations

founded in 1909. The CNO is charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readi- ness of plans for its use in war. It was quite natural

that the CNO would comment on the strength of the

Marine Corps inasmuch as it would affect the Marine

strength for the fleet.

Marine Corps Schools of the Thirties

Rear Admiral L. E. H. Maund, Royal Navy,

when speaking of the Gallipoli-Dardanelles

Campaign, stated: "It had imagination, it had

the promise of great strategic gains; while the

reasons for its failure could easily be discerned

and had to do with lack of technique, material

and belief in this form of warfare; shortcomings that could all be overcome." 10 So it was

at MCS that formalized instruction in landing

operations continued into the crucial decade

of the thirties. A development of a mature

doctrine of landing operations had been made.

The basis was the realization at the policymaking level that an assault of defended

beaches was feasible and that, indeed, future

wars would demand the execution of such

operations. Concurrently, as relaxation of tension in China and Nicaragua gradually released Marines in substantial numbers, the

various elements of the developmental process

began to complement each other.11 The MCS

began to devote a major effort to the study

of landing operations and by the end of 1939,

out of a total of 1,092 hours of instruction,

455 hours or 42 percent pertained to some

aspects of landing operations.12

Brigadier General Randolph C. Berkeley became the first general officer to command the

Marine Corps Schools in August 1930. Under

General Berkeley's tenure, great strides were

taken to resolve many problems concerning

landing operations. It was in 1931, a banner

year for MCS, that a special committee from

the Field Officers School, under the direction

of Colonel Charles F. B. Price, started work on

a tentative text for "Marine Corps Landing

Operations." Other members of the committee,

who were also instructors at the Field Officers

School, were Majors Charles D. Barrett and

Lyle H. Miller.13 In April 1931, Price asked

General Berkeley to assign Barrett and Miller

full-time to the preliminary work of preparing

the tentative text. Price stated that "the most

important part of the preliminary work will

be rather extensive practical experiments to

determine the capacity for personnel and

equipment of all of the various types of boats

in use in the Navy which might be employed

in actual operations." 14 General Berkeley concurred and appointed a board to "develop

and write the text for Landing Operations and

Small Wars." 15 In addition to appointing

Barrett and Miller, Berkeley added Major
44 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Pedro A. del Valle and Lieutenant Walter C.

Ansel, USN.'° The board became known as the

Landing Operations Text Board.

The CMC realized the importance of a naval officer as member of the Landing Operations Text Board as he "doubtless will be in

a position to obtain informally naval thought

on questions of naval doctrine which may

arise Concurrent with this board,

other boards such as the Experimental Landing Lighters Board and a Curriculum Board

were all doing yeoman work at MCS. As a

result of the Curriculum Board's recommendations, a considerably revised schedule was

worked out for the following school year, 1932.

Greater emphasis was placed on landing operations, despite the fact that the scheduled

number of hours already assigned to these

courses had been increasing steadily. Another

recommendation of the board was to have MCS

instruct and solve problems on the basis of

Marine Corps organization and material.18

The changes that took place in the instruction and curriculum at MCS from 1931 to

1933 undoubtedly affected the Landing Operations Text Board of 1931. By 1933, there was

no publication completed or printed from the

work of this board on a landing operations

text, The board's work was, however, the first

effort to develop a modern landing doctrine and

it provided a basis for the initial landing manual published a year later. Some of the work

accomplished by the board, and used later in

the 1934 manual, was studies on units of measurement for computing cargo requirements for

military equipment, establishment of standard

boat capacities for landing operations based

on specific data, and whole chapters on signals,

engineering, boats, air support, and artillery.

In April 1932, Brigadier General James C.

Breckinridge succeeded General Berkeley as Commandant, Marine Corps Schools (CMCS).

General Breckinridge, no stranger to MCS,

having previously served as CMCS from 1929

to 1930, encouraged the changes taking place.

In July of 1932, Lieutenant Colonel Ellis Bell

Miller joined MCS as assistant to General

Breckinridge. In two years, Breckinridge and

Miller brought MCS to the forefront not only

as the training center for Marine officers

but as the intellectual/academic center

for the Marine Corps. Miller reported into

MCS from the Naval War College where, after

completing the Senior Course, he had remained

to be an instructor in strategy and tactics in

its Senior and Junior Classes. In addition to

the Marine Corps Schools, Miller was a graduate

of two schools of the Army, Fort Leavenworth

School of the Line and General Staff and the

Army War College.19 He consequently brought

a great amount of service school experience

with him. With the encouragement of General Breckinridge, Miller not only disagreed

with the manner in which the school was run

but the content and subject matter of many of

the courses. He challenged the entire structure

upon which the education of Marine officers

was based.2°

The first drastic action came when all the

courses developed by the Army schools were

discarded. These courses, and accompanying

problems, had long been the basis for the cirriculum, but in order to make the problems

work, the Army Tables of Organization had to

be used. Instructors were directed to rewrite

all their material and gear it to Marine Corps

Tables of Organization and Equipment.

The changes at MCS were duly noted by

the CMC when he summarized this small revolution in his annual report to the Secretary

of the Navy in 1933.21 Some of the changes he

noted were:

(a) School problems are now based on Marine

Corps units and equipment.

Major General James C. Breckinridge, USMC. (USMC

Photo #521272).
ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL 45

(b) Certain personnel were designated to prepare

text books and pamphlets to cover fields of service

for which no Marine texts existed.

(c) Support by naval gunfire and other naval agencies was developed in greater detail, and a

closer relationship with the Naval War College

was maintained.

(d) More effort was placed on the development

of comprehensive courses on landing operations

and small wars.

In addition to the curriculum changes, the

content of a course in the study of landing

operations was revised. The Dardanelles-Gallipoli Campaign formed an important part of

the background in research on this subject.

During the academic year 1932—1933, each student was issued a copy of the British official

history of the Gallipoli Campaign. This book,

Military Operations, Gallipoli, being the

latest and most accurate publication on

the subject, was used as a source book. The

Gallipoli Course was organized "to acquaint

the students with the Gallipoli Campaign; to

train them in military research; and to provide

the Schools and through them the Marine

Corps with the material of value on a campaign

which is in many respects of the type we are

expected to be experts in." 22

Concurrent with the Gallipoli studies, the

students from the Field OfficersSchool at MCS,

in conjunction with the Naval War College,

worked together on what had come to be called

the Advanced Base Problem. The Advanced

Base Problem series, 10 in all, started during

the school year 1931—1932. Each year a theoretical problem of defending or seizing a base

in a given area was considered by both groups

of students. The Pacific area was the predominant choice of areas for such problems as

evidenced by problems dealing with Dumanquilas in the Philippines, Truk, Palau Islands,

Guam, Saipan, and Tinian.23 The Advanced

Base Problems afforded the Marine Corps

Schools a chance to present its solutions at the

Naval War College and most importantly, the

problems awakened an understanding of the

imporance of the establishment of organized

fleet landing units.

Colonel Richard 1\'l. Cutts, on the staff of

the Naval War College, had written to Colonel

Miller at MCS and Major General John T.

Myers, Assistant to the Commandant, proposing that a Marine base force be placed in the

operating forces of the fleet:

-. . . as a fleet unit, with as much consideration

given to it by the Navy as other fleet types, such

as cruisers, destroyers, or carriers . . . establishment of the fact that naval overseas operations are

doomed to failure lacking a proper Naval Ad- vanced Base Force operated by the Marine Expeditionary Force . . . and the establishment of

the fact that this necessary base force cannot be created by the Marine Corps alone; it requires

the active assistance of the Navy Department necessitating appropriations and constructive action.24

Colonel Miller replied that "it was becoming clear that a complete reorganization and

reequipment of forces was necessary to carry

out Marine Corps missions in support of the

fleet." 25 In an article in March 1931, Lieutenant Commander E. W. Broadbent, USN, who

was one of the first naval officers to serve at

MCS (1926—28) stated:

It is the mission of the Marine Corps to support

the fleet. But likewise it will be the mission of

some part of the fleet to support the Marine Corps

landing force. When two forces of different arms

have a mutual task, there must he mutual understanding, common thought, study, preparation, and

training. With these, if the time ever comes when

the Navy needs more and better bases, the Navy

and the Marines can take and hold them.2'

In August 1933, Major General John H.

Russell, Assistant to the Commandant, suggested to the CMC the discontinuation of the

old "expeditionary force" and the creation in

its stead of a new body to be called either the

Fleet Base Defense Force or the Fleet Marine

Force. The Fleet Marine Force, or FMF, as it

was to be called, was an old idea of General

Russell's and he crystallized his ideas, 1\'Iiller's,

Cutts', Myers', and many others when he insisted that "this force should be included in

the fleet organization as an integral part thereof, subject to the orders, for tactical employment, of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S.

Fleet." After approval by the CMC and the

appropriate authorities of the Navy Department, the Secretary of the Navy, Claude A.

Swanson, signed General Order No. 241 on 7

December 1933 designating the FMF from the

"force of marines maintained by the Major

General Commandant in a state of readiness

for operations with the Fleet." 28 The FMF

replaced the East Coast and West Coast Expeditionary Forces and the Commanding General, FMF and his staff were initially stationed

at Quantico.29 This force provided the Navy

with a "type-force" of reinforced infantry with

the specific mission of executing landing operations.

As significant as was the creation of this force,

the fleet did not yet possess the capability of

actually seizing bases and thus projecting itself across the oceans. The FMF needed a

basic doctrine to guide its training, and the
46 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

fleet elements which were to he involved in

landing operations required guidance as to how

they would perform their tasks in concert with

the landing force. Between 1919 and 1933, the

Joint Army-Navy Board had promulgated several manuals prescribing methods for Army

and Navy cooperation in joint overseas expeditions. The latest was published in 1933.°

The directives contained in the manual were

concerned with the techniques and agencies for

cooperation and with the respective functions

of each service in the conduct of joint operations. But a manual of landing operations was

still lacking. By late 1933, plans to work on a

landing manual by MCS were interrupted by

the mobilization of the 7th Marines for Cuban

duty and the consequent drain on personnel.

The CMCS recommended to the CMC that

all classes be discontinued at the schools and

that students and staff alike devote all time

and effort towards the production of a landing

operations manual. The Commandant agreed

and, on 30 October 1933, directed the CMCS

to prepare a manual on landing operations

as expeditiously as possible and to commence

work not later than 15 November. Classes were

discontinued on 14 November and the staff

and students began work on the manual.31

The Manual

How the finished product—the manual—was

written and the multiple changes in title it

went through is in itself a story almost as interesting as the contents.

Students F. instructors wrote out chronologically

itemized lists of the things to be done from the in.

ception of a landing operation to the tactical completion of a landing operation. a * * * * A committee of nine was appointed to consider

the itemized lists and draw up a consolidated list

embracing all recommendations and to group

them under headings. Each member of the com- mittee of nine formulated his own list, based on

the results of his study of all lists submitted. a a a a a A committee of five then studied and further

consolidated the lists from the committee of nine

which resulted in a rough outline for the contents of the manual. a a a The prophetic nature of the rough outline was

dramatically exemplified by an examination of the

six elements into which the landing operation was

subdivided: (I) Command relationships, (2) Naval gunfire support, (3) Aerial support, (4) Ship-to.

shore movements, (5) Securing the beachhead, and

(6) Logistics. These functions, together with com- munications, fornied the basis to a greater or

lesser degree of amphibious doctrine today.

On 9 January 1934, officers from the FMF,

HQMC, and Quantico participated in a conference with respect to the outline. The outline

was based on experience, both personal and

that culled from reports of landing operations,

experimentation, and the evolution of instruction and problems at the MCS. Some 70 officers

from lieutenants to brigadier generals, including

four Navy officers and one Army officer,

attended the meeting. Following the conference,

the manual was divided into various parts and

responsibility for writing these parts was assigned to various committees. The bulk of the

manual was grouped under three general areas:

(1) Tactics, which included landing anti defense of bases, prefaced by a general discussion of landing operations and the purpose of

the manual. The committee chairman was Major John Marston and subcommittee members,

Major DeWitt Peck and Major Charles J. Miller. (2) Staff functions, logistics, and plans

and orders. Committee chairman, Major Harold

L. Parsons and subcommittee members, Majors

Wilbur Thing, Samuel A. Woods, and Thomas

E. Thrasher; and (3) Training; chairman of

committee, Lieutenant Colonel Calhoun Ancrum. In addition, separate parts on naval

and aviation activities were prepared by Lieutenant Commander Clifford G. Richardson,

USN, Chairman of the Naval Committee, and

Captain Harold D. Campbell, Chairman of the

Aviation Committee.32 On 28 March 1934,

committees that had been at work in earnest

submitted to the CMC the first parts of the

manual. By 13 June 1934, the remaining chapters were submitted.

The sequence of development of the manual

was as follows:

Tentative Manual for Landing Operations of

1934 was used at MCS during the 1934—35 school

year in mimeograph format; it was not given

outside distribuiion. a a a * * By July 1934, the title was changed to Manual

for Naval Overseas Operations and published by

the Navy Department. * a * a a 15 May 1935, a board headed by Lieutenant

Colonel Charles D. Barrett was formed for revision

of the 1934 edition of the manual.a

*General Alfred H. Noble considers Barrett (later a

major general) to have been an outstanding original

thinker who almost singlehandedly wrote two-thirds of

the Tentative Manual based on the mass of uncoordinated material assembled at the time. "He [Barrett]

was the man ho put pencil to paper" Cen Alfred

H. Noble ltr to Director, MC. History, dated 3 April

1971 (Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine

Corps).
ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL 47

* * * * * Change #3 was issued in August 1943, based

on further experiences in the Solomons and in

North Africa. It was used during the remaining part of World War II.

The Contents

Major Charles D. Barrett, USMC. (USMC Photo

#519539).* * * * * 9 July 1935, a revised manual with photographs,

better sketches, etc., approved by the CNO on

25 May 1935, was distributed by the CMC throughOut the Marine Corps, Navy, and outside agencies

'ith a Restricted" classification. This 1935 edition

became the first widely-distributed Tentative Landing Operations Manual.83

* * * * * On 15 June 1936, a board headed by Lieutenant

Colonel Keller E. Rockey, along with Lieutenant

Colonels Archie F. Howard and Alfred H. Noble,

was convened to revise the 1935 edition of the

manual.

* * * * * A revised manual was issued, but not for general

distribution, on 21 June 1937 under the new title,

Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S. Navy 1937.

Command relationships as described in the

Tentative Manual dealt with the organization of the landing force as well as with command procedures. It was here that the inherent

naval character of the landing operation was

defined. The force was to be commanded by

a Navy flag officer. The task force would have

two main components: the landing force,

made up of Fleet Marine Force units, and the

naval support groups consisting of the Fire

Support Group, the Air Group, the Covering

Group, and the Transport Group. The specific

responsibilities of the various commanders during all phases of the operations were enumerated and the principle of parallelism of command, subject to the overall authority of the

amphibious force commander, was defined.

With these arrangements one of the major

causes of the Gallipoli disaster was overcome.

Finally, it insured that naval forces would organize so as to be responsive to the needs of

the landing force.35

The Tentative Manual recognized that a

landing force in the assault followed the same

pattern as conventional offensive action but it

also recognized the fact that the over-the-water

movements of troops complicated the problem

of fire support. In developing a solution to

this problem, an effort was macic to adapt

naval guns to missions normally performed by

field artillery. The problems of fire direction,

the nature of projectiles, magazine capacity, and

the muzzle velocities and trajectories of weapons were all considered, and a sound doctrine

for the effective delivery of naval gunfire was

developed.

As a result of the many problems associated with the delivery of naval gunfire in close

support of assault troops, the writers of the

Tentative Manual explored the possibility of

employing aircraft for this purpose. As a result,

the initial doctrine for close air support

evolved. This doctrine provided for both

visual and photographic reconnaissance, air defense, and airborne fire support during •the

final run of landing craft to the beach. This

doctrine will be discussed in the succeeding

chapter.

* On 26 May

report of the

* * * * 1937, the CMC sent to the CNO the

board on revisions.

a a * * a On 15 May 1938, a board headed by Lieutenant

Colonel Allen H. Turnage was convened to make

revisions on the 1937 edition of the manual. Other

members of the board were Lieutenant Colonel

Alfred H. Noble, Captain Francis M. McAlister, and Quartermaster Clerk Percy J. Uhlinger. a * * * * On 25 November 1938, CMC authorized destruction of the 1935 manual, technically the Landing

Operations Doctrine of 1937, with the issuance of

Fleet Training Publication (FTP) #167, also known

as the Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S. Navy

193 334

* a * * *

In May 1941, Change #1 to FTP #167 was issued based on experiences of the Fleet Landing

Exercises and material developments up until 1941.

This edition \ras the guide for the Guadalcanal

landings in August 1942. * * * * * Change #2 to FTP #167 was issued 6 days before

Guadalcanal, on 1 August 1942.
48 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

To no one's surprise, the part that had the

greatest impact on the art of landing operations was the ship-to-shore movement. The

manual recognized that the ship-to-shore movement embraces the most critical phase of the

landing operation and that it was more than a

simple ferrying operation. The text provided

a technique for the waterborne deployment of

the landing force for battle in accordance with

the principles of fire and movement. For securing the beachhead the manual defined the

techniques which would permit the landing

force to survive during the period between sole

reliance on seaborne fire support and the landing of its own artillery. It spelled out in detail

the procedures for establishing communications

promptly between echelons ashore and those

afloat, and it addressed itself realistically to the

complex problems of supply and services required by the landing force.

In the field of logistics, the Tentative Manual

emphasized the overriding importance of tailoring all loading to the requirements of the

landing force; the ships would be loaded in a

manner which would respond precisely to the

tactical needs of the landing forces as they

assaulted the hostile shore. The practice of

stowing as much materiel into a ship as it

would hold had to be replaced by a technique

that gave careful consideration to the requirements of the troops on the beach. Recognizing

this requirement and the related requirement

for standardizing procedure for embarkation

of the landing force, the Marine Corps developed and included in the manual instructions on embarkation. These instructions included the preparation of embarkation forms,

loading plans, and set forth the technique of

combat unit loading of assault ships.

The theory contained in the manual was

specifically tested in the annual fleet training

exercises from 1935 through 1941, conducted

at Culebra, Vieques, the island of San Clemente

near San Diego, and in 1941 at New River,

North Carolina. These exercises refined landing

force staff work, stimulated the evolution of

landing craft and radio equipment, underscored the need for improved gunfire and air

support doctrine, and gave practical experience

to the forces involved.36

The Tentative Landing Operations Manual,

initially published in 1934, is perhaps the most

important contribution to military science the

Marine Corps had made to date in the 20th

century; certainly it is one of the landmarks

in its history.

Boats, Lighters, and Amphibians

Along with developments in doctrine and

technique there was a corresponding demand

for specialized equipment to make the landing

operation effective. In 1933, the CMC established a Marine Corps Equipment Board composed of 11 members who served on an additional duty basis. The primary assigned duty

of the board was to recommend the types of

equipment best suited to the needs of the

Marine Corps. The Marine Corps was a "user"

rather than a "developer" of equipment at

this time. By 1937, the board, gaining momenturn and importance in pressing the Navy

Department to buy and develop landing boats,

expanded to 20 officers assigned on a fulltime basis.

The bureau within the Navy Department

responsible for designing, producing, and paying for all ships and boats was the Bureau of

Construction and Repair, later renamed

Bureau of Ships in 1940. This bureau was

of course struggling to make maximum use

of the little money the Navy had in the 1930s.

The development of landing boats was the

least important item on its agenda. Tenacity

and persistence on the part of the Marine

Corps plus a few sympathetic naval officers

in Construction and Repair had to be the

primary reason for the success of the develop.

ment of landing craft prior to United States

entry into World War II. The problems to be solved in procuring

special landing craft needed in landing operations fell into three categories: (I) Landing

boats—used as carriers of troops from shipto-shore; (2) Lighters—used to carry tanks and

trucks; and then finally (3) Amphibians—as

thought of in the 1930s as a fire support

weapon only, that is, an amphibious tank. By

January 1937, the importance of obtaining

suitable landing craft became apparent when

the Secretary of Navy established a "Department Continuing Board for the Development

of Landing Boats for Training Operations."

The board membership included representatives of the CNO, CMC, Bureau of Construction and Repair, and Bureau of Ordnance.3

I—Landing Boats

In an effort to explore the suitability of

existing commercial craft for landing operations, the Navy, at the request of the Marine

Corps, agreed to test a variety of small boats

in consonance with available funds. In 1935,
D ,8MA •P13IUpapH,4

ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL 49

Experimental surf boats lined up at Hampton Roads, Va., on 2 May 1938. (USNAS, Hampton Roads Photo #5773).

bids were advertised by the Bureau of Construction and Repair with specific details as

to weight and length of the boats desired. The

bureau had in mind the available deck space,

handling facilities, and davit strength of the

ships of the 1935 Navy. Undoubtedly, these

specifications hampered some bidders as only

nine replies were received by the Navy. Out

of these nine, five boats were accepted by the

Bureau and the Marine Corps Equipment

Board for testing at Cape May, New Jersey,

in the summer of 1936. The boats were not

superior to conventional boats, although they

included some improved features and would

consequently be tested again in May of 1938 at

Hampton Roads, Virginia. Four of the five

boats tested were modified fishing boats used

by Atlantic Coast fishermen for many years

and named after the ports from which they

came, Bay Head, Red Bank, Freeport, and

Philadelphia. The fifth boat, a metal surf boat,

was a separate commercial entry. In the May

1938 tests, none of the boats was satisfactory.

The following winter, during fleet exercises

at Culebra, three of the five boats, Bay Head,

Red Bank, and Freeport, were again tested.

"The modified fishing craft still had serious

drawbacks. Owing to their exposed rudders

and propellers they tended to dig in when

retracting. They were so high forward that

Marines debarking had to drop 10 feet from

the bow to the beach. They were, moreover,

all unsuitable for lowering and hoisting."

In the light of the drawbacks revealed by tests,

the "Bureau of Construction and Repair

undertook the construction of a boat embodying

all the best features of the fishing craft. This

was the beginning of a long and unsuccessful

effort by the Bureau to develop a satisfactory

landing craft The 'Bureau Boat' in various

forms showed up regularly at Fleet Landing

exercises from 1939 through 1941, but efforts

to get the 'bugs' out of its design were abandoned in 1940." Along with the "Bureau

Boats" that were being tested until 1940, experiments were carried out utilizing standard Navy

ships' boats. The standard boats, designed for

other purposes, also proved unsuitable for

Red Bank surf boat taking on board 18 Marines it

had landed during trials in May 1938. (USNAS, Hampton Roads Photo #5762).
50 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Philadelphia surf boat landing 18 Marines during

May 1938. (USNAS Hampton Roads Photo #5758).

beaching operations. They lacked speed and

maneuverability and were extremely difficult

to handle in the surf.

In 1937, Andrew Higgins, a New Orleans

boat builder, reentered the picture of solving

the problem of a suitable landing boat. Higgins reentered because he had previously endeavored to interest the Navy and the Marine

Corps in the Eureka boat that he invented in

1926. He had visited Quantico in 1934 to interest the Equipment Board in the Eureka boat, but with little or no money left in the

Bureau of Construction and Repair nothing

definite could be accomplished at the time.

In the 1935 bidding for test boats, Higgins declined to submit a bid to the bureau. In

October of 1936, Higgins wrote to the Navy

offering his Eureka as a troop landing craft.

The Eureka was a boat of promising design. It had a special shallow draft for the use of

trappers and oil drillers along the lower Mississippi and Gulf Coast. It had a tunnel stern

to protect the propeller and a special type of

bow, called by Higgins a "spoonbill," which

enabled it to run well up on low banks and

beaches and retract easily.40

Timing was again poor and the Navy, was

unable to purchase the boat. In 1937, Commander Ralph S. McDowell, who was responsible for landing craft development in the

Bureau of Construction and Repair, wrote to

Higgins inviting him to visit the Navy Department for further discussion of his boat.

Higgins visited McDowell in Washington

shortly thereafter and spent one week working

with him on redesigning the Eureka boat.

Higgins was soon given a proprietary contract

to deliver one boat, which he did within 30

days, to Norfolk. In the spring of 1938, McDowell and other members of the Continuing

Board went to Hampton Roads and tested the

Eureka boat. Everybody was pleased with the

way it performed. The Eureka made its first

maneuver appearance at Fleet Exercise 5 in

1939 where it competed against several bureau

boats and the by-now venerable fishing craft.

Again it surpassed all the tests but the Commander Atlantic Squadron recommended that

the Training Squadron of the Atlantic Fleet,

a counterpart of the Continuing Board, give

further tests to the Eureka boat.4'

These tests did produce good results and by

1940 money for naval procurement was beginning to be more plentiful. By about September,

transports and converted merchant ships replaced warships as troop carriers in landing

exercises. These ships were equipped with

davits capable of handling 36-foot boats and

as the Eureka of 36-foot length "had twice

the capacity of the 30-footer then in service

and could make the same speed without an

increase in horsepower, the Navy decided to

adopt the larger as standard." 42

After many years, the Navy and particularly

Higgins boat, 1937. (USMC Photo #526331).

S —

,,.,
ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL 51

the Marine Corps had the landing craft that

they wanted. The only existing drawback of

the 1940 Eureka was the difficulty in unloading troops and supplies from the fairly high

sides. On another visit to Quantico in April

1941, Higgins was shown a picture of a Japanese landing craft with a ramp in the bow by

Major Ernest E. Linsert, Secretary to the

Equipment Board.* Linsert and Brigadier

General Emile P. ]\Eoses, President of the

Equipment Board, asked Higgins to determine

the possibility of installing a ramp in the bow

of his 36-foot Eureka. Higgins was quite enthusiastic and agreed to make a prototype,

converting a standard Eureka into a ramp

bow at his own expense.

*The Japanese landing boat with ramp, shown Lin- sert, was part of a group of photographs that were

enclosures to a report prepared by then First Lieutenant Victor H. Krulak, Assistant R—2, 4th Marines

in 1937 entitled, 'Report on Japanese Assault Landing

Operations, Shanghai Area 1937." Lieutenant Krulak's

report stated that "during the landing operations the

Japanese forces were seen to employ a large number of

boat types." Of one type, I.anding Boat Type A" (see

photograph), Krulak observed "these boats are the only ones of the entire group which were obviously designed to negotiate, surf and shallow beach landings:"

Krulak Report (Historical Amphibious File, Breckinridge Library, Quantico. Va.).

The next month, May 1941, Brigadier General Charles Barrett, Director of Plans and

Policies at Headquarters, sent Linert to New

Orleans to see how Higgins was coming along

with the prototype Eureka. Linsert tested the

Eureka boat with a ramp on Lake Ponchartrain.

Tests were also made with a truck and with

36 Higgins' employees running on and off to

simulate embarkation and unloading of troops.

Linsert also inspected a 45-foot steel lighter

with a ramp bow that had been originally

built for the Colombian government for custom duties. A bulldozer was carried in the

lighter and of course the possibilities of using

this type of craft as a tank lighter became

immediately apparent. Linsert reported to

General Barrett that both Higgins' boats were

quite acceptable.43

On the recommendation of the Navy Department Continuing Board, a special board of

Marine Corps and Bureau of Ships officers

was appointed to conduct official acceptance

tests. With General Moses as senior member,

the board carried out the tests during the first

week in June. The ramp bow craft passed with

flying colors. Thus was born the precursor of

the LCVP (Landing Craft Vehicle, Personnel).

Re-embarking in a Eureka landing boat during joint Army.Marine exercises at New River,

(USMC Photo #529125).

N.C., in July 1941.
-s——

—i. —.- -- —- _1L. .

a.

11

52 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Japanese ramp landing boat Type "A", photographed in Shanghai harbor by 1st Lieutenant Victor H. Krulak,

USMC, in 1937. (Photo courtesy of Lieutenant General V. H. Krulak).

Il—Lighters

The design of a successful tank lighter

proved as difficult a process as did the develop.

ment of the personnel landing craft. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a 50-foot lighter

for landing artillery was tested in 1926. While

it would be used during the intervening years,

the lighters were not satisfactory to the Navy

or Marines because they were not self-propelled and had to be towed by another boat.

Forty-five foot artillery lighter (Artillery Lighter "B") unloading a 5-ton tractor at Quantico in 1935.

Troop Barge "A" is shown in the background.

The advantage of the 50-foot lighter, however,

was the fact that it had two parallel hinged

ramps in the stern and it could be beached

successfully stern-to.

In 1935, at Quantico, a plan evolved to use

a standard 50-foot motor launch for landing

light vehicles and artillery with the help of a

readymade rig, called Boat Rig A. In the 1935

fleet exercises at Culebra, the motor launch

and rig was tested. It proved so top heavy

that it nearly capsized in a moderate swell.

The experience was accordingly written off."

The importance of the the size of lighters

varied with the tank size and weight at the

time. In three separate years, 1935, 1939, and

1941, the modification of existing lighters had

to be considered with the adoption of different size tanks. In 1935, the Marmon-I-Ierrington Tank, a 9,500-pound model, could be

carried by a 38-foot lighter. A 38-foot lighter

was built at the request of the CMC and delivered for testing in the fleet exercises in 1938.

The lighter was self-propelled and had sufficient speed. Another lighter, built by the

Navy, was a 40-foot type used in FLEX 5 in

the winter of 1938—1939. This lighter was equally successful. Both the 38- and 40-foot

lighters were proved suitable for landing tanks

and motor vehicles. By 1939, the Marine Corps

had given up on the Marmon-Harrington

- .,—',--.. —

' -.- I

ç:
ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL 53

tank and began testing the Army's 15-ton tank.

The Navy accordingly produced a new 45-foot

lighter capable of carrying one Army or two

Marmon-Harrington tanks.*

The lighter was tested in FLEX 6 in the

winter of 1940. It proved adequate during the

exercises. Subsequent doubt arose as to the

seaworthiness of this lighter in another exercise

when one of the lighters sank after an Army

tank shifted to one side in a moderate sea.

The next year, in May of 1941, the Navy Continuing Board turned again to Higgins of

New Orleans. Higgins had on hand a 45-foot

boat and was asked to convert the boat to a

tank lighter. In a short time he made the converted tank lighter available to the Navy for examination**

During the summer of 1941, the 45-foot

Higgins lighter was tested during exercises at

New River, North Carolina. Concurrent with

these happenings, the Bureau of Ships had

built a 47-foot lighter which was used in the

fleet exercises at Culebra in 1941. Major General Holland M. Smith, the landing force commander, reported after the exercises that: "the

Bureau type lighters are heavy, slow, difficult

to control, difficult to retract from the beach

and equipped with an unpredictable power

plant." By the fall of 1941, the tank lighter

program had again changed direction with the

introduction of the newly developed Army 30-

ton medium Sherman tank. The 45-foot lighters, Bureau of Ships or Higgins, could not do

the job for the new 30-ton tank. The Secretary

of Navy directed the Bureau of Ships to remedy

this deficiency. "Accordingly, in December exMajor John Kaluf, Secretary to Equipment Board

in 1938, recalls when the futility of the MarmonHerrington tank was pretty well demonstrated, the

Equipment Board requested the procurement of an

Army 15-ton tank for try-out purposes. Brigadier General Holland M. Smith, Director of Operations &

Training, HQMC, told me to stop asking for such

heavy items as a 15-ton tank and confine yourself

strictly to the 5-ton limit. He said that the Navy Gen- eral Board had told him in no uncertain terms that

the Navy was never going to lift more than 5 tons."

(The Navy's insistence on a 5-ton limit, at the time, had to do with the boom capacity on board Navy

ships.) Col John Kaluf ltr to the Director, M.C. History, dated 19 January 1971 (Historical Division, Headquarters, US. Marine Corps). **The Commandant stated "Higgins was first approached in the matter of converting the 45-foot boat into a tank lighter on May 27 [l941J and the tank

lighter was ready for test yesterday 5 June [1941]. This

man is certainly a wonder." MajGen T: Holcomb memo

to Adm H. Stark, dated 6 June 1941, File A—llI—JCW

(Record Group 80, National Archives).

Andrew J. Higgins, New Orleans boat-builder, with

Sergeant Pearla McKinney at Camp Lejeune in October 1943. (USMC Photo #500883).

isting tank lighter contracts were changed to

provide 50-foot lighters in lieu of the 45-foot

Higgins and 47-foot Bureau types still to be

built. Both Higgins and the Bureau produced

designs of 50-foot craft. Before any deliveries

could be made President Roosevelt, at a White

House Conference on 4 April 1942, directed

the procurement of 600 additional 50-foot tank

lighters by 1 September for the North African

operation." 46

Tests of the Bureau of Ships' lighter and

the Higgins' lighter were held near Norfolk

in May 1942 with 30 tons of cement blocks

in each lighter.47 The Army sent observers to

the test inasmuch as the initial projected use

of the winning lighter would be in an Army

operation. General Smith reported that the Higgins entry proved vastly superior as everybody

who knew the two boats predicted. In fact

the Navy lighters failed to complete the tests.

As a result of these overall tests, the Bureau

of Ships notified all yards making their model

to shift to the Higgins design. Thus the Higgins 50-footer became the standard tank lighter

of the Navy, the prototype of the LCM

(Landing Craft, Mechanized).

Ill—Amphibians

The United States' first modern experience

in amphibians, that vehicle that can operate

on land and water, was the Christie Tank*

*See Chapter II.
54 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith in October

1914. (USMC Photo #38219).

After tests had found the Christie Tank unseaworthy off Culebra in 1924, it was subsequently

rejected as a military vehicle. It was never

purchased by the U.S. Government and plans

of the particular test model were sold to

Japan.

Great Britain, already credited with the de- velopment of the tank to the extent that it

could be used on the battlefield, also developed

the first amphibious combat vehicle, the Medium D Tank. This tank was completed after

the 1918 armistice. The intention of the British

was to give a tank sufficient characteristics to

get across a body of water, yet at the same

time retain, as far as possible, the perform- ance of the land tank. This characteristic of

British design progressed with land tank development and shows that the British had no

interest in true amphibian vehicles but preferrecl flotation devices for land tanks.48

The United States and particularly the

Marine Corps, in the early l930s, concluded

that tanks, if landed close to the early assault

waves, would prove valuable in the assault

and even justify less artillery strength. The Tentative Landing Manual of 1934 pointed

out that "the difficulties of transport and movement from ship-to-shore indicate that only

light tanks can be used in the landing operation. These may be land tanks or amphibious

tanks."

Ironically, the predecessor of the modern

amphibian tractor was designed as a nonmilitary vehicle for the rescue of downed aviators

and hurricane victims in the Florida Everglades. The developer of the craft was Donald

Roebling, son of financier John A. Roebling

and grandson of Colonel Washington Roebling,

builder of the famous Brooklyn Bridge. It was

John A. Roebling who, after hearing about

and witnessing several devastating hurricanes,

became aware that while he could not do

anything about the hurricanes, he perhaps

could help victims of such calamities. The

victims, many of whom were in the otherwise impenetrable reaches of the Okeechobee

region, needed help. John A. Roebling agreed

to finance the project to build a vehicle that

in his words, "would bridge the gap between

where a boat grounded and a car flooded

out." His son Donald became the dev.eloper and

the father ultimately spent $118,000 for two

amphibious tractors.

In designing such a vehicle, Donald Roebling

felt that two things were absolutely essential,

buoyancy and one means of propulsion for

both land and water. For buoyancy the vehicle

had to be constructed as light as possible and

weight would be of prime concern. In the early

l930s, aluminum was a comparatively new

product and Roebling believed that this material would be the key to the weight problem. In

combination with the weight problem was the

problem of locomotion on both land and water.

Roebling believed that the paddle-tread track

principle, similar to early paddle-wheel steamships, could be made to work.* Roebling, along

with members of his technical staff, Earl De

Bolt, Warren Cottrell, and S. A. Williams,

started to build the Alligator. The first ve- hicle, completed in 1935, was 24 feet long and

weighed 14,350 pounds and was powered by

a 92-horsepower Chrysler industrial engine**

The performance of the first vehicle was a

disappointment, because while it achieved 25

mph on land it slowed to a speed of only 2.3

1t was this paddle-tread principle that Roebling had

patented in 1938. He turned over his patent, #2138207,

to the government for universal use and without fee

during World War II. **The first model was immediately made available

to the U.S. Coast Guard and American Red Cross for

rescue work. There is nothing to indicate that either

agency accepted it at the time, perhaps because of the

initial performance of the vehicle.
ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL 55

Donald Roebling's original 1935 Alligator. (Photo

courtesy of Sun Photos, Clearwater Sun, Clearwater,

Fla.).

mph when run in water. Such performance indicated that the conventional straight tractor

cleats set straight across the tracks were extremely inefficient for water propulsion. The

first model was rebuilt and completed in April

1936. The cleats of the tracks were changed to

a diagonal setting across the chains to push

the water out from the sides, weight was reduced by 2,240 pounds, and a new 85-horsepower Ford V8 engine was installed. After testing, the vehicle's land speed was reduced to 18

mph but more important, water speed was more

than doubled to 5.45 mph.49

A second modification in September 1936

reduced the weight by 310 more pounds and

land and water speed slightly increased. The

third modification, completed in 1937, resulted

in the most significant changes of all. The

length of the vehicle was decreased by four

feet with corresponding decrease in track

length and weight and a new track was in- stalled. The new track was the highlight of

the 1937 model. All tractors had used bogie

and idler wheels, necessary appurtenances

which normally supported the track and kept

it moving properly. Roebling had not particularly liked this arrangement. He designed

a chain with built-in roller bearings, with a

smooth steel channel around the track contour

for the rollers to ride on while supporting the

weight of the vehicle. He replaced idler wheels

with idler blocks and replaced straight cleats

with curved cleats. The result of these changes

was an increase in maneuverability and water

speed. The water speed of this model was 8.6

mph while the land speed remained at 18 to 20

mph. The vehicle was reduced by 3,100 pounds

and now weighed 8,700 pounds.

It was this 1937 model that appeared with

picture and short story in the 4 October 1937

edition of Life magazine that would excite the

Marine Corps' interest in an amphibious tank.

Rear Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, Commander,

Battleships, Battle Force, U.S. Fleet, showed

Major General Louis McCarty Little, then commanding the Fleet Marine Force, the Life

magazine article with pictures of the strange

vehicle. General Little was quick to grasp its

potentialities and sent the article to the Commandant, Major General Thomas Holcomb.

