RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 23a0053p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

HALEY HRDLICKA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

GENERAL MOTORS, LLC,

Defendant-Appellee.

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No. 22-1328

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Port Huron.

No. 3:20-cv-11015—Robert H. Cleland, District Judge.

Argued: December 7, 2022

Decided and Filed: March 23, 2023

Before: SILER, GILMAN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Ray Carey, GASIOREK, MORGAN, GRECO, MCCAULEY & KOTZIAN, P.C., 

Farmington Hills, Michigan, for Appellant. Daniel G. Cohen, OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, 

SMOAK & STEWART, PLLC, Birmingham, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Ray Carey, 

GASIOREK, MORGAN, GRECO, MCCAULEY & KOTZIAN, P.C., Farmington Hills, 

Michigan, for Appellant. Daniel G. Cohen, Mami Kato, OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, 

SMOAK & STEWART, PLLC, Birmingham, Michigan, for Appellee.

______________________

AMENDED OPINION

______________________

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Haley Hrdlicka was employed by General 

Motors for over 30 years. After General Motors terminated her employment due to excessive 

absenteeism, she brought this employment-discrimination lawsuit. The district court granted 

>
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 2

summary judgment in favor of General Motors on all claims. For the reasons set forth below, we 

AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Hrdlicka’s employment at General Motors

Hrdlicka, a white female, began working for General Motors in March 1989. She was 53 

years old when terminated. Hrdlicka began her career as an associate sculptor in General 

Motors’s Sculpting Department, where she hand-sculpted vehicle models using clay. She held 

this position until 1998, when she took about eight months off to have her first child. When 

Hrdlicka returned to work, she remained in the Sculpting Department, but her responsibilities 

shifted to operating a mill for clay sculpting and training others on the machinery. In 2001, she 

took approximately three years off for “extended leave,” which included maternity leave for her 

second child, sick days to care for her family, and a leave of absence. 

When Hrdlicka returned to the Sculpting Department in 2004, her job duties again 

shifted. She began coordinating training and developing best practices for clay sculptors. By 

2007, Hrdlicka had completely moved away from sculpting and milling. She transitioned to 

outreach activities in 2012 and then later to recruiting efforts by 2017. 

B. General Motors transferred Hrdlicka from its Sculpting Department to its 

new Design Academy

Hrdlicka’s days in the Sculpting Department came to an end in 2017, when General 

Motors created a new department called the Design Academy. The Design Academy centralized 

recruitment, outreach, and training functions for all design operations. In May 2017, Hrdlicka 

was informed that she would be transferred to the Design Academy. She reluctantly accepted the 

transfer. 

The Design Academy consisted of six employees, including Hrdlicka. The previous 

Sculpting Manager, Marguerite Eko, was assigned to lead the new department. Unlike her time 

in the Sculpting Department, Hrdlicka was not fond of the Design Academy, expressing distaste 

with “the environment and leadership and hostility and the whole dynamic of the team.” 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 3

Hrdlicka had not worked directly under Eko in the Sculpting Department, but with Eko now her 

immediate supervisor, the relationship became strained. Conflicts soon arose between Hrdlicka, 

Eko, and another employee in the Design Academy named Kathy Englehart. Hrdlicka alleged 

that Eko showed favoritism to Englehart and that Englehart was “demeaning and hostile.” As 

tensions rose, Hrdlicka told Eko during a meeting in late 2018: “I do not trust [Englehart], and 

frankly, I do not trust you, and I do not enjoy my job anymore at all.” 

In addition to her disdain for her new work environment, Hrdlicka was dissatisfied with 

the substance of her new role. Hrdlicka thought that the Design Academy was “in chaos from 

the start because it had to quickly launch the summer intern program, and she was required to 

learn her new job duties and responsibilities ‘by fire.’” 

C. Unhappy with the Design Academy, Hrdlicka requested a transfer back to 

the Sculpting Department

The new work environment and her dislike of Eko and Englehart prompted Hrdlicka to 

seek a change. In August 2017, Hrdlicka asked Eko to be transferred back to the Sculpting 

Department. Hrdlicka wanted to return to her old department where she “got along with her 

bosses and co-workers,” and she felt “so extremely happy and respected.” According to 

Hrdlicka, her request was “open-ended,” and she hoped to transfer back to “any role for which 

she was qualified in the Spring or Fall [of] 2018” because that was her “career path.” 

Eko informed Mark Leavy, Eko’s supervisor, of Hrdlicka’s transfer request, but Leavy 

stated that Hrdlicka could not return to the Sculpting Department because her former position 

had been eliminated. In addition, Hrdlicka could not leave the Design Academy unless her 

current position could be backfilled. The Sculpting Department, for its part, had room only for a 

new sculptor and, as Hrdlicka conceded, she had not done hands-on sculpting for a “very, very 

long time.” Hrdlicka maintains, however, that she was told multiple times by a manager in the 

Sculpting Department that the manager would support her transfer request. She also argues that 

Eko failed to adequately communicate to Leavy that Hrdlicka was willing to accept any position 

for which she was qualified. 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 4

D. Hrdlicka began regularly missing work and arriving late, resulting in 

Hrdlicka missing crucial work related to her responsibilities for the summerintern program

Beginning in May 2019, Hrdlicka began regularly missing work or arriving late. 

Unbeknownst to both Hrdlicka and General Motors, Hrdlicka was suffering at the time from a 

brain tumor and a condition known as Persistent Depressive Disorder, neither of which were 

diagnosed until well after she was discharged. Hrdlicka now attributes her attendance issues to 

the “increasingly more severe physical and behavioral health related symptoms of the brain 

tumor and Persistent Depressive Disorder.” She used sick days, vacation days, or worked 

remotely as needed, informing Eko “as soon as she was able to do so.” 

The reasons that Hrdlicka gave Eko for why she would be absent or tardy, however, were 

often not related to her own health and sometimes did not contain any explanation. The 

communications between Eko and Hrdlicka included:

• May 7, 2019, 8:20 AM – Hrdlicka: “I am not coming in today. My head 

is really hurting. I will come get my laptop in a bit. Thank you.” 

• May 8, 2019, 8:24 AM – Hrdlicka called Eko and indicated that she was 

still not feeling well and asked a friend to pick up her computer. 

