Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

CASE STUDIES IN INSURGENCY 

AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE—

COLOMBIA (1964–2009)

United States Army Special Operations Command

Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

CASE STUDIES IN INSURGENCY 

AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE—

COLOMBIA (1964–2009)

Paul J. Tompkins Jr., USASOC Project Lead

Summer Newton, Editor

Katharine Raley Burnett, Christopher Cardona, Jesse Kirkpatrick, 

Sanaz Mirzaei, and Summer Newton, Contributing Authors

United States Army Special Operations Command

and 

The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

National Security Analysis Department
This publication is a work of the United States Government in 

accordance with Title 17, United States Code, sections 101 and 105.

Published by:

The United States Army Special Operations Command

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the 

United States government. Nonmateriel research on special warfare is 

performed in support of the requirements stated by the United States 

Army Special Operations Command, Department of the Army. This 

research is accomplished at The Johns Hopkins University Applied 

Physics Laboratory by the National Security Analysis Department, 

a nongovernmental agency operating under the supervision of the 

USASOC Special Programs Division, Department of the Army.

The analysis and the opinions expressed within this document are 

solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions 

of the US Army or The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics 

Laboratory.

Comments correcting errors of fact and opinion, filling or 

indicating gaps of information, and suggesting other changes that may 

be appropriate should be addressed to:

United States Army Special Operations Command

G-3X, Special Programs Division

2929 Desert Storm Drive

Fort Bragg, NC 28310

All ARIS products are available from USASOC at www.soc.mil

under the ARIS link.
ASSESSING REVOLUTIONARY AND 

INSURGENT STRATEGIES

The Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) series 

consists of a set of case studies and research conducted for the US Army 

Special Operations Command by the National Security Analysis Department of The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

The purpose of the ARIS series is to produce a collection of academically rigorous yet operationally relevant research materials to 

develop and illustrate a common understanding of insurgency and 

revolution. This research, intended to form a bedrock body of knowledge for members of the Special Forces, will allow users to distill vast 

amounts of material from a wide array of campaigns and extract relevant lessons, thereby enabling the development of future doctrine, 

professional education, and training.

From its inception, ARIS has been focused on exploring historical and current revolutions and insurgencies for the purpose of identifying emerging trends in operational designs and patterns. ARIS 

encompasses research and studies on the general characteristics of 

revolutionary movements and insurgencies and examines unique 

adaptations by specific organizations or groups to overcome various 

environmental and contextual challenges.

The ARIS series follows in the tradition of research conducted by 

the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of American University in the 1950s and 1960s, by adding new research to that body of 

work and in several instances releasing updated editions of original 

SORO studies.

VOLUMES IN THE ARIS SERIES

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume I: 1927–1962 (Rev. Ed.)

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009

Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (2nd Ed.)

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (2nd Ed.)

Irregular Warfare Annotated Bibliography

Legal Implications of the Status of Persons in Resistance

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia (1964–2009)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka (1976–2009)

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II (pub. 1961)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Cuba 1953–1959 (pub. 1963)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Guatemala 1944–1954 (pub. 1964)

SORO STUDIES

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Vietnam 1941–1954 (pub. 1964)

v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors acknowledge the following sources of illustrations 

included in this study:

Map images were derived from Map Resources © 2014, Map 

Resources, Lambertville, NJ 08530, www.mapresources.com.

Figure  3-1. Simón Bolívar. Painting by Ricardo Acevedo Bernal 

(1867–1930).

Figure 3-2. Reproduction of an oil painting of Francisco de Paula 

Santander. Original is located at the House of Nariño (Bogotá, Colombia). Via Wikimedia Commons, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/

File:Santander_by_Acevedo_Bernal.jpg.

Figure  5-3. Colombia’s politicized security force configuration 

after state formation. Reproduced with permission from Christopher 

Michael Cardona, “Politicians, Soldiers, and Cops: Colombia’s ‘La Violencia’ in Comparative Perspective” (doctoral dissertation, University of 

California at Berkeley, 2008), 4.

Figure 5-4. The structure of the Colombian government. Based on 

Rex Hudson, Colombia: A Country Study (Baton Rouge: Claitor’s Publishing Division, 2010), 218.

Figure 6-2. FARC-EP flag. Source: http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/

farc.html.

Figure 6-3. FARC incidents over time. Data from the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 

Responses to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

Figure 6-4. FARC target types. Data from the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 

to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

Figure 6-5. FARC attack types. Data from the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 

to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

Figure  7-1. ELN flag, via Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

File:Flag_of_ELN.svg.

Figure  7-4. Plaque commemorating Camilo Torres. By Sahaquiel9102 (own work) [GFDL (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html) 

or CC-BY-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0)]. Via Wikimedia Commons, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ACamilo_

Torres_Leyenda.JPG.

Figure 7-5. ELN target types. Data from the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 

to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.
vi

Figure 7-6. ELN incidents per year. Data from the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 

Responses to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

Figure 7-7. ELN attack types. Data from the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 

to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

Figure 7-10. Estimates of ELN revenues, in 1991 and 1994, in millions of US dollars. Data from Norman Offstein, “A Historical Review 

and Analysis of Colombian Guerrilla Movements: FARC, ELN, and 

EPL,” Desarrollo y Sociedad 52 (2003): 99–142.

Figure 8-1. Flag of M-19. By Jolle (Image:M19.png) [Public domain], 

via Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/

File%3AFlag_of_M-19.svg.

Figure 8-3. Carlos Pizarro, via Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/

wiki/File:CarlosPizarro.jpg, Colectivo Pizarro.

Figure  8-4. Antonio Navarro Wolff. By Briz (Own work) [GFDL 

(http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html) or CC-BY-SA-3.0-2.5-2.0-1.0 

(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AAntonio_Navarro.

jpg.

Figure 8-5. M-19 guerrilla. Photo by Marcelo Montecino.

Figure 8-6. M-19 incidents over time. Data from the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 

Responses to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

Figure 8-7. M-19 attack types. Data from the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 

to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

Figure 8-8. AUC target types. Data from the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 

to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

Figure 8-9. Rosemberg Pabón with another M-19 guerrilla in the 

Dominican Embassy Siege. Photo by Marcelo Montecino.

Figure 8-10. M-19 guerrilla celebrating the end of the Dominican 

Embassy siege. Photo by Marcelo Montecino.

Figure  8-11. La Chiqui, the female M-19 negotiator during the 

Dominican embassy siege. Photo by Marcelo Montecino.

Figure 8-13. M-19 newspaper advertisement announcing the arrival 

of the guerrillas. By M19 (Movimiento 19 de abril) - Periódico ‘El Tiempo’ 

[Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.

org/wiki/File%3ACartel_publicitario_M19_-_Peri%C3%B3dico_El_

Tiempo_-_17_Enero_1974.png.
vii

Figure  8-14. Flag of AD  M-19. By Jolle (Image: Flag of Alianza 

Democrática M-19.png) [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Alianza_

Democr%C3%A1tica_M-19.png.

Figure 9-3. AUC flag, via Wikimedia Commons, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_AUC.svg.

Figure 9-4. AUC incidents per year. Data from the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 

Responses to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

Figure 9-5. AUC attack types. Data from the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 

to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

Figure 9-6. AUC target types. Data from the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 

to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

Figure  9-7. Civilian fatalities attributed to AUC. Data from 

http://w w w.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountr y.php?id=35&

regionSelect=5-Southern_Americas#.
viii

LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

Since 1899, Colombia has been embroiled in a long and bloody 

series of interconnected insurgencies. The most famous of these are 

the Colombian fight against the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 

Colombia–Ejército del Pueblo (FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación 

Nacional (ELN). The campaigns against these violent non-state armed 

actors, as well as against the other groups analyzed in this study, show 

the true nature of unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency. 

These campaigns are not quick, they are not clean, nor are they easy. 

To the contrary, these campaigns are the most difficult and complex 

a nation can face, requiring the delicate and effective application of 

all elements of national power through a synchronized and flexible 

campaign plan with clearly defined end states. Most importantly, the 

nation waging these campaigns must take ownership of the problem in 

order to effectively address it. Colombia stands as a premier case study 

in this regard. Assessing both the successes and failures of the Colombian efforts to stabilize their country provide an invaluable resource for 

US Special Operations Forces to professionally develop in their craft. 

This study, along with the other ARIS works, provides a vital historical 

prospective for all SOF personnel to read, learn, and internalize. It is 

this knowledge of how governments have successfully or unsuccessfully 

met these challenges and how the insurgents and revolutionaries fighting them did the same that will allow us to evolve and meet the challenges of the future operating environment.

BG Kurt L. Sonntag

Commander

Special Operations Command South
ix

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ....................................................................... v

LETTER OF INTRODUCTION ........................................................viii

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY ............................1

Background.........................................................................................3

Purpose of the Case Study .................................................................4

Organization of the Study..................................................................4

Summary of the Study ........................................................................5

Timeline ..........................................................................................9

PART I. CONTEXT AND CATALYSTS OF THE INSURGENCY... 15

CHAPTER 2. PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT...................................... 17

Colombian Geography .....................................................................20

Colombia’s Weak Central State and Regionalism...........................22

Physical Environment and Armed Groups......................................26

CHAPTER 3. HISTORICAL CONTEXT........................................... 31

Gran Colombia..................................................................................34

Early Liberals and Conservatives: 

Santanderistas and Bolivarians................................................35

Collapse of Gran Colombia..............................................................39

Partisanship: Ideology or Social Identity? .......................................41

The Liberal Ascendancy...................................................................46

CHAPTER 4. SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS ...........................53

Ethnicity ............................................................................................55

Demographics...................................................................................57

Economic Policy and Social Inequality............................................57

Resource Curse: Coca, Coffee, Oil/Gas......................................60

Coca Economy...............................................................................61

Coffee ............................................................................................61

Oil and Gas ...................................................................................62

CHAPTER 5. GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS ..............................65

Institutional Context.........................................................................67

The Split Presidential Ticket of 1930: The Ascendancy of the 

Liberal Party..............................................................................70

The Split Presidential Ticket of 1946: The Return of the 

Conservative Party ....................................................................74

The 1948 Assassination of Gaitán and the Escalation of 

Partisan Violence ................................................................80

The Deterioration of National Politics in the Late 1940s...........82
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Table of Contents

La Violencia and its Aftermath........................................................85

La Violencia and Security Force Configuration .........................88

Colombia’s Military Dictatorship .................................................91

The National Front.......................................................................93

Colombia’s Government Under the 1991 Constitution ..................94

CONCLUSION TO PART I............................................................... 103

PART II. STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS 

OF THE INSURGENCY.................................................... 107

Introduction....................................................................................109

The Impact of Internal Armed Conflict in Colombia .............. 111

CHAPTER 6. FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS 

DE COLOMBIA (FARC)................................................... 115

Timeline .......................................................................................... 117

Origins of the FARC.......................................................................120

Organizational Structure, Command and Control, 

and Leadership .......................................................................121

Organizational Structure and Command and Control ...........121

Leadership...................................................................................125

Luis Alberto Morantes Jaimes (“Jacobo Arenas”).....................126

Víctor Julio Suárez Rojas (“Jorge Briceño Suárez” or 

“Mono Jojoy”) .................................................................126

Luis Edgar Devia Silva (“Raúl Reyes”).......................................127

Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas (“Alfonso Cano”)......................128

Simón Trinidad (“Federico Bogotá”) ........................................128

Components of the Insurgency......................................................129

Underground and Auxiliary ......................................................129

Armed Component.....................................................................131

Public Component......................................................................132

Ideology ...........................................................................................133

Legitimacy .......................................................................................134

Motivation and Behavior ................................................................137

Operations.......................................................................................139

Paramilitary.................................................................................139

Administrative.............................................................................148

Membership and Recruitment ................................................... 148

Psychological ...............................................................................151

Political........................................................................................152

External Actors and Transnational Influences.............................154

Nicaragua ....................................................................................155

Ecuador .......................................................................................155

Venezuela.....................................................................................156
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xi

Iran ..............................................................................................158

The PIRA.....................................................................................158

Europe .........................................................................................159

Finances, Logistics, Sustainment, and Communications.............160

Criminal Activity.........................................................................160

Sustainment Outside Criminal Activities..................................163

Logistics.......................................................................................163

Communications.........................................................................163

CHAPTER 7. EJÉRCITO DE LIBERACIÓN NACIONAL (ELN)... 173

Timeline .......................................................................................... 175

Origins of the ELN......................................................................... 177

Organizational Structure, Command and Control, 

and Leadership ....................................................................... 178

Organizational Structure and Command and Control ........... 178

Leadership...................................................................................182

Fabio Vásquez Castaño ............................................................... 182

Victor Medina Moron ................................................................. 183

Camilo Torres..............................................................................184

Manuel Pérez ...............................................................................185

Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista ........................................................186

Corriente de Renovación Socialista...........................................186

Components of the Insurgency......................................................186

Underground and Auxiliary ......................................................186

Armed Component.....................................................................188

Public Component......................................................................189

Ideology ...........................................................................................190

Legitimacy .......................................................................................190

Motivation and Behavior ................................................................ 191

Operations....................................................................................... 191

Paramilitary................................................................................. 191

Administrative.............................................................................195

Psychological ...............................................................................196

Political........................................................................................196

External Actors and Transnational Influences.............................197

Cuba ............................................................................................197

Nicaragua ....................................................................................198

Spain ............................................................................................198

Costa Rica....................................................................................198

Venezuela.....................................................................................198

Germany ......................................................................................199

Finances, Logistics, and Sustainment............................................199
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Table of Contents

CHAPTER 8. MOVIMIENTO 19 DE ABRIL (M-19).......................207

Timeline ..........................................................................................209

Origins of M-19 ...............................................................................210

Organizational Structure, Leadership, and 

Command and Control ..........................................................212

Organizational Structure ...........................................................212

Leadership...................................................................................213

Jaime Bateman Cayón (“El Flaco”) ............................................ 214

Álvaro Fayad Delgado (“El Turco”) ........................................... 214

Iván Marino Ospina (“Felipe Gonzalez”).................................. 215

Carlos Pizarro Leongómez (“Antonio or Caballo Loco”) ........ 215

Antonio Navarro Wolff ............................................................... 216

Command and Control .............................................................. 216

Components of the Insurgency...................................................... 217

Underground and Auxiliary ...................................................... 217

Armed Component.....................................................................221

Public Component......................................................................223

Ideology ...........................................................................................224

Legitimacy .......................................................................................226

Motivation and Behavior ................................................................228

Operations.......................................................................................233

Paramilitary.................................................................................233

The Dominican Embassy Takeover............................................238

M-19’s Invasion of Colombia.......................................................240

Palace of Justice Siege.................................................................242

From Military to Political Strategy.............................................246

Administrative.............................................................................247

Psychological ...............................................................................250

Political........................................................................................251

External Actors and Transnational Influences.............................257

Finances, Logistics, and Sustainment............................................257

CHAPTER 9. AUTODEFENSAS UNIDAS 

DE COLOMBIA (AUC).....................................................269

Timeline ..........................................................................................271

Origins of the AUC.........................................................................272

Organizational Structure, Leadership, and 

Command and Control ..........................................................275

Organizational Structure ...........................................................275

Leadership...................................................................................280

Fidel Castaño Gil.........................................................................283

Carlos Castaño Gil ......................................................................283

José R Castaño (“El Profe”) ........................................................284

Salvatore Mancuso Gómez (“Triple Cero”)...............................284
Table of Contents

xiii

Rodrigo Tovar Pupo (“Jorge 40”) ..............................................285

Hernán Giraldo Serna (“El Patrón”).........................................285

Jose Miguel Arroyave Ruiz (“Arcángel”) ...................................286

Ramón Isaza ................................................................................286

Luis Eduardo Cifuentes Águila (“El Águila”)...........................287

Command and Control ..............................................................287

Components of the Insurgency......................................................287

Underground and Auxiliary ......................................................287

Armed Component.....................................................................289

Public Component......................................................................292

Ideology ...........................................................................................294

Legitimacy .......................................................................................295

Motivation and Behavior ................................................................297

Operations.......................................................................................300

Paramilitary.................................................................................300

Administrative.............................................................................304

Membership and Recruitment ...................................................304

Psychological ...............................................................................305

Political........................................................................................307

External Actors and Transnational Influences.............................308

Finances, Logistics, Sustainment, and Communications.............309

Criminal Activity.........................................................................309

Sustainment Outside Criminal Activities.................................. 310

Logistics....................................................................................... 311

Communications......................................................................... 311

CONCLUSION TO PART II.............................................................. 321

PART III. GOVERNMENT COUNTERMEASURES.......................327

CHAPTER 10. GOVERNMENT COUNTERMEASURES..............329

Plan LAZO and its Aftermath (1960–1970)..................................331

Alberto Lleras Carmago (1958–1962), Guillermo León Valencia 

Muñóz (1962–1966), and Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966–

1970) ..................................................................................331

Misael Pastrana Borrero (1970–1974) and Alfonso López 

Michelsen (1974–1978) .....................................................335

Julio César Turbay Ayala (1978–1982) .......................................336

Negotiations: Betancur and Beyond (1982–1986) ....................338

Belisario Betancur Cuartas (1982–1986)...................................338

Counternarcotics, Counterinsurgency, and the End 

of the M-19.........................................................................341

Virgilio Barco Vargas (1986–1990)............................................341

César Gaviria Trujillo (1990–1994) ...........................................344

Ernesto Samper Pizano (1994–1998) ........................................347
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Table of Contents

Plan Colombia.............................................................................350

Andrés Pastrana Arango (August 7, 1998–August 7, 2002) .....350

Negotiations and Zona de Despeje ............................................ 351

Counterinsurgency and Intragovernmental Divisions ............353

Military Reform...........................................................................354

Plan Colombia.............................................................................354

Democratic Security and Defense Program and Integrated 

Action (2002–2009) ..........................................................356

Álvaro Uribe Vélez (August 7, 2002–August 7, 2010) ..............356

Resourcing the Counterinsurgent Campaign...........................358

Implementing the DSP ...............................................................359

Consolidation Phase and Integrated Action.............................360

AUC Negotiations .......................................................................363

ELN Negotiations........................................................................364

Counterinsurgency Success? ......................................................365

CONCLUSION TO PART III............................................................ 373

CHAPTER 11. CONCLUSION.......................................................... 377

Current FARC Negotiations...........................................................382

APPENDICES.....................................................................................387

APPENDIX A. ELN Manifestos .....................................................389

Camilo Torres Manifesto............................................................389

ELN Simacota Manifesto............................................................390

APPENDIX B. M-19: The Guerrilla Position Paper and Our 

Revision ...................................................................................392

Hostage Version ..........................................................................394

APPENDIX C. Acronyms................................................................397

APPENDIX D. Technical Appendix ..............................................399

Methodology of the Study ..........................................................399

Physical Environment .................................................................400

Historical Context.......................................................................401

Socioeconomic Conditions.........................................................402

Government and Politics ............................................................406

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................... 411

INDEX ................................................................................................ 437
Table of Contents

xv

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 2-1. Map of Colombia showing political boundaries.............. 19

Figure 2-2. Map of Colombia showing elevation/terrain................... 21

Figure 2-3. Areas impacted by armed violence. The data include 

operations conducted by FARC, ELN, M-19, and the AUC 

over the history of those organizations. .............................27

Figure 3-1. Simón Bolívar. Painting by Ricardo Acevedo Bernal 

(1867–1930). .........................................................................35

Figure 3-2. Reproduction of an oil painting of Francisco de Paula 

Santander. ............................................................................36

Figure 3-3. The evolution of the Conservative Party. ........................43

Figure 3-4. The evolution of the Liberal Party...................................43

Figure 5-1. Recurring pattern of subjective partisan motivation in 

mid-twentieth-century Colombian politics.........................76

Figure 5-2. Venn diagram illustrating the complexity of civil war 

dynamics. .............................................................................87

Figure 5-3. Colombia’s politicized security force configuration after 

state formation.....................................................................90

Figure 5-4. The structure of the Colombian government.................96

Figure 5-5. Example of Colombian voters’ ballot (Senatorial 

election)................................................................................97

Figure 6-1. FARC organization structure, 1993 time frame. ........... 122

Figure 6-2. FARC-EP flag................................................................... 131

Figure 6-3. FARC incidents over time. .............................................. 139

Figure 6-4. FARC target types. .......................................................... 140

Figure 6-5. FARC attack types. .......................................................... 141

Figure 6-6. Areas of armed action. ................................................... 148

Figure 6-7. Reasons for joining the FARC. ....................................... 149

Figure 7-1. ELN flag. .......................................................................... 177

Figure 7-2. Notional ELN organizational structure......................... 179

Figure 7-3. Map of San Vicente de Chucuri. .................................... 183

Figure 7-4. Plaque commemorating Camilo Torres......................... 184

Figure 7-5. ELN target types. ............................................................ 192

Figure 7-6. ELN incidents per year. .................................................. 192

Figure 7-7. ELN attack types.............................................................. 193
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Table of Contents

Figure 7-8. Highway Autopista Medellín-Bogotá. ............................ 194

Figure 7-9. ELN areas of influence. ..................................................200

Figure 7-10. Estimates of ELN revenues, in 1991 and 1994. ............ 201

Figure 8-1. Flag of M-19. .................................................................... 212

Figure 8-2. An example of an organizational structure adopted 

by M-19. .............................................................................. 213

Figure 8-3. Carlos Pizarro.................................................................. 215

Figure 8-4. Antonio Navarro Wolff................................................... 216

Figure 8-5. M-19 guerrilla..................................................................222

Figure 8-6. M-19 incidents over time. ...............................................233

Figure 8-7. M-19 attack types. ............................................................234

Figure 8-8. AUC target types.............................................................236

Figure 8-9. Rosemberg Pabón with another M-19 guerrilla in the 

Dominican Embassy Siege. ............................................... 237

Figure 8-10. M-19 guerrilla celebrating the end of the Dominican 

Embassy siege. ................................................................... 237

Figure 8-11. La Chiqui, the female M-19 negotiator during the 

Dominican embassy siege..................................................239

Figure 8-12. M-19 area of influence................................................... 245

Figure 8-13. M-19 newspaper advertisement announcing the arrival 

of the guerrillas. ................................................................ 251

Figure 8-14. Flag of AD M-19.............................................................254

Figure 9-1. AUC organizational structure. ....................................... 276

Figure 9-2. Map of departments of Colombia.................................. 281

Figure 9-3. AUC flag. .........................................................................290

Figure 9-4. AUC incidents per year...................................................300

Figure 9-5. AUC attack types............................................................. 301

Figure 9-6. AUC target types.............................................................302

Figure 9-7. Civilian fatalities attributed to AUC...............................302

Figure 9-8. AUC’s area of influence..................................................304
Table of Contents

xvii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 5-1. The relationships of political authority in Colombia in 

the early twentieth century..................................................68

Table 5-2. Presidential split tickets of 1930 and 1946.........................69

Table 5-3. Homicides per 100,000 residents in Colombian 

departments and intendencies, 1946–1960........................77

Table 8-1. AD M-19 national elections results...................................255

CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Chapter 1. Introduction and Summary

3

BACKGROUND

The purpose of the Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) series is to produce academically rigorous yet operationally 

relevant research to expand on and update the body of knowledge on 

insurgency and revolution for members of the US Special Forces. We 

began this work with a rigorous assessment of all known insurgent or 

revolutionary activities from 1962 through the present day. To conduct 

this assessment, we agreed on a basic definition of revolution or insurgency.a

 For the purpose of this research, a revolution is defined as:

An attempt to modify the existing political system at 

least partially through unconstitutional or illegal use 

of force or protest.2

Next we developed a taxonomy to establish a standard structure for 

analysis and to facilitate discussion of similarities and differences. We 

classified events and activities according to the most evident cause of 

the revolt. The causes or bases of revolution were categorized as follows:

• Those motivated by a desire to greatly modify the type of 

government

• Those motivated by identity or ethnic issues

• Those motivated by a desire to drive out a foreign power

• Those motivated by religious fundamentalism

• Those motivated by issues of modernization or reform

After applying this taxonomy, we selected twenty-three cases, across 

the five categories above, to be researched for inclusion in the Casebook 

on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009.

3

 For each 

of the twenty-three revolutions or insurgencies, the casebook includes 

a summary case study that focuses on the organization and activities of 

the insurgent group.

Subsequently, we selected several of the cases for a more detailed 

treatment that would apply a broader and more holistic analytical perspective, considering factors such as the social, economic, historical, 

and political context. Within the ARIS research series, these studies are 

a The terms insurgency and revolution or revolutionary warfare are used interchangeably 

in the ARIS series. We adopted the term revolution to maintain consistency with the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) studies conducted during the 1960s, which also 

used the term. Many social scientists use an arbitrary threshold of battle deaths to delineate civil war from other acts of armed violence. Our definition relied on Charles Tilly 

and Sidney Tarrow’s definition of contentious politics, activity that “involves interactions 

in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests or programs, in which 

governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties.”1
4

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia

referred to as “ARIS Tier 1 Insurgency Case Studies.” This case study 

on Colombia is one of these works.

PURPOSE OF THE CASE STUDY

This case study presents a detailed account of revolutionary and 

insurgent activities in Colombia during the period from 1964 until 

2009. It is specifically intended to provide a foundation for Special 

Forces personnel to understand the circumstances, environment, and 

catalysts for revolution; the organization of resistance or insurgent 

organizations and their development, modes of operation, external 

support, and successes and failures; the counterinsurgents’ organization, modes of operation, and external support, as well as their effects 

on the resistance; and the outcomes and long-term ramifications of the 

revolutionary/insurgent activities. This foundation will allow readers 

to distill vast amounts of material from a wide array of campaigns and 

extract relevant lessons, thereby enabling the development of future 

doctrine, professional education, and training.

Like all products in the ARIS series, this study examines revolutions and insurgencies for the purpose of identifying emerging trends 

in operational designs and patterns, including elements that can serve 

as catalysts and indicators of success or failure. Building on an understanding of the general characteristics of revolutionary movements and 

insurgencies, this study examines ways that organizations or groups 

adapt to overcome various environmental and contextual challenges.

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

ARIS Tier 1 Insurgency Case Studies are organized in five major 

sections:

1. Introduction and Summary

2. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

3. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

4. Government Countermeasures

5. Conclusion

This Introduction and Summary presents an introduction to the ARIS 

series and a brief description of how the content in each particular case 

is presented and ends with a synopsis of the case study on Colombia. 

Refer to the Technical Appendix for a discussion of the types of sources 

and methods that were used to gather and analyze the data, as well as 

any methodological limitations encountered in the research.
Chapter 1. Introduction and Summary

5

The section on Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency is divided into 

four chapters that address various aspects of the context within which 

the insurgency takes place. This section looks at the following elements:

• Physical environment

• Historical context

• Socioeconomic conditions

• Government and politics

The organization and inner workings of each of the primary insurgent groups are analyzed in the Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

section. Each insurgent group or organization is discussed separately 

in this section, providing details on the various aspects of each group. 

This analysis considers various characteristics including the following:

• Leadership and organization

• Ideology

• Legitimacy

• Motivation and behavior

• Operations

• External actors and transnational influences

• Finances, logistics, and sustainment

The Government Countermeasures chapter examines the political, 

military, informational, and/or economic actions taken by the government and by external forces in support of the government to counter 

the efforts of the insurgency. This chapter is presented chronologically, 

broken down by separate political administrations or by significant 

counterinsurgency campaigns or initiatives.

The final chapter, Conclusion, provides observations about the aftermath of the revolution, considering questions such as the following: 

Did any of the revolutionary or insurgent groups succeed in changing any political, economic, or social conditions as attempted? What 

changes took place over the time frame of the study—to the government itself as well as to the movement (e.g., did the insurgent group disappear, become the ruling government, become a legitimate political 

party, etc.)? This chapter includes a discussion about which objectives 

or goals of the opposing sides were met and which were not and what 

compromises or concessions, if any, were made by either side.

SUMMARY OF THE STUDY

The 1948 assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, the Liberal presidential candidate, is often described as an important turning point in 
6

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia

Colombian politics. The assassination marked the onset of Colombia’s 

mid-century civil war, known as La Violencia, which pitted Liberal and 

Conservative partisans against one another, primarily in the countryside. This, however, neglects the generations of conflict, disenfranchisement, and deep unrest that preceded 1948. The current cycle of 

violence plaguing Colombia has its roots in this conflict.

The Conservative and Liberal parties were established in the midnineteenth century in the wake of the disintegration of Simón Bolívar’s 

vision of a united Gran Colombia comprising modern-day Colombia, 

Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela.b These parties bore little resemblance to the political parties in the present-day United States. Partisanship was based more on social identity than it was political ideology. 

The strong partisan identity in Colombia was compounded by an 

entrenched tradition of clientelism and institutional mechanisms in the 

government that gave significant control over patronage appointments 

to the party that controlled the presidency. The presidency changed 

party hands twice before the civil war, once in 1930 and again in 1946. 

The partisan violence that followed these transitions, and the inability 

of the Colombian government to protect its citizens, spurred the localized violence that coalesced into La Violencia. The armed self-defense 

groups that formed to mitigate the profound insecurity enveloping the 

Colombian countryside during La Violencia were the precursors to the 

leftist guerrillas and the paramilitaries still operating today.

The political pact, called the “National Front,” between the Liberals 

and Conservatives that ended the civil war did little to accommodate 

the grievances of historically disenfranchised sectors of Colombian 

society. The pact alternated the presidency between the two parties, 

precluding the participation of minority parties in the political process, effectively shutting out rural and working-class poor. When the 

National Front took control of the government, leftist revolutions, such 

as the successful one in Cuba, began to sweep across the world.

The soil was fertile for revolutionary bands to foment armed resistance against the Colombian government to secure social justice 

through a socialist-inspired state. This study focuses on the four most 

influential nonstate armed actors in Colombia, the Fuerzas Armadas 

Revolucionarias de Colombia–Ejército del Pueblo, or the FARC; the 

Ejército de Liberación Nacional, or the ELN; Movimiento 19 de Abril, 

or M-19; and finally the paramilitary group, the Autodefensas Unidas 

de Colombia, or the AUC.

Two of these groups, the FARC and the ELN, formed the backdrop for the next fifty years of Colombian politics. The FARC, a direct 

b Gran Colombia also included parts of Peru, Brazil, and Guyana.
Chapter 1. Introduction and Summary

7

descendant of the earlier self-defense groups, matured slowly. It built 

its base among the rural poor while gradually enhancing its appeal 

to urban workers and a small number of liberal elites. At the same 

time, the ELN began in rural farming communities with a message 

of national liberation. Both groups have had fluctuating memberships 

and alliances. Since the inception of these two groups, the Colombian 

army has sought to eliminate both, whether directly or in clandestine 

concert with various paramilitary groups.

Between 1964 and 1965, the ELN and the FARC began their military campaigns with similar goals of radically changing the climate of 

Colombian politics and society. Both the FARC and the ELN rely on 

urban and rural networks of formal and informal supporters. The militarized component of the FARC is a highly structured organization, 

while the ELN’s armed component is less structured and more loosely 

organized. For a time, the FARC acted as the official military wing of 

the Colombian Communist Party. Both groups have used armed violence to defeat the government, make political statements, and pressure 

for favorable negotiating positions. They have also frequently engaged 

in hostage-taking/kidnappings and ransoms, at time terrorizing those 

very communities for which they claimed to advocate. The FARC is a 

larger, more capable organization than the ELN and has a much larger 

network of supporters. The FARC was the first to enter into the lucrative drug trafficking trade, with the ELN following suit early in the 

twenty-first century.

As a reaction to the far-left guerillas, the AUC was formed in the 

mid-1990s. The group is an umbrella organization for aligned paramilitary groups. Rabidly pro-state, the AUC was a far-right armed group 

whose mission was to combat leftist guerrillas. The AUC was funded 

by the cocaine trade and supported clandestinely by the Colombian 

government. The AUC was an especially violent organization; one of 

its primary tactics was targeting purported civilian supporters of leftist guerrillas. The group regularly engaged in civilian massacres, leaving scores dead. Available evidence points to purposeful collusion 

between paramilitaries, the military, and police in an effort to combat 

leftist guerrillas.

The M-19, although also a leftist insurgency, stands out from its 

FARC and ELN counterparts. Early on, the group adopted a flexible, 

Marxist-inspired ideology that agitated for democratic and structural 

reform but not the wholesale overthrow of the Colombian political 

system. The theater directors, artists, elected officials, students, and 

engineers that formed the group’s core utilized avant-garde messaging that relied on awe-inspiring theatrical spectacle rather than overwhelming firepower to demonstrate the injustice of the socioeconomic 
8

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia

and political climate of Colombia in the 1970s and 1980s. Although 

the M-19 was uninspiring strictly considering its military capabilities, 

the popularity of the group spoke to its success. However, a botched 

hostage barricade operation at the Palace of Justice in 1985 that left 

more than a hundred dead diminished the group’s popularity. More 

so than the FARC and the ELN, M-19 strategically positioned itself to 

legitimately participate in Colombian politics.

Over the past five decades, the Colombian government has pursued military and political solutions to the conflict, sometimes pursuing both together. In the early 1980s, the Betancur administration 

began formal peace talks with the leftist guerrillas. In a pattern that 

repeated itself with depressing regularity, talks led to cease-fires that 

ultimately failed as violence continued unabated. The FARC, ELN, and 

M-19 used violence as leverage to extract more advantageous negotiating positions. Cease-fires also afforded the groups opportunities to 

bolster their operational capabilities. M-19 remains the only group of 

those discussed in this work to successfully demobilize and enter the 

legal political process. After being elected to the National Constituent 

Assembly, former M-19 guerrillas played a critical role in drafting the 

1991 constitution that replaced the National Front pact with a more 

inclusive, transparent political system. 

The paramilitaries frequently acted as spoilers in the periodic 

peace processes. In the mid-1980s, paramilitaries engaged in a systematic campaign to assassinate amnestied guerrillas as well as those 

transitioning to the legal political process, as in the case of the Unión 

Patriótica, or UP, the FARC’s ill-fated public component. The assassination campaign launched by the paramilitaries fostered profound 

insecurity among the guerrillas, impeding a political solution with the 

FARC for many years. In 2006, due to the efforts of President Uribe, tens 

of thousands of paramilitary soldiers demobilized. However, because 

many have transitioned to other paramilitaries, right-wing violence 

still plagues Colombia. At the time of writing, the FARC is currently 

in peace negotiations with the government, although no substantial 

progress has been reported.
Chapter 1. Introduction and Summary

9

Timeline

1849 Conservative and Liberal Parties are founded.

1899–1903 “The War of the Thousand Days”—120,000 people die 

in civil war between Liberals and Conservatives.

1946 (–1965) La Violencia (“The Violence”), a localized civil war 

characterized by widespread violence between Liberal 

and Conservatives in the countryside. The conflict 

resulted in the deaths of 180,000–300,000 Colombians.

April 9, 1948 Liberal Party presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer 

Gaitán Ayala is assassinated in Bogotá. The assassin is 

killed on the spot and the Bogotazo riot ensues.

1949 Conservative Party candidate Laureano Gómez Castro 

wins the presidential election. Colombian Communist 

Party introduces “mass self-defense” as means for peasants to protect themselves from armed Conservatives.

June 1, 1953 President Gomez is deposed by a military coup. General 

Gustavo Rojas Pinilla becomes the new president of 

Colombia.

May 1, 1957 President Rojas resigns under the pressure of Liberals 

and Conservatives united under a combined political 

entity called the “National Front.”

1958 Conservatives and Liberals agree to form the National 

Front, a power-sharing agreement, in a bid to end civil 

war.

August 7, 1958 The first National Front president, Alberto Lleras Carmago, takes office.

August 1962 President Leon Valencia Munoz is inaugurated.

1963 ELN founders Fabio Vasquez Castaño and Victor 

Medina Moron travel to Cuba to study guerrilla warfare 

with Fidel and Raúl Castro and other members of the 

Cuban Revolution.

May 27, 1964 President Valencia orders Operation Marquetalia—a 

government effort to dissolve self-defense forces. 

Manuel Marulanda, also known as “Sureshot,” is able 

to hold out with a band of forty-eight men, marking 

the birth of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 

Colombia, or FARC. 

January 5, 1965 In its first armed action, ELN overtakes the town of 

Simacota. Many regard this seminal event as the founding of the group.
10

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia

1966 Communist Colombian Party holds its Tenth Political 

Congress. During the conference, the group declare 

mass popular action rather than guerrilla warfare as the 

primary means to achieve its goals. This is reaffirmed in 

1971 at the Eleventh Political Congress.

1966 Camilo Torres, a nationally known left-wing priest and 

recent ELN recruit, dies in firefight with the Colombian 

army.

May 1966 FARC holds its Second Guerrilla Conference. This is 

referred to as the “Constitutive Conference.”

May 1968 FARC holds its Third Guerrilla Conference. The 

National School of Ideological Formation is established.

1970 National People’s alliance is formed as a left-wing counterweight to the National Front.

1970 FARC holds its Fourth Guerrilla Conference.

April 19, 1970 Populist party the National Popular Alliance is denied 

electoral victory by Conservatives; the M-19 guerrilla 

group emerges.

1971 Communist Colombian Party holds its Eleventh Political Congress. The party reaffirms mass popular action 

rather than guerrilla warfare as the primary means to 

achieve its goals.

January 1973 FARC holds a plenary meeting during which Estado 

Mayor Central (EMC) is created.

January 1974 M-19 members steal Simón Bolívar’s sword, gaining 

national attention.

1974 FARC holds its Fifth Guerrilla Conference in Meta.

February 1976 M-19 kidnaps, tries, and executes José Raquel Mercado, 

president of Confederation of Workers of Colombia.

1978 ELN reaches record low numbers (perhaps thirty armed 

supporters). ELN reorients its overarching plan to gain 

control of resource-rich areas of Colombia in order to 

gain strategic advantage and economic independence.

1976–1978 M-19 engages in public actions, such as the distribution 

of milk, chocolate, and toys, alongside its armed propaganda operations.

January 1978 FARC holds its Sixth Guerrilla Conference. National 

command structure is fully articulated to include the 

general staff of fronts and the secretariat of the EMC.

1978 President Turbay begins intense fight against drug 

traffickers.

December 31, 

1979

M-19 tunnels into a Colombian Army weapons depot, 

taking more than 5,000 weapons.

February 1980 M-19 guerrillas seize the Dominican Republics’ embassy 

in Bogotá; hostages are held for sixty-one days.
Chapter 1. Introduction and Summary

11

May 4–14, 1982 FARC holds its Seventh Guerrilla Conference. The 

group’s “Strategic Plan for Taking Power” emerges, 

along with the additional moniker Ejército del Pueblo 

or “People’s Army,” which changes the insurgency’s official acronym to FARC-EP.

August 1982 President Belisario Betancur Cuartas is inaugurated. 

During his inaugural speech, he announces that the 

Colombian government will engage in peace negotiations with leftist guerrillas.

November 18, 

1982

President Betancur signs Congressional Law 35, granting general amnesty to all guerrilla combatants.

January 30, 

1983–March 28, 

1984

Government of Colombia and FARC-EP conduct peace 

talks. Talks end with el Acuerdo de Uribe (the Aribe 

Agreement).

May 28, 1984 Cease-fire begins under the Aribe Agreement.

1985 Eleven judges and ninety others are killed after M-19 

guerrillas force their way into the Palace of Justice.

March 1985 Founding of the Patriotic Union Party (UP), FARC’s 

public component.

1986 Right-wing paramilitary groups begin a murder campaign against UP politicians.

March 9, 1986 UP wins several seats in nationwide elections, to include 

fourteen members of congress. UP presidential candidate Jaime Pardo Leal receives 4.5 percent of the vote.

August 1986 President Virgilio Barco Vargas is inaugurated.

1987 UP leader Jaime Pardo is assassinated.

December 

25–29, 1987

FARC holds a guerrilla plenum and decides to renew its 

efforts toward the “new method of operating” adopted 

during the Seventh Guerrilla Conference.

May 1988 M-19 kidnaps Conservative party leader Álvaro Gómez 

Hurtado; Hurtado is released two months later in 

exchange for the promise of a national summit to 

include guerrilla representatives.

March 1, 1989 Colombian government and M-19 sign the Cauca Declaration, providing the rebels safe haven and opening the 

way for talks and eventual demobilization.

May 10–17, 1989 FARC holds a guerrilla plenum and develops a military 

plan known as the Bolivarian Campaign for a New 

Colombia (la Campaña Bolivariana por una Nueva 

Colombia), which represents a four-phase strategy to be 

implemented in January 1990.

1990 UP presidential candidate Bernardo Ossa is killed; 

FARC withdraws from legal politics and focuses on 

strengthening its military capabilities.
12

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia

March 1990 M-19 becomes a political party, the Alianza 

Democrática M-19 (AD-M-19).

1990 Jacobo Arenas, political and ideological leader of the 

FARC, dies; Manuel Marulanda becomes FARC’s top 

commander.

August 1990 President César Gaviria Trujillo is inaugurated.

February 1, 

1991

Bolívar’s sword is returned as a symbol of M-19’s 

demobilization.

1993 FARC holds its Eighth Guerrilla Conference. It also 

decides that it is ready to implement the “New Method 

of Operating” first defined during the Seventh Guerrilla Conference.

1993 Pablo Escobar is killed.

August 1994 President Ernesto Samper Pizano is inaugurated.

August 1996 FARC launches an attack on the Las Delicias military 

base in Putumayo.

April 1996 FARC devises another Bolivarian plan called “The Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia.” Included with 

the plan is the creation of the Colombian Clandestine 

Communist Party (PCCC).

April 1997 The far-right paramilitary groups unite under the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) to combat leftleaning FARC and ELN.

August 1998 President Andres Pastrana Arango is inaugurated.

November 7, 

1998

Peace talks with FARC begin. The zona de despeje, a safe 

haven the size of Switzerland, is established.

December 18, 

1998

ELN commits its most deadly attack—after targeting an 

oil pipeline, the ensuing oil spill caught fire, resulting 

in the deaths of forty-eight villagers.

July 1999 FARC conducts a coordinated attack including multiple fronts in Meta, Guaviare, Huila, Putumayo, and 

Caquetá.

2000 US Congress appropriates 1.3 billion dollars for Plan 

Colombia.

January 17, 

2000

ELN successfully bombs more than twenty power lines 

and towers, causing millions of Medellín residents to 

lose power.

January 2000 FARC conducts coordinated attacks against police stations in Une, Quetame, and Guyabetal, involving 800 

guerrillas.

February 20, 

2002

The zona de despeje is disestablished after FARC hijacks a 

commercial airliner, forcing it to land in rebel-held territory, and takes Colombian Senator Turbay hostage.
Chapter 1. Introduction and Summary

13

February 23, 

2002

Presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and her vicepresidential running mate are kidnapped by FARC.

August 6, 2002 FARC attacks the presidential palace, one day before 

inauguration of President Uribe.

August 2002 President Alvaro Uribe Vélez is inaugurated.

April 2003 The Uribe administration is able to modify the Colombian constitution to allow government forces to make 

arrests without warrants.

December 

2003

More than 31,000 AUC members agree to demobilize. 

An additional 15,800 insurgents from AUC, FARC, and 

ELN eventually voluntarily demobilize.

July 2004 AUC and government begin peace talks.

2004 Plan Patriota is introduced by Uribe, with the aim of 

establishing a permanent military presence in rebelheld territory.

December 2005 Exploratory peace talks with ELN begin in Cuba.

2006 The majority of AUC blocks are demobilized.

August 2007 ELN Havana dialogues end without agreement and 

“two different conceptions of peace and how to get 

to it.”

March 1, 2008 The Colombian military kills Raúl Reyes in his stronghold in Ecuador during a Colombian cross-border 

attack.

March 26, 2008 Manuel “Sureshot” Marulanda dies of a heart attack. 

His death is not announced until May 2008.

July 2008 The Colombian military rescues the highest-profile hostage of FARC, Ingrid Betancourt, who had been held in 

captivity for six years.

ENDNOTES

1 Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 

2007), 4.

2 Chuck Crossett, ed. Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009

(Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2012), xvi.

3 Ibid., xii–xiii.

PART I.

CONTEXT AND CATALYSTS OF 

THE INSURGENCY

CHAPTER 2.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

Chapter 2. Physical Environment

19

Caqueta

Cauca

Japura

Pastaza

Jurua

Apure

Ucayali

Maranon

Maranon

Ica

Negro

Purus

Guaviare

Apure

Amazon Napo

Orinoco

Putumayo

Meta

Guainia

Napo

Caribbean Sea Netherlands

Antilles

Aruba

V e n e z u e l a

P e r u

Panama

Ecuador

C o l o m b i a

B r a z i l

San Cristobal

Guanare

Coro

Barinas

Pucallpa

Piura

Chiclayo

Porto Viejo

Loja

Ibarra

Ambato

Villavicencio

Tunja

Sincelejo

Santa Marta

Popayan

Pereira

Pasto

Neiva

Monteria

Mocoa

Valera

Calabozo

Salinas

Manta

Buenaventura Palmira

Barrancabermeja

Aguachica

Merida

Barquisimeto

Maracay

Manizales

Ibague

Cucuta

Cartagena

Bucaramanga

Barranquilla

Colon

Medellín

Cali

Maracaibo

Guayaquil

Caracas

Quito

Bogotá

Panama

City

80 ̊ 75 ̊ 70 ̊

5 ̊

0 ̊

5 ̊

10 ̊

Colombia and Surrounding Areas

National Capitals

Cities 3,000,000+

Cities 900,000-2,999,999

Cities 250,000-899,999

Cities 75,000-249,999

International Boundaries

Highways

Primary Roads

Major Rivers

Intermediate Rivers

Lakes

0 190 380 Miles

0 190 380 KM

Figure 2-1. Map of Colombia showing political boundaries.

Colombia’s physical environment is a central factor in the violence 

that continues to plague the country today. Its rugged, mountainous 
20

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

interior shaped settlement patterns and troubling political legacies 

that have contributed to the cycles of violence in the past and in the 

contemporary era. Its rugged landscapes have offered safe havens for 

numerous insurgent and paramilitary groups, albeit with strategic 

tradeoffs. Most notably, Colombia’s geography, alongside its political 

history, has played a key role in the development of its weak central 

state. Colombia’s weak state capacity presents a threefold danger to its 

political stability—it foments grievances in underserved areas, allows 

the emergence and sustainment of insurgent organizations, and gives 

rise to armed self-defense and paramilitary groups.

In the modern era, physical environments are more than a country’s natural landscape. In the past century, many countries, including 

Colombia, have witnessed historically unprecedented rural migrations 

to urban environments. Most of the world’s population now lives in cities, not the rural countryside.a

 The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 

de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), 

two of the three leftist guerrilla groups discussed in the Structure and 

Dynamics of the Insurgency section, developed strategies that relied heavily on exploiting the rural hinterlands and the population those lands 

still supported. However, one guerrilla organization, the Movimiento 

19 de Abril (M-19), also discussed in Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency section, followed the urbanizing trend instead, adopting an 

urban-based strategy. Operating in the city presented difficulties for 

the group, especially in regard to operational security, given the high 

intelligence penetration within urban environments such as Bogotá, 

Cali, and Medellín. As it could not rely on military might alone, many 

of the M-19’s operations relied on spectacle to sway public opinion in 

their favor. Whether in terms of organizational structure or military 

strategy, the physical environment in which the insurgents operated 

impacted how they operated.

COLOMBIAN GEOGRAPHY

Colombia is infamous for its imposing, rugged terrain. At the 

northern end of the Andes mountain range, Colombia’s landscape 

is dominated by the commanding peaks—some reaching a height of 

17,000 feet. The average peak in the country, however, is a more modest 9,000 feet. The Colombian Andes generally lack the height of the 

Andean ranges in Peru and Bolivia. The mountains are divided into 

three chains, running nearly parallel with one another. The chains, or 

a According to the World Health Organization, in 1990, approximately forty percent of the world’s population lived in cities. As of 2010, that figure rose to more than 

fifty percent.1
Chapter 2. Physical Environment

21

cordilleras, are typically referred to as the Western, Central, and Eastern 

Cordilleras (known in Spanish as the Cordilleras Occidental and Central y Oriental). The Western Cordilleras, running along the Pacific 

coast, have the smallest peaks, averaging 6,000 feet. The more robust 

Central and Eastern Cordilleras, in contrast, run about 9,000  feet 

in elevation.

Administrative Boundaries

Terrain Map of Colombia

National Capitals

Cities 3,000,000+

Cities 900,000-2,999,999

Manizales

Ibague

Cucuta

Cartagena

Bucaramanga

Barranquilla

Medellín

Cali

Bogotá

Figure 2-2. Map of Colombia showing elevation/terrain.
22

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

As seen in Figure 2-2, the ranges cut a diagonal swath across the 

country from the northern border of Ecuador to the country’s northwest border with Venezuela. The low-lying coastal Caribbean region 

is north of the northernmost range. To the east of the Andes lie the 

vast tropical plains, known as the Llanos, or Llanos Orientales, roughly 

97,000 square miles of land. The plains become increasingly tropical as 

one travels south, eventually blending with the Amazonia region.

COLOMBIA’S WEAK CENTRAL STATE AND 

REGIONALISM

As discussed in the Methodology of the Study section in Appendix D. 

Technical Appendix, rugged topography can facilitate internal political 

violence by hindering the development of a strong central state. Colombia is certainly not an outlier in this regard. Throughout its history, 

the national government in Bogotá has struggled to solidify its control 

over the peripheral areas of the country. Efforts at centralization and 

development have been further hampered by a predisposition toward 

entrenched regionalism cultivated by the enforced isolation amongst 

the rugged mountainous interior. That regionalism, first notable in 

Colombia’s struggle for independence, continues to influence Colombian politics today. More detailed discussions on how the demands of 

regional autonomy affected the development of the state and, later, the 

prevalence and endurance of political violence can be found in the following study.

Colombia’s rugged geography influenced colonial settlement patterns that contributed to the country’s regionalism, which in turn has 

historically hampered the development of a robust central state government.b

 As one historian noted, “The Andes dominate the topography of 

the more peopled parts of the country and, for most of its inhabitants, 

have established, historically, the fundamental conditions of life.”3 The 

majority of human habitation in Colombia, since the Spanish colonization, has clustered around the highland regions, offering an escape 

from the heat of the lowlands and the tropical diseases encouraged by 

the lush vegetation, moist climate, and warm temperatures. The country’s proximity to the equator ensures that the regional temperatures 

remain relatively constant throughout the year. In the eastern highland region, the capital city, Bogotá, has a cool mean temperature of 

56°F. Other large highland cities, including Medellín and Cali, are at 

b Some scholars dispute the extent to which Colombia’s rugged geography cultivated 

strong regionalism in the country. Appelbaum argues that regionalism in Colombia 

emerged from the process of state formation in the nineteenth century, not from its geographic features.2
Chapter 2. Physical Environment

23

lower altitudes in the Andes, resulting in a warmer mean temperature 

of 70°F and 77°F, respectively. In contrast, populations in the Caribbean coastal areas experience much warmer temperatures, averaging 

82–86°F. Similar temperatures are common in other lowland areas, 

including the lowland river valleys of the interior and the Llanos.

Favorable climates and fertile land encouraged settlement in the 

intermontane valleys dotting the Andean landscape. Roughly nine percent of Colombia’s territory is between 3,300 and 6,600 feet, whether 

in the intermontane valleys or on the mountainsides. Only a small portion of the territory, about six percent, is above 6,600 feet in elevation. 

Surprisingly, it is in these lands above 1,000 feet, about fifteen percent 

of the total territory, where the majority of the population lives. In the 

nineteenth  century, about two-thirds of the population lived in the 

mountainous terrain. By 1964, that number had decreased somewhat 

to about three-fifths. Settlement in the lowlands, although accounting 

for over half of Colombia’s territory has historically been sparse. The 

exception is the Caribbean coast, where access to the outside world 

encouraged denser settlement. The trend of migration to lower altitudes, however, has increased in the past century.

Colombia’s imposing geography also fostered regional social, political, and economic differences. Populations in the Caribbean coast have 

identified more solidly with the culture and lifestyle of the Caribbean 

rather than with the Andean interior. The coastal region’s proximity 

to external commerce, and thus the outside world, also encouraged 

historical differences among the coast and the highland communities. 

The various villages, towns, and cities across the three major cordilleras have notably different development trajectories due to the extreme 

isolation cultivated by the formidable mountain landscape.

The difficulties in traversing the three mountain barriers further 

encouraged isolation, leading to the formation of three broad regional 

demarcations: the east, the west, and the Caribbean coast. The primary 

mountain pass across the central cordilleras, the Quindío, could only 

be crossed via mule, or human porter, for much of Colombia’s history. 

Likewise, the Honda pass, connecting the upriver port on the Magdalena to the Sabana de Bogotá, the highland plain, remained notoriously treacherous to navigate for more than 300 years. Many travelers 

have recounted the horrors of the path connecting Bogotá to Honda; 

precipitously steep ascents and descents coupled with heavy rainfall 

sometimes made the journey impossible. As a result, the net cost of 

transporting cargo was an astonishingly high thirty-eight to sixty cents 

per ton-mile in the mid-nineteenth  century, compared with two to 

four cents during the same time period in the United States.4
24

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

This logistical hindrance occurred throughout the mountainous 

interior. The steep cordilleras roughly demarcated two populated 

zones—“an eastern zone, consisting of intermontane valleys and the 

flanks and immediate watershed regions of the Eastern Cordilleras, 

plus the upper Magdalena Valley, and a western zone, consisting of the 

Central and Western Cordilleras and the Cauca Valley between them.”5

Travel within the zones was relatively easy, but it was difficult to travel 

between the two zones well into the twentieth century. A series of intermontane basins along the eastern cordilleras, running north to south 

and incorporating most of the Cundinamarca and Boyacá Departments, 

provided routes of communication and travel. Since before European 

settlements, these basins have been relatively integrated politically and 

culturally. Farther to the north, above the Cundinamarca and Boyacá 

Departments, lies the Guanentá region, which is crisscrossed with deep 

ravines. Although Guanentá is somewhat connected with the Cundinamarca and Boyacá Departments, the obstructive barriers have ensured 

a distinctive identity in the Guanentá.6 Likewise, the western population 

axis was historically connected through the Cauca River valley, encouraging greater political and cultural exchange. The valley allowed for 

overland traffic from Popayán in the south to travel over to Cartago in 

the north. The Pasto region, lying south of Popayán near the border 

with Ecuador, has historically maintained a more distinct identity due 

to difficulties accessing the land through the broken, mountainous terrain. Similarly, the more inaccessible Greater Antioquia region, north 

of the Cauca Valley, has long maintained an “ambiguous” relationship 

with its western neighbors in the country, sharing some cultural links 

but remaining “politically independent.”7

Colombia’s topographical features and the isolation they brought, 

as well as the influence on Spanish colonial settlement patterns, led to 

broad cultural differences between the regions. The decline of indigenous peoples in the west and on the Caribbean coast led to an influx 

of African slave labor, while the east retained more of its indigenous 

population. As a result, the western and Caribbean coast cultural 

identity is notably marked by influence of the African slaves. Cultural 

development in the east, by contrast, retained a “peasant population 

tinctured, in physiognomy and culture, with traces of the pre-Colombian Muiscas.”8

The isolation among the three regions fostered political antagonism as well. Powerhouse cities in each region—Bogotá in the east, 

Popayán in the west, Cartagena on the Caribbean coast, and eventually 

other cities as the urban landscape expanded and altered—developed 

politically antagonistic positions vis-à-vis their regional counterparts. 

Even within the regions, rugged terrain and a paucity of incentives 
Chapter 2. Physical Environment

25

to develop stable overland transportation and communication infrastructure, cultivated deep-seated locally autonomous tendencies that 

hindered the emergence of a centralized state similar to the levels of 

centralization in nearby states, such as Mexico. Historical settlement 

patterns among the cordilleras occurred sporadically in small pockets 

of arable land in the mountainous interior. The terrain limited the size 

but increased the quantity of agricultural settlements. In the lowlands 

and on the Caribbean coast, settlements tended to be small and widely 

dispersed, but for different reasons. The prevalence of cattle grazing, 

the foundation of a low labor-intensive economy, did not require larger 

settlements. Other regions, including the forested regions of the Llanos near the Amazonia region, consisted of scattered populations and 

little integration, either politically or economically, with their Andean 

and coastal brethren.

The diversity of arable zones in the mountainous interior also 

impacted national integration by discouraging trade. The fertile and 

diverse zones typically provided a wide variety of agricultural goods, 

significantly decreasing the need for interregional trade. Overland 

transportation networks would certainly introduce greater convenience, but it does not appear that Colombian officials were prodded 

to a significant degree by necessity for such routes. For much of the 

historical period, there was simply insufficient economic incentive to 

overcome the centrifugal forces dispersing Colombian political will on 

matters of national priority. More often than not, overland transportation routes were ignored, underfunded, or mired in regional political 

rivalries. As a result, while the Western world’s industrial economy proceeded apace these developments, cheap goods produced and transported as far away as the United States and Europe were often cheaper 

than those produced less than one hundred miles from the Colombian 

consumer. This lack of external trade, bolstered only by gold and, later, 

tobacco, contributed to further retardation of the growth of the central 

state by hampering federal revenue collection. In the latter half of the 

nineteenth century, the growth of the coffee industry, and accompanying external trade in the popular commodity, did eventually jumpstart 

Colombia’s infrastructural development. As a national market developed in the twentieth century, and the transportation infrastructure 

to support it, denser urban centers developed in the different regions, 

especially the four largest cities in the country—Bogotá, Medellín, 

Cali, and Barranquilla.c

The Magdalena River was the lifeblood of these divided regions. 

For most of Colombia’s history, it provided the only access to the 

c Other factors, of course, inhibited external trade. Please see Safford and Palacio for 

a further discussion.9
26

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

outside world for a majority of the population. The river provided 

important transportation downstream. Accessing the interior through 

the river, however, was problematic. Entering the mouth of the Magdalena through the Caribbean presented such difficulties that many were 

forced to transport goods via more indirect routes. The frequency of 

rapids, sandbars, and swollen waters made upriver trips “purgatory” for 

those forced to endure them into the modern age.10

Settlement patterns of the Colombian countryside resulted in 

small, agricultural communities that were relatively independent from 

one another. Interaction between settlements was limited by poor communication and transportation networks. Most populations settled in 

areas with temperate climates or access to transnational boundaries. 

Settlers favored, and continue to favor, the Andean region and coastal 

areas, as opposed to the Llanos or Amazonia. Population densities are 

more concentrated in the former regions.

Transportation infrastructure in the country was woefully inadequate at the turn of the nineteenth  century, even in comparison 

with that of its neighbors. Then, Colombia offered a sparse seventyfive miles of roads in a country nearly twice the size of Texas, hampered 

in part by its rugged topography and a wet climate several months 

of the year. Not surprisingly, Colombia has been called the “country 

without roads.” Likewise, Colombia’s development of railroad infrastructure also lagged behind that its neighbors. The country had only 

350 miles of rail at the turn of the century, compared with 12,400 miles 

in nearby Argentina. As a result, most of the country was accessible 

only via foot or mule. Thirty years into the twentieth century, Colombia 

still had severely limited transportation infrastructure, with 750 miles 

of rail and 3,700 miles of road.11 To compensate for poor transportation networks, the Colombian economy relied on river transportation, 

although decreased river levels throughout the dry months hamper 

even this infrastructure. To date, air transport remains the quickest 

and most reliable domestic transportation available.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND ARMED GROUPS

Rugged terrain and dense foliage assist insurgent groups primarily 

by providing refuge while denying access in the area to security forces.d Data collected by the Global Terrorism Database, an open-source 

database collecting information on terrorist activities from around the 

d Most researchers use mountains (or slope elevation) and forests as a proxy for 

“rough terrain.” Little attention has been paid to other topographical features that 

impede government access or surveillance, such as swamps.
Chapter 2. Physical Environment

27

world, revealed startling information regarding the ubiquity of violence throughout Colombia. Figure 2-3 illustrates that no departments 

in the country were fully immune from the influence of armed groups. 

These events, however, are varied in nature, ranging from a bombing 

of infrastructure to kidnapping to armed robbery. Not every department experienced the same level of violence, as is depicted on the map.

Amazonas

Vaupés

Guainía

Guaviare

Putumayo Caquetá

Nariño

Cauca

Tolima

Meta

Vichada

Casanare

Antioquia

Chocó

Córdoba

Sucre

 La

Guajira

Atlántico

Magdalena 

Arauca

Cesar

Bolivar

Santander

Norte 

de

Santander

Boyacá Caldas

Quindío

Risaralda Cundinamarca

Huila

Valle del

Cauca

Distrito

Capital

201–600 operations

76–200 operations

1–75 operations

Overall Area of Operations

Bogotá

Figure 2-3. Areas impacted by armed violence. The data include operations conducted by FARC, ELN, M-19, and the AUC over the history of those organizations.
28

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

The insurgent groups, discussed in the Structure and Dynamics of 

the Insurgency section, to varying extents, benefited from the mountainous interiors and heavy foliage of Colombia. The FARC and the ELN 

in particular relied on the inaccessible geography to locate headquarters and training camps and evade Colombian security forces and paramilitary groups. M-19, which adopted an urban-based strategy, did not 

benefit as widely as the other, more rural-based groups. Most of M-19’s 

attempts to launch rural fronts failed. Moreover, as the technological 

capabilities of the Colombian military increased, the inaccessibility of 

the insurgent’s jungle and high mountain sanctuaries became less of 

an advantage. Superior intelligence, and tracking devices, enabled the 

military to accurately target even the most remote insurgent leaders.

However, some initial geographic analyses of where insurgents 

operate and establish a presence suggests that these factors may not 

be as important as some researchers, and guerilla theorists, suggest. 

Research on conflict in political science has frequently found positive 

correlations between rugged geography and a country’s propensity for 

experiencing insurgent activity.12,13,14,15,e However, the researchers conducting the analysis have typically relied on data at the national level. 

Recently, political scientists have begun to explore the relationship 

between geography and conflict at the subnational level.f This research 

pinpoints the geographic location of insurgents’ headquarters, training camps, and operational events to better understand the conditions 

favoring the outbreak of conflict.

The limited geographic analysis of Colombia’s insurgent activity has 

returned some surprising results. At the date of publication, the subnational-level data on Colombia necessary to conduct this research is limited. One researcher, Sarah Zukerman Daly, has provided a geographic 

analysis of insurgent activity in Colombia from 1964 to 1984.17,g During that time, thirty-nine  percent of Colombia’s 1,056  municipalities 

experienced political violence, while the remaining sixty-one percent 

did not. About ten percent of municipalities housed an insurgent base. 

However, in contrast to the conventional wisdom regarding the utility 

of dense foliage and rugged terrain to insurgent groups, Colombian 

e However, no relationship has consistently emerged between dense foliage and 

civil war.

f For a detailed discussion of this emerging research program in the social sciences, 

please see Kalyvas.16

g Daly’s statistical model uses “geo-referenced information on the victims and perpetrators (state, rebel, paramilitary, criminal) and on the kind and intensity of 7,729 violent 

events.” The violent events themselves span 274,428 municipality-month observations. 

These observations, alongside the presence of a rebel base, comprise the dependent variables of the model. For a description of how social scientists use statistical methods in their 

research, please see Bos.18
Chapter 2. Physical Environment

29

insurgents were no more likely to operate in these inaccessible localities 

than other areas that did not have these features. Moreover, insurgents 

were no more likely to operate in localities farther from the centers of 

state and military power than in those localities closer to those centers 

of power. Rather than seeking out areas of sparse settlement, Colombian insurgents were more likely to operate in localities with greater 

population density.h This trend suggests that the insurgents’ calculus 

on where to operate favored strategic targets, not simple refuge:i

[Insurgents] do not aim only to hide; rather, they seek 

to exercise influence and gain support. Regions with 

higher populations, closer to the country’s political 

and economic heartland, represent strategic areas; 

these are generally centers of power worth controlling, 

especially for guerrillas aimed at state take-over.

At the start of the 1990s, around two-thirds of Colombia had no police 

station or city hall or any government representative who was locally 

available. So the armed groups chose these underserved intermontane 

populations from which to garner their support.

The factor that contributed the most to the outbreak of insurgent 

warfare in a given area was the human terrain, not the physical terrain. In her model, Daly found that the areas most likely to experience 

insurgent warfare were those that had a history of organized mobilization during La Violencia. Those municipalities had an eighty-two percent risk of insurgent violence, while those municipalities that were not 

affected by La Violencia had only a twenty-six percent risk of insurgent 

violence. The implications of this legacy of organized violence are discussed in greater detail in the following sections.

ENDNOTES

1 World Health Organization, Global Health Observatory (GHO): Urban Population Growth, 

accessed June 26, 2013, http://www.who.int/gho/urban_health/situation_trends/

urban_population_growth_text/en/.

2 Nancy P. Appelbaum, Muddied Waters: Race, Region, and Local History in Colombia, 1846–

1948 (Durham & London: Duke University Press 2003), 206.

3 Frank Safford and Marco Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society (New York 

and London: Oxford University Press, 2002), 2–3.

4 Ibid., 5.

h In the researcher’s statistical model, a one percent increase in population density in 

a locality led to twenty-two percent increase in risk for experiencing insurgent violence.

i Further researcher conducted on insurgent activity in six central African states 

echoes this relationship between geography and conflict.19
30

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., 5–6.

7 Ibid., 6.

8 Ibid., 7.

9 Ibid., 13–17.

10 Ibid., 6–7.

11 Jennifer S. Holmes, Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Kevin M. Curtin, Guns, Drugs, 

and Development in Colombia (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2008), 14–16.

12 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American 

Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.

13 Siri Camilla Aas Rustad, Jan Ketil Rød, Wenche Larsen, and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Foliage and Fighting: Forest Resources and the Onset, Duration, and Location of Civil War,” 

Political Geography 27, no. 7 (2008): 761–782.

14 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic 

Papers 56, no. 4 (2004): 563–595.

15 H. Hegre and N. Sambanis, “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War 

Onset,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 4 (2006): 508–535.

16 Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Promises and Pitfalls of an Emerging Research Program: The Microdynamics of Civil War” in Order, Conflict, and Violence, ed. Stathis Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro, 

and Tarek Massoud (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 397–421.

17 Sarah Zukerman Daly, “Organizational Legacies of Violence: Conditions Favoring Insurgency Onset in Colombia, 1964–1984,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 3 (2012): 473–491.

18 Nathan Bos, “Underlying Causes of Violence,” in Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, Second Ed., Nathan Bos, ed. (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army 

Special Operations Command, 2012): 13–15.

19 Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, “Introducing 

ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset: Special Data Feature,” Journal 

of Peace Research 47, no. 5 (2010): 652.
CHAPTER 3.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Chapter 3. Historical Context

33

The trajectory of Colombian history impacted the cycles of political violence that the country endured during the twentieth  century 

and well into the twenty-first century. Recurrent themes, redefined but 

recycled by successive generations, have dogged politics in Colombia. 

One of the most important of those themes has been the tug-of-war 

over the right to govern between the Liberal and Conservative Parties.a

The competing political visions of Simón  Bolívar and Francisco 

de Paula Santander, important historical figures in Colombian history, 

were the progenitors of the two political parties, the Conservatives 

and the Liberals, respectively. Bolívar and Santander, and later their 

followers, struggled over the issue of centralization, with Bolivarians 

championing a highly centralized state ruled from Bogotá and Santanderistas preferring a federal structure that gave regions more autonomy. Likewise, the competing factions contended over the influence of 

the church,b with the Conservatives supporting a more robust role for 

the Catholic Church in society. The factions also battled over whether 

to include the lower classes in the political system. The Santanderistas, 

and later the Liberal party, argued for more inclusive politics. External 

factors, especially demographic and economic developments, necessitated a response to this important question. As employment opportunities blossomed in the cities, rural migration to urban areas increased. 

The new urban working classes demanded more from their representatives in government—more inclusion in politics and more policies 

tailored to address their needs, such as greater labor rights.

Despite these political differences, it was the vast patronage networksc

 powering the parties that gave Colombian politics its peculiar 

characteristics. Political differences, to some extent, informed partisanship. Yet, one’s partisan identity was also inherited—from one’s family, 

friends, region, and patron. Party affiliation provided not only one’s 

political identity but also one’s social identity. Personal rivalries and 

loyalties overlaid overt political struggles.

The patronage networks rendered politics an especially high-stakes 

game in Colombia. Party members resorted to political violence to settle 

their differences, rather than through legal channels. During the nineteenth century, it is arguable that Colombian politics were punctuated 

not by war but by peace. Civil war after civil war marred the political 

landscape until the disastrous War of a Thousand Days in 1899–1902. 

a Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on Safford and Palacios.1

 For additional seminal works on Colombian history, please see Dix2

 and Bushnell.3

b As Colombia is a predominantly Catholic society, references to “the church” refer to 

the Roman Catholic Church throughout this study.

c See Chapter 5. Government and Politics for a description of patronage politics, or clientelism, tradition in Colombia.
34

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

The war left nearly a 100,000 Colombians dead and led to the territorial loss of Panama. Suitably chastened by the macabre consequences 

of the war, the Conservatives and Liberals entered an unprecedented 

era of bipartisan support and cooperation that spanned decades.

GRAN COLOMBIA

Colombia’s struggle against the Spanish Royalist forces was decided 

in 1819, when Simón Bolívar (Figure 3-1), a Caracas-born solider, led 

his forces to victory against the Spanish forces at the Battle of Boyacá. 

Bolívar, the former Viceroyalty of New Granada,d united the former colonies into a single polity, the Republica de la Gran Colombia, or Gran 

Colombia. However, the former colonies were not wholly liberated from 

Spanish rule until 1825. From the outset, Gran Colombia suffered from 

a multiplicity of conflicting opinions about the ultimate form the new 

polity would adopt. Some factions favored a more monarchical system, 

while others, including Bolívar, preferred a unification of South American republics ruled by a centralized state; still yet others wanted a federal system that provided for more regional autonomy. Several decades 

after the founding of Gran Colombia, these competing political visions 

formed the basis of the two political parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, which have alternately governed Colombia for centuries.

After helping to liberate New Granada and Venezuela from Spanish rule, Bolívar, along with other elites, moved to unite the former 

colonies, alongside Ecuador, into a single country. They debated the 

extent of centralization that the new country should implement. Some 

looked to the United States as an exemplar of a decentralized structure but worried that Gran Colombia did not have the right conditions 

to make decentralization feasible, especially in terms of civic culture 

and education. As a result, the original constitution of 1821, called the 

Cúcuta Constitution, established a highly centralized state. It protected 

the state against popular demands from its citizens in its provisions for 

limited suffrage and indirect elections. However, the constitution did 

include important social provisions, incorporating indigenous populations, abolishing slavery through attrition, and implementing a broadbased educational system.e

d New Granada included modern-day Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and, later, 

Panama.

e However, in the absence of federal funding, many communities did not have the 

resources to establish schools, nor were there sufficient trained teachers or incentives to 

fulfill the teacher labor demand.
Chapter 3. Historical Context

35

Figure 3-1. Simón Bolívar. Painting by Ricardo Acevedo Bernal (1867–1930).

EARLY LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES: 

SANTANDERISTAS AND BOLIVARIANS

The early split between the Liberal and Conservative Parties first 

began with a split between Bolivarians and Santanderistas, the followers of Simón Bolívar and his vice president, Francisco de  Paula 

Santander (Figure 3-2). The personal conflict between the two men 

(as well as between their followers) “may be thought of as establishing 

the magnetic field that has oriented a substantial part of Colombian 

political history.”4 The narratives supporting the divergent positions of 

these men framed the larger narrative that lie beneath the eventual 

split between the two dominant parties. In turn, the disagreement mirrored conflicts between different groups in society, each competing to 

uphold their own interests and ambitions.
36

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Figure 3-2. Reproduction of an oil painting of Francisco de Paula Santander.

One of the main points of contention among these elites in early 

Colombianf history was the role of the church. The church played an 

important social and political role in Gran Colombia. At the time of 

independence, the church represented the only organized and disciplined group in the country. Gran Colombia lacked a national military, and much of the civilian bureaucracy was dismantled during the 

war for independence. Moreover, the church, with its highly educated 

clergy, fulfilled an important function in a society of mainly illiterate 

citizens. The country had a notably high concentration of clergy per 

capita. Of the approximately 1.25  million inhabitants, about one in 

every 700 was a member of the clergy.5

f In this section, the terms Gran Colombia and Colombia are used interchangeably.
Chapter 3. Historical Context

37

Despite the prominent position of the church, a division of the 

political elite, educated according to Enlightenmentg ideals imported 

from Europe, championed policies that threatened the traditional values and role of the church. The Colombian congress passed a number 

of measures designed to constrain the church’s influence, including 

the abolishment of the Inquisition; the closure of religious houses with 

less than eight residents;h and the increase in age at which individuals could take religious vows to twenty-five. Heated disputes also arose 

regarding which institution had the right to appoint bishops. One faction of elites maintained that it was the inherent right of government to 

make religious appointments, while another faction upheld the right of 

the church to make its religious appointments.

In addition to questioning the role of the church, progressive elites in 

Colombia also encouraged the importation of “foreign ideas” designed 

to encourage European immigration to the country. These new ideas 

brought money, education, and other much-needed resources to the 

fledgling country. Freemasonry became prominent. As in other Western countries, many political elites belonged to various Masonic lodges. 

Membership became a common tie among members of the nascent 

Liberal Party. In addition, religious toleration was encouraged. The 

new toleration led to the formation of Bible societies that encouraged 

individual interpretation of scripture, viewed by many as an unacceptable Protestant intrusion into traditional Catholic practices. The clergy 

viciously attacked the spread of freemasonry, religious toleration, and 

other ideas.

Relations between two other influential actors in Colombian society—lawyers and military—were also notably strained. The military 

viewed the lawyers’ focus on legalities and the rule of law as an unnecessary obstacle to effective action. However, the lawyers maintained the 

importance of incorporating the military under the rule of law after the 

struggle for independence had concluded. Thus, the military argued 

that the lawyers did not appreciate their efforts in the struggle, while 

the lawyers feared violent reprisals from military officers. Class conflicts also contributed to these tensions. Lawyers were university educated, while the military officers were usually from the lower classes.6

g The Enlightenment was an intellectual movement that gained traction in Europe 

beginning in the seventeenth century, later moving to the New World colonies. The 

Enlightenment philosophers advocated the reform of government and society by means 

of reason, offering a direct challenge to previous notions grounded in scripture and tradition. Thomas Hobbes’s The Leviathan, published in England in 1651, is often regarded as 

the first treatise that systematically treated government and society through this modern 

lens. For this reason, Hobbes’s contemporaries labeled him an atheist, a serious charge at 

the time.

h The money saved from these closures was funneled to secondary education.
38

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

In addition to these larger societal issues, personal differences 

between Bolívar and Santander drove the split between the two camps. 

Relations between the two men deteriorated during the latter half of 

the 1820s. Bolívar styled himself the founder of “new modes of order,” 

as Machiavelli aptly described centuries before in The Prince,

7,i

 and perpetrated the extra-legal acts needed to accomplish those goals. In stark 

contrast, Santander acted as the defender of the constitutional order. 

Santander’s contemporaries named him El Hombre de las Leyes, “The 

Man of the Laws,” in recognition of his reputation for supporting the 

letter and spirit of the law.

Difficulties between the two men solidified over Bolívar’s desire 

to supplant the Cúcuta Constitution with his own Bolivian constitution. While in Peru fighting for the colony’s independence from Spain, 

Bolívar helped write a constitution for Upper Peru. In recognition of 

his critical role in the formation of the nation, the state adopted his 

name—Bolivia. Flush with success, Bolívar wanted to write a similar 

constitution for Gran Colombia. He hoped a new constitution, styled 

after Bolivia’s, would address some of the country’s difficulties, especially as they related to Venezuela. Numerous factions within Venezuela chafed at the rule of the centralized state based in Bogotá. Some 

pushed for separation from the larger polity. As a result, Bolívar’s proposed “Bolivian” constitution was controversial. Hoping to promote 

political stability, Bolívar included a provision for a life-term presidency. Offsetting this authoritarian provision, however, the proposed 

constitution would also institute legislative bodies designed to address 

more local concerns.

The Santanderistas opposed the methods that Bolívar used to 

press for the implementation of his constitution. He embarked on a 

campaign to adopt the constitution as quickly as possible. The Cúcuta 

Constitution singled out a specific date, 1831, before which time no 

constitutional reforms could be made legally. Despite these legal strictures, Bolívar pressed forward.j

 Because of Bolívar’s refusal to abide by 

this constitutional law, Santander opposed the reforms as illegal. He 

i “Those like these men, who become princes by the path of virtue, acquire their 

principality with difficulty but hold it with ease; and the difficulties they have in acquiring their principality arise in part from the new orders and modes that they are forced to 

introduce as to found their state and their security. And it should be considered that nothing is more difficult to handle, more difficult of success, nor more difficult to manage, 

than to put oneself at the head of introducing new orders.”

j The US Constitutional Convention of 1787 faced a similar problem. Technically, the 

convention had only the authority to revise the Articles of Confederation governing the 

United States at the time. Instead, key members, such as James Madison, pushed the convention to wholly rewrite the Articles of Confederation. Although it met some resistance, 

the faction was successful, leading to the adoption of the current US Constitution.
Chapter 3. Historical Context

39

believed Bolívar’s insistence on pursuing the new constitution threatened the stability of an already fragile system.

Not surprisingly, the Santanderistas also protested the substance of 

Bolívar’s constitution. They argued it was contrary to the republican 

idealsk that had fueled the struggle for independence against Spanish 

tyranny. A life-long president, which Bolívar’s constitution insisted on, 

too closely resembled a monarchy, violating one of the fundamental 

principles of republican government—the alternation of power. For a 

time, Santander privately castigated the proposed constitution. Eventually, Santander aired his grievances publicly. These public airings, combined with Bolívar and Santander’s pronounced differences of opinion 

on how best to handle a rebellion brewing in Venezuela, led the men 

to definitively split.

Bolívar’s handling of the Venezuelan separatist movement, headed 

by General Páez, furthered the split. The Liberator (Bolívar’s nom 

de guerre) quelled the nascent rebellion through conciliation rather 

than with the military. Bolívar regarded Páez, an influential military 

leader, as key to saving Gran Colombia. As a result, he reconciled with 

Páez by capitulating to the general’s demands for greater autonomy 

from Bogotá in Venezuela. Santander and his allies, meanwhile, had 

wanted to quash the rebellion, bringing Venezuela more fully under 

the authority of the crippled national government.

Proponents of Santander, spearheaded by university-educated 

lawyers, referred to themselves as constitutionalists or liberals for their 

support of the Cúcuta Constitution. The constitutionalists’ support 

was drawn from residents of the Magdalena Valley, from Mompox to 

Neiva, as well as moderates from Antioquia and the Eastern Cordillera. Some New Granadan military officers also supported the Santanderistas. Meanwhile, military officers, mainly Venezuelan, along with 

a contingent of New Granadan citizens, mainly aristocratic elements, 

supported the adoption of Bolívar’s constitution.

COLLAPSE OF GRAN COLOMBIA

By 1827, elites of all political persuasions questioned the future of 

the Gran Colombian polity. Venezuela, New Granada, and Ecuador had 

begun to operate more or less autonomously. In 1830, after Bolívar’s 

k Republicanism is a broad term often used to describe support for governance based 

on popular will. As such, it advocates democratic participation, but within parameters set 

by a constitutional order. Please see The Federalist Papers, available at http://avalon.law.yale.

edu/subject_menus/fed.asp, for the most thorough articulation of republicanism in modern times.
40

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

death, Gran Colombia dissolved into its constituent parts. Modern-day 

Colombia reformed into the Republic of New Granada in 1831.

In an effort to combat the centrifugal forces tearing apart Gran 

Colombia, Bolívar held a constitutional convention in 1828. Both sides, 

the Santanderistas and Bolivarians, made concessions. The Bolivarians, for example, conceded to the Santanderista demand for a limitedterm presidency. Despite these conciliatory efforts, intransigence on 

both sides triumphed. After the apparent failure of the convention, 

with the support of his followers, Bolivar proclaimed himself dictator 

of Gran Colombia. The office of the vice president, which Santander 

held, was abolished. Santander himself was sent to the United States as 

the Colombian envoy. In order to consolidate his rule, Bolívar courted 

institutions he had once shunned, notably the church, overturning 

legislation enacted by the Gran Colombian congress that especially 

irritated the clergy. He also shored up support among the military by 

restoring the full measure of privileges that military officers enjoyed 

under Spanish rule.

Bolívar’s efforts to hold together New Granada, Venezuela, and 

Ecuador failed as his regime met armed resistance from Santanderistas; Venezuelan, New Granadan, and Peruvian separatists; and other 

mutinous factions.

Bolivarians held another constitutional convention in 1830. The 

convention was packed with Bolivarian supporters, and the delegates 

appeared to come to a consensus on the future of Gran Colombia. 

The new constitution, however, emerged just as the country itself dissolved. Mutinous militias in Bogotá had confirmed the separation of 

New Granada and Venezuela. A dispirited and physically weakened 

Bolívar brushed off demands by the congress for him to return to the 

presidency. In his place, the congress elected political moderates as 

president and vice president. The moderate administration provoked 

armed disputes between Bolivarians and liberal supporters, leaving 

the Bolivarians in control of the capital. General Rafael Urdaneta then 

took over as provisional president with the understanding that Bolívar 

would take power when his health permitted. However, shortly thereafter, in 1831, Bolívar died. A compromise coalition government, under 

the rule of General Domingo Caicedo, took over rule of the new country, New Granada.

While the differing political visions of Santander and Bolívar 

divided the country, additional external factors also contributed to the 

collapse of Gran Colombia. After the threat of Spanish royalist forces 

departed, the former colonies had fewer reasons to unite than to disperse. The colonial authorities in Caracas and Quito were accustomed 

to independent authority, making rule from Bogotá an uncomfortable 
Chapter 3. Historical Context

41

change. Moreover, the respective capitals were a great distance from 

one another and separated by rugged terrain. These geographical 

obstacles rendered Venezuelan and Ecuadorian representation in the 

national government problematic. The former colonies also lacked 

internal trade relations and common fiscal policies that could have 

helped cement the troubled relationship.

PARTISANSHIP: IDEOLOGY OR SOCIAL IDENTITY?8

In the decades after the collapse of Gran Colombia, the split 

between Santander and Bolívar transformed into a macabre competition between the Liberal and Conservative Parties. If most people in 

the United States were asked to describe what distinguished a member 

of the Democratic Party from a member of the Republican Party, their 

explanations would be likely to include differences in political doctrine. 

However, the Liberal and Conservative Parties that emerged in nineteenth-century Colombia, while in part comprising differing political 

perspectives, also acted as powerful social identities for their members.

Liberal and Conservative partisan identity formed at the individual 

and regional levels. The individual motivations behind partisan identity 

can be difficult to determine. In general, however, individual partisan 

identity was formed “through a complex process in which events, relationships, and ideas [combined] to form political allegiance.”9

 A person’s economic interest, such as his/her position as a large landowner 

or a peasant, his particular patron–client relationship, adherence to 

certain ideals about how government and society should be managed, 

and, to some extent, pure chance, all intermingled to influence whether 

a person identified with the Liberal or Conservative Party.10

Social networks also influenced an individual’s partisanship. In the 

early nineteenth century, a member of the Caicedo family, Domingo 

Caicedo, a powerful Conservative, joined the faction in part because 

it supported his economic interests as a large landowner. However, 

his personal friendship with Bolívar likely also contributed heavily to 

his political predilections. Had Caicedo’s social networks tied him to 

Santander rather the Bolívar, his political loyalties could have developed quite differently.11 Connections with various political events also 

shaped identity. One staunch Liberal in the nineteenth  century followed in the footsteps of his father, executed at the hands of an early 

Conservative faction. As one scholar described, “He could no more 

have become a Conservative than he could have viewed his father as 

other than a martyred ‘lover of liberty’ and patriot shot for the ‘political crime’ of upholding the laws of his country.”12
42

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Regional differences in partisan identity are attributed to broader 

factors. Some regions, such as the Antioquia Department, historically 

associated with the Conservative Party, while others, such as the Cundinamarca Department, typically sided with the Liberal Party. Other 

regions, like the Tolima Department, were divided. There, Conservatives congregated in the south, characterized by large landholdings 

overseen by powerful local leaders such as the Caicedo family.

The Caicedo family serves as an apt example of the importance 

of patronage networks in Colombian politics. Early on, the Caicedos 

adopted the Conservative Party, which had traditionally supported the 

interests of powerful, landed elite such as their family. The Caicedo 

family was the overseer not only of land and wealth, but also the livelihoods of local residents entwined with the local ruling family. When 

the Caicedos adopted the tenets of the Conservative Party, they brought 

their followers with them into the Conservative fold.13

Meanwhile, free commerce, not an economy of landed elites, characterized the northern Tolima Department. Commerce exploded after 

the central government ended the tobacco monopoly, spurring private 

tobacco cultivation in the region. This economic development likely 

encouraged identification with the Liberal Party.14 Residents enjoyed 

the fruit of Liberal reforms in ways that the large hacienda owners in 

the south did not. The middle-class merchants and nouveau riche that 

emerged as a result of Liberal economic reforms were a threat, not a 

boon, to the landed elite in the south. Lastly, migration patterns in some 

areas reinforced or introduced regional partisan identities. A steady 

stream of Conservatives migrated to the northwest area of Tolima in the 

nineteenth century, making the area a bastion of Conservative support.15

Ironically, the emergence of the parties may have helped the nation 

coalesce into a more cohesive union. If not for the parties, Colombia 

may have remained a state of semi-autonomous regions ruled by men 

more closely resembling medieval barons, the caudillos,

l

 than citizens of 

a modern nation-state. One scholar notes that “Colombia escaped permanent rule by caudillos in the 19th century thanks to the formation of 

the Conservative and Liberal parties, which divided the nation into two 

political parts and was to have significant and enduring consequences.”17

l The caudillos were powerful, influential local leaders who maintained a patron–

client relationship with residents. Their leadership was based on “landownership, military experience, or charismatic personality” and often filled a vacuum left by ineffective 

regional or national government. Caudillos were a “weighty force” in politics throughout 

the nineteenth century, occasionally launching themselves from local leadership into the 

national presidency. In the early nineteenth century, caudillos such as General Domingo 

Caicedo based much of their power and influence on the allegiance they commanded 

from their followers. Caicedo could rely on the hundreds—if not thousands—of followers to come to his defense. In turn, Caicedo’s “clients” could rely on their “patron” as a 

“leader, protector, court of last resort, and in time of exceptional need their insurance.”16
Chapter 3. Historical Context

43

One of those consequences was a new intensity in politics, especially 

surrounding elections. Upon election, the victorious party gained the 

power to shape the future of the country as well as distribute financial 

and political booty. In this raucous time in Colombian history, election days were often met with violence as defeated parties resorted to 

the sword in protest. Between 1851 and 1895 alone, Colombia experienced seven civil wars and other localized revolts—all fought under the 

auspices of the Liberal and Conservative Parties. The juxtaposition of 

politics and violence solidified intense partisan identification so that 

“rare was the citizen who did not know where his political loyalty lay.”18

1830s

Moderates

1840s

Ministeriales

1848

Conservatives

Figure 3-3. The evolution of the Conservative Party.m

1830s

Exaltados

1840s

Progrestistas

1840s

Liberals

Figure 3-4. The evolution of the Liberal Party.

After 1831, a decisive split developed between factions of liberals 

with contrasting views of how the country should move forward after 

Bolívar’s death. The liberal exaltados, or “extremists or purists” faced off 

with the “moderate” liberals. One of the primary conflicts between the 

two factions related to lustration, or how to incorporate political elites 

from a previous regime. The exaltados favored a complete cleansing of 

Bolivarian elements from ruling institutions, including the government 

and the military, ensuring, they believed, that a future Colombia would 

maintain a Republican disposition. They favored dramatic, sweeping 

reforms that wholly cleansed the political and military spheres of leftover Bolivarians and decisively broke the juridical and financial power 

of the church. In contrast, as their name suggests, the moderates championed gradual, non-confrontational reforms that incorporated Bolivarians into the ruling structure while bolstering the role of the church 

m Early Conservatives used the term ministerales to describe members of their 

movement.
44

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

as an important institution maintaining social order. They believed 

this inclusion would ensure a more durable and lasting peace. Overlaying these political differences were personal rivalries and loyalties 

acquired during the fierce competition for political office and favor. 

Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4 depict the evolutionary trajectory of the two 

political parties.

The issue of purging and reincorporation continued to be a point of 

contention among political elites throughout the 1830s. The election of 

General Santander (1832–1837) to the presidency in 1832, Bolívar’s onetime arch rival, was followed by the election of José Ignacio de Márquez 

(1837–1841), a moderate. During Márquez’s presidency, the exaltados frequently accused Márquez of allying with Bolivarians, particularly after 

appointing several known Bolivarians to his cabinet, including General 

Tomás Cipriano Mosquera. After Márquez’s installment in the executive office, his administration received evidence that a prominent exaltados, General José María Obando, had murdered a high-ranking military 

officer in 1830. The accusations prompted an investigation, zealously 

pursued by Márquez’s secretary of war, Mosquera, conveniently also a 

bitter personal rival of General Obando’s. The investigation, and subsequent trial, led Obando to abandon the judicial process for armed 

rebellion against the moderate Márquez administration.

Exaltados resentment against the Márquez regime, and its perceived 

Bolivarian ties, had already led to unrest in a number of regions. A civil 

war, pitting the exaltados and moderates against one another, resulted 

from the violence. Local rebellions jump-started in many populated 

areas of the country. The military officers fronting the effort mobilized 

substantial mass elements in some regions. Regardless, the war lasted 

about twenty-nine months, from January 1840 until May 1842. Ironically, as one scholar notes, “The strident Santanderista opposition to 

the Márquez government, and the subsequent civil war, propelled moderates into the very alliances with the Bolivarians and the clergy about 

which the Santanderistas has worried.”19 This moderate faction would 

officially adopt the name “Conservative” in 1848.

The typical Conservative and Liberal Party members also disagreed 

on several important ideological matters. The Conservatives showed a 

preference for social and political order and the institutions that supported those values. In particular, this meant support for the church as 

well as the central role of the family in social life. Conservatives encouraged the influence of the church in government and society, such as 

supporting the church’s involvement in education. In matters related 

to politics, Conservatives advocated strong central authority and decisive responses to political opposition. Because most regarded property 

as a natural right, Conservatives supported only limited intervention 
Chapter 3. Historical Context

45

in the economy, favoring unfettered economic competition. Conservatives also adopted paternalist policies toward the less fortunate in 

society, relying on the sporadic charity and benevolence of the state 

and employers to aid those in need. These policies did not extend to 

any recognition of workers’ rights or support of unions to represent the 

labor movement.20

While the ideological tenets of the Conservative Party were influenced by Hispanic traditionalism, the Liberal Party was heavily influenced by nineteenth century liberalism. Liberals argued that reason, 

not the church or tradition, should guide political and social life. In 

particular, Liberals were adamantly opposed to church influence in 

politics, which they believed was a purely secular matter. Liberals also 

resented any intrusion of the church in public education. In contrast 

to the Conservatives, the Liberals advocated a federal government that 

granted more autonomy to Colombian regions to govern themselves. 

Originally, the Liberals favored similar economic policies as the Conservatives. Over time, however, Liberals supported a stronger interventionist role for the state. Liberals also gradually supported legislation 

and policies that granted more expansive workers’ rights, but not without internal struggles in the party.21

Other scholars have argued that it was not ideological differences 

that shaped the parties so much as the differing socioeconomic conditions. The most popular interpretation along these lines has pitted 

Conservative wealthy landowners, clergy, and military officers against 

the Liberal lawyers and merchants. A review of the evidence, however, 

suggests that cleavages based on socioeconomic status and occupation 

cannot reliably account for alignments to either party. More reliable 

interpretations conclude that the political alignments are attributable to the constellation of cities from which party members were 

drawn. For example, Conservatives, favoring the established political 

and social mien, were typically from former colonial centers, such as 

Bogotá, Cartagena, and Popayán. Indeed, Colombians who favored a 

more centralized state typically regarded those who favored federal 

structures, thereby preserving regional autonomy, as having lower 

social status. Some elites believed that those Colombians who favored 

regional autonomy did so only because it offered an entry into provincial politics for those whom otherwise had no access to politics at the 

national level.22

Despite their different views, the early Liberal and Conservative 

Parties emerged from a similar ideological tradition. The factions were 

united in their opposition to Bolívar’s constitutional project, and both 

maintained a commitment to the rule of constitutional law. More generally, both were committed to similar cultural projects and looked 
46

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

to similar sources of inspiration for political ideas. For instance, both 

groups sought to cultivate a society based on the Western European 

Enlightenment model, and both were versed in the political ideas of 

Baron de Montesquieu, Benjamin Constant, and Alexis de Tocqueville, 

all leading democratic theorists of the time. Furthermore, the specters 

of arbitrary military power and religious intolerance and fanaticism 

were equally unpalatable.23

THE LIBERAL ASCENDANCY

The election of General José Hilario López (1849–1853) to the 

presidency in 1849 signaled the beginning of several decades of Liberal rule.n The earlier civil war provided the context for both ends of 

the political spectrum. For the Conservatives, the violence confirmed 

the need for social and political order. For the Liberals, the violence 

galvanized its base to reclaim the national government. Once in power, 

the Liberal Party suffered from internal divisions but nonetheless 

adopted sweeping social reforms and decentralized the power of the 

central government.

Several important developments aided the Liberals. For the first 

time in Colombian history, portions of the popular classes mobilized to 

make political demands of their own. A class of young Liberals, influenced by the 1848 French Revolution, fomented the surge in populist demands. The French struggle had brought the ideals of the 1789 

French Revolution more clearly into the consciousness of the young 

elite in New Granada, particularly its demands for equality, liberty, 

and fraternity. Many of them believed the republican principles that 

had driven the struggle for independence from Spanish colonial rule 

remained unfulfilled. Vestiges of colonial rule were still apparent in 

slavery; the outdated revenue system, fiscal monopolies (such as on 

tobacco), and tithes; the role of the church in politics and society; and 

the failure to include the common man in politics. During this time 

period, partisan conflict generated by differing positions on these 

important issues led, once again, to open class warfare.

The Liberals, emboldened by European Enlightenment thought, 

pushed for organized mass politics. Mass politics signified both the 

inclusion of the lower classes into political institutions and enacting 

policies that addressed their needs. This Liberal contingent, comprising mostly young, university-educated elite, grew up in the shadow of 

the previous civil war and a ministeriales backlash against the inclusion 

n However, during this period, the Conservatives sometimes had control of 

the legislature.
Chapter 3. Historical Context

47

of Enlightenment thought in university education. Indeed, in the early 

1840s, the ministeriales brought back the Jesuitso to indoctrinate ideas 

of social order in New Granadan youth. The young Liberals’ aims dovetailed with the mobilization of the popular classes, such as artisans 

from Bogotá.

The artisan class resided in the middle ground between the elites 

and the illiterate, unskilled workers. The paternalistic approach of 

the Liberals eventually soured the relationship. However, the myriad 

Democratic societies that resulted from the alliance became the model 

for organized mass mobilization in many towns across the country. 

Occasionally, these organizations opted to intimidate their Conservative rivals through prodigious use of violence. After Conservatives 

complained of the armed tactics, Liberals dismissed the violence as 

“democratic frolics.”24 The violence drove the wedge further between 

competing groups, such as wealthy Conservative landowners and the 

popular classes.

For their part, Conservatives also sought to mobilize their followers 

and buttress their ideological position. The leader of the party at the 

time, Mariano Ospina Rodríguez, consciously adopted the symbology 

and rhetoric of the church to contrast its position with that of the “irreligious anarchism of the Liberal ‘reds.’ ”25 The Conservatives, like the 

Liberals, founded societies to mobilize mass support such as the Popular Society for Mutual Instruction and Christian Fraternity in Bogotá. 

Issues surrounding the role of the church in society and politics would 

prove a divisive issue, helping to propel the country into yet another 

civil war in the 1850s.

Liberal and Conservatives shared similar positions on economic 

issues, but most vehemently disagreed on the role of the church. Liberals advocated a separation of church and state, viewing it as too hierarchical and traditional to be truly democratic. Thus, the Liberals 

eradicated the fuero, the privilege that granted priests a trial in ecclesiastical, as opposed to state, courts in criminal and civil matters. Liberals also granted municipal councils greater sway in appointing parish 

priests and made the church more financially dependent on provincial legislatures. Despite admonitions from less radical elements of the 

party, fearful of the popular response the move would engender, President López expelled the Jesuit order in 1850. The Jesuits were feared 

as the “political instruments” of the Conservative Party.26 The reforms, 

o The Jesuits are part of a Roman Catholic religious order that has traditionally 

engaged in missionary and educational work since its founding in the sixteenth century. Because of the Jesuits’ political and economic clout, some European monarchs, 

including the Spanish crown, suppressed Jesuit activity in the eighteenth century within 

their territories.
48

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

combined with the abolition of slavery, fueled a Conservative rebellion, 

quickly suppressed, in 1851. This period in Colombian history solidified 

the alliance between the Conservative Party and the church, viewed by 

the latter as the only institution capable of checking the dangerous 

democratic innovations of the Liberal contingent.

The alliance between the well-meaning Liberals and the emergent 

popular classes did not endure. While the artisans demanded greater 

tariff protection from imported products, the Liberal elites delivered lectures on the benefits of free-trade to the struggling artisan 

class. The break was notable when a military coup in 1854, precipitated by an amended 1853 Constitution delegating greater autonomy 

to regional governments, was supported by artisan militias. Fearful of 

anti-military legislation enacted as part of the reformed constitution, 

the military garrison in Bogotá had deserted the barracks and ousted 

President  Obando’s (1853–1854) Liberal administration. Several factors helped to cement the alliance between the artisans and the military. Both nursed a mutual hostility to the Conservative and Liberal 

political elites. Because the two groups lived side by side in the same 

neighborhoods, they also shared the same social networks, making 

them natural allies.27

Responding to the challenge presented by the military, Conservatives and Liberals joined in an alliance, calling themselves constitutionalists, to defeat the ruling military junta. Later, the alliance installed 

a constitutional regime, dominated this time by Conservatives. For 

a period of a number of years after the military coup, the Conservatives enjoyed an “interlude” of rule, bolstered by its efforts to forcefully 

undermine Liberal hegemony in key regions during the opposition 

to military rule. Under them, decentralization continued, thought by 

many to be a cure for the political violence that marred the country.28

Most regions in the country supported the efforts, although some, 

like Bogotá, resisted. Despite the efforts to diminish the incentives for 

armed competition for the national seat of power, provincial armed 

struggles continued. Compounding the problem, the legal language 

outlining the relationship between the national government and the 

states was unclear. Vying interpretations regarding this relationship, 

alongside the intrusion of the national government into state politics, 

was a potent source of conflict for decades to come, eventually bringing 

the country to another civil conflict in 1859–1863.29

A splinter of the Liberal Party, known as the Radicals, gained control of the executive office after the conflict. They maintained control until nearly the conclusion of the 1870s. After it lost control of the 

presidency, the Liberal Party suffered an irreparable division after the 

presidential election of 1875–1876, separating the Radicals from the 
Chapter 3. Historical Context

49

Independents. The newly formed Liberal splinter, the Independents, 

allied itself with the Conservatives, ultimately leading to the election of 

Liberal Rafael Núñez to the presidency.

Núñez’s regime ushered in a period of state formation that proved 

critical for the development of the modern Colombian state. One of 

the most significant developments during his tenure was his adoption 

of a new constitution in 1886.p The Constitution, which remained in 

effect until 1991, included provisions for a more centralized republic. 

Political offices that had previously been filled through elections were, 

under the new constitution, replaced with government-determined 

appointments. Universal male suffrage was circumscribed with literacy 

requirements. He ensured that the Catholic Church’s role in politics 

and society was reinvigorated, especially in matters of education. With 

the aid of Conservatives, he oversaw the revocation of many political 

and social reforms which the Liberal Party had enacted during previous decades of rule.31 Núñez’s rethinking of the Colombian political 

landscape earned him the nickname the “Regenerator.”

The exclusion of Liberals from government, combined with falling 

coffee prices that exerted downward pressure on the economy, helped 

spark the War of a Thousand Days (1899–1902). This final, and bloodiest, of Colombia’s nineteenth century civil conflicts killed 100,000 people and ended in the loss of the Panama isthmus in 1903. One of the 

positive outcomes of the horrific, and costly, war was an about-face of 

political culture. Both Liberals and Conservatives were keenly aware of 

the high costs and few benefits of resorting to violence to resolve political differences. In the early twentieth century, a pragmatic return to 

partisan cooperation established the political stability requisite for the 

regeneration of the Colombian economy.32

The next several decades in Colombian history are occasionally 

referred to as the Pax Conservadora (1904–1930). A prosperous economy and bipartisan cooperation were some of the hallmarks of this 

Conservative era. The Conservative General Rafael Reyes, elected to 

the presidency in 1904, had support from a faction of moderate Conservatives and tacit, if not outright, support from Liberals. Although 

Reyes, due to a number of factors, eventually fell from grace, he was successful in abolishing many troublesome exclusionary policies enacted 

during the Regeneration, encouraging bipartisan support. Both parties agreed on the need for state and regional investments to boost the 

economy as members on either side belonged to the coffee economy 

and “endorsed the liberal political ideology, social conservatism, and 

p After the Cúcuta constitution, Colombians rewrote their constitution in 1830, 

1832, 1843, 1853, 1858, 1863, 1886, and 1991. Currently, the Colombia is ruled under the 

1991 constitution.30
50

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

pro-export economic policies of the new order.”33 Indeed, until 1950, 

all transitions of power within the government occurred constitutionally, a near miracle for a country riddled with political violence.

The Pax Conservadora, however, eventually tarnished. Charges 

of fiscal management, for instance, surfaced in the late 1920s. However, far more damning for the national government was the army’s 

response to a banana strike in 1928. The strikers were banana harvesters working for the United Fruit Company, a corporation headquartered in the United States. Soldiers attacked and killed the strikers. 

Many interpreted the response as evidence that the Colombian government favored US interests over those of their own countrymen.q

 Socialists already active within Colombia planned an ultimately unsuccessful 

armed revolt against the Conservative regime.34

The events highlighted the increasing political consciousness of 

many working-class Colombians. Many were drawn to the cities by the 

promise of well-compensated employment. A glut of public projects 

financed by borrowed monies created a wealth of employment opportunities. Some rural areas of Tolima were so depleted as a result of the 

urban migration that coffee crops could not be harvested. This bountiful period in the early twentieth century was called the “dance of the 

millions.” The increase of workers in urban areas, alongside employment that provided for more than basic needs, facilitated the rise of a 

“proletariat” class:

The lure of jobs in the city enticed many people into 

the money economy for the first time. A new class of 

workers sprang up among those who could now satisfy 

their own immediate needs and who entertained the 

prospect of constantly increasing salaries. Soon the 

urban proletariat began to explore ways of increasing 

its leverage within society.35

Strikes, such as those of transportation workers from urban regions 

in Tolima, became more commonplace. The rise of socialist activity 

concerned governing officials, fearful of “Bolshevik” subversion.

While political elites continue to govern the country, other organized political actors also gained influence during this time. Unions, 

for instance, and their attendant concern for worker’s rights, became 

an influential component of politics. This trend was especially apparent 

q This period also coincided with the publication of One Hundred Years of Solitude, a 

tremendously influential novel authored by Colombian Gabriel García Márquez. The novel’s moving depiction of the death of the strikers helped to shape Colombian’s collective 

memory of the incident. Later, leftist guerrilla insurgents from the M-19 would cite the 

work as influential in the development of their ideology. See the M-19 Ideology section.
Chapter 3. Historical Context

51

after the Liberals took control of the presidency in 1930, bolstered by 

turns to Socialist politics the world over during the Great Depression. 

Other leftist concerns included land reform to protect peasant access 

to lands, but, unlike the labor movement, there was no widespread, 

cohesive agenda pursued by peasant populations at this juncture. As 

one historian notes, “As a matter of party alliances, the unions were to 

the Liberals what the church was for the Conservatives.”36

In the 1930s, positions on labor determined where one stood on 

the political spectrum. The radical left of the Liberal Party took up 

the clarion call of Communism and Socialism, negating the need for 

a strong Communist or Socialist party as such. The Liberals’ efforts on 

behalf of workers’ rights—including the right to unionize; the right 

to strike; and eight-hour workdays and a forty-eight-hour workweek—

ensured popular sympathy for the Liberal Party. For its part, historically aligned with the Conservative Party, the church also attempted to 

co-opt and cultivate unions but met with little success.

ENDNOTES

1 Frank Safford and Marco Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society (New York: 

Oxford University Press, 2002), chaps. 7–12.

2 Robert H. Dix, Colombia: Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven and London: Yale 

University Press, 1967).

3 David Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

4 Safford and Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 118.

5 Jorge Pablo Osterling, Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (New 

Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction Publishers, 1989), 57.

6 Safford and Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 112–123.

7 Niccoló Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey Mansfield (Chicago: University of Chicago 

Press, 1998), 23.

8 Safford and Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society, Chap. 8.

9 James D. Henderson, When Colombia Bled: A History of the Violencia in Tolima (Tuscaloosa, 

AL: University Alabama Press, 1985), 40.

10 Ibid., 40–41.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., 42.

13 Ibid., 40.

14 Ibid., 40–41.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., 35–36.

17 Ibid., 37.

18 Ibid., 39–40.

19 Safford and Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 150–151.
52

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

20 Dix, Colombia: Political Dimensions of Change, 233–235.

21 Ibid., 235–237.

22 Safford and Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 151–156.

23 Ibid., 136.

24 Ibid., 199.

25 Ibid., 203.

26 Ibid., 204.

27 Ibid., 209–210.

28 Ibid., 212–213.

29 Ibid., 216–217.

30 Christopher Michael Cardona, “Politicians, Soldiers, and Cops: Colombia’s La Violencia 

in Comparative Perspective” (doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 

2008), 13.

31 Mary Roldán, Blood and Fire: La Violencia in Antioquia, Colombia, 1946–1953 (Durham, NC: 

Duke University Press Books, 2002), 14.

32 Cardona, “Politicians, Soldiers, and Cops: Colombia’s La Violencia in Comparative Perspective,” 56–59.

33 Roldán, Blood and Fire: La Violencia in Antioquia, Colombia, 1946–1953, 15.

34 Safford and Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 280–283.

35 Henderson, When Colombia Bled, 67.

36 Safford and Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 292.
CHAPTER 4.

SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

55

A variety of socioeconomic conditions have contributed to the ongoing violence in Colombia. Unlike many ongoing conflicts today, the violence in Colombia has not been fueled by ethnic differences.a

 Instead, 

the major insurgent groups contributing to the violence in Colombia 

rely on variations of communist, socialist, and nationalist rhetoric to 

mobilize and sustain their popular base. Rapid demographic changes 

in the twentieth century, including population growth and urbanization, helped to exacerbate the economic and social inequalities undergirding this rationalization, and support, of leftist insurgencies. These 

ideological motivations, especially in the case of the FARC, are often 

complemented by greed-based motivations for conflict, spurred by 

Colombia’s abundance of exploitable natural resources. The resources, 

especially coca, have helped to financially sustain, and personally 

enrich, guerrilla organizations and their leaders. When mixed with the 

closed, albeit democratic, political system characterizing Colombia, the 

socioeconomic conditions have created a potent environment for rebellion. The economically, socially, and politically excluded groups, such 

as peasants, small landholders, and the urban poor, form the backbone 

of popular support for leftist guerrillas.

ETHNICITY

Colombia originated as a Spanish colony, gaining independence 

in 1810.1 As a result of the country’s colonial heritage, Spanish is its 

primary language and Catholicism its primary religion, practiced by 

approximately ninety percent of the population. The people of Colombia are classified under three racial groups: Amerindians, blacks, and 

whites. As a result of 500 years of commingling, Colombia is described 

as one of the most diverse countries in the Western Hemisphere, 

comprising some eighty-five different ethnic groups.2 Many Colombians self-identify as white, even though only twenty percent of Colombians have primarily European ancestry.3

 Most are likely mestizos, of 

mixed European and indigenous descent; slightly more than half of 

the Colombian population falls in this category.4 Despite this apparent 

diversity, the conflict bedeviling Colombia for decades has not typically 

originated from these ethnic differences. Instead, political, economic, 

and social inequalities have proven to be much more salient.

a This peculiar aspect of the conflict partially derives from the legacy of clientelism 

that shaped Colombian politics, especially during La Violencia, when the seeds for the 

leftist insurgencies were first planted. The two dominant poles of Colombian politics, the 

Liberal and Conservative parties, built their popular bases on vast patronage networks. It 

was these relationships of benefit, oftentimes handed down in families over generations, 

that defined what constituted a “Liberal” or a “Conservative,” not any specific ideological 

or ethnic affinity.
56

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Colombia’s colonial rule divided the country, not only by geography but by ethnicity and class as well. Peasant populations in the eastern parts of the country succeeded in the agricultural sectors and 

were more independent than those on the western Caribbean coastlines where slaves were brought in to work the land. Colonial history 

also influenced where these concentrations of ethnic groups lived, 

with whites and mestizos living primarily in urban centers, including 

Bogotá.5

 The colonizers themselves settled in the larger highland cities 

and controlled only sections of the land, leaving the countryside mostly 

outside of their area of control. Colonizers chose to settle in cities with 

indigenous populations, which could be used to mine lands for gold, 

silver, and other minerals. However, these indigenous populations and 

Indian peasants were resistant to acculturation and difficult to control. 

As a result, the Spanish colonizers forced several labor rules on the 

indigenous to guarantee their cooperation.6

 Mestizos also moved into 

the Andean highlands as a result of Spanish conquerors intermingling 

with Amerindian women.7

Colombia has three groups of ethnic minorities that are socially, economically, and politically disadvantaged: indigenous or Amerindian, 

Romany gypsies, and Afro-Colombians or blacks. Although Colombia’s 

insurgencies are not triggered by ethnic claims, ethnically marginalized groups found new voices in the Communist insurgencies whose 

primary concern was that of class, not race. Black populations live primarily in the lowlands on the Caribbean and Pacific coasts, particularly 

in the departments of Bolívar, Chocó, and Valle de Cauca.8

 Because 

of their proximity to the Spanish, black slaves were more exposed to 

Spanish culture, allowing them to become a part of Colombian society, 

unlike Amerindians.9

 Adopting this Spanish culture enabled blacks to 

feel themselves superior to Amerindians at the end of colonial rule.10

Amerindians are mostly concentrated along the Amazonian areas. As 

a group, Amerindiansb

 exercise legal autonomy, implementing and 

enforcing their own traditional laws and customs within their own territories.11 Although the Amerindians represent a small percentage of 

the national population, they were granted nearly a quarter of Colombia’s territory under the 1991 Constitution.12

b Indigenous populations in Colombia have pressed for reforms on the basis of ethnic 

claims. One insurgent organization, the Quintín Lame Group, was formed expressly to 

represent the interests of indigenous populations. Indigenous political activists then allied 

with M-19 during the 1991 National Constituent Assembly to successfully press for constitutional reforms favorable to indigenous interests.
Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

57

DEMOGRAPHICS

The twentieth century was a period of rapid growth and demographic change in Colombia. The population grew from approximately 

four million people at the beginning of the twentieth century to about 

twelve  million by 1951.13 By 2012, the population had increased to 

47.7 million.14 Gains in human development facilitated Colombia’s population growth. Improvements in modern medicine and the Colombian public-health system, lower death rates, and increased income 

rates led to higher birth rates, which in turn led to a population growth 

of about two to three percent each decade. As other socioeconomic factors (including increased urbanization, better health care, and better 

education for women) improved, the birth rate fell by forty-five percent 

in 1966. Additionally, newborns were expected to live longer by about 

nine  years and to have better chances of surviving, with decreased 

infant mortality rates of about twenty-seven percent.15 Life expectancy 

at birth grew from fifty years of age in 1951 to sixty-two in the 1970s.16

Colombia’s population density, especially in urban areas, has also 

significantly increased over the past century. Most of the population is 

concentrated in the mid- to northwestern part of the country and in the 

cities of Medellín, Bogotá, Barranquilla, and Cali. Nearly sixteen percent of the country’s population now lives in Bogotá, a tenfold increase 

in the city’s population over the past sixty years. Four Colombian cities 

boast more than a million inhabitants while thirty-three smaller cities 

have between 100,000 and 500,000 residents. The number of Colombians living in urban areas has increased from a low of thirty-one percent 

in 1938 to seventy-five percent in 2010. By contrast, Colombia’s eastern 

lowlands, which comprise more than half of the country’s area, are 

scarcely populated.17

ECONOMIC POLICY AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY

Postcolonial land reform exacerbated existing social divides in 

Colombia. During the late nineteenth century, the newly independent 

Colombian government instituted a major land-reform effort, privatizing public lands and establishing many small and medium-sized farms, 

giving title to many small farmers. Two sets of legislation (one passed 

in 1874 and another in 1882) were instated to protect these new landowners from settler resistance.18 While this land reform enabled small 

and medium-sized farmers to own property and cultivate their newly 

acquired lands, peasant settlers were unable to overcome obstacles 

in the titling process, including legal fees, surveyor fees, and fencing. Peasants’ obstacles were compounded by large landowners who 
58

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

would occupy their lands and hinder the titling process for peasants 

who wished to claim their property rights.19 The need for land reform 

continues to be the source of the FARC’s political legitimacy among 

its supporters.

Colombian industrialization in the early 1900s benefited from payments from the United States for the separation of Panama as well as 

from Colombia’s growth in the agricultural sector. However, as Colombia’s economy developed, land reform policies contributed to growing tensions between rural and urban populations as well as between 

landowners and peasant farmers.20 Large landowners who benefited 

from the land reform legislation strived to match global demands from 

Colombia’s agricultural sector. As a result, these landowners needed 

to create a large labor force, which was often accomplished through 

large land seizures from peasant farmers.21 As divisions among the 

social classes expanded, the 1914 Indian peasant rebellion and the 

1919 labor conflicts among urban workers led to the formation of organized labor, which eventually created the umbrella organization called 

the the Partido Socialista Revolucionario (PSR), or the Revolutionary 

Socialist Party, in 1929.22 Centered in villages and small towns, the PSR 

helped organize mass action among the proletariat in both the coffee 

economy and other export industries.

Colombia witnessed a period of major socioeconomic and political change in the 1930s, which brought the Liberals to power until 

1946. During this period, economic problems threatened depression 

in the Colombian economy, which prompted Liberals to intervene by 

instating protectionist policies.23 These policies enhanced central government power and introduced social and economic reforms such as 

the right to strike, changes to welfare and labor laws, education policy, income taxes, and separation of church and state, which led to 

increased radicalization in the public.24 While the masses were becoming more radicalized, these social reforms averted leftist groups from 

taking advantage of the depressed situation. This remains one of the 

goals of the current Colombian government, which seeks to demobilize, deradicalize, and reintegrate FARC insurgents. The hope is that by 

doing so, and politicizing the group, other leftist parties can benefit by 

espousing similar social reform policies without the taint of FARC violence. Ultimately, this would erode FARC’s remaining popular support.

The global depression in the 1930s drove up coffee prices, contributing to higher rural incomes and greater government revenues for 

Liberals to use toward developing Colombia’s domestic industries and 

urban employment.25 However, the protectionist policies and focus 

on domestic economic growth did not favor the Conservatives or the 

peasant population, who were working the lands with little benefit, 
Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

59

fomenting violence between Liberals and Conservatives in La Violencia, a civil war described in greater detail in Chapter 5. Government and 

Politics. During this time, peasant resistance combined the self-defense 

model with guerrilla warfare until they joined the FARC in 1964 as a 

way to “use the armed struggle as part of a political strategy to seize 

national power.”26

In the post-World War II period (mid to late 1940s), agriculture, 

mostly coffee, at forty percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), 

dominated the Colombian economy.27 Coffee was the main export crop, 

which supplied seventy percent of all exports. Oil and other exports, 

including minerals, comprised the second-largest category, followed 

by other agricultural products (sugar, bananas, and tobacco).28 As a 

result of its heavy dependence on such a volatile commodity, Colombia 

attempted to diversify its exports by focusing on some of the less dominant exports. However, the coffee economy remained strong. Most of 

the policies implemented to expand other industries did not positively 

impact the trade industry. As a result of the strong coffee economy, 

the Colombian GDP grew above six  percent per year between 1952 

and 1954.29

Populist economic policies of the military dictator, General Rojas 

Pinilla, who took power in a coup d’état in 1953, were heavily influenced 

by Argentinean leader Juan Domingo Peron. Rojas Pinilla attempted to 

implement public works programs, taxed the elites, and instated rural 

credit programs to assist small farmers.30 However, his attempts at foreign exchange rate liberalization and import controls in the first two 

years of his rule failed to muster the support he sought. In addition to 

a large fall in coffee prices in 1956, “Colombia found itself facing growing balance of payments problems, capital flight, economic recession, 

and rising inflation.”31

In the post-Rojas Pinilla period, austerity programs led to devaluation of the peso and new fiscal and monetary policies. Although these 

programs demonstrated marginal success in reducing inflation and 

balance of payments problems, the solution was short-lived as balance 

of payments problems reemerged in early 1962. To improve the country’s economy, President Valencia was forced to implement two unpopular measures—instituting import controls causing the GDP to fall 

almost two percentage pointsc and eliminating “free” exchange rates.32

The ensuing devaluation of the peso and inflation caused considerable 

public discontent, leading to new economic policies.

After drastic economic, social, and demographic changes toward 

import substitution industrialization (ISI) from the 1950s to 1990s, 

c The GDP fell from 5.4 percent in 1962 to 3.3 percent in 1963.
60

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Colombia “more than doubled its population and became a substantially younger and more urban country with a rising middle class.”33

During this period, the real GDP and income per capita grew at 4.6 

and 1.9 percent per year, respectively.34 Population growth at this time 

was about 4.8 percent per year; however, per-capita income increased 

by only 1.4 percent. Colombia’s new ISI policies aimed at focusing “foreign direct investment (FDI) . . . in products that were oriented towards 

the domestic market and rarely exported,” which increased, “demands 

for employment, social services, and infrastructure from the emerging 

urban population [and] led to a broader involvement of the state.”35

While Colombia’s urbanization contributed to some improvements in 

health and education, unequal income distribution remains a point of 

contention for the countries with developing insurgent groups.36 Policies intended to ameliorate this skewed income distribution have consistently failed to be implemented, leaving those who moved from rural 

areas to turgurios, or slums, in the cities marginalized. Crime plagues 

these turgurios. Around eighty to ninety percent of homicides in Colombia derive from criminal, not political, motivations.37 Other social problems, such as child labor, abuse, and prostitution, in addition to sex 

trafficking of women and children, continue in Colombia and occur in 

the urban centers as well as rural locations.

Colombia’s social advances have historically been mixed, affecting 

some groups positively while excluding other groups. This unevenness 

has not only led to marginalization of some groups, providing a pool of 

recruits for its insurgencies, but has also widened the already existing 

social divides in the country. Although Colombia is resource rich and 

has high human capital, it remains troubled.38

Resource Curse: Coca, Coffee, Oil/Gas

Colombia’s rich agricultural industries, including both coffee and 

coca in addition to its oil and gas and other minerals, make the country 

susceptible to another dominant socioeconomic cause for conflict: the 

“resource curse”39 argument. The resource curse is a paradox that the 

presence of lootable natural resources such as diamonds, emeralds, gold, 

oil, or drugs often depresses a country’s ability to advance economically. 

One would expect that having such valuable natural resources would 

promote growth; however, dependence on these resources makes the 

economy more vulnerable as there are few incentives for governments 

to pursue activities outside of these resources. This dependence on 

natural resources leaves governments, which are often already developing and weak, susceptible to corruption, allowing space for insurgents 

to operate. In the case of Colombia, this paradox of plenty—both licit 
Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

61

and illicit natural resources—has enabled the sustainment of insurgent 

movements, as these resources are easily accessed, and, for the most 

part, they are cultivated from the movements’ rural strongholds.

Coca Economy

Coca production and cultivation in Colombia began in the 1970s, 

after most of the insurgencies in this study had already formed.40

Therefore, while the drug trade did not spark the insurgency, access to 

these resources provided a means for sustainment. As a direct result of 

strong antidrug policies in Peru and Bolivia in the late 1980s, Colombia 

witnessed an increase of coca production and trade.41 The FARC and 

other insurgencies then capitalized on this trade, which reached its 

peak in the 1980s–1990s. Grown in thousands of small peasant holdings, the coca leaves are harvested and dried by farmers who sell them 

to entrepreneurs, who then turn the dried leaves into paste to be processed into cocaine.42 Both insurgents and paramilitary groups profited from the coca trade as drug cultivation and conflict increased.43

See the Finances, Logistics, Sustainment, and Communications section in 

Chapter 6. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) for more 

details on the narcoeconomy.

Coffee

Colombia enjoyed greater political stability in the early twentieth century, helping to nurture the important coffee economy from the 

late 1800s to early 1990s. This coffee boom paved the way for Colombia’s subsequent industrialization, which led to conflict between liberal 

landowners and small family-owned farmers in the western highlands 

starting in the 1940s. These smaller growers disagreed with “radical 

ideologies that had made inroads in other countries where agrarian 

wage earners were more prevalent, or where major landowners were 

foreigners.44 Similarly, industrialization led to a migration of peasants 

to the cities—the foundation of a nascent working class.45

The coffee boom in the 1930s–1940s enabled coffee workers to cultivate their own small parcels of land. Additionally, they were able to 

legally organize and improve their contracts on large estates. These 

advances for coffee growers were indicative of the growth of unions 

nationwide. During this time, these unions became more politicized, 

leading up to the La Violencia clashes, from which the Colombian insurgencies grew. Both agricultural and economic policies hinged on the 

coffee economy, which consistently affected socioeconomic relations in 

Colombia, from labor rights to fair wages and land ownership. Booms 
62

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

and busts in the coffee economy throughout Colombia’s history have 

also corresponded to the decrease and increase of alternative crop cultivation, especially coca and marijuana. The coffee industry is also one 

of the best-organized resources, with large union representation in the 

Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia (FEDECAFE), or the 

National Federation of Coffee Growers, established in 1927. Given the 

dominance of coffee for domestic and international trade, FEDECAFE 

has had considerable influence over the Colombian government’s economic policy. FEDCAFE has also become a strong partner in Colombia’s disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process, 

providing employment for demobilized fighters and promoting a brand 

called El Café de la Reconciliación (Reconciliation Coffee).

Oil and Gas

Like the coca economy, the oil and gas industry became more relevant after the main Colombian insurgencies had already settled in 

the area. Although crude oil production had existed since the early 

1900s, enhanced production of this natural resource greatly expanded 

in the mid-1980s. To the guerrillas, Colombian oil represented the 

worst in capitalism; they believed it led to the subjugation of the poor. 

The oil companies were either American or tied to American markets, 

which was counter to the anti-imperialist tenets of the leftist guerrillas. In 1987, Colombia had more than 8,300 kilometers of oil pipeline 

in addition to its production and refinery capacity.46 Between 1986 

and February 1991, more than 650,000 barrels of oil were spilled as a 

result of FARC attacks, especially because the pipelines were difficult 

to defend.47 These events highlight the vulnerability of trading such 

valuable natural resources and the opportunities these resources offer 

insurgent groups who can exploit their supply-chain vulnerabilities for 

both monetary gain, through illicit trafficking in the diverted goods, 

and political leverage.

ENDNOTES

1 Central Intelligence Agency, “Colombia,” The World Factbook, accessed October 8, 2010, 

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html.

2 Rex Hudson, Colombia: A Country Study (Baton Rouge: Claitor’s Publishing Division, 

2010), 86.

3 Ibid., 87.

4 Ibid., 87.

5 Ibid.
Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions

63

6 Claire Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior on 

the Front Lines with the FARC, SPLA, and PKK (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 

83–84.

7 Hudson, Colombia: A Country Study, 88.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., 89.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., 88.

12 Ibid.

13 Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, eds., Colombia: A Country Study (Washington, 

DC: Government Printing Office for the Library of Congress, 1988).

14 World Bank, “Colombia,” http://data.worldbank.org/country/colombia.

15 Hanratty and Meditz, Colombia: A Country Study.

16 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision,” http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm.

17 Somik V. Lall, Nancy Lozano-Gracia, and Titio Yepes, “Amplifying the Gains from 

Urbanization,” in Colombia Urbanization Review: Amplifying Gains from the Urban Transition, 

eds. Taimur Samad, Nancy Lozano-Gracia, and Alexandra Panman (Washington DC: 

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2012), 21–23.

18 Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior, 85.

19 Catherine LeGrand, Colonización y Protesta Campesina en Colombia 1850–1950 (Bogotá: 

Centro Editorial, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1988).

20 Raina Zimmering, “Colombia, Labor Insurrection and the Socialist Revolutionary Party 

1920s–1930s,” in International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest, ed. Immanuel Ness 

(West Sussex, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2009).

21 Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior, 85.

22 Zimmering, “Colombia, Labor Insurrection and the Socialist Revolutionary Party 

1920s–1930s.”

23 Jorge Garcia and Sisir Jayasuriya, Courting Turmoil and Deferring Prosperity: Colombia 

Between 1960 and 1990 (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 1997), 5.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ricardo Vargas, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Illicit 

Drug Trade,” Transnational Institute: Drugs and Democracy, June 7, 1999, http://www.

tni.org/briefing/revolutionary-armed-forces-colombia-farc-and-illicit-drug-trade.

27 Ibid., 6.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., 6–7.

31 Ibid., 7.

32 Ibid., 8.

33 Jonathan Hartlyn and John Dugas, “Colombia: The Politics of Violence and Democratic 

Transformation,” in Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, eds. Larry Diamond, 

Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 

269.

34 Garcia and Jayasuriya, Courting Turmoil and Deferring Prosperity: Colombia Between 1960 and 

1990, 20.

35 Juan Carlos Echeverry, “Lessons from Colombian Economic Development: Discussion 

Draft” (2009 Latin America Emerging Markets Forum, 2009), 5.
64

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

36 Hartlyn and Dugas, “Colombia: The Politics of Violence and Democratic Transformation,” 269.

37 Hudson, Colombia: A Country Study, 66.

38 Ibid.

39 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic 

Growth,” in Leading Issues in Economic Development, 7th Ed., eds. G. M. Meier and J. E. 

Rauch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

40 Joshua D. Angrist and Adriana D. Kugler, “Rural Windfall or a New Resource Curse? 

Coca, Income and Civil Conflict in Colombia,” The Review of Economics and Statistics XC, 

no. 2 (2008): 192.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds. The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond 

Greed and Grievance (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 79.

44 Hartlyn and Dugas, “Colombia: The Politics of Violence and Democratic Transformation,” 257.

45 Ibid.

46 Hanratty and Meditz, Colombia: A Country Study, 47.

47 Ibid.
CHAPTER 5.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Chapter 5. Government and Politics

67

The strong democratic tradition embodied in Colombia, interspersed with bouts of political violence, is one of the distinguishing features of the country’s political system. Some have called this mixture of 

violence and democracy, prevalent throughout much of Latin America, 

“violent pluralism.”1

Several institutional factors impacted political violence in Colombia 

during the mid-twentieth century. A long history of two-party competition structured the political system and provided channels to connect 

local grievances with national causes. Paradoxically, this national twoparty system helped keep conflict localized because it gave subnational 

actors the resources to solve their problems within their own regions 

and municipalities. After a nineteenth century during which the two 

parties alternated power frequently, whether by ballot or by bullets, the 

first half of the twentieth century was characterized by a long period 

of peace. This peace was secured through one-party domination of the 

political system for multiple presidential terms. The Conservatives held 

power from 1902 to 1930, before ceding to the Liberals, who controlled 

the presidency from 1930 to 1946.

During this latter period, the seeds were sown for a larger conflict 

that would engulf Colombia in one of the more violent and protracted 

civil wars in Latin American history. Known as La Violencia, this period 

would see between 100,000 and 200,000 people killed between 1946 and 

the early 1960s. The guerrilla groups that have fought the Colombian 

state since the 1960s have their origins in La Violencia. Understanding 

the genesis and aftermath of this episode is central to understanding 

Colombian government and politics in the twentieth century.

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

For the majority of the twentieth century, Colombia had the same 

constitution, a document adopted in 1886 that gave broad powers to 

the central government and intentionally sought to curb the power of 

regions. The executive office, perched at the apex of a top-down hierarchy, directly or indirectly controlled the appointment of a vast network 

of government and bureaucratic positions at the national, regional, 

and local levels. When married with the strong clientelist tradition in 

Colombia, control of the executive office was critical to maintaining 

power at the national, regional, and local levels of government.
68

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Table 5-1. The relationships of political authority in Colombia in the 

early twentieth century.

Executive Legislative

National President (elected) Congress (elected)

State Governors (appointed by 

the president)

State assemblies 

(elected)

Local Mayors (appointed by 

governors)

Municipal councils 

(elected)

Reproduced with permission from Christopher Michael Cardona, “Politicians, Soldiers, and Cops: Colombia’s ‘La Violencia’ in Comparative Perspective” (doctoral 

dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 2008), 118.

Table  5-1 above describes the relationships of authority in the 

Colombian government in the early twentieth century. The table underscores the president’s downward stream of control over state and local 

governments. Whereas the president was elected by popular vote, he 

appointed state governors. In turn, the governors had the authority to 

appoint local mayors.

This centralized authority of the executive office conferred tremendous influence to the political party that controlled the presidency. 

The permeation of patron–client relations, or clientelism, in Colombian politics compounded this centralization of power in the executive office. Clientelism has been a constant in Colombian politics since 

colonial times. In this tradition, patrons and clients assure the maximum benefit from any and all assets under their control “by personally exchanging these assets among themselves.”2

 The patron–client 

network acts as a mechanism to distribute public goods and services 

to citizens in exchange for political support—in essence, vote buying. 

Under optimal conditions, governments allocate public goods and services equally to all citizens unless distributed differentially according 

to public rules of distribution with no obligation for political support.3

Beginning with social reforms in the late nineteenth century, the 

patron–client system adopted a more institutionalized structure. In 

its most basic traditional form, clientelism involved patrons of higher 

social strata in a reciprocal relationship of obligation with their clients in lower social strata. John Martz describes the relationship as an 

exchange of “labor, service, and general allegiance” for “[h]ousing, 

food, equipment, and specific usage of land.”4

As Colombia modernized in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 

centuries, its institutions of state governance developed as well. The values underpinning clientelism influenced the adoption of social reforms 

such as social security and public housing, expanding the perception 
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

69

of the state as the definitive patron. The traditional patrons, in turn, 

acted more as brokers between bureaucratic institutions distributing 

state largesse and their clients, typically party members.5 The adoption 

of the heavily centralized 1886 constitution, which established the topdown appointment model illustrated in Table 5-1, helped to consolidate the reach and authority of the dominant political parties, which 

based their strength on the patron–client ties they developed among 

their national, state, and local brokers.

Because of the significant benefits to the party that controlled the 

presidency under the 1886 constitution, the value of the presidency 

was significant. The losing party, on the other hand, faced disenfranchisement from a variety of political institutions as a result of the farreaching political control afforded the party winning the presidency.

Before La Violencia, the presidency changed hands on two occasions, once in 1930 and again in 1946. In both elections, party infighting led to a split presidential ticket. As can be seen in Table 5-2, the split 

ticket resulted in a victory for the opposing party despite the party not 

gaining the majority of the vote.

Table 5-2. Presidential split tickets of 1930 and 1946.

1930 1946

Liberal Cons. Liberal Cons.

Candidate 

(total % 

of vote)

Olaya

(32.7)

Válencia

(29.1)

Vázquez

(25.8)

Gaitán

(26.3)

Turbay

(32.3)

Ospina

(41.4)

Total % of 

party vote

32.7 54.9 58.6 41.4

The winning candidate’s name is bolded. Cons., Conservative. 

Based on Richard L. Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia (Lexington, MA: 

Lexington Books, 1973), 8.

These moments of partisan transition were flashpoints for armed 

unrest in the countryside. When the Liberal Party took control of the 

presidency in the 1930 presidential elections, ending decades of Conservative rule, skirmishes broke out in rural areas because Conservative leaders were reluctant to give way to their Liberal successors. This 

insurrection took on a much wider scope following the 1946 presidential election, in which the Conservatives regained control of the presidency. The dynamics of reprisal in the aftermath of the 1946 elections 

coalesced into a localized civil war within several years. This legacy of 

organized violence in the countryside directly impacted the development of leftist guerrilla insurgencies during the 1960s and 1970s.
70

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

The configuration of the Colombian security forces at the time of 

La  Violencia also exacerbated partisan violence. This configuration, 

developed during a critical juncture of state formation in Colombia, 

1880–1910, endured through much of the civil war. During the state formation period, subnational politicians gained control of local police,a

resulting in politicized police forces whose loyalty to the ruling government was not guaranteed. Oftentimes, police sided with insurrectionists rather than enforcing law and order. The result was a widespread, 

enduring, locally driven conflict.7

THE SPLIT PRESIDENTIAL TICKET OF 1930: THE 

ASCENDANCY OF THE LIBERAL PARTY

In the 1930 presidential elections, a fissure in the ruling Conservative 

Party occasioned a split ticket. The Conservatives lost the presidential 

election to the Liberals, ushering in the first major electoral transition 

of the twentieth century. The Liberal Party launched a systematic effort 

to claim the network of patronage government and bureaucratic positions for its supporters, replacing the Conservatives already occupying 

the positions. The party also enacted a series of controversial social 

reforms that evidenced the influence of its large populist constituent 

base. Factional infighting over the extent of those reforms led to a split 

within the party that Conservatives later exploited.

But in 1930, with a presidential election looming, it was Liberals 

who took advantage of a split in the opposing party. Two Conservatives, 

Alfredo Vázquez Cobo and Guillermo León Valencia, were vying for 

the presidential candidacy. Whereas Vázquez drew support from the 

church and the military, León relied on support from the Conservative Party. Recognizing the opportunity to exploit the rift, the Liberals 

quickly fielded candidate Enrique Olaya Herrera, the ambassador to 

the United States, who was elected to the presidency.8

Major electoral transitions, such as those that occurred in 1930 and 

later in 1946, led to the systematic replacement of opposition party 

members holding political and bureaucratic posts at virtually all levels 

of government. Typically, there was a lag between the installment of 

the incoming party and the replacement of opposition party members 

downstream. Negotiations between national and regional leaders over 

the appointments account for the lag time. Local appointments were 

negotiated between the governor and local politicians, with input from 

a The police include forces at the national, regional, and local levels and other 

related institutions, “investigative and judicial police; military police; federal bureaus of 

investigation; intelligence agencies; border patrols; highway patrols; customs agencies; and 

anti-narcotic agencies.”6
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

71

local and state police chiefs.9 Department governors acted as brokers 

between national and local governments. The Conservative governor 

of Antioquia, for instance, was not replaced with a Liberal until several 

years after the electoral transition of 1930. Predictably, the negotiations 

were fractious. In some areas, after the nationwide electoral transition 

of 1930, low-level hostilities broke out. These local struggles recurred, 

and expanded, during La Violencia, alongside other locally generated 

conflicts.10 After the Liberals gained the presidency in 1930, a number 

of social reforms increased the state’s level of intervention in society, 

swelling the bureaucratic ranks further. The party created new bureaucratic departments “to control business, taxation, customs houses, 

social services, [and the] armed forces.” These expansions increased 

the payoffs for the victorious party but increased the cost of defeat for 

the losing party.11

Liberals viewed Olaya’s election as a national mandate to implement 

its vision of the “Liberal Republic.” Liberals replaced Conservatives in 

governing positions at the local, regional, and national levels—a “thorough housecleaning.” Some Liberals were quite vocal, and brash, in 

announcing their intentions to root out every vestige of Conservative 

rule in the country.12 Liberals used a variety of tactics—intimidation, 

voting fraud, and the use of bureaucracy to deny Conservative representation at even the municipal level, among  others—to accomplish 

the party’s goal.

The Liberals’ return to power in 1930 coincided with shifts in the 

social landscape of Colombia. Many rural Colombians had begun to 

migrate to urban centers, leading to the transformation of Colombia 

from a rural-based to an urban-based society. Most migrants from the 

rural countryside moved to the largest urban centers in Colombia, 

such as Bogotá and Cali. By the 1920s, the population of Bogotá had 

increased by nearly half.13 The shifts increased the pressure on already 

burdened public services while the cost of living increased. Colombia was transforming into an industrialized economy, a process more 

pronounced in some regions than others. These factors combined to 

empower a vocal underclass that demanded more effective representation and visibility in the political process.

After Olaya was elected, he introduced policies that addressed these 

new demands. In general, the Colombian state adopted a more centralized and interventionist role, acting as a mediator between competing 

claims of various social and economic interest groups in society. One 

of the pressing issues during this time was the issue of land reform, a 

topic discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. Socioeconomic Conditions. 

After the 1920s brought an economic downturn to the country, as they 

did to most places in the world, Colombians began to look toward the 
72

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

open frontiers of the countryside to escape economic degradation. 

Colonists flocked to different regions, encouraged by the government, 

hoping to claim portions of the vast public lands still available for settlement. When they arrived, many found that the lands were already 

occupied—in their minds illegally. Large-scale cattle ranchers, commercial agriculture enterprises, and others had whittled away at public 

lands to increase their own holdings. The landless competed with these 

powerful landholders, and other hopeful colonists, over the lands. In 

some regions, such as centrally located Tolima, the “land invasions” 

perpetrated by colonists on the haciendas resulted in armed conflict.14

The Liberal Party, especially President Alfonso López Pumarejo in 

his first term (1934–1938), initiated reforms to mediate the agrarian 

unrest. In 1936, López enacted Law 200, which upheld the right of the 

person who could show that they resided on the property and made 

improvements to hold the legal title to the property. Conflict over land 

did diminish after the passage of Law 200, but its terms granted only a 

limited number of “squatter’s rights.”15

The Liberal regime enacted many such social reforms. López called 

his ambitious reform program the “Revolution on the March.” López’s 

reforms that were most unpopular with the political and economic elite 

were not the relatively benign property reforms but the legalization 

of labor organizations. Known Communists headed some of the labor 

unions, even in strategic sections such as oil. Before this era, Colombian politics was restricted to a narrow circle of elites. With the Liberal Party’s support of the lower classes, this restricted circle began 

to include other Colombians, such as those in the unions, historically 

removed from political considerations.

This new inclusion was especially the case with Colombians who 

were part of the rising urban and professional classes. These new leaders entered political life by appealing to the populistb

 interests of the 

emergent classes. Jorge Eliécer Gaitán Ayala, the presidential candidate whose assassination in 1948 helped jump-start La Violencia, is the 

quintessential example of this new type of leader. Gaitán’s dark skin, 

humble birth, and powerful oratorical messages castigating the oligarchic elites who ruled Colombia made him an exceedingly popular figure 

with the common man but a dangerous one to the elite. In a situation 

not unlike the so-called “Red Scare” in the United States during the 

1950s, members of both parties, along with the press, expressed fears 

b Populism or populist are terms used to describe a style of politics that makes appeals 

to “the people” in order to challenge established political systems, especially established 

political parties, and the dominant values underlying them. Although in the United States 

populism is most often associated with the left, populist politics are not specific to any one 

ideology or end of the political spectrum. See Canovan.16
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

73

over the perceived slow creep of socialist and communist tendencies 

into national and local political life. The “vituperative red-baiting” that 

followed contributed to the partisan violence that began in the 1940s.17

Nervous Liberals backed a less radical presidential candidate, Eduardo Santos Montejo, in the election following López’s first term. Santos rolled back many of the social reforms López had championed. 

However, López remained an important political figure and gained reelection to the presidency in 1942. His second term in office was troubled by Liberal Party infighting and fierce Conservative opposition, 

ultimately leading to a failed military coup in 1944. Because of these 

myriad concerns, López was eventually driven from the presidency in 

1945. By the time López’s successor, Liberal Alberto Lleras Camargo, 

took office, the concerns expressed by many in the Liberal Party over 

the pace and tenor of López’s social reforms had coalesced into a conservative social trend.

After gaining control of the presidency, Olaya and his Liberal successors also paid special attention to the police. Their policies aimed 

to increase the number of police as a counterweight to the army, which 

they believed would be more loyal to the Conservative Party. Because 

of these efforts, by the end of Olaya’s first term in 1934, Liberal Party 

members swelled the ranks of the police, giving the institution a distinct 

partisan tone. One Conservative member described the transition:

Into the National Police and the departmental guards 

entered delinquents and known wrongdoers and into 

a multitude of villages, characterized by their traditionalist fervor, were brought by evildoers for hire, 

duly armed, true mobs instructed in crime, whose mission consisted in attacking, pursing, and harming, if 

required, all those who did not share their political 

passion. Life became extremely difficult and it even 

became a heroic act to preserve one’s life in many 

parts of Colombia. The country had not known such a 

period of cruelty and barbarity since the dark time of 

the Spanish reconquest.18

López nationalized the police forces of some departments but not 

all—notably, Antioquia, Norte de Santander, and Santander departments (a department in Colombia is the equivalent of a state in the 

United States) were not nationalized. The reform left the cost of the 

force with the departments but gave the National Police more jurisdiction over their local counterparts. However, even in those departments with more nationalized forces, governors still controlled most of 

the resources needed for the police. As a result, the forces remained 

fairly politicized.19
74

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Liberals also sought to pack the police force with members of their 

own party. The resulting police force pursued local Liberal agendas 

in small towns throughout the country. Similar scenes such as the one 

that follows played out in small, remote towns throughout the country. 

In Santa Isabel, a town in the Tolima Department, a Liberal mayor 

installed by the governor after the Liberal takeover in 1930 reportedly 

terrorized local Conservatives with impunity. Concerned citizens carried reports to the governor of municipal police in the town who fired 

at will at Conservatives. Any complaints Conservatives chose to levy 

against the municipal police were registered in the municipal station 

while officers brandishing clubs and pistols surrounded the victims. 

Events escalated as early as 1939, when members of the Liberal police 

were accused of massacring a number of Conservatives in Gachetá, 

Cundinamarca. In response, the chief of the Conservative Party, Laureano Gómez, stormed the presidential palace to demand justice. His 

complaint to President López reflected the growing concern with security and legitimacy of the central government: “Understand that if the 

government does not fulfill its principal duty of guaranteeing human 

life, all of us will take to the streets in self-defense to see that we are not 

murdered with impunity.”20 In the view of partisans, the failure of the 

government to address the egregious violence erupting in the countryside was not only a matter of limited resources but also of will.

Gómez’s refrain was consistently repeated by the opposition party 

in the twentieth  century. In this instance, Gómez and his followers 

did adopt a more militant stance in the 1930s, citing the central government’s failure to adequately govern and protect its citizenry. One 

Conservative, in protest against what he saw as impotent Conservative 

leadership, advocated agrarian terrorism as a tactic to combat the “Red 

Dictatorship” orchestrated by the “urban proletariat.” A week later, the 

fiery Gómez announced that the party would henceforth adopt a new 

strategy, “Intrepid Action,” which would “meet violence with violence.” 

Reports to police stations and government representatives, complaints 

to party leaders, and other peaceful methods of redress gave way to 

force of arms to combat the opposition after the former proved ineffective. Conservatives across the country scrambled to arm themselves 

after the announcement.21

THE SPLIT PRESIDENTIAL TICKET OF 1946: THE 

RETURN OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY

In the lead-up to the 1946 presidential elections, the Liberal Party 

had difficulty integrating the populist leader, Gaitán. He aimed to 

capture the Liberal presidential candidacy in the upcoming elections. 
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

75

Previously, Gaitán had formed a political party, Unión Nacional Izquierdistat Revolucionaria (UNIR), or the Nationalist Leftist Revolutionary Union, which had had some success in parliamentary elections 

during the 1930s. Despite Gaitán’s popularity with the Liberal rank 

and file, the Liberal Party leadership denied him the presidential nomination. Gaitán refused to accept the decision and began his own campaign, running in tandem with the official Liberal candidate, Gabriel 

Turbay Ayala. Gaitán was the undisputed champion of the common 

man and the dissenter within the Liberal Party. His Liberal rival, Turbay, represented the entrenched elite interests and was the official 

party candidate.22

When voters went to the polls in 1946, there were two Liberal presidential candidates from which to choose, splitting the Liberal vote. 

The Liberal split ticket coincided with a surprise end of Conservative 

abstentionism,c a tactic the party had used since 1935. After nearly 

two decades of rule, the Conservatives wrested power from the Liberals, much as the latter had done in 1930. The Conservative candidate, 

Mariano Ospina Pérez, was elected to the executive office with less 

than a majority of the vote.23

Ironically, Ospina himself ran on a bipartisan platform, promising 

the inclusion of Liberals in his cabinet, gubernatorial offices, and municipal offices. He established a “National Union” composed of members 

of both parties. Extremists in both parties decried Ospina’s moderate 

position.24 Ospina did initially appoint Liberal mayors and governors to 

Liberal strongholds, but the replacement of Conservatives with Liberals in departmental bureaucracy moved at a “perceptible pace.”25

For a time, the tack proved sufficient in quelling partisan violence. 

As discussed above, the spoils system of Colombian politics meant 

that the party in control of the presidency also controlled many of 

the patronage jobs and local government positions appointed by the 

government. The party turnover meant a loss of resources and power, 

which was unacceptable, and frightening, to those in the opposition 

party. Figure 5-1 depicts the recurring partisan motivational pattern of 

political conflict following in Colombian politics, the subjective logic 

by which participants justified armed conflict.

c Abstentionism is a refusal to participate in government on the basis of the perceived 

illegitimacy of the political system.
76

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Rational, moral

basis for armed

insurrection

Party takeover Abuse of

opposition

Opposition party

abstentionism

Figure 5-1. Recurring pattern of subjective partisan motivation in mid-twentieth-century Colombian politics.

The pattern depicted in the figure illustrates a cycle of partisan 

competition that hamstrung the ability of the central government to 

effectively govern. After securing a takeover of the presidency, the 

former opposition party, whether Liberal or Conservative, initiated a 

concerted effort to remove the members of the opposing party from 

positions of power and influence—sometimes through fraud and 

intimidation. In response, the opposition adopted a policy of abstentionism, or refusal to participate in a political system perceived to be 

illegitimate. By officially endorsing the illegitimacy of the ruling government, the abstentionist policy imparted to its proponents a rational, 

moral basis for armed insurrection.26

Loss of government legitimacy is often an important factor contributing to political violence. As discussed in Human Factors Considerations 

of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, “a government has legitimacy when it is 

perceived as having both the right to rule and the competency to fulfill 

its expected functions.”27 Some of those key functions include security, 

justice, the fulfillment of economic needs, and ideological legitimacy. 

In the case of Colombia, the pattern of politics ensured that maintaining government legitimacy among members of the opposing party was 

a difficult endeavor.

The Conservative takeover in 1946, and the ensuing changeover 

produced by the spoils system of Colombian politics, contributed to 

eruptions of partisan violence in areas of the country that had a legacy 

of political polarization. Partisan violence during this time was especially concentrated in several departments of the Eastern Cordillera, 

including Boyacá, Santander, and Norte de Santander. Combined, the 

three departments covered twenty percent of Colombian territory and 

held nearly one-fifth of the country’s population. The areas were also 

some of the most politically polarized in the country. Table 5-3 shows 

the increase in homicides in these departments during the late 1940s.
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

77

Table 5-3. Homicides per 100,000 residents in Colombian 

departments and intendencies, 1946–1960.

1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

Antioquia 8.7 6.2 8.8 14.5 25.8 25.0 45.6 33.9 21.3 23.5 29.4 24.2 38.4 38.3 41.6Atlántico 3.1 3.0 9.2 9.2 12.1 9.7 6.2 7.6 7.6 6.6 7.5 4.7 6.0 6.6 6.3Bolívar 3.0 1.5 2.4 5.2 4.3 6.0 5.5 6.4 6.1 6.1 4.6 7.6 5.2 5.0 11.8Boyacá 12.8 17.8 32.1 50.6 33.5 35.9 38.2 25.3 20.1 17.0 19.2 19.7 26.6 22.3 27.9Caldas 6.6 7.9 14.1 29.0 30.1 34.7 37.0 41.8 42.2 51.8 59.5 91.0 117.0 81.1 43.5Cauca 9.3 7.0 11.9 12.6 11.7 15.5 14.8 15.9 19.9 26.1 27.6 32.1 44.8 27.1 25.9Córdoba

–

–

–

–

–

– 1.4 2.9 9.3 5.1 9.5 8.5 8.1 6.4 4.7

Cundinamarca 11.9 9.3 11.5 17.5 23.6 31.2 35.0 22.4 17.5 22.3 18.0 18.9 24.7 22.9 23.7Chocó

–

– 1.8 3.6 9.8 13.3 18.6 5.9 8.1 3.6 14.3 12.1 14.7 10.4 11.0

Huila 6.0 3.8 8.5 12.2 10.0 23.2 18.4 59.0 50.9 47.6 99.9 47.3 68.3 21.8 31.9Magdalena 5.3 6.3 12.1 17.9 17.2 14.9 9.5 17.9 15.1 12.2 11.5 14.1 14.2 12.5 11.8Nariño 9.6 11.4 8.6 9.2 5.9 8.9 6.9 6.4 9.1 11.0 5.6 8.5 9.0 10.3 8.0SantanderNorte de 48.0 77.1 46.0 79.5 53.5 43.5 52.0 51.0 46.3 47.7 51.5 49.6 62.7 66.4 56.8Santander 16.1 30.0 40.3 86.5 37.4 43.5 57.0 46.9 36.1 40.2 41.9 36.2 59.0 50.6 56.0Tolima 8.5 7.2 11.4 13.9 31.2 47.6 86.7 63.4 47.9 98.1 164.1 115.6 133.7 100.7 62.8Valle [del Cauca] 19.4 16.7 21.6 69.3 76.2 68.1 83.5 44.9 33.1 57.0 54.6 87.5 97.3 62.4 51.2Intendencies 14.5 5.7 15.2 27.1 35.3 45.7 60.9 40.3 20.4 24.4 21.2 28.8 27.4 29.6 27.9Source: Colombia, Ministerio de Justicia, Cinco años, anexo, 41, in James D. Henderson, When Colombia Bled: A History of the Violencia in Tolima(Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2010), 254.
78

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

In Boyacá, the rate of homicides per 100,000 residents increased 

from 12.8 in 1946 to 32.1 in 1948, peaking during this decade at 50.6 in 

1949. Similarly, in troubled Norte de Santander, the rate of homicides 

increased from an already elevated 48.0 in 1946 to a high of 79.5 in 

1949. Indeed, as part of a pattern of escalating local violence that did 

not aggregate up to the national level, Norte de Santander experienced 

a small-scale civil war in 1948 when Conservatives and Liberals shot 

each other for two weeks before being separated by the national army. 

Santander saw an even more dramatic rise, from 16.1 homicides per 

100,000 residents in 1946 to a high of 86.5 in 1949—a fivefold increase. 

Many of the Conservatives in these areas still remembered their persecution at the hands of Liberals after the Liberal takeover of government in the 1930s.28

Other areas, such as the department of Tolima, were able to escape 

immediate violence. In regions less prone to violence during this 

period, Liberals managed to maintain control over municipal governments. However, even in these less violence-prone areas, modern 

means of communication ensured that residents there were aware of 

the political violence plaguing other regions. Media reports filtering 

news of the violence frequently did so in distinctly partisan tones, making prodigious use of “doomsday rhetoric.” Liberal Party spokespersons 

in Bogotá used every incident, and the seeming inability or will of the 

central government to halt the violence, as evidence of “Conservative 

barbarism” in an effort to discredit and delegitimize Ospina’s rule and 

the central government. Thus, residents of remote villages, even if they 

were not experiencing the violence firsthand, vigorously protested the 

“outrages” to their congressional representatives.29

The politicization of the police force, discussed previously in this 

chapter, also contributed to the eruption and continuation of partisan violence. After taking the presidency in 1946, Ospina was troubled 

about the lack of control he had over such an important security institution. Indeed, Conservative Party chief Gómez referred to it as “the 

enemy police force.”

During its sixteen  years of rule, the Liberal Party had filled the 

National Police with officers from its party, many of whom were now 

hostile to the Conservative leadership and happy to sabotage its efforts 

to maintain control. In some areas, Liberal police officers resigned in 

droves, leaving the force woefully understaffed. In other instances, the 

police simply failed to enforce peace and order. In 1946, during a public disturbance in Bogotá spearheaded by leftist transportation workers protesting gasoline rationing, workers blocked streets and damaged 

public and private property.30 The police commander, sympathetic to 
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

79

the Liberal rioters, refused to take action against the unruly crowds. 

President Ospina later called on the national army to halt the violence.31

The predictable Conservative response to incidents such as these 

was to cleanse the police of Liberal sympathies. Ospina’s administration fired the Liberal police commander, replacing him with a Conservative. In other regions, rank-and-file Liberal policemen were 

also systematically fired for their partisan affiliations and gradually 

replaced with Conservatives. By the time of Gaitán’s assassination in 

1948, fearful Liberals in the mountains of northern Tolima referred to 

the National Police, stationed in their towns by edicts from Bogotá, as 

the policiá chulavita.

32,d Ospina had recruited the policiá chulavita from 

Conservative strongholds after it became apparent that the police stationed in Bogotá were disloyal to the central government. He sent the 

policiá chulavita to the departments where Gaitán’s followers were prevalent and vocal, such as Valle del Cauca and Tolima. The Conservative 

policemen attacked local Liberals, sometimes massacring them, initiating a chain of vicious reprisals that escalated into La Violencia.33

Conservatives were not picky about the quality of the men replacing Liberal police, at times staffing local forces with criminals. In one 

instance, a regional authority sent a recommendation to a local police 

chief for a man who was a convicted killer and cattle thief. The police, 

ostensibly the defenders of order and security for the Colombian populace, were often the perpetrators of crimes, from homicide to thievery. 

By mid-1947, the Conservative-dominated police force in some departments was arming “trustworthy” Conservative citizens, while Liberals 

were receiving arms shipments from bordering Venezuela.34

Even as they pursued partisan agendas at the local level through 

manipulation of the security forces, President Ospina and other moderates did attempt to calm the coming political storm. But ultimately the 

extremist positions in both parties continued to drive events in Colombia. In 1947, Ospina established a bipartisan commission to investigate 

partisan violence. The commission included both Gómez and Gaitán, 

leaders of the Conservative and Liberal parties, respectively. Unfortunately for Colombia, saddled with weak political institutions incapable 

of sustaining peacekeeping measures, the accord lasted about a week. 

Years of heated polemical bickering between the two leading figures 

made it exceedingly difficult for these politicians to execute an aboutface and relinquish the demagoguery that had proven enormously successful in building solid networks of supporters.

d The name refers to the village in the Boyacá Department where the police had 

originally been recruited.
80

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

The vitriol exchanged at the national level was mirrored in regional 

institutions, where heated debates between Liberals and Conservatives 

often degenerated into displays of weapon brandishing or outright violence. In a sign of the times, a shoulder holster was de rigueur for the 

“well-dressed” Colombian legislator of the 1940s.35 By 1947, even representatives of the national legislature were carrying revolvers. By March 

of that year, Gaitán had declared Ospina’s National Front government 

illegitimate and refused to collaborate. He encouraged every Liberal 

in the country who held a political position to resign immediately, 

reinitiating the dynamic of abstentionism. Liberals across many departments, including remaining Liberal police officers, heeded the call 

and resigned, leaving chaos in their wake as regional institutions had 

insufficient staff to administer and govern. Moderates in the National 

Assembly censured Gaitán’s “illogical” move, to no effect.36

Burdened with a disastrously ineffective central government, many 

Liberals in Colombia turned to their beloved party leader, Gaitán, for 

guidance and redress. After the 1946 elections, Gaitán’s influence and 

popularity grew. Liberal adherents to his program gained seats across 

the country in the 1947 parliamentary elections, creating Liberal 

majorities in the national Congress and in nine of the fourteen state 

assemblies. Gaitán’s success propelled him to the head of the Liberal 

Party. Under his leadership, the Liberal Party incorporated the labor 

movement, including not just workers but “all those sectors marginalized from production and wealth.”37

In the wake of the failed accord of 1947 to investigate incidents 

of political violence, Gaitán appealed to Ospina and national leaders 

to halt the violence. Gaitán, who closely studied the oratorical style of 

Mussolini while in Italy, was especially adept at stoking crowds to a fever 

pitch, vowing to defend the common man against powerful and corrupt oligarchs of the Conservative Party. He finished each speech with 

the challenge, “If I lead, follow me; if I falter, give me strength; if they 

kill me, avenge me! Charge!”38

The 1948 Assassination of Gaitán and the Escalation of 

Partisan Violence

Gaitán’s challenge was eerily prescient. In April 1948, a mentally 

disturbed gunman, Juan Roa Sierra, assassinated the charismatic Liberal presidential candidate and party chief. After shooting Gaitán, Roa 

was hunted down by members of an angry mob who beat and stabbed 

the assassin to death, then deposited his corpse in front of the presidential palace. Gaitán’s death, on the eve of the founding of the Organization of American States (OAS), has engendered much speculation. 
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

81

Even Fidel Castro, in attendance at the conference that established the 

OAS, was briefly investigated for the crime. Gaitán was reportedly on 

his way to lunch with the future leader of the Cuban Revolution.

Gaitán’s death set off a series of riots, the Bogotazo, which left portions of Bogotá in charred ruins. This urban unrest did not last long—

especially as compared with the conflict in the countryside.

While the relatively short-lived Bogotazo riots in the capital wound 

down, the uprising by “Gaitánistas” in the rural countryside evinced 

“organization and growing complexity.”39 Leftist students and other agitators used public radio broadcasts to foment Liberal violence against 

the Conservative government:

The Conservatives and the government have just assassinated Gaitán . . . comrades of Cauca and the Santanderes, now is the time to unsheathe your machetes 

because it is time to be glorious as you were in times 

past. . . . At this moment Bogotá is a sea of flames, as 

was the Rome of Nero. . . . the corpse of [Conservative leader] Guillermo León Valencia is hanging from 

a pillar in the Plaza de Bolívar. . . . The buildings of 

the assassin government are burning. The people are 

raising an uncontrollable cry for vengeance of their 

chief by dragging the corpse of [President] Ospina 

Pérez through the streets. Arm yourselves; take the 

hardware store and arm yourselves.40

Of course, although portions of Bogotá were indeed in flames, neither the president nor any high-ranking Conservative officials had been 

killed in retaliation. Similar inflammatory statements urging Liberals 

to “arm themselves” and kill Conservatives were broadcast over the 

national radio. Angry Liberals ripped Conservatives from their homes 

and businesses, killing them and destroying property. In one instance, 

in Armero, Tolima, an angry Liberal mob attacked a parish priest, hacking him to death with a machete on suspicion of harboring Conservative weapons in his church. Many were convinced that Conservatives 

had large weapon caches and were preparing to tyrannize their Liberal 

compatriots. Vague rumors of impending large-scale attacks against 

Liberals also proliferated, further stoking fear and anger. Despite the 

agitation, only one governor, Gonzalo París Lozano of Tolima, openly 

declared revolution against the central government, even allowing the 

revolutionary junta to operate out of his offices. Liberals founded revolutionary committees in many Liberal-dominated municipalities, some 

of which acted responsibly to deter violence against Conservative citizens and maintain order.41
82

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Ospina eventually restored order through the national army. He 

initiated limited reprisals against Liberal agitators, but he did replace 

a number of municipal officials with Conservatives loyal to his government. The move was a blow to Liberals, who lost a great deal of 

bureaucratic power as a result. Liberal political officials, including Governor París, made peace with Ospina and returned to the fold of the 

National Union.

The violence after Gaitán’s assassination had also served to increase 

tension between Conservative and Liberal neighbors—the former 

viewing the latter as capable of barbarous acts at a moment’s notice. 

Fears of reprisal were not unfounded and ran both ways. According to 

Henderson, after the assassination of Gaitán, one Liberal resident of 

Tolima was caught and killed by a Conservative who sold his flesh for 

chicharróne while young boys played soccer with his decapitated head.42

Examples of such violence and cruelty not only took place as the country descended into La Violencia, but also became part of how historians 

and the press documented the conflict. Vivid, almost lurid examples of 

violence such as the ones cited in this paragraph became part of the 

narrative of La Violencia, for protagonists and documenters alike, and 

served to demarcate it as a distinctive period in Colombian history.

The Deterioration of National Politics in the Late 1940s

The presidential election scheduled for 1949, like the assassination 

of Gaitán, proved to be a precipitating event that escalated violence. 

Liberals took advantage of growing demographic strength to make 

strong electoral inroads. The threat of an imminent Liberal victory in 

1949 led Conservatives to shut down normal democratic procedure.

For some time, the Liberal Party had been increasing its ranks. As 

a result of both violence and poor economic opportunity, the Colombian countryside emptied as many Colombians migrated to the urban 

centers of Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali. The urbanization trend favored 

Liberals as the party had long enjoyed dominance in larger cities.

In the 1940s, Liberals formed the clear majority, an especially worrisome revelation for Conservatives. The Liberal Party majority represented a clear and present threat to the constitutional order the 

Conservatives had nurtured after the close of the nineteenth-century 

civil wars. The bedrock of the constitutional order was the Conservative Party principles of “close church-state relations, governmental centralism, and limited state intervention in economic affairs.”43

e Pork rinds, a common fried street snack.
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

83

Conservatives, already convinced that the riots after Gaitán’s assassination were part and parcel of a subversive Communist plot, increased 

their efforts to maintain hold of the presidency, whether through means 

fair or foul. The Conservatives had a powerful weapon in the form of 

Laureano Gómez, an extremist Conservative who alternately struck 

fear and hatred in the hearts of Liberals. Gómez had fled Colombia to 

Spain during the Bogotazo riots, fearing for his life.44 After learning of 

the Liberal Party’s electoral triumph in 1949, Gómez vowed to return to 

Colombia as a presidential candidate in the coming elections of 1950.

His incendiary rhetoric made Gómez an implacable enemy of the 

Liberal opposition. After returning to Colombia in June, Gómez gave a 

famous speech in which he likened the Liberal opposition to a mythical 

beast, the basilisk:

Our basilisk walks on feet of confusion and naiveté, on 

legs of abuse and violence, with an immense oligarchic 

stomach, with a chest of rage, with Masonic arms and a 

tiny communist head . . . This creation is the result of 

intellectual reasoning. It is the conclusion one reaches 

through consideration of recent events, in the manner 

of a chemist in a laboratory who studies the reactions 

in order to reach a conclusion . . . the nueve de abril f

was a typically communist phenomenon, but one carried out by the basilisk.45

Gómez’s extremism and intransigence rendered nil any hope of 

bipartisan cooperation to calm the violence sweeping the countryside.

In response, the Liberal Party mounted an offensive campaign to 

prevent Gómez’s election. Determined to win the upcoming elections, 

the Conservative Party responded in kind. Conservatives had significant advantages over their Liberal counterparts as the former now controlled most government positions. As a result, Conservatives were able 

to turn to the police as a potent weapon to wield against Liberals. The 

party swept all remaining Liberals out of the police’s ranks, replacing 

officers with any able body sympathetic to the Conservative cause. The 

Conservative officers quickly proved their loyalty by shooting to death 

several Liberals halted at a temporary checkpoint in the department of 

Tolima. Other less deadly acts of intimidation and harassment followed.

After the Colombian Supreme Court approved an earlier presidential election, in 1949 rather than 1950, Conservative leadership at 

the national level urged its members to step up efforts to stamp out 

the supposed Communist threat from Liberals. Local Conservatives 

f A reference to April 9, 1948, the day of Gaitán’s assassination.
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Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

interpreted the directive broadly, firing Liberals in any remaining official positions; harassing Liberal citizens; and dispatching additional 

police, by now very partisan, to Liberal strongholds. Many Liberals fled 

in fear, aiding Conservatives’ quest for electoral domination.

Liberal national leadership debated the appropriate response 

to the outrages committed by Conservatives. One faction sought to 

encourage healthier bipartisan cooperation to halt the violence, while 

a more extremist faction refused any level of collaboration with the 

opposing party.

The issue came to a head in October  1949, a month before the 

moved-up presidential election. Official records indicated that Liberals in one-seventh of Colombian territory were prevented from registering for the upcoming vote. Gómez, apparently unsatisfied with 

a mere electoral victory, issued a statement indicating that if elected, 

he would refuse any semblance of power sharing with the Liberals. 

These events decided the Liberals’ course of action—abstaining from 

the presidential election and attempting to impeach President Ospina. 

The president responded by declaring martial law. A month later, in 

the wake of Liberal abstentionism, voters elected Gómez to the presidency. Liberal leadership made a clumsy attempt at a general strike, 

hoping the national army would mount a coup to restore order, but 

they were unsuccessful.46

As promised, Gómez made his presidency into a “relentlessly antiLiberal Party” force. He denounced the Liberal Party as the agent of 

destruction of traditional Catholic values and hierarchical social status. After dismissing the Congress, he installed a Constitutional Convention aimed at rolling back the Liberal political and social reforms 

initiated in the 1930s. One historian suggests that Gómez’s extreme 

methods of implementing the Conservative vision of Colombia were 

ironically responsible, in part, for the effects he hoped to avoid. Violence erupting in the countryside accelerated the migration of rural 

Colombians to cities, where the Liberal Party held sway. Additionally, 

the violence led to social disruptions and migrations that broke down 

the values underlying the traditions of privilege and wealth for the 

elite and limited social mobility for lower social classes. Members of the 

lower classes from both parties, heretofore excluded from the circles 

of power and influence, became warriors and leaders of rural society.47

The near total collapse of the central government in 1949 is referred 

to as an “institutional heart attack.” The Liberals’ earlier refusal to 

participate in the elections, and the Conservatives’ similar refusal to 

include Liberals in the national government, left millions of Liberal 

Colombians without any effective representation in the central government: “[Liberals’] clumsy attempts to seize power threw their party in 
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

85

such disarray that it would not play a significant role in politics for 

half a decade. Some six  million partisans, severely compromised by 

their leaders, were suddenly left to their own devices and were unrepresented in Bogotá.”48

The impact of the institutional heart attack is apparent when reviewing statistics on countrywide violence. Returning to Table 5-3, an uptick 

in homicides in several departments in 1949 is readily apparent. In Boyacá, the number of homicides increased from 32.1 in 1948 to 50.6 in 

1949. In Santander, homicides jumped twofold in 1949, from 40.3 in 

1948 to 86.5 in 1949. Traditional antipathies, alongside the abject failure of democratic institutions to address differences peacefully, led to 

a sustained period of civil conflict in the countrywide known as La Violencia, or simply “The Violence.”

LA VIOLENCIA AND ITS AFTERMATH

Confined primarily to the countryside, La  Violencia was fueled 

by a mixture of local grievances, national demagoguery, and sheer 

banditry. Over the course of two decades, 1946–1966, an estimated 

100,000–200,000 people were killed.g

After the institutional heart attack of 1949 and Gómez’s election, 

La Violencia surged into high gear, reaching a crescendo in the early 

1950s. Political leadership in both parties orchestrated peasant attacks 

against elites in the opposing camp. Faced with a known extremist Conservative president, a heavily partisan police force, and an indifferent 

national army, Liberals embarked on a policy of muted armed insurrection. Rather than leading insurgents in the field, however, Liberal 

political leaders in the capital instructed their followers to instigate 

rebellions in the countryside. The result was a curiously leaderless, 

localized rebellion that would continue in rural communities for the 

next two decades.

