Present: All the Justices 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 

DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 970938 CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 

 February 27, 1998 

BLANKS OIL CO., INC. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY 

J. Samuel Johnston, Jr., Judge 

 The question for decision in this sales tax case is 

whether the situs for the assessment of a local tax on 

sales of home heating fuel is the place of delivery or the 

place of the dealer’s business. The trial court ruled that 

the place of delivery was the proper situs for such 

assessment. Finding this ruling erroneous, we will 

reverse. 

The levy of a local one percent general retail sales 

tax by cities and counties is authorized by Code § 58.l605(B). Such tax is administered and collected by the 

State Tax Commissioner in the same manner as the state 

sales tax. Code § 58.1-605(D). The local taxes so 

collected are paid into a special fund of the state 

treasury and credited to the account of each particular 

city or county levying a local sales tax. Code § 58.1-

605(E). The local sales tax applies to home heating fuel 

unless exempted by a duly adopted ordinance of a local 

governing body. Code § 58.1-609.13. 
In a motion for judgment filed against the 

Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Taxation (the 

Department), Blanks Oil Co., Inc. (Blanks), whose place of 

business is located in Campbell County,* sought the 

correction of an allegedly erroneous assessment of a one 

percent local sales tax on home heating fuel that Blanks 

delivered to its customers in the counties of Pittsylvania 

and Bedford. Pittsylvania and Bedford exempt the sale of 

such fuel from the local sales tax; Campbell does not. 

 The trial court held that because the proper situs of 

the assessment of the local tax on sales of home heating 

fuel was the place of delivery and because such sales were 

exempt from the tax in the counties of Pittsylvania and 

Bedford, where the deliveries in question were made, the 

assessment against Blanks was erroneous. Accordingly, the 

court ordered that the Department refund to Blanks 

$2,536.40 for local sales taxes assessed in 1992 on 

deliveries Blanks made in such counties. We awarded the 

Department this appeal. 

Well-established rules govern the disposition of the 

question presented by this appeal. “Any assessment of a 

 *

 It is undisputed that Blanks’ place of business in 

Campbell County is where orders for home heating oil are 

placed and processed and where accounting functions are 

performed. 

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tax by the Department shall be deemed prima facie correct.” 

Code § 58.1-205(1). The burden is upon the taxpayer 

challenging an assessment to show that the assessment is 

erroneous or otherwise improper. Code § 58.1-1825; 

Department of Taxation v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 217 Va. 121, 

127, 225 S.E.2d 870, 874 (1976); Union Tanning Co. v. 

Commonwealth, 123 Va. 610, 632-33, 96 S.E. 780, 786-87 

(1918). The State Tax Commissioner is empowered to issue 

regulations relating to the interpretation and enforcement 

of the laws governing taxes administered by the Department. 

Code § 58.1-203. And the Commissioner’s construction of a 

tax statute, while not binding upon this Court, is entitled 

to great weight. Department of Taxation v. Wellmore Coal 

Corp., 228 Va. 149, 154, 320 S.E.2d 509, 511 (1984);

Webster v. Department of Taxation, 219 Va. 81, 84-85, 245 

S.E.2d 252, 255 (1978). 

In its final order, the trial court stated that City 

of Richmond v. Petroleum Marketers, Inc., 221 Va. 372, 269 

S.E.2d 389 (1980), supported the court’s ruling that 

Blanks’ assessment was erroneous. Blanks cites Petroleum 

Marketers on appeal, but we find that the case is 

inapposite. 

Petroleum Marketers did not involve a sales tax, and 

Code § 58.1-605, at issue here, was not implicated in any 

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way. That case determined whether a fuel oil dealer was 

engaged in the business of a wholesale merchant in the City 

of Richmond within the meaning of a provision of the City 

Code which imposed a wholesale license tax upon such 

merchants. 

he merchant in question maintained its place of 

business in Henrico County, where all its customer 

contracts were made, but delivered fuel oil to customers in 

the adjoining City of Richmond. The section of the City 

Code imposing the wholesale merchants license tax was 

silent on the issue of place of sale. Id. at 373 n*, 269 

S.E.2d at 390 n*. Accordingly, we looked to the Uniform 

Commercial Code (UCC) for a definition of the terms “sale” 

and “place of sale” as well as for assistance in 

determining whether “there [was] a sufficient nexus between 

the activities of Petroleum [Marketers] and the City to 

justify the City classifying Petroleum [Marketers] as a 

wholesale merchant subject to the City’s license tax.” Id.

at 374, 269 S.E.2d at 390. 

iting several provisions of the UCC, we held that 

“title [to the fuel oil] passed when the product was pumped 

out of [the merchant’s] tanks and into whatever facility 

[in the City of Richmond] its customer provided.” Id. 

