59–006 

114TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 114–743 

REQUIRE EVALUATION BEFORE IMPLEMENTING 

EXECUTIVE WISHLISTS ACT OF 2016 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2016.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 

State of the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. GOODLATTE, from the Committee on the Judiciary, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

DISSENTING VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 3438] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill 

(H.R. 3438) to amend title 5, United States Code, to postpone the 

effective date of high-impact rules pending judicial review, having 

considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment 

and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

The Amendment ...................................................................................................... 2 

Purpose and Summary ............................................................................................ 2 

Background and Need for the Legislation ............................................................. 2 

Hearings ................................................................................................................... 6 

Committee Consideration ........................................................................................ 6 

Committee Votes ...................................................................................................... 6 

Committee Oversight Findings ............................................................................... 11 

New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures ...................................................... 11 

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate .......................................................... 11 

Duplication of Federal Programs ............................................................................ 13 

Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings ..................................................................... 13 

Performance Goals and Objectives ......................................................................... 13 

Advisory on Earmarks ............................................................................................. 13 

Section-by-Section Analysis .................................................................................... 13 

Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ..................................... 14 

Dissenting Views ..................................................................................................... 15 


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The Amendment 

The amendment is as follows: 

Strike all that follows after the enacting clause and insert the 

following: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Require Evaluation before Implementing Executive 

Wishlists Act of 2016’’ or as the ‘‘REVIEW Act of 2016’’. 

SEC. 2. RELIEF PENDING REVIEW. 

Section 705 of title 5, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) by striking ‘‘When’’ and inserting the following: 

‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—When’’; and 

(2) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(b) HIGH-IMPACT RULES.— ‘‘(1) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection— 

‘‘(A) the term ‘Administrator’ means the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of the Office of Management and Budget; 

and 

‘‘(B) the term ‘high-impact rule’ means any rule that the Administrator 

determines may impose an annual cost on the economy of not less than 

$1,000,000,000. 

‘‘(2) IDENTIFICATION.—A final rule may not be published or take effect until 

the agency making the rule submits the rule to the Administrator and the Administrator makes a determination as to whether the rule is a high-impact rule, 

which shall be published by the agency with the final rule. 

‘‘(3) RELIEF.— 

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), an agency 

shall postpone the effective date of a high-impact rule of the agency until 

the final disposition of all actions seeking judicial review of the rule. 

‘‘(B) FAILURE TO TIMELY SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW.—Notwithstanding section 

553(d), if no person seeks judicial review of a high-impact rule— 

‘‘(i) during any period explicitly provided for judicial review under the 

statute authorizing the making of the rule; or 

‘‘(ii) if no such period is explicitly provided for, during the 60-day period beginning on the date on which the high-impact rule is published 

in the Federal Register, 

the high-impact rule may take effect as early as the date on which the applicable period ends. 

‘‘(4) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this subsection may be construed to 

impose any limitation under law on any court against the issuance of any order 

enjoining the implementation of any rule.’’. 

Purpose and Summary 

H.R. 3438, the ‘‘Require Evaluation before Implementing Executive Wishlists Act of 2016’’ or the ‘‘REVIEW Act of 2016,’’ amends 

the Administrative Procedure Act to require administrative stays of 

the effective dates of new regulations imposing one billion dollars 

or more in annual costs to the U.S. economy, if litigation to challenge the regulations is brought within statutorily specified periods 

for the initiation of such litigation. 

Background and Need for the Legislation 

I. GENERALLY

H.R. 3438 responds to situations like the United States Supreme 

Court’s decision in Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2699, 

192 L.Ed.2d 674 (2015), and the adverse regulatory cost phenomena for which that case is emblematic. 

In Michigan v. EPA, the Court ruled against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, holding that its Utility MACT rule, 

which newly regulated air emissions from power plants, was legally 


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1Sam Batkins, The House on Regulation: Addressing Billion-Dollar Rules, American Action 

Form (Oct. 22, 2015) (available at http://americanactionforum.org/insights/the-house-onregulation-addressing-billion-dollar-rules). 

infirm because the agency deemed costs irrelevant to its decision 

to promulgate the rule. Those costs totaled an estimated $9.6 billion per year, to achieve benefits in airborne mercury emissions of 

only $4–6 million per year. 

The Court, however, failed to set aside the rule, requiring the 

continuing incurrence of compliance costs pending remand to the 

court of appeals. Billions of additional dollars, moreover, had already been incurred by the power-generating industry under the 

unlawful rule, because the rule was not stayed by the courts pending the multi-year, ultimately successful legal challenge to the rule. 

The REVIEW Act would prevent such needless and wasteful expenditures to comply with unlawful, billion-dollar rules. To do so, 

it would require agencies, when they promulgate new rules determined by the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs to impose $1 billion or more in costs on the economy, 

to provide that the rules will not become legally effective until after 

the conclusion of litigation challenging them, if the litigation is 

timely filed in the wake of the rules’ publication. The Act would effectuate this reform by amending 5 U.S.C. sec. 705, the Administrative Procedure Act’s provision authorizing agency or judicial 

stays of agency action pending judicial review. 705 currently leaves 

it wholly to the discretion of agencies and the courts to issue stays, 

whether for new billion-dollar rules or otherwise. 

The reform contained in the REVIEW Act has become increasingly needed in recent years. Historically, it was unusual for regulatory agencies to promulgate new regulations with estimated annual costs of $1 billion per year or more. Since the turn of the century, however, and particularly under the Obama administration, 

billion-dollar rules have become more and more frequent. As the 

American Action Forum summarized in 2015: 

From 2006 to 2008, the nation averaged two of these rules 

annually. From 2009 to present, this figure has increased 

to roughly three per year. During the Obama administration, these mega-rules have imposed total annual costs of 

$65.1 billion, with a related 19.5 million paperwork burden 

hours. 

* * * 

[T]hese rules are somewhat rare . . . but their impact cannot be overstated. The five largest rules from [the current] 

Administration have imposed an average of $6.7 billion in 

annual costs and more than $33.6 billion in total annual 

burdens.1

As of today, based on available data, since 2005, there have been 

no fewer than 34 billion-dollar rules, including 24 from the Obama 

administration, following a total of ten from the George W. Bush 

administration. These rules include the following: 


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2 Require Evaluation before Implementing Executive Wishlists (REVIEW) Act of 2015; and the 

Regulatory Predictability for Business Growth Act of 2015, Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on 

Reg. Reform, Com. and Antitrust Law, 114th Cong. 51 at 57 (2015) (Legislative Hrg.) (testimony 

of Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Sr., Esq.). 

Although the courts, when rules are challenged judicially, have 

authority to issue stays pending review, testimony elicited at the 

Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust 

Law’s hearing on H.R. 3438 indicated that it is very difficult to obtain judicial stays and may be getting harder still.2 One case highlighted during the Subcommittee’s hearing provides an instructive 

example of the consequences when courts do not issue stays in 

what ultimately is successful litigation to challenge a new rule: 


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3Legislative Hrg. at 26 (testimony of Paul R. Noe, Esq.). 

In 2007, about $200 million in compliance investments 

were stranded in the paper and wood products industry 

when a court struck down the 2004 Boiler MACT rules 

just 3 months before the compliance deadline. When the 

rules were reissued in 2013, the new standards had 

changed significantly, and previous investments proved to 

be the wrong approaches to achieve compliance. Wasting 

limited capital undermines the competitiveness of U.S. 

businesses and impedes growth and job creation.3

The reluctance of courts to issue judicial stays creates increasing 

difficulties for the economy and economic recovery that are particularly acute in the cases of billion-dollar rules. It also provides undesirable incentives for administrative agencies. 

For example, in Michigan v. EPA, the challenged rule imposed an estimated $9.6 billion in annual costs to achieve only $4–6 million in benefits. The Court ultimately found the rule unlawful, but, 

even then, did not set it aside, nor did the courts ever stay the rule 

pending review. As a result, after years of litigation that still have 

not been concluded, but during which compliance has been required, it may well be the case that over $50 billion in vitally-needed economic resources will be wasted on compliance with a rule 

that ultimately is discarded for legal insufficiency. 

