J-S61027-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v. ROBERTO WALKER FRANKS Appellant No. 515 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of January 30, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at No.: CP-26-CR-0000504-2013
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., WECHT, J., and STRASS BURGER, J. * MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2014 Roberto Walker Franks appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on January 30, 2014, following a jury trial and con viction of manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance (“PWID”); knowingly or intentionally poss essing a controlled substance; use of, or possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia; and tampering with or fabricating evidence. 1 We affirm. The trial court set forth the following recitation of the facts: On October 18, 2012, at approximately 3:00 o’clock p.m., Jason A. Cox, Chief of the Uniontown City Police Departme nt (“UCPD”), observed [Franks] near the intersection of Morganto wn Street

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Cou rt.

1 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (16), and (32), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4910(1), respectively.J-S61027-14

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and Robinson Street, in Uniontown, Fayette County. [Franks] was leaving a hair salon known to the UCPD as a pos sible haven for drug-related activity. Chief Cox pulled his ma rked Ford Expedition alongside [Franks], to ask him a few que stions. While speaking with [Franks], Chief Cox noticed tha t [Franks] seemed nervous and evasive. [Franks] also would no t make eye contact and his hands were fidgeting near his waist

. Chief Cox decided to radio for backup, and exited h is vehicle to continue speaking with [Franks]. A short time late r, Officer Jamie Holland, also of the UCPD, arrived on the sce ne. Officer Holland immediately noticed [Franks] removi ng his hand from his pocket and making a throwing motion behind his back. This caused Officer Holland to move quickly in that direction, directly behind [Franks], to an area with some shru bbery, where he retrieved a tied-off corner piece of a plastic s andwich bag, with a white substance inside. That substance was later confirmed to be 2.8 grams of cocaine. [Franks] was placed under arrest and searched at th at time. The search revealed $300.00 in cash, a digital scal e, and a plastic sandwich baggie with one of the bottom corn ers missing. Officer Holland was also recognized by the [c]ourt as an expert in the field of narcotics investigation. He provid ed additional expert testimony concerning the indicia of [Franks’ ] intent to deliver the cocaine to another person. In particul ar: (1) the scale seized from [Franks] was capable of measuring minute weights, down to one-tenth of a gram, which is the measurement system typically used in the sale of co caine; (2) the plastic sandwich bag, with one missing corner, is a half-used version of what police often refer to as a “diaper, ” which is the byproduct of the packaging of cocaine for distribut ion; (3) the amount of cocaine is of a size typically purchased and broken down to sell for a profit; and (4) Officer Holland had never seen a mere user of drugs in possession of $300, a digit al scale, that quantity of cocaine, and a baggie with a corner mis sing. It was thus his expert opinion that these items indicated [Franks’] intention to distribute the cocaine. On cross-examination, Officer Holland stated that [ Franks] had admitted purchasing the cocaine for his own use, bu t not to any intention of selling the same. Instead, [Franks] c laimed to have just purchased the cocaine at the nearby hair salon . This wasJ-S61027-14

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the same salon the UCPD and others suspected of bei ng a distribution area for cocaine. [Franks] also testified. His recitation of the fac ts was nearly identical to that presented by the Commonwealth. I mportantly, he did not challenge his possession of the cocaine, his attempt to discard it, or that he owned the drug paraphernalia , the scale. Rather, the thrust of his testimony was to undermin e the Commonwealth’s evidence of his intent to deliver th e cocaine to another person. [Franks] explained the amount of money he was carry ing by stating that he was working two jobs, at or in exce ss of sixty hours per week, as a cook in the South Side of Pitt sburgh and a recycler at a local waste facility. Likewise, [Fra nks] explained that he normally used the scale to weigh spices at his job in Pittsburgh, but had started taking it to buy drugs at the hair salon to ensure he was not being cheated. As to the baggie corner, [Franks] indicated that wa s his preferred method of transporting cocaine for person al use. [Franks] also explained his rationale for buying mo re than a minimal quantity. He explained that, when a user p urchases three grams of cocaine, they “usually get one free. ” [Franks] elaborated, “That’s the way it is, the way it’s bee n since I been dealing, like, getting it.” . . . On cross-examination, [Franks] restated that his em ployer provided the scale, but avoided the question of doc umentation or other evidence to substantiate that claim. He also provided testimony in contradiction with Officer Holland. W hile Officer Holland noted that drug dealers would normally use both corners of a plastic baggie before discarding it, [Franks] asserted that the drug dealer he purchased from gave him the enti re baggie. [Franks] could not explain why he retained the bagg ie instead of throwing it away after knotting off the corner. Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 5/16/2014, at 2-5 ( record citations omitted). A jury convicted Franks of the above-mentioned cou nts on January 8, 2014, and on January 21, 2014, the court sentenced him to not less than eighteen months nor more than four years’ incarcera tion. Franks filed post-J-S61027-14

