The Honor able J. Ronni e Gr eer , United States District J udg e for the Easter

n District of * Tenne ssee, sitting by

desig nation

. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 07a0560n.06 Filed: August 8, 2007 Nos. 06-5319/06-5362
UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. NA NC Y W ILLI S and VICK IE HE RRON, De fend ant s- App e lla nt s. / ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE WEST ERN D ISTRIC T OF TEN NE SSEE

BEFORE: CLAY and S UTTON, Circuit Judges; and GREER, District Judge. * CLAY, Circ uit Jud ge. Def endants Na

ncy Wil lis (“Will is”) and V ickie He rron ( “He rron” ), appea l their convictions and se ntence s. On Octobe r 21, 2 0 0 5 , in connec tion with seven arme d
r o b b e r i e s , D e f

e n d an t s w e r e c o n v i c t e d

b y a j u r y o f i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h c o m m e r c e b y m e an s o f r o b b e r y, in v iol a tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 19 51 ; c arr yinga fi re arm in c onne c tio n w itha

c ri me of violenc e , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) ; a nd conspirac y , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. On Febr uary 27, 2006, Her ron wa s sentence d to a term of imprisonment of 140 months; and on Febr uary 28, 2006,Nos. 06-5319 and 06- 5362

2 Wil lis wa s sentenc ed to a term of imprisonment of 1,920 months, or 160 y ear s. For the re asons set forth below, w e AF F IRM De fe nd ants ’ c on vic tio ns and se nte nc e s. BACK GR OUND Willi s w a s c on vic te d o f r ob bin g se ve n wome n’ s c lot hin g sto re s in

or ne ar M e mph is, Tenne ssee be tween July

5, 2003, and Jul y

3, 2004. (J.A. 6 2 -7 8 ) He rron wa s convicted f or participating in the July

3, 2004, robber

y . The fa cts underly

ing e ach r obbery

are set forth be low. I. F irst Robbery On J uly 5, 2003, Wil lis ro b bed F ashion Cents in Memphis, Tennessee , approximately ten minutes before the st o re cl o sed at 8:00 p.m. Melissa Will iams (“Williams”), a store e mploy ee, observe d Wil lis “walk[ing] around and [ ] shopp[i ng ] for c lothes.” (J.A. 607) Wil lis “broug ht the clothes up the re g istered [sic], [ and] she laid them down on the counter .” (J.A. 607) Wil lis “walked around a nd [ ] looked at [ ] shoes and then when she c ame ba ck ar ound [a] panty rac k she had [a] g u no u t. ” ( J. A
. 6 0 8 ) Wi ll is “ p u ll e d the gun out on [Wi ll ia ms ] an d s h e to ld [Wi ll ia ms ] t o te ll [a store] employ ee to g et in the dre ssing r oom.” (J.A. 608) Wi llis “told [ Wil liams] to p u t al l o f the money in [ a] bag with the clothes” she selec ted, threatened “ to blow [ W i l l i am s ’] brains out,” and “dire cted [ Wil liams] to ge t in the dressing room with the [other] employ ee a fter [Wil liams] put the
m o n ey i nt h e b ag. ” ( J
. A. 6 0 9 ) W i l l i s l ef tt h e s t o re t ak i n g $ 1 1 0 0 i nca s h an d cl o t h i n g. II. Second Robb ery On Se pte mbe r 6 , 2 00 3, Willi s r ob be d Cato i n M ill ing ton , T e nn e sse e . A s wi th the fi rs t robber y , Wil lis entered the store a shor t time be fo re cl o s ing time a nd “wa s in the[ ] [st ore] shopping,” (J.A. 491), for “plus sizes,” (J.A. 733). At the t ime of t he robbery , two employ ees, L oriNos. 06-5319 and 06- 5362

3 Woodward (“ Woodward”) and Ashley Smit h (“Smith”), we re in the store
. Wil lis “ca me up to the reg ister with an ar

m load of clothes a

nd came up to chec k out.” (J.A. 492) As W o o d wa rd “w as ring ing he r up . . . . she pulled a g un.” (J.A. 492) “[W illis ] m ade [Woodward] ge t in the dressing
room and shut the door.” (J.A. 492) “[W illis ] put something on [S mith’s] back whi ch [ S m ith] believe[d] [ was] a g un” bec ause “ [i ]t felt like something hard a g ainst [her] back. ” (J
. A. 493) Woodward testified that Willi s used a “blac k pistol” during the robber y . (J.A. 738) “[W illis ] m ade [S mith] g ive her

the money

in both reg isters an d t h en [ W i l l is] made [Smi th] g o and g et in the dressingroom.” (J.A. 493) Wil lis lef t the store with appr ox imately $1800 and “a

bunch of c lothes.” (J.A. 494) At trial, Smit h’s testimony was c onsistent with W oodwar d’s testimony
. Com pa re J .A. 491-94 with J .A. 732-37. III. Thi rd Robbery On Oc tob e r 5 , 2 00 3, Willi s r ob be d a no the r C a to s tor e in Me mph is, Te nn e sse e . As i n th e fi rs t and second robber ies, Wil lis arr ived “right before [ ] closing time” and se lected c lothing. (J.A. 565) Wil lis “came up to the reg ister and laid her c lothing.” ( J .A. 568) As Car la West (“West”), the store
mana g e r, “ wa s still ri ng inghe r u p, [Willi s] c a me on

the op po sit e [sid e ] of

the re g ist e r t

hat [We st] was on, an d
. . . p u l l ed t h e g un.” (J.A. 568) “[Wi llis] told [ West] to give her the money . And [W est] said no.” (J .A. 568) Willi s asked for the money ag ain, but West ag ain “sa id no.” (J.A. 568) After the sec ond ref

usal, “[Wi llis] said g ive me the money or I ’m g oing to blow your fuc king he ad of f. ” (J.A . 5 68 ) A ft e r ob ta ini ng the mon e y , Willi s dir e c te d Wes t and the oth e r s tor e e mpl oy e e to g o into “the fittin g room.” (J.A. 570) Will is left with the money and “two jog g ing outf

