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Filed 9/5/13 Taylor v. Cal. Air National Guard CA3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

(Sacramento) 

---- 

GARY TAYLOR, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant, 

 v. 

CALIFORNIA AIR NATIONAL GUARD et al., 

 Defendants and Respondents. 

C070759 

(Super. Ct. No. 

34201100110670CUPOGDS) 

 Plaintiff Gary Taylor, a member of the California Air National Guard, filed suit 

against defendants California National Guard and California Air National Guard 

(National Guard), Colonel John Crocker, and Major Thomas Keegan alleging 

defamation. Taylor’s claims stemmed from an interview given to a Sacramento Bee 

reporter by Crocker and Keegan regarding an investigation into allegations that National 

Guard pilots, including Taylor, were receiving dual compensation. Defendants filed a 

demurrer and a motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-
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SLAPP statute.1 The trial court granted the motion to strike, finding Taylor’s defamation 

claim arose from defendants’ protected activity. Taylor appeals, arguing Crocker’s and 

Keegan’s statements were not protected speech, and he can prevail on the merits of his 

claim. We shall affirm the judgment. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

In 1982 Taylor enlisted in the National Guard. He earned his pilot wings in 

June 1985 and served as a fighter pilot, instructor pilot, evaluation pilot, squadron 

commander, and operations group commander. In September 2009 Taylor was appointed 

commander of the 144th Fighter Wing in Fresno. The 144th was in charge of performing 

air sovereignty alert duties. 

 In March 2010 a federal audit team from the National Guard Bureau conducted an 

audit of the air sovereignty alert mission at the 144th Fighter Wing. The audit team 

found that “ ‘in some cases, pilots may have received pay twice in one day (pay for alert 

duty and pay for regular technician work, although not necessarily for the same 8-hour 

period.’ ” Alert duty pay boosted some pilots’ annual salaries by tens of thousands of 

dollars. 

 In response to the audit, Taylor requested a legal review of the negative finding by 

the Staff Judge Advocate of the National Guard to determine whether the pay issue was 

in compliance with military regulations. On June 1, 2010, the Staff Judge Advocate 

prepared a written legal opinion which concluded that Taylor and the 144th Fighter Wing 

acted reasonably and within their proper authority in executing their mission, and that any 

technical violations were well within the legal interpretations contained in the relevant 

regulations. 

 

1 Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation; all further statutory references are to 

the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise designated. 
3 

 However, as a result of the audit, Taylor was removed from his position as the 

144th Fighter Wing commander in July 2010 and returned to his position as a member of 

the National Guard. He remained a member of the National Guard until November 2011. 

 At all times material to the complaint, Colonel Crocker was the Director of 

Government and Public Affairs of the National Guard; Major Keegan was a public affairs 

officer with the National Guard. 

 In December 2010 Crocker and Keegan met with a Sacramento Bee reporter at the 

National Guard headquarters. The reporter stated he was investigating allegations that 

some 144th Fighter Wing pilots were “ ‘double dipping’ ” in violation of United States 

law and military regulations. The reporter’s source was the 2010 federal audit. The 

comments made by Crocker and Keegan during this interview form the basis of Taylor’s 

defamation action. 

 Taylor filed suit, alleging defamation against defendants. According to Taylor, 

Crocker told the Sacramento Bee reporter, “ ‘There is at a minimum an appearance that 

(commanders) self-enriched, and boy, does that smell bad.’ ” Crocker stated: “[F]rom a 

criminal standpoint, we’ll have to wait and see,” but “from a leadership standpoint, there 

is no waiting and seeing.” According to Crocker, Brigadier General Mary J. Kight, the 

California National Guard’s top commander, had lost “ ‘full faith and credit in Taylor’s 

leadership skills.’ ” Crocker also theorized that the improper payments might reach into 

the millions of dollars. 

 Crocker also stated the pilots that were grounded because of the alleged improper 

payments might have been confused about the law and relied on Taylor’s guidance. 

Crocker told the reporter that “ ‘the money is less of an issue than the leadership, in my 

book. And General Kight fixed that.’ ” 

 Taylor’s complaint also alleged defendants told the reporter he was under criminal 

investigation and had violated both United States law and military regulations. Keegan 

stated General Kight had ordered an audit of all National Guard units, but no other 
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compensation problems had come to light. In addition, Taylor claimed Lieutenant 

General Harry Wyatt ratified Crocker’s and Keegan’s statements when he told the 

reporter, “ ‘I have great faith and confidence in the men and women of the 144th Fighter 

Wing. These are certainly trying times for the rank and file. It’s unfortunate the alleged 

actions of a few have brought discredit to those men and women.’ ” 

 Defendants filed a demurrer and “Motion to Strike/Anti-SLAPP.” Taylor opposed 

the motion. 