Further, when agencies know that the courts may allow them to 

impose such levels of costs on regulated entities pending lengthy 

judicial reviews, it creates a dangerous incentive for agencies to impose more legally infirm, high-cost rules on the economy. In these 

circumstances, the agencies know that they may be able to leverage 

very high compliance expenditures by covered entities pending review to force the entities’ ultimate acquiescence to the rules. This 

is because, once such costs are sunk into the regulated entities’ cost 

structures, it can be difficult for these entities to face both a complete loss of those costs and the risk of totally new and still unpredictable costs to comply with the requirements of a successor rule. 

Testimony received by the Committee indicating that it is exceedingly hard for entities challenging new agency rules to obtain 

judicial stays, even against rules imposing a billion dollars or more 

in costs on the economy per year, is deeply troubling to the Committee. Indeed, testimony received suggested that summary denials 

of stay petitions, even during challenges to high-cost rules, is routine. It is the Committee’s sincere hope that the REVIEW Act will 

provide an impetus to the courts to consider more deeply petitions 

for judicial stays filed by those who must bear the costs of new 

rules that impose high costs—particularly in light of the perverse 

incentive agencies have to impose even more costly rules, to leverage immediate and very high compliance costs to squelch opposition to the rules. The Committee’s concern extends, at a minimum, 

to the many major rules issued each year that impose one hundred 

million dollars or more in annual costs per year, albeit less than 

one billion dollars per year. Many of these rules can impose several 

hundreds of millions of dollars or even over one billion dollars in 

compliance costs over their life cycles, or even during the course of 

several years of litigation. That the REVIEW Act does not require 


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automatic administrative stays against these rules pending litigation does not mean that courts or agencies should assume Congress 

believes such stays, whether judicial or administrative, are not 

merited. On the contrary. The bill does, though, leave the question 

of whether to grant stays in such cases where it lies now, to the 

courts’ and the agencies’ case-by-case discretion, and subject to 

Congress’ continuing oversight for needs for further reform. 

Amending the APA to include the REVIEW Act’s important but, 

it is to be hoped for, only occasionally needed reform, would prevent such waste and preclude this undesirable incentive for agencies. It also would create a salutary incentive for agencies to devise 

new rules that achieve the similar levels of benefits for less than 

$1 billion in annual costs. Finally, the reform would be consistent 

with broadly applicable concepts long included in executive orders 

considering the rulemaking process. Executive Order 12866, for example, has since the Clinton administration highlighted the need 

for special care in the review and imposition of rules costing over 

$100 million annually, and has consistently encouraged agencies to 

tailor rules in the manner least burdensome to society. 

Hearings 

On November 3, 2015, the Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, 

Commercial and Antitrust Law held a legislative hearing on H.R. 

3438. Witnesses at the hearing included: Mr. Edward Brady, President, Brady Homes of Illinois and Second Vice Chairman, National 

Association of Home Builders; Paul R. Noe, Esq., Vice President for 

Public Policy, American Forest & Paper Association; Jeffrey 

Bossert Clark, Sr., Esq., Partner, Kirkland & Ellis, LLP; and, Professor William W. Buzbee, Georgetown University School of Law. 

Committee Consideration 

On September 8, 2016, the Committee met in open session and 

ordered the bill H.R. 3438 favorably reported, with an amendment, 

by a rollcall vote of 18 to 13, a quorum being present. 

Committee Votes 

In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the following 

rollcall votes occurred during the Committee’s consideration of H.R. 

3438. 

1. Amendment #2, offered by Mr. Conyers. The Amendment 

would carve out of the bill regulations that would provide for a reduction in the amount of lead in public drinking water. Defeated 

11 to 15. 

ROLLCALL NO. 1 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Goodlatte (VA), Chairman ................................. X 

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Jr. (WI) ..................................... X 

Mr. Smith (TX) ..........................................................

Mr. Chabot (OH) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Issa (CA) ..............................................................


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ROLLCALL NO. 1—Continued 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Forbes (VA) ......................................................... X 

Mr. King (IA) ............................................................. X 

Mr. Franks (AZ) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Gohmert (TX) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Jordan (OH) ........................................................

Mr. Poe (TX) ...............................................................

Mr. Chaffetz (UT) ......................................................

Mr. Marino (PA) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Gowdy (SC) .........................................................

Mr. Labrador (ID) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Farenthold (TX) .................................................. X 

Mr. Collins (GA) ........................................................ X 

Mr. DeSantis (FL) .....................................................

Ms. Walters (CA) .......................................................

Mr. Buck (CO) ............................................................ X 

Mr. Ratcliffe (TX) ....................................................... X 

Mr. Trott (MI) ............................................................ X 

Mr. Bishop (MI) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Conyers, Jr. (MI), Ranking Member ................. X 

Mr. Nadler (NY) ......................................................... X 

Ms. Lofgren (CA) ....................................................... X 

Ms. Jackson Lee (TX) ................................................ X 

Mr. Cohen (TN) .......................................................... X 

Mr. Johnson (GA) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Pierluisi (PR) ...................................................... X 

Ms. Chu (CA) .............................................................

Mr. Deutch (FL) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Gutierrez (IL) ......................................................

Ms. Bass (CA) ............................................................

Mr. Richmond (LA) ....................................................

Ms. DelBene (WA) ..................................................... X 

Mr. Jeffries (NY) ........................................................

Mr. Cicilline (RI) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Peters (CA) .......................................................... X 

Total ............................................................. 11 15 

2. Amendment #3, offered by Ms. Jackson Lee. The Amendment 

would carve out of the bill rules promulgated to prevent, respond 

to, or mitigate the adverse effects of public health emergencies such 

as the outbreak of the Zika and Ebola viruses. Defeated 14 to 14. 

ROLLCALL NO. 2 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Goodlatte (VA), Chairman ................................. X 

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Jr. (WI) ..................................... X 

Mr. Smith (TX) ..........................................................

Mr. Chabot (OH) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Issa (CA) ..............................................................


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ROLLCALL NO. 2—Continued 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Forbes (VA) ......................................................... X 

Mr. King (IA) ............................................................. X 

Mr. Franks (AZ) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Gohmert (TX) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Jordan (OH) ........................................................

Mr. Poe (TX) ...............................................................

Mr. Chaffetz (UT) ......................................................

Mr. Marino (PA) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Gowdy (SC) .........................................................

Mr. Labrador (ID) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Farenthold (TX) .................................................. X 

Mr. Collins (GA) ........................................................ X 

Mr. DeSantis (FL) .....................................................

Ms. Walters (CA) .......................................................

Mr. Buck (CO) ............................................................ X 

Mr. Ratcliffe (TX) ....................................................... X 

Mr. Trott (MI) ............................................................ X 

Mr. Bishop (MI) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Conyers, Jr. (MI), Ranking Member ................. X 

Mr. Nadler (NY) ......................................................... X 

Ms. Lofgren (CA) ....................................................... X 

Ms. Jackson Lee (TX) ................................................ X 

Mr. Cohen (TN) .......................................................... X 

Mr. Johnson (GA) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Pierluisi (PR) ...................................................... X 

Ms. Chu (CA) ............................................................. X 

Mr. Deutch (FL) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Gutierrez (IL) ......................................................

Ms. Bass (CA) ............................................................ X 

Mr. Richmond (LA) ....................................................

Ms. DelBene (WA) ..................................................... X 

Mr. Jeffries (NY) ........................................................

Mr. Cicilline (RI) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Peters (CA) .......................................................... X 

Total ............................................................. 14 14 

3. Amendment #4, offered by Ms. DelBene. The Amendment 

would carve out of the bill rules that would increase college affordability. Defeated 14 to 15. 

ROLLCALL NO. 3 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Goodlatte (VA), Chairman ................................. X 

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Jr. (WI) ..................................... X 

Mr. Smith (TX) ..........................................................

Mr. Chabot (OH) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Issa (CA) ..............................................................

