alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### § 436.404 Applicant's choice of category.

The agency must allow an individual who would be eligible under more than one category to have his eligibility determined for the category he selects.
#### Sharleen Marie LAVERGNE v. Mr. and Mrs. Russell MIRE.

No. 63103.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 20, 1978.

In re: Mr. and Mrs. Russell Mire, applying for remedial writs. Parish of Lafayette.

Writ denied. Application is moot.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


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<NAME>                        Communication Intelligence Corporation
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                 6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                  JUN-30-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>               1
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<SECURITIES>                  0
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<INVENTORY>                   49
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              4,919
<PP&E>                        1,842
<DEPRECIATION>                (1,545)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                5,513
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>         2,064
<BONDS>                       0
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<COMMON>                      844
<OTHER-SE>                    208
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  5,513
<SALES>                       2,074
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<CGS>                         1,332
<TOTAL-COSTS>                 817
<OTHER-EXPENSES>              2,379
<LOSS-PROVISION>              (9)
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<INCOME-PRETAX>               (2,015)
<INCOME-TAX>                  0
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</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-2624

SHIRLEY D. SEIBLES,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

COUNTY OF FAIRFIELD,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District

Judge. (CA-96-1780-0-17BD)

Submitted: July 22, 1998 Decided: July 31, 1998

Before ERVIN, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Shirley D. Seibles, Appellant Pro Se. Kenneth George Goode, GOODE

& ASSOCIATES, Winnsboro, South Carolina; William Henry Davidson,

II, Alice Price Adams, DAVIDSON, MORRISON & LINDEMANN, P.A.,

Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Shirley D. Seibles appeals from the district court’s orders

dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994), action claiming employment

discrimination action based on a jury verdict and denying her

motion to amend the judgment filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59.

The proper standard for review of a jury verdict is stated in Price

v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241 (4th Cir. 1996). “Recognizing

that we may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury or

make credibility determinations, if there is evidence on which a

reasonable jury may return verdicts in favor of Appellees, we must

affirm.” Id. at 1249-50 (citations omitted). There is ample evidentiary basis to support the jury's verdict that the County of

Fairfield’s decision not to hire Seibles for the 911 Coordinator

position was not the result of racial discrimination. See Seibles

v. County of Fairfield, No. CA-96-1780-0-17BD (D.S.C. Oct. 8 & 21,

1997).

Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED
I

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 3566

To expand the definition of limited tax benefit for purposes of the Line

Item Veto Act.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 4, 1996

Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin introduced the following bill; which was referred

to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, and in addition

to the Committee on Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined

by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall

within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To expand the definition of limited tax benefit for purposes

of the Line Item Veto Act.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. AMENDMENT TO CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET

4 ACT.

5 Section 1026(9) of the Congressional Budget and Im6 poundment Control Act of 1974 (as added by the Line

7 Item Veto Act) is amended to read as follows:

8 ‘‘(9) LIMITED TAX BENEFIT.—The term ‘lim9 ited tax benefit’ means any tax provision that has
2

•HR 3566 IH

1 the practical effect of providing a benefit in the form

2 of different treatment to a particular taxpayer or a

3 limited class of taxpayers, whether or not such provi4 sion is limited by its terms to a particular taxpayer

5 or class of taxpayers.’’.

Æ
No. 99-564.

#### Bado v. New Jersey.

Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**200 CA 14-00736**  PRESENT: PERADOTTO, J.P., CARNI, SCONIERS, AND WHALEN, JJ.

ANGELA SIMS, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KUSHNOOD HAQ, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

HAGELIN KENT LLC, BUFFALO (BRENT C. SEYMOUR OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

HOGAN WILLIG, PLLC, AMHERST (SCOTT M. DUQUIN OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Joseph R. Glownia, J.), entered January 15, 2014. The order denied the motion of defendant for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granted the cross motion of plaintiff for partial summary judgment on liability, i.e., on the issue of negligence and her claim that she sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by denying the cross motion and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries she allegedly sustained when her vehicle collided at an intersection with a vehicle operated by defendant. Plaintiff alleged that she sustained qualifying injuries pursuant to Insurance Law § 5102 (d) in the permanent consequential limitation of use, significant limitation of use, and 90/180-day categories. Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury in the accident under any of those categories. Plaintiff cross-moved for partial summary judgment on liability, i.e., on the issue of negligence and her claim that she sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category ( see Ruzycki v Baker , 301 AD3d 48-51, 52). Supreme Court properly denied defendant’s motion, but erred in granting plaintiff’s cross motion, and we therefore modify the order accordingly.

We conclude that the court properly denied the motion with respect to the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories. Although defendant met his initial burden, plaintiff raised triable issues of fact ( see Leahey v Fitzgerald , 1 AD3d 924, 926; Parkhill v Cleary , 305 AD2d 1088, 1089).**-2- 200 CA 14-00736** 
We further conclude that the court erred in granting that part of the cross motion concerning the 90/180-day category. The conflicting affirmations of the medical experts raise triable issues of fact whether plaintiff sustained a serious injury under that category ( see Linnane v Szabo , 111 AD3d 1304, 1305; Verkey v Hebard , 99 AD3d 1205, 1206).

The court also erred in granting that part of the cross motion concerning defendant’s negligence. The conflicting testimony of the parties with respect “to which driver was proceeding with a green light raised a triable issue of fact on the question of [negligence]” ( Alexandre v Dweck , 44 AD3d 597, 597-598; see D.F. v Wedge Mascot Corp ., 43 AD3d 1372, 1373).

Entered: February 13, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
### SERVED: July 7, 2015 U.S. DEPARTMENTOF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS

WASHINGTON, DC
IN THE MATTER OF STARCO d/b/a FOUR STAR CHEMICAL Docket No. FAA-2015- 1318 (Civil Penalty Action)
ORDER 

### OFDISMISSAL On May 27,2015, the Federal Aviation Administration (herein.after referred to as "FAA") filed a Complaint. On May 12,2015, STARCO d/b/a FOUR STAR CHEMICAL (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent'') filed a Request for Hearing. On June 18, 2015, the FAA requested that its Complaintbe withdrawn. 14 C.F.R. 

### § 13.215 states: "Atany time before or during a hearing, an agency attorney may withdraw a complaintorparty may withdraw a request for a hearing withoutthe consent ofthe administrative lawjudge. Ifan agency attorney withdraws the complaint or a party withdraws the request for a hearing and the answer, the administrative lawjudge shall dismiss the proceedings under this subpart with prejudice." WHEREFORE, the within filed Request to Withdraw Complainthaving been read and considered, 

### it is ORDERED as follows: 1. FAA's Requestto Withdraw Complaint be and is hereby granted; and 2. This proceeding be and is hereby dismissed withprejudice.

Richard C. Goodwin U.S. Administrative Law Judge Attachment- Service ListSERVICELIST- BY U.S. MAIL ORIGINAL & ONE COPY Federal Aviation Administration 800 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, DC 20591 Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W1000 1

Tiffany Hedgpeth, Re,\pondent 's C'ounsel Edgcomb Law Group, LLP 333 N. Glenoaks Blvd., Suite 610 Burbank, CA 91502 TEL: 818-861-7618 FAX: 818-861-7616 ONE COPY

Courtney Adolph, Complainant 's Counsel Office ofthe Regional Counsel, AWP-7.4 Federal AviationAdministration Western-Pacific Region P.O. Box 92007 Los Angeles, CA 90009-2007 TEL: 310-725-7128 FAX: 310-725-6816 The Honorable Richard C. Goodwin,Administrative LawJudge Office ofHearings, M-20 U.S. DepartmentofTransportation 1200NewJersey Avenue, S.E. (E11-310) Washington, DC 205'90 TEL: 202-366-5121 StaffAssistant FAX: 202-366-7536 DocketNo. FAA-2015-1318 (Civil Penalty Action)

