[Cite as Jones v. Dlugos, 2019-Ohio-3039.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

GREGORY A. JONES, ET AL., : 

 Plaintiffs-Appellees, : 

 No. 107757 

 v. : 

 

KARL DLUGOS, ET AL., : 

 

 Defendants-Appellants. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: DISMISSED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 25, 2019 

 

Civil Appeal from Rocky River Municipal Court 

Case No. 18 CVG 549 

 

Appearances: 

Vincent Esquire, Ltd., Paul W. Vincent, and Adam James 

Vincent, for appellees. 

Karl Dlugos, pro se, and Lisa Gottschalt, pro se. 
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J.: 

In this accelerated appeal,1 the defendants-appellants Karl Dlugos 

and Lisa Gottschalt2 appeal from the March 26, 2018 judgment of the Rocky River 

Municipal Court, which “accepted, approved and adopted” the magistrate’s 

decision. The decision found the appellants liable for nonpayment of rent. For the 

reasons that follow, we dismiss this appeal. 

Factual and Procedural History 

The record before us demonstrates that in February 2017, the 

appellants entered into a land installment contract with the plaintiffs-appellees, 

Gregory and Sharon Jones. The contract was for property located in North Olmsted, 

Ohio, and the monthly payment was $772.64, plus a $50 late fee, if applicable. 

In February 2018, the appellants failed to make payments according 

to the contract, and the appellees provided notice to them of their breach and how 

it could be remedied according to the terms of their contract. On March 5, 2018, the 

appellants made a $500 payment. On March 7, 2018, the appellees filed an action 

in the Rocky River Municipal Court; the complaint was for forcible entry and 

detainer and forfeiture. The appellants filed an answer in which they claimed, in 

part, that the appellees accepted their $500 payment. 

 1The purpose of an accelerated appeal is to permit this court to render a brief and 

conclusory opinion. State v. Priest, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100614, 2014-Ohio-1735, ¶ 1. 

2The appellants have proceeded pro se throughout the entirety of the proceedings 

below as well as in this court. 
A trial before the magistrate was held on March 26, 2018. At the 

conclusion of the trial, the magistrate found in favor of the appellees and against the 

appellants for nonpayment of rent on the “first cause of action,” that is, the forcible 

entry and detainer. The magistrate granted the appellants until April 16, 2018, to 

move to plead or file an answer as to the “second cause of action,” that is, the 

forfeiture. The trial court “accepted, approved and adopted” the magistrate’s 

decision as the judgment of the court. 

On April 2, 2018, appellants filed a motion to stay eviction, which was 

denied on April 5. A writ of restitution was filed, ordering that the appellants be 

“forthwith removed” from the property and the appellees have restitution of it. 

Appellants apparently did not vacate the property, and therefore the appellees filed 

a request to execute writ of restitution. The appellants filed a motion to set aside 

the magistrate’s order and stay the writ of restitution, which the trial court denied. 

Thereafter, the appellants filed objections to the magistrate’s order; the objections 

were overruled. 

On April 13, 2018, appellants filed an answer to the second cause of 

the complaint and a counterclaim. Their counterclaim sought an amount for equity 

they claim to have in the house. 

According to the appellees, the appellants were ordered to be out of 

the subject property on April 13, 2018. However, due to the trial court’s schedule, 

the date was continued one week, until April 20, 2018. The record demonstrates 
that on April 19, 2018, appellants filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy that resulted in an 

automatic stay of the case. 

The bankruptcy stay was lifted in August 2018, and the eviction 

proceedings resumed. On October 4, 2018, the day set for their eviction, appellants 

filed an emergency motion for stay of eviction in this court; they also filed an appeal 

in this court of the municipal court’s March 2018 judgment that again stayed the 

eviction date. Their emergency motion was denied on the same day it was filed, 

October 4, 2018. The appellants then filed a second notice of appeal on October 5, 

2018, that was transferred to the first appeal. Meanwhile, the eviction proceeded 

and the appellants were evicted in October 2018, and the property was restored to 

the plaintiffs. 

This court dismissed the appeal as untimely, but subsequently 

granted appellants’ motion for reconsideration and ordered appellants to file an 

App.R. 9(C) statement by November 26, 2018. On November 23, 2018, appellants 

filed a “notice of trial court’s inability to settle and approve appellants[’] statement 

of evidence as required by App.R. 9.” 

This court again dismissed the appeal, this time as moot because the 

appellants had been evicted in October 2018. The appellants filed a motion for 

reconsideration, which was granted. This court ordered the appellants to show 

cause why the record should not be converted into an App.R. 9(A) record. 

Appellants filed their show cause, and in February 2019, the praecipe was amended 

to an App.R. 9(A) record. 
Assignments of Error 

I. The trial court erred in its decision to not dismiss the case due 

to the plaintiffs failing to state a claim for which relief can be 

granted. 

II. The trial court committed plain error in accepting “Notice of 

forfeiture and demand to leave premises” (“Notice”) as being 

sufficient and properly serviced. 

III. The trial court has failed to approve, deny, and certify the 

Appellants’ statement of evidence as required under App.R. 

9(C). 

Law and Analysis 

The gravamen of the appellants’ contentions in this appeal relate to 

their eviction from the subject property. For the reasons that follow, that issue is 

now moot. A forcible entry and detainer decides only the right to immediate 

possession and nothing else. Seventh Urban, Inc. v. Univ. Circle, 67 Ohio St.2d 19, 

25, 423 N.E.2d 1070 (1981), fn. 11. If immediate possession is no longer an issue 

due to vacation, then continuation of the forcible entry and detainer action or appeal 

is unnecessary. “Once the landlord has been restored to property, the [result of the] 

forcible entry and detainer action becomes moot because, having been restored to 

the premises, there is no further relief that may be granted.” Long v. MacDonald, 

3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-02-10, 2002-Ohio-4693 (holding that the tenant’s appeal 

is moot regardless of whether the tenant’s vacation is voluntarily or not); U.S. Sec. 

of HUD v. Chancellor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 73970, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 605 

(Feb. 25, 1999) (agreeing with HUD’s argument that the tenants-appellants’ appeal 

was moot since they vacated the premises and affirming on that basis); see also Riolo 
v. Navin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79809, 2002-Ohio-1551; Blosser v. Bowman, 10th 

Dist. Franklin No. 00AP-1140, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1927 (May 1, 2001). 

The appellants here have vacated the property; therefore, their 

contentions relating to the alleged impropriety of their eviction are now moot. There 

was, as mentioned, a second cause of action relating to forfeiture. However, the trial 

court did not issue any judgment relating to that cause of action. Further, the trial 

court did not issue a judgment relative to appellants’ counterclaim. It is well 

established that “[a] court of appeals cannot consider [an] issue for the first time 

without the trial court having had an opportunity to address the issue.” State v. 

Peagler, 76 Ohio St.3d 496, 501, 668 N.E.2d 489 (1996). 

In light of the above, this appeal is dismissed as moot. 

It is ordered that appellees recover from appellants costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment 

into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., JUDGE 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., and 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR