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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON GARY W. ALEXANDER and DIANE M. ALEXANDER, husband and wife, Appellants,

v. CAPITAL ONE, N.A.; CHEVY CHASE BANK, F.S.B.; BISHOP, WHITE, MARSHALL &WEIBEL, P.S.; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., aka MERS; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY; CHICAGO TITLE CO.; U.S. BANK, N.A., as Trustee for Chevy Chase Funding, LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-2 Trust; CHEVY CHASE FUNDING LLC, Mortgage-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-2 Trust; CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA), LLC, Respondents. No. 71952-1-1 (consol. with No. 72350-2-1)

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FILED: September 21,2015 

### Dwyer, J. — Gary and Diane Alexander lost their property in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. They then sued their lender and other entities for wrongful 

### foreclosure, fraud, negligence, slander oftitle, declaratory reliefand violations of the deeds of trust act (DTA), chapter 61.24 RCW, and the Consumer Protection 

### Act, chapter 19.86 RCW. The superior court dismissed the Alexanders'No. 71952-1-1/2 (consol. with No. 72350-2-1) complaint on summaryjudgment and awarded respondents attorney fees and costs under the deed of trust, RCW 4.84.185, and CR 11. We affirm.
I In March 2007, the Alexanders signed an Adjustable Rate Note (Note) 

### acknowledging a $3 million loan from Chevy Chase Bank (Chevy Chase) and 

### promising to pay back that amount plus interest. The note was secured by a deed oftrust on the Alexanders' property. The deed oftrust named Mortgage 

### Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the beneficiary"acting solely as

a nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns." 

### In 2009, Chevy Chase mergedwith Capital One, N.A. (Capital One). In 

### October ofthat year, the Alexanders stopped making payments ontheir loan. On March 23, 2012, a Capital One employee authorized to sign 

### documents on behalf ofMERS assigned the deed of trust to Capital One. Capital 

### One then appointedBishop, White, Marshall &Weibel, P.S. (Bishop White) as the successor trustee under the deed oftrust. 

### OnMay 9, 2012, Bishop White sent a notice ofdefaultto theAlexanders, who had not made a loan payment for 32 consecutive months. When the Alexanders did not cure the default, Bishop White notified them that their 

### propertywould be sold at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. 

### The Alexanders filed a pro se complaint for wrongful foreclosure butdid not seek to enjoin the sale.No. 71952-1-1/3 (consol. with No. 72350-2-1)
On November 30, 2012, Capital One purchased the property at the 

### foreclosure sale and subsequently moved for summaryjudgment on the Alexanders' pro se complaint. 

### In April 2013, attorney J.J. Sandlin advised Capital One's counsel that he


### was assisting the Alexanders with theirlawsuit, that the Alexanders hadfiled for bankruptcy, and that an automatic stay was in effect. 

### OnJuly 30, 2013, while summaryjudgment on theAlexanders' pro se suit 

### was still pending, Sandlin filed a second complaint onbehalfoftheAlexanders 

### for wrongful foreclosure, fraud, slander oftitle, negligence, criminal profiteering, and violations ofthe DTA and the Consumer Protection Act. The complaint 

### alleged, among otherthings, thatthe defendants fraudulently manipulated the 

## nonjudicial foreclosure statute, thatthe note and deed oftrustwere securitized, and thattheforeclosing entities were not holders oftheoriginal note and lacked standing to enforce it. 

### Thecomplaint restedin part on the declarations oftwo alleged expert witnesses—Michael Wood and Dr. James Kelley. Wood stated in his declaration 

### that he was "amortgage documentexaminer." Helisted hisexaminer 

## qualifications as 20 years ofexperience in the mortgage industry, ownership ofa company called "DocAnalysis," and the fact that he"[sjtudied under" aforensic document examiner and "had the benefitof hisknowledge and guidance for three 

## years." Wood stated thatthe Alexanders' loan "was likely" securitized and "likely" placed "into the Chevy Chase
. . . MBS Certificates Series 2007-2" trust. HeNo. 71952-1-1/4 (consol. with No. 72350-2-1)
believed the assignment of the deed of trust from MERS to Capital One and the subsequent appointment of a successor trustee were invalid. Dr. Kelley described himself as "a computer expert" with a Ph.D. in electrical and computer engineering. He had 30 years' experience working with military and commercial computer systems and used "computer graphics" and "a variety of image-processing technique[s] to test the authenticity ofdocuments." He alleged that he examined signatures on "scans of documents that purport to be the [Alexanders'] original loan documents," including the "Construction / Permanent Loan Note Addendum," "Adjustable Rate Note" and "Prepayment 