• May 17, 2019, 8:07 AM – Hrdlicka: “Hi Maggie. I am taking a vacation 

day today. [My daughter] Ashley had a high temperature and a bad cough 

so I am taking her to the doctors . . . .” 

• May 24, 2019, 8:27 AM – Hrdlicka: “Hello, A family situation has come 

up. I will call you in a few. I will have to take a vacation day to deal with 

it. Thank you.” 

• May 31, 2019, 8:25 AM – Hrdlicka: “Hello Maggie. Would it be possible 

for you to run my laptop out to me at the south lobby at 9? If it is ok with 

you I would like to work from home today.” 

• June 6, 2019, 8:35 AM – Hrdlicka: “Hi Maggie, I am running late this 

morning. I’ll be in short[l]y.”—Hrdlicka arrived at nearly 12 p.m. after 

Eko responded “are you ok? I’m getting worried about you.” 

• June 7, 2019, 8:50 AM – Hrdlicka: “I am trying to see if I can get into the 

dr today. I am just so tired. I am going to work from home if that is ok. 

Hopefully something is off that a blood test can solve . . . iron or 

something.” 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 5

• June 11, 2019, 8:36 AM – Hrdlicka informed Eko that she was running 

late. 

• June 12, 2019, 7:37 AM – Hrdlicka: “Hello Maggie. . . . I am taking a 

vacation day today. Thank you.” 

• June 18, 2019, 8:08 AM – Hrdlicka: “I will be late this morning. One of 

[my daughter] Ashley’s friends stayed the night last night and long story 

short I need to stay here until her mom comes to get her. I’ll explain 

later.” She arrived around 11:00 AM. 

• June 25, 2019, 8:21 AM – Hrdlicka: “Good morning . . . . I’m at the 

doctors with [my daughter] Ashley. She is getting a breathing treatment 

and then I will be in.” 

• July 16, 2019, 9:20 AM – Hrdlicka informed Eko that she had a flat tire 

and would work from home. She appeared online for a meeting that 

morning, but “lost contact” and was not seen working online again after 

1:30 p.m. 

• July 24, 2019, 9:03 AM – Hrdlicka: “Hello Maggie . . . . I am home 

today. I have a fever and other symptoms. I will call in for your intern 

planning meeting.” 

• July 26, 2019, 9:04 AM – Hrdlicka: “I’m coming in. I am just having a 

tough time this morning. Please do not share that with anyone please 

. . . .” 

• July 31, 2019, 9:30 AM – Hrdlicka: “I will not make your 10 meeting. 

I am not feeling well . . . . But I will be online later. I’m in bed.” 

• August 2, 2019, 9:58 AM – Hrdlicka: “Hello. I have been with my dad 

this morning. He was having some issues. I will be in shortly.” 

• August 7, 2019, 9:28 AM – Hrdlicka: “Hi. I am getting [my daughter] 

Ashley’s hands wrapped before she goes to nannying.” 

• August 8, 2019, 10:32 AM – Hrdlicka: “Hi Maggie . . . . I’m struggling 

this morning and [I] am [not] sure if I make it in . . . . It’s more of a 

mental thing . . . please do not share . . . . Thank you. The certificates are 

on my desk. Black folders.” 

• August 9, 2019, 10:13 AM – Hrdlicka: “Hi . . . . I will not be in today.” 

• August 13, 2019, 12:06 PM – Hrdlicka: “Hello Maggie I will not be in 

today. I’m out sick and will review items from home. Thank you.” 

By June 2019, Hrdlicka was persistently late in arriving for work. Eko expressed concern 

to Hrdlicka about her attendance during a one-on-one meeting on June 10, 2019. During the 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 6

meeting, Eko “communicated the need to work a 40 [hour] work week,” “the need to text if she 

was planning on taking a day off,” and the “need to get ‘work from home’ approved in advance.” 

Eko appears to have never denied or questioned any of Hrdlicka’s time-off requests, nor 

did she inquire into the legitimacy of Hrdlicka’s stated reasons for missing work. Further,

although Hrdlicka mentioned trying to see a doctor in her June 7, 2019 text message, she admits 

that she never actually saw a doctor, nor was she ever treated for any of the ailments that she 

reported in her messages. 

In July 2019, with the assistance of Christie Spadine, a human-resources representative, 

Eko conducted Hrdlicka’s mid-year performance review. The review indicates that Hrdlicka was 

on track to achieve all but one of her year-end goals. It also acknowledges that the team had 

“faced several challenges and changes this year” due to “the unplanned loss of a team member,” 

and that Hrdlicka’s responsibilities had changed mid-year. Eko notes, however, that Hrdlicka 

was “[not] completing her . . . role” and that a “significant and contributing factor to [Hrdlicka’s] 

decreased performance has been her attendance. [Hrdlicka] has had a challenging last 6 months 

[and] she had to take several unplanned days off.” The review further states that Hrdlicka should 

“plan vacation in advance and seek approval prior to taking a vacation day,” and that the 

“expectation is for [Hrdlicka] to put in a full work week—with a minimum of 40 hours per 

week.” 

Hrdlicka’s attendance problems did not abate. She continued to miss work and call in 

late during August 2019. In particular, Hrdlicka missed several “critical” days in early August 

related to General Motors’s summer-intern program, over which she had chief responsibility. 

The summer interns made formal presentations during the second week of August that “impacted 

whether they would receive a job offer from GM.” On August 7, the day of the presentation dryruns, Hrdlicka did not arrive until after 1:00 p.m. Although Hrdlicka now claims that the reason 

for her late arrival was due to her own deteriorating physical and behavioral health, she did not 

inform Eko of this at the time and in fact texted Eko that she was late due to a medical issue 

involving her daughter’s hand. 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 7

The final intern presentations were conducted the following day, and Hrdlicka missed 

them entirely. And the day after that, on the interns’ last day, Hrdlicka once again missed work. 

She did not inform her team that she would be gone until after 10:00 a.m. on both days. 

Hrdlicka’s reason for missing the presentations was that she was dealing with a “mental thing.” 

She provided no reason for missing the interns’ last day.

