alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Walter F. Duckworth, Appellant, *v.*Margaret M. Cunningham, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term,

February, 1899.)

Appellate Term — Has no jurisdiction over annexed territory in the borough of The Bronx.

The Appellate Term has no jurisdiction of an appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the first district of the borought of The Bronx, as the territory in question, although annexed to the city and county of New York, remains, for judicial purposes, within the jurisdiction of the second judicial district and department.

Appeal by plaintiff from a judgment against him, rendered in the Municipal Court, first district, borough of The Bronx.

Epstein Bros., for appellant.

Peter A. Sheil, for respondent.

Freedman, P. J.

The appeal in this case being from a judgment of the Municipal Court, first district of the borough of The Bronx, the respondent moved for a dismissal of the appeal on the *404ground that no appeal to this court lies from the judgment in question and that the appeal should have been taken to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the second department.

It is not claimed that the court below was without jurisdiction, and no constitutional question as to such jurisdiction is involved. The case, therefore, differs essentially from the case of Irwin v. Metropolitan Railway Co., 25 Misc. Rep. 187, in which case *)&*constitutional objection to the jurisdiction of the trial court was interposed at the commencement of the trial.

In the case at bar the question simply is, whether the first district of the borough of The Bronx is within the first or the second judicial department. H in the first department this court has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. If in the second department this court is without jurisdiction. The question has been practically decided by the Court of Appeals in People ex rel. Henderson v. Board of Supervisors, 147 N. Y. 1.

The effect of that decision is that the territory now embraced within the boundaries of the first judicial district of the Municipal Court, borough of The Bronx, remains, notwithstanding its former annexation to the city and county of Hew York, part of the twenty-second senate district and of the second judicial district and department.

The motion for the dismissal of the appeal should, therefore, be granted, with $10 costs.

Leventritt, J., concurs.

MacLean, J. (concurring).

It is objected that this appeal will hot lie because not taken in the judicial department embracing the district wherein the action was brought. Arid the objection is good, because the territory of the first district of the borough of The Bronx lies within the second judicial district and department of the Supreme Court. People ex rel. Henderson v. Board of Supervisors, 147 N. Y. 1.

Appeal dismissed, with $10 costs.
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1864 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to direct the Secretary of Veterans 

Affairs to provide for the automated processing of veterans disability 

compensation claims. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 17, 2007 

Mr. LAMBORN (for himself and Mr. BUYER) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

A BILL 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to direct the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to provide for the automated 

processing of veterans disability compensation claims. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. AUTOMATED PROCESSING OF DISABILITY COM4 PENSATION CLAIMS BY DEPARTMENT OF 

5 VETERANS AFFAIRS. 

6 (a) AUTOMATED CLAIMS PROCESSING.—Chapter 77 

7 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by adding at 

8 the end the following new subchapter: 


jcorcoran on PROD1PC62 with BILLS
2 

•HR 1864 IH

1 ‘‘SUBCHAPTER III—AUTOMATED CLAIMS 

2 PROCESSING 

3 ‘‘§ 7741. Automated processing of disability com4 pensation claims 

5 ‘‘(a) REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary shall develop of 

6 a rules-based expert system to automate the adjudication 

7 of claims of veterans disability compensation. Such system 

8 shall be designed to provide a disability rating rec9 ommendation based on the applicable rate of disability 

10 compensation under chapter 11 of this title. 

11 ‘‘(b) CONTRACT AUTHORITY.—To carry out the re12 quirement of subsection (a), the Secretary may enter into 

13 a contract with a private entity with significant experience 

14 in developing rules-based expert systems. 

15 ‘‘(c) IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than four years 

16 after the date of the enactment of this section, the Sec17 retary shall implement the rules-based expert system de18 veloped under subsection (a) at not less than two regional 

19 offices of the Department. 

20 ‘‘(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

21 are authorized to carry out this section $5,000,000 for 

22 each of fiscal years 2008 through 2011.’’. 

23 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections 

24 at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding 

25 at the end the following new items: 


jcorcoran on PROD1PC62 with BILLS
3 

•HR 1864 IH

‘‘SUBCHAPTER III—AUTOMATED CLAIMS PROCESSING

‘‘2241. Automated processing of disability compensation claims.’’. 