Mr. Forbes (VA) ......................................................... X 


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ROLLCALL NO. 3—Continued 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. King (IA) ............................................................. X 

Mr. Franks (AZ) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Gohmert (TX) ......................................................

Mr. Jordan (OH) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Poe (TX) ...............................................................

Mr. Chaffetz (UT) ......................................................

Mr. Marino (PA) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Gowdy (SC) .........................................................

Mr. Labrador (ID) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Farenthold (TX) .................................................. X 

Mr. Collins (GA) ........................................................ X 

Mr. DeSantis (FL) .....................................................

Ms. Walters (CA) .......................................................

Mr. Buck (CO) ............................................................ X 

Mr. Ratcliffe (TX) ....................................................... X 

Mr. Trott (MI) ............................................................ X 

Mr. Bishop (MI) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Conyers, Jr. (MI), Ranking Member ................. X 

Mr. Nadler (NY) ......................................................... X 

Ms. Lofgren (CA) ....................................................... X 

Ms. Jackson Lee (TX) ................................................ X 

Mr. Cohen (TN) .......................................................... X 

Mr. Johnson (GA) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Pierluisi (PR) ...................................................... X 

Ms. Chu (CA) ............................................................. X 

Mr. Deutch (FL) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Gutierrez (IL) ......................................................

Ms. Bass (CA) ............................................................ X 

Mr. Richmond (LA) ....................................................

Ms. DelBene (WA) ..................................................... X 

Mr. Jeffries (NY) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Cicilline (RI) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Peters (CA) .......................................................... X 

Total ............................................................. 14 15 

4. Amendment #5, offered by Mr. Cicilline. The Amendment 

would carve out of the bill regulations that would reduce the cost 

of healthcare for a person over the age of 65. Defeated 13 to 17. 

ROLLCALL NO. 4 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Goodlatte (VA), Chairman ................................. X 

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Jr. (WI) ..................................... X 

Mr. Smith (TX) .......................................................... X 

Mr. Chabot (OH) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Issa (CA) .............................................................. X 

Mr. Forbes (VA) ......................................................... X 

Mr. King (IA) ............................................................. X 


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ROLLCALL NO. 4—Continued 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Franks (AZ) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Gohmert (TX) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Jordan (OH) ........................................................

Mr. Poe (TX) ...............................................................

Mr. Chaffetz (UT) ......................................................

Mr. Marino (PA) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Gowdy (SC) .........................................................

Mr. Labrador (ID) ......................................................

Mr. Farenthold (TX) .................................................. X 

Mr. Collins (GA) ........................................................ X 

Mr. DeSantis (FL) ..................................................... X 

Ms. Walters (CA) .......................................................

Mr. Buck (CO) ............................................................ X 

Mr. Ratcliffe (TX) ....................................................... X 

Mr. Trott (MI) ............................................................ X 

Mr. Bishop (MI) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Conyers, Jr. (MI), Ranking Member ................. X 

Mr. Nadler (NY) ......................................................... X 

Ms. Lofgren (CA) ....................................................... X 

Ms. Jackson Lee (TX) ................................................ X 

Mr. Cohen (TN) .......................................................... X 

Mr. Johnson (GA) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Pierluisi (PR) ...................................................... X 

Ms. Chu (CA) ............................................................. X 

Mr. Deutch (FL) .........................................................

Mr. Gutierrez (IL) ...................................................... X 

Ms. Bass (CA) ............................................................

Mr. Richmond (LA) ....................................................

Ms. DelBene (WA) ..................................................... X 

Mr. Jeffries (NY) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Cicilline (RI) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Peters (CA) .......................................................... X 

Total ............................................................. 13 17 

5. Motion to report H.R. 3438 as amended favorably to the 

House of Representatives. Approved 18 to 13. 

ROLLCALL NO. 5 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Goodlatte (VA), Chairman ................................. X 

Mr. Sensenbrenner, Jr. (WI) ..................................... X 

Mr. Smith (TX) .......................................................... X 

Mr. Chabot (OH) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Issa (CA) .............................................................. X 

Mr. Forbes (VA) ......................................................... X 

Mr. King (IA) ............................................................. X 

Mr. Franks (AZ) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Gohmert (TX) ...................................................... X 


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ROLLCALL NO. 5—Continued 

Ayes Nays Present 

Mr. Jordan (OH) ........................................................

Mr. Poe (TX) ...............................................................

Mr. Chaffetz (UT) ......................................................

Mr. Marino (PA) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Gowdy (SC) .........................................................

Mr. Labrador (ID) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Farenthold (TX) .................................................. X 

Mr. Collins (GA) ........................................................ X 

Mr. DeSantis (FL) ..................................................... X 

Ms. Walters (CA) .......................................................

Mr. Buck (CO) ............................................................ X 

Mr. Ratcliffe (TX) ....................................................... X 

Mr. Trott (MI) ............................................................ X 

Mr. Bishop (MI) ......................................................... X 

Mr. Conyers, Jr. (MI), Ranking Member ................. X 

Mr. Nadler (NY) ......................................................... X 

Ms. Lofgren (CA) ....................................................... X 

Ms. Jackson Lee (TX) ................................................ X 

Mr. Cohen (TN) .......................................................... X 

Mr. Johnson (GA) ...................................................... X 

Mr. Pierluisi (PR) ...................................................... X 

Ms. Chu (CA) ............................................................. X 

Mr. Deutch (FL) .........................................................

Mr. Gutierrez (IL) ...................................................... X 

Ms. Bass (CA) ............................................................

Mr. Richmond (LA) ....................................................

Ms. DelBene (WA) ..................................................... X 

Mr. Jeffries (NY) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Cicilline (RI) ........................................................ X 

Mr. Peters (CA) .......................................................... X 

Total ............................................................. 18 13 

Committee Oversight Findings 

In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the findings 

and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. 

New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures 

Clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives is inapplicable because this legislation does not provide new 

budgetary authority or increased tax expenditures. 

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate 

In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with respect to 


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the bill, H.R. 3438, the following estimate and comparison prepared 

by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 

402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974: 

U.S. CONGRESS, 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 

Washington, DC, September 12, 2016. 

Hon. BOB GOODLATTE, CHAIRMAN, 

Committee on the Judiciary, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3438, the ‘‘REVIEW Act 

of 2016.’’ 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew Pickford, who 

can be reached at 226–2860 

Sincerely, 

KEITH HALL, DIRECTOR. 

Enclosure 

cc: Honorable John Conyers, Jr. 

Ranking Member 

H.R. 3438—REVIEW Act of 2016. 

As ordered reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary 

on September 8, 2016. 

H.R. 3438 would require Federal agencies to postpone the implementation of any rule imposing an annual cost on the economy of 

at least $1 billion if a petition seeking judicial review of that regulation is filed within 60 days of the rule taking effect. Under the 

bill, implementation would be postponed until any judicial review 

is resolved. 

An analysis of recent reports by the Office of Information and 

Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and Budget indicates that about five regulations are issued each year that would 

have an estimated annual impact on the economy of $1 billion or 

more. A delay in implementing such regulations could affect spending subject to appropriation, direct spending, and revenues. For example, implementing the legislation could affect when rules related 

to Federal entitlement programs or the collection of fees would take 

effect and those timing delays could either increase or decrease 

Federal spending and revenues. However, CBO has no basis for estimating how long such delays would last, how delays in the implementation of such rules would affect the regulatory process, or 

what effect they might have on the Federal budget. 

Because enacting the legislation could affect direct spending and 

revenues, pay-as-you-go procedures apply. 

CBO cannot determine whether enacting H.R. 3438 would increase net direct spending or on-budget deficits by more than $5 

billion in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 

2027. 


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H.R. 3438 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. 

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Matthew Pickford. The 

estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant 

Director for Budget Analysis. 

Duplication of Federal Programs 

No provision of H.R. 3438 establishes or reauthorizes a program 

of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program, a program that was included in any report from the 

Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to section 

21 of Public Law 111–139, or a program related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. 

Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings 

The Committee estimates that H.R. 3438 specifically directs to be 

completed no specific rule makings within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 

§ 551. 