E. General Motors terminated Hrdlicka after she violates the terms in her 

Attendance Letter

Following the wave of attendance issues during the summer interns’ final week, Eko 

reached out to Spadine in human resources for “HR Support.” Eko wrote that Hrdlicka had 

“arrived late 10:30 and beyond almost every day after her [mid-year performance review] . . . . 

HELP! We need to work on next steps.” 

The following week, on August 14, 2019, Hrdlicka met with Eko and Anne Banks, a 

second human-resources employee, and was given an Attendance Letter. The letter specially 

noted Hrdlicka’s “erratic work schedule[]” and that it “create[s] a disruption to the team.” 

Further, the letter stated that Hrdlicka was expected to work from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. every 

day and that she must notify Eko “as soon as practicable” if she needed to deviate from this 

schedule, and by 7:00 a.m. should she need to be absent that day. It also provided that absences 

due to personal illnesses required a doctor’s note, but that these requirements were not applicable 

“when an appropriate health care provider certifies your eligibility for S&A [Sickness and 

Accident] benefits or provides satisfactory certification of need for a qualifying unpaid Family 

and Medical Act leave.” In addition, the letter noted that Hrdlicka should receive pre-approval 

before working from home. 

The Attendance Letter was also clear about the consequences of continued attendance 

issues, and it alerted Hrdlicka that she could contact HR for a possible accommodation if needed. 

Specifically, the letter states: 

We want to draw your attention to the seriousness of the current situation and the 

necessary steps required to improve your attendance. Your attendance must 

improve immediately. Your job is in jeopardy. We expect that you will take all 

necessary steps to remedy the situation. Failure to comply with these 

expectations can result in disciplinary action, up to and including discharge from 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 8

General Motors. Please contact Human Resources if you believe you may require 

an accommodation to help you perform your job duties. 

Hrdlicka signed the Attendance Letter, which was also read to her during the meeting and 

sent to her by email. In addition to the explicit reference to S&A services and FMLA leave in 

the letter, Eko’s email to Hrdlicka included a standard note about General Motors’s “People 

Services Program,” which can be used for assistance with “general policy questions.” Banks 

further recalls mentioning to Hrdlicka during the August 14, 2019 meeting that the Employee 

Assistance Program (EAP) was available should she need it, although Hrdlicka could remember 

only that Banks “may have” mentioned the program, and, in any event, she did not know what it 

was. 

Hrdlicka did not inquire into the S&A or sick-leave benefits, the People Services 

Program, or the EAP, which she attributes to her “state of shock” upon being presented with the 

Attendance Letter. She also did not take advantage of General Motors’s Socrates portal, which 

provides information about the confidential EAP, leaves of absences, and other accommodations.

Despite the Attendance Letter, Hrdlicka was 5 minutes and 32 minutes late on the very 

next two days that she worked, respectively. She reported neither delay to Eko, although she 

later explained that, on the day that she was 32 minutes late, she was on the phone with her 

father and did not want to end the call. That same day, on August 19, Hrdlicka met with Banks 

and Spadine, mentioning to them for the first time that she was unhappy in the Design Academy 

and with Eko’s lack of leadership. Hrdlicka also renewed her request to transfer to the Sculpting 

Department, which she admits was the only “accommodation” that she sought at the time. 

The parties dispute whether Hrdlicka mentioned to Banks and Spadine during the August 

19, 2019 meeting that she was depressed. According to Hrdlicka, she advised Banks and 

Spadine that she “had been experiencing severe depression since [her] transfer to the Design 

Academy . . . [and] this had caused [her] to request a transfer back to Sculpting and to be absent 

from work . . . and to arrive later than usual.” Hrdlicka argues on appeal that the depression that 

she experienced since transferring to the Design Academy “precipitated her request for a transfer 

back to Sculpting.” But Banks and Spadine deny that Hrdlicka ever mentioned that she was 

depressed or suffered from any medical condition. According to Hrdlicka, she was interrupted 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 9

by Banks and Spadine when she brought up her depression and was told that “they were only 

concerned about why she had been late arriving for work” for the past two business days. 

Hrdlicka also stated in her deposition and in her open-door appeal that, during the meeting, she 

explained to Banks and Spadine that “the reasons for [her] recent tardiness [were] related to [her] 

current work environment created by [Eko].” 

The very next day, and for the third workday in a row, Hrdlicka was late due to traffic. 

Eko then made the decision to terminate Hrdlicka and did so the following day, on August 21, 

due to her repeated violations of the Attendance Letter immediately after it was issued. 

F. Hrdlicka appeals her termination and is diagnosed with Persistent 

Depressive Disorder and a brain tumor while the appeal is pending

General Motors has an “Open Door Policy” that provides all salaried employees with the 

opportunity to appeal their termination through JustUs, a third-party company. JustUs is charged 

with determining whether General Motors “followed their policies and practices” in terminating 

an employee. The review is limited to the “facts [as] of the day that the decision is made and the 

action is taken.” 

Hrdlicka filed her appeal with JustUs in late August 2019, stating that, prior to her 

termination, she “notified HR of [her] depression,” which she “perceive[d] to be directly related 

to the work environment created by [Eko].” While the appeal was pending, in October 2019, 

Hrdlicka was diagnosed with Persistent Depressive Disorder. In November 2019, also before the 

appeal was decided, Hrdlicka was diagnosed with a brain tumor that was surgically removed a 

few days after diagnosis. 

Hrdlicka asserts, through her own affidavit and summary-judgment brief, that her doctor 

“opined that the brain tumor was the cause or contributing cause of the severe depression 

diagnosed . . . as Persistent Depressive Disorder that [Hrdlicka] had experienced during at least 

the last 18 months of her General Motors employment.” The affidavit also claims that these 

symptoms affected Hrdlicka’s “ability to care for herself, perform manual tasks, eat, sleep, 

concentrate, think and make decisions, communicate, interact with others, and work.” She did 

not, however, file an affidavit from her doctor. 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 10

Soon after Hrdlicka’s brain-tumor diagnosis, her husband forwarded an email to the 

JustUs personnel, informing them of the brain tumor. Her husband again emailed JustUs 

personnel after Hrdlicka’s surgery. Mr. Hrdlicka’s emails attributed Hrdlicka’s tumor, at least in 

part, to the stress and work environment of the Design Academy. 