### Penalty Addendum" documents. Kelley concluded the documents were not the originals. 

### InAugust 2013, the Alexanders voluntarily dismissed their pro se 

### complaint. They later voluntarily dismissed their claims against Bishop White in their remaining complaint. 

### Capital One and MERS then moved for summaryjudgment. They 

### supported the motionwith declarations alleging that Capital One possessed the original note and that the note had not been securitized. They argued that the Alexanders lacked admissible evidence to create issues offact on the 

### authenticity of the note and whether it had been securitized. Specifically, they 

### pointed to deficiencies in the qualifications and declarations ofMichael Wood and Dr. Kelley. With respect to Dr. Kelley, they submitted a 2013 federal district court

4-No. 71952-1-1/5 (consol. with No. 72350-2-1) ruling declining to pre-qualify him as an expert inforensic document analysis. The federal court concluded that Dr. Kelley has no training or education in the area, his experience is extremely limited, and the sources of his knowledge are mostly unidentified. In addition plaintiff has yet to establish that Dr. Kelley's methodology comports with that generally utilized by forensic document analysts
.... Absent a proper foundation for the admission of his testimony, the Court declines to pre-qualify Dr. Kelley as an expert inforensic document analysis. A second federal district court concluded that Dr. Kelley had "no education 

### or training in handwriting analysis or forensic document examination," that "none of his prior work experience involved document examination," and that he was 

### "not qualified to testify as an expert" under Federal Rule ofEvidence 702. The court also concluded that even if Dr. Kelley could be qualified as an expert 

### witness, there was no evidence that his methodology was reliable or accepted in 

### the scientific community. Dr. Kelley admitted in a deposition in that case that "his methods are new and that he is the only expert in this field that he is aware [of]." 

### The superior court struck the declarations of Wood and Dr. Kelley. The court concluded thatWood was not qualified as an expert in securitization and 

### that his declaration was "pure speculation" and legal opinions. The court noted that Wood's inadmissible speculation that the loan had been securitized in a 

### specific trust was contradicted by admissible evidence to the contrary. In addition, the court noted that Wood's declaration was not properly signed and did not comply with General Rule 30.No. 71952-1-1/6 (consol. with No. 72350-2-1)
The court also struck Dr. Kelley's first declaration, stating that the Alexanders "failed to show that [he] qualifies as an expert in forensic document analysis or that [his] methodology is generally accepted among the relevant scientific or technical community." The court did not consider a second declaration from Dr. Kelley filed the day before the summaryjudgment hearing. 

### In addition to being untimely, the second declaration was not properly signed and suffered the same foundational defects that prompted the court to strike Kelley's
first declaration. 

### The court also implicitly rejected the Alexanders' claim that they were 

### entitled to an evidentiary "Frye"1 hearing regarding the methodology underlying 

### Dr. Kelley's opinions. In opposing that claim, Capital One's counsel argued that the Alexanders had to first meet their burden on summaryjudgment, and that it


### was "within [the court's] discretion to rule on summary judgment that the expert declaration is notcompetent.. .." The court implicitly rejected the Alexanders' 

### position when it granted summary judgmentwithout holding a separate Frye hearing. 

### The court ultimately ruled in favor of Capital One and MERS, stating in part: So, even when Ilook at this inthe light most favorable to the 

### nonmoving party, there still needs to be admissible evidence. Here the admissible evidence leads me to the conclusion that
... 