Æ 


jcorcoran on PROD1PC62 with BILLS
Editorial Note on Part 411
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 411 appear at 71 FR 9471, Feb. 24, 2006

§ 411.23 Beneficiary's cooperation. ( a ) If CMS takes action to recover conditional payments, the beneficiary must cooperate in the action.
( b ) If CMS's recovery action is unsuccessful because the beneficiary does not cooperate, CMS may recover from the beneficiary.
EXHIBIT 32.1

# CERTIFICATION PURSUANT
TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In
connection with the quarterly report of National Home Health Care Corp. (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended January 31, 2007, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I,
Steven Fialkow, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that,
to the best of my knowledge:

|(1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
          Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|(2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
          respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: March 16, 2007

| | /s/ Steven Fialkow
Steven Fialkow
Principal Executive Officer
| | -------------------------------------------------------------

A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 1350 has been provided to National Home Health Care Corp.
and will be retained by National Home Health Care Corp. and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

-24-
§ 483.356 Protection of residents. ( a ) *Restraint and seclusion policy for the protection of residents.* ( 1 ) Each resident has the right to be free from restraint or seclusion, of any form, used as a means of coercion, discipline, convenience, or retaliation.
( 2 ) An order for restraint or seclusion must not be written as a standing order or on an as-needed basis.
( 3 ) Restraint or seclusion must not result in harm or injury to the resident and must be used only— ( i ) To ensure the safety of the resident or others during an emergency safety situation; and
( ii ) Until the emergency safety situation has ceased and the resident's safety and the safety of others can be ensured, even if the restraint or seclusion order has not expired.
( 4 ) Restraint and seclusion must not be used simultaneously.
( b ) *Emergency safety intervention.* An emergency safety intervention must be performed in a manner that is safe, proportionate, and appropriate to the severity of the behavior, and the resident's chronological and developmental age; size; gender; physical, medical, and psychiatric condition; and personal history (including any history of physical or sexual abuse).
( c ) *Notification of facility policy.* At admission, the facility must— ( 1 ) Inform both the incoming resident and, in the case of a minor, the resident's parent(s) or legal guardian(s) of the facility's policy regarding the use of restraint or seclusion during an emergency safety situation that may occur while the resident is in the program;
( 2 ) Communicate its restraint and seclusion policy in a language that the resident, or his or her parent(s) or legal guardian(s) understands (including American Sign Language, if appropriate) and when necessary, the facility must provide interpreters or translators;
( 3 ) Obtain an acknowledgment, in writing, from the resident, or in the case of a minor, from the parent(s) or legal guardian(s) that he or she has been informed of the facility's policy on the use of restraint or seclusion during an emergency safety situation. Staff must file this acknowledgment in the resident's record; and
( 4 ) Provide a copy of the facility policy to the resident and in the case of a minor, to the resident's parent(s) or legal guardian(s).
( d ) *Contact information.* The facility's policy must provide contact information, including the phone number and mailing address, for the appropriate State Protection and Advocacy organization.
#### Roger JACKSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 74-1206.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 28, 1975.

Maynard A. Gross, Miami Beach, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Stephen Nagin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before PEARSON, HENDRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal from an adjudication of guilt for the sale and possession of heroin assigns as error the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to compel disclosure of the identity and address of a confidential informant.

The essential facts are that a confidential informant aided an undercover police officer in being put in contact with one Davis, codefendant below, who in turn put the police officer in contact with appellant, defendant below. The defendant, in the presence of the confidential informant and codefendant Davis, sold a packet of heroin to the police officer.

Defendant, on appeal, complains that the confidential informant’s identity and address should have been disclosed. Defendant, himself, admits that the general rule in Florida gravitates against such disclosure, but defendant also calls our attention to exceptions to the rule.

We first note that this case is clearly distinguishable from those cases in which the informant himself had direct dealings with the defendant. See Monserrate v. State, Fla.App.1970, 232 So.2d 444. And although it is apparent here that the confidential informant’s activities in assisting the police officer in effectuating the ultimate sale of the narcotics were significant, it is also apparent that the informant’s activities were not so material as to bring this case within the exceptions to the general rule. See Doe v. State, Fla.App. 1972, 262 So.2d 11 and Kraus v. State, Fla.App. 1971, 243 So.2d 214. As to the question of “materiality” of. such information that is sought to be disclosed, see Harrington v. State, Fla.App. 1959, 110 So.2d 495, 497.