As part of its investigation, JustUs interviewed Hrdlicka, Eko, Banks, and Spadine. It did 

not, however, attempt to interview Hrdlicka’s doctor, even after learning of her diagnosis. But 

no one at General Motors, not even Hrdlicka herself, was aware of the existence of a brain tumor 

on August 21, 2019 when she was terminated. 

JustUs ultimately denied Hrdlicka’s appeal in late November 2019. The decision letter 

cites Hrdlicka’s continued attendance issues despite being made aware of the issue in her midyear review and in the Attendance Letter given to her just before her termination. It further 

states that Hrdlicka’s termination was consistent with General Motors’s policies and that there 

was a lack of suitable “evidence to substantiate [her] allegations of depression” at the time of her

termination.

Following the conclusion of her open-door appeal, Hrdlicka filed suit against General 

Motors, alleging the following claims: (1) disability discrimination and failure to accommodate 

under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. and Michigan’s 

Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA), Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 37.1101, et seq.; 

(2) violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq.; 

(3) violation of Section 510 of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 

29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq.; (4) age discrimination, in violation of the Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq. and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights 

Act (ELCRA), Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 37.2101, et seq.; (5) sex discrimination, in violation of 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. and the 

ELCRA; and (6) race discrimination, in violation of Title VII and the ELCRA. General Motors 

later moved for Summary Judgment, which the district court granted as to all claims. This timely 

appeal followed. 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 11

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of review

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Watson v. Cartee, 

817 F.3d 299, 302 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate if there 

is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). There is a genuine dispute of material fact “if the evidence is such 

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that 

there is no genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

In making this assessment, the court must “view all evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party.” Tennial v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 840 F.3d 292, 301 (6th Cir. 2016) 

(citation omitted).

B. ADA claims and PWDCRA claims

Hrdlicka argues that her ADA and PWDCRA claims should have survived summary 

judgment because there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether General Motors 

(1) discriminated against Hrdlicka on account of a disability, and (2) failed to accommodate her 

disability. The PWDCRA “substantially mirrors” the ADA, and a resolution of the ADA claims 

will “generally, though not always, resolve the plaintiff’s PWDCRA claim.” Donald v. Sybra, 

Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 287 F.3d 593, 597 

(6th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 

312 (6th Cir. 2012)). Claims under the ADA and the PWDCRA are “generally analyzed 

identically.” Henderson v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 610 F. App’x 488, 497 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting 

Steward v. New Chrysler, 415 F. App’x 632, 641 (6th Cir. 2011)). 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 12

a. Disability discrimination

Hrdlicka advances her theory of disability discrimination via circumstantial evidence. 

Courts use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework when a plaintiff uses 

circumstantial evidence to establish disability discrimination under the ADA and the PWDCRA. 

Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696, 703 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing McDonnell Douglas 

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973)). To establish a prima facie case, an employee 

must demonstrate that (1) she has a disability, (2) she is otherwise qualified for the job “with or 

without reasonable accommodation,” (3) she “suffered an adverse employment decision,” (4) her 

employer “knew or had reason to know” of her disability, and (5) her position remained open, or 

she was replaced. Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, 847 F.3d 384, 395 (6th Cir. 2017) 

(quoting Whitfield v. Tennessee, 639 F.3d 253, 259 (6th Cir. 2011)). 

If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to 

“demonstrate that there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment 

action.” Id. (citing Whitfield, 639 F.3d at 259). The burden then shifts back to the employee to 

show that the purported nondiscriminatory reason “was actually a pretext designed to mask 

discrimination.” Id. (citing Whitfield, 639 F.3d at 259). 

i. Hrdlicka failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination

We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Hrdlicka failed to establish a prima 

facie case of disability discrimination under either the ADA or the PWDCRA because her 

purported disability was unknown to either herself or General Motors until well after her 

employment was terminated. The parties agree that Hrdlicka was never diagnosed with any 

medical condition until after her termination. In fact, she never even sought medical help for any 

symptoms or conditions from which she was suffering while employed. Hrdlicka nevertheless 

maintains that General Motors was on notice that she was disabled (1) because of several text 

messages that Hrdlicka sent to Eko when Hrdlicka failed to show up for work and, (2) because 

she mentioned that she was depressed in a meeting with Banks and Spadine shortly before she 

was terminated. We address both of these arguments in turn. 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 13

The text-message communications between Eko and Hrdlicka were not enough to place 

Eko on notice that Hrdlicka was suffering from a disability. Although an employee is not 

required to use the word “disabled” to put his or her employer on notice, the employer still must 

“know enough information about the employee’s condition to conclude that he is disabled. 

Relevant information could include, among other things, a diagnosis, a treatment plan, apparent 

severe symptoms, and physician-imposed work restrictions.” Cady v. Remington Arms Co., 665 

F. App’x 413, 417–18 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal citation omitted) (noting that there is not likely 

sufficient notice “[i]f the sole evidence of notice [is] a vague assertion of concern”). “The 

employer is not required to speculate as to the extent of the employee’s disability or the 

employee’s need or desire for an accommodation.” Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 

441, 450 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1046–47 

(6th Cir. 1998)).

Hrdlicka’s text messages required Eko to speculate as to the existence of a disability. 

Many of the text messages reference only generalized ailments, such as Hrdlicka’s “head . . . 

really hurting,” having a “fever and other symptoms,” or simply being “sick.” Such symptoms 

are consistent with many short-term, nondisabling ailments, including a common cold. Other 

text messages make even more general references to “having a tough time” or dealing with “a 

mental thing.” Although these messages might have given Eko a general awareness of a health 

issue, that is not enough. See Messenheimer v. Coastal Pet Prods., Inc., 764 F. App’x 517, 519 

(6th Cir. 2019) (“[A] general awareness of some symptoms is not enough to show that [the 

defendant] knew of [the plaintiff’s] disability.” (citation omitted)). At bottom, these text 

messages were not sufficient to apprise Eko of a disability, especially when Hrdlicka herself was 

unaware of any disability. 