Accordingly, we concluded that the merchant had made 

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“wholesale sales within the City of Richmond . . . and 

. . . was a wholesale merchant within that jurisdiction for 

purposes of [the wholesale merchants license tax].” Id. at 

375, 269 S.E.2d at 390. 

Here, unlike the Richmond City Code, the statute 

authorizing the local sales tax in question is not silent 

on the issue of place of sale. The statute fixes the place 

of business of the dealer as the place of sale. Code 

§ 58.1-605(E) provides that the basis of the credit to the 

cities and counties levying a local sales tax “shall be the 

city or county in which the sales were made . . ., namely, 

the city or county of location of each place of business of 

every dealer paying the tax to the Commonwealth without 

regard to the city or county of possible use by the 

purchasers.” (Emphasis added.) 

Furthermore, consistent with the provisions of Code 

§ 58.1-605, a long-standing regulation promulgated by the 

Department also fixes the place of business of the dealer 

as the place of sale. Published in 23 Va. Admin. Code 10-

210-630(E)(1), the regulation provides as follows: 

The local 1% sales tax will be allocated to the 

locality in which the place of business from which the 

sale is made is located. Place of business is defined 

as an established business location at which orders 

are regularly received. Therefore the situs of sale 

shall be the business location that first takes the 

purchaser’s order, either in person, by purchase 

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order, or by letter or telephone, regardless of the 

location of the merchandise or the point of acceptance 

of the order or shipment. 

Blanks maintains, however, that this regulation is 

inconsistent with Code § 8.2-401(2), a part of the Uniform 

Commercial Code, and, therefore, violative of Code § 58.1-

203(A), which provides that the Department’s regulations 

“shall not be inconsistent with the Constitutions and 

applicable laws of this Commonwealth and of the United 

States.” 

Code § 8.2-401(2) provides that “title passes to the 

buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes 

his performance with reference to the physical delivery of 

the goods.” Here, Blanks argues, it completed its 

performance and title passed when the home heating oil was 

delivered and metered and invoices were rendered to its 

customers in Pittsylvania and Bedford counties. Blanks 

asserts that we are “bound by the UCC” and must recognize 

the place of delivery as the place of sale in this case. 

Blanks acknowledges that the General Assembly may 

override a provision of the UCC by the enactment of other 

legislation. But, Blanks says, the General Assembly’s 

enactment of the legislation authorizing the assessment of 

a local sales tax did not override the UCC’s § 8.2-401(2). 

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We disagree with Blanks. Code § 8.2-401(2) is a 

statute of general application while Code §§ 58.1-605 and –

609.13 are statutes of specific application. Code § 8.2-

401(2) speaks to innumerable types of sales generally; Code 

§ 58.1-605 deals with the specific subject of local sales 

taxes and Code § 58.1-609.13 with the sale of a specific 

commodity, viz., home heating fuel. 

“[W]hen one statute speaks to a subject in a general 

way and another deals with a part of the same subject in a 

more specific manner . . . and . . . they conflict, the 

latter prevails.” Virginia Nat’l Bank v. Harris, 220 Va. 

336, 340, 257 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1979); see also County of 

Fairfax v. Century Concrete Services, Inc., 254 Va. 423, 

427, 492 S.E.2d 648, 650 (1997); Dodson v. Potomac Mack 

Sales & Service, Inc., 241 Va. 89, 94-95, 400 S.E.2d 178, 

181 (1991). Hence, we conclude that the enactment of Code 

§§ 58.1-605 and –609.13 did override Code § 8.2-401(2) to 

the extent that the former sections fix the place of sale 

of home heating fuel for the purpose of assessing the local 

sales tax. 

Blanks contends, however, that Code § 58.1-605 is 

merely “an administrative statute.” Blanks argues that the 

Code section serves only to enable the Commissioner to make 

the ministerial determination of a place of sale for the 

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purpose of crediting the accounts of the localities levying 

the local sales tax. 

Again, we disagree with Blanks. In our opinion, Code 

§ 58.1-605 is a substantive measure, and it displays the 

clear legislative intent to make the city or county of the 

dealer’s place of business the situs for the assessment of 

the local sales tax as well as the basis for the 

Commissioner to credit the accounts of the localities 

levying the tax. 

Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 

court and enter final judgment here in favor of the 

Commissioner. 

Reversed and final judgment. 

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