 Following oral argument, the trial court granted defendants’ motion to strike. The 

court found Taylor’s defamation claim arose from defendants’ protected activity under 

section 425.16. According to the court, defendants’ statements to the Sacramento Bee 

reporter constituted acts in furtherance of their right to free speech in connection with a 

public issue. In addition, defendants’ statements were made in connection with an issue 

under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or made in a 

public forum in connection with an issue of public interest. 

 The court also determined Taylor failed to establish a probability of prevailing on 

his defamation claim. Defendants’ statements were privileged within the meaning of 

Civil Code section 47, and defendants were immune under Military and Veterans Code 

section 392. 

 Taylor filed a timely notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

Anti-SLAPP Motions 

Subdivision (b)(1) of section 425.16 sets forth the elements of an anti-SLAPP 

motion. It provides: “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that 

person in furtherance of the person’s right to petition or free speech under the United 

States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall 

be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has 

established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” 
5 

 Protected acts include any oral statement made in connection with an issue under 

consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body; any oral statement 

made in a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; or any other 

conduct in furtherance of the exercise of free speech in connection with a public issue. 

(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2), (3), (4).) Governmental employees may seek dismissal under 

section 425.16 because they are persons within the meaning of the statute. (Bradbury v. 

Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1114.) “[I]f government has a legitimate 

role to play in the interchange of ideas . . . then government should have some measure of 

protection in performing that role, at least as to matters of public interest.” (Id. at 

p. 1115.) 

 Section 425.16 requires the trial court to engage in a two-step process to determine 

whether to grant or deny a defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion. First, the court considers 

whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action 

arises from a protected activity. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The defendant bears the burden 

of showing the plaintiff’s cause of action arises from the defendant’s exercise of free 

speech or petition rights as defined in section 415.16, subdivision (e). If the defendant 

makes this threshold showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to make a prima facie 

showing of facts that, if credited by the trier of fact, would sustain a favorable judgment. 

(Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88; Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, 

Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 61.) 

 We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion to strike under 

section 425.16. “Whether section 425.16 applies and whether the plaintiff has shown a 

probability of prevailing are both reviewed independently on appeal.” (ComputerXpress, 

Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 999.) On a motion to strike under 

section 425.16, every legitimate inference must be drawn from the plaintiff’s evidence. 

(Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 828.) However, we must interpret 
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the anti-SLAPP statute broadly in order to encourage participation in matters of public 

significance. (§ 425.16, subd. (a).) 

Protected Activity 

The statements made by Crocker and Keegan that Taylor claims defamed him 

were made to a newspaper reporter and concerned an investigation by the National Guard 

into payment irregularities. As such, these statements were protected speech under 

section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(2), (3), and (4). 

 Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) encompasses any cause of action against a 

person arising from any statement or writing made in, or in connection with, an issue 

under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other 

official proceeding or body. (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 

734.) Defendants’ comments concerned the audit and investigation by the National 

Guard Bureau. They made their statements to a newspaper reporter, and the statements 

were reported in the press, a public forum. In addition, the allegedly defamatory remarks 

concerned an issue of public interest: an investigation into the propriety of payments 

made to military employees with tax dollars. 

 Taylor disagrees with the trial court’s determination that Crocker’s and Keegan’s 

statements to the Sacramento Bee reporter were protected speech. According to Taylor, 

defendant’s statements to the press were “in direct violation of military regulations which 

define their duties.” 

 In support of his claim, Taylor cites Air Force Instruction (AFI) No. 35-104, 

which provides that all public affairs personnel will closely consult with the Staff Judge 

Advocate prior to releasing pretrial publicity. AFI No. 35-104 also directs personnel to 

avoid “ ‘sensationalism, exaggeration, and the use of the term “criminal[”] ’ ” and not to 

use words “ ‘prejudicial to the accused before trial.’ ” Taylor asserts compliance with 

AFI No. 35-104 is mandatory. During oral argument, Taylor’s counsel stated, 
7 

“Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice makes it a crime to violate military 

regulations.” 

 Taylor contends: “Clearly there exist certain restrictions on the exercise of First 

Amendment rights in the military that are not applicable to civilian members of society. 

Both Crocker and Keegan were trained public affairs officer[s], to whom the regulations 

applied.” 

 The trial court disagreed, finding that if defendants’ statements violated military 

regulations, “such regulatory violations would not be subject to the rule of Flatley [v. 

Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299 (Flatley)] because they do not rise to the level of inherent 

‘criminal illegality’ as a matter of law.” In Flatley, the plaintiff, an entertainer, sued the 

defendant attorney, citing a letter sent by the attorney on behalf of a client who accused 

the plaintiff of rape. Subsequently, the attorney demanded money to settle his client’s 

claims against the plaintiff. The attorney brought a motion to strike. 

 The Supreme Court held that the anti-SLAPP statute does not protect speech that 

is conclusively shown or conceded to be “illegal as a matter of law.” (Flatley, supra, 

39 Cal.4th at p. 317.) Such speech is not a valid exercise of the constitutional right of 

petition or free speech. (Id. at p. 320.) The court concluded: “a defendant whose 

assertedly protected speech or petitioning activity was illegal as a matter of law, and 

therefore unprotected by constitutional guarantees of free speech and petition, cannot use 

the anti-SLAPP statute to strike the plaintiff’s complaint.” (Id. at p. 305.) 

 The illegal conduct at issue in Flatley was criminal extortion, which the court 

found not a constitutionally protected form of speech. (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 

pp. 330, 332.) Therefore, a defendant moving to strike a plaintiff’s complaint under the 

anti-SLAPP statute cannot show the plaintiff’s cause of action arises from an act in 

furtherance of the defendant’s protected speech rights if the evidence conclusively 

establishes as a matter of law, or the defendant concedes, the illegality of the defendant’s 

conduct on which the cause of action is based. However, if there is a factual dispute as to 
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the illegality of the defendant’s conduct, we cannot conclude that the conduct was illegal 

as a matter of law, and we proceed to determine whether the defendant has established a 

probability of prevailing. (Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (2011) 

198 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1168-1169.) 

 An alleged violation of AFI No. 35-104 does not rise to the level of inherent 

criminal activity as a matter of law. Defendants’ statements may violate the mandatory 

military regulations, but they do not constitute criminal activity as described in Flatley. 

Flatley does not extend to noncriminal conduct, even if that conduct may violate the law 

(e.g., a common law standard of conduct or statutory prohibition). (Price v. Operating 

Engineers Local Union No. 3 (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 962, 971; G.R. v. Intelligator 

(2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 606, 616.) 

 Plaintiff argues military regulations are treated differently and cites Parker v. Levy 

(1974) 417 U.S. 733 [41 L.Ed.2d 439] (Parker). In Parker, an army officer refused to 

obey orders to train Special Forces troops and made public statements urging Negro 

enlisted men not to go to Viet Nam if ordered to do so. He also described Special Forces 

personnel as liars, thieves, killers of peasants, and murderers of women and children. 

The officer was convicted by a general court-martial of violations of the Uniform Code of 

Military Justice for willfully disobeying a lawful command of a superior officer and 

conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces. (Id. at pp. 736-

738.) 

 The officer argued his speech was protected by the First Amendment of the United 

States Constitution. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding: “While the members of the 

military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First Amendment, the 

different character of the military community and of the military mission require a 

different application of those protections. The fundamental necessity for obedience, and 

the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the 

military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it. Doctrines of First 
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Amendment overbreadth asserted in support of challenges to imprecise language like that 

contained in Arts. 133 and 134 are not exempt from the operation of these principles.” 

(Parker, supra, 417 U.S. at p. 758.) 

 Taylor argues defendants cannot engage in conduct that is unlawful, as in Parker, 

and then argue it is protected speech: “Crocker and Keegan could and should have been 

court-martialed under the UCMJ [(Uniform Code of Military Justice)] for failure to obey 

a military regulation and for engaging in conduct unbecoming an officer, both of which 

carry a punishment of imprisonment. [¶] . . . The government cannot have it both ways. 

The government chose to proscribe the very conduct Crocker and Keegan engaged in. 

Therefore it was not protected speech.” 

 However, Parker does not abrogate or alter Flatley. Defendants’ conduct may or 

may not have run afoul of military regulations, but it did not constitute the illegal 

criminal conduct that Flatley found not to be protected speech. 

Ability to Prevail on the Merits 

We next consider whether Taylor has a probability of prevailing on his defamation 

claim. A plaintiff establishes a probability of prevailing on the claim by showing that the 

complaint is legally sufficient and supported by a prima facie showing of facts that, if 

proved at trial, would support a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. We do not weigh the 

evidence but determine whether, as a matter of law, the evidence is sufficient. We must 

consider not only facts supported by direct evidence, but also facts that reasonably can be 

inferred from the evidence. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 

820; Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 713-714.) Defendants can defeat Taylor’s 

evidentiary showing by presenting evidence that establishes as a matter of law that he 

cannot prevail. (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821.) 