The closer question is whether Hrdlicka put General Motors on notice of a disability 

when she met with Banks and Spadine shortly before she was terminated. In that meeting, 

Hrdlicka told them that she had felt depressed since transitioning to the Design Academy. In 

explaining her tardiness, however, Hrdlicka stated that “it was all related to [her] current work 

environment created by [Eko,] . . . includ[ing] a lack of leadership, direction, a lack of trust 

within the group, favoritism,” etc. See Schneiker v. Fortis Ins. Co., 200 F.3d 1055, 1062 (7th 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 14

Cir. 2000) (“Standing alone, a personality conflict between an employee and a supervisor—even 

one that triggers the employee’s depression—is not enough to establish that the employee is 

disabled, so long as the employee could still perform the job under a different supervisor.”); 

Burdett-Foster v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 574 F. App’x 672, 680 (6th Cir. 2014) 

(“Personality conflicts, workplace stress, and being unable to work with a particular person or 

persons do not rise to the level of a ‘disability’ or inability to work for purposes of the ADA.” 

(quoting Fricke v. E.I Dupont Co., 219 F. App’x 384, 389 (6th Cir. 2007)). Hrdlicka’s 

attribution of her depression to her work environment persisted even in her open-door appeal of 

her termination, where she said that, when she “notified HR of [her] depression,” she 

“perceive[d] [it] to be directly related to the work environment.” 

In sum, Hrdlicka made only a single, unsubstantiated statement that she was depressed 

without any corroborating medical evidence and without ever having sought medical help, and 

she consistently presented the issue as a workplace conflict, not a disability. Although a 

diagnosis is not necessary for an ADA claim to succeed, see Neely v. Benchmark Fam. Servs., 

640 F. App’x 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2016), Hrdlicka failed to present any of the “[r]elevant 

information” that this court has found pertinent to determining if an employer was placed on 

notice of a disability. See Cady, 665 F. App’x at 417.

The mention of depression alone is insufficient to constitute a “severe symptom” for two 

reasons. First, depression does not always render an employee “disabled.” See Huge v. Gen. 

Motors Corp., 62 F. App’x 77, 79–80 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The fact that a person has a history of 

depression does not necessarily mean that the person has a disability under the ADA.” (citing 

Morisky v. Broward County, 80 F.3d 445, 448 (11th Cir. 1996), for the proposition that “[v]ague 

or conclusory statements revealing an unspecified incapacity are not sufficient to put an 

employer on notice of its obligations under the ADA.”)). Second, Hrdlicka consistently and 

specifically attributed both her attendance issues and depression to a dislike of Eko and the work 

environment, leaving General Motors to “speculate” as to the existence of a disability as opposed 

to Hrdlicka’s concern about her interpersonal work conflict. See Hammon, 165 F.3d at 450 

(quoting Gantt, 143 F.3d at 1046); Tennial v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 840 F.3d 292, 306 (6th 

Cir. 2016) (“A prima facie case is not made out if the decisionmaker is unaware of the specifics 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 15

of an employee’s disabilities or restrictions, even if the decisionmaker has a general knowledge 

that a disability exists.” (citing Arthur v. Am. Showa, Inc., 625 F. App’x 704, 708 (6th Cir. 

2015))). 

ii. General Motors had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 

terminating Hrdlicka

Even if Hrdlicka were deemed to have made out a prima facie case, General Motors 

presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her. The record is clear that 

Eko terminated Hrdlicka because of multiple failures to arrive to work on time and for multiple 

absences without adequate notice, including absences during a critical week for her job. Eko 

informed Hrdlicka of Eko’s concerns about Hrdlicka’s attendance during both a one-on-one 

meeting in June 2019 and in Hrdlicka’s mid-year performance review in July 2019. The 

performance review noted that Hrdlicka’s performance had declined and that a “significant and 

contributing factor” was her attendance. Despite this, Hrdlicka continued to arrive late and miss 

important work, including the summer interns’ final presentations over which Hrdlicka had chief 

responsibility. 

After missing this “critical” week of work, Eko emailed Spadine in HR for assistance. 

Eko and Spadine ultimately decided that the behavior warranted issuing Hrdlicka an Attendance 

Letter, which made very clear that Hrdlicka’s “job [was] in jeopardy” and that her attendance 

and tardiness needed to improve. Yet the tardiness persisted. Eko terminated Hrdlicka after 

three days of tardiness immediately following the issuance of the Attendance Letter. 

The chronic tardiness and repeated absences, coupled with Hrdlicka’s immediate failure 

to abide by her Attendance Letter, were clearly legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons to 

terminate her. See Banks v. Bosch Rexroth Corp., 610 F. App’x 519, 528 (6th Cir. 2015) 

(finding that excessive absenteeism and tardiness were legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for 

terminating an employee (citing Brenneman v. MedCentral Health Sys., 366 F.3d 412, 421 (6th 

Cir. 2004)). Eko’s call for “HELP!” in her email to Spadine after Hrdlicka missed the summerintern presentations fully demonstrates that there were legitimate concerns about Hrdlicka’s 

attendance. 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 16

iii. Hrdlicka failed to establish pretext

Once an employer proffers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for making an adverse 

employment decision, the employee must present proof that the stated reason is pretextual in 

order to create a genuine dispute regarding a claim of disability discrimination. McDonnell 

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). To establish pretext, the employee must 

show “that the employer’s proffered reasons (1) have no basis in fact; (2) did not actually 

motivate the action; or (3) were insufficient to warrant the action.” Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. 

Co., 681 F.3d 274, 285 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Dews v. A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d 1016, 1021 (6th 

Cir. 2000)).

Hrdlicka offers practically no substantive analysis of pretext, and the record contains no 

evidence that could support such a finding. First, General Motors’s legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason to terminate Hrdlicka clearly had a basis in fact, and Hrdlicka does not 

argue otherwise. There is no dispute that she was both late and absent on multiple occasions. 

Second, the record reveals that General Motors was, in fact, motivated by Hrdlicka’s poor 

attendance. Eko communicated her attendance concerns to Hrdlicka in a June 2019 meeting, 

included those concerns in Hrdlicka’s mid-year review, reached out to HR about addressing the 

attendance concerns, and ultimately issued a formal Attendance Letter in August. When 

Hrdlicka continued to arrive to work late despite her Attendance Letter, she was terminated. 