### Capital One
... has the note. Idon't see a basis to make a finding that it's counterfeit, and Idon't see a basis to send this to trial. I'm granting the summaryjudgment. 1 Frve v. United States. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).No. 71952-1-1/7 (consol. with No. 72350-2-1)
The court subsequently awarded respondents $79,865.26 in attorney fees and costs under CR 11, RCW 4.84.185, and the attorney fee provision in the deed of trust. The court entered the following pertinent findings and
conclusions: I. FINDINGS OF FACT 6. Plaintiffs filed their first lawsuit against Capital One and MERS on November 21, 2012. 7. Plaintiffs were made aware of the fact that Capital One owned the Note and that the Note had not been securitized when defendants filed an affidavit of a Capital One representative in 

### support of their motion for summaryjudgment inJanuary 2013 in the 2012 lawsuit. 

### 8. On July 30, 2013, attorney J.J. Sandlin filed the second lawsuit against defendants on behalfofplaintiffs. The Complaint included a claim that the DOT was "void and of no further force and 

### effect," and plaintiffs sought title to the Property. Mr. Sandlin and 

### plaintiffs ignored the evidence presented in the first lawsuit and failed to make a reasonable inquiry into whether evidence existed 

### to rebut the evidence presented by defendants before plaintiffs filed the second Complaint on July 30, 2013. 

### 10. Throughout both lawsuits, plaintiffs and Mr. Sandlin conducted no discovery or other meaningful post-filing investigation. 12. Plaintiffs' opposition to defendants' motion for summary 

### judgment focused on the opinions of their alleged "experts" and on whether "global assignments" ofdeeds of trust are valid, even 

### though Capital One obtained plaintiffs' Loan through a merger and not an assignment. Plaintiffs made no attempt in their opposition to establish a prima facie case for any of their seven causes of action, even though each of them was addressed in detail indefendants' motion.

### 13. The day before the hearing on defendants' motion for 

### summary judgment, plaintiffs untimely filed a motion under CR56(f) to attempt to delay.No. 71952-1-1/8 (consol. with No. 72350-2-1)
15. Plaintiffs also filed the following, with the assistance of their counsel Mr. Sandlin, for the improper purpose of causing delay: a. Plaintiffs admitted that they filed for bankruptcy in order to prevent eviction. They filed for bankruptcy one business day before the scheduled hearing on defendants' summary judgment motion, resulting in cancellation ofthe hearing. b. Plaintiffs repeatedly claimed that Capital One did not own the Note and that the Note had been securitized, but made no investigation and conducted no discovery to determine whether their claims were correct. c. Plaintiffs named one expert (Lori Gileno) and 

### encouraged defendants to incur substantial fees deposing this 

### expert, only to rely on the opinions of different experts in their response to summaryjudgment and label Gileno a "consultant" during oral argument. d. Plaintiffs filed a motion for continuance the day before 

### the hearing on defendants' motion for summaryjudgment, even 

### though the purported basis for the motion (the need for the original DOT) had been apparent for a month. 

### e. Plaintiffs' summaryjudgment opposition was based 

### on experts who were unqualified and engaged in junk science, as 

### evidenced by the fact that the Court excluded both ofplaintiffs' experts from consideration. f. Plaintiffs also spent considerable time arguing about 

### whether the signatures on various original documents were genuine when, in fact, the plaintiffs admitted inthe first lawsuit signing the 

### Note and they attached a copy to theirVerified Complaint, and thus whether plaintiffs signed the Note was not indispute and whether Capital One possessed the original Note was not a material fact. 

### g. Plaintiffs signed a Warranty Deed and participated in the recording of numerous fraudulent documents on the title of the Property in an effort to cloud title and cause delay in the eviction. Defendants spent substantial time investigating the fraudulent title documents. h. Defendants expended time and costs preparing a 

### Joint Motion voiding the fraudulent title documents pursuant to an 

### agreement with Mr. Sandlin, butMr. Sandlinfailed to provide comments on the Joint Motion and it was never filed. 16. Plaintiffs have benefitted from their own delay in an 

### amount exceeding $900,000 for the fouryears and seven months that have elapsed since they defaulted on the Note and have continued to reside at the Property without making Loan payments.No. 71952-1-1/9 (consol. with No. 72350-2-1)

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 21. The Complaint was filed by Mr. Sandlin on plaintiffs' behalfeven though the Complaint was not well grounded in fact because the Note was owned by Capital One and the Loan was not securitized. 22. . . . [E]ven had the Loan been securitized, securitization does not discharge a promissory note, invalidate a Deed ofTrust or change the relationship ofthe parties under Washington law. 25. Mr. Sandlin did not conduct a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal basis ofthe claims inthe Complaint, because if he had he would have known that (1) Capital One owned the Note; (2) the Note had not been securitized; and (3) even if ithad been securitized, Capital One would still be entitled to enforce the Note. 26. The entirety of plaintiffs' lawsuit against defendants was frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause because it could 

### not be supported by any rational argument on the law or facts
.... 29. Mr. Sandlin and plaintiffsare hereby sanctioned forfiling 

### the Complaint in violation of CR 11 in the amount of the reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred by defendants. 

