# Somalia - United States Department of State

- G7 Italy 2024 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on Addressing Global Challenges, Fostering Partnerships Office of the SpokespersonThe text of the following statement was released by the G7 foreign ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union.I. INTRODUCTIONAs the international community faces multiple crises we, the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, renew our commitment to upholding the rule of law, humanitarian principles and international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and to protecting human rights and dignity for all individuals.We reiterate the need to take collective action to preserve peace and stability and to address global challenges such as climate change, pollution, biodiversity loss, global health, education, gender inequality, poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition, violent extremism and terrorism, information integrity and a digital transition that respects, protects, and promotes human rights and fundamental freedoms.We affirm our commitment to free societies and democratic principles, where all persons can freely exercise their rights and freedoms. Human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.We reaffirm our commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) and to re-energize efforts towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as multidimensional crises, and particularly the pandemic and ongoing major conflicts, have set back progress towards their achievement.We will continue to work in close cooperation with our partners and with relevant multilateral fora such as the G20. Global challenges require solidarity and a cohesive international response, looking for shared solutions for peace, stability, and development, leaving no one behind.II. FOSTERING PARTNERSHIP WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN AND AFRICAWe will continue to deepen the partnership with African countries and regional organizations, including the African union (AU). We welcome the AU participation in the G20 as a permanent member and reiterate our support for the G20 Compact with Africa. The G7-Africa partnership is guided by the objectives of the AU Agenda 2063, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement.The consequences of the Russian aggression and its weaponization of food supplies and energy resources have affected notably many vulnerable countries, particularly in Africa. In this perspective, Russia’s war is proving not just a war against Ukraine but against the world’s poorest and most vulnerable.We reiterate our strong partnership for just, green transitions to net zero emissions as core to sustainable development, and we are ready to inject new momentum into the pursuit of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Together with the entire international community and stakeholders beyond government, we need to urgently work in partnership to accelerate progress towards the 2030 Agenda and SDGs, consistent with the unanimous commitment reaffirmed at the UN General Assembly last September.Debt vulnerabilities are a significant challenge. We fully support the G20’s effort to improve the implementation of the “Common Framework” in a predictable, timely, orderly, and coordinated manner, providing clarity to participants. We recognize the importance of effective and long-term solutions, promoting coordination between official bilateral and private creditors. We call upon Multilateral Development Banks and development finance institutions to continue to play a key role to foster sustainable development through increased financing, policy advice and technical assistance for the benefit of developing countries, particularly the poorer and more fragile countries across the continent. In particular central to economic development is ensuring access to sustainable and resilient food systems, health care and health security, and clean, affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.We reiterate our commitment to supporting African governments as they address conditions leading to terrorism, violent extremism, and instability, while respecting human rights and the rule of law. Development and democracy are mutually reinforcing, and we underscore the importance of free and fair elections to meet the citizens’ needs and expectations.We are concerned about the activities of the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group and other emerging Russia-backed forces, which are producing a destabilizing impact, notably in North Africa, Central Africa, and the Sahel. We call for accountability of all those responsible for human rights abuses.1. LibyaWe will continue to help Libya put an end to its protracted internecine conflict, also fueled by foreign forces, fighters and mercenaries, in order to build a more peaceful and prosperous future and support its stability, independence, territorial integrity and national unity. The political stalemate leaves Libya extremely vulnerable to third state actors pursuing control over Libya’s security, politics and economy, sowing instability throughout the country and wider region.We therefore call on all Libyan political actors to engage in meaningful dialogue in order to break the current impasse and move towards a credible roadmap to free, fair and inclusive national presidential and parliamentary elections without delay. The international community must also be united in the pursuit of these goals.We take note with regret of the recent announcement by UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, Abdoulaye Bathily, regarding his decision to resign. We thank him for his dedicated service and renew our full support to the United Nations and the key role it continues to play in Libya. We call on the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint his successor without delay.2. SahelWe express our grave concern for the deterioration of the security situation in the Sahel, compounded by the backsliding of the principles of constitutional rule of law, democracy and good governance and regression in the regional cooperation frameworks.Such an increasingly precarious and unpredictable political scenario requires renewed efforts by all relevant actors and stakeholders in reconfiguring international and regional responses to the challenge of growing political tension, confrontation, and instability in the Sahel.We are also deeply concerned by the spread of terrorist threats and activities, leading to conflict and causing widespread misery and displacement of the civilian population. We are appalled by the grave human rights violations committed by multiple parties, including Russian proxies in the region.We look forward to strengthening further our cooperation with the African Union, regional organizations and the UN in fostering stability, security, good governance and development in the Sahel, preventing a “spill-over” of insecurity towards the Gulf of Guinea and North Africa, as well as irregular migration flows towards North Africa, Europe and the Western Hemisphere.We congratulate Mauritania on its taking over the rotating Presidency of the African Union and we commend its commitment to the rule of law, good governance, refugee inclusion and constitutional values. We stand ready to assist States of the Sahel in accelerating the pace of the transition towards the return of the constitutional order.3. Horn of AfricaWe reaffirm our strong commitment to promoting peace, security, and stability in the Horn of Africa. We continue to provide humanitarian support to those most affected by food insecurity, widespread poverty, armed violence, the impact of extreme weather events and displacement.We express our concern regarding the Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and the Somaliland region of Somalia announced in January 2024. We encourage both the Ethiopian and the Federal Government of Somalia to keep all channels of dialogue open to prevent further escalation, working with regional partners, in the framework of the African Union and through bilateral contacts, in accordance with international law and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity as enshrined in the UN Charter.4. SomaliaWe commend the important progress in the institutional, macroeconomic and security sector in Somalia. We encourage the Somali Authorities to continue to make meaningful progress in the fight against Al Shabaab and in the consolidation of the institutional framework, including completion of a transparent and inclusive constitutional reform process.The process of transitioning security responsibilities to the Somali security forces needs to be closely followed, especially in view of the termination of the mandate of the African Union Transitional Mission (ATMIS) in Somalia at the end of 2024. We welcome planning underway by Somalia and the African Union for a multinational mission to follow ATMIS to help maintain stability while Somalia continues to develop its security capabilities.5. EthiopiaWhile we welcome developments in the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, we express concern for the persistent and violent tensions in many areas of the country, as well as reports of human rights violations and abuses, the severe economic crisis and widening food insecurityWe encourage further and lasting developments in the protection of human rights, protection of civilians, political dialogue to resolve tensions, reconciliation and national dialogue, transitional justice and accountability for crimes committed during the conflict.We call for a similar commitment by those involved in conflicts in other regions of Ethiopia to pursue peace through dialogue.We underscore the importance of delivering peace dividend quickly for conflict-affected populations through recovery and reconstruction support, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants, and implementation of durable solutions for Internally Displaced People (IDPs).6. SudanWe strongly condemn the ongoing fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, where the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate more than one year into the war. We especially note the impact of the crisis on women and girls, and condemn the ongoing atrocities being committed by both sides of the conflict, including using rape and other forms of gender-based violence including conflict-related sexual violence. We are concerned by the increasing numbers of displaced people.Obstruction of humanitarian access by the Sudanese Armed Forces and rapid Support Forces is resulting in the starvation of the Sudanese people. We urge both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces to agree and implement a lasting ceasefire without pre-conditions and to establish safe and stable humanitarian cross border and cross line access channels, including from multiple points of entry to the most devastated areas of Sudan. We urge all actors to return to negotiations and to engage in a national dialogue inclusive of women and the composite Sudanese civil society and aimed at re-establishing civilian and representative institutions. An active African role and the continued support of the international community remain essential to help Sudan to restore the democratic transition process.We commend the outcomes of the Paris Conference for Sudan and the Neighbouring countries during which over 2 billion Euros have been pledged to support civilian population in Sudan and those who sought refuge in neighbouring countries in 2024.7. Democratic Republic of the CongoWe strongly condemn the resumption of attacks by the March 23 Movement (M23) in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). We are very concerned by the worsening of the humanitarian situation, and the increasing serious human rights violations and abuses the population is being subjected to. We also condemn all armed groups operating in the country. We demand the immediate cessation of hostilities and of any further advances by the M23 and its withdrawal from all occupied areas as agreed through the African Union-endorsed Luanda process. We demand all armed groups to cease hostilities, withdraw from the areas they are controlling and disarm.We expressed deep concern at the reports of the Group of Experts on the DRC on foreign military support for M23 and direct military interventions on DRC territory. We condemn any such support provided to M23 and any other armed group operating in the DRC and demand its cessation and the immediate withdrawal of any unauthorized foreign military presence from the DRC. We also condemn support, notably provided by military forces, to certain armed groups such as the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), and demand the cessation of such support.We stress that any violations of the UN arms embargo is unacceptable and urge all States to stop any support to these armed groups.We remain committed to the Luanda and Nairobi processes to reach a negotiated diplomatic solution to the conflict. We encourage an effective Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery, and Stabilization programme and the meaningful participation of women and youth in all their diversity. We also stand ready to work with the nations of the Great Lakes region to address the root causes of the cycles of violence in eastern DRC in a manner that takes into account the concerns and interests of the whole region, including by promoting accountability for all actors responsible for violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law.III. ADDRESSING IRREGULAR MIGRATION, FOSTERING HOPE AND OPPORTUNITYWe recognize that forced displacement and irregular migration have to be addressed in an integrated, comprehensive, and balanced manner, in a spirit of joint responsibility and commitment, and in accordance with international law and in full respect of human rights.We will support our partners in addressing the root causes of instability in Africa and other regions and countries of origin, while promoting a cycle of growth grounded in the huge potential of the Continent, particularly in view of the just and clean transition and growth in access to electricity, offering alternative solutions to irregular migration. Collectively, we will address migration drivers including through: better leveraging and coordinating our development and climate finance; supporting fragile and conflict afflicted states; and strengthening international capacity to address climate change, conflict, learning poverty and other drivers of migration. We are ready to build synergies among initiatives from all partners and institutions. We will also continue to support African countries hosting large number of displaced populations.We acknowledge that climate change is a risk multiplier already having a strong impact on human mobility. We see the need to further strengthen disaster risk reduction, adaptation, and resilience measures to counteract the drivers of involuntary displacement in the context of climate change.Human traffickers and people smugglers must be stopped from continuing their nefarious activities and we need to disrupt their business models. We recognize that women and girls are especially impacted by human trafficking, particularly trafficking for sexual exploitation. The UN and its Agencies have a role to play in this respect. Countries of origin, transit and destination must work together to stop migrant smuggling and human trafficking and uphold the dignity and worth of the human person – in line with the UN Charter.We will work towards reducing irregular migration and envisioning regular, safe and orderly migration on the basis of relevant national sovereign regulations. We are committed to find ways to better address challenges posed by irregular migration, within the framework of our international obligations.  We will enhance cooperation against migrant smuggling and human trafficking. In this respect, we acknowledge the “Rome Process” started in July 2023 with an International Conference on Migration and Development” with the dual objective of fighting human traffickers and smugglers and supporting economic development. We also acknowledge the “Mattei Plan for Africa” launched by Italy. We also recall the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and protection and the multilateral legal framework on migration and refugee protection. Legal migration pathways can contribute to economic growth and decent work in line with international standards in countries of origin and destination.We need to inject consistency and coherence in our investment in areas of shared priority for Africa, including food security, nutrition, sustainable rural development, energy transition, sustainable, inclusive, resilient, and quality infrastructure development, bridging digital divides, education, training and skilling, gender equality and good governance. Based on a mutually beneficial exchange, approaching issues on an equal footing, and ensuring alignment with Africa’s needs and priorities as identified by the African Union, African Governments and their peoples, we must step up efforts to achieve concrete sustainable development outcomes, contribute to the stabilization of areas of crisis, fight fundamentalism and address the root causes of irregular migration flows.IV. PROMOTING A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC, MANAGING ENGAGEMENT IN ASIAThe Indo-Pacific region is a key engine for global growth, with more than half of the world’s population.  We reiterate commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, based on the rule of law, which is inclusive, prosperous, secure, grounded on respect for international law, notably the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms, and human rights. We underscore that peace and stability of the region also contributes to prosperity and development of the entire international community. Developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.We reaffirm individual initiatives of the G7 members and welcome those of our partners, such as ASEAN, IORA, Australia, Republic of Korea, India and other South Asian as well as Pacific Island countries, to enhance their engagement in the region. We underscore our commitment to further strengthening our coordination among the G7. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of working together with all regional partners.We reaffirm our thorough support to ASEAN centrality and unity, as well as to initiatives aimed at fostering regional cooperation in line with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.We underscore our commitment to further strengthen our partnership with the Pacific Island countries, by supporting their needs and efforts in the implementation of the Pacific Islands Forum’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. We look forward to the 4th International Conference on Small Island Developing States under the theme “Charting the course towards resilient prosperity” (St. John’s, Antigua and Barbuda 27th-30th May 2024). We will broaden our support to civil society, private sector, and academia’s plans for the promotion of a free and open Indo-Pacific.8. ChinaWe recognize the importance of constructive and stable relations with China.  We reaffirm the need to engage candidly with and express our concerns directly to China. China is a key interlocutor in addressing global challenges, and we stand ready to cooperate with China on areas of common interest.We reaffirm our interest in a balanced and reciprocal collaboration with China aimed at promoting global economic growth, with a view to enabling sustainable and fair economic relations and strengthening the international trading system. Our policy approaches are not designed to harm China, nor do we seek to thwart China’s economic progress and development. However, we are concerned that China’s non-market policies and practices are leading to harmful overcapacity that undermines our workers, industries, and economic resilience. A growing China that plays by international rules would be of global interest. We are not decoupling or turning inwards.We reiterate the importance of ensuring a level playing field and a transparent, predictable, and fair business environment. Respect for the rules-based multilateral trading system based on market principles needs to be the hallmark of our relations, to protect our workers and companies from unfair and non-market policies and practices, including forced technology transfer or illegitimate data disclosure, which distort the global economy and undermine fair competition. We will protect our workers and business communities from unfair practices, including those that lead to overcapacity, create supply chain vulnerabilities and increase exposure to economic coercion, as we recognize that economic resilience requires de-risking and diversification where necessary.We reaffirm the need to uphold the principles of the UN Charter in their entirety.  In this respect, we call on China to press Russia to stop its military aggression. We express our strong concern about transfers to Russia from business in China of dual-use materials and components for weapons and equipment for military production.We are seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas and reiterate our strong opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. We continue to oppose China’s dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia in the South China Sea and its repeated obstruction of countries’ high seas freedom of navigation and we express serious concern about the increasing use of dangerous maneuvers and water cannons against Philippines vessels in this regard. There is no legal basis for China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea, and we oppose China’s militarization, coercive and intimidation activities in the South China Sea. We re-emphasize the universal and unified character of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and reaffirm UNCLOS’s important role in setting out the legal framework that governs all activities in the oceans and the seas. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on July 12, 2016, is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties.We restate the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to security and prosperity for the whole international community and we call for peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. We support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, including in the World Health Assembly and WHO technical meetings, as a member where statehood is not a prerequisite and as an observer or guest where it is. There is no change in the basic position of the G7 members on Taiwan, including stated one China policies.We remain concerned about the human rights situation in China, including in Xinjiang and Tibet. We express our concerns about the deterioration of pluralism and civil and political rights in Hong Kong since the 2020 National Security Law. We reemphasize these concerns following the recent passage of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance under Article 23 of the Basic Law, which will further erode autonomy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong. The new law will make it harder to live, work and do business in Hong Kong and undermine the ability of Hong Kong people to maintain free and open exchanges with the wider world. We reiterate our call on China to uphold its commitments under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, which enshrine rights and freedoms and a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong. Furthermore, we urge China and the Hong Kong authorities to act in accordance with their international commitments and applicable legal obligations.We call on China not to conduct or condone activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of our communities and the integrity of our democratic institutions, and to act in strict accordance with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. We encourage China to uphold its commitments to act responsibly in cyber space.9. North KoreaWe reiterate our strong condemnation of North Korea’s escalatory development of its unlawful weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programmes. We further reiterate our call for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and demand that North Korea abandon all its nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programs, and any other WMD and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. We urge North Korea to return to, and fully comply with, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and IAEA safeguards and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We reiterate that North Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon state in accordance with the NPT. We urge North Korea not to conduct any further nuclear tests. We urge all UN member states to implement all relevant UNSCRs fully and effectively and demand Security Council members to follow through on their commitments. We urge North Korea to cease activities that generate revenue for its unlawful ballistic missile and WMD programmes, including malicious cyber activities.In this context, we condemn in the strongest possible terms the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, including North Korea’s export and Russia’s procurement of North Korean ballistic missiles in violation of UNSC resolutions, as well as Russia’s use of these missiles against Ukraine. We are also deeply concerned about the potential for any transfer of nuclear or ballistic missiles-related technology to North Korea, in violation of the relevant UNSC resolutions. Russia’s veto of the UN Security Council resolution to renew the mandate of the UNSCR 1718 Committee Panel of Experts makes it easier for North Korea to evade the UN sanctions that Russia had previously voted for. We urge Russia and North Korea to immediately cease all such activities and abide by relevant UNSCRs. We reiterate our commitment to counter sanctions evasion and strengthen enforcement. We will increase efforts to maintain the Panel of Experts.We strongly condemn North Korea’s systematic human rights violations and abuses and its choice to prioritize its unlawful weapons development programs over the welfare of the people in North Korea. We call upon North Korea to resolve the abductions issue immediately and to meaningfully engage with the UN human rights system. We take note of the progressive re-opening of North Korea’s borders and call upon North Korea to take this opportunity to re-engage with the international community including through the return of all diplomatic and humanitarian personnel to North Korea.We are disappointed by North Korea’s continued rejection of dialogue and call on North Korea to accept repeated offers of dialogue, in order to enhance regional peace and security.10. MyanmarWe reiterate our strong condemnation of the military coup in Myanmar and reaffirm our support and solidarity with the people of Myanmar in their quest for peace, freedom, and democracy. The continuing attacks by the military destroying civilian infrastructure (including homes, schools, places of worship and hospitals), the repeated and serious violations of human rights and the alarming humanitarian situation &#8211; which particularly affect those in most vulnerable situations, including children, women and members of minority religious and ethnic groups &#8211; are unacceptable. We also condemn the recent implementation of the 2010 conscription law by the military regime. The forced recruitment of young people can only lead to further violence and trigger a massive exodus to neighboring countries.We urge the Myanmar military to immediately cease any violence, release all prisoners arbitrarily detained &#8211; starting from the democratically elected leaders- and establish an inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders, in view of restoring the path towards a meaningful and durable democratic process. We also reiterate our call on the Myanmar military to respect human rights and international humanitarian law, to desist from any form of forced labour and to allow prompt, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to all displaced persons and people in need.We continue to support ASEAN’s efforts to promote a credible and inclusive process to achieve the swift implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. We highlight the importance of a comprehensive implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 2669 (2022) and support the UN’s further engagement in the crisis, including through the leadership of the newly appointed UN Special Envoy on Myanmar and through the designation of a Resident Coordinator in country. Accountability for serious crimes committed in Myanmar remains essential.We reiterate our call on all States to prevent or to cease the flow of arms and other dual-use materiel, including jet fuel, into Myanmar. We stress the need to create conditions for the voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable return of all Rohingya refugees and displaced persons and justice and accountability for atrocities committed against Rohingya and other ethnic communities.V. ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES11. Development Finance and InfrastructureWe reaffirm our commitment to promoting sustainable, resilient, inclusive, and quality infrastructure as a key element for achieving sustainable development by addressing the infrastructure investment gap in low- and middle-income countries. The G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and initiatives such as the EU Global Gateway offer a framework we will use to promote our vision of sustainable and economically viable infrastructure, underpinned by transparent project selection, procurement and finance.We reaffirm our commitment to advancing high standards for quality infrastructure as a means to spur sustainable and inclusive economic development.We intend to work together to accelerate progress towards the commitment to mobilize up to 600 billion USD by 2027 by enhancing the strategic dimension of the Partnership for the Global Infrastructure and Investment  We propose to act in close cooperation with partner countries, multilateral development banks and development finance institutions, including through de-risking, co-financing initiatives and enhanced coordination mechanisms, including at country/regional level, to further promote the development of a pipeline of bankable projects in close cooperation with the private sector, as well as to reinforce project preparation.Infrastructure development should also encompass a wide range of initiatives (i.e. on regulatory frameworks, jobs market, energy access, training and research and health systems) to support partners in order to offer opportunities to the most marginalized and vulnerable and with a view to strengthening social cohesion and inclusion.We will promote a transformative shift towards quality investment, in key areas that drive inclusive and sustainable development and resilience, including food security, climate and clean energy, biodiversity and reducing pollution, connectivity including ICT and transport networks, global supply chain resilience, health and education, and mainstreaming gender equality. We will prioritize efforts to deepen partnerships with Africa and based on the continent’s investment needs, consistent with the goal of accelerating progress towards the SDGs, through concrete deliverables, such as ongoing work along the Lobito Corridor.  Given its global mandate, G7 countries will also continue to deploy investment while bringing forward the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment global strategy in other strategic regions, such as work on the Luzon Economic Corridor.Recognizing the insufficient progress towards the 2030 Agenda and the urgency to address the financing gaps in the context of a growing number of low-income countries and middle-income countries facing higher risk of debt distress and constrained fiscal space to invest in their own development and futures, we will work together with our partners and with international finance institutions to create the conditions to scale up long-term financing for the countries in need.  