Progress and Purpose:

A Developmental History

Of The

United States Marine Corps

1900- 1970

By

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth J. Clifford, USMCR

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380

I 973

PCN 19000412400
Library of Congress Card No. 73—600153

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,

Washington, D.C. 20402—Price: $1.75 GPO supply price

Stock Number 0855—00067
FOREWORD

In this work the fighting record of the U.S. Marine Corps is not discussed but rather the inventiveness of those Marines who pioneered the amphibious role that would be played by the Corps

in the 20th century.

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth J. Clifford, the author, has been active in the Marine Corps

Reserve for many years and served on active duty as an infantry platoon leader in Korea. More

recently he has taken leave from his civilian pursuits of teaching social and political history at

St. John's University in Jamaica, New York, to serve two years at the Historical Division of

Headquarters Marine Corps and a year in Vietnam as an assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff,

G—l, III Marine Amphibious Force. He has a PhD in American studies from the University of

London and is completing a book analyzing British and American amphibious (combined) operations, 1920— 1945.

This work is dedicated to the proposition that Marines, past, present, and future, are experts

in their craft, namely, amphibious warfare. However, amphibious warfare is a complex subject and

this book does not pretend to be the last and definitive work on 20th century development of

amphibious doctrine, tactics, equipment, and techniques. It should be considered an exploratory

work, one that invites further research and study. Comments on the text, including citation of

errors of both omission and commission, are solicited.

E. H. SIMMONS

Reviewed and approved: Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

1 March 1973. Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

U'

PREFACE

Marine Corps contributions to the development of doctrine, tactics, and techniques of amphibious warfare have been cited in various Marine Corps histories for at least the past 70 years. It

was the idea of Lieutenant General James M. Masters, Sr., then Commandant of Marine Corps

Schools, 1966—1968, to restate these contributions and to cite some other contributions such as the

doctrine of vertical envelopment and the use of helicopters in land warfare. My idea was to tell the

story of these contributions without using a chronology of Marine "firsts."

The book is generally divided into decades giving the status of the Marine Corps during the

particular decade, coupled with a brief introduction into the political and economic climate of the

times. This was of course important because it is those economic and political factors that directly

affected the military situation.

In researching for the story, three unique things became apparent. The first was that in 1932,

the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico chose to study a case history in disaster from World War I,

the Gallipoli-Dardanelles Campaign of 1915—16. Rear Admiral L.E.H. Maund, Royal Navy, might

have given the answer for Marine Corps Schools if it had been asked of them—Why study Gallipoli?

Admiral Maund said of Gallipoli, "It had imagination, it had the promise of great strategic gains;

while the reasons for its failure could easily be discerned and had to do with lack of technique,

material and belief in this form of warfare—shortcomings that could all be overcome." It is the

"shortcomings" that Marine planners had overcome by the commencement of World War II. The

second unique accomplishment that surfaced was that Marine Corps Schools had the first written

doctrine on landing operations before it had suitable landing boats to carry out the doctrine. In

like fashion, within 15 years after the "Tentative Landing Operations Manual" was published, the

Marine Corps Schools had the first written doctrine on helicopter operations before actually possessing a helicopter.

As a by-product of researching this book, I discovered and used quite extensively the General

Board Records of the United States Navy which apparently had seen little previous use by Marine

researchers. My profound thanks go to Dr. Dean C. Allard, Head of the Navy Operational Archives

Branch, Naval Historical Division and Mrs. Kathleen Lloyd who made these records available to me.

My major source of information came from Breckinridge Library, Marine Corps Educational Center at Quantico. Mr. Dave Brown and Mrs. Lyvia Garsys of the library helped me through the maze

of files there. The Historical Amphibious File at the library is a gold mine for amphibious warfare

researchers and the cooperation of all personnel there is outstanding. The people at the libraries

of the Office of the Chief of Military History of the Army and of the Navy Department were most

helpful noting particularly Mr. W. Bart Greenwood and Mrs. Rita Halle of the Navy Library.

Getting closer to home, Mrs. Clara Miller and Mrs. Frances Rubright of the History and Museums

Division Library and Archives were exceptionally helpful. Sergeant Michael L. Gardiner and Lance

Corporal Isaac C. Moon, Jr., both had a hand in typing various versions of the manuscript, but the

lion's share of work on the final manuscript was done by Miss Kay P. Sue. The index was compiled

and prepared for publication by Miss Cynthia J. Nash. The maps and sketches were prepared by

Sergeants Kenneth 'W. White and Jerry L. Jakes. I am particularly indebted to Mr. Henry I. Shaw,

Jr., Chief Historian of the History and Museums Division at Headquarters Marine Corps and Professor William H. Russell of the United States Naval Academy. I doubt if Winston Churchill could have

gotten his works past their critical eyes without their strong recommendation and comments.

In any event—they were right in all instances.

Historical accuracy is my responsibility alone and the very few unsolicited grains of personalV
opinion are mine also. A debt of gratitude goes to those officers who read my drafts and gave me

the benefit of their knowledge and invaluable experience. Unless otherwise noted, all illustrations

are official Department of Defense (Marine Corps) photographs.

Lastly, I would like to dedicate this book to the Amphibious Warfare Presentation Team killed

in the performance of their duty to their country and to their Corps in a plane crash in January

1968. In the final analysis, the members of the Presentation Team represented all Marines, past,

present, and future. They were about their duty, telling the story of what the Marine Corps/Navy

Team does best—conduct amphibious operations. As long as there are oceans and littoral areas of the

world, there will always be a need to know the workings that makeup the amphibious operation.

/<t

KENNETH J. CLIFFORD

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

BACKGROUND—1900-1920—COMING OF AGE . 1 The Nature of the General Board 6

Advanced Base Force—The Reason for Existence 8

Advanced Base Force Comes of Age 15

"The World Must Be Safe for Democracy" 21

II. POSTWAR DISARMAMENT PERIOD 25

Evolution of a Staff 27

Duties and Missions 29

Maneuvers, Expeditions, Football, and Mail 30

Fleet Maneuvers—l922 31

Fleet Maneuvers—1923—l924 32

Aloha—Fleet Maneuvers—1925 35

Marine Corps Schools 36

Aviation—The Magnificent Men in Their Flying Machines 38

III. ECONOMY AND WITHDRAWAL 41

Marine Corps Schools of the Thirties 43

The Manual 46

The Contents 47

Boats, Lighters, and Amphibians 48

I—Landing Boats 48

Il—Lighters 52

Ill—Amphibians 53

Marine Aviation in the Thirties 58

The Genesis of Close Air Support 58

IV. THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES—THE WAR AND THE BOMB 61

War Plans 61

Refinement of Tactics and Techniques in Amphibious Operations During World

War Il—Naval Gunfire (NGF) 65

Close Air Support (CAS) 67

Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) 69

Trials and Adaptations—Marine Aviation 70

And Then Came the Bomb 71

Repeat of the 1930s 73

Phib—31 77

V. THE FIFTIES: MASSIVE RETALIATION, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE,

AND NUCLEAR STALEMATE 79

Introduction 79

The Status of the Marine Corps in the 1950s 79

Korea—The Test 82

Optimum Organization and the Boards 84

Techniques and Hardware Development During the l950s 88

Research and Development (R&D) Cycle 91

vii
VI. THE DECADE OF THE SIXTIES 95

Pacification in General, Civic Action in Particular 96

In Support Of 100

The Helicopter and Refinement of Tactical Mobility 103

High Mobility and the Fire Support Base 105

Research, Development, and Studies in the 1960s 107

The Decade to Come 109

Vertical/Short-Take-Off and Landing 112

APPENDICES

A— Notes 115

B— Bibliography 127

C— Glossary of Abbreviations 133

D— Commandants of the Marine Corps in the Twentieth Century 135

E— Commanders at Quantico 137

F— Outline of the development of the Landing Operations Manual 139

G— Students and instructors who were assigned to MCS during preparation of

Tentative Landing Operations Manual

H— List of participants in conference held at Quantico, Virginia, on 9 January

1934 for purpose of discussing Tentative Landing Operations Manual 143

I— Fleet Marine Force Organization and Composition Board Members 145

J— Citation to accompany the award of the Medal of Merit to Donald Roebling ... 147

INDEX 149

VIII
CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND—1900-1920—COMING OF AGE

Mark Sullivan describes America on the

first day of the new century thus:

The American of 1900, reading his paper on

Monday morning, New Year's Day, or the Sunday

paper of the day before, or almost any paper during the year, observed, with some uneasiness, that

the head-lines continued to occupy themselves, as

they had for a considerable time, with the Philippines, Cuba, Porto Rico, Guam, Aguinaldo, the

Igorrotes; words which three years before had no

more meaning to him than to stir old memories of something he had seen in his schoolboy biographies—you couldn't be confident how to pronounce

the names . . . If the American, reading the papers

of New Year's Day, 1900, was more than commonly

reflective over the serious aspects of the news, it was only partly because the sporting page and the

comic strip had not yet arrived to overbalance the

American newspaper on the side of the merely

diverting. It was due also to the presence in the

newspapers of that day and in the sermons of the

day before, of a spirit of solemnity, occasioned by

the coming of a new year and, as some said, a new

century.1

The United States population at the start

of this new century had an estimated 76,094,000

persons of whom there were nearly 39 million

males.2 Out of this then-vast population came

the little known U.S. Marine Corps of 5,240

men and 174 officers including the Brigadier

General (later Major General) Commandant

Charles Heywood.

There was little difference, in the minds of

the general public, between the Marine Corps

and the Navy. The recent Spanish-American

War had been a "Naval War" and the subsequent events of occupation and the Philippine insurrection were an Army show. There

were no Marine national heroes, such as the

Navy's "Hero of Manila Bay," Admiral George

Dewey, or the Army's "Rough Rider," Teddy

Roosevelt. The only group of people who perhaps knew the difference between an officer

of Marines and an officer of the Navy line was

the Washington social crowd. When it came

to proper representation at the 'White House,

the Navy didn't hesitate to make clear that

Major General Charles Heywood, 9th Commandant

of the U.S. Marine Corps, 30 June 1891 to 2 October

1903. (USMC Photo #302066).

the Marines did not represent the Navy. The

Marines were quite separate.

During the early years of the McKinley

Administration, Colonel Theodore A. Bingham,

an Army Engineer, had the position of Commissioner of Public Buildings and Grounds and acted as a kind of major-domo of the

White House. Colonel Bingham had to select

the President's two military aides, traditionally

representing the two branches of the service.

There had been no objection to the first assistant, an able army artillery officer. The fatal

error was the choice of the Navy representative, Captain Charles L. McCawley. Captain

McCawley was an admirable young man, witty

I
2 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Lieutenant Dion Williams and a detachment from the USS Baltimore saluting Admiral Dewey on his visit to

the Navy Yard, Cavite, Philippine Islands on 13 June 1898. (USMC Photo #4831).

and well-bred. The trouble was that he did

not belong to the Navy proper. He was a

captain of Marines. Navy circles buzzed with

the news that officers of the line had been

passed over at the Executive Mansion. The

Navy Department was boiling with resentment.

To allay the fears of some of the Navy officials,

Marine gun crew on board the USS Alliance in

1888. (USMC Photo #515255).

Secretary of the Navy John D. Long got the

President's consent to augment the detail of

aides with a naval officer. The grave crisis of

Washington society was resolved and the Navy's

feelings were saved.

Willis J. Abbot has written a history of the

Marine Corps entitled Soldiers of the Sea,

published in 1918. In the foreword of the book,

it was noted that "until now one could search

the public libraries almost in vain for works

pertaining to the U.S. Marine Corps, as such,

and Mr. Abbot has rendered a notable service." The fact is that this statement was not

technically correct. There was in existence a

second edition (1903) of Major Richard S.

Collum's History of the United States Marine

Corps. Though it was not a runaway best

seller, it did provide, for those interested, the

story of the Marine Corps.

The Marines did get some notoriety of sorts

when the former Assistant Secretary of the

Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, in his last year as

President in 1908 caused the removal of

Marines from naval vessels. Efforts to remove

Marines from ships had been made by a group

of naval officers from 1890—94, led by the

Marine Corps antagonist, Captain William F.

Fullam, USN. These early efforts were rejected

- -
TL1

BACKGROUND—1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 3

Group of officers, 1st Battalion of Marines (Huntington's), Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H. (Seavey's Island), in

September 1898. Left to right: Lieutenants Lewis C. Lucas; Clarence L. A. Ingate; Melville J. Shaw; Newt H. Hall;

and George C. Reid. (USMC Photo *515616).

by the Secretary of the Navy but were again

brought up in 1908. This time the pleas fell on

the sympathetic ears of the President who

issued an Executive Order which defined the

duties of the U.S. \1arine Corps and specifically

left out duty on board naval vessels. Not

only were the Marines withdrawn from ships, but, to rub it in, the Wash ington Post, in a

feature article, declared that the Army was to

get the Marines by transfer to the Army infantry. The newspaper stated:

Mr. Roosevelt had not only reached this conclusion, but has taken preliminary steps toward the

practical development of the plan. He already

has conferred with officers of the general staff, and

also with General Leonard Wood, who is known

to be close to him in military matters. General Wood and the members of the general staff are

formulating a scheme outlining the Presidential

ideas.6

The Navy Department countered this rumor

by submitting a detailed statement to the

House Naval Affairs Committee. It was made

clear that "It is of the utmost importance that

the Marine Corps remain absolutely under the

control of the Navy Department and all war

plans thus far laid down provide for the close

cooperation of the Marine Corps with the Navy,

afloat and ashore." The President of the

General Board, Admiral Dewey, in a letter

to the House Naval Affairs Committee, reiterated the importance of Marines within the

Department of the Navy because of the need

for an expeditionary force to assist the fleet

in seizing and holding advanced bases. His

high regard for Marines stemmed back to his

Manila Bay victory when he asserted: "If there

had been 5,000. Marines under my command
4 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Sketched reproduction of a cartoon dealing with

Photo #528702).

at Manila Bay, the city would have surrendered

to me on May 1, 1898, and could have been

properly garrisoned. The Filipinos would have

received us with open arms, and there would

have been no insurrection." 8

It is interesting to note that this friend of

the Marine Corps, Admiral Dewey, was in favor

of the President's Executive Order 969, but

for different reasons; none were sinister. He

said that "while the marines will no longer

form parts of the crews of the ships, the navy

is to have the services of this fine corps for

the important and necessary duties laid down

in that order." Outwardly, it would appear

that it was a family fight between the Navy

and the Marine Corps. But of course it was not. It became quite political because it involved the actions of the President of the

United States and his use of the Executive

Order. The ramifications of the use of this

order not only affected the Navy and Marine

Corps but touched on prerogatives of Congress.