La  Violencia continues to have a profound impact on Colombia, 

and its study is a necessary precursor to understanding Colombia’s current cycle of violence driven by leftist guerrillas, narcoterrorists, and 

right-wing paramilitaries. Indeed, many of the insurgent organizations still active in the country today, including the Fuerzas Armadas 

Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), have roots in the conflict. The 

FARC emerged from the militias fighting in La Violencia in the eastern plains of Colombia in the 1950s. From 1949 until 1953, an estimated 20,000 Colombians joined the Liberal guerrillas that eventually 

g Researchers debate the number of people killed during the conflict. Estimates typically run from a low of 100,000 to a high of 200,000.
86

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

evolved into the FARC. In addition, the rampant insecurity during 

the conflict encouraged Conservative landowners to form self-defense 

groups, or private militias, of “worthy” citizens which were the predecessors to right-wing Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) paramilitaries currently battling guerrilla groups. After the initial partisan 

impetus, much of the violence degenerated into common criminality 

and banditry. In all, about 129 guerrilla and bandit groups operated in 

the Colombian countryside. By 1963, after the violence began to noticeably dwindle, thirty-six percent, or forty-seven, of those bands were still 

operative. Others retired, taking advantage of the amnesty the national 

government eventually offered the guerrillas.49

Most tragically, the conflict also displaced millions of Colombians, 

many of whom fled to the cities and have not returned to their rural 

homes. As recently as 2002, a humanitarian worker interviewing displaced Colombians noted that he repeatedly received the same answer 

when asking what had made them flee their rural homes: La Violencia.50

While La Violencia endured for two decades, the trajectory of the 

conflict shifted several times, resulting in four recognizable phases of 

the violence. The first phase was between the presidential election of 

1946 and Gaitán’s assassination. This period was characterized by low 

levels of partisan-inspired violence. The next phase, during which the 

highest levels of violence occurred, followed Gaitán’s 1948 assassination 

and lasted until the imposition of military rule in 1953. The period 

of military rule, from June 1953 to August 1958, is a third phase. The 

fourth and final phase of La Violencia began after the adoption of the 

National Front in August 1958, a bipartisan power-sharing agreement 

that rotated power between Conservatives and Liberals and lasted until 

1966, widely regarded as the official conclusion of the conflict.51

The traditional narrative of La  Violencia depicts it as a partisan 

struggle between Liberals and Conservatives, but recent research has 

pointed to the importance of local grievances as motivators for the 

conflict. In some areas caught up in La Violencia, this partisan cleavage continued to explain motivations for the violence. Yet, scholars 

that have researched the conflict at the more granular local level have 

shown that the violence did not always obey the “master cleavage” often 

thought to have dictated the trajectory of the conflict. Political scientist 

Stathis Kalyvas has noted that civil wars are often mistakenly conceptualized as “binary conflicts” between two unitary actors (Liberals and 

Conservatives in the case of Colombia). When investigating La Violencia at the local level, however, often it is the local, not national, concerns that are the primary drivers of conflict. At the local level, violence 

among belligerents, for instance, might have been more closely related 

to personal grudges and family feuds than to political identities such 
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

87

as “Liberal” or “Conservative.” Widespread violence and the disruption 

of state and local security institutions offer an ideal cover for settling 

such private disputes. The result is a much messier, ambiguous, complex affair than the typical binary conflict suggests. As Kalyvas notes, 

“ambiguity is endemic to civil wars.”52 Figure 5-2 illustrates the dynamics of civil war, taking into consideration the role the local context plays 

in proliferating the armed struggle.

Local

grievances/

identities

National

grievances/

identities

Armed

violence

Figure 5-2. Venn diagram illustrating the complexity of civil war dynamics.

In Figure 5-2, civil war is at the intersection of local and national 

grievances. Understanding the master cleavage of a civil war, whether 

Sunni versus Shia in Iraq or Liberals versus Conservatives in Colombia, 

does not always provide the careful observer with leverage when analyzing conflict at the micro-level (such as a village). A historian researching 

the impact of local issues and grievances in the dynamics of La Violencia observed that recruitment into guerrilla bands in one Colombian 

locality was based on kin-based networks. The nominally “Liberal” 

guerrilla bands battled “Conservative” police forces and paramilitaries, 

often called contrachusma. The apparent clear partisan divide, which 

maps to the master cleavage of La Violencia, is muddied by a closer 

examination of the local issues surrounding the factions. The struggle 

also mapped to feuds between various families. The picture was further complicated by the possibility of dual party affiliations. In some 

cases, individual family members held dual party affiliations—that 

is, they identified with both Liberals and Conservatives—attributable 

especially to marriage. As a result of these intersecting identities, some 
88

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Conservatives actually joined the guerrilla groups.53,h Cardona, as part 

of an evolving historiography of La Violencia that includes Roldán and 

seeks to delve deeper than traditional explanations that rely on partisan politics, depicted La Violencia as a series of local insurrections that 

never quite reached the level of a national conflict.55

During the course of the conflict, the character and motivation 

of armed struggle evolved. For example, in southwest Antioquia near 

the town of Urrao, the base of the Liberal guerilla group headed by 

the famous Captain Franco, patterns of violence during La Violencia 

followed the classic Liberal and Conservative partisan divide. After 

several years of intermittent violence, the aims of Liberal guerrilla 

groups, even if poorly articulated, took on socioeconomic overtones as 

the guerrillas began a land usurpation campaign. Guerrillas not only 

occupied the land, but they also alternated warfighting with sowing 

and harvesting the land. The violence became “a struggle over who 

should have the right to inhabit, control, or farm particular areas.” 

This turn encouraged a more vigorous response by the regional government, which was concerned about the struggle’s economic—even 

Communist—overtones, as opposed to the purely partisan motivations 

that had driven the conflict previously.56 Echoing the anti-Communist 

fervor in the United States during this time, Colombian officials exhibited strong concern for infiltration by the “Red” menace. To date, little 

evidence suggests that there was any widespread support for Communism in the area.57

La Violencia and Security Force Configuration

One of the most profound failures of the central government during 

La Violencia, and the years leading up to it, was its inability to protect 

average Colombians from violence. The preceding narrative describing 

the events leading up to the outbreak of La Violencia alludes to the role 

police forces played in spreading insecurity, especially in the countryside. This section delves further into how the institutional designi

 of 

the security forcesj influenced the behavior of actors involved in the 

h This depiction of the relative fluidity of partisan identity contrasts with other interpretations, which cast the Liberal and Conservative identities as primordial “hereditary 

hatreds.” In this latter depiction, Colombians’ partisan identity is a birthright in which any 

fluidity is untenable. See Dix.54

i Institutions can be described as a system of constraints that “structure political, 

economic, and social interaction.” These constraints can derive from formal rules, such as 

from a constitution or a law, or from more informal rules, such as customs, traditions, or 

general unspoken codes of conduct.58

j The security forces include “armed groups sanctioned, organized, controlled, and 

paid by the state to provide internal security and order within the national territory.”59
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

89

conflict. The resulting behaviors impacted the scope, endurance, and 

locality of the civil war.k

During a critical period in the formation of the Colombia state—

1880–1910l—the design of the military and nascent National Police 

emerged as a politicized security force configuration, a term defined 

in greater detail below. Political elites, during a time of heightened concern for centralization after a period of internal strife had disordered 

Colombia in the 1860s, established the police force by following the 

model the French gendarmerie had favored. The two salient characteristics of the French model, centralization and militarization, ultimately 

did not survive the realities of regionalism and bipartidismo. For the 

first twenty years after its founding in 1891, the National Police did not 

leave the capital. This lack of presence in rural areas resulted directly 

from a bargain with local politicians, who had no wish for a police force 

imposed by Bogotá. Ultimately, centralization and militarization were 

discarded in favor of the politicized model of police, which gave control of the subnational police to local politicians.62 No relationship of 

authority connected the army and police.63

During the period of state formation, Colombia developed its 

national military into a professionalized force. Initially, the Colombian 

military was “small, loyal, and unprofessional.”64 The loss of the Isthmus of Panama in 1903 was a key motivator for reforms that improved 

military education and the systemization of military hierarchy. After an 

appeal from their own generals, political leaders laid the groundwork 

for military education institutions—the Army Cadet School, the Naval 

School, and Army War College—to formally train officers and chiefs. 

The first generation of officers trained in these institutions had taken 

their first command by the time La Violencia began. By contrast, the 

police forces had not undergone the same level of professionalization 

as the military, a condition underlying the different role each security 

institution played in the civil war.65

Alongside these institutional factors, several characteristics of the 

security forces impacted the trajectory of La Violencia. As discussed 

in Chapter 2. Physical Environment, the geographic distribution of police 

forces affected their capacity for enforcing law and order. Most policing 

occurred in rural areas, where police struggled to cover vast distances 

over rugged landscapes and with limited resources. Secondly, unlike 

k Cardona also argues that characteristics of the political system, when combined 

with the politicized security configuration, led to an enduring, widespread, and local conflict. He highlights the political system’s ability to absorb third-party challengers, its ability 

to make pacts, and the stability those characteristics engendered.60

l The Colombian legislature established the police force with Law 90 of 1888 and 

Law 23 of 1890.61
90

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

in the United States, the Colombian military was oriented toward 

internal, not external, security, for the simple fact that Colombia has 

experienced almost no armed international conflict.m This resulted in 

blurred roles between police and the military, contributing to a balance of resources between the two institutions but not to similar levels 

of professionalization. The poorly trained police had less autonomy in 

decision making and were more likely to be manipulated by politicians, 

providing a ready-made supply of armed actors for rebel forces. Lastly, 

because of the balance in resources, when police were used to perpetrate partisan-driven conflict, the army was unable to quickly tamp 

down the violence.66

Executive

National

State

Local

Local

 Elected

Security Legislative

President Congress

National Army

commander

National

Police chief

State

police chiefs

Local

police chiefs

State Assembly

Mayors Municipal Council

Lists

Control

Governors

Negotiation

Figure 5-3. Colombia’s politicized security force configuration after state 

formation.

Figure 5-3 illustrates the institutional design underpinning the partisan police force. The president, elected by popular vote, appointed 

departmental governors. Those governors then had the authority to 

appoint local mayors. The appointment of police officials followed 

similar downward streams of control. The president, at his discretion, 

appointed both the National Army commander and the National Police 

chief. Similarly, governors appointed local state police chiefs, while mayors had the authority to select their local police chiefs. Elected officials 

were linked on electoral lists of candidates from which voters selected, 

connecting the different levels of government through partisan affiliation. Notice, however, that Figure 5-3 illustrates points of negotiation 

m Since 1878, military personnel in the United States have been prohibited from 

executing policing functions within the United States by the principle known as posse comitatus. The Colombian military has no such strictures.
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

91

in this process. Frequently, the selection of governors and mayors was 

a matter of negotiation between national and state authorities. As discussed previously, the negotiations could, and did, result in simmering 

hostility between the concerned parties, sowing the seeds for future 

conflict. The institutional design allowed opportunities for the party in 

power to use its appointment leverage to ensure a police force affiliated 

with its party and agenda.

The Colombian police force owed its loyalty to particular individuals or offices, not to the constitutional system itself or to the broader 

(military) structure of security forces. When the institutional factors 

are combined with an entrenched two-party system and deep partisan 

affiliation, the result is a highly politicized police force that often acts 

in the interests of the party in power, not in the interest of maintaining 

of law and order. In effect, the police became an armed force available 

to either rebel or government actors to initiate (in the case of rebels) or 

to repress (in the case of the government) armed insurrection.n

When the violence during La Violencia was at its height from 1949 

to 1954, the central government undertook a series of reforms to combat the politicization of the security forces. During this period, the 

army was increasingly drawn into police work, negatively impacting the 

professionalism of the institution. This confusion of the role between 

the police and army concerned security officials. After initial attempts 

at nationalizing the subnational police in 1951 failed to stem the violence, military dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, who took power in 1953, 

enacted a drastic reform, militarizing the police forces and placing 

them under a unified command.

Yet, just when the institutional development of the security forces 

proceeded apace, the nature of La Violencia changed as well. Previously driven by partisan conflict between the Liberals and Conservatives, the violence increasingly took on economic overtones as bandit 

groups looted and pillaged across the countryside. The conflict was 

also overlaid by factional fighting within the Conservative Party as well 

as strong anti-Communist rhetoric.67

Colombia’s Military Dictatorship

In 1953, Colombia experienced its first—and only—successful 

military coup of the twentieth  century. After the failure of central 

and regional political authorities to quash the violence raging in the 

n Cardona also notes that a balance of power in terms of resources and capabilities 

between the police force and the national army hindered the military’s ability to quash 

violence initiated or sustained by police forces.
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Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

countryside, the military took control of the government from Roberto 

Urdaneta Arbeláez, anointed by an ailing Gómez as acting president 

in 1951. On May 22, 1953, Lieutenant General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 

announced in a speech that the military would back the “acting” president until his successor was chosen. Gómez returned fire by attempting 

to have Rojas sent abroad or arrested. Neither ploy was successful. With 

the backing of the military, Rojas assumed the presidency in June.

With the exception of diehard Gómez supporters, most Colombians 

welcomed the military’s intervention. Throughout most of the conflict, 

the military had remained a more or less neutral party. The military 

had become associated with past Conservative administrations, but the 

onus of suppressing the Liberal insurrection in the countryside had 

rested mostly with police forces. On occasion, the military had even 

been called on to reel in the excesses of the police forces. Robert H. 

Dix also observes that the impetus behind the military coup was arguably a rival faction within the Conservative Party itself, followers of former Conservative President Ospina. He writes that, “In a real sense the 

Colombian military did not intervene in politics on its own initiative; 

instead, it had politics thrust upon it.”68

The main thrusts of Rojas’s dictatorship were the suppression of 

violence and alleviating social grievances. Rojas immediately enacted 

measures to end the strife, including amnesty for guerrillas and aid to 

speed the reintegration of demobilized fighters into normal society. 

The measure induced many guerrilla bands to lay down their arms. 

To combat the partisan culture of the police force, Rojas removed the 

police from under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, making the institution instead a fourth branch of the military. Rojas also 

enacted a series of measures to address social grievances, including 

extensive public works and social welfare projects, increased land taxation, expansion of available credit for small farmers, and protection of 

small businesses against larger monopolies.

Rojas’s propensity for combining these approaches with repressive 

methods eventually led to his peaceful ouster by a broad coalition of 

political and civic actors. Press censorship tightened under the regime, 

with the leading paper in the country, El Tiempo, shut down in 1955 

for insulting the president.69 The military and police used increasingly 

arbitrary, and deadly, measures against perceived threats to the presidency, including measures against student demonstrators, political 

opponents, and Colombians who were insufficiently vigorous in their 

welcome of the president at public events. After Rojas Pinilla maneuvered the National Constituent Assembly (which Gómez had installed 

to replace the Liberal Congress) to rubber stamp him for another 

term as “elected” president, his fragmented opposition coalesced into 
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

93

a unified effort to remove him from office. The traditional parties’ 

acceptance of a military regime was predicated on its eventual transition to a civilian administration—in which each party hoped to have 

a stake. After the military government placed a presidential candidate 

vetted by both parties under house arrest in May 1957, it became apparent to Liberals and Conservatives that a voluntary transition to civilian 

politics was unlikely. Party members, the church, students, businessmen, and others took to the streets in peaceful protest. Combined with 

a defection of military officers, the protests forced Rojas out of power 

in May 1957.70

The National Front

After the peaceful, civilian-led ouster of Rojas’ military dictatorship, the Colombian government was reconstructed via a concordance 

between the Liberal and Conservative parties. The political system that 

emerged, while dominated by the same elites that had contributed to 

the collapse of the previous system, included “new rules of the game” to 

forestall a return to the immoderate partisanship that guided Colombia’s descent into a brutal civil war. These new rules simultaneously 

reconfigured important components of Colombian government while 

ensuring that power, nearly uncontested, remained in the hands of 

political elites. Popular participation remained relatively circumscribed. 

The result was a combined governing coalition, the Frente Nacional 

(National Front, or FN). The new political system was enshrined in a 

constitution amending its 1886 predecessor. A national plebiscite on 

the new constitution resulted in a majority approval in late 1957. Important constitutional provisions included the following:

• Parity, or paridad, ensuring that each party had equal 

representation in legislative, ministerial, and other high-ranking 

positions.

• Alternation, or alternación, of the executive office (president) 

between the Liberal and Conservative parties. The president 

served a four-year term.

The impetus behind the constitutional provisions was encouraging a culture of conciliation and compromise between the two political factions.o

 In anticipation of the development of such civil political 

o The National Front is a good example of a type of democratic government known as 

consociational democracy. A consociational democracy constitutionally guarantees group 

representation in order to bring political stability to deeply divided societies like Colombia’s. For instance, in the aftermath of Lebanon’s civil war,71 the country adopted measures 

that allocate government positions according to the size of the religious communities 

involved in the civil war. For a description of consociational democracy, see Lijphart.72
94

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

character, the altered constitution abolished the provisions of paridad

and alternación in 1974. At that time, democratic elections, open contestation, and participatory politics were intended to prevail. “By 1974, 

it was hoped that arbitrary constraints introduced sixteen years earlier 

could be removed, proceeding without the embittered and venomous 

irresponsibility which had so contaminated national politics earlier.”73

The National Front system consciously readopted the hegemonic 

two-party system of the previous century. It controlled political participation and the impingements on elite rule that such participation 

might bring. The restraints encouraged much needed stabilization and 

more effective policy making in the short term. Yet, the restraints also 

alienated the average Colombian, who recognized the futility of political mobilization to effect change. Not surprisingly, visits to the ballot box dropped.74 The restrictions on political participation supplied 

leftist insurgents, like those discussed in Part III. Government Countermeasures, with ample material to construct compelling narratives illustrating the illegitimacy of the Colombian government.

As the planned end of the National Front in 1974 approached, discussions and public debate proceeded apace regarding the future of 

Colombian democracy in light of the coming abolishment of paridad

and alternación. Despite the provision for expiration of these measures 

in 1974, further constitutional adjustments enacted in 1968 ensured 

that after the deadline, the constitutionally constrained democracy 

installed in 1956 was not fully dismantled. Alternación was allowed to 

disappear, and as expected, the presidential elections of 1974 were 

openly contested. But the 1968 constitutional adjustment required the 

president to ensure equitable representation to the largest party other 

than his or her own. The measure further extended bipartisan control 

of the government, but there is disagreement on the extent to which it 

did so.75

However, the National Front was not fully dismantled until the 

adoption of the 1991 constitution. The following section describes the 

current constitutional design under the 1991 constitution.

COLOMBIA’S GOVERNMENT UNDER THE 

1991 CONSTITUTION

Colombia’s current political system follows the 1991 constitution, 

the country’s first in more than a century. The 1886 charter was highly 

centralizing, and despite subsequent reforms over the course of the 

twentieth century, continued to present an obstacle to the full democratization of Colombian society. A constituent assembly was convened 

in the 1980s to revive the legitimacy of Colombia’s constitutional system 
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

95

by expanding “citizens’ basic rights, increasing the participation of civil 

society in various decision-making processes, incorporating previously 

marginalized groups, including black and indigenous communities, 

and bringing illegal armed factions . . . into the political fold.”76

The Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19), one of the four insurgency 

groups analyzed in this study, played a vital role in bringing about the 

redesign of Colombia’s political system. The group insisted on a new 

constitution as a fundamental condition for laying down its arms in 

the 1990s.p M-19 leaders gained twenty-seven percent of the vote in a 

popular election to send representatives to the Constituent Assembly, 

the body responsible for rewriting Colombia’s constitution. There, they 

pushed for reforms, especially with regard to expanding opportunities 

for political participation. Despite these efforts, many of Colombia’s 

structural problems, such as department-level fiscal inequities, continue unabated under the 1991 constitution.

Figure  5-4 depicts the current structure of the Colombian government. Like the governments of many of its regional neighbors, 

Colombia’s government revolves around a robust presidential role. The 

president is the “chief of state, head of government, supreme administrative authority, and commander in chief of the armed forces.” Until 

recently, the president was elected for a single four-year term. In 2005, 

the Congress passed legislation authorizing a single re-election for the 

president, which enabled then-President Alvaro Uribe Vélez to stand 

(successfully) for a second term. Like in the United States, the vice 

president is elected on the same ticket as the president and succeeds 

him or her in case of illness, death, or resignation. The president oversees the executive branch, appointing all members to his or her ministerial cabinet, as well as heads of various administrative agencies. The 

president is responsible for maintaining internal order as well as the 

state’s national sovereignty. In a departure from US presidential powers, the Colombian executive office is empowered with significant legislative authority. The Congress can, when requested, grant the president 

the power to legislate laws, even those not related to public order.

p M-19’s impact on the drafting and adoption of the 1991 constitution is described in 

the M-19 Political Operations section.
96

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

Appointment

The Judiciary

Constitutional

Court

Superior

Judicial Council

Supreme Court

of Justice

Attorney

General

District

Superior

Courts

Circuit

Courts

Ordinary and

other lower

courts (including

indigenous)

Council

of State

Administrative

Courts

Ministerial Cabinet

Agriculture and Rural 

Development

Commerce, Industry, and 

Tourism

Communications

Culture

Environment, Housing, 

and Territorial 

Development

Finance and Public Credit

Foreign Relations

Interior and Justice

Mines and Energy

National Defense

National Education

Social Protection

Transportation

Popular Vote

The Executive The Legislature

Vice

President

President of

the Republic

Administrative

Departments (6)

Congress of

the Republic

House of

Representatives Senate

Departmental

Governors (32)

and Mayor,

Capital District

Departmental

Assemblies

Municipal

Councils

Mayors

(1,120

municipalities)

Figure 5-4. The structure of the Colombian government.
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

97

Colombia’s legislature has two branches: a Senate (102 members) 

and a House of Representatives (166 in 2009).q Colombians elect Congress members for four-year terms. Members of the Senate are elected 

nationwide, while members of the House are elected within the thirtytwo  departments. Congress members can be re-elected indefinitely. 

Rather than electing specific individuals for office in a “winner-takesall” system, as in the United States, the Colombian legislative elections 

are based on proportional representation. In a party-list proportional 

representation election, competing political parties provide lists of candidates that will be installed in office if voters select their party. Many 

parties in Colombia allow for an “open list,” which allows voters to 

mark candidate preferences. Parties are then allocated legislative seats 

according to the percentage of votes they received in the election. In 

the example below, a senate ballot from the 2010 elections, Colombian 

voters can either vote in Part A (national district) or Part B (indigenous 

set-aside seats). If voting for Part A, voters select the party logo at the 

top. If the party has an open list, then voters choose the number corresponding to their preferred candidate. Candidates typically include 

their number on their campaign ads.

Figure 5-5. Example of Colombian voters’ ballot (Senatorial election).

q The number of members in the House of Representative is fixed to the national 

population census and accordingly varies as the population grows.
98

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

The national legislative body of Colombia has a number of duties. 

Many revolve around legislation, including proposing, interpreting, 

reforming, or repealing legislation. Because of the internal dynamics 

of the Congress, the president is more successful in passing legislation 

than Congress, although the latter institution initiates more legislation. 

Others powers of the Congress include the following:

• Initiating a constitutional reform process77

• Approving the national development plan

• Approving or rejecting international treaties

• Determining internal boundaries of general national territory 

and administrative structures

• Granting extraordinary decree powers to the president

• Establishing the national legal currency

Despite the historic strength of Colombia’s two-party system, fragmentation and internal divisions within the parties have precluded 

disciplined voting behavior in Congress. Party members often have 

little identification with a party’s platform or ideology and anemic 

visions for national, regional, or local policies. A coherent opposition 

strategy, given the erratic voting patterns of representatives, is very 

unlikely. In some cases, sympathetic members of the opposition party 

are more likely to vote in favor of government initiatives than are dissident factions within the government’s own party. The 1991 constitution 

attempted to restore the public’s faith in the Congress and address its 

deficiencies, but today it plays a muted legislative and fiscal role relative to the powerful executive.78 This is partly due to the collapse of the 

formerly stable two-party system in the 2000s, which analysts point to as 

deriving at least in part from how the new constitution, along with associated decentralizing reforms in the late 1980s, altered the structure 

and incentives of clientelism within the political system.79 This collapse 

has led to a proliferation of parties outside the traditional Liberal and 

Conservative ones, which makes governance through coalition necessary. This has proved difficult for a political system unaccustomed to 

such an approach.

The territorial government in Colombian spans thirty-two administrative departments and the Distrito Capitál de Bogotá, the capital district. Departments are further broken down into local municipalities, 

with 1,120 spanning the thirty-two  departments. Governors, elected 

every four years for nonrenewable terms, administer the departments. 

Local municipalities are headed by mayors, also elected every four years 

for nonrenewable terms. Before the 1991 constitution, mayors were 

installed by presidential or gubernatorial appointments, as described 

in prior sections. The current constitution also devolves more resources 
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

99

and responsibilities from the central government to departments and 

local municipalities to enhance departmental autonomy, decentralize, 

and increase citizen participation in governance.80

A number of different courts and offices comprise the judiciary 

branch of the Colombian government. The highest court in the land is 

the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is responsible for a number of 

functions, listed below:

• Serve as the court of final appeal

• Judge cases involving accusations of wrongdoing by the president 

and other high-ranking public officials

• Judge cases involving accusations of wrongdoing of other 

governmental, diplomatic, and military officials

• Investigate and judge members of Congress accused of 

wrongdoing

• Review international agreements

Justices for the Supreme Court are selected by the Supreme Court 

itself from a list of candidates provided by the Superior Judicial Council.r

 Supreme Court justices, twenty-three in total, serve nonrenewable 

eight-year terms. One particularly sensitive political issue the Supreme 

Court handles is extradition requests. The number of such requests 

has risen considerably in the past decade, many originating from the 

United States with regard to drug trafficking. Since 2003, the court has 

extradited 400 individuals to the United States. The Supreme Court is 

also responsible for administering a series of subordinate courts, including district superior courts, the highest court at the regional level, and 

circuit courts and lower courts, which operate at the municipal level.

In addition to the Supreme Court and the lower courts, the judiciary branch includes the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional 

Court, limited to nine members, is the primary defender of the Colombian constitution. The Senate elects the judges from a list of candidates 

provided by a variety of government offices. Each judge serves an eightyear, nonrenewable term. The Court’s primary judicial function is ruling on the constitutionality of legal issues such as the following:

• Laws

• Administrative and legislative procedures

• Constitutional reform proposals

r The Superior Judicial Council is divided into two chambers, the administrative and 

the jurisdictional discipline chamber. Judges in the administrative chamber are elected 

by the Council of State (three judges); the Supreme Court (two judges); and the Constitutional Court (one judge). Judges in the jurisdictional chamber are elected by the Congress 

from a list of candidates provided by the government.
100

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

• Popular referenda

• Legislative decrees issued by the president

The Constitutional Court has ruled on a variety of political, economic, and social issues since its founding in 1992. Because its rulings 

are binding on other entities in the judicial branch and the government in general, its rulings tend to generate a fair amount of controversy. The Court has typically been well regarded by most Colombians, 

but several questionable appointments to its bench in recent years have 

tarnished its reputation for neutrality.81 In 2013, the Court struck down 

a government-led effort to reform the Constitution to allow military 

forces to prosecute charges against their members in military courts 

for all crimes except those classified as crimes against humanity. This 

ruling reflects the continued negotiation of relationships of power 

between civilian and military authorities in Colombia.

ENDNOTES

1 Enrique Desmond Arias and Daniel M. Goldstein, “Violent Pluralism: Understanding 

the New Democracies of Latin America,” in Violent Democracies in Latin America, eds. 

Enrique Desmond Arias and Daniel M. Goldstein (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010), 1–34.

2 Robert E. Gamer, The Developing Nations: A Comparative Perspective (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 

Inc., 1982), 104.

3 John D. Martz, The Politics of Clientelism (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers: 1997), 10. See also Susan C. Stokes, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco, Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics (Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press: 2013).

4 Ibid., 27.

5 Ibid., 28–31.

6 Christopher Michael Cardona, “Politicians, Soldiers, and Cops: Colombia’s ‘La Violencia’ in Comparative Perspective” (doctoral dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 2008), 48–49.

7 Ibid., 6.

8 Ibid., 111.

9 Ibid., 119.

10 Ibid.

11 James Zackrison, “La Violencia in Colombia: An Anomaly in Terrorism,” The Journal of 

Conflict Studies 9, no 4. (1989): 5–18.

12 Mary Roldán, Blood and Fire: La Violencia in Antioquia, Colombia, 1946–1953 (Durham and 

London: Duke University Press, 2002), 16.

13 James D. Henderson, Modernization in Colombia: The Laureano Gómez Years, 1889-1962

(Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2001), 155.

14 James D. Henderson, When Colombia Bled: A History of the Violencia in Tolima (Tuscaloosa, 

AL: University of Alabama Press, 2010), 77–78.

15 Roldán, Blood and Fire, 17.
Chapter 5. Government and Politics

101

16 Margaret Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy,” Political Studies 47, no. 1 (1999): 2–16.

17 Roldán, Blood and Fire, 18.

18 Germán Gúzman, Orlando Fals Borda, and Eduardo Umaña Luna, La Violencia en Colombia: Estudio de un Proceso Social (Bogotá: Editorial Iquemia, 1962), 25–26, as quoted in 

Cardona, “Politicians, Soldiers, and Cops,” 112.

19 Cardona, “Politicians, Soldiers, and Cops,” 115.

20 Henderson, When Colombia Bled, 91.

21 Ibid.

22 Cardona, “Politicians, Soldiers, and Cops,” 146.

23 Ibid.

24 Roldán, Blood and Fire, 20.

25 Henderson, When Colombia Bled, 103.

26 Ibid., 84–85.

27 Nathan Bos, “Underlying Causes of Violence,” in Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, ed. Nathan Bos (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special 

Operations Command, 2013), 19–20.

28 Henderson, When Colombia Bled, 103.

29 All quotations in this paragraph from Henderson, When Colombia Bled, 103–104.

30 Henderson, When Colombia Bled, 107.

31 Cardona, “Politicians, Soldiers, and Cops,” 156.

32 Ibid., 157.

33 Henderson, When Colombia Bled, 106–111.

34 Ibid., 110.

35 Ibid., 116–117.

36 Julio César Vásquez Higuera, Gaitán: Mito y Realidad de un Caudillo (Tunja, Colombia: 

Servicios Gráficos, 1992), 118, as quoted in Cardona, “Politicians, Soldiers, and Cops,”

148; Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, 

the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University 

Press, 1991).

37 As quoted in Henderson, When Colombia Bled, 111.

38 Cardona, “Politicians, Soldiers, and Cops,” 156.

39 As quoted in Henderson, When Colombia Bled, 118.

40 Henderson, When Colombia Bled, 106–107.

41 As quoted in Henderson, When Colombia Bled, 125–126.

42 Richard L. Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1973), 17.

43 Henderson, When Colombia Bled, 134.

44 As quoted in Henderson, When Colombia Bled, 135.

45 As quoted in Henderson, When Colombia Bled, 136–137.

46 Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia, 19.

47 As quoted in Henderson, When Colombia Bled, 140.

48 Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia, 8–9.

49 “La  Violencia in Colombia,” ReliefWeb, July 31, 2002, http://reliefweb.int/report/

colombia/la-violencia-colombia.

50 Cardona, “Politicians, Soldiers, and Cops,” 16–17.

51 Stathis Kalyvas, “The Ontology of ‘Political Violence’: Action and Identity in Civil Wars,” 

Perspective on Politics 1, no. 30 (2003): 475–494.
102

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

52 Ibid.

53 Roldán, Blood and Fire, 242–243.

54 Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven and London: Yale 

University Press, 1967), 211–216.

55 Cardona, “Politicians, Soldiers, and Cops,” 168.

56 Roldán, Blood and Fire, 266–267.

57 Ibid., 270–272.

58 Douglass North, “Institutions,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 1 (1991): 97.

59 Cardona, “Politicians, Soldiers, and Cops,” 21.

60 Ibid., 28–30.

61 Ibid., 65.

62 Ibid., 63–75.

63 Ibid., 81.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid., 82–88.

66 Ibid., 31–36.

67 Ibid., 212–213.

68 Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change, 116.

69 “50 Years Ago, Was Closing Time for Red,” El Tiempo, August 4, 2005, http://www.

eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1693414.

70 Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change, 117–121.

71 Shana Marshall, “Hizbollah: 1982–2009,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2012), 532–533. 

72 Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics 21, no. 2 (1969): 207–225. 

73 Martz, The Politics of Clientelism, 27.

74 Ibid., 26–28.

75 Ibid., 27–28, referencing Bruce Michael Bagley, “Colombia: National Front and Economic Development,” in Politics, Policies, and Economic Development, ed. Robert Wesson 

(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), 125–126. 

76 Rex Hudson, Colombia: A Country Study (Baton Rouge: Claitor’s Publishing Division, 

2010), 215. 

77 Antonia Ramirez, “An Introduction to Colombian Governmental Institutions and Primary Legal Sources,” GlobaLex, May 2007, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/

colombia.htm.

78 Hudson, Colombia: A Country Study, 228–229.

79 Jana Morgan, Bankrupt Representation and Party System Collapse (University Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 219; Eduardo Dargent and Paula Muñoz, “Democracy Against Parties? Party System Deinstitutionalization in Colombia,” Journal of Politics 

in Latin America 3, no. 2 (2011): 43–71.

80 Hudson, Colombia: A Country Study, 222–223.

81 Daniel E. Freeman, “Colombia’s Constitutional Court Knocks Down Controversial Military Justice Reform Law,” Colombia Reports, October 24, 2013, http://colombiareports.co/

constitutional-court-knocks-controversial-military-justice-law/.
Conclusion

103

CONCLUSION TO PART I

Colombia is currently experiencing a cycle of violence perpetrated 

by leftist guerrillas, drug traffickers, criminal bands, and right-wing 

paramilitaries. This cycle of violence has direct roots in yet another episode of political violence in Colombia’s history, La Violencia, Colombia’s mid-century civil war. In turn, the localized conflicts between 

Liberal and Conservative partisans in the Colombian countryside that 

composed the war resulted from the convergence of geographical, historical, socioeconomic, and political factors. In this regard, Colombia 

is an apt example of the advantages of using these important contextual factors to help explain and elucidate the dynamic processes that 

lead to sustained political violence in other states around the world. 

In particular, the roots of political violence in the country have been 

especially impacted by institutions that have governed political, social, 

and economic processes in Colombia. Examining the institutional 

context of political violence in Colombia also draws attention to the 

complementary influences of structure and agency in the study of 

political violence.

Since nearly its inception, the central government in Colombia has 

struggled to maintain its legitimacy in regions outside of Bogotá and 

other major urban centers. The discussions in the preceding section 

draw attention to the influence of different contextual factors affecting 

the legitimacy of governing institutions in Colombia. From the outset, the rugged, mountainous terrain and dense jungles in the country helped to entrench strong regionalism that led to struggles over 

the extent of autonomy exercised by regional and local governments. 

While the national government sought greater centralized control over 

regional governments, the latter sought greater autonomy from Bogotá.

More directly, the geography of Colombia proved a significant barrier to developing infrastructure connecting the capital with outlying 

regions. In large part, a state’s legitimacy is derived from its sovereignty. 

The Colombian government has de jure sovereignty over its territory, 

or sovereignty granted by legal recognition of its borders by the international community. However, in outlying regions Colombia lacks what 

is known as de facto sovereignty, or actual control over territory it purports to rule. That is, in many areas the state fails to act like a state. 

Local residents may lack physical security, roads, communications, and 

basic education and healthcare. The failure of the state to fulfill the 

obligations expected of it leeches legitimacy from the state in the eyes 

of its citizens.

The weak state in Colombia has had a direct and indirect influence 

on political violence in the country. The lack of public services as we 
104

Part I. Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency

as poverty and inequality in the country has led to grievances among 

underserved populations that have been aptly exploited by armed actors 

in Colombia. These remote areas of Colombia also provided sanctuaries for armed actors challenging the authority of the state. However, as 

discussed later in the FARC, ELN, and M-19 chapters, leftist guerrillas 

had to balance safety in these areas with attacks on strategic targets 

often closer to national security assets and populous areas. The FARC 

and the ELN in particular used attacks on strategic infrastructure to 

economically and symbolically damage the power of the state. With 

the assistance of the United States, Colombian security forces were 

able to use technology to degrade the advantages insurgents sought in 

remote areas.

Colombia’s weak state has also meant that it has failed to maintain 

a monopoly on violence in areas of poor governance. For many Colombians, this has resulted in a profound lack of personal security. During La Violencia, peasants in the countryside received little protection 

against partisan violence. As a result, Colombians banded together in 

self-defense groups to defend their communities. The long-standing 

tradition of self-defense groups as a substitute for state security has 

exacerbated the state’s control of violence. Liberal self-defense groups 

formed during La Violencia later became the seeds for the leftist insurgent groups still active in Colombia. Likewise, right-wing paramilitaries 

also evolved from self-defense groups formed to combat leftist guerillas. The multitude of armed actors has complicated the resolution of 

political violence in the country. In the Government and Countermeasures section, we discuss how Colombia’s counterinsurgent efforts in 

the twenty-first century have evolved to focus on the consolidation of 

national power in areas cleared of insurgents.

When thinking about the factors underlying political violence, we 

often look for explanation in the actions and decisions of individuals. 

This might mean looking at the actions and decisions of elite political 

leaders, insurgent leaders, or even those of rank-and-file soldiers in an 

insurgency. This method is often referred to as “agency” because it considers the capacity of individuals to make free choices. As one example 

of a focus on the role of agency in political violence, in The Rebel’s 

Dilemma Mark Lichbach looks at how individuals make the decision to 

engage in collective dissent despite the many disadvantages of doing so. 

He finds a host of “market solutions” that increase the benefits of participation, decrease the cost of participating, and improve the chances 

of winning alters the individual decision-making processes that would 

otherwise lead to nonparticipation.1

While examining the motivations of these key stakeholders is 

an important component of understanding conflict dynamics, the 
Conclusion

105

decisions individuals make is tempered by the institutions that shape 

political and social processes. Many social scientists study institutions to 

understand how they affect outcomes. Because it looks at how institutional rules shape individual or group behavior, this type of analysis is 

often referred to as “structure.” Institutions can be both informal (traditions, codes of conduct) and formal constraints (constitutions, laws) 

that structure political, social, or economic actions.2 A good example 

of a structural approach to political violence is found in Jeremy Weinstein’s book, Inside Rebellion. Weinstein argues that the organizational 

structure (the institution or structure) of insurgent groups affects the 

extent to which those groups abuse civilian populations, not the pursuit of any specific goals the group or individuals might have.3

Institutions establish “rules of the game” that make human interaction more orderly and predictable. The rules established in each institution constrain, limit, or incentivize individual and group behavior by 

setting parameters for the range of available choices or opportunities 

for those who operate within its the confines.4 For instance, the US 

Constitution sets the parameters for the separation of powers between 

the three branches of the government. Unless significant changes are 

made to the Constitution, individuals and groups active in politics in 

the United States are necessarily bound by these constraints.

There are a number of different methods that social scientists use 

to understand how institutions affect social, political, and economic 

behavior. One that is particularly useful for examining political conflict is called historical institutionalism. Historical institutionalism 

looks at how changes in institutions emerged from historical processes and affected the political, social, and economic outcomes in 

different states.a

In the preceding section, we discussed the development of a number of institutions that impacted political conflict in Colombia. Until 

the 1886 constitution was altered in 1991, all politics in Colombia took 

place under the constitution. It granted highly centralized authority 

to the executive office and thus ceded tremendous power to the party 

that controlled the office. Likewise, the more informal institution of 

clientelism in Colombia shaped the distribution of public goods in the 

country. Clientelism evolved from its more primitive variety to its more 

institutionalized form in the bureaucratic state over the course of centuries in Colombia. In the decades preceding La Violencia, the political 

party with control of the presidency limited the distribution of the significant largesse of the state to its members and parties. The institutions 

described above helped to create a winner-takes-all system that left the 

a For a description of historical institutionalism and how it differs from other closely 

related methods, such as rational and sociological institutionalism, please see Thelen.5
losing party in a significantly weakened position. The institutional configuration of the security forces impacted how well the state protected 

its citizens from harm resulting from these partisan struggles. Because 

the police forces were tied to the president, individual politicians had 

considerable control to direct the state’s security forces. The politicization and poor professionalization of the police force made it especially 

susceptible to manipulation by politicians in the ruling party. When 

married with the deep partisan affiliations in the country, this institutional configuration helped the ruling party repress and abuse those in 

the opposition who often had no means of redress.

This emphasis on institutions does not detract from the role that 

individuals played in this period so important to the violence that 

emerged in the decades after the civil war. The behavior of political 

elites, for instance, impacted the divisions of the Liberal and Conservative parties that led to the grand electoral transitions in 1930 and 

1946. Popular and influential leaders like Gómez and Gaitan affected 

political developments leading up to La Violencia. Of course, the individual decisions of those who participated in perpetrating violence in 

the countryside also clearly shaped the outcome of the civil war.

Political conflicts are complex events that take place in a constellation of social, political, economic, and geographic factors. In this 

section, we have examined how the convergence of these factors contributed to the outbreak of the civil war that preceded the leftist, drugtrafficking, and paramilitary violence still prevalent in Colombia today. 

A study of the contextual factors surrounding the conflict in Colombia 

draws attention to the complementary analysis of structure and agency 

in conflict dynamics. In the following sections, we analyze the insurgent groups and paramilitaries themselves.

ENDNOTES

1 Mark Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

2 Douglass C. North, “Institutions,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 1 (1991): 97–112.

3 Jeremy Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (New York: Cambridge 

University Press, 2007).

4 North, “Institutions,” 97–112.

5 Kathleen Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of 

Political Science 2 (1999): 369–404.
PART II.

STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF 

THE INSURGENCY

Introduction

109

INTRODUCTION

Armed conflict has dogged Colombia for more than seven decades. 

While many insurgent groups and paramilitaries have operated in the 

country during that time, the four discussed below, the FARC, ELN, 

M-19, and AUC, have arguably had the greatest impact on Colombia. 

The conflict has rarely been dyadic, that is, between two opposed armed 

groups. Instead, leftist guerrillas battle the state, while paramilitaries 

confront guerrilla forces and sometimes also the state. Despite having 

similar ideologies and goals, leftist guerrilla groups proved unable to 

unite under a single banner, with each group jealously guarding its 

own ideological interpretations and security. Occasionally, the guerrillas fought one another. Despite Colombia being home to some of the 

longest enduring insurgencies in the Western Hemisphere, only M-19 

has had any lasting impact on Colombian politics. In the early 1990s, 

the group was instrumental in rewriting the constitution that widened 

democratic participation in the country. The extended conflict has 

inflicted a terrible toll on the civilian population in Colombia. Tens of 

thousands have died or been injured in the violence, driving millions 

from their rural homes to face grinding poverty in urban slums.

The armed groups discussed in the following sections have used 

different ideological tenets to justify their actions and appeal to target populations. Three of the groups, the FARC, the ELN, and M-19, 

derived their core narratives from various leftist sources. All emphasized the need for social justice, opposition to Western imperialism, 

and the corrupt, elitist nature of the Colombian government. They 

claimed to speak on behalf of the marginalized poor. The FARC and 

the ELN were especially inspired by the ideals of the Cuban Revolution. The ELN’s ideological legacy draws heavily on Catholic liberation theology first articulated by Fabio Vasquez. Camilo Torres, the 

priest turned guerrilla who joined the group early in its history, carried 

on Vasquez’s work and became a focal point around which the group 

coalesced. At times, the FARC has lacked the ideological coherence 

of its counterparts. As the group became increasingly involved in the 

drug trade, greed, not grievance, appeared to become the insurgents’ 

primary motive. In contrast to the stricter interpretation of leftist doctrine of the FARC and the ELN, M-19 adopted a leftist ideology that 

incorporated strong nationalist overtones. Early M-19 leadership cultivated a flexible and accessible ideology to appeal to the broadest swath 

of society possible.

At the opposite end of the ideological spectrum is the AUC, the 

progovernment paramilitary group that sought to eradicate the leftist 
110

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

guerrillas.a The AUC developed an ideology that stressed the importance of private property, free enterprise, tradition, and law and order. 

These tenets translated into “social cleansings” of undesirables, such as 

beggars, drug users, and prostitutes.

The four armed groups also articulated contrasting political visions 

of their “ideal” Colombian state. As is the case with many insurgent 

groups, all four are more prepared to fight than to rule. The FARC 

and the ELN often looked to the Cuban state as a guide. Both the 

groups consistently highlighted the illegitimacy of the Colombian government and advocated for a fundamental restructuring of its institutions. However, in articulating their political visions, the groups usually 

defaulted to ambiguous statements about enfranchising marginalized 

classes, such as workers and peasants, while decreasing the influence 

of nefarious Western imperialists, especially the United States. By contrast, early on its career, M-19 supported Colombian democracy, while 

arguing that it needed to include all segments of society, not just the 

elites. The AUC, as a progovernment paramilitary, supported the status 

quo, although the group sought to ensure that its backers maintained 

positions of power in the government.

Two insurgent groups, the FARC and M-19, entered the legal political process. In the 1980s, the FARC concluded a truce with the government that, for a brief time, incorporated the group’s public component, 

the Unión Patriótica (UP), or the Patriotic Union, into the legal political process. The UP’s political platform, which included anticorruption 

and land reform measures, provides insight into the group’s political 

savvy. Unfortunately for the UP, the paramilitaries assassinated hundreds of its members, precluding a successful political solution for 

FARC. The UP debacle, and the death of Raúl Reyes, decimated the 

FARC’s core cadre of political thinkers. After its demobilization, M-19 

also entered the legal political process. More successful than their 

FARC counterparts, M-19 members nonetheless proved incapable of 

sustaining a long-term political movement. Subsequently, M-19’s public 

component faded to irrelevance in the 1990s, although some individual 

former guerrillas have enjoyed fruitful political careers.

A careful study of the insurgents’ paramilitary operations illustrates 

the myriad ends to which violence can be deployed. In this regard, the 

FARC is the most “traditional” in its use of violence to directly confront and defeat state security forces. M-19, on the other hand, is the 

least traditional, using carefully orchestrated violence as a primary 

a In the context of the Colombian conflict, the term paramilitary is commonly used to 

describe the armed, pro-state groups that continue to battle leftist insurgents. However, 

this study also uses the term paramilitary in a more traditional sense to describe the irregular, kinetic operations of the armed groups participating in the conflict.
Introduction

111

method of communication with the state and the general populace. 

For the group, such violence replaced speech in the public realm. ELN 

operations, although not as masterfully executed, sometimes followed 

similar patterns. The ELN and the FARC also used their paramilitary 

operations as means of delegitimizing the government; many of their 

attacks focused on critical infrastructure in the state such as utilities 

and roads. By contrast, the AUC deployed violence in a scorched earth 

policy to preclude the necessary civilian support for the leftist guerrillas. The group’s signature tactic, civilian massacres, was more effective 

than engaging the elusive guerrillas themselves. Finally, in lieu of military defeat of the Colombian state, the insurgents used violence as a 

lever to press for more favorable negotiating terms.

The Impact of Internal Armed Conflict in Colombia

The extended internal armed conflict in Colombia has taken a significant toll on the civilian population. In the period from 1988 to 

2003, 11,119 Colombian civilians were killed and 5,499 more injured 

as a result of political violence.b When civilians are killed by armed 

groups, they are typically not innocent bystanders caught in clashes 

between armed groups but instead are part of violence intentionally 

directed toward civilian populations by a single armed group. About 

eighty-five percent of civilian casualties result from these direct attacks.2

Massacre attacksc are the most devastating type of attack to civilians, 

accounting for forty percent of civilian deaths. Bombings, incursions, 

and road blockages account for the remainder of deaths.4 Bombing 

attacks resulted in the most civilian injuries in Colombia. While the 

leftist guerillas, especially the FARC, are responsible for most injuries 

to civilians, the paramilitaries are responsible for most civilian deaths.5

The ELN and the FARC have killed (2,280) and injured (2,981) 

many civilians, 5,261 in total, but most of the groups’ attacks have targeted government authorities or were aimed at economic sabotage. 

The FARC has committed hundreds of economic and infrastructure 

attacks, for instance, but civilian deaths or injuries during those attacks 

are few. Bombing attacks account for most civilian deaths and injuries, 

most of which occurred in the least densely populated municipalities and Colombia’s biggest cities. Only about two percent of guerrilla 

targets were massacres that specifically target civilian government or 

b Despite these high numbers, combatant casualties in Colombia outnumber civilian 

casualties by two to one.1

c Massacre attacks are defined as the “killing of more than three defenceless people with some selectiveness against either the people killed or the place where they are 

killed.”3
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

paramilitary supporters.6 With the exception of those in one year, 1998, 

the FARC attacks have been more deadly to civilians than those of the 

ELN.7 Guerrilla bombings, which account for the majority of civilian 

injuries, occurred both in sparsely populated areas (sixty percent) and 

Colombia’s big cities (thirty-one percent).8

Paramilitary attacks killed more civilians, 6,543 in the period under 

investigation, than leftist guerrilla attacks, largely because right-wing 

groups perpetrate more civilian massacres. Altogether, the paramilitaries have killed twice as many civilians in attacks as the guerrillas, 

three-fourths of which were killed in massacres. By contrast, the paramilitaries injured only 478  civilians. The most frequent method of 

attack, the massacre, is marked by close-range tactics that leave few 

civilians injured and alive. While surprising, the finding is consistent 

with the groups’ primary strategy—targeting civilians supporting the 

leftist guerrillas. The leader of the AUC, Carlos Castaño, describes the 

group’s strategy:

Since we could not combat [the guerrillas] where they 

were, we chose to neutralize the people who brought 

to their camps food, medicine, messages, liquor, prostitutes, and these types of things. And we realized that 

we could isolate them and that this strategy would give 

us very good results. Incredible.9

In line with this strategy, the paramilitaries killed more civilians per 

attack than the guerrillas (4.77 compared to 0.25 deaths per attack).10

Most paramilitary massacres, seventy percent, occurred in very lightly 

populated areas with three or fewer persons per square kilometer.11,d

Millions of Colombians have become refugees in their own country 

since La Violencia, the mid-century civil war, and the outbreak of leftist 

guerrilla insurgencies that followed in the 1960s. Since 1985, when the 

Colombian agency Consultaría par los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (CODHES) first began tracking internally displaced persons (IDPs), CODHES has counted 5.2  million displaced persons.13,e

As of 2011, 3.8 million Colombians, out of a population of 45 million, 

are officially registered as IDPs with the Colombian government.14

However, this number likely does not capture the full number of IDPs 

because of legal restrictions on eligibility, a lack of information, and 

other barriers to registration.15 An additional 500,000 Colombians are 

refugees outside of the country.16 Along with Iraq and Sudan, Colombia has the highest number of IDPs in the world.17 Many IDPs migrate 

d The population density threshold is even lower for guerrilla massacres, at two persons per square kilometer.12

e Other estimates of IDPs in Colombia are not as high.
Introduction

113

to the country’s largest cities, Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, and 

others. Around seventy-four percent of IDPs do not belong to a minority group. However, minority groups are disproportionately affected by 

violence in Colombia. While they account for only five percent of the 

total population, minority groups account for twenty-six percent of the 

IDP population.18

There are two primary patterns of displacement in Colombia. The 

first, known as gota-a-gota, or drop-by-drop, occurs when a single family 

or individual flees their home after receiving threats from an armed 

group or from fear of imminent violence. This is the most common 

pattern in Colombia today, accounting for ninety-three percent of all 

displacements.19 The less common pattern, mass displacement, occurs 

after a massacre or bombing, or knowledge of such an impending 

event. In these cases, entire villages and communities uproot to move 

to areas of safety. This pattern is most apparent in indigenous and 

Afro-Colombian communities, which tend to interpret threats of violence collectively. Most IDPs, around ninety-two percent in 1998–2008, 

originate in rural areas, migrating to urban areas where they reside in 

informal slums. In this same period, the rural areas of the north and 

west of the country produced the largest number of IDPs. After fleeing from violence, IDPs encounter many challenges. Most face extreme 

poverty. Nearly ninety-nine percent of IDPs live below the poverty line, 

with eighty-three percent of those living in extreme poverty. As a result, 

most are lacking basic necessities such as decent housing, employment, 

and health care.20

ENDNOTES

1 Jorge Restrepo and Michael Spagat, “Civilian Casualties in the Colombian Conflict: 

A New Approach to Human Security,” October 27, 2004, http://digirep.rhul.ac.uk/

file/99b8c494-e242-fe6b-7105-cf0410f7b47b/4/HS_in_Colombia_Civil_Conflict.pdf, 

13.

2 Ibid., 13–14.

3 Ibid., 11.

4 Ibid., 16.

5 Ibid., 4.

6 Ibid., 6.

7 Ibid., 24.

8 Ibid., 30–31.

9 Robin Kirk, More Terrible than Death: Violence, Drugs, and America’s War in Colombia (New 

York: Public Affairs, 2003), 152.

10 Restrepo and Spagat, “Civilian Casualties in the Colombian Conflict: A New Approach 

to Human Security,” 23.

11 Ibid., 29.
114

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

12 Ibid., 31.

13 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Current IDP Figures,” last updated September 5, 2011, http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/

(httpEnvelopes)/A7E1B7BD7528B329C12575E500525165?OpenDocument#expand.

14 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Colombia: 2013 UNHCR 

Country Operations Profile—Colombia,” accessed August 8, 2013, http://www.unhcr.

org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e492ad6&submit=GO.

15 Sara Feldman, Julie Freccero, and Kim Thuy Seelinger, “Safe Haven: Sheltering Displaced 

Persons from Sexual and Gender-Based Violence. Case Study: Colombia” (Geneva: UN 

High Commissioner for Refugees, 2013), 23.

16 Ibid., 23.

17 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Internally Displaced People: On the Run in Their Own Land,” accessed August 8, 2013, http://www.unhcr.org/

pages/49c3646c146.html.

18 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “IDP Population Movement and Patterns,” 

last updated September 5, 2011, http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/

countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/80020A3EB11B4DFAC12575E5005649FB?OpenDocum

ent#11.4.1.

19 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “IDP Population Movement and Patterns.”

20 Feldman, Freccero, and Seelinger, “Safe Haven: Sheltering Displaced Persons from Sexual and Gender-Based Violence. Case Study: Colombia,” 23–26.
CHAPTER 6.

FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS 

DE COLOMBIA (FARC)

Chapter 6. FARC

117

TIMELINE

August 1962 President Guillermo León Valencia Muñoz is 

inaugurated.

May 1964 President Valencia orders Operation Marquetalia—

a government effort to dissolve self-defense forces. 

Manuel Marulanda, also known as “Sureshot,” is able 

to hold out with a band of forty-eight men, marking 

the birth of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 

Colombia, or the FARC.

1966 Communist Colombian Party holds its Tenth Political 

Congress. During the conference, the group declares 

mass popular action rather than guerrilla warfare as 

the primary means to achieve its goals. This is reaffirmed in 1971 at the Eleventh Political Congress.

May 1966 The FARC holds its Second Guerrilla Conference. This 

is referred to as the “Constitutive Conference.”

May 1968 The FARC holds its Third Guerrilla Conference. The 

National School of Ideological Education is established.

1970 National People’s alliance is formed as a left-wing counterweight to the National Front.

1970 The FARC holds its Fourth Guerrilla Conference.

1971 Communist Colombian Party holds its Eleventh Political Congress. The party reaffirms mass popular action 

rather than guerrilla warfare as the primary means to 

achieve its goals.

January 1973 The FARC holds a plenary meeting during which the 

Estado Mayor Central (EMC) is created.

1974 The FARC holds its Fifth Guerrilla Conference in Meta.

January 1978 The FARC holds its Sixth Guerrilla Conference. 

National command structure is fully articulated to 

include the general staff of fronts and the secretariat of 

the EMC.

1978 President Turbay begins intense fight against drug 

traffickers.

May 1982 The FARC holds its Seventh Guerrilla Conference. The 

group’s “Strategic Plan for Taking Power” emerges, 

along with the additional moniker Ejército del Pueblo 

or “People’s Army,” which changes the insurgency’s 

official acronym to FARC-EP.

August 1982 President Belisario Betancur Cuartas is inaugurated. 

During his inaugural speech, he announces that the 

Colombian government will engage in peace negotiations with leftist guerrillas.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

November 1982 President Betancur signs Congressional Law 35, granting general amnesty to all guerrilla combatants.

January–March 

1984

Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP conduct 

peace talks. Talks end with el Acuerdo de Uribe (the 

Aribe Agreement).

May 1984 Cease-fire begins under the Aribe Agreement.

March 1985 Founding of the Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica, 

or UP), The FARC’s public component.

March 1986 UP wins several seats in nationwide elections, to 

include fourteen members of congress. UP presidential candidate Jaime Pardo Leal receives 4.5 percent of 

the vote.

August 1986 President Virgilio Barco Vargas is inaugurated.

1987 UP leader Jaime Pardo is assassinated.

December 1987 The FARC holds a guerrilla plenum and decides to 

renew its efforts toward the “new method of operating” 

adopted during the Seventh Guerrilla Conference.

May 1989 The FARC holds a guerrilla plenum and develops a 

military plan known as the Bolivarian Campaign for 

a New Colombia (la Campaña Bolivariana por una 

Nueva Colombia), which represents a four-phase strategy to be implemented in January 1990.

1990 UP presidential candidate Bernardo Ossa is killed; 

The FARC withdraws from legal politics and focuses on 

strengthening its military capabilities.

1990 Jacobo Arenas, political and ideological leader of the 

FARC, dies; Manuel Marulanda becomes the FARC’s 

top commander.

1993 The FARC holds its Eighth Guerrilla Conference. The 

FARC creates an elite cadre known as “los cien sabios,” 

or “the hundred wise men,” to be sent abroad to study 

in universities. It also decides that it is ready to implement the “new method of operating” first defined during the Seventh Guerrilla Conference.

1993 Pablo Escobar is killed.

August 1994 President Ernesto Samper Pizano is inaugurated.

August 1996 The FARC launches an attack on the Las Delicias 

military base in Putumayo, killing fifty-four soldiers 

and capturing sixty.
Chapter 6. FARC

119

April 1996 1. The FARC devises another Bolivarian plan called 

“The Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia.” 

Included with the plan is the creation of the Colombian Clandestine Communist Party (PCCC).

2. The FARC conducts a sophisticated attack involving 

400 guerrillas at Colombian Army facility at Las Delicias in the Department of Putumayo.

1997 The FARC requests a demilitarized zone of 13,000 

square kilometers to allow for safe passage while releasing Colombian soldiers.

August 1998 President Andres Pastrana Arango is inaugurated.

November 1998 Peace talks with the FARC begin. The zona de despeje, a 

safe haven the size of Switzerland, is established.

2000 US Congress appropriates $1.3 billion for Plan Colombia. Total appropriation through 2005 would reach 

$4.5 billion.

February 20, 

2002

The despeje is disestablished after the FARC hijacks a 

commercial airliner, forcing it to land in rebel-held territory, and takes Colombian Senator Turbay hostage.

February 2002 Presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and her vicepresidential running mate are kidnapped by the FARC.

August 2002 The FARC attacks the presidential palace one day 

before inauguration of President Álvaro Uribe Vélez. 

Twenty people are killed, and sixty are wounded.

August 2002 President Uribe is inaugurated.

April 2003 The Uribe administration is able to modify the Colombian constitution to allow government forces to make 

arrests without warrants.

2004 Plan Patriota is introduced by Uribe, with the aim of 

establishing a permanent military presence in rebelheld territory.

March 2008 The Colombian military kills Raúl Reyes in his 

stronghold in Ecuador during a Colombian crossborder attack.

March 2008 Manuel “Sureshot” Marulanda dies of a heart attack. 

His death is not announced until May 2008.

July 2008 The Colombian military rescues the FARC’s highestprofile hostage, Ingrid Betancourt, who had been held 

in captivity for six years.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

ORIGINS OF THE FARC

The political compromise between the two major parties, Conservatives and Liberals, after La Violencia left several groups, especially 

those on the far left, disenfranchised. The perspective and views of 

the Partido Comunista Colombiano (PCC), or Colombian Communist 

Party, placed it on the Liberal side of the country’s political spectrum. 

The Communist and Socialist parties, which had gained favor with the 

poor landless and working class since the 1940s, continued their antiestablishment agenda.1

 During this period, Communist guerrillas were 

able to develop the tactics and techniques that would heavily influence FARC ideology.2

 Their adherents, or at least the party’s potential 

constituents, were under constant threat from Conservatives. In 1949, 

the PCC developed the concept of “mass self-defense.” Peasants organized within a secure enclave to provide a modicum of protection.3

The PCC was not yet a dominant force, so it colluded with members 

of the Liberal Party to put this concept in place. Manuel Marulanda 

once reported, “The first meeting between Liberal and Communist 

guerrillas took place in the area of Irco, Chaparral, at the end of the 

1950’s.”4 In fact, the ongoing violence displaced Colombians of all walks 

of life, so some organizations were quite eclectic, including Communists, Liberals, and  Conservatives.5

 The concept of mass self-defense 

became so ingrained that autonomous sanctuaries formed and became 

known as “Independent Republics.” The first were Chicalá, Horizonte, 

La Marina, and Irco.6 El Pato, Río Chiquito, Sumapaz, and Marquetalia 

became among the most recognized.7

The government took a myriad of actions to dissolve the Independent Republics, especially during the National Front, post-Rojas Pinilla 

period. On May 27, 1964, President Guillermo León Valencia Muñoz 

ordered Operation Marquetalia to root out the last of the Liberal selfdefense forces in the region of southern Tolima and northern Huila. 

A group of forty-eight men, led by Manuel “Sureshot” Marulanda, was 

able to hold out and survive this onslaught. This band, in turn, was 

supported by a member of the PCC leadership named Luis Morantes 

who used the alias “Jacobo Arenas.” Marulanda and Arenas first met 

on April 17, 1964, after the PCC sent Arenas into the jungle to find 

Marulanda and give him any assistance he needed. Together, the two 

agreed that they could survive and achieve their goals for Colombia. 

Marulanda said to Arenas on that day, “with your company, the war 

must not be so hard.”8 In September 1964, Liberal guerrilla Marulanda 

and Communist ideologue Jacobo Arenas formally formed their group 

of self-defense fighters into a true revolutionary movement under the 
Chapter 6. FARC

121

name Bloque Sur de Guerrilla, or Southern Bloc.a A year and a half 

later, they changed the name to the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 

de Colombia. It has been known as the FARC ever since. Today, the 

FARC recognizes May 27, 1964, the day that President Valencia ordered 

Operation Marquetalia, as its official birthday.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, COMMAND AND 

CONTROL, AND LEADERSHIP

Organizational Structure and Command and Control

The FARC uses a military-like hierarchy for its guerrillas. The pinnacle of command is composed of a seven-man Secretariat that in turn 

leads a twenty-five–man Central General Staff or Estado Mayor Central 

(EMC). The subordinate units, from largest to smallest, are the bloc, 

front, column, company, platoon, and squad.

During the Fifth Guerrilla Conference held in 1974, the FARC 

divided the nation into seven blocs, assigning each a large state-like 

territory. The blocs are subdivided further into fronts that encompass 

smaller geographic areas. Within each front there are guerrillas who 

perform combat, support, and infrastructure functions. The basic combat unit is a squad of seven to eight fighters. Combining three or four 

squads forms a platoon of around twenty-five guerrillas. Two platoons 

comprise a company of fifty to fifty-five fighters, and two or more companies organized together form a column. The support elements are 

referred to as “commissions,” so a front may have logistic, intelligence, 

or finance commissions.9 There are seven blocs are dispersed throughout Colombia as follows:

1. The eastern bloc, with twenty-one fronts, covers the region 

east of the eastern cordillera of the Andes and the central 

departments of Cundinamarca and Boyacá. Its strategic task 

is to cut off the populous central highlands from the eastern 

plains and the Amazonian region.

2. The northwestern bloc, with eight fronts, operates in the 

departments of Antioquia, Chocó, and Córdoba. This bloc 

controls a corridor from the Panamanian border and the 

adjacent Atlantic and Pacific coasts to the middle Magdalena 

valley.

3. The middle Magdalena bloc is active in the area of the 

same name. Its units operate in parts of the departments of 

Antioquia, Bolívar, César, Santander, and Boyacá.

a “South Bloc Guerrillas.” The term bloc refers to an organizational unit.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

4. The southern bloc covers the FARC’s strongholds in 

southern Colombia, in the departments of Caquetá, Huila, 

Putumayo, and part of Cauca. This area also includes most 

of the “demilitarized zone” conceded to the FARC by the 

Colombian government.

5. The western (or southwestern) bloc operates in the 

departments of Nariño, Cauca, and Valle, the region from 

the western cordillera of the Andes to the Pacific Ocean and 

down to the Ecuadorean border.10

Pedro Antonio Marin

(also known as Manuel 

Marulanda Velez,“Tirojo”)

Secretariat

(Chiefs of Staff)

Eastern

Bloc

Southern

Bloc

Magdalena

Medio Bloc

Western

Joint Command

Caribbean

Bloc

Central Joint

Command

Northwestern

Bloc

General Staff International

 Commission

Mobile

Column

Front Mobile Company

Commission

Militia Company Company Company Company

Columns Columns

Figure 6-1. FARC organization structure, 1993 time frame.11

To maximize flexibility, there are fifteen companies that are independent of the FARC’s traditional structure. They are assigned to 

bloc commanders who use them as reserves.12 There are also columns 

assigned directly to the FARC Secretariat.13 A group of twelve fronts 

formed in Colombia’s Eastern Mountain range connecting la Uribe, 

Meta, with Venezuela; a second set would surround Bogotá. The FARC 

also developed el nuevo método de operar, or “new method of operating,” 

at the tactical level.14 It focused mobility, firepower, and coordination 

against Colombian military units that were in the vanguard of the 
Chapter 6. FARC

123

counterinsurgency fight. This tactical design was coupled with an ideological strategy, which meant that each level of the guerrilla army’s military-style chain of command was “assigned specific political-military 

objectives to be accomplished within each unit’s geographic region of 

the country.”15 Furthermore, the FARC’s political savvy had matured 

to the point where it realized that all kinetic action must be connected 

to a political goal to ensure their claims to political legitimacy and the 

continued support of their constituency.

In order to ensure this unity of purpose as it grew, the FARC wanted 

to formally introduce the tactical-level commanders to the “new method 

of operating.”16 It also needed to ensure that new members were properly indoctrinated politically, ideologically, and militarily. As a result, in 

1982, the FARC established a guerrilla training center called la Escuela 

de Cadetes (the Hernando González School of Cadets).17 Military topics 

included “mobile guerrilla warfare, military psychology, urban guerrilla warfare, communications, first aid, cartography, artillery, and 

related topics.”18 New recruits trained locally through a four-month 

course that included both military and ideological disciplines and the 

FARC’s organization and code of justice.19 This ensured the “little guerrilla army” of 28,000 was effective. However, internal divisions between 

the FARC’s front leaders in different parts of the country existed, especially between the fronts in colonization areas and those areas that 

were previously populated.20

The FARC began as a mostly defensive organization as it lacked 

the capacity to start military initiatives.21 However, over time, it developed its offensive strategy through periodic conferences, with the First 

Guerrilla Conference in late 1965 in Río Chiquito. Several disparate 

groups joined together forming what was called the “Southern Bloc” 

(the aforementioned Bloque Sur de Guerrilla) and what would eventually become the FARC. According to Marulanda, “[the conference] 

unified our tactics in all detachments and received a series of initiatives toward the creation of the current Revolutionary Armed Forces of 

Colombia (FARC).”22 Therefore, the armed movement was eventually 

able to provide protection to peasant supporters and members, to control new territory, and to offer basic services in its blocs.23

The PCC concurred with this strategy during its Tenth Congress in 

January 1966, which Jacobo Arenas attended on behalf of the FARC. 

Here it was proclaimed, “the guerrilla war is one of the highest forms of 

mass struggle.”24 However, the FARC and the PCC soon split as the PCC 

became less willing to use violence. At its Eleventh Congress in 1971, 

the PCC proclaimed that it “did not consider that guerrilla warfare had 

established itself as the principle form of struggle in this period since 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

it expressly declared that the vast majority of the population continued 

using mass action as the main form of struggle.”25

Realizing it was drifting from the PCC, the FARC understood it 

needed to establish and solidify its own organization and its own political theories. To do this, in May 1966, it made it clear during its Second 

Guerrilla Conference that it still possessed a Marxist–Leninist political 

platform. Jacobo Arenas stated:

for the first time that the Guerrilla Movement FARC 

was building up a struggle prolonged for the capture 

of the power in union with the Working class and the 

whole working people. There [sic] emphasized the vital 

importance of the political organization as the conscious and governing factor of the Colombian revolutionary process and that in this sense the FARC would 

do everything in fulfillment of that big mission.26

To continue this effort, a Marxist–Leninist solution that included 

armed struggle, the FARC established two things during its Third 

Guerrilla Conference in 1968. First, it founded the Escuela Nacional 

de Formación Ideológica (National School for Ideological Education) 

to train its leadership and improve continuity and define the national 

command structure. Second, it organized into units called “selfdefense groups.” These elements served as the FARC’s underground, 

controlling all manners of activity within a specified geographic area 

to include supporting FARC guerrillas operating nearby.27, b The selfdefense groups did not last beyond the 1970s, however. Each group 

had too much control, which allowed them to develop autonomously, 

threatening to fracture the whole. By the late 1970s, the FARC barely 

had nine fronts and suffered from internal divisions. Furthermore, 

effective Colombian government crackdown on insurgent movements 

weakened the political momentum behind the insurgent movements. 

As a result, the FARC disbanded the groups and centralized control. 

This phenomenon occurred again later in the 1990s as the FARC 

became involved in the narcotics trade. Initially, it allowed regional 

leadership to handle its own operations. Some of the groups mimicked 

the drug cartel culture and used funds for personal luxuries, which led 

to a disciplinary action by the FARC leadership.

It is important to emphasize that the blocs as described emerged 

over time—most of them after the FARC developed a strategic plan to 

grow its organization that was supported by the narcotics trade. First, 

however, it had to survive through the 1970s, the period that Colonel 

b Underground is a specific term to denote the unarmed popular support for an 

insurgency.
Chapter 6. FARC

125

Manuel Pérez described as the “indifference” phase, a time when the 

FARC had little impact because of its size and location. Before the 

1980s, there were really never more than about one thousand guerrillas at any one time. Furthermore, they were predominantly located in 

the jungle-covered eastern two-thirds of Colombia, whereas most of the 

population lived in the west and northwestern urban, coastal regions. 

By 2002, the FARC had presence in twenty-three departamentos28, c and 

four hundred municipalities.29

Leadership

Manuel Marulanda (“Tirofijo”) Manuel “Sureshot” Marulanda was 

born into a Liberal family as Pedro Antonio Marín in May of either 

1930 or 1932 in the municipality of Genova, Qunidio, Colombia. The 

young Marín completed a fifth-grade education but also learned the 

more patrician skills of shooting and fencing. At the age of thirteen, 

Marín left home to fend for himself, working as a baker, candy seller, 

builder, and merchant. When La Violencia began, Marín became a Liberal guerrilla. He suggests that to do so was in his blood.

“Taking up arms was the only way to survive,” he once said, “All of 

us were Liberal . . . my father, my mother, my uncles, and an endless 

chain which no one escapes, it was Liberal. It was like a lump of pure 

tradition . . . The family of us was Gaitán.”30

The Marín family was targeted, causing Pedro Antonio to flee and 

hide on an uncle’s farm. He was then tasked to form a guerrilla band 

of family and friends to fight the Conservatives. The self-defense force 

he formed became interested in Marxist–Leninist ideology when the 

PCC gave it military training. By the time the Pinilla administration 

offered amnesty, Marín was no longer simply a Liberal protector, he 

was a revolutionary.31

In 1953, Marín was first given the nickname “Sureshot” in recognition of his prowess with firearms. Two years later, he adopted the nom 

de guerre “Manuel Marulanda Vélez” after a Communist leader who 

was assassinated in Bogotá in January 1951.32

Marulanda led the FARC and its seven-man governing body—the 

Secretariat—through its growth and increased prominence in Colombia, and through peace talks and narcoterrorism, until his death from 

a heart attack in March 2008.

c Colombian departamentos, or departments, are comparable to states.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Luis Alberto Morantes Jaimes (“Jacobo Arenas”)

Jacobo Arenas’s birth name was Luis Morantes. He became a leader 

in the Communist movement while a student. Immediately following 

the Bogotazo, he began working on the rights of oil workers in Colombia.33 Arenas participated in the resistance against Rojas Pinilla and 

even rose to be a member of the PCC Central Committee. In 1964, Arenas met with Marulanda and other members of the self-defense forces 

just as they were forming their insurgency. Recognizing they needed 

his political savvy, Arenas decided to become the ideological brains 

behind the bloc’s military brawn.34

Ironically, just as Arenas joined the FARC, its ties with the PCC 

began to loosen. The PCC claimed the FARC as its armed element, but 

then shortly thereafter suggested that the time was not ripe to use violence as the means to take control.35 Similarly, with its first formal political declaration, the FARC showed that it would not heed the PCC party 

line. For example, the FARC stipulated that field laborers would be 

given rights to land that they worked but also allowed that the property 

rights of wealthy landowners who actively worked their own land would 

be respected. This was in contrast to another Marxist insurgency, the 

Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN), which planned to set up 

all lands under a shared collective.36

Jacobo Arenas was in effect a cofounder of the FARC and an important member of the Secretariat. He led the FARC delegation in engaging in peace talks with the Betancur administration in the early- to 

mid-1980s. Arenas was also the strongest opponent within the Secretariat to entering the drug trade because he was concerned that it 

would corrupt. This voice was silenced when he died of natural causes 

on August 10, 1990, after which the FARC continued headlong into 

narcoterrorism. Perhaps more importantly, the FARC lost its best 

political mind.

Víctor Julio Suárez Rojas (“Jorge Briceño Suárez” or “Mono Jojoy”)

Another important figure in the Secretariat was Jorge Briceño, who 

used the name “Mono Jojoy.”37,d Jojoy was born on February 5, 1953, 

in Cabrera, a town forty-four miles southwest of Bogotá.38 His parents 

were members of a Liberal self-defense force. His father was a guerrilla, and his mother, part of the auxiliary, cooked for the insurgent 

band. By the age of twelve, Jojoy was already acting as a messenger for 

the FARC.39

d Mono refers to a person with blonde or reddish hair. Monojojoy is a jungle worm 

that is very difficult to catch.
Chapter 6. FARC

127

Marulanda saw promise in Jojoy and began to mentor the youth. He 

even arranged for Jojoy to go to Moscow in the 1970s to receive political 

education and military training.40 In 1975, Jojoy officially became one 

of the guerrillas and began working his way up the chain of command 

until he became leader of the Eastern Bloc, one of the seven members 

of the Secretariat, and eventually recognized as the second in command behind Marulanda.41 Identified by his telltale black beret (perhaps a tribute to Che Guevara), Jojoy is credited with being the FARC’s 

most demanding commander and the mastermind behind capturing 

high-value hostages and trading them for FARC prisoners.42

Because of his military prowess and the respect he received from 

Marulanda, Mono Jojoy was expected to ascend to the top of the Secretariat if Marulanda stepped down or was killed. However, when Marulanda died, Alfonso Cano took over, in part because the Secretariat was 

unable to form and vote on the matter.

Mono Jojoy was killed by the Colombian Army in an attack on September 23, 2010.43 The Colombian Army obtained intelligence that he 

had diabetes and, as a result, required specific footwear. It obtained a 

pair that Jojoy ordered while the pair was in transit and embedded a 

tracking device that allowed an aerial attack.44

Luis Edgar Devia Silva (“Raúl Reyes”)

Raúl Reyes was born into a poor Colombian family in 1948 as 

Luis Edgar Devia Silva. His father was a farmer, his mother a schoolteacher. Reyes became a union leader and member of the Communist Party in his youth while he worked at a Nestlé dairy in Caquetá.45

Like Mono Jojoy, Reyes rose quickly through the ranks and married 

Marulanda’s daughter.46

Reyes was a member of the Secretariat and also acted as the FARC’s 

spokesman and negotiator. He first publicly fulfilled these roles during the Pastrana administration. As the FARC’s public persona, Reyes 

engaged a number of important persons and groups. For instance, he 

met with Colombian authorities to discuss prisoner exchanges. In 1997, 

he also interfaced with a US Department of State Official in Costa 

Rica. Reyes also met with Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) 

operatives to arrange advanced training for FARC members.47 Finally, 

Reyes is also considered the mastermind behind managing the FARC’s 

high-profile hostage operations, such as the kidnapping of presidential 

candidate Ingrid Betancourt.48

Reyes was killed by Colombian forces that attacked his stronghold 

in Ecuador on March 1, 2008. (Marulanda’s death was only a week later, 

though it was not reported until May 2008.) After the attack, Colombian 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

forces obtained Reyes’s laptop, which held valuable intelligence about 

the FARC’s connections to various state and nonstate actors.

Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas (“Alfonso Cano”)

Alfonso Cano did not fit the mold of a FARC leader. Next to Jacobo 

Arenas, he was the strongest ideologically, coming from a family of 

intellectuals. As a result, Cano was one of the FARC’s connections 

into the leftist university scene.49 Born as Guillermo León Sáenz on 

July 22, 1948, Cano grew up in Bogotá and was a student at National 

University when he got involved in radical movements and eventually 

joined the Communist Party’s youth organization.50 When Cano was 

released from having been in jail for six months as a result of his political activities, he left for the jungle and the FARC.51

Cano became the FARC’s second most important political leader 

after Jacobo Arenas. When Arenas died, Cano ascended to his role and 

was the brains behind developing the FARC’s most successful political 

party, the Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica, or UP).52 The party was 

formed as part of the peace process initiated by President Betancur in 

the early 1980s. After meeting all of the requirements stipulated in the 

peace agreement, the UP was allowed to submit candidates for office. 

It performed very well in the 1986 elections. Unfortunately, this was 

followed by the assassinations of party candidates, elected officials, and 

the massacre of UP members. This had a huge impact on the FARC, 

causing them to be reticent about putting down their weapons and 

politicizing, but most of all on Alfonso Cano:

The assault on the UP was particularly hard on Cano, who was 

one of the promoters of the idea of having the FARC form a political 

wing. The deaths of his friends and companions in that movement, 

particularly given the closeness of many in the Uribe government to 

the paramilitary units, may make Cano unwilling to negotiate in any 

meaningful way.53

Simón Trinidad (“Federico Bogotá”)

Simón Trinidad is the nom de guerre of Juvenal Ricardo Palmera 

Pineda, born July 30, 1950, to a wealthy landowning family in Valledupar, in the northern Colombian department of César. Extremely welleducated (and an active member of the local private club), Palmera 

attended the best schools in Valledupar and Bogotá before enrolling 

in Cartagena’s Naval College and then studying economics at Bogotá’s Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano and going on to an MBA from 

Harvard University, after which he worked for the Banco de Comercio 

(Commerce Bank) and became a professor at the Universidad Popular 

de César. An early supporter of UP since its inception in 1985, Trinidad 
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129

stole 30 million pesos and customer financial records from the bank 

where he worked and fled to the mountains to join the FARC in 1987. 

He then used the banking records to pick targets for kidnapping and 

extortion for the FARC. Intelligent and well-spoken, Trinidad rose 

quickly through the FARC ranks and by 1991 was commanding the 41st 

Front and, later, the Caribbean Bloc, where he was in charge of guerrilla propaganda. Trinidad was captured in Quito, Ecuador, in January 2004 and extradited to the United States in December that year 

to stand trial on drug trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism, 

using as evidence his involvement in preparing to use three kidnapped 

US contractors (Marc Gonzales, Keith Stansell, and Thomas Howes) as 

pawns in negotiating with the Colombian government for the release of 

dozens of FARC soldiers. Trinidad was tried in the US four times; three 

of the trials were declared mistrials as a result of hung juries. It was only 

in the second of the four trials that Trinidad was convicted of a charge: 

conspiring to hold the three US citizens hostage; on January 28, 2008, 

he was sentenced to sixty years in prison, which he is currently serving 

at the ADX “Supermax” prison in Florence, Colorado.

COMPONENTS OF THE INSURGENCY

Underground and Auxiliary

The FARC’s underground movement became an important force 

in the FARC’s growth because it created a bridge between urban and 

rural elements within the insurgency, increased awareness and membership among the Colombian population, and enhanced the insurgency’s political influence, power, and control. To connect the urban 

worker with the rural farmer at the Seventh Guerrilla Conference in 

1982, the FARC capitalized on Colombian urbanization and created 

los Núcleos de Solidaridad (Solidarity Nuclei) or Juntas Patrioticas.54,55

These solidarity nuclei were composed of union members, students, 

and peasants who were sympathetic to the FARC’s leftist ideology. This 

underground organization embedded itself in schools, universities, civil 

action groups, and the UP to rally the masses to support left-wing politicians, encouraging them to vote for measures that supported FARC 

ideology, and to help recruit new members. The FARC took advantage 

of the civil unrest that existed during this period of urbanization and 

used the underground to help recruit from the urban poor who struggled with poor wages and working conditions. University students supported the FARC’s underground by talking to people about problems 

of the urban poor and collecting information on the social and political views of peasants who had moved to the cities.56 Recognizing that 
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the conditions for urban insurrection were already present, the Secretariat surmised that a revised approach could attract guerrillas and 

build an underground in Colombia’s cities. Jacobo Arenas suggested:

In the [Seventh Guerrilla] conference it was said: the 

persistence of social struggles has to be given a new 

emphasis. And the FARC-EP must design a strategy 

that responds to the social conditions that exist within 

the nation. And in the conference it was decided that 

the FARC-EP had to develop a struggle that would tie 

the armed revolutionary activities of the countryside 

with the insurrectional activities of the country’s major 

cities . . . That is to say, everything should function as 

one strategic concept that would serve to define the 

taking of power.57

In addition to recruiting new members and spreading the FARC’s 

ideology, the FARC underground also used coercion to exert influence. 

The FARC’s underground began to strong-arm government officials 

with a combination of bribery and intimidation. As a result of FARC 

subversion, the Colombian government itself suggested at one time that 

almost sixty percent of country’s mayors collaborated with the insurgents in one form or another.58 The underground elements evolved 

from arm twisting to forming six-man cells that conducted improvised 

explosive device (IED) attacks and caused other forms of disruption. 

The FARC has used IED attacks against an array of targets, such as 

Colombian politicians and US oil company pipelines.59 Also integral 

to the underground was the formation of urban militias to support 

the Solidarity Nuclei, known as the Bolivarian and Popular militias. 

Their primary duties included gathering intelligence, sabotage, collecting taxes, and recruiting more members.60 The Bolivarian Militia was 

the more advanced of the two as it received political indoctrination and 

conducted military operations in rural areas for part of the year.61 Both 

received direction from the EMC to ensure that their activities incorporated both military and political lines of operation. According to 

Marulanda, the popular militias in particular were “made up of those 

whose age or physical condition prevents them from direct combat with 

the enemy.”62 By the early 1990s, the FARC’s underground was divided 

into seven operational regions: Northern (Caribbean), Northwestern 

(bordering Panama), Middle Magdalena (along the Venezuelan border), Central, Eastern, Western, and Southern; and each region had a 

military bloc associated with it.63
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Armed Component

At the beginning of 1982, the FARC appeared much as it did shortly 

after its birth in 1964, with its military activity concentrated in rural 

areas, especially where sharecropping dominated. Despite early efforts 

to establish a political framework, especially through education of the 

FARC’s leadership, its rhetoric remained immature. There were still 

only around 1,000 guerrillas in seventeen fronts in Colombia’s south 

and southwestern regions.64 The ranks comprised solely of rural peasants, farmers, and laborers who relied on their home community for 

logistical support. Though able to survive, the FARC was still relatively 

inexperienced and ill-equipped. As a result, its kinetic actions focused 

on small, isolated Colombian Army and National Police units and 

lacked significant impact.65 However, this trend changed beginning 

with the Seventh Guerrilla Conference in May 1982.