### The court enteredjudgment for the fees and costs against the Alexanders and their counsel. The Alexanders appeal.
II 

### We review a summaryjudgment order de novo, engaging inthe same 

### inquiry as the trial court. Lvbbert v. Grant County. 141 Wn.2d 29, 34, 1 P.3d 1124 (2000). We view the facts and allreasonable inferences therefrom in the 

### light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Lvbbert, 141 Wn.2d at 34. Summary judgment is properifthere are no genuine issues ofmaterial fact and 

### the moving party is entitled to judgmentas a matter oflaw. Lvbbert, 141 Wn.2d at 34. Mere allegations or conclusorystatements of fact unsupported by evidence

-9-No. 71952-1-1/10 (consol. with No. 72350-2-I)

are not sufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact. Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 127, 132, 769 P.2d 298 (1989). Nor may 

### the nonmoving party rely on speculation or argumentative assertions that unresolved factual issues remain. Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Entm't Co.. 106 Wn.2d 1, 13, 721 P.2d 1 (1986). 

### Initially, we note that the Alexanders' briefon appeal does notcomply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Despite the clear requirements of RAP 

### 10.3(a)(5), 10.3(a)(6), and 10.4(f),2 the briefdoes not contain a singlecitation to the record. The record in this appeal contains nearly two thousand pages of 

### clerk's papers. In these circumstances, counsel's completefailure to cite to the record is an egregious violation of the rules and isfatal to the appeal. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Boslev, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 819, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).3 

### Buteven ifthe Alexanders had complied withthe RAP, their arguments 

### would not warrant relief. They contend summaryjudgmentwas improper because an issue offact exists as to whether Capital One had "standing to 

### nonjudicially foreclose." Specifically, they argue that the declarations ofMichael

2RAP 10.3(a)(5) requires references to the record foreach factual statement in a party's statement of the case. RAP 10.3(a)(6)requires arguments "togetherwith citationsto legal authority and references to relevant parts of the record." 3 See also Mills v. Park, 67 Wn.2d 717, 721, 409 P.2d 646 (1966) ("We are not required to search the record forapplicable portions thereofin support of the plaintiffs' arguments."); Fishbum v. Pierce County Planning & Land Servs. Dep't, 161 Wn. App. 452, 468, 250 P.3d 146 (2011) (courts will not comb therecord tofind supportfor appellant's arguments); In reEstate of Lint, 135 Wn.2d 518, 532, 957 P.2d 755 (1998) ("Ifwe were to ignore the rulerequiring counsel to 

### direct argumenttospecificfindings
. .. and tocite torelevant parts oftherecord as supportfor thatargument, wewould beassuming anobligation tocomb therecord with aview toward constructing argumentsfor counsel.... This wewill notand should notdo.").
-10-No. 71952-1-1/11 (consol. with No. 72350-2-I)


### Wood and Dr. Kelley4 created fact questions regarding the authenticity of the note and deed of trust, and that the court erred in declaring their testimony 

### inadmissible without holding a separate evidentiary hearing. We disagree. Under the DTA, a trustee must have proof that the beneficiary has the 

### right to foreclose before itcan hold a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. RCW 

### 61.24.030(7)(a). The act provides that "[a] declaration by the beneficiary made 

### under the penalty ofperjury stating that the beneficiary is the actualholder ofthe promissory note or otherobligation secured by the deed oftrustshall be 

### sufficient proofas required underthis subsection." RCW 61.24.030(7)(a). Here, the record indicatesthat, priortoforeclosure, the trustee received a beneficiary 

### declaration from Capital Onestating thatit was the holder oftheAlexanders' note. And Capital One manager John Baxter stated in hisdeclaration that 

### Capital One acquired the Alexanders' note and deed oftrustwhen it merged with theoriginal lender, Chevy Chase, and that "Capital One is thecurrent holder of theoriginal Note and the Deed ofTrust."5 Baxterfurther stated that the loan "was never securitized, whether through the Chevy Chase Funding LLC,