Performance Goals and Objectives 

The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII 

of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. 3438 prevents 

the waste of compliance costs under new but legally infirm regulations imposing one billion or more in costs on the U.S. economy, by 

requiring stays of such regulations if litigation challenging them is 

timely filed within statutorily specified periods. 

Advisory on Earmarks 

In accordance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, H.R. 3438 does not contain any congressional 

earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined 

in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of Rule XXI. 

Section-by-Section Analysis 

The following discussion describes H.R. 3438 as reported by the 

Committee. 

Sec. 1. Short Title. Section 1 sets forth the short title of the bill 

as the ‘‘Require Evaluation before Implementing Executive 

Wishlists Act of 2016,’’ or the ‘‘REVIEW Act of 2016.’’ 

Sec. 2: Relief Pending Review. Section 2 amends section 705 of 

title 5 to designate as ‘‘high-impact’’ rules those rules determined 

by the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs to impose an annual cost on the economy of not less than 

$1 billion; requires agencies to submit new rules to the Administrator for the rendering of such determinations; requires agencies 

to publish such determinations with the rules; requires agencies to 

postpone the effective dates of high-impact rules until the end of 

litigation challenging the rules, if such litigation is filed within 60 

days after the rules’ publication or otherwise applicable statutory 

periods for the filing of litigation; and, sets forth a rule of construction that the legislation is not to be construed to limit the courts’ 

discretion to issue judicial stays against the implementation of any 

rules. 


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Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported 

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, 

as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, 

and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in 

roman): 

TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE 

* * * * * * * 

PART I—THE AGENCIES GENERALLY 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 7—JUDICIAL REVIEW 

* * * * * * * 

§ 705. Relief pending review 

øWhen¿ (a) IN GENERAL.—When an agency finds that justice 

so requires, it may postpone the effective date of action taken by 

it, pending judicial review. On such conditions as may be required 

and to the extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury, the reviewing court, including the court to which a case may be taken on 

appeal from or on application for certiorari or other writ to a reviewing court, may issue all necessary and appropriate process to 

postpone the effective date of an agency action or to preserve status 

or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings. 

(b) HIGH-IMPACT RULES.— (1) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection— 

(A) the term ‘‘Administrator’’ means the Administrator 

of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of the 

Office of Management and Budget; and 

(B) the term ‘‘high-impact rule’’ means any rule that 

the Administrator determines may impose an annual cost 

on the economy of not less than $1,000,000,000. 

(2) IDENTIFICATION.—A final rule may not be published or 

take effect until the agency making the rule submits the rule to 

the Administrator and the Administrator makes a determination as to whether the rule is a high-impact rule, which shall 

be published by the agency with the final rule. 

(3) RELIEF.— (A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph 

(B), an agency shall postpone the effective date of a highimpact rule of the agency until the final disposition of all 

actions seeking judicial review of the rule. 

(B) FAILURE TO TIMELY SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW.—Notwithstanding section 553(d), if no person seeks judicial review of a high-impact rule— 

(i) during any period explicitly provided for judicial review under the statute authorizing the making of 

the rule; or 


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1Letter from the Coalition for Sensible Safeguards to Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) and 

Representative John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI), Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 

7, 2016) (on file with Democratic staff of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary). Current members of 

the Coalition include: AFL-CIO; Alliance for Justice; American Association of University Professors; American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees; American Federation of 

Teachers Americans for Financial Reform; American Lung Association; American Rivers; American Values Campaign; American Sustainable Business Council; BlueGreen Alliance; Campaign 

Continued 

(ii) if no such period is explicitly provided for, during the 60-day period beginning on the date on which 

the high-impact rule is published in the Federal Register, 

the high-impact rule may take effect as early as the date on 

which the applicable period ends. 

(4) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this subsection 

may be construed to impose any limitation under law on any 

court against the issuance of any order enjoining the implementation of any rule. 

* * * * * * * 

Dissenting Views 

INTRODUCTION

H.R. 3438, the ‘‘Require Evaluation before Implementing Executive Wishlists Act of 2016’’ or the ‘‘REVIEW Act of 2016,’’ would 

automatically stay the implementation of any rule that imposes an 

annual cost of more than $1 billion on the economy if an entity 

sought judicial review of such rule within certain time-frames. The 

bill is essentially an open invitation to anyone who opposes a proposed regulation to stay its implementation by seeking judicial review. As a result, H.R. 3438 is yet another anti-consumer, antipublic health and safety measure intended to thwart the regulatory 

process, a process that is already very time-consuming and cumbersome. Rather than improving this process, the bill would lengthen it by years pending the outcome of a lawsuit, which could entail 

appeals that may ultimately need to be determined by the U.S. Supreme Court. Worse yet, the measure fails to include any exception 

for rules addressing emergent public health and imminent safety 

crises, such as the current Zika epidemic. 

As with other anti-regulatory measures that the Committee has 

considered this Congress, H.R. 3438 is dangerous solution to an undocumented problem. Courts already have adequate tools to stay 

poorly-designed rules through a well-calibrated test that serves the 

public interest. While regulatory stays are sometimes appropriate, 

the wholesale delay of high-impact rules upon the filing of even 

meritless litigation would upset this balanced and flexible approach 

designed to serve the public interest in favor of a standard that 

only benefits special interests. 

In recognition of these concerns, Coalition for Sensible Safeguards—an alliance of more than 150 consumer, labor, research, 

faith, and other public interest groups—strongly opposes this legislation, noting that the bill ‘‘further tilts the regulatory process in 

favor of corporate special interests by creating more opportunities 

for the manipulation and abuse of the process to their benefit and 

at the expense of protecting consumers, working families, and other 

vulnerable communities.’’ 1


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for Contract Agriculture Reform; Center for Effective Government; Center for Digital Democracy; Center for Food Safety; Center for Foodborne Illness Research & Prevention; Center for 

Independent Living; Center for Science in the Public Interest; Citizens for Sludge-Free Land; 

Clean Air Watch; Clean Water Network; Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities; Consumer 

Federation of America; Consumers Union; CounterCorp; Cumberland Countians for Peace & 

Justice; Demos; Economic Policy Institute; Edmonds Institute; Environment America; Farmworker Justice; Free Press; Friends of the Earth; Green for All; Health Care for America Now; 

In the Public Interest; International Brotherhood of Teamsters; International Center for Technology Assessment; International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW); League of Conservation Voters; Los Angeles Alliance for a 

New Economy; Main Street Alliance; National Association of Consumer Advocates; National 

Center for Healthy Housing; National Consumers League; National Council for Occupational 

Safety and Health; National Employment Law Project; National Lawyers Guild, Louisville 

Chapter; National Women’s Health Network; National Women’s Law Center; Natural Resources 

Defense Council; Network for Environmental & Economic Responsibility of United Church of 

Christ; New Jersey Work Environment Council; New York Committee for Occupational Safety 

and Health; Oregon PeaceWorks; People for the American Way; Protect All Children’s Environment; Public Citizen; Reproductive Health Technologies Project; Safe Tables Our Priority; Sierra 

Club; Service Employees International Union; Southern Illinois Committee for Occupational 

Safety and Health; The Arc of the United States; The Partnership for Working Families; Trust 

for America’s Health; U.S. Chamber Watch; U.S. PIRG; Union of Concerned Scientists; Union 

Plus; United Food and Commercial Workers Union; United Steelworkers; Waterkeeper Alliance; 

and Worksafe. Coalition for Sensible Safeguards, Our Members (last visited on Sept. 10, 2016), 

http://sensiblesafeguards.org/about-us/members/. 2 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2016). 

3 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2016). 

