NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-62

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

BRANDON CARRION.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant appeals from an order (1) finding that he had 

violated the terms of his probation by committing new criminal 

offenses and (2) revoking his probation. In this appeal, the 

defendant makes three arguments. First, he argues that due 

process dictates that proof of a probation violation be 

established by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Second, he argues that the judge 

failed to make written findings of fact, and failed to find that 

the hearsay evidence was reliable. Finally, he argues that the 

evidence was insufficient to establish that he had violated his 

probation. We affirm.

The defendant's first argument requires little discussion 

because the Supreme Judicial Court has repeatedly and 

unambiguously stated that a probation violation requires only 
2

proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Jarrett, 491 Mass. 437, 440 (2023). It is 

beyond our power as an intermediate court of appeal "to alter, 

overrule or decline to follow the holding of cases the Supreme 

Judicial Court has decided." Commonwealth v. Dube, 59 Mass. 

App. Ct. 476, 485 (2003).

Before addressing the merits of the defendant's remaining 

arguments, we set out the following background. The 

Commonwealth presented the testimony of four police witnesses to 

establish that the defendant had violated the terms of his 

probation.1 The officers' testimony was undisputed and 

consistent. Some of the officers' testimony was based on their 

own observations and investigation. Other important parts, 

however, consisted of hearsay in that the officers recounted 

what others had told them. We recite the facts as the judge 

could have found them.

The police were dispatched to an apartment on Clarkson 

Street in Worcester around 2 A.M. on December 3, 2020. The 

first officer to arrive observed a man (victim) sitting on a 

chair inside the apartment, bleeding from multiple stab wounds 

to his stomach. The victim had also been cut on his head and 

1 The defendant stipulated that he was on probation at the 

relevant time, that he had received the terms and conditions of 

his probation, and that he was aware of those terms and 

conditions.
3

hand. A witness on the scene told the officer that his uncle 

Brandon, the defendant, had been arguing with the victim outside 

the back door of the house. The defendant had then run into the 

house and out the front door. The victim had then come into the 

house, bleeding. This description of events was corroborated by 

the trail of blood that led from outside the back of the house, 

through the back door, and ended where the victim was seated. 

The witness claimed not to have seen what had happened outside 

the house (apart from seeing an argument), or the defendant with 

a knife. But he later stated at the station that the only 

people involved in the fight were the defendant and the victim. 

He also said that the defendant had "launched" at the victim.

The defendant's girlfriend told police that the victim had 

been drinking and trying to smoke inside the house, to which the 

defendant and the girlfriend's sons objected.2 Eventually, the 

defendant and the victim went outside and began to fight. The 

girlfriend saw the defendant throw a punch at the victim. She 

physically intervened between the two men and broke them apart. 

She then went inside the house for three to five minutes; when 

2 The girlfriend also stated that a locked, upstairs bedroom had 

been a guest room, but was no longer occupied. The police 

forced entry and discovered that the room appeared to have been 

recently inhabited, and found a paystub belonging to the 

defendant in the closet.
4

she returned, the victim had been stabbed, and the defendant was 

no longer there.

When the defendant was arrested later that day, he had 

recent lacerations on his hands, and blood splatter on his 

shoes. He admitted to police that he had been at his 

girlfriend's house and that he had been wearing the same 

clothes. He stated that he had been drinking and had no memory 

of the events of the night before, or why blood was on his 

shoes. The victim, too, admitted to police that he had been 

drinking, and recalled that he had been in an argument, but 

remembered nothing further.

Against this backdrop, we now consider the defendant's 

remaining legal arguments. First, the defendant argues that the 

judge did not make written findings regarding the reliability of 

the hearsay evidence. This argument fails because the record 

does not support it. The judge indicated on the "Probation 

Violation Finding & Disposition" form that he found the hearsay 

evidence to be reliable for six reasons which we set out in the 

margin.3 Nothing more was required by way of written findings 

3 The six reasons were that the evidence was based on personal 

knowledge and/or direct observation, that it involved 

observations recorded close in time to the events in question, 

that it was provided by a disinterested witness, that it was 

provided under circumstances that supported the veracity of the 

source, that it was factually detailed, and that it was 

internally consistent.
5

regarding the reliability of the hearsay evidence. See 

Commonwealth v. Hartfield, 474 Mass. 474, 484 (2016) ("In 

assessing whether the hearsay evidence is reliable, a hearing 

judge may consider (1) whether the evidence is based on personal 

knowledge or direct observation; (2) whether the evidence, if 

based on direct observation, was recorded close in time to the 

events in question; (3) the level of factual detail; (4) whether 

the statements are internally consistent; (5) whether the 

evidence is corroborated by information from other sources; (6) 

whether the declarant was disinterested when the statements were 

made; and (7) whether the statements were made under 

circumstances that support their veracity").

Next, the defendant argues that his due process rights were 

violated because the judge did not make written findings 

regarding the evidence. "Although a separate written statement 

of the evidence relied on and the reasons for revocation is one 

of the probationer's due process rights in such proceedings, it 

is not an inflexible or invariable mandatory requirement and can 

be satisfied in other ways." Commonwealth v. Morse, 50 Mass. 

App. Ct. 582, 592-593 (2000). Here, it is true that the judge 

did not make written findings of fact, and the better course 

would have been for him to do so. But the judge's oral 

determination on the record that the defendant had violated his 

probation, combined with his written notation on the Probation 
6

Violation Finding & Disposition form that the violation was 

based on the defendant's violation of criminal laws identified 

in a particular criminal complaint (which the judge identified 

by docket number), and his indication that the finding was based 

on the four officers' testimony (which, as we have noted, was 

consistent and corroborated), satisfied due process. See 

Commonwealth v. Bain, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 724, 725-727 (2018). 

Moreover, the defendant has not articulated, let alone shown, 

how the absence of detailed findings of fact makes any 

difference in this case. The testimony of the officers was 

consistent and corroborated. Not only did each officer speak to 

a percipient witness, but the percipient witnesses recounted the 

same rough sequence of events: the defendant and the victim had 

been arguing behind the house, after which the defendant ran 

through the house and out the front door, while the victim came 

back inside with stab wounds to the stomach, head, and hand. 

The defendant has failed to identify any pertinent factual 

dispute that required resolution by the judge, or any reason to 

think that the officers' testimony was not credible.

Finally, the defendant argues that the evidence was 

insufficient because there was no direct evidence that the 

defendant stabbed the victim. Although it is true there was no 

direct evidence of the stabbing, the circumstantial evidence 

more than amply permitted the reasonable inference that it was 
7

the defendant (as opposed to some other person) who stabbed the 

victim. See Commonwealth v. Coates, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 728, 732 

(2016) (circumstantial evidence suffices to prove identity).

For these reasons, we affirm the order revoking the 

defendant's probation.

So ordered.

By the Court (Wolohojian, 

Singh & Hand, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: July 20, 2023.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.