Holcomb in turn, passed it along to the Equipment Board at Quantico.5° The board, headed

by Brigadier General Frederic L. Bradman,

dispatched Major John Kaluf, Secretary to the

Board, to Clearwater to see the vehicle perform and to consult with Roebling. Kaluf

recalls that "Roebling had a vehicle fully operational at the time and put it through every kind of test that I could dream up. I took

about 400 feet of 16mm movie film which I

brought back with me. The Board liked what

they saw and gave it a very favorable boost." 51

In May 1938, the Commandant cited this opinion in recommending to the Navy that

"steps be taken to procure a pilot model of

this type of amphibious boat for further tests

under service conditions and during Fleet

Landing Exercise No. 5." Both the Continuing

Board and the Bureau of Construction and Repair endorsed the recommendation unfavorably on the grounds of economy. Funds were

so limited at this time that the few dollars

available were being spent on the development

of landing boats.52

1937 Alligator model undergoing tests at Clearwater,

Fla. Major John Kaluf, Secretary to the Equipment

Board, was the Marine observer. (Photo courtesy of

Sun Photos, Clearwater Sun, Clearwater, Fla.).

a
56 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Again the Marine Corps persisted and again

the few sympathetic naval officers at the bureau

came through with a small appropriation to

have Roebling start work on a model to be

used by the military as an amphibian tractor.

Three months earlier, in October 1939, General Moses, President of the Equipment Board,

visited Roebling at his shop in Clearwater,

Florida and persuaded Roebling to design a

model for such use.53 By January 1940, Roebling

had completed the new design and in May,

the new amphibious tractor was completed.

This model, built from the ground up, incorporated all of the experience gained from

the previous work including a further weight

reduction to 7,700 pounds. The vehicle was

20 feet long, 8 feet wide, and had a maximum

climbable grade of a 55 degree slope. Its water

speed was between 8 and 10 mph and in the

open sea, or when landing on a beach through

surf, the 1940 "alligator" was more seaworthy

than a normal boat of comparable size. It

would not sink, even with its 7,000-pound cargo

compartment full of water; nor would it

capsize in a dive into deep water off a 6-foot

seawall. This new model was powered by a

95 hp Mercury V8 engine. Two vertical hand

levers between the driver's knees controlled the

steering clutches, and without cargo, the vehicle drew less than three feet of water.

With more money in sight, the Bureau of

Ships contracted with Roebling to build one

other vehicle of the same general design of the

May 1940 model but powered with a 120 hp

Lincoln-Zephyr engine. On 26 and 27 August

1940, Brigadier General Moses, with a party

of Marine and Navy officers from the Bureau of

Ships, inspected the model being built. The

inspection was highly satisfactory and afforded

an opportunity to make minor adjustments

and modifications in the construction within

the terms of the contract.55 After the model

was completed and given a final testing at

Clearwater about the 14th of October, it was

delivered to Quantico the first week in

November.

Under the watchful eye of the CMC and a

large party of high ranking officers of the Army

and Navy, the October model travelled 29 mph

on land and 9.72 mph in water. The Quantico

demonstration was successful but had its bad

spots, including the model being bogged down

in the Chopawamsic Creek. Further tests were

scheduled.

During Fleet ExercisesNumber 7, in January and February 1941, the last such FLEX

before World War II, Captain Victor H.

Krulak of the 1st Marine Brigade staff with

two other members of his test crew, Sergeant

Clarence H. Raper and Corporal Walter L.

Gibson, put the "alligator" through various

tests. Lieutenant General Krulak recalls that

he went on board the USS Wyoming to request

Major General Holland M. Smith to ask Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander, Atlantic

Fleet, who was visiting Culebra, if he wouldn't

like to ride in the "alligator." Admiral King

said he was pressed for time but yes, he

would go for a short ride. General Krulak

recounts the following:

Admiral King came aboard and no one else

volunteered to come and he didn't ask anyone

else. It was just the Admiral, an aide, Raper,

Gibson, and I in the "alligator." We cruised about a little bit and I said, "Now let me show you

what it can do on this coral, Admiral." He looked

at his wristwatch and said, "I don't have very

long." "I said, "it will just be a minute." I was just

going to show him how we go right over the coral but we didn't. The track broke and we were in

%'ater about 4 feet deep. We weren't going to get

off the coral and no boat could get to us. We were about 50 yards from the beach, so he climbed

over the side of the boat with his aide, waded

ashore and was picked tip in a vehicle and taken

to the town of Dewey and went about his business.

My impression was that I don't think the Admiral ever forgot the "alligator."'

The "alligator" measured up in every respect with two exceptions. Its aluminum construction was not considered rugged enough for

hard military use and the track would not endure the abrasive effect of sand and salt water.58

The tractor was so impressive in every other

respect, however, that the Navy negotiated a

contract with Roebling to redesign the tractor

to include military characteristics with all steel

construction in place of aluminum.* Roebling

called on the Food Machinery Corporation

(FMC) for help in redesigning the "alligator." The corporation had plants in nearby

Dunedin and Lakeland and had made components for Roebling's earlier models. Mr.

James M. Hait, then Chief Engineer of the

Peerless Division, organized an engineering

group to redesign the "alligator." Using all

steel construction and changing from riveting

*On 29 August 1940, the M.C. Equipment Board recommended to the Bureau of Ships that future amphibian tractors be of welded steel construction. President, M.C. Equipment Board hr dated 8 October 1940

(Box 2, Record Group 65A—4939, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md.).
pi

ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL 57

to welding, considered by Hait to be essential

to the main design, two prototypes were built

in the Riverside, California plant of FMC.59

The Navy awarded FMC a contract for an

official design and further development of the

"alligator," now officially dubbed LVT (Landing Vehicle Tracked) (1). FMC was also

awarded a contract for 200 more LVTs and

the first one came off the assembly line in

July 1941.

By the end of World War II, 15,654 LVTs

were built. FMC's three plants in Lakeland,

Florida and Riverside and San Jose, California

built 11,251 LVTs. Borg-Warner Corporation

of Kalamazoo, Michigan, St. Louis Car Company of St. Louis, Missouri, and GrahamPaige Motors Corporation of Detroit, Michigan built the remaining 4,4Ø36O

As an anecdote to the building of the first

1,225 LVT (1)s, it was asked of Donald Roebiing why all the Roebling alligators were built

exactly 9 feet, 10 inches wide. Roebling gave,

while not a scientific answer, a humorous

reply when he said that the first military model

was built in his own shop on his estate. The

model produced was 9'lO" wide simply because

his shop doors and gate posts on the grounds

were only 10 feet wide.*

In order to observe and report on the construction of the LVTs, Major George W.

McHenry was appointed Resident Inspector of

Naval Material at the Food Machinery Corporation plant at Dunedin, Florida in February 1941.61 To work on and train in operating

the new LVTs scheduled to come off the assembly line, an Amphibian Tractor Detachment was organized 2 May 1941 at Dunedin,

Florida with Major William W. Davies as commanding officer. Four other officers and 33 enlisted men made up the detachment. This

detachment served as a nucleus for training

men in LVT operation. After training, officers

and men were then assigned to the newly

organized letter companies of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion. By 16 February 1942,

the battalion was complete with four companies, including an Headquarters and Service

Company, and was part of the 1st Marine

Division.62

*lt should be noted that after the war, President

Harry Truman presented the Medal for Merit to

Donald Roebling for his outstanding services to the

United States. (See Appendix H for citation). Robert

L. Longstreet, Clearwater News, 27 March 1Q47.

LVT(1)s being tested by the Marine detachment at Dunedin, Fla., on 18 September 1941. (USMC Photo *5295O6).
:i

I

58 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

An experimental observation aircraft, the Pitcairn

OP—i autogiro, at Quantico on 14 November 1932.

(USMC Photo #514902).

Marine Aviation in the Thirties

Marine aviators in the early thirties were

busy racing and testing aircraft. Captain

Arthur H. Page and Lieutenant Vernon M.

Guymon set a record for sustained blind flight,

flying from Omaha to Washington, D.C., in

July 1930. Captain Page, piloting an 02U from

a sealed, hooded cockpit, flew the instrument

flight of about 1,000 miles. Captain Page, who

earlier in the year won the Curtiss Marine Trophy Race, an annual event for service seaplanes,

died in a crash in September of 1930. He was

the only military entrant in a race for the

Thompson Trophy at Chicago.83 In another

part of the world, Major Francis P. Mulcahy

and other Marine aviators in November 1932

had tested a strange rotary.wing machine, called

the Pitcairn autogiro which was designated the

OP—i. Mulcahy reported that the autogiro's

chief value in expeditionary duty was in "inspecting small fields recommended by ground

troops as landing areas, evacuating medical

sitting cases, and ferrying of important person.

nel." 04 Technically, lack of weight-lifting

capabilities and high gas consumption where

two of the major shortcomings of the OP—I of

1932.

Organizational changes brought on by the

creation of the FMF in December 1933 raised

the importance of Marine aviation. In 1935,

the Aviation Section at Headquarters, Marine

Corps was separated from the Division of

Operations and Training and became an

independent section under the CMC. On 1

April 1936, it became a division under a Director of Aviation. The director of the new division served as an adviser to the Commandant

on all aviation matters and as a liaison officer

between the Marine Corps and the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics. Unlike the ground

units of the Marine Corps which drew their

equipment from both the Army and Navy, in

addition to supplying much of their own, Marine aviation depended solely on the Navy

for its aircraft and all other aviation gear.66

By 1939, FMF ground forces were organized

in two units, the 1st Brigade based on the east

coast at Quantico and the 2d Brigade based

on the west coast at San Diego. Each brigade

had the support of a Marine aircraft group

of corresponding numerical designation. In addition, FMF aviation further boasted a scouting squadron (VMS—3) based in the Virgin

Islands.66 By the end of the decade, the authorized strength of Marine Aviation, FMF, was

124 officers, 15 warrant officers, 56 aviation

cadets, and 1,120 enlisted men.67

The Genesis of Close Air Support

As the Marine Corps developed the various

techniques contributing to a smooth landing

operation, it had to give more consideration

to the means of providing early fire support

for landing troops. In the absence of the artillery support available in conventional land

warfare, the 11arine Corps evolved the unique

technique of close air support (CAS). The

term "close air support" referred to the attack

of ground objectives located close to friendly

units. By its very nature, Marine Corps aviation had long specialized in the development

of techniques for this type of support for

ground forces. This had always been the principal reason for the existence of Marine Corps

aviation as a separate branch of naval aviation. The development started shortly after

World War I when various Marine aviators

pursued with vigor any proposed technique

which would enable them to deliver bombs on

a ground target with an acceptable degree of

reliability and accuracy. Marine Corps participation in "small wars" in various foreign

countries from Haiti to China provided invaluable experience in supporting small

ground units under difficult conditions of terrain and climate. These experiences were consolidated and reduced to written form in the
ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL 59

1934 edition of the Tentative Landing Manual

and subsequent editions.68

The manual considered the vulnerable concentrations of troops in transports, landing

boats, and on the beach and called for a threeto-one numerical superiority over the enemy

in the air. In the 1938 edition, FTP—167, the

ratio was increased to four-to-one, primarily

to wipe the enemy air threat out of the skies

and secondarily to shatter the enemy's beachhead defense and to cut off his reinforcements.69 More important, emphasis was placed

on the direct assistance aviation could give

the troops such as guiding the landing boats

to the beach, laying smoke screens, and providing reconnaissance and spotting for naval gunfire and artillery. The kernel of CAS lay in

the importance of rendering direct fire support

to the landing force until the artillery was

ashore and ready to fire.

After the landing, the challenge became that

of applying the fire power of Marine air to

destroy specific enemy frontline positions withOut endangering nearby friendly troops. Refinement of this skilled technique as we know

it today was slow because of many factors.

An excellent analysis of this refinement of

techniques is contained in Volume I, History

of USMC Operations in World War II:

There was so much for pilots to learn about

rapidly developing military aviation that close air

support had to take its place in the busy training

syllabus after such basic drill as aerial tactics, air

to air gunnery, strafing, bombing, navigation, carrier landings, and communications and constant

study of the latest in engineering, aerodynamics,

and flight safety.

Also, whenever newer, faster, and higher flying

airplanes trickled into the Marine Corps in the

lean thirties, they were found to be less adaptable

for close coordination with ground troops than

the slower, .open cockpit planes which supported

the patrol actions of Nicaragua. In Nicaragua the

aviator in his open cockpit could idle his throttle

so as to locate an enemy machine gun by its sound,

but in the maneuvers of 1940 pilots flashing by

in their enclosed cockpits found it difficult to see

what was going on below or even to differentiate

between friendly and "enemy" hills. In Nicaragua,

the Marine flier was most often an ex-infantryman,

but 10 years later many of the new Navy-trained

Marine aviators were fresh from college and knew

little about ground tactics. The lack of a real

enemy to look for, identify, and to shoot at

hindered attempts at precision, especially since air- ground radio was not yet as reliable as the old

slow but sure system where pilots read code messages from cloth panels laid on the ground or

swooped down with weighted lines to snatch messages suspended between two poles.

The main key to development of close air support lay in reliable communications to permit

quick liaison and complete understanding between

the pilot and the frontline commander. Part of

the solution lay in more exercises in air-ground

coordination with emphasis on standardized and

simplified air-ground communications and maps.7°

By the end of the decade, the CMC noted

in his annual report to the Secretary of Navy

that "air-ground training between aviation and

ground troops has been conducted whenever

possible." Also as a step in the right direction,

an aviator was assigned as an air liaison officer to the 1st Marine Brigade Staff in 1939.

Thereafter, the billet became permanent. With

the theory of employing aircraft in tactical

support of troops well understood, and airground exercises conducted whenever possible,

the method of exercising control of supporting

aircraft, particularly large numbers of aircraft,

would have to be left to the next decade and

the initial engagements of World War II.

CHAPTER IV

THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES—THE WAR AND THE BOMB

The 1940s produced the most destructive

war in history and by the middle of the decade

had given birth to the atomic age. With the

fall of France in June 1940 and the Battle of

Britain about to begin, President Franklin D.

Roosevelt announced his policy of endeavoring to save Britain and at the same time prepared America for a national emergency. In

a speech to the graduating class of the University of Virginia on 10 June 1940, he announced:

En our American unity, we will pursue two

obvious and simultaneous courses; we will extend

to the opponents of force the material resources

of this nation; and, at the same time, we will

harness and speed up the use of those resources

in order that we ourselves in the Americas may

have equipment and training equal to the task

of any emergency and every defense.1

On 14 June 1940, the elate that the Germans

occupied Paris, the President signed a naval

expansion bill that had been under discussion

for months. In effect, it gave the Navy the

green light to build a "two-ocean" Navy. By

the end of the fiscal year Federal expenditures

for the Army and Navy rose from $1.8 billion

for the fiscal year 1940 to $6.3 billion for the

fiscal year 1941.

On 15 June 1940, the President appointed

a group of eminent civilian scientists to a new

National Defense Research Committee. Vannevar Bush, president of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, was the chairman. From

this committee stemmed most of the scientific

research done for the armed forces during the

war.* By September 1940, Congress established

the first peacetime compulsory military service

program with the Burke-Wadsworth (Selective

*An excellent history and analysis of the story of

the National Defense Research Committee and other

research and (Ievelopment agencies during the war is

contained in Chapter XIX of the Administration of

the Navy Department in World War II by Rear Admiral Julius A. Furer published in 1959.

Training and Service) Act which called for

the registration of all men aged 21—35. By the

end of the year, the President established the

Office of Production Management under William S. Knudsen to coordinate defense production. In 1941, Congress passed the LendLease Act, which empowered the President to

provide defense equipment to countries whose

security was vital to the defense of the United

States. During the war, lend-lea€e aid totaled

some $51 billion.

In the Far East, a Japanese imperial conference, in the summer of 1941, decided on

expansion southward even if it meant war with

the United States and Great Britain. Three

weeks later, the Japanese occupied southern

French Indo-China. America, two days later,

declared economic warfare on Japan by freezing all Japanese assets in the United States and stopped all trading with Japan. Diplomatically, the remaining months of 1941 were

concerned with talks between Japan and the

United States about resuming trade and the

American demand for Japan to get out of

China and Indo-China.

The day after the attack on Pearl Harbor,

the United States declared war on Japan and

three days later, Germany and Italy declared

war on the United States.

War Plans

The organization of our government is particularly well adapted to effective preparation

for and conduct of war, yet history shows that,

due to failure to give adequate consideration

to this subject during peace, war has always

found us unprepared, and our conduct of war

has been both uneconomical and inefficient.2

The United States, as all sovereign nations

before her, made plans for war with potential

enemies and their allies. America, a late61
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62 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

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THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES—THE WAR AND THE BOMB 63

starter in the business of foreign wars, began

making such plans only after it became a

nation with colonies; that is, after the Spanish- American War. The group in the military

services responsible for framing the war plans

of the United States was the Joint Army and

Navy Board. The board, founded in 1903, initially had a membership of eight; four Army

and four Navy officers.* The Marine Corps was

never represented on the Joint Board and

would have to wait until after World War II

to be represented on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It should be noted, however, that the CMC

or his representative, particularly during World

War 11, was always a close adviser to the

senior naval officer on the Joint Board, in

matters concerning the Marine Corps.

*After reorganization in 1919, the board consisted

of six members, the Army Chief of Staff and the CNO,

their deputies, and the Chiefs of the War Plans Divisions of each of the services. Kent Roberts Greenfleld,

ed., Command Decisions (Washington: Office of the

Chief of Military History, Department of the Army,

1960), p. 13.

Prior to World War II, war plans derived

their titles from the code name of the probable enemy, and because Japan was designated

ORANGE, the plan dealing with a conflict

with Japan was called ORANGE Plan.3 After 1907, and the war scare with Japan (see

Chapter I), the plan most likely to be used became the ORANGE Plan. It provided the

strategic concept and missions to be followed

in the event of war with Japan. Each of the

services developed its own plan to guide its

operations in an emergency, and field and fleet

commanders drew up the plans to carry out

these operations. Many changes in concept of the ORANGE Plan took place in the Intervening years because of changes in the international scene.

Before World War I, the broad concept was

that the Army was to defend the Philippines

until the fleet could carry reinforcements across

the Pacific. Naval strategists realized that before

a relief expedition could be dispatched to the

Philippines, Japan certainly would have seized

HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS, I AUGUST 1941
64 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Guam, thus depriving the United States of its

only fleet anchorage between Pearl Harbor

and Manila Bay. The Navy conjectured that

either Guam would have to be retaken or some

other site occupied as a coaling and repair

station. After World War I, the ORANGE Plan

took on new dimensions when Japan gained

control over the former German possessions in

the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas. The

Philippines were more vulnerable than before

and Guam now was ringed by Japanese outposts. The Joint Board again had to review

and revise the ORANGE Plan series.

The Marine Corps' claim for an important

role in an ORANGE war came in their contributory plan to the Navy's ORANGE Plan.

The plan, called 712D—Operatioii Plan, was

the work of Major Earl H. El1is. In 1921,

*Earl H. Ellis, also known as Pctc, was born in Luka,

Kansas, in 1880. After graduation from high school. he

enlisted in the Marine Corps and served about a year

before being commissioned from the ranks as a 2d

Ellis was assigned to the then newly formed

Division of Operations and Training at Headquarters Marine Corps. Having previously written a significant article on Advanced Base

Operations, Ellis wrote another study called

Lieutenant in December 1901. He attended the Naval

War College as a captain from 1911—1912, after which he

remained on the staff of the college. While on the stall,

he wrote a significant paper entitled 'Naval Bases;

Location, Resources, Denial of Bases, Security of Advanced Bases' in 1913. It was accepted and 1)uhlished

in 1921, the same year as his Advanced Base Operations

in Micronesia." He served in Fiance (luring \\'orld War

I and received a Navy Cross for his services with the 4th

Brigade. After a short tour at HQMC lie was granted a

leave of absence from the Marine Corps in 1922. He

traveled to the Philippines, Japan, and finally to the

Caroline Islands. The State Department notified the

CMC that Ellis had die(1 at l'arao, Caroline Islands, on

12 May 1923. It is with historical certitude to say that

Ellis had seen, while in the Caroline Islands. what the

world would ultimately know h' WW II. that the

apanese illegally fortified the mandated islands contrary

to the League of Nations instructions.
THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES-THE WAR AND THE BOMB 65

As a result of these studies, landing operations doctrine evolved, landing techniques

were refined, and new types of landing craft

were tested. There was no novelty or farsightedness in that Ellis had foreseen a war with Japan, that fact was quite common

among the planners and leaders of the times.

What was far-sightedness on his part was in

the unique contribution of his plan which

lay in the detailed guidelines on the tactics

and techniques employed in seizing an island

base. With newer and better equipment, the

tactics and techniques employed during World

War II were little different than what Ellis

had envisioned.

Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. Ellis, author in 1921 of

Operation Plan 712, "Advanced Base Operations in

Micronesia." (USMC Photo #307257).

'Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia,

1921." It was this study that the CMC, John A.

Lejeune, approved and accepted, in total, as 712D—Operation Plan.4

Ellis' plan concentrated on one segment of

a war against ORANGE, that of seizing a base

that would be urgently needed by the Navy

as a coaling or repair station. The objective

Ellis had in mind was that of the Marshall Islands. He outlined the tactics to be used

against islands within the Marshall group such

as Eniwetok, Wotje, and Maloelap. Although

his theories were limited by the equipment

then available, he made several sound recommendations, urging among other things that

troops fighting ashore have at their disposal

the on-call fire of supporting warships. Considering the times, Ellis' plan marked a complete break with tradition. No longer would

Marines be used primarily to defend advanced

bases; instead, they would seize these bases

from the enemy.5

Aside from the important contribution and

originality in Ellis' plan, the value of the writing lay in the fact that it was truly a first-step

approach to the problems of landing operations. Marine Corps and Navy officers of the

1920s and l930s elaborated on Ellis' concept

of seizing a base, as evidenced by the Advanced

Base Problems worked on and discussed by MCS and the Naval War College. Otherkey

Pacific islands were subsequently studied as potential battlefields.

Refinement of Tactics and Techniques

in Amphibious Operations

During World War II

Naval Gunfire (NGF)*

During World War II, many additions, deletions, and variations in general were made

on the proven existing tactics and techniques

involved in amphibious operations** Perhaps the greatest improvements occurred in

naval gunfire, close air support, and artillery

fire. Certainly the best coordination of the

three occurred during the war with the advent of the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC). In the area of naval gunfire, the

Tentative Landing Operations Manual recognized the danger inherent in NGF support

in conjunction with movement of troops

ashore. A rudimentary doctrine evolved by

the late 1930s, and bombardment experimentation was conducted on training ranges at

*Within the Marine Corps today, as a kind of a

tongue-in-cheek truism, a person might be described

as the 'duty expert" in such-and-such a field. Using

this term in retrospect, the "duty expert" in the naval gunfire area was Colonel Donald M. Weller. See his

two articles in the U.S. Naval institute Proceedings of

August and September 1954, 'Salvo-splash!, the Development of Naval Gunfire Support in World War II."

**"Amphibious operations' were words evolved during the early part of the decade of the l940s. The

meaning was not new but otilv the use of the words

Amphibious operations were synonymous with landing

operations, a term used during the preceding 50 years. The term, amphibious, started to be used in fleet

training publications during the late l930s. By 1940,

the U.S. Atlantic Fleet used it in a report to describe

training of Army and Navy forces. By june 1942, the

Navy added to the Fleet Training Division (Op—22) an

'amphibious warfare section" (F—45). By the end of the

war, it was quite a familiar term.
)

66 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Culebra and San Clemente Islands. These

bombardments were adjusted by shore fire control parties composed entirely of Navy personnel. Navy personnel were quite familiar with their ship's firing and no harm could

come from shelling an island as long as troops

were not involved. However, the same people were wholly unfamiliar with the tactical

maneuvers of the troops they would be supporting in an actual operation. By 1941, the

tempo of the development of NGF was accelerated. Shore bombardment exercises began

to be conducted on a scheduled basis. The

shore fire control party was reorganized as a

landing force unit with a Marine artillery

spotter and a Marine radio crew and a Navy

officer serving in a liaison capacity. These

shore fire control parties, as well as air spotters from potential fire support ships, received

special training in Quantico and at a newly

acquired bombardment range at Bloodsworth

Island in the Chesapeake Bay.°

By August 1942, naval gunfire support was

utilized in actual combat in the landing on

Guadalcanal. There was, however, no initial

hostile resistance to that landing. When planfling for the Gilbert Islands began, it was

General Alexander A. Vandegrift, 18th Commandant

of the Marine Corps, 1 January 1944 to 31 December

1947. (USMC Photo #306429).

General Thomas E. Holcomb, 17th Commandant of

the Marine Corps, 1 December 1936 to 31 December

1943. (USMC Photo #12444A).

realized that strong defensive fortifications

would be encountered, The plan of gunfire

support for the assault of Tarawa Atoll called

for 75 minutes of the heaviest naval support

ever delivered up to that time. Even so, although many enemy troops were neutralized,

the majority of the defensive installations

were still effective.* The lessons learned at

Tarawa marked a turning point in the concept and execution of naval gunfire support.

As a result, Marine Corps planners developed

a concept for deliberate destruction of individual targets as opposed to general neutralization. This concept proved its value throughout the remainder of World War II.

The Marine Corps continued to press for

improvements in gunfire support. At the request of the Marine Corps and with concurrence of the• Navy, 20 LSMs, Landing Ships

Medium, were converted into LSM(R)s,

(Landing Ships, Medium (Rocket)). The LSM

was developed as a tank carrier and was 203

feet long with a beam of 34 feet. It could

carry either five M4 medium tanks, or six

Landing Vehicles, Tracked (LVTs). The

*The commanding officer of the transport group

which landed the Marines at Tarawa recalled stating

his doubts of the efficacy of naval gunfire at Tarawa. He had witnessed a similar bombing and bombardment of Gavutu Island in the Solomons where he said

the results had been most disappointing. RAdm Herbert

B. Knowles lEr to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G—3,

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, dated 1 September

1962, as quoted in Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, p. 36.
THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES-THE WAR AND THE BOMB 67

LSM, when converted to the LSM(R), was

equipped in late 1944 and early 1945 with

from 10 to as many as 105 rocket launchers and

one 5-inch/38 caliber dual-purpose gun.7 The

LSM(R) was essentially an area suppressive fire

ship used to support amphibious operations.

These relatively inexpensive and simple ships

provided the capability of delivering large

volumes of fire in short periods of time.

Another support ship, a converted Landing

Craft, Infantry (Large) (LCI (L)) and dubbed

Landing Craft, Infantry (Mortar) (LCI (M))

was used extensively at Iwo Jima and later in

the Okinawa campaign. At Iwo Jima, LCI (M)s

provided "direct support on call and harassing

fire to break up enemy counter-attacks. With

their shallow draft they could work close inshore on the flanks and often were in a position

to shoot up gullies against enemy targets that

were not visible to the Marines." 8 During the

first week on Iwo Jima, 30 LCI (M) s were assigned, but owing to breakdowns not all were

available at the same time.

A LSM(R) fires its rockets at enemy targets in the

Kerama Retto off Okinawa in late March 1945. (USIV

Photo #474951).

Close Air Support (CAS)

In the years prior to the war, the mission

of Marine aviation, as directed by the General

Board, was:

Marine aviation is to be equipped, organized, and trained primarily for the support of the FMF

in landing operations and in the support of troop

activities in the field; and secondarily as replacement squadrons of carrier based naval aircraft

Out of the general definition the fine points

of CAS were defined as:

Attack by aircraft of hostile ground targets which

are at such close range to friendly front lines as

to require detailed integration of each air mission

with the fire and movement of ground forces in

order to insure safety, prevent interference with

other elements of the combined arms and permit

prompt exploitation of the shock, casualty, and

neutralization effect of the air attack.'°

The major problem initially of carrying out

the intentions of the CAS definition was the

lack of communications between the front

lines and the support aircraft. CAS at Guadalcanal was rendered by Navy carrier planes supporting the landing. Later, Army and Marine

pilots operating from Henderson Field gave

support to the troops. The difficulty was that

the line of communication extended from the

front line to the headquarters at Henderson

Field to the aircraft. Pilots were given the

target before takeoff. In many cases they

walked up to the front lines and visually

checked the target. This system might be one

of the forerunners of the Tactical Air Control

Party consisting of a Marine aviator and communications personnel.* Prior o the Bougainville operation, a close air support school

was organized under the direction of the 3d

Division Air Officer and was attended by officers from each infantry regiment and battalion headquarters.

Based on Guadalcanal experience, three

main objectives were sought in air support

studies conducted by the 3d Division. These

were: improved means of target designation,

exploration of the precise effect of bombs and

fusings of various types, and the determination of safety margins necessary for protection

of our own troops. The employment of varied

colored smoke for target designation was studied as a means of decreasing the effectiveness of the enemy's previous attempts to confuse our target designation with white smoke.

During the instruction, air liaison party per- sonnel were given intensive training in the

use of field communication equipment and

in air-ground communication procedure.

When the 3d Division went ashore at Bougainville, its subordinate units included

trained air liaison parties which could advise

*Brigadier General Edward C. Dyer suggests that

an even earlier forerunner of the Tactical Air Control

Party was the use of panels by front line troops and

the system of dropping and picking up written messages such as was done on Culebra in 1939. BGen

Edward C. Dyer ltr to the Director, MC. History,

dated 10 August 1970 (Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.)
68 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

the ground commander in matters of air support, transmit requests for such support, and

assume tactical direction of any aircraft as- signed.'1

The Bougainville operation in November

1943 marked a long stride in the evolution of

the part aircraft were to play in the support

of the amphibious advance. The techniques

of CAS were perfected throughout the war.

They paid greater dividends as the islandhopping program went on but there remained

the inherent danger; bombing friendlies.

There were instances of pilot error resulting

in strafing and bombing our own troops and

this of course did not improve the ground

troops' confidence in GAS. However, the decision to employ GAS, while recognizing the

calculated risk, rested with the commander

of the troops concerned.1' The ultimate doctrine of GAS that the Marine Corps evolved by the end of the war was based on two major techniques used in two major campaigns—the Philippines and Okinawa.

In October 1944, Marine pilots from MAG—

24, at Bougainville, were given a mission to

support an Army corps in the Philippines. A

GAS school was set up under the direction of

Lieutenant Colonel Keith B. McCutcheon.

The 37th Army Division was in the area and

joint training problems were scheduled with

them and MAG—24. McCutcheon noted:

All pilots had the opportunity to observe a terrain problem conducted by an infantry battalion

simulating an attack on a Japanese pillbox installation. To these problems the Group added planes

in close support with their own Air Liaison Parties on the ground. Live bombs were not dropped, but the infantry actually fired, everything in the

book.13

What came out of the school was the principle that Marine aviators adopted and which

was later adopted by Army Air and Navy that:

Close Air Support is an additional weapon to he

employed only at the discretion of the ground corn- mander. He may employ it against targets that

cannot be reached by other weapons or in conjunction with the ground weapons in a coordinated

attack. It should be immediately available and

should be carried out with deliberation and accuracy and in coordination with other assigned

units.'3

At various conferences prior to the Luzon

operation and MAG—24's support of the 1st

Cavalry Division's sweep toward Manila, the

Fifth Air Force, Southwest Pacific Area, with

the Navy concurring, stated that it was not

contemplating using direct communication between its Air Liaison Parties (ALPs) and the

planes in the direction of a mission. MAG--24

thought otherwise, so further emphasis was

placed on training its own Air Liaison Parties.

McCutcheon said that ". . . the Group did

intend to have good control of its aircraft

when engaged in close support, and if (Air

Force) Air Liaison Parties were not to be

permitted to give that control then the Group

would send out its own personnel to give it." '

So it was that MAG—24 furnished its own

ALPs. It was further determined that the

policy would be control of the aircraft by the

front line ALP on his own front using direct

communication. In this way the ALP talked

the support pilots to the target without going

through a distant control1er. This was possi

ble in the Philippines operation because air

units were supporting no more than one division at a time. This was not the case on

Okinawa. Inasmuch as five divisions were involved on Okinawa, four in line simultaneously, a closer,' coordinated control of aircraft

was necessary.

The aerial support of ground operations

was handled through a smoothly functioning

system of coordinating agencies. The breakclown was as follows:

Air Liaison Parties from the Joint Assault Signal

Companies (JASCOs) were attached to each of the

four divisions. * * * Requests for air suppos-t by the ALPs were

made to one of the three l.anding Force Air Support Control Units (LAFASCU5) all commanded

by Colonel Vernon E. Mcgee. Colonel Mcgee,

physically located at Tenth Army Headquarters in

LAFASCU—3, coordinated the work of LAFASCU—1

and LAFASCU—2 which handled the air support

requests of the III Amphibious Corps and XXIV

Corps respectively. * * * * Colonel Mcgee, in reality LAFASCU-3, screened

all requests for air support of the ground troops

and relayed all orders direct to 'Iactical Air Force

(TAF), Tenth Army. Out of its allocation of planes,

TAF responded accordingly. Because of the Japanese Kamikaze attacks (lirCCtCd against naval units

*Lieutenant General Keith B. McCutcheon stated, in

a letter to the Director of Marine Corps history, that

'The ALPS that we used (in the Philippines) were the

true forerunners of TACPS. We also had a van motintecl

radio that we farmed out to division CPs when it was

necessary, and it was the forerunner of the I)ASC. 'I'he

main contribution that we made in the Philippines,

however, was to break the ban on having controllers

in the front lines talk directly to aircraft and actually

control the strikes." (HRS, HD, IIQMC)
THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES-THE WAR AND THE BOMB 69

USS Idaho firing in support of landing operations at Okinawa on i April 1945. (USMC Photo #116412).

off Okinawa, "operational control of aircraft in the Ryukyus remained with the Navy until the area

was secured." °

By the end of the war a system of control

evolved which attempted to incorporate the

flexibility of the Philippine system with the

coordination of the Okinawa system. The request for air support would go direct to a center called the Tactical Air Direction Center. Intermediate echelons would monitor the

request, indicating their approval by silence.

When air support was approved, it would be

controlled by the Forward Air Controller

whenever the tactical situation permitted. This

introduced the flexibility of the Philippine

system without sacrifice of safety to the

ground troops or interference with the overall

tactical situation.

Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC)

Standard artillery tactics and doctrine

proved sound throughout the war. On different islands some organic weapons were inadequate for the task of destroying the type of

emplacements encountered. On Iwo Jima, the

105mm and 75mm howitzers of the divisional

artillery battalions were completely unsuited

for the work of destroying many of the imposing Japanese fortifications. Even the much

heavier 155mm shells of corps units required

10 to 12 hits, all in the same place, to inflict

major damage.17 All was not lost, however, in

the ultimate destruction of those targets on

Iwo Jima. If artillery could not do the job,

then naval gunfire or support aircraft might

be able to do so. Iwo Jima was an example

of successful coordination of supporting arms. It was at Iwo Jima that the first Marine

FSCC was established. Colonel John S. Letcher

was selected by Major General Harry Schmidt,

V Amphibious Corps commander, to coordinate all supporting arms ashore. Colonel

Letcher was, in addition, commander of the

1st Provisional Field Artillery Group, namely

two 155mm howitzer battalions constituting

the corps artillery. Colonel Letcher, who set

up the FSCC in a tent, was in continuous

communication, afloat and ashore, with liaison officers assigned to each of the three divisional artillery regiments. Always at his elbow

was a representative of the naval gunfire officer

of the V Amphibious Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Donald l\I. Weller, and a liaison officer

from the Landing Force Air Support Control

Unit, headed by Letcher's senior, Colonel Vernon F. Megee. Both Megee and Weller had staff

separate and distinct from Letcher's and the

FSCC functioned as a clearing house of requests for close support coming in from the

field. Letcher, giving orders only to corps artillery, along with the air and naval gunfire

liaison officers, screened and integrated these

requests, and Megee and Weller as the ranking corps air and naval gunfire officers forwarded them in the status of requests to the

implementing agencies afloat.1s This arrangement was in effect a safeguard against unwarranted duplication of fires and against impos-
70 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

sible demands being made on any given arm.

In practice, it functioned extremely well.

The essential elements of the FSCC were

used in the Okinawa operation. The Tenth

Army utilized a Target Information Center (TIC). At each staff level down to the battalion, the artillery officer acted as the target

coordinator for infantry support. Working in

close conjunction with the NGF and air liaison officers, the TIC collated intelligence

regarding enemy defenses. It allocated fire missions to the support elements whose capabilities promised the most effective results. The

"system stood the test of combat without

major difficulties and drew unanimous praise

from the divisions using it." 19

Trials and Adaptations—Marine

Aviation

In addition to improvements in NGF, CAS,

and artillery support, the Marine Corps adapted

from the European war experience certain

training thought usable in the Pacific. The

first Marine Night Fighter Squadron, VMF

(N)—531, was commissioned 16 November 1942

at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), Cherry

Point, with Colonel Frank H. Schwable commanding. By 17 June 1943, the squadron had

six combat aircraft. Marine night fighters operated for the first time during the Bougainyule campaign and supplied the experience

on which subsequent training was based. Pilots were given intensive training in interception of and firing at an airborne target at

night. The Marine Corps sent officers to Great

Britain in February 1943 where they studied

the technique employed by the British in control of interception. They worked with the

Royal Air Force and attended a Fighter Director school at Stanmore, England. What they

learned was brought back to the United States

where night fighter training was given greater

emphasis. Marine Night Fighter Squadron 531, the original unit, went to Eagle Mountain

Lake, Texas, in April 1944, but by that time six

more night fighter squadrons had been organized in the Marine Corps.20

In addition, Marine Aviation set up an air

warning program and commissioned at Cherry

Point, on 1 July 1943, Marine Air Warning

Group I undei the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing.

Subsequently, Air Warning Squadron 1 was commissioned as the first of 19 such units. Officers were trained in radar at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard,

then went to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina

or Ward Island, Corpus Christi, Texas. Enlisted

radar technicians were trained at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, by the Army. Officers

attended the air warning school at Orlando,

Florida and commenced training at NAS, St.