The right to issue such an order without

special provision of law was assumed on the

ground that the President as Commander in

Chief of the Army and Navy could dispose of

the naval forces according to his judgment.

In a vote two months later, the Senate would

dispel this view.

The controversy thus became a matter of

principle involving Presidential powers vis-avis Congressional prerogatives. Some strong

Congressional leaders upheld the President

on the basis of separation of powers. Among

the Senate luminaries supporting the President

were William E. Borah, Robert M. LaFollette,

and Henry Cabot Lodge.

The newspapers had to reorient the people

who followed the controversy from November

THE WASHINGTON POST FEBRUARY 26, 1909

WILL SOMEBODY TELL THE MARINE JUST WHERE HE'S UAT

By DeMar.

the Marines on Navy ships controversy. (Taken from USMC
BACKGROUND—1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 5

1908 to March 1909. They had to identify exactly what Marines were and what they did.

The public was learning, in popular newspaper fashion, that the Marines had been involved in the "Naval War" with Spain, that

Marines served on most naval vessels, including

the Maine, and thus participated in all the

naval battles of the war. They learned that

Marines were with Dewey at Manila Bay and

Sampson at Santiago. They learned that in

addition to Teddy Roosevelt's "Rough Riders,"

there were Marines in Cuba who fought the

Spaniards to capture Guantanamo Bay. They

further learned that in addition to the U.S.

Army in the Philippines and its occupation

force, the Marines had, at the end of 1901,

over 2,000 men in the Philippines. They became aware that Marines fought alongside of

the Army against the insurrectionists. The

public was reminded of Marines like Major

Littleton W. T. Waller and places like Samar.

The intricate matter of restoring Marines to

naval vessels was resolved in March 1909.

Senator Eugene C. Hale, Chairman of the

Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, tacked on

to the Naval Appropriations Bill a proviso

that eight percent of the enlisted men on board

battleships be Marines.'° Notwithstanding the

spirited defense of the President's action, the

Senate, by a vote of 51 to 12, adopted the

amendment restoring the Marine Corps to the

ships of the Navy. Those voting in the negative

were all Republicans and members of the

President's party, the majority party.1' In the

waning hours of his administration, in fact

the day before he left office, President Roosevelt

struck his colors, but only halfway. On 3

March 1909, he issued orders restoring the

Sketched reproduction of a cartoon dealing with the return of Marines to Navy ships. (Taken from USMC Photo

#528701).

THE DAILY EVENING TELEGRAPH - PHILADELPHIA, TUESDAY, MARCH 30. 1909

TEDDY HEARS BY WIRELESS.BvARTN.E0.

TAFT PUTS MARINES BACK ON THE QUARTER DECK
6 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

l\'farines to ships, but placing them under the

orders of the captains of the vessels on which

they were to serve.* The technicality was that

under the old order of things Marines had had

specific duties. One of these was to maintain

certain guns of the secondary battery. Now the

President's order placing them under the direction of the ship's captain made it possible to

assign the Marines any sort of duty on board

ship and conceivably remove them from all

guns.

The General Board of the Navy could envision difficulties arising out of this portion

of the order and consequently recommended to

the new Secretary of the Navy, George L. von

Meyer, and the new President, William

Howard Taft, that it be changed. So it was

that on 26 March 1909, three weeks after Mr.

Roosevelt had left office and sailed to Africa

for a lion hunt, President Taft issued a memorandum from the White House:

Upon the recommendation of the General Board

it was decided at the Cabinet meeting today that

the amendments to the regulations adopted on S

March in regard to the Marines should be revoked

and the old regulations should be restored.

The Marine Corps and friends of the Marine

Corps on the Naval Appropriations Committee

had won out. Benjamin Standish Baker, a popular correspondent for the Boston Transcript,

had written:

it is common to hear officers both of the

army and of the line of the navy admit that when

it comes to being in constant and effective touch

with members of Congress, and thus securing desired legislation and favors, the Marine Corps is

easily leader."

The point is that the controversy in 1908 was

a blessing in disguise for the Marine Corps if

not Theodore Roosevelt. If the action of the

President diminished for the time being the

duties of the Marine Corps by taking Marines

off naval vessels, the resulting publicity reminded the American public, including the

Congress, that there was such an organization

called the Marine Corps which definitely

shared the tasks of defense of the United States

with the Army and Navy.

It should be recalled that inauguration day for the

incoming President of the United States was 4 March

and that not until the 20th Amendment was ratified

in 1953 was it changed to 20 January.

The Nature of the General Board

"And doth not a meeting like this make amends"

Thomas Moore (Irish Melodies)

A general board has been made, of which

the Admiral is president, and the function of

which is to consider questions relating to the

efficient preparation of the fleet in case of war

and for the naval defense of the coast.

Thus the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. John D.

Long, reported to the President in his annual

report in November 1900. This routine mention of the General Board could not possibly

indicate the great ramifications that this board

would have on the defense structure of the

nation, Navy, and Marine Corps in the succeeding four decades. There was no question that

the need for this type of board existed, the

question was what role it should take—advisory

or executive in nature.

Prior to the Spanish American War, the

United States had no central advisory authority

for determining naval policy. During the war,

the Secretary of Navy appointed a Naval War

Board, sometimes called the Strategy Board, to

collect military information, prepare strategic

plans, and generally advise him on strategy,

policy, and the conduct of the war. The most

distinguished member of this board was Rear

Admiral Alfred T. Mahan. With the close of

the war, the War Board quietly went out of

existence. The success with which this rudimentary general staff functioned tended to crystallize sentiment within the Navy for the

establishment of a more permanent organization of comparable character. The fact that

after the war the Navy's increased responsibilities extended to opposite sides of the globe

made careful planning by a body similar to

a naval general staff an urgent necessity.

One of the most progressive officers in the

Navy, Captain Henry C. Taylor, urged the

Secretary of the Navy to approve a type of

general staff for the efficiency of the Navy.

Among Taylor's more influential supporters

was Admiral Stephen B. Luce, the elder

stateman of the Navy, who was then living in

retirement at Newport, Rhode Island.14 In

addition, Taylor had the support of the current hero, Admiral George Dewey, who was a

strong supporter of some sort of central authority. Dewey argued that "we had been making our appropriations without a proper regard for their expenditures to the definite end

of developing a fighting force as an efficient
BACKGROUND— 1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 7

whole; 'e had been building ships without

regard to homogeneity '5 Perhaps it was

the times and the fear of a Prussian-type general staff that had emerged in the Kaiser's Germany that frightened people. There were

misgivings in Congress and elsewhere by those

who feared that a full-fledged general staff,

with powers of command, would usurp the

authority of the civilian secretary. As a compromise, Secretary Long established the General Board of the Navy with no executive functions but merely with an advisory capacity.

A major factor in the immediate acceptance

of the board on the part of the rank and file

of the Navy and its prestige with the public

at large was the presidency of George Dewey,

Admiral of the Navy. His place in naval history

was already won; his character was above

reproach; his professional attainments were

of the highest.'6 The other members of the

board were the President of the Naval War

College, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation,

and the Chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence. Others were ordered to serve with the

body as their assistance was desired."

On 29 March 1900, Colonel George C. Reid,

USMC, Adjutant and Inspector of the Marine

Corps, was appointed by the Secretary of

Navy as a member of the board.18 Thus the

Marine Corps initially had a member on the

General Board. As its first order of business,

Secretary Long ordered the new board to consider campaign plans for different war situations in the Philippines and their vicinity. As

it turned out the main peacetime function of

the board would be that of making recommendations for the annual shipbuilding program. Along this line, a board member, Admiral Henry C. Taylor, defined the board's

function: "Not to say what force we should

have but to prepare for war whatever force

Congress should give us." 19 The General Board

of the Navy, while an advisory body to the

Secretary of Navy, became in reality the spokesman for him. During the first 20 years of this

century there were four administrations and

eight Secretaries of the Navy. With the exceptions of George von Meyer (1909—13) and

Josephus Daniels (1913—21), the Navy's Secretaries served on the average of two years. It

would be quite understandable that the Secretary of the Navy would rely quite heavily

on the General Board. The board was made

up of the most distinguished and, hopefully,

the most intelligent officers of the Navy. Until

his death in 1914, the President of the Board

was Admiral Dewey. The great experience and

continuity of the officers of the board would

be hard to ignore, if one were inclined to do

so. However, most Secretaries of the Navy were

pleasant people who were politically rewarded

and who wanted to do a good job, quietly.

They certainly did not want to overshadow

their Commander in Chief. In any event, Presidents such as Theodore Roosevelt, William

Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson would be

somewhat of a challenge to overshadow.

The General Board, therefore, studied a problem, had hearings, and then submitted its

report to the Secretary of the Navy with recommendations. Rarely, if ever, during this

period, did the Secretary of the Navy fail to

approve the General Board recommendations.

With the very nature of the structure of the Navy Department and the evolution of the

powers of the General Board, it became apparent that the Marine Corps could do very

little on its own without the approval of the

General Board. Considering the times, there

may not have .been anything inherently wrong

with the situation.

The Marine Corps did not suffer in any way

under this arrangement. On the contrary, the

General Board in most matters consulted the

Commandant when considering advanced base

deployments, increases in personnel strength,

and the like. The board, however, did make

its own decisions after hearing what the Commandant had to say. It was a unilateral

decision—the General Board's. The board was

quite vigilant in matters that would endanger

the loss of the Marine Corps to the Army and

was always favorably disposed to increasing

the Marine Corps when this could be justified.

So it was, in the early years, that the all-powerful General Board through the person of the

Secretary of the Navy made decisions on deployment, organization, training, strength, and

location of facilities. It was fortunate that the

Marine Corps had a sympathetic General Board

of the Navy in the early years of this century.

The only way the board's decisions could be

overridden was by the necessity of assigning

Marines in emergency expeditionary service.

A crisis in Cuba or Haiti, etc., predisposed

that the Marine Corps would be needed. It

was the President and Secretary of State who

made the decisions, the board simply and will-
I

8 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Marines of the Advanced Base Brigade demonstrate

the operation of the Colt machine gun at Philadelphia

in October 1913. (USMC Photo #517216).

ingly assented. The Marine Corps wa ordered

and the Marine Corps responded. In these decisions the role of the General Board was

minimal.

Advanced Base Force—The Reason

for Existence*

If one were interested in ascertaining what

specifically are the responsibilities of the Marine

Corps today, a reading of the National Security

Act of 1947, as amended, would give the answers. To use terms such as "responsibilities,"

"missions," and "roles" when discussing the

Marine Corps 70 years ago would be incorrect.

The designation of elements of the Marine

Corps as the Advanced Base Force came about

not in order to assign a "responsibility" or a

"mission" to the Corps, but rather to solve

a controversy within the Navy Department.

The controversy was over the question of to

whom should the assault mission be assigned,

There is inconsistency in the correspondence of the

General Board, Secretary of Navy, and the CMC relative to the use of the term Advanced or Advance as

it pertains to Bases, Forces, and the like. It is intended

that Advanced be used throughout this text.

and it would last four years.** On the one side,

some naval officers wanted to keep the Navy

line in exclusive control of landing operations.

Other naval officers simply believed that seamen were too busy for landing parties, that

they must concentrate on working the ship and

its guns. They could not be spared for landing

operations. The controversy focused attention

on the landing force issue and thoughtful men

concluded that the Marine Corps could fill the

bill. By the time of the Spanish-American War

those thoughtful men were vindicated when,

in the battle for Guantanamo in Cuba, a Marine battalion under Marine command had

seized the advanced base that conferred victory.

The Guantanamo precedent of successfully seizing advanced bases was strengthened by similar

experience in the Philippines and China.20 A

precedent of great value to the Marine Corps

was made and the evolutionary assignment of

the "assault mission" fell to the Marine Corps.

After bases were secured, the Marine Corps

would still be needed in defense and develop- ment of these bases. Its authority for this

mission came from the General Board immediately after it was organized, April 1900.

At the first meeting of the General Board,

Colonel George C. Reid, member of the board,

was requested to:

put before it the number and organization of a force of Marines sufficient to hold each of

three positions at Culebra in the West Indies,

Samana (in Santo Domingo), and Guantanamo in

Cuba; composition of this force as to infantry and

artillery to maintain a position against cruisers

or naval brigades landing to attack it.2'

In addition, the General Board recommended

to the Secretary of Navy that:

two transports of capacity sufficient to carry

500 marines each witb 2 months' commissary afl(I

Quartermaster Stores etc. be made ready in the

event of a naval compaign in Asiatic waters and

that they be moved to an advance base near the

scene of hostilities.

The General Board specifically recommended

that the Marines would be "best adapted and

most available for immediate and sudden call

"for use in defending any advanced base.23

The Army's role was considered at this time,

but:

Professor William Russell covers this controversy

eminently well in The Genesis of FMF Doctrine:

1789—1899," l'art 1, April 1951, Part II, May 1951, Part

III, June 1951, and Part IV, July. 1951 in the Marine

Corps Gazette v. 35, nos., 4, 5, 6. and 7.
BACKGROUNI)_19OO_192O_C011NG OF AGE 9
/1 *

10 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Marines of the Advanced Base Brigade practice as

winbling pedestal-mounted naval guns at Philadelphia

in October 1913. (USMC Photo #516704).

in the opinion of the General Board the

requirements of the naval establishment o{ the

United States include a military organization of

sufficient strength in numbers and efficiency, to enable the Navy to meet alt demands upon it for

services within its own sphere of operations, without dependence upon the cooperation of the Army

for ti-oops and military supplies, for such a force

of the Army may not always be available24

With the "who" completed, the "how" and

"where" phase of the advanced base situation

got underway. The General Board requested

the Secretary of Navy to direct the Brigadier

General Commandant to organize immediately

four companies of 104 enlisted men each, and

"have provided for such battalion and stored

at Philadelphia, ready for instant use, a complete equipment for expeditionary field service for such force." 25 The General Board further recommended that officers and enlisted

men of this battalion be thoroughly trained

and instructed in the following areas:

(a) The construction of field fortifications, gun

emplacements, gun platforms and magazines;

(b) The transportation of guns of less than 8-inch

caliber from ship to point of emplacement and the

mounting of same;

(c) The construction and operating of field telegraph and telephone lines, signal, searchlight and

range-finder stations;

(d) The planting of mines, countermining and

the operating of torpeclos for harbor defense.