1 Service was by U.S. Mail. For service in person orby expedited courier, use the following address: Federal Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building----Suite 2W 1000, Washington, DC 20591; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430. 2
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1875 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to permanently extend the 

Indian employment credit and the depreciation rules for property used 

predominantly within an Indian reservation. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 17, 2007 

Mr. BOREN (for himself and Mr. SULLIVAN) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to permanently 

extend the Indian employment credit and the depreciation rules for property used predominantly within an 

Indian reservation. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PERMANENT EXTENSION OF INDIAN EMPLOY4 MENT CREDIT AND DEPRECIATION RULES 

5 FOR PROPERTY ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS. 

6 (a) EMPLOYMENT CREDIT.—Section 45A of the In7 ternal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to Indian employ8 ment credit) is amended by striking subsection (f). 


jcorcoran on PROD1PC62 with BILLS
2 

•HR 1875 IH

1 (b) DEPRECIATION RULES.—Subsection (j) of section 

2 168 of such Code (relating to property on Indian reserva3 tions) is amended by striking paragraph (8). 

Æ 


jcorcoran on PROD1PC62 with BILLS
HomePeople...Ariel P. Eckblad

# 				Ariel P. Eckblad			

															Deputy Assistant Secretary						Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations												

				February 8, 2021 -									December 9, 2022							

**Ariel P. Eckblad's term ended on December 9, 2022.** Ariel P. Eckblad is a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO). Ariel leads the Bureau’s efforts to anticipate, prevent, and respond to conflict and instability in Africa and Asia. She also oversees the Bureau’s office of program design, monitoring, and evaluation.Ariel was most recently Chief-of-Staff in the Office of Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and had been the National Security Legislative Counsel in the former Senate office of Vice President Kamala Harris.  Outside of government, Ariel was the visiting Mullen Seminar of Law professor at Georgetown University.  She has taught negotiation and dispute resolution at the American University Washington College of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Harvard Graduate School of Education, and Harvard Law School.Ariel holds a Juris Doctorate from Harvard Law, and Masters of Science degrees from the University of Oxford and the University of London in diplomacy and international relations, respectively.  She has been both a Marshall Scholar in the United Kingdom and a Fulbright Scholar in India, and was the valedictorian of her class at Spelman College.
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U.S. Department *of* StateThe Lessons of 1989: Freedom and Our Future
HomePanama (86-911) – Taxation of Income of Contractors of the Panama Canal Commission

# 									Panama (86-911) – Taxation of Income of Contractors of the Panama Canal Commission							

TIAS

September 11, 1986

Panama: Taxation

Effected by exchange of notes at Panama September 11, 1986; entered into force September 11, 1986.  With attachments and related notes.
Download Agreement						 [13 MB]

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PanamaTaxationTreaties

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

**GLUE WILKINS,**

**Petitioner**

**v.**

**12TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT AND HON.**
**RICHARD A. LEWIS, PRESIDENT JUDGE,** 

**Respondents :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 85 MM 2016** 

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW **, this 22nd day of August, 2016, the Application for L eave to File** 

**Original Process is** GRANTED **, and the “King’s Bench Motion - PCRA” is** DENIED **. The**

**Prothonotary is** DIRECTED **to strike the name of the jurist from the caption.**
#### Charles McClure v. The State.

*No. 1085.*

*Decided February 10th, 1897.*

Xiocal Option—Illegally Giving Prescription—Recognizance on Appeal.

A recognizance on appeal for illegally giving a prescription to obtain intoxicating liquor in a local option precinct, is fatally defective, if it fails to recite, that said prescription was given after the qualified voters of said county bad determined, at an election for that purpose, that- the sale of intoxicating liquors should be prohibited in said precinct.

Appeal from the County Court of Eastland. Tried below before Hon. G. W. DAkast, County Judge.

Appeal from a conviction for illegally giving a prescription to be used in obtaining liquor in a local option precinct; penalty, a fine of $25 and twenty days’ confinement in the county jail.