The Seventh Conference was a turning point in the FARC’s armed 

component as it transitioned from a defensive organization to an 

offensive one. The Seventh Conference marked a new eighteen-year 

strategic plan to expand FARC operations and defeat the Colombian 

government. During this time, the FARC planned to build its army to 

eventually surround major cities, which would require at least 28,000 

troops by 1990 and a larger budget to finance the expansion.66 To stress 

the new offensive nature of the group, the FARC added “Ejército del 

Pueblo” or “People’s Army” to its name, making its new official acronym FARC-EP.67

Figure 6-2. FARC-EP flag.

To reinforce its new strategic decision, the FARC sent military personnel to the Soviet Union and Vietnam for training and created a 

military academy to form a new irregular revolutionary army. These 

developments forced the FARC to extract more war taxes from the 

areas under its control.68 The FARC budgeted for about $56 million 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

to account for the increase of forces from 13,200 in 1989 to 18,000 in 

1992. This money was “to be spent on arming, training, and upgrading 

the command, control, and communication system.”69 As a result of 

these efforts, the FARC almost doubled its army in the first seven years 

after the Conference, with forty-four fronts in 1989, and continued to 

increase to sixty fronts in 1992.70 In addition to expanding its army, 

the FARC also reorganized its military structure to parallel that of the 

Colombian government’s.71 The FARC’s main tactical unit is composed 

of two columns with approximately 150 to 200 armed combatants.72

The FARC surpassed its expansion goals when by 2000 it controlled seventy fronts divided into seven regional blocks with fifteen independent 

companies and a few mobile columns available for additional support.73

Although some of the FARC forces were concentrated in Caquetá, 

most of its troops were “strategically scattered throughout the country.”74

In the 1990s, the FARC also extended to new strategic areas outside 

of the planned expansion—the eastern slopes of the Andean Mountains—so that it could “move the war closer to urban centers and intermediate cities, and exert more political pressure on the state and the 

dominant class and increase its rent extraction.”75 The group developed 

a “professionalized-full time army”76 by the end of 1990, with representation in 622 of Colombia’s 1,071 municipalities (fifty-eight percent). By 

the late 1990s, the FARC had also become more coercive toward local 

populations, especially as paramilitary groups in FARC areas changed 

the dynamics of the conflict and the FARC became involved in the narcotrafficking economy.77

Public Component

The FARC had a two-pronged public component: public service 

and political participation through the UP. By offering public services 

including education, health care, and a semijudicial system to those 

living in FARC-controlled regions, the FARC gained both legitimacy 

and following, drawing peasants and urban youth to the communal 

lifestyle espoused by FARC propaganda. The FARC acted like a state 

in some departments, especially in rural areas with little government 

presence. In these areas, it maintained monopoly control of the use 

of force while also providing for the citizens in the area.78 The FARC 

offered transportation, built landing strips, provided health care and 

education, and even adjudicated disputes between citizens. Outside of 

some symbolic government entities in these rural areas, the FARC was 

the “sole provider of essential public services.”79

However, the FARC illustrates its mixed legal–illegal approach 

in its funding of these services. The FARC collected taxes for public 
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133

works projects, much like a state, and through other illegal means. 

By the 1990s, the FARC’s tax-collection methods became more complex, involving “intermediaries such as neighborhood councils (Juntas 

Acción Communal, JAC) subcontractors, and municipal councils”80 to 

negotiate on its behalf and lending political support to the group. The 

FARC often used coercive methods to collect financial support for public works. The group often forced public officials, including governors, 

local council members, mayors, and senators, to invest in its public 

works programs by publicly citing the officials’ corruption and through 

other guerrilla justice, including assassination.81 The FARC is able to 

continue such coercive behavior because it “controls all police, judicial 

and governmental functions in dozens of other smaller rural areas.”82

The second part of the FARC’s public component was its creation 

of the UP, which the guerrilla organization established in the 1980s 

through a partnership with the Colombian Communist Party. The 

FARC aimed to “address peasant grievances through negotiation and 

political processes as opposed to resorting to violence”83 through the 

UP party platform, which advocated anticorruption policies and liberal land and economic reforms. The development of the UP was yet 

another result of the strategic planning of the Seventh Guerrilla Conference and was one way the FARC aimed to enter mainstream politics, 

extending its influence to urban areas.84

However, given this leftist agenda, right-wing paramilitary groups 

heavily targeted UP members—at least 3,000 were murdered or disappeared in the early 1980s. It is estimated that “between 1986 and 

1990, more than four thousand members of the UP and Communist 

Party were assassinated.”85 The UP struggled to survive as paramilitary groups and narcotraffickers continued to target its members. The 

assassination of a leading UP presidential candidate, Jaime Pardo, in 

1987 and several other top leaders led to a mass exodus from the party, 

killing FARC chances for legitimate political participation and pushing 

the guerrilla organization to pursue violence and “military tactics as 

their only path to achieve political influence.”86 This turning point led 

the FARC to abandon participation in the legitimate political process 

and instead led the organization to turn to illegal means of sustainment and influence: the narcotics trade.87

IDEOLOGY

The FARC’s ideology is grounded in revolutionary Marxist–Leninist 

thought. Inspired by similar movements in Cuba and other neighboring countries, the FARC embraced anticapitalist and nationalist rhetoric, which spoke to landless peasants in rural Colombia who lacked the 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

political voice to stand up to the new elitist conservative government. 

In the Eighth National Conference, the FARC political declaration 

stated, “We have tried persistently to find the paths that lead us to a 

democratic peace, to a peace of social justice . . . and each time we have 

stumbled against the violent opposition of a militarized oligarchy.”88

Themes such as social justice and security resonated deeply with new 

FARC recruits and served to unite current FARC members. However, 

over time the FARC’s loyalty to its ideology waxed and waned as profits 

from the narcotics trade appealed to the group. Unlike the ELN and 

other groups, the FARC lacked ideological unity and “suffered from a 

deteriorated organizational cohesion.”89 For this reason, the FARC was 

not purely motivated by grievance; rather, greed played a more important role, making the FARC less ideologically pure than some of the 

other groups.

LEGITIMACY

Serving as a mediating force in rural Colombia, the FARC used several methods to garner legitimacy. One of its most effective methods 

was to provide services to peasants such as protecting them against elite 

landowner’s policies and providing education, food, and supplies, which 

made the FARC an “acceptable alternative to the Colombian government.”90 In protecting small landowners and peasant workers against 

large landowners and military, whom the peasants and landowners 

thought were serving solely the interests of the latifundistas (large landowners), the FARC gained local power and legitimacy and became “the 

legitimate organizing body for peasants.”91 As such, the FARC often 

adjudicated local disputes, policed areas under its control, protected 

subsistence farming, and created cooperatives for and provided education to peasants in exchange for a “progressive income tax.”92 The 

FARC also taxed beer and served as sort of a morality police, punishing 

drug and alcohol use, violence, and other social crimes. The Colombian government in effect allowed the FARC to have some autonomy 

in its regions called demilitarized zones, or zona de despeje, in 1998.93 In 

the despeje, the FARC erected flags, exerted total territorial control, and 

even issued “passports” to workers who entered and left the despeje. In 

effect, the despeje was their own country.

In addition to providing services, the FARC also had several active 

propaganda campaigns that emphazied a number of themes. One of 

the most prominent themes is that the FARC is a legitimate force that 

must be taken seriously. The FARC leadership, for instance, is shown 

throughout its various print media striking inspirational poses or 
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135

standing before a bank of microphones to imply the trappings of political importance.

There is also a clear emphasis on highlighting youth members, 

especially female soldiers. This is likely to support recruiting by emphasizing two things. First, spotlighting female soldiers sends a message 

that the FARC is not simply a band of macho jungle fighters; it has universal appeal and, therefore, universal membership. It also reinforces 

the Marxist ideal of individual empowerment for all, emphasizing liberation from oppression, which would resonate strongly with women 

in a macho society. Around forty-five percent of FARC guerrillas are 

female.94 However, once in the FARC, women are still cast in traditionally sexist roles of cooking and caring for the guerrillas; while many do 

see frontline action, it is far more difficult for them to get to that point 

and fight as equals alongside the men they serve. Second, it supports 

the recruitment of young men who may not be attracted to the austerity 

of a monastic life in the bush but would consider membership in a coed 

atmosphere, especially because the guerrillas are encouraged to form 

intimate relationships.

As a result, the FARC encouraged women to join the movement and 

foster romantic relationships with the FARC’s male members. However, 

women were discouraged from becoming pregnant, forcing those who 

were to either leave the movement or have an abortion, for which she 

will be sent to one of the FARC’s many clinics facilities in the jungles 

of Colombia.95 The lovers of higher-level commanders, however, have 

been allowed to keep their babies, fostering resentment amongst the 

lower ranks. This disparity of treatment, resulting in the destruction of 

a soldier’s nascent family, is used in information operation campaigns 

by the Colombian government to encourage defection. The FARC’s 

attempts to include young, attractive people to the group bolstered its 

image among its new recruits.96

In addition to enlisting women members, the FARC also recruited 

children to the movement, especially those whose parents were unable 

to care for them, offering the FARC as an alternative to their own 

families. The FARC “reached out to poor, uneducated rural youth and 

emphasized not its Marxist ideology but rather ‘three square meals per 

day’ and the vision of a prosperous future.”97 Often the FARC would 

give money to parents for their children, effectively buying soldiers as 

young as eight.

Propaganda videos also depict the FARC as a new family unit. The 

videos show all the “normal” activities of life, in addition to guerrillas training, marching, and going on patrols. There are scenes of men 

and women cooking, washing clothes, dancing, and even playing soccer. The viewer gets a sense that FARC members enjoy their communal 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

life. They may be remote, but they are able to enjoy an existence that is 

free of government oppression. All of these recruiting films are laced 

with patriotic-sounding music, marches that proclaim FARC accomplishments, and proclamations of what the movement will do for the 

Colombian people.98

Music and antigovernment and anti-US messages are found in other 

videos that focus more on proliferating the FARC narrative both inside 

and outside the organization. For example, on The Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia YouTube channel, there is a video entitled 

“El Gorila.” In this film, President Álvaro Uribe is a gorilla-marionette 

controlled by “Uncle Sam,” representing the United States. They are 

shown with United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, or AUC) paramilitaries who attack Colombians citizens performing a traditional dance. By the end of the video, through 

song, the FARC folk singers make it clear that they will put an end to 

this tyranny.99

The FARC faced three major challenges to its methods of legitimacy. First, the presence and violent confrontations of the paramilitary groups threatened the FARC’s ability to govern its areas of control. 

Second, the end of the UP (as a result of paramilitary attacks) crushed 

the FARC’s opportunity to exert its influence through legitimate political participation. Third, the FARC had strategic expansion plans that 

needed a great deal of funding, but it lacked legitimate methods for 

collecting war and protection taxes. As a result the FARC directed 

increased violence not only toward right-wing paramilitaries, but also 

toward the civilian populations it controlled.100

As the FARC struggled to survive amid the government’s counterinsurgent campaign in the twenty-first century, its counteroffensive 

alienated most Colombians. As the military forced the FARC to cede 

territory, the group seeded the land with mines. In order to increase 

the likelihood and severity of infection, the shrapnel was coated with 

excrement. Over the course of several years, the mines killed more than 

6,000 civilians, many of them poor farmers and their children. The 

FARC’s frequent attacks on oil pipelines have created environmental 

disasters and depleted revenues of local and national governments. In 

a desperate move to refill their ranks, the FARC also lowered its official 

recruiting age to twelve.

In 2008, a thirty-three-year-old Colombian man launched a Facebook campaign against the FARC called “One Million Voices Against 

FARC.” His message was simple, “No more kidnapping, no more lies, no 

more FARC.” Within several days, his Facebook page had 250,000 followers. A month later, the campaign inspired massive protests against 

the FARC in Bogotá. Estimates of participants range from 500,000 to 
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137

2 million.101 Thousands more joined the protests in over a dozen cities 

in the United States, Venezuela, France, and other countries. As one 

Colombian expatriate in the United States remarked, “We want the 

world to know we’re tired. What the FARC has done is just the limit. 

They’ve killed people, and we’re tired.” The sentiments expressed in 

the campaign especially targeted the FARC’s use of kidnapping and 

hostages. At the time, the group held around seven hundred hostages.102

MOTIVATION AND BEHAVIOR

The FARC’s primary goal as a group during its initial stage from 

1964 to 1982 was survival and self-defense; however, after the Seventh 

Conference, the FARC went from a defensive organization to an offensive one. In its initial stage, the FARC positioned itself as self-defense 

groups in the Independent Republics, focused on ambushing small 

military units to obtain weapons and equipment; raiding farms for 

sustenance; and settling scores with informers.103 Early on the group 

donned as much of the accoutrement of a uniformed army as possible 

and established a set of regulations to govern the guerrilla’s behavior.104

Individual FARC members, however, were mostly motivated by a “desire 

for belonging, camaraderie, respect, or even adventure.”105 According 

to a survey of first-hand interviews, other reasons for joining include 

revenge, family tradition, and lack of other viable options.106

The FARC has shifted its motivations from self-defense to the offensive goals of “destruction of the Colombian state and its replacement 

by a FARC-controlled government.”107 As part of its strategic expansion, 

the FARC claims that “once the group reaches its target of recruiting 

and arming 30,000 combatants it will initiate a ‘final offensive’ against 

the regular armed forces and take over the organs of the national government.”108 It was during this rapid expansion of recruitment that the 

Colombian military intelligence was able to infiltrate the FARC with 

its own operatives or turn some of the less committed new recruits. At 

the same time the FARC planned to launch a final offensive, it engaged 

in several rounds of negotiations with the government, most likely in a 

strategic effort to buy critical time for the organization to develop its 

operational capacity.109

In addition to its plans to dominate the Colombian government, 

the FARC also faced another challenge that forced the FARC to change 

its behavior. The FARC did not actively initiate a rivalry between other 

leftist guerilla groups operating during the same period. The groups 

shared a basic ideology and also a common enemy in the Colombian 

government. At times the leftist guerrilla groups clashed, but the 

groups had “an unwritten agreement to maintain boundaries . . . and 
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at a minimum [had] coordination and at a maximum cooperation 

between these groups preceding the 1990s.”110

However, with the rise of paramilitary groups in the 1990s aimed 

specifically at reducing FARC influence, a competition for resources 

and territory forced the FARC to change its behavior. Most notably, 

the group began to target civilians. The FARC also needed to increase 

its funding to better fight the paramilitaries as well as the government, leading the FARC to demand higher protection taxes through 

coercion of its local populations and increasing its involvement in the 

drug trade.111

In the early 1990s, the FARC altered it demands in response to 

a greater US neoliberal influence in the Colombian economy. The 

FARC introduced a new organizational goal: reducing US influence in 

Colombia.112 The FARC did not agree with the US-dominated neoliberal economic policy the Colombian government sought to implement 

in return for US financial support. Principles like trade liberalization 

and privatization ran counter to the FARC’s Marxist ideology, and the 

FARC thought these policies further enriched the “oligarchy” it sought 

to overthrow. Instead, the FARC supported protectionism and import 

substitution industrialization to protect Colombian industry and 

peasants from fluctuations in the world market and provide a strong 

domestically oriented economy.113 Furthermore, the FARC opposed 

extradition of Colombian narcotraffickers (known as los extraditables) 

to the United States and sought to control strategically important areas 

of the country where coca and poppy were cultivated.114

The FARC has implemented five general strategies to reach its 

goals: (1) have enough financial support to allow its autonomy; (2) use 

this funding to increase its guerrilla army; (3) be recognized as a major 

negotiating power in Colombian peace talks; (4) support relations with 

other developed countries as a way to decrease American influence over 

Colombia; and (5) exclude political rivals from the negotiating table by 

insisting on bilateral talks with the government.115 The first goal is pursued by a combination of drug trafficking, kidnappings, extortion, and 

contributions from sympathetic state and nonstate groups, including 

most notably Venezuela’s Chavista regime. The second goal is pursued 

via aggressive recruitment tactics including false propagandist promises targeting poorer and more marginalized sectors of Colombian 

society (including indigenous groups) emphasizing a steady income 

and social stature, as well as outright buying of children. To achieve its 

own greater stature in the previous and current peace talks, the FARC 

has pursued strategically timed and placed acts of violence, including 

the detonation of IEDs and attacks on police and military installations, 

while pursuit of the fourth goal has driven it to seek close ties with 
Chapter 6. FARC

139

Venezuela, Cuba, and the rest of the ALBA alliance, as well China and 

Iran. Because of this, 2013’s peace talks took place in Cuba.

OPERATIONS

Paramilitary

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

1975197719791981198319851987198919911993199519971999200120032005200720092011

Year

Incidents

Figure 6-3. FARC incidents over time.

Until the 1980s, the FARC’s paramilitary fought inequitable land 

redistribution and reform of the Colombian government. Organized 

as small groups of local peasants, the FARC engaged in small clashes 

with large landowners. As a result of Plan LAZO in the early 1960s, 

which sought to quell the supposed communist uprising in the rural 

south, the FARC’s initial self-defense groups also fought the Colombian 

military. Until the early 1980s, the FARC’s paramilitary operations consisted of these small bands of guerrilla fighters. As the group’s armed 

component matured, the FARC leadership attempted to transition to 

maneuver or conventional warfare, but it was thwarted by effective 

Colombian counterinsurgent tactics.

The FARC’s early paramilitary operations were guided by strategic 

decisions made during the 1982 Seventh Guerrilla Conference. While 

there, the FARC leadership developed an eight-year plan entitled “Strategic Plan for Taking Power.” The plan had three phases: “offensive,” 

“government,” and “taking power.” The overall intent was to create the 

necessary conditions to incite popular insurrection throughout Colombia. With the right level of chaos from the masses, it was expected that 

the Colombian military would take over and impose martial law as it 

did during the 1948 Bogotazo and the 1951 coup d’état. Then, the FARC 

would lead the people in a siege of military and police strongholds and 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

the capital. Once Bogotá capitulated, the FARC would form a revolutionary assembly that would draft a new constitution.

As part of these efforts, during the mid-1980s the FARC’s efforts 

focused on developing its political wing, the UP. When the struggle 

focused on politics more than kinetic operations, the FARC strengthened its lines of operation in intelligence to infiltrate Colombian 

society. The FARC was consistently able to obtain information on politicians, political candidates, and wealthy businessmen with enough fidelity to kidnap them for ransom. Perhaps equally important, through 

its underground and auxiliary, the FARC constructed a sophisticated 

intelligence collection capability to identify new recruits and develop 

the information needed for complex attacks.

Private citizens

and property

Military

Business

Police

Government

(general)

Utilities

Transportation

Other

Religious gures/

institutions

Journalists/

media

Government

(diplomatic)

Telecommunication

Airport and airlines

Educational institutions

Nongovernmental

organizations

Tourists

Terrorists

Violent political party

Food or water supply

Maritime

Figure 6-4. FARC target types.

As it has for much of its history, in the early 1990s, the FARC 

pursued a dual-pronged strategy that combined peace negotiations 

with the Colombian government and military operations. However, 

the sweeping assassination of UP members by paramilitaries in the 

late 1980s convinced many in the leadership that a political solution 

through the legitimate political process was unlikely. Jacobo Arenas, 

one of the staunchest supporters of a political solution, also died of 

natural causes in 1990. Arenas maintained the necessity of battling on 

multiple fronts, the military, political, economic, and social, in order to 

apply sufficient pressure to induce government concessions. His death 

provided an opportunity for those favoring a military solution to prevail. President Gaviria’s decision to decline the FARC’s participation in 

the constitutional reform process in 1990 confirmed the wisdom of this 

approach for those in the FARC who doubted the decision.116
Chapter 6. FARC

141

 The renewed military campaign after Gaviria’s refusal launched a 

brutal period in the early 1990s. As Figure 6-3 illustrates, there was a 

sharp spike in FARC activity in 1991. The FARC increased its operations, 

ultimately resulting in a military attack on La Casa Verde, the former 

headquarters of the FARC, in late 1990.117 La Casa Verde was symbolic, 

holding an emotional significance for the FARC. In response, the 

FARC entered into an alliance of convenience with the ELN in order 

to expand the scope of its paramilitary operations against the groups’ 

common enemy. In late 1990, the FARC and ELN began a large-scale, 

coordinated, guerrilla campaign they called “Operation Wasp,” one of 

the largest in Colombia’s history. More than 130 people were killed and 

200 wounded within the first two days.118 As part of this campaign, the 

FARC mounted attacks against police and military forces across the 

country. On January 2, 1991, alone, the FARC launched simultaneous 

armed assaults against police forces in six separate departments in the 

south, southeast, and northern regions of the country.e

Armed assault

Bombing/explosion

Hostage taking (kidnapping)

Assassination

Facility/infrastructure

Hijacking

Hostage taking (barricade incident)

Unarmed assault

Figure 6-5. FARC attack types.

After forming an alliance with ELN, the FARC formulated a plan 

to sabotage the Colombian infrastructure and economy. Throughout 

its history, the FARC often used these symbolic and strategic infrastructure sabotage operations. The attacks destroyed critical infrastructure, 

exacted significant economic damages, and detracted legitimacy from 

the government, curtailing its ability to provide basic services to the 

population in the area. Figure 6-5 shows the significance of facility/

e The departments included Guaviare, Arauca, Santander, Antioquia, Boyacá, and 

Guajira. The data are from the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the 

Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

infrastructure attacks in the FARC repertoire.f While most of the FARC’s 

attacks involved basic kinetic operations such as armed assault and 

bombings, attacks on facilities and infrastructure accounts for a sizable 

portion of the group’s targets. The infrastructure associated with the 

oil industry was one of the FARC’s favored targets. The long pipelines 

were very hard to defend, and oil represented the worst in capitalism, 

which the FARC believed led to the subjugation of the poor. Between 

1986 and February 1991, more than 650,000 barrels of oil were spilled 

due to FARC attacks.119

As part of its renewed offensive, in late 1990, the FARC initiated a 

wide-ranging campaign against energy, transportation, electrical, and 

communications targets. The scope and breadth of the attacks across several departments speaks to the FARC’s intelligence and planning capabilities. The bulk of the attacks took place in February. On February 6, 

1991, the FARC assaulted several Ecopetrolg oil infrastructure assets in 

the Santander and Norte de Santander departments using explosives. 

Other targets included several pipelines in Antioquia and Putumayo 

departments within the space of two days. The country’s transportation 

and communication nodes were also disrupted. The FARC used armed 

assaults and explosives to attack buses, toll booths, bridges, fuel trucks, 

and airports in at least five departments throughout January and February. During the same period, the FARC also attacked electric substations, high-tension line pylons, radio stations, and telecommunications 

transmission towers in several different departments.h In a testament to 

the extent of economic damage levied by the FARC, one attack on a coal 

mine in the César Department resulted in $2 million in damage. By the 

end of February 1991, the oil industry took a hit of $100 million.120

Following the renewed campaign, Gaviria initiated peace talks with 

the FARC and the ELN. As it did during many of the negotiations, 

the FARC used the negotiations to showcase its strength vis-à-vis the 

Colombian state in the limelight of domestic and international media. 

The insurgents participated in the negotiations without having agreed 

to a cease-fire and continued assaults on government and civilian targets, hardly a ringing endorsement for a strong central state. The negotiations ultimately failed as neither the insurgents nor the government 

made any concessions. After the FARC killed a prominent politician, 

f Many attacks on facilities and infrastructure are also labeled as bombing/explosions 

for reasons unclear to the authors of this study.

g Ecopetrol is a state-owned petroleum company.

h The departments included Meta, Norte de Santander, Cauca, Santander, and Putumayo. The data are from the Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the 

Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
Chapter 6. FARC

143

Gaviria halted the talks and reignited the military fight against the 

leftist threat.

With its Eighth Guerrilla Conference in April 1993, the FARC 

began to strategize in earnest the transition to maneuver warfare. The 

FARC prepared the future of its political leadership by sending an elite 

cadre called “los cien sabios” or “the one hundred wise men” to universities abroad. Militarily, the FARC prioritized expanding its influence in southern Colombia, utilizing the “new method of operating” 

that married guerrilla-style and maneuver warfare tactics that emphasized “besiege, attack, overwhelm and retreat.”121 The method relied on 

large-scale guerilla columns that attacked security forces while simultaneous harrying the enemy with typical hit-and-run guerrilla tactics 

executed by smaller guerrilla elements. The southern departments in 

Colombia, such as Putumayo and Caquetá, offered potential strategic 

advantages to the FARC. The area was rich in coca development. The 

FARC leadership required the revenue the region promised to deliver 

in order to bankroll the group’s expected growth. Additionally, the 

southern departments bordered Ecuador, which the leadership anticipated using to supply and support the guerrillas. The departments’ 

many rivers and streams also could also act as important transit routes 

to other FARC areas of influence farther to the northeast.122

The move to large-scale offensive operations, the FARC believed, 

would culminate in a general mass uprising. In order to manipulate 

events, the FAR began to build its urban networks in Bogotá in earnest.

The FARC wielded its “new method” of mobile warfare with great 

sophistication against the Colombian government in the latter half of 

the 1990s. During this period, the FARC leadership developed a strategy to clear swathes of territory of a government presence and isolate Bogotá from the rest of the country. One of the hallmarks of this 

campaign was the 1996 attack on Las Delicias, a military base in the 

Putumayo department. The successful strike left fifty-four Colombian 

soldiers dead and sixty more prisoner. The attack on Las Delicias was 

followed a week later by another that killed an additional thirty Colombian soldiers.123

The FARC’s strategy also called for debilitating the political order 

in the country. As a result, throughout the country, the FARC assassinated Colombian government officials, including mayors, governors, 

and other representatives of the central government.124 This meant that 

local officials and civic leaders were at the mercy of the armed groups. 

Just prior to the 1997 regional elections, the FARC succeeded in murdering 110 political candidates and activists, kidnapped 244 more, and 

forced the withdrawal of 359 mayoral candidates. In total, twenty-two 

municipalities in Colombia went without any candidates at all.125
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

The FARC’s intelligence capabilities proved an important component of its paramilitary operations. In two instructive examples, the 

FARC used covert insurgents posing as civilians to gather intelligence. 

As part of the planning for the 1996 attack on Las Delicias, members of 

the FARC underground sought employment on the base. Others joined 

a soccer league that competed there. One member of the FARC underground even befriended the base commanding officer and became his 

“fishing buddy.”126 In a second example, the FARC used locals to gather 

information on troop disposition within a Colombian Army unit operating in the Caguan River region in 1998. As a result, the insurgents 

were able to inflict a devastating blow that wiped out 107 of the unit’s 

154 soldiers.127

Thus, during the Samper administration, the FARC’s power, in 

both numbers and action, steadily grew, reaching its peak from 1996 to 

1998.128 During those years, the FARC “inflicted 18 consecutive defeats 

on [sic] the army, regularly mobilizing units of 1,500 to 2,000 troops to 

attack military outposts manned by a few hundred men.”129 One particularly damaging ambush occurred in March 1998 when the FARC 

surprised, and nearly annihilated, the 52nd Counterguerilla Battalion 

part of the 3rd Mobile Brigade. The battalion, like the brigade, was an 

elite military unit comprised entirely of professional, well-trained soldiers. The FARC killed sixty-two soldiers and took another forty-three 

prisoner. The revelation that the 52nd Battalion was on a special mission to capture FARC leader Mono Jojoy and return the state’s law to 

the area, was especially demoralizing for the military and damaging for 

the Samper administration.130

The Samper administration suffered from a number of crippling 

weaknesses. Early on in his election campaign, his political rivals 

revealed evidence of Samper’s connections with the Cali cartel. Despite 

winning the election, Samper’s administration operated under a cloud 

of suspicion. The impact of the suspicions were also felt internationally, 

leading President Clinton to revoke Samper’s US visa as well as those 

of several senior military commanders implicated in the scandal. Relations deteriorated to such an extent that there was little official contact 

between the two governments.131 As a result, when facing a significant 

threat from the leftist insurgency, Samper’s government was cut off 

from US aid and advice.132

Likewise, the Colombian military became increasingly ineffective 

against the onslaught of the FARC’s campaign. In 1997, a US Defense 

Intelligence Agency (DIA) warned that the fall of the Colombian government was imminent. It lambasted the military as “inept, corrupt, 

ill-trained and poor equipped.” The FARC, meanwhile, had an ample 

war chest gained from drug trafficking. With the funds, it acquired 
Chapter 6. FARC

145

Soviet-bloc weapons, such as surface-to-air missiles, and ferried its soldiers and supplies with a small air force. Later, a senior leader from 

US Southern Command confirmed those sentiments and voiced doubt 

that the Colombian military was capable of defending the government. 

It had already ceded almost half of the nation’s territory to the group. 

The military offset its own weakness by relying on paramilitary organizations to confront the leftist guerillas. The paramilitary’s excessive 

and brutal violence devastated the civilian population frequently the 

target of its armed operations.133,i

It is difficult to overstate the strength of the FARC’s position against 

the Colombian state in the late 1990s. Since its transition to a guerilla organization almost decades before, its manpower increased over 

1,800 percent to around 18,000. The FARC’s soldiers were distributed 

across sixty-one rural fronts, four mobile columns, fifteen mobile companies, and five urban fronts. Every department in Colombia housed a 

FARC presence.134

The FARC launched a series of attacks on the eve of the presidential elections in 1998 from this position of military strength. The most 

damaging attack was against a counternarcotics base in Miraflores, 

Guaviare department. The 1,200 FARC insurgents overwhelmed the 

outnumbered military and police stationed there, leaving thirty killed, 

fifty more wounded, and one hundred prisoner. The Colombian public was ready for peace and some also thought that the FARC would be 

especially willing to negotiate an end to the conflict at the height of its 

military power. Andres Pastrana, a presidential candidate, bet on this 

likelihood as well. He met with the FARC leaders during his campaign 

and promised them a temporary demilitarized zone. Pastrana ran, and 

won the presidency, on this peace platform.135

As part of the negotiations orchestrated by Pastrana, the Colombian 

government granted the FARC a 16,200-square-mile demilitarized zone 

in striking distance of the capital and other major centers. As part of 

the agreement, the FARC was supposed to refrain from military activity in the demilitarized zone, or zona de despeje. However, the insurgents 

used the zone as a “sanctuary to launch operations, rest and refit its 

army, move drugs and arms, and even hold prisoners and hostages.”136

In early 2000, despite reaching a recent truce with the government, the 

FARC initiated a multifront attack from the despeje in which 800 FARC 

insurgents attacked military and police posts about 37 miles south of 

Bogotá. The attack also cut off communications between the national 

capital and Villavicenio, the capital city of the Meta department.137

i See Chapter 9. Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) for a description of the paramilitaries strategic use of violence against civilians.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

After the turn of the century, the FARC continued its attacks and 

military and police posts and infrastructure. In 2000 alone, the FARC 

attacked 176 police posts. At this time police were thinly dispersed 

and maintained a presence in only seventy-five percent of the nation’s 

municipalities. The attacks used homemade bombs from propane cylinders. The cylinders were filled with explosives, napalm, or tear gas 

and launched from improvised mortars in 55-gallon drums or larger 

canisters. The bombs proved notoriously inaccurate and often resulted 

in civilian casualties.138 The FARC’s acts of sabotage peaked in 2002, 

when the FARC carried out 283 such events. In addition to targeting Colombian infrastructure, the FARC also brought its operation 

to major urban centers. From 2000 to 2002, FARC rebels took armed 

action in the Bogotá, placing bicycle bombs around the city that killed 

and injured many civilians.139 The attacks yielded only minor results, as 

their most important Bogotá cells, linked under the umbrella organization Red Urbana Antonio Nariño (RUAN), were infiltrated by Colombian military intelligence, who rounded most of them up in one night 

on Easter 2003. The few that escaped capture fled to the mountains, 

and the urban cells did not recover their strength until they waged 

strategic urban attacks just prior to and during the peace negotiations 

under the Pastrana administration. However, despite urban bombing 

campaigns in the early 2000s, the FARC “remains a largely rural and 

insular organization.”140

After 2000, the Colombian military began to make more headway 

against the FARC.j In part, the military attributed the FARC’s diminishing number of attacks at this time to the increased use of air power. 

The military’s poorly planned and implemented defense had led a rash 

of army general officers to tender resignations. Following these difficulties, a number of factors coalesced, such as rotation due to seniority, out-of-sequence appointments, and others, and contributed the 

development of a more able command team in Colombia that began 

to make headway against the FARC.141 One noticeable change was the 

transition to offensive, rather than defensive, operations. In the first six 

months of 2000 alone, the military carried out 1,808 counterinsurgent 

actions, killing over 500 insurgents. The entire previous year had seen 

only 855 counterinsurgent actions.142

In the twenty-first century, there was also a noticeable increase 

in FARC’s coercive behavior toward civilians. Several human rights 

organizations documented that the FARC “killed 496 civilians nationwide, employing methods that resulted in avoidable noncombatant 

j The increased effectiveness of Colombia’s military forces, including support from 

the United States in Plan Colombia, will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 10. Government Countermeasures.
Chapter 6. FARC

147

casualties”143 in 2000. Although the paramilitaries are especially infamous in their brutal treatment of civilians, the FARC proved equally 

destructive in 2003 and 2004. In June 2004, the FARC murdered thirtyfour coca gatherers in Santander.144 Several months later, the FARC 

detonated a mine and fired on a civilian vehicle in Antioquia, killing 

four civilians and injuring seventeen, including ten children.145 Despite 

the increase in civilian casualties, the FARC’s main targets were state 

military personnel, bases, and equipment.146 In 2005, the FARC initiated perhaps it most comprehensive attacks in terms of the sheer size of 

its impact when it used explosives to demolish six energy pylons, which 

resulted in 2.3 million Colombians losing electrical power.147

In addition to temporarily controlling its own section of the Colombian countryside in the despeje, the FARC has been a powerful force 

throughout the country. At times, it controlled up to a third of the 

entire country. The FARC had the greatest level of control in the 

southeastern region and in the high plains, while the departments of 

Santander and Antioquia saw the highest levels of FARC violence. The 

daily lives of civilians living in areas under heavy FARC control were 

impacted, but these areas did not necessarily coincide with the areas of 

the most violent attacks.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Amazonas

Vaupés

Guainía

Guaviare

Putumayo Caquetá

Nariño

Cauca

Tolima

Meta

Vichada

Casanare

Antioquia

Chocó

Córdoba

Sucre

 La

Guajira

Atlántico

Magdalena 

Arauca

Cesar

Bolivar

Santander

Norte 

de

Santander

Boyacá Caldas

Quindío

Risaralda Cundinamarca

Huila

Valle del

Cauca Distrito

Capital

220–400 operations

160–220 operations

80–160 operations

1–80 operations

FARC Influence

Figure 6-6. Areas of armed action.

Administrative

Membership and Recruitment

The FARC’s recruiting had two parallel goals: to grow the organization and to sustain the organization. To build the “little guerrilla army,” 

the FARC had to target and recruit new members. Solidarity Nuclei 
Chapter 6. FARC

149

from the FARC’s underground attracted members among Colombia’s 

growing urban population. In fact, Colombia’s Minister of Education 

indicated that the government monitored university students who may 

be have been sympathetic to the FARC and identified recruitment in 

public and private universities.148 In general, the FARC sought “entry 

into the FARC by personal, voluntary, and conscious decision between 

the ages of fifteen and thirty.”149 However, the FARC has used “coercion, intimidation, or enticement, offering salaries twice that of the 

Colombian army.”150

Forced recruitment

Allure of weapons and uniforms

False promises of a salary and good treatment

Political convictions

Other

Figure 6-7. Reasons for joining the FARC.

Although some did emerge from the urban sources, the vast majority 

of the guerrillas were drawn from rural areas that provided a constant 

stream of candidates who were young, poor, and uneducated. These 

three characteristics combined to form a recruit who was strong, needy, 

and malleable. More specifically, the rural youth of Colombia often think 

their brightest future comes from serving the military or joining a paramilitary or insurgent group, such as the FARC. Recruiting material capitalized on this; so, although the literature would include Marxist–Leninist 

propaganda, it also emphasized getting three meals a day,151 which persuaded youths to join the ranks. Faced with an uncertain future, those 

in these remote areas then chose the FARC (or another insurgent group, 

or one of the paramilitaries if they were present) because it was the one 

group that was around and offered opportunity.

To draw supporters, the FARC took advantage of Colombia’s decentralized government structure and weak control in rural areas by 

straddling a front across two Colombian departments. Then, it would 

become the de facto government, working to ingratiate itself with 

the public.152 After a start in the south, the FARC had formed a front 

in the Magdalena valley by 1969. By 1971, a third was in Urabá near 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Panama.153 From this start, the FARC sustained itself well enough that 

by the early 1980s, it was able to grow slowly as it latched onto Colombia’s narcotics trade. FARC membership appeals to many for the decent 

salary of “about $350 a month, which is $100 more than a Colombian 

Army conscript.”154

After an initial rapport was established, the FARC would also use 

coercion. At recruiting meetings, the candidates would be told to watch 

out for unwelcome strangers. Additionally, each person was informed 

that they had to decide which side they were on, and if they resisted 

joining, they had to explain “why they didn’t want to be involved,” 

implying that they could potentially be a spy.155 However, when Human 

Rights Watch interviewed 112 FARC guerrillas, only thirteen reported 

being forced to join.156

The Colombian government claims that the FARC actually recruits 

children, using them as guerrillas and as part of the underground to 

collect intelligence.157 Human Rights Watch puts a number on this accusation, stating that in 2003, approximately 4,100 of the regular guerrilla 

force were children. Add to this approximately one-third of the militias 

and the total number of children reaches about 7,400.158,k In the urban 

environments, the children sometimes even serve as the best recruiters. 

They begin by talking to potential recruits during casual interaction 

on the street. Then, they begin a pitch through a series of meetings. 

One youth recruiter said, “They chose pretty girls and handsome boys 

to the recruiting because the kids would fancy them. We’d say that we’d 

pay them and that life was good. We’d announce a meeting at school 

and people would turn up . . . .at the end of the meeting, people would 

join up.”160 Children soldiers were charged with some of the most brutal acts of combat because they “may not yet have developed a sense of 

justice or a strong sense of morality.”161

Raúl Reyes refuted this notion at times, stating that the FARC did 

not recruit children and would not press anyone into service because 

it violated safety rules.162 When it became blatantly obvious that there 

were children in the ranks, the FARC responded by saying that it was 

nearly forced to take them in because their families could not provide 

for them.163 Once in the FARC, the guerrillas could not voluntarily 

leave, often leading to depression and suicide as the only way out.164

Recruitment differs depending on the location; for example, urban 

recruiting poses a greater security threat because Colombian intelligence operations are far more effective in the urban centers. Urban 

recruitment “tend[s] to be more deliberate and gradual, and they place 

k According to Human Rights Watch, the Optional Protocol of the Geneva Convention on the Rights of the Child and international legal standards stipulate that anyone 

under the age of eighteen be considered a “child.”159
Chapter 6. FARC

151

greater emphasis on ideology because their targeted population is better educated.”165 On the other hand, rural recruitment can “afford to 

make a more direct and immediate approach to peasant communities, 

and they emphasize opportunity for food and economic success.”166

Psychological

One key component of the FARC’s ability to survive was its robust 

information operations capability, including the use of the Internet 

to express its concepts in written, photographic, and video formats. 

The insurgency has also invested hundreds of thousands of dollars (or 

more) in the maintenance and upkeep of twelve Internet pages, five 

clandestine radio stations, and various other means of communication.

Pre-eminent amongst its information operations is its monthly magazine, Resistencia, which is published in eight languages (Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, English, French, German, Russian, and Swedish) and 

distributed in approximately 30 countries. Its format and rhetoric are 

based on Iskra, the first revolutionary paper founded in Russia by Lenin. 

While the first edition of Resistencia was published in 1964, it did not 

enter regular editorial production until 1978; in 1987, Resistencia started 

publishing two editions: national and international. While the national 

edition focuses on analyzing Colombia from the FARC point of view, the 

international edition is focused on informing the world of the “policies 

imposed by local oligarchies in alliance with North American imperialism,” according to its own masthead. Furthermore, the FARC has its 

own global press agency, the Agencia Bolivariana de Prensa (The Bolivarian Press Agency), with offices all over the world, with a particular 

concentration in Europe and Latin America. The Agencia Bolivariana 

de Prensa also maintains its own YouTube channel: prensabolivariana. 

All these outlets have touted the work of the Movimiento Continental 

Bolivariano (the Bolivarian Continental Movement), which is headquartered in Caracas, Venezuela, since its founding on December 8, 2009, 

by 950 left-wing activists from 26 Latin American nations. At its opening session, it read a statement by FARC commander Simón Trinidad 

(causing erstwhile Colombian President Álvaro Uribe to condemn them 

as an organization that supports terrorism) and denounced Colombia’s 

agreement to allow the US military increased access to its bases for counternarcotics and counterterrorism operations.

Such operations, although highly unusual for a criminal enterprise, 

are consistent with those of a revolutionary organization that aspires 

to acquire international support via the dissemination of political propaganda. These attempts by the FARC to spread its message to the 

international community further illustrate that, despite the guerrilla 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

organization’s diplomatic and international isolation, it continues to 

seek support from abroad and to justify its war against the Colombian 

military as a legitimate struggle for “social justice.”167

Political

As part of its long-term strategy, the FARC developed a strong political wing in the 1980s. The group’s political wing, UP, was formed in 

early 1985 as part of a peace negotiation process. After meeting with 

FARC representatives in November 1989, the Colombian government 

agreed to the FARC’s recommendation that it be allowed to form 

a political party in exchange for a cessation of hostilities. In March 

1985, the FARC formed its first legal political party, known as the UP. 

Although it is clear that ties to the PCC were weak almost from the 

start, the FARC’s formation of its own political party created a final, 

clear delineation between the two. This meant that the FARC continued to mature politically. It began to combine its guerilla approach 

with a strong political wing.

The UP grew in prominence in November 1985 in preparation for 

the elections and engaged in negotiations with the Colombian government in 1986. In October of that year, the FARC named several conditions for demobilization of its fronts: “1) that the state of siege would 

have to be lifted and the constitutional article (121) allowing for such a 

state revised and (2) that the controversial Article 120 (which required 

the president to give ‘adequate and equitable’ participation to the second-largest party in his government) would have to be disbanded.”168

Simultaneously, the party was able to elect fourteen members to congress, eighteen deputies into eleven department (the equivalent of a 

US state) assemblies, and 335 counselors in 187 municipal (county-like) 

councils.169 The UP presidential candidate, Jaime Pardo Leal, garnered 

4.5 percent of the popular vote.170 However, any celebration on the part 

of the FARC was short-lived.

Paramilitary squads, some supposedly guided by Colombian intelligence, launched a campaign against the UP. Approximately 550 UP 

members, including Jaime Pardo Leal and four UP congressmen, were 

assassinated between 1985 and 1988.171 Leal’s successor, Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, was assassinated in 1990. By 1998, more than 4,000 UP 

and PCC members were killed by right-wing paramilitaries.172 John Otis 

reports that the dead included “everyone from office secretaries and 

mayors to two presidential candidates.”173 The FARC speculated that 

a nonviolent path might not be possible. Otis suggests that even more 

significantly, the best political minds in the FARC were lost, which had 

an ill effect on decision making later.174 As a result, the FARC returned 
Chapter 6. FARC

153

to armed struggle, officially ending the truce in 1990.175 Returning to 

a political or diplomatic solution was affected by these political assassinations; whenever someone suggested they lay down their arms as part 

of any peace agreement or negotiation, FARC members simply replied, 

“Unión Patriótica.”176 The FARC have made consistent demands for government action against paramilitary groups.

In April 1996 the FARC formed another political party. The development was part of the FARC’s strategic plan, The Bolivarian Movement 

for a New Colombia. The plan recommended the formation of a new 

political party, the Colombian Clandestine Communist Party (PCCC), 

as a replacement for the UP. The party was formed shortly before the 

initiation of massive offenses by the FARC, including the attack on Las 

Delicias in 1996 described above. The PCCC was probably intended as 

the vehicle to take military-political control of the territory and populations that the FARC leadership expected to rapidly gain as part of its 

offensive. As such, it signaled the political savvy of the FARC leadership 

who, although proponents of political violence to achieve their objectives, still recognized the need for a political platform to disseminate 

ideas to the public and gain new supporters for their cause.177

A state within a state, the despeje became a FARC sanctuary. Within 

this region, the FARC was uninhibited in its ability to recruit, train, 

finance, and, in violation of the spirit of any demilitarized zone, launch 

attacks. Building up its force structure in both numbers and capability, the FARC began to launch a series of coordinated attacks from the 

despeje. For example, in July 1999, it conducted simultaneous assaults 

against government bases and facilities in the departments of Meta, 

Guaviare, Huila, Putumayo, and Caquetá. This was followed by an attack 

in January 2000 conducted by 800 guerrillas against Colombian police 

and military elements, some as close as sixty kilometers from Bogotá.178

Maintaining a political front in its struggle against the Colombian 

government, the FARC used the despeje for political purposes as well. It 

tried to establish the Independent Republic of the Caguan in a similar manner to the independent republics that were established in the 

1960s and later in the 1980s.179 In the 1960s, as an extension of the selfdefense forces, the FARC and other Liberal and Communist elements 

constructed autonomous republics until the military came in and 

destroyed them between 1964 and 1966.180 The FARC tried this again in 

1986, forming three towns, Puerto Boyacá, Puerto Berrío, and Puerto 

Parra, into the Independent Republic of Middle Magdalena.181 This 

time it was thwarted by Colombian paramilitaries that overwhelmed 

FARC forces, causing them to abandon the region.182

The FARC collected everyone between the ages of thirteen and sixty 

for three days of training and indoctrination to aid with population 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

control in the despeje.

183 Topics included Marxist–Leninist theory and 

use of heavy weapons.184 Some of the people were formed into militias 

called “Citizen Vigilance” with tasking to spy, even on one another.185

Still others were forced to perform manual labor to build up the despeje’s infrastructure.186

The FARC’s political control over the despeje was pronounced in 

three ways. First, it issued identification cards to 90,000 people across 

five municipalities.l Second, it controlled who could enter the territory. 

Third, and perhaps most important, it installed a judicial system that 

reduced crime.187 The despeje also gave the FARC a place where it could 

train with other terrorist groups, such as the PIRA, unhindered.

In March 2000, the FARC held a Guerrilla Plenum. Its overarching goal was to develop the means to incite the whole population to 

join the revolution and wrest power from the Colombian government. 

To do this, the FARC implemented The Bolivarian Movement for a 

New Colombia.188 The overall intent was to call not just Communists, 

but Bolivarians, those who saw the FARC as the means to unite Latin 

America, to act as an underground to spur the population toward policies that would support the Bolivarian revolution. These disparate cells 

were also supposed to draw new members to the cause, leading the 

nation toward the destruction of the government.189

EXTERNAL ACTORS AND TRANSNATIONAL 

INFLUENCES

The FARC, though a Marxist–Leninist group at its inception, survived through the lean years of the 1970s and the fall of the Soviet 

Union in part because it did not emphasize ideology over its objectives 

and found support outside of Communism’s largest supporter. Specifically, by evolving its rhetoric to include Bolivarianism, the FARC 

garnered support from other Bolivarian proponents, such as former 

President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela. Similarly, the FARC endured as 

it begrudgingly engaged in the narcotics trade, but at the same time, it 

established and maintained connections with nonstate brethren, such 

as the Basque separatist group in Spain and France known as ETA and 

the PIRA.190 As a result, through both state and nonstate support, the 

FARC enjoyed everything from tactical-level training in IEDs to headof-state recognition.

The Colombian government suspected the FARC’s ties to state and 

nonstate actors throughout the history of the conflict. From time to 

l ETA is an acronym for Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, which in English is “Basque Homeland and Freedom.”
Chapter 6. FARC

155

time, the government enjoyed moments of success that pointed to these 

connections, such as the interception of three PIRA members as they 

tried to leave the country in the summer of 2001. The real coup came 

on March 1, 2008, when the Colombian Army attacked a FARC guerrilla outpost in Ecuador. During the attack, FARC leader Raúl Reyes 

was killed and his computer captured. The computer’s hard drive was a 

rich source of information about FARC state and nonstate relations.191

General Oscar Naranjo, commander of the Colombian National Police, 

said that the laptop had evidence of connections to Venezuela and 

Ecuador, but also to groups in Australia, France, Sweden, and Switzerland.192 These claims were later confirmed by an Interpol examination 

of the hard drive and a full publication of its contents by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Nicaragua

President Daniel Ortega had established a relationship with the 

FARC in the 1970s when he was leader of the Sandinista rebellion in 

Nicaragua.193 After ascending to office in 1979, he began to use the 

power of the presidency to support other Latin American revolutionaries. Two events exemplify Ortega’s relationship with the FARC. First, 

in 1998, he awarded Nicaragua’s highest decoration, the Augusto Sandino medal, to Marulanda.194 Two years later, he personally attended a 

conference for revolutionary movements in Libya. The FARC was also 

present.195 At the time, it hoped to obtain surface-to-air missiles so it 

could shoot down Colombian aircraft.196 Communications on Reyes’s 

computer revealed requests to Muammar Qadhafi for monetary support so that the FARC could obtain these missiles and appeals to Ortega 

to intercede with Qadhafi on the FARC’s behalf.197

Ecuador

The San Miguel River marks the border between Colombia and 

Ecuador. The whole region is covered in jungle, making it a difficult 

region to manage and an excellent area in which to hide. Because of 

this terrain, Colombians often cross the border into Ecuador to escape 

Colombian law enforcement or government forces. A culture developed in the region that recognizes that it is an ungoverned space, and 

like many border regions, a zone that is accepting of the movement 

of people and materiel. The region even developed familial relations 

between guerrillas and Ecuadorans.198 Ecuador became a major source 

of logistical support and sanctuary for the FARC.
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After taking office in 2003, rather than embrace the FARC, President Gutiérrez tried to solidify relations with the United States instead. 

He supported the operation to capture Ricardo Palmera (also known 

as Simón Trinidad, as discussed above), who was extradited to the 

United States, charged, and eventually sentenced to sixty years in 

prison for kidnapping three American contractors. The FARC then 

moved on to support Rafael Correa. With the FARC’s support of more 

than $100,000, he was elected and took office in 2007.199 In his second 

inaugural address, Correa said he would “deepen democracy and radicalize this revolution.”200

Venezuela

To have a sanctuary such as the despeje is a key factor in the success of any insurgency. The FARC first enjoyed sanctuary in Colombia’s 

remote jungle regions. These expanded into both Ecuador and Venezuela as the FARC became connected with the Bolivarian movement. 

At a minimum, Chávez provided moral support to the FARC by sharing 

his Bolivarian principles and rhetoric. There are accusations that Venezuela ignores FARC attacks on, and kidnappings of, wealthy ranchers 

on the Colombia–Venezuela border and that the Venezuelan government has even provided the FARC with military assistance.

No nation can be wholly characterized by only one dominant player. 

Still, to understand Hugo Chávez is instructive in understanding some 

of the success the FARC enjoyed after his ascendency to power. Chávez 

was born in 1954 as the son of schoolteachers who were so poor he had 

to be raised by his grandmother.201 A good athlete, he used his baseball prowess to obtain admission to the Venezuelan Military Academy. 

Chávez was commissioned in the Venezuelan Army in 1975 after completing a degree in engineering.202

Chávez developed sympathy for leftist insurgents early in his career. 

One of his first assignments was to suppress a Maoist insurgency. 

Chávez was sickened by the plight of the insurgents and became sympathetic. He recalls, “It is there [that] I began to see that the peasants 

were subject to huge repression. The army would burn their houses 

down, accuse them without respecting the rule of law.”203 Chávez 

became so concerned that by 1978, he started to connect with Venezuelan revolutionaries.

In 1979, Chávez returned to the military academy as a military ethics instructor.204 Through this role he was able to influence many of the 

cadets who would later become part of the Venezuelan officer corps.205

As he continued his own study of revolution in South America, Chávez 
Chapter 6. FARC

157

became enamored with Simón Bolívar. In 1982, he swore an oath similar 

to the one made by Bolívar almost 180 years before:

I swear by the God of my fathers, I swear by my honor, 

and I swear by my homeland that I shall give no respite 

to my arm nor rest to my soul until we have broken the 

chains that the powerful have placed upon us.206

Several men took the oath with Chávez. Together, they formed 

the Bolivarian Revolutionary Army. Ten years later, in February 1992, 

Chávez led them in an unsuccessful coup against then–Venezuelan 

President Carlos Andres Pérez.207 The coup failed, and Chávez spent 

two years in prison before being pardoned and released by the next 

president, Rafael Caldera. Chávez’s sympathizers attempted another 

coup in November 1992, which also failed. Still today, 4F (for the 4th of 

February) is feted by the chavistas as a major holiday, marking the start 

of their Bolivarian Revolution.

Chávez’s ascendance to power was very much a product of mass 

media. When his 4F coup failed, he was granted one minute of television to call down the troops in other parts of Venezuela. He took full 

responsibility for the day’s violence and then said his revolution had 

failed “por ahora,” “for now.” It was enough to make him a cult hero, 

and he continued to give press interviews while in prison. “Por ahora” 

continues to be a rallying cry when any effort of the Bolivarian Revolution suffers a setback, and the chavistas remain masters at manipulating 

media and shaping their narrative.

Chávez started his own political party called the “Movement of the 

Fifth Republic” (MVR). He campaigned for the presidency in 1998 on 

a platform that espoused improvements to government, effective use 

of the country’s oil resources, and an end to corruption. Like other 

Bolivarians, Chávez was anti-imperialist and thus vocally anti-United 

States. This approach resonated with the Venezuelan people. Chávez 

won the presidency and was inaugurated in February 1999. One of his 

first acts was to change the official name of the country to “The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.”208

Many Venezuelans were enamored with Chávez. He had a large audience each Sunday as he broadcast a chat show called “Aló Presidente,” 

which sometimes would go on for at least four hours and was broadcast 

on every national network. During these programs, Chávez did everything from singing patriotic songs, to firing inept ministers, to ordering the seizure of private property to threaten war against Colombia.

Venezuelan ranchers residing near the border with Colombia have 

endured the FARC’s kidnapping for ransom, violence, and murder. 

The ranching community has complained but to little effect. “Our 
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government is totally indifferent to the problem,” said one rancher, 

“Our sovereignty is being violated, and the response we get is total 

complacency.”209 Many ranchers suggest it is because the government is 

sympathetic to the FARC.210

Some Colombians report that the Venezuelan Army has actually 

supported the FARC with close air support as it battles paramilitaries near the border. There was an attack on March 21, 2003, followed 

by another on March 28 when Venezuelans F-16s and OV-10s bombed 

paramilitary forces near Monte Adentro.211 The next day, around 300 

FARC soldiers burned the village down.212 The Venezuelan ambassador 

to Colombia denied these charges. He said that Venezuelan forces were 

merely responding to paramilitary attacks on Venezuelan territory.213

Iran

Venezuela and Iran have strong ties. Iran also sought to support 

the FARC. In June 1999, Colombia’s High Commissioner for Peace, the 

Iranian Ambassador to Colombia, and a member of Colombia’s cattle 

industry signed an agreement to build the largest slaughterhouse and 

processing plant in Latin America.214 The facility included an airstrip 

longer than any at Bogotá’s international airport so that large aircraft 

could fly the meat nonstop to Iran.215 After making inquiries, it was 

discovered that there was not enough cattle in the despeje to support 

such an endeavor.216 The CIA surmised that the plant was likely a front 

for receiving aircraft from Iran delivering support for the FARC.217 The 

CIA recommended to the Colombian military that construction of the 

facility be blocked.218

The PIRA

In 2001, members of the PIRA traveled to the despeje to assist the 

FARC. The Irish delegation included Niall Connolly, Sinn Féin’s (the 

PIRA’s political wing) representative in Cuba; Jim “Mortar” Monaghan, 

the PIRA’s head of engineering and inventor of its first improvised 

mortars; and Martin MacAuley, Monaghan’s deputy.219 The three were 

caught by Colombian authorities on August 1, 2001, as they tried to 

board a flight out of the country. Each claimed to be in Colombia to 

monitor the peace talks (between the FARC and the Pastrana administration) and for ecotourism.220 The men used fake passports and were 

unable to explain the explosive residue found in their luggage.221 The 

PIRA claimed that it did not and had not sent any envoys to Colombia, 

whereas the Colombian military purported to know of at least fifteen 
Chapter 6. FARC

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PIRA soldiers sent to the region to train with the FARC in the construction and use of IEDs.222

Evidence against the three Irishmen was damning. More importantly, the FARC began a bombing campaign in early 2002 that had all 

the markings of IEDs used by the PIRA. The attacks continued through 

the 2002 presidential campaign, even targeting presidential candidate 

Álvaro Uribe Vélez. On April 15, 2002, an IED was detonated as Uribe’s 

armored car drove under a bridge in Barranquilla, Colombia. The 

car was completely destroyed, several people nearby were injured, and 

three people were killed.223

In some ways, the increased violence in urban areas backfired on 

the FARC. These attacks, and the relationship with the PIRA, suggested 

that the Pastrana peace process was a farce. Uribe’s defiant response 

reflected that of the Colombian people, which was borne out in his 

subsequent election. At the same time, the PIRA’s presence was another 

factor in the United States deciding to support Colombian efforts 

against the FARC as part of the war on terrorism. The US House International Relations Committee was discussing this support when the 

attack occurred. A few days later, US Representative Henry Hyde said, 

“There has . . . been a quantum leap in the FARC’s terrorist proficiency 

on the ground and in urban warfare, which the Colombian authorities 

believe is attributable to IRA [sic] training.”224 Following another round 

of violence in August—the week of the Uribe inauguration—General 

Luis Camilo Osorio proclaimed, “The techniques that the FARC has 

developed in recent years show that it has had technical assistance and 

used technology similar to that used by the IRA [sic].”225

Europe

To counterweight US influence in Colombia, the FARC sought to 

cultivate a relationship with Europe.226 The FARC valued international 

recognition as the primary armed group in Colombia, as it would 

increase the group’s legitimacy both domestically as well as internationally. Since the mid-1990s, the FARC proposed the European involvement 

was necessary for “any sort of political legitimacy to be established.”227

For example, the FARC insisted the Europeans monitor and validate the 

elections in September 1997. This reliance on Europe continued into 

the next century when FARC representatives toured Europe to learn 

about “European political economy as models for Colombia.”228 This 

trip garnered legitimacy for the guerrilla group as it suggested that the 

FARC’s power was comparable to that of the Colombian government. 

The European Parliament seemed to be persuaded by this image as 

it criticized the American assistance to Colombia in 2001 under Plan 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Colombia. The FARC capitalized on this new relationship and stated 

that the organization would consult with the European community in 

future peace talks. However, given the erratic, violent behavior of the 

FARC, Europe wished to end ties with the organization after a series of 

kidnappings in 2001.

FINANCES, LOGISTICS, SUSTAINMENT, AND 

COMMUNICATIONS

Criminal Activity

Since its inception, the FARC has survived in part by obtaining 

funds through extortion, kidnapping/hostage-taking, and stealing 

supplies.229,230 At first, it filled the coffers through typical organized 

criminal tactics such as extortion. The FARC was infamous for hostagetaking and kidnapping, perhaps even more than its narcotrafficking. 

Hostages were initially local businessmen and wealthy landowners, but 

the FARC began to target government officials, policemen, and soldiers. 

The FARC’s most notorious hostages were Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and American contractors Marc Gonsalves, 

Keith Stansell, and Tom Howes. The three Americans supported Plan 

Colombia by collecting intelligence on the FARC’s coca production 

from an aerial platform. On February 13, 2003, their plane went down 

in the Colombian jungle, literally right on top of a FARC patrol.231 They 

ended up spending more than five years in the Colombian jungle as 

prisoners of the FARC. At various points in the conflict, hundreds of 

Colombians have been incarcerated by the FARC, many of them for 

years, and thousands are held by the country’s various armed groups.

Once it had its prisoner in captivity, the FARC would make its 

demands. Sometimes it was for money, other times for a prisoner 

exchange, but it was always intended to draw attention to the FARC’s 

cause, gain political advantage, and create a lasting impact on the 

Colombian people.232 The negotiations usually included an intermediary, like the International Red Cross, and developed a sophisticated 

protocol—a cultural phenomenon—where the FARC used the opportunity to cover multiple issues in a message that was repeated over and 

over, allowing the FARC to shift from one subject to another for its 

advantage and to emphasize its narrative.233

A radio program was established in which family members broadcast messages to their family members living in captivity. Ingrid Betancourt’s mother broadcasted regularly, and the FARC usually allowed 

the hostages to hear the messages. At the same time, hostage-taking 

became an issue that eroded the FARC’s popularity as family members, 
Chapter 6. FARC

161

such as Betancourt’s husband, Juan Carlos Lecompt, and Gustavo Moncayo, father of an Army corporal in FARC hands, drew attention to the 

fate of their family members. Lecompt traveled the country, dropping 

leaflets and calling for his wife’s release.234 Moncayo met with the FARC 

after his son’s capture, but the FARC would not release him. He also 

chained himself to the national palace to draw attention to his cause 

but received no government assistance to free his son. Finally, Moncayo 

walked through most of Colombia bearing a cross and chains to call 

attention to his son’s suffering.235

Although extortion and kidnapping sustained the FARC for many 

years, growing the “little guerrilla army” required a corresponding 

growth in funding.236 During the 1982 Seventh Guerilla Conference, 

the FARC developed a plan to leverage four commodities on the black 

market: livestock, commercial agriculture, oil, and gold.237 When these 

revenues proved insufficient, the FARC reluctantly became involved in 

the narcotics trade. Initially, both Manuel Marulanda and Jacobo Arenas were opposed to drug trafficking for ideological reasons. In the 

long run, however, pragmatism prevailed. The illicit money and goods 

flowing through areas that the FARC controlled was just too rich a 

resource to bypass. However, the FARC’s involvement in the drug trade 

began in a piecemeal fashion, beginning with the taxation of narcotraffickers while protecting the peasant farmers that grew the coca.238

The increasing presence of paramilitaries in FARC areas at this time 

compelled the FARC to expand its criminal operations. This was especially true of kidnappings and extortion, which increased almost five 

times in only three years from only $15.5 million in 1991 up to $72.6 

million in 1994. Another marked increase in FARC income was from 

the mining of gold and coal, which doubled revenue from the roughly 

constant $12 million per year from 1991 to 1993 to $24.2 million in 

1994. However, some of the group’s methods of sustainment remained 

relatively stable during this time, with protection taxes, war taxes, and 

other sorts of financing bringing in around $40 million per year.239

The estimates of FARC financing through narcotics run from at 

least $30 million annually to as high as $1.5 billion.240 In fact, the FARC 

became so sophisticated that it developed standard costs for the drug 

trade that in October 1999 equated to $15.70/kilo for cocaine paste, 

$5,263 to protect a laboratory, and $52.60 to protect a hectare of coca.241

At one point, the FARC was responsible for exporting fifty percent of 

the cocaine consumed worldwide.242 However, revenues from drug 

trafficking likely represent only half of the group’s annual revenues. 

The Colombian government suggests the rest came from the FARC’s 

classic funding lines of kidnapping, robbery, and extortion.243 In 1998, 

when the narcotics trade was at $551 million, extortion and kidnapping 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

amounted to $311 and $236 million, respectively.244 By 2003, drugs 

provided the FARC with close to “48 percent of FARC’s budget—or 

approximately $200 million to $300 million annually.”245 Outside of 

this lucrative business, the FARC brought in “37 percent from extortion, 9 percent from kidnappings, and 6 percent from cattle theft.”246

Some analyst argue that the FARC would not have become such an 

important player in Colombian politics without the massive funding it 

received from drug trafficking. It is unlikely that the FARC could have 

mobilized to this extent while relying on mass mobilization:

FARC, in other words, did not become a serious factor 

due to mobilization of an alienated mass base. Rather 

it became a serious factor due to the power which 

came from drugs grown by a marginalized population. 

In terms of national percentage, these marginalized 

actors would not be major players. They became so only 

because of their role as the base upon which drug cultivation and—thus insurgent finances—was built.247

This conclusion recognizes that the value of the FARC’s involvement 

in narcotics stemmed not only from the funding derived from narcotics. The FARC’s drug enterprise connected the group to a large part 

of the Colombian population. The portion of the population involved 

in the drug trade alongside the FARC more closely resembled symbiotic partners than victims. The FARC tried to capitalize on this theme 

and emphasized its protection of peasants over narcotics. A FARC commander, Fabian Ramirez, explained:

Because the peasants do not have an Army, they are 

unarmed. If [the Colombian government] want to use 

force to fight the drugs they should use it in Bogotá, 

in Cali, Medellín, or Barranquilla, because that is 

where the drug traffickers are  .  .  .  where they have 

their armies.248

Not surprisingly, with the drugs came money and corruption. Some 

of the FARC in coca-rich areas began to live as drug lords, replete with 

gold jewelry, fancy cars, and other luxuries. This created dissent in the 

ranks as FARC members who remained ascetic guerrillas recognized 

others living large as gangsters.

Like the problem of decentralized control through the self-defense 

groups of the 1970s, the FARC’s structure made it difficult to control 

members who were becoming more drug lord than insurgent. To solve 

this problem, FARC leadership created the National Financial Commission. Responsible for allocation of all FARC funds, including major 

purchases, the commission reported directly to the EMC. A system was 
Chapter 6. FARC

163

developed wherein all FARC units were given a funding line and direction on how to use it. When these measures did not completely solve the 

corruption issue, the EMC assigned ayudantías or “advisors” to monitor 

what was happening at every level and provide advice to local leaders 

from time to time. If they suspected any foul play, the ayudantías would 

call for an investigation.249 Theft or even misappropriation of FARC 

funding was punishable by death.250

Sustainment Outside Criminal Activities

Outside of kidnappings, extortion, and the drug trade, the FARC 

implemented and collected protection taxes similar to those the state 

would collect. The FARC would use these taxes not only to fund its 

activities, but also to provide public works and services for its followers. 

It derived this funding from multinational companies, national companies, and public enterprises as well as state resources meant for municipalities.251 Through the FARC’s Law 2, the organization was successful 

in collecting “tributes” from corporations operating in the areas the 

FARC controlled.252

Logistics

The movement of narcotics not only provided the FARC with the 

funding needed to sustain its various armed units, but also established 

logistical pathways for smuggling weapons and other material to the 

guerrillas. Arms were brought into Colombia from El Salvador and 

Nicaragua and from and through Panama, Ecuador, and Venezuela. 

Much of the material came in through footpaths camouflaged within 

the jungle.253 Some of the weaponry was left over from civil wars and 

insurgencies in other parts of Latin America; some of it was provided by 

Venezuela. At times, weapons were obtained from Eastern Europe and 

Russia. Ten thousand AK-47 assault rifles were sent from Jordan, officially bound for Peru, but air-dropped into Colombia for the FARC.254

Communications

The FARC robust counterintelligence capabilities, which rely on 

effective deception and disciplined communication, have aided the 

group’s survival. Knowing that its communications may be intercepted, 

from time to time the FARC sent false messages to confuse anyone 

who may be listening. As a result, none of its signals could be trusted. 

Prisoner movements and the units that handled the hostages operated 

in strict radio silence to reduce the chance of rescue missions.255 FARC 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

leadership also avoided talking on radios or cell phones. Instead, they 

used intermediaries coupled with shifting communications to different 

frequencies.256 The former practice was used against the FARC as part 

of the Colombian Army’s rescue of Betancourt and the three American contractors. In this operation, Colombian intelligence was able to 

mimic the voice of one of the intermediaries. She then told the communicator for the cell that had the prisoners to deliver them at a certain place and time—right into the hands of the Colombian Army.257

Until the 1990s, FARC communications consisted of radios and 

frequent organizational meetings between the regional blocs. In 1989, 

the FARC planned to build a mobile strategic unit which included “6 

small airplanes, 2 ships, 10 speed boats, and a radio station and the 

construction of 4 airports, and 480 communication radios.”258 The 

FARC frequently used clandestine radio stations to send its message 

to rural areas; however, the Colombian army has intercepted and dismantled many of these radio stations.259 By the 1990s, the FARC had 

enough resources to invest in the “communication equipment available,” including VHF radios that were implemented at the company 

level.260 The FARC eventually added satellite telephones, the Internet, 

messengers, and cell phones as they became available, gained through 

raids against Colombian security forces. By the late 2000s, the FARC 

embraced the social media revolution and created Facebook and Twitter accounts and blogs to communicate with its followers and to release 

hostage information to the public.261

ENDNOTES

1 John-Paul N. Maddaloni, An Analysis of the FARC in Colombia: Breaking the Frame of FM 3-24

(Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2009), 9–10

2 Ibid.

3 Román D. Ortiz, “Insurgent Strategies in the Post–Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 25, no. 2 (2002): 131.

4 FARC-EP, “Chronology of Resistance: FARC-EP, A History of Struggle,” Bloques Iván Ríos 

y Martín Caballero de las FARC-EP, February 17, 2009, http://resistencia-colombia.org/

home/traduccion/english/463-chronology-of-resistance-farc-ep-a-history-of-struggle.

5 Ortiz, “Insurgent Strategies in the Post–Cold War,” 132.

6 FARC-EP, “Chronology of Resistance: FARC-EP, A History of Struggle.”

7 Ortiz, “Insurgent Strategies in the Post–Cold War,” 131.

8 FARC-EP, “Chronology of Resistance: FARC-EP, A History of Struggle.”

9 Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency 

and Its Implications for Regional Stability (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 25.

10 Ibid., 27.
Chapter 6. FARC

165

11 Darren D. Sprunk, “Transformation in the Developing World: An Analysis of Colombia’s 

Security Transformation” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September 2004), 

35.

12 Ibid., 29.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., 22.

15 Ibid., 21.

16 Ibid., 27.

17 Robert Leonhard, “Training,” in Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance 

Warfare, ed. Robert Leonhard (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations 

Command, 2013), 96.

18 Ibid., 34.

19 Ibid., 35.

20 Harvey F. Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986–1994 (Tuscaloosa, 

AL: University of Alabama Press, 1999), 116.

21 Geof Simons, Colombia: A Brutal History (London: Saqi Books, 2004), 43.

22 FARC-EP, “Chronology of Resistance: FARC-EP, A History of Struggle.”

23 Simons, Colombia: A Brutal History, 43.

24 Ibid.

25 Fragment of the Resolución Político of the 9th Congress as quoted in Ulises Casas, De la 

guerrilla liberal a la guerrilla comunista (Bogotá, 1987), 189, as quoted in Ortiz, “Insurgent 

Strategies in the Post–Cold War,” 133.

26 FARC-EP, “Chronology of Resistance: FARC-EP, A History of Struggle.”

27 Ortiz, “Insurgent Strategies in the Post–Cold War,” 133.

28 Thomas A. Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, January 2002), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/

pub18.pdf, 4.

29 Douglas Farah, “Lessons Learned From the Campaign Against the FARC in Colombia,” 

NEFA Foundation, Draft.

30 “Pedro Antonio Marin (Tirofijo) (FARC): Guerrillero Colombiano,” ColombiaLink.com, 

May 24, 2008, http://www.colombialink.com/01_INDEX/index_personajes/guerrilla/

marin_pedro_antonio.html.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 “Luis Morantes Alias Jacobo Arenas: Guerrillero FARC,” ColombiaLink.com, accessed September 7, 2010, http://www.colombialink.com/01_INDEX/index_personajes/guerrilla/

morantes_luis.html.

34 Ibid.

35 Ortiz, “Insurgent Strategies in the Post–Cold War,” 132.

36 Ibid.

37 Phil Gunson, “Mono Jojoy Obituary: Peasant Leader of the Colombian Guerrilla Organisation Farc,” guardian.co.uk, accessed October 19, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/

world/2010/oct/05/mono-jojoy-obituary.

38 “Profile: Farc Commander Mono Jojoy,” BBC News, September 23, 2010, http://www.bbc.

co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11400265.

39 Gunson, “Mono Jojoy Obituary.”

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.
166

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

42 John Otis, Law of the Jungle: The Hunt for Colombian Guerrillas, American Hostages, and Buried Treasure, 1st Ed. (New York: William Morrow, 2010), 122.

43 Gunson, “Mono Jojoy Obituary.”

44 Ibid.

45 Colin Harding, “Raul Reyes: Colombian Guerrilla Leader,” The Independent, March 3, 

2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/raul-reyes-colombian-guerrillaleader-790503.html?r=RSS.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Otis, Law of the Jungle, 270.

50 Steven Dudley, “In Colombia, New FARC Leader Seen as a Hard-Liner,” NPR, June 10, 

2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91355748.

51 Ibid.

52 Douglas Farah, The FARC in Transition: The Fatal Weakening of the Western Hemisphere’s Oldest Guerilla Movement (Miami: The NEFA Foundation, 2008), 12.

53 Ibid., 13.

54 P. E. Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARCEP): Marxist-Leninist Insurgency or Criminal Enterprise?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), 18.

55 Claire Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior on the 

Front Lines with the FARC, SPLA, and PKK (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 98.

56 Ibid.

57 Arturo Alape, Tirofijo: Los sueños y las montañas, 2nd ed. (Bogotá: Editorial planeta colombiana, 2002), 183, as quoted in Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP),” 18.

58 George H. Franco, “Their Darkest Hour: Colombia’s Government and the Narco-Insurgency,” Parameters, Summer 2000, accessed September 30, 2010, http://www.carlisle.

army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/00summer/franco.htm.

59 Franco, “Their Darkest Hour,” 2000.

60 Human Rights Watch, “You’ll Learn Not to Cry”: Child Combatants in Colombia (New York: 

Human Rights Watch, 2003), 23.

61 Ibid., 32.

62 Ibid., 23.

63 Robert Leonhard and Jerome M. Conley, “Leadership and Organization,” in Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare, ed. Robert Leonhard (Fort 

Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 15.

64 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP),” 

16.

65 Ibid.

66 Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior, 98; Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP),” 20.

67 Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior, 98.

68 Nazih Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia (New 

York: State University of New York Press, 2002), 76.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Bilal Y. Saab and Alexandra W. Taylor, “Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative 

Study of FARC and Paramilitary Groups in Colombia,” Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 6 

(2009): 460.
Chapter 6. FARC

167

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.

74 James F. Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia and Mexico 

(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 138.

75 Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia, 80.

76 Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia and Mexico, 137.

77 Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior, 107.

78 Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia, 78.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid., 80.

81 Ibid., 81.

82 United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Colombia: Information on 

Juntas de Acción Comunal (JACs), Community Action Boards, October 11, 2001, http://www.

refworld.org/docid/3decd39f4.html.

83 Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior, 97.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid., 99.

86 “Online NewsHour: Colombia’s Civil War: FARC,” PBS, May 2002, available at www.lb7.

uscourts.gov/documents/10-37511.pdf.

87 Ibid.

88 FARC Eighth National Conference, Las FARC-EP: 30 Anos de Lucha por la Paz, Democracia y Soberania, http://www.archivochile.com/America_latina/Doc_paises_al/Co/farc/

FARC-LAS%20FARC-EP%2030%20A%F1os%20de%20lucha%20por%20La%20Paz%20

Democracia%20y%20Soberania.pdf.

89 Leonhard and Conley, “Leadership and Organization,” 6.

90 Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior, 95.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid., 79.

94 James J. Brittain, “The FARC-EP in Colombia: A Revolutionary Exception in an Age of 

Imperialist Expansion,” Monthly Review 57, no. 4 (September 2005): http://monthlyreview.org/0905brittain.htm.

95 Robert Leonhard and Jerome M. Conley, “Recruiting,” in Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare, ed. Robert Leonhard (Fort Bragg, NC: United States 

Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 31.

96 Ibid., 32.

97 Ibid., 29.

98 Ibid.

99 “Horizonte Fariano: El Gorila,” YouTube video, 3:54, posted on May 24, 2010, http://

www.youtube.com/watch?v=m2UoiZzmxik.

100Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior, 109.

101 “Colombians in Huge FARC Protest,” BBC News, February 4, 2008, http://news.bbc.

co.uk/2/hi/americas/7225824.stm.

102 Juan Forero and Karin Bruillard, “Anti-FARC Rallies Held Worldwide,” The Washington Post, February 5, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/04/AR2008020403019.html.

103Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, 24.

104 Ibid.
168

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

105Based on first-hand interviews in the 2003 Colombian National Development Report, Brent Buxton, “Colombia: The Multi-faceted Motivation of 

the FARC and Prospects for Peace,” October 10, 2007, http://www.coha.org/

the-multi-faceted-motivation-of-the-farc-and-prospects-for-peace/.

106 Ibid.

107 Saab and Taylor, “Criminality and Armed Groups,” 460.

108 Ibid.

109Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia and Mexico, 133.

110 Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior, 114–115.

111 Ibid., 113.

112Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia and Mexico, 132.

113 Ibid., 134.

114 Ibid.

115 Ibid., 135.

116 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP),” 

44–45.

117 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP),” 

46.

118 Ibid., 47

119 Ibid.

120 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP),” 

47.

121As quoted in Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army 

(FARC-EP),” 51.

122As quoted in Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army 

(FARC-EP),” 52.

123Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, 8-9.

124 Ibid.

125Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, 51.

126Otis, Law of the Jungle, 17.

127Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, 42.

128Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia and Mexico, 139.

129Douglas Farah, “Lessons Learned from the Campaign Against the FARC in Colombia.”

130 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP),” 

57.

131 Farah, “Lessons Learned from the Campaign Against the FARC in Colombia.”

132Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, 8.

133Farah, “Lessons Learned from the Campaign Against the FARC in Colombia.”

134 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP),” 

57–58.

135Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, 8–9.

136Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, 43.

137 Ibid.

138Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, 50.

139Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia and Mexico, 139–140.

140 Saab and Taylor, “Criminality and Armed Groups,” 459.

141 Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, 11.
Chapter 6. FARC

169

142Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, 43.

143Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior, 108.

144 Ibid.

145 Ibid., 109.

146 Saab and Taylor, “Criminality and Armed Groups,” 460.

147 Dan Molinski, “Sabotage by Suspected Rebels Leaves 2.3 Million Colombians without Electricity,” Free Republic, September 6, 2005, http://www.freerepublic.com/

focus/f-news/1478260/posts.

148 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “The Recruitment Methods of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias De Colombia, 

FARC) and Government Measures to Help FARC Members Reintegrate into Civilian Society (2005–February 2008),” April 14, 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/

docid/4829b55c23.html.

149 Human Rights Watch, “You’ll Learn Not to Cry”: Child Combatants in Colombia, 29.

150 Saab and Taylor, “Criminality and Armed Groups,” 459.

151 Otis, Law of the Jungle, 41.

152Maddaloni, An Analysis of the FARC in Colombia, 62, 11.

153Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, 24.

154Rex A. Hudson, “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist 

and Why?,” Federal Research Division Library of Congress, September 1999, http://www.

scribd.com/doc/86968788/74/Group-Profile.

155 Ibid., 39.

156Human Rights Watch, “You’ll Learn Not to Cry”: Child Combatants in Colombia, 35.

157Brett Borkan, “Army Kills 2 FARC Guerrillas, Finds Evidence of Child Recruitment,” 

Colombia Reports, sec. News, May 3, 2010, http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/

news/9493-army-kills-2-farc-guerillas-recovers-evidence-child-recruitment.html.

158Human Rights Watch, “You’ll Learn Not to Cry”: Child Combatants in Colombia, 4.

159Human Rights Watch, “You’ll Learn Not to Cry”: Child Combatants in Colombia, 24.

160 Ibid., 38.

161Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia and Mexico, 138.

162 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “The Recruitment Methods of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.”

163Human Rights Watch, “You’ll Learn Not to Cry”: Child Combatants in Colombia, 166, 29.

164Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansel, Tom Howes, and Gary Brozek, Out of Captivity: Surviving 

1,967 Days in the Colombian Jungle (New York: Harper, 2009), 243.

165Nathan Bos, “Underlying Causes of Violence,” in Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, 

and Resistance Warfare, ed. Robert Leonhard (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special 

Operations Command, 2013), 27.

166 Ibid.

167 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP),” 

71.

168Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 35.

169FARC-EP, “The Illegality of ‘Legal Opposition’ in Colombia: About the Bolivarian Movement,” accessed March 27, 2005, http://www.FARC-EPep.org/pagina_ingles/articles/

illegality.html, as quoted in Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of ColombiaPeople’s Army (FARC-EP),” 25.

170 Ibid.

171 Ibid.

172 Ibid.
173 Otis, Law of the Jungle, 103.

174 Ibid.

175 US Department of State, “Background Note: Colombia (10/06),” accessed September 5, 

2013, http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/colombia/74125.htm.

176 Farah, The FARC in Transition, 13.

177 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP),” 

55.

178 Ibid., 80.

179 Ibid., 83.

180 Ibid.

181 Ibid.

182 Ibid.

183 Ibid., 84.

184 Ibid.

185 Ibid.

186 Ibid., 85.

187 Ibid.

188 Ibid.

189 Ibid.

190 Ibid.

191 Douglas Farah, The FARC’s International Relations: A Network of Deception (Charleston, SC: 

Nine Eleven Finding Answers Foundation, 2008), 1.

192 Ibid., 4.

193 Ibid., 6.

194 Ibid., 7.

195 Ibid.

196 Ibid.

197 Ibid., 8.

198 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP),” 

52.

199 Ibid., 62.

200Ibid., 11.

201W. J. Rayment, “Hugo Chavez–President of Venezuela,” accessed October 6, 2010, http://

www.indepthinfo.com/hugo-chavez/.

202“Profile: Hugo Chavez,” BBC News, accessed October 6, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/

hi/1925236.stm.

203Douglas Schoen and Michael Rowan, The Threat Closer to Home: Hugo Chavez and the War 

Against America (New York: Free Press, 2009) as quoted in W. J. Rayment, “The Military 

Career of Hugo Chavez,” accessed October 6, 2010, http://www.indepthinfo.com/hugochavez/military-career.htm.

204Rayment, “The Military Career of Hugo Chavez.”

205Ibid.

206Ibid.

207“Profile: Hugo Chavez.”

208“Hugo Chavez–Biography,” A&E Television Networks, accessed October 6, 2010, http://

www.biography.com/people/hugo-chávez-193225.
Chapter 6. FARC

171

209Chris Kraul, “Venezuela Cattlemen Living in Fear: Ranchers Say Rebels from Colombia 

are Running a Kidnapping Industry on their Land,” Los Angeles Times, July 25, 2006, 

http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jul/25/world/fg-cows25.

210 Ibid.

211 Scott Wilson, “Venezuela Becomes Embroiled in Colombian War; Reports of Bombed 

Villages on Northeastern Frontier Point to Military Support for Guerrillas,” The Washington Post, April 10, 2003, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=322987521&Fmt=3&clie

ntId=5241&RQT=309&VName=PQD&cfc=1.

212 Ibid.

213 Ibid.

214 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP),” 

81.

215 Ibid.

216 Ibid., 82.

217 Ibid.

218 Ibid.

219 Mervyn Jess, “Global Terrorism Movements: IRA Suspects on Foreign Land,” in Terrorism: 

Essential Primary Sources, eds. K. Lee Lerner and Brenda Wilmoth Lerner, 1st Ed. (Gale, 

2005), 307–310.

220Ibid., 309.

221Mark Burgess, “Globalizing Terrorism: The FARC-IRA Connection,” CDI Terrorism Project, June 5, 2002.

222Jess, “Global Terrorism Movements,” 309.

223“Bomb Targets Colombian Candidate,” BBC News, April 15, 2002, http://news.bbc.

co.uk/2/hi/americas/1929986.stm.

224Richard Willing, “IRA and Cuban Connection?” USA Today, April 24, 2002.

225Jess, “Global Terrorism Movements,” 310.

226Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia and Mexico, 140–141.

227Ibid.

228Ibid.

229Robert Leonhard and Jerome M. Conley, “Financing,” in Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare, ed. Robert Leonhard (Fort Bragg, NC: United States 

Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 68.

230Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, 107, 24.

231Gonsalves et al., Out of Captivity, 14.