There is also no basis to argue that Hrdlicka’s poor attendance record was insufficient to 

warrant her termination. As noted above, the attendance issues were chronic and persistent, even 

after multiple warnings. Further, Hrdlicka failed to attend the important final week of the 

summer internship, which was critical to her role. Hrdlicka does not challenge these facts and 

has not established a genuine dispute as to whether her actions were insufficient to warrant 

termination. 

Similarly, Hrdlicka has offered no evidence to establish that the denial of her open-door 

appeal or the issuance of her Attendance Letter were pretextual. She claims that the denial of her 

open-door appeal was made “in reaction to and predicated on the then recent diagnosis” of 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 17

Persistent Depressive Disorder and a brain tumor. There is no evidence in the record, however, 

to support this assertion other than Hrdlicka’s own conclusory allegations. 

The record is clear that JustUs did not consider Hrdlicka’s post-termination diagnoses 

when denying her appeal, but instead relied solely on evidence available at the time of her 

termination. See id. (“We have not required that the employer’s decision-making process under 

scrutiny ‘be optimal or that it left no stone unturned. Rather, the key inquiry is whether the 

employer made a reasonably informed and considered decision before taking an adverse 

employment action.’” (quoting Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 1998))). 

Further, the record is clear that JustUs rested its decision on a finding that General Motors 

terminated Hrdlicka in accordance with its established policies—not on the existence of a posttermination medical diagnosis. 

Hrdlicka has not offered any material evidence to challenge these facts. She has 

therefore failed to rebut General Motors’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse 

employment action. 

b. Failure to accommodate

Hrdlicka also argues that General Motors failed to reasonably accommodate her 

disability. We disagree. The ADA requires employers to make reasonable accommodations. 

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The parties agree that the analysis is the same under both the ADA 

and the PWDCRA. To establish a failure to accommodate, an employee must show: “(1) that he 

is disabled, and (2) that he is ‘otherwise qualified for the position despite his or her disability: 

(a) without accommodation from the employer; (b) with an alleged essential job requirement 

eliminated; or (c) with a proposed reasonable accommodation.’” Fisher v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 

951 F.3d 409, 417 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kleiber v. Honda 

of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 869 (6th Cir. 2007)). An employee bears the burden of 

demonstrating that a proposed accommodation “seems reasonable on its face.” Blanchet 

v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC, 27 F.4th 1221, 1229 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting U.S. Airways, Inc. 

v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401 (2002)). 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 18

The only accommodation that Hrdlicka requested was a transfer back to the Sculpting 

Department. Although she also made earlier requests to transfer back to Sculpting, only this 

renewed request made while meeting with Banks and Spadine on August 19, 2019 can 

reasonably be interpreted as a request for a disability accommodation. There is no genuine 

dispute that, in originally requesting a transfer, Hrdlicka’s motivation was based on her dislike of 

the Design Academy and the people within it. Hrdlicka presented no evidence that she ever 

linked this request to a disability. General Motors therefore could not have interpreted the initial 

request as a request for an accommodation under the ADA. See Deister v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 

647 F. App’x 652, 658 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[I]n requesting an accommodation, we require plaintiffs 

not only to request to be accommodated, but to also provide their employers with a sufficient 

basis to understand that the request is being made because of their disability.”).

Hrdlicka’s renewed request for a transfer to the Sculpting Department when she met with 

Banks and Spadine is closer to a request for an accommodation under the ADA and the 

PWDCRA because, as noted above, she explicitly stated that she was “depressed.” Based on the 

facts in the record, however, this request was not “reasonable.” A transfer request is not 

reasonable if it was made to avoid working with certain people. Coulson v. Goodyear Tire & 

Rubber Co., 31 F. App’x 851, 858 (6th Cir. 2002). A court is not in a position to “act as a superbureau of Human Resources” and determine who should work with whom. Id. 

Hrdlicka herself conceded during her deposition that, when meeting with Banks and 

Spadine, she “complained about Kathy Englehart and Eko’s lack of leadership at this meeting” 

and that her tardiness was “related to [her] current work environment created by [Eko].” In other 

words, she attributed her attendance issues to the work environment and to her supervisor. She 

explicitly noted that her depression began once she was transferred to the Design Academy, and 

that this “precipitated her request for a transfer back to Sculpting.” 

These facts compel the conclusion that her transfer request was specifically linked to her 

distaste for her current work environment. Basically, it was a desire to “force [the defendant] to 

transfer [her] so that [she] will not be required to work with certain people.” See id.; see also

Deister, 647 F. App’x at 658 n.2 (“[A]n employer is not obliged to honor, as a ‘reasonable 

accommodation,’ an employee’s request for assignment to a different supervisor.” (citing 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 19

Burdett-Foster v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 574 F. App’x 672, 680 (6th Cir. 2014)));

Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 526 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that a request for a 

different supervisor is not a reasonable accommodation because that would ask the court to allow 

her to “establish the conditions of her employment”). 

Even assuming that Hrdlicka adequately attributed her request to a disability and not just 

to a desire to escape the Design Academy, her request was untimely. “When an employee 

requests an accommodation for the first time only after it becomes clear that an adverse 

employment action is imminent, such a request can be ‘too little, too late.’” Parsons v. Auto Club 

Grp., 565 F. App’x 446, 449 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 

78, 90 (1st Cir. 2012)). The plaintiff in Parsons, for example, requested an accommodation only 

a day before he was suspended and a week before he was terminated. Id. By then, the employer 

had already completed a five-month investigation finding that Parsons had violated company 

policies and had lied to investigators. Id. The court concluded that this request for an 

accommodation “likely came too late to be considered reasonable.” Id. 

Similarly, Hrdlicka’s request came after a long history of attendance issues and a warning 

that her “job was in jeopardy” if she did not improve. After Hrdlicka arrived late for three 

successive days immediately following the issuance of her Attendance Letter, she was 

terminated. Her last-minute request for a transfer back to the Sculpting Department was not 

reasonable under the circumstances. 