In that regard, we welcome the launch of infrastructure certification schemes, such as the Blue Dot Network and the Finance to Accelerate the Sustainable Transition Infrastructure initiatives, which aim to mobilize increased private investment in emerging markets. We will strive to enhance the development finance toolkit, to mobilize additional financing from international financial institutions, bilateral partners and the private sector to more effectively reduce poverty and protect the planet.12. Food Security and Nutrition SecurityWe express concern about rising food insecurity and malnutrition stemming from the combined impact of climate change, loss and degradation of ecosystems, the growing number of conflicts, inflationary pressures, and the reduced fiscal space in many developing economies. We are committed to addressing, with partners, the worsening hunger crisis affecting parts of Africa. Strengthening the resilience of agri-food systems is necessary to effectively address food insecurity and malnutrition. That makes internationally coordinated action more urgent than ever. Ensuring food and nutrition security remains a challenge for the international community and affected countries, especially in known hunger hotspots in Africa and beyond, that are vulnerable to climate and conflict-related shocks.We reaffirm our intention to increase investments to build more resilient and sustainable food systems, to help mitigate against future food shocks and diversify food supply chains. To that end, we reaffirm our commitment to contributing to sustainable and resilient food systems transformation, in the spirit of the Roadmap for Global Food Security-Call to Action and the UN Secretary General’s Call to Action for Accelerated Food Systems Transformation, issued at the UN Food Systems Summit +2 held in July 2023 in Rome. We recall the Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security, issued by G7 Leaders and invited countries. We also reaffirm our support for the G20 Matera Declaration on Food Security, Nutrition and Food Systems and the G7 Global Alliance for Food Security. We acknowledge the importance of supporting fertilizer use efficiency and value chains, including local fertilizer production. The G7 is committed to the success of the next Nutrition for Growth Summit in 2025.We also reaffirm our commitment to work with the Rome-based agencies FAO, IFAD and WFP. We recognize the role of the Committee on World Food Security as an inclusive and multi-stakeholder platform to work together on food security and nutrition.In continuity with the UAE Leaders Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action, endorsed at the COP28 by 159 Countries, including all the G7, we will enhance our efforts to address the food security-climate change nexus in a coherent and pragmatic manner, including through initiatives like the Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils (VACS).We stress the need for better coordination of international initiatives and projects aimed at countering food insecurity and malnutrition in order to maximize the delivery and impact of already existing resources. We continue to need innovative financial solutions for food systems, especially involving responsible private investment.13. Economic Resilience and Economic SecurityEconomic resilience and economic security are critical for the proper functioning of the G7 and wider global economies. We will foster cooperation in accordance with the G7 Leaders’ Statement on economic Security issued at Hiroshima last year. To this end, we remain committed to making global supply chains more resilient and reliable especially for critical products and technologies.We will continue to co-ordinate work on de-risking, diversification and reduction of critical dependencies and systemic vulnerabilities, actively engaging the private sector.We emphasize the importance of honoring international norms and obligations to safeguard global economic security and resilience and reaffirm our commitment to building global economic resilience and responding to harmful practices that undermine the rules-based multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core. We will continue working within the G7 and with trusted partners towards resilient supply chains, built in a transparent, diversified, secure, sustainable, trustworthy, and reliable manner.We reiterate our concern about increasing threats to economic security for all global economies, notably economic coercion, and comprehensive strategies that use non-market policies and practices, as well as other practices in the pursuit of market dominance that lead to harmful overcapacity and supply chain concentration, thereby creating vulnerabilities and dependencies. We remain committed to enhancing our coordination and cooperation within the G7, while at the same time engaging other interested international partners about joining our efforts. We will continue work, principally through the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion to improve our assessment, preparedness, deterrence, and response to economic coercion, in accordance with our respective legal systems and in conformity with international law.We acknowledge the key role of semiconductors as a critical part of supply chain resilience and economic security. To that end, we welcome the establishment by the G7 Industry, Technology and Digital Ministers of a semiconductors Point of Contact (PoC) Group dedicated to facilitating information exchange and sharing best practices among G7 members.14. Climate, Energy Security and EnvironmentWe are facing the unprecedented triple global crises of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution that are mutually reinforcing and intrinsically linked, as well as an ongoing global energy crisis, health threats, and environmental damage, including those caused or exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.The international community needs to come together and act decisively, irrespective of geographic or political divides, taking concrete steps collectively to achieve the global target to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and achieve global net zero (CHG) emissions by 2050.To this end, we reaffirm our commitment, and we reiterate the call on all countries to contribute to global efforts to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly, sustainable and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science and to accelerate low and zero-emission technologies.We recognize the primary need to accelerate the transition to net-zero emissions by 2050, while ensuring policies to diversify energy sources and supplies to address potential security risks to energy systems, in a manner consistent with our climate and sustainability goals.We are determined to promote energy efficiency as the “first fuel”, and fast-track clean, safe, and sustainable energy development and deployment, while reducing our dependency on fossil fuels. Moreover, actions must be taken to increase access to electricity and clean cooking as well as to accelerate sustainable, just and inclusive clean energy transitions in emerging and developing countries and to continue efforts to swiftly implement the Just Energy Transition Partnerships.We are determined to promote affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy in Africa. With this objective, under the Italian Presidency we look forward to continuing discussions on how the G7 can concretely advance and contribute to Africa’s industrial advancement and to its sustainable, resilient, and inclusive growth.The connection between climate, environment and energy is critical to making progress towards our climate change and environmental goals while implementing economically sustainable, just, and rapid transitions. Seizing the opportunities presented by innovative technological solutions and the alignment of global financial flows to support the goals of the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework will be critical to ensuring prosperity and environmental sustainability, while simultaneously fostering development and poverty alleviation, especially in developing countries.We underline the G7 role in advancing implementation of the CMA5 global effort to triple renewable energy capacity globally and double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements, globally by 2030, considering national circumstances, and welcome the consensus reached at CMA5 calling on all Parties to contribute to its achievement.We need to play a key role in defining secure, sustainable, and affordable energy systems, ensuring just and inclusive clean energy transitions. We therefore commit to achieving concrete steps forward in strategic areas. Among these, we recognize the key role of renewables, including from sustainable biological origin, nuclear energy for those who opt to use it, including advanced and small modular reactors, energy efficiency, methane emissions reduction in line with the Global Methane Pledge, industrial de-carbonization, most innovative technologies such as renewable and zero-emission hydrogen, and carbon management technologies.  We will pursue secure, resilient, affordable and sustainable supply chains for critical minerals and raw materials, including through the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and MSP Forum, and pursue implementation of the Five Point Plan for Critical Minerals Security adopted by G7 Climate Energy and Environment Ministers. We also underline the opportunities offered by circular economy, including recycling and resource efficiency, as well as innovative technologies. Investing in innovation should also help us in addressing the key topic of reducing GHG emissions in heavy-emitting sectors and promoting the development of a circular economy.Leveraging private sector financing as well as innovative financing mechanisms are important steps to support energy transitions in developing countries, increase resources for adaptation and resilience and enable actions for responding to loss and damage to assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, especially SIDS and LDCs.The transition to a net zero-emissions, sustainable, climate resilient and nature positive, pollution free and circular economy will necessarily need to involve all the members of society, to ensure just and inclusive transitions, leaving no one behind. Women, youth, and Indigenous Peoples s tend to bear the brunt of climate change-related disasters. In this context, we place particular emphasis on need to empower these societal sectors and include them in efforts to address climate change and environmental degradation. We highlight the importance of nature-based solutions in this context. Plastic pollution is a global problem that requires urgent attention. We look forward to an ambitious and effective global agreement to end plastic pollution.Biodiversity loss is an equally serious threat. Climate, biodiversity, and human health are interrelated and interdependent. We recall our commitment to implement the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework fully and swiftly and to achieve each of its goals and targets, which is the landmark plan to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. We also underline the G7 role in advancing implementation of the CMA5 global effort halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.We will work to mobilise nature finance from all relevant sources and to align financial and fiscal flows, as appropriate, including international development assistance, with the GBF. We also call on Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to increase and report nature finance by CBD COP16.  We welcome the Global Stocktake Decision’s recognition of the importance of nature for achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal, including through halting, and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.Given the risk of a global water crisis and continued lack of universal access to water and sanitation, we call for stronger collaboration at multilateral level in line with the UNEA-6 Resolution on Water. We welcome the UN System-wide Strategy on Water and Sanitation and are committed to the implementation of the Water Action Agenda as a key outcome of the UN Water Conference 2023. We also call for prompt appointment of a UN Special Envoy on Water.15. Global HealthGlobal health is a pre-requisite for sustainable development. Building on the lessons learned during the COVID -19 pandemic, we will continue to promote global health, knowing that health emergencies are a global challenge that need a global response.We support a reform of the Global Health Architecture fostering a more coordinated approach, strengthening Pandemic Prevention Preparedness and Response (PPR) including sustainable financing for capacity strengthening and for health emergency response, especially through the Pandemic Fund. We recognize the importance and reiterate our commitment to reaching a successful, equitable outcome of the ongoing negotiations for a new WHO convention, agreement, or other international instrument on pandemic PPR and targeted amendments to the International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR 2005) by May 2024. Completing the negotiations in time is critical to leverage political attention, strengthen future pandemic responses and improve equity.We commit to redouble our efforts to advance universal health coverage, including by supporting countries to restore access to essential health services and reduce mortality rates to be better than pre-pandemic levels by 2025. We also reaffirm our commitment to invest in resilient health systems, primary health care service delivery, and a skilled health workforce &#8211; including through the WHO Academy &#8211; as essential to reclaiming lost ground due to COVID-19 and promoting Universal Health Coverage as essential elements of pandemic preparedness.We acknowledge that climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution are   having a dramatic impact on global health and both noncommunicable and infectious disease threats. We are therefore addressing these challenges in a coherent and strategic manner, through the “One Health” approach that recognizes that the health of people is linked to the health of animals, plants and our shared environment.In this framework, we reaffirm that antimicrobial resistance is a key priority, and we will work closely for a successful upcoming UN High Level Meeting on AMR in September 2024.16. Gender EqualityWe reiterate our commitment to give a new impetus to gender equality. We recall the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the outcome documents of its review conferences and confirm our determination to deliver on the 2030 Agenda relevant Sustainable Development Goals.We reaffirm the G7’s continued global leadership on gender equality and the promotion and protection of the rights of women and girls in all their diversity as well as LGBTQIA+ persons. We express our strong concern over the global rollback of all women’s and girls’ rights, including sexual and reproductive health and rights, and the disproportionate impact of conflict and crisis on them.Gender equality and women’s empowerment is a fundamental pre-requisite to eradicate poverty, to stimulate prosperity and sustainable and inclusive growth, and to build peaceful, just, and inclusive societies.  We recognize that unpaid care and domestic work are major obstacles to the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women and negatively impact women’s economic empowerment by impairing their ability to work full-time or in leadership positions.  We reaffirm the significant value of the World Bank Invest in Childcare initiative and aim by 2035 to support 200 million more women to join the workforce by investing in efforts to close the global childcare gap.We must pursue gender equality as a cross cutting priority to promote and protect the rights of women and girls and members of minority groups, including their ability to exercise their human rights, by ensuring freedom from all forms of discrimination and gender-based violence.  We need to strengthen their economic security and empowerment by increasing and addressing barriers to their participation and building their resilience against the impacts of climate change, including by advancing their access to jobs in green and blue industries critical to our future and the future of our planet. We will promote comprehensive sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR, including at the UN General Assembly and Summit of the Future.Women and girls are disproportionately affected by conflicts and crises which can exacerbate existing gender inequalities and expose women and girls, to heightened risks of violence, exploitation, and discrimination. The involvement of women and girls in all areas related to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts as well as disaster risk reduction is crucial to creating and ensuring sustainable and inclusive peace and address the root causes of conflicts. In line with UNSCR 1325 and subsequent Resolutions on Women Peace and Security (WPS), we underscore the importance of women’s full, equal, and meaningful participation and leadership in all areas of policy decision-making spaces and tangible implementation, and through women’s civil society organizations, non-government partners, and throughout the political, security and development spheres. We remain committed to protecting women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence before, during, and after conflicts, ensuring accountability for perpetrators, and providing support and services to survivors.17. Disaster and Risk ReductionWe reaffirm our commitment to strengthen and accelerate the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the &#8220;Early Warning for All&#8221; Initiative by scaling up international cooperation.We acknowledge the interrelated causes and effects of disasters, particularly climate change-induced disasters, on different aspects, including peace and stability, local, regional, and international security, health, education, gender equality, and vulnerability. We renew our commitment to act ahead of disasters by working across the Humanitarian, Development Peace Nexus. Our aim is to reduce risks, anticipate and prepare for disasters, minimize the impacts of disasters on communities and infrastructure in order not to hamper development progress.We stress the importance of the outcome of COP28 in terms of operationalizing new funding arrangements to respond to loss and damage, including the fund. We welcome the pledges to the fund that have already been made and we encourage further support, to be provided on a voluntary basis and from a wide variety of funding sources. This is part of our wider commitment to assist those developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.19. Global GovernanceWe reiterate the significance of maintaining and strengthening the free and open international order based on the rule of law, respecting the UN Charter, and the paramount importance of international and multilateral cooperation in promoting peace, stability, and prosperity. We share the UN Secretary General’s ambition for inclusive, networked, and effective multilateralism, as outlined in the “Our Common Agenda” Report. We look forward to the UN Summit of the Future as an opportunity to accelerate these efforts, to tackle global challenges and accelerate progress on the SDGs.To restore a sense of common purpose among UN Members States and to make international and multilateral cooperation stronger, more effective, more inclusive, more democratic, more efficient and more transparent, we commit to actively contribute to the Summit of the Future as an opportunity to foster dialogue and to find shared solutions to common problems. Human rights as one of the founding pillars of the UN system will be our common compass throughout the Pact for the Future. We welcome the latest report of the UN Secretary General on human security. We are committed to working with all UN Member States to strengthen the roles of the UNSG as well as the UNGA. We also recommit to the reform of the UNSC.We reaffirm the need for strengthened international financial institutions and underscore the role of multilateral developments banks (MDBs) in the SDGs achievement, including in crisis affected contexts. We support the ongoing efforts for MDBs reform, including the World Bank Group (WBG) evolution roadmap, to better address global challenges. In this respect, we look forward to the WBG and International Monetary Fund annual meetings.We stress the key role of MDBs in addressing global challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and fragility and conflict, which are critical to achieving poverty reduction and sustainable development that is inclusive and resilient.19. Conflict Prevention and Management, Support to UN Peace OperationsWe renew our commitment to strengthening peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts to address increasingly complex and interconnected security challenges. We need to build resilient societies, uphold human rights, support good governance, and invest in people to achieve sustainable peace. We condemn sexual and gender-based violence, especially when related to armed conflict situations.We highly value the role of the UN and support an integrated approach to peacebuilding and peacekeeping. We support the Peacebuilding Commission in its role as a convener of relevant stakeholders and an advisory body to other UN organs and we support the Peacebuilding Fund as a critical tool to help to ensure adequate financing for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.We reaffirm that the UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions are valuable tools to prevent escalation and the recurrence of conflicts and to protect civilians where mandated to do so.We further reaffirm our general support for the UN Secretary General’s ‘’New Agenda for Peace’’, “Action for Peacekeeping” and “Action for Peacekeeping Plus” to reform and strengthen such operations, based on a conflict prevention approach to crises. We will enhance capabilities and work to ensure the safety and security of those deployed, for example through the UN Triangular Partnership Programme.We underscore the importance of strengthening the global implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS), Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) and Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) agendas.20. A Global Resilient Cyberspace, Artificial IntelligenceWe reiterate our commitment to an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure cyberspace. We highly value the role of the Ise-Shima Cyber Group to define common ground.While relying on the leadership of governments and international organizations, we recognize the importance of the multistakeholder model, with the invaluable contribution of the private sector in promoting technological development and of civil society in advancing a common understanding of threats and providing solutions to improve cybersecurity.As the international community is increasingly confronted with disruptive activities carried out through Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems, we reiterate that international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, apply in cyberspace. We call for the full implementation of existing norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace, and we encourage States to deepen their understanding of how international law applies to cyberspace.We condemn malicious cyber activity, and we will continue to work together at the national level and in multilateral fora to increase accountability in cyberspace. We will increase our cooperation against malicious cyber activities, including state-sponsored ones. We are determined to protect our democratic systems and critical infrastructures from malicious cyber threats. We express our concern for the increasing number of ransomware attacks , particularly  targeting hospitals and healthcare facilities, and in this regard we recall relevant norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, which emphasize states’ commitment to not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICT and to respond to appropriate requests to mitigate malicious ICT activity emanating from their territory aimed at  the critical infrastructure of another state.  We welcome significant international initiatives, such as the Counter Ransomware Initiative and the Pall Mall Process, which contribute to increase awareness and improve oversight coordination.We urge countries to enact legislation in line with the provisions of the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe (Budapest Convention) and engage in accession to the treaty. We also urge countries to fully utilize the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime as a tool to combat cybercrime.We call on the international community to be guided by the framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace to reduce risks to international peace and stability and make cyberspace a less contested domain. We underline the importance of confidence building measures, international cooperation, and capacity building. We affirm our support for the “Programme of action to advance responsible State behavior in the use of ICTs in the context of international security”, as the permanent and action-oriented mechanism to hold discussions on cybersecurity at the UN from 2025 onward.We reaffirm the G7 support to Ukraine’s cyber resilience, and we welcome multilateral initiatives aimed at providing assistance, such as the Tallinn Mechanism.We will continue to coordinate and, where possible, unite our efforts to assist countries to improve their capacity to address the multiple challenges of cybersecurity and resilience. Exchanging information on respective national projects may help identify best practices. We will be inspired by a demand driven approach and aim to fully integrate cybersecurity into digital development, as highlighted by the Accra Call for Cyber Resilient Development. To this end, we will continue to cooperate where it is relevant with International Financial Institutions, for instance the World Bank, and the private sector.Malicious cyber activities are disrupting critical services in G7 countries – including hospitals, energy companies and water companies – and costing our economies billions of dollars in disruptions. We commit to taking concrete steps to improve our collective cyber resilience.Considering the key and complementary role played by high-level policy makers and the National Agencies for Cybersecurity in ensuring a safe cyberspace and in fostering international collaboration at a policy and technical level, we also welcome the first meeting at G7 level, scheduled in Rome on 16-17 May, and we look forward to the outcome of their discussions.  We resolve to keep analyzing the multifaceted applications of artificial intelligence and other new and emerging technologies, in such a way as to strike an effective balance between the advantageous uses for people and the need to mitigate the potential negative impacts in certain domains, including cyberspace. With this regard, we acknowledge the importance of advancing our efforts to ensure safe, secure and trustworthy AI, which is human-centric and human rights-based, including through advancing the outcomes of the Hiroshima AI Process, and foster interoperability between AI governance frameworks to support our common vision.As new technologies are defining the future of our societies, we endorse the UN General Assembly resolution “Seizing the Opportunities for Safe, Secure and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence Systems for Sustainable Development” that was adopted by consensus and co-sponsored by 123 countries. We will also endeavor to provide contributions to the Global Digital Compact and  WSIS+20 Review and the UN Pact for the Future, in order to protect an open, free, secure and inclusive Internet for future generations, governed through multi-stakeholder processes, and by protecting the ability  for all to share information and communicate freely and securely, making sure the voices of younger generations, emerging economies and developing countries are properly heard.We recognize the nexus between AI and cybersecurity, and we commit to countering the risks posed to cybersecurity by AI. We also underscore the importance of ensuring the cybersecurity of AI systems and note the publication of the Guidelines for secure AI system development.21. Countering hybrid threats, including foreign information manipulation and interferenceMalign foreign influence operations, including malicious cyber activities, and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), are a growing challenge to democratic societies around the world, threatening to undermine democratic values, human rights, governmental processes, political stability, and international partnerships. These operations aim at misleading and deceiving our citizens, interfering in our democratic processes, destabilizing our governments and democratic institutions, and undermining our shared values, creating, and exploiting cultural and societal frictions, as well as negatively affecting our ability to conduct foreign and security policy. FIMI threatens to destabilize the very fabric of our rules-based international system and is exacerbated by the exploitation of emerging technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI).We are committed to addressing the potential risk of the misuse of new technologies for purposes of disinformation, and the role of AI in FIMI, especially in the context of forthcoming elections.AI has the potential to strengthen democracy by advancing resilience, openness, civic engagement and participation, and access to government services and information. But AI can also be used as a tool to undermine democracy, including through voter suppression, information manipulation and curtailment of civic engagement. We are concerned with the potential for authoritarian states and non-state actors to misuse current and emerging technologies to undermine democracy and confidence in elections and to erode the information environment.FIMI negatively affects the ability of citizens to take rational, informed decisions, which lies at the very heart of our democratic institutions and aims at undermining confidence in democratic governments and societies. Disinformation can be used to polarize society; it often supports violent extremist activities and is fuelled by malicious foreign players. Online disinformation campaigns are being widely used by a range of malign actors to create or exacerbate tensions.State and non-state actors are increasingly adopting hybrid tactics, also through their proxies. In particular, Russia, since beginning its war of aggression against Ukraine, has been augmenting military efforts on the ground with hybrid tactics, including cyberattacks and foreign information manipulation and interference. We condemn the widespread use of FIMI and AI by the Russian Government and its proxies to support its war of aggression against Ukraine and fuel further tensions globally. Building our resolve to promote information resilience, we will enhance coordination to establish a common operating picture and develop coordinated responses to information manipulation. A whole-of-society and whole-of-government effort is required to combat FIMI and foster information integrity.We are committed to protecting our information environment and democratic values against any attempt of foreign manipulation. We commit to championing free and independent media at home and around the world and promote pluralism and freedom of expression. Together we seek to strengthen public resilience to and awareness about FIMI, through education, including digital, media and information literacy initiatives and awareness-raising campaigns, also addressing gendered disinformation.We plan to strengthen our coordinated effort to better prevent, detect, respond to, and mitigate FIMI threats, addressing the impact of hybrid threats at the earliest stage possible. As billions of citizens will cast their ballots globally in 2024, the protection of free and fair elections from foreign interference is a central focus of the G7 Agenda.We also call on tech companies, in particular social media platforms, to intensify their efforts to prevent and counter FIMI campaigns and to reduce the potential abuse of AI technology for this purpose, also by increasing their transparency.Through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) we are strengthening our coordination to identify and respond to diverse and evolving threats to our democracies. We are determined to intensify our efforts, to protect our democratic systems and open societies from foreign information manipulation and interference, including through sharing information and analysis, and identifying opportunities for coordinated response.22. Digital and Transnational RepressionAdvances in surveillance technology, including AI and commercial spyware, can enable foreign governments and their proxies to monitor, track, and target individuals more effectively and invasively. We are committed to countering the misuse of technology to target human rights defenders, journalists, perceived political opponents, and other civil society members.Transnational repression (TNR), which involves reaching across state borders to intimidate, silence, attack, and/or murder dissidents, human rights activists, and others for peacefully exercising their human rights and fundamental freedoms, has a detrimental impact to free speech, freedom of expression and other fundamental freedoms. It is one of the most harmful manifestations of authoritarian governments that aims to export repressive forms of governance extraterritorially.  