In passing, we feel compelled to note that even though the State did not furnish the name and address of the informant, the record strongly indicates defense counsel’s awareness of the informant’s identity.

Finding that no showing has been made to overcome the general rule of non-disclosure of the identity of confidential informants, we hereby affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to compel disclosure.

Affirmed.
Editorial Note on Part 410
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 410 appear at 62 FR 46037, Aug. 29, 1997.

§ 410.23 Screening for glaucoma: Conditions for and limitations on coverage. ( a ) *Definitions* : As used in this section, the following definitions apply: ( 1 ) *Direct supervision in the office setting* means the optometrist or the ophthalmologist must be present in the office suite and be immediately available to furnish assistance and direction throughout the performance of the procedure. It does not mean the physician must be present in the room when the procedure is performed.
( 2 ) *Eligible beneficiary* means individuals in the following high risk categories: ( i ) Individual with diabetes mellitus.
( ii ) Individual with a family history of glaucoma.
( iii ) African-Americans age 50 and over.
( iv ) Hispanic-Americans age 65 and over.
( 3 ) *Screening for glaucoma* means the following procedures furnished to an individual for the early detection of glaucoma: ( i ) A dilated eye examination with an intraocular pressure measurement.
( ii ) A direct ophthalmoscopy examination, or a slit-lamp biomicroscopic examination.
( b ) *Condition for coverage of screening for glaucoma.* Medicare Part B pays for glaucoma screening examinations provided to eligible beneficiaries as described in paragraph (a)(2) of this section if they are furnished by or under the direct supervision in the office setting of an optometrist or ophthalmologist who is legally authorized to perform these services under State law (or the State regulatory mechanism provided by State law) of the State in which the services are furnished, as would otherwise be covered if furnished by a physician or incident to a physician's professional service.
( c ) *Limitations on coverage of glaucoma screening examinations.* ( 1 ) Payment may not be made for a glaucoma screening examination that is performed for an individual who is not an eligible beneficiary as described in paragraph (a)(2) of this section.
( 2 ) Payment may be made for a glaucoma screening examination that is performed on an individual who is an eligible beneficiary as described in paragraph (a)(2) of this section, after at least 11 months have passed following the month in which the last glaucoma screening examination was performed.
[66 FR 55328, Nov. 1, 2001, as amended at 70 FR 70330, Nov. 21, 2005]
#### John J. Ryan, Respondent, *v.*George Voelkl, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, rendered in the Municipal Court of the city of New York, borough of Manhattan, for the seventh district.

Edward Herrmann, for appellant.

Augustus S. Houghton, for respondent.

Leventritt, J.

The plaintiff brought this action to recover the sum of $179.90, being the balance due on contract and for extra work done on an extension to the defendant’s premises. The answer embraces an admission to the extent of $97.20, a general denial and a counterclaim in the sum of $300 for imperfect work and delay. Respecting the item of delay no proof was offered. As to the other issues the conflicting evidence was weighed by the court, and resulted in an adjustment of the respective claims in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $116. We find that conclusion amply justified by the evidence. The 'defendant seeks reversal upon the denial of his motion to dismiss the complaint, on the-ground that there was failure to prove that the work was done to the satisfaction of the architect and in compliance with the laws of the health department. We find no provision in the agreement introduced in evidence calling for the satisfaction of *841the architect, and the plaintiff, therefore, became entitled to recover upon establishing substantial performance and showing approval of the health authorities. There was abundant evidence of substantial performance. Although there may have been slight defects and unintentional omissions, the plaintiff in good faith intended to comply with the contract and substantially did so. Woodward v. Fuller, 80 N. Y. 312; Crouch v. Gutmann, 134 id. 45. Whether the contract had been substantially performed, was a question of fact-to be determined on all the circumstances of the case by the trial court. Bolan v. Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648; Smith v. Brady, 17 id. 189. Therefore the plaintiff became entitled to recover the contract price less the damage resulting from the defects and omissions (Woodward v. Fuller, *supra),*provided the work was done according to law. That fact the architect admitted. There was, consequently, no foundation for the motion, the judgment is just, and must, therefore, be affirmed.