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sentence motions on January 31, 2014, which the tri al court denied on February 24, 2014. On March 5, 2014, Franks timely appealed to this Court, and on the same day, filed a concise statement of e rrors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial co urt entered an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on May 16, 2014. Franks raises the following three questions for ou r review: 1. Did the Commonwealth fail[] to prove beyond[ a] reasonable doubt that [Franks] possessed the contro lled substance with the intent to deliver [it] to anothe r party? 2. Was there insufficient evidence proffered by the Commonwealth for the jury to [find] that [Franks] p ossessed the controlled substance with the intent to deliver [it ] to another party? 3. Was there insufficient evidence presented by the Commonwealth to support the charge of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver [it ] to another party? Franks’ Brief at 7. In his argument, Franks combin es these issues into a single challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding that he possessed the cocaine specifically with the intent to deliver. Id. at 8-18. He claims that the testimony was “unreli able and contradictory” and that “[s]imply because the police use one of th eir own as an expert and to articulate the ‘buzz words’ for each case does n ot give rise to intent.” Id. at 17, 18. We disagree. When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, our standard of review is as follows:J-S61027-14

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We must determine whether, viewing all the evidence at trial, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn there from, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury could have found that each element of the offense was proven b eyond a reasonable doubt. Both direct and circumstantial e vidence can be considered equally when assessing the sufficienc y of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Bull , 618 A.2d 1019, 1020 (Pa. Super. 1993) (quotation omitted). In order to prove the offense of possession with in tent to deliver a controlled substance, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt both that the defendant possessed the controlled substance and had the intent to deliver. When determining whether a defendant had the requisite i ntent to deliver, relevant factors for consideration are the manner in which the controlled substance was packaged, the be havior of the defendant, the presence of drug paraphernalia, and large sums of cash. Expert opinion testimony is also adm issible concerning whether the facts surrounding the posses sion of controlled substances are consistent with an intent to deliver rather than with an intent to possess it for person al use. The expert testimony of a witness qualified in the fiel d of drug distribution, coupled with the presence of drug par aphernalia, is sufficient to establish intent to deliver. Commonwealth v. Carpenter , 955 A.2d 411, 414 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the quantity of drugs and the presenc e of packing materials and paraphernalia, in addition to the expert testim ony of Officer Holland, which the jury found credible, established intent t o deliver beyond a reasonable doubt.J-S61027-14

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At trial, Officer Holland, an officer with eight ye ars on the force and a member of the Fayette County Drug Task Force, was a dmitted without objection as an expert in the field of narcotics in vestigation. N.T. Trial, 1/06/2014, at 27. Officer Holland testified that Franks possessed the cocaine with intent to deliver because Officer Holland watched Franks d iscard a baggie that contained 2.8 grams of cocaine, and Franks possesse d a digital scale, $300.00 in cash, and a clear plastic baggie with on e of the corners missing. Id. at 31-32, 36, 39. Officer Holland testified that the digital scale was capable of measuring to one tenth of a gram, a unit of measurement used to distribute drugs, and that such a scale would typic ally be found with someone who is packaging narcotics. Id. at 36, 41. He further testified that 2.8 grams of powder cocaine, such as Franks was see n to discard, was worth approximately $300.00 in the Uniontown area. Id. at 40. Although he noted that some users do buy in bulk, they usually possess less than a gram, and he had never seen a user who had “$300.00 worth of cocaine on his person, a digital scale, and a baggie with a co rner missing.” Id. at 43. Furthermore, Officer Holland stated that street dea lers typically package drugs for sale by placing them in a corner of a pla stic baggie and tying it off, and that he would expect the dealer to remain in po ssession of the baggie, whereas a user would only possess the corner. Id. at 38-39, 41-42.
In Bull , supra , we also found the evidence sufficient to constitu te intent to deliver. There, the defendant had packag ing materials, such asJ-S61027-14

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plastic bags, and the expert witness, qualified in the field of drug distribution and investigation, stated that the amount possessed by the defendant was more than an individual user would have. Bull , 618 A.2d at 1021. Here, similarly, we conclude that there was sufficient ev idence to support the PWID conviction where “[t]he testimony and the drug paraphernalia taken together established intent to deliver.” Carpenter , 955 A.2d at 415. Franks’ argument that the Commonwealth failed to pr ove intent to deliver lacks merit. 2 Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 11/14/2014

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2 To the extent that Franks makes a passing referen ce to “unreliable and contradictory” testimony, Franks’ Brief at 17, we o bserve that this claim is waived for failure to identify the alleged contradi ctory witness testimony. Id. at 17-18. Even if he had developed this claim, we would deem it an unpreserved challenge to the weight of the evidence ; moreover, “[t]his Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of th e jury on issues of credibility.” Commonwealth v. Brown , 71 A.3d 1009, 1014 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). Thus, it would not merit relief.