4Although theAlexanders also pointtothedeposition testimony ofLori Gileno, they never mentioned hertestimony in their response tosummaryjudgmentandaffirmatively abandoned it at thehearing, telling thecourtthatwhile they originally "thoughtwewere going to 

### use [Gileno] as anexpertwitness," they "wentwith MichaelWood instead ofLori Gileno because wefelt that... his opinions were more precise and onpoint." Gileno's declaration isthus not listed among thedocuments thecourtconsidered onsummaryjudgment. TheAlexanders alsopointtoGary Alexander's declaration, stating that he"unequivocally 

### testified that his signature on thepurported [original] documents wasnot anoriginal signature, 

### because he always signed in blue ink as abusiness practice " BriefofAppellantat3. Butno such allegations appear in the declaration considered by the courton summaryjudgment. 5In addition, theTrustee's Deed recited that"Capital One, N.A. being then theholderof theindebtedness secured by said Deed ofTrust, delivered tosaid Trustee awritten request directing said Trustee to sell the described property -11

-No. 71952-1-1/12 (consol. with No. 72350-2-I) 

### Mortgage-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-2 Trust or through any other securitization trust." This evidence carried Capital One's initial burden on summaryjudgment. 

### In response, the Alexanders relied on the declarations ofMichael Wood and Dr. Kelley, but the superior court struck theirtestimony as inadmissible. 

### Contrary to theAlexanders' assertions, the superiorcourt did not errin striking
the declarations. 

### Generally, experttestimony is admissible ifthe expert is "'qualified as an 

### expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, oreducation,'"6 relies on 

## generally accepted theories in the scientific community, and would be helpful to the trier offact. Johnston-Forbes v. Matsunaqa, 181 Wn.2d 346, 352, 333 P.3d 

### 388 (2014) (quoting ER 702). The court "mustfind thatthere is anadequate foundation so that an opinion isnot mere speculation, conjecture, ormisleading. 

### It is the properfunction ofthe trial courtto scrutinize theexpert's underlying information and determine whether it is sufficient to form an opinion on the relevant issue. Johnston-Forbes, 181 Wn.2d at 357. Ifthe expert's opinionrests


### on novel scientific evidence, it must also satisfy the Frye standard. State v. 

### Gregory. 158 Wn.2d 759, 829-30, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006), overruled on other

6 ER 702 states: Ifscientific, technical, or otherspecialized knowledge will assist thetrier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 

### qualified asan expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, oreducation, may testify thereto in theform ofan opinion orotherwise.

-12No. 71952-1-1/13 (consol. with No. 72350-2-I) grounds by State v.W.R.. 181 Wn.2d 757, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014). Expert testimony is admissible under Frye if: "(1) the scientific theory or principle upon which the evidence is 

### based has gained general acceptance inthe relevant scientific community of which it is a part; and (2) there are generally accepted methods of applying the theory or principle in a manner capable of producing reliable results." Lake Chelan Shores Homeowners Ass'n v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 176 

### Wn. App. 168, 175, 313 P.3d 408 (2013) (quoting State v. Sipin. 130 Wn. App. 403, 414, 123 P.3d 862 (2005)), review denied. 179 Wn.2d 1019 (2014). We 

### review evidentiary rulings made in conjunction with a summary judgmentmotion de novo. Taylor v. Bell, 185 Wn. App. 270, 285, 340 P.3d 951 (2014), review denied, 183 Wn.2d 1012 (2015). 

### Wood's and Kelley's declarations simply do not meet the requirements of Frye and/or ER 702 and 703. Neither declaration demonstrated the requisite 

### expertqualifications. Wood's declaration also containedinadmissible speculation and legal opinions, and Kelley's declaration failed to demonstrate 

### general acceptance of hismethodology in the scientific community. Thecourt did not err in striking the declarations. 

### Without citing pertinent authority, the Alexanders contend they were "entitled to an evidentiary hearing to prove the admissibility of their expert's 

### testimony." Br. of Appellant at 12. We need not consider arguments 

### unsupported byauthority. Cowiche Canyon, 118Wn.2d at 809. Furthermore, 

### werecently sustained a summaryjudgmentthatwas based on the inadmissibility

13No. 71952-1-1/14 (consol. with No. 72350-2-I)
of the nonmoving party's expert opinions and that was entered without holding a Frye hearing. Lake Chelan Shores, 176 Wn. App. at 174-79. In Lake Chelan Shores, as in this case, the moving party pointed to the absence of evidence demonstrating the admissibility ofexpert testimony, and the nonmoving party failed to produce such evidence. 176 Wn. App. at 179. The superior court did 