Simon's Island, Georgia.h1

The Marine Corps considered training with

parachute troops and gliders. Marine Corps

paratroopers made their first demonstration

jumps at Lakehurst, New jersey, 29 December 1940. It was during fiscal year 1941, that

the Marine Corps was authorized to organize

two parachute battalions. A parachute training school was established in 1941 on the

West Coast near Santee, in the San Diego area,

and named Cam Gillespie in May 1942. These

courses lasted six weeks. By April 1943, there

were sufficient parachute troops available, approximately 3,000 men, to meet the operational

requirements. However, because of the terrain

of the Pacific Islands, and the lack of sufficient

lift capabilities, parachute units were disbanded

on 10 December 1943.22

In a similar vein, the Marine Corps organized

a barrage balloon training school at Parris

Island on 12 june 1941. Facilities were set up

in September 1941 at New River (Camp Iejeune), North Carolina. The purpose was to

train barrage balloon units with defense battalions in base defense operations Of six barrage balloon squadrons (designated ZM squadrons) four remained in the United States to

guard Navy yards and bases, two went overseas,

one to Tillagi and the other to New Caledonia.

It was learned that the l)alloon barrages crcateci as great a hazard to friendly aircraft as to

enemy planes. Their mission was to protect

the artillery of the defense battalion to which

they were assigned, but it was found that the

90mm antiaircraft guns proved more effective.

The barrage balloon organization was al)afl-

(toned 15 December l943.2

Another type o. training was in the use of

gliders. A study by the Bureau of Aeronautics

in june 1941 of towed gliders for the purpose

of transporting personnel and equipment culminated in the organization of a Marine Corps

Glider Detachment on 6 January 1942 at

Parris Island for primary and advanced trainiiig. The bureau was responsible for the procurement of glider equipment, while the Marifle Corps was responsible for training the

personnel required to operate gliders as-
THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES—THE WAR AND THE BOMB 71

signed for troop-carrying purposes. In order

to administer the program, the CMC authorized the Division of Aviation in July 1942, to

organize a glider-paratroop unit, and had as

officer-in-charge, Major John Wehie. By December 1942, there were 240 Marines taking training. Glider bases were constructed at Eagle

Mountain Lake, Texas, and Edenton, North

Carolina in the summer and fall of 1942 and

training got under way at Eagle Mountain Lake

in the spring of 1943. Again, after much

thought about the type of terrain in the Pacific

and the potential drain on pilot resources, the

glider program was abandoned 24 June 1943

when Marine Corps Glider Group 71 was disbanded and its personnel transferred to the

3d Aircraft Wing. A total of 207 gliders were

on order but none was delivered.24

And Then Came the Bomb

The atomic bomb ended the war and ushered

in the atomic age. Much information and misinformation and legend came as a result of the

survey of the damage at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In order to get the facts, the government

set up a series of tests, under the cognizance

of the Navy, called Operation CROSSROADS

in the summer of 1946. The place was Bikini Lagoon in the western Marshalls. Two

atomic bombs, one in the air, the other underwater, were exploded in the midst of a fleet

of obsolescent warships used as targets. The

results of the tests indicated that enough damage was done to drastically alter the World War II techniques of amphibious warfare.

Certain responsible military leaders were

quoted as saying that it would be impossible

to conduct an amphibious assault in a nilclear war. It is important to note that the

Navy and Marine Corps, from the outset, believed that the atomic weapon had had no

significant effect upon amphibious doctrine

but it did, of course, affect techniques and

equipment.

The senior Marine officer at the tests, Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, Commanding

General, FT\IF Pacific, wrote to the CIIC three

weeks after the tests what must be considered

a truly historic document of the Marine Corps.

His deep concern was reflected in the impressions he conveyed in his letter as follows:

tinder the assumption that atomic bombs can be

produced in large quantities, that thcv can l)e used

i'i mass attacks against an enemy objective, and

that our probable future enemy will be in possession of this weapon, it is my opinion that a

complete review and study of our concept of am- phibious operations will have to be made. It is

quite evident that a small number of atomic

bombs could destroy an expeditionary force as now

organized, embarked and landed. Such a force

might not fare so badly on the high seas, if properly dispersed—It is my opinion that future amphibious operations will be undertaken by much

smaller expeditionary forces, which will be highly

trained and lightly equipped, and transported by

air or submarine, and movement accomplished

with a greater degree of surprise and speed than

has ever been heretofore visualized. Or that large

forces must be dispersed over a much wider front than used in past operations. With an enemy in

possession of atomic bombs, I cannot visualize

another landing such as was executed at Normandy

or Okinawa. It is trusted that Marine Corps

Headquarters will consider this a very serious and

urgent matter and will use its most competent officers in finding a solution to develop the technique of conducting amphibious operations in

the atomic age."

Only 13 days after receiving this grim warning, the CMC appointed a special board headed

by Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and

two other members, Major General Field

Harris, Director of Aviation and Brigadier

General Oliver P. Smith, Commandant of the

Marine Corps Schools. The task of the Special

Board was to take up the matter of amphibious warfare in the atomic age.26 As it hap.

pened a decade or more before, and will undoubtedly happen in the future, the Marine

Corps Schools were called upon again to help

arrive at a solution. This Special Board appointed a Secretariat, to conduct the actual

research into probable effects of atomic explosion on future amphibious operations. The

Secretariat consisted of Colonel 1\Ierrill B.

Twining, Colonel Edward C. Dyer, and Lieutenant Colonel Clair W. Shisler.

The problems confronting the ]\larine Corps

in conducting amphibious assaults in the face

of atomic attack were exceedingly complex. The Navy believed, and the Marine Corps

agreed, that naval air and surface warfare

could be conducted in an atomic attack with

increased dispersion of the fleet. However, the

immediate problem for the FMF would be that

dispersion would not provide increased protection for the landing force. On the contrary, the landing force, as in the past, had

to concentrate in strength at the point of

landing or risk the consequences of depleted

firepower aggravated by insurmoun table dif-
72 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

ficulties of control and communications. Dispersion, which was necessary to the fleet, likewise deprived the amphibious attack of its

greatest characteristic—the ability to strike

swiftly and in overwhelming force. General

Alexander A. Vandegrift, the CMC, advised

the Special Board that in surmounting certain requirements revolutionary measures might

be required. He stated that "details are neither

expected nor desirable at this time, but general

principles must be determined in order to orient

the effort of the Marine Corps away from the

last war and toward the next." 21

The Shepherd Board's precept directed it to

study:

(1) Employment of helicopters for ship.to.shore

movement,

(2) Damage effects of the explosion of an atomic

bomb, and,

(3) Special equipment for amphibious operations.28

Within number (3) above, special equipment

for amphibious operations, the board considered airborne landings, submarine landings,

large flying boats, and helicopters.

On 16 December 1946, the Special Board

submitted to the CMC the findings of their

study. The Special Board stated:

The atomic bomb now prohibits the heavy concentrations of ships and landing craft heretofore

used in amphibious operations. The answer lies

in a wide dispersion of our attack force, a rapid

concentration of our landing force by means other

than small boats or amphibians and thereafter

maintaining close contact with the enemy. Airborne operations by landplane transport, by para- chute or by glider are not suitable for Marine

Corps employment . . . Submarine transports will he useful but to a limited extent. The develop- ment of a combination of large flying boats and

helicopters will overcome the limitations of a purely

airborne method, keep the enterprise a purely naval one, and permit its rapid exploitation and

support from widely dispersed and more economical surface vessels.'9

The report, in studying airborne landings,

submarine landings, large flying boats, and

helicopters, indicated that while all of the

courses of action had some elements of advantage, all had marked disadvantages. It

was obvious, even at this early date, that the

board had more faith in the helicopter. The

second choice was the large seaplane.* The

*At the time, the seaplane in the immediate future was the Martin "Mars" with an empty weight of

75,000 pounds and a cargo and fuel load of 63,000

pounds. It was to have a troop.carrying capacity of 133

board felt that the speed of the helicopter offered a practical means of overcoming the

effects of dispersion while likewise reducing

exposure to atomic attack. In addition, it possessed many of the advantages of the airborne

attack with few attendant disadvantages. Under

the method visualized, helicopters would be

carried by transport carriers with additional

maclimes carried by transports and LSTs. The

board felt that personnel could be landed in

proper formation on the flank or rear of the

hostile position and that palletized supplies

could be landed in or near dumps without

further handling. Helicopters of the future

could be constructed to carry larger loads; they

could he made faster and ultimately less vulnerable than landing craft. The board concluded that "the speed of the helicopters renders the degree of transport dispersion at sea

a matter of no disadvantage and likewise introduces a time space factor in landing that

will avoid presenting at any one time a remunerative atomic target." 30

The board believed that the helicopter

amphibious assault technique capitalized on

the inherent characteristics of the vehicle with

a view of providing the landing force with

those precious ingredients, "speed," "flexibility," and "dispersion." The report also included a proposed program for the use of

helicopters by the Marine Corps. The board

recommended the following: (1) that an experimental squadron should he organized and

equipped with 12 helicopters of the first available type; (2) that a study of techniques,

tactics, logistics, and other phases of shipto-shore movement by helicopters be made to

include military requirements for future helicopter design.31

Within three days, the Commandant concurreci in the hoard's conclusions and forwarded th report to Brigadier General Oliver

P. Smith, CMCS, directing him to implement

the developmental program outlined in the

report.32 The CMC directed the MCS to undertake "an imme(liate study of the employment

of helicopters in an amphibious operation,"

equipped men in seats. Howard Hughes, millionaire

aircraft designer, was building a prototype eightmotored transport seaplane, which was designed to

carry a 44-ton tank as part of its payload of 120,000

poumis. Clamshell doors and a landing ramp could be

added to the design. The Special Board did not seem

very optimistic about the outlook for either the Hughes

or Martin seaplane being delivered in adequate numbers "within the next live years."
- _rS - t rn.-

THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES-THE WAR AND THE BOMB 73

USS Thetis Bay (CVEA—1) with helicopters on deck preparing to ferry troops to attack positions during operation SKi JUMP (January 1957) at Camp Pendleton, Calif. (USMC Photo #11352474).

and to submit: "a. A tentative doctrine for

helicopter employment, and b. The military

requirements of a helicopter specifically designed for ship-to-shore movement of troops

and cargo." In the same letter, MCS was di- rected to further study the employment of

transport seaplanes in amphibious operations.

As a last bit of guidance, the CMC stated:

As a concurrent problem it is obvious that operations using such air-vehicles may well require a

complete revision of Tables of Organization as well

as prescribed equipment. If it is found that revision or reduction in the size of organizations or changes in the types of amounts of arms, equip- ment, and supplies are necessary, recommendations to that effect should be includecL3'

Repeat of the 1930s

Unlike 1933, and the writing of the Tentative Landing Operations Manual, classes did

not have to be suspended at MCS during

1947 to write the new doctrine for helicopters. The Committee to do the work was officially called the Committee of the Academic

Board (referring to the Academic Board of

the Educational Center of MCS). This Committee, headed by Colonel Robert E. Hogaboom, was assisted by the Secretariat that researched for the Special Board, Colonels

Twining, Dyer, Shisler, and (later added to

the Secretariat) Lieutenant Colonel Samuel

R. Shaw.*

Unlike other boards that would bear the

name of the chairman, the Committee of the

*presumably because any work done at MCS is a

team effort, official reports covering tactical and doctrinal

work are signed only by the chairman of a committee or the CMCS even though a dozen men might have

contributed. This method may be commendable but it

plays havoc with historical records.
74 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Academic Board simply became known as the

Helicopter Board. Colonel Hogaboom would

indeed head another board in 1957 that would

be called the Hogaboom Board and would

reshape the FMF.

Within three months of the CMC directive

of 19 December 1946, the Helicopter Board

submitted a report entitled "Military Requirements of Helicopter for Ship-to-Shore Movement of Troops and Cargo." 84

The report envisioned a helicopter with a

seating space for a minimum of 15 and a

maximum of 20 infantrymen "suitably armed

and equipped to initiate combat." The report did not set its sights on a helicopter carrying more than 20 men as "a capacity in

excess of twenty (20) men is not desirable in

an assault helicopter since the craft will undoubtedly be extremely vulnerable." When

the committee initially outlined the problem,

it appeared to be realistic in view of the times:

On the premise that the helicopter offers a valuable means of accelerating and dispersing the

ship-to-shore movement, it is recognized that complete replacement of all existing ship-to-shore

conveyances may at some future date be desirable.

Under such conditions it would appear necessary

that there be designed a relatively small type helicopter for transportation of assault troops, as well

as a large type helicopter capable of lifting all

divisional loads. However, examination of current

technical developments indicates that the latter

type may not be practical for some time to come.

Accordingly, it is considered more realistic to approach the problem in increments, establishing

initially the characteristics for a purely assault conveyance. . . In general terms, the report briefly discussed the payload, range, speed, armor, etc.,

desirable for the 15—20-man helicopter.

However, it was the 1930s again, doctrine being evolved first and then the equipment to

fit the doctrine.

In view of the recommendation of the Shepherd Board of December 1946, the CMC requested the Secretary of the Navy through

the CNO to activate an experimental helicopter squadron (HMX). This squadron,

HMX—l, was placed under operational and.

administrative control of the CMC via the

Commanding Officer of the Marine Corps

Air Station at Quantico who was designated

to furnish logistic support for

•The CMC assigned missions and tasks to

HMX—1 as follows:

Missions

1. Develop techniques and tactics in connection

with the movement of assault troops in amphibious

operations.

2. Evaluate a small helicopter as replacement for

the present fixed-wing observation (OY) aircraft in

gunfire spotting, observation, and liaison missions

in connection with amphibious operations.

Tasks

1. Develop a doctrine for the aviation tactics

and technique in the employment of the helicopter

in amphibious operations.

2. Assist the Marine Corps Schools in the development of a doctrine covering the tactics and

techniques of the employment of helicopters in

amphibious operations.

- 3. Study the operation and maintenance of assigned aircraft.

4. Develop the flight proficiency of pilots and

air crewmen.

5. Develop and maintain the technical proficiency

of mechanics.

6. Submit recommendations for tables of organization, equipment allowances, and related data for

future helicopter squadrons.as

Colonel Clayton C. Jerome, Commanding

Officer of Marine Corps Air Station, Quantico,

welcomed the new HMX—l squadron with

instructions that it was to get the pick of personnel and the best facilities of the station.

The first commanding officer of HMX—l was

Colonel Edward C. Dyer, former member of

the Secretariat of the Helicopter Board. While

waiting for helicopters, Colonel Dyer ar- ranged to have the eight officers that were

assigned to the squadron sent to the naval

experimental helicopter squadron, VX—S, at

the Naval Air Station, Lakehurst, New Jersey,

to obtain some flight training. Among the few

experienced instructor pilots at Lakehurst was

a Marine, Major Armond H. DeLalio, "who is

recognized as the pioneer helicopter pilot of

the Marine Corps. He had taken part from

the beginning in the Navy's helicopter program; and as operations officer of VX—3 in

1947, he provided training for Dyer's officers

in Navy helicopters At Colonel Dyer's

request, Major DeLalio was subsequently assigned to HMX—l as operations officer in early

1948.

The year 1948 was a good year for HMX—l.

In February it received its first two helicopters, both HO3S—1, Sikorsky-built with a 450-

horsepower Wasp engine. Though listed as a four-place craft, it could actually lift only

two combat-equipped men in addition to the

pilot, or two casualties on external litters.

The maximum load, including gas, pilot and

passengers or cargo, was 1,180 pounds; the
THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES—THE WAR AND THE BOMB 75

Sikorsky HO3S—1 observation-utility helicopters at

Quantico's air station in May 1948. (USMC Photo

t256O5).

operating radius, 80 miles; and the maximum

speed at sea level, 103 miles per hour.4°

While not the large prototype theoretical

helicopters discussed in doctrinal writings, the

HO3S—l proved invaluable for training the pilots for better models to come. As in the

thirties, when Roebling and Higgins were encouraged to manufacture their craft for military needs, so, too, did Marine officers, namely

Colonels Dyer and Twining, encourage Sikorsky, Piasecki, and Bell to design for the needs

of the Marine Corps.*

Paradoxically at HMX—1, the first mission,

in addition to training purposes, occurred

when a helicopter was used to "determine the

best route for a salvage party to remove a

'Weasel' (Amphibious Jeep) that had become

mired in a nearby creek." 41

By 1 May 1948, the squadron had enough

personnel, 12 officers and 32 enlisted men, plus

*Igor Sikorsky, Russian-born, American aeronautical

engineer, builder, inventor, and founder of the Sikorsky Aviation Corporation and Engineering Manager of

Sikorsky Aircraft Division of United Aircraft Corporation. Holder of many honorary degrees, awards, and

honors, Sikorsky retired in 1957 but acted as con- sultant and adviser to United Aircraft until his death

in 1972.

Frank N. Piasecki, American-born aeronautical engineer, builder, inventor, and founder of the Piasecki

Helicopter Corporation and Piasecki Aircraft Corporation. Piasecki was president of his corporation and

director of the Crown Cork International Corporation.

Lawrence D. Bell, American-born aeronautical engineer, builder, and designer. General Manager of the

Glenn L. Martin Corporation, he later became vice-president in charge of sales for Consolidated Aircraft Company and later organized the Bell Aircraft Corporation.

During World War H, Bell Corporation manufactured

the P—39 Air Cobra fighter. Bell entered the helicopter

field during 1943, specializing in light utility machines.

a total of five HO3S—ls to participate in Operation PACKARD II. This operation was

the second amphibious command post exercise

held jointly by Navy and Marine forces to

simulate a ship-to-shore assault landing against

an enemy defending the beaches. This time,

the beach was not at Culebra but at Onslow

Beach, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

The following objectives were assigned to

HMX—l during the PACKARD II exercise:

To take a positive step forward in the development program by making an actual landing of

troops by carrier-based helicopters;

To gain experience in operating helicopters on

board an aircraft carrier and experience in helicopter landing operations upon which a sound

doctrine for these operations could be written;

To gain individual and collective experience for

pilots, aircraft crews, and other squadron personnel

so that more extensive operations could be undertaken in the future;

To determine probable military requirements for

landing force helicopters of the future.

Colonel Dyer and his squadron reported to

Captain R. E. Dixon, USN, commanding the

CVE (escort aircraft carrier) USS Palau. In

the exercise, HMX—1 was to simulate landing

one regimental combat team. During the actual landing, a total of 66 men and considerable communications equipment were

transported to the beach by helicopter. A total

of 35 flights were made between the ship and

the landing zone.43 For the entire operation,

a total of 28.6 hours were flown and a total

of 103 carrier landings and take-offs were

made.

Foremost among the conclusions arrived at by the HMX—1 report was the need for a

larger helicopter. Change the name of the

equipment and it would sound like the concluding remarks in the fleet landing exercises

of the l930s, "a better landing boat is

needed." The report went on to say "if troops

are to be landed expeditiously and in battle

formation the time consumed and the movement of the very few troops transported in

this operation served to point up the fact

that a transport helicopter carrying at least

eight passengers is urgently required." In an

entirely optimistic vein, the report concluded:

No unsurmountable obstacles, either theoretical

or actual, were developed or experienced that might

prevent the future operation of mass landings of

troops by helicopters. The operation was entirely

successful in that its limited objectives were reached.

No attempt, however, was made to fully exploit the
:.,..'.

76 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

capabilities of rotary wing aircraft. Much remains

to be done in the future and these operations must

continue to be thought of as experimental and

developmental .

After PACKARD II, HMX—l provided

aerial demonstrations and transportation to

various groups, both military and civilian. In

addition, experiments were made with an

aerial public address system for directing traffic, troop movements, or rescue work. Highspeed wire laying was successfully tested in

conjunction with the Marine Corps Equipment

Board, which had been evaluating various dispensers under all climatic conditions. By

August of 1948, two new arrivals sparked the

interest at HMX. The first Bell helicopter

was flown to HMX—1 from Lakehurst, New

Jersey. It was a three-place craft powered by

a 178-horsepower motor. Dubbed the HTL—2,

it was suitable for reconnaissance, artillery

spotting, or aerial photography. No familiarization flying was necessary for this model as

the pilots who trained at Lakehurst had been

given their first 15 hours of flight instruction

in this light aircraft.45

The great event of the year was the ar- rival at HMX—1 of the first HRP—1. It was

the largest helicopter in operation at that

time. The HRP—1 was a Piasecki-built, 10-

passenger helicopter, powered by a 600-horsepower engine driving twin rotors. The maximum speed at sea level was 100 miles per

hour and 75 miles per hour represented the

cruising speed. It had a cargo space about

14-feet long and 5-feet wide with a cargo

l1oist of 400 pounds capacity and a cable

length of 100 feet. Because oF its elongated

and curved configuration, the HRP—1 was

nicknamed the "flying banana." By the end

of the year, four more HRP—ls were delivered

to Quantico where flight indoctrination training continued both for pilots and crews. This

preliminary stage was followed by an intenHRP—ls spotted on the flight deck of the USS Palau ready to load troops and equipment in June 1950. (US\

Phofri #707741).
THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES—THE WAR AND THE BOMB 77

sive program of testing tactics and techniques

for landing assault troops in an amphibious

operation.46

Phib-S 1

The evolution of a set of principles governing

helicopter employment cannot await the perfection

of the craft itself, but must proceed concurrently

with that development.47

As if following a script written a generation

before, the MCS had prepared a tentative doctrine on the employment of helicopters before there was any appreciable amount of

helicopters in the world. The Army's air mobile divisions can only be the outgrowth of

what the Marine planners of 1948 envisioned—

a Marine helicopter, wing composed of 240

aircraft, "each capable of carrying a payload

of fifteen (15) fully armed troops or four thousand (4,000) pounds of cargo." There were

not at that time as many as 240 helicopters

in the entire world. The planners at MCS

envisioned a "simultaneous lift of one RCT

(regimental combat team), helicopter borne."

They continued that "where helicopters are

of lesser capacity the numbers of helicopters

in helicopter units should be increased as necessary to provide for maintaining the tactical integrity of troop organizations." 48

The tentative doctrine for helicopters, in

mimeograph instructional form, was revised

after PACKARD II in May 1948. Revisions

were made in consonance with operations at

HMX—1 and finally with the arrival of the

first HRP—l machines.

In November 1948, a 52-page booklet was

published by MCS entitled "Amphibious Operations—Employment of Helicopters (Tentative)." As the 31st in a series of manuals on

amphibious operations, the production was

usually referred to as Phib31.* The booklet

was initially classified "Confidential" and approved for instructional purposes in MCS.

The purpose of Phib-31 was contained in the

preface:

The advent of the troop carrying helicopter and

its establishment as standard equipment within the

Marine Corps gives rise to a variety of questions

'Phi b—31 was written by then Colonels Victor H.

Kruiak and Edward C. Dyer. Krulak recalls that "we had

so little to go on, no data; just conviction." LtGen V.H.

Krulak hr to Director, M.C. History, dated 3 August 1970

(Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps).

related to the employment of such conveyances in

the conduct of amphibious operations. It is the purpose of this pamphlet to explore the various aspects

of helicopter employment, discerning the manner

in which the characteristics of the vehicles can be

best exploited to enhance the effectiveness of the

amphibious attack, and providing thereby the basis

for a body of doctrine governing helicopter landing

operations.4°

Phib-31 contained the following sections:

Introduction, Organization and Command,

Tactical Considerations, Embarkation, the

Ship-to-Shore Movement, Fire Support, Logistics, Communications, and Characteristics

of HRP—1 and HO3S—1. Much of the spadework had already been done in amphibious

manuals of prehelicopter days, and the basic

principles governing the conventional amphibious attack were still generally applicable.

While the limitations of rotary-wing aircraft

were apparent at the time, Phib-31 took into

account the potential advantages:

The ability of the helicopter to rise and descend

vertically, to hover, and to move rapidly at varying

altitudes all qualify it admirably as a supplement

or substitute for the slower, more inflexible craft

now employed in the ship-to-shore movement.

Furthermore, its ability to circumvent powerful

beach defenses, and to land assault forces accurately

and in any desired altitude, on tactical localities

farther inland, endow helicopter operations with

many of the desirable characteristics of the conventional airborne attack while avoiding the undesirable dispersal of forces which often accompanies such operations. The helicopter furthermore.

when transported to the scene of operations in aircraft carriers, makes operations possible at ranges

which have not yet been achieved by the existing

conventional carriers.'0

The MCS doctrinal work on the employment of helicopters came full-circle with the

publication of Phib-31. The helicopter with

its nicknames of "whirlybird," "flyinging windmill," "eggbeater," "flying banana," and the

like, was certainly here to stay. What remained was how the military services would

use this new and improving craft. The Marine Corps, seeing the vast possibilities in the

craft, would have it fully and rapidly developed, as it was fully committed to new techniques of amphibious warfare. In these early

years, the Navy and Coast Guard attitude toward their helicopter programs was more of

progression rather than expansion. The Army

was primarily interested in the helicopter for

its logistical possibilities, envisioning it as a

successor to the truck. The Air Force looked

at the helicopter chiefly as an air-rescue craft.
78 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

By the end of the decade, the Marine Corps

experimented with the helicopter in cold

weather operations off Newfoundland and at

the other extreme, tested it under tropical

conditions off the coast of Puerto Rico in the

Atlantic Fleet Exercise in 1949. On the other

side of the world, in Tsingtao, China, a Marine captain, Wallace D. Blatt, flew an

HO3S—1 helicopter as a rescue aircraft during

the American withdrawal from China in February 1949. In May 1949, HMX—1 participated in PACKARD III, off Onslow Beach,

and among its new techniques it deployed an

HTL—2 helicopter from a Landing Ship Tank

(LST) for spotting operations. HMX—1 subsequently recommended that "the operation of

small helicopters from LST's be further pursued by the operating forces of the fleet." In

May and June 1949, HMX—1 gave demonstrations in techniques of wire laying, evacuation

of casualties, and flying crane lifts of 75mm

pack howitzers before the 81st Congress and

President Harry S. Truman at Quantico. The

amphibious doctrine and boat development in the late thirties just prior to World War

II was similar to the helicopter employment

doctrine and development of various craft

prior to the Korean War. The Marine helicopter program was overtaken by the Korean

War by June 1950. It was only 30 months

since HMX—l was activated and the time in

which to evaluate the capabilities of a new

type of aircraft was short. In Korea a good deal would depend on the experience of

HMX—l and the doctrinal conclusions of the

MCS since it was a truism of history that no

new weapon is any better than the doctrines

and techniques behind it.53
CHAPTER V

THE FIFTIES: MASSIVE RETALIATION, PEACEFUL

COEXISTENCE, AND NUCLEAR STALEMATE

Introduction

The fifties, beginning with a conflict in

Korea, saw the end to the fighting and signing a truce in July 1953. At the time, it

looked as if the United States had fought

the last "conventional" war. We were in the

midst of the Cold War and well advanced

into the nuclear age. The new Republican

Administration was in office about a year

when Mr. John Foster Dulles, th Secretary of

State, announced in January 1954 the new

national defense policy based on "massive

retaliation." As in any decade, the foreign

relations of the United States were guided

by the strength of the military posture. Our

military strength in the mid-50s looked good

as far as nuclear stockpiles were concerned,

and by the end of the decade we were busy

catching-up with the Russians on perfecting

intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Military planners, taking into account

United States defense policies, had to consider a nuclear solution to the next war. But

as the decade came to a close, it was believed

that Russia and the United States had so increased their capacity to destroy each other

that nuclear or total war was completely outside the realm of rational policy. A policy of

"Peaceful Coexistence" became fashionable.

Nuclear "stalemate" replaced nuclear "superiority" as the principal deterrent to total conflict. In place of total war, the Communists

chose the tactic of using war by proxy, war

by satellite, war by threat and subversion.

In the 1950s, the United States met the war

by threat with the Formosa Resolution in

1955 and the landings in Lebanon in 1958. At

the Inter-American Conference in Caracas in

1954, we met the threat of subversion in

Guatemala by a multilateral anti-Communist

resolution and support for an anti-Communist

government. By the 1960s, we would be

destined to fight in a proxy war, the unconventional war of the guerrilla.

The Status of the Marine Corps in

the 1950s

The Marine Corps came of age, as it were, when in June 1952, Public Law 416, 82d

Congress, was passed giving the Marine

Corps, for the first time in its history, a voice

in the highest military councils in those matters that directly concerned it.

To go back several years, in 1947 Congress

enacted the National Security Act which set up

a new organization for national defense. This

act created a National Military Establishment

consisting of three executive or military departments of cabinet level and the Joint Chiefs of

Staff (JCS), all under the "general direction,

authority and control" of a Secretary of Defense, who was given a small staff to help him

provide policy guidance and high-level coordi- nation for the separate departments in his

charge. The basic act did not clarify the specific roles and missions of the different services.

As an example, the Air Force philosophy, simple in theory but difficult in practice, had the

view that everything that flies should be under

Air Force control. Obviously, Marine and

Navy air thought otherwise. In order to correct

"overlapping" in the basic law, President Harry

S. Truman issued Executive Order 9877 entitled "Functions of the Armed Forces," spelling out specific roles and missions. Again different interpretations of the basic law and the

executive order varied, which led to the Key

West Conference in March 1948. At this conference, Secretary of Defense Forrestal met

with his top civilian and military aides to in79
80 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

NORTh

KOREA

JA4N

uTh

KOREA

YEUOW

SEA

c2
THE FIFTIES 81

terpret and adjust the roles and missions of

the services to conform to the legislative requirements of the National Security Act, This

conference resulted in agreement on a document designed to define more specifically, and

to amplify, the basic functions assigned in law.

On 21 April 1948, the President revoked

Executive Order 9877 and directed the Secretary of Defense to issue the statement of functions agreed to at Key West. This the Secretary

did in a directive entitled "Functions of the

Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,"

also referred to as the Key West Agreements

and by the short title "Functions Paper." In

another major change to the basic law, the National Security Act Amendment of 1949 was

passed establishing the Department of Defense

as an executive department, and creating a

deputy and three assistant secretaries. The Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force

were reduced in status to "military departments," whose Secretaries no longer enjoyed

cabinet status or statutory membership in the

National Security Council.

Public Law 416 of the 82d Congress, enacted 28 June 1952, specifically applied to the

composition and missions of the Marine Corps.

It provided:

(1) The strength of the Marine Corps should be

not less than three combat divisions and three air

wings.

(2) The Commandant of the Marine Corps should

have co-equal status with members of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff in matters of direct concern to the

Marine Corps.'

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CMC are

furnished with an agenda listing the items to

be discussed before each meeting. If there are

items on the agenda of direct concern to the

Marine Corps, the CMC attends the meeting

and participates as a co-equal member. In the

first year after the passage of the law, the CMC

had attended 84 meetings of the Joint Chiefs

to deliberate upon 175 items of direct concern

to the Marine Corps.2 Aside from the CMC,

Marine officers for the first time began serving

on committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization such as the Joint Strategic Plans

Committee and Joint Logistics Plans Committee.

Other changes in the National Security Act

were the Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953

and the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.

These changes gave greater authority to the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and esGeneral Clifton B. Cates, 19th Commandant of the

Marine Corps, 1 January 1948 to 31 December 1951.

(USMC Photo #A42546).

tablished a different chain of command running from the President to the Secretary of

Defense through the JCS to the commanders of

unified and specified commands.3 The "Functions Paper," still intact from 1948, was revised

in 1953 and on 31 December 1958 it was promulgated as Department of Defense Directive

No. 5100.1, subject: "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components."

The contents of this directive have since been

included in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2,

"Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)" of

November 1959.

In 1953, the Secretary of the Navy approved

and issued two General Orders, Numbers 5 and

19, that directly affected the Marine Corps.

These orders changed the position of the Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy,

elevating the Commandant to a position comparable to the Chief of Naval Operations. The

changes gave further recognition to the fact that

there were Marine Corps forces other than those

assigned to the Operating Forces and Shore Establishment of the Navy. In addition, the

authority of the Naval District Commandants

as it pertained to the Marine Corps became

limited. Control responsibilities previously exercised by the District Commandants were

given to commanders of Marine Corps forces

within the district and to the CMC.
-

82 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

complete the squadron, there were eight OY—2

planes, fixed-wing, with eight officers and 43

enlisted men. Under the command of Major

Vincent J. Gottschalk, VMO—6 sailed for Korea

on 14 July under the operational control of the

brigade and the administrative and logistical

control of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.5

The mission of VMO squadrons had been

stated in 1949 as the conduct of "tactical air

reconnaissance, artillery spotting and other

flight operations within the capabilities of assigned aircraft in support of ground units." 6

The definition left plenty of room for the

helicopters to show what they could do under

combat conditions. The first demonstration

came on the very first morning in Korea, when

General Craig and his aides utilized the rotary- Naval gunfire sup port from the 16-inch guns of the wing aircraft not only for reconnaissance but USS Missouri firing on North Korean positions at Chong

Jin in October 1950. (USN Photo #421049). also for locating assembly areas and directing

troop movements. During the most critical

phase of the Chosin operation, the helicopters The 1\Iarine Corps fared well in the 1950s, provided the only liaison between isolated

coming into its own and truly becoming a commands. Wirelaying by air was first em- partner on the defense team. ployed by VMO—6 during the second battle of

the Naktong River Bulge, in September 1950.

Korea—The Test

A month after the Korean truce of 27 July

1953, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., CMC

stated:

It is not the Navy Yard Guards or the Ships'

Detachments or the State Department Security

Forces that give us our fundamental strength. These

are all fine and useful elements of our Corps, but

realistically it is the ability to go into combat with

our ground and air elements on short notice; to do

what is required when it is required, that gives us

our real strength.4

General Shepherd had in mind Korea, where

in such a test the Marines on short notice activated the 1st Provisional Brigade on 7 July

1950 under the command of Brigadier General Edward A. Craig. Exactly one week later,

the ground element, a reinforced regimental

combat team (RCT), sailed from San Diego to

the Far East. The air component, commanded

by Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, consisted of three fighter squadrons and an observation squadron of Marine Aircraft Group (MAG)

33, 1st 1\'Iarine Aircraft Wing. Included in this

air strength was the first helicopter unit in history to be trained and organized for combat

duty, the 7 officers, 30 enlisted men, and 4 General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., 20th Commandant HO3S—1 aircraft of the rotary-wing unit of of the Marine Corps, 1 janualy 1952 to 31 1)ccewlu'r Marine Observation Squadron (VMO) 6. To 1955 (USMC Photo #A46471).

Th
—4

THE FIFTIES 83

Hospital Ship Repose used for the evacuation of the

wounded at Inchon Harbor, Korea, 1952. The platform

where helicopters landed is shown. (USMC Photo

#A134641).

The value of the helicopter for the evacuation of the wounded became immediately apparent and VMO—6 did its job well. A wounded

Marine could be transported from the front

line to a hospital ship, perhaps 20 miles away,

within 30 minutes. The United States Hospital

Ship (USHS) Consolation was outfitted with

a helicopter loading platform in July 1951 and

eventually all hospital ships had such landing

platforms. VMO—6 was joined on 31 August

1951 by Marine Transport Helicopter Squad.

ron 161 (HMR—161) with its 15 new 10-place

HRS—ls. This was the first such helicopter

squadron in history. While evacuation of the

wounded was a secondary mission for both

VMO—6 and HMR—16l, the importance of this

mission lay in the fact that nearly 10,000

wounded Marines were evacuated by helicopter, 7,067 of whom were flown out by VMO—6

and another 2,748 by HMR—161.

The first step toward using the helicopter in

the mission most closely envisioned by Marine

Corps planners, that of transporting troops and

supplies in support of ground operations, was

accomplished on 13 September 1951. In operation WINDMILL I, HMR—l6l carried out

the first Marine mass helicopter combat resupply operation in history in a one day's lift of

supplies in the Soyang River vicinity. A total

of 28 flights was executed in overall time of 21⁄2 hours (total flight time of 14.1 hours)

to transport 18,848 pounds of equipment and

74 Marines a distance of seven miles.8

Marine Corps General Order No. 85, of 15

February 1951, proclaiming the doctrine of

vertical envelopment was only in effect 59 days

when HMR—l61 transported 224 fully equipped

Marines and 17,772 pounds of cargo from the

reserve area to the main line of resistance.

This was the first helicopter lift of a combat

unit in history. On 11 November 1951, in

Operation SWITCH, HMR—l 61 transported

nearly 2,000 troops in 12 HRSs in 262 flights in

an overall time of 10 hours (95.6 hours of

flight time).9

In Operation HAYLIFT IL from 23 to 27

February 1953, HMR—l61 set an all time cargocarrying record when it lifted over a million

and a half pounds of cargo to supply completely two regiments with daily requirements

for a five-day period. This task represented a

total of 1,633 lifts and 583.4 flying hours for the

operations. Other tasks that became routine included ammunition resupply from the ammu- nition supply point to the front line, and a

complete lift of a 4.5-inch rocket battery with

personnel and rockets from one firing point to

another. In July 1952, HMR—l61 answered the

call from the Army to evacuate 1,172 Army

troops cut off by heavy rains in the Chunchon

area of western Korea.'°

Speaking in the same vein, about saving

lives, two other innovations came out of the

Korean War, the thermal boot and the

armored vest. A limited test of body armor

was made during the late months of World

War II but tests were discontinued after the

war had ended. The Marine Corps, through the

Field Medical Service School at Camp Lejeune,

North Carolina, had renewed the development

of a lightweight plastic body armor. It was a

Marine helicopter (Bell HTL) lands on the Repose.