4 CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32240, THE FEDERAL RULEMAKING PROCESS: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2005). 5The APA defines ‘‘rulemaking’’ as the ‘‘agency process for formulating, amending or repealing 

a rule.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2016). A ‘‘rule’’ is defined as ‘‘an agency statement of general or parDESCRIPTION AND BACKGROUND

DESCRIPTION

When ‘‘justice so requires,’’ section 705 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) authorizes agencies to postpone the effective date 

of a rule pending judicial review.2 Courts may also stay the effective date of a rule under ‘‘such conditions as may be required and 

to the extent to prevent irreparable harm.’’ 3 H.R. 3438 amends section 705 in several respects. First, the bill establishes a new section 

705(b) of the APA that would prohibit a final ‘‘high-impact rule’’ 

(defined as a rule that imposes an annual cost on the economy in 

excess of $1 billion) from being published or taking effect until the 

Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 

(OIRA) determines whether the rule qualifies as a high-impact 

rule. Such determination would have to be published in the Federal 

Register by the agency together with the final rule. Second, the bill 

would require an agency to postpone the effective date of any highimpact rule until the final disposition of all actions seeking judicial 

review of it. Third, the bill provides if no person seeks judicial review of a high-impact rule either: (1) within any period explicitly 

provided for judicial review under applicable law; or (2) during the 

60-day period beginning on the date the high impact rule is published in the Federal Register, then the rule can take effect as soon 

as the applicable period ends. 

BACKGROUND

I. Overview of Federal Rulemaking 

Federal regulations impact nearly every aspect of our lives and 

are ‘‘one of the basic tools of government used to implement public 

policy.’’ 4 Enacted in 1946, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 

establishes the minimum rulemaking and formal adjudication requirements for all administrative agencies.5 The APA’s baseline 


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ticular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy 

or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency.’’ 5 U.S.C. 

§ 551(4) (2016). 6Letter from 84 administrative law academics to H. Judiciary Comm. Chair Bob Goodlatte 

(R-VA) and H. Judiciary Comm. Ranking Member John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI), 2 (Jan. 12, 2015) 

(on file with the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Democratic staff). 7 Examples of legislative mandates include the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 

104-4 (1995); the Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164, 1169 (1980); and 

the Congressional Review Act, Pub. L. No. 104-121 (1996). In addition, both Republican and 

Democratic Presidents have issued executive orders mandating additional procedural and analytical requirements for Federal rulemakings. See, e.g., Exec. Ord. No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 190 

(Sept. 30, 1993) (outlining requirements for cost-benefit analysis and review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs for significant rules issued by executive branch agencies). 8 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-791, REEXAMINING REGULATIONS: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS AND TRANSPARENCY OF RETROSPECTIVE REVIEWS 1 

(2007). 9See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the 

Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493 (2012); H.R. 348, the ‘‘Responsibly And Professionally Invigorating Development Act of 2015’’ (RAPID Act); H.R. 712, the ‘‘Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2015;’’ and, H.R. 1155, the ‘‘Searching for and Cutting Regulations that are Unnecessarily Burdensome Act of 2015’’ (SCRUB Act): Hearing Before the 

Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 1, 4-5 (2015) (statement of Amit Narang, Regulatory Policy Advocate, Public 

Citizen), http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/cfc2a8c6-729e-4e77-9f9f-561f60f1c153/narangtestimony.pdf. 10 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2016). 11 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2016). Agencies may also choose or may be required by statute to use other 

rulemaking procedures, including formal rulemaking, negotiated rulemaking, and hybrid or expedited approaches, which generally tend to have greater procedural requirements and be subject to stricter judicial review than section 553 notice-and-comment rulemaking. Though rarely 

used, agencies must sometimes follow the APA’s formal rulemaking procedures ‘‘when rules are 

required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.’’ 5 U.S.C. 

§ 553(c) (2016). 12 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (2016). 13 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2016). 

procedural requirements serve to maintain a balance between 

agency flexibility and the requirements of due process. As 84 leading administrative law academics have observed, ‘‘The APA has 

served for nearly 70 years as a kind of Constitution for administrative agencies and the affected public—flexible enough to accommodate the variety of agencies operating under it and the changes in 

modern life.’’ 6 In addition to the APA, numerous other procedural 

and analytical requirements have been imposed on the rulemaking 

process by Congress and various presidents.7 These requirements 

focus ‘‘predominately on agencies’ development of new rules,’’ according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO).8

In general, proposed rules go through an extensive vetting process that many believe is already too ossified and burdened by 

delay.9 The APA defines ‘‘rulemaking’’ as the ‘‘agency process for 

formulating, amending or repealing a rule.’’ 10 The process for informal rulemaking, commonly referred to as notice-and-comment rulemaking, is outlined in section 553 of the APA, and is the process 

that agencies follow for promulgating the rules in the overwhelming majority of cases.11

In the informal notice-and-comment rulemaking process, agencies are required to provide the public with adequate notice of a 

proposed rule and a meaningful opportunity to comment on the 

rule’s content.12 A notice is ‘‘adequate’’ if an agency publishes a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register and the notice 

contains the time, place, and nature of public rulemaking proceedings, reference to the legal authority under which the rule is 

proposed, and either the terms or substance of the proposed rule 

or a description of the subjects and issues involved.13 With respect 

to the required public comment period, the agency must provide 


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14 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2016). 15 Id. 16 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (2016). The APA exempts from all of its informal rulemaking requirements 

rules relating to certain subject matter areas. These rules include those governing: (1) ‘‘a military or foreign affairs function of the United States;’’ (2) ‘‘a matter relating to agency management or personnel;’’ or (3) a matter relating to ‘‘public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2016). The APA also exempts from the notice-and comment requirements rules that are issued for ‘‘good cause,’’ i.e., where an agency finds that ‘‘notice and public 

procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.’’ 5 U.S.C. 

§ 553(b) (2016). 17 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2016). 18 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2016). 19 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2016). 

the public with the opportunity to submit written ‘‘data, views, or 

arguments.’’ 14 There is no minimum time period during which an 

agency must accept comments, but courts reviewing an agency’s 

compliance with this APA requirement inquire as to whether the 

opportunity to comment was ‘‘adequate,’’ which may inform how 

long the comment period should be for a given rule. 

After the comment period closes, the agency must consider the 

public’s comments and incorporate into the adopted rule a ‘‘concise 

general statement’’ of the ‘‘basis and purpose’’ of the final rule.15

From this general statement, the public should be able to obtain 

a general idea of the purpose of and basic justification for the rule. 

The final rule and the general statement must be published in the 

Federal Register not less than 30 days before the rule’s effective 

date.16

II. Judicial Review of Final Agency Action 

Section 702 of the APA subjects agency rulemaking to judicial review, providing a statutory mechanism for relief for ‘‘any person 

suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.’’ 17 The APA requires a reviewing court to compel 

agency action when it is unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed and to set aside as unlawful agency action, findings, and conclusions when they are found to be: 

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; 

(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 

(C) in excess if statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; 

(D) without observance of procedure required by law; 

(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in [a formal rulemaking] or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency 

hearing provided by statute; or 

(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts 

are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.18

The two exceptions to this presumption of judicial review under 

the APA are when ‘‘statutes preclude judicial review’’ and when 

‘‘agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.’’ 19 A 

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20See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988); Oestereich v. Selective Service System, 393 U.S. 