232David J. Topel, “Hostage Negotiation in Colombia and the FARC: Deconstructing the 

Problem,” Iberoamerica Global 2, no 1. (February 2009): 29.

233Ibid.

234Otis, Law of the Jungle, 171.

235Ibid., 231.

236Leonhard and Conley, “Financing,” 67.

237 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP),” 

32.

238Ibid.

239Norman Offstein, “An Historical Review and Analysis of Colombian Guerrilla Movements: FARC, ELN and EPL,” Desarrollo Y Sociedad no. 52 (2003): 136–137.

240 Sprunk, “Transformation in the Developing World: An Analysis of Colombia’s Security 

Transformation,” 29.

241Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, 32.
172

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

242US Drug Enforcement Agency, “United States Charges 50 Leaders of Narco-Terrorist 

FARC in Colombia With Supplying More Than Half of the World’s Cocaine,” March 22, 

2006, http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr032206a.html.

243 Sprunk, “Transformation in the Developing World: An Analysis of Colombia’s Security 

Transformation,” 29.

244Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, 32.

245 Saab and Taylor, “Criminality and Armed Groups,” 463.

246 Ibid.

247Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, 3.

248 “Death by Coca – Colombia,” YouTube video, 15:34, posted by “Journeyman Pictures” 

on January 9, 2008, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DRO-BjIYJtY&feature=channel.

249 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP),” 

37.

250Ibid.

251Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia, 80.

252Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia and Mexico, 137.

253Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, 35.

254Ibid., 36.

255Otis, Law of the Jungle, 60.

256Ibid., 274.

257 Ibid.

258Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia, 76.

259Carlos Andrés Barahona, “Colombia: Authorities Target FARC Communications,” Infosurhoy.com, December 10, 2012, http://infosurhoy.com/cocoon/saii/xhtml/en_GB/

features/saii/features/main/2012/11/12/feature-01.

260Ron Buikema and Matt Burger, “Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC),” 

in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2012).

261Barahona, “Colombia: Authorities Target FARC Communications.”
CHAPTER 7.

EJÉRCITO DE LIBERACIÓN NACIONAL (ELN)

Chapter 7. ELN

175

TIMELINE

1849 Conservative and Liberal Parties are founded.

1899–1903 “The War of the Thousand Days”—120,000 people die 

in civil war between Liberals and Conservatives.

1946 (–1965) La Violencia (“The Violence”), a localized civil war 

characterized by widespread violence between Liberal 

and Conservatives in the countryside. The conflict 

resulted in the deaths of 180,000–300,000 Colombians.

April 9, 1948 Liberal Party presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer 

Gaitán Ayala is assassinated in Bogotá. The assassin is 

killed on the spot and the Bogotazo riot ensues.

1949 Conservative Party candidate Laureano Gómez Castro 

wins the presidential election. Colombian Communist 

Party introduces “mass self-defense” as means for peasants to protect themselves from armed Conservatives.

June 1, 1953 President Gomez is deposed by a military coup. General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla becomes the new president 

of Colombia.

May 1, 1957 President Rojas resigns under the pressure of Liberals 

and Conservatives united under a combined political 

entity called the “National Front.”

1958 Conservatives and Liberals agree to form the National 

Front, a power-sharing agreement, in a bid to end civil 

war.

August 7, 1958 The first National Front president, Alberto Lleras Carmago, takes office.

August 1962 President Leon Valencia Munoz is inaugurated.

1963 ELN founders Fabio Vasquez Castaño and Victor 

Medina Moron travel to Cuba to study guerrilla warfare 

with Fidel and Raúl Castro and other members of the 

Cuban Revolution.

January 5, 1965 In its first armed action, ELN overtakes the town of 

Simacota. Many regard this seminal event as the founding of the group.

1966 Camilo Torres, a nationally known left-wing priest and 

recent ELN recruit, dies in firefight with the Colombian army.

1970 National People’s alliance is formed as a left-wing counterweight to the National Front.
176

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

1978 ELN reaches record low numbers (perhaps thirty 

armed supporters). ELN reorients its overarching plan 

to gain control of resource-rich areas of Colombia 

in order to gain strategic advantage and economic 

independence.

1978 President Turbay begins intense fight against drug 

traffickers.

August 1982 President Belisario Betancur Cuartas is inaugurated. 

During his inaugural speech, he announces that the 

Colombian government will engage in peace negotiations with leftist guerrillas.

November 18, 

1982

President Betancur signs Congressional Law 35, granting general amnesty to all guerrilla combatants.

May 28, 1984 Cease-fire begins under the Aribe Agreement.

August 1990 President César Gaviria Trujillo is inaugurated.

1993 Pablo Escobar is killed.

August 1994 President Ernesto Samper Pizano is inaugurated.

August 1998 President Andres Pastrana Arango is inaugurated.

December 18, 

1998

ELN commits its most deadly attack—after targeting an 

oil pipeline, the ensuing oil spill caught fire, resulting 

in the deaths of forty-eight villagers.

2000 US Congress appropriates 1.3 billion dollars for Plan 

Colombia. Total appropriation through 2005 would 

reach 4.5 billion dollars.

January 17, 

2000

ELN successfully bombs more than twenty power lines 

and towers, causing millions of Medellín residents to 

lose power.

August 2002 President Alvaro Uribe Vélez is inaugurated.

2004 Plan Patriota is introduced by Uribe, with the aim of 

establishing a permanent military presence in rebelheld territory.

December 2005 Exploratory peace talks with ELN begin in Cuba.

February 2006 US and Colombia reach a free trade deal (eventually 

passed in 2011).

August 2007 ELN Havana dialogues end without agreement and 

“two different conceptions of peace and how to get to 

it.”

March 1, 2008 Raúl Reyes is killed in his stronghold in Ecuador during a Colombian cross-border attack.
Chapter 7. ELN

177

ORIGINS OF THE ELN

Figure 7-1. ELN flag.

In the early 1960s, a group of students in Colombia, inspired by 

the revolution in Cuba, founded an armed group committed to bringing revolution to their country. These students, led by Fabio Vásquez 

Castaño, sought military training in Cuba before returning to Colombia to establish their own army of national liberation, dedicated to replicating what they had witnessed abroad. Accounts vary as to the actual 

beginning of the Ejército de Liberación Nacional, or the ELN, but most 

agree that the group coalesced in 1964, with their first combat operation occurring in Simacota on January 7, 1965, which is often cited as 

the date of foundation.

The primary motivation for engaging in armed insurrection against 

the Colombian government was the success of the Cuban Revolution. 

Fabio Vásquez adopted the foquismo, or foco theory,a which was inspired 

and perpetuated by Guevara. In the late 1950s, Guevara, together with 

Fidel and Raúl Castro, used the foco model of warfare to achieve revolution in Cuba. After attempting to legally overthrow the corrupt government of Fulgencio Batista through the judicial process in 1952, Fidel 

Castro decided that an armed revolution was the only means to victory. 

An initial failed attempt landed the Castro brothers in prison; after significant pressure was applied to the Batista regime to release all political prisoners, they were freed in 1955. Shortly after being released from 

prison, they fled to Mexico. There they met with other exiles, and they 

a “The foco is basically made up at first, of some 25 to 35 men under the politicomilitary leadership of a man in charge of the whole operation. The foco has supporters 

and sympathizers in the city, but will not receive orders from any organized group or party 

stationed in the urban centers. It operates as the vanguard of a popular army. The foco 

will establish close relations with the peasants of the area in which it operates, but at no 

time will it sacrifice the mobility and safety of the guerrilla band for the sake of village 

or territory.”
178

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

planned to overthrow the Batista regime. In June of 1955, the Castro 

brothers met Ernesto “Che” Guevara, the Argentinian revolutionary, 

and Guevara joined the brothers in their call for a Cuban revolution.

The Castro brothers, Guevara, and less than a hundred other 

guerrillas returned to Cuba on December 2, 1956. By the first of January 1959, Batista was ousted and his regime was replaced by the revolutionary government of Fidel Castro. The Batista regime, whose armed 

forces numbered more than 30,000, was defeated by the revolutionaries who adhered to the foco model. Small, focused groups of armed 

guerrillas, with support from local populations, conducted small, strategic attacks on the Batista regime, eventually defeating the army and 

police force while suffering few casualties. Small groups of armed revolutionaries dispersed dissent throughout the countryside. The strategy 

the small groups employed emphasized targeting specific areas of the 

government infrastructure, with the goal of destabilization1,2

Had the revolution in Cuba not been successful, it is doubtful that 

the ELN would have formed in the manner it did. However, it is significant that, in the era after La Violencia, the political climate was one of 

severe distress and upheaval, and many protest movements launched at 

that time. One social scientist characterizes two intertwining motifs of 

Colombian history: “(1) social relations marked by inequality, exploitation, and exclusion and (2) violence employed by those with economic 

and political power over the working majority and the poor in order 

to acquire control over resources, forcibly recruit labor, and suppress 

or eliminate dissent.”3 It is within this context that the ELN began its 

revolution in earnest.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, COMMAND AND 

CONTROL, AND LEADERSHIP

Organizational Structure and Command and Control

The ELN’s fragmented structure has directly evolved from its foco 

foundations. The small, easily mobile guerrilla bands are dispersed 

throughout Colombia. These groups integrate themselves into the 

local communities and foment support for the insurgency. The ELN’s 

small guerilla bands span at least twenty-three departments and an 

area from Narino in the extreme south, La Guajira in the north, Aurca 

in the east, and Choco on the Pacific coast.4 These nuclei comprise the 

multiple guerilla fronts, or frentes.

5

A central command (COCE), comprising five commanders, oversees 

the organization, providing a framework of “federalism and consensual 

democracy.”6 The COCE’s military commander is also the commander 
Chapter 7. ELN

179

of the entire organization. Another COCE commander oversees political functions; a third is responsible for international affairs; a fourth 

manages the group’s finances; and the fifth commander is charged 

with communications with the fronts.7 Below the COCE is the National 

Directorate (Dirección Nacional), with twenty-three members.

All political and military decisions are made by the COCE, but commanders of the ELN’s fronts have more autonomy than their counterparts in the FARC. Control is typically regional, and commanders often 

use different tactics to achieve their goals. For example, the Domingo 

Laín Front is said to be the most radical, and the wealthiest, of the 

war fronts.8

In practice, this structure does not provide for strict oversight. In 

addition, this structure hinders the possibility of a cease-fire, as the 

rural, semiautonomous bands rarely interact because they are disbursed throughout the country. The ELN’s wide dispersal complicates 

verification and force protection as most of the nuclei tend to stay in 

their respective regions during cease-fires.9

The ELN holds a session of Congress, approximately every decade.10

At these Congress sessions, the leadership makes broad, policy-decisions 

for the organization. For example, at the Congress session in 1996, the 

leadership emphasized its commitment to ideological pursuits rather 

than financial advancement through the drug trade.11

Central

Command

(COCE)

Carlos

Alirio

Buitrago

Front

Foco Foco Foco Foco Foco Foco

Domingo

Laín

 Front 

Foco Foco Foco

Foco Foco

Jaime

Bateman

Cayón

Front 

Foco Foco

Jose

Antonio

Galan Front 

National 

Directorate

Figure 7-2. Notional ELN organizational structure.
180

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Fabio Vásquez and Victor Medina were captivated by the success of 

the Cuban Revolution. Together, they established the ELN, mimicking 

the methods used in Cuba, with the same goal of government takeover. 

As in Cuba, the insurgency began in the rural mountainside. The rural 

community of San Vicente de Chucuri in the Magdalena Valley in the 

Santander Department was specifically selected to serve as the home 

of the new insurgency. The home of the “guerrilla foco incubation” 

required “rugged geography that allowed clandestine mobilization” 

along with traditions of rebellions, peasant struggles, and a familiarity 

of violence and dissent.12 Santander’s Magdalena valley had the requisite terrain and proximity to “several villages with peasants with former 

guerrilla experience that included cooperation with Liberal guerrilla 

groups,” thus possessing an ideological affinity.13

Vásquez ingratiated himself into the community, over the course 

of many months, working alongside the peasant farm laborers. He 

reminded the workers of the first peasant to rebel against the Spanish, 

José Antonio Galan, who had been born in Santander and was hanged 

for his insurrection. Vásquez also brought up the struggles of the local 

unions that had for more than forty  years fought for equitable pay 

from the foreign corporations that were extracting Santander’s local 

resources.14 The local workers, over time, adopted Vásquez’s vision that 

change could be possible. A few dozen villagers set up camp in the 

jungle, led by Vásquez, to begin training in preparation for their first 

activist demonstration.

The groups’ first combat operation was the assault on Simacota, 

Santander on January 7, 1965. Fewer than thirty guerrillas opened fire, 

killing two policemen, and distributed their manifesto.b

 The assault 

was considered a success and garnered a great deal of publicity.

Within days, Vásquez received word from the left-wing priest 

Camilo Torres. Torres had requested a meeting and expressed interest 

in joining the ELN. Vásquez ordered men to begin observing Torres to 

determine whether his behavior and public and private engagements 

would indicate whether he was prepared to join an armed insurgency. 

After seven months of observation, Vásquez issued Torres an invitation 

to join the ELN. After a clandestine journey from safe house to safe 

house, Torres arrived at the ELN jungle headquarters, where he immediately was introduced to the guerrilla life.

After Torres perished in a firefight in 1966, the ELN struggled 

to maintain its cohesive structure. Deep discord between urban and 

rural guerrillas and continual infighting led to the loss of members. 

At one point, the armed component of the ELN dropped to as low 

b See Appendix A. ELN Manifestos for a copy of the manifesto.
Chapter 7. ELN

181

as thirty guerrillas. Slowly, the organization grew, emphasizing armed 

control over areas rich in natural resources.15 The 1990s were a period 

of rebuilding for the ELN, and this rebuilding extended into the twentyfirst century. Three goals were explicitly set for the insurgency:

The first was to expand its finances as well as the capacity of its military troops in order to achieve the status 

of a major political actor among Colombia’s potent 

assortment of belligerents.

Second, . . . the ELN has been nothing short of desperate for a piece of territory under its own control. 

Indeed at the turn of the century, this became the 

group’s most enunciated objective.

Finally, the rebels have been attempting to influence 

a restructuring of the Colombian political economy 

consistent with their ideological premises.16

The desire for a zona de despeje, a territory fully under ELN control, 

has been the single driving focus of the late twentieth and early twentyfirst centuries. All peace talks since the late 1990s have centered on such 

a cease-fire zone over which it would have primary political control.17

The foco model lent itself well to the new emphasis on strategic 

regional control. Small, semi-autonomous, rural-based guerrilla 

groups moved easily through the jungle to specific targets. Rural, jungle mountainous areas have less security, less infrastructure, and fewer 

opportunities for interactions with police than urban areas.

The founding foco theory was carried throughout the organization. 

Groups of rural guerrillas were placed on the rural front and in urban 

centers. Since the late 1970s, however, the uniformity of the armed foco 

has dwindled. The part-time and amateur nature of the ELN’s recent 

armed component is in stark contrast to the full-time and professional 

armies of the FARC and AUC.18 Additionally, the ENL “has been more 

adept at committing spectacular crime and terrorism than at direct 

military combat.”19

The armed component of the ELN has been based primarily in 

the rural jungle, comprised of majority rural guerrillas, with urban 

guerrillas joining less frequently. A raid in late 2012 revealed a massive 

guerrilla camp in the southwestern province of Nariño, home to possibly 200 guerrillas. While this discovery revealed the ease with which 

the ELN moved about Nariño, it is very unusual for the insurgency to 

have such a large base of operations.20

An internal crisis of infighting brought the numbers of ELN guerrillas and supporters to a historic low. By 1978, the ELN was nearly 
182

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

annihilated. It could marshal only about thirty armed supporters.21 A 

resurgence was fueled by a return to the ideologies of its beginning:

The group started also to “plan how to bring about 

consciousness during agitation. It was the epoch of 

writing handbooks, talks, envisioning with the masses 

what could be created . . . We even started to make 

extraordinary things, like completing sociological 

research in areas, characterizing local communities, 

their problems, contradictions. . . .”22

Many acts of spectacular crime and terrorism have occurred since 

this time of rebuilding, and while this reemergence has waned since 

the beginning of the twenty-first century, estimates of the size of the 

armed guerrilla component hovers at a few thousand.23 Since 2000, the 

ELN has increased its involvement in the drug trade, particularly the 

trade crossing the porous Ecuadorean and Venezuelan borders.24

Leadership

The most important component of Fabio Vásquez’s leadership was 

his legacy. Camilo Torres and Vásquez both serve as mythologized figures. Vásquez demanded unfailing commitment, creating something 

of a cult of personality. Torres inspires a commitment of another kind; 

the priest-martyr has inspired the loyalty of many young guerillas.

Today, the leadership of the ELN is in the hands of Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista, who was recruited to the ELN as a young man early in 

the insurgency. Bautista was central to the ELN’s resurgence and has 

maintained its viability into the twenty-first century.

Fabio Vásquez Castaño

Fabio Vásquez Castaño  left Cuba for Colombia in 1963, with the 

explicit intention of organizing a foco-based guerrilla insurgency. 

While the oligarchic structure of Colombian politics left no inroads for 

dissent, the corrupt partisan violence that had characterized Colombian society and squelched upward mobility for the majority of Colombians came to a head in the early 1960s, with the formation of many 

rebellions, each with their own particular flavor of dissent. The leftwing ideology of Cuban’s Communist revolution appealed greatly to 

young Vásquez, who had witnessed first-hand the senseless killings and 

displacement characteristic of La Violencia. His father, who had owned 

an ordinary coffee farm and had been a leader in Liberal politics, 

was killed by a Conservative faction, and his family was forced to flee 

their homeland of Quindío.25 Vásquez went on to become a respected 
Chapter 7. ELN

183

schoolteacher and community leader. He was active in unions and kept 

close contacts with students, teachers, Communist leaders, and leftwing intellectual and political leadership in both Bogotá and Bucaramanga (the capital city of the Santander Department).

Vásquez had already become something of a notable leader in the 

left-wing movement before he formed the ELN. Additionally, his brothers, Manuel and Antonio (with whom Fabio maintained close contact), 

had become “intellectual and political leaders of the student movement in Bogotá at Universidad Nacional de Colombia.”26 Fabio naturally implemented a tenet of the foco ideology—to spread dissent in 

rural communities. Tall, charismatic, handsome, and inclined to “go 

and work with the peasants on the fields,” Fabio easily ingratiated himself into the rural area of San Vicente de Chucuri.27

San Vicente

de Chucuri

Figure 7-3. Map of San Vicente de Chucuri.

Victor Medina Moron

Victor Medina Moron, an urban intellectual, traveled with Vásquez 

to Cuba and was also selected to participate in the strenuous training 

Fabio received.28 Fabio appointed Medina to the number two position 

in the ELN. The appointment fostered deep discontent and division 

between rural and urban guerrillas. Most viewed Medina as a privileged 

rural elite, while the urban guerrillas came to resent his leadership.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Camilo Torres

Figure 7-4. Plaque commemorating Camilo Torres.

Camilo Torres was not a founding member of the ELN, though he 

is often attributed with that distinction. Born in 1929 to a bourgeois 

Bogotá family, Torres eventually became a proponent of liberation theology, which was a component of the ideological legacy he left to the 

ELN. A girlfriend of his during his youth introduced Torres to some visiting Dominican priests, and they eventually became regular attenders 

at the Dominican’s lecture cycles.29 Before this introduction, Torres’s 

religious education had been nominal, at best, even for such a deeply 

Catholic society. He eventually entered the priesthood.

The presence of slums within sight of the seminary yard, and the 

distinct separation between the priests and those in the slums, deeply 

impacted Torres. His concern for the evident disparity between the 

cloistered clergy and the poor laid a foundation for his future work 

in improving living conditions for all Colombians. For the entirety 

of his priestly career, he sought to bridge the separation between the 

church and the people. His studies took him abroad to Louvain, Belgium, where he established social study circles at universities he visited. 

He was extremely charismatic and well liked. As he traveled on breaks 

from school, he eventually spent considerable time in Berlin, where he 

was first introduced to the Communist student movement. Additionally, at that time, he encountered student workers in Paris, serving communities of slum dwellers.

After returning to Colombia in January of 1959, Torres accepted 

a position as a sociology professor and university chaplain at Bogotá’s 
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185

National University. Torres’s courses took place both at the university 

and in Bogotá’s slums, developing courses on issues such as urbanization, living standards, land reform, political violence, education, 

democracy, and sociology. Eventually, he established training courses 

for peasants in the countryside.30 He was continually refining and seeking better, more effective ways to effect the change he could see was 

necessary for those not part of the ruling elite. These efforts helped 

him realize that the peasants, slum dwellers, professional people, and 

others needed to be linked together to pressure for change.31 This 

united front would capture and focus the energy of massive student 

protests, the unionist’s momentum, the peasants cries for land reform, 

all of which was fomenting in the early 1960s.

The united front was the culmination of Torres’s theological evolution. He witnessed the oligarchic stronghold on resources, access, and 

power and believed a fundamental change was necessary—revolution. 

His eventual defrocking due to his political activism did not impact his 

reputation, and his popularity continued to grow throughout Colombia 

as he shared his message, “In language that echoed the gospels Torres 

said that revolution was ‘the way to bring about a government that feeds 

the hungry, clothes the naked, teaches the ignorant, puts into practice 

the works of charity, and love for neighbor, not just every now and then, 

and not just for a few, but for the majority of our neighbors.’ ”32, c

In the days after the ELN’s initial public appearance—the assault 

on Simacota—Torres was captivated by the group. After reading the 

manifesto, published in newspapers around the country, he began to 

make inquiries as to how to connect with these revolutionaries. Eventually, word reached Fabio Vásquez, who spread the word for the priest to 

be monitored. After Torres proved himself, the ELN leadership invited 

him to join the resistance movement. Unfortunately for the ELN, Torres was killed in his first combat experience in Santander Department 

in 1966. Subsequently, he became a martyr for the movement.

Manuel Pérez

A Spanish-born priest, Manuel Pérez was deeply inspired by Camilo 

Torres’s commitment to the ELN and the call to revolution. He was 

one of the few remaining members after internal conflicts tore apart 

the ELN in the late 1960s into the early 1970s. In 1973, Pérez stepped 

into leadership of the ELN, a position he held until his death in 1998, 

alongside Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista.

c See Appendix A. ELN Manifestos for Torres’s entire manifesto.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista

A peasant recruit in 1964, Nicolás Bautista (also known as Gambino) is one of the longest-standing members of the ELN, even participating in the ELN’s first military exercise. Bautista is the current leader 

of the ELN. After proving himself, the ELN leadership invited Torres 

to join the resistance movement. Unfortunately for the ELN, Torres was 

killed in his first combat experience in Santander Department in 1966. 

Subsequently, he became a martyr for the movement.

Corriente de Renovación Socialista

The Corriente de Renovación Socialista, or CRS, was a splinter faction of the ELN. The CRS demobilized and disarmed in the mid-1990s 

after signing a peace accord with the Colombian government.33 Marxist 

intellectuals started the political group, which was initially called Movimiento de Integración Revolucionaria (MIR). The MIR joined the ELN 

after a few years of existence as an independent guerrilla movement. A 

few years after joining the ELN, the MIR severed ties to the larger organization because of differing political and military viewpoints. After 

separating from the ELN, the MIR formed the CRS, and the group was 

ultimately reintegrated into civilian society in the mid-1990s.34

COMPONENTS OF THE INSURGENCY

Underground and Auxiliary

The division between rural and urban guerrillas highlighted the 

socioeconomic differences between these groups. Urban sympathizers 

within the ELN tended to be more educated. The moral tenets and 

general sophistication of the ELN’s ideology had cultivated support for 

the group among middle-class students and professionals.35 Auxiliary 

support tended to be based in urban settings, tasked with fomenting 

protests and gathering information. The ELN’s auxiliary support in 

rural settings was typically less distinguishable from that of the rural 

underground. The underground and the auxiliary provided similar 

support to the ELN.

However loosely the ELN may be structured today, the early decades 

saw stricter adherence to the focused, tight guerrilla units. The underground component of the ELN has played an important role in recruitment and support of guerrillas on both the rural and urban fronts. 

Fabio Vásquez initially chose to plant the roots of the ELN in the peasant community of San Vicente de Chucuri, in the jungles of Santander 

Department, which was historically sympathetic to the cause of revolution. Supplies for the early members of the ELN were stored at the 
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187

home of the future ELN leader, Nicolás Rodrigues Bautista. Bautista 

was enthralled by the charismatic Vásquez and observed the deference 

and respect given to Vásquez by the community. Bautista’s parents were 

early supporters. His mother stitched the uniforms for the first guerrillas. When Bautista contemplated officially joining Vásquez and his 

guerrillas, his father spoke plainly:

Listen. If you decide to struggle, you must be faithful 

until the death. Victory is not just turning the corner. 

If you decide to struggle, that becomes your life. It is 

not like in a movie, it won’t be easy. In this struggle 

there are not heroes that come, fight, vanquish and 

then return home . . . This struggle is for the rest of 

your life.36

This early underground perpetuated the importance of the values 

of the ELN, specifically its founder. Vásquez viewed the revolution in 

the context of a long line of honorable struggles, and loyalty was central to his vision of the foco army. Considering the advice of Bautista’s 

father, “it is clear that the decision was taken in a wider context of sociability in which his decisions were conditioned by a larger historical narrative.”37 Additionally, the early underground established the patterns 

followed throughout the history of the ELN. The peasantry offered the 

primary hideout for the ELN after major operations or during attacks 

by security forces.38

The family of a guerrilla member commonly acted as a component 

of the underground. As one former guerrilla describes, his mother 

“met my friends and knew about my activities. She helped me a lot in 

my work . . . My siblings also helped me. They had a lot of information 

about my situation but they never joined the organization.”39 Familial 

integration is commonly an indicator of future participation:

You ended up introducing other members of the guerrilla movement to nephews, nieces, and children . . . So 

everybody felt integrated into the community, into a 

[political] project. The children didn’t care, but little 

by little they were introduced to it.40

The urban underground and auxiliary was a source of intelligence 

for the ELN. In the case of recruiting Camilo Torres, Vásquez relied on 

the informal networks that guerrillas established in Bogotá to observe 

and assess the priest.41 The primarily urban auxiliary provided support, 

gathered intelligence, and served as community organizers. One guerrilla describes organizing political protests, “mobilizing the masses.”42

Urban guerrillas had to take care to blend in with neighbors while 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

still following orders from commanders. Safe houses were common in 

urban communities, and great care was taken to not attract attention.43

Urban members tended to be more educated and were attracted to 

the ELN because of its ideological roots. A guerrilla recalls discovering ELN text as a student protester; “There were also a lot of events in 

grassroots organizations. Once I attended an event at a place that had 

a good library, so I began borrowing books . . . I thought those documents were from the MIR [a legal left-wing movement]. Later, I was told 

that they were from the ELN. This was how I made my first contacts 

with the guerrilla organization.”44 Other guerrillas have memories of 

“reading Marxist literature in the school library” before joining the 

ELN.45 These urbanos could have transitioned into the armed component of the ELN, but to become a soldier required proving oneself to 

the rural guerrilla front.

The urban auxiliary has been a prominent component since the 

early years of the ELN. For example, Camilo Torres worked with the 

student leader Jaime Arenas. Unbeknownst to his circle of student revolutionaries in the 1960s, Arenas was a member of the ELN. Arenas had 

become a prominent leader after he led a three-month-long student 

strike and student marches.46

Armed Component

In the days of Vásquez, the life of the armed guerrillas was 

entrenched in ritual and hierarchy. Today, the guerrillas are less bound 

by the strict rules of those early days, the legalism of which contributed 

to the decline in numbers.

All new members of the ELN are baptized with a new guerrilla 

alias. Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista recalls, “Everyone was given the name 

from that moment on, there was a list . . . [Vásquez states] ‘Forget about 

your usual name and use now the name of war’ Fabio then gave us a 

discourse, that we were the continuity of Bolívar and Galan’s struggles. 

I got the goose bumps!”47 This ritual act of baptism detached the new 

guerrilla from his old life and marked the beginning of a new one.

The transition into the armed guerrilla component was highly 

ritualized:

The EscuelaPalito (Wooden stick training) was a mimicry of combat created by the leaders of the ELN to 

maintain the expectation for confrontation with the 

enemy whilst each guerrillero had the possibility of 

practicing tactical movements, without a real gun 

machine. The escuelapalito was established by 1967 as 
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189

the ritual transition between a recently clandestinized 

guerrillero, and a fighter fully active in operations. In 

the training a piece of wood simulated the form of a 

gun machine, and the guerrillero had to learn how 

to clean it, hold it, and care for it as the main element 

for its survival in case of a combat. The piece of wood 

was replaced by a real gun machine after an operation 

where the goal was to disarm a soldier. This ritual was 

part of the ‘baptism of fire‘ for guerrilleros, and was 

laden with symbolism and ceremonies for the transition from normal life to revolutionary belonging. 

Details about this ritual in Sánchez Sierra.48

Another ritual of the guerrilla component was to educate urban 

and rural guerrillas through daily courses, varying from literacy to the 

martyr history of the ELN, specifically regarding Torres. Those guerrillas coming from an urban background struggled to integrate into the 

jungle life. Victor Medina, though a guerrilla from the creation of the 

ELN, was not accepted by the rural guerrillas. He did not participate 

in the military drills or the storytelling and was perceived to be lazy 

and possessing “disdain” for their routines. The peasants’ view of Victor Medina became a typical stereotype held by rural insurgents about 

their urban counterparts.49

The armed component swore an unbreakable vow of full compliance, “once you are in, you cannot escape the call of revolution.” Such 

a vow was more significant than the work of the auxiliary.50 An armed 

guerrilla explains, “if you compared people engaged in military activities with those involved in political propaganda, the members of the 

military unit developed higher levels of solidarity because they had to 

trust each other with their lives.”51

Public Component

The ELN has always viewed the public component of its work with 

great importance. As the ELN leader Fabio told his followers, the guerrillas needed to engage in th dual actions of military blows and the 

“gradual winning-over of whole peasant areas.”52 To this end, after the 

insurgency’s first military action, they distributed copies of their manifesto, and this pattern continued throughout many of their military 

actions. Urban guerrillas often created the propaganda materials to 

be distributed.53

Urban guerrillas produced newspapers and often wrote editorials. 

For example, in a typical editorial in October 1999, the ELN criticized 

the national government. In addition to accusing the government 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

of fomenting state terrorism and social inequality, the ELN called 

into questions the government’s motivation for pursuing peace with 

the rebels, accusing the government of trying to wear out the rebels 

through negotiations.54 The media has been an outlet for spreading 

their ideological paradigm, and today the ELN has a website (http://

www.eln-voces.com/) where they distribute their writings, as well as a 

Spanish-language magazine.55

IDEOLOGY

The modern ELN has integrated the liberation theology of Torres’s legacy with the Marxism first perpetuated by Vásquez. Additionally, the ELN has adopted a nuanced stance on neoliberalism to which 

they had previously been generally opposed. The stance presents 

“well-developed if controversial ideas regarding such issues as foreign 

investment and privatization.” The ELN makes a clear ideological distinction between their opposition to neoliberalism and their support 

of foreign investment in the extractive sector of Colombia’s economy.56

While opposing the privatization of the energy sector and other strategic industries, the ELN proposes that Colombians should welcome the 

investment of transnational corporations to limit dependence on other 

countries, mainly the United States. The ELN supports the development of “human, material, scientific and technological infrastructure” 

as long as the masses of Colombians are integrated and the profits are 

not held by the oligarchy.57

Most importantly, the “unique interpretations of Christianity and 

political realism” appeals to peasants and left-wing intellectuals alike.”58

The ideology informs the broad policy-level decisions of the ELN’s central command. The ELN resisted engaging in drug trafficking and 

chose to continue its commitment to the ideals of social justice and 

liberation theology. This resulted in the weakening of the group’s paramilitary wing.59

LEGITIMACY

The greatest legitimacy that the ELN seeks is the acquisition of a 

cease-fire zone to obtain primary political control. In the late 1990s, 

the FARC was given land to control, and the ELN has sought the same 

ownership ever since.60 However, the AUC has continually thwarted any 

gains to this end.61

Civic support has been critical to the sustainment of the ELN, particularly in relation to its peace-building efforts. To contrast with the 
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191

actions of the FARC, the ELN “has actively sought greater civil society 

input into its dialogues with the government.”62

Additionally, the foco nature of the ELN warrants intimate connections with local communities. One rural community experienced the 

ELN even arranging for marriages and divorces.63 The ELN provided 

for the rural communities; “[the ELN] helped the community, filled 

many vacuums left empty by the State . . . You might say that’s how a 

close and affectionate relationship was formed between the communities and the guerrillas.”64

MOTIVATION AND BEHAVIOR

The ELN’s origins lie in the Cuban Revolution. However, the ELN 

relied on the confluence of multiple ideologies and social groups to create a wide foundation of followers. Through their commitment to liberation theology, social justice and anti-neoliberalism, the ELN united 

Christians, middle-class professionals, and students—Colombians who 

were not represented by the Liberals or Conservatives.65

As stated in a previous section, the primary inspiration for the foundation of the ELN was the success of the Cuban Revolution, motivated 

by the possibility of overthrowing the oligarchy. Currently, the motivation behind the current actions of the ELN are twofold—the acquisition 

of their own cease-fire zone and the continual financial independence 

garnered by the pattern of kidnappings, extortion placed on corporations, and possibly the entry into the drug trade.

OPERATIONS

Paramilitary

The ELN used its paramilitary operations nearly exclusively for furthering its political agenda. The strength of the ELN lies in the political 

and social ideology rather than a tightly formed militaristic operation.

The fundamental premise inherent in the ELN’s strategic thinking is that ‘to the disgrace of Colombian 

society, the governing class will only listen to the voice 

of dynamite and of guns.’ Thus, due to the strong 

exclusionary tendencies that historically have blighted 

governing policy, the principal strategy of the ELN was 

to get the states attention through the clever and organized deployment of shocking and often nonmurderous spectacles. But this required substantial funding.66
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

The ELN has primarily targeted businesses, utilities, and the government, using firearms and bombs almost exclusively. The intention for 

the attacks was primarily hostage taking and kidnapping—correlating 

directly to the need for funding.

Food or water supply 

South America 

Terrorists 

Maritime 

Telecommunication 

Nongovernmental

organizations 

Violent political party 

Airports and airlines 

Educational institutions 

Tourists 

Unknown 

Government (diplomatic) 

Other 

Religious gures/

institutions 

Journalists/media 

Transportation 

Police 

Business 

Government

(general) 

Military 

Utilities 

Private citizens

and property 

Figure 7-5. ELN target types.

The rapid increase of incidents in the early 1980s is directly tied to 

the ELN’s time of rebuilding after almost complete annihilation in the 

late 1970s. In the 1980s, the leadership of the ELN refined their strategy, specifying specific regions of Colombia that held key economic 

resources. These regions were targeted in the early 1980s, reflected in 

the steep increase of attacks beginning in 1982. The late 1990s have 

shown a steady decrease in attacks, with the exception of 2001. Otherwise, the data demonstrates the declining power of the ELN in the 

twenty-first century.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

19721974197619781980198219841986198819901992199419961998200020022004200620082010

Year

Incidents

Figure 7-6. ELN incidents per year.
Chapter 7. ELN

193

The ELN relied upon extortions and kidnappings to almost entirely 

fund their operations, comprising over half of their attacks.

Firearms 

Hostage taking (barricade incident) 

Hijacking

Facility/infrastructure attack

Unknown 

Assassination 

Armed assault 

Hostage taking (kidnapping) 

Bombing/explosion

Figure 7-7. ELN attack types.

The complete shutdown of the Medellín power grid is an example of 

the typical action from the paramilitary. The ELN successfully bombed 

more than twenty power towers and power lines on January 17, 2000. 

The incident caused millions of Medellín residents to lose power. The 

motivation for this massive attack was to protest the nationalization of 

a power company. The ELN hoped to use the attack to pressure the 

government to establish a demilitarized zone for negotiations.67

A significant example of ELN and FARC collaboration occurred 

after the Colombian military bombed FARC headquarters in La Uribe. 

Both the FARC and the ELN “responded in kind by launching multiple attacks throughout the country.”68 This aggressive response 

was the beginning of a severe increase in attacks: 612 armed actions 

occurred in 1989 and barely 690 in 1990, but in 1991, 1,321 armed 

actions occurred.69

Other collaborative efforts included a series of deadly attacks, at 

least forty-two individual incidents, throughout the country on August 

3 and 4, 1998. The government, oil lines and pumps, and citizens were 

their targets—using bombs, car bombs, and other weapons—and 275 

individuals were killed.70

Their most deadly single attack occurred in Segovia on December 

18, 1998. The ELN targeted an oil pipeline using dynamite. After oil 

spilled into a nearby village, a fire erupted. Forty-eight villagers were 

killed, and more than one hundred were injured.71

The massive highway Autopista Medellín-Bogotá has proven to be a 

lucrative and significant holding for the ELN. Throughout the 1990s, 
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the ELN and the FARC jockeyed for greater control, imposing roadblocks or shutting down stretches of highway entirely. The ELN would 

impose taxes at the roadblocks, or “engage in pescas milagrosas, or ‘miracle fishing,’ that is, random kidnappings for ransom of drivers and 

passengers travelling the road.”72 In February 2000, the ELN blocked 

the eastern section of the highway, prohibiting the flow of goods and 

services in and out of the towns along the roads.73 Eight thousand locals 

were forced to relocate.

Autopista MedellinBogota

Primary Roads

Manizales

Ibague

Bucaramanga

Medellín

Cali

Bogotá

Figure 7-8. Highway Autopista Medellín-Bogotá.

In an effort to purge a Medellín neighborhood of guerrilla and 

criminal elements, President Uribe ordered a massive military offensive strategy at the end of 2002. In retaliation, the ELN imposed a tenday blockade of three regions (Cocorná, San Luis, and Granada). In 

an effort to isolate villages and prevent inter-municipality travel and 

communication, the guerrillas bombed electrical towers and blew 

up bridges and roads.74 The operation also prevented villagers from 

accessing food or medical care. Authorities eventually reached a consensus with local ELN leaders, promising to remedy social inequality in 

the region.

The ELN was never particularly successful against the direct attacks 

of the Colombian military. Their strategy has been to retreat and 

return to designated safe houses. Segovia is a mining village in the 

mountainous jungle of Antioquia. The ELN had long held Segovia as a 

safe haven, even after the FARC moved to the area. In fact, both insurgencies “enjoyed a sense of invulnerability in the area.”75 After a military offensive launched by the Colombian government in 1970, which 

nearly wiped out the ELN, the rebels said they were open to peace 

talks. While the ELN retreated further into the mountains to regroup, 

the military retreated. When no peace negotiations began, the ELN 

slowly reemerged to retake control of Segovia.76
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195

Administrative

Frequently, recruits became of member of the ELN because of a 

connection already involved in either the armed component or the 

underground/auxiliary sectors. Bautista’s experience is an instructive 

example of joining the ELN early in its early inception. His parents 

were early supporters of Fabio Vásquez, and their introduction to the 

insurgency was integral to his life commitment to the revolution.77 In 

fact, fifty-seven percent of CRS members (ELN splinter group) claim 

family influence as their reason for entering the guerrilla movement.78

The ELN’s intellectual image was perpetuated by the recruits; 

one hundred percent of studied CRS members cited Communist propaganda, clandestine guerrilla literature, left-wing publications, or 

popular literature as an influence,79 and the majority of recruits claim 

their concern for social injustice or sympathy with Communist and 

nationalist ideologies were significant motivators for joining the guerrilla movement.80

Once in the movement, recruits underwent various ritualized stages 

of induction—a new name (baptism), wooden stick training or baptism 

by fire, educational courses, and a highly regimented daily schedule.81

A guerrilla’s identity could become fully immersed in the insurgency.

For many guerrillas, the insurgency overtook all other facets of 

their lives. Rural guerrillas especially were subject to the insurgency’s 

total command. One guerrilla speaks; “as an individual, I depended 

on the organization for everything” from clothes, girlfriends, to food, 

housing and access to health care.82 This dependence created a natural 

opportunity for guerrillas to find their identities in the insurgency.

Additionally, self-sacrifice was always integral to forming loyalty 

and commitment among the ranks of guerrillas. A former guerrilla 

provides this account:

When you were fighting, sometimes you needed to hold 

off the enemy attack while other members escaped. 

You put your life in jeopardy for others. It happened 

to me many times when I was protecting the leadership of the movement. . . . In everyday life, sometimes 

a comrade’s hammock got broken so you needed to 

share your hammock, despite the fact that the other 

person was not your friend or lover. During times 

when food was scarce, everybody ate equal portions. 

On long walks, males helped females by carrying their 

backpacks. And when we were fighting, we never left 

the wounded or dead behind. In jail everybody tries 

to help each other. There are many more examples. 
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We lived like siblings. I loved my comrades in that way. 

They were my family.83

The following gruesome tale depicts the sacrificial demands 

Vásquez placed on guerrillas under his command. In a time of food 

rationing, one guerrilla was found to have eaten more than his share. 

He was condemned to death, executed by a firing squad of his own 

companions.84

While leaving an insurgent guerrilla group can be challenging, once 

a guerrilla has left, apparently they received no retaliation from the 

ELN. The ELN’s strong ideology determines the targets of its attacks, 

yet former guerrilla members hold immunity from the ELN’s paramilitary actions because they have entered into agreements with the government. The splinter group, CRS, received no retaliatory attacks once 

they reached a demobilization agreement.85

Psychological

The ELN has always emphasized the ideological battle, rather 

than the militaristic, violent acts that characterized the FARC or the 

AUC. The likely and recent engagement in the drug trade is a significant departure from the ideological commitment to political action 

espoused during the fourth Congress session in 2006.86

Political

The ELN has long relied on kidnappings and extortion as their 

primary sources of revenue. These acts have also held political significance. As discussed previously, the ELN struggled with achieving political legitimacy, particularly in relation to the FARC. The conjunction of 

multiple actions has raised the ELN’s national and international profile, providing the ELN with more independent negotiating power in 

its search for a demilitarized zone.

Several high-profile “retentions” between 1999 and 2000 are particularly noteworthy in this regard. The ELN initiated the kidnappings not 

for the typical profit motive, but as public relations schemes designed to 

attract global media coverage. In addition to the kidnappings, the ELN 

adopted two other tactics to complement its media exposure strategy.87

The first was the ELN’s bombing of the Medellín power grid, causing 

millions to be without power.88 Another tactic was the perpetual bombing of oil pipelines, costing the “Colombian government and private 

businesses $32 billion between 1998 and October 2000.”89 These tactics avoided the indiscriminate violence used by other insurgencies and 
Chapter 7. ELN

197

eventually influenced the state to engage in dialogue with the ELN.90

Lastly, in an effort to further the plan to declare a peace zone in Sonson, the ELN kidnapped the mayor in 2001, which is one example of 

the politically motivated kidnappings for which the ELN is known.91

The ELN leadership has vocally criticized insurgencies for setting 

aside their weapons and becoming legitimate actors in the political process. For example, M-19 is a former left-wing insurgent group that ceased 

violent action in exchange for political legitimacy as a recognized political party. Manuel Pérez Martínez has publicly criticized the abandonment of arms, stating: “They not only lost their weapons . . . they lost 

their ideals . . . We find no difference between the political practices of 

traditional parties and those of the M-19.”92 This outright criticism is an 

indication of the remaining distrust of the established political system, 

regardless of the actors.

Surprisingly, the ELN has found a potential political alliance with 

the emerging left party, PDA. The PDA has made significant gains in 

local elections, and the ELN publicly supported the PDA presidential 

candidate in 2006.93

EXTERNAL ACTORS AND TRANSNATIONAL 

INFLUENCES

Many countries have demonstrated real commitment to finding a 

successful and peaceful path to a cease-fire agreement with the ELN. 

While the ELN is regularly considered second tier compared to the 

FARC, the ELN’s ideological commitment garnered sympathy from 

the international community. Despite repeated failures at coming to 

a peace agreement, the ELN continues to receive support. Attempts 

at peace have always found ready advocates in various countries, institutions, or even celebrities. Safe houses and protected passage are 

typically provided for ELN negotiations.94 However, to date, no peace 

accords have been reached.

Cuba

Cuba has long held an affinity toward the ELN and has hosted 

peace negations, expressing an interest in legitimizing the insurgency. 

In November 2002, a declaration of intent was signed, signaling the 

ELN’s commitment to peace, but the declaration was abandoned during the change of presidential administrations.95 An ELN commander 

was released from government imprisonment for the expressed reason 

of attending peace talks held in Havana in 2005.96 After Fidel Castro 
198

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

stepped down as Cuban president in 2008, his successor and brother, 

Raúl Castro, began facilitating peace negotiations.97

Nicaragua

In addition to the clear influence of the Cuban Revolution, the 

success of the Nicaraguan Sandinistas was very influential to the ELN 

beginning in the late 1970s. The Sandinistas were also influenced by 

the Cuban Revolution, and their success in establishing a left-wing government bolstered the resolve of the ELN. The ELN sent some members 

to Nicaragua to witness the final takeover of the government there.98

Spain

In 1997, an ambitious “preagreement” was crafted between the ELN 

and the Colombian government, facilitated by the Colombian National 

Conciliation Commission. This broad-sweeping preagreement was “to 

have been studied and ratified by the ELN Central Command and the 

Colombian president, but before these steps could be taken, news of 

the plan was leaked, and the resulting public debate prevented those 

last steps from being taken.”99

Costa Rica

Costa Rica hosted a broad spectrum peace talk in October 2000. 

The FARC declined to attend, but the ELN has demonstrated consistent interest in peace negotiations in the twenty-first century.100

Venezuela

The ELN received implicit support from Venezuela. Prior to his 

death, former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez provided “guerrilla 

units the ability to cross Venezuelan borders to ‘rest and re-supply with 

little concern that they would be pursued by Venezuelan forces.’ ”101

At this time, it is unknown whether the current Venezuelan president 

Nicolás Maduro Moros will continue to provide that support, though 

given that he is an avid supporter of the Cuba, it is highly likely that he 

would therefore continue support to the ELN.
Chapter 7. ELN

199

Germany

Germany hosted civic leaders conducting peace negotiations with 

the ELN in the late 1990s.102 A significant negation occurred in Germany, where the ELN signed an agreement “stating that it would not 

kidnap pregnant women or anyone over seventy-five years of age.”103

FINANCES, LOGISTICS, AND SUSTAINMENT

After a period of internal struggle, the leadership of the ELN understood that it needed to attain financial solvency. To that end, during 

the mid-1980s, the ELN devised a plan to gain control of targeted key 

resource-rich, economically significant areas. “These strategic regions 

were concentrated in the Magdalena Medio area, as well as in the country’s frontier with Venezuela. More specifically, the ELN planned to 

play a dominant role in the oil-producing area of Barrancabermeja, in 

the coal-producing region of Carmen and San Vicente, as well as in the 

northern Antioquia and southern Cauca, which were the site[s] of strategic highways and important agricultural production. The ELN also 

established a strong presence in Norte de Santander, near the country’s border with Venezuela, as well as in Urabá, the banana-producing 

region of the Caribbean coast.”104

The ELN hoped to exploit the resource-rich areas to supplement 

its coffers. The ELN planned to impose “taxes” (impuestos)—extortion—on the businesses in these areas, specifically the multinational 

corporations. In addition to imposing taxes, the ELN employed “retentions”—kidnappings—mostly of high-level foreign executives hired by 

multinational corporations in the extractive sector.105 Additionally, the 

ELN has gained enough legitimacy to negotiate with these corporations directly; in exchange for taxes, the ELN guarantees they will not 

damage infrastructure or kidnap employees.106
200

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Amazonas

Vaupés

Guainía

Guaviare

Putumayo Caquetá

Nariño

Cauca

Tolima

Meta

Vichada

Casanare

Antioquia

Chocó

Córdoba

Sucre

 La

Guajira

Atlántico

Magdalena 

Arauca

Cesar

Bolivar

Santander

Norte 

de

Santander

Boyacá Caldas

Quindío

Risaralda Cundinamarca

Huila

Valle del

Cauca Distrito

Capital

220–400 operations

160–220 operations

80–160 operations

1–80 operations

ELN Influence

Figure 7-9. ELN areas of influence.
Chapter 7. ELN

201

0.0

20.0

40.0

60.0

80.0

100.0

120.0

Kidnappings/

ransoms

Extortion

(including from

the petroleum

industry)

Gold/coal Drugs Transportation Diversion of

government

funds

Other

1991 1994

Revenue Source

US Dollars (Millions)

Figure  7-10. Estimates of ELN revenues, in 1991 and 1994, in millions of 

US dollars.

The significance of this model cannot be underestimated: “While 

Soviet-supported leftist groups would begin their swan song in the 

1980s, the ELN would ride a wave of increasing power through the dawn 

of the twenty-first century.”107 The economic independence gained by 

the ELN’s practice of extortion and kidnapping has fueled its ability to 

survive into the twenty-first century.

There is evidence that the ELN’s reliance on drug trafficking has 

increased as its emphasis on extortion and kidnapping has decreased.108

This shift has occurred primarily within the last ten years, but there is 

inconsistency on exact numbers. Known areas of influence for these 

recent ELN activities reside in the drug trafficking realm, specifically 

on the Venezuelan border.109

The ELN’s reliance on independent financing was a significant factor in its sustainment after the fall of the Soviet empire. The resistance 

to changing financing sources could have contributed to a decline in 

their significance at the turn of the century. Also, there is evidence 

that resistance may be waning. At the ELN Congress session in 1996, 

Manuel Pérez, ELN leader, decided “not to get involved in drug trafficking” as involvement in drug trafficking was not in line with ELN 

moral principles.110 At this time, financing sources declined. “Only a 

few of its fronts collect taxes from the campesinos who grow coca or from 

those who produce coca paste. Kidnapping and extortion of foreign 

companies—the ELN’s main sources of financing in past decades—

have diminished.”111 The FARC and the paramilitaries adapted to the 

new opportunities presented by the drug trade, and initially the ELN 

declined to participate. This trend appears to be changing, however, as 

ELN attacks in drug trafficking regions have significantly increased.

The logistical details were less successfully executed than the plan 

for independent financing. Unless the rare headquarter camp could 
202

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

be established, the ELN often struggled to acquire sufficient resources 

for guerrillas, leading to desertion. Constant movement, tedium, and 

a lack of supplies nurtured disputes and revenges.112 Punishment for 

eating more than “ones share” could have devastating, even deadly consequences, but “the stiff application of a vague code of behavior promoted fear and disrespect from the low ranks to the cadres.”113

A typical logistical failure of the ELN was in the delegation of cooking. Cooking for fellow guerrillas was a task adamantly avoided by rural, 

jungle-based guerrillas. Those in charge of cooking by necessity moved 

slower through the jungle; “the transportation of pans, supplies and 

foodstuffs was burdensome and loud. . . . A cook was thus an easy target 

during an attack.”114 This task was given to guerrillas as punishment or 

to shame a fellow guerrilla. This inability to delegate such a banal task 

demonstrates why internal divisions threatened to disestablish the ELN. 

These internal conflicts have lessened under Bautista’s leadership.

ENDNOTES

1 Juan Carlos Sánchez Sierra, “Worshiping Leadership: Morality, Revolutionary Values, 

and the Politics of Magnicidio (Assassination) in the Case of Camilo Torres and Fabio 

Vásquez with the ELN, Colombia 1963–1978” (dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2011), 91.

2 José A. Moreno, “Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare: Doctrine, Practice and Evaluation,” 

Comparative Studies in Society and History 12, no. 2 (1970): 114–133, http://www.jstor.org/

stable/177959.

3 Jasmin Hristov, Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia (Athens, OH: Ohio 

University Press, 2009), 3.

4 Bouvier, Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War, 102.

5 Ibid., 252.

6 Ibid., 102.

7 “ELN,” InSightCrime, accessed July 9, 2013, http://www.insightcrime.org/groupscolombia/eln.

8 Human Rights Watch, War Without Quarter: Colombia and International Humanitarian Law 

(New York, Washington, London, Brussels: Human Rights Watch, 1998), 162–163.

9 Bouvier, Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War, 102.

10 Ibid. 98–99.

11 Ibid., 98.

12 Sánchez Sierra, “Worshiping Leadership: Morality, Revolutionary Values, and the Politics of Magnicidio (Assassination) in the Case of Camilo Torres and Fabio Vásquez with 

the ELN, Colombia 1963–1978,” 91.

13 Ibid., 92.

14 Broderick, Camilo Torres: A Biography of the Priest- Guerrillaero, 201.

15 James F. Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003), 104.

16 Ibid., 125.
Chapter 7. ELN

203

17 Ibid., 127.

18 Ibid., 126.

19 Ibid.

20 Geoffrey Ramsey, “Colombia Raids Rebel Camp with Dance Floor, Bar,” 

InSightCrime, November 2, 2012, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/

colombia-raids-guerrilla-camp-with-dance-floor-bar.

21 Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico, 104.

22 Sánchez Sierra, “Worshiping Leadership: Morality, Revolutionary Values, and the Politics of Magnicidio (Assassination) in the Case of Camilo Torres and Fabio Vásquez with 

the ELN, Colombia 1963–1978,” 294.

23 Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico, 103.

24 Ramsey, “Colombia Raids Rebel Camp with Dance Floor, Bar.”

25 Sánchez Sierra, “Worshiping Leadership: Morality, Revolutionary Values, and the Politics of Magnicidio (Assassination) in the Case of Camilo Torres and Fabio Vásquez with 

the ELN, Colombia 1963–1978,” 94.

26 Ibid., 95.

27 Ibid., 96.

28 Ibid., 91.

29 Walter J. Broderick, Camilo Torres: A Biography of the Priest-Guerrillero (New York: Doubleday, 1975), 30.

30 Phillip Berryman, Liberation Theology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 17.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., 18.

33 Virginia M. Bouvier, Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War (Washington, DC: Endowment of the United States Institution of Peace, 2009), 39.

34 Mauricio Florez-Morris, “Reinsert Life Stories: A Description of the Colombian Ex-Guerrillas’ Life-Course from a Sociological Perspective” (dissertation, University of Maryland, 

College Park, 2005), 2.

35 Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico, 103.

36 Sánchez Sierra, “Worshiping Leadership: Morality, Revolutionary Values, and the Politics of Magnicidio (Assassination) in the Case of Camilo Torres and Fabio Vásquez with 

the ELN, Colombia 1963–1978,” 106.

37 Ibid., 107.

38 Ibid., 111.

39 Florez-Morris, “Reinsert Life Stories: A Description of the Colombian Ex-Guerrillas’ 

Life-Course from a Sociological Perspective,” 79.

40 Ibid., 114.

41 Broderick, Camilo Torres: A Biography of the Priest- Guerrillaero, 215.

42 Florez-Morris, “Reinsert Life Stories: A Description of the Colombian Ex-Guerrillas’ 

Life-Course from a Sociological Perspective,” 128.

43 Ibid.,121.

44 Ibid., 99.

45 Ibid., 107.

46 Broderick, Camilo Torres: A Biography of the Priest- Guerrillaero, 270.

47 Sánchez Sierra, “Worshiping Leadership: Morality, Revolutionary Values, and the Politics of Magnicidio (Assassination) in the Case of Camilo Torres and Fabio Vásquez with 

the ELN, Colombia 1963–1978,” 108.

48 Ibid., 128 (footnote).

49 Ibid., 114.
204

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

50 Ibid., 124.

51 Florez-Morris, “Reinsert Life Stories: A Description of the Colombian Ex-Guerrillas’ 

Life-Course from a Sociological Perspective,” 124.

52 Broderick, Camilo Torres: A Biography of the Priest- Guerrillaero, 266.

53 Sánchez Sierra, “Worshiping Leadership: Morality, Revolutionary Values, and the Politics of Magnicidio (Assassination) in the Case of Camilo Torres and Fabio Vásquez with 

the ELN, Colombia 1963–1978,” 112.

54 Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico, 124.

55 Juan Carlos Sánchez Sierra, “Discourse, Practices, and Historical Representations in Two 

Guerilla Groups: The ELN and MPLA, Colombia-Angola, 1956–1986” (master’s thesis, 

Social, Political, Ethical, and Cultural Thought, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 

University, 2008).

56 Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico, 123.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid., 103.

59 Bouvier, Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War, 104.

60 Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico, 127.

61 Bouvier, Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War, 57.

62 Ibid., 34.

63 Ibid., 251.

64 Ibid., 282.

65 Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico, 104.

66 Ibid., 125.

67 Global Terrorism Database (GTD), National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Incident Summary Report for GTD ID# 

200001170004, Colombia,” http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.

aspx?gtdid=200001170004.

68 Bouvier, Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War, 45.

69 Ibid.

70 Global Terrorism Database (GTD), National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Incident Summary Report for GTD ID# 

199808030008, Colombia,” http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.

aspx?gtdid=199808030008.

71 Global Terrorism Database (GTD), National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Incident Summary Report for GTD ID# 

199810180002, Colombia,” http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.

aspx?gtdid=199810180002.

72 Bouvier, Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War, 287.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid., 290.

75 Steven Dudley, Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia (New York: Routledge, 2004), 118.

76 Ibid., 118.

77 Sánchez Sierra, “Worshiping Leadership: Morality, Revolutionary Values, and the Politics of Magnicidio (Assassination) in the Case of Camilo Torres and Fabio Vásquez with 

the ELN, Colombia 1963–1978,” 106.

78 Florez-Morris, “Reinsert Life Stories: A Description of the Colombian Ex-Guerrillas’ 

Life-Course from a Sociological Perspective,” 87.

79 Ibid., 102.
Chapter 7. ELN

205

80 Ibid., 113.

81 Sánchez Sierra, “Discourse, Practices, and Historical Representations in Two Guerilla 

Groups: The ELN and MPLA, Colombia-Angola, 1956–1986,” 68.

82 Florez-Morris, “Reinsert Life Stories: A Description of the Colombian Ex-Guerrillas’ 

Life-Course from a Sociological Perspective,” 118.

83 Ibid., 126.

84 Sánchez Sierra, “Discourse, Practices, and Historical Representations in Two Guerilla 

Groups: The ELN and MPLA, Colombia-Angola, 1956–1986,” 75.

85 Bouvier, Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War, 51.

86 Ibid., 99.

87 Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico, 126.

88 Global Terrorism Database (GTD), “Incident Summary Report for GTD ID# 

200001170004, Colombia.”

89 Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico, 126.

90 Ibid., 126.

91 Bouvier, Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War, 252.

92 Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico, 122.

93 Bouvier, Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War, 99.

94 Ibid., 103.

95 Ibid., 109.

96 Ibid., 33.

97 Julia E. Sweig, “The Revolution of Santos,” Folha de Sao Paulo, September 26, 2012, http://

www.cfr.org/colombia/revolution-santos/p29146.

98 Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico, 105.

99 Bouvier, Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War, 105.

100 Ibid., 28.

101 J. Peter Pham, Foreign Terrorist Organization Policy Briefing Book: Ejército de Liberación Nacional (Colombia: National Liberation Army, ELN, 2006), POSC 435, 6, http://www.jmu.

edu/mwa/docs/2007/Morin.pdf.

102 Ibid., 23.

103 Ibid., 107.

104Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico, 104.

105 Ibid., 125.

106 Ibid., 126.

107 Ibid., 105.

108Bouvier, Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War, 13.

109 “ELN in Venezuela,” InSightCrime, accessed July 9, 2013, http://www.insightcrime.org/

groups-venezuela/eln-in-venezuela.

110 Bouvier, Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War, 98.

111 Ibid.

112 Sánchez Sierra, “Discourse, Practices, and Historical Representations in Two Guerilla 

Groups: The ELN and MPLA, Colombia-Angola, 1956–1986,” 74.

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid., 76.

CHAPTER 8.

MOVIMIENTO 19 DE ABRIL (M-19)

Chapter 8. M-19

209

TIMELINE

1849 Conservative and Liberal Parties are founded.

1899–1903 “The War of the Thousand Days”—120,000 people die in 

civil war between Liberals and Conservatives.

1946 (–1965) La Violencia (“The Violence”), a localized civil war characterized by widespread violence between Liberal and 

Conservatives in the countryside. The conflict resulted in 

the deaths of 180,000–300,000 Colombians.

April 9, 1948 Liberal Party presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán 

Ayala is assassinated in Bogotá. The assassin is killed on 

the spot and the Bogotazo riot ensues.

1949 Conservative Party candidate Laureano Gómez Castro 

wins the presidential election. Colombian Communist 

Party introduces “mass self-defense” as means for peasants to protect themselves from armed Conservatives.

June 1, 1953 President Gomez is deposed by a military coup. General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla becomes the new president of 

Colombia.

May 1, 1957 President Rojas resigns under the pressure of Liberals 

and Conservatives united under a combined political 

entity called the “National Front.”

1958 Conservatives and Liberals agree to form the National 

Front, a power-sharing agreement, in a bid to end civil 

war.

August 7, 1958 The first National Front president, Alberto Lleras Carmago, takes office.

August 1962 President Leon Valencia Munoz is inaugurated.

1970 National People’s alliance is formed as a left-wing counterweight to the National Front.

April 19, 1970 Populist party the National Popular Alliance is denied 

electoral victory by Conservatives; the M-19 guerrilla 

group emerges.

January 1974 M-19 members steal Simón Bolívar’s sword, gaining 

national attention.

February 1976 M-19 kidnaps, tries, and executes José Raquel Mercado, 

president of Confederation of Workers of Colombia.

1976–1978 M-19 engages in public actions, such as the distribution 

of milk, chocolate, and toys, alongside its armed propaganda operations.

1978 President Turbay begins intense fight against drug 

traffickers.

December 31, 

1979

M-19 tunnels into a Colombian Army weapons depot, 

taking more than 5,000 weapons.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

February 1980 M-19 guerrillas seize the Dominican Republics’ embassy 

in Bogotá; hostages are held for sixty-one days.

August 1982 President Belisario Betancur Cuartas is inaugurated. 

During his inaugural speech, he announces that the 

Colombian government will engage in peace negotiations with leftist guerrillas.

November 18, 

1982

President Betancur signs Congressional Law 35, granting 

general amnesty to all guerrilla combatants.

May 28, 1984 Cease-fire begins under the Aribe Agreement.

1985 Eleven judges and ninety others are killed after M-19 

guerrillas force their way into the Palace of Justice.

August 1986 President Virgilio Barco Vargas is inaugurated.

May 1988 M-19 kidnaps Conservative party leader Álvaro Gómez 

Hurtado. Hurtado is released two months later in 

exchange for the promise of a national summit to 

include guerrilla representatives.

March 1, 1989 Colombian government and M-19 sign the Cauca Declaration, providing the rebels safe haven and opening the 

way for talks and eventual demobilization.

March 1990 M-19 becomes a political party, the Alianza Democrática 

M-19 (AD-M-19).

August 1990 President César Gaviria Trujillo is inaugurated.

February 1, 

1991

Bolívar’s sword is returned as a symbol of M-19’s 

demobilization.

ORIGINS OF M-19

The Movimiento 19 de Abril, or M-19, was founded in 1972 by a 

diverse group of about twenty1 students, artists, and professionals disenchanted by the restricted opportunities for democratic participation in Colombian politics. Several of its early progenitors had already 

taken up arms with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 

(FARC) and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) but were dissatisfied with the groups’ ideologies and strategies.

For the M-19 founders, the presidential elections held on 

April  19,  1970, defined Colombia’s anemic democratic institutions. 

The National Front pact that ended Rojas’s dictatorship officially 

restricted participation in elections to the Liberal and Conservative 

Parties. However, political opposition to the two parties’ dominance 

did arise. Popular movements, such as Rojas’s Alianza Nacional Popular (ANAPO, or National Popular Alliance), ran candidates under the 
Chapter 8. M-19

211

Liberal and Conservative labels to challenge the establishment. Rojas 

founded his party in 1961 after returning from exile, appealing to the 

urban masses and peasantry by promising solutions to the high unemployment and inflation plaguing the country.2

 The former dictator ran 

under the Conservative label in the 1970 presidential elections against 

the National Front Conservative candidate, Misael Pastrana Borrero.a

A poll conducted shortly before the election showed Rojas with a comfortable lead ahead of Pastrana. Nevertheless, National Front candidate Pastrana was announced the victor. Many in Colombia, including 

the M-19 founders, believed that Rojas was robbed of his victory by systematic electoral fraud.

The group’s adoption of the date as the name for its movement 

signaled its intentions to protect the people against electoral theft 

through force of arms. At first, M-19 leaders had thought to form 

“urban guerrilla enclaves under the name Movimiento de Liberación 

Nacional (MLN)” after the example of the Uruguayan Tupamaros. The 

disgruntled popular sentiment sweeping across Colombia after Rojas’s 

defeat, however, convinced M-19 founders to adopt a name based on 

the national event.3

Despite their firm connections with Rojas’s popular movement 

and the associated party ANAPO, the formation of M-19 also owed a 

great deal to the FARC. Several of its founders, including Jaime Bateman, were former FARC guerrillas. The FARC itself claimed that M-19 

evolved from its urban wing. In support of that conjecture, FARC leader 

Jacob Arenas argued that his organization provided the men, money, 

and ideas for M-19. In this regard, M-19 could be considered a FARC 

“fifth column,” operating within ANAPO. Ultimately, however, FARC 

leadership was unable to resolve the “internal contradictions” with 

Bateman, who firmly severed ties to the organization.4 In describing its 

own origins, M-19 emphasized its links to ANAPO, not the FARC.

a The pact establishing the National Front ensured that the presidency rotated 

between the Liberal and Conservative parties each election year. The presidency rotated 

to the Conservative party in 1970, so each candidate who ran did so under the Conservative label.
212

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Figure 8-1. Flag of M-19.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, LEADERSHIP, 

AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

Organizational Structure

M-19, unlike most leftist insurgent groups in Colombia at the time, 

adopted a specifically urban strategy early in its formation. M-19’s focus 

on urban centers as the primary theater of operations necessitated a 

structure that relied heavily on an underground that was organized 

with a cellular structure. Its structure maximized secrecy through a 

technique called compartmentalization. The early structure of the 

group emphasized the weight M-19 leadership accorded the political aspect of an insurgency. While M-19 maintained that substantive 

change in Colombia’s political system necessitated force of arms, the 

group’s leadership also recognized the importance of education and 

organization amongst the “masses.” Forming a popular army capable 

of defeating Colombian security forces first required uniting different 

sectors of Colombian society, each with their own interests, through 

influencing public opinion.b As the group matured, M-19 moved into 

the rural hinterlands, with limited success. The group adopted a more 

traditional, hierarchical structure to meet the demands of rural insurgency that relied more on force of arms, not politics, to achieve its objectives. M-19’s organizational structure was highly flexible and adaptable. 

The group’s periodic changes in strategy and tactics frequently led to 

low-level organizational restructure to accommodate the alterations.

b See Crossett and Newton on Solidarity for an example of a social movement that 

successfully developed a narrative and program capable of uniting disparate sectors 

of society.5
Chapter 8. M-19

213

(column leaders)

Pilar, Iván, Pedro, el Karateca, Máximo, Marcela, 

Ariosto, Ernesto, Rosa la Primorosa, Arturo, 

el Gamín, Félix, Adriana, other muchachos

and muchachas

Fayad

(national leader 

of the PMO)

Violeta Facundo Abraham Maria

(PMO ofcials)

Manuel Dúmar Palomo

(hierarchical superiors)

Pacho Alvear

Figure 8-2. An example of an organizational structure adopted by M-19.

Leadership

M-19 leadership was drawn from a number of existing guerrilla 

organizations as well as from various regions and professions. Unfortunately for M-19, the Colombian government and paramilitaries proved 

especially effective in decimating the ranks of the M-19 leadership, at 

times severely hampering the group’s operational capability. The earliest M-19 leader, Jaime Bateman Cayón, perished in a plane crash in 

1983. In the 1980s, M-19 commanders Iván Marino Ospina, Álvaro 

Fayad Delgado, and Carlos Pizarro Leongómez were all murdered by 

Colombian security forces or the paramilitaries.6 Antonio Navarro 

Wolff assumed leadership of the demobilized guerrillas after Pizarro’s 

murder in 1990.

These leaders were drawn from several different existing organizations. One contingent, including Jaime Bateman Cayón, Álvaro 

Fayad Delgado, Iván Marino Ospina, and Carlos Pizarro Leongómez, 

migrated to M-19 from the Communist party and the FARC. A separate 

cadre came from the socialist ANAPO, including Carlos Toledo Plata, 

Andrés Almarales, and Israel Santamaría.7

The early founders of the group, mostly young people, came from 

Colombian urban centers such as Bogotá, Cali, and Santa Marta. Each 
214

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

region exhibits distinct characteristics, which clearly had an imprint 

on the overall style and tenor of the group. Most notable is the impact 

of the charismatic Jaime Bateman Cayón, acknowledged as the group’s 

primary founder, a tall, lanky, handsome man from the Caribbean 

city of Santa Marta. Bateman, famous for his endurance and skill in 

dancing, had been expelled from the ascetic FARC. He had repeatedly 

urged FARC leadership to take the fight to the cities rather than focusing solely on the hinterlands.8

Bateman is also attributed with developing M-19’s distinctive relaxed, 

warm discourse, which separated them from the harsher, rigid style of 

the typical leftist guerrillas. He articulated a “vital new discourse that 

was warm and very easy for common people to understand.” The M-19’s 

famous early motto, “Revolution is a Party,” was also Bateman’s invention. The sentiment “surmised a mood, a spirit that was expressed in 

day-to-day life” of M-19.9

In contrast to the leadership of the other guerrilla groups in Colombia, M-19’s leadership and core members were disproportionately drawn 

from the ruling classes of the country.

Jaime Bateman Cayón (“El Flaco”)

Bateman was born into a middle-class, liberal family in Santa Marta 

in 1940. Bateman’s childhood proximity to the United Fruit Company 

factories influenced his participation in insurgent groups. There, he 

saw the common Colombian worker banned from the company’s stores, 

pools, and other amenities while bearing the brunt of the labor. His 

participation in contentious political activity began at an early age. 

He joined protests against then dictator General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 

in 1957. Bateman also later joined various Communist organizations, 

even traveling to Moscow, where he trained in the social sciences. Later, 

Bateman joined the FARC, where he acted as the secretary for Manuel 

Marulanda, Jacob Arenas, and Ciro Trujillo.10 He left the organization because of disputes with its leaders.11 Bateman reportedly favored 

initiating armed insurrection in urban environments and including 

nationalist elements in the struggle, a position with which the FARC 

leadership did not agree. Bateman died in a plane crash in Panama 

in 1983.12

Álvaro Fayad Delgado (“El Turco”)

Like other leaders, Fayad was an educated man, trained in psychology at the National University of Colombia. He was raised in Cartago, 

Valle de Cauca Department. Fayad first participated in leftist political 

activity as a member of a Communist youth organization. While there, 

he met Bateman and helped found the M-19. He was imprisoned after 
Chapter 8. M-19

215

Operation Colombia but was pardoned by President Betancur in 1982. 

Fayad took over the leadership of the group in 1985. He was the primary instigator of the Palace of Justice siege. In 1986, policemen killed 

Fayad in a friend’s home in Bogotá.13

Iván Marino Ospina (“Felipe Gonzalez”)

Marino was born in the Valle de Cauca Department. He joined a 

Communist youth organization, through which he met his fellow M-19 

founders. Marino took leadership of the M-19 in 1983 after Bateman’s 

death that same year. He perished in 1985 during a firefight with the 

Colombian army in Cali.

Carlos Pizarro Leongómez (“Antonio or Caballo Loco”)

Pizarro was born into a privileged family, the son of Navy Admiral 

Juan Antonio Pizarro. An educated man, Pizarro studied law at the 

National University of Colombia, where he participated in leftist political activism. He later joined the FARC but left, with Bateman and others, after disagreements with FARC leadership, to found M-19. Pizarro 

was imprisoned in 1979 after his arrest in the Santander Department, 

but he was granted amnesty by President Betancur in 1982. Pizarro 

became the M-19’s commander in 1986 and led the group to the negotiating table with the Colombian government in 1989. Pizarro was assassinated while aboard a commercial airliner en route to political rallies. 

At the time, he was a presidential candidate in the 1990 elections. The 

Colombian authorities ultimately held the leader of the Autodefensas 

Unidas de Colombia (AUC), Carlos Castaño, responsible for his death.14

Figure 8-3. Carlos Pizarro.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Antonio Navarro Wolff

Navarro assumed leadership of the demobilized M-19 after the 

paramilitaries assassinated Pizarro. An engineer by trade, Navarro was 

educated at both Londonborough University in Britain and University of Valle in Colombia, where he later became a professor. Navarro 

joined the M-19 guerrillas in the 1970s, participating in the infamous 

Palace of Justice siege in 1985. Later that same year, he lost the lower 

part of his left leg in an army grenade attack.15 After the demobilization and disarmament of the M-19, Navarro launched a successful and 

distinguished political career. After a failed presidential campaign in 

1990, President Gaviria appointed him minister of health. In the 1990s, 

Navarro was elected mayor and served two terms in the Colombian congress, once as a representative and later as a senator. In 2008, Navarro 

was elected governor of the Nariño Department.16 Currently, Navarro is 

the national spokesman for the Progressive Movement.17

Figure 8-4. Antonio Navarro Wolff.

Command and Control

The cellular structure favored by M-19 presented difficulties for 

command and control. M-19 leadership was able to influence the strategic direction and tactical integrity through a number of functions. 

Underground members of various urban cells report that they established automatic meetings with their fellow operatives in order to maintain contact, train, and plan operations. Despite these challenges, and 

the military structure of the organization, M-19 tried to implement its 
Chapter 8. M-19

217

political ideals internally. As a result, M-19 members made many of the 

group’s decisions collectively.18

M-19 leaders also regularly held national conferences to set the strategic direction for the upcoming year.19 One of the most important 

national conferences was the seventh, held in June of 1979.20 There, 

the M-19 defined their overarching political objective as the struggle 

for democracy, clearly separating the group from its Communist counterparts such as the ELN or the FARC. The last, and perhaps most significant national conference, took place in October 1989. At the tenth 

national conference, 227 of 230 M-19 insurgents who had gathered 

there voted to disarm and demobilize.21

COMPONENTS OF THE INSURGENCY

Underground and Auxiliary

M-19 leadership adopted a cellular structure to organize its underground networks operating in major urban centers such as Bogotá, 

Medellín, and Cali. Insurgent organizations with a cellular structure 

typically trade off a tight command-and-control apparatus for the integrity of the organization in dense, urban environments. Other urban 

insurgent movements also adopted a cellular structure; for example, 

the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) used such a structure 

to ensure its continued viability in light of the sophisticated counterinsurgent tactics employed by the British army. Cellular structures rely 

on small, agile units, called cells, usually comprising only a handful 

of operatives and a commander. Cellular structures are typically characterized by compartmentalization, a technique used by insurgents to 

severely restrict contact among operators and between subordinates 

and superiors. The restrictions prevent compromising the entire organization in case of capture or surveillance.c

The M-19 underground fulfilled a number of functions, including 

security, logistics, propaganda, and operations. In regard to the latter, 

the M-19 underground executed several important operations designed 

to influence public opinion. M-19 called the operations “armed propaganda.” As the term suggests, the operations relied more on the force 

of ideas than the force of arms. One of M-19’s most infamous operations was the theft of Simón Bolívar’s sword from the national museum. 

Members of the tight-knit M-19 underground in Bogotá planned and 

c Please see Bos for more detailed information on cellular structures and compartmentalization generally.22
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

carried out the operation, which served as a launching point for 

the movement.23

Some similar operations were specifically designed to garner support for the organization among the poor, creating a future recruitment 

pool for a popular army. The approach was modeled after the Sandinistas’ strategy in Nicaragua. M-19 operatives, à la Robin Hood, hijacked a 

milk delivery truck and distributed the milk to children in poor neighborhoods.d Later, the M-19 underground dropped its strict clandestine 

policy, albeit with reservations, to work directly with the population in 

urban slums. During the 1985 truce with the Colombian government, 

M-19 referred to the areas of influence they had established as “peace 

camps.”e Operatives gained the trust of local populations by addressing 

concrete needs of the people. Those needs were determined through 

consultations with marginalized populations. Among other activities, 

the underground handed out food, clothing, and construction materials—all without the masks that typically hid the guerrillas’ identities. 

Other operatives performed simple tasks, such as guarding hoses that 

supplied water to neighborhoods. Powerful landlords and unscrupulous land profiteers often cut off the water as an intimidation tactic. As 

one underground member described:

We met with business owners to support the labor 

demands of the employees, with the owners of the 

Central de Abastos (Corabastos) to negotiate a space 

in the plaza in the name of hundreds of small-scale 

retailers, with owners of bullfighters in defense of the 

national toreros, with television programmers, proactor unions—the list was a long one.

A former insurgent believed that the populace responded positively to the underground’s involvement in addressing local grievances 

because the underground’s solutions were ultimately backed by the 

force of arms.26 The underground’s efforts paid dividends. By 1984, 

M-19’s underground swelled from a handful of members in 1983 to 

more than one hundred, not including the network of sympathizers 

and collaborators (the auxiliary, discussed below).27 After the truce fell 

apart in mid-1985, the army destroyed the camps.28

d M-19 trained its underground in weapons, and reportedly the operatives did carry 

arms during the group’s operations. However, in many instances, the underground successfully carried out armed propaganda with limited, or no, casualties. An inexperienced 

operative tasked with carrying out the hijacking of the milk delivery truck shot the driver 

accidentally.24

e M-19 founded the first official peace camps in 1985 after entering into a temporary 

truce with the Colombian government following negotiations spanning 1983–1985. The 

truce fell apart shortly thereafter.25
Chapter 8. M-19

219

Building a solid base of support with the potential for a major 

insurrection requires the political education of the targeted population. Successful armed propaganda operations required nurturing a 

cadre of educated, and creative, operatives. Much of the early work of 

the underground revolved around careful study of influential leftist 

thinkers. The typical treatises by Mao, Che Guevara, and Lenin were 

complemented by works of Colombian novelists and thinkers, such 

as Gabriel García Márquez.f Likewise, the underground’s social work 

in the urban slums was accompanied by education that attempted to 

connect the population’s grievances with the political situation in the 

country. One underground operative developed a technique for establishing peace camps in Cali that was replicated elsewhere. “El sardino 

Lucia,” as he was called, planted two flags—the M-19 flag and the 

Colombian flag—on an empty lot in a Cali slum. With a megaphone, 

he delivered a speech that quickly attracted a number of recruits. The 

empty lot, with the planted flags, became a pseudo-town square where 

locals could meet and talk with their neighbors and the M-19. The 

underground also used a variety of symbols in the square to increase a 

sense of belonging fostered by the civic actions taking place there. At 

its height, the M-19 had as many as fifteen peace camps in a number of 

major urban centers.29

Lastly, the M-19 underground fulfilled a number of logistical requirements crucial to the movement. Early on, M-19 leadership trained the 

underground in observation skills that would help the group acquire 

the weapons, money, and other items it needed to operate and survive. 

Data gathered from careful observation of the underground’s immediate environment—and personal networks—led to resource-gathering 

missions. In one of the movement’s first weapons runs, an underground 

unit broke into the home of a close friend of one of the members to 

steal his weapons.30 M-19’s most successful weapons raid, however, was 

on a military compound in Bogotá, where operatives constructed a tunnel leading to the weapons depot, capturing more than 5,000 weapons. 

Once in possession of the weapons, the underground was instrumental 

in storing and transporting them.31 As a testament to the inexperience 

of the group, some members of the underground stashed the weapons 

with friends and family. The Colombian army captured and tortured 

these M-19 collaborators.32 After M-19 expanded from the city to the 

rural countryside to develop a popular army, the underground transported weapons and other materials to fronts; this was sometimes the 

f Márquez is the author of the literary classic One Hundred Years of Solitude, a 1967 novel 

describing several generations of a Colombian family through the turbulent entrée of 

Colombia into the modern world. Márquez received the Nobel Prize for Literature for his 

work in 1982. Márquez is known for his leftist sympathies and support of insurgent organizations throughout Latin America.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

only connection the fronts had with the high command.33 Kidnapping 

supplied the bulk of M-19’s finances. Housing the kidnapped individuals while waiting for the ransom to materialize fell to the underground. 

Operatives rented facilities to establish safe houses with the capacity to 

hold the prisoners for extended periods while M-19 waited for ransom 

from the target.34 The safe house, called a “house-jail,” was first used by 

the Tupamaros in Uruguay.35

Like any clandestine movement, the M-19 underground faced serious challenges to its security. As discussed above, the group’s cellular 

structure, and the attendant compartmentalization, was a first crucial 

layer of security for the group. The underground’s safe houses provided an important security component. A former member of the M-19 

underground described how she and her urban unit first set up a safe 

house in Bogotá. Operatives rented the home themselves rather than 

relying on sanctuary from the local population. The group went to tremendous lengths to develop a plausible cover for the “residents” living 

there, making every effort to present a typical Colombian multi-family 

unit to curious onlookers. The underground acquired curtains, furniture, and other decor to lend plausibility to the house’s normalcy. 

Visiting operatives were even provided “spouses.” Several operatives 

had children, who also resided at the house. Ironically, another M-19 

safe house, located in Melgar, was in the same town that housed the 

military’s counterguerrilla unit. An additional safe house in Bogotá, 

located in close proximity to a military weapons depot, was used as 

cover to construct and underground tunnel to seize the weapons. On 

at least one occasion, an M-19 safe house also acted as a sanctuary for 

guerrillas from an international leftist insurgent movement.g M-19 leadership also used safe houses scattered throughout major urban centers 

as hideouts. Colombian security forces killed Iván Marino Ospina while 

he hid in a safe house in Cali.37

In addition to the underground, M-19 also received assistance from 

the auxiliary—collaborators and supporters of an insurgent movement 

that are not necessarily active members of the organization. The auxiliary component often worked closely with the underground. Supporters 

acted as “spouses” for M-19 operatives in safe houses, of particular use 

because they could not be traced to any illegal activity. In one instance, 

a respected lawyer sympathetic to the movement acted as a spouse to an 

M-19 member living in a safe house. His patina of “normality” was crucial to developing a believable cover for residents there. He continued 

his practice and knew nothing of the underground’s internal assignments or any details of what went on in the house. Another woman, 

g In this instance, the Tupamaros from Uruguay.36
Chapter 8. M-19

221

a poor peasant from the countryside, also acted as a spouse. In some 

instances, family members of the underground participants also lived 

in the safe houses, providing assistance as necessary but having little to 

no information about the group or its operations. On the rural fronts, 

auxiliary offered intelligence and assistance with transport, and small 

children often acted as couriers.38 In the peace camps, the areas of 

influence that M-19 established in urban slums in the mid-1980s, M-19 

operatives assigned potential recruits peripheral activities, such as 

extortion and robbery, to test their combat mettle and integrate them 

into the organization.39

Armed Component

At its founding, M-19 operated primarily in urban centers, a strategy that informed the tactics adopted by the leadership. The group 

initially sought to distance itself from an “apparatist” approach, which 

it believed placed an undue emphasis on the armed component of an 

insurgency. Instead, it used members of the urban underground component, seeking to cultivate popular support through the use of armed 

propaganda rather than strict military objectives. The popular support 

garnered from these spectacular operations, it was hoped, would form 

the seed of the broad-based support necessary to fully confront the 

state and its security force institutions.

It was not until several years after its formation, in 1978, that M-19 

began to earnestly build its rural-based armed component. A former 

M-19 commander estimated that, at its height, M-19 could field approximately 1,500–2,000 combatants.40 Henceforth, most of the activities in 

the urban underground components served to complement the operations of the armed component in the countryside. However, commandolike units, each with colorful names, continued to operate in the urban 

environment, planning and executing several high-profile operations, 

including the takeover of several embassies and a raid on a military 

weapons depot.41 Some insurgents within the organization expressed 

concern that, at this juncture, M-19 began to emphasize the military 

component above the political objectives of the group.42,43 In particular, a change in leadership from Bateman, who perished in a plane 

crash in 1983, to Iván Marino Ospina signaled a greater emphasis on 

the armed component. Under Marino’s “trigger-happy leadership,” the 

urban and political efforts declined, and the M-19 came to resemble 

a more traditional “ ‘old-style’ military guerrilla organization.”44 The 

emphasis on the armed component further solidified under the leadership of Carlos Pizarro Leongómez in the latter half of the 1980s.45
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Figure 8-5. M-19 guerrilla.