The board also recommended that the companies composing such a battalion be kept

organized and maintained at their full strength,

ready, in all respects, for immediate service.26

The request by the General Board to the

Secretary of the Navy to direct the Marine Corps

to organize, train, and equip a unit to accomplish a specific task was a first of its kind.

Colonel Reid, as member of the General Board

and the Brigadier General Commandant,

Charles Heywood, set about forming a fixed

defense battalion to fulfill the requirements set

by the Secretary of Navy. To build up the

battalion of four companies of approximately

104 men per company, Marines were transferred from Seavey's Island (Portsmouth, New

Hampshire), League Island (Philadelphia

Navy Yard), and Port Royal, South Carolina

(Parris Island, South Carolina) to the battalion.

The battalion was physically located in two

places, Newport, Rhode Island, and Annapolis,

Maryland. Instruction in the subjects outlined

above began at these two posts by July 1902.

Before the sites of Newport and Annapolis

were chosen for this advanced base schooling,

the Commandant was requested to comment

on the best site for such instruction. He said

that:

- - - of all the stations, Port Royal was the best

station for such instruction as it is nearly stirrounded by water—and being removed from the

pernicious influences of a large city, in consequence

of which the men will be more apt to be interested

in this work - - - 27 Future Marine Corps "boots," at what was

later to become Parris Island Recruit Depot,

would partly agree with the Commandant that

it was indeed "removed from the pernicious influences of a large city." Instruction in advanced base work was continued until September 1902 when the battalion, under the command of Colonel Percival C. Pope, was assembled at Norfolk, Virginia. In October,

another company, under the command of

Captain Smedley D. Butler, joined the battalion

increasing its total strength to 19 officers and

522 enlisted men.ss The battalion sailed for

Culebra in November on board the USS

Prairie where practical application was demonstrated in developing a plan for the defense

of that island. The Marines participated in extensive advanced base exercises with the fleet

until January 1903. It was generally agreed

that Marines had done a good job in defending

Culebra. The next year, 1904, similar work in
— - ______t.wu,tu._.

BACKGROUND—1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 11

the defense of Grande Island in Subic Bay,

Philippines, was accomplished.29

While there was no need to convince naval

officials, the Russo-Japanese War furnished

further evidence of the value of advanced bases,

particularly the Japanese naval advanced base

established in the Elliot Islands.* The occupation of the Elliot Islands was of inestimable

value to Japan in operations against the Russians.

The question of possible and probable advanced base sites was under constant review

by the General Board. All the war plans made

by the General Board required advanced bases

in addition to the permanent base, Guantanamo

in the Caribbean and the advanced base,

Grande Island, in the Philippines. The Marine

Corps dictum, "it depends on the situation,"

was all too true in planning for advanced

bases. The General Board felt that the precise location, defense, and time of occupation

would depend upon the circumstances of the

particular campaign. International "flaps" did

tend to narrow speculation as to the site of

possible future campaigns.

American relations with Japan in 1906 and

1907 became strained when the San Francisco

School Board decided to segregate Asians from

other students and designated a special "Oriental Public School" for all Chinese, Japanese,

9The Elliot Island Group is located in the Gulf of

Korea of the Yellow Sea, approximately 60 miles northeast of Dairen and Port Arthur.

and Korean students. Flushed with victories

over Russia, "the Japanese people were deeply

incensed by such measures. Their press re- sponded immediately to the school board's

action with protests that ranged from rage to

hurt incredulity." 30 President Theodore Roosevelt, in February 1907, called San Francisco's

entire school board, headed by:

a bassoon-playing mayor under indictment

for graft, to come to the White House. The President flusally broke the deadlock, but not until he

waved his Big Stick and l)ared his big teeth. The

Californians were persuaded to repeal the offensive

school order anti to accept what came to be known

as 'the Gentlemen's Agreement.' This secret understanding was worked out, during 1907—08, by an

exchange of diplomatic notes between Washington

and Tokyo. The Japanese, on their part, agreed

to stop the flow of coolies to the mainland of the

United States by refusing to issue passports. The

Californians, their fears largely allayed, henceforth

slept easier.'1

It is interesting to note that during the period

of the American and Japanese war scare, the

American Naval Attaché in Berlin reported to

the Navy Department:

German opinion would undoubtedly favor

the United States in a Japanese-American conflict.

But he added the discomforting bit of intelligence

that the British and German admiralties agreed

Japan would probably vin.'

In spite of the talk of war, the Navy, through

its spokesman Admiral Dewey, President of the

General Board, stated "that he did not expect serious trouble with Japan for a very long

Marines of the Advanced Base Brigade work with mobile searchlights in Philadelphia in October 1913. (USMC Photo

#516701).
12 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

STAFF AND CLASS, SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, ANNAPOLIS, MD., 1906.

Officers of the Staff, seated left to right: First Lieutenant W. G. Fay, Captain D. P. HaIl, Captain J. H. Russell, Major F. J. Moses,

Captain George C. Thorpe, Captain Harold C. Reisinger. Officers of the class, standing left to right: Second Lieutenants W. W. Buckley, Julian P. Wilcox, Benjamin B. Gossett, H. B. Pratt, Bennet Puryear, Jr., Robert L. Denig, Logan Tucker, Henry S. Greene,

Randolph Coyle, C. F. B. Price, William C. Wise, Jr., Charles S. McReynolds.

Many future senior officers of the Marine Corps, including the 16th Commandant, John H. Russell, Jr., are included

in this portrait, (USMC Photo #514699).

time." Some other members of the General

Board believed there was, in the realm of

possibility, a chance of future hostilities with

Japan. Consequently, in January 1907, the

Army and Navy decided to undertake joint

studies along those lines for a possible war with

Japan. The studies were inaugurated at the

suggestion of Major General J. Franklin Bell,

the Army Chief of Staff.

On a lower level, Marines were ordered to

commence extensive construction of temporary defenses at Olongapo in the Philippines.

Twenty 6-inch, four 4.7-inch, four 4-inch, and

sixteen 6-pounder guns were mounted in 10

weeks. "The work amounted to the temporary

defense of a permanent base for which permanent fortifications had not been pro- vided." The situation at Olongapo resulted

in some confusion as to the character and

purpose of a naval advanced base. The Philip.

pine construction brought up the question of

the cooperation of the Army in such work.35

During the protracted consideration of the matter in 1908 and 1909, the strength of the Marine

Corps was materially increased by Congress "so

that there was a sufficient force of Marines

to meet the probable demands of the Navy

in this respect, and the cooperation of the

Army received no further considerations."

In 1907 and again in 1909, the General

Board urgently presented to the Navy Department the need for consolidating equipment

with regard to advanced bases. The Secretary

of Navy approved the board recommendations that the materiel on the Atlantic coast

be assembled at Philadelphia and that for the

advanced base outfits in the Pacific be as- sembled at OIongapo. The Commandant of
BACKGROUND—1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 13

the Marine Corps (CMC)* was given the responsibility for the custody and care of all

advanced base material. In addition, he was

to "take the necessary steps to instruct the

officers and men under your command in the

use of this material."

On 18 April 1910, Major General Commandant George F. Elliott submitted to the Secretary of Navy a copy of the proposed course of

instruction for an advanced base school to be

established at New London, Connecticut. While

it was to be primarily an officers' school, 40 enlisted men were assigned to the first class of instruction which began in July 1910. In addition

to the advanced base school, two Marine officers

were assigned to the Army School for Submarine

Defenses at Fort Monroe, Virgina. This was necessary because the Navy had planned to use

Army mines, pending the acceptance of a new

naval mine. In addition, two other Marine officers were detailed to attend the Army Signal

School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, "in order

that they may acquire a complete knowledge of

wireless telegraphy and the construction and

operation of field telegraph and telephone

lines." °

In a memorandum to the prospective officer

students of the Advanced Base School, the

Commandant declared:

The establishment of a school for the purpose of

instructing and training marine officers along certain well-defined lines of work, pertaining to the

attack and defense of advanced bases, presupposes

a good working knowledge of the elementary professional subjects and is in the nature of a postgraduate course.

In order to obtain the best results, the instruction in such a course must be both theoretical and

practical, systematic and progressive. The military

subjects covered in the defense of a base are many;

and, while theoretical instruction in these subjects

is essential, the training or practical work is none

the less important. The subjects are so varied and

their scope so comprehensive that it is considered

a year should, if possible, be devoted to the course. In general terms, the defense of an advanced

base may be divided into

(1) The Gun Defense

(2) The Mobile Defense

(3) The Mine Defense

(4) General Governing Considerations 4°

The Commandant envisioned the Gun Defense instruction to include naval ordnance;

gunnery; explosives and projectiles; fortifications, as relating to defense of the guns; and

*Commandant of the Marine Corps has been used

throughout the text for uniformity, but the more common title prior to World War II was Major General

Commandant.

communications. Instruction in Mobile Defense

was to encompass construction of more or less

permanent field fortifications, obstacles and

demolitions, map reading, and field artillery.

The Commandant made note that when

studying field artillery, consideration would be

given to "the development and use of this arm

in connection with infantry and for both direct

and indirect fire." ' It is easy to look back and

put labels on things. But in the meaning of

the quotation above, the Commandant's instruction in a sense paved the way for the

concept of combined arms within the Marine

Corps. In studying Mine Defense, all types of

mines, torpedoes, and obstructions were to be

considered. In examining General Considerations, the Commandant recommended a study

of the organization, supply, and movement of

Marines assigned to advanced base work be

made. He believed that other considerations

involved the study of bases, their necessity and

use, and historical studies that would be useful and applicable to advanced base work and

the making and use of war plans. The textbook material, where applicable, was supplied

by the Navy and Army. As an example, the

Navy's Bureau of Ordnance supplied the book

High Explosives and Mines and the Army donated Field Artillery Drill Regulations. The

Marine Corps' Major Dion Williams contributed an original booklet Instructions for the

Reconnaissance of Bays, Harbors And Adjacent Country.* Practical work formed a large

part of the course involving assembling and

dismounting of guns, construction of field

works, and the like. The location of the school

at New London was not entirely suitable and

the next year, 1911, the school was removed to

Philadelphia.2 The school was successful although interrupted during the subsequent

years by calls to expeditionary service in Nicaragua, Cuba, and Mexico. The Commandant

had responsibility for maintenance, readiness, and training of the Advanced Base Force.

Likewise, the General Board had the responsibility for continual study of the feasibility

of advanced base locations and the make up of

advanced base outfits.

Late in 1909, as the General Board began

serious consideration of the advanced base

*First published in 1905 by direction of the President of the Naval War College. A second revised edition

was published in 1917 by the Government Printing

Office under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy.

Copy at Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
±1

I: . •_ •

14 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Marines preparing to embark at Philadelphia for duty in Nicaragua, August 1912. (USMC Photo #516235).

problem, three men, destined to play an important part in the evolution of the Advanced Base Force, had written papers, several

weeks apart, that were ultimately forwarded

to the General Board, all dealing with advanced bases. Major Dion Williams, who as

early as June 1902 had written an article about

the defense of naval stations while assigned

to the Office of Naval Intelligence, submitted

a report dated 2 November 1909: "Report on

Men, Material & Drills Required for Establishing a Naval Advance Base."" Commander

William L. Rodgers, USN, then the Naval

War College representative at the Army War

College, submitted a report dated 20 November 1909, entitled "Advanced Bases."" Major

John H. Russell, a student at the Naval War

College, submitted a study, "General Principles Governing the Selection and Establishment of Advanced Bases and the Composition

of an Advanced Base Outfit," and an additional concurrent report, "Additional Notes on Field Work Construction for Advanced

Bases." 46 Perhaps writing ability had nothing

to do with it, but in any event, this Major

Russell later became the 16th Commandant

of the Marine Corps. Also about the same

time, Lieutenant Colonel Eli K. Cole, after

installing the advanced base material at Subic Bay in the Philippines, was ordered to the

Army War College. While there he wrote a

study entitled, "Outfit Necessary for Seizure

and Fortifications of Positions by a Small Expeditionary Force."

If the Marine and Navy contributions were

not enough, in the January—February 1911 issue of the Journal of United States Artillery

was an article by a "Colonel Martin—an ExConfederate Officer" entitled "The Selection and Defense of Naval Bases." 48 This article was brought to the attention of Admiral

Dewey, President of the General Board. Admiral Dewey wanted to know the true identity of "Colonel Martin" and wrote to the editor of the Journal accordingly. The Manager

and Editor of the Journal, Major T. W. Winston, replied to the Admiral that the author

of the article was Captain R. E. Wyllie, Coast

Artillery Corps, presently stationed at Fort

Hancock, N.J.49 Major Winston explained that

Wyllie's assumption of the nom-de-plume was

merely to get an impersonal discussion of the

merits of the arguments which he advanced.

Major Winston was elated to know that someone on the General Board read the Journal

and offered to send a copy of the Journal

regularly with "our compliments." Two days

later, the Secretary of the General Board

wrote to say that he would be glad to be added

to the mailing list. It would seem that there

was a pat-on-the-back for Captain Wyllie of

the Army, but not so. Admiral Dewey forwarded the article to the Secretary of the Navy

and said that:

in the opinion of the General Board, this

article is very ably written, and sets forth the

writer's conception of the subject in an exceedingly

clear and pleasant style. The views expressed by

"Col Martin" are not at all novel, however, and

have often been expressed by naval officcrs in the

discussions by the general board and the Naval

War College."

Captain Wyllie would probably have agreed

in the dictum—you win some and lose somel

To round out the articles on the subject of

the various aspects of advanced bases, Major

Henry C. Davis, wrote an article "Advance

Base Training" for the March 1911 issue of the

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Lieutenant

Colonel L. C. LUcas, wrote a report for the

General Board entitled "Artillery Armament

of Advanced Base Regiment," dated about 1 July 1913. Captain H. A. Knapp, USN, delivered a lecture and paper on the "International Law in its Relation to Advance Bases"

to the Naval War College on 29 May 1915. It
BACKGROUND—l900-l920--COMING OF AGE 15

would seem that there was enough written on

the subject of advanced bases at the time but

there were many questions still unanswered.