233 (1968). 21Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance 

with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 

1791 (2007). 22 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2016). 23Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance 

with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 

1791 (2007). 24 Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1487 (9th Cir. 1992). 25Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance 

with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 

1791 (2007). 26See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945) (holding that courts must 

defer to agency interpretation of an existing regulation unless plainly erroneous). 27 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (2016) 28 Hearing on H.R. 3438, the ‘‘Require Evaluation before Implementing Executive Wishlists Act 

of 2015;’’ and, H.R.2631, the ‘‘Regulatory Predictability for Business Growth Act of 2015’’ Before 

the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the 

Judiciary, 114th Cong. 5 (2015) (statement of William Funk, Lewis & Clark Distinguished Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School). 29 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009). 30 Id. at 432. 31 Id. at 433. 

tionality of agency action, including those actions that are otherwise unreviewable.20

Even where agencies agency action suffers a deficiency, the APA 

recognizes that no agency is perfect and leaves room for harmless 

error.21 Section 706 of the APA instructs courts to take into account ‘‘the rule of prejudicial error,’’ 22 which courts have occasionally utilized to excuse deviations in the rulemaking process.23 The 

Ninth Circuit has held that a failure to provide notice and comment is harmless only where the agency’s mistake ‘‘clearly had no 

bearing on the procedure used or the substance of decision 

reached.’’ 24 Courts have been reluctant, however, to excuse deficiencies in notice and comment through the harmless-error doctrine,25 though the Supreme Court has held that courts must ordinarily defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations.26 Although the APA does not contain a statute of limitations for civil actions, there is a 6-year limitation on civil actions 

brought against the United States.27

Under current law, both the court and the agency issuing a rule 

may stay the effective date of a final rule.28 While agencies have 

broad discretion in postponing the effective date of a rule, a court 

typically considers four factors in deciding whether to stay a rule: 

(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing 

that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the 

applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) 

whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the 

other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where 

the public interest lies.29

The authority of courts to grant stays of final agency action has 

‘‘historically been justified by the perceived need ‘to prevent irreparable injury to the parties or to the public’ pending review.’’ 30 Importantly, the Supreme Court has also clarified that judicial stays 

are not ‘‘a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result.’’ Rather, courts exercise discretion on an case-by-case 

basis.31 Indeed, the Supreme Court has long-held that since tradiVerDate Sep 11 2014 23:59 Sep 13, 2016 Jkt 059006 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR743.XXX HR743

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32 Id; Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 777 (1987). 33See, e.g., A Review of Regulatory Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Gov’t Affairs, 114th Cong. 4 (2015) (statement of Sidney Shapiro, Vice President, Center for Progressive Reform, and Chair of Administrative Law, Wake Forest University 

School of Law), http://progressivereform.org/articles/Shapiro—SenateRegReform—091615.pdf. 34 Id. citing SEC. OF ADMIN. L. & REG. PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASSOC., Policy: Regulatory Impact 

Analyses 3, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/administrative—law/policy.html (last visited Oct. 

29, 2015) (’’The steady increase in the number and types of cost-benefit or rulemaking review 

requirements has occurred without any apparent consideration being given to their cumulative 

effect on the ability of agencies to carry out their statutory obligations.’’). 35 A Review of Regulatory Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Gov’t Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Sidney Shapiro, Vice President, Center 

for Progressive Reform, and Chair of Administrative Law, Wake Forest University School of 

Law), http://progressivereform.org/articles/Shapiro_SenateRegReform_091615.pdf. 36 Id. at 6; see Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative Rulemaking, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 533 (2000) (cataloguing 110 different requirements for agency 

rulemaking), http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/lawreview/downloads/272/Seid.pdf; E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1494 (1992). 37Michael Tanglis, Unsafe Delays: An Empirical Analysis Shows That Federal Rulemakings 

To Protect the Public Are Taking Longer Than Ever, PUBLIC CITIZEN (June 28, 2016), http:// 

www.citizen.org/documents/Unsafe-Delays-Report.pdf. 38 Id. at 5. 

tional stay factors ‘‘contemplate individualized judgments in each 

case, the formula cannot be reduced to a set of rigid rules.’’ 32

CONCERNS WITH H.R. 3438

I. H.R. 3438 Will Further Delay the Implementation of Time-Sensitive Rules That Are Critical to Public Health and Safety 

There is broad agreement among administrative law experts that 

the regulatory system is already too ossified and burdened by regulatory delay.33 Both the American Bar Association (ABA) and the 

Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) have urged 

Congress to ‘‘exercise restraint’’ in imposing additional procedural 

and analytical requirements in agency rulemaking.34 In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs in 2015, Professor Sidney Shapiro noted that 

‘‘rules can take several years, if not decades to come to fruition, 

and scarce public resources are wasted,’’ while ‘‘the risks these 

rules are meant to address do not pause or evaporate into the 

ether; rather, they continue unabated, threatening the health and 

security of families and businesses across the country.’’ 35 Professor 

Shapiro and others have also observed that, as of 2000, agencies 

may be subject to ‘‘as many as 110 separate procedure requirements in the rulemaking process,’’ noting that more procedural requirements have been added since that time.36

Earlier this year, Public Citizen, a consumer interest non-profit, 

released a seminal report on regulatory delays that found that increasing burdens imposed on the rulemaking system have resulted 

in years of delays in actually adopting a proposed rule.37 For example, the study found that while the Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration (OSHA) promulgated many lifesaving rules in less 

than a year in its early years, OSHA has required 12 years on average to adopt economically significant rules since 1996.38 Amit 

Narang, a Regulatory Policy Advocate for Public Citizen, explains: 

It is true that the regulatory system is broken, but not because there is too much regulation. Rather the system is 

broken because the current regulatory process is too slow, 

too calcified, and too inflexible to respond to public health 

and safety threats as they emerge . . . the current process 

is a model of inefficiency, with a dizzying array of duplicaVerDate Sep 11 2014 23:59 Sep 13, 2016 Jkt 059006 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR743.XXX HR743

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39 A Review of Regulatory Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Gov’t Affairs, 114th Cong. 3 (2015) (statement of Sidney Shapiro, Vice President, Center 

for Progressive Reform, and Chair of Administrative Law, Wake Forest University School of 

Law), http://progressivereform.org/articles/Shapiro_SenateRegReform_091615.pdf. Even the lateJustice Antonin Scalia has expressed concerns with imposing greater analytical requirements 

on agency rulemaking. In 1981, Justice Scalia, then a professor of law at the University of Chicago, wrote that ‘‘the procedural advantages of rulemaking for the agency itself are headed for 

extinction,’’ pointing to burdens imposed by the courts and Congress on flexible agency rulemaking. Antonin Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules, AEI JOURNAL ON

GOV’T & SOCIETY 25, 26 (July/Aug. 1981), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1981/7/v5n4-5.pdf. 40 AFL-CIO, Death on the Job: A National and State-by-State Profile of Worker Safety and 

Health in the United States 1 (Apr. 2016), http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/174867/ 

4158803/1647_DOTJ2016.pdf 41 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2016). 42 Id. 43 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009) 44 Id. at 427. 45 Hearing on H.R. 3438, the ‘‘Require Evaluation Before Implementing Executive Wishlists Act 

of 2015,’’ and H.R. 2631, the ‘‘Regulatory Predictability for Business Growth Act of 2015’’ Before 

the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the 

Continued 

tive and redundant requirements interspersed throughout 

a byzantine network that is a virtual maze for agencies to 

navigate. This is the result of an accumulation of analyses 

and procedures that Congress and the Executive have imposed on agencies over the years leaving agencies in a 

state of ‘paralysis by analysis.’ Far from the popular conception of ‘regulators run amok,’ the reality is that agency 

delays are rampant, congressional and judicial deadlines 

are routinely missed or pushed back, and ample evidence 

exists that the situation is getting worse. . . . As is apparent, delay permeates all aspects of the rulemaking process, 

touching virtually all agencies and regulatory sectors.39

These delays have serious consequences on human lives. In April 

2016, the AFL-CIO reported that OSHA regulations have saved 

more than 532,000 lives since the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, which ‘‘promised workers in this country 

the right to a safe job.’’ 40

Rather than streamline the regulatory system, H.R. 3438 would 

worsen regulatory paralysis and delay in the rulemaking system by 

enabling regulated interests to block the implementation of critical 

rules simply by filing a lawsuit. Under current law, the agency that 

promulgates a high-impact rule may delay the rule’s effective date 

on a discretionary basis when ‘‘justice so requires.’’ 41 Courts may 

also postpone a rule’s effective date to prevent irreparable injury 

to a party.42 In practice, the Supreme Court has clarified that this 

requires a reviewing court to determine whether the party seeking 

to delay the rule will be irreparably harmed absent a stay and has 

made a strong showing that it will succeed on the merits of the 

case, or alternatively, whether granting a stay serves the public interest and avoids substantial injury to another party to the litigation.43 The Court has also noted that stays are an intrusion into 

the ‘‘ordinary processes of administration,’’ while judicial review is 

‘‘not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise 

result to the appellant.’’ 44

As Lewis & Clark Law School Professor William Funk explains, 

the bill’s ‘‘absolute incentive’’ to challenge and stay the implementation of high-impact rules would create years of costly delays.45


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Judiciary, 114th Cong. 5 (statement of Professor William Funk, Lewis and Clark Law School) 

(on file with Democratic staff of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary). 46 Id.at 53 (statement of Professor William Buzbee, Professor of Law, Georgetown University 

Law Center). 47 Id. 48 Id. 49 Id. at 54. 50 Id. 51Tr. of Markup of H.R. 3438, the ‘‘Require Evaluation Before Implementing Executive 

Wishlists (Review) Act of 2015’’ by the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 26 (Sept. 8, 

2016). 

