NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

File Name: 17a0088n.06 

Case No. 16-6197 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

ERIC LLOYD HERMANSEN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

LADONNA THOMPSON, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE WESTERN 

DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 

O P I N I O N

 BEFORE: GIBBONS, ROGERS, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges. 

 McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Eric Hermansen is a Jewish prisoner in the 

custody of the Kentucky Department of Corrections, who alleges he was denied his First 

Amendment right to kosher meals while incarcerated at the Kentucky State Penitentiary 

(“KSP”). Hermansen commenced this civil rights action in April 2013, seeking declaratory, 

injunctive, and monetary relief. During proceedings below, the parties reached an agreement 

that substantially satisfied Hermansen’s dietary demands. This agreement became the premise 

for rulings: (1) awarding summary judgment to the individual defendants based on qualified 

immunity; (2) denying the claim for injunctive relief as moot; (3) denying the claim for punitive 

damages for lack of a showing that defendants acted other than in good faith in attempting to 

accommodate Hermansen’s strict dietary beliefs; and (4) denying Hermansen’s request for 
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attorney’s fees because he was not a “prevailing party.” Hermansen challenges each of these 

rulings. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in all respects. 

I 

 A. The Froman Litigation 

Hermansen was transferred to KSP in February 2012, but that’s not when his kosher diet 

difficulties began. He had formerly been incarcerated at the Kentucky State Reformatory 

(“KSR”). During his time at KSR, Hermansen was a plaintiff, with other Jewish inmates, in civil 

rights litigation regarding kosher dietary rights, Froman v. Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections, 

No. 3:08-cv-243 (W.D. Ky.). The Froman case culminated in a settlement agreement whereby 

the Kentucky Department of Corrections adopted Kosher Meal Program Guidelines. See R.1, 

Complaint ¶ 29, Page ID 8; R. 1-1, Complaint App. B and C, Page ID 41–47. On May 25, 2010, 

the district court issued an order: (1) requiring all parties to abide by the settlement agreement 

and requiring the defendants to file monthly reports with the court outlining their compliance; 

(2) dismissing all other pending claims; (3) denying all pending motions; (4) establishing a 

deadline for the plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees, if any; and (5) retaining jurisdiction to 

monitor settlement compliance and resolve attorney’s fees issues. Froman, No. 3:08-cv-243 

(W.D. Ky.), R. 138, Order, Page ID 1197. This was followed by an order on October 20, 2010, 

awarding plaintiffs attorney’s fees and costs of $11,750 and $31.28, respectively, id., R. 149, 

Order, Page ID 1276; and an order on June 21, 2011, closing the case after defendants had 

demonstrated compliance for over a year, id., R. 166, Order, Page ID 1450. 

 Hermansen was one of three Froman plaintiffs who appealed the order closing the case. 

A panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining that the defendants had complied in good faith with the terms of the settlement 
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agreement. Froman v. Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections, No. 11-5868 (6th Cir. June 14, 2012). 

After his transfer to KSP, Hermansen learned that the kosher meal guidelines implemented at 

KSR as a result of Froman were not being followed at KSP. He filed a motion in the Froman

district court for issuance of a permanent injunction requiring implementation of the kosher meal 

guidelines at KSP and all other Kentucky Department of Corrections prisons. The district court 

denied the motion on September 18, 2012, holding that the settlement agreement reached in 

Froman applied only to KSR. Froman, No. 3:08-cv-243 (W.D. Ky.), R. 198, Order at 4, Page 

ID 1592. Hence, this action. 

B. Procedural Background 

Hermansen filed his complaint pro se on April 30, 2013, proceeding against the 

Kentucky Department of Corrections (“KDOC”) for injunctive relief; and against defendant 

LaDonna Thompson, KDOC Commissioner, and other KDOC employees for damages in their 

individual capacities. The 39-page complaint describes in detail Hermansen’s dissatisfaction 

with KSP employees’ assurances of their good faith efforts to meet his kosher food preparation 

requirements, including lengthy recitations of his various grievances and defendants’ responses. 