We strongly condemn the targeting of activists, critics and journalists in this respect.23. Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Outer SpaceWe remain firmly committed to uphold the international non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. We intend to maintain and strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation efforts for a more secure, stable, and safer world and endorse the statement of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors’ Group.We are greatly concerned by Russia’s continuing war of aggression against Ukraine and its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and actions, North Korea’s and Iran’s continued advancement of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. These developments pose serious challenges for international peace and security and require our united resolve in defense of the global disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.Recalling the G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, we reaffirm our commitment to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all, achieved through a realistic, pragmatic, and responsible approach.In this spirit, we remain resolved to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and advance the NPT’s implementation across all three of its mutually reinforcing pillars. We reaffirm the centrality of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear technology.We underline the urgent need to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force and to provide sufficient resources to ensure the continued operation and the long-term sustainability of all elements of the CTBT verification system. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, we call on all states that have not yet done so to declare new or maintain existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. We deeply regret Russia&#8217;s withdrawal of its ratification of the Treaty and we are gravely concerned by Russian statements with respect to nuclear explosive testing. We urge Moscow to continue to adhere to its moratorium on nuclear tests.We call for the immediate commencement of long-overdue negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT)  while urging all states that have not yet done so to declare and maintain voluntary moratoria on the production of such material.We adhere to the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation. We underscore the IAEA&#8217;s crucial role in upholding the international non-proliferation architecture, enhancing nuclear safety and security, and safeguards, and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear technology for the benefit of all Member States. We recall the G7 Leaders’ commitment to evaluate measures to reduce reliance on civil nuclear-related goods from Russia and to assist countries seeking to diversify their supplies. We support Japan’s safe, transparent and science-based process to responsibly manage the discharge of Advanced Liquid Processing System treated water and in proactively coordinating with scientists and partners as well as the IAEA.The G7 is committed to working with all States to further identify and implement measures to minimize the risk of nuclear weapons use and to strengthen arms control. We recall the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States issued on January 3, 2022, on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, and reaffirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. We call on Russia to recommit – in words and deeds – to the principles enshrined in that Statement. We welcome the transparency of G7 nuclear-weapon States in providing data on their nuclear forces and the objective size of their nuclear arsenals. We call on others that have not yet done so to follow suit.We reiterate our deep regret over Russia’s purported suspension of the New START Treaty and we call on Russia to return to its full implementation and to engage with the U.S. on reducing nuclear risks. We are also concerned about China’s ongoing and accelerating expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and development of increasingly sophisticated delivery systems, without transparency – including providing data and objective size of its nuclear arsenal &#8211; or good faith arms control and risk reductions measures. The G7 urges China to engage in concrete strategic risk reduction discussions with the U.S. to promote stability through greater transparency of China’s nuclear weapon policies, plans, and capabilities.We underscore the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education, while encouraging other leaders, youth and others to also visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We recognize the important role that f conventional arms control, confidence-building measures and regional risk reduction have in reducing the risk of armed escalation or miscalculation, improving trust and transparency, and promoting strategic stability between states.Conventional weapons continue to be used for regional coercion, raising international tensions, and in acts of military aggression that have resulted in disproportionate civilian casualties.  This highlights the urgency of implementation agreements and commitments relating to conventional arms control and disarmament that take into account humanitarian factors.Reaffirming our strong commitment to effective multilateral action against the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, we underline the need for the universalization and full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).We will actively seek to advance efforts in the working group on the strengthening of the BTWC to examine and develop concrete measures to enhance the implementation of the Convention.We recognize the high priority of addressing biological threats worldwide as an utmost priority. With rapidly advancing technology and more acute biological risks, it is crucial to ensure that biological research, development, and innovation are conducted in a safe, secure, responsible, transparent, and sustainable manner. Strengthening domestic measures, engaging international organizations, academia, and the private sector remains paramount to promote and establish effective regulatory biosafety and biosecurity measures for the life sciences and global health.We reaffirm the key importance of addressing biosecurity challenges in the African continent, strengthening preparedness, and empowering the African scientific community, involving women and youth. We recognize the important progress made through the Signature Initiative to Mitigate Biological Threats in Africa (SIMBA), a flagship effort pf the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity, national frameworks, surveillance and epidemic intelligence and non-proliferation capacities in Africa.In this overall effort, we will work together across the G7, the G7-led 31-member Global Partnership against the spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the BTWC, the WHO and other appropriate international fora to raise the bar globally on biosafety and biosecurity.We commit to maintaining and updating export controls on materials, technology and research that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including through multilateral export control regimes and in cooperation with all responsible international actors.We reaffirm the key role of the G7 Global Partnership in addressing threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and CBRN materials and supporting vulnerable countries around the world in to build security capacity to better mitigate all manner of CBRN threats. We welcome the launch of the Global Partnership’s new initiative to counter WMD disinformation.Working with partners, we e will continue to assess the risks posed by exports of rapidly advancing dual-use technologies.  Where necessary and according to our respective legal frameworks, we will cooperate and promote efforts to implement export controls to address risks to international security.We celebrate in 2024 the tenth anniversary of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), in which all G7 members participate. The development of realistic processes and technologies by IPNDV will help ensure future agreements contain robust verification provisions.Space-related services, data and activities are increasingly key for the functioning of our economies and the implementation of public policies for the welfare of our citizens. However, we see globally an intensification of threats and the development of capabilities directed at disrupting the peaceful use of space.We reiterate the importance of upholding the existing legal framework for activities in outer space, notably the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty”). We remain committed to fostering international cooperation, transparency, and confidence-building measures to promote responsible behavior with the goal of improving space security for all states. In parallel, we will also remain vigilant and invest in the resilience of space-related services against potentially hostile activities.We affirm the obligation of all States Parties to fully comply with the Outer Space Treaty, including not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.24. Countering terrorism and transnational crimeWe condemn terrorism in all its forms, and we reiterate our determination to protect freedom and security in our societies, upholding democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights &#8211; including the right to be free from arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy &#8211; freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief.Terrorist networks know no borders and countering terrorism requires a strong collective and internationally aligned approach that includes combating the financing of terrorism and terrorist propaganda. We need to recognize and tackle new threats emanating from malign actors’ use of emerging technologies, such as drones and artificial intelligence, while the risk of chemical, biological, and radiological attacks remain a serious threat. The potential use of technologies to counter terrorism and violent extremism must be recognized as well.Countering terrorism needs a holistic approach, aimed also at preventing violent extremism. It is imperative that we prevent radicalization to violence online and offline, in prison as well as in societies, through work with civil society, women-led organizations, local leaders and communities. We should work to promote rehabilitation and reintegration efforts for former terrorists in order to reintegrate them back into society with a reduced risk of recidivism. We intend to step up information sharing and international cooperation, promoting capacity building domestically and with partners, including in border management. All our efforts are based on respect for human rights and the principles of the rule of law.Organized crime is also a major threat to our societies and citizens and also knows no borders. Organized crime can take advantage of the insecurity, instability and conflicts caused by terrorism and it can also be a way that terrorist groups support their activities. Terrorism can leverage organized crime, too. Human trafficking, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, crimes that affect the environment, trafficking of cultural property, money laundering and corruption can find a fertile ground when exploiting war and conflicts. Capacity building in justice and security measures to counter the illicit economy can help to foster inclusive and peaceful societies.We reaffirm our commitment to fight organized crime and its illegal profits, focusing on new risks such as cybercrime. Trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants have become major sources of income for organized crime, together with drug trafficking. We are firmly committed to stop the criminal exploitation of vulnerable peoples, breaking the business model of organized criminal groups.We also reaffirm our commitment to fight against the illicit production and distribution of synthetic drugs including fentanyl. Trafficking of illicit fentanyl and other synthetic drugs props up large, adaptable, and resilient transnational criminal organizations that operate across the globe – with the financial means and capacity to corrupt society, undermine governance, and weaken government institutions around the world.  Together, we reaffirm our commitment to countering the production, distribution, and sale of illicit narcotics; to sharing threat information and engaging in joint investigations and enforcement efforts; to scheduling precursor chemicals and other drugs, in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations and other international entities; to collectively coordinating efforts with key international partners, especially with countries where synthetic drugs  are produced; to participating in multilateral fora, such as the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, that unite countries and key institutions in fighting the scourge of deadly drugs; and to advancing public health interventions and services to those who need it.  Individually and collectively, we will crack down on the global criminal networks that fuel overdose deaths, disrupt the illicit financial mechanisms that support these networks; seize deadly drugs before they enter our communities; and deliver life-saving medication and care. We are ready to work with other governments to tackle these transnational challenges and to support the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.We welcome the valuable input of the G7 Roma-Lyon Group’s work on preventing and combating terrorism and transnational organized crime.25. Fight against CorruptionWe recognize that corruption and related illicit finance and proceeds of crime drain public resources, can often fuel organized crime and undermine democratic governance. Corruption and illicit finance also undermine progress across all the Sustainable Development Goals.We reaffirm the fundamental role that the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and its supporting bodies play in the global fight against corruption. We will strive to further support and enhance the effectiveness of its Implementation Review Mechanism, especially with a view to its next review phase.We also reaffirm our commitment to timely and effective implementation of the FATF standards on transparency of beneficial ownership of legal persons and legal arrangements, underscoring the importance of accountability tools that will deny corrupt actors access to our territories and our financial systems.We also recognize the challenges faced by some developing countries in meeting international standards designed to combat corruption and illicit finance, and we encourage the international financial institutions to coordinate and increase their efforts to support countries in their efforts across their operations, particularly in fragile and conflict affected countries.26. Threats to maritime securityWe reiterate our commitment to promoting a cooperative system of international governance for the ocean and seas and to maintaining the rules-based maritime order based on international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms and human rights. In this context, we recognize the importance of the role of international courts and tribunals including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.We firmly reiterate our condemnation for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, terrorism and transnational organized crime in the maritime domain, trafficking of human beings, smuggling of migrants, trafficking of weapons and narcotics, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and other illegal maritime activities. We reaffirm the importance of national and regional ownership in pursuing the fight against illegal activities at sea.V1.  TACKLING REGIONAL ISSUES27. Western BalkansWe reaffirm our shared commitment to the security, economic prosperity, and European perspective of the six Western Balkans countries as a crucial investment for peace and stability. We emphasize the importance of advancing the necessary internal reforms, particularly on rule of law, including tackling organized crime, illicit finance, and corruption.We fully support further progress on regional cooperation and integration, including by implementing the Common Regional Market, and we encourage local political elites to make decisive progress on regional reconciliation. To this aim, we call on Kosovo and Serbia to implement without further delay the Agreement on the Path to Normalization and its Implementation Annex adopted in 2023. We urge both sides to engage constructively in the framework of the EU-facilitated dialogue, refraining from provocations, inflammatory rhetoric, and uncoordinated actions.We firmly reject any attempt from internal or external actors to undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity and multiethnic character of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We fully support the executive mandate of the EUFOR ALTHEA operation to support the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina in maintaining a safe and secure environment in the country.We urge all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina to put aside divisive and inflammatory rhetoric, to avoid any act that could destabilize the country and to focus on internal reforms that would move the country closer to realizing its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.We welcome the European Council’s decision in March 2024 to open negotiations for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession to the European Union.  We support the mandate of High Representative Christian Schmidt.28. South CaucasusWe urge Armenia and Azerbaijan to remain fully committed to the peace process to achieve a dignified and durable peace based on the principles of non-use of force, respect for sovereignty, the inviolability of borders, and territorial integrity. We recall the Joint Statement issued by the sides on December 7th, 2023, and encourage them to uphold that spirit of cooperation in their future interactions. Further escalation would be unacceptable.We call on Azerbaijan to fully comply with its obligations under international humanitarian law and encourage appropriate steps to ensure the safe, dignified, and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons wishing to come back to their homes.The G7 and its members are ready to facilitate further constructive contacts at all levels, notably within the established negotiating frameworks provided by the EU and the USA, whose enduring efforts we commend.We reiterate the importance of the commitment to the Alma Ata 1991 Declaration through which Armenia and Azerbaijan recognize each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. We encourage greater regional cooperation and the re-opening of all borders, including the border between Armenia and Türkiye.29. Central Asian countriesWe remain resolved to support the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and the right of self-determination of the Central Asian countries.We are committed to enhancing our cooperation with the Central Asian countries to tackle regional challenges, including the consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the enduring impact of the situation in Afghanistan, the regional terrorist threat, as well as managing water resources and climate change and promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms.We encourage the further strengthening of regional cooperation, especially in the field of connectivity and infrastructure, including the Middle Corridor, to improve ease of trade between the Central Asian countries, bolster global supply chains, foster trade, forge investment and energy links, provide economic diversification and enhance resilience, while upholding labor rights and environmental protection.We will continue to support the implementation of the socio-economic and political reforms announced in the Central Asian countries. Throughout the region, we support the expansion of civic and political participation, the strengthening of the rule of law, and the safeguarding of human rights.30. AfghanistanWe remain committed to supporting the people of Afghanistan. We condemn the continued and systemic abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Taliban, notably of the political, economic and social rights of women and girls, as well as the rights of members of ethnic and religious minorities. We deeply regret that the Taliban has taken no serious step to initiate an inclusive political process with fellow Afghans regarding the future of the country. Peace and stability in Afghanistan will require the establishment of an inclusive and representative political process which allows Afghanistan to fulfill its international obligations and includes full, equal, safe, and meaningful participation of Afghan women, upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms.We intend to remain vigilant against the risk of Afghanistan serving as a base for hosting or exporting terrorism to other countries.The safe and secure departure of all Afghans wishing to leave the country must be guaranteed, as well as humanitarian access and the possibility to effectively provide humanitarian aid.We support the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan.We are committed to the swift appointment of a UN Special Envoy in line with the recommendations of the UN’s Independent Assessment and as mandated by Security Council Resolution 2721.VII. COOPERATION WITH LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEANStronger cooperation with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean is of paramount importance as we have common values and shared interests. We commit to further partner with the Region to address global challenges, including by protecting the international system based on international cooperation and international law, tackling natural disasters and climate change, countering transnational organized crime, and promoting trade and investments aimed at improving socio-economic resilience.31. HaitiWe express our solidarity to the Haitian population, which is suffering from unprecedented levels of gang violence. We reiterate our support to the ongoing international efforts aimed at strengthening public institutions and law enforcement, as well as combating criminal gangs, whose illegal activities have led to a marked deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation of the country.We encourage the international community to scale up its humanitarian support to the Haitian population. We note the urgent need to protect women and children in Haiti, who are suffering disproportionately from the recent and rapid escalation in violence.We welcome UNSCR 2699, authorizing the deployment of a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, in close cooperation and coordination with the Government of Haiti, to support the efforts of the Haitian National Police to re-establish security in Haiti and build security conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections. We commend the Government of Kenya for its readiness to lead the mission. Every effort should be made to expeditiously provide robust financial support to the mission so that it may deploy as soon as possible.  The people of Haiti cannot wait.We also welcome UNSCR 2700, which renews the sanctions regime for Haiti for an additional year. The sanctions regime promotes accountability by extending the territorial arms embargo and ability to sanction individuals and entities who are responsible for, or complicit in, actions that threaten the peace and security in Haiti.We commend the outcome of the CARICOM Summit held in Kingston, Jamaica, on March 11 and the commitment taken by Haitian stakeholders to implement an inclusive transitional governance arrangement.We support the ongoing efforts of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti and call on the political actors to bridge their differences and commit in a forward-looking, transparent, and fair national dialogue, which is essential to stabilize the Country.We reiterate the importance that the process to find lasting solutions to the ongoing security and humanitarian crisis be Haitian-led and owned.32. NicaraguaWe call on the Nicaraguan government to end its human rights violations as well as widespread repression and related violations and abuses against civil society, Indigenous Peoples, academics, students, the independent press, and political and religious actors.We urge authorities to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners and abide by their international obligations. We condemn the closure of CSOs and the systematic attacks on religious institutions and organizations, including the Catholic Church and its ministers, many of whom have been arrested and then sent into exile, along with hundreds of political actors and civil society members – and moved to strip them of their citizenship.  We call on the Government to restore their citizenship under international conventions.We further call on the Nicaraguan Government to hold free and fair elections, allowing the members of the opposition to exercise their rights to the freedom of assembly, and to free speech.33. VenezuelaWe are deeply concerned about the ongoing political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. We call on Venezuela to swiftly implement the Barbados Agreements of October 2023, with particular regard to electoral guarantees, and the deployment of international electoral observations missions in order to ensure free and fair elections.We are deeply worried by the recent decisions to prevent members of the opposition from exercising their core political rights and the continued detention and harassment of opposition members. We call for the immediate release of political prisoners still detained.We follow closely developments between Venezuela and Guyana over the Essequibo region and we demand Venezuela to refrain from destabilizing initiatives. The matter must be resolved in line with international law.
- Somalia HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Somalia				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																											i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Somalia during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of:  arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners or detainees; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious abuses in a conflict, including reportedly unlawful or widespread civilian deaths or harm, enforced disappearances or abductions, torture, physical abuses, and conflict-related punishment; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflict by the government and nonstate groups; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, and the enforcement of criminal libel laws to limit expression; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic or intimate partner violence, sexual violence, female genital mutilation/cutting, and other forms of such violence; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting members of ethnic minority groups; laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, although information regarding their enforcement was unclear; and existence of the worst forms of child labor.The government took credible steps to identify and punish some officials who may have committed human rights abuses, but impunity generally remained the norm.Conflict involving the government, militias, and al-Shabaab resulted in death, injury, and displacement of civilians.  Al-Shabaab committed most of the severe human rights abuses, particularly terrorist attacks on civilians and targeted killings, including summary executions and religiously and politically motivated killings; enforced disappearances; physical abuses and other inhuman treatment; rape; and attacks on employees of nongovernmental organizations and the United Nations.  Al-Shabaab also blocked humanitarian assistance, recruited or used child soldiers, and restricted freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, and movement.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were numerous reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year.  While reliable data were difficult to collect, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) reported state security personnel killed 61 civilians between February and October.  According to media reports, federal government soldiers killed 14 civilians during daily security-related activities between August and October alone.  The civilian casualties included two taxi drivers, two women bystanders, and three demonstrators.  Nine perpetrators were arrested, prosecuted, and sentenced.In the self-declared breakaway region of Somaliland, fighting in Las Anod between government troops and clan militias resulted in numerous civilian deaths.Al-Shabaab and clan militias carried out indiscriminate deadly attacks and, in some cases, targeted killings of civilians.  While al-Shabaab and clan militias were the primary perpetrators, extrajudicial killings of civilians by state security forces and to a much lesser extent by African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) forces also occurred.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of federal authorities.There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of Somaliland authorities.Al-Shabaab abducted persons, including humanitarian workers.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The law prohibited such practices, but there were credible reports that government officials employed them.National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) agents routinely conducted mass security sweeps against al-Shabaab and terrorist cells, as well as against criminal groups.  Observers alleged that authorities held detainees for prolonged periods without following due process and mistreated suspects during interrogations.  Government security forces, including NISA and the Puntland Intelligence Agency, reportedly threatened, beat, and forced detainees to confess to crimes.  There were reports of rape and sexual abuse by government agents.Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment at the hands of clan militias, some of which were affiliated with the government, remained frequent.  Al-Shabaab imposed harsh treatment and punishment on persons in areas under its control.A strong and widespread culture of impunity was present in state security forces and militias, due mainly to clan protection of perpetrators and weak government capacity and will to hold the guilty to account.  While some military and police personnel accused of abuses were arrested and prosecuted, not all faced charges or were punished.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Except for newly built facilities, several of which remained unopened, prison conditions in most areas of the country remained harsh and life threatening.  Gross overcrowding, poor sanitation and hygiene, inadequate food and water, and lack of medical care were common, and disease outbreaks in crowded prisons could be life threatening.Abusive Physical Conditions:  Life-threatening outbreaks of diseases such as tuberculosis and cholera occurred, particularly in overcrowded prisons such as the Mogadishu Central Prison.  Authorities generally required the families of inmates to pay for health services, and inmates without family or clan support had very limited access to such services.  Human rights advocates in Puntland expressed serious concerns regarding conditions in Garowe Prison, where inmates experienced water, food, and electricity shortages.Al-Shabaab detained persons in areas under its influence in the southern and central regions, and conditions were often harsh and life threatening.Administration:  Federal law did not specifically allow prisoners to submit complaints to judicial authorities without censorship.  The Attorney General’s Office, the Human Rights Committee, and the Prison Commander were required to conduct investigations of credible allegations of mistreatment, but authorities arbitrarily abided by this requirement and investigations varied throughout the country.  Most prisons did not have ombudspersons.  