Georgetown University Law Center Professor William Buzbee concurs that the bill would create years of delays for ‘‘virtually all’’ 

high-impact rules blocked by ‘‘years of litigation.’’ 46

It is particularly problematic that H.R. 3438 fails to impose any 

requirement that a judicial review challenge to a rulemaking be 

meritorious. As a result, any entity that opposes a proposed regulation could commence a lawsuit against it, if only to delay its implementation while the court determines the sufficiency of the suit.47

II. H.R. 3438 Fails to Exempt from its Onerous Mandates Rules 

Needed to Prevent Imminent Public Health and Safety Crises 

Although the unnecessary regulatory delays imposed by H.R. 

3438 would cost the U.S. economy billions of dollars,48 most importantly is the bill’s threat to public health and safety. Agencies typically adopt high-impact rules in response to serious public health 

risks or to prevent imminent environmental disasters.49 As Georgetown University Law School Professor William Buzbee warns: 

A virtually guaranteed stay would mean that the regulated harms might go unchecked for years, potentially resulting in illnesses and deaths or environmental destruction on a huge scale. That such impacts would continue 

has been shown by innumerable cost-benefit analyses by 

agencies and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB). US laws regulate many risks, and in our highly urbanized and industrialized society with massive and often 

uniform methods of production, risks and harms on a huge 

scale are a prevalent risk. Cost-benefit analysis is criticized by many, but one of its valuable lessons is that prudent regulation should be preceded by consideration of 

both the costs and the benefits of any regulation. An automatically stayed regulation would turn those regulatory 

benefits into years of ongoing harms.50

For example, few matters are more important to Americans than 

the safety of the water they drink as illustrated by the national 

outrage in response to the lead-contaminated public water system 

in Flint, Michigan. Nevertheless, H.R. 3438 lacks any exception for 

a time-sensitive rule dealing with contaminated public water systems. To highlight this shortcoming in the bill, Ranking Member 

John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI), offered an amendment that would have 

exempted from the measure high-impact rules issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) intended to reduce lead and 

copper in drinking water.51 As Ranking Member Conyers explained, his amendment was necessary to prevent delays to critical 

high-impact rules promulgated in response to public-health crises 


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52 Id. at 28. 53 Id. at 27. 54 Id. at 35. 55 Id. at 37. 56 Id. at 38. 57 Anne Schuchat, Zika 101, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (Jan. 28, 2016), http:// 

www.hhs.gov/blog/2016/01/28/zika-101.html. 58 CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Cases Counts in the US (Sept. 7, 2016), 

http://www.cdc.gov/zika/geo/united-states.html. 59Tr. of Markup of H.R. 3438, the ‘‘Require Evaluation Before Implementing Executive 

Wishlists (REVIEW) Act of 2015’’ by the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 45 (Sept. 8, 

2016). 

‘‘such as the EPA’s proposed revisions to lead to its lead and copper 

rule.’’ 52 And, as Ranking Member Conyers observed, ‘‘the drinking 

water of potentially millions of Americans may be contaminated by 

lead.’’ 53 Unfortunately, this amendment failed by a party-line vote 

of 15 to 11.54

Representative Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX) similarly offered an 

amendment to exempt from the bill high-impact rules intended to 

prevent the spread of infectious diseases such as the Zika virus.55

She stated in support of her amendment that H.R. 3438 is ‘‘an unnecessary and misguided bill that can dangerously hamper our Nation’s efforts to respond to public health emergencies.’’ 56 According 

to Anne Schuchat, Principal Deputy Director of the Center for Disease Control (CDC), increased cases of the Zika virus, which causes 

severe permanent birth defects in children that are untreatable, 

have been reported in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico earlier 

this year.57 Since then, the CDC reports that the Zika virus disease 

has infected 2,964 people in the United States, and 15,809 cases in 

U.S. territories.58 Speaking in support of the amendment, Resident 

Commissioner Pedro Pierluisi (D-PR), who represents 3.5 million 

U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico, stated that 98% of those infected with 

Zika were in Puerto Rico: 

On August 12, 2016, Health Secretary Sylvia Burwell declared a public health emergency for Puerto Rico. The declaration is an administrative tool that provides flexibility 

for health officials in Puerto Rico to address the outbreak 

on the island. Through the public health emergency declaration, the government of Puerto Rico can apply for funding to hire and train unemployed workers to assist in vector control and outreach efforts, and request temporary reassignment of local public health department or agency 

personnel who are funded through public health service 

act programs in Puerto Rico, to assist in the Zika response. . . . You all should remember that Puerto Rico is 

a U.S. territory. We do not need passports to travel from 

Puerto Rico to the States. There is migration all the time, 

travel all the time. Women are exposed, particularly. Unborn children and children are particularly exposed, so this 

amendment is well-taken, is well thought-out, and I urge 

my colleagues to make this exception. Zika, again, merits 

an exception.59

Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) similarly observed that H.R. 

3438 would disrupt regulatory efforts to prevent the transmission 

of the Zika virus, which ‘‘is a very devastating disease for families’’ 


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60 Id. at 46. 61 Id. at 52. 62The Congressional Review Act defines ‘‘major rule’’ as one having an annual effect on the 

economy of more than $100 million, as determined by OIRA, or a rule that adversely impacts 

competition, employment, or results in major costs to consumers, among other considerations. 

5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (2016). 63OFFICE OF MGMT & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 2015 RE- PORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COM- PLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 2 (2015). 64 Id. 65Tr. of Markup of H.R. 3438, the ‘‘Require Evaluation Before Implementing Executive 

Wishlists (Review) Act of 2015’’ by the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 53 (Sept. 8, 

2016). 66 Id. 67 Id. 68 Id. at 55. 69 Id. at 56. 70 Id. at 57. 71 Id. at 64. 72 Id. at 65. 

and ‘‘carries at least $2 million in treatment costs.’’ 60 Unfortunately, this amendment failed by a party-line vote of 14 to 14.61

It should also be noted that high-impact rules often concern the 

administrative transfer of billions of dollars in Federal benefits to 

the public. During fiscal year 2014, for instance, executive branch 

agencies adopted 54 major rules,62 35 of which were transfer 

rules.63 According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 

transfer rules merely ‘‘implement Federal budgetary programs as 

required or authorized by Congress, such as rules associated with 

the Medicare Program and the Federal Pell Grant Program.’’ 64

H.R. 3438, however, fails to exempt such rules and thus, as a result, any entity could challenge the transfer of these funds and 

thereby effectively postpone them to the detriment of millions of 

Americans. 