R. 1, Complaint at 17–33, Page ID 17–33. In paragraph 94, Hermansen sets forth numerous 

particular ways in which the food storage and preparation practices in the separate kosher kitchen 

at KSP fell short of the strict requirements of his Jewish faith, allegedly rendering meals served 

to him and other Jewish prisoners not “truly kosher . . . in accordance with the Jewish laws of 

kashruth.” Id. at 33–35, Page ID 33–35. Hermansen alleges that defendants have conspired to 

violate his First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion by refusing to comply with the 

Kosher Meal Program Guidelines adopted by way of settlement in Froman. He prays for 
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declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and monetary relief in the form of punitive damages, as well 

as attorney’s fees and costs. 

 On September 23, 2013, the district court allowed Hermansen to amend his complaint to 

add a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., based substantially on the same allegations of denial of his right to 

kosher meals. R. 11, Order, Page ID 239. In the same order, the court sua sponte dismissed 

KDOC as a party. Counsel Gregory Belzley and Camille Bathurst of Prospect, Kentucky, 

entered their appearances on behalf of Hermansen on March 20, 2014. 

 Defendants moved for summary judgment on January 1, 2016, contending the claim for 

injunctive relief had been rendered moot by agreement reached and signed by the parties in 

December 2015; and that Hermansen could not recover on his claim for punitive damages 

because defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and because, in any event, there was no 

evidence of evil intent or reckless or callous indifference to Hermansen’s rights. The Magistrate 

Judge addressed the motion for summary judgment and prepared proposed findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, recommending the motion be granted. R. 86, Recommendation, Page ID 

640. The district court overruled Hermansen’s objections, adopted the recommended findings 

and conclusions, and granted the motion for summary judgment. R. 91, Order, Page ID 683. In 

the same order, the court denied Hermansen’s motion for attorney’s fees as moot. On July 26, 

2016, the district court denied Hermansen’s motion for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 60(b)(1). R. 96, Order, Page ID 708. 
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II 

 A. Summary Judgment Ruling 

Hermansen first challenges the summary judgment ruling based on qualified immunity. 

He contends his First Amendment right to kosher meals is clearly established law that defendants 

knowingly violated before the parties reached their December 2015 agreement. 

 We review the summary judgment ruling de novo. Smith v. Perkins Bd. of Educ., 

708 F.3d 821, 825 (6th Cir. 2013). Under Rule 56, summary judgment shall be granted “if the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The reviewing court must view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences 

in his favor. Smith, 708 F.3d at 825. 

 Here, summary judgment was awarded to the individual defendants based in part on 

qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil 

damages if their actions did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 

which a reasonable person would have known. The court must therefore determine (1) whether 

the facts shown by the plaintiff make out the violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether 

the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). The court may address these prongs in any order, but the 

defendant official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff can make both showings. 

Brown v. Lewis, 779 F.3d 401, 412 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). Qualified 

immunity “‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the plainly 

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 

(1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 343 (1986)). Qualified immunity applies 
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irrespective of whether the official’s error was a mistake of law or a mistake of fact, or a mistake 

based on mixed questions of law and fact. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. 

 Since defendants raised the qualified immunity defense, Hermansen bears the burden of 

showing that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. Johnson v. Moseley, 790 F.3d 

649, 653 (6th Cir. 2015). At the summary judgment stage, this burden is carried by adducing 

facts that could reasonably support the finding that defendants violated a constitutional right that 

was clearly established at the time of the violation. To satisfy this latter requirement, the right 

allegedly violated must have been clearly established in a “particularized” sense, such that a 

reasonable official confronted with the same situation would have known that his actions would 

be in violation of that right. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199–200 (2004). In making the 

“clearly established” determination, we look first to decisions of the Supreme Court, then to 

decisions of this court and other courts within our circuit, and finally to decisions of other 

circuits. Benison v. Ross, 765 F.3d 649, 664 (6th Cir. 2014). To be deemed clearly established, 

existing precedent must have placed the unlawfulness of the officials’ conduct “beyond debate.” 

Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014). 

 Both sides cite Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 2010), as defining the clearly 

established right that was allegedly violated before the parties reached their December 2015 

agreement. Colvin recognizes that “prison administrators must provide an adequate diet without 

violating the inmate’s religious dietary restrictions.” Id. at 290 (quoting Alexander v. Carrick, 31 

F. App’x 176, 179 (6th Cir. 2002)); see also Welch v. Spaulding, 627 F. App’x 479, 482 (6th Cir. 

2015) (applying the Colvin standard). 