The very basic question was "What number of

men is sufficient for the defense of an advanced base?" Of the Marine writers, Lieutenant Colonel Cole and Major Russell agreed

that a regiment would be needed for the

proper defense of a base. Major Russell suggested that each company of the total 12

companies should have 150 men each, giving

the three-battalion regiment 1,800 men. Major

Williams' report differed somewhat as he envisioned a proper defense based on two regiments of 1,300 \'1arines each, assembled at the

site of the advanced base outfit. With this

accomplished, the "force would be drilled in

all of the operations of establishing a base

from the preparatory stage of map reading

to the actual firing of the guns at target practice with towing targets." 51 It would be several

years before the General Board would decide

what would be the proper defense force. It

would come closest to Major Williams' ideas.

The next item to be considered was the

terms in general use concerning advanced base

forces. In 1911, the Navy issued a general

order which defined the temporary character

of the naval advanced base, and this definition

along with other terms were incorporated in

the Navy Regulations in 1913. The Marine

Corps understood these definitions, as interpreted by 1\Iajor General Commandant

George Barnett, as follows:

Advanced Basesmay be divided into two general

classes—permanent and temporary. The permanent

advanced base is ordinarily defended by permanent

fortifications and covers an extensive repair plant. By 1914, an example of this type of advanced

base was Pearl Harbor. The temporary advanced

base is not ordinarily fortified until after the declaration of war, but in view of the length of time

available the defense installe(l must, at the start at any rate, be of temporary nature. Again, in

1914, examples of this type of advanced base were Olongapo and Guam. The temporary nature of an advanced base involves three main elements: first,

the best defense necessary to meet an attack by

gunfire from the sea: second, the use of mines and

minefield guns, that would prevent the approach of

hostile craft in the vicinity of the train which the

base is covering: third, proper defense against attacks by forces landing beyond the range of the

fixed defense guns, that attack the train from the

land side.

It should be noted at this point, that the use

of the term "train" refers to "fleet train."

During the decade preceding 1914, the coilcept had developed of an organized fleet train

consisting of auxiliaries, colliers, tankers, repair ships, water-distilling ships, supply ships,

destroyer tenders, and the like needed to service and supply a combat fleet at sea, independent of a fixed shore base.

In a prophetic note on things to come, the

Major General Commandant stated that "in

view of the recent developments in aeronautics, adequate defenses against attacks by dirigibles or aeroplanes must be considered," 52

General Barnett believed that the forces assigned to the defense could be divided into

two parts: the fixed defense regiment, which

installed and manned the guns and mines,

and the mobile regiment which opposed landings beyond th'e range of the fixed defense

guns:

In case the enemy has once landed, retain them

at such distance from the base, that the base itself could not he reached by gun fire. In addition

to the fixed defense and infantry forces there must

of necessity he searchlight detachments, an engineer company, signal company and field artillery.1'

Advanced Base Force Comes of Age

As previously mentioned, the question of

the actual size of the Advanced Base Force

was settled temporarily in 1913. The General

Board recommended to the Secretary of Navy

who agreed, that there be a fixed defense regi- ment of 1,250 men assembled on the East

Coast at Philadelphia and another at Mare

Island on the WestCoast. The Advanced Base

equipment on Olongapo would l)e redistributed

to Guam and Mare Island. The board also

recommended that:

two mobile defense regiments about 1,250

men each. may be required in war to reinforce the

fixed defense regiments, one on each coast—such

organizations in peace are (lesirahle but not strictly

necessary.'4

In 1914, the recommendations of the General Board regarding sti'ersgth of fixed and

mobile defense regiments were reafhrmecl by

the Secretary of Navy. "The recommendations

of the General Board concerning the size of

the advanced base regiments are approved for

the present." The Major General Commandant agreed to the advanced base site locations. He said:

both stations are centrally located in regard

to other Posts of the Marine Corps. transportation

facilities are satisfactory and supplies can be ohtamed in a minimum of time, and both are near

Marine Corps Depots."
/7

hi

16 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

That the General Board had faith in the

Marine Corps is reflected in a letter to the

Secretary of Navy which stated that:

• judging from the excellent work of the

Marine Corps under all conditions with which it has been confronted for many years in the past

it is reasonable to believe that, with a proper Outfit, it will be able to make good whatever circumstance require the establishment of an advance

base.1

The next logical step in the evolution of

the Advanced Base Force was :0 test the equipment and men to determine whether this organization required any changes. The General Board requested and the Secretary of Navy

directed that exercises be heki in connection

with the Atlantic Fleet during the winter of

1913—14. More Marines became available in the

summer of 1913 with the return of expeditionary forces from Cuba.5 In addition, the

Advanced Base School was reopened at Phila- delphia and the 1st Regiment (Fixed Defense) was stationed there for training. The

regiment consisted of one battery of 5-inch

rapid fire .40 caliber guns; one battery of 3-

inch rapid fire guns; one battery of 3-inch

landing guns; two U.S. Army experimental

4.7-inch heavy field guns; one mine battery

with 60 mines; one signal company; one engineer company with the necessary equipment, together with eight automatic rifles and

four 1-pounders.59

A young captain of Marines described the

stepped-up training taking place at the time:

A new scheme of things was under way in the

Itarine Corps. A regiment had been designated as

an Advance Base Force. It was being trained to occupy a base jn advance of the arrival of the

fleet.

I found that the easy days in Philadelphia were

over. With drills and 4 hours a day schooling, we

didn't get out of the Yard until 4:30 in the afternoon. Then we had to study at night.

We had six companies. One was a field artillery, one had four 5-inch naval guns, one had four

3-inch naval guns, one was engineers and machine

guns, one was mines and one was signals. I

was put in command of the Sixth Company, to

handle the 3-inch naval guns. - - - Hours every

day in the Yard we had to haul those 3-inch

naval guns around. We had to build a portable

railroad. We had to dig pits. We had to build gun

Supplies are brought alongside the USS Prairie, frequent Marine troopship, loading at Philadelphia in 1913. (USMC Photo #516234).
BACKGROUND—1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 17

platforms. We had to mount the guns. And then,

when we had it all done, we had to tear the whole

business down and do it all over again. That kept

up until the first of January, l914.°

The Atlantic Fleet exercises in January 1914

were to become the first thoroughly planned

advanced base problem whereby the Marine

Corps would try out the advanced base materials. It became especially important that it be

successful, as far as Marine Corps participation was concerned, if not for any other

reason but to counteract a report given by

the Aide-for-Inspections. In March 1910, the

Secretary of Navy had charged th Marine Corps to prepare for the care and custody

of advanced base material and to give instruction in the use of this equipment. In addition, he advised that the Naval Division of

Inspections would be charged with its inspection.61 It is with this wedge that the Marine

Corps nemesis, Captain William F. Fullam,

USN, reappeared on the scene. As Aide-forInspections, Captain Fullam was all too happy

to give out the news of his findings upon his

inspection and report concerning the advanced

base outfit, personnel, and instruction at Philadelphia in 1913. His report was forwarded to

the General Board by the then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, on

2 May 1913.

Captain Fullam reported that the advanced

base outfit and its operations were a failure.

He said no actual work was done except for

minor work at Culebra and Subic Bay and

that "from the point of real efficiency for

war purposes, it may be said that practically nothing has been accomplished during the

past 13 years 62 Captain Fullam stated

that the Naval War College and the Advanced

Base School handled the problems of advanced bases academically with a few officers

receiving elementary as distinguished from

practical instruction. In "painful contrast,"

he pointed out, the Italians had completely

and promptly established an advanced base

outfit in Sicily in October 1911 in 48 hours.

This, hesaid, was an example of what could

be done and ought to be done in advanced

base operations. He later admitted that he

purposely refrained from inviting special attention to the fact that the Italian force was

apparently composed of naval officers and

sailors! Captain Fullam blamed what he called

the "past failures" on the material, personnel,

instruction, and lack of transports. He attribRear Admiral William F. Fullam, vigorous opponent

of the use of Marines for sea duty. (USN Photo

#19—N —3646).

uted these past failures to the Marine Corps

and categorically stated that it was the fault of

Marine Corps organization. Never at a loss for

words, Captain Fullam not only inspected the

problems but solved them. He believed the

Marine Corps should have been broken into

permanent battalions to serve under their own

colors. After reorganizing the Marine Corps,

Captain Fullam introduced in a disguised form

the argument that the Marines should be removed from naval vessels:

It is plain that the work assigned to Marines on

board battleships and cruising vessels of the Navy

gives them no training or experience whatever

with mines, torpedoes, and other practical work, but this employment simply scatters them in such

manner that an effective and properly instructed

organization is impracticable. This fact is emphasized because it has been, and will continue to be,

the one most serious obstacle to that organization

and instruction which would make the Marine

Corps most effective in time of war, and which

would at the same time secure homogeneity in our

man-of-war crews and recognize that the bluejackets

are in every way fitted for, and that the) should

he instructed in, every military duty on board

ship.'

Major General Commandant William P.

Biddle answered the charges of Captain Fullam

in detail. Perhaps the most poignant reply from

the CMC was that pertaining to the organization of the Marine Corps. He said:

- . the subject of a proper organization of the

Marine Corps has received the careful study of
18 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Major General William P. Biddle, 11th Commandant

of the Marine Corps, 3 February 1911 to 24 February

1914. (USMC Photo #308435).

Marine officers of ability and experience and it is

believed by me and by them that the present system of semipermanent companies, battalions and

regiments is much better suited to the requirements

of the Marine Corps than would be the system by

which officers and men were attached permanently

to one organization during their entire service.'4

The President of the General Board, in the

person of Admiral Dewey, carefully examined all of the proposals and criticisms of

Captain Fullam regarding the Marine Corps

and the Advanced Base Force. He carefully

read the replies to the criticism by Major

General Biddle. Without exception, including

the proposal to move the Advanced Base

School from Philadelphia to Pensacola, Captain Fullam's proposals were logically and

systematically disapproved by Admiral Dewey

and the General Board. Admiral Dewey was

particularly agitated with Fullam's attempt

to resurrect the argument concerning removal

of Marines from naval vessels, He said:

the General Board does not believe that any

actual economy will result from the removal of

the Marines from the battleships and cruisers for, as the Marines now are stationed at the battery

and its accessories their places will have to be

taken by an equal number of bluejackets. Their

commanding officer, being a division officer, will

have to be replaced by a line officer. The General

Board regrets the renewed agitation of the question of removal of Marines from ships of the Navy

in which the strength of the Marine detachment

is sufficient to demand the presence of a Marine

officer, and it further believes that this action, if

persisted in, may eventually cause the loss of the

Marine Corps to the Navy and its absorption by

the Army."

Captain Fullam should have been awarded a

medal as the one most likely to wreck NavyMarine Corps relations. In spite of the Fullams, or because of the Fullams, the NavyMarine Corps relationship survived and out of

it was forged the Navy.Marine Corps team of

today.

It was with this background, the Marine

Corps Advanced Base Force commenced the

Atlantic Fleet Exercises in January 1914. It

was going to defend thoroughly the advanced

base against invasion. The theories on paper

would now become the realities of a defense

of an invasion. Though not realized at the

time, the exercise was the forerunner of several phases of what are known no* as amphibious operations. At no time was that term

used during the period being discussed. The

General Board specifically requested the Marine Corps to give practical instruction and

application to such items as:

(I) Stowing material on transports;

(2) Landing material from the transport to the

beach;

(3) Transporting the material from the beach to

the various sites;

(4) Preparation of battery sites and mounting of

the guns;

(5) Establishment of fire control and observation

points;

(6) Planting of mines;

(7) Defense of mine fields;

(8) Establishment and use of searchlight sta

tions;

(9) Exercise with guns, including target practice;

(10) Covering the site selected against attacks

from the land, including transportation necessary

for supply and handling of material."

The Marine Corps phase of the exercise got

under way when, on 3 January 1914, the First

Advanced Base Regiment, a fixed defense regiment commanded by Colonel Charles G. Long,

sailed from the Philadelphia Navy Yard on the

transport Hancock. The Second Advanced Base

Regiment, a mobile regiment of 27 officers

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John A.

Lejeune, sailed from Pensacola, Florida on the

transport Prairie. 67 These two regiments be-
BACKGROUND—1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 19

came the First Advanced Base Brigade under

the command of Colonel George Barnett and

arrived off Culebra on 10 January 1914. *

After the exercise Barnett, then Major General Commandant reported to the Secretary

of Navy that:

upon their arrival at Culebra the men, with

the advance base material, landed—guns were mounted and proper disposition was made of the guns and material for the advance base defense

against an attack by the fleet, who landed forces

from the ships. In 6 days time the guns were

all mounted and ready for firing and the island was declared in a state of war. From that time

on affairs on shore were conducted as nearly as

possible as they would have been in case of real

war. Bombardments of the shore fortifications were

made, operations were conducted for the discovery

of mine fields and attempts made to drag for the

mines. Searchlight tests were made, also tests for

plotting from the plotting stations of the mine

company. A night attack was made by a landing

force from the fleet, which the umpires decided

would have been unsuccessful in case of real war,

under the conditions existing.'

In an unofficial version of the exercise, Captain Frederic M. Wise recalled:

There was a peculiar situation on Culebra. It had no land.locked harbor where we were going

to land, though at another part of the island you

can go through a cut and find a land-locked harbor

big enough to shelter the whole fleet. But at the

spot where we landed, with a heavy wind blowing

up every afternoon, all the material had to be

landed mornings. In the afternoon the sea was

too heavy. Lighters we had carried down on the

Hancock's deck were swung overboard. Those heavy

naval guns were hauled up from the holds, lowered

aboard the lighters, and towed ashore by launches.

They were skidded ashore, the portable railroad was constructed up to the gun positions high on

the hills, gun.pits dug, platforms built, guns

mounted. Inside several days, the Island of Culebra

was fortified. Mine fields had been laid while we

were getting our batteries into position. Telephone

communications were established. An infantry regiment had arrived with us. They dug rifle pits. We were ready for the "enemy" fleet.

Ten days or 2 weeks after we had the island

fortified, all the preliminaries were completed, umpires appointed, all the maneuvers started. The

big ships of the fleet, which were supposed theo.

retically to have transports full of troops with them, slipped up under cover of the night, and sent

landing parties of sailors and Marines ashore.