The rural strategy was first hatched in 1978 at M-19’s sixth national 

conference. There, the leadership opted to alter the existing organizational structure in favor of a traditional hierarchical model more conducive to military operations.46,47 At its height, M-19 had two primary 

fronts—the Frente Sur, or Southern Front, in Putumayo and the Frente 

Occidental, or Western Front, operating in the Caldas, Cauca, Valle 

de Cauca, Quindío, and Tolima Departments. Each front was further 

divided into columns, each for a different municipality.48

Former M-19 insurgents describe the rural fronts as organized 

around units called “mobiles.” These mobiles, built on work already 

done by peasant organizations in rural areas, were to be the “embryos 

of the popular army” that M-19 hoped to construct to confront the 

state.49,50 A long-standing M-19 member, María Eugenia Vásquez Perdomo, was given the responsibility of nurturing the nascent mobiles. 

Based in Melgar, she aided mobiles located in Córdoba, Santander, 

Quindío, Tolima, Cauca, and Caquetá, supplying the units with ammunition, weapons, and money. She, along with a male companion, crisscrossed the departments in a Jeep with a false floor to transport the 

goods, sometimes evading military checkpoints, relying on quick thinking and “a pair of suggestive shorts, a loose blouse, and a pistol in [her] 

belt” to evade the soldiers.51

The military capabilities of the armed component varied. The armed 

component suffered a significant setback in 1981 after a botched invasion of Colombia by M-19 combatants exiled to Cuba in the aftermath 
Chapter 8. M-19

223

of the Dominican embassy siege.h The failed operation exposed the 

significant deficiencies in the group’s military training. One former 

insurgent described the Southern Front, established before the Western Front, as having “heart” but little training in the way of tactics and 

techniques. The Southern Front received additional training in Cuban 

military schools, in addition to incorporating tactics of peasant origin.52,i

 At the peak of its capabilities, the Southern Front, led by Carlos Pizarro, sustained an engagement with the Colombian military for 

twenty-two days near Yarumales, in the Cauca Department, in December 1984. The army attacked the fortified peace camp that M-19 had 

established after the group had signed a truce with the government 

in 1984.53

Public Component

M-19 placed a great deal of emphasis on the political aspect of its 

organization. The guerrillas frequently operated in both the legal and 

illegal—overt and clandestine—worlds simultaneously. In 1990, after 

the M-19 agreed to disarm and demobilize, the guerrillas continued 

their struggle in the public component as a legal political party.

Two distinct periods in the M-19’s public component are apparent. 

The first period corresponds to M-19’s early alliance with ANAPO after 

General Rojas’s electoral defeat in the 1970 presidential election. The 

second period came decades later, when, after signing a peace treaty 

in 1990, M-19 guerrillas laid down their arms and transitioned the 

movement into a legal political party, the Alianza Democrática M-19 

(AD M-19), or the M-19 Democratic Alliance.54 This second phase is 

described in greater detail in the Political Operations section. However, 

M-19 ultimately failed to develop a solid organization with grassroots 

support, relying more on “audacious political-military feats” than the 

“patient work of building a political movement.”55

When M-19 first formed in the early 1970s, the group was the de 

facto armed wing of ANAPO. General Rojas, a former military dictator and founder of the party, had a healthy cadre of supporters, many 

of them angry over his loss in the 1970 presidential elections. In large 

part, the M-19 was formed expressly to ensure, through force of arms, 

that the Colombian people were not swindled out of another election. 

h The failed operation is described in greater detail in the Paramilitary Operations

section.

i The authors do not go into any great detail about exactly what constituted these tantalizing “intuitive” tactics adopted from local peasants. M-19 received foreign training and 

weapons from a number of foreign governments and non-state actors, described in the 

Administrative section.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

After Rojas’s death in 1975, a power struggle ensued over the future 

leadership of the party; leadership was eventually granted to his daughter, María Eugenia Rojas Pinilla. María Eugenia’s husband, Samuel 

Moreno, another contender for the leadership, favored greater rapprochement with the Conservative party, a path that was denounced by 

the radical wing of the party.56

A short time later, another split divided ANAPO after the radical 

wing of the party left to form Socialist ANAPO. The radicals were dismayed over ANAPO’s rapprochement with the traditional parties, the 

“enemy” to the radical faction. M-19 worked in concert with Socialist 

ANAPO, acting as the party’s armed wing, making the group a distinctly “political-military” organization. There was overlap among the 

two group’s leaderships, and some M-19 operatives simultaneously 

belonged to a legal political party and an illegal, clandestine insurgent movement. A “management team” within ANAPO, called the 

Buró, acted as M-19’s command. The Buró was divided into two distinct 

branches, the political and the military, and made decisions on the 

basis of consensus. ANAPO’s primary political tool was its newspaper, 

Mayorías, and one of M-19’s early tasks was to keep the paper afloat. 

The newspaper was the primary conduit to educate the populace and 

influence public opinion. Arguments erupted within M-19, however, 

regarding the efficacy of this approach:

We in the M-19 built a political-military alternative by 

less than orthodox means. The work in the ANAPO 

taught us a lot. Mayorías was not the Rude Pravda Lenin 

talked to us about in What is to Be Done? and the Leninist structuring of groups didn’t work inside a populist 

party. One could not appeal to broad segments of the 

population with leftist radicalism.

Debates ensued over whether to halt production of the newspaper 

and direct the resources to military action or to continue with political education. By 1977, the Mayorías folded, precluding the need for 

any agreement on the matter. The M-19’s connection with the newspaper exposed the guerrillas to the populace they purported to represent, moderating the typical orthodox leftist theory espoused by many 

leftist insurgents.57

IDEOLOGY

M-19 was part of a second wave of leftist guerrilla movements in 

Latin America in the 1970s that broke from the Castroist traditions 

of previous guerrillas. Many of the founders of the group began their 
Chapter 8. M-19

225

guerrilla careers in the FARC and the ELN, insurgent groups that did 

share genealogical ties with the Cuban Revolution. M-19, in contrast 

to other leftist guerrilla groups operating in Colombia, simultaneously viewed itself as nationalist, democratic, and revolutionary—and 

devoted to armed struggle.58 If the other leftist guerrilla insurgents in 

Colombia wanted to “put the guerilla movement into the nation,” M-19 

wanted to “put the nation into the guerrilla movement.”59

While Marxist views were certainly the backdrop for M-19’s ideology, the group adopted a remarkably unconventional narrative that 

during the time was described as “nationalist and Trotskyist, romantic and nihilist, Communist and non-Communist.”60 The Colombian 

army could provide no evidence of foreign links between the group 

and Communist overlords in Moscow or other Soviet bloc countries. 

One national police chief, seemingly stymied by the inability to quickly 

pigeonhole M-19’s narrative, held fast to the theory that M-19 was really 

a right-wing group in disguise.61

M-19’s ideology made judicious use of an ingredient that was absent 

from the ideology of its leftist counterparts in Colombia—nationalism. M-19 founder and commander Jaime “El Flaco” Bateman told 

the faithful that the group had to “nationalize the revolution, place it 

beneath the feet of Colombia, make it a ‘pachanga,’ do it with ‘bambucos, vallenatos, and cumbias’ [Colombian rhythmic music], singing the 

national anthem.”62 During the Dominican embassy siege of 1980, the 

guerrillas periodically raised their fists in unison, singing the Colombian national anthem.63 The nationalist strain, a pronounced contradiction from the internationalist perspective of other guerrilla groups 

at the time, is not surprising when considering that the initial impetus for the group’s founding was anger and despair over the electoral 

fraud that robbed General Rojas of the 1970 presidential election. As 

one M-19 leader, Navarro, described, “we went into the mountains not 

to impose communism, but to open democratic spaces.”64 But, such as 

Colombian politics were at the time, one had to shoot in order to be 

heard, a former M-19 combatant said.65 In an analysis of the motivations of former M-19 insurgents, in interviews, several of them cited the 

positive influence of popular literature with distinct nationalist overtones on their decisions to join the organization.66

The first crucial step in M-19’s nationalist project was the resurrection of the respectability of the nation. Orthodox Marxist theory 

insisted that nationalism was a distinctly “bourgeois” value that was 

inappropriate for the practitioner aiming for the emancipation of the 

working class. M-19 leadership, by contrast, “began from the premise that national symbols were a national heritage.” Reclaiming those 

symbols, and using them for a “second independence” movement that 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

more fully realized the ideals of their ancestors, was at the heart of 

M-19’s nationalist project. The resurrection of Colombia, and especially Bolívar, in M-19 ideology represented a “latinamericanization” of 

guerrilla struggles in the region.67

LEGITIMACY

Throughout most of its armed operation stage, M-19 lacked a 

clearly articulated political vision for Colombians to consider. However, 

especially before its disastrous Palace of Justice siege in 1985, M-19 did 

enjoy popular sympathy, if not outright support, with its “daring theatrics” such as the Dominican embassy takeover and the theft of Simón 

Bolívar’s sword. M-19 was adept at drawing attention to the conditions 

of inequality and “numbing political immobility” engendered by the 

two-party patronage system that disturbed so many Colombians.68 One 

foreign minister called the M-19 a “symbol of desperation” in a country bedeviled by rampant illiteracy, unemployment, and inadequate 

resources to meet even the basic needs of many of its citizens.69

M-19 executed many showy, symbolic acts designed to present the 

group as the defender of the people’s interests and to sway public opinion in favor of the movement. The sympathy continued even after M-19 

dirtied its hands, murdering several men, including a union leader 

and an American unjustly accused of being a spy. For a time during 

the early 1980s, members of the M-19 retained their images of Robin 

Hood-like adventurers fighting on behalf of the people.70

The siege of the Palace of Justice in 1985 marked a turning point 

in public opinion of the M-19. The much-publicized bloodbath that 

followed the armed takeover of the building left a bitter taste for the 

group for many Colombians. Eleven Supreme Court Justices died in the 

conflagration alongside more than one  hundred others.71 The M-19 

initially increased its kinetic operations against security forces in the 

aftermath of the siege, but the group eventually fine-tuned its strategy 

to harmonize with the public’s war weariness. Instead, the M-19 actively 

sought dialogue with the Colombian government to facilitate its transition to a legitimate political party.j

As discussed in the Ideology section, M-19 wove nationalist, leftist, and revolutionary themes into its narrative. Not surprisingly, the 

symbolic act that launched M-19 into the public consciousness deftly 

interlaced all three of these themes. After releasing newspaper advertisements to build anticipation of its arrival, M-19 stole the sword of 

j See the Political Operations section for a description of this important strategic 

transition.
Chapter 8. M-19

227

Simón Bolívar, the spiritual godfather of the Colombian nation, from 

a national monument. In its place, the guerrillas left a note saying, 

“His sword now begins new combats. Now it confronts the Yanqui, the 

exploiter, those who deliver our country to sorrow, the landlord, the 

capitalist, the oligarch.”72 The symbolism positioned M-19 in a nationalist lineage dating back to the liberator himself. M-19, like Bolívar, 

would take up arms in just cause to free the Colombian people from a 

repressive regime. Ironically, M-19 leadership entrusted the safekeeping of Bolívar’s sword to one of the most destructive forces in Colombia—drug lord Pablo Escobar. After signing a peace treaty with the 

federal government and transitioning to a legitimate political party in 

the early 1990s, M-19 retrieved the sword from Escobar, returning it to 

Colombian officials as a sign of good will.73

After this episode of political theater, M-19’s actions targeted special interest groups perceived as especially harmful to the Colombian 

people. These included employers, union leaders, foreign corporations, and other agents associated with imperialist America. In February of 1976, M-19 abducted the leader of the Confederation of Workers 

of Colombia (CTC), José Raquel Mercado. M-19 accused Mercado of 

corrupt practices and collaboration with the US Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA).

In 1981, M-19 abducted Chester Bitterman, an American missionary employed by the Wycliffe Bible Translators, a religious organization 

based in California. After his arrival in Bogotá for a medical procedure, Bitterman stopped at his employer’s headquarters in the capital 

when six M-19 guerrillas entered the facility looking for the director. 

After learning that the director was not present, the M-19 members 

abducted Bitterman. The Wycliffe Society’s Latin American branch, 

known at the time as the Summer Institute of Linguistics, was a controversial organization that specialized in studying native languages 

and customs. M-19 and other critics claimed that the organization’s 

primary goal was the conversion of indigenous peoples in the region 

to Christianity, leading to the destruction of native cultures. M-19 also 

charged the institute with acting as front for the CIA.74 The guerrillas demanded that the institute leave Colombia or Bitterman would 

be killed. The institute declined. After Bitterman was in captivity for 

six weeks, a woman telephoned radios, newspapers, and television stations reporting Bitterman’s execution, indicating that his body could 

be found in an abandoned bus in Bogotá.75 Colombian authorities 

retrieved the body.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

MOTIVATION AND BEHAVIOR

Motivations for involvement with insurgent organizations vary 

according to what stage of the process is analyzed. Individuals have different motivations for joining a movement, staying in a movement, and 

leaving a movement.76 Decisions can be influenced by both the agency 

of the individual as well as surrounding environmental factors. Because 

of the clandestine nature of insurgent groups, this information is often 

difficult to extract. The following section is based on research that 

relies on in-depth interviews with fourteen former M-19 insurgents.77,k

The former M-19 insurgents consistently identified several factors 

as important influences on their decisions to join an insurgent group. 

The first set of factors emphasize the importance of the social networks, 

both family and friends, in the insurgents’ decisions. M-19 leader Bateman described these networks as a “chain of affection.”78 The influence 

of family is important in several regards. Family influence can occur 

after a family crisis, such as a death or assault of a family member by an 

out-group that encourages support of the guerrilla movement. In some 

cultures, certain families have a long history of participation in guerrilla warfare, and this history influences each generation to continue 

in the venerated tradition.79,80 An even fifty percent of M-19 insurgents 

indicated that their decisions to join the group were influenced by these 

family factors. One insurgent identified a family crisis stemming from a 

failure of the Conservative party to address pressing grievances as the 

impetus for family support of the leftist guerrilla movements. Interestingly, another insurgent noted that, although her family did not have a 

tradition of supporting guerrilla movements, her involvement in M-19 

facilitated a large familial network of M-19 collaborators.81

In addition to familial networks, peer networks also played a role 

as motivation for joining the M-19. Peers might be similar to potential 

recruits in terms of basic demographic characteristics, giving recruiters access to a pool of recruits engaged in activities at work, school, or 

other political organizations that are similar to those of the recruiters. Another type of peer identified is the “revolutionary role model,” 

who might have been better educated or more experienced in political issues than potential recruits but still shared many similar activities. These peers, whom recruits already knew—and in some cases, 

admired—acted as in important source of validation for recruits’ decisions to join the organization. One recruit described meeting with a 

k Please note that the number of M-19 members interviewed was not great enough 

to be a representative sample of the whole group. Rather, the research discussed above 

should be read as anecdotal. However, because of the difficulty in penetrating clandestine 

groups, anecdotal information is often all that is available.
Chapter 8. M-19

229

figure she respected, a well-known member of a local teacher’s union 

who was connected to the education sector in the federal government, 

soon after joining the organization. At the meeting, she noted she was 

happy because she knew him from her workplace and regarded him as 

a trusted figure.

In other instances, the “peers” were more removed from the recruits. 

Another recruit described the influence of Camilo Torres, a priest and 

proponent of liberation theology, as well as the activities of Che Guevara. In his neighborhood, he also interacted with a number of people 

from ANAPO. Once he decided he wanted to join the M-19, his ANAPO 

connections made it easier to gain acceptance into the clandestine 

group.82 In all, six of the fourteen M-19 members identified family and 

peer networks as motivational factors for joining the group.83

In addition to describing the impact of social networks, recruits 

also recounted joining the M-19 in response to environmental factors, including the general “revolutionary climate” as well as government policies that denied ordinary citizens legal channels to effectively 

address their grievances. Recruits reported feeling a profound lack of 

political efficacy, noting the inability to make significant contributions 

or reforms to local or federal governments. A number of the recruits 

were already active in political organizations, pursuing political reform 

through peaceful and legal means. When the peaceful activity was 

ineffective—or worse, met with heavy government repression—recruits 

turned to armed violence to effect the political and social reforms they 

felt were necessary to correct Colombia’s political course. One woman 

who joined M-19 described her frustration and anger over police repression of peaceful strikes and protests, as well the failure of such protests 

to produce any significant results. She said that at many of the events 

she had participated in, police beat or killed protestors. Protestors were 

always prepared, she said, to run from the police, who carried truncheons, guns, and tear gas equipment. Witnessing the helplessness of 

the protestors, including a family member who was assaulted by policemen at a protest event, coupled with a feeling of political inefficacy, 

convinced her of the need to defend her rights with arms.84

Other important environmental factors included the influence 

of “generational imprinting.” Researchers have found that social or 

political events that occur during what is called the “reminisce peak,” 

usually sometime during late adolescence or early adulthood, have an 

especially strong influence on an individual’s worldview. In the case of 

Colombia, such events could be the Cuban or the Nicaraguan Revolutions. Some M-19 recruits recounted that the success of the Sandinistas 

in effecting political change in Nicaragua was an important precipitating event. One recruit said, “The historical reference of the Sandinista 
230

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

revolution was very important, because you believed that if revolution 

is possible in Nicaragua, then it was possible everywhere.85 In her biography of her time in the M-19, Maria Eugenia Vásquez Perdomo made 

reference to the inspiration of the Sandinistas as well as other Latin 

American insurgent groups such as the Tupamaros guerrillas from 

Uruguay.86 Describing the revolutionary fervor infecting Colombia and 

other parts of the world, Vásquez said, “My generation wanted both to 

end the war in Vietnam and to change the world by revolutionary war; 

practice free love and build utopias in South America; break political 

continuity and propose other ideologies; and create a more egalitarian 

society.”87 In the research conducted on M-19 motivations, M-19 members identified this generational imprint, which cultivated a revolutionary climate in Colombia, as a more important motivational factor than 

government repression.88

Lastly, the power of ideas can also compel recruits to join armed 

organizations. The most frequently cited reason among the former M-19 

insurgents was a “concern for social injustice.” Issues endemic throughout Colombia during the time—rural poverty, homelessness, violation 

of human rights—encouraged some to address the widespread grievances through political action. For those who joined guerrilla organizations, of course, political action eventually meant armed violence. 

As discussed above, recruits to guerrilla organizations like M-19 were 

already active in various politically or socially minded organizations, 

especially while attending universities. One insurgent reported first 

belonging to a group, Empujemos (“Let’s Push”), which provided fellowship but also opportunities for community work. Among conducting 

other activities, the group offered legal advice to women and workers. 

Her work for and dedication to the group attracted the attention of 

M-19, which she was later asked to join. She eventually discovered that 

nearly everyone in Empujemos was in fact a member of M-19.89 Likewise, Vásquez explained her attraction to leftist ideologies and groups 

in terms of a strong desire for social justice.90 Not surprisingly, many of 

the recruits who joined M-19 expressed their concerns, and found solutions, in the predominant ideology of the time—Communism. Of the 

participants interviewed, 78.6 percent identified a “concern for social 

injustice,” and 64.3 percent identified “communist and nationalist ideologies” as key influences motivating them to join M-19.91,l

The motivations for joining are different than the motivations for 

staying in a guerrilla organization. Vásquez, whose autobiography 

about her time in the M-19 is cited above, described in vivid detail the 

l Participants were allowed to select more than one motivation.
Chapter 8. M-19

231

psychological impact of living the double life necessary for maintaining 

the security of a clandestine insurgent group:

Two diametrically opposed women lived inside me, one 

delicate and fragile, the other tough as nails. When 

I got back from the trips [related to M-19 activities] 

and went into the house, the characters pitted against 

each other. I felt dizzy, unreal. . . . Family I no longer 

had . . . I felt utterly uprooted.92

Life in a rural-based insurgency also has its travails. Inadequate 

food, shelter, and clothing and other physical hardships associated 

with life in a remote area can quickly quell the romantic ideal of guerrilla life some recruits may have. The average length of service of those 

interviewed was about ten years.93 Approximately forty-three percent of 

the interviewees reported belonging to M-19 for three to nine years. A 

greater percentage, around fifty-seven percent, reported belonging to 

the group for a greater length of time, from nine to eighteen years.94,m

The most important reason M-19 members reported for staying in the 

group was their dependence on the group. Nearly seventy-nine percent 

of the participants in the study described being “very dependent” on 

the group. One of the former insurgents recounted that she was “totally 

dependent” on the organization “politically, militarily, and economically.”95 Virtually all of her daily activities centered on work for M-19. 

In addition, many of her basic necessities, such as clothing and shelter, were also acquired from the group. These effects are amplified 

when insurgents belong to rural fronts, where individual autonomy is 

more severely restricted due to the harsh environmental conditions.96

Additional factors that induced continued participation in the group 

included the fraternity the group provided. More than ninety-two percent of interviewees reported that the sense of brotherhood permeating 

the group at least sometimes provided an incentive for staying in the 

group.97,n Other important factors included individuals’ sense of how 

important they were to the group,98 as well as its clandestine affiliation. 

In the latter case, the clandestine nature of the group cultivated behavior patterns that reinforced continued participation in the group.99

In the case of M-19, there are two important stages at which members left the insurgency. In October of 1989, at its tenth national conference, 227 of 230 M-19 members voted to lay down their arms and join 

m The author noted that the length of service of M-19 members was arguably skewed 

because she was unable to interview any senior officials who may have belonged to group 

for a more extended period.

n Fifty percent of participants reported that “membership perception of brotherhood 

and self-sacrifice for the group” always applied, and approximately forty-three percent 

reported that the incentive sometimes applied.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

the political process. By March of 1990, M-19 had voluntarily handed 

over its weapons and officially demobilized.100 After this time, M-19 transitioned to a legal political party, called the M-19 Democratic Alliance, 

or AD M-19. An analysis of M-19’s transition to a legal political party 

is included in the Political Operations section. For the purposes of this 

section, the discussion of motivation focuses on the second stage: participants’ exit from the public component, AD M-19.o

 Notably, during 

the interviews, several participants described their struggle as existing 

on a continuum. M-19’s disarmament was not a halt in the struggle for 

social justice and political reform but merely a transition of the means 

by which those objectives were achieved. A small number of insurgents, 

however, opted to continue the struggle in a splinter group of M-19, the 

Jamie Bateman Front. The splinter group is believed to be responsible 

for a number or armed attacks throughout Colombia.

Factors both internal and external to the group seem to have induced 

individuals to leave AD M-19. Many of the participants in the study felt 

profoundly that they did not matter to the party. Some indicated that 

they had not been given roles in the party or had not been invited 

to any regular party functions, such as meetings.102 A similar number 

of participants reported having received little or no attention from 

AD M-19.103 Some depicted the party as having been more concerned 

with attracting newcomers than with integrating former combatants. 

In part, these portrayals of AD M-19 reflect the overall weakness of the 

party as a cohesive political organization. Those members who were 

elected to seats in the Congress during the first election held in 1991 

often developed their own agendas and campaign committees at the 

expense of the internal cohesion of the party.104

Other factors external to AD  M-19 also led a number of former 

combatants to leave the party. Reinsertion to civilian life often places 

new demands on former insurgents. Most reinserts, as they are sometimes called, hold jobs, provide for families, and learn new skills. The 

demands of everyday life can refocus the reinserts on themselves as 

individuals rather than sublimating personal concerns to the needs of 

the guerrilla organization. Such demands leave little time for political 

work. In addition, participants holding government positions described 

feeling a sense of “cultural shock,” overwhelmed by the reality of politics despite their many years of struggle to insert themselves in the 

political process. They felt ill-prepared to govern the nation. This insecurity was one of the reasons AD M-19 opted to make political alliances 

o Although this focus is not ideal, the authors are limited by available data. This 

section is based on research that discusses the perspective of those who opted to leave 

AD M-19 (the public component), not the armed or underground component of the M-19 

insurgency.101
Chapter 8. M-19

233

with other organizations and bring in newcomers, which helped to 

further erode the cohesion of the party.105 Lastly, the fear of violence 

from other armed groups also persuaded some participants to leave 

AD M-19 and political activities. Many former M-19 members, including 

AD M-19 presidential candidate Carlos Pizarro, were assassinated. The 

culprits of violence against the former insurgents included right-wing 

paramilitary groups, government security forces, and active insurgents 

who sought to legitimize their positions by murdering so-called “traitors” to the revolution.106

OPERATIONS

Paramilitary

Over the course of its history, M-19 perpetrated approximately 558 

documented incidents, spanning from kidnappings and bombings of 

media outlets to more spectacular operations such as the disastrous 

siege of the Palace of Justice in 1985. The height of M-19 activity, as 

shown in Figure 8-6, was in the mid-1980s. Although M-19 made some 

inroads into the rural countryside, the insurgency gained most traction in urban areas. Of the 558 documented incidents, M-19 carried 

out forty-two percent of them in Colombia’s three largest cities, Bogotá 

(Capital District Department), Cali (Valle de Cauca Department), and 

Medellín (Antioquia Department).

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

Year

Incidents

Figure 8-6. M-19 incidents over time.

M-19 used a number of different methods of attack,p but the group 

heavily favored simple armed assault and bombings/explosions. Of the 

p The Global Terrorism Database tracks nine attack types: assassination, hijacking, 

kidnapping, barricade incident, bombing/explosion, facility/infrastructure attack, armed 

assault, unarmed assault, and unknown.107
234

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

total number of incidents, more than 216, or roughly thirty-nine percent, were armed assaults. M-19’s second most common attack type 

was bombings/explosions, accounting for twenty-three  percentq of 

total incidents the group perpetrated over several decades. Not surprisingly, the weapons M-19 most frequently used during its operations 

were firearms. Approximately fifty-four percent of its operations relied 

on firearms. The second most used weapons were explosives, bombs, 

and dynamite, accounting for about twenty-one percent of incidents in 

which M-19 used weapons.108, r

Armed assault

Bombing/explosion

Hostage taking (kidnapping)

Hostage taking (barricade incident)

Facility/infrastructure attack

Assassination

Unknown

Hijacking

Firearms

Figure 8-7. M-19 attack types.

M-19 attacked a variety of strategic targets throughout its history. As 

discussed above, although at times M-19 leadership favored a military 

strategy over a more explicitly political strategy, M-19 leaders mostly 

used the group’s operations as armed propaganda, designed more to 

communicate and persuade than to defeat Colombia’s security apparatus. The strategy is apparent when analyzing M-19’s operations. Of the 

558 incidents, only about thirty-five percent specifically targeted the 

q Bombings/explosions: 127 of 558.

r The authors searched by perpetrator, M-19, and removed any incidents perpetrated 

after the 1991 cease-fire because these incidents are likely attributable to splinter groups, 

as M-19 officially demobilized and disarmed after the 1991 agreement.
Chapter 8. M-19

235

military and police. Likewise, M-19 intentionally targeted the governments

 in relatively few of its operations, approximately eleven percent. 

The remainder of the targets included businesses (fourteen  percent), private citizens and property (thirteen percent), transportation 

(eleven  percent), and journalists/media (five  percent), among others.110,t

 In some instances, M-19 attacked businesses, oftentimes those 

with connections to Western countries, especially the United States. At 

various times, M-19 bombed or assaulted offices of US businesses such as 

IBM, Coca Cola, General Electric, Houston Oil Company, Texas Instruments, and several others. The group also attacked several British companies, including Yardley Co. and a British Airways office. In addition, 

M-19 targeted individuals thought to be engaged in exploitative practices, such as company executives or landowners. Occasionally, M-19 

took hostages during these operations, indicating that the motivation 

for these attacks was sometimes extortion to supplement the group’s 

financial resources. The section below describes several of M-19’s largescale operations, including those not traditionally categorized as paramilitary, such as takeovers of embassies and government buildings.u

s The incidents cover the target types “government general” and “government diplomatic.” Government general targets are defined as attacks on a “government building; 

government member, former members, including members of political parties in official 

capacities, their convoys, or events sponsored by political parties; political movements; or 

a government sponsored institutions where the attack is expressly carried out to harm the 

government . . . . This value includes attacks on judges, public attorneys (e.g., prosecutors), 

courts and court systems, politicians, royalty, head of state, government employees (unless 

police or military), election-related attacks, intelligence agencies and spies, or family members of government officials when the relationship is relevant to the motive of the attack.” 

The targets categorized as government diplomatic include “attacks carried out against foreign missions, including embassies, consulates, etc.”109

t The authors searched by perpetrator, M-19, and removed any incidents perpetrated 

after the 1991 cease-fire.

u Several smaller-scale operations specifically intended to ingratiate M-19 with sympathetic audiences are discussed in the Legitimacy section.
236

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Military

Business

Private citizens

and property

Police

Transportation

Government

(general)

Journalists/

media

Educational

institution

Government (diplomatic)

Religious gures/

institutions

Utilities

Other

Airports and airlines

Telecomunication

Unknown

Violent political

party

Tourists

South America

Figure 8-8. AUC target types.

M-19’s first major operation, described in more detail above, was 

the theft of Simón Bolívar’s sword. In the mid-1970s, many of M-19’s 

activities supported its propaganda efforts and logistic requirements. 

In 1978, M-19 tunneled into a military depot from a nearby safe house, 

acquiring thousands of weapons. However, in retaliation, an embarrassed government undertook draconian countermeasures that nearly 

decimated the M-19 ranks, eventually leaving many in prison, including M-19 leader Jaime Bateman. Reportedly, the security forces made 

judicious use of torture in their persecution of the M-19. In the late 

1970s, the M-19 also executed the first of several operations targeting 

foreign embassies in Bogotá. In 1979, a commando unit from Bogotá 

briefly took over the Nicaraguan embassy, ostensibly in support of the 

Sandinista insurgents.

The M-19 launched a formative operation in March 1980, the seizure of the Dominican embassy in Bogotá. Although the insurgents that 

executed the operation carried weapons, the sixty-one-day siege miraculously ended without any hostage deaths. One guerrilla, a young man, 

died in the initial siege of the embassy, as did an innocent bystander.111

One M-19 operative who participated in the operation reported that 

the guerrillas did not have enough weapons to successfully defend the 

embassy, nor did they have the wherewithal to physically throw hostages 

from the windows to end their lives.112 The insurgents, led by Rosembergv

 Pabón, known as Commander One, were armed with automatic 

weapons and grenades. At least one of the insurgents wore a bulletproof vest.113

v Pabón’s first name is alternately listed as “Rosenberg” and “Rosemberg.”
Chapter 8. M-19

237

Figure  8-9. Rosemberg Pabón with another M-19 guerrilla in the Dominican 

Embassy Siege.

Despite the lack of significant casualties, the impact of the operation was far-reaching. Not only did operation solidify M-19’s ties with 

Castro’s Cuba, the M-19’s negotiations with the Colombian government 

to release the hostages introduced the M-19 leadership to the strategic 

utility of negotiations. In an interview, a guerrilla participant noted 

that the conclusion of the siege illustrated, for the first time, the possibility of negotiated solutions with “no winners and no losers.” It represented a “win” for the country as a whole.114

Figure 8-10. M-19 guerrilla celebrating the end of the Dominican Embassy siege.
238

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Although the Colombian government ultimately did not grant the 

bulk of M-19’s ransom demands, the insurgents reported feeling some 

sense of victory after the siege concluded. The M-19 leaders cited the 

successful negotiations as influential in the group’s decision to adopt a 

political strategy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, eventually leading 

to the group’s demobilization and disarmament.

The Dominican Embassy Takeover

The M-19 guerrillas stormed the Dominican embassy in Bogotá, 

with the intent of capturing and holding hostage high-ranking diplomatic personnel. A total of sixteen  operatives participated in the 

operation. For a time, intelligence on the number of guerrillas in the 

embassy was confounded by the insurgents’ tactic of assigning only odd 

numbers as monikers for each of the guerrillas.115 Early media reports 

listed the number of operatives as high as thirty. One of the primary 

demands of the group was the release of 311 political prisoners held by 

the Colombian government, including M-19 operatives, in the La Picota 

penitentiary. Other objectives included denouncing the army’s human 

rights violations, rejecting the military penal justice system, acquiring 

fifty million dollars in ransom, and achieving worldwide publication of 

M-19’s grievances against the Colombian government.116,117

Planning for a takeover of an embassy might have begun as early 

as 1978, according to US and Colombian intelligence sources. The 

planning was resurrected after the capture and detention of M-19 commander Jaime Bateman. Shortly after hearing of Bateman’s arrest, guerrilla strategists met to arrange his release, or at the very least, to avenge 

him. The planners of the siege had family connections with the government, the local business community, and foreign diplomats. M-19 

decided to seize the Dominican embassy during celebrations of the 

Dominican Independence Day, which would draw a number of highranking foreign officials.118 The operation also coincided with upcoming elections in Colombia. Ironically, the planning for the operation 

took place in Melgar, home to one of the Colombian army’s counterguerrilla units.119

After the ambassadors had assembled for the celebrations, M-19 

operatives ran down the dead-end street that housed the Dominican 

embassy. The guerrillas had grouped into commando units, four apiece, 

and posed as athletes congregating after a game.120 Pulling weapons 

from their sports satchels, the guerrillas ran over the guards at the 

entrance to the compound.121 Security at the embassy was notably weak, 

and it was easy for the guerrillas to overcome security forces. Several 
Chapter 8. M-19

239

of the attending ambassadors did have bodyguard details that opened 

fire on the insurgents, killing one and wounding several others.122,w

In all, the guerrillas managed to capture seventy-five  hostages, 

including fourteen  ambassadors from the United States and several 

Latin American, European, and Middle Eastern countries, holding a 

handful of them for sixty-one days. The other hostages included additional diplomats, spouses, the papal nuncio, and employees of the 

embassy. M-19 eventually released most of the nondiplomatic staff and 

the female diplomats. For strategic reasons, M-19 assigned the negotiator role to a female guerrilla, La Chiqui.

Figure  8-11. La Chiqui, the female M-19 negotiator during the Dominican 

embassy siege.

Several of the diplomats being held hostage helped the guerrillas craft their written demands, softening the rhetorical tone that the 

guerrillas had originally adopted.x

 As stated before, the Turbay administration refused to meet most of M-19’s demands, especially the release 

of the political prisoners. Although the administration publicly refused 

to meet the fifty-million-dollar ransom, some sources indicate that the 

M-19 did receive a ransom of some kind from the business community.123

w The Soviet bloc diplomats all left the festivities early, giving rise to suspicions, ultimately unfounded, that they were aware of the pending operation.

x See Appendix B. M-19: The Guerrilla Position Paper and Our Revision for copies of the 

letter the guerrillas originally wrote to state their demands to the Colombian government and the letter the diplomats revised that was actually sent as part of the negotiation 

process.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

The final agreement reached by the negotiation team called for the 

release of the hostages and provisions for the guerrillas’ safe transport 

to Cuba on a Cuban jetliner. The guerrillas traveled with eleven of the 

hostages to Cuba, where they were then safely released.124 On the way 

to the airport, the guerrillas were greeted by crowds lining the streets, 

“waving white kerchiefs,” in support of the guerrillas.125 The operation 

garnered a great deal of publicity for M-19, another important victory 

for the guerrillas.

M-19’s Invasion of Colombia

The holdover in Cuba proved fortuitous for the M-19 guerrillas. 

While there, they received military training, which many of the insurgents lacked, including training in military tactics and planning. In 

tandem with the Dominican embassy operation, Bateman and the M-19 

leadership adopted a refined military strategy that sought to establish 

guerrilla zones, or focos, in the Colombian hinterlands, especially the 

rugged, jungle-covered Caquetá. In support of the strategy, M-19 leadership sent additional members to Cuba for further training.126

In part, the M-19 leadership’s two-pronged urban and rural strategy 

was influenced by the successes of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in 1979. 

The Sandinistas also used this approach. The ransom M-19 received 

from its operation in the Dominican embassy operation financed the 

group’s regeneration. The apex of Bateman’s new strategy was an offensive that would land his guerrillas, led by Toledo Plata, in Colombia 

from the Pacific Ocean. Although he was sympathetic to M-19, and 

reportedly enamored with the charismatic, free-wheeling Bateman, 

Fidel Castro declined M-19’s request to launch an invasion from Cuban 

territory. Bateman also had connections with influential actors in Panama, an occasional base for the group. He worked in conjunction with 

Panamanian General Omar Torrijos,y who eventually approved the use 

of Panamanian territory for M-19’s Colombian invasion.

The plan called for two separate M-19 contingents, both launching 

from Panama. Toledo Plata’s contingent of about one hundred fighters 

left Panama for the mouth of the Mira River on the Pacific. Their ship, 

the Freddy, evaded the Colombian navy, which expected any expeditions to be coming from Cuban territory. The second, smaller, contingent embarked from Panama City, arriving on the coast of the Chocó 

Department near Utria. This latter force met a band of hostile natives 

who had been terrorized by Colombian soldiers disguised as guerrillas. 

Many of the M-19 insurgents were killed by the natives in retaliation for 

y Fidel Castro had previously brokered the introduction of Jaime Bateman Cayón and 

the Panamanian general.
Chapter 8. M-19

241

the misattributed acts; those that survived scattered, and many of these 

survivors eventually surrendered to the army.127

It appears that both these contingents operated under ambiguous 

orders from the M-19 leadership. Toledo Plata interpreted his orders 

to establish a guerrilla zone in Chocó, while the leadership of the 

smaller contingent may have planned to march straight to the interior 

of the Caquetá to intercept Bateman and his forces, delivering his supplies and weapons.128 Lacking military robustness, the invasion was an 

unmitigated disaster, displaying the group’s ineptness outside of its 

urban environs.

The larger contingent, led by Toledo Plata, made a series of grievous 

tactical mistakes. After their arrival on the Mira River, the unit deposited their supplies on a sandy beach that was only accessible during the 

dry season. While the group camped nearby, a torrential downpour 

flooded the river, washing away a good deal of the group’s supplies. 

M-19 also lacked local support in the region, creating logistical challenges for the units. However, they were able to occasionally acquire 

food, transportation, and navigation from local peasants. In addition, 

Toledo Plata’s contingent carried only a small topographical map of 

the region, supplied by a crew member of the Freddy. No one in the 

unit had any intimate knowledge of the region or the route to Caquetá. 

Eventually trapped in a corner between the Mira River and Ecuador, 

the guerrillas needed to cross the river to the north and disappear 

into the highlands before being discovered by the army. Toledo Plata, 

a doctor by profession, first required his troops to rest to regain their 

strength. He estimated that the guerrillas, weakened by low morale, 

constant precipitation, malaria, and general misery, were in no condition to move farther.129

The Colombian army, however, had acquired intelligence of the 

guerrillas’ position. The army sent patrols to the Mira. Toledo Plata, 

who reportedly confused the patrols for smugglers or curious onlookers, failed to break camp or put the guerrillas on high alert. When the 

army attacked the camp, the guerrillas initially mistook the soldiers for 

smugglers. Taken by surprise, the guerrillas split into two units, leaving 

most of their supplies behind. Those that managed to flee were burdened by heavy packs, dense vegetation, slippery mud, and oppressive 

heat. The army picked off the fleeing, exhausted guerrillas, eventually 

chasing them into Ecuador after a final firefight on March 12. One 

column surrendered to Colombian troops who they mistook for members of the Ecuadorian military. Another column surrendered to the 

Ecuadorian military, which promptly handed over its prisoners to the 

Colombian military.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

The failed operation devastated the group’s military capabilities 

and its leadership. The Colombian army captured Toledo Plata and 

Pabón, the infamous Commander One who spearheaded the Dominican embassy siege. The media reported the decisive government victory 

to have “crippled, if not broken” M-19. While the government defeated 

the group militarily, it clearly had not defeated the idea of M-19. The 

Colombian public watched the trials of the erstwhile guerrillas with 

rapt fascination. One political writer, speaking of the capture of the 

leaders, said, “what a shame,” a refrain frequently repeated throughout a country dissatisfied with the closed democracy practiced by the 

National Front.130

Palace of Justice Siege

The paramilitary operations of the M-19 were punctuated by peace 

negotiations with different administrations. After the group’s recovery from the disastrous invasion from Panama, M-19 leader Bateman 

entered into negotiations with President Betancur, who had taken office 

in 1982. Betancur adopted an amnesty program for guerrilla groups, 

but the negotiations bore little fruit. A year later, Bateman perished in 

a plane crash under mysterious circumstances. The M-19 leader was 

supposedly on his way to further negotiations with Betancur in Panama. Under Marino’s leadership, the group adopted a more hard-line 

stance toward negotiations with the government, refusing negotiations 

unless the dialogue was with the president himself. Betancur did agree, 

meeting M-19 leaders in Spain and Mexico. The peace agreement that 

followed provided M-19 room to maneuver in urban areas, establishing peace camps (discussed in the Underground and Auxiliary section) 

that were a base for recruitment and indoctrination. Clashes with the 

military increased, eroding the peace agreement that ultimately failed 

to bring M-19 into the political process.131 As the backdrop for its withdrawal from the peace process, M-19 cited the government’s failure to 

uphold the truce provisions and initiate promised political reforms.132

Notably, M-19 also violated the provisions of the truce as well.133

After the peace agreement with Betancur faded to irrelevance, M-19 

frequently clashed with the military. Alongside these changes, M-19 

also began to actively pursue its long-held dream of uniting leftist guerrillas under a single banner. The group established the Coordinadora 

Nacional Guerrillera (CNG), or the National Guerrilla Coordinating 

Group and the America Battalion, the organization through which a 

cohesive leftist armed opposition was to take place. Before the coordination coalesced, however, M-19 undertook its most notorious mission, 

the siege of the Palace of Justice.
Chapter 8. M-19

243

The November  1985 siege of the Palace of Justice was an extension of the failed 1984–1985 peace process with Betancur. Its failure 

stemmed not only from the government’s failure to uphold key provisions but also from the M-19’s use of peace as a tactic rather than an end 

goal. The peace camps set up by the group in numerous urban slums 

acted as bases for military training while the group was supposedly 

poised to disarm and demobilize. Not surprisingly, the security forces 

targeted the peace camps and M-19 representatives. The destructive 

dynamic precluded the success of the peace process. Under leadership 

of Álvaro Fayad, M-19 took the armed component to the limits; particularly notable is Fayad’s emphasis on cultivating the “special forces.” It 

was his special forces unit that executed the siege.134

During the siege, M-19 leadership hoped to secure a forum in 

which to put Betancur on trial for his failure to sign the peace accords. 

Undoubtedly, M-19 also hoped to quash the public perception of the 

group as a “spent” force. Although the Dominican embassy siege also 

relied on a hostage barricade, Betancur’s response diverged widely 

from that of his predecessor. Turbay had opted to solve the hostage barricade incident at the Dominican embassy through negotiation. The 

Betancur administration, in stark contrast, gave the army the go-ahead 

to retake the building by whatever means necessary. The abject failure 

of M-19 to achieve any of its stated goals is due to the response Betancur adopted.135

The ill-fated decision left at least 115 dead. The events initiated a 

controversy that continues to this day. In 2010, the Colombian judicial 

system punished retired Colonel Alfonso Plazas Vega, the commander 

that led the assault on the Palace of Justice, with thirty years of imprisonment for his role in the alleged killing of “M-19 members and suspected collaborators hors de combat (outside of combat),” including the 

forced disappearance of eleven cafeteria workers.136 The sentence followed a 2005–2006 Truth Commission, led by the Supreme Court, that 

investigated the events surrounding the siege.

The siege of the building began on November 6, 1985, and concluded the following day. Approximately thirty-five heavily armed M-19 

guerrillas stormed the building, which was home to the Colombian 

Supreme Court. The guerrillas participating in the operation had 

trained in Libya, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Several M-19 members had 

already infiltrated the building by using their standings as bona fide 

lawyers to gain access. While entering the building, the guerrillas 

gunned down several security guards and bodyguards. M-19 leadership 

later claimed that the group did not intend to take hostages, but within 

minutes of entering the building, M-19 had already secured a number 

of hostages. Shortly thereafter, police opened fire on the guerrillas.137
244

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

By two p.m. that afternoon, the army began a planned assault to 

retake the building. In part, the military’s attack was hastened by M-19 

threats that they would start killing hostages if several high-ranking 

government officials did not present themselves to a senior M-19 leader 

for negotiation.138 A total of 240 soldiers and fifteen commandos participated. In the twenty-eight-hour bloody battle that ensued, the 

M-19 had little opportunity to engage in the political action it initially 

planned. Approximately 315 people are believed to have been trapped 

in the building. At the conclusion of the siege, 115 were killed, including seventy hostages and forty-one guerrillas. The hostages killed in 

the attack included “11 magistrates of the 24-member Supreme Court, 

3 auxiliary judges, 12 assistants to judges (all women), 1 auxiliary judge 

of the Council of the State, 2 Council of the State lawyer assistants, 

and 4 Council State auxiliaries (including 3 women).” The government 

forces suffered eleven fatalities and thirty-one wounded.139 According 

to one historian, despite the heavy-handed measures taken by the government, “most Colombians actually approved of their government’s 

forceful response, blamed the M-19 for having provoked it, and believed 

the Mafia sponsored the terrorist attack.”140 Nevertheless, the siege 

amounted to a national tragedy even in the already violence-ridden 

landscape of Colombia.141

The narrative of the siege—pieced together from witness testimony, 

media reports, embassy wires, and a host of other sources—contains 

several especially controversial components. The first involves the 

alleged hors de combat killing of M-19 members and suspected collaborators, especially the eleven cafeteria workers that went missing after the 

conclusion of the siege. Video footage of the government assault clearly 

shows several cafeteria workers being escorted from the building by 

security forces. However, the government repeatedly denied that the 

workers had been captured, claiming that they had died in the conflagration. Various sectors also implicated the Medellín Cartel as co-conspirators in the operation. According to these stories, Pablo Escobar 

paid M-19 an undisclosed sum, typically reported in the millions, to 

storm the palace in order to destroy the state’s evidence against himself 

and other traffickers. Many documents were indeed destroyed in the 

ensuing fires (including incriminating evidence against M-19), but no 

source has definitively established a connection between the guerrillas and the cartel.z

 A final point of controversy is the purported collusion between the United States’ Reagan administration and President 

Betancur, both working alongside the media, to lay a false trail accusz One academic notes what while “hard evidence is lacking, the circumstantial evidence is strong.” The day M-19 stormed the Palace of Justice, the courts were to deliberate 

on the extraditions of traffickers to the United States.142
Chapter 8. M-19

245

ing the M-19 guerrillas of executing the Supreme Court justices rather 

than laying the fault at the military’s ineptness.143, aa

The M-19 did not seek to gain militaristic control of any area of 

Colombia, but rather each armed act had a strategic or political purpose. Additionally, the group’s emphasis on urban attacks is clearly seen 

in Figure 8-12, with the highest concentration of attacks in Bogotá, Cali 

and Medellín.

Amazonas

Vaupés

Guainía

Guaviare

Putumayo Caquetá

Nariño

Cauca

Tolima

Meta

Vichada

Casanare

Antioquia

Chocó

Córdoba

Sucre

 La

Guajira

Atlántico

Magdalena 

Arauca

Cesar

Bolivar

Santander

Norte 

de

Santander

Boyacá Caldas

Quindío

Risaralda Cundinamarca

Huila

Valle del

Cauca

Distrito

Capital

100–150 operations

30–100 operations

10–30 operations

1–10 operations

M-19 Influence

Medellín

Cali

Bogotá

Figure 8-12. M-19 area of influence.

aa For competing accounts of the Palace of the Justice siege, see Hudson.144
246

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

From Military to Political Strategy

The emphasis on military strategy continued in the aftermath of 

the Palace of Justice siege. In addition to forming the special forces 

units, Álvaro Fayad also developed urban-based militias while attempting to coordinate the unite the 15,000  armed leftist guerrillas. The 

urban units, formerly more oriented toward political action, increasingly adopted military logic, essentially forming urban militias. The 

urban militias then carried out larger-scale operations, such as the 

siege of army battalions in Armenia and Ipiales; military operations 

in Cali; and attacks against important government personnel, such as 

General Zamudio, commander of the military, and Minister of Internal 

Affairs Jaime Castro.145 M-19 also took over a series of towns in its area 

of operations but never held territory for any period of time.146

The turn to an urban militia is most evident in the city of Cali. In 

1985 and 1986, the city experienced a surge in politically motivated 

violence.147, ab Originally, M-19 had established its headquarters in 

nearby Yumbo but gradually moved to Cali. After the signing of the 

doomed peace accords in 1985, the urban militia there forcibly took 

Yumbo, sparking low-intensity violence in that municipality and in Cali. 

Afterward, M-19 founded its peace camps in Cali, which sometimes 

appeared to be military camps rather than peace camps. The civilian 

and security sectors unease with M-19’s increasing military presence 

in the city culminated in an army offensive against M-19 in the Siloé 

neighborhood several days after the Palace of Justice siege. Although 

the initial offensive was successful, the authorities recognized the popular support the insurgents enjoyed in many areas of the city. Official 

security forces and private paramilitaries proceeded to sweep the area 

of “undesirable” elements (which included M-19) by using violence.149

M-19’s position in Cali deteriorated after the concerted attacks on its 

position there.

After the Palace of Justice siege, M-19 leadership also began to 

coordinate leftist guerrilla activity in Colombia. The group pursued 

the objective through bilateral means as well as through coordinating organizations. Bilaterally, M-19 ran training schools with the ELN; 

formed the Fuerza Conjunta EPL-M19 (Joint Force EPL-M19) and the 

Batallón America (Battalion America); and ran joint operations with 

the Quintín Lame group. As discussed above, M-19 also established 

the CNG and later the Simón Bolívar Coordinating Board. Although 

M-19 executed a number of operations with other guerillas under 

ab Camacho uses the term public, rather than political, to distinguish between public 

and private violence. He describes public violence as acts perpetrated by individuals in the 

name of the “general social order,” or motivated by the social order, and when the victims 

are targeted due to their “reputation, job, or social function.”148
Chapter 8. M-19

247

the auspices of various coordinating mechanisms, the efforts were ill 

fated. The joint guerrilla organizations made no significant military 

or political strategic decisions. The separate guerilla groups differed 

in terms of ideology and were fiercely protective of their identities and 

independence.150

 M-19 leader Carlos Pizarro Leongómez likened the group’s heavy 

military focus after the Palace of Justice siege to “crossing a desert.” 

The Colombian public of the late 1980s was war weary. The first major 

mobilization for peace, the Movement for Life, took place in 1986 on 

the anniversary of the siege. Others followed, particularly in 1988 and 

1989. Increasingly, the public no longer supported the idea of war or its 

aftereffects. Deftly taking the pulse of the public, M-19 began to seriously pursue the possibility of peace in the late 1980s.ac

During the late 1980s, as a group, M-19 underwent a series of transformative events that helped the leadership rethink an armed strategy 

for achieving its objectives. In 1988, M-19 members kidnapped Álvaro 

Gómez, a hard-line Conservative politician. Gómez had more or less 

made his political career by baiting and castigating any Conservative 

politicians that advocated negotiation with the leftist guerrilla groups. 

During the long months of his captivity, Gómez whiled away many 

nights discussing Colombia’s problems with the guerrillas. Gómez and 

M-19 leadership found unexpected common ground during that time. 

After his release, Gómez and the political wing of M-19 allied together 

to press for a constitutional assembly.151

Administrative

Many of the early recruits, as well as later recruits, were targeted at 

Colombian universities. The universities acted as a sort of clandestine 

job fair for insurgent groups in Colombia, including M-19, the ELN, 

and the FARC. The university setting offered leftist recruiters ample 

opportunity to observe, interact with, and ultimately draw in sympathetic individuals. The recruitment process could last several years, and 

most recruits were unaware that they were being targeted for recruitment into clandestine organizations until very late in the process.

M-19 used a common risk-averse approach to recruitment by targeting individuals who were already politically active in legal organizations 

that had objectives and ideologies similar to those of the clandestine 

organization. Many of the original M-19 leaders (Jaime Bateman, Iván 

Marino Ospina, Luis Otero Cifuentes, Alvaro Fayad, Carlos Pizarro 

Leongómez, Augusto Lara Sánchez, and Rosemberg Pabón Pabón)152

ac This strategic about-face is further discussed in the Political Operations section.
248

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

belonged to the Juventudes Comunista (JUCO), or Communist Youth 

Movement, establishing a solid social network among the founding 

members. With the help of this existing network, the founding members later participated in the FARC, the ELN, and ANAPO.ad When 

recruiting members, M-19 drew heavily from various political and 

social student organizations that exhibited leftist sympathies. Recruiting from these organizations provided a ready pool of recruits with 

the appropriate ideological affinities but also decreased the likelihood 

that the individuals were covert agents.153 The danger of infiltration by 

covert agents was a problem particularly after M-19 killed union leader 

José Mercado and after Operation Colombia, during which M-19 stole 

thousands of weapons from the Colombian army. The students were 

also “biographically available” for participation in a clandestine group. 

Most often, they lacked immediate familial duties and had sufficient 

time and resources to engage in clandestine activity.154

The recruitment process was typically slow. Known operatives carefully watched and vetted potential recruits, sometimes for as long as 

several years, before formally approaching them with invitations to join 

the clandestine organization. Often, the recruits were wholly unaware 

that they had been targeted for recruitment. One former M-19 insurgent 

reported that she was unwittingly courted by M-19 for nearly two years 

before receiving a formal invitation. At the time, she belonged to a leftist political student organization that engaged in legal protest activities. 

After she accepted the invitation to join, she discovered that the vast 

majority of her fellow compatriots in the student organization were in 

fact M-19 members. Before officially being accepted into the organization, recruits were also given assignments to test their mettle and value 

to the organization.155

M-19 received training from a variety of sources. The founding 

members, such as Bateman and Pizarro, had already received training as guerrillas active in the FARC and the ELN. Undoubtedly, the 

organizational training necessary to sustain a social movement was also 

derived from their participation in student activist groups. In 1978, 

after deciding to complement their urban operations with an armed 

rural component, M-19 leaders opened special training schools for the 

would-be rural organizers.156 Former members of the underground 

also described receiving ad hoc training and indoctrination in various 

reading circles and meetings outside the city. Recruits received training in logistics, resource procurement, and basic weapons training.157

During the peace negotiations of 1984–1985, M-19 established peace 

camps in urban slums that acted as safe havens for the group. While in 

ad See Leadership section.
Chapter 8. M-19

249

these peace camps, M-19 actively recruited and trained its members, a 

precursor to the failure of the peace process.

M-19’s formal military training occurred in military schools of Cuba, 

Libya, Nicaragua, and other sympathetic countries. Military training in 

Cuba began in earnest in the aftermath of the Dominican embassy 

siege in 1980 when M-19 guerrillas were given safe passage to Cuba as 

part of the negotiated settlement that ended the hostage barricade. 

The Cubans instructed the insurgents in military tactics and planning:

[Cuban] Military school trained us for combat. It 

molded us into willing soldiers and got us used to psychological pressure. It developed tactical skills on land, 

gave us tools to calculate dimensions by sight, put in 

order our operative processes for fulfilling a mission, 

taught us operational planning techniques and how to 

use necessary instruments.158

Other critical training included instruction in “adapting battlefields 

by engineering works such as trenches, pits, tunnels, vaults  .  .  .  and 

using tactical, operational and strategic communications, camouflage 

for infiltration operations, and mining for active defence operations.”159

The training also provided M-19 with less tangible benefits, such as 

general discipline, more refined ideological arguments, heroism, and 

solidarity.160 M-19 actively shared its training and knowledge with other 

insurgent groups in Colombia, running joint training camps with the 

ELN, the El Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL), or Popular Liberation Army, and Alfaro Vive.161

Bateman initiated the training in anticipation of an invasion of 

Colombia from Panamanian territory, described in the Paramilitary

Operations section. However, after acquiring arms from various international arms bazaars, Bateman pulled many of his guerrillas from the 

training, mistakenly relying on firepower rather than sound training.162

The invasion ended in disaster for M-19, displaying their ineptness to 

operate as a rural front.ae

In the mid-1980s, Libya also provided training to M-19. The group 

sent about seventy insurgents to North Africa to receive training in combat tactics and using war technology. The relationship between M-19 

and its Libyan sponsors was problematic. While M-19 desired secrecy 

in its activities, the Libyans printed stories and pictures of the guerrillas in the local newspapers. Eventually, concerns over secrecy led the 

M-19 commanders in Libya to halt attendance at the class. The Libyan 

ae See the Paramilitary Operations section for a description of M-19’s basic tactical 

mistakes.
250

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

military also clearly expected reciprocity—the guerrillas’ final exam 

was fighting alongside Libya in its border war with neighboring Chad.

According to a former insurgent who participated in the training, 

the cultural, linguistic, and technological gaps between M-19 and its 

Libyan trainers prevented the training from being overly effective. She 

described the first week of weapons training as “pathetic.” The group 

did establish a communications training course there with the help of 

an Ecuadorian guerrilla radio technician.163

Psychological

In its inception, M-19 was an urban-based insurgent movement 

that relied more on theatrics than overwhelming firepower. Many of 

its operations focused on gaining publicity rather than achieving significant military victories.164 Known for their “theatrical, freewheeling 

style,”165 M-19 was especially adept at cleverly crafted symbolic operations. Two days before a four-month amnesty granted by President Turbay came to a conclusion, M-19 lobbed three sixty-millimeter training 

mortar shells into the grounds of the presidential palace in Bogotá. The 

show of derision was complemented by the twenty-hour kidnapping of 

Colombia’s leading television star, talk show host Fernando Gonzalez 

Pacheco, in an effort to publicly air M-19’s counterproposal to President Turbay’s terms. Photographs published the next day showed Gonzalez conversing with Bateman over a drink. As one military officer 

noted, M-19 had a knack for “making the government look foolish.”166

M-19 leaders were avant-garde propagandists, making use of “guerrilla marketing techniques” before the term was coined in 1984 by Conrad Levinson. In what can only be described as a masterful introduction 

into the bloody Colombian political landscape, M-19 announced its 

arrival with a series of mysterious newspaper advertisements that simply read, “Wait for M-19.”167 One former government official noted, 

“Nobody knew if it was something to clean your floors with, or cigarettes, or what.”168
Chapter 8. M-19

251

Figure 8-13. M-19 newspaper advertisement announcing the arrival of the guerrillas. It reads, “Parasites . . . worms? Wait. M-19.”

Political

M-19 was a remarkably political group. With some exceptions, M-19 

leadership understood its military tactics in relationship to its political strategy. The group’s political strategy was fundamentally defined 

during the seventh national conference. There, M-19 members defined 

their overarching political goal as a struggle for democracy, in sharp 

contrast with the FARC and the ELN, which advocated for a Socialist 

or Communist state.

Some of M-19’s earliest political objectives reflected those of its first 

political wing, ANAPO. Among other ideas, M-19 advocated “the direct 

elections of governors, free education and socialized medicine, and 

agrarian reform.”169 However, its greatest concern remained opening 

the anemic democracy of the National Front to greater participation by 

common men and women.170 Its paramilitary operations were usually 

undertaken with the understanding that the operations would achieve 

political goals, especially pressuring the government for more favorable 

negotiation terms: “The plan was the same was always: to take actions 

that would pressure the authorities for advantageous negotiations with 

the guerrillas. From the military trials, the prisons, and amnesty, we 

armed groups had gained an audience.”171

Unlike some insurgent groups, which view participation in governing political institutions as a serious breach of their fundamental 

values, M-19 actively sought to insert itself into the political process. 

For instance, in November  1980, M-19 announced leader Bateman’s 
252

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

presidential candidacy. Periodically, M-19 also used media outlets, particularly TV and radio stations, to air its negotiation proposals to the 

authorities.172 Likewise, the objective of the Palace of Justice siege was to 

use Colombia’s judicial institutions to put President Betancur on “trial” 

for his failure to sign peace accords during the 1984–1985 negotiations.

These actions, and M-19’s incorporation of nationalist rhetoric, 

illustrate the group’s fundamental view of the Colombian state. While it 

agitated for serious structural reform to correct the closed democratic 

institutions of the National Front, M-19 still upheld the essential legitimacy of the state. By contrast, other insurgent groups, such as the ELN, 

disavowed most political activity within legitimate state institutions.af

Several factors internal to the organization influenced the group’s 

decision to lay down its arms. As discussed earlier, M-19 adopted the 

struggle for democracy early in its career. That decision ensured a measure of ideological consistency when it opted to pursue legalization as 

a political party. A change in leadership in the mid-1980s also brought 

the charismatic Pizarro to the helm. He had a great deal of military 

credibility with his subordinates, bolstering his authority. It was his 

capabilities and vision as a leader that created the aperture for a wholly 

political strategy for the armed organization. Finally, the “dirty war” 

raging in Colombia, in which civilians bore the brunt of the guerrillas’ 

struggle for justice, led to a notable dissonance between M-19’s ends 

and the means by which it pursued them:

A proliferation of new actors in the confrontation was 

leading to a violent dynamic in which it was no longer 

clear who the enemies were, what they were fighting 

for, and who was benefitting from the violence. The 

intensification of the war started affecting the civilian 

population in the areas under the control of guerrilla 

groups. It was unacceptable to harm those whom we 

were supposed to defend, intensifying the alienation 

of the people from politics—the very opposite of what 

M-19 hoped to achieve.174

This trend was aggravated by authoritarian trends within the guerilla groups themselves. The Ricardo Franco Frente, a FARC offshoot, 

systematically murdered 163 of its guerrillas in an internal purge in the 

mid-1980s. M-19 publicly condemned the actions. Internally, M-19 questioned the Frente’s purported objectives, wondering how the group 

af Also see Crossett and Newton on the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) 

case, where the IRA had long adopted a policy of abstentionism, or refusal to sit in legitimate political institutions. Sinn Féin and IRA members regularly ran for office but, when 

elected, would refuse the seat in protest against British occupation.173
Chapter 8. M-19

253

could claim to be in pursuit of democracy while contributing to such 

gross abuses of human rights.175

Other external factors also facilitated M-19’s transition to a wholly 

political strategy. Arguably one of the most crucial factors was the Barco 

administration’s policies. His administration actively sought to alter 

state institutions to more adequately respond to Colombians’ social and 

political grievances. A crucial first step was the administration’s offer 

of constitutional reform as an initial conciliatory offer to the armed 

groups. This more democratic ethos in Colombia was buoyed by other 

democratic transitions in southern South America. Lastly, as discussed 

above, a social fatigue of war had beset the Colombian population.176

M-19’s 1988 kidnapping of Álvaro Gómez afforded the group an 

opportunity to jump-start the transition to a political strategy. Gómez 

was a former presidential candidate and representative of the ruling 

elite. While holding Gómez prisoner, the M-19 leadership began to contemplate the possibility of initiating negotiations with the government. 

During his captivity, Gómez had extensive dialogue with M-19 leaders 

regarding Colombia’s problems. Gómez became an unlikely ally after 

his release, aligning with M-19 in pushing for a constituent assembly to 

reform the country’s outdated constitution.177 Pizarro, the M-19 leader 

at the time, offered to both release Gómez and disarm and demobilize 

M-19 if the government would commit to deep structural reforms. The 

Barcas administration responded positively to Pizarro’s overture.178

The subsequent peace negotiations were marred by several acts of 

violence, including the assassination of Liberal presidential candidate 

Luis Carlos Galán and the murder of Carlos Pizarro in 1990. M-19 

steadfastly refused to abandon the peace process, even amid the failure 

of the government to adequately protect M-19 members. During the 

negotiations, M-19 insisted on three “rectifications” that later became 

the building blocks for the Pacto Pólitico por la Paz y la Democracia 

(Political Pact for Peace and Democracy), signed on November 2, 1989:

1. A new constitution

2. Respect for human rights

3. A national social and economic plan to ensure peace and 

prosperity for all179

The signing of the pact was preceded by M-19’s decision to lay down 

its arms, cemented at its tenth national conference in October 1989. 

True to form, M-19 came to a consensus on disarmament through a 

democratic vote. Of the 230 M-19 members in attendance, 227 voted in 

favor of laying down their arms.180

At that moment, M-19 began the transition to a political party 

whose primary instrument was the ballot, not bullets. In March of 
254

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

the following year, the M-19 became the Alianza Democrática M-19 

(AD M-19) after absorbing other demobilized guerillas from the EPL, 

the Quintín Lame, and the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores 

de Colombia (PRT), or Workers Revolutionary Party of Colombia, after 

to the peace accords that ended those groups’ armed struggles.181

Figure 8-14. Flag of AD M-19.

AD M-19’s influence on the constitutional reform process significantly altered the future trajectory of the Colombian government. 

However, as a political party, AD M-19 was largely a failure. In its slogans, the group touted itself as “more than a party” and presented 

itself as political alternative to the traditional Conservative and Liberal parties.182 Pizarro wanted a space for the “nonconformists.” In this 

regard, statistics were on Pizarro’s side. AD M-19 came in first place in a 

1988 survey asking the public to select its most favored guerrilla group.

However, AD M-19 proved inept at the business of building a political 

party.183 One researcher identified several key variables crucial to establishing a durable political party. Of those factors internal to the party, 

one is the presence of an “ideologue,” or leader, who commits resources 

to building a party from the ground up, with a staunch local base of 

support at the grassroots level. AD M-19 had such an ideologue in the 

leader Pizarro. Unfortunately for the party, the paramilitaries assassinated him in 1990. Antonio Navarro Wolff took over where Pizarro left 

off, but his leadership was “pragmatic,” characterized more by concern 

with electoral competition than development of grassroots support.184

Navarro took over leadership of AD M-19 before the group’s first election, which would select the officials that would attend the Constituent 
Chapter 8. M-19

255

Assembly, the forum charged with developing constitutional reforms 

it would present to the Colombian Congress for a vote. The election 

was a rousing success for the new party. The party fielded a diverse 

candidate list that garnered 26.75 percent (992,613 votes) of the vote. 

AD M-19 won nineteen  seats in the seventy-seat forum, second only 

to the Liberal party, which won twenty-five seats. During the reform 

process, which took place between February and July 1991 in Bogotá, 

AD M-19 played a critical role in designing the new constitution that 

Congress adopted that year. Party reform was the critical element of 

the party’s platform. AD M-19 succeeded in implementing substantial 

changes “to statutes governing candidate registration, financing, and 

legal recognition.”185

After some initial successes at the polls, AD M-19 clearly faltered. In 

its first congressional election, the party captured nine percent of the 

vote, granting them a total of nine senators and thirteen representatives in Congress. Several years later, the party garnered a fraction of 

those votes, granting them only one representative in Congress. The 

party fared similarly in local elections.

Table 8-1. AD M-19 national elections results.

Election Date Type Percentage 

of vote

Representatives 

elected

May 27, 1990 Presidential 12.5 0

September 12, 1990 Constituent 

Assembly

27.3 19 of 70 seats

October 27, 1991 Congressional 9.0 9 senators, 13 

representatives

March 13, 1994 Congressional 2.7 1 representative

May 29, 1994 Presidential 2.8 0

Based on a table included in Mauricio García Durán, Loewenherz, Vera Grabe, and 

Otty Patiño Hormaza, The M-19’s Journey from Armed Struggle to Democratic Politics, Berghof Transitions Series no. 1 (Berlin: Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2008), http://www.berghof-conflictresearch.org/documents/publications/

transitions_m19.pdf, 30.

Several critical factors contributed to the failure of AD M-19 to consolidate as a political force in the country. Internal political divisions, 

accompanied and compounded by Navarro’s pragmatic leadership 

style, and finally political decisions made by the group all impacted the 

implosion of AD M-19. The group discovered that building a political 

party was not as simple as grafting existing military structures onto 

a new frame. The skills gained during the armed struggle had not 

adequately prepared the guerrillas for their newfound political roles. 
256

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

At the end of the day, AD M-19 was not successful in translating the 

local support it cultivated as a guerrilla organization into support for 

its political project.186

Internal rifts, exacerbated by Navarro’s pragmatic leadership style, 

decreased the staying power of the party. After 1992, AD M-19 was no 

longer running unified candidate lists; instead the group fielded individual candidates. The decision reflected internal divisions within the 

party itself. A sharp decline in votes, from nearly one million in 1990 to 

less than half that a year later, led to finger pointing and blame. Divisions over the party’s vision for the future continued to fracture over 

the course of the next several years. The problem was exacerbated by 

Navarro’s coalition-building tactics that had increased the reach of the 

party in elections. The coalitions led to some short-term electoral victories but left the party with little internal coherence.187

Navarro’s “obsession” with coalition building came at the expense 

of cultivating a solid local support base necessary to sustain a political 

movement long term. This trend is reflected in the area of operations 

for the group—the party stationed itself primarily in Bogotá, not in 

the smaller cities and the countryside. When the party did develop an 

eight-plank platform in 1993, Navarro seemed too ready to compromise the principles to gain new coalition allies capable of defeating 

the Liberal party. Despite its efforts to revive a local base of support in 

1994, AD M-19 became more or less irrelevant in Colombian politics.188

Individual former guerillas, however, such as Navarro, have continued 

their involvement in Colombian politics, and several of former guerrillas continue to serve in local and national government seats. In 2008, 

Navarro was elected to the governorship of the Nariño Department.

Other political decisions also negatively impacted the legitimacy of 

the party. After the 1990 elections, the Gaviria administration offered 

the Health Ministry post to AD  M-19. Navarro briefly accepted the 

post before turning it over to another AD  M-19 member. However, 

the Gaviria administration adopted belligerent and unpopular policies, such as a neoliberal economic program that gutted social justice 

programs, and took a hard-line stance against the remaining guerrilla 

groups during peace talks. By 1992, after Gaviria had opted to renew 

the offensive against the guerrillas, AD M-19 had withdrawn from the 

government. However, AD M-19’s association with the administration 

had tarnished their reputation.189
Chapter 8. M-19

257

EXTERNAL ACTORS AND TRANSNATIONAL 

INFLUENCES

On numerous occasions, M-19 attempted to unite the various leftist 

guerrilla organizations operating in Colombia and neighboring countries in Latin America. Their efforts met limited success. In the mid1980s, M-19, along with guerrillas from Ecuador and other regional 

countries, established the Americas Battalion. The group is thought to 

have had as many as 400 to 500 members at one time. The Americas 

Battalion engaged in a series of confrontations with the armed forces 

in northwestern Colombia.190 M-19 prisoners captured after a botched 

1981 land invasion admitted to being trained in Cuba and receiving 

weapons from Panama.191

FINANCES, LOGISTICS, AND SUSTAINMENT

M-19 relied on various revenue streams throughout its history to 

maintain the viability of the organization. Early on, the movement 

struggled to fund training expenses and propaganda, as well as to 

secure the means to neutralize the violence of the Colombian state. 

Like many insurgent movements, M-19 turned to criminal activity to 

supply needed resources. In 1973 and 1974, M-19 operatives robbed 

a series of banks.192 Other recorded incidents included a 1984 train 

robbery during which M-19 members boarded a train carrying hundreds of tourists near Bogotá. The guerrillas shot and wounded two 

policeman after demanding that the engineer stop the train. Tourists 

on board were stripped and robbed of their valuables.193

One of the group’s primary revenue streams was from the “recovery” of so-called “people’s funds” from wealthy Colombians and foreign corporations. In plain terms, this meant kidnapping targeted 

individuals or corporations and collecting ransoms. M-19 targeted the 

American-owned Sears, Roebuck & Co. in one of its earliest kidnappings. Several insurgents stormed the home of Donald Cooper, a Sears 

executive living in Bogotá at the time.194 After detaining Cooper for 

six months, M-19 released him, reportedly for a one-million-dollar ransom paid by Sears. These kidnappings became fairly common early in 

M-19’s career.195 M-19 acquired most of its funds through ransoms paid 

to the group for the return of kidnapped individuals. Only rarely did 

the group receive “a dollar here or a dollar there” from international 

allies such as Libya or Cuba. Occasionally, M-19 briefly took over small 

towns, acquiring funds from local institutions and individuals, but this 

activity provided only “pocket money” for the guerrillas.196
258

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Eventually, the group suffered from its financial successes, ushering in an unfortunate era in Colombian history that linked paramilitary groups and drug cartels. Hoping to acquire the cash necessary to 

fund a rural-based insurgency, Bateman opted to target the rich and 

powerful drug-trafficking families.197 M-19’s initial foray into kidnapping the traffickers highlighted the group’s exceedingly poor intelligence capabilities. A contact from Bogotá suggested a target to M-19, 

one wealthy enough to ensure a hefty ransom—Pablo Escobar. Upon 

his capture, Escobar, already a powerful, dangerous man, convinced 

his captors to release him, giving the group another target, this time 

the Ochoa family. After being released, Escobar apparently contacted 

the Ochoa family to give them the identity of the group that captured 

their relative.198 M-19 abducted Marta Nieves Ochoa, one of five sisters 

of the powerful Ochoa drug-running family, from a university campus 

outside of Medellín. In addition to targeting Escobar and the Ochoas, 

M-19 also kidnapped the three small children of drug trafficker Carlos 

Jader Alvárez, demanding a five-million-dollar ransom. Using his contacts, Alvárez extracted information regarding M-19 from law enforcement officials. Acting on the intelligence, Alvárez scooped up anyone, 

mostly university students, known to be connected or sympathetic to 

the group.

The reaction of the community of trafficking families helped to 

cement nascent cartels, as well as link paramilitary groups with the 

drug-trafficking syndicates. The abduction of the Alvárez and Ochoa 

children prompted a gathering of concerned drug-trafficking families 

in 1981 in Cali. During the historic meeting, the families formed a 

vigilante group, Muerte a Secuestradores (MAS), or Death to Kidnappers. MAS was one of the first paramilitary organizations to form in 

response to leftist guerrillas that emerged after La Violencia. The purpose of MAS was to recover abductees and punish kidnappers. Each 

family represented at the meeting donated to the MAS war chest.ag

Recalling the meeting, Escobar, one of the key attendees, said the 

families contributed hundreds of thousands of dollars, along with cars, 

motorcycles, airplanes, and even a submarine. Some of the funds went 

to pay for information that law enforcement had on M-19. Soon after, 

in Esocbar’s words, M-19 “began to fall.” MAS captured M-19 members 

and tortured them for information regarding the locations of the kidnapping victims and the perpetrators of the crimes. Colombian security officials, already smarting from previous M-19 antics, also applied 

pressure to M-19.

ag Some argue that this first cooperative arrangement between the region’s drug-trafficking families helped to spawn the drug cartels—in this case, the Medellín Cartel.199
Chapter 8. M-19

259

MAS hired a plane to fly over a soccer stadium during a playoff game, 

dropping leaflets to announce its formation. The vigilantes threatened 

to “hang kidnappers from trees in the public parks or shoot them and 

mark their bodies with the insignia MAS and a cross.” If the kidnappers 

themselves were unavailable, MAS promised to deliver retribution to 

the perpetrators’ families. The drug kingpins also promised a $200,000 

reward for any information leading to the capture of kidnappers. It did 

not take long for the body count to pile up after MAS distributed the 

leaflets. Within the first six weeks, MAS had rounded up one hundred 

M-19 members.200 Press reports attributed the capture of Elvencio Ruiz 

Gomez, M-19’s second in command, to MAS. Gomez had reportedly 

masterminded a plan to abduct a wealthy businessman’s daughter.201

The incident altered the relationship between the drug cartels and 

M-19. M-19 leadership had seriously underestimated the consequences 

of their kidnapping tactics: “They were like adolescents on a joyride.”202

Bowing to pressure brought to bear by MAS, which captured, tortured, 

or killed dozens of M-19 members, M-19 released Nieves. In revenge 

for the killings of its members, M-19 later murdered the three Alvárez 

children, an accusation the group tried, unconvincingly, to deny.203 It 

is unclear whether the Ochoa patriarch, Fabio, paid the requested onemillion-dollar ransom for the release of his daughter. One account, possibly apocryphal, says the offended patriarch soon thereafter purchased 

a thoroughbred racehorse worth more than $500,000. The horse, aptly 

named Ransom, was displayed in the public eye whenever possible.ah

Less fantastic, however, is the mercenary relationship that developed between leftist guerrilla groups, including M-19, and the drug 

cartels after the incident. To seal the “truce” between the traffickers 

and the guerrillas, M-19 leader Iván Marino Ospina and Pablo Escobar 

met. At the meeting, Marino gave Escobar a Soviet submachine gun 

as a token of the guerrillas’ pledge to never target trafficking families again.205, ai Later, Colombian authorities would discover a number 

of weapons caches destined for M-19 on vessels owned by the Medellín Cartel. Rather than paying M-19 and other kidnappers’ ransom, 

the cartels agreed to transport weapons for the groups in return for 

“amnesty from kidnappings, assistance in guarding remote jungle laboratories and permission to traffic cocaine through Colombian territory.” 

The extent and duration of the relationship of convenience between 

M-19 and the powerful drug cartels is still unclear. Years later, the cartels formed Asociación Campesina de Ganaderos y Agricultores del 

ah Other accounts suggest that Nieves’s release was facilitated by Manuel Noriega and 

Fidel Castro.204

ai Another source indicates that the truce between M-19 and the drug traffickers was 

brokered by Panama’s Manuel Noriega.206
260

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Magdalena Medio (ACDEGAM), or Association of Middle Magdalena 

Ranchers and Farmers, a MAS successor, which spent several decades 

systematically exterminating guerrillas and their sympathizers.207

In addition to its illicit activities, M-19 pursued legal financial 

streams. M-19 leadership encouraged several of its members to pursue opportunities in private entrepreneurship. The individuals set up 

a medical equipment distribution company that provided the organizations with a regular stream of income for a number of years. Produmedicos, as the firm was called, earned approximately $5,300 each 

month but also allowed leaders to obtain easy credit as needed.208 Likewise, Bateman legally invested the one-million-dollar ransom collected 

from the kidnapping of Sears executive Donald Cooper. The investment produced a steady stream of income that funded M-19’s 1978 raid 

on a military weapons depot in Bogotá, described below.209

Just as the group had a multiplicity of revenue streams, M-19 also 

acquired weapons from a variety of sources. As discussed above in the 

Underground and Auxiliary section, M-19’s underground often stole 

weapons piecemeal in urban centers it they operated. Acquiring weapons sufficient to confront the Colombian military was difficult, if not 

impossible. Instead, Bateman chose to target a weapons depot of the 

military itself. After extensive intelligence gathering and planning, 

M-19 dug an underground 264-foot tunnel from a safe house it rented 

to the facilities storing the weapons cache in Bogotá, called the Blue 

Whale. On New Year’s Eve 1979, while the officers recovered from the 

celebrations, M-19 operatives absconded with thousands of weapons. 

Embarrassed by being caught flat-footed, the Colombian security forces 

launched a concerted campaign against the group, arresting dozens of 

members, including several leaders. The military’s concerted retribution seriously hampered M-19’s capabilities. The army recovered most 

of the weapons.210

M-19 also enjoyed the support of several international benefactors, including Cuba, Libya, and Nicaragua, which helped arm the 

group. Bateman, the M-19 leader, used his connections with a close 

Cuban friend, Jaime Guillot Lara, to facilitate the transfer of arms to 

the group. Guillot was also indicted on drug trafficking to the United 

States. According to the US Drug Enforcement Agency, Cuba’s complicity in Guillot’s trafficking activities helped the latter acquire the hard 

currency necessary to support leftist revolutionaries in Latin America, 

including those of his friend, Jaime Bateman.211 Libya’s dictator at the 

time,212 General Qadhafi, also supplied M-19 with much-needed arms. 

M-19 leader Bateman personally traveled to Libya to meet with the dictator. In mid-1983, Brazilian authorities intercepted a Libyan cargo 

plane en route to Nicaragua after a technical fault forced the plan to 
Chapter 8. M-19

261

land there. The authorities discovered a sizable cache of weapons destined for M-19 in the hold.

Transport of supplies in Colombia’s rough terrain also proved challenging. In 1981, M-19 successfully hijacked a cargo plane in northwestern Colombia, using the plane to transport five tons of arms and 

ammunition to its new area of operations in the jungles of the Caquetá 

Department. The military sent army patrols to investigate the downed 

plane, which had been crash-landed in a river. M-19 fighters ambushed 

the patrol with machine gun fire and rockets. Several soldiers were 

killed over the course of a dozen firefights. M-19 fighters also captured several journalists who traveled to the site of the hijacked plane. 

The reporters were forced to march with the guerrilla columns. After 

identifying two of the reporters as “infiltrators,” the unit commander 

ordered their execution. The remaining reporters captured the shootings on film. Eventually, M-19 released the remaining reporters and the 

crew of the hijacked plane.213

ENDNOTES

1 Jorge Pablo Osterling, Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (New 

Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction Publishers, 1989), 302.

2 “Colombia,” Encyclopedia of the Nations, accessed March 29, 2013, http://www.countrydata.com/cgi-bin/query/r-3004.html.

3 Eduardo Pizarro, “Revolutionary Guerrilla Groups in Colombia,” in Violence in Colombia: 

The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective, eds. Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Peñaranda, 

and Gonzalez Sanchez (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Books, 1992), 182.

4 Timothy Wickham-Crowley, Guerillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study 

of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 226.

5 Chuck Crossett and Summer Newton, “Solidarity,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Fort Bragg, NC: United States 

Army Special Operations Command, 2012), 825.

6 Osterling, Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 302.

7 Pizarro, “Revolutionary Guerrilla Groups in Colombia,” 182.

8 Robin Kirk, More Terrible than Death: Drugs, Violence, and America’s War in Colombia (New 

York: PublicAffairs, 2003), 63.

9 Durán, Loewenherz, and Hormaza, The M-19’s Journey from Armed Struggle to Democratic 

Politics, 12.

10 Harvey F. Kline, Historical Dictionary of Colombia (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2012), 

69.

11 Ana Gómez Romero, “Bateman Cayón, Jaime: Ficha Bibliográfica,” Biblioteca Virtual, 

Biblioteca Luis Ángel Arango, accessed June 17, 2013, http://www.banrepcultural.org/

blaavirtual/biografias/batejaim.htm.

12 Romero, “Bateman Cayón, Jaime: Ficha Bibliográfica.”

13 “Álvaro Fayad Delgado,” Wikipedia, accessed 17 June 2013, http://en.wikipedia.org/

wiki/%C3%81lvaro_Fayad.

14 Kline, Historical Dictionary of Colombia, 391–392.
262

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

15 Osterling, Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 302.

16 “Antonio Navarro Wolff,” Wikipedia, accessed 17 June 2013, http://en.wikipedia.org/

wiki/Antonio_Navarro_Wolff.

17 Ibid.

18 Henry Lawrence Boudon, “New Party Persistence and Failure: A Comparative Analysis 

of Colombia’s M-19 Democratic Alliance and Venezuela’s Radical Cause” (dissertation, 

University of Miami, 1997), 103–104.

19 Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 87.

20 Ibid., 250.

21 Ibid., 258.

22 Nathan Bos, “Insurgent Use of Media: Traditional, Broadcast, and Internet,” in Human 

Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, Second Ed., ed. Nathan Bos (Fort 

Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 40–42.

23 María Eugenia Vásquez Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary: Reflections of a Former Guerrilla, trans. Lorena Terando (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005), 61.

24 Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 192–193.

25 Ibid., 254 (Chronology 1985).

26 Ibid., 199.

27 Ibid., 194.

28 Ibid., 207–208.

29 Ibid., 207–208.

30 Ibid., 48–50.

31 Ibid., 88, 90.

32 René De La Pedraja, Wars of the Latin Americas, 1948–1982: The Rise of the Guerrillas (Jefferson, NC, and London: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2013), 228.

33 Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 95.

34 Ibid., 77–85.

35 Ibid., 78, fn. 1.

36 Ibid., 83–86.

37 Osterling, Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 302.

38 Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 80, 203.