 In substance, Hermansen’s grievances at KSP did not involve the nutritional adequacy of 

foods he was given that are permissible to eat under kosher requirements. Rather, they stemmed 
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from his observations that he was occasionally served items not in strict compliance with kosher 

requirements (e.g., items of meat and dairy impermissibly served on the same tray; freeze-dried 

potato slices that he believed were not an approved kosher item). These instances allegedly 

resulted in contamination of kitchen space and utensils that must be properly “kashered,” or 

made clean, by certification of a competent rabbi. Until such certification was obtained, food 

products subsequently prepared in such contaminated spaces with contaminated utensils were 

allegedly not kosher. 

 Hermansen’s allegations find some support in the unsigned May 7, 2015 “expert report” 

of Rabbi Boruch Susman. R. 64-1, Statement, Page ID 449. The report describes Rabbi 

Susman’s observations during an inspection of the KSP kosher kitchen on April 30, 2015. 

Observing that the kosher kitchen was “separate, locked and gated off from the general kitchen,” 

and that “food ingredients and products used on the kosher menu were all acceptable,” the report 

nonetheless noted that “complications with the kosher status of the utensils” were caused by their 

concurrent use for meat and dairy meals. Id. Rabbi Susman suggested various simple remedies. 

Indeed, the December 2015 agreement between the parties was directly responsive to Rabbi 

Susman’s concerns and was approved by him. See R. 79-2, Agreed Report, Page ID 561. 

 Prior to that time, Hermansen contends defendants’ failure to honor the strict 

requirements of his sincerely held religious beliefs was violative of his clearly established rights. 

Yet, he has failed to identify persuasive precedent from the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit, or 

any of our sister circuits specifically holding that any technical variance from the strict 

requirements of kashruth by prison officials violates Jewish prisoners’ First Amendment rights. 

 As recently as last month, the Supreme Court unanimously and insistently reaffirmed its 

repeated admonition that, for purposes of qualified immunity, “clearly established law” is not to 
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be defined “at a high level of generality,” but must be defined in a “particularized” sense. White 

v. Pauly, --- S. Ct. ---, No. 16-67, 2017 WL 69170 at *4 (Jan. 9, 2017) (internal citations 

omitted). The Court reiterated that although “general statements of the law are not inherently 

incapable of giving fair and clear warning” to government officials, their conduct is protected by 

qualified immunity unless its unlawfulness was “apparent” or “obvious” in light of pre-existing 

law. Id. at *5 (citations omitted). 

 Applying this teaching, we find the instant record devoid of support, in fact or law, for 

the notion that it should have been obvious to defendants that their provision of kosher food 

products to Hermansen, prepared in a separate kitchen facility, was nonetheless violative of his 

First Amendment free exercise rights because the same utensils used to prepare or serve 

otherwise approved meat products had also been used to prepare or serve otherwise approved 

dairy products, at some point, without having first been kashered and certified by a rabbi. 

 Hermansen contends these defendants are without excuse because they were on notice of 

the Froman case, where Kosher Meal Program Guidelines were implemented by agreement at 

KSR as early as 2010. Yet, even if one or more of the individual defendants was actually aware 

of the guidelines implemented by agreement at KSR, the fact remains that no court had, in 

authoritative precedent, interpreted the First Amendment as requiring strict compliance with the 

guidelines, whether at KSR or elsewhere. Even though the Froman agreement was enforced by 

district court order, it never ripened into a precedential ruling on the merits of the free exercise 

claim. The Froman agreement simply did not become precedent defining the “clearly 

established law.” 
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 Accordingly, there was no error in the district court’s ruling that defendants are protected 

from damages liability by qualified immunity and are therefore entitled to summary judgment on 

Hermansen’s First Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1

 

B. Denial of Injunctive Relief 

 After the district court awarded defendants summary judgment, Hermansen moved for 

relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), asking the court to incorporate the parties’ agreement into 

an injunctive order. The district court declined, noting the parties’ voluntary cooperation and 

seeing “no need to enter a separate judgment enforcing the agreement.” R. 96, Order at 3, Page 

ID 710. On appeal, Hermansen argues that without a court order, there is no guarantee that 

defendants will continue to honor his rights, citing the June 22, 2016 declaration of Rabbi 

Susman, who stated: 

I was subsequently advised that a contamination of the kosher kitchen had 

occurred by use of the kitchen by inmates for heating non-kosher food, who then 

were passing the food over the fence into the other kitchen. This rendered the 

kitchen, and all food stored or prepared in the kitchen, non-kosher. On April 13, 

2016, at the request of Defendants, I inspected and rekashered the kitchen so that 

it could again be used for the storage and preparation of kosher food. 