### not err in granting summaryjudgmentwithout holding a Frye hearing. Cf. Madura v. BAC Home Loans Servicing. LP. 593 Fed. Appx. 834 (11th Cir. 2014) 

### (court did not abuse its discretion in denying a hearing on the admissibility of expert testimony where summaryjudgment submissions failed to meet the standards for admissibility on their face). 

### Next, the Alexanders contend summaryjudgment was improper because 

### Capital One "cannot rely upon the 'merger' ofChevy Chase Bankwith [Capital One] toconclude it is the holder ofthe original note and [Deed ofTrust]." Br. of Appellant at 7. They argue that "[t]he 'global assignment' ofdeeds oftrustfrom Chevy Chase Bankto Capitol One . . . does notlogically allow [Capital One] to assert preemption of the Washington Deeds of TrustAct." Br. ofAppellant at 7- 8. This argument is meritless. 

### Capital One does not allege preemption ofthe act orreliance on a "global 

### assignment" of deeds oftrust. Rather, Capital One argues, and theAlexanders do not dispute, that "[a]s a matter of corporate law, Capital One acquired all 

### rights in the Note whenChevy Chase was merged into Capital One." Br. of Resp'ts at 17. And more fundamentally, as noted above, Capital One submitted

14No. 71952-1-1/15 (consol. with No. 72350-2-I)
unrebutted evidence that itpossessed the original note when itforeclosed. It therefore had standing to enforce the note and deed of trust regardless ofthe validity ofthe assignment.7 See Truiillo v. Nw. Trustee Services. Inc.. 181 Wn. App. 484, 496-502, 326 P.3d 768 (2014), reversed in part. 2015 WL 4943982 (Wash. Aug. 20, 2015); In re Butler. 512 B.R. 643, 656 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2014) (under the deed oftrust act, "a security interest follows the obligation it secures," and this is true whether the deed of trust was assigned properly or at all); In re Jacobson. 402 B.R. 359, 367 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009) (holding that 

### "[i]n Washington, only the holder of the obligation secured by the deed of trust is entitled to foreclose.
... '[Transfer of the note carries with itthe security, without 

### any formal assignment ordelivery, or even mention of the latter'" (alterationin original) (quoting Carpenter v. Longan. 83 U.S. 271, 21 L Ed. 313 (1872))); Ukpoma v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n. No. 12-CV-0184, 2013 WL 1934172, at*3

7The same reasoning defeats the Alexanders' argumentthat the document 

### purporting to assign the deed of trust to Capital One was ineffective because the assignee, MERS, "did nothold the Alexanders' note, and therefore it had no powerto assign the [deed oftrust] even ifthe assigning 'officer' could be construed to be an agent 

### ofChevy Chase Bank." Br. ofAppellant at 9. Furthermore, Capital One responds, and the Alexanders do not dispute, that borrowers are third parties to such assignments and therefore lack standing to challenge them. Borowski v. BNC Morta.. Inc., No. C12-5867, 2013 WL 4522253, at *5(W.D. Wash. Aug. 27, 2013) ("[B]orrowers, as third parties to 

### the assignment of their mortgage (and securitization process), cannot mount a challenge to the chain ofassignments."); Andrews v. Countrywide Bank. NA, No. C15-0428, 2015 WL 1487093, at *3 (W.D. Wash. April 1, 2015) ("[A] borrower generally lacks standing to challenge the assignment of its loan documents unless the borrowershows that it is at a 

### genuinerisk ofpaying the same debttwice."). And even ifthe Alexanders' had standing 

### tochallenge the assignment, their argument isunavailing because thevalidity ofMERS' assignment did notdepend onwhether MERS was the actual holder ofthe note. In Bain v. Metro. Morta. Grp.. Inc.. 175 Wn.2d 83, 106, 285 P.3d 34 (2012), our Supreme Court held that because it was "likely true" that "lenders and their assigns are entitled to name 