(USMC Photo #A163539).
84 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

available and foot frostbite was virtually eliminated. In a rather bizarre side effect, the

thermal boot was found to afford some protection against land mines, perhaps because of its

cumbersome shape and weight.13

Optimum Organization and the Boards

An HRS—Sikorsky helicopter from the 1st MAW

lands on Hospital Ship Repose. (USMC Photo

#A163539).

sleeveless jacket with zipper front and water

resistant green cloth with armor consisting of

ballistic nylon and curved plates, similar to

fiberglass. The vest weighed 73/4 pounds and

provided protection for the wearer against

missiles of a velocity of 1,200 feet-per-second or

less.h1

By 30 January 1952, 500 of the armored vests

had arrived in the 1st Marine Division for

testing. The vests became a satisfactory and

desirable item of equipment. By July 1953, the

division had received its authorized quota of

24,000 vests. Since 70 percent of all battle

casualties came from wounds in the chest, back,

or abdomen, the vests prevented many wounds

to those parts of the body with resultant lives

saved and a l)OOSt in morale. By the end of the

war, the armored vest or "flak jacket" was

joined by another piece by body ak-mor to protect the lower torso. This lower torso body

armor resembled drawers and weighed about 3 pounds. It was worn as a supplementary

item with the armored vest.12

If the thermal or vapor-barrier boot did not save lives, it certainly saved Marines from

frostbite from the cold and gave comfort to

those who wore them. In the first winter of the

war in 1950, inadequate footgear and the shortcomings of shoepacs, the existing winter gear,

caused serious frostbite cases. The dark days of

the Chosin Reservoir and the move to the sea

(lid not lend themselves to men stopping and

changing socks in order to prevent frostbite,

even if they had dry socks. By the second winter, thermal or "mickey-mouse" boots were

As we have seen from Chapter IV, the guiding doctrinal publication for the tactical employment of helicopters was Phib-31, Amp/tibious Operations—Employment of Helicopters

(Tentative), prepared by MCS and used

throughout the Korean War. In spite of the

war, however, in December 1952, the Navy and

MCS began publication of a related series, the

Navy's Naval Warfare Publication (NWP—22)

and the Marine Corps' Landing Force Manuals (LFMs) and Landing Force Bulletins

(LFB5). These publications replaced the Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Fleet

series (USFs), and included the doctrines and

techniques for the execution of the helicopterborne amphibious assault based on Phib-31 of

1948.

In February of 1953, a major original doctrinal contribution was made by the Marine

Corps with the publication of Landing Force

Bulletin 2, Interim Doctrine for the Conduct

of Tactical Atomic Warfare. This document

presented a concise and mature approach to

the conduct of operations wherein atomic munitions are employed. At the time of its publication, this paper was the only doctrinal

source of its kind promulgated by any of the

armed forces. Other important LFBs published

in the 1950s were LFB No. 17, Concept of

Future Amphibious Operations and LFB No.

24, Helicopter Operations.

Concurrent with the publishing of LFMs

and LFBs at MCS, the Marine Corps was involved with study boards. The boards, appointed by the CMC, met either at Quantico or

Headquarters Marine Corps to study current

problems and to make recommendlations accordingly. At all times, the boards, regardless

of what they studied, had to keep in mind the

major concepts of the time, namely, the "new"

concept of amphibious operations—dispersion

of ships and possible tactical employment of

atomic weapons—and the doctrine of vertical

envelopment. To meet such concepts most of

the boards during the 1950s concerned them- selves with organization and structure of a

lighter and faster Marine Corps. Some ex-
THE FIFTIES 85

amples of these boards and their range of

studies were:

Report of Board to Study and Make Recommendations on Air-Ground and Aviation Matters (Harris

Board), headed by Major General Field Harris,

August 1951.

Report of Board to Review the Basic Organizational Structure of the Fleet Marine Force, Ground

(Wornham Board), headed by Major General

Thomas A. Wornham, April 1952.

Report of Board to Review Aviation Organization

in Order to Achieve Personnel Economy (Condon

Board), headed by Brigadier General John P. Condon, February 1953.

Report of Board to Review Headquarters Organization of Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic for Tactical

and Administrative Purposes (Hogaboom Board),

headed by Major General Robert E. Hogaboom,

June 1953.

Report of Board to Study Characteristics of Fleet

Marine Force Ground and Air Units (Snedeker

Board), headed by Brigadier General Edward W.

Snedeker, October 1953.

Report of Board to Study the Composition and

Functions of Marine Corps Aviation (Smith Board),

headed by Colonel John L. Smith, February 1955.

In addition, the Commandant issued individual directives and reports on matters pointing to organization and doctrine for the future

years of the Corps. Included in this category

were CMC letters, with subjects as follows:

Air-Ground Relations, July 1954

The Marine Air-Ground Task Force Concept,

November 1954

Provisional Force Service Regiment, February

1955

Concept for Logistic Support of the Landing

Force, August 1955

Employment of Marine Corps Aviation, January

1956

Recommendations from whatever source had

to be tested in the field. The CMC accordingly

authorized the activation of Marine Corps

Test Unit No. 1 (MCTU #1) in the summer

of 1954, under the command of Colonel Edward N. Rydalch.14 Its organization was equivalent to a reinforced infantry battalion, expressly for the purpose of developing tactics

and techniques in support of the conduct of

tactical atomic warfare. The principal highlight of the first year of operations was the

unit's participation in Exercise DESERT

ROCK VI, conducted at the Atomic Proving

Ground in Nevada, in February 1955. The

Marine 3d Provisional Atomic Exercise Brigade, comprising MCTU #1 and Marine aviation elements, was involved in the exercise.

The CMC reported that "despite the inevitable artificialities, the exercise served to confirm Marine Corps theories and to provide a

sound footing for projected efforts.""

By the end of the fiscal year 1955—56, MCTU

#1 had completed testing 33 projects. Some

of these focused on such weighty problems as

the determination of what echelon of command should possess the capability of surfaceto-surface delivery of atomic weapons. Primarily, solving the problems endemic to battalions

and smaller units was emphasized by MCTU

#1. During 1956 and until 30 June 1957, when

the unit was disbanded, MCTU #1 completed

27 additional projects. The variety of tests and

reports submitted by MCTU #1 ranged from

determining size of a TACC controlling GAS

to the distance helicopters should be from enemy atomic weapons.

The unit participated with other Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac) units with the

use of the USS Thetis Bay.'6 The Thetis Bay

was the first of a series of ships converted to

serve as transports for helicopter landing

teams. The Navy, again endeavoring to meet

the needs of the Marine Corps, recommissioned the old escort-carrier in 1956, which

became the first assault helicopter transport,

LPH-1.

In 1956, the CMC appointed a study board,

General Randolph McC. Pate, 21st Commandant of

the Marine Corps, 1 January 1956 to 31 December

1959. (USMC Photo #A402599).
86 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Marines turn their backs to ground zero during rehearsal for Operation DESERT ROCK VI, at Yucca Flats, Nev.,

1955. (USMC Photo #A327428).

whose recommendations a year later would

change the basic structure of the FMF for the

next several decades. The board that convened

at the MCS on 4 June 1956 had as its president, Major General Robert E. Hogaboom.

The board was instructed to "conduct a thorough and comprehensive study of the Fleet

Marine Force and make recommendations to

Atomic blast of Operation DESERT ROCK VI.

(USMC Photo #A327288).

the Commandant of the Marine Corps for the

optimum organization, composition and equipping of the Fleet Marine Force in order to

best perform its mission." 17

The Hogaboom Board in its deliberations

had to keep in mind what the Navy and Marine Corps viewed as a proper approach to

the "new" concept of amphibious warfare.

Concisely, the concept was as follows:

The assault is initiated by landing troops by

helicopter to the rear and on the flanks of the

desired landing beaches, These troops, supported by

naval gunfire and air, then proceed to clear Out the

enemy defenses and seize the beaches from the rear.

The beaches are then rapidly cleared of obstacles

and prepared to receive landing craft and landing

ships. The helicopters are subsequently used to

provide tactical mobility for the troops ashore and

to supply the widely dispersed tactical troop units.ls

There were those in the Navy who believed

that:

At some time in the distant future it may be

possible to build vertical rising and landing aircraft of sufficient speed, endurance and cargo capacity to make landings entirely by these craft. They

would also, of course, have to be small enough to

be transported in and operated from the decks of

ships.1'

Whatever the means for future ship-to-shore

movement, whether it be helicopter or landing

boats, the Navy felt that Navy ships would

have to bring that means within range of the

beaches.

There were those people in the Marine

Corps who also believed that all movement
THE FIFTIES 87

from ship-to-shore would be by helicopter in

the "foreseeable future." The Hogaboom

Board disagreed with this view. The board reported that it was working on problem areas

in most cases that did not extend beyond

"five to six years and in no area beyond about

ten years." The "all" movement was not in

that range of time. The board cautioned the

"all" movement thinkers that the "all helicopter assault" should not become the "all

helicopter concept." It said it believed this to

be invalid and that it should be corrected immediately. In very simple terms the board laid

to rest the "all helicopter concept":

The Board believes that this line of thinking has

perhaps obscured the continuing importance of

crossing the beach operations in our modern concept. We believe that for the foreseeable future a

substantial portion of the men and material required in effecting a lodgement on a hostile shore

must still cross the beach in a "conventional"

fashion. This is not in our opinion inconsistent

with the 'all helicopter assault" concept, or with

the requirement for the projection of seapower

ashore without the necessity of direct assault on the

shoreline. Reduced to its simplest terms the Board

visualized an operation wherein the flexibility of

the helicopter-borne assault forces would be exploited to uncover and secure the beaches and to

seize critical areas which will be required to enable

us to phase in the additional means to maintain

the momentum of the assault and secure the objective area. The Board considers that helicopters will

be employed initially to displace the assault elements of the landing force from ships at sea to

attack positions ashore from which they can seize

the critical terrain features. In subsequent operations ashore helicopters will be employed to maneu- ver disengaged units into attack positions from

which they can launch an attack against critical

objectives at a decisive time.2°

The Hogaboom report was forwarded to all

major commands within the Marine Corps "for

information." But the CMC stated that it was

approved for "purposes of staff planning at

this headquarters." 21 The value of the board

report was that it had taken a thorough and

objective look at existing doctrine and concepts and in many cases, such as the employment of Marine aviation, affirmed that they

were basically sound. Other concepts such as

the "all helicopter assault" and the "MarineAir-Ground Task Force" were given approval

but more definition and clarification of some

aspects of both was needed. The board's recommendations for the change in structure of

the ground forces of the FMF and in particular

the division were, with few exceptions, ac- cepted in total by the Marine Corps. A review

Major General Robert E. Hogaboom, president of the

board that restructured the Fleet Marine Force in 1956.

(USMC Photo #A401975).

of the current T/Os reflects substantially what

the board recommended in 1957.22

After much study and comparison of the

then-projected pentomic structure of the

Army's division, the board maintained the integrity of the triangular structure of the Marine

division at the regimental level—three regiments consisting of three four-company battalions. Other major changes, recommended by

the board and subsequently adopted by the

Marine Corps, were:

1. Tank battalion taken out of the division

(then under the 'L" Series T/O) and placed in

Force Troops.

2. Ontos battalion added.*

3. Reconnaissance battalion added, replacing reconnaissance company.

4. Service regiment replaced by a service battalion.

5. Shore party battalion deleted and shore party

function incorporated into service battalion.

6. Engineer battalion changed to a pioneer battalion with reduced personnel and equipment.**

7. Hospital company deleted from medical bat.

*Ontos battalion is listed as antitank battalion irs

1970 T/O.

**Narne rechanged to engineer battalion as shown in

current T/O.
88 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

talion and a fourth collecting and clearing company added.

8. Infantry and artillery regimental headquarters

become purely tactical in function.

9. Infantry regimental 4.2-inch mortar company,

antitank company, and battalion weapons companies were all deleted.

10. A fourth rifle company added to the infantry

battalion.

11. The artillery regiment reorganized and rearmed.

12. A communication intelligence company added

to division headquarters battalion.2'

The board reported the following:

The Marine division has been lightened considerably by personnel reductions in headquarters,

supply, maintenance, and other supporting elements and by equipment reductions in tanks, artillery, motor transport, heavy engineer equipment

and heavy maintenance equipment. The resulting

division is air transportable—and its assault elements are helicopter transportable. It is a wellbalanced fighting entity capable or effective ground

assault operations under conditions of either conventional or nuclear warfare. For sustained operations, this division requires additional external

support. This support is furnished by Force Troop

units, the numbers of which are based on the requirement to support at least one Division/Wing

task force in each Fleet Marine Force.24

Techniques and Hardware

Development During the 1950s

The list of projects investigated, tested, and

completed by various agencies, internal and

external to the Marine Corps, ran into hundreds of items during the decade. The range

included successful development of lightweight

radio relay communication equipment to the

issuance of a new ration, "Meal, 25-in-I, Landing Force." In addition, work on dehydrated

foods was being conducted. While the average

Marine who ate at the battalion messhall would

probably find it hard to believe, a pilot pro- gram, instituted by Food Service Demonstration Teams and the various Cooks and Bakers

Schools, attempted to indoctrinate Food Service Personnel in newly developed methods of

preparing and servicing dehydrated foods.

One of the major problems confronting the

Marine Corps in perfecting its new tactical

doctrine was that of providing operating facilities for aircraft ashore in the objective area,

early in an amphibious operation. The con- struction of long concrete or asphalt runways

for jet aircraft was virtually impossible in a

landing operation. To eliminate the need for

such runways, research was begun in 1954 on

the problem of constructing an expeditionary

airfield, long enough to land a jet plane, refuel it, and to have it take-off, all within the

early stages of the operation. The rather successful conclusion to this problem, which indicated the development programs had paid full

dividends, was installed at Chu Lai in the

Republic of Vietnam in 1965.25 The 15 odd

years of hard work at the Development Center

in developing and refining such a solution lies

in a concept called "Short Airfield for Tactical

Support" or SATS. The concept envisions the

rapid establishment of hastily constructed or

rehabilitated airstrips from which tactical aircraft can be operated through the use of

launch and arrest equipment. The SATS today

is a kind of a shorebased carrier deck. The

deck, AM—2 matting, however, is aluminum and

air transportable and the basic runway measures

about 2,000 feet by 72 feet. Many elements

make up the SATS including a CE—2 catapult,

a shore-based expeditionary catapult powered

by a J—79 turbo jet engine; an arresting gear

called the MK—5 MOREST, a relatively heavy

(74,000 lbs.) arresting system operating on the

hydraulic ram principle; a Fresnel Lens Optical

Landing System, consisting of a self-contained

source light system that provides glide slope

information to the pilot which enables him to

make a precise landing into SATS arresting

gear; and TACAN, Tactical Air Navigation

System, composed of airborne and ground

equipment operating at ultra high frequencies

which provide pilots with continuous range

and bearing information.

Formal test evaluation of the concept with

selected equipment was directed in 1958 with

the establishment of Project 51—58—01 at

MCDC. The first airfield test under this project

was conducted at the I\[arine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina in 1959.20 The

first operational test of a complete expeditionary jet airstrip was made in March 1960

during Exercise BLUE STAR. This test was

conducted in an amphibious assault environment on Taiwan by elements of the 3d Marine

Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. A

3,400 foot by 36 foot airstrip with all-weather

air conti-ol and complete aircraft servicing facilities was established on the site of an

abandoned Japanese fighter strip within 70

hours of the commencement of beach unloading; One hundred and eighty Mai-ine engineers resurfaced the BLUE STAR runway

with aluminum matting. It was again tested on
THE FIFTIES 89

Vieques Island during February 1961. At that

time the airfield was constructed, in the main,

on an old airstrip with a portion of it on an

unprepared surface. The length of the airfield

was reduced from the one tested on BLUE

STAR to only 2,150 feet.2 Short Expeditionary

Landing Fields (SELF5), consisting of a SATS

minus the expeditionary catapult, were established at Quantico and Bogue Field, North

Carolina. In 1964, SATS was established along

the southern coast of Spain during Operation

STEEL-PIKE I. The use of it during STEELPIKE was a great success. In only 1⁄2 days the

SATS field was fully operational and ready to

receive an F8 Crusader squadron as it flew in

from the United States. "Nothing was used

from the land. All matting and all control installations and fuel farm were landed over the

beach." 28

The problem of attacking ground targets

without visual reference by the aircraft crews

was solved with the introduction at the end of

World War II of radar-controlled bombing

equipment. With little refinement this equipment was introduced into the Korean War in

the summer of 1951 by the U.S. Air Force

using the MPQ—2 radar.* Based on a concept

oriented towards deep support of troops in extended land campaigns, the Air Force system

made use of 20-ton vans to house its ground

components. Thus, the MPQ—2s used by the

Air Force in 1951 were primarily for strategic

long-range bombing as opposed to tactical

bombing.

It was during this time, 1951, that the Marine Corps was developing a radar bombing

system, to be used tactically and sDecifically

designed for amphibious operations. The Marine system, called the MPQ_14, was built un-

(icr the direction of Major Marion C. Dalby

at the Naval Air Materiel Test Center, Point

Mugu, California. The MPQ—l4 reached the

combat area of Korea in July of 1951 for evaluation. The unit was designed so that the

largest piece could be put into a one-ton

trailer. Major ground items included a generator power supply, a tracking radar, and a

computer; the last essential component, an automatic bombing control, was mounted in the

*The letters MPQ indicate the type of installation.

M—rnobile ground installation, the kind of electronic

equipment, P—radar, and finally, its purpose, Q—intended for a combination of purposes. In this case, the

number 2 indicates the model numher in the development of the equipment.

aircraft.29 The MPQ—14 was evaluated by the

Marine Corps and the Fifth Air Force against

two other radar types, the MPQ—2 and MSQ—1

in tests called "PINPOINT ABLE." Even with

some mechanical difficulty experienced with

the radar bombing, "it soon became apparent

that the accuracy (bomb cluster dispersion) of

the MPQ—14 was greater than that of either the

MPQ—2 or the MSQ—1." ° The MPQ—14 was

sufficiently reliable to permit bomb drops within one mile of friendly lines. By the middle of

summer 1952, the Marines had obtained Fifth

Air Force permission to use the MPQ—14 in a

close support role. By the start of the truce in

July 1953, properly trained controllers and

technicians made up Marine Air Support Radar Team One (MASRT—1), who operated

the MPQ—14 on a 24-hour basis. Operations of

MASRT—1 demonstrated impressively that the

Marine Corps had, the capability to provide

sustained direct air support to frontline troops

under all conditions of weather and darkness

in the target area. The development of the

Marine MPQ—l4 has proven to be a most significant step forward in tactical aviation.

In the field of logistics, the concept of "continuous flow" of supplies across the beach

was developed in order to eliminate the

buildup of large and vulnerable beach supply dumps. The refinement of this concept

provided for the rapid delivery of ammunition, fuel, and other supplies directly to Ma- rine air and ground units deep inland. As

had happened many times before, the concept led directly to implementing techniques

and related equipment. One of the techniques

formulated was that of fuel handling in

amphibious operations.

In September 1954, a report of .a test of

fuel handling was submitted to the CMC by

the Development Center, culminating efforts

in this area since 1950. The objective of the project was: "To provide the Marine Corps

with a suitable amphibious assault bulk fuel

handling system for receiving, transferring,

storing and dispensing bulk liquid fuels during the initial phases of an amphibious operation." Small prototypes were tested and used

successfully 1)0th ifl Korea and the United

States.32 A year later, now called the expeditionary bulk fuel handling system, it was

again tested successfully by a 1\{arine aircraft

group at Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico.33 The

system, a versatile, self-contained, portable,

and readily installed complex, was capable of
-. :

- I

-a

-

90 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

receiving, storing, and dispensing motor, aviation, diesel, or jet fuel in quantities well

over 300,000 gallons. The tank farms were

essentially composed of collapsible 10,000-

gallon capacity, rubber, pillow-like tanks with

pumps and accessory equipment. Known today as the Amphibious Assault Fuel System

(AAFS), it has become one of the many

items which permits the execution of "continuous flow" of supplies.

The Marine Corps continued to support

selected research and development efforts of

other military services by serving on appropriate program and project steering and coordination agencies and contributing funds to

joint projects. Interest in various items ranged

from the smallest sensing devices to the

guided missile programs of the HAWK and

RED EYE. For the direct support of ground

combat forces, a joint project was established

with the Army in 1958 for the development

of "Lacrosse," a field artillery guided missile.

The "Lacrosse" missile was first conceived in

1947 by the Marine Corps but was dropped.

When the project was reactivated, the initial

development work was carried Out under Marine Corps and Bureau of Ordnance sponsorship.'4 As is the case in many such developmental projects, the eventual decision was made

not to purchase the missile.

To round-out the decade, the CMC reported

to the Secretary of the Navy in 1959 that "the

Marine Corps is closely monitoring the development of hydrofoils, ground effect devices and

planing hulls that can be used in the development of high speed amphibious vehicles." "'

Within the next two years, the Marine

Corps built prototype developmental hydrofoil

models, the LVHX—l and the LVHX—2, a plan.

ing hull, LVW—1, and an air lubricated hull

model, ARCK-..1, to ascertain their capabilBulk Fuel Farm at Chu Lai, 1965. (USMC Photo #4184696).
THE 'FIFTIES 91

ities to fulfill its high speed amphibian support vehicle requirements. It also purchased

experimental models of ground effects ma- chines or air cushion vehicles for the shipto-shore movement of troops, vehicles and

supplies." 36

Research and Development (R&D)

Cycle

In addressing a general officers' meeting in

1953, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., CMC,

stated:

I consider it appropriate to recall to your attention the words of the National Security Act of 1947,

as amended which say, "It shall be the duty of the

Marine Corps to develop those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique and equipment employed by landing forces."

These words are a serious charge to the Marine

Corps. They admit of no interpretation. They make

it our duty to take the lead in landing force

development. True enough, they require us to coordinate with other services, but there is no question

as to who is responsible to the Congress in the last

analysis. To me that means that the Marine Corps

Development Center is our primary developmental

agency."

General Shepherd's words of 1953 are essentially true today. The Marine Corps' development is primarily done at Quantico, where

the Development Center is now part of

MCDEC, Marine Corps Development and

Education Command.

The R&D process, let alone the term, was unheard of in the Marine Corps prior to

World War I. In developing the proper balance for an advanced base force, the Marine

Corps had doctrinal experience. The 1920s

and 1930s produced the doctrine for the

whole spectrum of amphibious operations in

the publication of the Landing Operations

Manual. Tactics, techniques, and equipment,

particularly at the turn of the century, were by the nature of the times, completely of

Army origin. Aside from uniforms and personal equipment, field equipment changed

very little. It was in the 1930s and 1940s that

the "Marine" tactics, techniques, and equipment development came into their own.

Before tracing Marine Corps involvement

in the R&D process, definitions are in order.

Research is theoretical analysis, exploration,

and experimentation directed toward the increase of knowledge. Development is the extension of the investigative findings and theories into practical application for experimental or demonstration purposes. This includes

the construction and testing of experimental

models or devices. Service Test is the test of a

specifically developed item—material, equipment, system, or device—under service or simulated service conditions in order to determine as accurately as possible its operational

characteristics or performance and its utility

in military operations.38

Today the R&D process takes in the foregoing definitions and many more. The Marine Corps' first step in the process was the

establishment of the Marine Corps Equipment

Board (MCEB) in 1933 (See Chapter III).

This was the first organized attempt to have

a group from within the Corps recommend

the type of equipment best suited to the

needs of the Marine Corps. The development and testing of the equipment recom- mended could be made by any agency so

designated by the CMC, whether it be civilians, such as Donald Roebling or Andrew

Higgins, or government, such as the Navy Department Continuing Board foi the Development of Landing Boats. Marine Corps representatives were members of this board.

After the Roebling "Alligator" was adopted

for military use, inspection and contract follow-up were performed by the Inspector of

Naval Material with the assistance of Marine

Corps offcers. Marine Corps liaison officers

were assigned to the Bureau of Ships in order

to provide Corps influence in the development.39 During World War II, a Marine Corps

liaison officer was assigned to the Army

Ordnance Department in 1942. The liaison

officer represented the Marine Corps in the

formulation of policies and procedures affecting procurement, allocations, and the supply of ordnance material. However, one of the

most helpful and profitable duties occurred

when he received ordnance information concerning the development of new material or

modifications to existing materiel of interest

to the Marine Corps.4°

During World War II, 65 percent of the

supplies and material used by the Corps for

ground troops was obtained from the Army.

"Included were 85 percent of all ordnance

items, 75 percent of all food, and 5 percent of

all engineer equipment." 41 Of the remaining

figures, the "Navy contributed five percent,

the Marine Corps manufactured five percent,

principally clothing, and the remaining 25

percent was purchased on the open market." 42
92 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

A substantial amount of signal gear came from

the Army but the Bureau of Ships procured

all electronic equipment for the Marine

Corps.3 Aviation clothing and personal equipment were acquired through regular Marine

Corps channels. All aviation materiel, including ground equipment, was developed and

supplied by the Navy through the Bureau of

Aeronautics.

Also during World War II, the Division of

Plans and Policies of HQMC guided the continuous studies of new types of equipment

made available within the Navy and Army and

made recommendations concerning equipment

which should be adopted by the Marine Corps.

In addition, it had cognizance over the following: 1. All inventions submitted to the Marine Corps

for consideration

2. Maintenance of liaison with the Marine Corps

Equipment Board

3. Selection of representatives for committees

such as

—Army Ordnance Technical Committee

—Naval Liaison Committee on Naval Research

—Navy Department Continuing Board for

Development of Landing Boats.

After World War II, a separate R&D Section

was formed within the Division of Plans and

Policies, This section, which constituted the

first organizational component that formally

recognized the R&D program in the Corps,

was responsible for all research and development activities. In 1947, the Congress, through

the passage of the National Security Act, gave

the Marine Corps direct responsibility for amphibious development.

Section 206, (c)—"It shall be the duty of the

Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the

Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious

operations which pertain to the tactics, technique

and equipment employed by landing forces."

For all practical purposes, the law merely

declared and recognized certain functions

which the Marine Corps had been doing for

the past several decades. The immediate problem, after the law was passed, was the lack of

a coordinating agency functioning under the

CMC to carry out the law. Colonel Merrill B.

Twining, Executive Director of the Marine

Corps Board at Quantico, stated:

There is serious need for standardization; there

is need for providing specifically for a means of Army and Air Force participation and a means

must be provided for the Commandant to exercise

an authority imposed by law.°

By order of the CMC, a board of general

officers met at Quantico on 10 July 1950, with

Lieutenant General LeRoy P. Hunt as President. The Hunt Board recommended

the establishment of a "Landing Force Development Center" to be located at Quantico. 'Fhe

board further recommended that a Tactics and

Techniques Board be established and com- bined with the Equipment Board into the

Landing Force Evaluation Group. The newly

created group should have the responsibility

of studying, analyzing, and evaluating recommendations proposed by the Education and

Development Centers in the field of amphibious development. The board also recommended

that the Commandant Marine Corps Schools

be designated "Coordinator, Marine Corps

Landing Force Development Activities" (MCLFDA).47 These recommendations were approved by the CMC and were implemented

by two letters of August and October 1950.

To further implement the coordinating aspect of MCLFDC, the Joint Landing Force

Board for the armed services was established

by DOD at MCS to speed interservice agreement on amphibious landing techniques. The

Joint Board, headed by Lieutenant General

Franklin A. Hart, considered mutual problems

of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air

Force in the landing force field.48 The Joint

Landing Force Board lasted until 1 February

1955 when it was disbanded by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. The board, then at Camp Lejeune,

North Carolina, had been responsible for four

joint service agreement reports and had published two joint landing force manuals. The

Marine Corps Development Center at Quantico took over the joint aspects of amphibious

problems.4

In March 1952, the responsibilities for research and development within the Marine

Corps were revised.50 The Division of Plans

and Policies was abolished and a general staff

organization was instituted at Headquarters

Marine Corps. In this HQMC reorganization

the R&D Section became a branch of the G—4

Division. While not part of but akin to the

R&D process, a Marine Corps Advanced Research Group (ARG) was established at

Quantico. The first group, consisting of 10

colonels, was given the mission of conducting

advanced study and original research with

respect to problems affecting the Marine Corps.

The group was under the direct supervision

of the Director of the Education Center at
THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES 93

Quantico.51 The group's course of study and

research usually lasted 10 months whereupon

its recommendations would be submitted to

the CMC. Many recommendations and resultant changes were made through acceptance of

their studies. As an example, the Advanced

Research Group of 1955—1956 was given the

task of determining the adequacy with which

the Marine Corps was fulfilling its statutory

responsibility for landing force development,

and steps which should be taken to achieve

improvement. The ARG concluded that the

Marine Corps research and development organization required improvements. The ARG

stated that the R&D program be given "high

level direction, coordination and supervision"

to all of its plans and programs.52 The G—4

Division, with so many other duties, could

not adequately handle the tremendous task

of R&D.

As a result of the research group's recommendations, in 1956 the office of the Deputy

Chief of Staff (Research and Development)

DC/S (R&D) was created. However, the R&D

Branch in G—4 (AO4E) continued to function

until 1961 but was responsive to the new DC/S

(R&D). In 1961 all AO4E personnel were transferred to the Office of the DC/S (R&D). The

primary mission assigned to the deputy was to

assist the Chief of Staff in the direction, coordination, and supervision of HQMC staff activities

in R&D. He was also to direct and supervise

the formulation and maintenance of Marine

Corps R&D plans and programs. Further, DC/S

(R&D) represented the CMC on all departmental and interdepartmental committees,

boards, and groups which were concerned with

policy making and overall coordination in the

field of R&D. Aviation research and development, though monitored by the Marine Corps,

was primarily performed through Navy activities. The Marine Corps ended the decade of

the 1950s squarely involved in the maze of

what was called the R&D process.

t

CHAPTER VI

THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES

There is one resource of the Marine Corps that

has always been fully developed: the individual

Marine. What made a good Marine during the

Revolutionary War still makes a good Marine. A

competent, loyal, highly motivated Marine is an

asset far exceeding in value all the developments of

a technological age.1

General Oliver P. Smith,

USMC (Retired)

The decade of the 1960s began with the

oldest President of the United States being

succeeded by the youngest. By the end of the

decade, two other Presidents had served. The

sixties will have to he remembered for the violence at home and abroad experienced by

General David M. Shoup, 22d Commandant of the Marine Corps, 1 January 1960 to 31 December 1963.

(USMC Photo #A408673).

Americans. Looking back, the violence at home

seemed to have commenced with the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in November 1963. Subsequent unrelated violence in the

cities and on. college campuses tested the basic

fiber of American social and political institutions.

In spite of the violence, not because of it,

legislative history was made in the decade.

The 1964 session of Congress enacted more

domestic reform legislation than any session

since 1935, the climactic year of New Deal

laws.2 Before the decade passed into history,

Americans, through the Congress, produced

General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., 23d Commandant of

the Marine Corps, 1 Janiaiy 1964 to 31 December 1967.

(USMC Photo #A415346).

95
96 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

the strongest civil rights act in American history, the most aid to education, and medicare, and began the "unconditional war on

poverty."

On the international scene, America faced

crises with Cuba, the Dominican Republic,

North Korea, and North Vietnam. It was, however, the Vietnam War, the longest in America's history, that dominated the 1960s. As in

every other war, the Marine Corps was called

upon to play its role; it played it well. The

Marine Corps' contribution to the peak

strength of United States forces in Vietnam of

543,400 men (31 December 1969) was 81,800

men.3 By 30 June 1971, most Marines having

been deployed to Okinawa, Japan, Hawaii,

and Camp Pendleton, the number left in Vietnam was a little over 500 men. This figure

represented advisOry, communications, and embassy personnel.

The Vietnam War will probably rank on

the level of World War II as the most written

about and documented war in American history. Certainly, television brought the war more

quickly into America's thoughts than the newsreels of World War II and Korea.

There is a myriad of material that could be

discussed regarding the Marine Corps and Vietnam. Two major areas, however, are

covered in this chapter, one of peace, that is the

participation of Marines in pacification, more

specifically civic action. The other area is the

refinement of tactical mobility, and use of

the fire support base. Neither of these areas

were new to the Marine Corps, only to this

generation of Marines. Past pacification experiences were incorporated in the Small Wars

Manual published in 1940 (see Chapter II).

Tactical mobility, in the form of helicopterborne forces, is the fruition of post-World War

II Marine thinkers. The Marine Corps envisioned the use of helicopters to carry regimental landing teams before any of the

military services, including the' Marine Corps,

had a working helicoper (see Chapter IV).

Pacification in General, Civic Action

in Particular

Pacification, as a concept, successfully carried out, could well become a milestone of the

Vietnam War. Within the etymological essence

of the word pacification is the meaning of

peace. What better way could Americans in

Vietnam be remembered than having been involved in pacification. The definition of the

term, as approved by the Military Assistance

Command, Vietnam (MACV), is as follows:

Pacification is the military, political, economic,

and social process of establishing or reestablishing

local government responsive to and involving the

participation of the people. It includes the provision

of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy's underground government,

the assertion or reassertion of political control and

involvement of the people in government, and the

initiation of economic and social activity capable of

self-sustenance and expansion. The economic element of pacification includes the opening of roads

and waterways and the maintenance of lines of

communication important to economic and military

activity.4

The Marine Corps' role in pacification took

the name of civic action. Civic action is that

segment of the overall effort of pacification

that utilizes the local or military population.

Civic action is defined as follows:

The use of preponderantly indigenous military

forces on projects useful to the local population at

all levels in such fields as education, training, public

works, agriculture, transportation, communications,

health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also

sen'e to improve the standing of the military forces

with the population.'

To reiterate, the involvement in civic action

by the Marine Corps was not new. The Marines

of the l960s retrod the paths other Marines

had journeyed from 1915 th1'ough 1933 in

Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican

Republic. The experiences as reflected in the

Small Wars Manual may be summed up in

the following two quotations from the manual:

The motive in small wars is not material dcstruction. It is usually a project dealing with the

social, economic, and political development of the

people.' * * S * * The purpose should always be to restore normal

government or give the people a better government

than the)' had before, and to establish peace, order,

and security on as permanent a basis as practicable—In so doing, one should endeavor to make

self-sufficient native agencies responsible for these

matters.'

Experience gained and recorded in a manual written 25 years before can only be a reference for the new generation. A new chapter,

not only of military action but of civic action,

was begun on 8 March 1965 with the landing

of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade at
THAILAND

THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES 97

LAOS

I CORPS

.

c

'N

(

j CAMBODIA

II CORPS

1 HI CORPS

SOUTH VIETNAM
.,— r

98 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

School house built with the help of the 7th Marines'

civic action program at Chu Lai, March 1967. (USMC

Photo #A369955).

Da Nang, Republic of Vietnam.*, Limited initially to the local defense of the fast-growing

air base at Da Nang, Marine civic action consisted primarily of spontaneous acts of commiseration and charity by individual Marines

toward a small population. As the military situation improved, more use of organic resources

was made. Civic action projects were oriented

toward medical assistance, repair of existing

roads and facilities, and minor new construction projects. The doctors soon discovered that

many of the superficial ills of the people,

such as rashes and sores, could be cured by

simply keeping the infested areas clean. The

Staff Sergeant Thad Jones and Lance Corporal Robert

Brogan of 4th Marines Civic Affairs Team give show.

ers 10 Vietnamese Children during MEDCAP visit, 14

June 1967. (USMC Photo #AJ88734).

result was a loud plea for soap and other materials. By June 1965 the Commander in Chief,

Pacific, Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, notified the Commanding General of III Marine

Amphibious Force (III MAF), then Major

General Lewis W. Walt, that supplies of all

kinds would be available for use by the Marine

Corps civic action groups through Project

HANDCLASP. Project HANDCLASP, an official Navy program since 1962, was part of the

Navy's people-to-people effort and overseas

community relations program. Individuals and

organizations within the United States donated

material to the naval service and shipped it to

warehouses at San Diego for further delivery

by the Navy overseas on a space available

basis. Within six months, 63,000 pounds of miscellaneous basic commodities were shipped to

III MAF.

As the civic action program matured, other

needs and problem areas became evident. Requests for commodity support often could not

be filled due to the lack of certain needed

items and the uncertain arrival'time of materials being shipped on a space available basis.

This situation often resulted in embarrassing

delays, and tended to erode the overall effect

of the program. As though in answer to this

problem, the Marine Corps Reserve concluded

an agreement with CARE (Cooperative for

American Relief Everywhere) whereby the

USMCR would solicit money for support of

the III MAF civic action program and CARE

would act as the custodian of the fund. On

the 13th of September 1965, this program was

officially launched by the CMC. The program

immediately proved successful, and III MAF

was provided with one of the most flexible

and useful civic action tools in its inventory.9

Of the many programs implemented by the

USMCR/CARE project, two were most successful:

1. MEDCAP (Medical Civic Action Program)—In

addition to giving medical help to the people in

the local hamlets, MEDGAP trained GVN (Government of Vietnam) medical personnel and trained

rural health workers. On-the-job training was given

*Three years earlier, April 1962, Marine military

action was begun when a squadron of UH—34 helicopters

landed at Soc Trang in the Delta. The squadron was

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM—•362)

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Archie J. Clapp.

LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, Marine Aviation in

Vietnam 1962—1970," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,

v. 97, no. 819 (May 1971), p. 124.

. I.i
THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES 99

to volunteers who offered to assist the MEDCAP

teams, and in this way the local people were encouraged to contribute to the welfare of their own

Community.

2. School Building Program—Tn the spring of

1966, III MAF developed an effective classroom

building Construction program. Local hamlets were

required to provide a site for the classroom, a

teacher, and people to provide self-help labor for

Construction. III MAF agreed to provide in return,

Construction materials, technical advice, and equipment for clearing and grading the site. The

USMCR/CARE Civic Action Fund proved to be

invaluable in support of this program by providing

a ready means for acquiring special hardware items

not available through other sources.1°

The presence of a number of U.S. civilian

agencies in I Corps was known to the Marines

since March 1965, though interrelationships had not been developed at that time.* The

mutual need for coordination and cooperation

immediately became apparent when the civic

action program began. The civilian agencies

possessed commodities but lacked the manpower to provide an effective system of distribution and control. The Marines were in daily

contact with the civil populace located in and

adjacent to the areas which they controlled

militarily, but they needed commodities for use

in the civic action program. The largest civilian organization in I Corps in regard to available commodities were the U.S. Agency for

International Development (USAID), the Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere

(CARE), and Catholic Relief Services. USAID

representation in I Corps consisted of a regional

office located in Da Nang, and a provincial

office located in the capital city of each of the

five provinces. CARE and CRS each had one

representative for the entire corps area, both

located in Da Nang."

The need for a means to insure continuous

coordination and cooperation among the various agencies and organizations which shared

an interest in winning the willing support of

the people for the GVN resulted in formation of the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council

(JCC) in August 1965. This council's membership included senior representatives of all

major U.S. and GVN organizations and agencies, both military and civilian, located in I

*For military purposes, the Republic of Vietnam was

divided into four corps tactical zones. In July 1970, Corps

Tactical Zones were redesignated Military Regions, i.e.,

Military Region I (MR—I). At this point, I Corps will

be used. I Corps comprised the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam, Quang Tn, Thua Thien, Quang

Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai.