The number of credible complaints investigated annually by the government was unknown.Somaliland law allowed prisoners to submit complaints to judicial authorities without censorship, and prisoners reportedly submitted such complaints.Independent Monitoring:  Federal authorities worked with international humanitarian and monitoring groups, and allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross, UNICEF, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to conduct joint inspections of prisons.  International Development Law Organization personnel also visited prisons in Mogadishu.  Independent monitors did not report any improvements to address allegations of mistreatment or to improve prison or detention center conditions.Somaliland authorities reportedly did not permit independent nongovernmental organization (NGO) observers to monitor prisons during the year.Geographic inaccessibility and insecurity impeded such monitoring in territory controlled by al-Shabaab and in remote areas where traditional authorities controlled detention facilities.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										Although the provisional federal constitution prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention, state security forces, allied militias, and regional authorities arbitrarily arrested and detained persons.  The law provided for the right of persons to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court, but only politicians and some businesspersons could exercise this right effectively.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The provisional federal constitution provided for arrested persons to be brought before judicial authorities within 48 hours.  The law stated suspects could be detained only when necessary and for as short a period possible.  The decision to detain a person prior to trial and the length of pretrial detention could be challenged in court.  A March law granted NISA the ability to detain and interrogate terrorism suspects.To apprehend suspects, the law required warrants be issued by authorized officials and based on sufficient evidence unless suspects were observed committing a criminal offense.  The law also required that arrestees receive prompt notification of the charges against them and judicial determinations, prompt access to a lawyer and family members, and other legal protections.  Adherence to these safeguards was rare.  Transportation to court facilities while awaiting trial was limited, as was information on the ability of defendants to access legal counsel while in pretrial detention.The federal government reportedly made arrests without warrants and arbitrarily detained individuals.  The government sometimes kept high-profile prisoners associated with al-Shabaab in safe houses before officially charging them.  The law provided for bail, although citizens were rarely aware of this right, authorities did not always respect this provision, and judicial personnel lacked adequate training in criminal procedures to administer bail provisions.  In some cases, security force members, judicial officers, politicians, and clan elders used their influence to have favored detainees released.Arbitrary Arrest:  Federal and regional authorities arbitrarily arrested and detained numerous persons, including persons accused of terrorism and either supporting or opposing al-Shabaab.  Authorities frequently used allegations of al-Shabaab affiliation to justify arbitrary arrests.Media NGOs including the National Union of Somali Journalists and the Somali Journalists Syndicate (SJS), a network of seven journalist unions and media house associations, noted a marked increase in arbitrary arrests and detentions of journalists across the country, and documented 84 such cases.  Between June and October, UNSOM recorded arbitrary detention of eight journalists in Mogadishu, Jubaland, and Hargeisa.  Media NGOs attributed the trend to security measures to counter al-Shabaab propaganda.There were numerous abuses like the following example.  On August 17 authorities arrested Mohamed Ibrahim Bulbul, a journalist with a privately owned online broadcaster and known media freedom advocate.  Bulbul was reportedly beaten and threatened over his August 16 report alleging police officers were involved in an embezzlement scheme.  He was held for a month without charges and released after 56 days of detention when a judge dismissed the case against him.Somaliland’s government used arbitrary detention and arrest to suppress negative reporting by journalists as well as demonstrations of political expression by residents, particularly regarding unification with Somalia and territorial disputes with Puntland.Pretrial Detention:  Lengthy pretrial detention was a common problem.  Although the law established strict time limits for pretrial custody, it was generally not observed.  Large numbers of detainees, a shortage of judges and court administrators, and judicial inefficiency resulted in trial delays.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The law provided for an independent judiciary, but the government did not always respect judicial independence and impartiality.  The civilian judicial system remained dysfunctional and unevenly developed, particularly outside of urban areas.  Some local courts depended on the dominant local clan and associated factions for their authority.  The judiciary was reportedly subject to influence and corruption and was strongly influenced by clan-based politics.  Authorities often did not respect court orders or were unable to enforce the orders.  Without clear procedures for the transfer of cases from military to civilian courts, authorities prosecuted only a handful of serious criminal cases.  Civilian judges lacked the necessary security to perform their jobs without fear.In Somaliland, functional courts existed, although there was a serious shortage of trained judges, as well as limited legal documentation upon which to build judicial precedent and prosecute widespread allegations of corruption.  There was reportedly widespread interference in the judicial process, and government officials regularly intervened to influence cases, particularly those involving journalists.  International NGOs reported local officials interfered in legal matters and invoked the public order law to detain and incarcerate persons without trial.Traditional clan elders mediated conflicts throughout the country.  Clans frequently applied traditional justice practices, and judgments sometimes held entire clans or subclans responsible for alleged abuses by individuals.																Trial Procedures						The law provided for the right to a fair and public trial, but the lack of an independent functioning judiciary meant this right was often not enforced.  According to the law, individuals had the right to a presumption of innocence.  They also had the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges against them in a language they understood, although the law was unclear on whether the right to translation applied through all appeals.  Detainees had the right to be brought before a competent court within 48 hours of arrest, to communicate with an attorney of their choice (or have one provided at public expense if indigent), and to not be compelled to incriminate themselves.  Authorities did not respect most of these rights.  Clan politics and corruption often impeded access to a fair trial.  The law did not address confronting witnesses, the right to appeal a court’s ruling, the provision of sufficient time and facilities to prepare a defense, or the right to present one’s own evidence and witnesses.  Free legal representation for defendants facing serious criminal charges was often not available in South Central regions, but two functioning legal aid clinics at Mogadishu University and City University Law School provided some legal services.Cases involving security personnel were heard by military courts.  Military courts tried some civilians, primarily those accused of terrorism offenses.  Defendants in military courts rarely had legal representation or the right to appeal.  Authorities sometimes executed those sentenced to death within days of the court’s verdict, particularly in cases where defendants confessed to membership in al-Shabaab in court or in televised videos.  In other cases, the courts offered defendants up to 30 days to appeal death penalty judgments.  Some government officials continued to claim that a 2011 state of emergency decree gave military courts jurisdiction over crimes, including those committed by civilians, in areas from which al-Shabaab had withdrawn.  There was no clear indication whether this decree remained in effect, although the initial decree was for a period of three months and never formally extended.In Somaliland, the government did not always inform defendants promptly and in detail of the charges against them and did not always provide access to government-held evidence.  The government did not provide defendants with dedicated facilities to prepare a defense.There was no functioning formal judicial system in al-Shabaab-influenced areas, and al-Shabaab enforced a strict form of sharia that imposed steep penalties, including death, for certain offenses.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						Government and regional authorities arrested journalists as well as other persons critical of authorities, including high-profile political figures.  Neither government nor NGO sources provided an estimate of the number of political prisoners.  The government generally did not provide humanitarian organizations with access to political prisoners.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Observers reported some federal and state officials abused their positions to engage in land grabbing and forced evictions, primarily involving the property of internally displaced person (IDP) returnees, without due process.  Those driven from their homes were often too politically and socially disempowered to resist or obtain restitution.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										According to the provisional federal constitution, “every person has the right to own, use, enjoy, sell, and transfer property,” and the private home was inviolable.  Nonetheless, authorities reportedly searched property without warrants.Government and regional authorities harassed relatives of al-Shabaab members.																																				i. Conflict-related Abuses										Conflict involving the government, militias, ATMIS, and al-Shabaab resulted in death, injury, and displacement of civilians.  Other abuses included abductions, torture, recruitment or use of children in armed groups, and denial of access to humanitarian assistance.In the self-declared breakaway region of Somaliland, the late 2022 killing of an opposition political leader sparked months-long fighting between Somaliland troops and tribal militias near Las Anod, resulting in numerous civilian deaths, injuries, and population displacement.Killings:  UNSOM reported 312 civilians were killed by al-Shabaab between February and October.  The group committed religiously and politically motivated killings that targeted civilians affiliated with the government and attacked humanitarian NGO employees, UN staff, and diplomatic missions.  The group attacked soft targets such as popular hotels in Mogadishu and other cities, often using suicide bombers, mortars, and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices to kill noncombatants.  Al-Shabaab also killed prominent peace activists, community leaders, clan elders, electoral delegates, and their family members for their roles in peace building, in addition to beheading persons accused of spying for and collaborating with state security forces and allied militias.According to media, in May the group publicly executed five individuals, including Mohamed Ibrahim Olow, in Bu’aale following accusations they were spying for the United States, the federal government, or the Jubaland state.  In August, the group killed a federal army colonel, Ali Abdi Mohamed “Qoriyow,” and Hassan Mohamed Ibrahim, a police officer in Mogadishu.  Most killings of civilians attributed to al-Shabaab resulted from indiscriminate use of force.  The number of civilian causalities from incidents involving the group’s explosive weaponry increased greatly compared with the previous year.According to Amnesty International, Somaliland security forces indiscriminately shelled Las Anod town over a period of several months, killing more than 100 persons and injuring more than 600, including dozens of civilians.In February an ATMIS peacekeeper killed a civilian suspected of being an al-Shabaab affiliated suicide bomber.  The peacekeeper was arrested, and an investigation was continuing at year’s end.Abductions:  Al-Shabaab kidnapped and abducted civilians throughout the year.  For example, media reported the group kidnapped 20 civilian farmers from Beerhaano and Dhoqor villages near Beletweyne district on January 2.Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture:  Government forces and allied militias reportedly used excessive force, including torture.Al-Shabaab committed gender-based violence, including through forced marriages, and meted out punishment according to the group’s interpretation of Islamic law.  Those detained by al-Shabaab were incarcerated under inhuman conditions for relatively minor offenses such as smoking, having illicit content on cell phones, listening to music, watching or playing soccer, wearing a brassiere, or not wearing a hijab.From January to September, ATMIS reported three incidents in which their troops were responsible for the bodily harm of a civilian or damage to property.  While some cases resulted in financial compensation to the civilians involved, others were still pending further review at year’s end.Child Soldiers:  During the year there were reports state security forces and allied militias, as well as al-Shabaab, unlawfully recruited and used child soldiers.The Ministry of Defense Child Protection Unit (CPU) led federal government efforts to address the recruitment and use of child soldiers within government armed forces.  Between January and March, the CPU screened several hundred army personnel and identified no soldier younger than age 18.  The CPU also provided training to raise awareness of unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers and to verify the number of children in security sector units for corrective action.  The CPU used biometric registration to detect and deter unlawful recruitment of child soldiers.  In the absence of birth registration systems, it was often difficult to determine the age of national security force recruits.Al-Shabaab recruited and forced children to participate directly in hostilities, including suicide attacks.  According to UN officials, al-Shabaab committed most abuses related to the recruitment and use of child soldiers.Al-Shabaab raided schools, madrassas, and mosques and harassed or coerced clan elders and family members to recruit and use children in direct combat and support roles.  Children in al-Shabaab training camps were subjected to grueling physical training, weapons training, an inadequate diet, physical punishment, and forced religious training in line with al-Shabaab’s ideology.  The training reportedly also included forcing children to punish and sometimes execute other children.  The group used children in direct hostilities, including placing them in front of other fighters to serve as human shields and suicide bombers, and to plant roadside bombs and other explosive devices.  In addition, al-Shabaab used children in support roles, such as carrying ammunition, water, and food; removing injured and dead militants; gathering intelligence; and serving as guards.  Media frequently reported accounts of al-Shabaab indoctrinating children according to the group’s extremist ideology at schools and forcibly recruiting them into its ranks.The Secretary of State determined Somalia had governmental armed forces, police, or other security forces that recruited or used child soldiers during the reporting period of April 2022 to March 2023.  See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.Other Conflict-related Abuse:  Denial of humanitarian access by armed groups, state security forces, or security incidents was common.  Armed groups deliberately restricted the passage of relief supplies and other items, as well as access by humanitarian organizations, particularly in the southern and central regions.  Humanitarian workers regularly faced access obstacles due to insecurity, generalized violence, and restrictions imposed by parties to conflicts.In Somaliland, Amnesty International reported fighting in the Las Anod area displaced approximately 200,000 persons.  In July, the NGO Doctors Without Borders withdrew support to health-care facilities in Las Anod town due to shelling by Somaliland forces.Al-Shabaab attacked state security forces along main supply routes, increasing insecurity along these routes and impairing delivery of humanitarian supplies.  The group seized main supply routes and limited movement of food and commodities trucks, which led to increased prices for consumers.  Al-Shabaab blockaded a critical road linking Mogadishu and Baidoa for 10 days in July, preventing the movement of basic commodities including food and fuel.  The blockade limited the delivery of humanitarian assistance to an estimated 600,000 IDPs residing in Baidoa.ISIS-Somalia reportedly targeted business leaders for extortion in urban areas and used violence when they did not meet extortion demands.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The law provided for freedom of expression, including for the press and other media.  Both federal and regional authorities, however, disregarded or failed to uphold this right.  The law included a provision criminalizing the dissemination of “false news,” a term left undefined, that carried potential penalties such as six months’ imprisonment.In Somaliland, regulations prohibited the publication or circulation of news deemed exaggerated or incitive and having the potential to disrupt public order.  Authorities used these regulations to detain and press charges against journalists.Freedom of Expression:  In regions under government control, individuals faced the possibility of retaliation when they criticized government authorities or raised concerns regarding perceived instances of official corruption or alleged incompetence of security officials.  Retaliation incidents were reported in different regions including Mogadishu, Puntland, Jubaland, and Somaliland.  In Somaliland, local media rights organizations reported multiple incidents in which residents were arrested for social media posts criticizing government institutions, services, and corruption.Violence and Harassment:  Domestic media NGOs reported regular harassment of journalists by state security forces, clan and other private groups, and al-Shabaab.  Government agents, government-aligned militias, authorities in Somaliland, Puntland, South West State, Galmudug, and Jubaland, al-Shabaab, and unknown assailants killed, abused, and harassed journalists with impunity.As an intimidation tactic, 15 journalists were detained briefly, without official charges brought against them, and later released.  Six of these arrests took place in Galmudug, five in South West State, and four in Hirshabelle.Media NGOs such as SJS and the National Union of Somali Journalists reported that arbitrary imprisonment, intimidation, constraints, and impediments to information accessibility increased throughout the year.  There was a notable rise in assaults on journalists by federal and regional authorities following their reporting on the conflict between government forces and al-Shabaab in different parts of the country.In October 2022, NISA officers attacked television reporter Liban Abdi Warsame and camera operator Najib Farah Mohamed from Goobjoog media while they conducted interviews in Mogadishu.  In December 2022, security forces assaulted journalist Nur Mohamed while he covered a segment on parliament.The highest number of incidents took place in Somaliland, according to media NGOs.  Authorities fined and arbitrarily arrested journalists for defamation and other alleged crimes.  Penalties included prison terms ranging from a few days to several months, as well as fines.  Journalists were intimidated and imprisoned for conducting investigations into corruption or topics deemed sensitive such as clan meetings.  In May, the Human Rights Center in Somaliland reported the arrest of five journalists related to their reporting or social media posts.  As of year’s end, the journalists were not formally charged.Al-Shabaab also engaged in violence and harassment of journalists and banned journalists from reporting news that did not comport with the group’s ideology.  Numerous journalists were killed or injured in al-Shabaab’s indiscriminate attacks.  For example, in October journalist Abdifatah Moalim Nur was killed in a suicide blast at a restaurant in Mogadishu.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media:  Journalists engaged in rigorous self-censorship to avoid reprisals.  Radio Barawe in Lower Shabelle region, an outlet shut down by government authorities due to its broadcasts in a local dialect in 2020, continued to face censorship and harassment.  Since late 2022, seven media outlets were subjected to raids and forced closure due to their critical coverage.According to the SJS, police commanders, judges, government officials, clan leaders, and individuals affiliated with al-Shabaab restricted the access of media outlets and journalists to information in Mogadishu, Hirshabelle, Galmudug, South West, and Jubaland, resulting in self-censorship.In Somaliland, authorities employed stringent measures to curtail access to information.  These measures included internet disruptions and temporary closures of media establishments.Al-Shabaab prohibited persons in areas under its control from listening to international media outlets.  The group’s destruction of critical infrastructure, including radio towers, while its forces were in retreat limited community access to information.Libel/Slander Laws:  Laws providing criminal penalties for publication of “false news” existed throughout the country, including Somaliland.  On September 7, Somaliland’s information minister temporarily halted the operations of CBA TV’s headquarters in Hargeisa.  Invoking the provisions of the region’s media legislation, the minister accused the station of “disseminating news and content that opposed the peace and unity of the Somaliland population” along with asserting that the station’s license had expired.  CBA TV management contested both accusations in an official statement.  After the station paid $10,000 in fines, the ministry allowed it to continue operations.The law criminalized blasphemy and defamation of Islam, with punishments including fines, up to two years in prison, or both.  In October 2022, Hoodo Abdi Abdillahi received a seven-year prison sentence on blasphemy charges related to her alleged conversion from Islam to Christianity, although her sentence was shortened to five years in May.National Security:  Federal and regional authorities frequently cited national security concerns to suppress media and other criticism and to prevent press coverage of opposition political figures.  On August 20, the communications and technology minister ordered access to TikTok, Telegram, and the gambling site 1xBet be prohibited, citing national security and the fight against terrorism as justification.Nongovernmental Impact:  Clan militias, criminal organizations, and terrorist groups, foremost among them al-Shabaab, actively sought to inhibit freedom of expression, including for members of the press, when it suited their interests.																Internet Freedom						Authorities restricted access to the internet.  Media NGOs expressed apprehension regarding the growing government utilization of Facebook reporting mechanisms, such as respect for “community standards,” as tactics to stifle and censor journalists online.  According to the SJS, journalists who disseminated online content critical of authorities were targeted for retaliation by government agents.  The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunication issued directives to internet service providers, resulting in the suspension or blocking of dozens of online sites.Al-Shabaab prohibited companies from providing access to the internet and forced telecommunications companies to shut down data services in areas under its control.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The law provided for freedom of peaceful assembly and association, but the government limited these freedoms.  A general lack of security effectively limited the ability to exercise these rights as well.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						In Somaliland, the use of force by security personnel against peaceful protests led to loss of lives and destruction of property.  In December 2022, Somaliland security forces used excessive force to disperse peaceful gatherings in Las Anod to protest the killing of a prominent opposition party figure.  The crackdown led to skirmishes that spread within the Sool region, resulting in full-blown armed clashes that continued during the year.Al-Shabaab did not allow any gatherings without its prior consent.						Freedom of Association						The law provided for freedom of association, but government officials reportedly harassed NGO workers.  There were also reports that regional authorities restricted freedom of association.Al-Shabaab did not allow most international NGOs to operate in areas it controlled.  Persons in the southern and central regions outside of al-Shabaab-controlled areas were able to join civil society organizations focused on a wide range of problems.In addition to security and safety concerns, humanitarian organizations faced significant interference from federal and state authorities who attempted to impose taxation and registration requirements, as well as control over contracting, procurement, and staffing.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided that all persons lawfully residing in the country had the right to freedom of movement, to choose their residence, and to leave the country.  Freedom of movement, however, was restricted in some areas, particularly in Somaliland.In-country Movement:  Checkpoints operated by government forces, allied groups, armed militias, clan factions, and al-Shabaab inhibited movement and exposed citizens to looting, extortion, harassment, and violence.  Roadblocks manned by armed actors and attacks on humanitarian personnel severely restricted movement and the delivery of aid in the southern and central regions.Somaliland prohibited federal officials, including those of Somaliland origin who purported to represent Hargeisa’s interests in Mogadishu, from entering Somaliland.  It also prevented its residents from traveling to Mogadishu to participate in federal government processes or cultural activities.  Access to such information was limited, making it difficult to accurately evaluate the scope of this problem.Al-Shabaab and other nonstate armed actors hindered commercial activities in the areas they controlled and impeded the delivery of humanitarian assistance.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										Federal government and Somaliland authorities cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern.Access to Asylum:  The law recognized the right to asylum; however, the federal government had no legal framework or system to provide protection to refugees on a consistent basis.  Authorities granted prima facie status to Yemenis, while most other nationalities underwent individual refugee status determination procedures.  Bureaucratic delays caused backlogs in the process.Employment:  There were credible reports the government placed restrictions on refugees’ ability to work after their status as refugees was official.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										A drought caused by five sequential failed rainy seasons, extreme flooding once rains started, and continued conflict led to an increase in internal displacement, and the country was home to more than 3.8 million IDPs.  Approximately 60 percent of drought-related IDPs were children.  Acute food insecurity and malnutrition levels remained higher among IDPs than among nondisplaced residents.  Citizens who returned from refugee camps abroad often moved to IDP camps and required humanitarian assistance.Forced IDP evictions remained a particular concern in view of the sharp increase in displacement.  In 2022, more than 125,900 persons were evicted across the country, and significant increases in forced evictions and secondary displacements were expected due to the continued influx of IDPs in search of humanitarian services and continued land tenure insecurity.  Forced evictions often resulted in the complete destruction of critical livelihood assets, severely impacting the resilience of the most vulnerable and often marginalized persons and perpetuating their social marginalization.  Urban IDPs almost always settled on privately owned land, where they were subjected to extortion and cycles of secondary forced displacement as they relied mainly on informal oral tenancy agreements.  Private persons with claims to land, as well as government authorities, regularly pursued the forced eviction of IDPs in Mogadishu.Increased reports of gender-based violence accompanied increased displacement, including reports of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by various armed groups and state security personnel.  Women and children living in IDP settlements were particularly vulnerable to rape by armed men, including government soldiers and militia members.  Gatekeepers in control of some IDP camps reportedly forced girls and women to provide sex in exchange for food and services within the settlements.For further information about IDPs in the country, please see the materials of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center:  https://internal-displacement.org.																																				g. Stateless Persons										There was no estimate for the number of stateless individuals in the country during the year, but a UNHCR-led study identified weaknesses in local law that presented risks of statelessness.  For example, the law was discriminatory in the transmission of nationality to children – Somali national fathers could transmit nationality at birth, but mothers could not – and other administrative procedures and weak identification systems limited how some individuals could claim their legal right to nationality.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The law provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage, but not all citizens could exercise that ability.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections:  National elections were marred by reports of election abuses and irregularities.  The country last conducted parliamentary elections in March 2022 and indirect presidential elections by the federal parliament two months later.  The United Nations noted the “positive” nature of the electoral process and peaceful transfer of power.Opposition leaders were reportedly prevented from campaigning in Baidoa, South West State’s capital, in the run up to November local elections.  Their names were reportedly placed on no-travel lists at government checkpoints and they were thus unable to travel to or within the state.Somaliland last conducted presidential elections in 2017.  Legislative and local council elections took place in 2021, with international observers noting their sophistication, fairness, and security.  In 2022, long delays in scheduled elections for both the presidency and political parties led to violent clashes between opposition party members and Somaliland security forces.  After intervention by clan elders, the elections were scheduled for November 2024.  Somaliland laws prevented residents of its region from participating in federal government-related processes, although the federal parliament included members “representing” Somaliland.Al-Shabaab prohibited residents of the areas it controlled from changing their al-Shabaab administrators.  Some al-Shabaab administrators, however, consulted local traditional elders on specific matters and allowed preexisting district committees to remain in place.Political Parties and Political Participation:  The Somaliland constitution and electoral legislation limited the number of political parties to three and established conditions pertaining to their political programs, finances, and constitutions.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups:  Cultural factors limited the participation of women.  Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons also had limited participation because they could not make their identities known publicly due to the risk of violence, harassment, and discrimination.Civil society, minority clans, Puntland authorities, and some national opposition figures called for the abolition of the “4.5 formula” by which political representation was divided among the four major clans, and “minority” clans were combined to comprise the remaining “0.5” share.  