They were to capture the batteries and clear the

path for a big landing force. The umpires watched

*Ten days after his return to Washington in February 1914, Colonel Barnett was appointed the 12th

Commandant. He became the first graduate of the

Naval Academy (Class of 1881) to become CMC, and

the first CMC to be appointed to a 4.year term, in

accordance with a law passed the previous year.

it all. It was one glorious "Fourth of July." Every- body was blazing away. And then the umpires

solemnly announced that the Island of Culebra was

impregnable, which I always thought was a damned

lie.'9

On board the USS Hancock at Pensacola,

Florida, the First Brigade Commander, Colonel Barnett, was transmitting the "Report on

Maneuvers and Operations." In the last paragraph of his letter, Colonel Barnett said "I

have this day turned over command of the

Brigade to Lieutenant Colonel John A. Lejeune, and I feel that in so doing I am

turning over to him a most efficient brigade." 70

In general, Colonel Barnett was praising

the performance of the brigade—an efficient

brigade. The brigade commander's analysis

of the exercise had listed several minor failings but did state that "one of the most serious

problems to be dealt with is the providing of

proper transportation for supplies, guns and

ammunition, etc., on shore, and it is believed

that a reasonable amount of motor tractors

must be provided." 71 The Commander in

Signal tower manned by Marines at Vera Cruz, 1914.

(USMC Photo #517450).
;-• V .. -

S —

p

20 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Marines leaving for Vera Cruz, 23 April 1914. (USMC Photo #H—276--3).

Horse-drawn 3-inch naval landing gun drill, Camp klliott, Panama Canal Zone, 1913. (USMC Photo #521516)..

.:
BACKGROU ND— 1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 21

Chief of the United States Atlantic Fleet, Rear

Admiral Charles J. Badger, explained:

the actual establishment of the Advanced

Base at Culebra this winter, the joint exercises held

with the fleet, and the gun and mine practices held have been of great benefit to the personnel

of the Brigade. Unfortunately, the gun and mine

practices were unavoidably hurried and the maximum benefit could not be derived therefrom. It is

strongly recommended that frequent opportunity

be given for extended Advance Base work of this

kind. . . The now Major General Commandant and

former brigade commander, George Barnett,

replied:

the experience gained in the exercise last

winter, I have no doubt that the outfit as furnished

can be standardized and cut down somewhat, as I

fully appreciate the necessity of mobility which

can only result where the outfit furnished is as small as possible, considering all the necessities of

the portions in use.7'

Unquestionably much valuable experience and

training was gained from the establishment of

the advanced base at Culebra in January 1914.

Many of the mooted questions as to the number of personnel and types of equipment were

settled. Specifically settled was the size of the

Advanced Base Force. Admiral Dewey wrote

that the:

General Board therefore considers that two

Marine Regiments, one fixed defense and one mobile, of about 1,250 enlisted men each, regularly

drilled in advanced base operations, is an adequate

peace time provision to defend Culebra or any of

the advanced base sites so far considered by the General Board. This number is well within the

capacity of the peace complement of the Marine

Corps to furnish, and of the Navy to transport.74

The Secretary of Navy, Josephus Daniels,

approved Admiral Dewey's and the General

Board's recommendation two weeks later. The

General Board had recommended that the advanced base exercises be held each year as a matter of routine training. History and events

would interfere with the training until the

winter of 1922. The expeditionary role of the

Marine Corps was realized with the landing of

Marines at Vera Cruz in Mexico in April

1914, Haiti in 1915, Santo Domingo in 1916,

and France in 1917. The decade of the 1920s

would see the resumption of advanced base

training.

The Advanced Base Force, while not destined to be actively committed during World

War I, was kept intact, numerically at least,

during the war. The potential use of the force

in the Caribbean was always considered. The

General Board felt that one of the immediate

weaknesses was the poorly equipped bases in

the Caribbean. The board felt:

in a war with Germany the United States

may at some stage in the conflict find Germany on

the offensive with her fleet at large and in a position to operate in the Caribbean against the

Virgin Islands, Porto Rico, Cuba and ultimately

the Panama Canal. To meet this offensive the

United States must have properly equipped bases

in the Caribbean. . . Again time and events in other parts of the

world would directly affect the happenings

in the Caribbean. Events in Congress during

the summer of 1916 would change the Marine

Corps for the remainder of the decade, and

indeed for the remainder of its history.

"The World Must Be Safe

for Democracy"

Woodrow Wilson, War Message,

2 April 1917

The Naval Appropriation Bill which became law on 29 August 1916 ostensibly authorized the largest shipbuilding program ever

undertaken by the United States up to that

time. The Marine Corps personnel bill that was

incorporated into the appropriation bill had

increased the authorized number of enlisted

men by 5,000, from about 8,000 to over 13,000,

and the number of commissioned officers from

343 to 600. It also permitted the Marine Corps

to promote to brigadier general, Colonels Littieton W. T. Waller, Joseph H. Pendleton, Eli

K. Cole, and John A. Lejeune. An active recruitment campaign was instituted for enlisted

men, and numerous hours of examination for

promotion of a great many officers and the

appointment of many second lieutenants

took place. Another aspect to be considered

was the acquiring of new bases to train these

hoped-for new personnel. In quick order, San

Diego was chosen by the House Naval Affairs

Committee as the site for the West Coast base.

The city of San Diego had donated a large

tract of land which was supplemented by the

government purchase of additional tracts.

Quantico, Virginia, became the East Coast

base. It had all the area for field exercises,

and rifle and artillery ranges. The Commaridant "did not want a base within the limits of

an active navy yar(1 as the industrial and

other Navy requirements paramount there
I

IT

22 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

would probably crowd out the Marine Corps

activities." Expansion of the Marine Corps

became a fact. Over a period of approximately

two years, the Marine Corps expanded and demobilized in record breaking numbers. The

following figures illustrate these fluctuations:

Commissioned and

Warrant Officers

Enlisted

Men

Total

Marines

U.S. Declared War 6 April 1917 511 13,214 ' 13,725

30 June 1917 776 26,973 27,749

13 March 1918 1,389 38,629 40,018

30 June 1918 1,503 51,316 52,819

Armistice Day 11 November 1918 1,474 70,489 72,96S

Maximum Strength Peaked 11 December 1918 2,462 72,639 75,101

30 June 1919 2,270 46,564 48,834

30 June 1920 1,104 16,061 17,165

"Major Edwin N. McClellan, USMC, The United States Marine Corps in the World War, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920).

U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States—Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington:

Government Printing Office, 1960).

"Strength of the Navy, March 13, 1918," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 43, no. 5 (May 1918), P. 936.

These figures include USMC reserve personnel and female reservists.

Guidance of all this expansion within the

Marine Corps became the responsibility of the

administrative staff departments and the Assistant to the Commandant, Brigadier General

John A. Lejeune, and his small working group.

They supervised a more than five-fold expansion of the Marine Corps. They dispatched

two brigades to France, maintained an advanced base force of brigade size, provided expeditionary forces in the Caribbean, and furnished security detachments and sea-going Marines for the Navy.78 The best summary of the

actions of l\'Iarines in 'World 'War I, is still

McClellan's account. He observed that:

Within 1 year after the outbreak of war the

Marine Corps placed about as many enlisted men

in France as there were in the Marine Corps when

war was declared . . . Approximately 30,000 Marines were sent overseas to join the American Expeditionary Forces and 1,600 for naval duty ashore

During the war a great many additional Ma.

Machine gun instruction at Marine Officers' School, Quantico, during World War I. (USMC Photo 2O447).
BACKGROUND— 1900-1920—COMING OF AGE 23

rifle detachments were detailed to guard the radio

stations, naval magazines, ammunition depots,

warehouses, cable stations and other naval activities, and the detachments already established were

largely augmented . The Marine Corps, while

maintaining the Fourth Brigade of Marines a total

of .258 officers and 8,211 enlisted men, that fought

in eight battle operations suffering approximately

12,000 casualties, placed and maintained the Fifth

Brigade of Marines of the same strength in France;

supplied the Commanding General of the Second

Army Division, and many officers on his staff; furnished a considerable number of officers to command Army units of the Second and other divisions,

and for staff and detached duty throughout the

American Expeditionary Forces; participated in the

naval aviation activities in France and in the Azores;

and during the period of the war succeeded in performing in a highly satisfactory manner the naval

duties required of it, including the maintenance of

two brigades of prewar strength standing by to

protect the Mexican oil fields, and as an advanced base force in Philadelphia; one in Cuba; one in

Santo Domingo and one in Haiti; administered and

officered the Haitian Gendarmerie and Guardia Nacional Dominicana; as well as providing efficient

1ariiie detachments for numerous navy yards and

naval Stations in the United States; and in the

Virgin Islands; Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Pearl

Harbor, Hawaiian Islands; Guam; Cavite and

Olongapo, P.!.; Managua, Nicaragua; Peking, China;

San Juan, P.R.; London, England; Cardiff, Wales;

Paris, France; and the Azores; and supplied many

officers and enlisted men for special and detached

duty at home and abroad.

World War I gave the Marine Corps experience in integrated staff work:

After a study of the British and French Army

Staffs, as developed through 3 years of combat

experience, the Commanding General, AEF, adopted

a system patterned upon the French staff . . . In

turn the US. Army staff system became thoroughly

familiar to Marines serving in the AEF. It was

employed by the 4th and 5th Marine Brigades, as

they were organized under AEF tables of organization. While brigades were the largest Marine units

to serve in France, individual Marines learned the

functioning of the staff at divisional level through

assignments to Army Units. A Marine General com- manded the 2d Infantry Division, while other

Marines served on its staff from time to time. That

this staff system proved useful for Marine purposes

is attested to by the fact that Marine Corps staff

development in the postwar period was based on

the staff of World War J9

Another aspect of Marine Corps experience

from World War I was in the aviation field.

The relatively new Marine Corps aviation

component, on the day the United States declared war against the Central Powers, 6 April

1917, consisted of four officers and 30 men, all

part of the complement of the Naval Air

Station, Pensacola, Florida.80 By the end of the

war, the total officer and enlisted strength exceeded 2,400. The Marine Corps selected and

trained its own pilots and mechanics. They

Planes of the 1st Marine Aviation Force at La Fresne, France, in 1918; on the left are DH—9As of "A" Squadron, on the right is a DH—IB of "C" Squadron. (USMC Photo #529554).
24 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

flew just about all types of planes existing at

the time, DeHaviland 4Bs, Curtiss JNs, etc.

The 1st Marine Aeronautic Company, consisting of 13 officers and 133 enlisted men, deployed to Ponta Delgado, Azores, for antisubmarine patrol operations in January 1918.

With 18 seaplanes, it was the first fully trained

and equipped American aviation unit to go

overseas in World War J81

In July 1918, the First Aviation Force landed

in France. While waiting for their Dellaviland

DH—4Bs to arrive, the pilots did some moonlighting with the British and French. This Aviation Force consisted of Squadrons A, B, C,

D, and Headquarters Company. It was organized to operate under the Navy as the Day Wing of the Northern Bombing Group in

northern France. It operated in the Dunkirk

area against German submarines and their

bases at Ostend, Zeebrugge, and Bruges in

Belgium. Incidents of Marine aviators destroying a troop train and dropping food to beleaguered French troops were omtnendable

but isolated.

The war would not be won by Marine aviation or any other aviation. The war was a landmass war—with great armies engaged, supported by artillery, and later tanks. Aviation,

in its infancy, had to wait for another day. It

was ironic that, through no fault of their

own, Marine aviators did not fly support for

any Marine ground forces. It was Major Alfred

A. Cunningham, the first Marine aviator and

the fifth naval aviator, who commented that

"the only excuse for aviation in aiy service is

its usefulness in assisting the troops on the

ground to successfully carry out their operatiOns." 82 Other times and other wars would

fully justify Marine aviation and what it could

do in support of the Marines on the ground.

In France in 1918. Left to Right: Brigadier General

Wendell C. Neville, commanding the 4th Brigade of

Marines; Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D.

Roosevelt; and Major General John A. Lejeune, commanding the 2d Division. (USMC Photo #529042).
CHAPTER II

POSTWAR DISARMAMENT PERIOD

America's present need is not heroics but healing; not nostrums but normalcy; not revolution

but restoration; . . . not surgery but serenity.

Senator Warren C. Harding, 1920

Normalcy, while difficult to define, was what

the American people wanted. The decade of

the twenties would usher in a new President,

a new political party, and for the Marine Corps,

a new Commandant. The American people rejected the League of Nations and the Democratic Party. They wanted to leave the problems

that international relations brought and return

to the "normalcy" promised by the Republicans in the presidental election of 1920. Warren

G. Harding and his party won and, with this

popular support, disowned the League of Nations. If the League was unpopular, disarmament was not. Senator William E. Borah of

Idaho introduced in December 1920, a month

after Harding's election, a resolution that was

to become a joint congressional resolution,

which favored a tripartite disarmament conference. By June 1921, it passed the Senate

unanimously and the House by a vote of 332

to 4. Harding's Secretary of State, Charles

Evans Hughes, made informal overtures to

the governments of Britain, Japan, France, and

Italy in a note of 8 July 1921. He later broadened this invitation to Belgium, China, Portu- gal, and the Netherlands. The agenda was

also enlarged to include not only arms but

problems of the Far East in general. Although

a great Asiatic power, Russia was not invited

to attend since the United States refused to

recognize the existence of the Soviets. All but

Japan promptly replied with polite enthusiasm. After a 21⁄2-week delay, Japan acceded to

the invitation to discuss naval disarmament,.

On 11 August 1921, Secretary Hughes issued

formal invitations to the nine select powers.

Three months later on 12 November 1921,

the conference met in Washington with all the

fanfare appropriate to the first international

congress of this kind ever to be held in the

Western Hemisphere:

Secretary Hughes, instead of mouthing the usual

platitudes at the opening session, threw a verbal

bombshell by suggesting that the nations limit their

naval weapons and scrap existing ships. He pro. posed that the United States, Great Britain and

Japan junk a total of 66 ships amounting to 1.87 million tons. Hughes stunned the audience with

this audacious proposal; hushed silence greeted him

while he read his proposals followed by wild applause at the conclusion of his address.1

"In less than 15 minutes, he destroyed 66

ships with a total tonnage of 1,878,043—more,

as one British reporter put it, 'than all the

admirals of the world have sunk in a cycle of

centuries.'" 2 Summarized, Secretary Hughes

proposed a 10 year "holiday" in capital ship

construction; * scrapping specific ships which

would result in a 5:5:3:1.7:1.7 ratio among

the United States, Great Britain, Japan, Italy,

and France.**

The dramatic announcement vastly shortened the time of negotiation and helped assure the acceptance of the American propos- als. "The reactions of the press and pulpit

all over the world were tremendously enthusiastic. If Hughes' address was intended as an

oblique bid for worldwide popular support,

it was outstandingly successful." The three

great powers most concerned, the United States,

Great Britain, and Japan, ultimately agreed

to the ratio formula but with compromises by

all. France and Italy had no problem agreeing to their ratios.