its which would include a ja cket a

nd a pair of pants.” ( J .A. 570)Nos. 06-5319 and 06- 5362

4 IV. F ourth Robbery On May 8, 20 04 , Wil lis ro bb e d H oll ida y F a sh ion s in Me mph is, Te nn e sse e . T ili sh a Willi a ms (“Tilisha” ), the store manag er, w as p re s en t d uring the robbe ry . Acc ording to Tilisha, “[t ]hree fema les” robbe d the store and she “disti nctly noticed the older lady , the heavy set lady ,” (J.A. 624), wh o “ wa s v e ry

he a vy e sp e c ia lly aro un d the wa ist ,” (J.A
. 63 2)
. “ [T]he old e r h e a vie r- se t la dy wa s ju st walking around in the c are er section. And the y oung er two [women] wer e in the back pic king out clothing. And when they came up to the counter, they had two hands f

ull of clothing.” (J.A. 625) “[Tili s h a] was standing[ ] at the counte r havinga conve rsation with the two y oung er g irls” when “the older lady escor ted . . . [an] e m p l o y ee [ ] t o t h e front with a g un at her back.” (J.A. 626-27) “[O]ne of t he y oung er girls .
. . told [ Tilisha] to go a head a nd start putting the c lothes in bag s. And rig ht after

that the heavy set lady

came around the cash wrap a nd to l d [ T ilisha] to open up the reg isters” a

nd “the sa fe.” (J.A. 627-28) (for mat omitted). Wil lis for ced the store employ ees “ in[ to] the lay awa

y room and [ ] c losed the door.” (J.A. 630) I n this robbery , Wil lis and her pa rtners took “ca sh and clothes . . . [and] some personal items.” ( J .A. 631-32) V. F if

th Robbery On May 30, 2004, Wil lis robbe d another Fa shion Cents store in Memphis, Tennessee . As in the fourth robbe ry , Wil lis was acc ompanied by two other wome n. W i l l i s an d t he two other
women enter ed the store “[r]i g ht be fore [t he] c losing time” a nd selec ted clothing . (J.A. 454) Sharon Scarbr oug h (“Sca

rbroug h”), the store mana g er, “we nt up to the reg ister and started r ingingout one of the y oung ladies. [S car broug h] starte d taking off the sensors and the hang ers and scanningi t .”Nos. 06-5319 and 06- 5362

5 (J.A. 457) “[T[ he hea

vy set lady

came behind [S car

broug h] and put one foot behind the cou nter.” (J.A. 458) “[Scarbroug h] continued to ring , and then [W illis ] made a sound, she went psst, pss t, rea l loud. [ Scarbr oug h] was . . . not turning a round .
. . . [and] sat there playing stupid ring ing a nd then [W illis ] did it a g ain rea l loud.” (J.A. 458-59) “[Scarbroug h] g rabbe d a shirt a nd [ ] sa id it did not have a tag on it.” (J.A. 459) She “put the shirt betwee n [her] and the heavy set lady and tried to be nd do wn to hit the pa

nic bu tto n, ” bu t “[Willi s] said , don ’t hit that butto n, bit c h. ” (J.A . 4 59 ) “ [Willi s] g rabbe d [S car

broug h ] b y

[t he] arm and slung[her] aga inst [ a] shoe wall and [she] hit it, kind of [falling] back a

littl e bit.” (J
. A. 460) Will is and her pa rtners w ere arme d and plac ed the store
em p l o y ee s “i nt h e f

i t t i n g ro o m . ” ( J
. A. 4 6 0 ) T h ey t o o k $ 2 , 9 1 1 an d

o n e o f t h e “l ar ges ts h o p p i n g b ags . . . fill[ ed] up [ with] just tons of clothing.” (J.A. 462) The stolen merc handise ha d secur ity sensors attache d to it. VI. Sixth Rob bery A day afte r the fif

th robbery , on May 31, 2004, Wil lis and her a ccomplice s robbed a nother Ho lli da y F a sh ion s st or e in Mill ing ton , Te nn e sse e . Wil lis and the tw o o the r w ome n u se d th e same strateg y : they enter ed the store approximately “10 or 15 minutes” be fore the store c losed, (J.A. 111), selec ted clothing , “wa lked up to the counter with an arm load of clothes,” ( J .A. 113), a nd brandished a fire arm as the employ ees wer e “exchang ing hang ers and taking the sensors off,” (J.A. 111). The
ro bb e rs fo rc e d th e sto re e mpl oy e e s to g o int o “ the fi tti ng ro om, ” (J.A . 1 15 ), “ lin e d [th e e mpl oy e e s] up . . . [and ] tol d [ th em] th at th e y we re g oin g to k ill [the m],” (J.A . 1 17 ). Th e ro bb e rs fl e d w ith approximately

$1,500 and “severa l bag s” full of m erc handise. (J.A. 118) After the robbe rs left, the employ ees tried to c all the police, but “ [t he robber s] had ripped all of the phones out of the walls andNos. 06-5319 and 06- 5362

6 [t he employ ee’ s] purses were gone .” (J.A. 116) The store manag er, Ivy Bodr y , had “mone y

order s to pay [her] rent” in her pur se, (J.A. 120), that wer e “made out to Smit h I nvestments,” (J.A. 121). VII. Seventh Robbery L ast, on J uly

3, 2004, Wil lis robbed another Holliday Fa shions store in Memphis, Tenne ssee. T h i s s t o r e i s l o c a t e d

n e x tt o t h e C a t o s t o r e W i l l i s r o b b e d d u r i n g t h e t h i r d

r o b b e r y. In t h i s r o b b e r

y, Wil lis was assisted by

Her ron. De fenda

nts enter ed t he store a

short time before closing , selec ted clothing and other items, a nd brandished a

firea rm at the c ash re g ister. Def endants for ced thr ee store employ ees, K athry

n Guzman (“Guzman”) , Ashley J ohnson (“Johnson”), and Sara h Tate ( “Tate”) , into the dressing room, and took money , clothing, je welry and sung lasses. J are d Huey

(“H uey”), the boy friend of a store e mploy ee, obse rved D efe n d an t s leavingthe sto re “ with th ree or four b a g s in e a c h h and ” and

dr ivi ngawa

y in a re d Po nti a c Gr and

Am wi th license plate number Q WS 399. (J.A. 340) Huey enter ed the store and found the employ ees. L aw enfor ceme nt officials de termined that the ve hicle wa s a re ntal car that was rente d to a woman who liv e d at 92 4 B arb ara