This system afforded marginalized clans and other groups a fixed number of seats in the federal parliament, but advocates from these communities claimed the formula underrepresented the real size of their populations.  The country conducted its most recent publicly available census in 1975, so the validity of these criticisms remained unclear.  Some academic research suggested certain minority groups, such as the Bantu, represented a much larger share of the country’s population than that reflected by their representation in government under the 4.5 formula.  Under the provisional federal constitution, the electoral process was intended to be direct, thus transitioning from the 4.5 formula, but in 2022 federal and regional leaders maintained the 4.5 formula in determining lower house composition.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law stipulated that criminal penalties could be imposed upon corrupt officials, and the government arraigned several government officials on corruption charges.  There were numerous reports of government corruption during the year.Corruption:  In the absence of a government anti-corruption commission, the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) conducted independent annual and forensic audits to establish corruption cases.  In June, an OAG forensic audit of visa and work permit revenues generated by the government revealed significant embezzlement of funds amounting to $21 million.  Upon concluding the investigation, the OAG submitted a final report to the attorney general recommending prosecution of government officials from the Ministry of Finance, Central Bank, and the Immigration and Naturalization Directorate.  The cases continued at year’s end, and some of the accused government officials fled the country before they could be arrested.The OAG submitted an annual compliance audit and financial statement audit for the fiscal year ending December 2022 to the cabinet and parliament for review and debate before it was officially published.  The audit identified key gaps but found general compliance with accounting standards.  Key audit conclusions included a finding that agencies engaged in procurement activities without an approved annual procurement plan, and that lack of asset management policies and registers led to the illegal occupation of government land and buildings.The Financial Governance Committee (FGC) – an advisory body that had no legal authority but was responsible for reviewing all government contracts of more than $5 million – consisted of federal government officials from the Ministry of Finance, Central Bank, Office of the President, Office of the Prime Minister, and Office of the State Attorney General, as well as the chair of the parliamentary finance committee.  The FGC noted some concession contracts that should have yielded substantial non-tax revenues were either awarded on highly suboptimal terms or managed in a way that undercut revenues.  The concession contracts related to oil and gas, air navigation fees, port and airport revenue management, import conformity assessment services, and leasing of public land to private interests.Somaliland had an auditor and a presidentially appointed good governance and anti-corruption commission, but during the year they did not prosecute any Somaliland officials for corruption.Due to its role in fueling instability and serving as a source of revenue for criminal and terrorist organizations, the export and import of charcoal after 2012 was banned pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 2036.  The Council maintained its ban on charcoal exports as they remained a corruption concern.  The Council underscored the need to reduce the size of charcoal stockpiles in and around Kismayo, and expressed deep concern regarding weak port control structures, lack of a capable coastguard and oversight by port authorities, including in Kismayo.  The Council urged authorities to monitor and control existing charcoal stockpiles at export points.For additional information about corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						Several domestic and international human rights groups operated in areas outside al-Shabaab-controlled territory to monitor or investigate human rights cases or conditions and publish their findings.  Government officials were somewhat cooperative and responsive to their views.  Security concerns constrained the ability of NGOs to operate in the country’s southern and central areas.  International and local NGOs generally worked without major restrictions in Somaliland, although clan politics, localized violence, and perceived interference with traditional or religious customs sometimes curtailed NGO activity in these areas.Authorities sometimes harassed or did not cooperate with NGOs, for example, by dismissing findings of official corruption.  Harassment remained a problem in Somaliland.Government Human Rights Bodies:  The provisional federal constitution called for the formation of an independent national human rights commission and a truth and reconciliation commission within 45 days and 30 days, respectively, of the formation of the Council of Ministers in 2012, but these provisions were never implemented.  There was no formal government mechanism for tracking abuses.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence:  The law criminalized rape of a woman and provided penalties of five to 15 years in prison.  There was no law criminalizing rape of a man.  Military court penalties for rape included death sentences.  The government did not effectively enforce the law.  There were no federal laws against spousal violence, including spousal rape.As was the case in previous years, government forces, militia members, and individuals wearing what appeared to be government or other uniforms reportedly raped women and girls.  While authorities sometimes arrested security force members accused of such abuses, impunity was the norm.IDPs and members of marginalized clans and groups suffered disproportionately from gender-based violence.  Local NGOs documented patterns of rape perpetrated with impunity, particularly of women IDPs and members of minority clans.Gender-based violence, including rape, affected women and girls when going to collect water, going to the market, and cultivating fields.  Dominant patterns included the abduction of women and girls for forced marriage and rape, perpetrated primarily by nonstate armed groups, and incidents of rape and gang rape committed by state agents, militias associated with clans, and unidentified armed men.  Police were reluctant to investigate and sometimes asked survivors to do the investigative work for their own cases.  Some survivors of rape were forced to marry perpetrators.Over the past several years the United Nations recorded hundreds of instances of gender-based violence, including sexual violence against women and girls by unidentified armed men, clan militiamen, al-Shabaab elements, and members of state security forces.  The 2020 Somali Health and Demographic Survey (SHDS), the most recent data source available, noted that cases of gender-based violence were underreported due to a “culture of silence,” and in most instances families and survivors preferred to refer survivors to traditional courts.  In some cases, these bodies awarded damages to survivors’ male family members or directed the perpetrator and survivor to marry, in accordance with local customary law.  The United Nations reported sharia and customary law often resulted in further victimization of women and girls, with no justice for survivors and impunity for perpetrators.  While the United Nations noted that the federal government approved a national action plan on ending sexual violence in conflict and the Somaliland parliament approved a sexual offenses act (suspended due to opposition from religious authorities), impunity remained the norm.Local civil society organizations in Somaliland reported gang rape was a problem in urban areas, primarily perpetrated by youth gangs and male students.  It often occurred in poorer neighborhoods and among immigrants, returned refugees, and displaced rural populations living in urban areas.Domestic and sexual violence against women remained serious problems despite laws prohibiting any form of violence against women.  Intimate partner violence and coercion remained a problem, since 59 percent of respondents to the SHDS stated husbands committed the largest number of violent acts against women in the community, and 12 percent of married women reported spousal abuse within the prior year.  While both sharia and customary law addressed the resolution of family disputes, women were not included in the decision-making process.  Exposure to domestic violence was also significantly heightened in the context of displacement and socioeconomic destitution.  Survivors faced considerable obstacles accessing necessary services, including health care, psychological support, and legal assistance; they also faced reputational damage and exclusion from their communities.  In several cases survivors and providers of services for gender-based violence survivors were directly threatened by authorities when such abuses were reportedly perpetrated by men in uniform.Al-Shabaab also committed gender-based violence, primarily through forced marriages.  The organization forced marriages on girls and women between the ages of 14 and 20 in villages under its control, and the families of the girls and young women generally had little choice but to acquiesce or face violence.  Al-Shabaab sentenced persons to death for rape.Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C):  Although the provisional federal constitution described the “circumcision” of women as cruel and degrading, equated it with torture, and prohibited the circumcision of girls, FGM/C was almost universally practiced throughout the country.  According to the SHDS, FGM/C remained prevalent, with 99 percent of women and girls between 15 and 49 having received the procedure.  Type III (infibulation), considered to be the most extreme form of FGM/C, was the predominant type.  Although few SHDS respondents were aware of FGM/C implications for maternal morbidity, 72 percent believed that the practice was a religious requirement.The Somaliland Ministry of Religious Affairs issued a fatwa (a ruling by a recognized religious authority on a point of Islamic law) in 2018 that condemned the most severe forms of FGM/C and allowed survivors to receive compensation but did not specify punishments for the practice.  Health workers from the Somaliland Family Health Association traveled from village to village to explain that FGM/C had no health benefits and could lead to health complications.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment:  Sexual harassment was reported to be widespread.  Adultery in al-Shabaab-controlled areas was punishable by death or lashing.  Child, early, and forced marriages frequently occurred.Discrimination:  The law and regulations prohibited discrimination regarding race, sex, disability, political opinion, color, language, or social status.  Despite these provisions, women did not have the same status as men and experienced systematic subordination to men.  Women experienced discrimination in credit, education, politics, employment, and housing.Only men administered sharia, which often was applied in the interests of men.  According to sharia and the local tradition of blood compensation, anyone found guilty of the death of a woman paid to the victim’s family only one-half the amount required to compensate for a man’s death.  While formal law and sharia provided women the right to own and dispose of property independently, various legal, cultural, and societal barriers often prevented women from exercising such rights.  By law girls and women could inherit only one-half the amount of property to which their brothers were entitled.  The labor code required equal pay for equal work, but the government did not enforce the law.  There were legal barriers to women working the same hours as men and restrictions on women’s employment in some industries.The exclusion of women was more pronounced in al-Shabaab-controlled areas, where women’s participation in economic activities was perceived as antithetical to Islam.Reproductive Rights:  There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.According to the SHDS, 38 percent of women expressed a desire for greater birth spacing than was preferred by their families, and only 3 percent reported that desire met.  Most women surveyed stated six or more children was the ideal family size, and most births were wanted.  Immediate and long-term reproductive health consequences were associated with the dominant form of FGM/C practiced, Type III infibulation, ranging from menstrual and urination disorders to prolonged and obstructed labor, sometimes resulting in fetal death and obstetric fistula.Despite the absence of a government legal and policy framework on family planning, contraceptives were available.  Fewer than 1 percent of women of reproductive age had their needs for family planning satisfied with modern methods; discussions concerning sexual and family planning matters remained limited to close family and friends.  Government officials reporting to the International Family Planning 2020 Initiative claimed “multidimensional barriers” frustrated the expansion of family planning services.  The officials also noted that traditional beliefs and lack of support from community and religious leaders negatively impacted the acceptance of such services.  Academic research indicated that religious leaders, an important source of influence in society, remained open to the use of contraceptives for birth spacing but not for limiting births.According to the SHDS, by the age of 49, 68 percent of married women were aware of one method of contraception.  Only 50 percent of married girls ages 15 to 19 had heard of at least one method.  Despite this awareness level, the SHDS found that contraceptive use was 10 percent for girls and women ages 15 to 19 and 7 percent for women ages 30 to 34.  According to the International Family Planning 2020 Initiative, the government remained committed to expanding quality reproductive health services and sought to put in place legal policy frameworks for family planning, but progress was slow.According to the SHDS, 17 percent of girls and women who survived gender-based violence ages 15 to 49 sought care after an assault.  NGOs reported that the government provided limited and largely donor-funded access to sexual and reproductive health services, including emergency contraception, for sexual violence survivors.  The government had supplies of postexposure prophylaxis, but it was reportedly difficult for survivors to obtain due to bureaucratic obstacles.According to the SHDS, 68 percent of mothers received no antenatal care, and only 32 percent of births were delivered with the assistance of a skilled health-care provider, with access strongly associated with education levels and wealth.  The United Nations Population Fund attributed these shortcomings to the high cost of health care and distance to health facilities.  Additionally, the practice of seeking consent from a spouse or male relative presented a cultural barrier to seeking care.  In 2020 the Danish Immigration Service reported that medical facilities in some areas dominated by one clan barred women patients from another clan or group, specifically from minority and marginalized groups, from accessing health care in those locations.The high maternal death rate of 1,168 per 100,00 live births was attributed to numerous factors.  Health facilities were unevenly distributed countrywide.  Delivery care and involvement of skilled birth attendants were limited.  Women’s cultural and geographic isolation compounded these factors.  The adolescent birth rate was 140 per 100,000 women.While data on access to menstruation hygiene was difficult to obtain, the United Nations Population Fund reported in 2022 that most young girls in Mogadishu had missed classes during their menstruation period, affecting their performance in school.  The report highlighted circumstances in which this problem caused women and girls to drop out of school, particularly among IDPs.  Based on cultural norms, most adolescent girls who became pregnant either were not in school or dropped out due to motherhood duties.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										More than 85 percent of the population shared a common ethnic heritage, religion, and nomad-influenced culture.  In most areas the dominant clan excluded members of other groups from effective participation in governing institutions and subjected them to discrimination in employment, judicial proceedings, and access to public services.  Employment discrimination occurred because of clan connections in numerous industries and sectors of the economy.Minority groups, often lacking armed militias, were disproportionately subjected to killings, torture, rape, kidnapping for ransom, and looting of land and property with impunity by faction militias and majority clan members, often with the acquiescence of federal and local authorities.  Many minority communities lived in deep poverty and suffered from numerous forms of discrimination and exclusion.  Some observers believed minority clan resentment concerning abuses made them more vulnerable to recruitment by al-Shabaab.  Bantu advocacy groups stated the community’s isolation from the government’s security sector integration efforts pushed some Bantu youth into joining al-Shabaab.Bantu communities, primarily living between the Juba and Shabelle rivers in the southern region, faced discrimination, including verbal abuse and being forced to adopt Arabic names.  The discrimination also occurred in IDP camps, where Bantu women were not protected by traditional clan structures.Fighting between clans resulted in deaths and injuries.																																				Children										Education:  Nearly two-thirds of the school-age population remained out of school due to barriers such as poverty, lack of security, lack of schools or long distances to schools, and competing household and labor demands.  Educational opportunities were often limited to more secure urban areas.  IDP children had much lower rates of attendance than nondisplaced children.  Girls faced additional obstacles such as early marriage and low prioritization of girls’ education, leading to even lower attendance.Child Abuse:  Child abuse and rape of children were serious problems, and there was no law or reported efforts by the federal government or regional governments to combat child abuse.  Children remained among the chief victims of societal violence.The practice of asi walid, whereby parents placed their children in dhaqan celis (“returning to (Somali) culture”) boarding schools, other institutions, and sometimes prison for disciplinary purposes and without any legal procedure, continued throughout the country.  Physical abuse and sexual assault in these facilities were common.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage:  The law required both marriage partners to have reached the “age of maturity” and defined a child as a person younger than age 18 but did not specifically outlaw child marriage.  It noted marriage required the free consent of both the man and woman to be legal.  Early marriages frequently occurred.  According to the SHDS, more than 62 percent of married women and 74 percent of unmarried girls and women ages 15 to 49 indicated they viewed forced marriage as a form of domestic violence.  In areas under its influence, al-Shabaab arranged compulsory marriages between its soldiers and young girls and used the lure of marriage as a recruitment tool for its soldiers.  There were no reported efforts by the government or regional authorities to prevent child, early, and forced marriage.Sexual Exploitation of Children:  The law did not expressly prohibit using, procuring, and offering a child for commercial sex, pornography, or pornographic performances.  Additionally, children exploited in commercial sex were not protected from criminal charges under the law.  There was no statutory rape law or minimum age for consensual sex.  The law did not expressly prohibit child pornography.  The law on sexual exploitation was rarely enforced, and such exploitation reportedly was frequent.																																				Antisemitism										There was no known Jewish community, and there were no known reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization:  The law criminalized “carnal intercourse with a person of the same sex” with a penalty of three months’ to three years’ imprisonment; there were no official reports of enforcement.  Under local interpretations of sharia, homosexuality was punishable by death; there were no known state-conducted executions during the year under this law.In Somaliland, same-sex sexual conduct was also criminalized with stiff penalties; the law was enforced.  In March a parliamentary committee reported 40 persons were being held on charges of homosexuality; four persons were sentenced to eight years imprisonment, while the remainder awaited charges or had been released by year’s end.Violence and Harassment:  There were few reports of societal violence based on sexual orientation or gender identity or expression, likely due to severe societal stigma that dissuaded LGBTQI+ persons from making their sexual orientation, gender identity, or expression known.  There were no known actions to investigate or punish those responsible.  Hate crime laws or other criminal justice mechanisms did not exist to aid in the prosecution of bias-motivated crimes against members of the LGBTQI+ community.There were accounts over the past decade of militant Islamic groups such as al-Shabaab killing men extrajudicially for alleged homosexual acts, but no such killings were reported during the year.Discrimination:  The law did not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics.  There were few reports of discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity or expression, likely due to severe societal stigma that dissuaded LGBTQI+ individuals from making their sexual orientation or gender identity or expression known.  This stigma also represented a significant barrier to employment in the rare cases in which individuals made their LGBTQI+ status known.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition:  There was no process for legal gender recognition.  There was little to no societal recognition of transgender persons, as well as a significant lack of awareness regarding gender identity or expression.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices:  Although anecdotal information indicated some families sent their children suspected of being LGBTQI+ to reform schools or forced them to enter heterosexual marriages, discussion of so-called conversion therapy practices largely stayed out of the public sphere.  There were no known actions to investigate or punish those complicit in abuses.There was little to no societal recognition of intersex persons, and no reporting available on whether intersex persons were subjected to involuntary surgery.  There were no known government or medical association actions to limit such practices.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly:  Due to severe societal stigma that dissuaded LGBTQI+ persons from making their sexual orientation or gender identity or expression known, LGBTQI+ persons rarely tested freedoms of expression, association, and assembly.  There were few, very discreet, and mostly online-based LGBTQI+ organizations that held events.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities could not access education, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others.  Disability rights organizations reported a widespread lack of equal access to education, health services, public buildings, and transportation.  There were no laws requiring such access.  The government did not provide information and communication on disability concerns in accessible formats.The needs of most persons with disabilities were not addressed.  According to Amnesty International, persons with disabilities faced human rights abuses such as unlawful killings; violence including rape and other forms of gender-based violence; forced evictions; and lack of access to health care, education, or an adequate standard of living.  Government responses to such reports remained inadequate.  Children and adults with all types of disabilities were often not included in programs aimed at supporting persons in the country, including humanitarian assistance.  IDPs with disabilities were often victims of multiple forced evictions.  Domestic violence and forced marriage were prevalent practices affecting persons with disabilities.  Women and girls with disabilities reportedly faced an increased risk of rape and other forms of gender-based violence, often with impunity, due to perceptions that their disabilities were a burden to the family or that such persons were of less value and could be abused.The law provided equal rights before the law for persons with disabilities and prohibited the state from discriminating against them.  Authorities did not enforce these provisions.  The law did not discuss discrimination by nongovernmental actors.  Persons with disabilities faced discrimination in hiring and access to the workplace.  Without a public health infrastructure, few services existed to provide support or education for persons with mental disabilities.  It was common for such persons to be chained to a tree or restrained within their homes.Local organizations advocated for the rights of persons with disabilities, including the ability to participate in public life and voting accessibility in elections, with negligible support from local authorities.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Persons with HIV and AIDS faced discrimination and abuse in their local communities and by employers in all regions.  The United Nations reported that persons with HIV and AIDS experienced physical abuse, rejection by their families, and workplace discrimination and dismissal.  Children of HIV-positive parents also suffered discrimination that hindered access to services.  There was no known official response to such discrimination.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The constitution provided for general worker rights to freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike.  The law did not address antiunion discrimination.  The government did not effectively enforce the law.Penalties for violations of freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike for workers were not commensurate with those for analogous crimes such as civil rights violations and were never applied against violators.Worker rights organizations and trade unionists reported the labor code remained inconsistent with the constitution and internationally recognized worker rights.  The Federation of Somali Trade Unions (FESTU), the largest trade union federation in the country, participated in stakeholder discussions with the government and private sector in August on a new draft labor code and advocated for its passage.  In September, FESTU and the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions signed a union-to-union accord, supported by the International Labor Organization, to protect and promote the rights of migrant workers.There were no instances of government interference with union activities, reflecting an improved environment for labor rights and increased cooperation between the labor movement and government.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings&nbsp;.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws:  The law provided for a standard workweek of 48 hours.  The law required premium pay for overtime and work performed on holidays and limited overtime to a maximum of 12 hours per week.  The law did not provide for a national minimum wage.Occupational Safety and Health:  The law set occupational safety and health (OSH) standards, although FESTU claimed they were insufficient to protect workers.  The law did not specifically provide for the right of workers to remove themselves from situations that endangered health or safety without jeopardy to their employment.  Responsibility for identifying unsafe situations remained with OSH experts, and workers could also identify such situations.  Violations of working condition regulations were widespread in the public and private sectors.  Workers in the electrical, transportation, and petroleum sectors were routinely exposed to hazardous conditions.  Additionally, telecommunications and media workers faced targeted attacks by al-Shabaab, and some informal-sector workers were victims of suicide bombers.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement:  The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs was responsible at the federal level for establishing OSH standards and enforcement.  The ministry did not effectively enforce labor laws.  The ministry established an inspectorate but did not conduct any labor-related inspections.  Penalties for abuses of the law were not applied.  Wages and working conditions were established largely through arrangements based on supply, demand, and the influence of workers’ clans.The country had an informal economy largely based on livestock, remittance/money transfer companies, and telecommunications.  Approximately 95 percent of workers worked in the informal sector, where labor regulations were not applied.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																						i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																						g. Stateless Persons																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Somalia
- Designating Transnational Network Supporting al-Shabaab Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonThe United States is designating sixteen entities and individuals in a transnational network that spans the Horn of Africa, United Arab Emirates, and Cyprus, for facilitating financing and money laundering for the al-Shabaab terrorist organization.The threat posed by al-Shabaab is not limited to Somalia.  Al-Shabaab’s revenues are disbursed to other al-Qa&#8217;ida-linked groups worldwide and help fund al-Qa’ida’s global ambitions to commit acts of terrorism and undermine good governance.Today’s action reflects the United States’ counterterrorism priorities in Somalia and supports the dynamic relationship we have established with the Somali government to counter the terrorist threats endangering the Somali people and undermining their communities.  The United States also remains focused on disrupting al-Qa&#8217;i&#8217;da’s access to the international financial system.The Department of the Treasury actions were taken pursuant to Executive Order 13224, as amended.  For more information on today’s action, see Treasury’s press release.						Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs																								Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs																																Counterterrorism																															Cyprus																								Division for Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions																								Office of the Spokesperson																																Sanctions																															Somalia																								United Arab Emirates