Considering the time, the United States was

in the mood for massive cuts in the federal

budget. "Senators Henry Cabot Lodge and

Oscar W. Underwood bluntly informed

*As defined at Washington, a capital ship was a

warship. not an aircraft carrier, exceeding 10,000 tons

or carrying guns in excess of 8 inches in caliber.

**The ratio 5:5:3:1.7:1.7 referred to the total tonnage

allowed in capital ships as 500,000; 500,000; 300,000;

175,000; and 175,000 tons.

25
26 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Hughes that Congress, ever-conscious of the

taxpayer, would not vote additional burdens

in order to attain the costly and unnecessary

honor of ruling the waves." ' Great Britain,

with a badly strained economy, welcomed a

holiday in building. By 15 December 1921, Japan consented to the Hughes ratio in spite of

mass meetings in Tokyo and newspaper editorials supporting demands for greater tonnage.

The alternative, for Japan as well as the other

powers, was a ruinous naval race. Japan's

reward for her consent to the ratio was the

controversial nonfortification clause to be included in the treaty.

America agreed not to fortify her Pacific

islands, excepting Hawaii. The United States

particularly agreed not to fortify the Philippines, Guam, Wake, and the Aleutians. Great

Britain agreed not to fortify Hong Kong, Borneo, the Solomons, and the Gilberts. Japan, in

turn, agreed not to fortify Formosa or the

former German possessions in the Pacific

north of the equator, which had been mandated to her, notably the Marianas (less

Guam) and the Carolines. It would be an

understatement to say that the nonfortification

clause was bitterly denounced by the Navy:

American naval authorities were shocked at the

agreement to forego the development of adequately

defended naval bases in Guam and the Philippines.

To them it appeared that the United States was

automatically foreswearing the possibility of successful fleet operations in Asiatic waters and in effect

underwriting Japanese naval supremacy in the Far

East. Subsequent history has of course largely substantiated this view.'

Professor Thomas A. Bailey, American historian and writer, asserted:

- . . as far as naval limitation was concerned,

the non-fortification agreement was the crucial

compromise. Japan accepted a small naval ratio,

but obtained greater security. Britain and America

consented to leave Certain of their insular possessions inadequately protected, but retained greater

tonnage in capital ships.'

In the context of the times:

• . . there was a well founded Conviction Ofl the

part of the American delegation that it was bar- gaining away an empty right, one that Congress

would probably either never exercise at all or else

implement on too modest a scale to make any dif- ference in event of war. After all, both Guam and

the Philippines had already been American possessions for 23 years without anything much being

done toward military and naval development. What

real prospect was there of a change of American

policy? On the other hand, there was good reason

to think Japan would fortify her island posses- sions, in the absence of a treaty prohibition.'

The major achievements of the Washington conference were reflected in the adoption

of three closely interrelated treaties. The

United States, Great Britain, France, and

Japan agreed in the Four-Power-Treaty to respect one another's rights in their insular

possessions in the Pacific and to consult together should such rights be threatened. With

the addition of Italy, these same nations concluded the Five-Power-Treaty with its naval

ratio and nonfortification clause. "The public

accepted the Five-Power-Treaty, not as a temporary naval arrangement at best, but as the

final substitute for the irksome necessity of

naval expansion." S And finally, all those

countries with interests in the Pacific joined

in the Nine-Power-Treaty in which they undertook to respect the sovereignty and independence of China and to uphold the principles of the Open Door policy. This then was

the climate, the climate of disarmament and

hopeful peace, that the United States embarked

on in the decade of the twenties.

In America and elsewhere, it is a generally

accepted sociological certainty that wars,

whether the world war variety or the undeclared Korean and Vietnam types, do affect

society at all levels. The essence of war transforms, for good or bad, the social, political,

economic, and military fabric of our nation.

The twenties were no exception. Excluding

the military, the bibliography of the "Roaring

Twenties" or "Jazz Age" reflected one of the

best documented decades of our history. The

military bibliography is sparse. Suffice it to

say the public became less and less interested in war and anything related to it. The

Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover administrations

pursued the policy of economy in the government. Obviously, this policy affected the military services. It curtailed the personnel strength,

equipment, and general spending of the services. For this period, it would seem that the

military was in a retrenchment phase. Possibly so, but it did channel the Services into

making do with what they had and preparing

for war with what they hoped to have. It

gave time to study the lessons of the Great

War and to experiment.

In a rather paradoxical situation, the les- son of World War I that the Navy and the

Marine Corps chose to study was the greatest

military failure of modern times—Gallipoli.

For decades, Gallipoli would be the symbol of

the absurdity of endeavoring to land troops
POSTWAR DISARMAMENT PERIOD 27

and supplies on a hostile shore. The Army

would not give Gallipoli a second thought,

primarily because it was in the business of

land-mass warfare and not that of seizing a

beach. The Marine Corps, from the late twenties up until World War II, would have as an

integral part of its schools' curriculum a definitive study of Gallipoli and the how's and why's

of its failures.

The Marine Corps would also experiment

with its own internal reorganization, schools

system, and equipment. This decade would

become one of awareness. The most responsible

people in the Marine Corps became cognizant

of the fact that it could not continue to duplicate the Army, as it did in World War I.

The Marines, however, by their experience in

advanced base training and vast amount of

expeditionary service could work out a mission that was, by its very nature, unique for

the Marine Corps.

Evolution of a Staff

In June 1920, the last months of the Wilson

Administration and Navy Secretary Josephus

Daniels' tenure, Major General John A. Lejeune was appointed 13th Commandant of the

Marine Corps. He was to have a rather rare

distinction of serving three Presidents as Commandant and could have been appointed for a

fourth term had he not chosen to retire in

1929. Many problems faced the new Commandant such as recruiting, officer promotions, and

internal reorganization of Headquarters. In

the area of recruitment, Congress and specifically the House of Representatives, authorized certain personnel strength for the Marine Corps. In fiscal year 1920, the authorized

strength for officers and men was 27,400. The

House of Representatives, however, only appropriated funds for 20,000 officers and men.

Similarly, today's authorized strength of the

Special cognizance

HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS, I DECEMBER 920

(Derived from HEADQUARTERS MEMORANDUM of above date)
28 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Marine Corps is 400,000 men as provided for

by the National Security Act of 1947 as amended, but actually the appropriated funds

for the personnel strength for fiscal year 1971

was 237,100 men.9 In any event, the recruitment drive in the early years of the decade

was a success and the appropriated strength

of the Marine Corps averaged about 20,000

men for the remainder of the twenties. The

Commandant unsuccessfully asked Congress

for legislation to change the method of officer

promotions for most years of his tenure as

Commandant. The system, with its inequities

in the examinations adopted by the Marine Corps in 1892, did not keep pace with the

Army and Navy systems of promotions of their

officers. The Marine Corps would have to wait

9 or 10 more years before a "selection" method

of officer promotion was authorized by Congress.

In regards to internal reorganization of the

Headquarters, it was apparent to the Com- mandant and to other thinking Marine officers that the Marine Corps could never return

to the pre-World War I years of operation.

In those years, the Commandant plus three or four of his aides could totally manage

the operations of the Corps. It would be impossible for them to do so in the postwar

Marine Corps. As a consequence, the Army

staff system, familiar now to many senior Marine officers with World War I experience,

was adopted. It must not be assumed that Marine Corps officers were totally without staff

experience. On the contrary, valuable staff

experience, while not the functional variety

evolved in World War I, was gained by Marine officers serving with the Haitian Gendarmerie and the Guardia Nacional of the Dominican Republic. In addition, officers serving with

the Advanced Base Force and with the fleet

gained valuable staff experience. It is interesting to note that a look at the evolution of

the Officer Fitness Report reflects the emphasis

placed on command and staff assignments.

Prior to 1916, general comments were made

on record cards and in correspondence concerning officer qualifications. From about October 1916, the Adjutant and Inspector's Division of Headquarters Marine Corps introduced

into the administrative system Navy-Marine

Corps (NMC) Form 652. This form was entitled "Report on the Fitness of Officers of the

U.S. Marine Corps." The form would continually change in subsequent years to add or

delete items deemed essential or nonessential

COMMANIING OFFICER ANI) STAFF, MARINE (ORI'S SCHOOLS, QCANTI('O. VA.. 1927-I92

. t tt to rht I,4,tt, n'it i i \V. Iti 1. i. Na . . , t g-i, 1 3. r W. - I ..-. ..n-3 \V. I, iI.II(Il. it It. fliflILp, 5Ij.r R. L. J,g, tij i it. it, t!I y, \Ttj.''

.1. 'i t. ,'I-ht): 1.,\i-i tt, (1at.ir (t. }-t. t''i,i'. It'' [. I.. t.-'_-.

II III ', ,I!tI! .2i.,\ittiui, (tta,1t I'. It. iI.'t ,', I'. itr''

Itii.' .\I,u'ie,' te.'' .1 I F!-t J.t-,,',-ii'u,l t. i', itt&tI.','Itt, I_,.tzt t. . '-, , -

- I' -,.-i. I'i-t .t,ut,uint it. A. i'i... iit t,1,trte aster Clerk It. i5an.

Many of the general officers who led the Marine Corps in World War II and the Korean War (Geiger, Denig, Larsen,

Erskine, Hermle, Rockey, Nini,ner, Pollock) are included in this group. (USMC Photo #29442).
POSTWAR DISARMAMENT PERIOD 29

to the Marine Corps. In the initial NMC form,

among the many items under "Professional

Qualifications," there appeared "Advanced

Base Work" and "Fleet Marine Officer." The

latter item pertained to a senior Marine officer

assigned to the fleet as a staff and liaison officer. In about April 1922, the NMC form was

revised again and this time "Advanced Base

Force" was deleted but "Force Marine Officer"

was added. Force Marine Officer referred to

duty with the Expeditionary Forces that was

quite familiar to all Marine officers of the

twenties. The form also reflected new billets

stemming from World War I such as "gas officer," "machine-gun officer," and "Division

Marine officer." In about October 1926, the

fitness report was again updated to the form

which would be used until about September

1935. It was essentially the same form but with

the addition of specific questions as to the fitness of an officer to command an organization

"appropriate to the next higher grade" such

as platoon, company, battalion, regiment, brigade, or corresponding organization.

General Lejeune reorganized his Headquarters into a staff system which, in essence, is

still in effect today. The Commandant, in a

Marine Corps Order of 1 December 1920, reorganized the Headquarters staff as follows (see

also Chart 1):

The Planning Section was expanded into the

Division of Operations and Training, composed of

Operations, Training, Materiel, Military Intelligence, and Aviation Sections . . . Although it was not organized according to the numbered

system employed by major field commands, the

Division of Operations and Training, nevertheless

was divided into functional subdivisions, encompassing operations, intelligence, training, and logistics, such as were found in the field-type staff.

There was no personnel section, however and the

Aviation Section was an organization not found in

the executive staff of major field commands. Staff

organization for the control of aviation matters was

complicated by the fact that the officer in charge of

Marine Aviation served both the Commandant of

the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations. As first organized in 1919, the Marine Aviation Section was directly under the control of the

Director of Naval Aviation in the Office of the

Chief of Naval Operations. The duties of the Marine Aviation Section included supervision of recruiting, training, personnel, and logistical matters

pertaining to aviation.

By this organization, the Commandant also

created the Personnel, Recruiting, and Educational

Sections. Their function was to relieve the Corninandant and his immediate aides of what had become an unmanageable burden of routine adni inistration .'°

In the field, the reorganization paralleling

that of Headquarters took the form of a functionally organized executive staff, combined at

the higher levels with a staff of technical experts. The executive staff, according to a Marine Corps definition, was "that body of assistants to the Commanding General of a Force or Independent Brigade of Marines

which coordinates the work of the Administrative, Technical, and Supply Staffs, and of

the Troops; and which composes and issues

the detailed orders by which the decisions of

the Commanding General are communicated."

The tables of organization of 1922, which first

provided for executive staffs in the Marine

Corps, specified that an independent brigade

rated a staff made up of B—I, personnel; B—2,

intelligence; B—3 operations and training; and

B—4, supply. A brigade which was part of a

larger unit, however, used the World War Itype staff in which personnel and supply were

combined. Infantry regiments, as part of a brigade, had a staff similar to that of an inde- pendent brigade except that the four numbered sections were designated R rather than

B. Independent infantry regiments had these

same staff positions as did independent infantry battalions, but without the numerical

designations. Within a regiment, battalion

staffs at first lacked a supply officer, but this

deficiency was remedied by 1925. By 1936,

however, the four section staff had been

adopted for all ground units in the Marine

Corps from battalion through brigade level."

Duties and Missions

In 1922, the Commandant wrote to the members of the General Board recommending to

them that the strength of the Marine Corps

should be determined by its peacetime duties

and wartime missions. He was endeavoring to

point out that:

hereas the Conference on the Limitation

of Armament has restricted the immediate material

means (navies) for waging war on sea, there is no

restriction on the size of the mobile forces which

may he attached to, or be held in readiness for

service with the Fleet. 12 It would be pointed out that the Conference on the

Limitation of Armament is synonymous with the

Vashington Disarmament Conference and the Naval

Disarmament Conference. Subsequent American history

hooks use the names interchangeably. As a result of

the Conference, initially held in Washington, nine separate treaties were drafted and signed.
30 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

The Commandant set forth the Marine Corps

duties and missions as follows:

• . • 2. The duties which the Marine Corps is required to perform in time of peace are as follows:

(a) As marine detachments on board the vessels

of the Fleet in full commission.

(b) As guards for navy yards, naval stations, ammunition depots, naval prisons, etc., at home and

abroad.

(c) As garrisons for Haiti, Santo Domingo, Virgin Islands, Guam, Peking, Managua, etc.

(d) As a mobile force in training for use on expeditionary duty abroad for the purpose of carrying out the foreign policy of our Government, or for

emergency use at home.

(e) As detachments necessary for the recruiting

service, for training recruits, and for adniinistrative purposes.

3. The primary war mission of the Marine Corps

is to supply a mobile force to accompany the Fleet

for operations on shore in support of the Fleet: This force should be of such size, organization,

armament and equipment as may be required by

the plan of naval operations. Also it should be

further utilized in conjunction with Army operations on shore, when the active wival operations

reach such a stage as to permit its temporary detachment fron1 the Navy.