Dr ive , Me mph is, Te nn e sse e . On July 5, 20 04 , de te c tiv e s we nt to t he a dd re ss
and dis c ov e re d th a t it

wa s th e re sid e nc e of

Willi s and

he r m oth e r. De te c tiv e s sp ok e to Wi lli s’ mother and r equeste d that she conta ct Will is. W illis arr ived in the vehicle and wa s arr ested. L aw e nforc ement off

icials discover ed “nume rous sung lasses, ea rring s, j ewelry

box , [and]
c l o t h i n g , ” i nW i l l i s ’ h o m e w i t h F a s h i o nC e n t s an d H o l l i d ay F a s h i o n s “ p r i c e t a g s o r . . . [ s e c u r i t y]
se ns or s. ” (J.A . 1 74 ) T he sto le n me rc ha nd ise wa s c onne c te d to th e fi ft h a nd se ve nth ro bb e ri e s. Police also discover ed two money order s in W illis ’ purse made out to Smith I nvestments.Nos. 06-5319 and 06- 5362

7 Af te r Wi lli s w a s arr e ste d, sto re e mpl oy e e s ide nti fi e d Wil lis fr om a ph oto g ra ph ic arr ay a s a robber in connec tion wi th the arme d robber ies. I n Fe bruar y 2005, police dete rmined that He rron, Willi s’ ne ig hb or , a ssi ste d in the se ve nth

ro bb e ry . St ore emp loy e e s id e nti fi e d H e rr on fr om a photogr aphic a

rra y as one of the robbe rs involved in the seve nth robbery
. On Marc h 8, 2005, a fe dera l gr and jury in the Wes t er n Di s t ri ct of Te nnessee returne d a
se ve nte e n- c ount i nd ic tme nt a g a ins t D e fe nd ants . T he ind ic tme nt c on ta ine d s e ve n c ounts a g ainst Wil lis, and one count a g ainst both W illis and He rr o n , for inter fer ing w ith commerce by threat or vio le nc e , in

vio latio n o f 18 U. S.C. § 195 1; se ve n co un ts ag a ins t Willis, and on e c ount a g a ins t bo th Wil lis an d He rr o n , for usinga fire arm in conne ction with a cr ime of violence , in violation of 18 U. S.C. § 92 4( c ); and on e c ount of c on sp ir a c y , in vio latio n of 18 U. S.C. § 37 1, a g a ins t bo th Wi lli s and He rron. Def endants were tried toge ther before a jury on October 17, 2005. At trial, store e mploy ees te sti fi e d a g a ins t D e fend ants . O n O c tob e r 2 1, 20 05 , th e jur y re tur ne d a g uil ty ve rd ic t a g a ins t Def endants on a ll charg es. On Fe bruar y 27, 2006, Her

ron wa s sentence d to a term of imprisonment of 140 months. Wi llis was sentence d to a term of imprisonment of 160 y ear s on Fe bruar y 28, 2006. De fe nd ants fi le d ti me ly

no tic e s o f a

pp e a l. T his Court

ha s c on so lid a te d D e fe nd ants ’ a pp e a ls. DI SCU SSIO N I. Willis ’s Mot ion to Sever Counts of the Ind ictm ent Wil lis arg ues th a t t

h e d is tr ic t c o u rt e r

r e d in d e n yin g a

mo ti o n to s e v e r th e c o u n ts in

the indictment. This Court reviews a district c ourt’s denia l of a motion to sever c ounts of an indictmentNos. 06-5319 and 06- 5362

8 for a buse of discr etion. United States v. Atchle y , 4 74 F .3 d 8 40 , 8 52 (6 th C ir . 2 00 7) ; se e als o United States v. Jac obs , 244 F.3d 503, 506- 07 (6th Cir. 2001). Under Rule 8(a) of the F eder al Rules of Criminal Procedur e, [an ] ind ic tme nt .
. . may

c ha rg e a de fe nd ant i n sep arate c ounts wi th 2 or more of

fense s if the offe nses cha rg ed--whether

felonies or misdemeanors or

both- -ar e of the same or similar c hara cter , or ar e based on the s am e ac t or transa ction, or ar e conne cted with or constitute parts of a

common scheme or plan. Howeve r, “[i] f the joinder of offe nses or de fenda

nts in an indictment . . . appea rs to p rejudice a defe ndant . .
. the court may order separ ate tria ls of counts, sever the def endants’ tr ials, or provide
any oth e r re lie f that jus tic e re qu ir e s. ” F e d. R. Cr im. P. 1 4( a ); see also United St ates v. Hang Le- Thy Tran , 433 F.3d 472, 478 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (“[e]ven when joinder is appropriate under

Rule 8(a) , a district c ourt may , in its discretion, g rant the defe ndant a sever ance if it appea rs that the def

endant is prejudiced by

a joinder of

the offe nses.”)
. This Court has found that “[ t] he resolution of a Rule 14 motion i s left to the sound discre tion of the trial court and will not be dis turbed a bsent an a buse of that discr etion.” Hang Le-Thy Tran , 4 3 3 F. 3 d at 4 7 8 (c i t i n g United States v. Mc Coy , 8 48 F .2 d 74 3, 74 4 ( 6th Cir . 1 98 8) ). “ To e sta

bli sh an abuse of discret i o n , ” a defe ndant must make “‘ a strongshowing of pre judice.’” Id. (quoting Un ite d Stat es v . G allo , 763 F.2d 1504, 1525 ( 6th Cir. 1985)). “The movant must prove that joinder would compromise a spe cific tria l r ight or preve nt the jury from makinga re liable judg ment about g uilt or innocence .” Id. (c i t i n g Zafir o v. United States , 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993)) . “[A] defendant
mus t sh ow c omp e lli ng , sp e c if ic , and a c tua l pr e

jud ic e fr om a c ourt ’s re fu sa l to g ra nt t he mot ion

to
sever .” United States v. Saade y , 393 F.3d 669, 678 ( 6th Cir. 2005).Nos. 06-5319 and 06- 5362