- Department Press Briefing – February 21, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – February 21, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – February 21, 2024																																																					February 21, 2024																																																								1:24 p.m. ESTMR MILLER: Good afternoon.QUESTION: Good afternoon.MR MILLER: I do not have any opening comments, so Matt &#8212;QUESTION: Oh, really?MR MILLER: &#8212; take it away.QUESTION: Nothing? You don’t have anything exciting and new to tell us today?MR MILLER: It depends on what your questions are. (Laughter.)QUESTION: Well, yeah, obviously. Hold on, let me start my recorder here. So I know a lot of people want to talk about Gaza, but I have something else that I just need to get off at the top. The Russia sanctions package that the White House, the President, Kirby, you, everyone has said is coming on Friday – what can you tell us about what that is? Is it related to the two-year anniversary? Is it related to Navalny’s death? What is it? What is it?MR MILLER: So I don’t want to speak in detail about announcements that will be coming two days from now, but the – excuse me, I’ve got a bit of a lingering cough from this cold I’ve had – the sanctions that we’ll be announcing on Friday will be in connection both to the two-year anniversary of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and to Navalny’s death.QUESTION: Okay. And Russia is one of – along with Iran and North Korea, is already one of the most heavily sanctioned countries by the United States and others on the planet. Where would you expect these sanctions to target?MR MILLER: I don’t want to preview too much of what we’re going to do on Friday, but it will be a robust sanctions package. We are always looking at additional ways that we can choke off the Russian war machine, that we can deny the Russian military industrial complex components that it needs to use to fund its war effort, as well as to hold accountable those involved in it. So without getting into too much detail, like – as I said, two days before the announcement, you should expect them to follow the general direction of our past sanctions as well as some sanctions specifically related to the death of Alexei Navalny.QUESTION: Right. But when you say that they’re going to – it’s going to be robust, I go back to a line from Spinal Tap, right: How much more robust can they be?MR MILLER: You &#8212;QUESTION: Aren’t they already pretty robust?MR MILLER: They &#8212;QUESTION: Didn’t you guys exact super-big sanctions on Russia after the Ukraine invasion?MR MILLER: They are incredibly robust and they’ve had an impact on Russia’s economy and Russia’s military industrial complex, but &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah, so the question is: How much more robust can they be?MR MILLER: Well, you will see on Friday, but I can guarantee you it’s – it is, as I said, a strong, robust package, partly because we are always – look, this is a dynamic situation, right. Russia watches the sanctions, sees the sanctions and tries to respond to the sanctions that we impose, and so we watch the actions that they take and we look to impose new sanctions either on individuals or new areas that they explore, and also to focus on sanctions evasion. When we see them or entities that deal with Russia trying to evade the sanctions that we previously put into place, we have ways to tighten those sanctions.QUESTION: Okay, last one. Does that suggest, then, that a bunch of the stuff in this package might be secondary sanctions?MR MILLER: I don’t want to make any comments about what they’ll look like, again, two days before we roll them out.QUESTION: Can I have a question on that?MR MILLER: So I’ll come – I’ll come to – oh, okay. Go ahead. She graciously yielded the floor.QUESTION: Yeah, apparently there’s a new intelligence assessment from Western governments suggesting that Putin thinks he eventually can win the war in Ukraine for three reasons: one, a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House; two, increased conscription; and three, a rejuvenated military manufacturing sector. Does State believe, on the record, that Putin does believe that these factors can help him win the war? Does this increase the need to provide funding for Ukraine if, in fact, there’s a belief that Putin may now have some leverage in this situation?MR MILLER: So I never want to discuss intelligence matters from here, real or imagined, but I think it should be obvious to everyone that Vladimir Putin is watching what happens in Washington closely. You have to assume that he is watching what happens in Congress. I think he has always assumed from the beginning of this conflict that he can wait out the West – that the West’s attention would flag, that the West’s interest would flag, that the West would be unwilling to maintain sanctions. And so far the West has proved them – proved him wrong, and I don’t just mean the United States but Europe as well, which took dramatic action early on to wean itself from Russian energy, something I think Putin never thought would happen.But I have to think that the entire world, including those in Moscow, are watching whether the United States Congress is willing to step up and continue to fund Ukraine to help it defend itself from Russia’s aggression. We have been very clear in the Biden administration what we think ought to happen. We have been very clear what is in the United States’ national security interests, and we will continue to make that case, and we hope that Congress will respond because, as I said, the entire world is watching.QUESTION: Does the U.S., though, actually believe that Putin now has the advantage given &#8212;MR MILLER: No, we do not believe that at all. If you look at the shape of this conflict over the past not just two years, but even the most recent history, yes, you have seen Russia make gains on the battlefield; we saw gains just over this week – this last weekend because Ukraine was not able to properly resupply its troops, in large part because Congress has not taken the action that we think it should to continue to support Ukraine as it fights to defend its territory. But you have also seen Ukraine make dramatic improvements on the battlefield, most significantly, I think, in the Black Sea where they have pushed the Russian fleet back, they have opened up a new shipping corridor that has allowed them to export not just wheat and grain, but also other manufactured goods through the Black Sea, something that was not possible in the early days of the war when Russia had blockaded Ukrainian ports. So we think they’ll continue to make progress there, and we’ll continue to support them to the best of our ability, but we need a partner in Congress to help us.QUESTION: Can I – can I follow up the there on North Korea and Ukraine?MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. There are &#8212;MR MILLER: Humeyra’s just adding to the list of questions she gets to ask. (Laughter.) Go ahead; sorry.QUESTION: Yeah. There are reports that North Korean missiles that Russia recently used – excuse me – recently used against Ukraine contained U.S. and European components. How many times has Russia used North Koreans’ missiles against Ukraine?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to that in detail. We will continue to use all of our relevant tools – export controls, sanctions, interdiction and law enforcement actions – to prevent the DPRK from acquiring sensitive items and technology that it can use in its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs, and that includes preventing Russia from acquiring weapons and other sensitive items, including components from North Korea or from anywhere else.QUESTION: One more quick question. North Korea Kim Jong-un and Putin’s relative with the luxury cars. Russian President Putin gave Kim Jong-un a luxury car as a gift. Is this a violation of UN sanctions?MR MILLER: So I did see that report. I actually, frankly, didn’t know there was such a thing as a Russian luxury car. I hope Kim got the extended warranty. I would note that the &#8212;QUESTION: (Laughter.) He &#8212;MR MILLER: I just – look, when it comes to &#8212;QUESTION: Even if he didn’t, I bet he can still expect his cell phone – the spam cell phone calls &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; from the warranty department for the &#8212;MR MILLER: I bet that’s right. I’m not sure, if I were buying a luxury car, Russia would be the place I would look, even if it was – even if it wasn’t with respect to sanctions.But UN Security Council resolutions do require all UN member states to prohibit both the supply of transportation vehicles and the supply of luxury automobiles to the DPRK. And if this is true, it would appear to be once again Russia violating UN Security Council resolutions that it itself supported.Humeyra.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. I just want to ask you &#8212;MR MILLER: Excuse me.QUESTION: &#8212; a couple of comments that Benny Gantz just made about an hour ago. He basically – he said there were promising early signs of progress on a new deal for the hostages. I’m just wondering what’s the latest that you guys are hearing, and whether you’re picking up the same promising early signs of progress as well.MR MILLER: I don’t want to discuss those discussions, those negotiations in detail. And I don’t want to offer any assessments beyond what we have said previously, which is we do think that there is space to reach an agreement here. We are going to continue to stay engaged in this matter with everything that we can bring to bear on behalf of the United States to work with Israel, to work with Egypt, to work with Qatar, because we want to see the hostages released, we want to see a pause in the fighting. And so that’s what we’ll continue to pursue.QUESTION: Okay. He is also saying that if no new deal were struck, the Israeli military would keep fighting in Gaza even into the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. I’m just wondering if that would be something the United States would be supportive.MR MILLER: So I think I got a version of this question yesterday, and I don’t have anything new to add. We want to see a deal struck. So I’m not going to get into what might happen if we don’t get an agreement, but we want to see an agreement reached, and we want to see it reached as soon as possible. That would include, of course, before Ramadan. It could include – it could be even earlier than that. So that’s what we’re going to continue to pursue.QUESTION: Right. But I think you guys have made it a bit of a red line – I mean, if I guess one can call it that – the need for a humanitarian plan on top of, obviously, a military strategy before Israel goes into Rafah. So I think what I’m trying to get at is whether fighting continuing in Ramadan is really offensive – starting or continuing into Ramadan – whether that’s a similar red line or not.MR MILLER: I just don’t want to speak to where we’ll be in two weeks, because I think it’s impossible to say. We want to see a hostage agreement that secures a temporary ceasefire where we can get the hostages out and get humanitarian assistance in. Ultimately, we want to see a durable resolution to this conflict, and we want to see it as soon as possible. With respect to where we’ll be in two weeks, I just don’t want to speak beyond &#8212;QUESTION: Okay. I &#8212;MR MILLER: I don’t want to speak to that in detail.QUESTION: Okay. I have a few quick ones on UNRWA; I’ll be quick.MR MILLER: Take your time; you got interrupted a few times, so go ahead.QUESTION: Sorry. (Inaudible.)MR MILLER: Said attempting to interrupt you again. And now I interrupted you; sorry. Go ahead. Go ahead, Humeyra.QUESTION: Have you asked other UN agencies – like, your funding is stopped for now. And there is legislation that has not yet passed within supplemental that might bar you completely from resuming that funding. But that legislation is not on the House floor yet. So I guess I’m wondering what you guys are doing in the meantime. Have you asked other UN agencies to pick up the slack? And exactly what did you ask them to do? Like, are there UNRWA workers on the ground right now working for – actually working for other UN agencies who are doing the distribution of aid?MR MILLER: We have been in conversations both with the United Nations and with other countries around the world about how to make sure that the important work that UNRWA does is not interrupted. We want to ensure that humanitarian assistance continues to flow to the Palestinian people. Right now, UNRWA is the key facilitator of humanitarian assistance in Gaza, and we don’t want to see that humanitarian assistance disrupted in any way.At the same time, we are obviously cognizant of the draft legislation and the provision that it contains. It’s not law, as you said, but we have to plan for all possibilities, including the possibility that it becomes law. So we’re looking at all the options that may be available to us. But I don’t want to discuss that in detail; it’s internal planning that continues to go on inside the government.QUESTION: All right. The final thing is there is the reporting in Devex which says that you have actually asked other UN relief agencies to pick up slack. But Secretary-General Antonio Guterres have urged the heads of those agencies to basically rebuff your plea. I mean, is this something you can confirm or &#8212;MR MILLER: I’m just not – I’m not going to confirm that report at all. Sorry.QUESTION: Can I just very briefly follow-up on (inaudible) &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: I’m guessing you may not have a lot to say about this, but following up with Humeyra’s question, Brett McGurk, of course, is in the region. I know he works in a different building. But do you have any –MR MILLER: Correct. (Laughter.)QUESTION: But do you have anything you could say more generally about what he’s – about the tone of what he’s doing or what &#8212;MR MILLER: No. I will leave it to the White House to speak in detail to Brett’s work and what he’s trying to accomplish on the trip. But I think, look, you know – you have seen from the administration broadly what our goals are with respect to the conflict right now. Our immediate goal is to try to achieve a deal that brings about a ceasefire in the fighting. A temporary ceasefire in the fighting allows us get hostages out and allows us to get humanitarian assistance in and kind of would help with some of the bottlenecks that have begun to pop up inside Gaza, to preventing humanitarian assistance actually getting out to the people that need it because there’s fighting on the ground and looting and other obstacles.So we are trying to achieve all those things, and that, of course, is Brett McGurk. It’s the Secretary. It’s the President himself. They’re focused on that issue.Said, go ahead.QUESTION: And I thank you. To follow up on Humeyra’s fair point and –MR MILLER: Thank you for being sort of patient.QUESTION: Sorry?MR MILLER: Thank you for being somewhat patient.QUESTION: Oh, no, no. I did not mean to interrupt her.MR MILLER: That’s fine. It’s fine.QUESTION: So apologies if that was perceived as such &#8212;MR MILLER: I feel like a schoolmarm up here, scolding – I feel like a schoolmarm, scolding people unnecessarily.QUESTION: That’s right. Anyway, just to follow up on Humeyra’s &#8212;QUESTION: A schoolmarm?MR MILLER: Yeah, I don’t know. Is that the – that’s &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah, wow. Texas coming out (inaudible).MR MILLER: A little bit of an archaic – a little bit of an archaic term, yeah.QUESTION: All right. Okay. So just to follow up on her point, you’ve said that you’re hoping that a deal will be struck. What if it doesn’t get struck? I mean, we have been there before. They were – these artificial deadlines and calendars and a week here, and the end of October, then the end of November, then December, the end of the year, and all these things – I mean, to be honest, the Palestinians and Israelis fought in Ramadan many, many times, and they were struck. So what if a deal is not struck? What is your vision on how this thing will end?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to deal with a hypothetical, as I think you know. I will tell you, though, I think it’s a fair question about where we want to see this conflict go. In the short term, we want to see, as I said in response to several other questions, a temporary ceasefire that allows us to get the hostages out, bring more – bring more humanitarian assistance in.But we have also been very clear, and if you’ve looked at the Secretary’s many public comments on this, he’s been not just clear but quite detailed in what we want to see in the long term. And what we want to see in the long term is a durable agreement that allows – that brings about peace and security for both Israel and Palestinians through the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, with real security guarantees for Israel, Israel further integrated into the region. That is our long-term vision, and that is what the Secretary has been focused on through his diplomatic engagements in the region, and what it – it is what we will continue to pursue.Now, the first step in that is getting an agreement to get the hostages out while we work on this longer-term plan for the region.QUESTION: Well, I’m sorry (inaudible) point. But in the meantime, people can’t get food. I mean, kids, children, 5-year-olds, my grandson’s age, and so on. So, I mean, they’re not getting – they’re asking for bread, for crying out loud. They’re standing in line asking for bread, and bread is not getting in. So what are you – I mean, you keep saying about things that – the need for things to go in. But it’s not going in, Matt.MR MILLER: So the humanitarian situation in Gaza continues to be extremely difficult, dire for many people, which is why we continue to focus all the efforts of the United States to improve that situation. When it comes to bread, the United States has funded flour that would feed 1.5 Palestinians for five months.QUESTION: No, no, no. A lot more than 1.5.MR MILLER: One point five million Palestinians for five months. Thank you – thank &#8212;QUESTION: If it was only 1.5 Palestinians, that would – that would be &#8212;MR MILLER: Right. Fair. Obviously a misspeak. One point five million Palestinians for five months. We have worked to not just fund humanitarian assistance but get it into Gaza, and continue to stay engaged on that every day, not just on the big picture issues but on very minor logistical issues that have a big impact, things that seem minor but that have a big impact in getting – in getting in. Is enough food and water and other humanitarian assistance getting in? Absolutely not, which is why we continue to stay engaged, to improve the situation every day.QUESTION: You talk about the Palestinian state, although we’ve heard statements that are really emphatic by the prime minister of Israel saying, no – under no circumstances whatsoever, and so on. I just want to read you what a member of his cabinet – from the Likud, as a matter of fact – May Golan of the group during a Knesset hearing about the motion to expel MK Ofer Cassif. She said, quote, “I am personally proud of the ruins of Gaza and that every baby, even 80 years from now, will tell their grandchildren what the Jews did,” unquote.I mean, this is the kind – I mean, this is not someone extremist. It’s not Smotrich. It’s not Ben-Gvir. This is in the prime minister’s – Benjamin Netanyahu’s party.MR MILLER: Said, I would encourage you to take a close look at the comments the Secretary made in Tel Aviv at a press conference two weeks ago where he talked specifically about the effects of dehumanizing language and why it’s important that no one on either side of this conflict dehumanize anyone else. That will continue to be our position. It will continue to be what we pursue because as the Secretary has spoken, we care about the lives not just of Israelis but of Palestinians – Palestinian men and women and children – and we grieve for all of those who have been killed, all of those who have been injured, and it’s what animates our work to try to bring a durable end to this conflict.QUESTION: Does that go for Congressman Ogles as well?MR MILLER: I’m sorry. What?QUESTION: Does that go for Congressman Ogles as well?MR MILLER: I don’t know what your comment you’re referring to.QUESTION: He made – he made a comment in response to a protestor up on the Hill about the deaths of Palestinian children, and I’m slightly paraphrasing, but “ should kill all of them.”MR MILLER: So I haven’t seen his comments. It’s the first I’ve heard of them. And with a slight paraphrase, I’m reluctant to – without seeing the comment, reluctant to react. And we typically don’t respond to comments made on the Hill, but obviously we would urge anyone – whether in the United States or abroad – to avoid dehumanizing language and dehumanizing sentiments.QUESTION: Matthew, the majority of the Israeli Knesset has voted today against the unilateral recognition of Palestinian statehood. How do you feel this step?MR MILLER: So I again will only continue to speak for the United States and what we are trying to pursue, and we are trying to pursue the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. We are focusing our diplomatic efforts on that, not just because we think – and again, you’ve heard the Secretary speak to this a number of times – not just because we think it’s in the interests of the Palestinian people but because we think it is in Israel’s short, medium, and long-term security interest as well.QUESTION: But if the government and the Knesset in Israel don’t want the establishment of a Palestinian state &#8212;MR MILLER: You – so, again, you have heard the Secretary speak to this, that what we will do is continue to lay out what we think the best choice for the Government of Israel to make and the best choice for the Israeli people to make. Ultimately, Israel will have to make its own decisions, as every sovereign country does. We will present to them the ideas and plans that we are developing with our partners in the region, the commitments that other countries are willing to make to Israel’s security. And every country will have to make its decisions about its – how it’s going to proceed.MR MILLER: I don’t have any further readout of the meeting other than what we already offered publicly.Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. And a few questions here; please bear with me. Going back to your line of questioning with Matt on the sanctions, the EU today came up with its – agreed on its 13th packet of sanctions with some 2,000 listings in total. Could it be a template for you on Friday?MR MILLER: I would want to just say: Everyone, just wait for two days and you’ll see all the sanctions that we’re going to impose. Obviously, we work closely with the EU and countries around the world on the – on various sanctions packages, and we’re glad to see the EU take its&nbsp;– the steps that it did. But you should just watch and look at our sanctions when we roll them out on Friday.QUESTION: And my colleague made a point about North Korea. Early in January, you guys announced the provision of ballistic missiles from North Korea to Russia. Several weeks passed; neither Russia nor North Korea have faced any consequences. Why? Is it going to be addressed during this next package?MR MILLER: Again, I have said everything I’m going to say about a sanctions rollout that is not happening for another two days. I would encourage you to check back on Friday to see &#8212;QUESTION: That would be nothing.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: I said a little bit. I gave a little more than nothing, but we’ve got two days to go.QUESTION: Fair enough. Fair enough. Any update for us on the latest U.S. citizen arrested in Russia and access to her?MR MILLER: No, I have no further updates. We continue to seek consular access; it’s not yet been granted.QUESTION: I want to go back – if I may, going back to Munich last week, the Secretary met with Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders. Does he still believe that the peace is within reach? I’m just borrowing the vocabulary he used last year at this time.MR MILLER: He still does believe that peace is within reach, and he discussed that with the leader of both – directly with the leaders of both of those countries, and encouraged them to work together to bridge the – what ultimately are just a remaining few issues. And we will continue to encourage those countries to reach a peace agreement. I know that the two leaders met bilaterally in Munich, and so we will continue to offer the assistance and the support of the United States in reaching agreement.QUESTION: He also reminded – my last one, I promise – he also reminded Aliyev of his obligations on human rights, according to your readout. Just day before that meeting occurred, the Secretary was addressed on the Hill – so 21 congressmembers called him out, telling him that – to – asked him to prioritize the cares of Gubad Ibadoghlu and his well-being. Did the Secretary have a chance to go through the cases, including Mr. Ibadoghlu?MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Two questions on Iran. The country’s national virtual space center has banned the use of VPNs, and it has been also endorsed by the supreme leader. I was wondering if the Iranian people should be worried about having access to information to the outside world or as, in the past, during the demonstrations the U.S. was going to – is going to step in?QUESTION: Could I ask a few different issues around the world?MR MILLER: So this decision is just the latest reminder of how much the Iranian regime fears its people and what they are capable of when they are giving – given unfettered access to the internet and unfettered access to information. The internet disruptions that the Iranian regime has put in place in the past have cost the economy billions of dollars. It caused pain to businesses as well as, of course, choking off information that people need to make decisions about their lives and decisions about their futures. Support for internet freedom in Iran will continue to be a central pillar of our efforts to support human rights in the country. As you’ve said, in the past in the height of the protests in 2022 and 2023, as many as one in three Iranians used U.S.-supported anti-censorship and digital security tools such as VPNs. There are millions of Iranians that have continued to use those tools to this day, so I’m not going to speak to what actions we will take in the future, but as I said, upholding internet freedom and ensuring Iranians – Iranians – citizens’ access to the internet will continue to be a central pillar of our engagement in that country.QUESTION: Thank you. Also, Abram Paley, special envoy for Iran, is or was in Vienna. He met with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi. I was wondering if you could tell us anything about the nature of this visit given that Grossi has spoken out a lot recently about his concerns about Iran’s nuclear program.MR MILLER: Sure. So Deputy Special Envoy Paley was in Vienna to meet with Director Grossi. He reiterated the United States appreciation for the IAEA’s extensive efforts to engage Iran on longstanding questions related to Iran’s safeguards obligations. Iran’s cooperation remains severely lacking. We remain seriously considered about Iran’s continued expansion of its nuclear program in ways that have no credible civilian purpose, including its continued production of highly enriched uranium, and that was the focus of the discussions today.QUESTION: Any discussions, any solution to gaining access to Iran’s nuclear program by the IAEA?MR MILLER: I don’t want to give any further comments about that meeting other than to say that they did discuss how Iran should fully uphold its safeguards obligations and provide full cooperation to the IAEA without further delay.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Senegal – I know the Secretary spoke not so long ago with President Sall about the election. The – there was a court decision calling for a new date but it hasn’t been set yet. Do you have any update on U.S. engagement there and the U.S. stance about what’s happening now?MR MILLER: So we continue to stay engaged with the government in Senegal. I don’t have any specific engagements to read out, but as – we have been – stayed in close coordination with them, and I’ll just say that we want to see the election take place as soon as is practical – practicable.QUESTION: Sure. Elsewhere in Africa, there was an agreement signed today between Somalia and Türkiye on a naval upgrade or a coastal upgrade. It’s obviously a bilateral, but this is in the context of Ethiopia and Somaliland having a pact. Does the U.S. have any stance on Türkiye’s involvement here?MR MILLER: Let me take that one back and get an – get you an answer on it.QUESTION: Sure. And one other thing: Pakistan.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: I know you’ve been saying in recent weeks that it’s – you’re not going to comment till a government is formed, but there’s a coalition that actually has – is being formed between two of the major factions without Imran Khan’s enforcement. Is there an idea that this is a representative government? How does the U.S. feel about this?MR MILLER: Again, I don’t want to comment on the government before it’s formed. Ultimately, as is the case whenever you see coalition politics taking place inside any given country, that’s – it’s a decision for that country itself, not something that we would weigh in on.QUESTION: Sure, sure. And in terms – I know in the past you’ve talked about allegations of fraud, of rigging. Is there any follow-up on that? Is the U.S. looking for anything in particular before a government comes in?MR MILLER: We want to see a full investigation into any claims of irregularities.QUESTION: Okay. And just finally, yesterday I asked about the disruptions on social media in Pakistan. Is there anything further on that, whether it was (inaudible) communication?MR MILLER: So we are concerned by any report of restrictions on the exercise of the freedom of expression and association in Pakistan, including the partial or complete government-imposed internet shutdowns, which includes, of course, on social media platforms. We continue to call on Pakistan to respect freedom of expression and restore access to any social media that has been restricted, including Twitter, I think now known as X. We have and will continue to emphasize the importance of respecting these fundamental freedoms during our engagements with Pakistani officials.QUESTION: Sure. And just finally, that’s – has that been communicated through official channels or &#8212;MR MILLER: It has been, yeah.QUESTION: Follow-up on Pakistan?MR MILLER: Go ahead. Right here.QUESTION: The Foreign Policy magazine, in a recent report titled “The Taliban Wants a Piece of Pakistan,” reveals that Taliban engaging to border tension with Pakistan through their supporting TTP. While the Taliban publicly refuse the &#8212;MR MILLER: I’m sorry, what was the – what would – what was the – just didn’t hear the last – the beginning of the last sentence.QUESTION: Oh, sorry. It’s about a Foreign Policy report that they titled “The Taliban Wants a Piece of Pakistan.”MR MILLER: Right.QUESTION: And while the Taliban publicly refuse the Durand Line as the official border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, what’s the position of United State about Durand Line?MR MILLER: We support the territorial integrity of both Afghanistan and Pakistan within their internationally recognized borders.QUESTION: Follow-up &#8212;QUESTION: Another question about Afghan Adjustment Act that was not passed by the Congress recently. While there are some reports that United State Department of State is going run out of the SIV P-1 and P-2 quotas, do you confirm this report? And what are you doing about SIV and Afghan Adjustment Act (inaudible)?MR MILLER: So as the President has said, we urge Congress to pass the Afghan Adjustment Act. We support it and want to see it passed. When it comes to Special Immigrant Visas, I would just note that in the last fiscal year, 2023, the government issued more than 18,000 Special Immigrant Visas to Afghan applicants outside the U.S. That was the most in any single year.So go ahead. We’ll work down &#8212;QUESTION: On Pakistan, thank you. Pakistan Ambassador Masood Khan here in D.C. yesterday said that Pakistan is pleading with the Congress, with the U.S. Congress, to help restore the U.S. military aid that was suspended in 2018 by the Trump administration. Is the U.S. considering restoring the program given that Pakistan is a major non-NATO ally in the region?MR MILLER: I just don’t have any comment on that.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. A question on the Kurdistan Region parliamentary election, which was expected to be held in October 2022, but due to the disputes, political status, they delayed. And last year, the Iraqi top court ruled against the self-extension of that parliament, which the region has no parliament now. And today the Iraqi top court ruled against the Christian regional parliament minority seats. Any reaction and comment on that? And have you ever engaged with Erbil and Baghdad on that issue?MR MILLER: So we have seen the reports that the court issued rulings today related to the Iraqi Kurdistan parliament elections and other issues concerning relations between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Iraqi federal government. We are still reviewing the full scope of the decision. As a matter of longstanding U.S. policy, we support holding parliamentary elections in the Iraqi Kurdistan region at the earliest opportunity. And as we do everywhere, we encourage those elections to be free, fair, and transparent.QUESTION: And one more question on Iraq. We know the situation in Iraq has been cooled down and the militia groups is not attacking you as they did before. And today the U.S. ambassador met with the Iraqi prime minister, and they discussed the upcoming visit of the Iraqi prime minister &#8212;MR MILLER: The discussed what?QUESTION: The upcoming visit of the Iraqi prime minister to Washington. So my question is that are you done with the response to those groups who were responsible for killing three U.S. service members and injuring 40 others?MR MILLER: I am not going to preview or rule out any potential steps from this podium.QUESTION: So what’s your general assessment about the current situation? Do you think that these groups are taking their words when they say that we are not going to attack the U.S. forces?QUESTION: And how the United States analyze those comments in a moment that there is an effort to de-escalate tensions in the region?MR MILLER: I don’t want to offer any assessment or speak for any of these groups. I will say on behalf of the United States we have made very clear, not just with our words but with our actions, that we are prepared to defend U.S. forces and U.S. interests in Iraq and in the region. And we are prepared to hold accountable anyone who attacks U.S. forces, and I think I’ll leave it at that.