 Taylor argues the trial court erred in finding Feres v. United States (1950) 

340 U.S. 135 [95 L.Ed. 152] (Feres) barred his defamation claim. In Feres, the Supreme 

Court held that members of the armed forces may not bring tort lawsuits under the 
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Federal Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act; 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq.) for physical injuries 

that “arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.” (Feres, supra, 

340 U.S. at p. 146.) While the Feres case and its holding—that Congress did not intend 

to extend the remedies of the Tort Claims Act to servicemen where the injuries arise out 

of or are in the course of activity incident to service—concerned the Tort Claims Act, the 

rationale of Feres has been applied to a wide variety of statutory and constitutional 

claims. Thus, the “Feres doctrine” has a wider ambit than the Feres case. “Feres quite 

simply offers a template for construing a general statute as applied to active duty 

members of the military.” (Estes v. Monroe (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1347, 1354 (Estes).) 

Moreover, “[i]t is beyond question that the Feres doctrine generally applies to claims 

brought by National Guard members. [Citations.]” (Stauber v. Cline (9th Cir. 1988) 

837 F.2d 395, 399.) 

 Under Feres, a service member may not bring an action against the government or 

armed service personnel for injuries when such a legal action would require a civilian 

court to examine decisions regarding management, discipline, supervision, and control of 

the armed forces. While the Feres doctrine has been broadly construed as creating an 

immunity (Hodge v. Dalton (9th Cir. 1997) 107 F.3d 705, 710; Zaputil v. Cowgill 

(9th Cir. 2003) 335 F.3d 885, 887), other courts suggest “immunity” is not the proper 

term (Estes, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1355). However, the result is the same: a 

member of the military is not permitted to recover in tort for injuries that arise out of or in 

the course of activity incident to service. (See Feres, supra, 340 U.S. at p. 146.) 

 We consider two factors to determine whether Feres applies to Taylor’s claims: 

(1) whether Taylor was a member of the United States armed forces at the time he was 

injured, and (2) whether Taylor’s injury arose from or occurred in the course of an 

activity incident to military service. (McGowan v. Scoggins (9th Cir. 1989) 890 F.2d 

128, 132 (McGowan).) To make this determination, we examine the totality of the 

circumstances, including where the act occurred, the duty status of Taylor at the time, the 
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benefits accruing to Taylor from his military status, and the nature of Taylor’s activities 

at the time. (McConnell v. United States (9th Cir. 2007) 478 F.3d 1092, 1095 

(McConnell).) 

 The trial court found the Feres doctrine applied “because the action would require 

this civilian court to examine decisions regarding management, supervision, and control 

of members of the armed forces, or may intrude in military affairs and second-guess 

military decisions. At a minimum, plaintiff’s claim would or could include inquiries into 

the application and effect of numerous military regulations on the dual status pay matter, 

the propriety of a military audit, the authority and limitation of military public affairs 

officers to make statements on behalf of the [National Guard], and the decision of a 

commanding officer to relieve another from command.” The court also found the subject 

matter of the alleged defamatory statements arose directly from Taylor’s military service 

and Taylor was not separated from his military service or status at the time of defendants’ 

statements. 

 Taylor disputes these conclusions. He argues that at the time defendants made the 

defamatory statements, he was not subject to military control, under compulsion of 

military orders, nor was he performing any military mission. Instead, Taylor contends, 

he was a civilian airline pilot who had not performed any military function for over two 

months. 

 To the contrary, Taylor was a member of the National Guard until 

November 2011. Defendants’ alleged defamatory statements were made on December 7, 

2010. Feres applies to persons who are members of the armed forces at the time of 

injury; Taylor’s discharge took place almost a year after defendants made the alleged 

defamatory statements to the Sacramento Bee.2

 

2 Taylor concedes that at the time the statements were made, “he was no longer a fulltime employee of the California Air National Guard, but was instead a part-time 
12 

 Taylor also disagrees with the court’s finding that his injury was incident to his 

service. He reasserts his argument that “[t]he nature of plaintiff’s activities at the time of 

the act was that he was a civilian airline pilot living in San Diego. At the time of the act 

he was not subject to military authority, and his employment had ended.” 

 We disagree. Taking into consideration the factors enumerated by the court in 

McConnell, we agree with the trial court’s finding that the alleged defamatory statements 

were incident to Taylor’s service in the National Guard. Defendants made the statements 

while on a military installation. The statements refer to Taylor’s status as a wing 

commander at the 144th Fighter Wing. The subject matter of the statements was military 

payments made to Taylor, and the statements relate directly to his performance as wing 

commander. 