9 As a thre shold matter, the g overnme nt argues that W i l l i s fa i led to rene w the seve ranc e motion at the end of

the evidenc e. The failure to rene w a se vera nce motion may

result in a wa iver of the motion. “[T] his [Court] is ba rre d from ruling on the merits of appellants’ claim . . . . [because ]
a mo ti o n to s e v e r c o u n ts o r c o - d e f e n d an ts is d e e me d w a iv e d if it is n o t r e n e w e d a t th e end of the evidenc e.” United States v. Hudson , 5 3 F .3 d 7 44 , 7 47 (6 th Ci r. 19 95 ) ( c itatio n o mitte d) . “ Th is pr oc e dure a llo ws the tr ia l c ourt to a sse ss whe th e r j oin de r w a s in fa c t pr e jud ic ia l, a

nd pr e ve nts a defe ndant from deliberately failing to make a me ritorious motion t o wait and se e what verdict the jury returns.” Id. (citations omi t t ed ). I n t he instant ca se, Will is is procedura lly fore closed fr om raising this claim beca

use she did not re new the se vera nce motion at trial. Even if we a ssume arguendo that Wil lis preserve d this claim, we find that the district cour t did not abuse its discr etion in de ny ing the sever ance motion. Wil lis a rg ues that “no re asonable juror could distinguish betwe en the evidence prese nted on eac h of t he various counts.” (Wi llis’ Br. at 29) Wil lis also contends that “it [was] i mpossible for the jury to se [si c] the ca s es as s ep ar ate and dis tin c t.” (Wi lli s’ B r. a t 30 ) Wi lli s d oe s n ot c ite any fa c ts o r c a se law i n s up po rt of the se argume nts
. This Court ha s found that “abse nt a showing of substantial prejudice , spillover of evide nce f rom one [ count] to another doe s not require sever ance .” Hang Le-Thy Tran , 4 3 3 F
. 3 d a t 4 7 8 ( internal quotation marks and c itation omit ted )
. “ E v e n if p r e judicial spillover actua lly occur red, the defe ndant would still need to pr ove that such a spillover cause d her substantial pre judice.” Id. “A diff

ere nce in the quantum of evide nce as t o t h e [differe nt] counts is not gr ounds to overturn a denial of
se ve ra nc e un le ss t

he re is a su

bs tanti a l risk

that th e jur

y c ou ld n ot c omp artme nta lize or dis tin g uis h betwee n the evidence pr oduced on e ach c ount.” Id. (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted).Nos. 06-5319 and 06- 5362

10 Willi s mak e s only c on c lus or y a lle g a tio ns of pr e

jud ic e ; w e the re fo re fi nd

that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

did not abuse its discretion in deny ing the sever ance motion. II. Do uble Je opa r dy Willi s ar g ue s tha t she wa s pla c e d in doub le je op ard y a t tria l. T his Court

re vie ws de novo the de nia l of a mot ion to d ism iss pr e se nti ngdo ub le je op ard y iss ue s. Un ite d S

tates v . D e Car lo , 434 F.3d 447, 452 (6th Cir. 2006) (c i t i n g In re Fo rd , 987 F.2d 334, 339 ( 6th Cir. 1992)). “The Double J eopar dy Clause of the Fifth Ame ndment provides: . . . nor shall any person be subject for

the same offense to be twice put in jeopa rdy of life or limb.” Un ite d S

tates v . E ng le , 458 F.2d 1021, 1025 n.5 ( 6th Cir. 1972) (a l t eration in original) ( internal quotation marks omitted). A

“ ve rd ic t of a c qu itt a l [i]s f ina l, a nd c ou ld n ot b e re vie we d .
. . wi tho ut p utt ing[a d e fe nd ant] twi c e in jeopar dy , and ther eby

violating th e const itution.” Fong Foo v. United States , 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (interna l quotation mar ks and citation omitted). “The de velopment of the D ouble J eopar dy Cla us e fr om i ts c omm on -l aw o ri g ins
. . . s ug g e sts that i t was dir e c te d at th e thr e a t of mul tip le prosec utions.” United S t ates v. Martin Linen Supply Co. , 4 30 U. S. 5 64 , 5 69 (1 97 7) (a lte ratio n in orig inal) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The D ouble J eopar dy Clause also ac cords nonappea l ab l e fi n ali ty

to a ver dict . . . enter ed by judge or jury , disabling the Gover nment from seekingto punish a defe ndant more tha n once f or the same of

fense .” Id. at 569 n.6. “At the he art of this policy

is the conce rn that per

mitti ng the sovere ign f

ree ly to subject the citizen to a sec ond trial for the sa me offe nse would ar

m Governme nt with a potent instrument of oppression.” Id. “T he Cla us e , th e re fo re , gua

ra nte e s th a t th e State sh all n ot b e pe rm itt e d to make re pe a te d atte mpt s to convict the accuse d, there by subjecting him to embarra ssment, expense and orde al and c ompellingNos. 06-5319 and 06- 5362

11 him to li ve in a c ontinuing state of anxiety and insec urity

as we ll as enhanc ing the possibili ty that
even though innocent he may be found g uilty .” Id. (interna l quotation marks and citations omitted). At trial, Wil lis argued that the gover nment did not prese nt sufficie nt evidence that a fire arm
w a s u s e d d u r i n g t h e r o b b e r i e s . In p e rt i n e n tp art , t h e r e c o r d r e f l e c t s t h e f o l l o w i n g c o l l o qu y: Counsel: Iwould like t o rene w my motion for judgme nt of ac q u i t t al m ainly

as to the USC 924(c) matters. The g o v e r n m e n t h a s p u t o n n o p r o o f t h a t t h e s e we re , in fac t, firea rms under the definition of a f irea rm . . . .

. . . The Court:
. . . I n looking at th e 924(c) motion, I said y esterda y that the testimony

in the rec ord combined with the . . . testimony

that it was a we apon w as suffic ient, I t h o u g h t , t o g e tt h e c a s e t o t h e j u r y. I n the interim I have g one back an d looked a g a in at th e . . . la

w a nd loo ke d at the sp e c if

ic e le me nts
.

. . . I’m going to grant the defe nse mo tion regarding that charge -- Go ve rnme nt: Judg e , c ou ld I a dd re ss you on so me law o n th a t? The Court: Sure.

. . . Gover nment: . . . All that is required is some evidence , such as the te sti mony of an o bs e rv e r, that w ou ld p e rm it a rea sonable jury

to inf er t hat the objec t car

ried by the de fe nd ant w a s a

fi re arm .

. . . And t h at is U.S. versus J ones, 907 F ed. 2d 4 5 6 , an d i t ’ s a l s o P ar

k e r v e r s u s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , s ays the testimony

of bank te llers wh o observe d the wea pon.

. . . The Court:
. . . When I focuse d on this c ase – o n t h i s s i t u ation

ear lier, I focuse d on the languag e of the statute . . . .