4. (a) The secondary mission of the Marine

Corps in time of war is to continue the performance of its peace time duties, as outlined in Paragraph 2, immediately above.13

As it turned out, the Marine Corps would

not get the added men requested—that is from

the appropriated figure of 21,000 to 27,400,

the authorized figure. By the end of the fiscal

year 1922, the Marine Corps would balance

out to 21,233, losing 1,757 from the preceding

year. The Navy would balance out to 100,211,

losing 32,616 and the Army 148,763, losing

81,962.14 The importance of the CMC Memorandum in February 1922 was not the superficial request for added personnel for the

Marine Corps, that would become a national

pastime for succeeding Commandants, it was

rather the terminology and basis for doctrine

that would evolve from it.

In discussing a possible war in the Pacific,

the Commandant alluded to the fact that between Honolulu and Manila, the United States

had no developed naval base. In a war, such a base would be necessary. "The loss of Guam

under this situation would be most serious and

its recapture would he necessary to the conduct

of successful naval operations in the Pacific."

He pointed out that "the advantage of having

immediately available a mobile Marine Corps

force adequate to conduct offensive land operations against hostile Naval Bases is apparent" He recommended that there he adequate

personnel and material to "maintain in readiness in the United States on the Pacific Coast

and on the Atlantic Coast, the nuclei of such

Marine Corps organizations as may be necessary to guarantee success in war to any naval

expedition requiring a mobile land force.

- - "iS The recommendations of General Lejeune of February 1922, in a routine memorandum to the General Board, changed the

tactical direction the Marine Corps would

pursue in the succeeding decades. He envisioned a mobile force, a force in readiness, and

a force capable of offensive operations. This

force would not be seizing an undefended or

uninhabited advanced naval base, On the contrary, "offensive land operations against hostile naval bases" would be the task facing the

Marine Corps. In the final analysis, was this

not the birth of the Fleet Marine Force as it

is known today?

Maneuvers, Expeditions, Football,

and Mail

The Quantico Marine Base having been

greatly improved since its founding in 1917, became the home for the Advanced Base Force

for the Atlantic Coast in 1920. By 1922, "the

discontinuance of the use of the term Advanced Base Force as now applied to organizations of the Marine Corps" was recommended

by the CMC.16 Finally in 1923, "the general

term Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces shall

be used to designate as a whole, those permanently or provisionally organized units of the

Marine Corps which are available for overseas

service with the Fleet." 17 The old Advanced

Base Force for the Atlantic Coast was accordingly changed to the East Coast Expeditionary

Force. It was joined in 1925 by a West Coast

counterpart. The West Coast Expeditionary Force became a reality with the addition of

Marines from the 4th Marine Regiment recently returned from Santo Domingo.'8 Marines

not involved in expeditionary service in Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti, Santo Domingo, Cuba,

and Chifia were involved in less dangerous

but just as strenuous work called maneuvers:

The first of these maneuvers took place near the

sites of the Battle of the Wilderness. A reinforced

brigade with a considerable amount of heavy equipment, including 155 millimeter guns pulled by 10-

ton tractors, marched to that area from Quantico.

As part of its effort to obtain favorable publicity,

President Harding was induced to attend the

maneuvers. During the following summer (1922)

similar field exercises, but on a larger scale, were
POSTWAR DISARMAMENT PERIOD 31

staged at Gettysburg with a small army of about

4,000 marines, armed with all manner of equipment

left over from the World War. They even had a platoon of tanks. The Commandant of the Corps commented that the organization was a 'miniature

army small but highly trained and powerfully

armed.' President Harding again attended the

maneuvers. A bid for publicity was made by the

re-enactment of Pickett's famous charge in the

Battle of Gettysburg. During the following year

(1923) the Marines from Quantico went into the

Shenandoah Valley for maneuvers. Together with

the corps of cadets from the Virginia Military In.

stitute, they re-enacted the Civil War battle of

New Market, in which battle the cadets of that

institution had formed part of the Confederate

forces. The summer maneuvers of 1924 were held

in the vicinity of Sharpsburg, Maryland, with more

than 3,000 Marines from Quantico and ended with

the spectacular reenactment of the Civil War battle of Antietam, carried Out as a modern attack.

This time the reinforced brigade returned through

Washington where it was reviewed by President Coolidge."

There was no question that the maneuvers

were important. The Commandant felt that

"these . . . maneuvers offered excellent opportunities in respect to troop and staff training and the testing of equipment and other material." 20 They also did no harm to the

Marine Corps image with the American public.

Aside from the summer maneuvers, the Marine was involved with guarding the mails,

winning national rifle competitions, attempting but failing to build a 50,000-seat stadium

at Quantico, sponsoring a nationally-known

football team that after a good fight was

beaten by the University of Michigan in 1923—

26 to 6. The overwhelming importance of the

decade for the Marine Corps, however, was

the experience gained, along with the Navy,

from the fleet exercises held during the winters

of 1922 and 1923 and the spring of 1925.

Fleet Maneuvers—i 922

If, as the CMC said, staff training and testing

of equipment were important in the land maneuvers held during the 1920s, then the practical and valuable experience gained in the

fleet maneuvers were of inestimable value to

the Marine Corps. It is this same period of

trial, error, and sometimes disaster, that company and field grade officers obtained the

knowledge that would be the key to the successful operations of World War II. Most

senior Marine commanders of the 40s, such as

Holland M. Smith, Charles D. Barrett, Alexander A. Vandegrift, etc., were participants in

the valuable fleet maneuvers of the l920s. The

first such exercise took place from January to

April 1922 when a Marine expeditionary detachment under the command of Lieutenant

Colonel Richard M. Cutts participated in exercises held at Guantanamo Bay and at Culebra.

These exercises were designed primarily to test

the possibilities of landing the 155mm gun and

accompanying 10-ton tractor from ship-toshore in small boats. The 9th Company, 10th

Marines, consisting of three officers and 135 men

with one 155mm and two 75mm field guns,

one .10-ton and three 5-ton tractors, was landed

from the USS Florida at Guantanamo Bay.

"During the period at Guantanamo, close attention was paid to the training of the gun's

crews and special details, the hardening of the

men, and testing out of all material, and communication." 21

In March, the company was reembarked in

the Florida and taken to Culebra. The 35th

Company, consisting of three officers and 100

men, joined the force at Guantanamo and took

part in the exercises at Culebra. Material was

again moved by small boats from ship-to-shore

at Culebra and three problems of attack and defense were worked out with the Control Force,

U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Lieutenant Colonel Cutts

commented that "it has been conclusively demonstrated that artillery up to and including

155mm guns and 10-ton tractors can be trans- ported by battleships and landed in ship's

boats." 22

Cutts, however, qualified his recommendation by pointing out that "all conditions must

be exceedingly favorable to obtain a successful

result at the land place; more favorable than

can normally be expected." The favorable conditions referred to implied that there must normally be a calm sea and moderate surf.

These ideal conditions that would be rarely

found in operations such as this did not make

the task impossible. Colonel Cutts recommended that a "lighter" be constructed for

transporting heavy guns. "It should not be

self-propelled owing to increased weight entailed, and the absolute necessity of grounding." 23

Four years later, Cutts would get to test a

troop and artillery lighter, however, it was not

self-propelled. In the summary of his report,

Colonel Cutts noted that what must have been

obvious to officers of the Marine Corps that "in

attempting to weigh carefully the advantages

and disadvantages of both the attack and defense of a base, by far the greater stress has
82 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

come on the defense . It is hoped

some method and material may be developed

to solve the problem of the attack." 24 In assessing the exercises of 1922, the Commandant

commented that "while the exercises of 1922

were defensive in their nature, they brought

out the difficulties of attack in landing operations against hostile opposition and the further

presumption that the Marine Corps should be

preparing for offensive landing operations in

addition to the defensive advanced base work.25

Fleet Maneuvers—1923—1924

In the winter maneuvers of December 1923

through February 1924, the CMC assigned an

expeditionary force of over 3,300 officers and

men under the command of Brigadier General

Eli K. Cole to Fleet Exercise No. IV. The fleet

exercises under the command of Admiral

Richard E. Coontz, Commander in Chief, U.S.

Fleet, were conducted at Culebra and the

Canal Zone. The force was divided approximately in half with 1,550 men with 6 155mm

guns, 12 75mm guns, and 18 machine guns defending Culebra against attack. This force was

known as Marine Corps Expeditionary Force

(MCEF), Culebra, P.R. and under the command of Colonel Dion Williams. The defense

force at Culebra included engineers, gas and

signal troops, plus aviation, balloon service,

and antiaircraft units and a light tank platoon.26

Brigadier General Eli K. Cole, USMC. (USMC Photo

#520349)

Brigadier General Dion Williams, USMC. (USMC

Photo #529182).

The remaining portion of the expeditionary

forces, totalling 1,750 Marines, were known as

MCEF, U.S. Fleet, and under the command ol

General Cole. It comprised a hostile landing

force which effected landings in the Panama

Canal Zone and at Culebra against Colonel

Williams' men. The MCEF, U.S. Fleet comprised the 5th Marine Regiment, a headquarters company, radio service company, gas platoon, naval medical corps personnel, and four

Army liaison officers. To say the results of the

exercises were unsatisfactory would have to be

the understatement of the decade. Landing

on the wrong beach, boats being lost for a time,

insufficient naval bombardment, transport

poorly loaded, etc. were some of the criticisms

of what went wrong.27 It was expected that

many things would not go right. What was

important in the exercises of 1924 was the

experience of a large-scale landing and the many

recommendations to improve future landings.

If one transport was poorly loaded, the

freighter USS Sirius was not. The assignment

of a detachment of 25 Marines and one officer,

the forerunner of a combat cargo officer, made

cargo off-loading feasible. Colonel Williams reported "that the loading and unloading of the

Sirius constituted one of the most valuable lessons of the maneuvers." 28 The 1924 exercises

were significant in that they demonstrated

great problems that were endemic in a shipto-shore landing at the time. They also pro-
I

POSTWAR DISARMAMENT PERIOD 33

duced the beginning of serious experimentation with landing craft more suitable than the

standard ships' boats. Two types of boats were

tested, the first of which was a derivation of

the British 'beetle" boats first used by them at

Suvia Bay, Gallipoli in August 1915. The CMC

requested the CNO to have the one "fifty foot

(50') motor lighter, (Beetle boat), now

being built at Norfolk, Virginia, placed on

board the USS Henderson" 29 for testing during

the winter maneuvers. The Henderson, the

transport Chaumont, and the Sirius were the

other ships assigned to the MCEF.

General Cole assessed the value of the

"beetle boat," officially designated "Troop

Barge A," as follows:

We had with us a so-called "Beetle' capable of

carrying a 75mm gun and about 60 men, or 100

riflemen—this is a beginning, but the present de- sign must be altered, if for no other reason than

that its stowage on board ship reduces the motor

sailers by two—i.e. one 50' and one 40', with landing capacity of 160 men. Some design must be

arrived at whereby a transport can carry boats for

at least 60 percent of the infantry force on board,

with special provisions for artillery, transportation, supplies, etc. These boats should be sea- worthy enough to allow them to go 20 miles under

their own power, and if possible of a design to

Unloading equipment of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force at Culebra, Puerto Rico, January 1924.

(USMC Photo #516047).

permit their being towed by a minesweeper or a

destroyer at reduced speed. A design which will

give protection against machine gun fire and which

provides for some machine gun fire from the boat

is desirable.°

Unloading a 75mm gun from a "Beetle" boat during fleet maneuvers at Culebra, Puerto Rico, in 1924. (USMC

Photo #515227).

_t'I

I!
r -

34 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Christie amphibian tank, mounting a 75mm gun, is

tested at the Culebra maneuvers in 1924. (USMC Photo

*523 115).

The other boat tested during the winter

maneuvers of 1924 was the "Christie Tank."

Unlike the "beetle boat," this test was scheduled to be a great surprise to Colonel Williams'

forces defending Culebra. Its appearance was

attributed to Brigadier General Smedley D.

Butler. He had been designated to command

the MCEF but was replaced by Brigadier General Eli K. Cole on 14 December 1923. While

Butler was still concerned with the exercise,

he had corresponded with Walter Christie of

the Sun Shipbuilding Company of Chester,

Pennsylvania who had built an amphibious

tank in 1922. After successful tests on the Hudson River in New York and later tests on the

Potomac River, Christie asked the CMC to test

his tank in the winter maneuvers of 1924. The

CMC accepted his offer and the Commander in

Chief, U.S. Fleet, Admiral Robert E. Coontz,

gave authorization to the Commander, Scouting

Fleet, Vice Admiral Newton A. McCully, to

test the Christie Tank.32 General Butler asked

Christie and Admiral McCully to keep the use

of the tank a secret in order to surprise the

defenders of Culebra.33

The tests were conducted on the Christie

tank but no mention of it surprising the defenders of Culebra was noted in the reports

after the exercises were over. The CMC noted

to the Secretary of the Navy that "two special

1Ien of the 5th Marine Regiment landing at Culebra, Puerto Rico, during fleet maneuvers, 1924. (USMC Photo #515293).

—,•

iv i

I'

I
POSTWAR DISARMAMENT PERIOD 35

types of boats for landing operations were

used experimentally with interesting, although

not decisive results." The Christie tank,

while successful on rivers, proved unseaworthy.

"Even though never perfected, it was the

earliest forerunner of the amphibian tractor

(LVT) which was to make such a remarkable

record in World War II."

Aloha—Fleet Maneuvers— 1925

In April 1925, joint Army and Navy exercises were held off the Hawaiian Islands. The

number of Marines employed was a simulated

42,000-man landing force but in reality 1,500

took part. An important factor was an experiment with the landing force staff. The normal

school activities in the Field Officers School at

Quantico were suspended in March and the

students and instructors all became members

of the "Blue" MCEF (attacking force) of Exercise #3. The group was commanded by Colonel Robert M. Dunlap, Commanding Officer of

Marine Corps Schools. "The exercises ... were

completely successful from the standpoint of

the Marines. The plans worked to perfection

and the landing was accomplished." ° Colonel

Dunlap and his staff participated in a Navy

critique at the Marine Barracks, Pearl Harbor

from 1 to 4 May. After his return to Quantico,

another critique was held there on 1—5 June

1925 emphasizing Marine problems. Recommendations in the critique ranged from proper

tactical organization to discarding canvas leggins. They pointed out the need for experiments to develop a "boat suitable for landing

the first waves ashore on a defended coast

capable of being carried on transports and capable of being turned out in quantity once

war is determined upon 38 If there was a single unchanging thread in

all of the fleet exercises during the 1920s it

was the constant recommendation that a "suitable boat' be developed to land the landing

forces. Marine participation in fleet exercises

was interrupted for the remainder of the decade due to renewed expeditionary commitments in Nicaragua, Haiti, and China and the

bandits' return to robbing the mails at home. It would not be until 1932 that the Marine

Corps would resume its participation in fleet

maneuvers. However, the intervening years

would bring more experimentation with landing lighters and see the development of a mission.