 However, Taylor argues that for Feres to apply he must have been “on orders” at 

the time of the injury. In support, Taylor relies on Johnson v. United States 

(9th Cir. 1983) 704 F.2d 1431 (Johnson); McGowan, supra, 890 F.2d 128; Brooks v. 

United States (1949) 337 U.S. 49 [93 L.Ed. 1200] (Brooks); and United States v. Brown

(1954) 348 U.S. 110 [99 L.Ed. 139] (Brown). 

 In McGowan, a retired army captain was involved in an auto accident on an Air 

Force base while conducting a personal errand. The court found the Feres doctrine 

inapplicable to the captain’s claim, since his injuries were not incident to his military 

service. (McGowan, supra, 890 F. 2d at p. 129.) Similarly, in Johnson, a member of the 

armed forces was injured in an auto accident. The plaintiff and the driver, both on active 

duty, worked as bartenders at an officers club during off-duty hours. (Johnson, supra, 

704 F.2d at p. 1433.) In finding Feres inapplicable, the court determined the plaintiff’s 

off-duty work as a bartender “bears no such relevant relationship to the military 

 

guardsman, and had long been relieved of his command.” However, the dispositive fact 

is that he remained a member of the National Guard. 
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disciplinary structure that the Feres doctrine was meant to safeguard.” (Johnson, at 

p. 1438.) 

 The plaintiff in Brooks, also a member of the armed services, was injured when his 

car was hit by a United States Army truck. (Brooks, supra, 337 U.S. at p. 50.) The 

Supreme Court found the plaintiff’s injury did not arise out of or in the course of military 

duty. (Id. at p. 52.) In Brown, a discharged veteran brought suit for negligence by 

physicians at a Veterans Administration hospital. (Brown, supra, 348 U.S. at pp. 110-

111.) The court found Feres did not apply: “We adhere also to the line drawn in the 

Feres Case between injuries that did and injuries that did not arise out of or in the course 

of military duty.” (Brown, at p. 113.) Another traffic accident claimed the life of a naval 

officer in Mills v. Tucker (1974) 499 F.2d 866. The officer was killed on a roadway 

maintained by the Navy and adjacent to a naval depot. The court found Feres 

inapplicable since the officer was on furlough the day of the accident and returning from 

a civilian job “ ‘moonlighting’ as a fry cook.” (Mills, supra, 499 F.2d at pp. 867-868.) 

The court found Feres did not apply, since the officer was “only in the remotest sense 

subject to military discipline.” (Mills, at p. 867.) The court distinguished accidents on 

base, noting the accident site was not part of the naval depot. (Id. at p. 868.) 

 In contrast to the cases cited by Taylor, most of which involve auto accidents and 

activities not involved with military service, here Taylor’s claims center on comments 

made by military personnel concerning a military investigation and audit into payments 

made to military personnel. These differences militate a different result. 

 As the trial court noted, in Meagher v. Heggemeier (D.Minn. 2007) 513 F.Supp.2d 

1083, 1097-1098, the court applied Feres to a defamation claim asserted by a retired 

colonel in the National Guard stemming from comments made in a meeting at which 

other officers were present and where the colonel’s application for a National Guard 

position was being considered. (Meagher, at pp. 1086-1087.) The court concluded: “We 

recognize that not every purported defamatory comment, by one military employee 
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against another, would necessarily implicate the Feres doctrine, since the purported 

defamation could be wholly unrelated to military service. Here, however, the alleged 

defamation was assertedly made solely in the context of a military promotion decision, by 

a member of the Board tasked with deciding who should be promoted, and in the very 

proceedings in which he was appointed to participate. The interrelationship between the 

defamation action, and military service, is direct, and avoidable, as Heggemeier is plainly 

being sued for his acts as a military man. . . . Accordingly, we find no ground, in this 

case, to ignore the clear precedent surrounding the Feres doctrine, so as to interfere in an 

intra-military decision that arose in the context of a personnel decision.” (Id. at pp. 1097-

1098.) 

 Notwithstanding the authorities cited by Taylor, his claim in the present case 

centers on comments made by defendants regarding his military service and his abilities 

as a commander. These alleged defamatory comments fall squarely within the purview 

of Feres. Therefore, we agree with the trial court’s finding that Feres bars Taylor’s claim 

of defamation based on defendants’ statements regarding the audit and subsequent 

actions by the military.3

DISPOSITION 

The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover costs on appeal. 

 RAYE , P. J. 

We concur: 

 BUTZ , J. 

 DUARTE , J. 

 

3 Since we find Feres bars Taylor’s claims of defamation against defendants, we need 

not address Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) or Military and Veterans Code 

section 392.