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks. Barbara Miller, ABC Australia. The Australian parliament recently passed a motion calling for the Assange matter to be brought to a close and for him to be allowed to return home. What’s your response to that motion?MR MILLER: So I spoke about Julian Assange extensively from this podium yesterday, and I don’t think I have anything to add on to that matter. It is an ongoing legal matter and an extradition matter, and beyond what I said yesterday I think I don’t want to comment in any more detail.Go ahead. Yeah.QUESTION: Good afternoon, Matthew. Good to see you. Two questions – one on Ukraine, one on Haiti. On Ukraine, the Knights of Columbus – they’re an organization that has provided millions of dollars in aid to Ukraine, helping people there during this very terrible time. How would you describe the impact of groups like the Knights of Columbus?MR MILLER: So look, we support any organization that wants to deliver aid to people in Ukraine or anywhere in the world who are in need of it.QUESTION: And then on Haiti, where of course we all know there’s been terrible violence. Catholic – the other day Catholic Bishop Pierre-André Dumas was hurt in an explosion at a house. He is in stable condition, reportedly. Recently, six Haitian religious sisters were recently abducted and then released. What’s the State Department’s reaction to those incidents?MR MILLER: So I will just say generally we continue to be very concerned about the ongoing violence in Haiti. And it’s why we continue to focus on the launch of a multinational security force to help with the situation on the ground in Haiti, and that Secretary Blinken will in fact be engaging with counterparts at the G20 about the deployment of such a mission today and tomorrow while he’s in Brazil.QUESTION: Can I just very briefly follow up?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Do you have anything to say About the indictments over Jovenel’s killing – on Jovenel’s killing in Haiti?MR MILLER: I do not. I do not.Go ahead, back – yeah. Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you so much. On U.S. and Brazil, what is the evaluation of the meeting this morning in Brasília between Secretary Blinken and President Lula?MR MILLER: So we put out a readout about that meeting, and I will say that they discussed a number of issues, including the work through the G20 to help alleviate poverty and combat climate change. They talked about regional issues, including the work that Brazil has done to try and de-escalate tensions between Venezuela and Guyana; talked about Brazil’s support for democracy in South America, including in Venezuela; and then they talked about bilateral issues between the United States and Brazil, as well as issues around the world such as the war in Ukraine and the conflict between Israel and Hamas.QUESTION: Just a follow-up. Yesterday on this podium it was sad that the United States does not agree with what President Lula said last weekend on Gaza. But from your perspective, are those comments a matter of public retraction, as the Israeli foreign minister suggested?MR MILLER: So &#8212;MR MILLER: So they are comments with which we disagree. As I made clear today, the Secretary had a chance to discuss the comments with President Lula today in his meeting, in the context of an overall discussion about the conflict in Gaza, and made clear – as I did yesterday, made clear that those are comments with which we disagree.QUESTION: And the G20, is it possible to highlight the priorities from the U.S., the summit of ministers – summit that is happening &#8212;MR MILLER: Well, as I said, you – and you will see comments from the Secretary – he’s going to have a press conference tomorrow before he leaves the G20. So I don’t want to get too – I don’t want to get ahead too far of his comments. But we will be focused on fighting poverty, addressing climate changes, and other issues that President Lula has put on the agenda for this meeting of the G20.QUESTION: A follow-up?MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Matthew. A few questions. When will the draft U.S. resolution calling for a temporary ceasefire be put forth before and voted on by the Security Council?MR MILLER: I don’t want to put a timetable on it. It’s something that we continue to discuss with partners on the council.QUESTION: And the administration supports Israel’s goal to annihilate Hamas, yet the support does not seem unconditional, as the administration opposes any further Israeli military operation in Rafah. How do you square the two? If Israel’s goal of annihilating Hamas requires going into Rafah, why would that not be supported by the U.S.?MR MILLER: We support Israel’s goal to defeat Hamas and to ensure that the terrorist attacks of October 7th can never be repeated, but we have always said that it needs to – the campaign that Israel is carrying out needs to be carried out in a way that puts civilian protections first. And so we don’t see any tension between those two, and that’s why we have said that before Israel conducts a full-scale military campaign against the Hamas battalions that remain in Rafah, that it needs to have that kind of civilian protection plan.QUESTION: And finally, does the State Department have any reaction to the rise in cyber operations by China? Has the administration taken any actions to hold the CCP accountable for targeting the U.S. infrastructure with malware recently?MR MILLER: We have long made clear that we oppose any cyber actions in that – of that regard by both the PRC and others, and if you look, there is a long history of us taking action to impose consequences when we see them.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead, Shannon.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Then I think we’ll wrap there.QUESTION: As Russia’s treatment of dual citizens has become a more visible problem, has the State Department taken any steps to push Russia to change its policy and allow regular consular access to American dual citizens beyond just asking for access to those already in detention in Moscow?MR MILLER: Oh, we have pressed it at a number of levels. Both – you’ve seen the Secretary raise this in direct conversations in the past – not – have a lot of regular engagements with the Russian Government now, but our embassy continues to raise it on a regular basis. The unfortunate truth, though, is that Russia continues to detain its own citizens and continues to detain American citizens, and it’s why we have tried to make clear as – just as plainly as we possibly can that no American citizen should consider traveling to Russia for any reason, period, because they are at risk of detention, imprisonment by the Russian regime.So we will continue to work to try to get consular access to Americans that have been detained. We will continue to try to work to free those American citizens who we have determined to be wrongfully detained. And we will continue to call on humane treatment for everyone, but I think people need to remember the kind of brutal regime that we’re dealing with that’s willing to inflict brutality on its own citizens and willing to inflict brutality on citizens of other countries. And if you are considering travel to Russia for any reason, do not do it. I don’t think we can say that any more clearly.QUESTION: Wait &#8212;QUESTION: On the State Department – sorry, quick follow-up &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, go &#8212;QUESTION: They shouldn’t even consider traveling to – they shouldn’t think about it?MR MILLER: Think about it and make a very quick decision not to do it.QUESTION: But in that Travel Advisory, the State Department’s language says that Russia may refuse to acknowledge dual nationals’ U.S. citizenship. Are you aware of any case where Russia actually has acknowledged U.S. citizenship (inaudible)?MR MILLER: I’d have to look back through history. I’m not aware of any recent case where they have, no.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: And so &#8212;QUESTION: I just have one more, and this goes back to something that was raised yesterday about the UN expert – panel of experts on the sexual – alleged sexual assault of Palestinians. You said that you were looking for independent confirmation or an investigation into that. Has that gone anywhere?Okay, thanks.QUESTION: Can I ask you about (inaudible)?MR MILLER: That’s it for today. Thanks, everyone.QUESTION: Thank you.(The briefing was concluded at 2:05 p.m.)						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Armenia																								Azerbaijan																								Brazil																								China																								Haiti																								Iran																								Iraq																								Israel																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Senegal																								Somalia																								Turkey																								Ukraine
- Online Briefing with Molly Phee, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; Michael Hammer, Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa; and John Godfrey, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Sudan Johannesburg HubDownload or listen to the audio file here .MODERATOR:  Good afternoon to everyone from the U.S. Department of State’s Africa Regional Media Hub.  I welcome our participants logging in from across the continent and thank all of you for joining this discussion on the topic of U.S. efforts with African partners to advance peace and security.  Today, we are very pleased to be joined by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee; Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Michael Hammer; and U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Sudan John Godfrey.  Our three speakers will discuss the recent African Union Summit in Addis Ababa and U.S. efforts in partnership with African institutions to promote peace and stability in eastern DRC, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan.We will begin today’s briefing with opening remarks from our speakers and we will then turn to your questions.  We will try to get to as many of your questions as we can during the briefing.With that, I will turn it over to Assistant Secretary Molly Phee, Ambassador Godfrey, and Ambassador Hammer for their opening remarks.ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  Hello, everyone.  Thanks to our hub team for pulling this together and to those journalists who can join us for this call.  We have a lot to cover today given that we did a lot during our travel last week to the African Union Summit in Addis as well as to Somalia.  I was joined by the U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Mike Hammer and my USAID counterpart, Assistant Administrator Dr. Monde Muyangwa.  And of course I was able to see and work with our great team on the ground in Addis, which includes Ambassador Erv Massinga, our ambassador to the – to Ethiopia; Ambassador John Godfrey, who is our ambassador to Sudan; and our chargé d’affaires at the U.S. Mission to the African Union, Mika Cleverly.If you follow me on X, or formerly Twitter, you will have seen we had a very active week of diplomacy with our African partners, and so today we thought it would be useful to share more details with you as well as answer any questions.  You know we value your work as journalists, even when you’re critical, and we firmly stand for freedom of the press on the continent and around the globe.Let me begin with our visit to Addis, which reflects our strong partnership with African institutions and countries.  You have heard Secretary Blinken frequently emphasize in his speech announcing the U.S. strategy towards Africa and highlighted at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit that President Biden hosted in December 2022 that the United States is deeply committed to strengthening genuine partnerships on the continent to work to solve shared challenges and to deliver on the promises and the fundamental aspirations of the people of Africa and the people of the United States.This past week, the primary focus of our efforts were the ongoing crises in eastern DRC and Sudan as well as tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia resulting from the January 1st Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU.  We also held important discussions about the nature and scope of a follow-on mission to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia, known as ATMIS, and bilaterally we had a chance to meet with many members of the Ethiopian Government as part of our work to advance peace, human rights, and stability in Ethiopia.First, let me share some of our efforts on eastern DRC as we try to de-escalate the conflict between the DRC and Rwanda.  I had the opportunity to meet with President Tshisekedi, President Lourenço, and President Ruto, and President Hichilema in an effort to defuse the situation.  As many of you know, we’ve been actively engaged to prevent conflict between DRC and Rwanda for months.  This effort intensified last November with the visit of the Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, and when she went to Kinshasa and to Kigali, and as you know, I and a few other team members were on that trip.As a result of that engagement, there have been intense, regular conversations between senior U.S. Government officials and the senior officials of the governments in Kigali and Kinshasa, including President Tshisekedi and President Kagame.  Our goal is to keep all the stakeholders engaged.  And I also want to remind folks that Secretary Blinken had a chance to talk with President Lourenço in person about this matter when he traveled to Luanda in January.Throughout this recent time period, we have been directly engaged with both governments as well as regional partners to develop and enact mutually agreed upon confidence-building measures that could de-escalate the situation and create room for the Luanda and Nairobi processes to resume.  Our engagement is designed to support these regional diplomatic efforts, especially the Luanda and Nairobi processes, as they are designed themselves to promote de-escalation and create the conditions for lasting peace in the DRC.It was agreed that our role would be to assess and be clear if either side is not honoring the confidence-building measures and commitments that were forged in our discussions.  Keeping the stakeholders engaged and responsive in this process is our goal.  As you know, we’re quite concerned about recent events, and you may have seen the statement that was issued last Saturday.On the other hand, we were also really delighted to see the serious engagement of regional leaders, and we stand ready to support their efforts to resolve this conflict.  And again, we call on all sides to participate constructively in reaching a negotiated solution.During the past week, I also visited Mogadishu with Ambassador Hammer.  That trip was planned as a follow-on to discussions that were organized at our request at the African Union in Addis on February 14th – I’m sorry, February 13th – with the Core Security Partners Group to maintain momentum to counter al-Shabaab after the ATMIS mission concludes at the end of this year.  As dedicated partners of Somalia, we are fully committed to strengthening the Somalia National Army and supporting their counterterrorism efforts, as you saw with the announcement of U.S. funding support for an additional five bases for the Danab Somali Brigade.  It is also important that an appropriately scoped multinational presence remains in Somalia to help maintain stability until Somalia security forces can fully take over.And in our meeting with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, as we did in our meeting with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Addis, we urged a de-escalation of tensions based on respect for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity – the same words you heard AU Chairperson Moussa Faki stress in his opening address at the summit.The issue of Ethiopia’s desire for increased commercial port access – a valid concern – should be resolved through talks with the federal Government of Somalia and neighboring states, or possibly as part of a regional approach that is based on cooperation and regional economic and security integration.The issue of Somaliland’s status should be resolved by the people of Somalia, including the people of Somaliland, not by external actors.  The region can ill afford more conflict.I also had a chance to discuss important efforts towards constitutional reform with the president and separately with the speaker of the parliament and several other MPs.And as I close my remarks at the top on Somalia, I’d like to express my admiration for the team on the ground – the State Department, USAID, and other interagency partners – for their stellar service in a very difficult environment.  And we also greatly appreciate the role of the U.S. military who are also deployed in Somalia.So I’m going to close off here and turn it over to John Godfrey to review our engagements with Sudan, as we remain deeply concerned about the worsening humanitarian situation and the continued fighting that is threatening to break up the country.  I spent a lot of time in Addis this past week with pro-democracy Sudanese civilians – women, representatives of grassroots organizations, and emergency response rooms, which are groups of young Sudanese trying to get humanitarian assistance out.  I also met with members of the Taqaddum front and others, all who are working tirelessly to advocate for the Sudanese people and prepare for post-conflict governance.  I want to underscore upfront that the United States does not support military governance and will continue, as we have done for decades, to support the Sudanese people against military oppression and in their goal of charting a democratic future.After John talks about Sudan, Mike will brief on our bilateral meetings with Ethiopia, and then we’ll turn to your questions.  Thank you very much for your time and attention.  Over to you, John.AMBASSADOR GODFREY:  Thank you very much, Assistant Secretary Phee.  As Assistant Secretary Phee said, we are deeply concerned about the worsening humanitarian situation and intensified fighting in Sudan, which threatens to divide the country and further destabilize the region.  And just for context, I wanted to highlight a UN OCHA report released last Saturday that estimated that there are more than 6.2 million Sudanese who have been internally displaced since the fighting began last April, and about 1.8 million further Sudanese who are refugees in neighboring countries, which makes this the largest displacement crisis anywhere in the world at the moment.  At the same time, acute food insecurity affects about 17.7 million Sudanese, 5 to 6 million of whom may face acute starvation as early as May.During her time here in Addis last week, Assistant Secretary Phee held an intensive series of meetings on Sudan, as she mentioned, and her meetings focused on three sets of issues: one, the urgent need to stop the fighting; two, facilitating humanitarian access, which is badly needed; and three, supporting Sudan’s civilians, who must determine the country’s post-conflict future.As Assistant Secretary Phee said at the top, she met with women civil society representatives, leaders of grassroots organizations, and resistance committee members, representatives of the emergency response rooms, and members of the Taqaddum pro-democracy front.  Her discussions with Sudanese civilians focused on increasing women’s participation in a political process and in post-conflict governance, on expanding international actors’ engagement with local actors providing humanitarian assistance – and that includes the ERRs that were mentioned – and further diversifying Taqaddum to be more broadly representative and able to speak with a unified voice to articulate civilians’ concerns and put pressure on the two warring parties.Throughout, she made it clear that the United States has long stood with the Sudanese people – that is, the Sudanese civilians – and that neither SAF nor RSF should play a role in post-conflict governance, and that ending the Sudan conflict and restoring civilian governance are high U.S. priorities.  In her many meetings with key stakeholders on multilateral efforts, Assistant Secretary Phee discussed the need for resumed ceasefire talks and coordination of regional initiatives; the urgent need to facilitate humanitarian assistance, which is becoming more urgent by the day, and that includes cross-border assistance from Chad and South Sudan ahead of the impending rainy season, which will make roads impassable; pressing for Sudan-related action in the UN Security Council; and insisting the belligerent parties fulfill their obligations under international humanitarian law as well as meet their commitments to facilitate humanitarian assistance and protect civilians as they agreed to do under the Jeddah Declaration, which neither have done.Thank you.AMBASSADOR HAMMER:  Thank you, John.  This is Mike Hammer.  Good afternoon, good morning, depending on where you are.  Regarding the meetings that we had with Assistant Secretary Phee and our Ambassador to Ethiopia Erv Massinga, I’d like to highlight those meetings that we had with Prime Minister Abiy, Foreign Minister Taye, Finance Minister Shide, civil society representatives, as well as the Interim Regional Administration President Getachew Reda of Tigray, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission Director Daniel Bekele.  And in all those meetings, we expressed U.S. support for the full implementation of the Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, which is known as COHA, as well as our willingness to facilitate dialogue with the Oromo Liberation Army and participate in possible talks with the Amhara Fano aimed at finding a peaceful resolution to ongoing violence, as there is no military solution.  We appreciate that the Government of Ethiopia has expressed its openness to dialogue.We also raised our rising concerns about the human rights situations in Amhara and Oromia and urged that the government ensure the protection of civilians and hold to account perpetrators of abuses.  While work remains, we acknowledge progress on transitional justice and advancing a national dialogue that is inclusive and credible.  Both are key to overcoming past grievances and setting Ethiopia on a better trajectory.Specifically to advance the COHA, Ambassador Molly Phee, of course Ambassador Massinga and I, participated in a meeting February 17th hosted by the National Reconciliation Committee headed by Ambassador Teshome with key donors in support of disarmament, demobilization, and the reintegration program in Tigray that is essential to advancing a lasting peace.  The United States stands ready to disburse $15 million to support DDR activities, and we came away heartened by the considerable financial commitments made by international partners to enable the launch of the program soon.  And today I’m actually calling in from Mekelle, the capital of the Tigray region, where I’m following up with the IRA leadership and had a chance to meet with civil society organizations that our USAID is supporting, which provide assistance to survivors of gender-based violence from the horrific two-year war.I was also briefed by the African Union’s Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission.  And while there has been a dramatic decrease in human rights violations since the end of the war brought on by the Pretoria Agreement in November of 2022, we remain concerned by the lingering presence of Eritrean troops on Ethiopian territory.  It is also urgent that internally displaced people who have suffered so much be able to return to their homes.Allow me to make a final point.  We know from experience that following agreements to end hostilities, the really hard work is implementation.  That is what we are doing now.  Much remains to be done, but we are encouraged that 15 months after Pretoria, both the federal government in Addis and the Tigrayan Interim Regional Administration remain committed to peace.Now I believe the assistant secretary, John, and I are ready to take your questions.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  Okay.  Thank you very much, Assistant Secretary Phee, Ambassador Godfrey, and Ambassador Hammer.  We will now begin the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  For those of you who are listening in in Arabic and French, I believe we have had a technical problem with the Arabic interpretation, and I apologize for that.  You are nevertheless welcome to submit questions in the Q&amp;A tab in either French or Arabic, and we will address your questions at the very least, and we’re working on the interpretation issue.As for all journalists, please – if you would like to ask a question live, please indicate that by clicking on the raise hand button, and then also please make sure that we can see your name, your media outlet, your location, and preferably your question also in the Q&amp;A tab.  I just want you to understand that, from our side, we only see your Zoom logon, and we quite possibly might only see a telephone number.  So if we cannot tell who you are or what outlet you’re from, we will not call on you.So for all questions, we’d ask you that – ask that you limit yourself to one question only.  And again, the topic of today’s briefing is: U.S. Efforts with African Partners to Advance Peace and Security.So for our first question, I’d like to go to Mr. Steve Wembi of Infos Direct, Democratic Republic of the Congo.  The question is:  “The U.S.A. had called for a ceasefire in the armed conflict in the east of the country and asked the belligerents to resolve the conflict politically.  Unfortunately, this ceasefire was respected for only a few days, and today there is a full resumption of fighting.  What is your next approach to silence the weapons in the east?”Assistant Secretary Phee, if you would like to take that question.ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  Sure.  Thanks very much, Steve.  We remain committed to the idea and the principle that there is no military solution to the crisis in eastern DRC.  What I took away from our meetings in Addis about this discussion – and as you heard, we talked with the leadership of Angola and Kenya and Zambia, as well as President Tshisekedi.  We understand that everyone is ready to do their part to try and reduce tensions, reduce fighting, and provide relief to the people of eastern DRC who have suffered so much and for so long.  So again, we are trying to provide our unique resources and capabilities in monitoring actions in that part of the world to contribute towards confidence and legitimacy processes to resolve the tensions.So we’re committed, our partners are committed, the parties are committed to working with us, and we continue to work intensively to address the crisis.MODERATOR:  All right.  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  So for our second question, I’d like to go to Mr. Alula Birhanie of the Addis Media Network in Ethiopia.  And the question is:  “How extensive are the political measures taken by the U.S.A. to stabilize the region?”  Ambassador Hammer, would you like to address that one?AMBASSADOR HAMMER:  Well, maybe I could defer first to Molly as the broader region, and then maybe dive deeper into Ethiopia.ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  I’m not really sure I understand the question, Johann.  What was it again?  What measures we’re taking &#8212;AMBASSADOR HAMMER:  Yeah, I can &#8212;MODERATOR:  How – yeah.AMBASSADOR HAMMER:  &#8212; take a first crack at it.ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  Okay.AMBASSADOR HAMMER:  Basically what this call reflects is the tremendous American engagement at senior levels – from the White House to Secretary Blinken to the travels that the assistant secretary has just done – in our effort to work with our African partners, to – as the question asked – to actually stabilize the region.  I think that it goes without question that the United States is focused on trying to alleviate the suffering that we’ve seen throughout the Horn, and that we are prepared to remain very much engaged, not only to end the conflicts but also to help Africans in the Horn of Africa build a better future for themselves.And really, it is important that it be recognized that we don’t do this alone, and we do it with our African partners.  The visit to the African Union Summit was an opportunity for all of us to engage on these issues, to think together on how we can partner and how we can be most effective in trying to, again, bring peace and stability to the region.  But perhaps, again, the assistant secretary would like to add something further.ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  No, thanks, Mike.  I think you’ve covered it, and I believe it should be clear from the number and type of meetings that we described how deeply we value our engagement with our African partners to support them as they strive to bring peace and prosperity for their populations.  And where there are those who engage in disruptive activities, we are there to counsel otherwise and to encourage getting back on the path to peace and prosperity.MODERATOR:  Okay, thank you very much.  I’d just like to remind all the participants today:  If you do have a question, please type that into the Q&amp;A box, not the chat, okay?  And again, if you wish to ask a question, please make sure that you have identified yourself and we know what outlet you’re from.Okay.  So next question comes from Aidan Lewis, Reuters, in the UK:  “How concerned are you about foreign states deepening Sudan’s war by supporting the rival sides or fighting proxy conflicts there?  And to what extent are the warring factions in Sudan impeding the delivery of humanitarian aid?”So Ambassador Godfrey?AMBASSADOR GODFREY:  Great, thank you, Johann.  To answer the question, I would say that we are deeply concerned by external support to SAF and RSF, and have since the beginning of the conflict urged external actors to refrain from providing materiel support to the two belligerent parties, which has two principle consequences: one, it prolongs the fighting, extends the war; it also reduces the prospects for finding a negotiated exit from the conflict.  And I would just note here that the recent UN panel of experts report highlighted violations of the Darfur arms embargo.  In addition, there is – there are reports about resumed ties between Sudan and Iran that could include, reportedly include Iranian materiel support to SAF, which is also very troubling and a source of great concern for us.On the issue of humanitarian assistance, I think this is a really timely question, and unfortunately the answer to the query is that neither side has taken the steps that they have repeatedly committed to to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.  So just to remind:  Under the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Sudanese Civilians, both SAF and RSF signed on to allow and facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief.  And very candidly, that has not happened.In addition to that, there were a series of measures that they agreed to, confidence-building measures, in the second round of Jeddah talks, that included participation in a humanitarian forum under the auspices of UN OCHA, as well as specific steps to facilitate humanitarian assistance corridors and distribution of aid inside Khartoum itself.  Those have not been met either.And finally, there is the persistent issue of so-called bureaucratic impediments, which includes things like visas for humanitarian assistance workers, travel permits, and inspection of humanitarian cargoes.  Those remain persistent challenges for humanitarian actors.  