Freedman, P. J., and MacLean, J., concur.

Judgment affirmed, with costs to respondent.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER>1,000
       
<S>                                                                 <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                                       YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                                   DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                                                        DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                                                  2,708
<SECURITIES>                                                                0
<RECEIVABLES>                                                              52
<ALLOWANCES>                                                               22
<INVENTORY>                                                                 0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                                            0
<PP&E>                                                                    750
<DEPRECIATION>                                                            746
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                                          3,287
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                                       0
<BONDS>                                                                     0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                                       0
<PREFERRED>                                                                 0
<COMMON>                                                                    0
<OTHER-SE>                                                              1,816
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                                            3,287
<SALES>                                                                     0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                                        1,121
<CGS>                                                                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                             114
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                                            0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                        (136)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                                          0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                                         1,007
<INCOME-TAX>                                                                0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                                     1,007
<DISCONTINUED>                                                              0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                             0
<CHANGES>                                                                   0
<NET-INCOME>                                                            1,007
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                                            2.88
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                               0
        

</TABLE>
No. 99-9041.

#### Gutierrez-Gonzalez *v.*United States.

C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
- Home
- Cases Filed Against the United States of America
- Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada
- Cases Filed Against the United Mexican States

HomeNAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations...Cases Filed Against the United Mexican States

# 									Cases Filed Against the United Mexican States							

Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for International Claims and Investment Disputes

		Cases Filed Against the United Mexican States Archive		

        - Espiritu Santo Holdings, LP and L1bre Holding, LLC v. United Mexican States
        - Legacy Vulcan v. United Mexican States
        - Alicia Grace and Others v. United Mexican States
        - Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. United Mexican States
        - Carlos Sastre v. United Mexican States
        - Vento Motorcycles, Inc. v. United Mexican States
        - B-Mex, LLC and others v. Government of Mexico
        - Joshua Dean Nelson, Tele Fácil Mexico, S.A. de C.V., and Jorge Luis Blanco v. United Mexican States
        - Lion Mexico Consolidated LP v. United Mexican States

Tags

ArbitrationFree Trade AgreementsLegal AdviserMexicoNorth American Free Trade Agreement

Back to Top
§ 493.1252 Standard: Test systems, equipment, instruments, reagents, materials, and supplies. ( a ) Test systems must be selected by the laboratory. The testing must be performed following the manufacturer's instructions and in a manner that provides test results within the laboratory's stated performance specifications for each test system as determined under § 493.1253.
( b ) The laboratory must define criteria for those conditions that are essential for proper storage of reagents and specimens, accurate and reliable test system operation, and test result reporting. The criteria must be consistent with the manufacturer's instructions, if provided. These conditions must be monitored and documented and, if applicable, include the following: ( 1 ) Water quality.
( 2 ) Temperature.
( 3 ) Humidity.
( 4 ) Protection of equipment and instruments from fluctuations and interruptions in electrical current that adversely affect patient test results and test reports.
( c ) Reagents, solutions, culture media, control materials, calibration materials, and other supplies, as appropriate, must be labeled to indicate the following: ( 1 ) Identity and when significant, titer, strength or concentration.
( 2 ) Storage requirements.
( 3 ) Preparation and expiration dates.
( 4 ) Other pertinent information required for proper use.
( d ) Reagents, solutions, culture media, control materials, calibration materials, and other supplies must not be used when they have exceeded their expiration date, have deteriorated, or are of substandard quality.
( e ) Components of reagent kits of different lot numbers must not be interchanged unless otherwise specified by the manufacturer.
#### N. F. C. MORTGAGE CORPORATION, a Florida Corporation, et al., Appellants, v. BLANCOM PROPERTIES et al., Appellees.

No. 74-941.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Dec. 6, 1974.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Henry ANDERSON, Jr.

No. 63116.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 20, 1978.

In re: Henry Anderson, Jr., applying for writ of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. Parish of Orleans.

Writ denied.