General Lewis W. Walt, Commanding General, 111

Marine Amphibious Force, 1965—67. (USMC Photo

#A416364).

Corps. The council, as such, had no directive

authority or funds but through its senior mem- bership had access to the sum total of the

available authority and resources. The mission

of this council was to monitor progress of the

GVN Revolutionary Development (RD) Program* and to provide a ready forum for frequent discussion of attendant problems.'2 To

underscore the importance of the I Corps

JCC, General Walt designated Brigadier Generals Keith B. McCutcheon and Melvin D.

Henderson to sit on the council to ensure the

best possible support in assisting the government of Vietnam in the execution of its rural

construction program."

By the end of the summer of 1965, the III

MAF had developed the framework of the organization which was to conduct its civic

action program. A fifth general staff section

was created which was called the G—5 Section.

This section was assigned the staff responsi- bility for the conduct of civil affairs which

*The Revolutionary Development Program was the

Vietnamese effort in pacification. With RD cadres in the

hamlets, it was hoped that the RD program would foster

wide public construction anti social development at all

levels.
I -, - t —— I

I .i -

100 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Vietnamese listen to a speaker during a county fair

being held by Company "G", 2d Battalion, 7th Marines

at Phu Le Village near Chu Lai. (USMC Photo

#A189710).

included civic action. The 3d Marine Division

followed suit and established a G—5 Section.

Regiments and battalions appointed civil affairs officers, either as a primary or an additional duty assignment. This organization facilitated the development of effective

techniques for distribution of civic action commodities, for dissemination of civic action information, and for collection of data for use

in evaluating the effectiveness of the program.

To bring the generalities of civic action

down to a statistical example for the reader,

the following material contributions made by

1\Iarines in the short period from J\Larch to

December 1965 is shown below:

Persons given medical treatment

Pounds of food distributed

Pounds of soap distributed

In Support Of

In endeavoring to achieve the peaceful ends

of civic action, new types of military activity in

support of the Revolutionary Development

Program and the Civic Action Program envolved. Three such actions, COUNTY FAIR,

GOLDEN FLEECE, and the establishment of

the Combined Action Force, were among the

more successful Marine efforts within country.

(1) COUNTY FAIR Operations.—Initially

started by the 9th Marines in August 1965 in

the Da Nang area to find the local guerrillas,

COUNTY FAIR Operations involved coordinated psychological warfare and combat power.

These operations combined Marine Corps personnel and ARVN (Army, Republic of Vietnam) forces in an effort to destroy the Viet

Cong influence in selected hamlets and restore

government influence. Essentially, the operation consisted of a Marine unit moving into

position early in the morning around a hamlet and establishing a cordon to prevent the

escape of any Viet Cong. At first light, ARVN

troops and political cadres of the GVN entered

the area and moved all the civilians to a predesignated collection point where the

people were fed, given medical aid, counted,

identified, given propaganda lectures and

drama presentations, and shown movies. While

this segment of the operation was going on,

ARVN troops thoroughly searched the hamlet

for hidden tunnels, food, ammunition, and

weapons. Militarily, it was simply a cordonand-search operation and there was nothing

new in that. General Lewis W. Walt stated

that what was new about the COUNTY FAIR

Operations was "such things as the explanation

offered the people, the food and medical attention provided, shelter from the sun and/or the

rain, and decent regard for the community as

individuals and families . . . it worked well

for us."5

Possibly as a result of the success of the

Marine COUNTY FAIR, the Army in I Corps

started a similar program a year later calling it

HAMLET FESTIVAL. Regardless of what it

was called, it proved to be highly successful.

(2) GOLDEN FLEECE Operations. in

August 1965, a rather simple request from a village chief to the Commanding Officer of

1st Battalion, 9th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel

Verle E. Ludwig, whose battalion controlled

a sector of four villages and numerous hamlets

in the Hoa yang District of I Corps, produced

one of the most successful and lasting operations. The opportunity came when some of

the village chiefs wanted to know if the Marines

would help them protect their rice crop from

the Viet Cong tax. The chain of events was

ideal. The peasants needed assistance and had

requested it through their government leader.

The Marine Corps got an opportunity to support a representative of the local government

and to fulfill ,a basic need of a large number

of people. Lieutenant Colonel Ludwig's efforts

at coordination, and demonstrations of Marine

Corps superiority over the Viet Cong, fused

with the basic needs. of a terrorized and partially starved population.'°

199,631

142,756

46,53514
*1Ui ' \

Ul

S 4I

4

• •;JJv

THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES 101

5th Marines help the Vietnamese gather their rice

Photo #A369634).

The challenge was met by the battalion cornmander by covering the area with guards and

patrols and keeping mobile forces in reserve

throughout the harvest season. He worked

with the district chief to provide safe storage

for the harvested grain and worked Out a

system of credit by which each family could

draw their rice as they needed it, to eat or to

sell.17 Patrols were sent into the nearby hills

to locate and if possible return rice already

confiscated and hidden by the Viet Cong.

The success of GOLDEN FLEECE in the

Hoa yang District resulted in the populace of

I Corps requesting Marines to protect their

crops at the two harvest times each year. The

GVN responded to requests with local guard

forces and communal transportation from the

fields to safe storage. Tue Agency for International Development provided cement and

clop in GOLDEN FLEECE Operations, October 1966. USMC

tin for the construction of dry buildings in

safe areas.ls The simplicity and total value of

GOLDEN FLEECE Operations became SOP

(Standing Operating Procedure) throughout

III MAF.

(3) Combined Action Force (CAF).—The

CAF was one of the most successful and rewarding experiences Marines encountered during their tour in Vietnam. The primary purpose of the CAF was to "I) to enhance village

and hamlet security by the conduct of integrated military operations with the Popular

Force, and 2) to increase the ability of the

villagers to sustain an(l defend themselves by

participating in and encouraging projects contributing to the people's well-being and their

identification with the national government." 19

Starting with a contribution of four Marine
.fr 4;

102 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

rifle squads in 1965, by March 1970, there were

2,000 Marines and Navy corpsmen, along with

about 3,000 Popular Force (PF) soldiers involved in the Combined Action Force.

By way of background, between 1959 and

1961, the RVN government began to relocate

the rural population into peasant-constructed

rural towns called agrovilles in an effort to

protect them against the growing insurgency

threat. For many reasons the program did not

work, but primarily because the rural population resented the forced relocation and the

local defense forces were incapable of responding effectively to the Viet Cong hit-and-run

tactics. The agrovilles were abandoned in 1961.

From 1961 to 1963, the Strategic Hamlet theory

was tried out by the Army. The elements were

the same as the agrovilles, forced relocation

with self-defense forces inadequately armed

and poorly trained. The ARVN endeavored

to strengthen the defense forces and give

genuine security to the Strategic Hamlets but

had other missions to perform.2° The Strategic

Hamlet concept was also abandoned.

In the spring of 1965, the GVN government

opened, a political cadre training center whose

graduates were organized into Political Action

Teams (PAT). Aside from the political ac- tivity, a 30-man PAT was assigned to the defense of a hamlet or village. The people were

not relocated but allowed to stay in their own

village. Again for a variety of reasons, this

concept failed. There was no immediate and

direct liaison with the ARVN and/or U.S.

forces in the area. Their isolation from the

other forces in the area, coupled with their light

A Marine and Popular Forces of Combined Action

Group 4 check the IDs of villagers where E'iet Cong

ac/jon zeus located. (USiVIC Photo #A191951).

armament and inadequate knowledge of the

local situation, foredoomed the PAT forces to

failure.21

In August 1965, the Marine Corps combined

two elements, namely, not relocating the population and utilizing the local forces now called

Popular Forces. They added to these elements

another ingredient, the U.S. Marine. There

was no question that if the people were insecure, all of the other efforts within the

pacification framework would fail. In the Hue/

Phu Bai area, the Marine Corps with the cooperation of several village chiefs formed a

joint force to meet the problem of local

security. Both the Marines and the Vietnamese

knew the limitations of Popular Forces but

wanted to. place local security on Vietnamese

shoulders. Several village chiefs agreed to allow four Popular Force platoons to work

directly with four Marine rifle squads. The

resultant force was called a Joint Action Company and was commanded by Lieutenant Paul

R. Ek of Company I, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines.22

The Marines in the Joint Action Company

trained the Popular Forces in small unit tactics,

marksmanship, and improved fire support and

served as the nucleus for patrols and ambushes

throughout the village area assigned to each

platoon. The joint platoons also conducted

vigorous civic action programs in support of

the local governing officials. The program emphasized self-help by the peasants in the civic

action projects while the joint platoons provided security. The integration of Marines into

Popular Force platoons succeeded from the

beginning.

Basic to the success of the Combined Action

Companies (CACO), the subsequent name for

the former Joint Action Companies, or CAP,

Combined Action Platoons, was the fact that

the PFs, being local residents, provided knowledge of the area, rapport with the people, and

improved access to information about the

enemy. The PFs had the motivation that was

inherent in the defense of one's own home.

Although the PF comprised the lowest paid

and least trained element of the Vietnamese

military, their value was inestimable.23

By 1967, the Combined Action Program cx1anded throughout I Corps. It was necessary

to appoint a CAP Director at the III MAF

level, who operated under the general staff

cognizance of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G—3,

and who discharged administrative control
THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES 103

over the program but without operational

command. By October 1967, the number of

CAPS necessitated an intermediate level of supervision, and so the Combined Action Group

(CAG) was activated. In January 1970, the

Combined Action Force (CAF) was formed

and had control of all 114 CAPs dispersed

throughout the populated coastal lowlands of

all five provinces in I Corps. Although the

basic element of the CAF was the CAP, controlling and coordinating headquarters existed

at the district, province, and corps levels. The

114 CAPs were organized into 19 CACOs which

in turn were organized into four CAGs. Generally speaking CAG headquarters corresponded with and were located close to province

headquarters. The CACO commander and

CAG commander were counterparts to the

district and province chiefs, respectively. Corps

level coordination was effected throtigh close

liaison between the Commanding Officer, CAF

and the Deputy Commander for I Corps.24

'With the stepped-up redeployment of Marines from Vietnam in 1970, the CAF was deactivated on 21 September 1970 leaving only

the 2d Combined Action Group functioning

under III I\IAF. The last Commanding Officer

of the CAF, Colonel Ralph F. Estey, summed

up the CAF by stating that "it had played a

unique and unparalleled role in combat operations supporting the pacification effort in the

Republic of Vietnam. The neutralization of

7,785 enemy demonstrated the aggressive, tenacious, and courageous character of this force

which never numbered more than 2,100

Marines and Navy personnel and 3,000 Popular

Forces at any one time." 25

Colonel Estey pointed out the positive statistics of the contribution of the CAF since its

beginning in 1965, that the number of Medical

Civic Action Program visits throughout I Corps

approached nearly two million and that by

1970 the population protected by CAPs numbered over 425,000.

That the Combined Action Program worked,

and worked well, in Vietnam did not preclude

the fact that the program could have been

improved. Definitive studies by the Marine

Corps and private research groups will sift out

the flaws and analyze what was done. Quoting

from one research group writing in December

1969:

The Combined Action Program is doing an excellent job in Vietnam, far more excellent, in fact.

than we were led to expect by what reports are

available in the tJnited States. In the Combined

Action concept, the Marine Corps has developed

a tool with capabilities that are unique among the

services and with a potential far wider than its

present application. However, it is not in line with

Marine traditions to rest on one's laurels—and it is

especially important in today's rapidly changing

world to reassess and perfect our instruments continually in order to meet the demands both of today

and the future with maximum effectiveness.2'

The Helicopter and Refinement

of Tactical Mobility

In mid-1971, revisions being prepared for

the series of Fleet Marine Force Manuals

(FMFM) published by MCDEC reflected the

importance of tactical mobility when applying

combat power to the immediate battlefield.

What will be stressed in the revisions will be a

reminder to the commander that he will have

greater means of obtaining higher mobility as

additional equipment is added to the Marine

Corps inventory. The ability to move infantry

and maneuver direct support artillery units

rapidly will provide the commander greater

flexibility and depth on the battlefield.

Vietnam experience is replete with ex- amples of successful use of helicopter-borne

movements. General Keith B. McCutcheon

Lieutenant General Keith B. McCutcheon, aviation

pioneer and Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, 1970. (USMC Photo #A700390).
•1' a4

r

104 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

A Mzrine ground crewman guides a UH—34D helicopter to

Photo #A329571).

stated: "Vietnam was certainly a helicopter war

for U.S. forces. It is difficult to envisage how

we would have fought there without them." 27

The Marine Corps' faith and vision in

utilizing the helicopter as a means to achieve

high mobility in warfare was evidenced as early

as 1946 and borne out in MCS publication of

Phi b—31, Amphibious Operations—Employment

of Helicopters—Tentative in 1948. (See Chapter IV of this book). Subsequent years

of study and development by the Marine Corps

pioneered the use of helicopters in ground warfare in Korea. The Marine Corps pursued the

development of aircraft that would provide

the helicopter lift to execute the ship-to-shore

movement in an amphibious operation. By the

time of Vietnam involvement in 1962, the

Marine Corps had squadrons equipped with

UH—34s and CH—37s. In any other time, 1)0th

a landing in a small jungle clearing in Vietnam. (USMC

models would have been considered obsolescent

but imperative need deemed otherwise. In

addition to having troop carrying helicopters

in 1962, the 1st l\IAW had, by 1965, the Ull—

1E. While the Marine Corps experimented

with armed helicopters as early as 1950, it (lid

not pursue an active program inasmuch as the

greatest need was for a helicopter to carry men

and material. General McCutcheon recalls that

the Marine Corps:

sought to procure a light helicopter which

could perform a myriad of tasks, including the role

of gunship. This program was a long time in

materializing, but it finally resulted in the UH—

lE . . . One gunship version of the Marine lill—1E

was armed with a nose turret which could be dcvatccl, depressed and swung left and right. In addition, weight permitting, it could mount left and

right fixed, forward-firing machine guns, or 2.75-

inch rocket pods. A .30 caliber machine gun could

also be installed in each of the two side doors.
The helo gunship proved to be indispensable. It

was more immediately available than jets, more

maneuverable, and it could work close-in with

transport helicopters. . . .The AH—1G Cobra was not

available for Marine use until 1969. The gunship

was accepted with enthusiasm by the pilots, performed well in a fire suppression role and was

maintained at a rather high rate of availability.2

Happy times for the 1st MAW came when the

transition from UH—34s to CH—46s began in

March 1966. It was not until 1969, however,

that all UH—34s were withdrawn. CH—37s did

yeomen service in Vietnam from 1965 to the

arrival of the CH—53 in January 1967.

Combat helicopter (CH—46) used by Marines in Vietnam. (USMC Photo #A140869).

High Mobility and the Fire Support Base

At the end of the first year in Vietnam, 1965,

Marine transport helicopters were lifting an

average of 40,000 passengers and over 2,000

tons of cargo a month while operating from

their main bases at Ky Ha and Marble Mountain in I Corps. Five years later, Marine helicopters were lifting more than 70,000 passengers and 5,000 tons of cargo in a month. Part

of this increase was attributed to the increased

use of the CH—53 in troop lifts.29 Another

reason for the increase was the extensive use

of Fire Support Bases (FSB). A simple definition of a FSB is a "rapidly constructed

artillery position defended by a minimum of

infantry. The infantry and tactical elements

operate within the protective fan of the artillery FSB. The FSB themselves offer overlapping artillery support to each other and

protection for several landing zones." 30 Construction of the fire support base was a complex job that included everything from matAnother combat helicopter (CH—53A). (USMC Photo

#A412902).

ting for the landing zone to helilif ted rubbertired tractors. The concept had expanded during the war to all parts of South Vietnam,

depriving the enemy of staging areas and infiltration routes. It allowed the infantry to

move throughout the I Corps area while retaining the protective fires of friendly artillery.

Perhaps a forerunner of the FSB technique,

as developed by 1968 with its extensive use of

helicopters, was a major operation that occurred

during Operation HARVEST MOON in December 1965. The UH—34s of MAG—36 and

MAG—16 flew over 9,230 sorties and lifted

12,177 passengers and 638 tons of cargo during

the 12-day operation. A helicopter staging area

was established at a logistic support area (LSA)

located half-way between Chu Lai and Da

Nang on Route 1. After the initial insertion

of three Marine battalions into the area of

operations on 11 and 12 December, the helicopters made 60 other lifts of platoon-sized

and even larger forces. Brigadier General

Jonas Platt, the task force commander of the

operation, states that for the first time in combat, 105mm howitzers from Chu Lai and Da

Nang were helilifted into the battle area. General Platt also noted that 4.2-inch mortars

were helilifted in the area of operations and

utilized in a leap-frog manner.3'

By mid-1968, all III MAF forces went from

a static defense to a mobile offense posture.

Major General Raymond Davis' 3d Marine Division fanned out in wide arcs penetrating

and establishing a presence in areas the enemy

had once considered havens. Throughout the

remaining months of 1968, 3d Division Marines ranged the length and breadth of western

THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES 105
106 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Fire Support Base of the 3d Marine Division near the Rock Pile in January 1969. (USMC Photo #A192512).

Quang Tn Province in I Corps, employing

heliborne infantry and mobile fire support

bases to keep the enemy constantly off stride.

By the end of the year the enemy, by and large,

pulled back his major units, unwilling and

to a large extent unable to risk further destruction at the hands of this maneuver and

firepower. Within a year, the 3d Marine Division had pursued its checkerboard concept to

the extent of carving out more than 140 FSBs

from the jungled terrain in northern I Corps.

If there can be a classic example of the mobile

concept operation, it would have to be Operation DEWEY CANYON, conducted in and

around the Da Krong Valley from 22 January

to 18 March 1969. DEWEY CANYON was a

multi-battalion operation involving the 9th

Marines and two battalions of the Vietnamese

1st Army Division.

An excellent account, including the fine

work accomplished by the 1st MAW during

DEWEY CANYON, is extracted from an article

on the history of Marine aviation in Vietnam

by General McCutcheon.*

On 21 January 1969, a team was formed

of representatives of the 1st MAW and 3d

Marine Division. Infantry, engineer, helicopter, and observation aircraft specialists were

included. The team was responsible to the overall ground commander for landing zone and

fire support base selection and preparation and

coordination of the helicopter assaulL Early

on D-Day the initial landing zones (LZs) were

*Another fine account of Operation DEWEY CANYON, written by a lieutenant and platoon leader is

First Lieutenant Gordon M. Davis, "Dewey Canyon—All

Weather Classic," Marine Corps Gazette, V. 53, no. 7 (July 1969), p. 33.
THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES 107

prepared by fixed-wing air strikes (made suitable for helicopter landing by bombing and

strafing to reduce the threat of opposition to a

minimum) and elements of the 2d Battalion,

9th Marines, landed at 0800. In the rapid buildup that followed, CH-46s, under the control

of the division direct air support center and

under the protective umbrella of gunships and

observation aircraft, brought 1,544 Marines and

46 tons of cargo into two LZs. By the evening

of 24 January, a battery of 105mm howitzers

from the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines and the

command post of the 9th Marines were in place

on one of these landing zones, which became

known as Razor. The following day, three

companies of the 3d Battalion were helilifted

onto i ridgeline further forward, known as Co

Ka Va. It would soon be developed into FSB

Cunningham, named for the first Marine aviator. In a few more days, elements of the 2d

Battalion from FSB Riley pushed down the

ridgeline to establish another FSB (Dallas) to

guard the western approach to the area from

Laos. To the east, the two Vietnamese battalions were lifted into two other bases. They

would secure the left flank and cut-off the

enemy escape route to the east.

About the 1st of February, the "crachin"

season really began to make itself felt. This is

a period when low clouds and drizzle cover

the mountain tops in northern I Corps and

obscure visibility in the valleys. On 4 February,

a company of the 3d Battalion moved into and

occupied what was to become the last FSB

for the coming infantry advance. Erskine was

to be its name. Marine helicopters continually

worked out of the Combat Support Base Vandegrift carrying essential supplies of ammunition, rations, and water to the various bases.

On the return trips they carried wounded back

to aid stations. Often the weather precluded

access to the area except by flying on instruments. Under such conditions, over 40 pallets of

critically needed supplies were dropped by KC—

130 transports and CH—46 helicopters, under

control of the TPQ—10 at Vandegrift. When

artillery was in place on both Cunningham and

Erskine, the 9th 1\Iarines began moving on foot

from their bases into the Da Krong Valley with

battalions on line. Their objective was Tiger

Mountain and the ridgeline that ran west from

it. As they advanced, landing zones were carved

out of the jungle with 2,000 pound bombs or,

as a minimum, sufficient space was created so

that a medevac could be performed by hejicopter hoist, or an external load could be dropped to the troops on the ground.

The 22d of February saw the lead element

of the 3d Battalion gain the crest of Tiger

Mountain. In a few days it became FSB Turnage.

The 24th found the 1st Battalion in possession of the enemy's headquarters at Tam Boi.

The 2d Battalion took control of the ridgeline

overlooking Route 922, where it crosses from

Vietnam into Laos. The 27th marked the first

time a TPQ—10 had ever been emplaced and

operated from a FSB. One was placed on Cunningham and remained there for 17 days, controlling 72 air strikes, 10 A—6 beacon drops, and

3 emergency paradrops. The 18th of March

marked the finaj day of operation of DEWEY

CANYON. On this day virtually the entire

resources of the 1st MAW were committed.

Over 350 tons of cargo and 1,400 Marines were

helilifted out of Turnage and Tam Boi without

a casualty. These were the last two bases to be

vacated. Gunships and jets flew close cover

and close air support. Perhaps the most notable accomplishment of the operation was that

only one helicopter was lost in spite of the adverse weather and terrain and the efforts of a

stubborn, well-trained, and professional enemy

to counter the operation. Lieutenant General

Richard G. Stilwell, U.S. Army, commander

of all U.S. ground forces in the northern two

provinces of I Corps under the Commanding General, III MAF, summed it up in a few

words when he said, "Dewey Canyon deserves

some space in American military history by

sole reason of audacity, guts, and team play.

I cannot applaud too highly the airmen of the

1st lIAW in a variety of roles." 32

Research, Development, and Studies

in the 1960s

Research and development has been acknowledged as being a major force in our nation's

impressive economic growth since World War

II. The Marine Corps' portion of R&D comes

out of the Navy's Research, Development, Test

& Evaluation Objectives and Budget. The

Marine Corps' R&D figure ranges from $35

to $40 million dollars per. year. The figure is

misleading, however, because the value of R&D

done by the other services and of interest to

the r\Earine Corps encompasses expenditures approximating $600 million." The significant contribution of other services to Marine Corps
108 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

R&D is almost entirely in the execution phase

of hardware development, including test and

evaluation. They make very little contribution

to Marine Corps concepts, plans, doctrine, and

tactics. The Marine Corps has to do nearly

alone whatever there is to be done in structural

and doctrinal development and in the determination of its materiel requirements. This

situation is not without its pluses, however,

since development of, refinements to, and new

tactical deployments of the Marine Corps AirGround Team make it unique in benefits and

capability and its concept demands undivided

attention.

Studies performed during the 1950s indicated

that the Corps needed operations researchf

analysis capabilities. An operations research

or operations analysis capability was first introduced into the Marine Corps in March 1957

with the appointment of a civilian analyst

(civil service) to HQMC. Within a year this

capability was augmented with the addition

of a CNO Operations Evaluation Group (OEG)

representative to the Headquarters. This provided the Headquarters with a two-man operations analysis effort for the next four years—

a minimal operations analysis capability primarily directed toward improving the efficiency

of man-machine systems especially in tactical

problems or field exercises. One of the team's

first efforts was directed to evaluations of the

vertical envelopment assault capabilities as exemplified by LANTPHIBEX—58 and the

BRIGADELEX series of 1959—1960. In 1958

the l\Earine Corps commenced a program to

train a number of officers in operations analysis

at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. In 1962 the OEG billet at

HQMC was moved to MCLFD at Quantico and

with two other analysts an operations analysis

unit was formed as a sub-element of the OEG.

To implement future goals, a Landing Force

War Game Group was established at Quantico

in 1961 in order to "develop objective methodology for the war gaming of amphibious operations." The group in conducting war games

"acts" out the landing force aspects of amphibious operations. It simulates a military operation using rules, data, and procedures designed

to depict an actual or assumed real life situation.

In June 1964, DC/S (R&D) prepared a staff study entitled "HQMC Capability to Support Programming, Planning, Budgeting and

Appraising." This study concluded that HQMC

must develop a cost-effectiveness study capability which would assist the Headquarters in

participating more effectively in the Department of Defense Programming System and in

complying with Secretary of Navy Directives.

It recommended the establishment of a Studies

Office and a Headquarters Study Group under

the direction of DC/S (R&D). The study was

approved and a Studies Group, Marine Corps

Operations Analysis Group (MCOAG) was

formed in the newly designated DC/S (Research, Development, and Studies).84 The DC/S

(RD&S) acting for the CMC provides research,

development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)

requirements within the Marine Corps.

RDT&E is characterized by progression from

the general to the specific or from concept

to reality. As the initial step, a long-range concept is prepared which portrays the world as

it is expected to appear 20 years in the future.

Based upon this long-range projection, the

Marine Corps Long-Range Plan (MLRP) is

created to describe the operational, organizational, and material concepts which the Marine

Corps needs to achieve in order to carry out

the roles and missions which are projected for

it in this long-range future. The Marine Corps

Mid-Range Objectives Plan (MMROP) is

created against the background of the MLRP.

It translates the long-range plan into more

definitive goals which must be accomplished

10 years in the future to provide for an orderly

progression from the present towards the longrange concept of Marine Corps combat forces.

Both of these documents, the MLRP and the

MMROP, serve as guides for the identification

and establishment of RDT&E objectives, for the

determination of the RDT&E Program as well

as the Studies Program, and for the execution

of implementing actions to achieve future

goals.35 Both plans support the JCS' Joint

Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) which in

turn supports U.S. national objectives.

Within the R&D process of the Marine Corps,

there are two unique features that complement

the duties of DC/S (RD&S). While he works

on a close and continuing basis with all general staff officers, he has a special relationship

with the Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) and Assistant Chief of Staff, G—4. The Deputy Chief

of Staff (Air) in Headquarters Marine Corps

has, in addition to his responsibilities to the

Ci\IC, a responsibility to the Deputy Chief of

Naval Operations (Air). He is concurrently

DC/S (Air) in HQMC and Assistant Deputy
THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES 109

Chief of Naval operations (Air) for Marine

Aviation in the office of the CNO. Air developments in the Department of the Navy are coordinated Navy/Marine efforts whenever it is

possible. The Secretary of Navy requires the

CMC to "provide Marine Corps RDT&E requirements in aircraft and related equipment

to CNO." 36 The Marine Corps monitors aviation research and development hut it is performed and funded by the Navy. The AC/S.

G—4 is responsible for the materiel planning

and requirement effort. In addition, he manages

the execution of the majority of the ground

R&D efforts. It must be remembered that DC/S

(RD&S) coordinates the R&D effort but does not

task the execution of development projects. The

CMC has in effect selected the AC, G—4 to

execute ground materiel development.

On 1 January 1968, MCS was redesignated

the Marine Corps Development and Education

Command (MCDEC). The Marine Corps Landing Force Development Center subsequently

became the Development Center, Marine Corps

Development and Education Command. The

Commanding General, MCDEC is designated

by the CMC as his field representative for all research and development activities. He has a

total of 22 permanently assigned liaison

officers located at major armed forces development centers throughout the United States to

aid him in keeping abreast of developments and

tests at their respective locations. Close liaison

is maintained with the Canadian Army and

the British Royal Marines.37

Throughout testing and development, information concerning new equipment and ideas

is given by the Development Center to students

of the MCDEC's various schools and the students provide their experience and knowledge

in study efforts for the centers. In speaking

of all efforts supporting the R&D program,

whether it be from analysis groups, MCDEC

students or liaison officers, Major General Louis

Metzger, while DC/S (RD&S) in 1968, stated:

The aim or objective of our R&D effort is to

design and prepare the Marine Corps of the future

to carry out its assigned roles and missions as the

amphibious force in readiness of the United States

and, additionally, to meet the broad mandate of

"such other functions as the President may direct."

We must be able to carry out assigned functions

whenever and wherever we are called upon to do so,

and must be capable of a flexible and rapid response to the wide spectrum of possible operations.

In brief, we must violate the old drill maxim not

to "anticipate the command" in order to retain our

position of professional excellence.38

The Decade To Come

Officially, the policy and objectives of the

Marine Corps during the next 10 years is

contained within the Marine Corps Mid-Range

Objectives Plan (MMROP). What will be discussed here is the reaffirmation of one doctrine,

the Marine-Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)

and the discussion of a possible variant emanat- ing out of the Vertical/Short Takeoff and

Landing concept.

The MAGTF is simply a task organization

tailored to accomplish a specific mission or

missions. Composition of the MAGTF many

vary considerably, but will normally include

a command element, ground combat element,

an aviation combat element, and a combat service support element. It is in general a close

integration of air and ground power formed

for combat operations, training exercises, and

deployments.

The MAGTF doctrine is over 25 years old.

It is noted in this chapter because of its function in the decade of the l960s and its implementation in Vietnam. The concept stems

from a long period of development based

upon and influenced by the advent of great

tactical mobility (helicopters) and fire power

atomic weapons). It is after all the old "forcein-readiness" concept of ground combat units

supported by air. Since the introduction of

air power into 20th century warfare, the Marine

Corps, from the beginning, had considered

aviation resources as complementing the ground

forces for the highly flexible team that would

ensue. There was never a question that "aerial

support" was an integral part of the amphibious

operation as evidenced by it being a major

chapter in the 1935 "Tentative Landing Operations Manual" (see Chapter III).

In the post-World War II period, the new

ingredients of helicopters and atomic weapons

introduced the dispersion theory as one of the

answers to atomic warfare and consequently

control and composition of forces had to be

reconsidered. Examining all of the factors, the

Commandant in 1955 reaffirmed, in Landing

Force Bulletin No. 17, the simple maxim that,

with or without nuclear weapons, the most

effective employment of the FMF is in the

form of an integral military organization emphasizing both air and ground elements re-
110 A DEVELOPMENTAL HIST'ORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., 24th Commandant

of the Marine Corps, i January 1968 to 31 December

1971. (USMC Photo *A415547).

sponsive to a single Marine commander This

organization can be structured to meet anything from a show-of-force situation to a major

conflict. What must be remembered is that

the MAGTF is a task organization tailored to

accomplish a specific mission. The current

Marine Corps Order 3120.3A39 points out that

the composition of MAGTF may vary considerably but will normally include the following major components:

A Command Element

A Ground Combat Element

An Aviation Combat Element

A Combat Service Support Element, including Navy

Support Elements.

At the present time, the FMF can task organize

three types of MAGTF:

Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU)

Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB)

Marine Amphibious Force (MAF)

Before discussing the MAU, MAB, and MAF,

let us look at the major components of a MAGTF. The Command Element is simply

that commander appointed normally from

sources outside the major elements of the task

force. He will have a separate air-ground

headquarters and the communications and service facilities required for its support.

The Ground Combat Element is constructed

around a combat infantry unit with appropriate combat support and combat service support units. So too with the Aviation Combat

Element. This element includes those aviation

commands, including air control agencies, combat, combat support, and combat service support units, required by the situation. Normally

both fixed-wing attack and helicopter aviation

facilities are included in the aviation combat

element of a MAGTF. The other component

is the Combat Service Support Element which

of course supports both the ground combat

element and the aviation combat element.

In the evaluation of the MAGTF, it was

envisioned, in 1953, that the MAGTF would

be composed only of elements combining a

division and wing such as the 2d MAGTF,

composed of Headquarters, 2d MAGTF,

2d Marine Division, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing,

and Force Troops then commanded by Lieutenant General Oliver P. Smith who was Commanding General, FMFLant. As a result the

LANTAGLEX in April 1954 was one of the

first division/wing level amphibious exercises

of the 2d MAGTF. In subsequent years, however, LANTRAEXES were held which considered that a MAGTF was only comprised of

an infantry regiment and a MAG.

Influential in changing the makeup of the

MAGTF were the changing concepts of future

amphibious operations as contained in the

Advanced Research Group Reports and Landing Force Bulletin No. 17. Summarized below

are some of the high-points of the evolutionary

process of the MAGTF of today:

1954—Advanced Research Group 1953—54—Considered landing force aspects of future (within next

10 years). In essence, the report recommended the

all" helicopter concept based only on fighting a

nuclear war.

1955—Advanced Research Group 1954—55—With a

revised concept and an 'all helicopter assault" concept in mind, this group tempered its recommendation with the real possibility of fighting a nonnuclear war.

1955—Landing Force Bulletin No. 17—Promulgated a concept which envisaged the employment.

with or without nuclear support, of integrated

Marine landing forces of ground and supporting air

components, organized, trained, and equipped to

exploit the speed and flexibility of the helicopter,

for the projection of seapower deep ashore at any

point on the world littoral without the necessity

of direct assault on the intervening shoreline.
r:: ..J

THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES Ill

Marine air-ground team concept acted out at Marine Corps Air School, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T.H. by the 1st

Provisional Marine Air-Ground Task Force. (USMC Photo #A290042).

1958—LANTPHIBEX 58—The first major test of

the vertical envelopment concept was successfully

conducted at OnSlow Beach, N.C., with the entire

2d Marine Division involved in an assault landing.

The vertical assault was conducted from three

carriers (USS Tarawa, CVS—40; the USS Valley

Forge, CVS—45; and the USS Forrestal, CVA—59) by

helicopters of MAG—26 commanded by Colonel

Keith B. McCutcheon.

1959—60—BRIGADELEXES—The vertical envelopment concept was perfected through a series of

brigade vertical envelopment exercises conducted by

elements of the 2d Marine Division and MAG—26 at

Vieques, P.R., and Onslow Beach using the USS

Boxer as the new LPH—4. The USS Princeton

(LPH—5) was similarly employed in West Coast

exercises.

1960—CMC promulgated a letter, dated 31 May

1960, describing air-ground task force command

relationships and structures.

l962—CMC promulgated MCO 3340.3, dated 20

April 1962, subject—Employment of Marine AirGround Task Forces in Future Amphibious Operations. This is a broad conceptual statement on

employment of a MAGTF.

1970—MCO 3l20.3A, dated 18 August 1970, subpect—The Organization of MAGTF. This order is

the current doctrinal guide on the structure of the

MAGTF.

The structure of the types of MAGTF as

contained in the current order is outlined

below:

Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU)—The MAU, normally commended by a colonel is employed to perform combat operations in a relatively limited

scope. The ground element is normally a battalion

landing team (BLT) and the aviation element is

normally a composite helicopter squadron. However, the aviation unit may consist of an attack

squadron, a helicopter squadron, and elements of an

observation squadron. The combat service support

element of the MAU is formed primarily from

division, wing, and force troops including the Force
- g___

112 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Service Regiment (FSR). Detachments from Navy

combat serivce support resources may be added.

Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB)—The MAB,

normally commanded by a brigadier general, is

capable of conducting air-ground amphibious

assault operations in low- and mid-conflict environments. The ground element of the MAE is normally

equivalent to a regimental combat team (RCT).

The air element is usually a MAG with varied

aviation capabilities. The combat service support

element includes significant resources from force

troops, including the FSR, division and wing combat service support Units, and the Navy support

units. The present Marine Corps Division/Wing

Team has the capability to deploy two MABS for

separate missions should unusual circumstances require such flexibility.

Marine Amphibious Force (MAF)_Formerly designated Marine Expeditionary Force. This designation was changed in the early period of the

Vietnam war in deference to Vietnamese uneasiness

to the term "expeditionary." The MAF, largest of

the Marine air-ground task forces, may be formed

with many variations in task organization structure.

The MAF is commanded by either a major general

or a lieutenant general, depending on its size and

mission. It is capable of conducting a wide range

of amphibious assault operations and sustained

operations ashore. It can be tailored for any intensity of combat and to any geographic environment.

The ground element of a MAF is Usually a reinforced division. The aviation combat element is

usually an aircraft wing organized to conduct all

types of tactical air operations. The combat service

support element of a MAF can be a single entity or

can be composed of a logistic support element and

an engineer support element. The MAF may include an organic MAB or MAU as a separate

element in order to conduct air-ground operations

sufficiently in space or time from other MAF

elements.

The MAGTF worked well in the past and

particularly in the immediate past, Vietnam.

The doctrinal experience of the MAGTF, an

experience not shared by any of the Armed

Forces, demonstrates great flexibility in task

organization and satisfies generally any opera.

tion requirement.

Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing

V/STOL has, in one form or another, interested the Marine Corps for over 25 years.

The Marine Corps' introduction and development of the helicopter into military operations

after World War II only pointed out the need

for increasing the possibilities to extend V/

STOL capabilities into high performance, tactical fixed-wing aircraft. The Marine Corps

believes that it has the answer to the need

in the British-built Hawker-Siddeley Aviation

Corporation jet aircraft called the Harrier. The

Harrier is a single seat, single fan jet aircraft

powered by a Rolls Royce Bristol Pegasus 10

engine of 21,500 pounds thrust. By utilizing

four rotatable exhaust nozzles, enough thrust

is available to have the jet operate like a helicopter.

Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing Aircraft (Hawk.

er-Siddeley A V—BA "Harrier") used by Marines. (Photo

courtesy of Naval Air Test Center, Naval Air Station,

Patuxent River, Md.)

The United Kingdom had been experimenting with a V/STOL aircraft called the P—1127.

With substantial improvements to the P—I 127,

then called the Kestrel, a successful flight occurred 21 October 1960. By 1968, the P—l127

Kestrel, now Harrier, was in the process of

being adopted by the Royal Air Force. At the

same time, in mid—1968, Lieutenant Colonel

John J\'Ietzko, then Head, RD&S Section, Air

Weapons Systems Branch of Headquarters

Marine Corps, requested the Marine Corps to

take a hard look at the new improved Harrier. "Recognizing the value of such an aircraft

for the Marine Corps, Major General Keith B.