R. 95-2, Susman Decl. at 1–2, Page ID 706–07. 

 Far from supporting Hermansen’s argument, Rabbi Susman’s declaration actually 

supports the district court’s conclusion that the parties’ agreement had mooted the claim for 

 1 The same reasoning also justifies the district court’s refusal to consider punitive 

damages. First, qualified immunity, where it applies, protects against liability for monetary 

damages, whether compensatory or punitive. Second, punitive damages are available in relation 

to a § 1983 claim only “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or 

intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of 

others.” King v. Zamiara, 788 F.3d 207, 216 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 

30, 56 (1983)). Where a plaintiff has failed to overcome qualified immunity for lack of a 

showing that defendant’s conduct was in obvious violation of clearly established law, the record 

can hardly be deemed to nonetheless meet the requisite showing of “willful or malicious 

conduct.” See id. at 216 (quoting Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 n.9 

(1986)). 
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injunctive relief and there was no manifest need for continuing judicial supervision. As Rabbi 

Susman recounted, when an incident causing contamination occurred, defendants, consistent 

with their agreement and without any need for judicial intervention, requested him to inspect and 

rekasher the kosher kitchen, which he did. This is compliance. This isolated episode hardly 

constitutes a guarantee of one hundred percent compliance with the agreed-to accommodation of 

Hermansen’s religiously motivated dietary practices. It represents no ironclad assurance that 

inmates will never cause contamination again in the future. However, it clearly substantiates the 

continuation of good-faith cooperation, which obviates the need for federal judicial monitoring 

of state governmental officials. We find only wisdom and no error in the district court’s 

restraint. 

C. Denial of Attorney’s Fees 

 Hermansen moved the district court for attorney’s fees and costs as prevailing party 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, noting that the parties had, in their agreement, expressly reserved the 

issue. In response, defendants did not contest Hermansen’s entitlement to an appropriate award, 

but objected to the claimed fees and costs as excessive. See R. 88, Response, Page ID 655. The 

court initially denied the motion as moot, without explanation. R. 91, Order at 4, Page ID 686. 

But in response to the motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(1), the court “clarified” that Hermansen 

was not entitled to fees because he had not recovered damages. That is, even though the court 

misstated that Hermansen had “obtained injunctive relief,” it held that he was not a prevailing 

party. R. 96, Order at 3–4, page ID 710–11. 

 We review for abuse of discretion. Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Bissell, 

210 F.3d 595, 597 (6th Cir. 2000). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly 

erroneous findings of fact . . . or when it improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous legal 
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standard.” Id. (quoting Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 753 F.2d 

1354, 1356 (6th Cir. 1985)). 

 We agree with Hermansen that the district court applied an erroneous legal standard. In 

Bissell, cited here by both sides, we summarized the existing standard governing determination 

of “prevailing party” status under § 1988: 

 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, district courts have the discretion to award 

attorneys’ fees to a “prevailing party” in a civil rights lawsuit. A “prevailing 

party” need not actually prevail on the merits of its claim so long as it “succeed[s] 

on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the 

parties sought in bringing suit.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983), 

quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278–79 (1st Cir. 1978). Any 

enforceable judgment, or comparable type of relief, or settlement, therefore, will 

generally make a plaintiff a “prevailing party” as long as “his claim materially 

alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s 

behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 

103, 111 (1992). A plaintiff is benefitted by “monetary damages, injunctive 

relief, or a voluntary change in a defendant’s conduct.” Woolridge v. Marlene 

Indus., 898 F.2d 1169, 1173 (6th Cir. 1990). 