To underscore this concern, Representative Suzan DelBene (DWA) offered an amendment to exempt high-impact rules that would 

increase college affordability.65 She observed that 56% of college 

graduates in Washington, her home state, ‘‘owe more than $23,000 

upon graduation,’’ 66 while student debt exceeds $1.3 trillion nationwide.67 Representative DelBene further explained that her amendment was needed to prevent the underlying bill from facilitating 

frivolous challenges to the transfers of Federal financial aid.68

Speaking in support of the amendment, Representative David 

Cicilline (D-RI) noted that ‘‘the Federal Pell Grant program, named 

for United States Senator Claiborne Pell, who represented my 

home State of Rhode Island in the United States Senate, is one 

more critical way to open doors and doorways of opportunity for 

more than 8 million low-income students who receive financial aid 

to pay for tuition, books, and room and board each year.’’ 69 He also 

observed that H.R. 3438 would allow any party to delay the effective date of any high-impact rule,’’ including those involving the 

transfer of Federal funds, such as the Pell Grant program.70 This 

amendment failed by a party-line vote of 15 to 14.71

Likewise, Representative Cicilline offered an amendment to exempt high-impact rules that lower health-care costs for persons 

over the age of 65.72 Describing H.R. 3438 as a ‘‘gift to the special 

interest, who wish to spend millions and waste years fighting regulations that could benefit the American people,’’ he explained that 

the bill could allow a frivolous claim to automatically stay the 


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73 Id. at 67. 74 Id. 75 Id. at 93. 76 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY ON H.R. 427, REG- ULATIONS FROM THE EXECUTIVE IN NEED OF SCRUTINY ACT OF 2015 (July 27, 2015), https:// 

www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/114/saphr427r_20150727.pdf. 77OFFICE OF MGMT & BUDGET OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 2015 REPORT

TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS, AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE

WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 1-2 (2015). 78 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2016). 79 Id.at 7 80 Adam Liptak & Coral Davenport, Chief Justice Rejects Effort to Block E.P.A. Limit on Power 

Plants, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/us/politics/supreme-courtchief-justice-john-roberts-epa-coal.html. 81 Envt’l Protection Agency, Fact Sheet: Clean Power Plan Benefits (last visited on Sept. 9, 

2016), https://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-clean-power-plan-benefits. 

transfer of funds through the Medicare Program.73 Representative 

Cicilline warned that allowing frivolous lawsuits to delay the benefits of the ‘‘44.9 million seniors on Medicare in this country . . . 

would be a grave betrayal of the promise we have made to keep 

America’s seniors healthy.’’ 74 Notwithstanding these serious concerns, his amendment failed by a party-line vote of 17 to 13.75

The risk of delaying these highly beneficial rules could be devastating. As the Administration noted in its opposition to another 

regulatory reform bill designed to impede the implementation of 

rules on the basis of cost, these delays ‘‘would increase business uncertainty, undermine much-needed protections of the American 

public, and create unnecessary confusion. There is no justification 

for such an unprecedented requirement.’’ 76

III. H.R. 3438 Is a Solution in Search of Problem That Ignores Existing Procedural Safeguards 

H.R. 3438 is a dangerous solution to an undocumented problem. 

To begin with, it ignores the benefits of regulations, which typically 

exceed their cost by many multiples. For example, the 13 rules that 

had both quantified and monetized annual costs in fiscal year 2014 

ranged between $2.5 billion and $3.7 billion, while the estimated 

benefits of these rules ranged between $8.1 billion and $18.9 billion.77

In addition, any entity under current law already may challenge 

a proposed rule in court and seek to have the rule’s effective delayed, subject to the court’s discretion.78 Such discretionary basis 

serves an important purpose. As Professor William Funk explains, 

‘‘[e]xisting law regarding stays weeds out frivolous claims and 

takes account of both the costs of the rule and the benefits of the 

rule that would be avoided by granting the stay.’’ 79 In March 2016, 

for example, the Supreme Court issued a stay of the Clean Power 

Plan, a high-impact rule to limit carbon pollution produced by existing power plants, delaying the rule’s effective date until the lawsuits filed against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 

have been resolved,80 even though the climate and health benefits 

of the rule, according to the EPA, are an estimated $55 billion to 

$93 billion per year in 2030, in addition to reducing thousands of 

premature deaths and hundreds of thousands of children’s asthma 

cases, compared to a $7.3 billion to $8.8 billion cost in 2030.81

The Majority claims that H.R. 3438 is intended to maintain the 

status quo until the validity of a proposed rule is determined by 

a court and cites in support Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan 


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82Tr. of Markup of H.R. 3438, the ‘‘Require Evaluation Before Implementing Executive 

Wishlists (Review) Act of 2015’’ by the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 10 (Sept. 8, 

2016) (statement of Representative Tom Marino (R-PA)). 83Michigan v. E.P.A., 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015). 84Tr. of Markup of H.R. 3438, the ‘‘Require Evaluation Before Implementing Executive 

Wishlists (Review) Act of 2015’’ by the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 10 (Sept. 8, 

2016) (statement of Representative Tom Marino (R-PA)). 85 H.R. 3438, the ‘‘Require Evaluation before Implementing Executive Wishlists Act of 2015’’; 

and, H.R.2631, the ‘‘Regulatory Predictability for Business Growth Act of 2015’’: Hearing Before 

the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the 

Judiciary, 114th Cong. 5-6 (2015) (statement of Professor William Funk, Lewis and Clark Law 

School) (on file with Democratic staff of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary). 86 Id. 87 Id. at 54 (statement of Professor William Buzbee Georgetown University Law Center). 

v. EPA,82 where it invalidated a rule adopted by the EPA to reduce 

power plants’ emissions of hazardous air pollutants.83 Although the 

Majority claims this rule caused irreparable harm and cost billions 

of dollars to implement while only offering potential benefits in the 

millions of dollars,84 OIRA states that annual benefits of the rule 

range between $30 to $90 billion, very much dwarfing their annual 

costs of $9.6 billion.85 Moreover, as Professor Funk has noted, ‘‘the 

grounds upon which the Supreme Court found the rule invalid appear to be easily remedied,’’ while delaying this rule would cost the 

U.S. economy $20 to $80 billion per year.86 Additionally, as Professor Buzbee has observed, courts already provide an adequate 

‘‘check on shoddy regulation’’ through traditional motions for stays: 

Courts will hear from a wide array of supporters and challengers. This bill, in contrast, would by fiat grant a stay, 

regardless of the stakes, the legal merits, and risks and 

costs of the harms that would otherwise be addressed. It 

is rare that even very high cost rules are not accompanied 

by massive, usually far higher societal and economic benefits of regulation. With this bill’s automatic stay, those 

harms would go on for years, typically costing the country 

and its citizens and possibly the environment billions of 

dollars in harms that would usually far surpass regulatory 

costs.87

Consider the costs to industry presented by an extended period 

of uncertainty once a stay is imposed under H.R. 3438. Proposed 

rules with significant costs and benefits typically undergo thorough 

vetting through the notice-and-comment process that often takes 

several years and allows industry to adjust its future plans in anticipation of its timely finalization. In sharp contrast, under H.R. 

3438, this regulatory certainty would suddenly be subject to an 

automatic stay of unpredictable length should some itinerant entity 

seek judicial review of such rule. 

Absent any evidence that courts have refused to grant stays in 

appropriate cases, it is clear that existing law adequately protection against the theoretical harms the bill is designed to fix. 

CONCLUSION

H.R. 3438 would severely undermine the efficiency of the rulemaking system, which is already burdened by needless delay. It accomplishes this goal by encouraging well-funded opponents of regulations to delay the implementation of critical rules by simply filing 

lawsuits challenging such rules and thereby triggering the bill’s 

automatic stay preventing these rules from going into effect. The 


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bill does not prevent or deter frivolous challenges. Nor does the bill 

recognize critical exceptions for emergent public health and safety 

rules or rules that simply authorize Federal funding transfers for 

important programs such as Medicare and Federal student loans. 

The bill replaces well-established legal doctrines designed to protect the public interest with statutorily sanctioned legal uncertainty that will delay and perhaps derail the implementation of 

critical regulations. As with nearly every other anti-regulatory 

measure that the Committee has considered this Congress, H.R. 

3438 completely ignores the benefits of regulation and well-established law that shapes the rulemaking process. Rather than improving this process, the bill is simply a blatant effort to prevent 

the implementation of rules. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, we must respectfully oppose H.R. 

3438 and we urge our colleagues to join us in opposition. 

MR. CONYERS, JR. 

MR. NADLER. 

MS. LOFGREN. 

MS. JACKSON LEE. 

MR. COHEN. 

MR. JOHNSON, JR. 

MR. DEUTCH. 

MR. GUTIERREZ. 

MR. JEFFRIES. 

MR. CICILLINE. 

Æ 


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