. . . The g overnme nt has to pr ove in this case that . . . a fire arm was used in conne ction with a cr ime of violence.Nos. 06-5319 and 06- 5362

12 Clearly the gover

nment has m et i ts burden . . . to ge t the case t o a jury that a cr ime of violence was comm itte d

b e c a u s e th e w it

n e s s e s a ll te s ti f

ie d th at people r obbed them and that they had a gun.

. . . But i n looking more closely at these othe r case s, the Six th Circ u i t s eems to say that while a statutory definition is very

technica l, that this element can be satisfied by lay

testimony

. . . . th[ e] testimony c omb ine d w ith[sic ] the y sa id they

wo uld blo w my brains o ff i s en o u g h to ge t to the jury . . . . it will be up to the j ury to decide whether or not the proof

is . . . devoid . . . .

. . . So having read more c losely these othe r cases and not just f

ocusing on the statute an d the c o m m e n t a r

y , a s I di d l a s t e v e n i n g

, I w i l l h av e to re v e rsetha t e ar lie r ruli ng an d allo w the c as e to go to the jury. (J.A . 7 93 -8 21 ) ( e mph a sis and fo rm a tti ng a dd e d)
. As ill us tr a te d a bo ve , th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a pp e ars to have r eac hed a de cision o n W i l lis’ motion, but revie wed c ase la w to ensure that its holdi ng was l ega l l y co rr ec t
. Af

t er re v i ew i n g t h e re l ev an t ca s e la w, t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt re v er s edi t s ea rl i er ru l i n g. Ultimately , the district court a llowed the jury to decide whether

Wil l i s u s ed a fire arm in the robber ies. Wil lis maintains that this re versa l violated her double jeopar dy rig hts. W illis offe rs no
case law in support of t his proposition. The recor d clea rly indicates that the district court allowed the par ties to present a dditional arg uments and revisited pertinent case law to rea ch a de termination. As the S econd Circuit has recog nized, “[a]n oral gra nt of a motion for acquittal is ‘no m ore tha n an interlocutory

order ,’ which the court ha s ‘inhere nt power to reconsider and modi fy
. . . prior to the entry of judg ment.’” U

n ite d S ta te s v . W a s h ington , 4 8 F. 3 d

7 3 , 7 9 (2 d

C i r. 1 9 9 5 ) ( qu o t i n g United Sta te s v . Lo Ru sso , 695 F .2 d 4 5, 52 -5 3 ( 2d Cir . 1 98 2) ); see also United States v . Byrne , 203 F.3d 671,Nos. 06-5319 and 06- 5362

13 674 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that “double jeopa rdy does not bar a

district court fr om revising a ruling on a motion for ac quittal when that ruling is tentative or re ndere d subject to rec onsideration.”)
. I n the instant case, “ the [dist rict] court [ ] reve rsed its own ruling outside the jury ’s pre sence and in a timely

fashion. Such conduc t did not subj ect [Wi llis] t o a ‘se cond trial’ or ‘succ essive prosec ution.’” W

ashington , 48 F.3d at 79 (citation omitted). Since the oral ruling was not final a nd
wa s c le arl y

su bje c t to fu

rt he r a rgume nt a

nd le g a l ana ly sis , w e fi nd

that Wi ll is was no t pla c e d in d o u b l e j e o p ar dy. III. Suf

fi ciency of the Evidence De fe nd ants ma int a in that the e vid e nc e pr e se nte d a t tr ia l w a s c on sti tut ion a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o support a conviction on any of t he counts contained in the i ndictment. The standard of review f or a cha lleng e t o t h e s ufficie ncy of the e vidence is “whethe r, af ter view ing the evidenc e in the lig ht most fa vorable to the prosec ution, any ratio na l trie r of fa c t cou ld have fo un d the e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c rime beyond a re asonable doubt.” Un ite d States v. D av is , 473 F.3d 680, 681 (6th Cir. 2007) (e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s and c itatio ns omi tte d) ; se e als o J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “‘When re viewingthe suffic iency of evidence in support of a jury verdic t, this Court vi ews the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution a nd g ives the prosec ution the benef it of all rea sonable inferenc es from the testimony .’” United States v. J ackson , 473 F.3d 660, 669 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Abboud , 438 F.3d 554, 589 (6th Cir. 2006) ). “‘V iewing the evidenc e in this m anner , a jury

verdic t is supported by

sufficie nt evidence if anyratio nal tr ier of fac t c ou ld have found the essential elements of the crime bey ond a re asonable doubt.’” Id. (q u o t i n g Abboud ,Nos. 06-5319 and 06- 5362

14 43 8 F .3 d at 58 9) ; se e als o United States v. J ohnson , 440 F.3d 832, 839 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that this Court i s “bound t o make a ll reasona ble infer ence s and cr edibility choice s in support of the jury ’s verdic t”) (inter

nal quotation marks and citation omitt ed). “ ‘[A] defe ndant claiming insufficienc y of the evidenc e bea

rs a ve ry heavy burden.’ ” Jack

son , 4 7 3 F. 3 d

at 6 6 9 (q u o t i n g Abboud , 438 F.3d at 589). “[P] hy sical evide nce is not re quired to sustain a conviction.” Un ite d S tates v . D av is , 306 F.3d 3 9 8 , 4 0 9 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g Un i t ed S t a t es v. Ev ans , 883 F.2d 496, 501- 02 (6th Cir. 1989)). “Circumstantial evide nce a lone is sufficient to sustain a c onviction and such ev i d ence nee d not
remove ever

y rea sonable hy

pothesis except that of g uilt.” Un ite d S tates v . B ar

ne tt , 398 F.3d 516, 5 2 2 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Spe arman , 1 86 F .3 d 7 43 , 7 45 (6 th C ir . 1 99 9) ); se e als o United States v. Adams , 265 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that “[c]ircumstantial evidence alone may sustain a conviction.”)
. A. Ro bbe r y C onv ic ti ons I n the instant c ase, the g overnme nt pr offe red ample evidenc e showing that Wil lis commit ted
seven a rmed robberies. The g overnme nt presente d testimony from employ ees of

the diffe rent store s that w e re ro bb e d. “ Vi c time y e wi tne sse s f ro m a ll b ut o ne of

the ro bb e ri e s p os iti ve ly

ide nti fi e d Wil lis as the woma

n who robbe d them.” (Gov’t Br. at 21) As to the May 31, 2004 robber

y wher e ther e was no positive ey ewitness identification, police office rs di scover ed money order s that were taken during the robbe ry

in Wi llis’ purse. Will is was see n leavingthe sce ne of the l as t ro b b er y and the police discove red stolen mer chandise during Wil lis’ arre st. S i m i l ar l y , there was e vidence that Her ron assisted Willi s in the last robbery and store e mploy ees ide ntified Herron as one of theNos. 06-5319 and 06- 5362