39 “Colombia: Presence of Armed Groups in Eight Key Areas in Bogota Causes Concern,” El 

Espectador, September 24, 2002, BBC Monitoring International Reports.

40 Vera Grabe, “Laying Down Arms: The M-19 Renunciation of Violence in Colombia,” in

Negotiating Disarmament: Reflections on Guns, Fighters, and Armed Violence in Peace Processes, 

Viewpoints 2, ed. Cate Buchanan (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2008), http://www.

hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/75ViewpointsEdition2.pdf, 12.

41 Mauricio García Durán, Vera Grabe Loewenherz, and Otty Patiño Hormaza, The M-19’s 

Journey from Armed Struggle to Democratic Politics, Berghof Transitions Series no. 1 (Berlin: 

Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2008), http://www.berghof-conflictresearch.org/documents/publications/transitions_m19.pdf, 13–14.

42 Durán, Loewenherz, and Hormaza, The M-19’s Journey from Armed Struggle to Democratic 

Politics, 14.

43 Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 218.

44 Osterling, Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 306.

45 Ibid.

46 Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 87.

47 Durán, Loewenherz, and Hormaza, The M-19’s Journey from Armed Struggle to Democratic 

Politics, 13.
Chapter 8. M-19

263

48 Sean K. Anderson and Stephen Sloan, Historical Dictionary of Terrorism (Lanham, MD: 

Scarecrow Press, 2009), 406.

49 Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 87.

50 Durán, Loewenherz, and Hormaza, The M-19’s Journey from Armed Struggle to Democratic 

Politics, 13–14.

51 Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 97.

52 Durán, Loewenherz, and Hormaza, The M-19’s Journey from Armed Struggle to Democratic 

Politics, 14.

53 Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 253–254.

54 Pizarro, “Revolutionary Guerrilla Groups in Colombia,” 183.

55 Ibid., 182–183.

56 Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 68.

57 Ibid., 67–72.

58 Jorge Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left After the Cold War (New York: 

Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 114.

59 Pizarro, “Revolutionary Guerrilla Groups in Colombia,” 183.

60 Paul Montgomery, “Bogota Terrorists in Profile: They Fit No Political Mold,” New York 

Times, March 10, 1980.

61 Ibid.

62 Patricia Lara, Siembra Vientos y Recogerás Tempestades (Bogotá: Editorial Planeta, 1986), 

110–111, as quoted in Castañeda, Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left After the Cold 

War, 116.

63 Montgomery, “Bogota Terrorists in Profile: They Fit No Political Mold.”

64 As quoted in Boudon, “Colombia’s M-19 Democratic Alliance: A Case Study in New-Party 

Self-Destruction,” Latin American Perspectives 28, no. 1 (2001): 76.

65 Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 195.

66 Mauricio Florez-Morris, “Reinsert Life Stories: A Description of the Colombian Ex-Guerrillas’ Life Course from a Sociological Perspective” (dissertation, University of Maryland, 

College Park, 2005), 91–92.

67 Pizarro, “Revolutionary Guerrilla Groups in Colombia,” 183.

68 Warren Hoge, “In Bogota, Rebel Daring vs. the Club,” New York Times, August 18, 1981.

69 Cynthia Gorney, “Voices from a Bogota Jail: Why did Folk Say, ‘What a Shame’ When the 

Terrorists were Nabbed?” Washington Post, June 7, 1981.

70 Ibid.

71 Osterling, Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 306.

72 Montgomery, “Bogota Terrorists in Profile: They Fit No Political Mold.”

73 Kirk, More Terrible than Death, 137.

74 “No Bargaining for a Hostage,” Newsweek, February 9, 1981.

75 Tom Wells, “Chester Bitterman is Killed by His Kidnappers in Colombia,” Lewiston Journal, March 7, 1981.

76 Bos, Human Factors, 117.

77 Florez-Morris, “Reinsert Life Stories: A Description of the Colombian Ex-Guerrillas’ Life 

Course from a Sociological Perspective.”

78 Ibid., 81.

79 Ibid., 75.

80 Bos, Human Factors, 120.

81 Florez-Morris, “Reinsert Life Stories: A Description of the Colombian Ex-Guerrillas’ Life 

Course from a Sociological Perspective,” 77–79.
264

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

82 Ibid., 81–82.

83 Ibid., 102.

84 Ibid., 95.

85 As quoted in Florez-Morris, “Reinsert Life Stories: A Description of the Colombian ExGuerrillas’ Life Course from a Sociological Perspective,” 88–89.

86 Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 79, 194.

87 Ibid., 38.

88 As quoted in Florez-Morris, “Reinsert Life Stories: A Description of the Colombian ExGuerrillas’ Life Course from a Sociological Perspective,” 102.

89 As quoted in Florez-Morris, “Reinsert Life Stories: A Description of the Colombian ExGuerrillas’ Life Course from a Sociological Perspective,” 95.

90 Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 38–39.

91 As quoted Florez-Morris, “Reinsert Life Stories: A Description of the Colombian ExGuerrillas’ Life Course from a Sociological Perspective,” 102.

92 Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 97.

93 As quoted in Florez-Morris, “Reinsert Life Stories: A Description of the Colombian ExGuerrillas’ Life Course from a Sociological Perspective,” 104.

94 As quoted in Florez-Morris, “Reinsert Life Stories: A Description of the Colombian ExGuerrillas’ Life Course from a Sociological Perspective,” 103.

95 As quoted in Florez-Morris, “Reinsert Life Stories: A Description of the Colombian ExGuerrillas’ Life Course from a Sociological Perspective,” 108.

96 Florez-Morris, “Reinsert Life Stories: A Description of the Colombian Ex-Guerrillas’ Life 

Course from a Sociological Perspective,” 111.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid., 127.

99 Ibid., 111–126.

100Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 258–259.

101 Florez-Morris, “Reinsert Life Stories: A Description of the Colombian Ex-Guerrillas’ Life 

Course from a Sociological Perspective,” 137.

102 Ibid., 142.

103 Ibid., 146.

104 Ibid., 147–149.

105 Ibid., 149.

106 Ibid., 161–162.

107Global Terrorism Database, Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables (College Park, MD: 

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2012), 

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf, 18–19.

108Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 

Responses to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

109Global Terrorism Database, Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables http://www.start.

umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf, 27–28.

110 Global Terrorism Database, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

111 Diego Asencio and Nancy Asencio, Our Man is Inside (Boston, Toronto: Atlantic Monthly 

Press Book: 1982, 1983), 9.

112 Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 118.

113Asencio and Asencio, Our Man is Inside, 10.

114 Temple University Press, “Author Interviews: Maria Eugenia Vásquez Perdomo Answers 

Questions about her Life as a Colombian Revolutionary,” accessed June 10, 2013, http://

www.temple.edu/tempress/authors/1756_qa.html.
Chapter 8. M-19

265

115Asencio and Asencio, Our Man is Inside, 14.

116 Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 107.

117 Asencio and Asencio, Our Man is Inside, 15.

118 James Nelson Goodsell, “Bogota Hostage-taking Tied to Capture of Guerrilla Leader,” 

Christian Science Monitor, March 4, 1980.

119 Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 107.

120 Ibid., 109.

121Goodsell, “Bogota Hostage-taking Tied to Capture of Guerrilla Leader.”

122Asencio and Asencio, Our Man is Inside, 6–16.

123Richard Clutterbuck, “Negotiating with Terrorists,” Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 4 

(1992): 273.

124United States Department of State, Terrorist Group Profiles (Collingdale, PA: Diane Publishing Co., 1989), 91.

125Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 119.

126De La Pedraja, Wars of the Latin Americas, 1948–1982: The Rise of the Guerrillas, 282.

127 Ibid., 283.

128 Ibid.

129 Ibid., 284.

130Gorney, “Voices from a Bogota Jail: Why did Folk Say, ‘What a Shame’ When the Terrorists were Nabbed?”

131 Osterling, Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 306.

132Grabe, “Laying Down Arms: The M-19 Renunciation of Violence in Colombia.”

133Rex A. Hudson, “Colombia’s Palace of Justice Tragedy Revisited: A Critique of the Conspiracy Theory,” Terrorism and Political Violence 7, no. 2 (1995): 93.

134Durán, Loewenherz, and Hormaza, The M-19’s Journey from Armed Struggle to Democratic 

Politics, 16.

135Hudson, “Colombia’s Palace of Justice Tragedy Revisited: A Critique of the Conspiracy 

Theory,” 93.

136The National Security Archive, “Landmark Conviction in Colombia’s Palace of Justice 

Case,” June 11, 2010, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB319/.

137Hudson, “Colombia’s Palace of Justice Tragedy Revisited: A Critique of the Conspiracy 

Theory,” 93–94.

138 Ibid., 126.

139 Ibid., 95.

140 Ibid., 97.

141 Ibid., 98.

142Mark Steinitz, “The Terrorism and Drug Connection in Latin American’s Andean 

Region,” Policy Papers on the Americas XIII, no. 5 (2002), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/

pubs/pp_steinitz%5B1%5D.pdf, 3.

143Ana Carrigan, The Palace of Justice Tragedy: A Colombian Tragedy (New York and London: 

Four Walls Eight Windows, 1993).

144Hudson, “Colombia’s Palace of Justice Tragedy Revisited: A Critique of the Conspiracy 

Theory,” 93–142.

145Durán, Loewenherz, and Hormaza, The M-19’s Journey from Armed Struggle to Democratic 

Politics, 16.

146Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 249–259.

147Alvaro Camacho, “Public and Private Dimensions of Urban Violence in Cali,” in Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective, eds. Charles Bergquist, 
266

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Ricardo Peñaranda, and Gonzalez Sánchez (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 

1992), 252–253.

148 Ibid., 243.

149 Ibid., 253–255.

150Durán, Loewenherz, and Hormaza, The M-19’s Journey from Armed Struggle to Democratic 

Politics, 14.

151 Steven Dudley, Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia (New York and 

London: Routledge, 2004), 155–156.

152Boudon, “Colombia’s M-19 Democratic Alliance: A Case Study in New-Party Self-Destruction,” 100.

153Florez-Morris, “Reinsert Life Stories: A Description of the Colombian Ex-Guerrillas’ Life 

Course from a Sociological Perspective,” 81–82.

154 Ibid., 105.

155Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 249–259.

156De La Pedraja, Wars of the Latin Americas, 1948–1982: The Rise of the Guerrillas, 226.

157Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 44, 49, 66.

158 Ibid., 120.

159Durán, Loewenherz, and Hormaza, The M-19’s Journey from Armed Struggle to Democratic 

Politics, 14.

160Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 120–121.

161 Durán, Loewenherz, and Hormaza, The M-19’s Journey from Armed Struggle to Democratic 

Politics, 14.

162De La Pedraja, Wars of the Latin Americas, 1948–1982: The Rise of the Guerrillas, 283.

163Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 224–225.

164Boudon, “Colombia’s M-19 Democratic Alliance: A Case Study in New-Party Self-Destruction,” 104.

165Montgomery, “Bogota Terrorists in Profile: They Fit No Political Mold.”

166Hoge, “In Bogota, Rebel Daring vs. the Club.”

167Gorney, “Voices from a Bogota Jail: Why did Folk Say, ‘What a Shame’ When the Terrorists were Nabbed?”

168 Ibid.

169Boudon, “New Party Persistence and Failure: A Comparative Analysis of Colombia’s M-19 

Democratic Alliance and Venezuela’s Radical Cause,” 102.

170 Ibid.

171 Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 195.

172 Ibid., 249–259.

173Chuck Crossett and Summer Newton, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett 

(Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2012), 379–421.

174 Grabe, “Laying Down Arms: The M-19 Renunciation of Violence in Colombia,” 15.

175 Ibid., 15–18.

176 Ibid., 18–20.

177 Dudley, Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia, 155–156.

178 Grabe, “Laying Down Arms: The M-19 Renunciation of Violence in Colombia,” 15.

179Boudon, “New Party Persistence and Failure: A Comparative Analysis of Colombia’s M-19 

Democratic Alliance and Venezuela’s Radical Cause,” 106.

180Perdomo, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary, 258.
Chapter 8. M-19

267

181Boudon, “Colombia’s M-19 Democratic Alliance: A Case Study in New-Party Self-Destruction,” 75.

182 Ibid., 76.

183 Ibid.

184 Ibid., 74.

185 Ibid., 78–79.

186 Ibid., 77.

187 Ibid., 85–88.

188 Ibid., 81–85.

189 Ibid., 81.

190 Joanne Omang, “Violence in Colombia Raises Doubts on Truce,” Washington Post, October 22, 1986.

191 “Guerrillas in Colombia Quits Cities to Open a Jungle Offensive,” New York Times, November 11, 1981.

192Osterling, Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 301.

193 “Around the World: 400 Are Robbed on Colombian Train,” Globe and Mail, April 30, 

1984.

194Michael Newton, The Encyclopedia of Kidnapping (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2002), 72.

195Osterling, Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 303.

196Durán, Loewenherz, and Hormaza, The M-19’s Journey from Armed Struggle to Democratic 

Politics, 15.

197Kirk, More Terrible than Death, 104.

198Personal communication with Doug Farah, journalist, who interviewed M-19 insurgents, 

April 4, 2013.

199Dudley, Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia, 74.

200Dominic Streatfeild, Cocaine: An Unauthorized Biography (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 

2001), 254.

201 “Colombian Godfathers Organize to Fight Abductors,” Globe and Mail, January 29, 1982.

202Kirk, More Terrible than Death, 106–107.

203Ibid.

204Streatfeild, Cocaine: An Unauthorized Biography, 255.

205Kirk, More Terrible than Death, 107.

206Steinitz, “The Terrorism and Drug Connection in Latin American’s Andean Region,” 3.

207Streatfeild, Cocaine: An Unauthorized Biography, 256.

208Osterling, Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 303.

209Kirk, More Terrible than Death, 104.

210 Osterling, Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 304.

211 Leslie Maitland Werner, “U.S. Officials Link Castro and Drugs,” New York Times, November 10, 1983.

212Reuters, “Arms Sent for M-19, Colombia Says,” Globe and Mail, April 23, 1983.

213 “Guerrillas in Colombia Quits Cities to Open a Jungle Offensive,” New York Times, November 11, 1981.

CHAPTER 9.

AUTODEFENSAS UNIDAS DE COLOMBIA 

(AUC)

Chapter 9. AUC

271

TIMELINE

1849 Conservative and Liberal Parties are founded.

1899–1903 “The War of the Thousand Days”—120,000 people 

die in civil war between Liberals and Conservatives.

1946 (–1965) La Violencia (“The Violence”), a localized civil 

war characterized by widespread violence between 

Liberal and Conservatives in the countryside. The 

conflict resulted in the deaths of 180,000–300,000 

Colombians.

April 9, 1948 Liberal Party presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer 

Gaitán Ayala is assassinated in Bogotá. The assassin is 

killed on the spot and the Bogotazo riot ensues.

1949 Conservative Party candidate Laureano Gómez 

Castro wins the presidential election. Colombian 

Communist Party introduces “mass self-defense” as 

means for peasants to protect themselves from armed 

Conservatives.

June 1, 1953 President Gomez is deposed by a military coup. General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla becomes the new president 

of Colombia.

May 1, 1957 President Rojas resigns under the pressure of Liberals 

and Conservatives united under a combined political 

entity called the “National Front.”

1958 Conservatives and Liberals agree to form the 

National Front, a power-sharing agreement, in a bid 

to end civil war.

August 7, 1958 The first National Front president, Alberto Lleras 

Carmago, takes office.

August 1962 President Leon Valencia Munoz is inaugurated.

1970 National People’s alliance is formed as a left-wing 

counterweight to the National Front.

1978 President Turbay begins intense fight against drug 

traffickers.

August 1982 President Belisario Betancur Cuartas is inaugurated. 

During his inaugural speech, he announces that the 

Colombian government will engage in peace negotiations with leftist guerrillas.

November 18, 

1982

President Betancur signs Congressional Law 35, 

granting general amnesty to all guerrilla combatants.

May 28, 1984 Cease-fire begins under the Aribe Agreement.

1986 Right-wing paramilitary groups begin a murder campaign against UP politicians.

August 1990 President César Gaviria Trujillo is inaugurated.
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1993 Pablo Escobar is killed.

August 1994 President Ernesto Samper Pizano is inaugurated.

April 1997 The far-right paramilitary groups unite under the 

Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) to combat 

left-leaning FARC and ELN.

August 1998 President Andres Pastrana Arango is inaugurated.

2000 US Congress appropriates 1.3 billion dollars for Plan 

Colombia. Total appropriation through 2005 would 

reach 4.5 billion dollars.

August 2002 President Alvaro Uribe Vélez is inaugurated.

April 2003 The Uribe administration is able to modify the 

Colombian constitution to allow government forces to 

make arrests without warrants.

December 2003 More than 31,000 AUC members agree to demobilize. 

An additional 15,800 insurgents from AUC, FARC, 

and ELN eventually voluntarily demobilize.

July 2004 AUC and government begin peace talks.

2004 Plan Patriota is introduced by Uribe, with the aim of 

establishing a permanent military presence in rebelheld territory.

2006 The majority of AUC blocks are demobilized. 

February 2006 US and Colombia reach a free trade deal (eventually 

passed in 2011).

March 1, 2008 Raúl Reyes is killed in his stronghold in Ecuador during a Colombian cross-border attack.

March 7, 2008 Iván Ríos, the youngest member of the secretariat, is 

assassinated by his chief of security, Rojas.

October 2009 Colombia and the United States sign deal giving US 

military access to seven Colombian military bases.

ORIGINS OF THE AUC

The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia—AUC) was an umbrella organization for Colombia’s 

semiautonomous right-wing paramilitary groups. Although the AUC 

was officially formed in 1997, like many of Colombia’s paramilitary 

groups, its origins date back to the 1950s when wealthy landowners and 

cattle ranchers hired militia groups to enhance their physical security 

and protect their property interests. After La Violencia, there was a rise 

in leftist guerrilla movements. These groups often had roots in Marxist-Leninist ideology, with the espoused goal of violent revolutionary 
Chapter 9. AUC

273

change.1 With large landholdings and significant wealth, these rural 

elites were concerned with the growth of the guerrillas and, in turn, 

enlisted militias as protective forces.

Recognizing the militias’ efficacy, Colombia’s early paramilitary 

groups received both tacit and active political and military support. 

This support was largely due to the fact that the paramilitary groups 

and the Colombian government shared a common enemy in the leftist 

guerrillas who sought advancement of economic and rural land reform 

agendas and, ultimately, the violent overthrow of the Colombian state. 

In the 1960s, the Colombian government took steps to legally permit 

the existence of these paramilitary groups; Presidential Decree 3398 

and Law 48 allowed for the “creation of civil defense organizations” to 

protect against the activities of leftist guerrillas.2 Throughout the 1960s 

and 1970s, the military continued its role in setting up and supporting 

such forces.

A series of military operational manuals issued in the 

1960s encouraged the creation of paramilitary structures. In 1969, the Reglamento de EJC 3-10, Reservado, 

de 1969, EJC-3 Order, Restricted, 1969, stated that the 

armed forces should organize “self-defence committees” which “are a military-type organization made up 

of civilian personnel in the combat zone, which are 

trained and equipped to undertake operations against 

guerrilla groups that threaten an area or to operate 

in coordination with combat troops.” The Colombian 

military’s efforts were facilitated and supported by 

“local political and economic elites, particularly landowners and agro-industrialists, at best tolerated and at 

worst supported the creation of civilian “self-defence” 

groups by the army. The justification for this support 

was that such self-defence groups were needed to prevent the guerrilla from extorting local businesses—

enforced through kidnapping—in areas where there 

was little or no armed state presence. In many areas, 

paramilitary structures were created by the army at the 

behest of and with financing from local landowners.3

The Colombian military’s support of paramilitaries, known locally 

as self-defense groups (in Spanish, autodefensas) was a key component of 

its counterinsurgency strategy in fighting leftist guerrilla movements. 

In addition to the growing role that the state played in the creation and 

support of self-defense groups, the main constituencies of these groups 

remained landowners, cattle ranchers, and, increasingly, drug cartels.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

As the spoils of the illegal drug trade became apparent to leaders 

of these groups in the 1980s, their involvement in narcotrafficking 

increased,4 and the more enterprising paramilitaries began aggressively 

competing in the illicit drug market.5 The Castaño brothers, leaders of 

the fearsome Las Tangas group (which would later go on to become 

the Peasant Self-Defense Forces of Córdoba and Urabá [Autodefensas 

Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá—ACCU], the primary self-defense 

group of the AUC) were heavily involved in narcotrafficking. In 1998, 

the Castaño brothers made an astute move that would help cement their 

ascendancy toward leading the AUC: “the brothers Castaño started buying land in Córdoba, Urabá, southeast Antioquia, and the Viejo Caldas, 

and amassed a fortune mostly through extortion and narcotrafficking.”6

Richani goes on to conclude that the Castaño’s “links first with the 

Medellín Cartel and then with that of Cali consolidated their linkages 

with narcotraffickers.”7 Such linkages between the self-defense groups 

and the illicit drug industry were not uncommon. Despite these links, 

the Colombian government continued their support of the self-defense 

groups. For example, “in 1987 . . . then Minister of Defense, General 

Refael [sic] Samudio affirmed the . . . defense of the paramilitary groups 

by saying ‘that the civil communities of autodefense are legitimate if 

these communities are organized to defend their property and lives.’8

For decades, the self-defense groups would be supported by the powerful military and political institutions of the Colombian state under the 

justification of legitimate self-defense from the guerrilla threat.

By the 1990s, the cartel system was unraveling. Even though the 

major paramilitary groups had ceased long ago being simply the hired 

hands of the cartel kingpins, when the cartels fell in the 1990s, these 

groups moved to cement their positions as major players in the narcotrafficking business. Smaller-scale drug producers began to proliferate, and with these “baby cartels” came a dramatic increase in violence, 

pitting leftist guerrillas against right-wing paramilitaries as both vied 

for control over the illegal drug market.

An increase in the paramilitaries’ attacks against not only leftists such as labor leaders, once a staple target of the groups, but also 

against government officials led then President Barco “to declare the 

creation of paramilitary groups illegal in April 1989.”9,10 The illegality 

of the paramilitaries was short lived. In the early 1990s, President César 

Gaviria issued Decree 356, which again legalized self-defense groups. 

Proponents of the re-legalization of the autodefensas argued that the 

groups would operate under the model of neighborhood watch groups, 

performing a kind of benign surveillance function. As Tate reports, 

“this decree was the basis for the [government’s] creation of the 

CONVIVIR, or paramilitaries, which were officially launched through 
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275

Resolution 368 in 1995.”11 The ostensive purpose of the CONVIVIR, 

Community Rural Surveillance Associations, was surveillance, increased 

intelligence sharing with the government, and provision of public security. Ultimately, the CONVIVIR decree helped cement the relationships between the government and the major paramilitary groups.

The paramilitaries’ use of widespread terrorist violence, drug trafficking, and massacres of civilians led to increased scrutiny of the 

state’s support of CONVIVIR, and in 1997, the CONVIVIR program 

was officially declared unconstitutional by Colombia’s Constitutional 

Court. Nevertheless, the Colombian state’s long history of tacit and 

direct support for paramilitaries was a significant contributing factor 

in the origins and growth of paramilitaries in Colombia in general and 

the AUC in particular.

In 1994, the paramilitary groups convened their first national summit, the National Conference of Self-Defense Groups, with the aim of 

creating a modicum of unity in the groups’ conduct and political programs. Despite these goals, the groups continued to maintain regional 

and local foci and “lacked a unified command structure and an articulated antisubversive national strategy.”12 After the summit, the groups 

continued to strengthen their alliances and relationships among each 

other and with “narcotraffickers, landed oligarchy, agribusiness groups, 

cattle ranchers, conservative political leaders and sectors of the military.”13 The same year, Fidel Castaño was killed in a guerrilla ambush, 

and Carlos became head of the ACCU. Carlos Castaño quickly moved 

to increase the strength of the organization, and in 1997, under the 

leadership of Carlos, the AUC was formed.

In summary, the origins of the AUC can be largely attributed to the 

rise of revolutionary guerrilla movements in the 1950s and 1960s, the 

emergence of narcotrafficking, and the tacit and overt support of the 

Colombian state.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, LEADERSHIP, 

AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

Organizational Structure

Although the AUC was not a vertically hierarchical group, members 

were partially answerable and somewhat subordinate to the AUC’s core 

leadership group—the central command. The central command consisted of twenty-one leaders who represented both the AUC’s constituent 

self-defense groups and independent self-defense groups.14 The central 

command was responsible for developing and coordinating the overall 

political, ideological, and strategic objectives of the AUC membership.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Under the central command were four main organizational units, 

which were not always organized according to vertical hierarchy; their 

hierarchy was sometimes determined simply by size. From largest to 

smallest were the self-defense groups, blocs, fronts, and groups. This 

organizational structure was standardized and largely shared throughout the AUC’s membership.15 The self-defense groups were typically 

divided into political and military wings. In this respect, the AUC’s 

organizational structure closely resembled those of Colombia’s guerrilla movements, although the sizes of the blocs and fronts generally 

were comparatively smaller.16

 General Command

21 Leaders of the Autodefensas

Self-Defense Groups

Blocs Fronts

Political

Wing

Military 

Wing Bloc HQ and Staff

Staff: nance, intelligence, 

Two rural ops. commissions. 

Commission is like a 

task force with area 

specialization

Groups

Figure 9-1. AUC organizational structure.

The organizational model of the individual self-defense groups generally consisted of the following leadership structure: The self-defense 

group was headed by a general commander who immediately oversaw 

a central staff and was responsible for operational control and for overseeing the various blocs, fronts, and groups in his zone of control. A 

bloc was typically led by a bloc area commander or, in the absence of 

this position, a military commander who was in charge of operations. 

In addition to having a military commander, many of the blocs also had 

a political commander whose function was to ensure internal morale 

and to act as an external liaison between the bloc, members of the 

public, and public institutions. The blocs were organized into a headquarters, usually staffed by a finance manager, intelligence agent, and 

members of a task force who specialized in single areas. Blocs typically 

consisted of more than 300 individuals.
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277

The AUC further divided blocs into fronts, although some fronts 

existed independently of any bloc. Fronts typically ranged between 

100 and 300 individuals and, not unlike blocs, each front had a commander. Groups were similarly arranged and comprised approximately 

seventy-five people.17

The structure and organization of the most prominent of the selfdefense groups, the ACCU, demonstrates the general organizational 

model of the AUC’s self-defense groups. According to a US Defense 

Intelligence Agency report, the ACCU consisted of “a Central Staff, five 

blocs, a mobile school [this is an armed rapid response mobile unit], 

and one front. A security force of approximately 500 combatants protects Castaño (the leader) and his staff.”18 Although the ACCU was one 

of the most important self-defense groups, its organizational structure 

is demonstrative of the AUC’s high level of organization, transforming 

it from a collection of disparate militias to a partially unified force with 

clear command and control.

The year 1981 would prove to be seminal in the evolution and growth 

of the AUC. That year, FARC members kidnapped Jesus Castaño, father 

of Fidel, Carlos, and Vicente (the three brothers who would later go on 

to found and lead the AUC), demanding a ransom that far exceeded 

the modest net worth of the Castaño estate. When the Castaño children failed to produce the full sum, Jesus was tied to a tree, beaten, and 

left to die.19 Carlos and Fidel vowed revenge and joined a small, local 

antiguerrilla militia.20 Shortly after the death of Jesus, Carlos and Fidel 

founded the group Las Tangas, named after Fidel’s estate, to avenge 

the death of their father.

During this period, Colombia’s paramilitary groups grew in power 

and number. As the country’s illegal drug trade exploded, the paramilitaries grew increasingly entwined in the illicit drug business.21 With 

Fidel at the helm, the Castaño brothers turned to the cocaine trade. 

Fidel rose through the ranks of the Escobar Cartel, amassing considerable wealth and power along the way. When the cartels began to openly 

war against each other in the early 1990s, a number of paramilitary 

leaders broke away from Escobar. Although for reasons not totally 

known, it was around this time that Fidel too had a falling out with 

Escobar. It was reported that Escobar murdered some top associates at 

a meeting Fidel was supposed to attend, leading Fidel to believe that 

his absence at the meeting spared his life.22 After the murders, Escobar 

then sent assassins to wipe out the dead men’s organizations. Fidel, in 

turn, founded Los PEPES (People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar), an 

anti-Escobar group funded by the rival Cali Cartel and working in close 

concert with Colombian military and intelligence. The group fed the 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

military information about Escobar in return for leniency on the Cali 

Cartel and its associates.

After Escobar was killed by a police sniper in 1993, Los PEPES was 

disbanded. Fidel, along with Carlos, returned to Córdoba, where the 

two continued to hunt FARC guerrillas. When Fidel was killed in a 

1994  battle with FARC guerrillas, Carlos inherited the leadership of 

Las Tangas. The same year, Carlos would transform the group into the 

ACCU. The ACCU would grow to become one of the strongest and 

most effective of Colombia’s paramilitary groups, eventually serving as 

the predecessor for the AUC, and from which Carlos Castaño would 

emerge as the head.

Castaño was an excellent political tactician—good at building 

an organization and effective at combating guerrillas. “By the end 

of 1996, the Accu had done the impossible: driven the rebels out of 

Urabá. Invitations were pouring in from Farc [sic]-held areas across the 

country for the Castaños to mobilise their paramilitary army. The idea 

of the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) was born—a 

new nationwide federation of right-wing vigilante groups dedicated to 

fighting the rebels.”23 In 1997, Carlos formed the AUC as the umbrella 

group for the regional, semiautonomous paramilitaries. While the 

AUC’s member groups retained some autonomy and still functioned 

largely at the regional level, the AUC’s central command consolidated 

control and centralized the groups’ strategic decision making.24 Under 

Carlos’s leadership, the group grew considerably and “by 2001, most 

sources suggest the AUC had between 8,000 and 10,000 armed combatants with a presence in approximately 40 percent of Colombia’s municipalities.”25 This number would almost triple by the time of the AUC’s 

disarmament in 2006.

Ideologically, the AUC “defined themselves as an anticommunist 

advance guard in ‘defense of private property and free enterprise,’ 

and they offered their security model to owners and businessmen in 

areas plundered by the guerrillas. They [saw] themselves as a ‘civilian 

self-defense organization,’ compelled to protect themselves, given ‘the 

state’s abandonment’ of its security duties towards proprietors.”26 Not 

only did the AUC target guerrilla movements, but it also targeted perceived sympathizers and allies of the guerrillas, including journalists 

and human rights advocates who spoke out against the AUC. The AUC 

sought to stamp out any and all opposition. This activity led the United 

States to designate the AUC as a foreign terrorist organization on September 10, 2001.27 Then Secretary of State Colin Powell articulated the 

US motivation for the designation:

The AUC has carried out numerous acts of terrorism, including the 

massacre of hundreds of civilians, the forced displacement of entire 
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279

villages, and the kidnapping of political figures to force recognition of 

AUC demands. Last year, AUC members reportedly committed at least 

75 massacres that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians. Many 

of these massacres were designed to terrorize and intimidate local populations so the AUC could gain control of those areas. The AUC has also 

committed hundreds of kidnappings, including the abduction of seven 

Colombian congressional representatives in November of last year.28

It is beyond dispute that the AUC was engaged in the perpetration 

of widespread atrocities. But unlike FARC, the AUC did not seek the 

state’s overthrow. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the AUC’s 

criminal activity and use of widespread violence was a threat to Colombia’s domestic stability. The AUC eroded the state’s capacity to extend 

law and order to all sectors of society and all geographic areas, seriously 

challenging the state’s monopoly on the use of force.

From the time of the AUC’s inception, Castaño sought to achieve 

political legitimacy for the group. It was a natural evolution, as it would 

allow the paramilitaries a seat at the negotiating table when the government turned to talks of peace. The AUC began demobilization 

in 2003, under the framework of the Santa Fe de Ralito Accord. The 

accord, subsequently codified in 2005 under the Justice and Peace Law, 

committed the group to a cease-fire, disarmament, and reintegration 

into Colombian society.29,30 Castaño was killed in 2004 in the middle 

of negotiations; Colombian authorities recovered his body in a shallow 

grave in 2006.31 By that time, approximately 31,000 individuals sought 

to participate in the Desarme, Desmovilización y Reinserción (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, or DDR) program.32, a

Despite the large number of people who sought to participate in 

the DDR program, and the conclusion that much of the AUC had been 

effectively demobilized, some signs indicate that former members of 

the AUC have reorganized themselves into armed groups who continue 

to engage in violence and illegal activities. Some of these groups, such 

as the Black Eagles (Águilas Negras), have openly asserted the ideological and political motivations of the AUC and adopted their violent 

paramilitary tactics and strategies. Others function more clearly as 

criminal narcotraffickers. Both are known in Colombia as bacrim (or 

BACRIM), short for bandas criminales (criminal gangs). It remains to be 

a It is important to note that the DDR program’s approach to human rights abuses 

and drug trafficking has proved controversial. For example, see Amnesty International’s criticism33 and an article in the New York Times.

34 In 2009, the DDR program was 

restructured to emphasize deradicalization and psychological rehabilitation to prevent 

recidivism. As a result, the program was renamed the Desarme, Desmovilización y Reintegración (Disarm, Demobilize, and Reintegration) program, highlighting the reintegration 

of fighters into normal society as opposed to mere insertion.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

seen if these are neo-AUC splinter groups forming another period of 

the group’s evolution and growth.

In conclusion, we can track the AUC’s evolution from the early 

state-sponsored counterinsurgency and self-defense groups of the 

1950s–1970s through the rise of the cartels, for which AUC members 

acted as hired militias and private armies for narcotraffickers. In the 

wake of the fall of the big cartels, the AUC would coalesce into an organization of antiguerrilla self-defense groups with leadership comprising key narcotraffickers. Throughout its history, in its pursuit of wealth, 

power, and territory, the AUC would perpetrate numerous atrocities and 

massacres, eventually earning the group designation as a terrorist organization by several Western governments. Finally, under Castaño’s leadership, the AUC would embark on a quest for recognition as a legitimate 

political actor, eventually leading to an officially demobilized force.

Leadership

The AUC functioned as the umbrella group for Colombia’s rightwing paramilitary self-defense groups, which were divided by geographic region. Under the AUC structure, member groups remained 

semiautonomous, retaining varying degrees of political, social, economic, and military control over their areas of operations. Archival 

web analysis indicates that the AUC included among its members the 

following seven self-defense groups:b

1. The ACCU, the largest and most powerful group

2. The Mountain Self-Defense Group (Autodefensas de la 

Sierra), located on Colombia’s northern coast

3. The Southern César Self-Defense Group (Autodefensas del 

Sur del César)

4. The Tolima Self-Defense Group (Autodefensas del Tolima)

5. The Puerto Boyacá Self-Defense Group (Autodefensas de 

Puerto Boyacá)

b It is important to note that while there is some consensus on the structure and 

membership of the AUC, scholars and organizations continue to disagree over what constitutes the exact composition of the AUC’s membership. For example, the AUC’s now 

defunct website recognizes the above membership list, but at the time of disarmament, 

many more self-defense groups and blocs came forward. This may be a result of power 

disputes in which the AUC leadership sought to exclude given groups from their organizational charts or evidence of the prevalence of autonomous self-defense groups that were 

not subordinate to the AUC’s central command. The list provided herein relies on the 

membership lists as found in several authoritative sources.35,36,37,38,39 These lists have been 

cross-referenced, and the product is a “consensus” membership list.
Chapter 9. AUC

281

6. Self-Defense Group of Ramón Isaza (Autodefensas de Ramón 

Isaza), located in the middle-Magdalena region

7. The Cundinamarca Self-Defense Group (Autodefensas de 

Cundinamarca)

Administrative Boundaries

Departments of Colombia

National Capitals

Cities 3,000,000+

Cities 900,000-2,999,999

Amazonas

Vaupés

Guainía

Guaviare

Putumayo Caquetá

Nariño

Cauca

Tolima

Meta

Vichada

Casanare

Antioquia

Chocó

Córdoba

Sucre

 La

Guajira

Atlántico

Magdalena 

Arauca

Cesar

Bolivar

Santander

Norte 

d e

Santander

Boyacá Caldas

Quindío

Risaralda Cundinamarca

Huila

Valle del

Cauca Distrito

Capital

Figure 9-2. Map of departments of Colombia.

The AUC was led by a central command, which was populated by 

individuals who represented both the AUC’s constituent self-defense 

groups and some independent groups.40 The central command was 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

responsible for developing and coordinating the overall political, ideological, and strategic objectives of the AUC membership. The AUC’s 

leadership was divided into both political and military wings, a feature 

shared by the AUC’s self-defense groups.

Under the central command were four main organizational units, 

which were not always organized according to vertical hierarchy; their 

hierarchy was sometimes determined simply by size. From largest to 

smallest were the self-defense groups, blocs, fronts, and groups. This 

organizational structure was generally standardized throughout the 

AUC’s membership.41

The key leadership of the AUC varied over time. The group was 

plagued by violence and infighting, making it prone to instability 

and sudden leadership change. The backgrounds of the key principals varied with respect to geographic origins and social strata. The 

educational levels of leaders also ranged from dropouts who failed to 

complete even primary school to those possessing university degrees. 

Those in key leadership positions included individuals from humble 

rural backgrounds and also landowners, cattle ranchers, narcotraffickers, former guerrillas, and former members of the Colombian military. 

The principal head of the AUC was Carlos Castaño. After his death in 

2004, Salvatore Mancuso, long Castaño’s second-in-command, assumed 

the position.

The early paramilitary leadership of the 1960s was more homogeneous than today’s AUC leaders. The early leadership comprised members of various sectors of the military and individuals hailing from 

“those societal sectors who were interested in maintaining the status 

quo, such as the young elite.”42 These constituents were bolstered by 

smaller landholders who sought to directly protect their property and 

increase security by forming independent militias. These militias were 

often engaged in counterinsurgency operations with Colombian military forces. This early leadership component was important because it 

advanced the anti-Communist, antiguerrilla ideology that would form 

the basis of the self-defense groups that would later constitute the AUC. 

This ideology, and the leadership who espoused it, could marshal the 

manpower and garner public support from members of the middle and 

upper classes of rural Colombia.

By the late 1980s, the groups that would later go on to constitute 

the AUC drew their leadership from paramilitaries associated with 

narcotrafficking, emerald gangs, landed elites, and cattle ranchers.43,44

Despite the huge amounts of wealth that supported them, many of the 

AUC’s leaders came from humble backgrounds. The Castaño brothers (Carlos, Fidel, and Vicente), for example, were three of twelve children that were raised on a farm and came from a lower-middle-class 
Chapter 9. AUC

283

background. Hernán Giraldo Serna, a major player in the AUC and 

leader of the Sierra Nevada Self-Defense Group, never completed elementary school, grew up tending livestock, and picked coffee before 

rising through the ranks of paramilitary leadership.45 Others, such as 

eventual AUC leader Salvatore Mancuso, attended university and came 

from a wealthy family. The geographic roots of the leadership were 

generally rural but later drew from urban areas as the AUC expanded. 

The leadership shared a right-wing ideology that was intent on eradicating left-wing political, civilian, and guerrilla elements from Colombia as well as enforcing traditional Catholic values in the towns they 

controlled: they enforced a ban on miniskirts and public disorder, as 

well as a strict curfew.

Fidel Castaño Gil

Fidel Castaño’s early life was similar to those of his brothers Carlos 

and Vicente.c Fidel was born in 1951 in Amalfi, Antioquia. In the late 

1970s, Fidel met Pablo Escobar and quickly became a “key member of 

the cartel.”47 Fueled by profits made through his work with the Escobar 

Cartel, Fidel began consolidating land holdings in Córdoba and amassing a small personal army. In 1981, Fidel’s father was murdered by FARC 

guerrillas. After this formative event, Fidel volunteered for a local militia and collaborated with the Colombian army’s Bomboná Battalion in 

Puerto Berrío, Antioquia.48 During this period, Fidel gained valuable 

counterinsurgency training, and after leaving the local militia, Fidel 

put the training to use in the operations of his newly created group, 

Las Tangas. Ruthless and effective, the force grew, and Fidel deepened 

his relationship with Escobar. Fidel’s split with Escobar in the early 

1990s caused him to create the anti-Escobar group, Los PEPES. After 

Escobar’s death, Fidel returned to Córdoba and continued to battle 

leftist guerrillas for control of territory and share of the narcotrafficking market. Fidel was known for his entrepreneurial spirit and business 

acumen and is reported to have engaged in the sale and trade of fine 

art, even living in Paris at one point.49,50 Known as “Rambo” for his willingness to fight on the front lines, in 1994, Fidel was killed in a battle 

with FARC guerrillas.

Carlos Castaño Gil

Carlos Castaño, along with his brother Fidel, was one of the founders of the ACCU and later became the head of the AUC. One of twelve 

children, eight boys and four girls, Carlos was born in the Antioquia 

Department in 1965. Carlos and his siblings lived a modest childhood, 

c For an overview of Fidel’s life from his own perspective, see Semana.

46
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engaged in dairy farming and cheese selling, with the proceeds of the 

latter used to fund their education.51 In 1981, the FARC kidnapped 

Carlos’s father, Jesus, and later killed him. Carlos and Fidel vowed 

revenge and founded the antiguerrilla group Las Tangas. This group 

later became the ACCU, of which Carlos was the leader, and in 1997, 

Carlos formed the AUC. Carlos eventually resigned as the AUC’s military commander, assuming political leadership of the group, although 

it is believed that he continued to lead overall operations, both political 

and military. Carlos was known as intelligent and charismatic, possessing good political instincts. He sought to gain political legitimacy for 

the AUC, working toward encouraging the Colombian government to 

recognize the AUC as a political group, not just a criminal syndicate. 

Castaño’s demobilization negotiations with the government caused 

a rift among AUC leadership, and in 2004, Castaño was murdered; 

Colombian authorities recovered his body in a shallow grave in 2006.52

Carlos’s brother Vicente was later convicted of the murder.

José R Castaño (“El Profe”)

José Vicente Castaño (also known as “El Profe,” the Professor) was 

born in 1957. He is reported to speak with a prominent stutter and to 

have “none of the charisma of Fidel and Carlos.”53 For years, little was 

known about Vicente’s involvement in the organization, as he avoided 

media and public attention. At the time of his brother Fidel’s death, 

Vicente began to take a larger role in the AUC. Vicente became influential in the AUC, handling finances, logistics, and strategic expansion. 

Although he never commanded his own bloc or men, he was known 

for his strategic acumen and good relations with AUC commanders. 

His strategic intellect and financial management earned him the nickname “the Professor.” One of Vicente’s primary innovations was instituting a paramilitary training school focused on teaching military, 

political, and social strategies.54 For this task, Vicente enlisted Fidel’s 

former head of security, Carlos Mauricio García Fernández (commonly 

known as Rodrigo), a former army captain and known as a brilliant 

military tactician. Vicente was indicted in the United States in 2005 for 

conspiracy and money laundering. In 2011, Vicente was sentenced in 

absentia to forty years in prison for the kidnapping and murder of his 

brother Carlos. As of 2013, Vicente’s whereabouts are unknown.

Salvatore Mancuso Gómez (“Triple Cero”)

Salvatore Mancuso (also known as “Triple Cero,” Triple Zero) 

served as the AUC’s second-in-command under Carlos Castaño. After 

Castaño’s murder, Mancuso assumed the leadership of the AUC’s political division, subsequently leading peace negotiations with the Uribe 
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administration. The son of an Italian immigrant and a Colombian 

mother, Mancuso was born in the department of Córdoba in 1964. 

Mancuso is well educated, having studied civil engineering and, later, 

English at the University of Pittsburgh. After several years as a successful landowner, Mancuso joined the AUC as a means for retaliation 

against left-wing guerrilla violence and extortion.55 After the AUC’s 

demobilization, Mancuso was imprisoned in Colombia. In 2008, Mancuso was extradited to the United States, where he was convicted on 

charges of drug trafficking. Mancuso has continued to communicate 

from the Northern Neck Regional Jail in Warsaw, Virginia, particularly on matters concerning peace and demobilization. Mancuso has 

claimed that many sectors of the Colombian state were involved in the 

paramilitaries’ activities.d Mancuso also claims to have met with former 

President Uribe in 2006 to discuss how the AUC could help his reelection efforts.56 In 2012, Mancuso wrote a letter to President Santos suggesting that he could be a part of the peace negotiations with FARC.

Rodrigo Tovar Pupo (“Jorge 40”)

Rodrigo Tovar Pupo (also known as “Jorge 40”) led the Northern 

Bloc of AUC and demobilized in March  2006. Although Pupo was 

the lead spokesman during the Santa Fe de Ralito meetings, he and 

his men were the last of the AUC to demobilize. The son of a retired 

army officer, Pupo became acquainted with Salvatore Mancuso while 

attending college in Bogotá. In an effort to recruit Pupo to join the 

AUC, partly hoping that he could recruit members of other prominent 

families, Carlos Castaño and Salvatore Mancuso arranged a meeting 

with him.57 It was decided that Pupo would be given command of the 

powerful Northern Bloc. Pupo was ambitious and sought aggressively 

to expand the bloc. This leadership style, and the inevitable encroachment on other blocs’ zones of control, led to friction and violence with 

Hernán Giraldo, leader of the Autodefensas de la Sierra. Like many 

AUC leaders, Pupo was convicted in Colombia for his crimes and later 

extradited to the United States on drug trafficking charges. Pupo is 

perhaps most known for helping to trigger the Parapolitical Scandal 

when his laptop was seized in 2006. The computer held details of the 

AUC’s involvement with politicians and Colombian security forces.

Hernán Giraldo Serna (“El Patrón”)

Hernán Giraldo Serna (also known as “El Patrón”) led the SelfDefense Group of the Mountains (Autodefensas de la Sierra) and was 

d Much of this communication is done through interviews with the media 

and, while imprisoned in Colombia, through his own personal website, http://www.

salvatoremancuso.com/ppal.php.
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born on August 16, 1948, in San Bartolomé, Caldas. Serna spent his 

childhood engaged in agriculture and the raising of livestock and is 

reported to have never finished primary school.58 In the late 1960s, 

Serna relocated to the Sierra Nevada, and in the 1980s, he formed 

the paramilitary group Los Chamizos, which merged with the AUC in 

1999.59 Serna and his group were infamous for using ruthless violence 

in the pursuit of the huge amounts of wealth available in the trafficking of cocaine. Serna, a hard-drinking mustachioed man, was known 

for his group’s kidnappings, the use of chain saws to dismember opponents, and his ability to elude authorities in the Sierra Nevada.60 Serna 

is linked to hundreds of murders and numerous kidnappings. He is 

accused of raping at least nineteen women, including girls as young 

as twelve.61 Fearing extradition, Serna initially refused demobilization 

but later relented. His group demobilized in 2006. On May 13, 2008, 

Serna was extradited to the United States, where he faces charges of 

drug trafficking.

Jose Miguel Arroyave Ruiz (“Arcángel”)

Born in 1954 in Amalfi, Antioquia, Miguel Arroyave (also known 

as “Arcángel”) was a prominent AUC leader who commanded the Centaurs Bloc. It is believed that Arroyave, friend of the Castaños since 

childhood, purchased the bloc for approximately seven  million  dollars.62 The bloc included such prominent areas as Casanare and 

Bogotá; its primary sources of funding were through narcotrafficking 

and extortive “taxes” on the regions’ cattle ranchers.63 Arroyave and 

the Centaurs Bloc became known for the vicious “war” fought against 

the Orientales Llanos, a rival self-defense group with overlapping and 

competing interests in territory and the illegal drug trade. The feud led 

to more than one thousand battle-related deaths.64 Arroyave was a key 

leader in the demobilization negotiations between the AUC and the 

government. In 2004, Arroyave was killed by two of his men in an assassination that was ordered by a rival narcotrafficker, Daniel “El Loco” 

Barrera. Barrera sought to consolidate his territorial control, particularly over the Bogotá region.

Ramón Isaza

Ramón Isaza, leader of the eponymously named self-defense group, 

was born in 1940 in Antioquia. The Isaza group’s area of control was 

the Middle Magdalena region. Isaza’s paramilitary involvement began 

in 1978, when he organized and helped arm farmers in his region. 

Under the persuasion of Carlos Castaño, Isaza joined the AUC. For 

the Isaza clan, paramilitarism was a family affair; six of Ramón’s eight 

sons were commanders in the AUC. Known by the nom de guerre El 
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287

Viejo (the “Old Man”) for his age, Isaza was “sentenced to 16 years of 

imprisonment for killings committed in May 2003, and was separately 

sentenced to another 20 years of imprisonment for killings and abductions committed in April 2002.”65 Isaza is currently serving his sentence 

in La Picota prison.

Luis Eduardo Cifuentes Águila (“El Águila”)

Luis Eduardo Cifuentes (also known as “El Águila,” the Eagle) was 

born in 1960 in England. An early member of the Colombian Communist Youth (JUCO), Cifuentes went on to train with the AUC, attending 

the group’s paramilitary school.66 Ultimately, Cifuentes commanded 

the Self-Defense Group of Cundinamarca for nearly two decades. The 

Eagle is notable for negotiating a nonaggression pact with the FARC. 

The pact dissolved in 1990 after the FARC killed twelve of Cifuentes’s 

men.67 Under the Justice and Peace Law, Cifuentes confessed to perpetrating more than a dozen murders. Cifuentes is currently imprisoned 

in La Pillory.

Command and Control

Positions and duties were clearly delineated within the AUC’s organizational units. Former combatants who underwent the disarmament 

process reported that command and control positions included bloc 

area commanders, political commanders, and counterinsurgency commanders. In addition to the direct combat personnel positions of the 

self-defense groups, several staff positions also comprised the various 

blocs and fronts. These positions included such personnel as financial 

managers, equipment and logistics personnel, gunsmiths, and nurses.68

COMPONENTS OF THE INSURGENCY

Underground and Auxiliary

The underground and auxiliary components of the AUC were 

deeply intertwined and constituted important elements of the group’s 

growth and efficacy. The paramilitaries’ enlistment and use of civilians 

as both underground members and as armed auxiliary forces has a 

long and complicated history. After the period of La Violencia and the 

founding of FARC in the 1960s, the Colombian military began a close 

relationship with the United States. Both countries shared an interest 

in halting the spread of Colombia’s leftist guerrillas, a goal that comported with the United States’ broader desire to eradicate leftist groups 
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sympathetic to Communist ideals more generally.e The backbone of 

Plan LAZO, the US-Colombia counterinsurgency plan, called for close 

collaboration between Colombian military officials and members of 

the US military in the pursuit of combating the guerrilla threat. As 

Human Rights Watch notes:

U.S. advisors proposed that the United States “select 

civilian and military personnel for clandestine training 

in resistance operations in case they are needed later.” 

Led by Gen. William P. Yarborough, the team further 

recommended that this structure “be used to perform 

counter-agent and counter-propaganda functions and 

as necessary execute paramilitary, sabotage and/or 

terrorist activities against known communist proponents. It should be backed by the United States.”70

As we can see from General Yarborough’s assessment, a key aspect 

of the plan’s counterinsurgency strategy relied on the training and use 

of civilian assets.

Plan LAZO called for training that consisted of two main aims: 

“1) combat the [leftist guerrilla] insurgency and 2) monitor and gather 

intelligence on the rebels, their civilian supporters, and social organizations by establishing networks throughout the country.”71 Such 

networks included unarmed underground components that could provide intelligence, ideological, and financial support. The underground 

comprised individuals such as cattle ranchers and landed elite, as well 

as “army reservists, retired officers predisposed to a fierce anticommunism, and men familiar with local residents, customs, and terrain.”72

The latter group “would be armed and trained by the army and provide troops with intelligence and logistical help, like guides; assist in 

psychological operations; and even fight alongside regular soldiers.”73

The early days of the paramilitaries relied on state-sanctioned support 

and training, and the state, in turn, relied on the nascent paramilitary 

leadership to cultivate an effective and robust underground. A decisive 

event in the use of civilians as auxiliary forces was when it moved from 

military doctrine to open state policy, “the government promulgated 

Decree 3398—which became permanent with Law 48 in 1968—which 

allowed the military to create groups of armed civilians to carry out joint 

counter-insurgency operations.”74 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the 

military continued its involvement in instituting auxiliary forces in the 

form of self-defense groups (see the Origins of the AUC section).

e For a discussion of Plan LAZO, the paramilitary-state connection, and how it 

related to broader US geo-strategic interests, see Maullin.69
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289

With the explosion of the drug trade in the 1980s, the primary constituencies lending underground support expanded to include “largescale landowners, cattle ranchers, mining entrepreneurs (particularly 

those in the emerald business), and narco-lords.”75 These new groups 

of support for the paramilitaries increasingly intertwined the underground support with direct arming and auxiliary support of the paramilitaries. These new sources of revenue and support led to an increase 

in underground collaboration. Some paramilitaries were known to have 

teamed up with cattle ranchers and devised a strategy to deepen the 

underground by strengthening relationships between the self-defense 

groups and farmers, peasants, and local businessmen. For example, in 

the Middle Magdalena region, this collaboration resulted in the creation 

of more than thirty anti-Communist schools.76 The ranchers’ properties 

also served as a convenient hub for the storage of arms, and the ranchers 

themselves were reliable conduits for the dissemination of propaganda.77

Years later, “the ACCU [the predecessor organization to the AUC 

headed by the Castaño brothers] organized a sophisticated communication network in the region, linking approximately a thousand cattle 

ranches and plantations, whose administrators became permanent 

watch men, reporting to the police, the army, and Castaño’s headquarters.”78 This network was bolstered by the longtime involvement of the 

Colombian military in establishing rural and urban intelligence networks.79 Given Castaño’s influence and deep connections, the group 

was able to build a sophisticated network of communications and intelligence. When the AUC was created in 1997, and the Castaños took the 

helm, their power and influence was clear. Support from the underground swelled. For example, “Castaño’s solid support in Córdoba was 

demonstrated in early 1997, when 75 cattle ranchers from the Sinu area 

sent a letter to the defense minister, protesting the government’s offer of 

a US$ 500,000 reward in exchange for information concerning Castaño’s whereabouts.”80 The 1990s also signaled a period in which Carlos 

Castaño would build legitimacy; a key element of this strategy involved 

growing the underground component by creating foundations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that worked to distribute land.81

Armed Component

The armed component of the AUC dates back to the creation of the 

paramilitaries, government-supported and -sanctioned “self-defense” 

groups, and later, the CONVIVIR.f Precise figures of the size of the 

AUC’s combatants are elusive. Some estimates approximate that, as of 

f As Tate notes, “members of Convivir were authorized to carry sophisticated offensive-combat weapons, including mini-Uzi machine guns, repeating rifles and revolvers.”82
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2001, the AUC’s armed component was as small as 5,000–7,000 combatants.83 Others suggest that the AUC had a force of 8,000 combatants at the height of its power;84,85,86 and still others estimate that the 

force ranged between “8,000 and 10,000  armed combatants with a 

presence in approximately 40 percent of Colombia’s municipalities.”87

A 2002 estimate even put the number as high as 12,000.88 Tate’s analysis 

of the US Department of State’s estimates of the size of AUC is indicative of the difficulty that surrounds such figures.89 As found in several 

years of the Patterns of Global Terrorism report (that is, after the AUC was 

added to the United States’ list of terrorist groups), the estimates vary 

widely. For example, the 2001–2002 report estimates 6,000–8,150 combatants. In 2003, the numbers jumped to between 8,000 and 11,000 

(with an uncounted number of underground and ideological supporters), and finally, a 2005 report notes that more than 20,000 paramilitary members had demobilized, and 10,000  more were expected to 

undergo the process.

Figure 9-3. AUC flag.

It is difficult to determine why there were so few reliable estimates 

of the AUC’s size. One reason that could account for the discrepancy 

between many estimates and the size of the AUC at the time of demobilization is that during the demobilization period, the AUC purposefully inflated its numbers in an attempt to facilitate the appearance of 

having a larger armed component then it in reality possessed. Some 

reports indicate that AUC leadership paid military-aged men and peasants to take part in demobilization and disarmament. PBS reported that 

“evidence obtained from one paramilitary commander’s laptop computer proved that many of the ‘demobilized paramilitaries’ were actually peasants recruited as stand-ins, not actual combatants.”90 Evidence 
Chapter 9. AUC

291

suggests that the AUC’s numbers at the time of demobilization were 

not truly reflective of the actual size of the group’s armed component.g

Even if the AUC attempted to overcount its armed members, the 

variations in year-to-year estimates, especially in estimates of the group’s 

strength before disarmament, indicate a linear growth under the leadership of Castaño. Rochlin notes that shortly after its creation, the AUC 

was “distinguished by the most rapid military growth of any Colombian subversive group in the 1990s.”92 This rapid growth of first the 

ACCU, and then later the AUC, is noted by Richani: “the paramilitaries 

counted only several hundred (according to the Ministry of Defense, 

the ACCU counted 93 men in 1986) during their first phase and largely 

depended on the logistical support of the army in terms of armament 

and training . . . By 2000, the Ministry of Defense estimated that the 

number of the AUC force increased to 8,000 fighters.”93 It would seem 

that a more assertive role in violent affairs, coupled with the increase in 

narcotrafficking profits, helped swell the ranks of the AUC.94

With windfall profits due to securing new markets and territory 

after the fall of the large drug cartels, “the paramilitary groups in the 

1990s reinvented themselves from a mere satellite to the army and its 

intelligence services to forces with their own momentum and needs 

for expansion and political agenda.”95 This expansion was evidenced 

not only by a sharp and consistent increase in combat personnel but 

also in acquisition of armaments and hardware. One scholar notes that 

the AUC added “mortars, anti-aircraft missiles, and U.S. made-helicopters—it is rumored that this include Apache helicopters.”96 More specific estimates state that, “by the late 1990s, the AUC acquired about 

thirty aircraft, eleven of which are Cessna, four shipping planes, fourteen helicopters with military equipment (including Black Hawk), and 

one sophisticated military helicopter equipped with the state-of-the-art 

emergency operations. This is in addition to several boats to be used 

for water transportation.”97 By the time of disarmament, the AUC had 

acquired a considerable arsenal. In addition to receiving training from 

the Colombian military, the AUC hired British and Israeli mercenaries 

to professionalize their forces.98,99

With the increase in revenue and combat capabilities, the AUC’s 

military operations began to move from its traditional strongholds and 

areas of operational competency in the northwest to the south and east 

of the country. The strongest area of support for the AUC remained in 

g Felbab-Brown speculates that the motivation to increase the counting of armed 

members during disarmament was an attempt to appear to be in compliance with the 

legal requirements of the disarmament plan. In addition, she argues that, given the fluidity between FARC- and AUC-held areas, it is likely that many guerrillas defected to the 

AUC to take advantage of the demobilization’s perquisites.91
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“Northwest Colombia, with affiliate groups in Valle del Cauca, on the 

west coast, and Meta Department, in Central Columbia [sic].”100 The 

increase in combatant ranks, combined with greater firepower and territorial expansion, permitted increased engagement with the AUC’s 

primary enemy, the leftist guerrillas, but it also included a brutal campaign of human rights abuses and massacres of civilians, civil society 

members, and political foes.h

Public Component

The AUC’s public component included public service provision, 

execution of quasi-state functions, and direct political participation 

(both illicit/clandestine and overt/legal).

Because the AUC amassed considerable wealth and power through 

narcotrafficking, the group was provided with its own capital and 

resources to engage in quasi-state activities while perpetrating widespread violence. At various times throughout its existence, the AUC 

led the country’s armed groups in the perpetration of human rights 

abuses, political assassinations, massacres, and actions that made the 

group responsible for approximately 700,000 of the country’s two million internally displaced persons.i

 The AUC’s strategy for the use of its 

public component dovetailed with its capacity as an armed actor able 

to wield the use of force at its own will. The group pursued a doublebarreled strategy: acts aimed at sowing terror and increasing control 

mixed with the provision of goods and services, aimed toward blunting 

the blowback from its atrocities and potentially co-opting those it did 

not brutalize.

As Rochlin notes, the AUC employed “terror and carnage as the 

principal basis for its political power,” with the objective of gaining 

“political recognition.”103 The strategic use of violence by the AUC was 

important because it allowed the group to approach a monopoly on the 

use of force, increase territorial control, and consolidate political, economic, and military power in its zones of control. These developments, 

in turn, contributed to the AUC’s ability to carry out its public activities, undertaken largely for the purpose of increasing its recognition 

as a legitimate political force (see the Legitimacy section). The public 

components of the AUC allowed it to engage in acts of violence against 

noncombatants while continuing to advance the twin narrative of the 

h See Human Rights Watch’s World Report 1992 for some grim statistics on the AUC’s 

atrocities.101

i For the AUC’s use of violence and the statistical information concerning the usage, 

see Human Rights Watch’s World Report 1992.

102
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group as both “an expression of civil society” and as a force whose purpose was to provide security and protection of life and property where 

the state was unable.104

To soften the group’s image, the AUC instituted and engaged in 

significant and vast social service programs. Such quasi-state activities included the development of critical infrastructure such as road 

construction and maintenance, the management of health clinics, the 

organization of public health groups, and the development and funding of schools.105 The AUC’s quasi-state activities also included dispute 

resolution activities related to “property, debt, and political rivalry.”106

In some areas, the group also engaged in “traditional” forms of revenue generation, such as the taxation of activities and goods associated 

with coca production and trafficking.j The AUC’s use of taxation was 

not limited to only illegal activities. Paramilitary groups were known 

to tax municipal spending in an effort to control local officials.108 This 

process of taxation was sometimes combined with coerced protection payments. The ostensive purpose of these latter collections was 

the funding of the AUC’s antiguerrilla capabilities. Nevertheless, such 

schemes often generated resentment for their extortive nature, particularly as they spread beyond the illicit drug industry to include even 

those individuals engaged in legal commerce, such as cattle ranchers 

and landholders. In these cases, such taxes and fees were often viewed 

as simply another way in which the AUC’s self-defense groups were 

enriching themselves.

In addition to allowing the group to provide direct services, levy 

taxes, and regulate commercial activity, the AUC’s power and wealth 

granted it access to influential political elites. Such access provided 

opportunities to directly engage with legally established state institutions. For years, the AUC exercised influence on Colombia’s electoral 

politics and government institutions. As Hristov notes, “there is much 

evidence to suggest  .  .  .  paramilitarism has attained a considerable 

presence (expressed in many ways) in political governance at all levels: presidential, congressional, regional, and local.”109,k

 The AUC often 

used violence, intimidation, and coercion to influence local political 

leaders and local elections.111 Another strategy was the co-opting of 

political officials, often achieved through bribes and payoffs.112 Former 

AUC leader Salvatore Mancuso once boasted that the AUC controlled 

approximately one-third of the Colombian Congress. Rabasa et al. note 

that, while Mancuso’s claim is likely overblown, nevertheless, “there is 

j On this point, and the “traditional” model of armed actors’ economic resource generation, see Brewer Norman.107

k For a discussion of the ways that paramilitaries overtly and covertly influence 

Colombian politics see Hristov.110
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a group of rural legislators who openly support the AUC in varying 

degrees.”113 In fact, the AUC’s involvement in the Colombian Congress 

ran significantly deeper. In an event that is known as the Parapolitical 

Scandal, it was discovered that numerous Colombian lawmakers were 

deeply involved with paramilitary groups. The scandal has touched 

many of Colombia’s national institutions including the courts and congress. To date, thirty-seven  members of congress and five  governors 

haven been convicted for their collusion with paramilitaries, including 

former President Uribe’s cousin, Mario, who apparently relied on paramilitary financial support for his 2002 run for the senate.114

While the Parapolitical scandal is evidence of the vast interconnections between the AUC and the Colombian government, the group’s 

public component culminated in peace negotiations and the disarmament process, signaling the transition from the AUC’s categorization as thuggish narcotraffickers—common criminals—to (arguably) 

legitimate actors with a political program, worthy of a seat at the 

negotiating table.

IDEOLOGY

The AUC’s ideological heritage was rooted in the early paramilitaries of the 1950s and 1960s. These groups’ ideologies were distinguished by their opposition to Communism and the revolutionary 

reform agenda of left-wing guerrilla groups. In contrast to the ideologies of left-wing guerrillas, the paramilitaries’ ideological narrative 

was located in the protection of “private property and free enterprise” 

and the groups’ abilities to provide protective services for the upper 

and middle classes in areas where the state was unwilling or unable.115

While this ideological narrative pervaded Colombian paramilitarism, 

in their earliest days, the paramilitary predecessors of the AUC lacked a 

unified political and ideological agenda. This changed with formation 

of the AUC. As longtime AUC researcher and journalist Jan McGirk 

notes, after taking the lead in the wake of Fidel Castaño’s death, “Carlos saw himself not just as the leader of a crusade, but its ideologue.”116

The days of disparate and competing ideological narratives were over 

once Castaño took charge.

Two key areas of the AUC’s ideology emerged as the group grew. 

First, the AUC honed its anti-Communist, right-wing, antiguerrilla 

rhetoric. This was evident in the AUC’s founding principles, which 

called for the creation of a clear political project that was antiguerrilla, 

protective of the state, and intent on advancing the narrative that the 
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295

group was acting in legitimate self-defense.l As the AUC developed, so 

did its ideological platform, and “by 2002 . . . [the AUC] was increasingly 

developing a political message and a political following among urban 

middle classes and large business interests,” who found the AUC’s law 

and order, antiguerrilla rhetoric appealing.118 This narrative was attractive to those who viewed the leftist groups as a threat and who sought 

stability and protection of their economic interests.

The second ideological area to emerge stemmed from the AUC’s 

claim to function as a bulwark of traditional values. As Rochlin notes, 

the paramilitaries possessed “an ideological agenda that included 

“social cleansing” of such targets as homosexuals, prostitutes, drug 

addicts, beggars, and the homeless. . . . Overall, they have promoted 

ultra-right wing social policies against the backdrop of a society beset 

with shifting moral code.”119 Here the AUC appealed to conservative values that viewed the poor and down-trodden, and the petty criminal acts 

that they perpetrate, as base and perverse and in need of eradication.

Finally, in an interesting shift in the early 2000s, the group began to 

espouse populist rhetoric calling for land reform. This led one analyst 

to claim that the discourse closely resembled the guerrillas’ rhetoric.120

Paramilitary groups that preceded the AUC had recognized the efficacy of populist appeals but had lacked the unification and sophistication of such public relations messaging that the central command 

could now execute.m We can conclude that “while there exists a general 

consensus that economic motivations were at the heart of paramilitary 

activity, the AUC did make an effort to present itself as ideologically 

driven.”121 In summary, the AUC’s ideology can be characterized as representing the trinity of “tradition, property, and order,” appealing to 

values that are staunchly antiguerrilla.122

LEGITIMACY

The paramilitaries of Colombia have received their greatest support from two sectors of Colombian society: (1) the middle and upper 

classes, including landed elite, cattle ranchers, and business people 

(including some multinational corporations) seeking security and protection from the guerrillas; and (2) the Colombian military and political establishments.

l Hristov notes the key principles that the AUC articulated as the basis of its 

founding.117

m See the Public Component section for a discussion on the use of NGOs and cattle 

ranching partners to facilitate land exchanges and advance the AUC’s populist rhetoric 

and social programs.
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This support, and the public’s view of the AUC as a legitimate 

actor, was partly contingent on the group’s conduct in a given area of 

control. In some cases, the AUC was extortive, such as in its demands 

that ranchers, landowners, and small businesses pay “taxes” and “contributions” that would ostensibly fund the group’s protective services. 

When viewed as unduly burdensome, instituted simply to enrich the 

AUC’s leadership, such activities, coupled with brutal massacres and 

obvious connections to narcotrafficking, reduced the legitimacy of the 

group in the eyes of some of these constituents.123 At the same time, 

the AUC’s involvement in narcotrafficking, and the particular form of 

stability that it could sometimes bring, also helped increase its legitimacy among the population in these same areas. In what social scientists call the “political capital” model of armed groups’ participation 

in illicit economies, the AUC’s support, protection, and engagement in 

the illegal drug trade increased its legitimacy among various members 

of the public.n By helping the AUC “feed, protect, and serve the local 

population,” the resources generated from illicit economic participation allowed the group to “quickly demonstrate their power and expose 

the government’s unwillingness or inability to provide for the population’s needs.”129 Having the resources to engage in quasi-state functions 

legitimated the AUC among beneficiaries of these goods and services.

Dating back to the Colombian military’s early creation and support of the self-defense groups as counterinsurgency auxiliary forces, 

military support for the AUC (and its predecessors) has remained relatively strong. The strength of such overt military support for the AUC’s 

groups had been linked historically to the Colombian political establishment. Colombia’s political and judicial sectors vacillated between 

conferring legal legitimacy on the various instantiations of paramilitarism to declarations of the illegality of the paramilitaries. While overt 

political support, and the legitimacy attached to it, ebbed and flowed 

as the groups were legalized and illegalized at various points in Colombia’s modern history, it is important to note that the AUC enjoyed 

covert political support throughout its existence, thus contributing to 

the group’s legitimacy (see the Origins of the AUC section).

Under Castaño, the AUC was long engaged in a sophisticated and 

concerted effort to gain legitimacy at the local, regional, and national 

levels. In fact, as early as 1991, Castaño had advocated that the groups 

“construct a solid and coherent political platform.”130 In 1997, the CONVIVIR was officially declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional 

n See Felbab-Brown124 for a discussion of the political capital model of legitimacy and 

its relationship to illicit economies. For a broader discussion of this “hearts and minds” 

approach to counterinsurgency, of which the political capital model is part, see Thompson,125 Galula,126 Nagl,127 and Kilcullen.128
Chapter 9. AUC

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Court of Colombia. Under Decision  C-296, the once legal paramilitaries were now illegal, and many of the illegal groups simply joined 

up with the AUC.131,132 Of course, many of the groups that constituted 

the AUC were officially illegal even before the court’s ruling. Given 

this fact, one motivation for Castaño’s quest for gaining legitimacy for 

the AUC vis-à-vis the state was that it provided the group with an exit 

strategy. Instead of challenging the state to a zero-sum game, the AUC 

chose to seek recognition as a political actor.o

This quest for legitimacy resulted in the AUC slowly changing its 

paramilitary tactics, although the group did continue to kill civilians 

and rivals and engage in intragroup assassinations.134 In addition to 

making small tactical changes, the group waged a sophisticated public relations campaign aimed at members of the Colombian public, 

the international community, and the political and economic elite of 

Colombia.p Legitimization, and the recognition of the AUC as a political actor and not merely just a criminal syndicate, would provide the 

group with a seat at the negotiating table and, as facts have borne 

out, a path to disarmament and reduced prison sentences for many 

AUC members.

MOTIVATION AND BEHAVIOR

The motivation for why individuals become involved with armed 

groups is complex. There are significant variations in the motivations 

for why people join, why they stay, why they leave, and why they defect 

(like leaving the FARC and joining the AUC). Not only do these motivations vary from agent to agent, they also vary depending on one’s 

role in the organization—whether one holds a leadership position or 

rank and file membership. Compounding this complexity is the clandestine nature of these groups, which often makes these motivations 

opaque to those outside of the organization. One of the best ways to 

ascertain motivations is through in-depth qualitative research. The following section draws from scholarly research on the motivations of the 

AUC’s members.q

o Hristov points out the efficacy of this strategy: even drug lords began to purchase 

AUC franchises and the AUC name in gambits aimed at reducing prison sentences and 

avoiding extradition.133

p This full-court public relations press included sophisticated websites, exclusive 

interviews with journalists, and claims to respect international humanitarian law. For a 

fascinating discussion of the AUC’s public relations program, see Tate.135

q This section relies on two sets of in-depth interviews that scholars conducted with 

demobilized AUC members. Theidon136 conducted in-depth interviews and observation of 

forty-eight ex-combatants of the AUC. Scholars from the National University of Colombia, 

Bogotá, conducted extensive interviews with demobilized AUC members.137,138
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Research suggests that “with ex-combatants of the AUC, their principal reasons for joining were: via an acquaintance who convinced the 

person to join (29%); because they lived in a zone under paramilitary 

control and joining was ‘just what you did’ (17%); recruited by force 

or threat (14%); or economic motivations (27%).”139 This research by 

Theidon demonstrates the role that familial, peer, and social networks 

played in motivating individuals to join the AUC. Among the rank and 

file, many members were also motivated by a desire for revenge, others 

by “a love of arms,” and still others joined during times of economic 

hardship, hoping to increase their economic opportunities.140 This latter point was important because, unlike other groups, the AUC paid 

their soldiers, even offering a bonus for every guerrilla they killed.141

The reasons for joining cited by one ex-combatant, boredom, social 

status, and good pay and treatment, are indicative of the various motivations that many recruits possessed.142 In addition, social expectations 

and a culture of paramilitarism were contributing motivational factors. 

Machismo and status played an integral role in individuals joining the 

AUC and remaining in the group. These individuals cite membership 

in the AUC as providing a feeling of self-worth, along with incentives 

such as respect from those in their communities, the ability to obtain 

fine clothes, and the lure of beautiful women.143, r

There was also motivation on behalf of some rank-and-file membership once in the AUC to climb its ranks. The more ambitious members, 

and those with reasonable hope of achieving a leadership position, 

would often remain with the group. Interviews suggest that this ambition was largely underpinned by financial motivations. Not only did 

those in command positions receive a significant increase in salary 

but, as one ex-combatant detailed, the self-defense groups had billing 

offices that paid out percentages (typically ten percent) to commanders according to the number of guerrillas they killed and fought.144 In 

addition to an increase in salary, with a better rank came access to 

better resources, increased physical protection, and subordinate staff. 

Commanders had “cars, motorcycle, guns, and staff” that made their 

lives easier.145 So sought after were these positions that the competition to attain them bred an environment full of deceit and murder. As 

one former AUC combatant put it, “through any method, we sought to 

achieve a top position,” and AUC members would “kill a family member 

or a friend to climb the ladder.”146

With respect to AUC leadership, a large motivation for joining and 

staying was the desire for financial gain. Once at the top, the financial 

r It should be noted that these romanticized notions rarely fit empirical reality. Of 

Theidon’s interviewees, ninety percent were foot soldiers who endured grueling conditions 

that were anything but filled with beautiful dates and fancy clothing.
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299

rewards were staggering. The top members of the AUC were exorbitantly wealthy.s

 In at least one case, leadership of the Centaurs Bloc was 

purchased by Miguel Arroyave for approximately seven  million  dollars—a good investment given the AUC’s ability to turn a profit.148 The 

huge financial incentives for the AUC’s leadership led some scholars to 

argue that their motivations had little to do with ideology. According to 

Chernick, while the top leadership was influenced by ideology, it was, 

ultimately, more interested in land—its use, its acquisition, and keeping it in the hands of rural oligarchs.149,t

 Such land policies ensured the 

AUC control over illicit drug production and smuggling routes, as well 

as direct links to petroleum pipelines and areas of resource extraction.

Timing also affected the AUC’s members’ motivations, particularly around the time of its peace talks with the government through 

the period of demobilization. For example, during this time, the AUC 

saw a large growth in its armed combatant membership. This growth, 

combined with low attrition rates, resulted in more than 30,000 armed 

individuals taking part in the disarmament program, a number that 

far exceeded previous estimates of the size of the AUC’s armed component. As Porch and Rasmussen suggest, many poor joined the AUC 

(or tried to argue that they were current members) to receive the disarmament stipend.151 The AUC leadership encouraged this membership; a larger membership size increased their bargaining power. In 

addition, drug lords were known to buy the AUC name, or sometimes 

whole AUC groups, in order to take advantage of the lenient prison sentences for AUC members that were enshrined in the Justice and Peace 

Law.152,153 Practically overnight, the drug kingpins became “members” 

of the AUC. As for the leadership, the motivation to remain in the 

AUC during demobilization and disarmament was pragmatic. It nearly 

ensured (as a result of the Justice and Peace Law) that they would see 

little prison time and that sentences would be served in Colombia.u

s To get a sense of this wealth, see Felbab-Brown for a discussion of the AUC’s share 

of the illicit drug market in Colombia.147 Also see the website Verdad Abierta (http://www.

verdadabierta.com), which has an excellent collection of statistical information (including 

information on the narcoeconomy) and primary documents from the AUC.

t For land acquisition as a general objective of the AUC’s political program, see 

Rochlin.150

u This latter belief was unfounded, as many of the top leadership were subsequently 

extradited to the United States.
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OPERATIONS

Paramilitary

Reliable statistical data on the AUC’s paramilitary activity are difficult to obtain and vary according to the source and the source’s 

methodology.v The Global Terrorism Database counts fifty-six terrorist 

incidents perpetrated by the AUC between 1999 and 2002. While these 

data are incomplete (they exclude attacks that occurred in 1997 and 

1998), they provide a useful look into the activities of the AUC.

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

0

5

1999 2000 2001 2002

Year

Incidents

Figure 9-4. AUC incidents per year.w

The bulk of such activity (sixty-four percent) came in the form of 

armed assaults.x A smaller number of attacks included kidnapping 

(twenty-eight percent) and assassination (seven percent).y The AUC typically carried out these attacks using automatic weapons, and, in some 

cases, incendiary devices, grenades, and explosives.

v For example, the Global Terrorism Database (a reliable source) counts zero terrorist attacks perpetrated by the AUC in 2005.154 Conversely, the Colombian National Police’s 

2005 Crime Report attributes twelve terrorist attacks to the self-defense groups (a proxy 

term for the AUC).155 The Global Terrorism Database also fails to include the Mapiripán 

Massacre, one of the most brutal and well known of the massacres perpetrated by the 

AUC, nor does it include any acts occurring before 1999. One reason that the Global Terrorism Database does not show a complete picture of the AUC’s activities is because the 

data set disaggregates some of the activities of the AUC’s member groups (such as the 

ACCU) and counts those attacks separately.

w Although the original data set attributed post-disarmament attacks to the AUC, it 

remains unclear whether these groups are neo-AUC units or more informal criminal elements with loose ties to former AUC members. Therefore, these data omit attacks occurring after the AUC’s demobilization and disarmament (2006).

x Thirty-six of fifty-six total incidents.

y Sixteen of fifty-six total incidents and four of fifty-six total incidents, respectively.
Chapter 9. AUC

301

Armed assault

Hostage taking (kidnapping)

Assassination 

Figure 9-5. AUC attack types.

The targets of the AUC varied over time and were typically guerrillas and their suspected civilian sympathizers. As the paramilitaries 

grew in strength and number, they expanded their targets. As the list 

of targets grew, attacks on political actors who were considered sympathetic to the guerrillas became a common tactic of Colombia’s paramilitaries. The groups’ activity in the 1980s and 1990s typifies the strategy 

of political assassination. During this period, the left-wing opposition 

party, the Patriotic Union, saw 4,000 of its members killed. At one point 

in 1996, the party saw a member killed an average of every other day. 

The New York Times reports, “the dead include most of the presidential candidates the party has fielded, seven members of the House of 

Representatives, two senators and thousands of regional and municipal office holders.”156 Such killings were not limited to only aspirants 

of public office but also included “whoever might vote for them. In 

the eastern and northern parts of the country—particularly the Urabá 

zone, a strategic corridor for drugs and weapons—right-wing death 

squads are waging a campaign of extermination, terrorizing residents 

and frequently forcing them to flee.”157 These killings are evidence of 

the widespread violence that Colombia’s paramilitaries were willing to 

perpetrate against their political opponents.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Private citizens and property

Government (general) 

Business 

Other 

Journalists/media 

Figure 9-6. AUC target types.

In addition to political killings, the AUC’s activities included violence against noncombatants.z

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2004 2005

Year

Incidents

Figure 9-7. Civilian fatalities attributed to AUC.

Under Castaño, the AUC sought expansion, and this resulted in 

significant attacks on civilians. Writing in 2001, Tate concludes:

The AUC has embarked on a calculated strategy to 

expand their operations into new regions of the country. In public documents and press statements, they 

have announced their intention to begin an offensive military campaign, and have in fact carried out a 

series of massacres targeting the civilian population in 

these areas. These operations are carried out by newly 

created ‘mobile squads’—elite training and combat 

units. Following a summit in July 1997, the AUC issued 

z For an extensive analysis and documentation of the AUC’s atrocities, see various 

Human Rights Watch reports. Human Rights Watch has documented numerous paramilitary atrocities in past reports.158,159,160
Chapter 9. AUC

303

a statement announcing an offensive war ‘according to 

the operational capacity of each regional group,’ establishing as the primary targets the traditional guerrilla 

strongholds of the western plains and the eastern 

jungle departments. The July massacre in Mapiripán, 

Meta appeared to be the first step in implementing 

this new plan. From 15 July through 20 July 1997, gunmen from the AUC took control of Mapiripán, killed 

at least 30 people, and threatened others. The exact 

death toll was never established, as many of the bodies 

were dismembered and thrown into a nearby river.161

The AUC’s expansion is demonstrated through the sprawl of 

documented incidents. This well-documented paramilitary strategy 

of expansion was fueled through assassinations, massacres, and the 

attempted eradication of guerrillas and their suspected sympathizers.aa

It made the AUC one of the most well known and, in large sectors of 

Colombian society, also one of the most reviled groups in Colombia.

aa See Hristov for a small sample of these acts.162
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

Amazonas

Vaupés

Guainía

Guaviare

Putumayo Caquetá

Nariño

Cauca

Tolima

Meta

Vichada

Casanare

Antioquia

Chocó

Córdoba

Sucre

 La

Guajira

Atlántico

Magdalena 

Arauca

Cesar

Bolivar

Santander

Norte 

de

Santander

Boyacá Caldas

Quindío

Risaralda Cundinamarca

Huila

Valle del

Cauca Distrito

Capital

10–20 operations

5–10 operations

1–5 operations

AUC Influence

Figure 9-8. AUC’s area of influence.

Administrative

Membership and Recruitment

The AUC’s membership was primarily young men. It consisted 

of former members of the drug cartels’ security personnel, drug 

lords, landowners, former Colombian military officials, and former 
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305

guerrillas.163,164,165 Because of the AUC’s ability to pay its members well, 

the group often drew from low-income populations, both rural and 

urban.166 In addition to financial motivation, Villegas has identified 

three other factors for individuals’ enlistment in the AUC: fun and a 

sense of adventure, retaliation for past abuses, and generic promises 

made by the group to the enlistee.167 Nevertheless, there is general consensus that economic motivations were probably the primary reason 

new members enlisted.168,169 The AUC certainly capitalized on these 

motives in its recruitment initiatives. As Human Rights Watch reports, 

“the one reason we heard most frequently was that they [AUC recruits] 

simply wanted a job, and the paramilitaries paid better than most.”170

Knowing this, the AUC offered selective incentives in the form of relatively high salaries.

In addition to the rural and urban poor, the AUC’s membership was 

also heavily populated by former Colombian armed service members 

and former guerrillas. Castaño boasted in 2000 that within the AUC 

ranks were 800 former guerrillas, more than 1,000 former soldiers, 

and approximately 135 former army officers.171 Similar to the guerrilla 

groups, the AUC recruited, and sometimes forcibly conscripted, both 

women and children. At the time of demobilization, there were 1,911 

women registered, comprising roughly six percent of the demobilized 

AUC population.172 It is estimated that approximately twenty percent 

of the AUC’s combatants were children.173 Although the AUC was the 

only group in Colombia to officially restrict membership to those ages 

eighteen and above, the requirement was routinely violated.174

Psychological

The AUC engaged in psychological activities both internal and 

external to the group.ab These activities were constituted by a threepronged psychological strategy: (1) indoctrination and coercion; (2) 

terror and intimidation; and (3) the quest for political legitimacy. The 

use of psychological tactics dates back to the early days of the paramilitaries, constituting an important part of the Colombian military’s 

counterinsurgency plan. These psychological operations included the 

building of a vast network of underground supporters (see the Underground and Auxiliary section) who were ideologically sympathetic to the 

“grievance discourse” that was articulated by the early paramilitaries.177

This narrative of an aggrieved middle class beset by a guerrilla threat 

and in need of self-defense capabilities could be disseminated through 

ab For a historical overview of the early psychological operations that the Colombian 

military and paramilitary units engaged in under Plan LAZO, see Maullin.175 Also see 

Human Rights Watch.176
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informal networks of ranchers, landowners, and business people, with 

the idea being that such narratives would help vilify the guerrillas, 

thus undermining their support, while simultaneously increasing sympathy for the paramilitary groups. This narrative was effective, and 

it extended through the lifetime of the AUC. The narrative was later 

more formally disseminated through institutionalized processes such 

as the curricula of anti-Communist schools in the rural countryside.178

The power of the antiguerrilla self-defense narrative, coupled with proparamilitary institutions, helped reinforce the image of the AUC as a 

legitimate political actor both within the group’s own ranks and among 

the general public.