And finally, I would highlight the confusing signals principally from the Sudanese Armed Forces about whether they would or would not facilitate cross-line assistance into areas under RSF control.The upshot of all of that is that humanitarian assistance since last April has not been able to flow in a rapid and unimpeded way that both sides have committed to, and that you now have a situation where 17.7 million Sudanese, approximately, are in a state of acute food insecurity, and 5 to 6 million of them may be in a situation of acute starvation as early as late May.MODERATOR:  Thank you, Ambassador Godfrey.  So I see a hand up and a submitted question from Sisay Sahlu.  Sisay, can we open your mic?  Please limit yourself to just one question, and keep it brief, if you don’t mind.QUESTION:  Can you hear me?MODERATOR:  Yes, we can hear you now.QUESTION:  Thank you.  My name is Sisay Sahlu; I’m a journalist in Ethiopia, media called The Reporter newspaper.  I would like to know just, Assistant Secretary of State Molly Phee, regarding the resolution of the conflict between the two largest groups in Oromia and Amhara region, regarding the fight and the death of numerous civilians, the fight with the federal troop.  My argument here is, like, I want to make clear that is, like, the U.S. officials are trying to solve the – see the issue, like, as it was seen in the northern Ethiopia?These are – the ongoing conflict in Oromia and Amhara is tough, and it has never been seen by U.S. officials.  Is there any sanction?  Is there anything that the U.S. officials are looking to impose or to try to solve that’s happening in Oromia and Amhara region, especially with the Fano groups and with the (inaudible) groups?  Is there any sanction list for authorities who are, like, unwilling to resolve the dispute?  Thank you.ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  Thank you, Sisay.  If you heard about the number of meetings we had in Ethiopia, we met with many members of the government as well as community and human rights activists, as well as Dr. Daniel Bekele.  So this has been a recurring theme in our discussions with our Ethiopian partners.  The prime minister says that he is committed to peaceful resolution of the challenges that Ethiopia is now facing in the Amhara and Oromia regions.  We encourage him to act on that commitment.We have expressed concern publicly and privately about the conduct of security services in responding to insurgent and criminal attacks.  We know that that’s a complicated security challenge, but more must be done to respect the rights of civilians.  And we remain postured through our ambassadors in the region to support the Ethiopian Government and other stakeholders as they try to restore calm to both regions.AMBASSADOR HAMMER:  If I may add – this is Mike Hammer – you may also recall that we were directly involved in a round of talks with the Oromo Liberation Army in Dar es Salaam last November, and remain ready, as we’ve offered to the government and the parties, to help facilitate a peaceful resolution to that conflict.  And we know that our Ambassador Massinga in Addis is also offered to the government, and if there’s an opportunity to engage with the Fano, we would welcome the opportunity to try to, again, advance peace.  And as we’ve said repeatedly, there is no military solution to these conflicts.  And in fact, the focus right now should be on dialogue and of course ensuring the protection of civilians.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  All right, thank you very much.  I’d like to invite Ange Kasongo, Reuters, in the DRC, to ask her question, which was posed in French.  Ange, you may pose your question in French or in English, as you like.  We do have interpretation.QUESTION:  (In French.)MODERATOR:  All right, thank you for the question.  Which of our panelists would like to address that?ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  You need to provide us with some guidance about where we can find the translation so we’re properly responding to the question.MODERATOR:  Ah.  Okay, apologies.  There is a translation tab, but I will – let me just read; we have a translation of it at any rate.  “So the efforts in Addis Ababa between Kigali and Kinshasa, under the auspices of Angola, have not succeeded in either a promise of dialogue or in a ceasefire.  Can you tell us a little bit about the blockage which has not permitted this conflict to arrive to a stage of dialogue?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  Well, I can reaffirm the commitment of the United States to continue to press both sides, as well as to work energetically with regional countries to try and address the current spike in conflict that we’re seeing in eastern DRC.  We have – we would prefer to use the channel that we’ve established between the two parties in which we’ve agreed together with them on a series of confidence-building measures that would restore calm and create a space for dialogue.  And when the parties don’t agree to those measures, we – or don’t follow through on their promised implementation, we will call them out.This conflict, as you know better than I, has been long running for decades.  So it is not a surprise that we haven’t reached immediate resolution, but we have had some success over the past few months.  Again, I was encouraged by my engagement in Addis, where it was clear to me that the regional partners are committed to trying to take additional steps to de-escalate the situation.  And we will just continue to try, because the consequences for the people of eastern DRC and for the security and stability of the region are too costly not to remain actively engaged and pressing forward.I would like to highlight that yesterday the UN Security Council adopted additional sanctions measures against the M23, and we will continue to look at all tools available to us to encourage resolution of the tensions.MODERATOR:  Okay, thank you very much.  Our time is running short.  I think we might have time for one more question.  There’s a question in the Q&amp;A from Galami Ahmat Galami of Tchad Media in N’Djamena.  And the question is translated:  “Thank you for this press conference.  The situation in Sudan has consequences for Chad, and it’s important to address those consequences.  The United States has proposed several solutions to stop the war, including diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, and peacekeeping initiatives.  It’s a complex issue, but an international cooperation and dialogue are crucial for finding a resolution.  Is – what is the United States approach to resolving the conflict and the spillover effects into Chad.”ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  John, do you want to address that first?AMBASSADOR GODFREY:  Yeah, sure, happy to do so.  Thank you for the question.  First of all, I’d like to start by thanking Chad for hosting such a large number of Sudanese refugees, including but not only from the Darfur region, who have been displaced by the fighting.  Chad has been a very good host for those refugees, and we know that that puts a burden on the country.  You’re right that we have adopted a series of different measures to try to bring an end to the fighting, facilitate humanitarian access, and ensure that in a post-conflict environment there is civilian governance with no role for either of the military parties in governance.We have called on SAF and RSF to fulfill the commitments they both made to IGAD at the extraordinary summit on December 9th to meet face to face at the level of General Burhan and General Hemedti.  We’ve also called for them to implement what they agreed to in principle there, which is an unconditional and – ceasefire, and an immediate one.  We have worked actively from the beginning of the conflict, as I mentioned earlier, to urge external actors to refrain from providing materiel assistance.  We were actively involved in two rounds of talks in Jeddah that were designed to achieve ceasefires and facilitate humanitarian assistance.  And in the first round of Jeddah, we were able to effect some short-term ceasefires that enabled the delivery of about – of humanitarian assistance to about two and a half million people.We have used sanctions, and Assistant Secretary Phee has been very clear with both sides that we will continue to identify additional potential actions going forward for as long as the fighting continues and the two sides refuse to negotiate an exit to the fighting.  And just to remind – since the beginning of the conflict, we’ve sanctioned 14 individuals and entities to deny the belligerents the means to prosecute the war, and also to reduce and deter atrocities and other human rights violations, as well as to ensure that there’s a post-conflict civilian government, and again, not one that is dominated by either of the belligerents.  And the other measures have included the Secretary of State issuing an atrocities determination on December 6th that indicated that SAF has committed war crimes and that the RSF has committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.But maybe just to get to what’s arguably the most important part of the question, we’ve now had several different efforts to reach a negotiated exit from the conflict, including the Jeddah talks, IGAD’s initiative in December and January, and more recently, talks in Manama.  We are open to the possibility of going back to talks, and frankly, I think we’re open in terms of what the venue is and what the format is.  We do think there needs to be participation by the external actors who have leverage to bring to bear against both parties so that we can find a negotiated exit to this terrible conflict.MODERATOR:  Okay.  Well, I think we might have time for one more question.  And there’s a question in here from Constance Daire for Africa Intelligence.  “Regarding the MOU between Ethiopia and Somaliland, are you worried it will affect the fight in Somalia against al-Shabaab, especially regarding the Ethiopian forces in ATMIS?  And has the official signing of the MOU been delayed after meetings with the Ethiopian authorities in the context of the AU Summit?”  And that will &#8212;ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  Thanks for that question.  As I explained in my opening statement, we had always planned to travel to Mogadishu on the occasion of the African Union Summit, because now is the time for everyone to be focused on discussing the scope and shape of the future ATMIS mission, which is designed to end at the end of this year.  We were grateful that the African Union Commission hosted a meeting with all the stakeholders who are engaged in Somalia’s fight against al-Shabaab, and that includes the troop-contributing countries from Africa, including Ethiopia.  Those were – that was an important discussion about how we can all work together on that project, and that’s where the focus needs to be.  That’s why I had agreed to travel to Somalia to highlight the American commitment to Somalia as they seek to liberate their country from al-Shabaab and be able to develop their country for their people.So that is the goal for all of us.  That’s what we shared with the Ethiopian Government, that while we recognize their legitimate concerns as a landlocked country, we needed to address those concerns in a way that didn’t disrupt the shared commitment among all partners in the region, on the continent, and internationally, to help Somalia through this difficult period.  So that’s where our focus is now, and that we’re encouraging all sides to de-escalate the tensions that were provoked by the MOU, to communicate better.  We’re contributing, hopefully, to improve communication, and we also consulted with other partners in the Horn about how to, again, focus on what we’re doing together to tighten up our effort to combat al-Shabaab and help Somalia develop.It was important to me to also have a conversation with Somali partners when I was in Mogadishu about their need to continue to focus on governance, to deprive al-Shabaab from any sort of weakness among their engagement among the member states that creates a vulnerability for the terrorists.  So that’s the focus of the parties, that’s our focus, and we will continue to contribute to, again, a reduction in tensions and an expansion in communication so there’s no room for misinterpretation or inadvertent miscommunication that could cause trouble.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  All right.  Thank you very much.  So that does conclude the Q&amp;A portion of our briefing today.  And I’m glad we were able to get to so many of the questions.  There were a lot of journalists online and a lot of interest.  We were not able to get to everybody, but unfortunately our time is limited.  I’d like to find – I’d like to ask whether Assistant Secretary Phee, Ambassador Hammer, or Ambassador Godfrey have any final words and invite you to deliver any final thoughts you might have at this point.ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  Well, thanks for that opportunity.  And again, thanks to all for spending some time with us today.  I hope you walk away from this conversation with the knowledge that the United States remains deeply engaged with all of our partners across the continent in a support role to help them address these longstanding tensions and challenges.  Again, we’re acutely focused on the crises in Sudan and in eastern DRC given the damage they are doing both to the people of those regions and to stability on the continent.  And we continue to remain engaged with all partners in an effort to promote stability and create the conditions for peace and economic development.I know that Mike and John would much rather be working, as I would, on expanding trade and investment, but we need to see secure conditions to allow that focus on economic development.  So thanks to all of you for listening to us.  I hope you come away reassured that we’re deeply engaged and will remain deeply engaged across the continent.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  All right.  Ambassador Hammer, Ambassador Godfrey, any final words for us?AMBASSADOR HAMMER:  No, I think the Assistant Secretary covered it well.  Again, as always, we appreciate your interest and also your courage.  Oftentimes, as journalists working in very difficult and challenging environments, freedom of the press, as Molly said at the opening, is essential and is something that we as the United States support not only on the continent but around the world.  So thank you again for your time and the work that you do.AMBASSADOR GODFREY:  Just would echo Assistant Secretary Phee’s expression of appreciation for the chance to engage with everybody today on a really important set of challenging issues facing the region, and appreciate the interest and the thoughtful questions.MODERATOR:  All right, that concludes today’s briefing.  I want to thank Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Michael Hammer, and U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Sudan John Godfrey, for joining us.  Thank you to all the journalists for participating.  A recording and transcript of today’s briefing will be distributed to participating journalists as soon as we can produce them this evening.  If you have any questions about today’s briefing, you may contact the Africa Regional Media Hub at AFMediaHub@state.gov.  I would like – also like to invite everyone to follow us on Twitter at our handle @AfricaMediaHub.  Thank you.# # #
- Assistant Secretary Phee’s Travel to Somalia Office of the SpokespersonAssistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee and Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Mike Hammer visited Mogadishu, Somalia February 15-16, 2024.  In a meeting with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, they discussed the current state of play in the region and the importance of avoiding further tensions.  They reiterated U.S. support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and discussed the importance of counterterrorism efforts and planning for a seamless transition from the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to a new multinational force post-ATMIS.  Assistant Secretary Phee and President Hassan Sheikh presided over the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding for the construction of facilities for the Somali National Army’s “Danab” advanced infantry brigade, a cornerstone of the U.S.-Somalia security partnership.  In a meeting with Somali parliamentarians, the delegation discussed the importance of inclusive and transparent constitutional reform.  The delegation also met international partners to discuss shared interests in promoting security and stability in Somalia.  Assistant Secretary Phee recognized International Woman of Courage nominee LTC Iman Elman for her courageous leadership of the Somali National Army’s Civil Affairs Directorate and life-long advocate for peace, human rights, and dignity.						Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Office of the Spokesperson																																Official International Travel																															Somalia
- Welcome Corps:  First Year of Refugee Private Sponsorship a Big Success Lenore T. AdkinsWhen Edwige* left Cameroon seeking refuge and political freedom, she resettled in the United States.Now, through Welcome Corps, a U.S. Department of State program, she and six other members of Boston’s Mission Maranatha church have formed a private sponsor group that is helping Ibrahim*, a newly arrived refugee from Somalia adjust to life in the United States. “Because of my faith, I believe that we should share the love of Christ in practical ways, not just preach to people, but demonstrate the love of God by doing good deeds, by helping our neighbor,” Edwige says in a Welcome Corps story video interview. Edwige, a former refugee herself, pays it forward by helping another refugee in Boston through Welcome Corps. Photo Courtesy: Welcome Corps / Axie BreenWelcome Corps empowers everyday Americans to sponsor refugees. In groups of five or more adults, Americans form sponsor groups to help refugees build new lives in the United States. This involves greeting refugees at the airport, securing and preparing initial housing, enrolling children in school, helping adults secure jobs, and helping them settle into their new communities. A consortium of nonprofit organizations specializing in resettling refugees has partnered with the Department to implement the program and support sponsors. The consortium, led by the Community Sponsorship Hub, includes Church World Service, the International Rescue Committee, International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), Integrated Refugee &amp; Immigrant Services (IRIS), HIAS, and Welcome.US. Beyond the consortium, dozens of community organizations have signed up to serve as private sponsor organizations (PSOs), providing technical expertise and support to sponsor groups as they carry out core services for refugees once they arrive in the United States.As a member of the consortium, IRIS provides support to sponsor groups throughout the application process. But IRIS also serves as a PSO, and in that role, they have supported the Mission Maranatha sponsor group with additional training, answering questions about local benefits for refugees, and how they can best deliver on their core responsibilities.“We’re basically here to provide resources to help them through ... any kind of little challenges that they might come across,” said IRIS Welcome Corps Coach Cindy Dunn. Fleeing war and violence in Somalia, Ibrahim landed in South Africa. In 2013, he moved to a refugee camp and three years later, he was admitted into a resettlement program. After Welcome Corps launched in 2023, Ibrahim resettled in the United States, with help from a private sponsor group.  Ibrahim, center, shares a moment with Ann O’Brien, director of sponsorship at IRIS, at left and Dr. Simone Bamba, pastor of Mission Maranatha church in Boston. Photo Courtesy: Welcome Corps / Axie Breen“Every time, I used to dream of coming to the U.S.,” he said in the video. “Today, my dream came true.” In the year since the State Department launched Welcome Corps, more than 15,000 American sponsors have applied to receive more than 7,000 refugees through Welcome Corps, exceeding the Department’s first year mobilization goal. Included in that milestone are more than 100 private sponsor groups from 32 states that have signed up to be matched with refugees they did not know from around the world. Under the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, these refugees, from around the world, were already being considered for U.S. resettlement.Welcome Corps is one of the ways the Department is expanding domestic resettlement capacity and reaching the Administration’s target of admitting up to 125,000 refugees in fiscal year 2024. In the first year of the program, sponsors have welcomed nearly 100 refugees from various countries including Cuba, Ethiopia, El Salvador, Venezuela, and Syria. They settled in several states, including Arizona, Massachusetts, Illinois, and Texas. Last summer, the program added the Welcome Corps on Campus program, which helps qualifying refugee students pursue higher education in the United States, while private sponsor groups within their new college or university forming to support them. Nineteen universities have applied to welcome 35 refugee students for the fall 2024 semester.Welcome Corps recently expanded to let private sponsor groups refer refugees they know for consideration under the U.S. Refugee Admission Program. This marked the first time Americans have been allowed to refer specific refugees for resettlement. Willy Buhendwa Muhigirwa leads the Association for Congolese in Austin (ACA), a 12-member group that is supporting a Venezuelan refugee family, their way of giving back to a country that welcomed them. He pointed out that there are millions of refugees who have been displaced in many countries, including his own, due to war. They have no shelter, no water, no electricity, no food, no hope and are desperate.“We thought this was a good opportunity to change other people’s lives,” he said. “Some of us came here as refugees and understand the advantage of being helped.” ACA is helping Ronald*, his wife, Yoliana*, and their baby daughter Romina*. They arrived in the United States about a week before Christmas in 2023, and the group has helped them secure housing and register for English classes, furnishing their apartment before they move in, and finding employment for them.“We&#8217;ve had everything we&#8217;ve needed for living, for eating,” Ronald said. “ care and attention dedicated to our child, that group is always looking after her and after our needs to be met at every point.”*DipNote used first names to protect people’s privacy. About the Author:  Lenore T. Adkins is a public affairs specialist in the Bureau of Global Public Affairs and also produces The Week At State newsletter.
- Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Hammer Travels to Uganda and Ethiopia HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Hammer Travels to Uganda and Ethiopia				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Hammer Travels to Uganda and Ethiopia																																		Media Note																														January 17, 2024																																							U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Mike Hammer will travel to Kampala and Addis Ababa January 17-24.&nbsp; In Kampala, Ambassador Hammer will attend the 42nd Extraordinary Summit of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Assembly Heads of State and Government, focused on the ongoing situation between Ethiopia and Somalia and on Sudan.&nbsp; The United States welcomes this IGAD diplomatic initiative and reiterates U.S. recognition of the Federal Republic of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its 1960 borders.&nbsp; On Sudan, Ambassador Hammer will continue to support ongoing regional and international efforts to end the conflict, press for unhindered humanitarian access, promote a democratic transition, and support justice and accountability for victims of the violence.In Ethiopia, Ambassador Hammer intends to meet with African Union officials to coordinate efforts on Sudan and other regional priorities.&nbsp; He will also discuss with Ethiopian officials the urgent need to continue implementing the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement on northern Ethiopia, including making progress on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and moving forward with a victim-centered transitional justice process.&nbsp; Ambassador Hammer will urge dialogue to address the political and security crises in the Amhara and Oromia regions, calling on all parties to protect civilians, refrain from incendiary rhetoric, and respect human rights.&nbsp;						Tags																													Africa																																							African Union																															Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																Democracy																																							Disarmament																															Ethiopia																																Human Rights																																							Humanitarian Aid																															Office of the Spokesperson																																Official International Travel																																																					Refugee and Humanitarian Assistance																															Somalia																																Sovereignty																															Sudan																								Uganda
- Somalia HomeReportsBureau of CounterterrorismCountry Reports on Terrorism 2022&#8230;Somalia				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							Country Reports on Terrorism 2022: Somalia																																					Bureau of Counterterrorism																																																																																																				 In this section																																												Somalia																																												Somalia				Overview:  Al-Shabaab continued to pose a significant terrorist threat in Somalia and the region, despite shared efforts by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), neighboring countries, and the African Union.  Al-Shabaab continued to leverage its influence in Somalia to extort millions of dollars in revenue from residents and businesses.  The group regularly conducted deadly operations, including IED attacks, suicide bombings, complex attacks, targeted assassinations, ambushes along supply routes, and indirect fire.  Al-Shabaab’s tactics, techniques, and procedures preserved its ability to strike U.S. interests in the region, and the group conducted a major propaganda campaign distributed in local Kenyan and Ethiopian languages and dialects to increase foreign fighter recruitment.ISIS-Somalia remains isolated in Puntland, northern Somalia, owing to pressure from al-Shabaab, and in 2022 focused its efforts on revenue generation and extortion activities rather than on high-profile attacks, with some reports of intent to expand revenue generation into the neighboring Somaliland region.  In November, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated eight individuals and one entity as part of the weapons trafficking networks integrated with ISIS-Somalia.The FGS made security gains against al-Shabaab in 2022 with international assistance.  Led by the U.S.-trained Danab Advanced Infantry Brigade, the Somali National Army (SNA) and local clan militias dubbed Ma’awisley conducted clearing operations against al-Shabaab in the Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions and transitioned control of some of these areas to local authorities.  Holding recovered areas remained a significant challenge.  International stabilization assistance has helped establish governance structures and repaired community infrastructure in newly liberated areas, which in turn has contributed to greater security in some areas.  Al-Shabaab fighters contested SNA control of defensive positions and supply lines.2022 Terrorist Incidents:  Somalia suffered continual, low-intensity conflict between government-aligned forces and terrorists in 2022.  High-profile terrorist incidents included the following:On May 3, al-Shabaab attacked an African Union Transition Mission in Somalia base in Ceel Baraf, killing about 35 Burundian soldiers.  Roughly 300 al-Shabaab fighters breached the base perimeter, using two car bombs, followed by heavy gunfire.On July 20, al-Shabaab militants attacked towns located along the border with Ethiopia in Bakool region, where they clashed with Ethiopian paramilitary forces.  Following a three-day battle, Ethiopian officials reported more than 100 fighters had been killed after the militants crossed the border, reportedly traveling about 100 kilometers into Ethiopia.  Numbers of civilian and security forces killed or wounded were not published.On August 19, al-Shabaab launched a complex attack on Mogadishu’s Hayat Hotel, which ended after a 40-hour siege, with at least 32 killed.  This marked the first hotel attack in Mogadishu since January 2021.On October 3, at least 20 people were killed in a triple car bombing attack by al-Shabaab in the city of Beledweyne in central Somalia.On October 29, two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) detonated near Zobe junction in Mogadishu, killing about 121 people and injuring more than 330, the largest civilian casualty attack since a suicide VBIED attack in the same area in 2017.On November 27, al-Shabaab launched a high-profile, complex attack on Villa Rays Hotel, located adjacent to Mogadishu’s highly protected government mall area.  The subsequent attack and siege lasted 22 hours, with nine persons killed and five wounded, including the Minister of Internal Security.Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:  The FGS and local authorities demonstrated a continued commitment to improve Somalia’s law enforcement and judicial entities and made progress on U.S.-supported counterterrorism initiatives.  In 2022 the Somali Police Force leveraged U.S. mentorship and increased its capacity to investigate and prosecute terrorism cases.  Draft legislation on counterterrorism, the National Intelligence and Security Agency Act and the National Identification and Registration Act were introduced to Parliament in December 2021 and approved in mid-January, but they have yet to be signed.Countering the Financing of Terrorism:  Somalia is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force.  Its FIU is the Financial Reporting Center.  In December the FGS closed around 250 bank and 70 mobile money accounts with suspected al-Shabaab connections, and it will continue to investigate the suspicious accounts.Countering Violent Extremism:  The Office of the Prime Minister is responsible for coordinating FGS efforts and international support for the prevention and countering of violent extremism.  The FGS has gathered religious leaders to counter al-Shabaab religious narratives, supported in part by the U.S. Agency for International Development.  In 2022, U.S. support enabled continuance of a messaging and hotline campaign that boosted enrollments in defector rehabilitation centers.International and Regional Cooperation:  The African Union Mission on Somalia evolved into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in March, as endorsed and authorized by the UN Security Council in resolution 2628 with a mandate (subsequently extended in United Nations Security Council resolution 2670) through midyear 2023.  ATMIS’s anticipated exit is envisioned as year-end 2024, when Somalia is expected to assume full responsibility for its own security.																												    							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- Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism Landberg’s Travel to Kenya and Somalia Office of the SpokespersonActing Coordinator for Counterterrorism Christopher Landberg travelled to Kenya and Somalia November 13 – 17 to discuss shared counterterrorism objectives, review State Department-funded capacity building programs, and engage with his counterparts to strengthen security cooperation.In Kenya, Acting Coordinator Landberg met with senior government officials to reaffirm the United States’ strong security partnership with Kenya and to discuss priorities for regional coordination and cooperation against terrorism threats in East Africa. Acting Coordinator Landberg joined Kenya’s Principal Secretary for the Ministry of Interior and National Administration, Dr. Raymond Omollo, in the ribbon-cutting ceremony for a State Department-funded law enforcement training center in Kanyonyo, Kenya.In Somalia, Acting Coordinator Landberg met with senior government officials to discuss shared counterterrorism objectives in the country.