15 ro bb e rs . T he re fo re , w e fi nd that th e te sti mony

of the stor e emp lo y e e s su pp or ts D e fe nd ants ’
c on vic tio ns fo r t

he ro bb e ri e s. B. F ir e ar m Co nvi c ti ons De fe n d an t s co n t en d

t h at t h er e w as i n s u ff

i ci en tev i d en ce t o s u

p p o rt a c o n v i ct i o n fo r us i n g a firea rm in a cr ime of violence . The use of a fire arm in furtheranc e of a crime of violence tr igg ers statutory mandatory

minimum sentenc ing pr ovisions set forth i n 1 8 U. S
. C. § 924. The statutory min imums c on ta ine d in

§ 9 24 a pp ly to any perso n w h o , d

u r in g an d in r e lati o n to an y c r im e o f v io le n c e or drugtraff

icking crime ( including a crime of

violence or

drug tr a ff ic kin g c ri me that pr ov ide s f or an enh anc e d p un ish me nt i f committed by

the use of a deadly

or dang erous we apon or de vice) for wh ic h the pe rs on may be pr os e c ute d in a c ourt of the Un ite d St a te s, uses or c arr ies a fir ear

m, or who, in furthe ranc e of a ny such cr ime, po sse sse s a

fi re arm . 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (A). F or purpose s of this statute,

[t ]he term ‘fire arm’ me ans (A) any wea pon (including a starte r g un) wh ic h w ill or

is d e sig ne d to or

may read ily be c on ve rt e d to e xpe l a projec tile by

the ac tion of an explosive; (B) the frame or re ceive r of any such weapon; (C) any firea rm muffler or fire arm silence r; or (D ) any destructive de vice. Such ter m does not includ e an a ntique fi re arm . 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) . The Supreme Court has found “that C o n gre s s i n tended the f irea rm typerelated words it used in § 924(c) (1) to re fer to an eleme nt of a sepa

rate , ag g ravated cr ime.” Cas til lo v. United States , 530 U.S. 120, 131 (2000). I n this case , the gover

nment did not introduce a firea rm into evidence , and did not offe r any photogr aphic or

video evidenc e that De fenda nts used a firea

rm during the robbe ries. Howe ver, store
e mpl oy e e s te sti fi e d th a t they saw a fi rea rm . Wil lis ma int a ins that th is w itn e ss t e sti mony isNos. 06-5319 and 06- 5362

16 insufficient to prove that she used a firea rm during the robbe ries, espe cially beca use the store employ ees a

re not e x perts on fire arms. This contention is without merit. “Althoug h § 924(c)
re qu ir e s p ro of

that th e g un

is r e a l, t he g ov e rnme nt’ s p ro of

ne e d n ot re a c h a

le ve l of sc ie nti fi c
cer tainty .” United States v. Robe rson , 459 F.3d 39, 47 ( 1st Cir. 2006) ( internal quotation marks and
c itatio n o mitte d) . Si mpl y pu t, “ [d]e sc ri pti ve lay op ini on te sti mony c an be su ff ic ie nt” to s up po rt

a conviction under

§ 924. Id. (c i t i n g United States v. Kirvan , 997 F.2d 963, 966- 67 (1st Cir. 1993));

se e als o United St ates v. Dobbs , 449 F.3d 904, 911 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that “lay testimony

from ey ewitnesses c an be suf

ficient to support a f

inding that a

n o b j ec t is, in fact, a f

irea rm under § 92 1( a )( 3) (A ). ” ); Parker v . United States , 801 F.2d 1382, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that nonexpert testimony

constitutes “suffic ient evidenc e to per mit a rea sonable jury

to inf er that the object
c arr ie d b y

[de fe nd ant] w a s a

‘f ir e arm .’ ” ); United States v. J ones , 907 F.2 d 4 5 6 (4t h Cir. 1990) (holding that “[a]s five ey ewitnesses te stified that a gun was used in the robber y , there was e vidence fr om w hic h r a tio na l tr ie rs of fa c t c ou ld f

ind guil t be y on d a

re a so nab le do ub t on th e fi re arm s char g e.”)
. I n the instant case , the re cord c lear ly establishes that numerous store employ ees te stified that Def endants br an d i s hed a f

irea rm during the robbe ries. We find that De fenda nts’ convictions and sente nces unde r § 924 ar e supported by evidenc e in the reco rd an d t he testimony of the store
e mpl oy e e s. C. Conspi racy C onviction Def endants c ontend that there was i n s u ff icient evidenc e to support a c onviction for conspirac y . Conspiracy

to interfer e with commer ce by threats or violence, 18 U .S.C. § 1951,
re qu ir e s th e fo llo wi nge le me nts :Nos. 06-5319 and 06- 5362

17 (1 ) a n a g re e me nt b e tw e e n tw o o r m or e ind ivi du a ls, (2) a ffe cting interstate c ommerce , (3) to obtain prope rty

from anothe r, (4 ) w ithc on se nt, (5 ) i nd uc e d und e r c olo r o f o ff

ic ia l r ig ht. United States v. Be nton , 852 F.2d 1456, 1465 ( 6th Cir. 1988). “I n establishing the exis tence of a
c on sp ir a c y

to v iol a te fe de ra l la

w, the g ov e rnme nt n e e d n ot p ro ve a fo rm a l a g re e me nt, be c a

us e a ta c it or mutual understa

nding a mong the parties is suffic ient to show a conspiratorial ag ree ment.” United Sta te s v . B av e rs , 7 8 7 F. 2 d

1 0 2 2 , 1 0 2 6 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 8 5 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Toney , 527 F.2d 716 (6 th Cir
. 1 9 7 5 )
. “ Ac o n s p i r a c y m ay b e i n f e r r e d f r o m c i r c u m s t an t i a l e v i d e n c e t h a tc anr e a s o n a bly be interpr eted a s participation in the common plan.” Id. (citations omitted). I n this ca s e , D e f

e n d a nts ’ c o n d u c t i n c o nn ection with the seve nth robbery clea rly demonstrates
a ta c it un de rs tand ing and a g re e me nt to ro b the Ho lli da y F a sh ion s st or e on