 If the plaintiff’s relief stems from a voluntary change in the defendant’s 

conduct, the plaintiff must show that his or her lawsuit was the “catalyst” behind 

that change. Payne v. Board of Educ., Cleveland City Schools, 88 F.3d 392, 397 

(6th Cir. 1996). 

Bissell, 210 F.3d at 597–98. 

 Under Bissell, given that defendants voluntarily changed their behavior, Hermansen’s 

right to recover attorney’s fees would have been contingent on his ability to show that his lawsuit 

was the catalyst behind defendants’ agreed-to change. However, the catalyst theory recognized 

in Bissell was rejected by the Supreme Court in Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West 

Virginia Dep’t of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001). In Buckhannon, the Court 

limited the term “prevailing party” to a party who obtains either a judgment on the merits or a 

court-ordered consent decree. “A defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps 
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accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial 

imprimatur on the change.” Id. at 605. 

 Under the terms of the Agreed Report, Hermansen obtained much of the relief that he 

sought. But it is undisputed that he never obtained a judgment on the merits or a consent decree. 

Rather, the district court viewed the December 2015 agreement and defendants’ subsequent 

compliance with it as mooting both the need for a ruling on the merits and the need for any 

injunctive relief. 

 In Toms v. Taft, 338 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2003), we applied the rule of Buckhannon under 

circumstances closely analogous to those presented here. In Toms, like here, the plaintiffs had 

obtained a voluntary change in conduct as a result of a court-supervised settlement conference, 

but failed to obtain a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree or injunction. Id.

at 529. In affirming the denial of attorney’s fees, we held that “[p]rivate settlement agreements 

do not confer prevailing party status.” Id. Toms dictates the same result in this case. 

 We acknowledge that defendants did not contest Hermansen’s prevailing party status 

below; they merely challenged the amounts of fees and costs requested.2

 On appeal, defendants 

have attempted to defend the district court’s denial of fees, but the sole rationale offered, citing 

Bissell, is that the accommodations granted Hermansen per the Agreed Report were gratuitous, 

not required by law. Though defendants thus fail to recognize that the catalyst theory is no 

longer good law, their argument is roughly consistent with the thrust of Buckhannon and Toms. 

 2 Hermansen originally sought attorney’s fees in the amount of $17,325 and costs of 

$1,313.37. R. 84, Renewed Motion at 3, Page ID 629. Defendants objected to the amount of 

time claimed and the hourly rate used to calculate the challenged fees and the lack of 

substantiation for the claimed costs. R. 88, Response in Opposition, Page ID 655. In reply, 

Hermansen adjusted the claimed fees downward to $10,527.30 and offered additional 

documentary support for recovery of costs totaling $1,943.78. R. 90, Reply at 2, Page ID 671. 
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 We also acknowledge that the district court could be deemed to have abused its 

discretion, insofar as it did not apply the correct legal standard. 3 Yet, we may affirm on any 

grounds supported by the record. United States ex rel. Harper v. Muskingum Watershed 

Conservancy Dist., 842 F.3d 430, 435 (6th Cir. 2016). Because it is clear that defendants’ 

changed conduct pursuant to the Agreed Report was voluntary and never received the requisite 

judicial imprimatur, Hermansen did not achieve prevailing party status and is not entitled to an 

award of fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Fidelity to the teachings of Buckhannon and Toms

compels us to uphold the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees.4 

III

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s challenged rulings in all respects. 

 3 The district court’s order denying Hermansen’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion for relief from 

judgment also includes language referring to the Agreed Report as “the Agreed Order” and 

describing as immaterial “the fact that Hermansen obtained injunctive relief.” R. 96, Order at 3–

4, Page ID 710–11. Review of the record, however, confirms that the terms of the Agreed 

Report were never incorporated into an order of any kind. Instead, the Agreed Report was filed 

in support of defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which was granted as the court held 

judicial supervision and enforcement of the agreement unnecessary. 

4

 Hermansen urges us to apply a different, more generous approach to the prevailing 

party determination, as did the Ninth Circuit in Justin R. ex rel. Jennifer R. v. Matayoshi, 561 F. 

App’x 619 (9th Cir. 2014), an unpublished ruling. We decline. Toms is controlling in the Sixth 

Circuit.