McCutcheon, Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) directed efforts to obtain approval for two pilots

to participate in a short flight evaluation of

the Harrier." 40

Colonel Thomas H. Miller and Lieutenant

Colonel Clarence M. Baker departed for the

United Kingdom in September 1968 and completed flight evaluation tests by October. After
THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES 113

20 sorties which involved all flight modes of the

Harrier's operational capabilities, Colonel Miller stated:

In addition to the unique take-off and landing

capabilities afforded by the vectored thrust concept

used by the Harrier, there are several inflight

maneuvering advantages. For instasce, during glide

bombing runs the nozzles can be moved to the

reverse thrust position to provide unprecedented

speed control in the dive. Another advantage is the

ability to rapidly reduce speed and increase turn

rate (luring air-to-air combat maneuvering.4'

Colonel Miller pointed out that an unprecedented potential in the advantages of the

Harrier could lead to a complete overhaul in

aircraft tactics and procedures.

In 1969, the Defense Department approved

the Marine Corps request to purchase an initial

increment of 12 Harriers during Fiscal Year

1970 with another 18 authorized (luring Fiscal

Year 1971,12 The Marine Corps designated the

Harrier as AV—8A, and after testing and modifying it to fire Sidewinder missiles, established

the first Harrier squadron, VMA—513, at Marine

Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina.

By mid—1971, VMA—513 had the first five AV—

8A Harriers and the potential to add whole

chapters to Marine tactical air doctrine.

In 1965, the then Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Wallace M. Greene, Jr.,

in discussing the Long Range Marine Corps

Concept (addressing the period 1975—1985 time

period), envisioned the value of Marine AirGround teams and V/STOL as follows:

The primary amphibious assault capability of

the landing force will consist of fully V/STOLmobile Marine air-ground teams, launched and supported from mission designed amphibious shipping,

under all conditions of weather and visibility. This

will be complemented by a surface assault capability

utilizing high speed! surface craft, either water or

air cushion borne able to project troops, equipment, and supplies onto the beach beyond the high

water line43

APPENDIX A

NOTES

Chapter I

l Mark Sullivan, Our Times: The United States, 1900—

1920, v. I (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920), pp.

4, 11—12. 2 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,

Historical Statistics of the United States—Colonial Times

to 1957 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960),

p. 8, hereafter U.S. Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics.

Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York:

Harper & Brothers, 1959), p. 468.

Willis J. Abbot, Soldiers of the Sea: The Story of the

United States Marine Corps (New York: Dodd, Mead and

Company, 1918).

'Executive Order No. 969, dated 12 November 1908

(Record Group 432, Operational Archives Branch, Navy

History Division, Navy Department (hereafter OAB,

NHD)).

6 Washington Post, 4 December 1908.

'Washington Times, 15 January 1909.

'Adm George Dewey ltr to Chairman, Subcommittee

of the Naval Committee, House of Representatives, dated

14 January 1909 (Record Group 408, GAB, NHD).

'Ibid.

10 Washington Herald, 27 March 1909.

11 Washington Star, 17 February 1909.

12 Baltimore Sun, 27 March 1909.

"Boston Transcript, 2 December 1908.

14RAdm Albert Gleaves, USN, Life and Letters of Rear

Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U.S. Navy (New York: G.P.

Putnam's Sons, 1925), p. 238.

12 U.S. Navy, General Order No. 544, dated 13 March

1900 (Record Group 408, OAB, NHD).

10 jarvis Butler, "The General Board of the Navy,"

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v.56, no. 8 (August

1930), I- 702.

U.S. Navy Department, Annual Reports of the Navy

Department for the Year 1904 (Washington: Government

Printing Office, 1904), p. 469.

"Annual Report of the Brigadier-General Common.

dan! of the United States Marine Corps to the Secretary

of the Navy, 1900 (\'ashington: Government Printing

Office, 1900), p. 49, hereafter Annual Rt of CMC with

appropriate year.

10 As quoted in Dotiald W. Mitchell, History of the

Modern .-lmeriean Navy, from 1883 through Pearl Harbor (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p. 30.

'° William Russell, The Genesis of Fleet Marine

Force Doctrine: 1879—1899,' pt. IV, Marine Corps Gazette,

v. 35, no. 7 (July 1951), p 59.

21 General Board memo, dated 29 May 1915 (Record

Group 408, OAB, NHD).

22 Adm George Dewey ltr to Secretary of the Navy,

dated 6 October 1900 (Record Group 127, National

Archives).

"Ibid.

24 Adm George Dewey ltr to Secretary of the Navy,

dated 1 November 1900, ibid.

20 RAdm A.S. Crowninshield ltr to Secretary of the

Navy, dated 1 November 1901 (Record Group 127,

National Archives).

"Ibid.

27 Brigadier General Commandant endorsement of 15

November 1901 to General Board ltr, dated 1 November

1901 (Record Group 408, OAB, NHD).

28 Annual R! of CMC, 1903, p. 26.

"General Board memo, dated 15 May 1915 (Record

Group 408, OAB, NHD).

3° William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy

in the Pacific, 1897—1909, (Austin: University of Texas

Press, 1958), p. 192, hereafter Braisted, U.S. Navy in the

Pacific.

"Thomas A. Bailey, The American Pageant: A History

of the Republic, . II (Boston: D.C. Heath & Company,

1966), p. 648.

3° As quoted in Braisted, U.S. Navy in the Pacific, p.

198.

"Ibid., p. 199.

' General Board memo, dated 29 May 1915 (Record

Group 408, OAB, NHD).

"Joint Committee of Officers of the Army and Navy,

Army War College, rpt to General Board, dated 7 April

1908 (Record Group 408, OAB, NHD).

3° General Board ltr to Secretary of the Navy, dated

30 December 1909 (Record Group 408, OAB, NHD).

"General Board ltr to Secretary of the Navy, dated

19 February 1910 (Record Group 408, OAB, NHD).

Secretary of the Navy hr to CMC, dated 24 March

1910 (Serial 16721—39, USMC General Correspondence,

1904—1912. Record Group 127, National Archives).

"CMC hr to Secretary of the Navy, dated 18 April

1910, bc. cit.

Major General Commandant ltr to Assistant Secretary of the Navy, dated 18 April 1910 (Record Group

432, OAB, NHD).

41 Ibid.

"Major General Commandant memo to Secretary of

the Navy, dated 8 December 1914 (Recordl Group 432.

OAB. NHD).

Capt Dion Williams, USMC, 'The Defense of Our

115
116 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

New Naval Stations," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,

v. XXVIII, no. 2 (June 1902), PP. 181—194.

RAdm R.P. Rodgers, USN, ltr to General Board,

dated 10 December 1909 (Record Group 408, OAB,

NHD).

"Ibid., dated 26 November 1909. a Ibid., dated 10 December 1909.

President, Naval War College ltr to General Board,

dated 27 April 1908, w/ Army War College rpt enclosed

(Serial 146, Record Group 408, OAB, NHD).

"Journal of the U.S. Artillery (Fort Monroe, Va.), v.

35, no. 1(1911).

Maj T.W. Winston, CAC, ltr to Adm George Dewey,

dated 26 April 1911 (Record Group 408, OAB, NHD).

'° General Board ltr to Secretary of the Navy, dated

26 April 1911 (Record Group 408, OAB, NHD).

Maj Dion Williams, 'Report on Men, Material and

Drills Required for Establishing a Naval Advance Base,"

MS., Office of Naval Intelligence (Record Group 408,

OAB, NHD).

Major General Commandant memo to Secretary of

the Navy, dated 8 December 1914 (Record Group 432,

OAB, NHD).

Ibid.

'° General Board Itr to Secretary of the Navy, dated

13 November 1913 (Record Group 432, OAB, NHD).

Ibid., dated 30 January 1914.

Major General Commandant memo to Secretary of

the Navy, dated 8 December 1914, op. cit.

"General Board ltr to Secretary of the Navy, dated

21 July 1913 (Record Group 432, OAB, NHD). a Maj Frank E. Evans, "The Marines Have Landed,"

Marine Corps Gazette, v. 2, no. 3 (September 1917), p.

219.

Major General Commandant memo to Secretary of

the Navy, dated 8 December 1914, op. cit.

a Col Frederick Ma)' Wise, A Marine Tells It To You

(New York: J.H. Sears & Company, Inc., 1929), p. 119.

Secretary of the Navy itt to CMC, dated 24 March

1910 (Serial 16721—39, USMC General Correspondence,

1904—1912, Record Group 127, National Archives). " Aide for Inspections memo to Secretary of the Navy,

dated I May 1913 (Record Group 432, OAB, NHD).

"ibid.

Major General Commandant ltr to Secretary of the

Navy, dated 7 July 1913 (Serial 10190, Record Group

432, OAB, NHD).

"General Board ltr to Secretary of the Navy, dated

21 July 1913 (Record Group 432, OAB, NHD).

a General Board Itr to Secretary of the Navy, dated

19 August 1913 (Record Group 432, OAB, NHD).

"Major General Commandant ltr to Secretary of the

Navy, enclosure F, dated 8 September 1913 (Record

Group 432, OAB, NHD).

"Major General Commandant memo to Secretary of

the Navy, dated 8 December 1914 (Record Group 432,

OAB, NHD).

"Wise, op. cit., pp. 120—121.

'° Col George Barnett, "Report on Maneuvers and

Operations," to Major General Commandant, dated 15

February 1914 (Record Group 432, OAB, NHD).

Major General Commandant memo to Secretary of

the Navy, dated 8 December 1914 (Record Group 432,

OAB, NHD).

"U.S. Atlantic Fleet, USS Arkansas, Flagship, "Report

on Operations of Advance Base Expedition. Culebra,

WI., Jan-Feb 1914," dated 15 April 1914 (Record Group

432. OAB, NHD).

Major General Commandant, 4th endorsement of

"Supplemental Report, Brigade Commander, Advanced

Base Expedition, Culebra, Jan-Feb 1914," dated 23 April

1914 (Record Group 432, OAB, NHD).

"Ibid., 3d endorsement.

"General Board ltr to Secretary of the Navy, dated

3 April 1917 (Record Group 408, OAB, NHD).

'° MajGen John A. Lejeune, Reminiscenses of a Marine

(Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, 1930), p. 229.

"ibid., p. 230.

"Kenneth W. Condit and Maj John H. Johnstone,

A Brief History of Marine Corps Staff Organization

(Washington: Historical Branch, G—3 Division, Headqtlarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1963), p. 10. Hereafter

Historical Branch, G—3 Division, Headquarters, U.S.

Marine Corps will he cited as HistBr, G—3, HQMC.

'°Condit and Johnstone, op. cit., pp 10—Il.

'Maj Alfred A. Cunningham, "Value of Aviation to

the Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 5, no. 3

(September 1920), p. 223.

Maj Harvey D. Bradshaw, "Marine Corps Aviation:

Cunningham to Chu Lai," U.S. Naval Institute Pro.

ceedings, v. 92, no. 11 (November 1966), p. 109.

Cunningham, op. cit., p. 222.
Chapter II

George Harmon Knoles, The New United States: A

History Since 1896 (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1960), p. 229, hereafter Knowles, New United

States.

2 As quoted in Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: AppletonCentury Crofts, Inc., 1958), p. 640, hereafter Bailey,

Diplomatic History.

E.B. Potter, ed., Seapower: A Naval History (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 581.

Bailey, Diplomatic History, p. 641.

Potter, op. cit., p. 481.

6 Bailey, Diplomatic History, p. 642.

Potter, op. cit., pp. 48 1—482.

0 Norman A. Graebner, ed., An Uncertain Tradition:

American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century

(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1941),

p. 141.

Summary of Military Personnel Strength of the Military Budget for FY 1971 (Fiscal Division, HQMC).

10 Condit and Johnstone, op. cit., pp. 11—12.

11 ibid., pp. 13—14.

12CMC memo to General Board, dated 11 February

1922, Subject: Future Policy for the Marine Corps as

Influenced by the Conference on Limitation of Armament (Record Group 432, OAB, NHD).

"Ibid.

14 U.S. Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics, p.

736.

"CMC memo to General Board, dated 11 February

1922, op. cit.

16 Ibid. '

RQMC ltr, dated 5 November 1923 (Historical

Division (HD), HQMC).

10Annual Rpt of CMC, 1925, p. 17. ° LtCol Clyde H. Metcalf, A History of the United

Stales Marine Corps (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons,

1939), p. 527. o U.S. Navy Department, Annual Reports of the Navy

Department for the Fiscal Year 1922 (Washington:

Government Printing Office, 1923), p. 822.

Commanding Officer, Expeditionary Detachment,

USMC rpt to Major General Commandant, dated 20 July

1922, Subject: 'Report on Expedition to Guantanamo

and Culebra, Operating with Control Force, U.S. Atlantic

Fleet, January 9, 1922 to April 25, 1922," p. 2 (General

Files, Breckinridge Library, Quantico, Va.).

22 Ibid., p. 7. '

Ibid., pp. 8—9. 24 ibid., p. 48. 25 CMC memo to Secretary of the Navy, enclosure F,

dated 8 September 1931, Subject: Examination of the

Organization and Establishment of the USMC (Record

Group 432, OAB, NHD).

26 Headquarters, MCEF, Marine Barracks, Quantico,

Va., Basic Plan of Winter Maneuvers for the U.S. Fleet,

1924, dated 1 December 1923 (Box 23, Accession No.

62A—2059, Record Group 127, Washington National

Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md.).

2TBGen Eli K. Cole rpt to CMC, dated 15 February

1924, Subject: "Concerning Operations at Isla Margarita

(Fort Randolph) Canal Zone, Jan 16—18, 1924," bc. cit.

Col Dion Williams rpt to CMC, dated 24 March 1924,

Subject: Report of Operations, MCEF, Culebra, P.R., p. 3

(Box 24, bc. cit.).

CMC ltr to Chief of Naval Operations, dated 18 December 1923, Subject: Motor Lighter (Beetle Boat) for

Winter Maneuvers (Box 23, bc cit.).

'° BGen Eli K. Cole, Headquarters, MCEF, Culebra,

P.R. rpt, dated 5 February 1924, Subject: "Reports and

Comments on Landing Operations, Blue Force, Culebra,"

p. 10, bc cit. '

CMC ltr to BGen E.K. Cole, dated 14 December 1923,

Subject: Appointment as Commanding General, MCEF

(Biographical File, Historical Reference Branch, Historical Division, HQMC (hereafter HRB, HD, HQMC)).

'2CMC ltr to Commanding General, Quantico, Va.,

dated 7 December 1923, Subject: Christie Tank—Test of

and Use of in Culebra during Winter Maneuvers (Box

23, Accession No. 62A—2059, Record Group 127, WNRC,

Suitland, Md.). '

BGen S.D. Butler ltrs to Walter Christie and VAdm

N.A. McCully, USN, dated II December 1923, bc. cit.

Annual Rpt of CMC, 1924, p. 668.

'5Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines

and Amphibious War (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1951), p. 31, hereafter Isely and Crowl, Amphibious

War.

'°Annual Rt of CMC, 1925, pp. 11—12.

Col R.M. Dunlap rpt, Subject: "Recommendations

Based on Report of Critique on Joint Army & Navy

Problem No. 3 by Officers of Marine Corps Schools, June

1 to 5, 1925," undated (Box 23, Accession No. 62A—2059,

Record Group 127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.).

'°Ibid.

'° Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va. Special Order 181,

dated 3 July 1926 (Box 1, Accession No. 65A—6573,

Record Group 127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.).

'°Col Richard M. Cutts memo to CMC, dated 17 June 1926, Subject: "Information Relative to Designed

Operating Condition and Tests of 50' Motor Troops

Lighter and 50' Lighter for Landing Artillery" (Box 23,

bc. cit.).

41 lstLt Charles Connette ltr to Commanding Officer,

Fifth Regiment, dated 20 July 1927, Subject: Report of

Tests of Infantry Landing Barge, bc. cit. '

Cutts memo, op. cit. °' LtGen K.E. Rockey ltr to Assistant Chief of Staff,

G—3 Division, dated 21 June 1957 (Historical Reference

Section (HRS), HD, HQMC). General Rockey (then

117
118 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

captain) had been one of four observers sent by the CMC

to report on the tests of the artillery lighter (Special

Order 181, dated 3 July 1926, Marine Barracks, Quantico,

Va.).

[U.S.] Joint Board, Joint Action of the Army r Navy

(Washington, 1927), p. 3, para. vii, ii (a).

Ibid., p. 12, para. VI, 8 (b).

Col Ben H. Fuller hr to Maj S.M. Harrington, dated

16 October 1922 (Box 23, Accession No. 62A—2059, Record

Group 127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.).

Headquarters Bulletin, USMC, dated 10 March 1926,

p. 5, bc. cit.

Research Section, MCS, memo, to Academic Section,

MCS, dated 16 September 1949 (Breckinridge Library,

Quantico, Va.).

40Ibid., p. c—2.

50Ibid.

51 Elizabeth L. Tierney and Rowland P. Gill, A Brief

History of Marine Corps Aviation (Washington: HistBr,

G—3, HQMC, 1969), p. 2, hereafter Tierney and Gill,

Marine Corps Aviation.

Robert Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation in

World War if (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952),

p. 23.

Ibid., p. 25.

54Ibid., p.27.

Officer-in-Charge, School of Aerial Observation hr to

Brigade Commander, MCEF, Quantico, Va., dated 28

September 1926, Subject: Air-Ground Communications

Problem (Box I, Accession No. 65A—6573, Record Group

127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.).
Chapter III

1 William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and

the New Deal, 1932—1940 (New York: Harper Torch.

books, Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 1—2.

2 Knoles, New United States, p. 444.

As quoted in John E. Wiltz, From Isolation to War,

1931—1941 (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company,

1968), p. 17.

Knoles, New United States, p. 446.

5Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign

Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960),

p. 146.

U.S. Fleet Base Force, USS Argonne, Flagship,

Operational Order 22—34, dated 12 July 1934 (Box 2,

Accession No. 65A—4939, Record Group 127, WNRC,

Suitland, Md.).

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,

Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1936 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1936), pp. 149, 172.

Chief of Naval Operations ltr to Secretary of the

Navy, dated 2 March 1933, Subject: Examination of

Organization and Establishment of the USMC (File

Op—13/PS, KK/A3—l (310624), Record Group 432, OAB,

NHD).

°tbid.

10RAdm L.E.H. Maund, RN, "The Development of

Landing Craft," Journal of the Royal United Service

institution, v. XC, no. 558 (May 1945), pp. 212—217. CMC rpt to Assistant Secretary of the Navy, dated

7 April 1959, Subject: "The Evolution of Modern Amphibious Warfare" (Historical Amphibious File (HAF),

Breckinridge Library, Quantico, Va.).

12 Research Section, MCS, memo to Academic Section,

MCS, dated 16 September 1949 (Breckinridge Library,

Quantico, Va.).

Col C.F.B. Price memo to Gen Berkeley, dated 2

March 1931 (HAF No. 43, Breckinridge Library, Quantico, Va.).

14 Col C.F.B. Price ltr to Commandant, MCS, dated 17

April 1931, bc. cit.

MCS memo, dated 3 June 1931, bc. cit.

16 Commandant, MCS, ltr to Major General Corn. mandant, dated 5 October 1931, bc. cit.

13 Major General Commandant ltr to Commandant,

MCS, dated 20 October 1931 (Serial 1520—30—100,

AO—l55-cel, bc. cit.)

Anthony A. Frances, "History of the Marine Corps

Schools," MS., MCS, December 1945 (Breckinridge

Library, Quantico, Va.), hereafter Frances, "History of

Marine Corps Schools." ° Ellis B. Miller, Officer Records (HQMC).

70 Frances, "History of Marine Corps Schools.'

21Annual Rpt of CMC, 1933, pp. 11—13.

MCS Instruction Memo No. 10, 1933 (Accession No.

62A—6573, Record Group 127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.).

23 Advanced Base Problem Files (Breckinridge Library,

Quantico, Va.).

24 Col Richard M. Cutts ltr to Col LB. Miller, dated

23 September 1932 (Box 1, Accession No. 65A—4939,

Record Group 127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.). " Research Section memo, op. cit. ° LCdr E.W. Broadbent, USN, "The Fleet and the

Marines," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 57, no. 3

(March 1931), p. 372.

27 MajGen John H. Russell, "The Birth of the Fleet

Marine Force," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 72,

no. 1 (January 1946), p. 79.

20General Order No. 241, dated 7 December 1933

(HRS, HD, HQMC).

Marine Corps Order No. 66, dated 3 December 1933,

bc. cit.

20 [U.S.] Joint Board, Joint Overseas Expeditions

(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933).

Frances, "History of Marine Corps Schools."

MCS, Proceedings of Conference, 9 January 1934

(Correspondence File 1520—30—120, Record Group 127,

National Archives; HAF No. 41, Breckinridge Library,

Quantico, Va.).

CMC ltr, w/ enclosed manual, dated 9 July 1935,

Subject: Tentative Landing Operations Manual (Serial

AO—89—tgl, File 2275—1—10, Breckinridge Library, Quantico, Va.).

Chief, War Plans Section ltr to Division of Opera.

tions and Training, dated 21 June 1937 (Box 3, Accession

No. 65A—4939, Record Group 127, WNRC, Suitland,

Md.).

Research Section memo, dated 16 September 1949,

o/. cit.

Ibid.

RAdm Julius A. Furer, USN (Ret.), Administration

of the Navy Department in World War II (Washington:

Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 591.

00 Commanding General, 1st Marine Brigade, Fleet

Exercise 4 rpt, dated 12 March 1938; BGen V.H. Krulak

ltr, w/ attached comments, to Head, HistBr, G—3,

HQMC, dated 1 February 1957 (HRS, HD, HQMC). " LtCol Frank 0. Hough, Maj Verle E. Ludwig, and

Henry I. Shaw, Jr., History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, v. I—Pearl Harbor to

Guadalcanal (Washington: HistBr, G—3, HQMC, 1958),

hereafter Hcugh, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to

Cuadalcanal.

ibid., p. 24.

41 Capt Ralph S. McDowell, USN, interview by HistBi,

G—3, HQMC, dated 19 June 1957 (Accession No.

65A—5l96, Record Group 127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.).

"Chief of Naval Operations ltr to Chief, Bureau of

Ships, dated 23 September 1940 (2455—130—60, HQMC

119
120 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Files). Cited in Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor

to Guadalcanal, p. 28.

LtCoI E.E. Linsert interview by HistBr, G—3, HQMC,

dated 3 June 1957 (Accession No. 65A—5196, Record

Group 127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.).

Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadal.

canal, p. 29. ° Gen Holland M. Smith and Percy Finch, Coral and

Brass (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), p. 92.

Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadal.

canal, p. 31.

LtGen V.H. Krulak ltr to Director, M.C. History,

dated 3 August 1970 (Developmental History Comment

File, Archives, HRS, HD, HQMC), hereafter Krulak

Comments.

'° Borg.Warner Corp., 'Research, Investigation

Experimentation in the Field of Amphibian Vehicles for

USMC, Contract #66245," Final Rpt, dated 1957 (Inger.

soil Kalamazoo Division, Kalamazoo, Mich.), hereafter

B-W Rpt. 4 Ibid., p. 46.

°° Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadal.

canal, p. 32.

Col John Kaluf hr to Director, M.C. History, dated

19 January 1971 (Developmental History Comment File, v. II, Archives, HRS, HD, HQMC), hereafter Kaluf

Comments.

CMC Itr to Senior Member, Navy Department

Continuing Board for Development of Landing Boats,

dated 18 May 1938 (Accession No. 65A—4939, Record

Group 127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.). ° MajGen E.P. Moses hr to Assistant Chief of Staff,

G—3 Division, HQMC, dated 11 April 1957 (HRS, HD,

HQMC).

°4B.W Rpt, pp. 47-48.

°° President, MC. Equipment Board hr to Major

General Commandant, dated 8 October 1940, Subject:

Development Project List for Period 1 April 1940 to 30

September 1940 (Box 2, Accession No. 65A—4939, Record

Group 127, WNRC, Suitlanci, Md.).

°° Krulak Comments.

°° LtGen Victor H. Krulak interview by Historical

Division, dated 15 june 1970 (Oral History Collection,

HD, HQMC).

°° Krulak Comments.

°°James M. Hait, Chairman of the Board, Food

Machinery Corp. interview by author, dated 24 June

1969, San Jose, California.

°° Lee McFarland, Ordnance Division.Material, ibid. '

Muster Rolls, Unassigned Units, dated February

1941 (HRS, HD, HQMC). 62 Muster Rolls, Amphibian Tractor Detachment,

Dunedin, Fla., dated May 1941, ibid.

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) and Chief,

Bureau of Weapons, United States Naval Aviation,

1 91 0—60, NAVWEPS 00—80P—l (Washington: Department

of the Navy, 1960), p. 66.

64 Ibid., p. 69. °°Tierney and Gill, Marine Corps Aviation, p. 4.

Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, p. 47.

°° Major General Commandant rpt to Secretary of the

Navy, 15 August 1939, Subject: "Annual report of the

condition and service of the U.S. Marine Corps, fiscal

year ending 30 June 1939."

°° CMC rpt to Assistant Secretary of the Navy, dated

7 April 1959, op. cit. ° Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadal.

canal, p. 17.

°°Ibid,p. 18.
Chapter IV

Samuel I. Rosenman, comp., The Public Papers and

Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, v. 9—War and Aid

to Democracies (New York: Macmillan Company, 1941).

p. 264.

Capt W.S. Pye, USN, "Joint Army and Navy

Operations—Part I," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v.

50, no. 12 (December 1924), p. 1967.

Division of Operations and Training, HQMC (Box 2,

Accession No. 65A—4939, Record Group 127, WNRC,

Suitland, Md.).

'Maj Earl H. Ellis, 712D-Operation Plan approved by

Major General Commandant, dated 23 July 1921 (HAF

No. 165, Breckinridge Library, Quantico, Va.).

Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T.

Turnbladh, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in

World War II, v. Ill—Central Pacific Drive (Washington:

HistBr, G—3, HQMC, 1966), pp. 4—5, hereafter Shaw,

Nalty, and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive.

o CMC rpt to Assistant Secretary of the Navy,

dated 7 April 1959, Subject: "The Evolution of Modern

Amphibious Warfare" (HAF, Breckinridge Library,

Quantico, Va.).

Office of Naval Research, U.S. Navy Department,

"The History of United States Naval Research and

Devclopment in World War II," MS. Historical Staff

Study, University of Pittsburgh (Navy Department

Library, Washington, D.C.), p. 294.

° Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval

Operations in World War II, v. XIV—Victory in the

Pacific, 1945 (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1960),

p. 63.

'U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Aviation, General,

1940 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940), p.

'°CMC ltr to Senior Member of the Board to

Re-Examine the Adequacy of the Present Concept of

Missions and Functions of the Marine Corps, dated 11

October 1945, Subject: U.S. Strategic Bombing SurveyJapan (Serial MC—558459, Marine Barracks, Quantico,

Va.). It should be noted that this letter and enclosures

svere reprinted as a report by a board headed by Colonel

Merrill B. Twining. The board's report was entitled "An

Evaluation of Air Operations Affecting the U.S. Marine

Corps in World War II," hereafter Twining Board

Report.

11 Twining Board Report, p. 111—27. '

Maj WE. Sullivan, Jr., "History and Development of

Close Air Support," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 40, no. 11

(November 1956), p. 20.

"LtCol Keith B. McCutcheon, "Close Air Support

SOP," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no. 8 (August 1945),

p. 48. '

Maj Charles \V. Boggs, Jr., Marine Aviation in the

Philippines (Washington: HD, HQMC, 1951), p. 61.

05 McCutcheon, op. cit.

10 Major Charles S. Nichols, Jr. and Henry I. Shaw, Jr.,

Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific (Washington: HistBr,

G—3, HQMC, 1955), p. 264.

"LtCol Whitman S. Bartley, Iwo Jima: Amphibious

Epic (Washington: HistBr, G—3, HQMC, 1954), p. 206.

Isely and Crowl, Amphibious War, p. 503.

19 Nichols and Shaw, op. cit., p. 270.

29 U.S. Navy, Bureau of Aeronautics, World EVar II

Administrative History, v. XX—Marine Corps Aviation

(Washington, 1957), pp. 91—92, hereafter BuAer Admin

Hist.

21BuAer Admin Hist, v. XX, p. 98.

Maj John H. Johnstone, United States Marine Corps

Parachute Units (Washington: HistBr, G—3, HQMC

1962), p. 7.

"BuAer Admin Hist, v. XX, p. 99.

21 Ibid., p. 100. 23 LtGen Roy S. Geiger ltr to CMC, dated 21 August

1946 (Serial 0265—46, Box 11, Accession No. 14051, Record

Group 127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.). a CMC ltr to Chairman, Special Board, dated 13 September 1946 (Serial 03A25646, bc. cit.). 27 As quoted in LtGen James P. Berkeley, "The

Modern Concept of Vertical Envelopment," Naval

Engineers Journal, v. 77, no. 3 (June 1965), pp. 367—376,

hereafter Berkeley, "Vertical Envelopment."

29 CMC hr to Chairman, Special Board, dated 13 September 1946, op. cit.

29 Chairman, Special Board rpt, w/ enclosures A.E, to

CMC, dated 16 December 1946 (HAF, Breckinridge

Library, Quantico, Va.), hereafter SpecBrd Rpt.

30 SpecBrd Rpt, enclosure C, p 7.

'1lbid., p. 11.

CMC ltr to Commandant, MCS, dated 19 December

1946, Subject: Study of Helicopters and Large Seaplanes

in Amphibious Warfare, with Special Board Report as

enclosure (Serial 008A3546, HAF, Breckinridge Library,

Quantico, Va.).

Ibid.

Commandant, MCS ltr to CMC, w/ enclosure, dated

10 March 1947 (Serial 001120, bc. cit.).

Ibid., p. 2.

'°!bid., p.1.

32 Chief of Naval Operations dispatch to CMC, dated

November 1947 (Serial 221351Z, bc. cit.).

CMC ltr to Commanding Officer, MC. Air Station,

Quantico, Va., dated 3 December 1947 (Serial 007A33547

and DA—0022470 (bc. cit.).

Lynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky: The Story oJ

U.S. Marine Combat Helicopters (New York: Harper &

Brothers, 1954), p• 80, hereafter Montross, Cavalry of the

Sky. It should be noted that Mr. Montross was a historian, Head of the Korean History Unit of the

Historical Branch of the U.S. Marine Corps, at the time

he wrote this work. The book, published nearly 20 years

121
122 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

ago, is still the most readable work on the subject of

Marines and helicopters. This portion of the chapter on

the development of doctrine and early history of the

helicopter is primarily based on Mr. Montross' book.

Original sources were checked but all leads to these

sources came from the Montross book.

4° HMX—l Squadron History, 1 December 1947—31 December 1949 (Box 2, Accession No, 64A—3731, Record

Group 127, WNRC, Suitland, Md.), p. 1, hereafter

HMX—1 SqnHist.

HMX—1 SqnHist, p. 1.

HMX—1 rpt on Operation PACKARD II, Amphibious

Command Post Exercise, 10—26 May 1948 (Box 2,

Accession No. 64A—3731, Record Group 127, WNRC,

Suitland, Md.), pp. 1—1, 1—2).

'3lbid., p. 111—7.

Ibid., p. V—2.

4° HMX—1 SqnHist, p. 8.

Montross, Cavalry 0/the Sky, p. 91.

MCS, "Amphibious Operations—Employment of Helicopters (Tentative)," NAVMC—4544, No. 31 in a Series on

Amphibious Operations, 1948 (HAF No. 243, Breckin.

ridge Library, Quantico, Va.), p. 1, hereafter Phib—31.

MCS, Junior Course, "The Employment of Helicop.

ters in the Amphibious Attack," [1947] (Brcckinridge

Library, Quantico, Va.). 4° Phi b—31, preface.

4°tbid.

Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, p. 97.

HMX—1 rpt on Operation PACKARD III, 18—24 May

1949 (Box 2, Accession No. 64A—3731, Record Group 127,

WNRC, Suitland, Md.), p. VI—!. 4° Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, p. 108.
Chapter V

1 MCS 1—9, Organization of the U.S. Marine Corps

(MCDEC, MCS, Quantico, Va., July 1967), p. 12.

Report of General Officers' Conference, HQMC, dated

21 August 1953 (Breckinridge Library, Quantico, Va.),

p. 1, hereafter Rpt of General Officers, 1953.

MCS 1—9, op. cit.

Rpt of General Officers, 1953, p. 1.

Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, pp. 109—110.

Lynn Montross, "Flying Windmills in Korea," Marine

Corps Gazette, v. 37, no. 9 (September 1953), p. 20.

'LtCoI Pat Meid and Maj James M. Yingling, "U.S.

Marine Operations in Korea, 1950—1953", v. V—"Operations in West Korea," MS. (HD, HQMC), unpaged.

'Thid.

'ibid.

'°lbid. '

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Korean War,

U.S. Pacific Fleet Operations, Chapter 9—"Fleet Marine

Force-Ground," Interim Evaluation Report No. 4, 1 January 1952—30 june 1952 (Archives, HRS, HD,

HQMC).

12 Rpt of General Officers, 1953, p. 109.

"U.S. Pacific Fleet, Korean War, Chapter 9, op. cit. '

MC. Test Unit #1, Unit Diary, dated 2 September

1954 (HD, HQMC).

"Annual Rt of CMC, 1955, p. 9.

"Annual Rt of CMC, 1957, pp. 61—62.

"CMC ltr to Commanding General, Fleet Marine

Force, Atlantic; Commanding General, Fleet Marine

Force, Pacific; Commandant, MCS, dated 30 April 1956,

Subject: Fleet Marine Force Organization and Composition Board (Serial AO3A—cec, VE 23.2.N121312/l,

Archives, HRS, HD, HQMC).

"Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet Operations

& Readiness) memo to Chief of Naval Operations, dated

21 September 1955 (Serial OP—343/at, TAB 29, VE

23.2.N1213112/2, Archives, HRS, HD, HQMC).

"Ibid..

"CMC cover ltr to Distribution List, w/ Hogaboom

Rpt enclosed, dated 7 January 1957 (Serial AD 2513—reg,

VE 23.2.Nl213l2/l, Archives, HRS, HD, HQMC),

hereafter enclosure will be cited as Hogaboom Rpt.

"Hogaboom Rpt, Section E, Pt. 11—14.

"Table of Organization No. M—1990, revised No. 1,

dated 11 July 1963, Subject: Marine Division, Fleet

Marine Force.

"Hogaboon Rt, Section B, pt. V11—3.

"ibid., Pt. 111—2.

"LtGen William K. Jones ltr to Director, M.C.

History, dated 4 February 1971 (Developmental History

Comment File, v. II, Archives, HRS, HD, HQMC),

hereafter Jones Comments.

"U.S. Marine Corps, Division of Information, A Brief

History of SATS (Washington: Division of Information,

HQMC, 1965).

"Ibid.

"Berkeley, "Vertical Envelopment," p. 375.

"Meid and Yingling, "Operations in West Korea,"

op. cit.

'° Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Korean War,

U.S. Pacific Fleet Operations, Chapter lO—"Fleet Marine

Force-Air," Interim Evaluation Report No. 4, 1 January

1952—30 June 1952 (Archives, HRS, HD, HQMC), p. 10—

85.

"MC. Landing Force and Development Center Project

No. T—727, Subject: Fuel Handling in Amphibious

Operations (Breckinridge Library, Quantico, Va.).

"Annual Rt of CMC, 1954, p. V—4.

M.C. Equipment Board-M.C. Development Center,

Status Report, dated April 1956 (Breckinridge Library,

Quantico, Va.).

"Annual Rt of CMC, 1957, pp. 63—64.

"Annual Rpt of CMC, 1959, p. 11.

"Deputy Chief of Staff (RD&S) memo to Director,

M.C. History, dated 25 November 1970 (HD, HQMC).

"Rpt of General Officers, 1953, Shepherd address.

"Marine Corps Order 3900.1A, dated 14 November

1956, Subject: Marine Corps Research, Development, and

Testing.

"U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval

Research, A Study of the Marine Corps R & D Pro gram—

Final Report, Volumes Ii through VIII, pp. 11:19:42—43,

under ONR Contract Authority Identification No. NR

259—068/1—37—67 (Code 463), July 1967, hereafter Office

of Naval Research, M.C. Research & Development.

"Ibid.

41 RAdns Julius Augustus Furer, USN, Administration

of the Navy Department in World War ii (Washington:

Office of Naval History, 1959), p. 587.

"Office of Naval Research, M.C. Research & Developmnent, p. 11—20.

"Capt L. S. Howeth, USN (Ret.), History of Corn.

munications-Electronics in the United States Navy

(Washington: Bureau of Ships and Office of Naval

History, 1963), pp. 434—435). '

Ibid., p. 435.

"Office of Naval Research, M.C. Research & Developmnent, p. 11—20.

"Col MB. Twining memo to Executive Director,

Marine Corps Board, dated 1 February 1950, Subject:

Study on Coordination of Amphibious Development

Activities (Breckinridge Library, Quantico, Va.).

"Board of General Officers, Findings and Recommendations, dated 18 july 1950, Subject: Program for

Coordination aiid Integration of Marine Corps Developmental Activities (Serial 007Dl9950, Breckinridgc

Library, Quantico, Va.).

U.S. Department of Defense, Office of l'ublic

123
124 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Information, Release No. 1287—51, dated 27 September

1951 (Breckinridge Library, Quantico, Va.).

'9Annual Rt of CMC, 1955, p. 15.

50Marine Corps General Order No. 107, dated 11 March 1952.

"General Officers Conference, HQMC, 21 August

1953 (Breckinridge Library, Quantico, Va.).

"Office of Naval Research, M.C. Research & Develop.

nent. p. 11—22.

DC/S (RD&-S) memo to Director, M.C. History, dated

25 November 1970, Subject: Draft Manuscript, "Developmental History of the United States Marine Corps, 1900—

1970" (Developmental History Comment File, v. I

Archives, HRS, HD, HQMC).
Chapter VI

1 Gen Oliver P. Smith ltr to Director, M.C. History,

dated 21 September 1970 (Developmental History Comment File, v. I, Archives, HRS, HD, HQMC).