### [MERS] as their agent," nothing in Bain "should beconstrued to suggest an agentcannot
-15-No. 71952-1-1/16 (consol. with No. 72350-2-I) (E.D. Wash. May 9, 2013) ("[B]yvirtue of being in possession ofthe note, U.S. Bank is the lawful owner. Its right to receive payment on the note does not depend upon any assignment ofthe note from MERS."). Last, citing RCW 62A.3-104, the Alexanders contend Capital One was not 

### "a legitimate 'holder'" of the note because the note was not an unconditional promise to pay a debt and was therefore not a negotiable instrument. But as 

### Capital One correctly points out, the note contains a clear promise "to pay Three Million . . . Dollars . . . plus interest." The Alexanders fail to identify a single 

### condition to that promise in the note. The Alexanders also fail to acknowledge or 

### apply the criteria for an unconditional promise set forth in RCW 62A.3-106. Accordingly, their contention fails.
Ill 

### The Alexanders and their counsel challenge the superior court's award of 

### $79,865 in attorney's fees and sanctions to Capital One. As noted above, the court's award rested on three alternative bases: the frivolous action statute, RCW 

### 4.84.185, theattorney feeprovision in the deed oftrust, andCR 11.8 The
represent the holder ofa note." 175Wn.2d at 106; Andrews, 2015 WL 1487093, at*3. ("MERS may act as an agent of the note-holder."). 8CR 11 (a) provides in pertinent part: The signature of a party . . . constitutes a certificate . . . that the party
.. . has read the pleading, motion, or legal memorandum, and that to the best 

### of the party's . . . knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an 

### inquiry reasonable underthe circumstances: (1) it is well grounded in fact; (2) it is warranted by existing law or a goodfaith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal ofexisting law or the establishment ofnew law; (3) it is not interposedfor any improper 

### purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delayor needless increase in the cost oflitigation
.... If a pleading, motion, or legal
-16-No. 71952-1-1/17 (consol. with No. 72350-2-I)
Alexanders only challenge the court's reliance on CR 11. We review a trial court's imposition of CR 11 sanctions for abuse of discretion. Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. &Ass'n v. Fisons Corp.. 122 Wn.2d 299, 338-39, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993). The trial court knows the tenor of the litigation and is in the best position to determine whether facts exist to impose sanctions. Miller v. Badglev. 51 Wn. App. 285, 300-01, 753 P.2d 530 (1988). On the briefing presented, we cannot say the court abused its discretion. The portions ofthe Alexanders' brief pertaining to CR 11 contain no 

### references to the record and no assignments oferror to or discussion of any of 

### the superior court's manyfindings and conclusions. The Alexanders also offer
no response to Capital One's extensive arguments and discussion of the court's 

### findings and conclusions. This briefing is inadequate and precludes review. Norcon Builders. LLC v. GMP Homes VG. LLC. 161 Wn. App. 474, 486, 254 

### P.3d 835 (2011) ("We will not consider an inadequately briefedargument."); Donnerv. Blue. 187 Wn. App. 51, 65, 347 P.3d 881 (2015) (same). 

### In any event, the court's unchallenged findings are verities, Humphrey Indus.. Ltd. v. Clav St. Assocs.. LLC. 176 Wn.2d 662, 675, 295 P.3d 231 (2013),

memorandum is signed in violation of this rule, the court. . . may impose upon the person who signed it... an appropriate sanction, which may include an orderto pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or legal memorandum, including a reasonable attorney fee. 

### (Emphasis added.) Thisrule authorizes sanctionsfor baseless filings orfilings madefor an improper purpose. Brvant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 119Wn.2d 210, 219-20, 829 P.2d 1099(1992). -17-No. 71952-1-1/18 (consol. with No. 72350-2-I)


### and those findings support the court's conclusions oflaw.9 In addition, the Alexanders' principal argument against CR 11 sanctions—i.e., that they reasonably relied on their "experts" opinions—ignores the glaring deficiencies in the experts' qualifications and declarations. The Alexanders fail to demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions under CR 11.
Affirmed.

We concur:

9While the Alexanders argue that courts "should not consider Rule 11 sanctions 

### ifan applicable andappropriate remedy isavailable by statute orunder otherRules," theycite noauthority supporting thatproposition. Br. ofAppellant at 17. We neednot consider arguments that are not supported by authority. Cowiche Canyon. 118Wn.2d at 809.

18