Hrdlicka has also failed to show that General Motors violated its duty to engage in an 

interactive process regarding an accommodation. “[O]nce an employee requests an 

accommodation, the employer has a duty to engage in an interactive process.” Blanchet, 27 

F.4th at 1232 (quoting Hostettler v. Coll. of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844, 857 (6th Cir. 2018)). The 

purpose of the duty is to “identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and 

potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” Rorrer v. City of 

Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1040 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 

862, 871 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 20

General Motors did not violate a duty to engage in an interactive process because the 

duty is an independent violation of the ADA only “if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie 

showing that he proposed a reasonable accommodation.” Id. at 1041. As discussed above, 

Hrdlicka did not request a reasonable accommodation and, therefore, General Motors did not fail 

to engage in an interactive process. 

Hrdlicka has ultimately failed to establish a failure-to-accommodate claim because she 

did not identify a reasonable accommodation. Her reliance on Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio 

Alzheimer’s Research, 155 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 1998), and two out-of-circuit cases cited therein 

does not persuade us otherwise. Cehrs and the other two cited cases are clearly distinguishable 

because, among other reasons, the employer in those cases was on full notice of the employee’s 

diagnosed disability and need for an accommodation prior to making the termination 

decision. We find no authority for Hrdlicka’s argument that the ADA imposes an obligation on 

employers to provide an accommodation for a disability that is first discovered posttermination. Moreover, nothing in the official E.E.O.C. Guidance suggests a deviation from this

established principle simply because the employer provides a post-termination appeal 

process. See E.E.O.C. Enforcement Guidance, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Applying 

Performance and Conduct Standards to Employees with Disabilities, 2008 WL 4786697, at *12-

13 (Sept. 25, 2008). We therefore find no merit in her ADA and PWDCRA claims for a failure 

to accommodate. 

C. FMLA claim

We now turn to Hrdlicka’s FMLA claim. The FMLA provides eligible employees with 

the right to take up to 12 weeks of leave per year when the employee suffers from a “serious 

health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions” of her job. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 2612(a)(1)(D). This court recognizes two distinct theories for recovery under the FMLA: 

(1) the “‘entitlement’ or ‘interference’” theory under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), and (2) the 

“‘retaliation’ or ‘discrimination’” theory under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). Killian v. Yorozu Auto. 

Tenn., Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 555 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hoge v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 384 

F.3d 238, 244 (6th Cir. 2004). Hrdlicka pursues only the entitlement/interference theory 

(referred to below as the “interference theory” for simplicity) on appeal. 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 21

The interference theory applies when an employer attempts to “interfere with, restrain, or 

deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise” any FMLA leave rights. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). 

To establish a prima facie case of FMLA interference, an employee must show “(1) she was an 

eligible employee; (2) the defendant was an employer as defined under the FMLA; (3) the 

employee was entitled to leave under the FMLA; (4) the employee gave the employer notice of 

her intention to take leave; and (5) the employer denied the employee FMLA benefits to which 

she was entitled.” Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Killian, 454 

F.3d at 556). 

We need not belabor the FMLA analysis because Hrdlicka’s interference claim clearly 

fails under the fourth prong because she did not provide adequate notice of her intention to take 

FMLA leave. An employee must provide “notice and a qualifying reason for requesting the 

leave.” Walton v. Ford Motor Co., 424 F.3d 481, 486 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Brohm v. JH 

Props., Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir. 1998)). Although an employee does not have to 

expressly mention the term “FMLA,” she must provide enough information for her employer to 

know that an FMLA qualifying event has occurred. Id. (citing Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 

165 F.3d 441, 451 (6th Cir. 1999)). “The critical test for substantively-sufficient notice is 

whether the information that the employee conveyed to the employer was reasonably adequate to 

apprise the employer of the employee’s request to take leave for a serious health condition that 

rendered him unable to perform his job.” Koch v. Thames Healthcare Grp., LLC, 855 F. App’x 

254, 256 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Brenneman v. MedCentral Health Sys., 366 F.3d 412, 421 (6th 

Cir. 2004)). 

As with her ADA and PWDCRA claims, Hrdlicka relies heavily on her text-message 

communications with Eko to establish FMLA notice. But for the same reason discussed above 

with regard to her ADA and PWDCRA claims, these messages are insufficient. Hrdlicka’s 

general references to her head “really hurting,” feeling “sick,” or having a “fever and other 

symptoms” are simply generalized descriptions of ailments that do not rise to the level of 

“serious health conditions” within the meaning of the FMLA. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(d) 

(“Ordinarily, unless complications arise, the common cold, the flu, . . . headaches other than 

migraine, . . . etc., are examples of conditions that do not meet the definition of a serious health 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 22

condition and do not qualify for FMLA leave.”); see also Beaver v. RGIS Inventory Specialists, 

Inc., 144 F. App’x 452, 456–57 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding no FMLA notice, in part because the 

plaintiff used only “general terms when describing her health such as she ‘didn’t feel good,’ was 

‘sick,’ and ‘needed a couple of days to get better’”). 

The better argument is when Hrdlicka more explicitly referenced having “depression” in 

her meeting with Banks and Spadine shortly before she was terminated. But this conversation 

was not accompanied by any request for FMLA leave despite the fact that Hrdlicka was familiar 

with the process because she herself had already taken FMLA and maternity leave when she had 

had her two children. Moreover, the possibility of taking FMLA leave was directly stated in her 

Attendance Letter, which was both read and emailed to Hrdlicka. See Brenneman, 366 F.3d at 

428 (noting that an employer is not required to be “clairvoyant” when determining if an 

employee needs leave). 

Hrdlicka’s own admissions reveal that her statements made during the meeting with 

Banks and Spadine would not have put General Motors on notice of a “serious health condition.” 

The analysis is substantially the same as that discussed in Part II.B. above. Hrdlicka’s 

conclusory allegations that her depression led to her attendance issues is contradicted by her own 

deposition, where she directly stated that “the reasons for [her] recent tardiness [were] related to 

[her] current work environment created by [Eko].” So, even under Hrdlicka’s version of the 

conversation, her primary concern stemmed from a disdain for her work environment. 

In sum, Hrdlicka made only a single statement that she was depressed, which was not 

made in the context of requesting time off, but as a justification for her desire to transfer back to 

the sculpting Department (and to continue working, not stop working as FMLA leave would 

entail). We therefore conclude that Hrdlicka has failed to establish that General Motors was on 

notice of her desire to take FMLA leave.
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 23

D. ERISA claim

We next consider Hrdlicka’s ERISA claim. Section 510 of ERISA prohibits an employer 

from terminating an employee for the purpose of interfering with the employee’s rights under an 

employee-benefit plan. In relevant part, Section 510 states:

It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, 

or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to 

which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan, . . . or for 

the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such 

participant may become entitled under the plan . . . . 