Dumas Malone and Basil Rauch, American and

World Leaaership, 1940—1965 (New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts Publishers, 1965), p. 285.

Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Selected Manpower

Statistics (Washington: Department of Defense, OASD

(Comptroller) Directorate for Information Operations,

1972), p. 58.

4LtCoI DL. Evans, Civil Affairs Branch, G—3, HQMC,

February 1970.

1 joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of United States

Military Terms for Joint Usage, JCS Pub. 1 (Washing.

Lon: JCS, 1 August 1968).

° U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, United

States Marine Corps, 1940 (Washington: Government

Printing Office, 1940), Section III, 1—11, p. 18.

Ibid., Section III, 1—17, p. 32.

Capt Russel H. Stolfi, U.S. Marine Corps Civic Action

Effort in Vietnam, March 1965 to March 1966 (Washing.

ton: HistBr, G—3, HQMC), p. 73.

LtCol D.L. Evans, jr., "USMC Civil Affairs in Vietnam, a Philosophical History," Marine Corps Gazette,

v. 52, no. 3 (March 1968), p. 23.

10Ibid., p. 24.

11 Ibid., p. 22. 12Ibid

78 Stolfi, op. cit., p. 36. '

Capt William D. Parker, U.S. Marine Corps Civil

Affairs in I Corps, Republic of South Vietnam, April

1966 to April 1967 (Washington: HD, HQMC, 1970), p.

12.n Gen Lewis W. Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy,

A General's Report on Vietnam (New York: Funk and

Wagnalls, 1970), p. 39.

10 Stolfi, op. cit., pp. 37—38.

17 Ibid., p. 52.

10Ibid., p. 53. '

U.S. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, Overview and Index (Fleet Marine Force, Pacific), pp. 36—37, hereafter FMFPac, Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam.

20 Cornelius D. Sullivan, George Fielding Eliot, Gordon

D. Gayle, and William R. Corson, The Vietnam War: I Is Conduct and Higher Direction (Washington: The

Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University,

1968), pp. 86—87.

21Ibid., p. 88.

Capt William D. Parker interview by author of

August 1969. Captain Parker had been platoon leader of 1/3/4.

23 FMFPac, Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam,

pp. 35—39; W.R. Corson, "Marine Combined Action Program in Vietnam" (Subject File: "Combined Action Program," HRS, HD, HQMC).

24Ibid. 27 Col Ralph F. Estey interview by author of 21 September 1970.

20 Bruce C. Allnutt, Marine Combined Action Capabilities: The Vietnam Experience (McLean, Va.: Human

Sciences Research Inc., 1969), p. 67.

27 LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in

Vietnam, 1962—1970," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,

v. 97, no. 819 (May 1971), pp. 122—155, hereafter McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation."

23Ibid., pp. 145—146.

20lbid. 20 Maj Robert V. Nicoli, "Fire Support Base Development," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 53, no. 9 (September

1969), p. 38.

jack Shulimson, "U.S. Marine Operations in Vietnam, july—December 1965," MS (Secret) (HD, HQMC),

p. 4:44. Information used is unclassified.

32 McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation," pp. 149—152.

Office of Naval Research, M.C. Research & Development, p. 31.

34Ibid.

88 Marine Corps Order 3900.3B, dated 26 August 1969,

Subject: Marine Corps Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation.

'° Office of Naval Research, M.C. Research 6- Develop.

inent, p. 31.

'TM.C. Development and Education Center pamphlet,

1971 (HD, HQMC).

18Chief of Staff memo, w/ enclosed book, to Distribution List, dated 15 July 1968, Subject: "Symposium

Book, 1968 General Officers Symposium" (Secret)

(Archives, HRS, HD, HQMC). Information used is unclassified.

Marine Corps Order 3120.3A, dated 18 August 1970,

Subject: "The Organization of Marine Air-Ground Task

Forces." ° Col Thomas H. Miller, "Flying the Harrier," Marine

Corps Gazette, v. 54, no. 5 (May 1969), p. 24. '

ibid., p. 27.

42 "Congressional Action on FY 71 Major Weapons

Programs," Armed Forces Journal, v. 108, no. II (Feb.

ruary 1971), pp. 30—31.

Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., "A Long Range Marine

Corps Concept," dated 9 june 1965 (HD, HQMC).

125

APPENDIX B

Bibliography

A Note about Sources

For this writer, and as is generally the case, the primary source material for the hook is the most valuable.

The titles of record sources listed below are selfexplanatory. There arc, however, three particular sources

worthy of special mention. Within the Naval History

l)ivision Operational Archives, there is a complete record

of the correspondence of the General Board of the Navy.

Record Groups 432, pertaining to the Marine Corps in

general, and 408, pertaining to advanced bases, overlap

by the nature of their contents. General Board correspondence was most important inasmuch as it was little

used by previous Marine Corps writers and researchers.

With only a cursory glance at these records, the reader

will become aware of the Marine Corps' position in its

relationship to the Department of the Navy during the

first 45 years of this century. Another source is the

Historical Amphibious File (HAF) at Breckinridge Library. Containing nearly 1,000 documents, the 1-IAF encompasses material from original doctrinal reports to

personal reports, observations, and letters. The HAF is

a must for any writer-researcher in the field of amphibi.

ous warfare. The third source most worthy of mention

is contained in the "Monographs, Reports, Letters, and

Memoranda" list. Some of the reports on landing exercises, particularly during the fleet exercises of the 1920s,

are already contained in the HAF. However, miscellaneous reports and memoranda were found in the Records

of the U.S. Marine Corps (Record Group 127) at the

National Archives and the General Correspondence files

o Marine Corps Schools (Accession No. 62A—6573).

The list of secondary sources of books and magazine

articles is not exhaustive but rather selective for the

range of this book. The value of secondary sources to

the writer is that they give him an appreciation of other

viewpoints and approaches in telling a story.

Suffice it to say, the critical comments by the reviewers of the draft manuscript were of supreme importance. Most of the reviewers had participated in

nearly all of the period of Marine Corps history dis.

cussed. Their personal experiences in a specific exercise

or development of doctrine of weapon cannot be underestimated. Their valuable comments bolster the dictum

that there is no substitute for personal experience.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Private Papers

John A. Lejeune—Library of Congress and Marine Corps

Museum

Official Records

Navy Department

Naval History Division—Operational Archives

General Board of the Navy

U.S. Marine Corps (Record Group 432)

Advanced Bases (Record Group 408)

Library of Congress

Prints and Photographs Division

National Archives

Records of the Office of Chief of Operations (Record

Group 38)

General Records of the Department of the Navy

(Record Group 80)

Records of the United States Marine Corps (Record

Group 127)

joint Army and Navy Board (Record Group 225)

Records of the Office of Scientific Research and

Development (Record Group 227)

Washington National Records Center. Suitland, Md.

Records of the U.S. Marine Corps (Record Group

127)

Marine Corps Photographic Centers, Washington Navy

Yard and Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Va.

Marine Corps Development and Education Center,

Quantico, Va.

General Correspondence, MCS (Record Group 127,

WNRC) James Carson Breckinridge Library—

Historical Amphibious File

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

Central Files

Historical Reference Section, Historical Division

Official Documents

U.S. Department of State.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the

United States with Annual Message to the Presi.

dent, 1901—1910. Washington. 1915.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the

United States, General Index, 1900—1918. Washington, 1941.

U.S. Department of Commerce.

Statistical Abstract of the Uniterl States. Washington.

1936.

Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial

Times to 1957. Washington, 1961.

127
128 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Statistical Abstract of the United States. Washington, 1968.

U.S. Marine Corps.

Commandant. Report to the Secretary of the Navy.

Washington, 1900 through 1941.

Small Wars Manual. Washington, 1940,

Landing Force Manual 01, Doctrine for Amphibious

Operations

Landing Force Manual 02, Doctrine for Landing

Forces (Draft)

Fleet Marine Force Manuals

3—1, Command and Staff Action

3—3, Helicopterborne Operations

6—1, Marine Division

6—2, Marine Infantry Regiment

U.S. Navy.

NWP 11, Naval Operations Planning

NWIP 10—3(A), Naval Warfare Terms

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JCS Pub 1, Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms for

Joint Usage.

JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

Joint Board.

Joint Action of the Army and Navy. Washington,

1927.

Joint Overseas Expeditions. Washington, 1933.

U.S. National Archives.

Maizie Johnson, comp. Records of the United States

Marine Corps, National Archives Inventory Record

Group 127. Washington 1970.

lwono graphs, Reports, Letters, and Memorandi.t

Report by Joint Committee of Officers of the Army and

the Navy at the Army War College to the General

Board, 7 April 1908.

Maj Dion Williams, ONI Report, 2 November 1909, "Re- port on Men, Material and Drills Required for

Establishing a Naval Advance Base."

Col George Barnett, Report on Maneuvers and Operations," 15 February 1914.

U.S. Atlantic Fleet, USS Arkansas, Flagship, "Report on

Operations of Advance Base Expedition, Culebra,

W.L., Jan—Feb 1914," 15 April 1914.

Major-General Commandant, 4th endorsement, "Supple.

mental Report, Brigade Commander, Advanced Base

Expedition, Culebra, Jan—Feb 1914," 23 April 1914.

Maj Earl H. Ellis, "7l2D-Operational Plan," 23 Juh

1921.

CMC memo for General Board, "Future Policy for the

Marine Corps as Influenced by the Conference on

Limitation of Armament,' II February 1922.

Report of Commanding Officer, Expeditionary Detachment, USMC, to CMC, "Report on Expedition to

Guantanamo and Culebra Operation with Control

Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Jan 9, 1933 to April 25.

1922," 20 July 1922.

Headquarters, MCEF, Quantico. "Basic Plan. Winter

Maneuvers, 1924, MCEF. U.S. Fleet." 1 December

1923.

Report of BGen Eli K. Cole to CMC, "Concerning Op.

erations at Isla Margarita (Fort Randolph) Canal

Zone, Jan 16—18, 1924," 15 February 1924.

Report of BGen Eli K. Cole, Hdqrs, USMCEF, Culebra,

P.R., "Reports and Comments on Landing Opera.

tions, Blue Force, Culebra," 5 February 1924.

Report of Col Dion Williams to CMC, "Report of Opera.

tions, MCEF, Culebra, P.R.," 24 March 1924.

Col Robert M. Dunlap, "Recommendations Based on

Report of Critique on Joint Army and Navy

Problem No. 3 by Officers of Marine Corps Schools,

June 1 to 5 1925," n.d.

Col Richard M. Cutts memo to CMC, "Information

Relative to Designed Operating Condition Tests of

50' Motor Troop Lighter and 50' Lighter for

Landing Artillery," 17 June 1926.

Letter report from lstLt Charles Connette to CO, 5th

Regiment, "Report of Tests of Infantry I.anding

Barge," 20 July 1926,

Letter from Officer in Charge, School of Aerial Observa.

tion to Brigade Commander, MCEF, Quantico, "AirGround Communications Problem," 28 September

1926.

CMC memo to Secretary Navy, "Examination of the Or.

ganization and Establishment of the United States

Marine Corps," 8 September 1931.

Proceedings of Conference concerning Tentative Land.

ing Operations Manual, Marine Corps Schools, 9

January 1934.

Report of 1st Lt Victor H. Krulak, "Report on Japanese

Assault Landing Operations, Shanghai Area 1937,"

1937.

Lt William F. Royall, USN, "A History of United States

Fleet Landing Exercises: Pictorial Record of Landing Boat Development," Manuscript, September

1939.

Night Fighters Folder—original reports, official and per.

sonal letters—Marine Night Fighter Development

During World War 11," HRB, HQMC, c.1945.

CMC letter to Senior Member of the Board to Re.

examine Adequacy of Present Concept of Missions

and Functions of the Marine Corps, Subj: "United

States Strategic Bombing Survey—japan," 11 October

1945.

Marine Aviation in Close Air Support Folder—original

records and reports included in report entitled

"Marine Aviation CAS," no author, HRB, HQMC.

1946.

Staff Study, "The History of United States Naval Research and Development in World \Var 11," IJniversity of Pittsburgh Historical Staff at ONR, unpublished manuscript, 1946.

Director of Naval History, "U.S. Naval Administration

in World War Ii, U.S. Marine Corps," Manuscript.

10 October 1946.

CMC letter to CMCS, "Study of Helicopters and Large

Seaplanes in Amphibious Warfare," 19 l)ecember

1946.

"Findings and Recommendations from Board of Gcncral

Officers," to recommend a program for coor(linalion

and integration of Marine Corps (lcvelopmental

activities. 18 july 1950.

Special Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Monograph on Amphibious

Warfare," Chapters 1 through VI, December 1949

to February 1951.

Lt Grace P. Hayes, USN, "History of the joint Chiefs of

Staff in World War II," 3 July 1953.

Report, "Research, Investigation and Experimentation

in the Field of Amphibian Vehicles for 1.'SMC,"
APPENDIX B 129

Borg-Warner Corporation, Ingersoll Kalamazoo Division, December 1957.

CMC report to Assistant Secretary of the Navy, "The

Evolution of Modern Amphibious Warfare," 7 April

1959.

ONR, Department of the Navy, "A Study of the Marine

Corps Research and Development Program," July

1967.

Cdr Daniel J. Costello, USN, Doctoral Dissertation,

'Planning for War: A History of the General Board

of the Navy, 1900—1914," 1968.

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Capt L.S. Howeth, USN (Ret.). History of Communicalions-Electronics in the United States Navy. Washington: Bureau of Ships and Office of Naval History, 1963.

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APPENDIX B 131

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Corps Gazette, v. 37, no. 9 (September 1953).

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Marine Corps Gazette, v. 53, no. 9 (September 1969).

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(February 1961).

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12 (December 1924).

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Doctrine," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 1, no. 6 (June

1916).

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Institute Proceedings, v. 72, no. 1 (January 1946).

William H. Russell. "The Genesis of Fleet Marine Force

Doctrine: 1879—1899," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 35,

nos. 4—7, 11 (April-July 1955; November 1955).

Gen Holland M. Smith. "Development of Amphibious

Tactics in the U.S. Navy," Marine Corps Gazette,

v. 32, nos. 6—10 (June-October 1948).

MajGen Paul R. Tyler. "The Marine Corps and

Amphibious Lift," Naval Engineers Journal, v. 77,

no. 3 (June 1965).

Capt Dion Williams. "The Defense of Our New Naval

Stations," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, V. XXVIII, no. 2 (June 1902).

Newspapers

Baltimore Sun, 27 March 1908

Boston Transcript, 2 December 1908

Clearwater News, 27 March 1947

The New York Times, 1 June 1969

Washington Herald, 27 March 1909

Washington Post, 4 December 1908

Washington Star, 17 February 1909

Washington Times, 15 January 1909

REVIEWERS OF DRAFT MANUSCRIPT

Major General Norman J. Anderson; USMC

Lieutenant General James P. Berkeley, USMC (Ret.)

Brigadier General William N. Best, USMC (Ret.)

Lieutenant General Thomas E. Bourke, USMC (Ret.)

Lieutenant General Alpha L. Bowser, USMC (Ret.)

Major Lance J. Burton, USA

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Burton, USA

Colonel Eugene F.C. Collier, USMC (Ret.)

Major General John P. Condon, USMC (Ret.)

Lieutenant General Edward A. Craig, USMC (Ret.)

Professor Philip A. Crowl, University of Nebraska

Brigadier General Gale T. Cummings, USMC (Ret.)

Professor William A. Darden, U.S. Naval Academy

General Raymond G. Davis, USMC

Lieutenant General Pedro A. del Valle, USMC (Ret.)

Brigadier General Edward C. Dyer, USMC (Ret.)

Major General Paul J. Fontana, USMC

Lieutenant Colonel James L. Fowler, USMCR

Brigadier General Gordon D. Gayle, USMC (Ret.)

Colonel George C. Hamner, USMC (Ret.)

Colonel Archibald Hanna, USMCR (Ret.)

Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC (Ret.)

Brigadier General Frederick P. Henderson, USMC (Ret.)

General Robert E. Hogaboom, USMC (Ret.)

Major General Louis R. Jones, USMC (Ret.)

Lieutenant General William K. Jones, USMC

Colonel John Kaluf, USMC (Ret.)

Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret.)

Lieutenant General Robert B. Luckey, USMC (Ret.)

Brigadier General Arthur T. Mason, USMC (Ret.)

Lieutenant General Keith B. McCutcheon, USMC

Lee McFarland, Food Machinery Corporation

Lieutenant General John C. McQueen, USMC (Ret.)

Major General Louis Metzger, USMC

Lieutenant General Herman Nickerson, Jr., USMC (Ret.)

Colonel Franklin B. Nihart, USMC (Ret.)

General Alfred H. Noble, USMC (Ret.)

Major General DeWitt Peck, USMC (Ret.)

Major Thomas P. Redden, Jr., USMCR

Lieutenant Colonel Theophil P. Riegert, USMC

Major General William W. Rogers, USMC (Ret.)

Professor William H. Russell, U.S. Naval Academy

Major General Michael P. Ryan, USMC

Colonel Edward N. Rydalch, USMC (Ret.)

Brigadier General Ronald D. Salmon, USMC (Ret.)

Colonel John A. Saxten, USMC (Ret.)

Professor Robert Seager II, Washington College

General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC (Ret.)

Lieutenant General Merwin H. Silverthorn, USMC (Ret.)

Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC

General Oliver P. Smith, USMC (Ret.)

Lieutenant General Edward W. Snedeker, USMC (Ret.)

General Gerald C. Thomas, USMC (Ret.)

Lieutenant Colonel Wilcomb E. Washburn, USMCR

Major General Frank D. Wier, USMC (Ret.)

Colonel Herbert H. Williamson, USMC (Ret.)

Colonel Roger Willock, USMCR (Ret.)

Lieutenant General Louis E. Woods, USMC (Ret.)

Lieutenant General Thomas A. Wornham, USMC (Ret.)

APPENDIX C

Glossary of Abbreviations

AC/S Assistant Chief of Staff FMC Food Machinery Corporation

Adm Admiral FMF Fleet Marine Force

AEF American Expeditionary Force FMFLant Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic

AKA Attack Cargo Ship FMFPac Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

ALO Air Liaison Officer FSCC Fire Support Coordination Center

ALP Air Liaison Party FSR Force Service Regiment

Amphib CPX Amphibious Command Post FTP Fleet Training Publication

Exercise FY Fiscal Year

AO Aerial Observer C—B C—S Division (Assistant Chief of

ARG Advanced Research Group Staff, Operations and Training) ARG/SLF Amphibious Ready Group/Special C—4 G—4 Division (Assistant Chief of

Landing Force Staff, Logistics)

ARVN Army, Republic of Vietnam GO General Order

ASRT Air Support Radar Team GVN Government of Vietnam

AWC Army War College HAF Historical Amphibious File

BASIC Battlefield Area Surveillance Hdqtrs Headquarters Communication HistBr Historical Branch

BGen Brigadier General HD Historical Division

BLT Battalion Landing Team HMM Marine Medium Helicopter

Bu Bureau Squadron

B-W Borg-Warner (Corporation) HMX Marine Experimental Helicopter

CAC Combined Action Company Squadron

CAP Combined Action Platoon HQMC Headquarters Marine Corps Capt Captain HRP—l Rescuer (Flying Banana),

CARE Cooperative for American Relief transport helicopter

Everywhere manufactured by Piasecki

CAS Close Air Support HRB Historical Reference Branch

Cdr Commander HRS Historical Reference Section

CC Commanding General HRS—l Observation helicopter,

CH—46D Sea Knight, medium transport manufactured by Sikorsky helicopter manufactured by HTL—2 Training helicopter, manufactured

Boeing-Vertol by Bell

CH—53D Sea Stallion, heavy transport JASCO Joint Assault Signal Company helicopter manufactured by JCC Joint Coordinating Council

Sikorsky JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps LFASCU Landing Force Air Support

CMCS Commandant of Marine Corps Control Unit

Schools LANTAGLEX Atlantic-Air Ground Landing

CNA Center for Naval Analyses Exercise

CNO Chief of Naval Operations LCdr Lieutenant Commander

CO Commanding Officer LCM Landing Craft, Mechanized

Col Colonel LCVP Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel

CICR (Bureau of) Construction and LFB Landing Force Bulletin

Repair LFM Landing Force Manual

CRS Catholic Relief Services LHA Amphibious Assault Ship CVE Escort Carrier (Multi-Purpose) DASC Direct Air Support Center LPD Amphibious Transport, Dock DCNO Deputy Chief of Naval Operations LPH Amphibious Assault Ship DC/S Deputy Chief of Staff (Helicopter Transport)

DOD Department of Defense LSD Dock Landing Ship

ECEF East Coast Expeditionary Force LSM Landing Ship, Medium

FAC Forward Air Controller LST Landing Ship, Tank

133
134 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

LtCol Lieutenant Colonel Op(s) Operation(s)

LtGen Lieutenant General O&T Operations and Training

ltr letter OV—IOA Bronco, light armed

LVT Landing Vehicle Tracked reconnaissance aircraft

LVTP Landing Vehicle Tracked, manufactured by North

Personnel American

MAB Marine Amphibious Brigade PacFlt Pacific Fleet

MACV Military Assistant Command, PAT Political Action Team

Vietnam QM Quartermaster

MAF Marine Amphibious Force RAdm Rear Admiral

MAG Marine Aircraft Group RLT Regimental Landing Team

MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task Force RD Revolutionary Development

Maj Major R-D Research and Development

MPQ—l4/TP Mobile Ground Multi-Purpose RD&S Research, Development, and

Radar Studies

MAU Marine Amphibious Unit RDT&E Research, Development, Test, and

MAW Marine Aircraft Wing Evaluation

MBT Main Battle Tank Regt Regiment

MCB Marine Corps Base Rev Revised

MCDC Marine Corps Development Center rpt Report

MCDEC Marine Corps Development and RVN Republic of \'ietnam

Education Command SATS Short Airfield for Tactical Support

MCEB Marine Corps Expeditionary SecNav Secretary of the Navy

Brigade SID Seismic Intrusion Detector

MCEC Marine Corps Education Center SOP Standing Operating Procedure

MCEF Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Sqdn Squadron

MCLFDA Marine Corps Landing Force STATE Simplified Tactical Approach

Development Activities Terminal

MCLFDC Marine Corps Landing Force TACC Tactical Air Command Center

Development Center TAF Tactical Air Force

MCM Marine Corps Manual TAOC Tactical Air Operations Center

MCO Marine Corps Order TDCC Tactical Data Communications

MCOAG Marine Corps Operations Analysis Central

Group T/E Table of Equipment

MCS Marine Corps Schools TIC Target Information Center

MCTU Marine Corps Test Unit TIP! Tactical Information Processing

MEDCAP Medical Civic Action Program Interpretation Systems

MLRP Marine Corps Long-Range Plan T/O Table of Organization

MMROP Marine Corps Mid-Range UH—IE Utility Helicopter, manufactured

Objectives Plan by Bell

MOREST Mobile Aircraft Arresting System UH—IG Hucv Cobra, helicopter gunship

MS. Manuscript manufactured by Bell

MTDS Marine Tactical Data System USA United States Army

NAVMCO Navy-Marine Corps Order UNAAF Unified Action Armed Forces

NCO Noncommissioned Officer USAID U.S. Agency for International

NDRC National Defense Research Development

Committee I'SFs United States Fleet series

NGF Naval Gunfire USHS United States Hospital Ship

NHD Naval History Division USMC United States Marine Corps

NOA Naval Operational Archives IJSN United States Navy

NVA North Vietnamese Army USS Umuited States Ship

NWC Naval War College v. volume

NWP Naval War Publication \'Adm Vice Admiral

OAB Operational Archives Branch \'C Viet Cong

OCMH Office of the Chief of Military 'MO Marine Observation Squadron

History V/STOI. Vertical, Short Take-Off and

OIC Officer in Charge Landing ON! Office of Naval Intelligence WCEF West Coast Expeditionary Force ONR Office of Naval Research WNRC Washington National Records

Op0 Operation Order Center
APPENDIX D

Commandants of the Marine Corps in the Twentieth Century

135

Major General Charles Heywood 1891—1903 Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb 1936—1943

Major

Major

Major

Major

Major

Major

Major

General

General

General

General

General

General

General

George F. Elliott

William P. Biddle

George Barnett

John A. Lejeune

Wendell C. Neville

Ben H. Fuller

John H. Russell, Jr.

1903—1910

1911—1914

1914—1920

1920—1929

1929—1930

1930—1934

1934—1936

General Alexander A. Vandegrift

General Clifton B. Cates

General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.

General Randolph McC. Pate

General David M. Shoup

General Wallace M. Greene, Jr.

General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr.

General Robert E. Cushman, Jr.

1944—1947

1948—1951

1952—1955

1956—1959

1960—1963

1964—1967

1968—1971

1972—

APPENDIX E

Commanders at Quantico

Commanders, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia

Muster Rolls do not show a commanding officer or commanding general for. the period 1 Feb 1942 to 2

Oct 1942. BGen Samuel M. Harrington is shown as CMCS. BGen julian C. Smith is shown as Commanding General,

TTC.

MajGen Philip H. Torrey 2 Oct 1942—31 May 1946

MajGen Clifton B. Cates 1 Jun 1946—30 Dec 1947

BGen Oliver P. Smith 31 Dec 1947— 4 Apr 1948

MajGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr .. 26 Apr 1948—31 May 1948

Commandants, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia

MajGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. -- ... MajGen Franklin A. Hart

LtGen Franklin A. Hart .._

LtGen Clifton B. Cates ... LtGen Gerald C. Thomas

LtGen Edwin A. Pollock

LtGen Merrill B. Twining

1 Jun 1948—16 Jun 1950

1 Jul 1950—22 Feb 1951

23 Feb 1951—31 Dec 1951

1 Jan 1952—30 Jun 1954

1 Jul 1954—31 Dec 1955

1 Jan 1956—22 Jul 1956

13 Sep 1956—30 Oct 1959

137

Maj Chandler Campbell

Maj Julius S. Turrill

Col Albertus W. Catlin

BGen John A. Lejeune

Col Smedley D. Butler

BGen Charles A. Doyen

BGen Albertus W. Catlin

Col Dion Williams

BGen John T. Myers

MajGen John A. Lejeune

BGen Smedley D. Butler

Col Ben H. Fuller

Col Charles S. Hill

BGen Dion Williams

MajGen Eli K. Cole

MajGen Wendell C. Neville

BGen Harry Lee

MajGen Wendell C. Neville

BGen Harry Lee

BGen Smedley D. Butler

BGen Randolph C. Berkeley

Col James J. Meade

LtCol Andrew B. Drum

BGen John H. Russell

BGen James C. Breckinridge

BGen Harry Lee

Col Henry M. Manney, Jr.

BGen Thomas Holcomb

BGen Charles H. Lyman

MajGen James C. Breckinridge

MajGen Louis McC. Little

14 May 1917—24 May 1917

25 May 1917— 8 Jun 1917

13 Jun 1917—26 Sep 1917

27 Sep 1917—23 May 1918

24 May 1918—20 Jun 1918

21 Jun 1918— 5 Oct 1918

6 Oct 1918—11 Nov 1918

12 Nov 1918—14 Nov 1918

15 Nov 1918—26 Oct 1919

27 Oct 1919—29 Jun 1920

30 Jun 1920— 4 Jan 1924

4 Jan 1924—10 Jan 1924

11 Jan 1924—26 Feb 1924

27 Feb 1924—12 Aug 1924

13 Aug 1924— 2 Jun 1927

3 Jun 1927—11 Dec 1928

12 Dec 1928—30 Jan 1929

31 Jan 1929— 4 Mar 1929

5 Mar 1929—23 Apr 1929

24 Apr 1929—30 Sep 1931

1 Oct 1931— 7 Nov 1931

8 Nov 1931—27 Nov 1931

28 Nov 1931—30 Nov 1931

1 Dec 1931—29 Jan 1933

30 Jan 1933—28 Feb 1933

1 Mar 1933—13 May 1935

14 May 1935—19 May 1935

20 May 1935—17 Jun 1935

18 Jun 1935—23 Jun 1937

24 Jun 1937—24 Sep 1939

25 Sep 1939—31 Jan 1942
138 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

LtGen Edward W. Snedeker 31 Oct 1959—30 Jun 1963

LtGen Frederick L. Wieseman 1 Jul 1963—30 Jun 1966

LtGen James M. Masters, Sr. 1 Jul 1966—31 Dec 1967

Commanding Generals, Marine Corps Development and

Education Command, Quantico. Virginia

LtGen James M. Masters, Sr.

LtCen Lewis J. Fields

LtGen Raymond G. Davis

LtGen William G. Thrash

LtGen Robert P. Keller

1 Jan 1968—30 Jun 1968

1 Jul 1968—30 Jun 1970

1 Jul 1970—11 Mar 1971

12 Mar 1971—30 Jun 1972

1 Jul 1972—
APPENDIX F

Outline of the Development of the Landing Operations Manual*

1921—OPlan 712—Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia—Major Earl H. Ellis.

1925—Major S.M. Harrington—compiled study of small

wars entitled The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars."

This publication presented certain principles of landing

operations as they applied to small wars. Only 5 percent

of instruction at MCS concerned itself with landing

operations of any kind.

1926—By this year instruction in landing operations

increased to 49 hours and increased thereafter.

1927—l928--MCS completely revised and expanded

courses on landing operations.

Early l927—MCS recommended establishment of an

advanced course for the study of expeditionary operations pertaining to USMC. CMC approved but owing to

lack of personnel, course not established.

Early 1929—CMC directed that in September 1929 a

class of four field officers be assembled at the MCS for

study and preparation of plans for small wars and

expeditions. In July, however, the CMC found that no

officers were available and thereby disapproved of the

establishment of this class.

1930—Map problems of Oahu, Southern California,

etc., were now changed to be included as landing

operations and coordination with the Naval War College

had begun. NWC assumed that when an advanced base

was to be seized it would be seized by Marines.

No detailed consideration of the seizure had been

given.

At the MCS it had been assumed that the Marines in

effecting a landing would be supported by naval gunfire.

The Field Officers Course general problem was to solve

the occupation and defense of a naval base. This

problem was presented to the Field Officers Course by

NWC in advance so that the solution of the schools

could be forwarded to the NWC in time for incorporation in the naval problem when discussed by the classes

there.

1931—A banner year for MCS. A special board was

appointed in 1931 for the express purpose of critically

examining the entire curriculum of the schools. Classes

continued to meet in their normal manner while the

board prepared its recommendations for changes and

improvements.

In 1931, a considerably revised schedule was adopted

for the following school year (1932). Instruction based on

material of the Command and General Staff School at

Fort Benning was discarded or revised to conform with

Marine Corps organization and material. Instruction was

*War Plans Section, Division of O&T, HQMC (Box 3,

Accession No. 65A—4939, WNRC, Suitland, Md.).

based on all levels of command, from the attack force

down through the force, division, brigade, regiment, and

battalion.

Instructors at MCS were directed to rewrite all their

material and gear it to the Corps' T/O and T/E.

Instruction material in pamphlet form was written, but

not a single manual.

During the remainder of 1931 and 1932 this writing

and other revolutionary measures, although modified

considerably before they were adopted, had a far.

reaching effect upon the schools. The CMC summarized

this small revolution in his annual report to SecNav for

the FY ending 30 June 1933:

Problems were based on Marine Corps units and

equipment.

Certain personnel were designated to prepare text

books and pamphlets to cover fields of service for

which no Marine texts existed. Support by naval

gunfire and other naval agencies was developed in

greater detail, and a closer relationship with the

NWC was maintained. More effort was placed on the

development of comprehensive courses on landing

operations and small wars.

Recommendations of a special board on naval gunfire in support of landings were the basis of

future experimental firings conducted by the Navy.

Units of measurement for computing cargo requirements for military equipment.

A system of cargo measurements and classification

of equipment to facilitate the determination of cargo

requirements and the loading of a ship to meet

tactical requirements.

Preparation of reference data sheets.

Establishment of standard boat capacities for

landing operations based on specific data.

1933—The Gallipoli operation had formed an important part of the background in research on landing

operations. Early in 1933, each student was issued a copy

of the British official history of the Gallipoli Campaign.

The hook, being the latest and most accurate publication

on the subject, was used as a source book.

The Gallipoli Course was organized, 3 March to 5

April 1933, to acquaint the students with the Gallipoli

Campaign, to train them in military research, and to

provide the schools and through them the Marine Corps

with material of value on a campaign which was in

many respects of the type that the Marine Corps was

expected to be expert in.

Between 1919 and 1933, the Joint Army-Navy Board

had promulgated several manuals prescribing methods

for Army and Navy cooperation in joint overseas expeditions. ("Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast

I 89
140 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Defense") ("Joint Action of the Army and Navy"—23

April 1927) ("Joint Overseas Expeditions"—l2 January

1933)

The 1933 pamphlet's purpose was to "present a set of

general principles for the planning and conduct of joint

overseas expeditions in order to insure the most effective

cooperation and coordination between Army and Navy

forces participating therein," The directives contained in

the manual were concerned with the techniques and

agencies for cooperation and with the respective functions

of each service in the conduct of joint operations. But a

manual on landing operations (that is, how to do it) was

still lacking.

29Sep33—CMC recommended that all classes be discontinued and that students and staff alike devote all

time and effort towards the production of a landing

operations manual.

300ct33—CMCS received a directive from CMC to

prepare a manual on landing operations as expeditiously

as possible and to commence work not later than 15

November.

l4Nov33—Classes were discontinued and the staff and

students commenced work on the manual.

How it was done:

a. Instructors/students wrote Out a chronological, itemized list of the things to be done from the inception to

the tactical completion of a landing operation.

b. Committee of nine was appointed to consider these

papers and to draw up a consolidated list embracing all

recommendations and to group them under headings.

Each member of the committee formulated his own list

based on the results of his study of all papers submitted.

c. Each of these lists was in turn studied by another

committee of five, who further consolidated the recommendations and produced a rough outline for the

manual.

9Jan34—Officers from FMF, HQMC, and Quantico

participated in a conference with respect to the outline.

The outline/manual was based on experience, both

personal and that culled from reports of landing

operations, experimentation, and the evolution of

instruction and problems at the MCS. Some 70 officers

from lieutenants to brigadier generals attended the

meeting—including four Navy officers and one Army

officer.

Following the conference, the manual was divided into

six subsections and responsibility for writing those

sections was assigned to various committees. The bulk of

the manual was grouped under three general headings:

(1) Tactics, whih included landing and defense of bases,

prefaced by a general discussion of landing operations and the purpose of the manual; (2) Staff Functions,

Logistics, and Plans and Orders; and (3) Training. In

addition, separate sections were assigned on naval

activities and aviation, plus the usual appendices attendant to such a manual.

28Mar34—Committees that had been at work in earnest

submitted to the CMC the first parts of the manual.

l3Jun34—Last chapters submitted to CMC. For the

school year (1934—35) the "Tentative Manual for Landing

Operations" was used at MCS for all theoretical

instruction in landing operations. This 1934 edition was

in mimeograph format.

Jul34—Title changed to "Manual for Naval Overseas

Operations" and published by Navy Department.

l5May35—Board for Revision of Manual was convened at MCS headed by Lieutenant Colonel Charles D.

Barrett.

9Jul35—A revised manual with photographs, better

sketches, etc., was approved by the CNO 25 May 1935

and distributed by the CMC throughout the Marine

Corps, Navy, and outside agencies with a "Restricted"

classification. This 1935 edition became the first widely

distributed, official publication of the Tentative Landing

Operations Manual.

l5Jun36—A board headed by Lieutenant Colonel

Keller E. Rockey (including Lieutenant Colonels Archie

F. Howard and Alfred H. Noble) was convened to revise

the Tentative Landing Operations Manual.

26May37—CMC sent to CNO report of Board on Revision of Tentative Landing Operations Manual.

21Jun37—Complete with revisions, the Tentative Land.

ing Operations Manual was issued under the technically

correct new title of Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S.

Navy, 1937. (This edition does not seem to have had a

general distribution.)

l5May38—A Marine Corps board for revision of Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S. Navy, 1937, was convened

to make recommendations for new printing of the man- ual for FY 1939. Heading the board 'as Lieutenant

Colonel Alfred H. Noble, with Captain Francis M.

McAlister, and Quartermaster Clerk Percy H. Uhlinger

(A&I), also recorder of original board).

25Nov38—CMC authorizes destruction of Tentative

Landing Operations Manual. This manual, the 1935

version, and the technically correct edition entitled

Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S. Navy, 1937 were superseded by the issuance of the Fleet Training Publication (FTP) #167. FTP #167 was also known as Landing

Doctrine, U.S. Navy, 1938.
APPENDIX G

Students and Instructors Who Were Assigned to MCS During

Preparation of Tentative Landing Operations Manual—

November 1933 through May 1934*

BGen James C. Breckinridge CMCS

Col Ellis B. Miller ACMCS

Col Edward W. Banker Student (Joined Jan34)

LtCol Calhoun (N) Ancrum Student

LtCol Lauren S. Willis Student

Maj Cecil S. Baker Instructor (Joined Apr34)

Maj David S. Barry, Jr. Student

Maj Robert Blake Instructor

Maj Henry M. Butler Student

Maj Woolman G. Emory Instructor (Joined Apr34)

Maj Louis E. Fagan, Jr. Student

Maj George C. Hamner Director of Correspondence Class

Maj Earl H. Jenkins Instructor (Joined Apr34)

Maj Roy D. Lowell Student

Maj John Marston Director, First Year Class

Maj Charles J. Miller Chief of Section F—3

Maj Harold L. Parsons Director, Second Year Class

Maj Roger W. Peard Student

Maj DeWitt Peck Instructor

Maj Harold C. Pierce Student

Maj Lowry B. Stephenson Instructor (Joined May 34)

Maj Thad T. Taylor Student

Maj Wilbur Thing Student

Maj Thomas E. Thrasher, Jr. Chief of Section F—I, •F—2

Maj Samuel A. Woods, Jr. Instructor

Capt Edward L. Burwell, Jr. Student

Capt Eugene F.C. Collier Instructor

Capt Ralph W. Culpepper Student

Capt Gale T. Cummings Instructor

Capt Thomas B. Gale Instructor

Capt Alexander Galt Instructor Uoined May 34)

Capt Charles C. Gill Instructor

Capt John Kaluf Instructor (Joined Feb34)

Capt Robert M. Montague Officer in Charge Reproduction

Capt Stewart B. O'Neill Student (Joined Jan34)

Capt Albert W. Paul Instructor

Capt Edward S. Shaw Student

Capt Norman E. True Student

lstLt Samuel S. Ballentine Student (Joined May34)

lstLt William 0. Brice Student

lstLt Pierson E. Conradt Student

lstLt William H. Doyle Student

lstLt Roy M. Gulick Student

lstLt Ernest E. Linsert Student

lstLt Louis E. Marie Instructor

lstLt Arthur T. Mason Instructor

Muster Roll of Officers and Enlisted Men, Marine Corps Schools Detachment, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va.,

1 November 1933 to 31 May 1934 (HRS, HD, HQMC).

141
142 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

lstLt Vernon E. Megee Instructor

lstLt John C. McQueen Instructor

lstLt Lyman G. Miller Student

lstLt Edwin A. Pollock Instructor

lstLt Frank D. Weir Student

lstLt Walter W. Wensinger Instructor
APPENDIX H

List of Participants in Conference Held at Quantico, Virginia on

9 January 1934 for Purpose of Discussing Tentative Landing

Operations Manual*

Conference convened at 0900.