July 3, 20 04 . D e fe nd ants
we nt to the sto re tog e the r, se le c te d c lot hin g , br and ish e d fi re arm s and wo rk e d to g e the r t o in tim idate store employ ees a

nd rob t h e s t o re . Def

endants’ c onduct clea

rly indicates the a doption and imp le me ntatio n o f a

pla n o r s tr a te g y fo r the ro bb e ry . T his pla n e vin c e s a

c on sp ir a tor ia l a g re e me nt. Def endants maintain that the g overnme nt failed to prove that the conspira cy lasted “f rom on or about July

5, 2003 to on or about Jul y 3, 2004,” as alleg ed in the indictment. Howeve r, this Court h as fo u n d t h at the exact date of the c onspiracy is not an element of the crime. See, e .g. , U n ited Sta te s v . A rn old, 8 90 F .2 d 8 25 , 8 29 (6 th C ir . 1 98 9) (f ind ingthat “ [a]lt

ho ug h th e pa

rt ic ula rs c ou ld have be en more specific on the time frame, ade quate notice was g iven to the def endant that the alleg ed conspira cy

continued for some time.”). Since Def endants’ conduct in c onnection with theNos. 06-5319 and 06- 5362

18 se ve nth ro bb e ry ind ic a te s a

c on sp ir a tor ia l a g re e me nt, De fe nd ants ’ c on vic tio n f or c on sp ir a c y

is supported by

evidenc e in the re cord. D. Interfere nce With Interst ate C om m erc e Wil lis arg ues that the g overnme nt failed to prove an interstate commerc e nexus wit h respe ct to m e rc ha nd ise sto le n f

ro m H oll ida

y F a sh ion s. Con tr ary

to W il lis ’ a

ve rm e nts , th e re c or d c le arl y indica te s th a t H o ll id ay F a s h io n s is inv o lv e d in in te r s tate c o mm e r c e . I n p e rti n e n t p art, th e “[v] ice pr e sid e nt o f f

ina nc e ” fo r H oll ida

y F a sh ion s te sti fi e d at tr ia l a s f oll ow s: Qu e sti on : . . . w he re is your h e a dq ua rt e rs ? Answer : Her e in Memphis . . . Qu e sti on : Ok ay . A nd
. . . w he re do y ou

a ll h a ve sto re s? An s we r: We h av e s t o re s i nv ar i o u s s t at es , i nM i ssissippi , Tenne ssee, L ouisiana,

Arka nsas . . . Qu e sti on : An d .
. . is H oll ida y ’s [sic ] F a sh ion s . . . a

bu sin e ss t

hat do e s b us ine ss a c ro ss s tate lin e s? A n s w e r : A b s o l u t e l y.

. . . Question: Does .
. . Ho lliday ’s [sic] Fa shions stores purcha se g oods from

outside of Tenne ssee to sell it in stores in Tennesse e? Answer : Yes, we do. Qu e sti on : An d d o you have nume ro us ou t of

state ve nd or s? Answer : Yes, a

majority of our ve ndors ar e out of state. Question:
. . . what perc entag e would y ou say of the products in your stores f rom out of state? An sw e r: To be c on se rv a tiv e it w ou ld b e a t le a st 9 0 p e rc e nt.

. . . Qu e sti on : Do y ou

a ll s e rv e ou t of

state c us tom e rs ? Answer : Yes, we do. Question: I s mone y t h at y o u lose in one of your robbe ries of one of y our

Tenne ssee stores money

that y ou could use to buy

g oods from outside of Tenne ssee? A n s w e r : A b s o l u t e l y. (J.A. 150-52) (for

matting a dded). The rec ord clea rly establishes that Holliday Fa shions is enga g ed in interstate commer ce. Willis arg ues that the g overnme nt was re quired to prove specific ally thatNos. 06-5319 and 06- 5362

19 the merc handise stolen by Wil lis was manufa cture d outside of Tenne ssee. H o w e v e r, the g overnme nt onl y has to prove that the business eng ag es in interstate c ommerce . United States v. Dupre e , 323 F .3 d 4 80 , 4 85 (6 th Cir . 200 3)
. Sin c e the re c or d sho ws that Holl ida y F a sh ion s is e ng a g e d in

int e rs tate
c omm e rc e , w e fi nd

that Will is’ c la im i s me ri tle ss. IV. Cruel and Unu sual Punish m ent Wil lis maintains that the dist rict cour t’s sentenc e violates the Eig hth Amendment’s pr oh ibi tio n a g a ins t c ru e l and unus ua l pu

nis hme nts b ecaus e he r s e nte nc e of 16 0 y e ars is a lle g e dly dis pr op or tio nate to t

he un de rl y ingc ri me . T his Cou rt re vie ws de novo a

c on sti tut ion a l c ha lle ng e to a district cour

t’s sentenc e. United States v. Mark s , 209 F.3d 577, 583 ( 6th Cir. 2000). I n interpre ting the E ighth Ame ndment, “‘[t] he Supreme Court has arti cu l at ed a ‘na rrow pro po rt ion a lity

pr inc ipl e ’ w he re by

it h e ld t

hat on ly ‘e xtre me se nte nc e s th a t are g ro ssl y disproportionate to the c rime ar e prohibited.’” United States v. Flowal , 163 F.3d 956, 963 ( 6th Cir. 1 9 9 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Harmelin v. Michigan , 501 U.S. 957, 959-60 (1991)) . I n Ha rm e lin , th e Sup re me Court upheld Michig an’s pe nalty of life imprisonment without parole for possession of more than 65 0 g ra ms of c oc a ine
. Th e Sup re me Cou rt re a ff ir me d th is h old inginEwi ng v . Ca lif or nia , 5 38 U. S. 11 , 2 8 ( 20 03 ) (rej ect in g a rgume nt t

hat “ se nte nc e of

25 y e ars to l if

e is u nc on sti tut ion a lly disproport ionate to [an] offense of shoplifting three g olf clubs”) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted)). This Court has adopted the “ narr ow proport i o n ali ty principle” set forth in Ha rm e lin , and
re c og nize d that “on ly an e xtre me dis pa ri ty be tw e e n c ri me and

se nte nc e of

fe nd s th e Ei g hth Amendment.” Marks , 2 0 9 F. 3 d at 5 8 3 (c i t i n g United St ates v. Hoppe r , 941 F.2d 419, 422 ( 6th Cir.Nos. 06-5319 and 06- 5362