The Assistant Attorney-General moved to dismiss the appeal, because the recognizance was fatally defective.

No brief for appellant.

*Mann Trice,*Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

Appellant was convicted under &n indictment charging him with giving a prescription to be used in obtaining intoxicating liquors in a local option precinct, and appeals. The recognizance binds the appellant “to well and truly make his personal appearance before the honorable County Court of Eastland County, at the court' house of said county, in Eastland, from day to day and from term to term until discharged by due course of law, then and there to answer the State of Texas upon a charge by indictment duly presented in said court, wherein the said Charles McClure is accused of the offense of unlawfully, in the county of Eastland and State of Texas, giving a prescription to be used in obtaining intoxicating liquor in said county and *130State, in which said county the sale of intoxicating liquors had theretofore been, and was then and there, prohibited under, and by the laws of said State of Texas, and the said Charles McClure not then and there being a regular practicing physician, and of which offense the said Charles McClure has been convicted in this court,” etc. We are of opinion that this recognizance is fatally defective in not reciting therein that this prescription was given after the qualified voters of said county had determined, at an election held for that purpose, that the sale of intoxicating liquors should be prohibited therein. This recognizance, to say the least of it, is very informal, if not illegal, in other respects. There may be some question as to whether the requirement “that the defendant shall make his personal appearance before the honorable County Court of Eastland County, Texas, at the court house of said County of Eastland from day to day and from term to term until discharged by due course of law,” is equivalent to the statutory requirement to appear before that court from day to day and term to term, and not depart without leave of this court.” But, whether it is or not, it is defective in regard to the matter pointed out. The motion of the Assistant Attorney-General is well taken, and the appeal is dismissed.

*Dismissed.*
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§ 486.308 Designation of one OPO for each service area. ( a ) CMS designates only one OPO per service area. A service area is open for competition when the OPO for the service area is de-certified and all administrative appeals under § 486.314 are exhausted.
( b ) Designation periods— ( 1 ) *General.* An OPO is normally designated for a 4-year agreement cycle. The period may be shorter, for example, if an OPO has voluntarily terminated its agreement with CMS and CMS selects a successor OPO for the balance of the 4-year agreement cycle. In rare situations, a designation period may be longer, for example, a designation may be extended if additional time is needed to select a successor OPO to replace an OPO that has been de-certified.
( 2 ) *Re-Certification.* Re-certification must occur not more frequently than once every 4 years.
( c ) Unless CMS has granted a hospital a waiver under paragraphs (d) through (f) of this section, the hospital must enter into an agreement only with the OPO designated to serve the area in which the hospital is located.
( d ) If CMS changes the OPO designated for an area, hospitals located in that area must enter into agreements with the newly designated OPO or submit a request for a waiver in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section within 30 days of notice of the change in designation.
( e ) A hospital may request and CMS may grant a waiver permitting the hospital to have an agreement with a designated OPO other than the OPO designated for the service area in which the hospital is located. To qualify for a waiver, the hospital must submit data to CMS establishing that— ( 1 ) The waiver is expected to increase organ donations; and
( 2 ) The waiver will ensure equitable treatment of patients listed for transplants within the service area served by the hospital's designated OPO and within the service area served by the OPO with which the hospital seeks to enter into an agreement.
( f ) In making a determination on waiver requests, CMS considers— ( 1 ) Cost effectiveness;
( 2 ) Improvements in quality;
( 3 ) Changes in a hospital's designated OPO due to changes in the definitions of metropolitan statistical areas, if applicable; and
( 4 ) The length and continuity of a hospital's relationship with an OPO other than the hospital's designated OPO.
( g ) A hospital may continue to operate under its existing agreement with an out-of-area OPO while CMS is processing the waiver request. If a waiver request is denied, a hospital must enter into an agreement with the designated OPO within 30 days of notification of the final determination.
[71 FR 31046, May 31, 2006, as amended at 79 FR 27156, May 12, 2014]