Present:

From Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.

LtCol Bennet Puryear, Jr.

Maj Charles D. Barrett

Maj Roy S. Geiger

Maj Ralph J. Mitchell

Maj Allen B. Turnage

Maj LeRoy P. Hunt

Maj Harry E. Pickett

Capt Thomas E. Bourke

Capt Francis F. Mulcahy

From Fleet Marine Force, Quantico, Va.

BGen Charles H. Lyman

LtCol Robert L. Denig

Maj Harold S. Fassett

Maj Leander A. Clapp

Maj Alexander A. Vandegrift

Maj Lloyd L. Leech

Capt Henry D. Linscott

Capt Bernard Lutel

From Post Headquarters

LtCol Philip H. Torrey

Maj Earl I. Buse

Capt Chaplain G. Hicks

From Marine Corps Schools

BGen James C. Breckinridge

Col Ellis B. Miller

LtCol Calhoun Ancrum

Maj David S. Barry, Jr.

Maj Robert Blake

Maj Henry M. Butler

Maj Louis E. Fagan, Jr.

Maj George C. Hamner

'Correspondence File 1520—30—120 (Record Group 127,

National Archives).

Maj Roy D. Lowell

Maj John Marston

Maj Charles J. Miller

Maj Harold L. Parsons

Maj Roger W. Peard

Maj DeWitt Peck

Maj Harold C. Pierce

Maj Thad T. Taylor

Maj Wilbur Thing

Maj Thomas E. Thrasher, Jr.

Map Samuel A. Woods, Jr.

Capt Edward L. Burwell

Capt Eugene F.C. Collier

Capt Ralph W. Culpepper

Capt Gale T. Cummings

Capt Thomas B. Gale

Capt Charles C. Gill

Capt Robert M. Montague

Capt Albert W. Paul

Capt Edward S. Shaw

Capt Norman E. True

lstLt William 0. Brice

lstLt Pierson E. Conredt

lstLt William H. Doyle

lstLt Roy M. Gulick

lstLt Ernest E. Linsert

lstLt Louis E. Marie

lstLt Arthur T. Mason

lstLt Vernon E. Megee

lstLt John C. McQueen

lstLt Lyman C. Miller

lstLt Edwin A. Pollack

lstLt Frank D. Weir

lstLt. Walter \V. Wensinger

LCdr Thomas V. Cooper, USN

LCdr Clifford G. Richardson, USN

Lt Harold E. McCarthy, USN

Lt Joseph H. Seyfried, USN

lstLt John H. Stadler, USA

143

APPENDIX I

Fleet Marine Force Organization and Composition Board

(Hogaboom Board) Members(*)

MajGen Robert E. Hogaboom—President

BGen Ronald D. Salmon

Col Cliff Atkinson, Jr.

Col Frederick P. Henderson

Col Henry H. Crockett

Col Norman J. Anderson

CMC ltr to CG's FMFLant, FMFPac, dtd 30 April

1956, AO3A—cec, 03C9756.

Col William K. Jones

Col Allan Sutter

Col David W. Stonecliffe

Col Odell M. Conoley

Col William R. Campbell

Col Herbert H. Wil1iar.son

Col Keith B. McCutcheon

Col Bruce T. Hemphill

Col Lewis W. Walt

Maj Frank R. Young—Recorder

145

APPENDIX J

Citation to Accompany the Award of The Medal of Merit to

Donald Roebling

DONALD ROEBLING, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services to the

United States. Mr. Roebling conceived, developed, and perfected an amphibian vehicle capable of traversing both land

and water, presented it to the Government of the United States and released it for manufacture without compensation.

Conceived originally in December 1934, for humanitarian purposes as-a means of carrying emergency supplies to inundated and isolated areas in Florida during the hurricane seasons, and completed after 5 years of intensive research, tireless effort, and tremendous personal expense, his fourth model, the "Roebling Alligator" is the forerunner of all amphibian tractors constructed for the Navy, the Marines, the Army, and Lend-Lease. The Roebling Amphibian Tractor

contributed to the success of our armed forces in Africa, and in addition, rendered valuable service during landings on

the Pacific Ocean Islands, and with its unique ability to negotiate surf and beach terrain, moved supplies and equipment to otherwise inaccessible locations, broke trails through the jungle and formed pontoons for temporary bridges

permitting the passage of troops. Mr. Roebling's unselfish devotion to the perfecting of an effective war weapon, released without thought of benefit to himself, was a vital and inspiring contribution to the defense of his country.

/S/ HARRY TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE

December 18, 1946.

147

Abbott, Willis J. 2

Adams, Charles F. 43

'Additional Notes on Field Work Construction for

Advanced Bases" 14

Adjutant and Inspector's Division 28

Adjutant and Inspector of the Marine Corps 7

Administration of the Navy Department in World War

1161

Advanced base 21, 36

Advanced base operations 64

"Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, 1921" 64—65

Advanced base problems 45, 65

"Advanced Bases" 14

Advanced Base School 13, 16, 18

"Advance Base Training" 14

Advanced base work 29

Advanced Research Group 93

Agency for International Development 101

Aguinaldo I

Aide-for-Operations 43

Air Force, United States 68, 77, 79, 89, 92

Air Group 47

Air Liaison Parties (ALPS) 68

Air Weapons Systems Branch 112

Aleutians 26

Alligator 54,91

America 1,26, 41—42, 61, 96

American Republic 41

American Expeditionary Forces 22—23

Amphibious Assault Fuel System 90

"Amphibious Operations—Employment of Helicopters

(Tentative)" 77

Ancrum, LtCol Calhoun 46

Annapolis 10, 36

Ansel, Lt Walter C. 44

Antietam 31

Armistice Day 22

Army, United States 5, 8, 10, 12—13, 18, 27—28, 30, 32,

35—38, 44, 46, 53, 58, 61, 63, 65, 67—68, 70, 77, 83, 90—92,

102, 108

Units

Tenth Army 68-69

XXIV Corps 68

1st Cavalry Division 68

2d Infantry Division 23

37th Infantry Division 68

Army Chief of Staff 12, 63

Army Command and Staff College 36

Army Ordnance Department 91

Army, Republic of Vietnam 100

Army School for Submarine Defenses 13

Army Signal School 13

Army Tables of Organization 44

Army War College 14, 36, 44

"Artillery Armament of Advanced Base Regiment" 14

Asia 42

INDEX

Assistant Chief of Staff, C—S 66

Assistant Chief of Staff, G—4 109

Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) 109

Assistant R—2 51

Assistant Secretary of the Navy 2, 17

Assistant to the Commandant 22

Atlantic Coast 12, 30, 49

Atlantic Fleet 16—17

Atlantic Fleet Exercises 18, 78

Atomic Proving Ground, 85

Aviation Section 29, 58

Azores 23—24

Badger, RAdni Charles J. 21

Bailey, Professor Thomas A. 26

Baker, Benjamin Standish 6

Baker, LtCol Clarence M. 113

Barnett, Col George 19, 21; MajGen, 15

Barrett, Maj Charles D. 31, 43; LtCol, 46; BGen, 51

Battle of Britain 61

Battle of Gettysburg 31

Battle of the Wilderness 30

Bay Head 49

Beard, Charles A. 42

Beaufort 88, 113

Beetle boat 33

Belgium 24—25

Bell Aircraft Corporation 75

Bell, MajGen J, Franklin 12, 75

Bell, Lawrence D. 75

Berkeley, B1'.en Randolph C. 43—44

Biddle, MajGen William P. 17—18

Bikini Lagoon 71

Bingham, Col Theodore A. 1

"Black Thursday" 41

Blatt, Capt Wallace D. 78

Bloodsworth Island 66

Boat Rig A 52

Bogue Field 89

Borah, Senator William E. 4, 25

Borg-Warner Corporation 57

Borneo 26

Boston Transcript 6

Bougainville 67—68, 70

Boxer 111

Bradman, BGen Frederic L. 55

Brainard, Maj Edwin H. 39

Breckinridge, BGen James C. 44

Breckinridge Library 51

British Royal Marines 109

Broadbent, LtCdr E. W. 45

Brooklyn Bridge 54

Bruges 24

'Bureau Boat' 49

Bureau of Aeronautics 58, 70, 92

Bureau of Construction and Repair 48—50

149
150 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Bureau of Navigation 7

Bureau of Ordnance 19, 48

Bureau of Ships 48, 53, 56, 91

Burke-Wadsworth (Selective Training and Service) Act 61

Bush, Vannevar 61

Butler, Capt Smedley D. 11; BGen, 34

Cabinet 6

California 57, 89, 108

Campbell, Capt Harold D. 46

Camp Gillespie 70

Camp Lejeune 70, 75, 83, 92

Camp Pendleton 96

Canadian Army 109

Canal Zone 32

Cape May 49

Caracas 79

Cardiff 23

Caribbean 11,21—22

Carnegie Institution 61

Caroline Islands 26, 64

Catholic Relief Services 99

Cavite 23

Central Pacific Drive 66

Central Powers 23

Chauinont 33

Cherry Point 70

Chesapeake Island 66

Chester 34

Chicago 58

Chief of Naval Operations 29, 33, 43, 48, 63, 74, 81, 108—

109

Chief of the United States Atlantic Fleet 21

China 8, 23, 25—26, 30, 35, 38, 43, 58, 61, 78

Chopawamsic Creek 56

Chosin Reservoir 84

Christie tank 34—35, 53

Christie, Walter 34

Chrysler industrial engine 54

Chu Lai 88, 99, 105

Chunchon 83

Civil War 31

Clapp, LtCol Archie J. 98

Clearwater 55—56

Clearwater News 57

Coast Artillery Corps 14

Coast Guard 77

Co Ka Va 107

Cold War 79

Cole, LtCol Eli K. 14—15; Col, 21; BGen, 32—34

Collum, Maj Richard S. 2

Combat Support Base Vandegrift 107

Combined Action Force 100

Commandant of the Marine Corps 8, 10, 13, 25, 27—33,

43—46, 48, 52—53, 63, 65, 72—74, 81, 85—87, 89—91, 93, 113

Command Decisions 63

Commander in Chief 7

Commissioner of Public Buildings and Grounds I

Communists 79

Condon Board 85

Conclon, BGen John P. 85

Conference on the Limitation of Armament 29

Congress 6—7, 12, 21, 26—28, 61, 78—79, 81, 91—92,95

Connecticut 13

Connette, 1st Lt Charles 35

Consolation 83

Consolidated Aircraft Company 75

Coolidge, President Calvin 26, 31

Coontz, Adm Richard E. 32, 34

Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE) 98—

99

Corps Tactical Zones 99

Corpus Christi 70

Cottrell, Warren 54

COUNTY FAIR 100

Covering Group 47

Craig, BGen Edward A. 82

Cuba 1,5, 7—8, 13, 16, 21, 23, 30, 42,96

Culebra 8, 11, 17, 19, 21, 31—32, 34, 48—49, 52, 54, 66—67,

75

Cunningham, Maj Alfred 24

Curriculum Board '44

Curtiss JNs 24

Curtiss Marine Trophy Race 58

Cushman, BGen Thomas J. 82

Cutts, LtCol Richard M. 31; Col, 45

Dairen 11

Da Krong Valley 106—107

Dalby, Maj MarionC. 89

Da Nang 98—100, 105

Daniels, Josephus 7, 21,27

Davies, Maj William W. 57

Davis, 1st Lt Gordon M. 106

Davis, Maj Henry C. 14

Davis, MajGen Raymond C. 105

Day Wing 24

DeBolt, Earl 54

DeHaviland 4Bs 24

DeLalio, Maj Armond H. 74

Delta 98

del Valle, Pedro A. 44

Democratic era 41

Democratic Party 25

Department of Defense 113

Department of the Air Force 81

Department of the Army 63, 81

Department of the Navy 81

Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) 109, 113

Detroit 57

Development of Naval Gunfire Support 65

Dewey, Adm George 1,3,5—7, 11, 14, 18,21

"Dewey Canyon—All Weather Classic" 106

Director, Marine Corps History 67—68, 77

Director of Operations & Training 53

Director of the Crown Cork International Corporation 75

Division of Aviation 71

Division of Operations and Training 29, 58, 64

Division of Plans and Policies 92

Dixon, Capt R. E. 75

Dominican Republic 28, 96

Dong Ha 99

Dulles, Mr. John Foster 79

Dunedin 56—57

Dunkirk 24

Dunlap, Col Robert M. 35, 37

Dyer, Col Edward G. 71, 73—75, 77; BGen, 67

Eagle Mountain Lake 70—71

East Coast 15, 21

Edenton 71

Educational Section 29

Ek, Lt Paul R. 102

Elliott, BGen George F. 13
INDEX 151

14—16, 18, 21,

Elliott Islands 11

Ellis, Maj Earl H. 64—65; LtCol, 64

England 23, 70

Eniwetok 65

Equipment Board 50—51, 53, 55—56

Estey. Col Ralph F. 103

Eureka Boat 50

Europe 42

Everglades 54

Executive Mansion 2

Exercise BLUE STAR 88

Exercise DESERT ROCK VI 85

Expeditionary Forces 29

Experimental Landing Lighters Board 44

Far East 25, 61, 82

Federal Records Center 56

Field and Company Officers' Schools 37

Field Artillery Drill Regulations 13

Field Medical Service School 83

Field Officers Course 37

Field Officers School 35, 43, 45

Fifth Air Force 89

Fire Support Bases 105

Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) 65

Fire Support Group 47

I Corps Joint Coordinating Council 99

Five.Power Treaty 26

Fleet Exercise No. IV 82

Fleet Marine Force (See also Marine Corps, U. S.) 30, 45,

47, 86, 88

Fleet Marine Force Manuals 103

Fleet Marine Officer 29

Fleet Training Division 65

FLEX 5 52

FLEX 6 53

Florida 18—19. 23, 54, 56—57, 70

Florida 31

Fokker transport 39

Food Machinery Corporation 56

Food Service Demonstration Teams 88

Force Marine Officer 29

Ford V8 engine 55

Formosa 26

Formosa Resolution 79

Forrestal, James D. (Secretary of Defense) 79, 111

Fort Hancock 14

Fort Leavenworth 13

Fort Leavenworth School of the Line and General Staff

44

Fort Monmouth 70

Fort Monroe 13

Forward Air Controller 69

Four-Power Treaty 26

France 21—26, 61, 64

Freeport 49

French Indo-China 61

Fresnel Lens Optical Landing System 88

Fullam, Capt William F. 2, 17—18

Fuller, Col Ben H. 37; MajGen, 43

Fuller, 1st Lt Melvin E. 35

"Functions of the Armed Forces" 79

"Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of

Staff" 81

"Functions Paper" 81

Furer, RAdm Julius A. 61

Gallipoli Campaign 26—27, 43, 45, 47

Gavutu Island 66

Geiger, LtGen Roy S. 71

General Board of the Navy 5—8, 10—12,

29—30, 43, 53, 67

General Governing Considerations 13

General Motors 41

General Order No. 241, 45

"General Principles Governing the Selection and Establishment of Advanced Bases and the Composition of

an Advanced Base Outfit" 14

"Gentlemen's Agreement" 11

Georgia 70

Germany 7,21,42, 61

Gettysburg 31

Gibson, Cpl Walter L. 56

Gilbert Islands 26, 66

Glenn L. Martin Corporation 75

GOLDEN FLEECE 100-101

Gottschalk, Maj Vincent J. 82

Government Printing Office 37

Graham-Paige Motors Corporation 57

Grande Island 11

Great Britain 25—26, 54, 61

Great Depression 41

Great War 26

Greene, Gen Wallace M., Jr. 113

Greenfield, Kent Roberts 63

Griswold, Capt Ralph M. 38

Guadalcanal 47, 66—67

Guam 1, 15, 23, 26, 30, 38, 45, 64

Guantanarno Bay 5,8, 11,23, 31

Guardia Nacional Dominicana 23, 28

Guatemala 79

Gulf Coast 50

Gulf of Korea 11

Gun Defense 13

Guymon, Lt Vernon M. 58

Hait, Mr. James M. 56

Haiti 7, 21, 23, 30, 35, 39, 42. 58, 96

Haitian Gendarmerie 23, 28

Hale, Senator Eugene C. 5

HAMLET FESTIVAL 100

Hampton Roads 35, 49

Hancock 18

Harding, Senator Warren G25—26, 30—31

Harrier 112—113

Harrington, Maj Samuel M. 37

Harris Board 85

Harris, MajGen Field 71, 85

Hart, LtGen Franklin A. 92

Harvard 70

Hawaii 26, 96

Hawaiian Islands 23, 35

Hawker-Siddeley Aviation Corporation 112

Headquarters Marine Corps 28—29, 51, 53, 58, 64, 66—67,

77, 84, 92, 108—109, 112

Helicopter Board 74

Henderson 33

Henderson Field 67

Henderson, BGen Melvin D. 99

Heywood, BGen Charles 1, 10

Higgins, Andrew 50—51, 53, 75,91

High Explosives and Mines 13

Hiroshima 71

Historical Amphibious File 51
152 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

21; BGen, 22;

Historical Division 53, 67, 77

History of the United States Marine Corps 2

History of USMC Operations in World War II 59

Hitler, Adolph 42

Hoa yang District 100—101

Hogaboom Board 85—87

Hogaboom, Col Robert E. 73—74; MajGen 85—86

Holcomb, MajGen Thomas 55

Honduras 30

Hong Kong 26

Honolulu 30

Hoover, President Herbert 26, 41

House Naval Affairs Committee 3, 21

House of Representatives 25, 27

Howard, LtCol Archie F. 47

Hudson River 34

Hue-Phu Bai area 99, 102

Hughes, Charles Evans 25—26

Hughes, Howard 72

Hull, Cordell 42

Hunt Board 92

Hunt, LtGen LeRoy P. 92

Idaho 25

Igorrotes 1

Indo-China 61

Instructions for the Reconnaissance of Bays, Harbors and

Adjacent Country 13

Inter-American Conference 79

"International Law in its Relation to Advance Bases" 14

Italy 25—26, 61

Iwo Jima 67, 69

Japan 11—12, 25—26, 42,54,61,63—65,96

"Jazz Age" 26

Jerome, Col Clayton C. 74

Johnson Debt Default Act 42

Joint ArmyNavy Board 36, 46, 63

Joint Board 36—37, 64, 92

Joint Chiefs of Staff 36, 63, 79, 92

Joint Logistics Plans Committee 81

Joint Strategic Plans Committee 81

Journal of United States Artillery 14

Kaiser 7

Kalamazoo 57

Kalbius, RAdm Edward C. 55

Kaluf, Maj John 53, 55

Kamikaze attacks 68

Kansas 13, 64

Kennedy, President John F. 95

Kentucky 41

Kestrel 112

Key West 81

Key West Conference 79

King, Adm Ernest J. 56

Knapp, Capt H. A. 14

Knoles, George Harmon 42

Knowles, RAdm Herbert B. 66

Knox, Capt Dudley W. 38

Knudsen, William S. 61

Korea 79, 82—83, 89, 96, 104

Korean War 78, 84, 89

Krulak Report 51

Krulak, 1st Lt Victor H. 51; Capt, 56; Col, 77

Ky Ha 105

LaFollette, Robert M. 4

Lakehurst 70, 74, 76

Lakeland 56—57

Lake Ponchatrain 51

Lammers, Cdr Howard M. 38

Landing Boat Type "A" 51

Landing Exercise No. 5 55

Landing Force Bulletin No. 17 110—111

Landing Force Manuals 84

Landing Force War Game Group 108

Landing Operations Doctrine, U. S. Navy, 1937 47

Landing Operations Manual 91

Landing Operations Text Board 44

Laos 107

Latin America 38, 42

League Island 10

League of Nations 25, 64

Lebanon 79

Lejeune, LtCol John A. 18—19; Col,

MajGen, 29—30, 65

Lend-Lease Act 61

Letcher, Col John S. 69

Leuchtenburg, Professor William E. 41

Life Magazine 55

Lincoln-Zephyr engine 56

Linsert, Maj Ernest E. 51

Little, BGen Louis McC. 42; MajGen. 55

Lodge, Senator Henry Cabot 4, 25

London 23

Long, Col Charles G. 18

Long, Secretary of the Navy John D. 2, 6—7

Longstreet, Robert L. 57

Los Angeles 41

Lucas, LtCol L. C. 14

Luce, Adm Stephen B. 6

Ludwig, LtCol Verle E. 100

Luka 64

Luzon 68

Mahan, RAdm Alfred T. 6

Maine 5

Maloelap 65

Managua 23, 30, 39

Manila 30, 68

Manila Bay 3, 5, 64

Manual for Naval Overseas Operations 46

Marble Mountain 105

Mare Island 15

Mariana Islands 26, 39, 64

"Marine-Air-Ground Task Force" 87

Marine Amphibious Brigade 110, 112

Marine Amphibious Force 110, 112

Marine Amphibious Unit 110, 112

"Marine Aviation in Vietnam 1962—1970" 98

Marine Barracks, Pearl Harbor 35

Marine Barracks, Quantico 39

Marine Barracks, Washington 36

Marine Corps, United States 1—2, 4—6, 8, 10—13, 15—18,

21—22, 25—30, 32, 39, 42—45, 47—48, 50—52, 54—56, 58—59,

63—66, 68, 70—71, 75, 77, 79, 81—83, 85—93, 95—98, 100,

102, 104, 107—109, 112—1 13

Air Units

1st Marine Aircraft Wing 82, 88

2d Marine Aircraft Wing 110

3d Marine Aircraft Wing 70—71

1st Aviation Force 24

Marine Aircraft Group 33 82
INDEX 153

Denial of Bases,

Marine Air Warning Group 1 70

Marine Corps Glider Group 71

Northern Bombing Group 24

Air Warning Squadron 1 70

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 98

Marine Night Fighter Squadron 531 70

Marine Observation Squadron 6 82

Marine Transport Helicopter Squadron 161 83

Marine Corps Glider Detachment 70

1st Marine Aeronautic Company 24

Squadron A 24

Squadron B 24

Squadron C 24

Squadron D 24

Ground Units

Advanced Base Force 8, 15—16, 18, 21, 28, 30

East Coast Expeditionary Force 30, 39, 45

Expeditionary Force 32, 112

Fleet Base Defense Force 45

West Coast Expeditionary Force 30, 39, 45

III Amphibious Corps 68

III Amphibious Force 98—99

V Amphibious Corps 69

1st Marine Division 84

2d Marine Division 110—111

3d Marine Division 67, 88, 100, 105—106

1st Advanced Base Brigade 19

1st Marine Brigade 39, 42, 56, 58—59

1st Provisional Brigade 82

2d Marine Brigade 39, 58

4th Marine Brigade 23

5th Marine Brigade 23

9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade 96

1st Advanced Base Regiment 18

1st Marine Regiment 16

5th Marine Regiment 32, 35, 39

4th Marine Regiment 30

4th Marines 102

9th Marines 100, 106

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion 57

1st Provisional Field Artillery Group 69

2d Combined Action Group 103

Joint Action Company 102

Joint Assault Signal Companies 68

6th Company 16

35th Company 31

Landing Force Air Support Control Units 68—69

Marine Corps Air Station 70, 88, 113

Marine Corps Development and Education Command 91,

109

Marine Corps Development Center 91

Marine Corps Equipment Board 48—49, 56, 76, 91

Marine Corps Gazette 8, 37, 106

"Marine Corps Landing Operations" 43

Marine Corps Reserve 98

Marine Corps Schools 35, 37, 43, 71, 74, 92

Marine Officer's School 36

Marmon-Herringron tank 52—53

Marshall Islands 64—65, 71

Marston, Maj John 46

Martin "Mars" 72

Maryland 31, 56

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 70

Materiel Section 29

Maund, RAdrn L. E. H. 43

McAlister, Capt Francis M. 47

McCawley, Capt Charles L. 1

McClellan, LtCol Edward N. 22

McCully, VAdm Newton A. 34

McCutcheon, LtCol Keith B. 68; Col, 111; BGen, 99;

MajGen, 113; LtGen, 68, 98; Gen, 103—104

McDowell, Cdr Ralph 5. 50

McHenry, Maj George W. 57

McKinley Administration 1

Medal for Merit 57

Medical Civic Action Program 98, 103

Medium D Tank 54

Megee, Col Vernon E. 68—69

Mercury V8 engine 56

Metzger, MajGen Louis 109

Metzko, LtCol John 112

Mexico 13, 21

Michigan 57

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 96

Military Intelligence Section 29

"Military Requirements of Helicopter for Ship-to-Shore

Movement of Troops and Cargo" 74

Miller, Maj Charles J. 46

Miller, LtCol Ellis Bell 44—45

Miller, Maj Lyle H. 43

Miller, Col Thomas H. 113

Mine Defense 13

Mississippi 50

Missouri 57

Mobile Defense 13

Monterey 108

Montevideo 42

Moore, Thomas 6

Moses, BGen Emile P. 51, 56

Motor Troop Lighter 35

Mulcahy, Maj Francis P. 58

Myers, MajGen John T. 45

Nagasaki 71

Naktong River Bulge 82

National Archives 53

National Defense Research Committee 6!

National Military Establishment 79

National Security Council 81

Naval Air Materiel Test Center 89

Naval Air Station, San Diego 39

Naval Appropriations Bill 5, 21

Naval Appropriations Committee 6

'Naval Bases; Location, Resources,

Security of Advanced Bases" 64

Naval Disarmament Conference 29

Naval Division of Inspections 17

"Naval Gunfire in Support of a Landing" 38

"Naval Intelligence" 38

Naval Station, Guam 39

Naval War Board 6

Naval War College 7, 14, 17, 44—45, 64—65

"Naval War" with Spain 5

Navy, United States 1—2, 5, 10, 12—13, 15, 21—22, 26, 28,

30—31, 35—38, 43, 46—47, 49—50, 52—53, 57, 61, 63—69, 71.

75, 77, 79, 85—86, 92—93, 98, 102, 108

Navy Cross 64

Navy Department 2—3, 8, 12, 42—43, 45, 48, 51

Navy Regulations 15

National Security Act of 1947 8, 28, 79, 81, 91—92

Netherlands 25

Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936 and 193742

Nevada 85

New Caledonia 70
154 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

New Deal 42, 95

Newfoundland 78

New Hampshire 10

New Jersey 14, 49, 70, 74, 76

New London 13

New Market 31

New Orleans 50—51, 53

Newport 6, 10

New River 48, 53, 70

New York 34

Nicaragua 13, 23, 30, 35, 38—39, 43, 59, 96

Nine-Power Treaty 26

Noble, LtCol Alfred H. 47

Norfolk 11,33,35—36,50

Normandy 71

North Africa 47

North Carolina 48,53,70-71,75,83,89,92, 111

North China 42

North Korea 96

North Vietnam 96

Observers School 39

Ocean View Beach 35

Office of Naval Intelligence 7, 14

Office of Production Managements 61

Office of the Chief of Military History 63

Officer Fitness Report 28

Officer-in-Charge of Marine Aviation 39

Okeechobee region 54

Okinawa 67—71, 96

Olongapo 12, 15, 23

Omaha 58

Onslow Beach 75, 78, 111

Open Door policy 26

Operation CROSSROADS 71

Operation DEWEY CANYON 106-107

Operation HAYLIFT 83

Operation HARVEST MOON 105

Operation PACKARD II 75—77

Operation PACKARD III 78

Operation STEEL-PIKE I 89

Operation SWITCH 83

Operation WINDMILL 83

Operations Section 29

ORANGE plan 63-64

Oriental Public School 11

Orlando 70

Ostend 24

"Outfit Necessary for Seizure and Fortifications of

Positions by a Small Expeditionary Force" 14

Overseas Expeditions 37

Pacific 12, 26, 30, 37—38, 45, 63, 65, 70—71, 85,98

Pacific Coast 30

Pacific Islands 70

Page, Capt Arthur H. 58

Palau 75

Palau Islands 45

Panama Canal 21

Parao 64

Paris 23, 61

Parris Island 10, 70

Parris Island Recruit Depot II

Parsons, Maj Harold L. 46

"Peaceful Coexistence" 79

Pearl Harbor 15, 23, 61, 64

Peck, Maj DeWitt 46

Peerless Division 56

Peking 23, 30

Pendleton, Col Joseph H. 21

Pennsylvania 34

Pensacola 18—19, 23

Personnel Section 29

Philadelphia 10, 12—13, 15—18, 23, 36, 49

Philadelphia Navy Yard 10, 18

Philippines 1, 5,7—8, 11—12, 14, 26, 45, 63—64, 68—69

Piasecki Aircraft Corporation 75

Piasecki, Frank N. 75—76

Piasecki Helicopter Corporation 75

Planning Section 29

Platt Amendment 42

Platt, BGen Jonas 105

Point Mugu 89

Political Action Teams 102

Ponta Delgado 24

Pope, Col Percival C. 11

Port Arthur 11

Port-au-Prince 39

Port Royal 10, 36

Portsmouth 10

Portugal 25

Potomac River 34

Prairie 11, 19

President of the General Board 14

President of the United States 6, 25, 27, 95

Presidential Executive Order 969 4

Price, Col Charles F. B. 43

Princeton 111

Project HANDCLASP 98

"Professional Qualifications" 29

Public Law 416, 79

Puerto Rico 1,21, 78, 89, 111

Quang Tn Province 106

Quantico 21, 30—91, 35—37, 39, 45—46, 50—52, 55—56, 58,

66, 74, 76, 78, 84, 89, 91—92, 108

Raper, Sgt Clarence H. 56

Recruiting Section 29

Red Bank 49

Reid, Col George C. 7—8, 10

"Report on Japanese Assault Landing Operations Shanghai Area 1937" 51

"Report on Maneuvers and Operations" 19

"Report on Men, Material & Drills Required for

Establishing a Naval Advance Base" 14

"Report on the Fitness of Officers of the U. S. Marine

Corps" 28

Republican Administration 79

Republican era 41

Republicans 5, 25

Republic of Vietnam 88, 98—99, 103

Revolutionary Development Program 99—100

Revolutionary War 95

Rhode Island 6, 10

Richardson, LCdr Clifford G. 46

Riverside 57

"Roaring Twenties" 26

Rockey, LtCol Keller E. 47

Rodgers, Cdr William L. 14

Roebling, Donald 54—57, 75, 91

Roebling, John A. 54

Roebling, Col Washington 54

Rolls Royce Bristol Pegasus 103, 112
INDEX 155

Roosevelt, Franklin D., Assistant Secretary of the Navy

17; President of the United States, 41—42, 53, 61

Roosevelt Roads 89

Roosevelt, President Theodore 1—2, 5—7, 11

"Rough Riders" 5

Rowell, Maj Ross E. 39

Royal Air Force 70, 112

Royal Navy 43

Russell, Maj John H. 14—15; MajGen, 45

Russell, Professor William 8

Russia 11, 25, 79

Russians79

Russo-Japanese War 11

Rydalch, Col Edward N. 85

Ryukyus 69

St. Louis 57

St. Louis Car Company 57

St. Simon's Island 70

Saipan 45

Samana 8

Samar 5

Sampson 5

San Clemente Islands 48, 66

Sanderson, Lt Lawson H. M. 38

San Diego 21, 48, 58, 70, 82, 98

San Francisco School Board 11

San Jose 57

San Juan 23

Santee 70

Santiago 5

Santo Domingo 8, 21, 23, 30, 38

Schmidt, MajGen Harry 69

Schofield, RAdm Frank H. 38

School of Aerial Observation 39

School of Application 36

Schwable, Col Frank H. 70

Seavey's Island 10

Secretary of Defense 79, 81

Secretary of the Navy 6, 8, 10, 12—13, 15—17, 19, 21, 34,

43-44,48, 53, 59, 81, 90, 108—109

Secretary of State 25, 42, 79

Senate 25

Senate Committee on Naval Affairs 5

Senior Naval Officer 63

Seventh Pan-American Conference 42

Sharp, Adm Ulysses S. Grant 98

Sharpsburg 31

Shaw, LtCol Samuel R. 72

Shearer, Maj Maurice E. 35

Shenandoah Valley 31

Shepherd Board 72, 74

Shepherd. MajGen Lemuel C., Jr. 71; Gen, 82,91

Ship-to-Shore Operations 37

Shisler, LtCol Clair W. 71; Col, 73

Short Airfield for Tactical Support" 88

Sicily 17

Sikorsky Aviation Corporation 75

Sikorsky Aircraft Division 75

Sikorsky, Igor 75

Sirius 32—33

Small Wars Manual 37, 96

'Small Wars Operations" 37

Smith, BGen Holland M. 53; MajGen, 31, 53, 56

Smith Board 85

Smith, Col John L. 85

Smith, BGen Oliver P. 71—72; Gen, 95, 110

Snedeker Board 85

Snedeker, BGen Edward W. 85

Soc Trang 98

Soldiers 0/the Sea 2

Solomon Islands 26, 47, 66

South Carolina 10, 88, 113

South Vietnam 99, 105

Southwest Pacific Area 68

Soviets 25, 42

Soviet Union 42

Soyang River 83

Spaniards 5

Spanish-American War 1, 6, 8, 36, 63

Spencer, Herbert 36

Spruance, Cdr Raymond A. 38

Stanmore, England 70

Stark, Adm H. 53

State Department 64

State Department Security Force 82

Stilwell, LtGen Richard G. 107

Strategic Hamlet theory 102

Strategy Board 6

Subic Bay 11, 14, 17

Suitland 56

Sullivan, Mark 1

Sun Shipbuilding Company 34

Suvla Bay 33

Swanson, Claude A. 45

Tables of Organization 73

Tables of Organization and Equipment 44

Tactical Air Control Party 67

Tactical Air Direction Center 69

Tactical Air Navigation System 88

Taft, President William H. 6—7

Tam Boi 107

Tarawa 111

Tarawa Atoll 66

Target Information Center 70

Taylor, Capt Henry C. 6; Adm, 7

Tentative Landing Operation Manual 47—48, 54, 59,

65, 73

Texas 70—7 1

"The Genesis of FMF Doctrine: 1789—1899" 8

"The Selection and Defense of Naval Bases" 14

"The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars" 37

"The Strategy of the Atlantic" 38

"The Strategy of the Pacific" 38

Thetis Bay 85

Thing, Maj Wilbur 46

Thompson Trophy 58

Thrasher, Maj Thomas E. 46

Tientsin 38

Tiger Mountain 107

Tinian 45

Tokyo 11,26

Training Section 28

Transport Group 47

Troop Barge A 33

Truk 45

Truman, President Harry S 57, 78—79

Tsingtao 78

Tulagi 70

Turnage, LtCol Allen H. 47

Turnbladh 66

Turner, Maj Thomas C. 38—39
156 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

20th Admendent 6

Twining, Col Merrill B. 71, 73, 75,92

Uhlinger, Quartermaster Clerk Percy J. 47

Underwood, Senator Oscar W. 25

United Aircraft Corporation 75

United Kingdom 112—113

United States 1, 25—26, 42, 48, 53—54, 57, 61, 64, 70,

89, 95—96, 98, 103

U. S. Agency for International Development 99

U. S. Atlantic Fleet 65

"United States Fleet Operations and the Naval Staff" 38

United States Government 54

United States Hospital Ship 83

U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings 14, 65, 98

U. S. Naval Postgraduate School 108

United States Steel 41

University of Michigan 31

University of Virginia 61

Uruguay 42

Valley Forge 111

Vandegrift, Gen Alexander A. 31, 72

Vera Cruz 21

Vieques Island 48, 89, 111

Viet Cong 100—102

Vietnam 26, 96, 99, 103—105, 112

Vietnamese 1st Army Division 106

Vietnam War 96

Virginia 11, 13,21,33,35,49,51

Virginia Military Institute 31

Virgin Islands 21, 23, 30, 58

von Meyer, Secretary of the Navy George L. 6—7

Wake 26

Wales 23

Waller, Maj Littleton W. T. 5; Col, 21

Walt, MajGen Lewis W. 98; Gen, 99—100

Ward Island 70

Washington, D. C. 25—26, 29, 31, 50, 58, 61, 63

Washington Disarmament Conference 29

Washington Post 3

'Weasel' (Amphibious Jeep) 75

Wehie, Maj John 71

Weller, LtCoI Donald M. 69; Col, 65

West Coast 15, 21, 30, 70

Western Hemisphere 25, 42

West Indies 8

West Virginia 41

White House 1,6, 11

White House Conference 53

Williams, Maj Dion 13—15; Col, 32, 34

Williams, S. A. 54

Wilson Administration 27

Wilson, President Woodrow 7, 21

Winston, Maj T. W. 14

Wise, Capt Frederic M. 19

Wood, Gen Leonard 3

Woods, Maj Samuel A. 46

World War I 21—24, 26—29, 31, 38, 42, 58, 63—64, 91

World War II 27, 31, 35—36, 38, 42, 47—48, 56—57, 59,

63—66, 71, 75, 78, 83, 89, 91—92, 96, 107, 110, 112

Wornham Board 85

Wornham, MajGen Thomas 85

Wotje 65

Wyllie, Capt R. E. 14

Wyoming 56

Yellow Sea 11

Zeebrugge 24

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1978 0—500-449