20 1991)). In Marks , a ca se whe re D efe ndants wer e involved in nine arme d bank robbe ries, this Court upheld a 2,242 month sentenc e. Id. This Court has made c lear that “strict propor

tionality betwee n
a cr ime and its punishment is not require d.” Id. at 5 8 3 (c i t i n g Ha rm e lin , 5 0 1 U
. S. at 959-60). Supreme Court pre cede nt supports this vi ew. Indeed, in Deal v. U nited States , the Supreme Court
u p h el d a 1 0 5-y ear

sentenc e for

six arme d robber ies finding that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) re quired enhanc ed conse cutive sente ncing . 508 U.S. 129, 132-33 (1993). W i l l i s r e c o g n i z e s t h at“ t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e s e n t e n c e w a s dr i v e nb y t h e m an d a t o r y [ s t a tu t o r

y] min i mum requireme nts of § 924(c) ,” (Willis’ Br. at 45), but argues that her “sente nce w as not develope d to be proportional to the c rime cha rg ed, but instead wa s dri ven by a blanke t leg islative decision that does not allow f or a district c ourt judg e to sentenc e the de fe n dant as their c riminal culpability

require s,” id . at 42. As the district court acknow ledg ed, “the mandatory minimum s and the ot her counts do provide a sentenc e, accumulative sentence that is extremely harsh.” (J.A. 855) Howeve r, as the district c ourt aptly stated, this is “[C ]ongre ss’ doing and the c ourt doesn’t have the po we r t o r e a lly

a dju st that.” (J.A . 8 55 ) Simp ly pu t, “ Con g re ss h a s b e e n v e ry e xplic it i n it s d ic tate s” and the district cour

t is “unable to a lter the [st atutory ] manda tory minimum s.” (J.A. 855) I n light of the ov e rw he lmi ngSup re me Court pr e c e de nt, we fi nd that Willis’ se nte nc e is not c ru e l or unus ua l. V. Reasonableness of the Sentence Wil lis c halleng es the re asonable ness of he r sentenc e. This Court revie ws a sente nce imposed by a district cour

t for re asonable ness. Rita v. United States , N o . 0 6

- 5 7 5 4 , – S. Ct
. – , 2 0 0 7 WL 1772146, at *9 (June 21, 2007); United States v. Book er , 543 U. S. 220 , 2 61 -6 2 ( 20 05 ); United States

v . H ar ris , 3 97 F .3 d 4 04 , 4 09 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) ; United States v. Cage , 458 F.3d 537, 540 ( 6 t h Cir.Nos. 06-5319 and 06- 5362

21 20 06 ). Th e Court

re vie ws the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s int e rp re tatio ns of the se nte nc ingg uid e lin e s de novo and its fa ctual findingfor c lear err or. United States v. W

illiams , 411 F.3d 675, 677 (6th Cir. 2005); United S t a t es v. Burk

e , 345 F.3d 416, 428 ( 6th Cir. 2003). The Court def ers to the district cour

t’s application of the sentenc ing g uidelines to the fac ts. United States v. Charles , 138 F .3 d 2 57 , 2 66 (6 th Cir. 1998). “In deter mining the se n tence to be imposed, the district court must consider the advisory Guidelines rang e and all rele vant fa ctors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) .” Un ite d Sta te s v . J on es, 44 5 F .3 d 8 65 , 8 69 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; see a l s o Un i ted States v. Mc

Bride, 43 4 F .3 d 4 70 , 4 76 (6 th Cir .2 00 6) ; United States v. Jac kson , 408 F.3d 301, 304 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (“[D]is trict courts a re require d to consider the a pplicable Guide lines sentencingrang e wh en ar ri ving at a def endant’ s
se nte nc e , 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 53 (a )( 4) , b ut o nly a s o ne fa c tor

of se ve ra l la id out

in § 35 53 (a ). ” ); Booke r , 543 U.S. at 259 (“Without the ‘mandatory ’ provision, the Ac t nonetheless re qu i re s j u dg es to take
a c c ount o f t

he Gu ide lin e s to g e the r w ithoth e r s e nte nc ingg oa ls” ). “ [T]he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on to deny a Guideline-ba sed depar

ture
. . . is not revie wable by this Court so long a s the district court wa s
awa re of and under stood i t s d i scre tion to make such a G uideline-ba sed depa rture.” McBride , 434 F .3 d at 47 6; se e als o J

on es, 44 5 F .3 d at 86 8; Un ite d S tates v . S te war t , 306 F.3d 295, 329 (6th Cir. 2002). “Absent [an] articulation on the rec ord that t h e § 3 5 5 3 (a) fac tors wer e conside red, w e ar e unable to re view De fenda nt’s sentenc e for

rea sonablene ss, and we de cline to find that a se ntence
w it h in th e G u id e li n e s r an g e is r e a s o n able.” Un i ted States v. J ohnson , 467 F.3d 559, 564 ( 6th Cir. 20 06 ); see also Cage , 458 F.3d at 537. I n the ins tant ca se , Willis argue s tha t her se nte nc e “ wa s lo ng e r t

ha n n e c e ssa ry to c omp ly

wi thNos. 06-5319 and 06- 5362

22 the sentenc ing f

actor s outlined in 18 U.S.C . § 3553(a) .” ( Wil lis’ Br. at 45) Wil lis arg ues that “bec ause the majority

of the sente nce w as driven b y t he mandatory [st atutory ] m inimum require ment s o f § 9 2 4 (c ) . . . any sentenc e in excess of the ma ndatory minimum on the § 924(c ) counts was unr easona

b l e.” ( Wil lis’ Br. a

t 45) Wil lis cites no case in support of this proposition. I n this case, the r ecor d clea rly indicates that the district court c onsidered the sentenc ing guidelines and the § 3553( a) f

actor s, and pro p er l y ca l culated D efe ndant’s sente nce. We ther efor e find the district court’s sente nce to be rea sonable. CO NC LU SION For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM De fe nd ants ’ c on vic tio ns and se nte nc e s.