During July 1926, a detachment of Marines under the command of Major Maurice E.

Shearer was ordered to Hampton Roads, Virginia to make tests of two 50-foot motor lighters, one for landing troops and the other for

landing artillery. Both lighters were built by

the Navy. The detachment was broken into

two platoons, the infantry platoon from the

5th Regiment commanded by First Lieutenant

Charles Connette and a section of 155mm artillery from the 10th Regiment commanded by

First Lieutenant Melvin E. Fuller.39 The Motor

Troop Lighter was a development from a previous design generally known as the "beetle

barge" It was a "special purpose" lighter to

be used primarily for the landing of the first

troop wave under fire. Smaller boats carrying

about 100 men were envisioned to be used to

carry the rest of the troops as soon as the beach had been cleared. The motor troop

lighter being tested was 50-feet long and had

about a 14-foot beam. It was propelled by two

motors, and was armored against small arms

fire. It had the capacity to carry machine guns

or 37mm guns for offensive power. The designers had no special provisiOns for retraction

of this boat from the beach but "if the landing

is on a beach of such a nature as to permit

withdrawal they may be used in landing of

subsequent waves, if not, they afford protected

dressing stations, or even machine gun nests." 40

Lieutenant Connette made three different

tests of the capacity of the boat. He had loaded

as many as 126 men with light marching

packs but concluded that "it would not be

practical to place so many men in the boat in

any kind of rough sea." When tests were made

in landing the boat, 100 men with heavy

marching packs were loaded on board at the

naval base in Norfolk:

The boat proceeded under her own power to

Ocean View Beach, a distance of about four miles

where Jandings were made through a very light surf.

The boat was put up to the beach with her bow

about three feet clear of the water. The landing

from boat was made, clearing the boat in two

minutes at first trial and about one and one half

minutes at the second trial. Had the front hatch

opening been larger the boat could have been unloaded in less than one minute. The boat left the

beach very easily after being reloaded.1

The 50-foot lighter for landing artillery was

designed primarily for a maximum effort of

landing the 155mm gun and its tractor on any

stretch of good beach in a moderate surf. However, a secondary purpose was considered in
36 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

duct of landing operations." This was indeed a milestone in the restatement of the

Marine Corps mission.

Marine Corps Schools

"Education has for its object the formation of

character"

—Herbert Spencer

Series "E" light tank of the 3d Brigade being loaded

on board ship at Tienisin, China, in September 1928.

(USMC Photo #528193),

using the lighter for landing troops, equipment, and ammunition, "thus securing distribution at beach head, and avoiding congestion

at landings which are possible only for ships'

boats," 42 The lighter was not self-propelled and

had to be towed by another boat:

It had to be beached stern-to and the gun or vehicle unloaded over a stern ramp. Retracting

was easy but the single disadvantage was that the

lighter could not be worked in and beached until the beach had been secured.

In 1927, the Joint Board of the Army and

Navy* recognized the history, experience, and

affinity for Marine Corps in landing operations

and assigned as a general function the responsibility to "provide and maintain forces for land

operations in support of the fleet for the initial

seizure of advanced bases and for such limited

auxiliary land operations as are essential to the

prosecution of the naval campaign." The report further established that "the Marines

because of the constant association with naval

units will be given special training in the con-

*As a result of command experiences in the Spanish American War, which showed the need for a better

U.S. military organization to handle preparation of

joint war plans, the conduct of joint training, and

control of joint operations, the Joint Army-Navy Board

was established in 1903. This body was responsible

for advising the civilian secretaries on major policies

affecting the two armed services, It was superseded by

the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization after May 1942.

Formal military education of officers in the

Marine Corps only goes back to 1891 when

the School of Application was founded for

newly commissioned officers. The initial location of the school was at the Marine Barracks

in Washington but subsequently it moved to

Annapolis, Port Royal, Norfolk, and finally to

Quantico in April 1917. By 1920, and after

going through several name changes, the

school was known as the Marine Officers'

School. By July 1922, it had three separate

courses in session—the field officers course, the

company officers course, and the basic course.

For the first time, all courses or, as it evolved,

all schools, were located at Quantico. The Basic School would subsequently be moved to

Philadelphia in 1923 but would return to

Quantico during World War II.

The curriculum of all of the schools at

Quantico, commonly called Marine Corps

Schools (MCS) during the 1920s, was naturally Army oriented. This orientation was by

design, organized as such, because of the recent

experiences in World War I. In addition, all

texts, with the exception of Advanced Base

writings, used by MCS were written by the

Army. Army orientation continued throughout

the education of Marine officers in that many

senior Marine officers attended the Army War

College or the Command and Staff College of

the Army.

The Army's schools were excellent but by

their nature patterned for the organization

training, equipment, and mission of the Army.

The knowledge gained from the Army schools

could only serve as good experience to the

individual officer and perhaps give him new

ideas as to how to improve his own organization, etc. The Marine-Army graduate returning to his battalion, regiment, or some staff

duty, found an organization, different in number, equipment, and mission. Mission was the

key. What was the mission of the Marine Corps? Marines in the past had had a great diversity of jobs. They had been part of a
POSTWAR DISARMAMENT PERIOD 37

land mass war, had seized and defended small

islands, fought bandits abroad, had governed

whole countries, and had guarded the mails.

In addition, the new decade of the twenties

brought the further improvement of the airplane, tank, and radio. How would these new

developments be utilized in the spectrum of

possible missions? How could a school prepare

officers to meet the challenges of carrying Out

any of the above mentioned tasks? The answer came not by a single, simple order but by

an evolutionary process. War plans, prepared

under the Joint Board of the Army and Navy,

provided the impetus of the evolutionary process that ultimately restated the landing operations mission that was the responsibility of the

Marine Corps.

With this task in mind, the Marine Corps

Schools would have to develop a course of

study of their own. The traditional Army

courses could not give them the answer, they

were not geared for it. One such original work

was the study of the technique of small wars.

A vast amount of uncorrelated information

had accumulated through the years, but no attempt had been made to consolidate it into a

form which could be used in passing on this

information to other officers. In 1922, Major

Samuel M. Harrington, while a student of the

Field Officers Course, undertook a comprehensive study of small wars. As a result, he prepared a definitive treatise entitled, "The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars." * After

Harrington left Quantico, Colonel Ben H.

Fuller, Commanding Officer of MCS, requested

Major Harrington to send him copies of his

work on small wars "in order to build up a

course strictly [patterned for] Marine Corps

work 46 Colonel Fuller had Harrington's work incorporated into the school's curriculum. This

publication presented certain principles of

landing operations, the seizure of cities, and

operations in the field, as they applied to small

wars. It constituted the first consolidated analysis of small wars available for study. Since

small wars continued to be an immediate concern of the Marine Corps, Major Harrington's

work was the basis for more detailed writing

on the subject later. In 1935, a "Restricted"

*Major Harrington had published two articles entitled, "The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars," Marine Corps Gazette, v, 6, No. 4 (December 1921) and

v. 7, No. 1 (March 1922). These articles were a condensed version of his definitive treatise.

book entitled Small Wars Operations was

published for use within the MCS. In 1940, a

revised and corrected version of small wars

was published for the Marine Corps by the

Government Printing Office for general use,

entitled the Small Wars Manual.

The curriculum at MCS began to change.

As a result of the report of Colonel Robert H.

Dunlap, Commanding Officer of MCS, concerning the Fleet Exercises of 1925, the CMC

directed that the subject of Overseas Expeditions and Ship-to-Shore Operations be developed and made an important feature of the

tactical course in both the Field and Company

Officers' Schools.47 By 1926, tactics studies emphasized Marine Corps activity in conjunction

with the fleet and landing operations. The following subjects became part of the MCS regular curriculum: 48

tion

(a) The strategy of the Pacific Ocean

(b) Expeditionary forces

(c) Naval considerations for an overseas expediBrigadier General Samuel M. Harrington, USMC.

(USMC Photo #25101).

(d) Embarking and loading troops and supplies

(e) Hydrographic and meteorological study

(f) Tactical principles of securing a beachhead

(g) Landing places (configuration, terrain, and

naval artillery support)

(h) Naval gunfire

(i) Beach parties

(j) Shore parties

(k) Waves

(I) Naval provisions for disembarkation

(m) Disembarkation
— ii

38 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

(n) Boats

(o) Night landings

(p) Command and liaison

(q) Exercise and debarkation

(r) Consolidation and exploration

(s) Withdrawal

The above subjects of instruction, with respect to landing operations, totaled 49 hours

as compared to five hours in 1925. The increased

part the MCS would play in the development

of landing operations was reflected in the

schedule for the academic year 1927—28. A

complete revision and expansion of the courses

tripled the emphasis on landing operations.

MCS added a touch of sophistication with the

addition of Army and Navy Officers as instructors or visiting lecturers. Army officers persented topics with respect to their own specialties. Naval officers quite definitely added their

talents to the climate whereby landing operations would be made. Some of the lectures

were presented by Captain Ralph M. Griswold,

"United States Fleet Operations and the Naval

Staff"; Captain Dudley W. Knox, "The Strategy

The Commandant, Major General John A. Lejeune,

Senator Edward C. Hale, Chairman of the Committee

on Naval A flairs, and Brigadier General Eli K. Cole,

at Quantico's airfield on 25 March 1925. (USMC Photo

#515907).

of the Atlantic"; Commander Raymond A.

Spruance, "Naval Intelligence"; Rear Admiral

Frank H. Schofield, "The Strategy of the Pacific"; and Commander Howard M. Lammers,

"Naval Gunfire in Support of a Landing."

During the academic year 1928—29, the

schools were crippled by depletion of the staff

of instructors, most of whom were sent to Nicaragua. However, this did not result in a decrease in the emphasis on landing operations

instructions.50

By 1930, the MCS had become the center for

the development of techniques in landing operations. It would be at MCS, in the succeeding

decade, that the experience, theory, and findings would be incorporated into a functional

manual of doctrine.

Aviation—The Magnificent Men in

Their Flying Machines

If ground Marines were making strides in

landing operations during the l920s, the air

Marines were making strides in tactics and

techniques in aerial warfare. We have seen

that through no fault of their own, Marine

aviators did not support Marine ground troops

during World War I. However, Marine air

made up for it after the war. Marine aviation

under the command of Major Thomas C.

Turner was the only U.S. military air service

that actually saw combat during the period between World War I and World War II. Marine

air served in Santo Domingo from February

1919 until July 1924, in Haiti from March 1919

to August 1934, and in Nicaragua from 1927

to 1933. Throughout those years, Marine pilots

were not only experiencing combat but were

also contributing radically new tactics to both

ground and air warfare.5' During this period of

the twenties, Marine planes and pilots were

sent to the Pacific for the first time when they

were assigned to Guam. In April 1927, elements of three squadrons were shipped to

Tientsin, China in support of the MCEF sent

there. There was no combat action in China—

it was centered in Latin America, It was in

Santo Domingo in 1919 that Lieutenant Lawson H. M. Sanderson first experimented with

dive-bombing.

Sanderson found that he could hit a target

more often by pointing his plane toward the

target and releasing his bomb from a makeshift rack after diving to a low level (about

250 feet) at an angle of about 45°—the angle
POSTWAR DISARMAMENT PERIOD 39

which came to be known as glide bombing in

World War 11.52

In February 1927, Major Ross E. Rowell,

commanding officer of a unit of 6 DHs and 81

men, was directed to support the 5th Marines

that had been dispatched to Nicaragua a month

earlier. Rowell had further experimented with

dive-bombing and made it mandatory in

training his pilots. Dive-bombing became a

standing operating procedure in Rowell's unit

and a first for Marine air. Other services and

other countries used dive-bombing developed

in their own way. "Most senior Marine aviators

doubt that any individual can claim credit for

trying to hit his target by aiming his plane at

it." Also in the late twenties, Major Edwin

H. Brainard, who succeeded Turner as Officerin-Charge of Marine Aviation, managed to obtain the first plane the Marines ever had which

was built to transport cargo, the three-engine

Fokker transport. In 1927, Brainard himself

delivered the Fokker to Nicaragua for use. After two other Fokkers arrived, Marine cargo

operations made military history in flights

made and pounds of freight carried.5 In another first of sorts, a Marine patrol• pinned

down by Nicaraguan bandits spotted several

Marine planes. The patrol laid out on the

ground panels of cloth indicating the direction

and range of the enemy and asked for an air

attack. The subsequent bombing and strafing

attack became the first known instance of an

air attack being directed by ground troops.'5

This tactic became a fundamental element of

close air support later on.

At home, in July 1926, Marine aviation was

preparing for its second class of aerial observation. The Commanding Officer of the School of

Aerial Observation located at Quantico had

requested the Brigade Commander, MCEF to

direct cooperation of the Fifth Regiment with

the Observers School in an air-ground communication problem. He considered the practice essential in rounding out the aerial observer for work with the infantry. In addition

to their normal duties with expeditionary

forces, Marine aviators participated in national

air races, aerial surveys, night flying, exhibition flying, and other flight training.

By 1930, Marine Corps aviation was firmly

entrenched in two major installations and

three overseas bases located as follows:

Aircraft Squadrons, East Coast Expeditionary

Force, Marine Barracks, Quantico

Aircraft Squadrons, West Coast Expeditionary

Force, Naval Air Station, San Diego

Detachments with 2d Brigade, Managua, Nicaragua

Detachments with 1st Brigade, Port-au-Prince, Haiti

Detachments with Naval Station, Guam, Mariana

Islands

An early Marine transport p/one, the Fokker TA—2,

gaining altitude over Lake Managua, Nicaragua, on 9

April 1930. (USMC Photo #530022).
I

40 A DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY OF THE USMC: 1900-1970

Lieutenant Christian F. Sc/iilt and his crew standing in front of a DT—2 torpedo bomber at New York in October

/925. Lieutenant Schilt was awarded the Medal of Honor for actions in Nicaragua in 1928. (USMC Photo #515971).