29 U.S.C. § 1140.

To establish a violation of Section 510 of ERISA, an employee must show “the existence 

of (1) prohibited employer conduct (2) taken for the purpose of interfering (3) with the 

attainment of any right to which the employee may become entitled.” Smith v. Ameritech, 

129 F.3d 857, 865 (6th Cir. 1997). Importantly, the employer must have had a “specific intent to 

violate ERISA.” Humphreys v. Bellaire Corp., 966 F.2d 1037, 1043 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting 

Rush v. United Techs., Otis Elevator Div., 930 F.2d 453, 457 (6th Cir. 1991)). The employee 

must show that interfering with her rights was at least a “motivating factor” in the decision. Id.

(citations omitted). Once the employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer can rebut by 

offering a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its challenged action.” Id. (citation omitted).

If the employer does so, then the employee has the burden to prove that interference was 

nonetheless a motivating factor or to establish that the explanation was pretextual. Id. (citations 

omitted). 

The only decision that Hrdlicka claims was a violation of ERISA was General Motors’s 

denial of her open-door appeal. But General Motors clearly had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reason for denying Hrdlicka’s open-door appeal, and Hrdlicka has not shown that the reason was 

pretextual or that interference with her rights was nonetheless a motivating factor. JustUs based 

its denial on the facts that Hrdlicka had chronic attendance issues in the months leading up to her 

termination and that General Motors acted in accordance with its established policies. The 

record also fully shows that the open-door review was based solely on the facts in existence at 

the time Hrdlicka was terminated. In resting on Hrdlicka’s well-documented attendance issues, 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 24

JustUs decided the appeal using a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification that was fully 

consistent with the scope of its authority. 

Hrdlicka has offered no material evidence challenging the JustUs decision. Her main 

argument focuses on the fact that her appeal was denied shortly after JustUs was informed of 

Hrdlicka’s brain tumor. But simply pointing out the temporal proximity does nothing to rebut 

the fact that JustUs based its decisions on the facts that were available to General Motors at the 

time it terminated Hrdlicka. Her post-termination diagnoses did not factor into the analysis, and 

Hrdlicka has offered no evidence to the contrary. Her ERISA claim therefore fails. 

E. Age discrimination under the ADEA and the ELCRA; race and sex 

discrimination under Title VII and ELCRA

This leaves Hrdlicka’s claims of age, race, and sex discrimination. These claims are 

woefully insufficient and require little analysis to dispose of each. There is simply no genuine 

dispute that General Motors presented legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for each of the 

alleged discriminatory employment actions, and Hrdlicka has failed to establish any pretext. 

Hrdlicka’s briefing is not entirely clear, but she appears to challenge General Motors’s decision 

to (1) deny her transfer request, and (2) to deny her open-door appeal for reinstatement. We thus 

analyze these two alleged adverse actions. 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 25

a. Age discrimination under the ADEA and the ELCRA

The ADEA and the ELCRA prohibit firing or otherwise discriminating against 

employees on the basis of age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2202(1)(a). Agediscrimination claims under both the ADEA and the ELCRA utilize the McDonell Douglas 

framework. Lewis v. City of Detroit, 702 F. App’x 274, 278–79 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing 

Richardson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 836 F.3d 698, 704 (6th Cir. 2016)). The employee must 

first establish a prima facie case; the burden then shifts to the employer to establish a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action; if it does so, the burden shifts back 

to the employee to establish pretext. See id. at 281–84; Town v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 568 N.W.2d 

64, 68 (Mich. 1997), abrogated in part on other grounds by Gross v. FLB Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 

U.S. 167 (2009).

General Motors’s reasons for denying Hrdlicka’s transfer request are that (1) Hrdlicka’s 

original sculpting position was eliminated over a year prior, (2) Hrdlicka no longer possessed the 

requisite skills to be a sculptor, and (3) General Motors was unwilling to transfer Hrdlicka unless 

it could backfill her existing position. The reason for denying Hrdlicka’s open-door appeal was 

that she was appropriately terminated in accordance with General Motors’s policies because of a 

history of attendance issues. 

These reasons have nothing to do with Hrdlicka’s age. Hrdlicka’s conclusory statement, 

without evidence, that General Motors’s decisions had “no basis in fact” is insufficient to

establish a genuine dispute as to pretext. There is no other attempt to demonstrate that her age 

was a motivating factor behind the denial of her transfer. This claim is therefore without merit. 

b. Race and sex discrimination under Title VII and the ELCRA

Title VII applies when an employer attempts to “discharge any individual, or otherwise to 

discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s” race or sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 

The ELCRA similarly prohibits “discriminat[ing] against an individual with respect to 

employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of” race 

or sex. Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2202(1)(a). 
No. 22-1328 Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC Page 26

Just like the age-discrimination claims, Hrdlicka’s claims of sex and race discrimination 

rely on circumstantial evidence and therefore utilize the McDonnell Douglas framework. See 

Town, 568 N.W.2d at 67–68. Also like the age-discrimination claims, there is no genuine 

dispute that General Motors had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for denying Hrdlicka’s 

transfer and denying her open-door appeal. The same legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons that 

General Motors advances against a finding of age discrimination apply equally to the claims of 

sex and race discrimination.

General Motors clearly established that its decision to deny Hrdlicka’s transfer was not 

based on either sex or race, but entirely premised on the fact that her prior sculpting position had 

been eliminated, that Hrdlicka no longer possessed the skills to be a sculptor, and that the Design 

Academy needed to backfill her position before she could transfer. Likewise, her open-door 

appeal was denied solely due to a finding that she had well-documented, chronic attendance 

issues. There is no evidence that sex or race had any influence on these decisions. The claims 

therefore lack merit.

III. CONCLUSION

Hrdlicka’s post-termination diagnoses of serious health conditions are indeed unfortunate 

but, for the reasons discussed above, they do not create a genuine dispute of material fact that 

would justify denying General Motors’s motion for summary judgment. We therefore AFFIRM 

the judgment of the district court.