These soft coercive practices were “complimented” by the AUC’s 

strategy of sowing terror and fear into the civilian population. This 

was achieved through assassinations of guerrillas and their family 

members, as well as those suspected of being guerrilla sympathizers, 

collaborators, or clandestine members. In addition to targeting guerrillas, the AUC practiced the “cleansing” and purging of undesirable 

elements of the population such as prostitutes, petty thieves, and the 

homeless. One effective strategy the group used when taking over a 

new town or village (especially when wresting it from guerrilla control) 

was to identify a highly respected member of the community, take him 

to the town square, and publicly hack him to pieces with a chainsaw 

starting at the ankles and working upward, so the victim lived (and 

screamed) as long as possible. Other times, the AUC would carry out 

massacres of civilians.ac The message was clear—opposition to the AUC 

was a grave mistake—and killings that terrorized everyday Colombians 

were a potent psychological tool.

The third leg of the AUC’s psychological operations was impacted 

by its desire to achieve political legitimacy. This resulted in what can be 

described as nothing other than a full-blown public relations campaign 

to “engender public acceptance of their [the AUC’s] role as political 

spokesmen.”179 This campaign was bolstered by the changed electoral 

map (changed through heavy AUC involvement) and the allies that it 

produced for the AUC among the political establishment. This, combined with the public relations push, was integral to the AUC’s attempt 

at changing the public’s perception of the group from merely criminal drug lords with private militias to legitimate political actors. This 

savvy, and ultimately successful, aim to gain legitimacy involved creating websites for the various blocs and bloc commanders, replete with 

editorials, links to news articles, interviews, organizational charts, and 

ac These tactics have been discussed throughout this chapter at length.
Chapter 9. AUC

307

communiqués.ad In addition to making use of the Internet, the AUC’s 

members effectively courted the press, both in Colombia and internationally. Castaño even had a biography written about him, and not to 

be outdone, Salvatore Mancuso did as well.

The AUC also established NGOs and foundations with missions 

(like land reform and redistribution) that would garner popular support, with the rationale being to display that the AUC cared about 

political issues and political reform—in effect demonstrating that they 

were not simply drug lords.180 The AUC openly claimed to practice selfrestraint in its combat operations by adhering to strict rules of engagement that comported with international law. This position, and the 

legitimacy that it conferred, was aided when the AUC’s Castaño met 

with the International Committee of the Red Cross, who recognized 

the AUC’s role as an armed belligerent. The goal again was to shift the 

public’s perceptions and attitudes toward the group so that the AUC 

would be viewed as an armed party to an antiguerrilla struggle, willing 

to negotiate its way to peace.

This three-part strategy of early traditional psychological operations, coupled with the use of terror and fear and capped off with an 

embrace of contemporary public relations, is testimony to the AUC’s 

adept use of psychological operations.

Political

Given their direct and indirect support from the political and 

military institutions of the Colombian state, Colombia’s paramilitary 

groups have been engaged in political involvement since their inception. Much of this involvement has been clandestine and illicit. As 

Colombian Senator Rafael Pardo pointed out, in many municipalities, 

mayoral candidates and aspirants for town councils are elected only 

with the permission of the AUC.181 For years, the AUC had been bribing 

people into office, bundling money for friendly candidates’ campaign 

coffers, and intimidating voters into supporting the AUC’s candidates 

of choice.ae Such activities were clearly helped by the endemic corruption in Colombia.

When Carlos Castaño formed the AUC, he did so with a clear eye 

toward the group’s political involvement. In many cases, where the state 

was anemic, the AUC would exercise near total control over political 

ad The AUC’s main web page, http://www.colombialibre.org/, has been taken down 

and replaced with a tourism site, although parts of the site remain archived and can be 

accessed through web crawls and other archival tools.

ae See the Public Component section for a discussion of these tactics.
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

affairs. For example, the AUC was involved in arbitration of disputes 

involving finances, even in some cases of inheritance disagreements.182

In some places members were such an accepted part of the community, 

they were referred to as los muchachos, “the boys.” In other areas, the 

AUC acted like the local police. In areas where state institutions were 

stronger, commanders worked directly with local and regional officials. 

As Commander Andres of the Northern Bloc commented, “we advise 

the authorities so they take advantage of the best opportunities for 

their communities.”183 Such activity was part of the AUC’s clear political 

agenda, marked by the desire to achieve political legitimacy. This aspiration was, in part, achieved. For example, in 2004, as the government 

and the AUC began peace negotiations, three top AUC commanders 

(including Salvatore Mancuso, then the AUC’s leader) addressed the 

Colombian Congress.184 Of course, as the Parapolitical Scandal has 

demonstrated, members of the AUC were no strangers to Colombian 

legislators (see the Public Component section).

Perhaps the AUC’s largest display of political power was the passage of the Justice and Peace Law in 2005. The law required the AUC 

to relinquish its weapons in exchange for lenient prison sentences, a 

statute of limitations on prosecutable crimes, and guarantees (later 

revoked) of not being extradited.

EXTERNAL ACTORS AND TRANSNATIONAL 

INFLUENCES

Much of the AUC’s activities were confined to Colombia—the 

group had largely a domestic focus and little interest in exporting 

(with the exception of its illegal goods) the violence and terror that 

it waged at home. As Saab and Taylor conclude, “most of the activities of the AUC focused on attaining local and regional political and 

economic power.”185 But for the group to attain such power, the AUC 

had to engage in activities that were not isolated to only the borders of 

Colombia.

Not unlike for the FARC, the primary source of income for the 

AUC was derived from the illegal drug industry. The group’s reliance on narcotrafficking and criminal activities such as arms smuggling extended the AUC’s activities beyond the borders of Colombia.186

These activities created complex relationships with Colombia’s most 

immediate geographic neighbors. The AUC would battle other armed 

groups for control of the lucrative smuggling routes along the borders 
Chapter 9. AUC

309

of Panama, Venezuela, and the Caribbean.af Such activity would sometimes lead to tension with Colombia’s neighbors. For example, in 2004, 

Venezuela discovered several AUC members within its borders, leading 

then President Chávez to speculate that they were planning a coup.188

Having large areas of territories ungoverned by the Colombian state 

and effectively controlled by the AUC led to various forms of support 

and opposition from Colombia’s neighbors.

Of course, the AUC’s illegal activities, particularly its narcotrafficking and terrorism, were viewed as international issues by many states. 

Evidence indicates that the AUC engaged in export of illegal drugs to 

North America, Europe, and West Africa.189 The AUC’s involvement in 

narcotrafficking activity led to several US indictments against its top 

leadership, many of whom have been extradited and are facing trial or 

imprisoned in the United States. Finally, the United States and many 

European states have designated the AUC a terrorist organization.

The United States probably has had the most significant involvement with the AUC and its predecessor groups. Much of this history 

dates back to the United States’ Cold War counterinsurgency strategy 

(see the Origins of the AUC section).ag The more recent history of US 

involvement involves Plan Colombia, the massive military assistance 

program designed to aid Colombia in coca eradication. The plan, a 

joint cooperation between the US and Colombian governments instituted in 2000, was largely a counterinsurgency effort focused on aerial 

coca eradication aimed at the FARC.191

FINANCES, LOGISTICS, SUSTAINMENT, AND 

COMMUNICATIONS

Criminal Activity

The AUC was engaged in significant criminal activity throughout 

its existence. The primary source of the group’s income came from 

involvement in the illicit drug trade. With the fall of the cartel system, 

the paramilitaries moved from working for and with the cartels to 

engaging directly in narcotrafficking. Activities included cultivation, 

production, and distribution of coca, as well as the taxing of peasants 

involved in growing and producing coca paste. By the time the AUC was 

formed, the self-defense groups were firmly entrenched in Colombia’s 

illicit drug trade. Richani estimates that, in 2002, the AUC’s annual 

af For a detailed analysis of the AUC’s activity along the Venezuelan border, see 

Rabasa et al.187

ag For an excellent discussion of this history, see Maullin.190
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

profits from the illicit drug trade were about seventy-five million dollars, a figure that comprised about eighty percent of the group’s total 

income.192, ah The AUC would eventually come to control a sizable proportion of Colombia’s drug business. Felbab-Brown estimates that the 

group controlled forty percent of the industry, aided by its comparative 

advantage of geographic proximity to Panama, its control of Urabá, 

and its access to lucrative smuggling routes.194 According to Carlos 

Castaño himself, in the year 2000, seventy percent of the AUC’s funds 

were generated from the illicit drug market, with the other thirty percent derived from extortion.195

The AUC also diversified. Its other forms of criminal sustainment 

included extortion and “taxation” (see the Public Component section) 

and gasoline theft (important in coca paste processing). This latter activity constituted a main source of funding for some blocs and 

self-defense groups. In fact, one petroleum company’s losses reached 

approximately five million dollars a month; an investigation discovered 

that eighty percent of these losses funded the AUC and constituted the 

main source of funding for the Puerto Boyacá group.196 Other forms 

of criminal activity for the AUC included smuggling, counterfeiting, 

prostitution, and gang activity.197 A final form of criminal activity was 

the AUC’s “protection” services that it offered to multinational corporations. In what is perhaps the most well-known case, the AUC provided “security” and “protection” for the US-based company Chiquita 

as it worked in Colombia. Chiquita reportedly paid the AUC 1.7 million dollars over a six-year period, three years of which the AUC was 

on the US list of designated terrorist groups. Chiquita later publicly 

admitted the illegal payments and, under court order, paid a fine of 

twenty-five million dollars.ai

Sustainment Outside Criminal Activities

Outside of extortion, the illicit drug trade, and counterfeiting, the 

AUC had a large system of “taxation” that ostensibly funded services 

similar to the protective security that the state would provide.aj These 

taxes, or voluntary contributions, were levied against coca farmers, small 

business people (including poor urban vendors), large multinational 

corporations, agribusiness, and state funds earmarked for particular 

ah Alternatively, Rochlin puts the estimate at about seventy percent, but he fails to 

provide a source for this figure.193

ai For a record of Chiquita’s involvement, see the National Security Archive’s “Chiquita Papers.”198

aj See Hristov for a discussion of legal and illegal sustainment.199
Chapter 9. AUC

311

municipalities.200 In addition to collecting these protection rents, the 

AUC expanded its operations directly into Colombia’s legal economy. 

This expansion included involvement in government contracts (particularly at the local level), and apparently the AUC’s involvement in 

contracting has been most active in the area of grants and contracts for 

government-subsidized health care for the poor.201 In some cases, the 

AUC had created its own companies to provide services such as private 

security and cable television.202 In true Mafioso form, the group put 

competitors out of business through threats and intimidation.203

Logistics

Due to the history of the paramilitaries’ involvement in both rural 

and urban Colombia, the AUC had a sophisticated logistical system 

that permitted it a steady flow of arms and supplies. The logistical pathways were aided by “an alliance among narcotraffickers, landed oligarchy, agribusiness groups, cattle ranchers, conservative political leaders 

and sectors of the military” that occurred during the nascence of the 

paramilitaries’ formation.204 In addition to receiving these logistical 

forms of support, former AUC members have claimed that the group 

received logistical support from the Colombian military when carrying 

out operations. For example, Salvatore Mancuso alleged that the military provided support in the case of specific massacres.205

Communications

The AUC possessed sophisticated strategies and methods for disseminating information both internally and to the outside public. With 

respect to intragroup communications, the AUC benefitted from the 

networks of informal channels that had been instituted earlier. One 

such example is the vast informal network of cattle ranchers that the 

ACCU had organized in its early days to provide intelligence and pass 

messages.206 These human intelligence and communications networks 

proved indispensable in the AUC’s operations. The AUC also embraced 

more modern and cutting-edge communications technology, employing faxes, the Internet, sport utility vehicles and pick-up trucks, radios, 

helicopters, laptops, and cellular and satellite telephones to disseminate threats, identify targets, prepare death lists, and coordinate massacres.”207 The AUC also used code words and decoy names to avoid 

detection and infiltration.208

The AUC also had a sophisticated public communications strategy 

(see the Psychological Operations section). As mentioned previously, this 

strategy included the development and use of members’ own personal 
312

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

websites. Carlos Castaño had a site and so did Salvatore Mancuso; 

Mancuso even maintained his site from prison in Colombia. The AUC 

was also known to cultivate journalists, rolling out exclusive interviews 

that would garner national and international attention.ak The AUC’s 

“leaders used the media to articulate a version of Colombian history 

that depicted paramilitary forces as both victims and heroes who took 

responsibility for the security and social welfare dimensions of the state 

that abandoned them,” with a public relations strategy worthy of Madison Avenue.210

ENDNOTES

1 Norman Offstein, “An Historical Review and Analysis of Colombian Guerrilla Movements: FARC, ELN and EPL,” Desarrollo Y Sociedad no. 52 (2003): 99–142.

2 Claire Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior on 

the Front Lines with the FARC, SPLA, and PKK (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 

103.

3 Amnesty International, Colombia: The Paramilitaries in Medellín: Demobilization or Legalization? September 2005, 4, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR23/019/2005.

4 Mauricio Romero, “Changing Identities and Contested Settings: Regional Elites and the 

Paramilitaries in Colombia.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 14, no. 1 

(2000): 59.

5 Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs (Washington, 

DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 94–95.

6 Nazih Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia

(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 108.

7 Ibid., 108.

8 Ibid., 104.

9 Winifred Tate, “Paramilitaries in Colombia.” Brown Journal of World Affairs VIII, no. 1 

(2001): 166.

10 Joe Foweraker and Roman Krznaric, “The Uneven Performance of Third Wave Democracies: Electoral Politics and the Imperfect Rule of Law in Latin America,” Latin American 

Politics and Society 44, no. 3 (2002): 29–60.

11 Tate, “Paramilitaries in Colombia,” 166.

12 Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia, 123.

13 Ibid.

14 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Information Report: Order of Battle, Leadership and 

Areas of Operations for the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia.”

15 Universidad Nacional de Colombia Observatorio de Procesos de Desarme, Desmovilización y Reintegración (ODDR), “Estructuras de Autodefensas y Proceso de Paz en 

Colombia.”

16 Human Rights Watch, “You’ll Learn Not to Cry”: Child Combatants in Colombia, 126, n. 41.

17 Universidad Nacional de Colombia Observatorio de Procesos de Desarme, Desmovilización y Reintegración (ODDR), “Estructuras de Autodefensas y Proceso de Paz en 

Colombia.”

ak See Tate for an excellent discussion of the AUC’s public relations strategy.209
Chapter 9. AUC

313

18 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Information Report: Order of Battle, Leadership and 

Areas of Operations for the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia.”

19 Jan McGirk, “Revealed: The Secrets of Colombia’s Murderous Castaño Brothers,” Telegraph, November 7, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/

colombia/3391789/Revealed-The-secrets-of-Colombias-murderous-Castano-brothers.

html.

20 “Yo Fui el Creador de Los Pepes,” Semana, June 27, 1994 (in Spanish), http://www.

semana.com/nacion/articulo/yo-fui-el-creador-de-los-pepes/22770-3.

21 Jasmin Hristov, “Self-Defense Forces, Warlords, or Criminal Gangs? Towards a New Conceptualization of Paramilitarism in Colombia,” Labour, Capital & Society 43, no. 2 (2010): 

19.

22 McGirk, “Revealed: The Secrets of Colombia’s Murderous Castaño Brothers.”

23 Ibid.

24 Max Manwaring, Nonstate Actors in Colombia: Threat & Response (Cambridge: Woodhead 

Publishing Limited), 6.

25 Bilal Y. Saab and Alexandra W. Taylor, “Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative 

Study of FARC and Paramilitary Groups in Colombia,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, 

no. 6 (2009): 461. See n. 43 for source material.

26 Mauricio Romero, “Changing Identities and Contested Settings: Regional Elites and the 

Paramilitaries in Colombia,” 66, n. 36.

27 United States Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” accessed June 4, 

2013, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.

28 United States Department of State Archive, Secretary Colin Powell, “Designation of the 

AUC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,” accessed June 25, 2013, http://2001-2009.

state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/4852.htm.

29 Guillermo Gonzalez, “Presentation of the Minister of Justice on Disarmament,” Accessed 

June 25, 2013, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/events/061102_col_justice.pdf.

30 Jonathan Morgenstein, “Consolidating Disarmament: Lessons from Colombia’s Reintegration Program for Demobilized Paramilitaries,” United States Institute of Peace Special Report 217, November 2008, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr217.pdf.

31 “Carlos Castano Murder: Nine Men Sentenced in Colombia,” BBC News, March 17, 2011, 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12779945.

32 Gonzalez, “Presentation of the Minister of Justice on Disarmament.”

33 Amnesty International, “Continued Presence of Paramilitary-Type Groups in Colombia,” accessed June 25, 2013, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/americas/

colombia/continued-presence-of-paramilitary-type-groups-in-colombia.

34 Juan Forero, “New Colombia Law Grants Concessions to Paramilitaries,” New York Times, 

June 23, 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/06/23/international/americas/23colombia.

html.

35 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Information Report: Order of Battle, Leadership and 

Areas of Operations for the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia,” October 2000, 

http://www.dia.mil/public-affairs/foia/pdf/colombia/IIR%206%20819%200051%2001.

pdf.

36 Military Periscope Database, “United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC),” January 

2013.

37 Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia.

38 Jasmin Hristov, Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia (Athens, OH: Ohio 

University Press), 2009.

39 Human Rights Watch, “You’ll Learn Not to Cry”: Child Combatants in Colombia (New York: 

Human Rights Watch, 2003), n. 40, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/colombia0903/.

40 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Information Report: Order of Battle, Leadership and 

Areas of Operations for the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia.”
314

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

41 Universidad Nacional de Colombia Observatorio de Procesos de Desarme, 

Desmovilización y Reintegración (ODDR), “Estructuras de Autodefensas y Proceso de 

Paz en Colombia” (Bogotá, 2012, in Spanish), http://www.observatorioddr.unal.edu.

co/productos_academicos/nuevos/informeestructurasdeautodefensasyprocesode%20_

pazen_colombia_version15_02_12_final.pdf.

42 Hristov, Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia, 61.

43 Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia, 104.

44 Hristov, Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia, 63.

45 “ ‘El Patrón’, Hernán Giraldo Serna,” Verdad Abierta, December 29, 2008, 

http://www.verdadabierta.com/component/content/article/36-jefes/683-perfil

-de-hernan-giraldo-serna-alias-el-patron.

46 “Yo Fui el Creador de Los Pepes,” Semana.

47 McGirk, “Revealed: The Secrets of Colombia’s Murderous Castaño Brothers.”

48 “Yo Fui el Creador de Los Pepes,” Semana.

49 Ibid.

50 McGirk, “Revealed: The Secrets of Colombia’s Murderous Castaño Brothers.”

51 Ibid.

52 “Carlos Castano Murder: Nine Men Sentenced in Colombia,” BBC News.

53 McGirk, “Revealed: The Secrets of Colombia’s Murderous Castaño Brothers.”

54 “Habla Vicente Castaño,” Semana, June 05, 2005, http://www.semana.com/portada/

articulo/habla-vicente-castano/72964-3.

55 “ ‘The Monkey Mancuso’ Salvatore Mancuso,” Verdad Abierta, December 30, 2008, 

http://www.verdadabierta.com/component/content/article/36-jefes/704-prueba.

56 “Salvatore Mancuso Reveals that He Met with Former President Alvaro 

Uribe,” Semana, May 11, 2012, http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/

salvatore-mancuso-revela-reunio-expresidente-alvaro-uribe/257791-3.

57 “Jorge 40, Rodrigo Tovar Pupo,” Verdad Abierta, December 29, 2008, http://www.verdadabierta.com/victimarios/691-perfil-rodrigo-tovar-pupo-alias-jorge-40.

58 “ ‘El Patrón’, Hernán Giraldo Serna,” Verdad Abierta.

59 “War Without End,” Newsweek Magazine, May 20, 2001, http://www.thedailybeast.com/

newsweek/2001/05/20/war-without-end.html.

60 Ibid.

61 International Human Rights Law Clinic, Truth Behind Bars: Colombian Paramilitary Leaders in U.S. Custody (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, February 

2010), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/IHRLC/Truthbehindbars.pdf.

62 “ ‘Arcángel’, Miguel Arroyave,” Verdad Abierta, January 7, 2009, http://www.verdadabierta.

com/component/content/article/36-jefes/711-perfil-miguel-arroyave-alias-arcangel.

63 “A Arroyave lo Mató el Narcotráfico,” Semana, accessed June 25, 2013, http://m.semana.

com/nacion/articulo/a-arroyave-mato-narcotrafico/69425-3.

64 “Martín Llanos, Héctor Germán Buitrago,” Verdad Abierta, accessed July 15, 2013, 

http://www.verdadabierta.com/victimarios/los-jefes/714-perfil-hector-germanbuitrago-alias-martin-llanos.

65 International Criminal Court, Situation in Colombia: Interim Report, November 2012, http://

www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/3D3055BD-16E2-4C83-BA85-35BCFD2A7922/285102/

OTPCOLOMBIAPublicInterimReportNovember2012.pdf.

66 “ ‘The Eagle’ Luis Eduardo Cifuentes,” Verdad Abierta, December 29, 2008, http://

www.verdadabierta.com/component/content/article/36 -jefes/659-perfil-luiseduardo-cifuentes-alias-el-aguila.

67 Harvey Kline, “Autodefensas de Cundinamarca,” in Historical Dictionary of Colombia (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press., 2012), 56–57.
Chapter 9. AUC

315

68 Universidad Nacional de Colombia Observatorio de Procesos de Desarme, Desmovilización y Reintegración (ODDR), “Estructuras de Autodefensas y Proceso de Paz en 

Colombia.”

69 Richard L. Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1973), 61–81.

70 Human Rights Watch, Colombia’s Killer Networks: The Military-Paramilitary Partnership 

and the United States (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1996), http://www.hrw.org/

reports/1996/killer2.htm#9. Accessed June 25, 2013. Here Human Rights Watch is quoting from Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counter-Terrorism, 1940–1990 [New York: Pantheon Books, 1992], 222).

71 Hristov, “Self-Defense Forces, Warlords, or Criminal Gangs? Towards a New Conceptualization of Paramilitarism in Colombia,” 18–19.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.

74 Amnesty International, Colombia: The Paramilitaries in Medellín: Demobilization or Legalization? 4.

75 Hristov, “Self-Defense Forces, Warlords, or Criminal Gangs? Towards a New Conceptualization of Paramilitarism in Colombia,” 19.

76 Winifred Tate, “From Greed to Grievance: The Shifting Political Profile of the Colombian Paramilitaries,” in Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War, ed. Virginia Marie Bouvier (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 117.

77 Ibid.

78 Romero, “Changing Identities and Contested Settings: Regional Elites and the Paramilitaries in Colombia,” 65–66.

79 Human Rights Watch, Colombia’s Killer Networks: The Military-Paramilitary Partnership and 

the United States, Appendix A, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/killerapendixa.htm.

80 Romero, “Changing Identities and Contested Settings: Regional Elites and the Paramilitaries in Colombia,” 66.

81 Tate, “From Greed to Grievance: The Shifting Political Profile of the Colombian Paramilitaries,” 122.

82 Tate, “Paramilitaries in Colombia,” 166.

83 Doug Stokes, “Better Lead than Bread? A Critical Analysis of the US’s Plan Colombia,” 

Civil Wars 4, no. 2 (2001): 64.

84 Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia, 123.

85 Manwaring, Nonstate Actors in Colombia: Threat & Response, 6.

86 Saab and Taylor, “Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative Study of FARC and 

Paramilitary Groups in Colombia,” 473, n. 42.

87 Ibid., 461.

88 Julia Sweig, “What Kind of War for Colombia?” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2002, 

123.

89 Tate, “Paramilitaries in Colombia.”

90 Jennifer Janisch and Oriana Zill de Granados, “Colombian Victims of 

Paramilitary Violence Plead for Access to U.S. Justice System,” PBS, September 10, 2010, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/women-war-and-peace/features/colombianvictims-of-paramilitary-violence-plead-for-access-to-u-s-justice-system/.

91 Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, 240, n. 224.

92 James F. Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 146.

93 Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia, 123.

94 Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior, 105.
316

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

95 Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia, 126.

96 Ibid., 123.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid., 124.

99 Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, 235, n. 170.

100United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, July 31, 2012, http://

www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195553.htm#AUC.

101 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1992, accessed June 25, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/

reports/1992/WR92/AMW-04.htm#P259_96870.

102 Ibid., 147.

103Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico, 146.

104 Ibid., 148, n. 117 (as quoted in AUC, “Entrevista a Lost Comandantes de Las ACCU,” 

September 9–10, 1998, translation by Rochlin).

105Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, 98.

106 Ibid.

107 Susan Brewer Norman, “A Tale of Two Paramilitaries: The Political Economy of Local 

Paramilitary Rule in the Magdalena Medio, Colombia,” The Latin Americanist 56, no. 1 

(2012): 37–56.

108United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Protection 

Considerations Regarding Colombian Asylum-Seekers and Refugees (Geneva: UNHCR, March 

2005), 28.

109Hristov, Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia, 142.

110 Ibid., chap. 3, all, and 142–145.

111 Angel Rabasa, Steven Boraz, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Theodore W. Karasik, Jennifer 

D. P. Moroney, Kevin A. O’Brien, John E. Peters, Ungoverned Territories: Understanding 

and Reducing Terrorism Risks (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), http://www.

rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG561, 248.

112 Hristov, Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia, 78.

113Rabasa et al., Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks, 248. n. 15.

114 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2012: Colombia,” accessed June 25, 2013, http://

www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/colombia.

115Romero, “Changing Identities and Contested Settings: Regional Elites and the Paramilitaries in Colombia,” 66.

116 McGirk, “Revealed: The Secrets of Colombia’s Murderous Castaño Brothers.”

117 Hristov, Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia, 70–71.

118 Mark Chernick, “PCP-SL: Partido Communista de Peru-Sendero Luminoso,” in Terror, Insurgency, and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts, eds. Marianne Heiberg, Brendan 

O’Leary, and John Tirman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 58.

119 Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico, 107.

120Adam Isacson, Peace—or “Paramilitarization? (Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, July 4, 2005), http://www.ciponline.org/research/html/peace-or-paramilitarization.

121 Juan E. Ugarriza and Matthew J. Craig, “The Relevance of Ideology to Contemporary 

Armed Conflicts: A Quantitative Analysis of Former Combatants in Colombia,” Journal of 

Conflict Resolution 57, no. 3 (2013): 455.

122Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, 95.

123Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico, 147.

124 Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs.

125Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966).
Chapter 9. AUC

317

126David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (London: Faber and Faber, 

1971).

127 John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 

Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

128David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New 

York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

129Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, 17.

130Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico, 148.

131 Hristov, Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia, 70.

132Amnesty International, Colombia: The Paramilitaries in Medellín: Demobilization or Legalization? 8–9.

133Hristov, Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia, 154.

134 Scott Wilson, “Paramilitary Army Seeks Political Role in Colombia AUC Wants Recognition, Vows More Civilized’ Fight,” Washington Post, September 19, 2001, http://www.

latinamericanstudies.org/auc/role.htm, A28.

135Tate, “From Greed to Grievance: The Shifting Political Profile of the Colombian 

Paramilitaries.”

136Cristina K. Theidon, “Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and 

Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia,” International Journal of Transitional 

Justice 1, no. 1 (2007): 66–90.

137Universidad Nacional de Colombia Observatorio de Procesos de Desarme, Desmovilización y Reintegración (ODDR), “Estructuras de Autodefensas y Proceso de Paz en 

Colombia.”

138 Ibid.

139Theidon, “Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 

of Former Combatants in Colombia,” 75.

140Universidad Nacional de Colombia Observatorio de Procesos de Desarme, Desmovilización y Reintegración (ODDR), “Dinámicas de las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia” (Bogotá, August 2009, in Spanish), 16, http://alfresco.uclouvain.be/alfresco/d/d/

workspace/SpacesStore/f6c1ffc2-2a02-4823-94fa-2de37c2a7bf1/Universidad%20Nacional%20-%20Dinamicas%20de%20las%20AUC%202009.pdf.

141 Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, 96.

142Theidon, “Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 

of Former Combatants in Colombia,” 75–76.

143 Ibid., 76.

144Universidad Nacional de Colombia Observatorio de Procesos de Desarme, Desmovilización y Reintegración (ODDR), “Dinámicas de las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia,” 

13.

145 Ibid.

146 Ibid.

147 Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, 95–96.

148 “ ‘Arcángel’, Miguel Arroyave,” Verdad Abierta.

149Chernick, “PCP-SL: Partido Communista de Peru-Sendero Luminoso,” 58–59.

150Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico, 146.

151 Douglas Porch and Maria Jose Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 6 (2008): 526.

152 Ibid.

153Hristov, Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia, 154.

154Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 

Responses to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.
318

Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

155Colombian National Police, Crime Report 2005, http://guncite.com/colombian_crime_

rpt_2005.pdf.

156Diana Jean Schemo, “Colombia’s Death-Strewn Democracy,” New York Times, July 24, 

1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/24/world/colombia-s-death-strewn-democracy.

html.

157 Schemo, “Colombia’s Death-Strewn Democracy.”

158Human Rights Watch, The “Sixth Division”: Military-Paramilitary Ties and U.S. Policy in 

Colombia (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2001).

159Human Rights Watch, War Without Quarter: Colombia and International Humanitarian Law

(New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998).

160Human Rights Watch, Colombia’s Killer Networks: The Military-Paramilitary Partnership and 

the United States.

161Tate, “Paramilitaries in Colombia,” 167.

162Hristov, Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia, 103–127.

163 Saab and Taylor, “Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative Study of FARC and 

Paramilitary Groups in Colombia,” 461.

164Hristov, Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia, 71.

165Human Rights Watch, “Smoke and Mirrors: Colombia’s Demobilization of Paramilitary Groups,” Human Rights Watch 17, no. 3 (August 2005): 13, http://www.hrw.org/

reports/2005/colombia0805/colombia0805.pdf.

166Hristov, Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia, 71.

167Cristina Villegas, “Motives for the Enlistment and Demobilization of Illegal Armed Combatants in Colombia,” Peace and Conflict 15, no. 3 (2009): 263–280.

168 Ibid., 267.

169Theidon, “Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 

of Former Combatants in Colombia.”

170 Human Rights Watch, “Smoke and Mirrors Colombia’s Demobilization of Paramilitary 

Groups,”19.

171 Eduardo Pizarro, Una Democricia Asediada: Balance y Perspectivas del Conflict Armado en 

Colombia (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 2004), 120 (as quoted in Hristov, Blood and 

Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia, 71).

172 Universidad Nacional de Colombia Observatorio de Procesos de Desarme, Desmovilización y Reintegración (ODDR), “Dinámicas de las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia,” 

34.

173 Human Rights Watch, “You’ll Learn Not to Cry”: Child Combatants in Colombia, 21.

174 Ibid., 9.

175 Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia, 74. Also see Human Rights Watch.

176 Human Rights Watch, Colombia’s Killer Networks: The Military-Paramilitary Partnership and 

the United States, chap. 2.

177Tate, “From Greed to Grievance: The Shifting Political Profile of the Colombian Paramilitaries,” 113.

178 Ibid., 117.

179 Ibid., 112.

180 Ibid.

181Rafeal Pardo, “Key Issues in the Negotiations Process,” in The Peace Process in Colombia 

with the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia-AUC (Woodrow Wilson Center Report on the 

Americas no. 13), ed. Cynthia J. Arnson (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005), 22.

182Tate, “From Greed to Grievance: The Shifting Political Profile of the Colombian Paramilitaries,” 124.
Chapter 9. AUC

319

183 Ibid.

184 “Colombia Warlords Visit Congress,” BBC News, July 27, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/

hi/americas/3930247.stm.

185 Saab and Taylor, “Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative Study of FARC and 

Paramilitary Groups in Colombia,” 462.

186Kim Cragin and Bruce Hoffman, Arms Trafficking and Colombia (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND Corporation, 2003).

187Rabasa et al., Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks, 248, esp. 

chap. 12.

188Gregory Wilpert, “Chavez Identifies Leaders of Colombian Paramilitary Group in Venezuela,” VenezuelaAnlaysis, May 15, 2004, http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/506.

189Bruce Bagley, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the 

Twenty-First Century: Woodrow Wilson Center Update on the Americas (Washington, DC: 

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, August 2012), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/BB%20Final.pdf.

190Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia, 61–81.

191 Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, 101.

192Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia, 109.

193Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico, 137.

194Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, 95 (citing former 

Ambassador to Colombia, William Wood), n. 157.

195Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency 

and Its Implications for Regional Stability (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 

58–59.

196Brewer Norman, “A Tale of Two Paramilitaries: The Political Economy of Local Paramilitary Rule in the Magdalena Medio, Colombia,” 48.

197 Isacson, Peace—or “Paramilitarization? 7.

198National Security Archive, “The Chiquita Papers,” April 7, 2003, http://www.gwu.

edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB340/.

199Hristov, Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia, 74.

200Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia, 108, 124, 125.

201 Isacson, Peace—or “Paramilitarization? 8.

202Ibid.

203Ibid.

204Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia, 123.

205“Former Paramilitary Leader Salvatore Mancuso said that AUC Received Help from the 

Police and the Military in Massacre,” Semana, November 18, 2008, http://www.semana.

com/international/headlines/articulo/former-paramilitary-leader-salvatore-mancusosaid-that-auc-received-help-from-the-police-and-the-military/97433-3.

206Romero, “Changing Identities and Contested Settings: Regional Elites and the Paramilitaries in Colombia,” 65–66.

207Human Rights Watch, The “Sixth Division”: Military-Paramilitary Ties and U.S. Policy in 

Colombia, 14.

208Universidad Nacional de Colombia Observatorio de Procesos de Desarme, Desmovilización y Reintegración (ODDR), “Dinámicas de las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia,” 

25–28.

209Tate, “From Greed to Grievance: The Shifting Political Profile of the Colombian 

Paramilitaries.”

210 Ibid., 130–131.

Conclusion

321

CONCLUSION TO PART II

In the preceding section, we have analyzed the origins of political violence in Colombia. The leftist guerrilla insurgencies in the state 

are among the longest running insurgencies in the world. The persistence and intensity of political violence in the country gives rise not 

only to questions about how the conflict began but also to possible 

settlements between the guerrillas, the government, and paramilitary 

fighters. Traditionally, wars are thought to be settled by armed forces 

on the battlefield. In the case of insurgencies, which pit the asymmetric 

forces of insurgents against the stronger forces of the state, conflicts are 

also fought in the political domain. The leadership of the Provisional 

Irish Republican Army called its struggle against British occupation 

in Northern Ireland the “long war” in recognition of the entrenched 

political battle necessary to erode the will of the enemy to fight. With 

changes in the international system after the Cold War, political settlements to conclude insurgencies are as likely as decisive military victories 

by either government or insurgent forces. As a result, more insurgents 

are becoming politicians responsible for governing. However, in the 

social sciences, this transition, from an insurgent group to a political 

party, is among the least studied aspects of political conflict.

Traditionally, civil wars and insurgencies have ended on the battlefield, with either the government or rebel forces emerging as the 

clear military victor. In Colombia, however, a clear military victory by 

either the FARC or the Colombian government is unlikely. Instead, the 

long-running insurgency is most likely to be settled at the negotiating 

table, as was the case with the M-19 in 1991. Since the end of the Cold 

War, the incidence of negotiated settlements has increased all over the 

world. Today, most political conflicts are intrastate, or within states, as 

opposed to interstate, or between states. Increasingly these intrastate 

warsado not end in decisive military victories but instead through negotiated settlements.b

 A negotiated settlement is as “an ideal-type war 

a Toft uses six criteria to define civil wars, an amalgamation of criteria from various 

respected scholars in the field. The criteria includes a commonly used “death threshold,” 

a macabre moniker for a criteria of at least an average of one thousand battle deaths 

per year. This high death threshold excludes “smaller-scale” insurgencies, such as in the 

Northern Ireland conflict. However, other conflict researchers, such as Nicholas Sambanis, use a death threshold of a total one thousand battle deaths throughout the duration 

of the conflict, which would include the conflict in Northern Ireland. As evidenced here, 

political scientists have struggled to agree on a precise quantification of what constitutes a 

“civil war.”1

b Negotiated settlements, and civil war termination in general, are thought to have 

increased in the post-Cold War environment for a number of reasons, including the withdrawal of US and Soviet resources from proxy wars as well as increased pressure on the 

United States and the international community to intervene in civil wars.2
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termination in which neither side admits defeat and the combatants 

agree to end the violence and accept common terms on how to govern 

a postwar state.”3 A military victory, by contrast, is as “an ideal-type 

war termination in which one side explicitly acknowledges defeat and 

surrenders.”4 In the 129 civil wars that took place in 1940–2000, seventy-nine, or seventy percent, ended in a military victory. Only twentytwo wars, or nineteen percent, ended in negotiated settlement. The 

1990s saw a dramatic increase in the number of civil wars that ended, 

thirty-seven in all, or one-third of all the wars that began in 1940–2000. 

Furthermore, of those wars that ended in the 1990s, forty-one percent 

ended through negotiated settlement, tied with the percentage of those 

ending in military victory. What is striking is that of all the civil wars 

that have ended in negotiated settlement, two-thirds of those settlements occurred in the 1990s.5

The net effect of the prevalence of negotiated settlements and 

power-sharing agreements is that more insurgents are “changing their 

stripes”6 and demobilizing into the political process. The transformation 

of insurgent groups to the legitimate political process occurred before 

the end of the Cold War, but most groups entered politics through the 

use of force, either through victory over extant governments or former colonial powers.7

 Insurgent groups face numerous challenges in 

this transformation from illegal, armed opposition groups to bona 

fide actors in the political process, including those related to organizational structure and security matters. The transition to conventional 

politics “requires adopting a new political culture, formulating a new 

programme, installing party organisational structures, recruiting party 

cadres, and building their capacity to govern.”8 Those insurgent groups 

that have operated on dual tracks, like the Provisional Irish Republican 

Army (IRA) and Sinn Féin, appear to adapt more readily to the changing environment but still face numerous obstacles. A leader of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa notes that despite the 

organization’s victory in the 1994 elections after the peace process, the 

ANC would have benefited from more attention to building a team 

“ready to govern and build up its capacity to deliver.”9

The successful transition to “normal” politics after concluding an 

insurgency or civil war is rare. Many civil wars reignite within a few 

years of ending. One of the least studied but most important aspects of 

the transition to normal politics is the transformation of armed groups 

to nonarmed political parties taking part in the legitimate political 

process. Many insurgent groups are ill prepared for the challenges 

of governance. Few of the skills, organizations, and resources necessary for mounting a successful insurgency are beneficial in this new 

environment. This challenge is among the most difficult of all peacebuilding challenges:
Conclusion

323

It not only requires that former combatants lay down 

their weapons and hand in their military fatigues, but 

more importantly compels former rebel leaders to 

change their military strategies into political ones and 

to reorganize their war-focused military organizations 

into dialogue-based political entities.10

Once insurgents have entered the legitimate political process, it 

is also difficult to determine the extent to which the group has truly 

transformed from an armed group to a political party. Although such 

political parties might fall short of Western standards, political parties in this context are simply defined as those organizations fulfilling 

the primary function of political parties—fielding electoral candidates 

for political office. Some groups continue to operate as armed groups 

while participating in legitimate politics. One scholar developed a 

typology to help better understand this transformation. The spectrum 

runs from a full-fledged, successful transformation to a facade transformation that results in little deviation from an armed strategy by the 

insurgent group. Transformations occur at both the structural and attitudinal levels. That is, the organizational structures of the group alter 

to accommodate political activities, and changes in attitude and behavior accommodate the shift to political strategies.11

Two of the armed groups in Colombia, the ELN and the AUC, have 

evidenced few attempts to transition to the legal political process. For 

most of its history, the ELN leadership has maintained a distance from 

direct participation in Colombian politics to avoid legitimizing what it 

views as an unjust regime. However, a peace agreement that includes 

substantial reforms of the Colombian political system and mechanisms 

for political participation by former guerrillas is likely to signal the onset 

of a transition by the ELN to the legal political process as it did for the 

M-19. The AUC’s position was unique among the armed groups in the 

country. At times, the Colombian military and politicians supported 

the paramilitaries as proxy groups to combat the leftist guerrilla threat. 

As a result, the group’s participation in the legal political process was 

indirect and clandestine. Some suggest that the AUC received such an 

attractive settlement from the government in the Justice and Peace Law 

of 2005 because of the group’s position as the government’s counterinsurgent proxy. Regardless, the demobilized paramilitary combatants 

engaged in no meaningful transition to a political party. After demobilizing, it appears that many combatants have instead reorganized into 

new armed groups of either newly formed paramilitaries, drug traffickers, of bacrims.

In Colombia, only the M-19 evidenced a successful transition to the 

legitimate political process. There are a number of developments that 
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Part II. Structure and Dynamics of the Insurgency

indicate an insurgent group has made a successful transition. Arguably the most important step is the dismantling of its military wing, 

the demobilization of its soldiers, and strict adherence to a cease-fire. 

Secondly, the insurgent group must have developed a stable party organization capable of fielding candidates for political office. Finally, an 

insurgent group must recognize the ballot, not bullets, as the principal 

means to achieve its objectives and for selecting executive and legislative leadership in the country. These factors encompass both the structural and attitudinal changes described above.12

The M-19 fulfilled all of the requirements for a successful transformation from rebel to political party. In 1989, the insurgents nearly 

unanimously agreed to dismantle their militant wing in favor of a political party. By 1990, the M-19 had developed the AD M-19, a political 

party organization that fielded candidates for the constitutional convention as well as traditional political offices. Former M-19 insurgents 

have also described the attitudinal changes that many in the group 

underwent in the latter half of the 1980s. Many were war weary and 

disillusioned by the dirty war’s mounting cost to the civilian population the group claimed to protect, seeing a clear disjunction between 

the ends of the leftist guerrilla struggle and the means used to accomplish those goals. Under the leadership of Pizarro, the M-19 recognized 

peace not as a strategy for the continuation of the military struggle 

but as an end worthy of pursuit itself. The M-19’s resolve to achieve 

peace was sorely tested when Pizarro was gunned down by a paramilitary assassin. After Navarro took on the mantle of leadership, the M-19 

persevered in its transition to a political party.

Like other insurgent groups that have made the transformation, 

the M-19 faced a number of challenges. The hierarchical decisionmaking structure of the military organization was inadequate for the 

dialogue and consensus-building necessary for a political party. One 

former member described the transition as a difficult one for both 

Pizarro, accustomed to making unilateral decisions, and the rank and 

file, accustomed to carrying out directives. However, the M-19 did evidence a culture that could support dialogue-based decision making. 

For example, when making the crucial decision of whether to disarm 

in 1989, M-19 leadership used an internal vote, a democratic decisionmaking mechanism, to make the final decision to disarm. Furthermore, 

as the AD M-19, the leadership had difficulties incorporating former 

combatants into the political party. Former insurgents that underwent 

the transition to AD M-19 reported being insufficiently involved in the 

political party by M-19 leadership, ultimately resulting in many leaving 

the organization.
Conclusion

325

Finally, after taking the helm of AD M-19 after Pizarro’s assassination, Navarro attempted to develop a strong popular base through coalition building. The myriad groups that joined the M-19 helped to dilute 

the character of AD M-19. With this dilution, combined with increasingly individualist political campaigns, the AD M-19 ceased to be a force 

in Colombian politics. As discussed in the M-19 chapter, however, individual M-19 leaders, such as Navarro, did become successful politicians 

in their own right. It is important to note that determining the success 

of an insurgent group’s transformation to a political party is not based 

on the success of the party at the polls. Rather, success is determined 

by the factors described above. As a result, although the AD M-19 faded 

into insignificance, it is still an example of a successful transformation.

Unlike the M-19, the FARC’s attempt to transition to participation 

in the legitimate political process in the 1980s was a facade transformation. A facade transformation occurs when an insurgent groups fails 

to make any significant structural or attitudinal changes to a political 

party. The insurgent group might erect a political organization, but 

it acts primarily as a strategic front for receiving support, money, or 

concessions from the target government. The “facade” political front 

is designed primarily to further the leadership’s military strategies. 

In a facade transformation, the insurgent group also continues its 

armed campaign.13

The FARC established the UP as part of a peace agreement with 

President Betancur in 1985. At the time of the creation of the UP in 

1985, the FARC leadership intended the party to act as a mechanism 

for dissemination of propaganda and recruitment. The strategy was 

part of the FARC’s efforts to execute its struggle on multiple fronts. 

However, the UP did successfully field candidates for political office. 

Also, under the leadership of Jacob Arenas, the FARC built some of 

the organizational structure necessary to carry out its political strategies. While the UP fielded candidates for office, the military wing 

of the FARC continued its armed campaign, eventually leading to a 

breakdown of the cease-fire. In part, the failure of the FARC to mature 

its political participation resulted from the highly insecure domestic 

context in which the transition took place. The paramilitaries, some 

argue in collusion with the government’s security forces, engaged in 

a concerted campaign to exterminate UP members. The paramilitaries were ultimately successful in derailing the FARC’s participation 

in the political process after assassinating hundreds of UP members. 

Alongside the death of Jacob Arenas, the FARC’s reluctance to pursue 

further political solutions to the conflict in the 1990s stemmed from 

this experience.
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The next section, Government Countermeasures, will detail the government’s efforts to combat the leftist guerrilla threat. In the late 1990s, 

both Colombian and US government officials were concerned that 

the FARC was on the cusp of defeating the Colombian military and 

deposing the government in Bogotá. Since a series of countermeasures 

adopted in the early 2000s, Colombia’s security forces’ successes have 

nearly precluded the possibility of a FARC military victory. Nevertheless, 

after nearly sixty years of struggle, the Colombian security forces are 

unlikely to wholly eradicate the threat to the country’s stability through 

military force. A negotiated settlement to the conflict, a common trend 

in the international community today, remains the most likely conclusion to end leftist political violence in the country. Any settlement will 

require reforms of the Colombian political system that safeguard basic 

human and political rights, decrease social and economic inequality 

and corruption, and consolidate state government in all areas of the 

country. As part of that negotiated settlement, leftist guerrillas will 

likely transition from armed insurgents to legitimate political parties. 

The Conclusion to this study will review the current negotiation efforts 

with the FARC under President Juan Manuel Santos.

ENDNOTES

1 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical 

and Quantitative Analysis,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (2000), 779–801.

2 Monica Duffy Toft, “Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?” International Security

34, no. 4 (2010), 14–15.

3 Ibid., 11.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., 12–14.

6 Mimmi Soderberg Kovacs, “When Rebels Change their Stripes: Armed Insurgents in 

Post-War Politics,” in From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding, eds. Anna K. Jarstad 

and Timothy D. Sisk (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

7 M. Hoddie and C. Hartzell, “Power Sharing in Peace Settlements: Initiating Transition 

from Civil Wars,” in Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars, eds. P. G. Roeder 

and D. Rothchild (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 138, fn.1.

8 Veronique Dudouet, From War to Politics: Resistance/Liberation Movements in Transition, 

Berghof Report No. 17 (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2009), 39.

9 Ibid., 39.

10 Jeroen de Zeeuw, “Understanding the Political Transformation of Rebel Movements” 

in From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel Movements After Civil War, ed. Jeroen de 

Zeeuw (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), 1.

11 Ibid., 11–19.

12 Ibid., 16–17.

13 Ibid., 18.
PART III.

GOVERNMENT COUNTERMEASURES

CHAPTER 10.

GOVERNMENT COUNTERMEASURES

Chapter 10. Government Countermeasures

331

The Colombian government’s response to the leftist insurgencies, 

the paramilitaries, and narcotrafficking has spanned the spectrum 

from negotiation to armed offensives. During some periods, the government has applied these varied methods to treat different threats 

simultaneously. Its policies have shifted between counterinsurgency 

and counternarcotics programs over the years. The United States is 

Colombia’s greatest ally in its efforts to quell threats to national security, whether from insurgent groups or drug cartels. The United States 

has supported the Colombian counterinsurgency effort through monetary aid, training, and supplies. The following section discusses the 

countermeasures each successive presidential administration adopted 

to address threats to Colombia’s national security.

PLAN LAZO AND ITS AFTERMATH (1960–1970)

Alberto Lleras Carmago (1958–1962), Guillermo León 

Valencia Muñóz (1962–1966), and Carlos Lleras Restrepo 

(1966–1970)

At various points in Colombia’s history, assistance from the United 

States played a crucial role in the Colombian government’s efforts to 

tamp down illegal armed actors operating within its borders. That assistance began as early as the first administration of the National Front 

government with Plan LAZO. Although only partially implemented, and 

partially successful, the plan shaped the government’s countermeasure 

policies during this time period. Plan LAZO, adopted in mid-1962, featured a two-pronged carrot-and-stick approach to combatting leftist 

insurgents such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 

(FARC), Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), and Ejército Popular 

de Liberación (EPL). In addition to these military and socioeconomic 

strategies, government countermeasures also included the formation 

of autodefensa, or civilian self-defense groups. Despite these efforts, the 

Colombian government made little progress on addressing the root 

causes of grievances underlying the leftist insurgency.

The adoption of Plan LAZO was preceded by several missions to survey Colombia’s internal security situation. Alberto Lleras Camergo, the 

National Front’s first president, requested assistance from the United 

States in addressing the threat posed by insurgents groups. The Eisenhower administration responded by initiating the survey missions.

The first survey mission, undertaken in 1959, was overseen by the 

Department of State, with Department of Defense support. It fielded 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives with wide-ranging experience in irregular warfare. After spending two months in the country, 
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Part III. Government Countermeasures

ranging more than 23,000 kilometers, and meeting with a wide range of 

societal sectors, the team issued a report assessing the security situation. 

According to the report, the violence in Colombia mostly originated 

from greed-based economic motives rather than ideological ones. The 

so-called guerillas amounted to little more than bandits. The scope 

of the banditry problem was compounded by poor security and intelligence forces largely incapable of mitigating the violence. The army 

was largely garrison-bound, while the police faced distrust at best and 

utter hatred at worse from the public after the trauma of La Violencia. 

Furthermore, the report noted these conditions were exacerbated by 

poor economic and social conditions that cultivated grievances among 

many Colombians.

As a result of these dynamics, the recommendations of the survey 

team included marrying a military approach with wide-ranging social 

reforms that sought to undercut the source of public discontent. However, both Colombian and US official policies eventually favored the 

military approach at the expense of social reform.1 In 1961, the Kennedy administration sent a special shipment to the Colombian military, 

one of the first real efforts to assist the Colombian government’s efforts 

to quell internal violence. The shipment included about $1.5 million 

in military hardware, ranging from communications equipment to 

small arms, to equip ranger-style units deployed to campaign in the 

rural countryside.2

In 1962, the United States conducted a second survey mission in 

Colombia. Brigadier General William P. Yarborough led the effort, 

fielding a US Army Special Warfare Center team on a twelve-day mission to conduct an additional assessment.3

 The recommendations issued 

by the team encouraged the United States to adopt a more militarized 

policy to address Colombia’s security problems, but also promoted “professionalization of security forces, collaborative intelligence structures, 

[and] development of rapid reaction capabilities.”4 Subsequent to the 

survey mission and its recommendations, the Valencia administration 

formulated an internal defense plan that combined military responses 

with social reforms.

Colombian military and police officers, assisted by US counterinsurgency mobile training teams (MTTs), developed Plan LAZO to 

combat the internal violence. Specifically, the plan targeted the Communist guerrillas (eleven enclaves, with 1,600 to 2,000 militants); nonCommunist guerrillas (twenty-nine enclaves, with approximately 4,500 

militants, although most were inactive); and ninety to 150 bandit gangs 

(approximately 2,000 bandits) harassing the coffee region in the Cauca 

Valley. Plan LAZO integrated the command structure of all forces in 

order to clarify military responsibility in all operations. Furthermore, 
Chapter 10. Government Countermeasures

333

the plan called for more versatile tactical units to better respond to 

irregular warfare. The military also provided resources for social 

reforms to improve the conditions in poor rural areas to compete with 

the shadow governance activities of the guerrillas. Psychological operations, aimed at improving civilian attitudes toward the pacification 

program, were also implemented under the plan. Lastly, the plan also 

corrected national intelligence deficiencies through restructuring and 

inculcating an “unconventional” mindset in its agencies.5 Although the 

original survey mission reports drew attention to the poor capabilities 

of the Colombian security forces, the institutions took readily to counterinsurgent techniques. By 1962, around seventy  percent of all the 

military forces had engaged in antiviolence campaigns under the plan. 

Defense spending and the size of the armed forces increased substantially, from 17,900 personnel and 280 million pesos in 1960 to 59,000 

personnel and 520.5 million pesos in 1969.

6

 The defense funds were used 

for military restructuring, creating more mobile tactical units, and 

public works financing.

Historically, weak infrastructure had precluded a robust state presence in the periphery where many of the armed groups operated. The 

development of communication infrastructure in the affected regions, 

such as in the Llanos-Amazonas and on the Pacific coasts, facilitated 

the integration of the autodefensa with the security forces. The technological networks combined with human networks to form “rural civil 

defense early warning systems” that provided security forces with intelligence and early warnings against guerrilla or bandit attacks. The early 

warning systems effectively integrated the affected populace, responsible army brigades, the national police, and the air force.7

 The systems 

leveraged existing institutional social networks, like coffee cooperatives 

and agricultural groups. The initial success of the systems encouraged 

their expansion into forty-seven more installations in 1966–1968.8

During this period, successive administrations, beginning with Lleras, complemented counterinsurgent strategies with acción cívica militar, or military civic activities. Some of the activities took place under 

Plan LAZO. Others, like the Impact program developed in 1962, were 

undertaken separately.9 Through these activities, the government, with 

the support of the military, hoped to cultivate popular support for its 

pacification policies and increase government presence in rural areas 

with traditionally weak state capacity. The Lleras administration established rehabilitation commissions and thirty welfare teams to coordinate efforts to improve living conditions of those affected by violent 

activity. The rehabilitation commissions, which operated at a national 

level, tracked programs in designated zones, coordinated relief efforts, 

and improved access to credit for peasants displaced by the violence. 
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Part III. Government Countermeasures

The welfare teams, which operated at a local level, consisted of a doctor, a nurse, agrarian technicians, an engineer, a veterinarian, a home 

economist, and sometimes a public administrator. The teams acted as 

on-the-ground advisors for small, local projects, such as “[building] 

rural schools, mills, medical facilities, or ‘model’ farms.”10 In conjunction with the US country team, the military also developed plans to 

mend violence-ridden regions through social projects. First on an ad 

hoc basis, but then under the auspices of a presidential decree, the 

Colombian government developed road infrastructure, health care 

facilities, literacy programs, and access to potable water, among other 

activities, in the affected areas.

The government’s policies proved initially successful. Many military personnel in Colombia were trained at the US Army School of the 

Americas in the skills necessary to execute the civic action programs.11

By 1969, the Colombian government had built 138 road systems; provided medical treatment to 1.1 million civilians and dental care to 

nearly 900,000; and built forty-four wells, twenty-three health centers, 

and ninety-nine schools. The evidence is mixed on the impact of these 

programs on levels of violence in the country. The government conducted a kinetic military campaign concurrently against the guerrillas, 

so distinguishing the effects of civic action versus the kinetic operations is difficult. The crime statistics during this period did decline, as 

did participation in criminal bands. A study of the impact of the civic 

action projects (code name Simpatico) conducted in the late 1960s by 

the Colombian and US governments did report a positive impact after 

exhaustive research in the affected areas.12 However, the projects failed 

to consolidate a permanent presence in the rural areas, leaving the 

areas open for insurgent incursions.13

These civic action programs, among the first in Latin America, were 

spearheaded by General Ruiz Novoa. He had served as the second-incommand of Colombia’s battalion in Korea. Later, he became minister of war. He was a proponent of the US government’s view of the 

potential of the military as a force multiplier in civic action programs. 

As his popularity increased, he presented a challenge to the National 

Front leadership. Eventually, his career, and influence, withered. Ruiz 

was also instrumental in forming alliances between civilian populations and the military in defense against leftist guerrillas. The autodefensa that resulted from his efforts would plague peace in Colombia 

for decades.

Plan LAZO also led to changes within the intelligence apparatus 

in Colombia. The resulting enhancement in intelligence capabilities 

was a force multiplier contributing to the overall success of the early 

counterinsurgent program. Lleras established the Department of 
Chapter 10. Government Countermeasures

335

Security, or DAS, which coordinated all counterintelligence and countersubversive activities among the country’s security forces (anti-bandit 

measures still resided with the National Police), although the restructure fell short of an agency that coordinated and shared all intelligence 

collection. With the assistance of US MTTs, Colombian intelligence 

operatives were trained in psychological operations, counterresistance 

training, interrogation, mobile intelligence groups, and intelligence 

hunter-killer teams.14

Some of President Valencia’s counterinsurgent policies would prove 

controversial. His efforts to combat leftist guerrillas included the 

adoption of civilian autodefensa in 1965, both in the countryside and 

in urban areas.15,16 Decades later, these incipient self-defense groups 

would bedevil the government’s efforts to establish a lasting peace. 

President Valencia also passed a “state of siege” legislation that allowed 

security forces to arrest civilians for even vague crimes in order to prevent political dissent, strikes, and other nonviolent activity.17 This state 

of siege continued over the next twenty-five years, with a widening definition of who could be arrested and punished.18 Not surprisingly, the 

public’s reaction to these policies was mixed. Many were treated as tacit 

supporters of leftist movements.

By the late 1960s, the military campaign initiated under Plan LAZO 

exhausted the newly formed ELN and FARC.19 The military’s earlier 

successes against troublesome areas encouraged it to take Plan LAZO 

techniques to the guerrilla’s nominally independent “republics.”20 Its 

most famous offensive, Operation Marquetalia, had driven most of the 

irregular forces from the self-declared “Republic of Marquetalia” established by future FARC leader Manuel Marulanda Vélez in 1964. Ironically, the operation was the precursor for the founding of the FARC.21

The Colombian security forces seriously compromised, but did not 

eliminate, many guerrilla fronts.22

Misael Pastrana Borrero (1970–1974) and Alfonso López 

Michelsen (1974–1978)

Government offensives launched against the guerrillas were so 

successful during this period that the early 1970s is considered the 

historical ebb of the leftist insurgency.23 In a contrast to the government’s earlier countermeasures, the country’s national security strategy 

was left largely in the hands of the military. As a result, the focus of 

the countermeasures was military operations and not guided by any 

broader state policies or political considerations.24

By the early 1970s, the FARC was reduced to only a few marginal 

fronts,25 the Colombian military having detained nearly one hundred 
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Part III. Government Countermeasures

guerrillas.26 Consequently, the FARC’s focus was recuperating from the 

losses it had suffered after the Plan LAZO’s offensives. The Colombian 

military launched several punishing attacks on the ELN, which almost 

eliminated the group in 1978. At that time, the ELN was left with only 

thirty armed fighters.27 The group lost most of its territorial gains, in 

addition to one of its key members, José Manuel Martínez.28

As a result of these successes, the FARC and the ELN retreated to 

Segovia in Antioquia. The hardscrabble mining town in the mountains 

of eastern Antioquia offered an ideal sanctuary for the guerrillas. The 

town was harshly ruled by a traditional armed group affiliated with the 

Liberal party, the Codfish, a leftover from the horrors of La Violencia. 

Its workforce, exploited by a multinational mining company, first mixed 

with the Communist Party (PCC) but later with the guerrillas. The two 

factions, the dregs of La Violencia and the leftist guerrillas, clashed frequently. Eventually, the guerrillas took control of Segovia. It remained 

the ELN’s headquarters, and later the FARC’s, for many years.29

The government offensive against the ELN highlighted a troubling 

trend in Colombian security forces—collusion with paramilitary forces. 

After suffering numerous defeats, the ELN initiated peace talks with 

the government. After the military withdrew from insurgent territory, 

the ELN guerrillas slowly trickled back into the town, retaking control of the town piecemeal and rebuilding the group’s support network. 

Military leaders fumed over the government’s naiveté in the peace talk 

debacle, leading one leader to resign in protest.30

In frustration, these same officers later sought extrajudicial, or illegal, ways to eliminate their enemies. They found ready allies among the 

local population. Years of guerrilla violence had nurtured substantial 

grievances among some families. One family, the Castaños, had reason 

enough for its malfeasance— years before, the FARC had killed the 

head of the family after kidnapping him. The Castaños answered the 

officers’ call to violence and initiated a machete killing spree that left 

eight to ten dead every week for a month in 1983. The Castaños, along 

with others in the Segovia region, were among the first in line to join 

the paramilitary groups as they took shape. Carlos Castaño, alongside 

his brothers, became the leader of a paramilitary group that helped 

found the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC).31

Julio César Turbay Ayala (1978–1982)

Turbay adopted both offensive and conciliatory countermeasures 

to internal security threats. He faced a relatively new threat during 

his administration. The security forces had succeeded in chastising, 

if not eliminating, the FARC and the ELN. However, a successful new 
Chapter 10. Government Countermeasures

337

insurgent group, the Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19), had emerged during the mid-1970s. Upon election, Turbay opted to treat the emergent 

guerrilla threat with a hard-line approach only briefly punctuated by 

attempts at negotiation.32 He handed strategic planning for the country’s internal security to the military.

Just four weeks after taking office, Turbay enacted the Security 

Statute, which granted military and police forces significant leeway in 

countering subversives. In doing so, the statute significantly restricted 

civilian rights.33 The statute was part of a general trend that was apparent over the course of the decade. During this time, the government 

increasingly relied on ad hoc legal measures to counter leftist insurgents. Many times, the government relied on the implementation of 

states of emergency:

Constitutional provisions authorized the president to 

implement emergency measures, including legislation, 

in cases of extreme public disorder or war. Executive 

emergency decrees provided cover for summary executions, permitted the trial of citizens by military courts, 

and granted the military authority over the civilian 

population.34

Turbay’s Minister of Defense, General Camacho Leyva, launched 

an unrestrained offensive against the insurgency, expanding the government’s ability to arrest those suspected of sympathizing with the 

guerrillas.35 His administration made permanent many the extraordinary measures previously adopted with the Security Statute. Turbay 

and Leyva’s efforts gave more power to the military than any time since 

1958, allowing almost complete military rule with “civilians serving only 

as figureheads.”36 This campaign not only targeted guerrillas but also 

strove to reduce recruit pools for the insurgency by targeting civilians.

The M-19 faced the full import of these changes after lifting thousands of weapons from a military weapons depot in Bogotá. Colombian 

security forces launched a fierce campaign against M-19 and any suspected collaborators in the coming years, arresting and detaining hundreds. The countermeasures sapped the M-19 of much of its strength. 

By 1979 alone, the government had arrested close to one  thousand 

people.37 Many were held indefinitely without bail or counsel, tortured, 

and killed.38 This harsh stance against civilians carried into the next 

few years when “search and destroy” tactics displaced thousands of 

country-dwellers in Caquetá.39

Although these measures were meant to turn people away from 

guerrilla support, as a result of the human rights violations and harsh 

measures against innocents, they had the opposite effect, and many 
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turned to joining the insurgency.40 However, under intense international scrutiny, Turbay’s administration responded to the M-19’s 1980 

hostage barricade operation at the Dominican Embassy with a measure 

of equanimity, particularly relative to President Betancur’s response 

to the group’s occupation of the Palace of Justice several years later. 

Turbay’s administration ended the Dominican Embassy siege through 

peaceful negotiations with minimal bloodshed. A decade later, M-19 

members cited the negotiations as an important contributor to the 

group’s favorable stance toward resolving its armed struggle through a 

negotiated settlement.

Public outcry over the widespread abuses perpetrated by the police 

and military under Turbay eventually prompted a search for alternative 

approaches to end the violence. Turbay’s modest conciliatory approach 

followed the measures discussed above. After negotiations with Congress, he signed an amnesty law in March 1981 (and again in 1982) that 

gave guerrillas four months to hand themselves over to the authorities.41 All guerrillas were able to take advantage of the amnesty law, 

“except those who had participated in ‘atrocious crimes’ such as kidnapping, extortion, non-combat-related homicide, arson, poisoning 

of water, and ‘in general  .  .  .  acts of ferocity of barbarism.’”42 These 

excluded crimes included many that formed the basic repertoire of 

most guerrillas at the time, precluding most insurgents from taking 

advantage of the law.43

In addition to the amnesty, Turbay authorized former President 

Restrepo to form a peace commission to explore additional measures 

to quell the internal violence. The findings of the commission included 

many basic structural reforms, such as agrarian reform, that triggered 

public grievances. Just months from the end of his term, Turbay failed 

to implement any of the commission’s recommendations. However, a 

short time before leaving office, Turbay lifted the state of siege, nullifying the Security Statute and the 1982 amnesty. Some political prisoners incarcerated under the nullified measures received commuted 

sentences or their freedom.44

Negotiations: Betancur and Beyond (1982–1986)

Belisario Betancur Cuartas (1982–1986)

In contrast to Turbay, Betancur softened the government’s position 

on the leftist insurgents considerably. Betancur sought alternatives to 

the failed military-centric approach adopted by his predecessor. Notably, Betancur campaigned on the promise to broaden political participation and initiate a national dialogue to reform Colombian politics. 

Reincorporating the leftist guerrillas back into society, and into legal 
Chapter 10. Government Countermeasures

339

politics, was to be precipitated by a generous, unconditional amnesty. 

John Aguedelo Ríos, the head of the Peace Commission who Betancur had charged with facilitating the peace negotiations, estimated 

that the countermeasures the Betancur administration had adopted 

to mitigate insurgent violence effectively ended ninety-five percent of 

guerilla activity.45 However, the peace negotiations were hampered by 

the government’s inability to protect demobilized guerrillas as well as 

the guerrilla’s failure to credibly commit to the process. The problematic relationship between the military and the civilian government also 

contributed to the breakdown of negotiations.

The Peace Commission established by Betancur actively lobbied for 

guerrilla amnesty, resulting in Law No. 35, enacted in 1982. The law 

granted amnesty to “all those in armed conflict with the government 

before November 20, except those who had committed homicide including ‘cruelty,’ and those who victim had been in a position of ‘inferior 

strength.’ ”

46 The amnesty law did not include any requirements for disarmament and paved the way for dialogue among government officials 

and leftist guerrillas. The Betancur administration sought to engage 

directly with the guerrillas to discuss cease-fire terms that would facilitate the insurgents’ integration into the country’s legal political system. 

Betancur himself met with guerrilla leaders in the presidential palace 

and in far-flung locations such as Mexico and Spain. Members of his 

administration also met with guerrilla interlocutors in their remote 

hideouts. The discussions, however, did not include terms of disarmament, a noteworthy distinction from previous negotiation efforts. 

Betancur also established two other committees to facilitate the peace 

process. The Negotiation and Dialogue Commission pursued agreements and terms favorable to both sides, while the Verification Commission monitored violations of the cease-fire agreement.47

As a result of these more lenient programs and negotiations, three 

guerrilla groups (the FARC, EPL, and M-19) signed peace agreements 

with the government. In the dialogues, the insurgents stressed that 

the generous amnesty law was merely the beginning. They promised 

to continue the armed struggle until the administration implemented 

needed structural reforms. A total of 1,089 guerrillas took advantage of 

the amnesty terms, including 818 from M-19; 152 from the FARC; and 

another seventy-five from the ELN. Additionally, several M-19 leaders 

were released from prison.48

The FARC was an early supporter of the peace negotiations. In 

March 1984, it signed a bilateral treaty with the government at FARC’s 

La Uribe camp in a remote town in the Mesetas Department. FARC 

agreed to halt all armed activity in its regional fronts as well as all economic extortion activities.49 The La Uribe Agreement, as the treaty was 
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known, was in effect from 1984 to 1987.a It included “(1) a cease-fire 

for a period of one year, (2) the creation of a high-level commission to 

verify the carrying out of the agreement, (3) the granting of a series 

of juridical, political, and social guarantees in order to facilitate the 

transition of the guerrilla forces back into democratic life, and (4) a 

program rehabilitation of the peasant areas affected by the violence.”50

The FARC also announced its intention to form a public component, 

or political party, the Unión Patriótica (UP). The M-19 and EPL signed 

similar agreements in the following month. Only the ELN refused to 

sign agreement with the government.

The peace negotiation process was not without its detractors. Early 

in the process, the chair of the Peace Commission, former Minister 

Morales Benitez, resigned in protest. He claimed that “enemies” of the 

peace process, both inside and outside the government, sabotaged his 

efforts, although he did not identify any individuals or organizations by 

name. Additionally, a great deal of violent activity continued unabated 

during the negotiations. Violence diminished among the insurgent 

groups that signed the peace agreements, but those insurgents that 

opted not to participate in agreements, especially those located in 

rural areas, continued violent operations. Economic extortions, such 

as kidnappings, still occurred with alarming frequency in many areas.51

The death knell of the peace settlements, however, was the murder 

of scores of amnestied guerrillas by paramilitaries and the slow pace of 

the promised reforms. The most publicized case was the August 1984 

murder of M-19 leader Carlos Toledo Plata near his house in Bucaramanga in the Santander Department. A year later, a grenade attack at 

a cafeteria in Cali injured another M-19 leader, Antonio Navarro Wolff. 

Several amnestied ELN and EPL guerrillas were also killed. Both murders were attributed to paramilitary violence. Insurgents, particularly 

members of the M-19, were also frustrated with the uncertainty surrounding the agreements as well as the slow pace of the Betancur 

administration in adopting promised structural reforms.52

The M-19 also used the negotiations as a strategy to rebuild its 

armed capability. As part of the peace process, the M-19 retreated to 

a militarized camp where it used the sanctuary to build their military strength. Under these justified suspicions, the Colombian military attacked the fortified camp, leading to a twenty-five-day standoff 

between the forces. After engaging in dialogue with the Verification 

Commission, M-19 retreated to another location, effectively solving the 

crisis. Several months later, the M-19 organized a conference to be held 

at its new fortified camp in Los Robles. After government efforts shut 

a Named for the municipality in which it was signed. Also known as Betancur Agreement or Betancur Initiative.
Chapter 10. Government Countermeasures

341

down the proposed conference, the M-19 accused the Betancur administration of failing to uphold its end of the bargain. Part of the peace 

agreement with the M-19 had included government promises to initiate 

“national dialogues” in public areas. By mid-1985, the M-19 declared 

the cease-fire to be over.53

When the M-19 occupied the Palace of Justice, Betancur refused to 

negotiate the release of scores of hostages held by M-19 in the building. He directed the military to mount a siege against the guerrillas, 

ultimately a public relations disaster for the government and M-19. The 

siege, heavily covered by the media, left more than a hundred people 

dead. Some claim that Betancur’s problematic relationship with the 

military pushed the institution to act as a spoiler during the negotiation process. Betancur’s policies had generated a great deal of discontent within the military. He cut the military’s budget, decreased 

its supplies and troops, and failed to consult military leaders on the 

peace process.54

Counternarcotics, Counterinsurgency, and the End of 

the M-19

Virgilio Barco Vargas (1986–1990)

Both domestic and international factors shaped the Barco administration’s stance toward the guerrilla groups. In his first year in office, 

Barco faced a significant uptick in guerrilla violence despite FARC’s 

adherence to the terms of the peace agreement through much of 1986. 

Changes in the international system helped contribute to the rise of 

narcotics trafficking in Colombia. At times, Barco juggled the triple 

threat presented by leftist insurgents, paramilitary vigilantism, and 

emergent drug cartels. Despite these difficulties, the administration 

oversaw a peace process that eventually led to the demobilization of 

one of Colombia’s most active guerrilla groups at the time—the M-19—

and the most significant constitutional reform in a century..

In the late 1980s, two important international affairs impacted 

Colombian countermeasures levied against illegal armed actors within 

the state. First, as drug production decreased in Bolivia and Peru it 

(especially the cultivation of coca and poppy) increased in Colombia. 

Given the lack of uniform government control in the rural, mountainous areas where these drugs were grown and processed, narcotrafficking became a lucrative business for guerrillas and paramilitaries 

operating in these areas. Second, with the fall of the Communist Soviet 

Union in 1989, American foreign policy shifted away from containing 

Communist insurgency as it gained hegemony in the international system. With the Soviet-Communist threat gone, the United States shifted 
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its assistance to the Colombian government to counternarcotic operations. As a result of these developments, with the help of US-funding, 

the Colombian security forces began counternarcotic operations in 

earnest in the 1980s. However, during Barco’s administration, much of 

the counternarcotic efforts shifted to the national police.

Meanwhile, domestic factors helped to shape Barco’s conciliatory 

approach toward the guerrillas. Perhaps most importantly, key actors 

within Barco’s administration actively sought reform. They acknowledged the necessity of altering state institutions to make them better 

equipped to address the economic, political, and social grievances of 

the common population historically excluded from the political process. This political will was matched by public support. At this juncture, the war-weary Colombian public was ready to see a negotiated 

end to the conflict. A public survey conducted at the time showed that 

80.4 percent of Colombians preferred negotiations rather than continued war with the guerrillas.55

While the Barco administration experienced success in its peace 

negotiations with the M-19, negotiations with FARC faltered over security concerns and a perceived lack of political will. While the FARC did 

stay in truce the first year of Barco’s presidency, by 1986 they issued a 

communiqué stating that with seven of its twenty-seven fronts battling 

troops, they were engaged in a de facto civil war with the government.56

The FARC negotiator made several related demands necessary for the 

group to demobilize, most relating to constitutional reform, such as 

eliminating an article allowing the government to institute a state of 

siege. By 1987, it was evident that the cease-fire with the FARC no was 

no longer in force.57

In part, the difficulties with the peace agreement stemmed from 

the numerous threats facing the Barco administration. The administration’s attention had turned to the rising power of the Medellín and Cali 

cartels because of pressure from the United States. In addition, paramilitary groups continued to murder UP members by the hundreds. 

The government, partially due to a scarcity of resources, had made only 

weak efforts to rein in the paramilitary vigilantism. Lastly, the government had made no progress on initiating any reforms stipulated in the 

La Uribe Agreement. Combined, these factors led the FARC to conclude that the political elite was not invested in the peace process.58

The peace agreement officially unraveled in 1987 after a FARC ambush 

on a military unit in the Caquetá Department.59

An unlikely event, the kidnapping of Alvaro Gómez in 1988, helped 

spark dialogue between the Barco administration and the M-19 guerrillas. Although technically an act of war, the kidnapping offered a 

window of opportunity for the two sides to explore the possibility of a 
Chapter 10. Government Countermeasures

343

negotiated solution to the conflict as well as establish a relationship of 

trust. As the negotiations proceeded, M-19’s resolute pursuit of peace 

as a final objective, not as a tactic of war, was likewise met in good faith 

by the Barco administration.

After months of dialogue between the two factions, in August 1988 

Barco attended formal talks with the guerrillas, which included M-19, 

the FARC, and the ELN. The dialogue resulted in a list of proposals, 

which included: (1) the necessity of a political solution; (2) a promise 

to respect human rights and the Geneva Conventions and humanize 

the conflict and reciprocity from the government in these matters; (3) 

the willingness of the ELN to suspend bombing of pipelines; (4) constitutional reform; and (5) support of the Unified Central of Labor 

Unions petitions and general strike. In a departure from the tactics of 

Betancur, at this juncture Barco required disarmament as a precondition for further talks. Despite the proposal offered to the government, 

shortly after, in August 1988 in the Córdoba Department, more than 

300 FARC and ELN guerrillas ambushed the army and police forces, 

killing ten soldiers, four policeman, and twenty-five guerrillas.60

The following month the Barco administration responded with the 

Initiative for Peace, a three-phase peace process: (1) an initial détente to 

decide on the progression of the negotiations; (2) transition, in which 

cease-fire would be reached and negotiations produce agreement; and 

(3) incorporation, under which guerrillas lay down arms and become 

reintegrated into society. In the final stage, the government proposed 

to grant amnesty while providing a guarantee for safety of former guerrillas. This last measure was especially important to the peace process 

as paramilitary assassination of amnestied guerrillas marred previous 

attempts at peace.61

While the M-19 responded favorably to Barco’s overtures, the FARC, 

the ELN, and various other insurgent groups remained reluctant to 

engage in talks with the government. Barco demanded that insurgents 

willing to engage in negotiations under these terms initiate a ceasefire as a sign of good faith. While the FARC flirted with the idea of 

negotiations, declaring a truce on a number of actions, the group continued with armed operations. The ELN adopted a more hard-line 

stance than the FARC. The group steadfastly refused to contemplate 

further negotiations with the government. However, this decision fostered internal divisions within the group. Several years later, two ELN 

splinters demobilized.62

By mid-1989, the Barco government and M-19 signed the Declaration of Cauca. The declaration signaled the process of reintegration of 

the guerrilla group. As part of its guarantees for safety, the declaration 

created an M-19 encampment, Santo Domingo, in the mountains of 
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Part III. Government Countermeasures

the Cauca Department. Although several incidents of violence against 

M-19 did occur, the intent of the Santo Domingo camp was to protect 

M-19 from attacks by the Colombian military. Later that year, the government and M-19 signed a pact that led to the demobilization and 

disarming of the guerrillas over a six-month period. By the following 

year, 1990, M-19 had symbolically melted down its weapons and offered 

candidates in upcoming elections.63

Unlike his predecessor, Betancur, Barco was adept at managing different actors within his government who might act to spoil the peace 

process. He actively engaged rightist political figures, working to convince them that political concessions to the guerrillas were necessary 

for lasting peace. He also worked hand in hand with the military, establishing close cooperation on matters related to the peace process. This 

likely forestalled the military acting unilaterally to sabotage the process. Barco’s efforts in this regard were likely key to keeping the negotiations afloat.64,b

César Gaviria Trujillo (1990–1994)

In his inauguration speech, Gaviria called out the four sources of 

violence plaguing Colombia—guerrillas, narcoterrorists, self-defense 

groups, and paramilitary groups. For the guerrillas, Gaviria promised 

dialogue. The common self-defense groups were to receive simple justice. Gaviria, however, reserved the harshest military measures for the 

narcoterrorists and paramilitary groups.”65

Gaviria’s early negotiations with the guerrillas occurred while 

Colombian politicians prepared to debate constitutional reform in the 

National Constituent Assembly. His interlocutor was the Coordinadora 

Guerrillera Simón Bolívar (CGSB), or the Simón Bolívar Guerrilla 

Coordinating Board, an amalgamation of guerilla groups including the FARC, the ELN, the EPL, and others.c

 He dangled a powerful incentive before the CGSB, an opportunity to participate in the 

reform process. A December 1990 military attack on the Casa Verde, 

the headquarters of the FARC in the Meta Department, threatened to 

derail the negotiations. The remaining guerrilla groups returned fire 

with a series of terrorist assaults, but both sides, for a time, remained 

nominally committed to the process.66 The military offensive, however, 

initiated a series of guerrilla reprisals that eventually soured the negotiations. Symbolically, the offensive was also a disaster, occurring on 

b Spoiler violence, however, did mar these negotiations as well. Paramilitaries gunned 

down M-19 leader and presidential candidate Carlos Pizarro Leongómez in 1990.

c At its inception, the CGSB included the M-19, which by Gaviria’s term had disarmed 

and demobilized.
Chapter 10. Government Countermeasures

345

the day of the elections for the constituent assembly that was charged 

with redrafting the constitution.67

The Gaviria administration initiated a series of high-level talks held 

in Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico. The government forwarded a 

bargaining position similar to that of the previous Barco government—

“the acceptance of international supervision over any agreement that 

might be signed; the inclusion of nongovernmental participants in the 

conversations; the compliance with certain international protocols, 

according to the behavior of the guerrilla groups; and the willingness 

to begin peace talks immediately, without a previous cease-fire.”68

Early on, the opposing sides had difficulty reaching consensus, but 

the talks did include discussion on novel mechanisms to halt violence. 

As in many talks, negotiations stuck on the sequencing of events. For 

instance, during the first round, the government insisted on a CGSB 

unilateral cease-fire, while the CGSB countered that it would countenance nothing less than a joint cease-fire. However, government negotiators did consider the novel possibility of establishing “demobilization 

zones.” Under this mechanism, the guerrillas were to successively 

retreat to fewer and fewer operational zones.69

Par for the course, violence between the opposing sides continued 

while the leaders talked peace. Despite these inauspicious conditions, 

the government and the CGSB sought common ground that would 

enable a cease-fire; the participation, whether limited or full, of the 

CGSB in the National Constituent Assembly; and concerted action 

against paramilitary and vigilante justice.70 During the course of the 

talks, Colombia’s new constitution was ratified, lifting the state of 

siege. Government authorities broadcast demands for the guerrillas to 

accept the new constitution and cease violence. The call was echoed by 

now demobilized M-19 leaders who had participated in the drafting of 

the constitution.

The talks broke down in mid-1991 but were revived in September 

that year. During this round of talks, government negotiators made several important concessions. The government offered a bilateral ceasefire and changes to the structure of the demobilization zones favorable 

to the CGSB. One of the most important concerns to the CGSB was 

the security of its members. Paramilitary organizations continued to 

present a threat, especially to disarmed and demobilized guerrillas. 

To mitigate this security risk, the CGSB demanded the government’s 

protection as well as its promise to forcefully demobilize the paramilitaries. The government conceded on these issues. In return, the 

CGSB demanded that its demobilization zones extend to two hundred 

towns, nearly a third of the national territory. Government negotiators 

responded with incredulity. A short time later, guerrillas kidnapped 
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Part III. Government Countermeasures

the president of the lower house of congress, Aurelio Iragorri Hormoza, leading the government to suspend the negotiations despite the 

CGSB’s protestations.71

During the next calendar year, 1992, the talks continued but with 

little hope of success. The CGSB adopted new tactics, which included 

an intensification of armed operations to pressure the government to 

concede on economic policy. Gaviria had initiated a series of economic 

policies that liberalized Colombia’s economy, a tack denounced by 

the Marxist-leaning CGSB. The guerrilla’s attempts to draw the government into discussions about Gaviria’s economic policies had limited effect. Gaviria’s patience drew to a close after the EPL kidnapped 

another high-ranking politician, Argelino Quintero, who later died in 

captivity after having a heart attack.d

The desultory talks continued for a time after the Quintero kidnapping but with no progress. The government continued to insist on a 

cease-fire before further substantive and procedural matters could be 

addressed, while the guerrillas demanded regional, municipal, local, 

and department-level dialogues before a cease-fire was implemented. 

After these 1992 talks, Gaviria relied increasingly on a military solution to eradicate guerrilla violence. The EPL’s apparently unilateral 

decision to kidnap Quintero also led to in-fighting among the CGSB. 

Alfred Cano denounced the operation as “crazy.”72

Gaviria’s negotiations failed to produce concrete results for a number of reasons, including the lingering conviction on both sides that 

they could still prevail militarily. Both sides also viewed peace much 

differently. For the government, peace meant the guns stopped firing. 

In the minds of the CGSB guerrillas, however, peace meant drastic 

structural adjustments, such as agrarian and economic reform. While 

both sides claimed to want peace, neither had solid proposals of how 

that peace was to materialize. The CGSB’s positions often amounted to 

little more than empty slogans. In return, particularly after the drafting of the constitution had concluded, the government had little incentives with which to entice the guerrillas into seriously exploring the 

possibility of peace.73

Gaviria’s conviction that his government could win the war against 

the guerrilla’s militarily informed policies implemented to increase 

the operational capability of the armed forces. To fund his effort, in 

1991 the government enacted Decree  416, which established a “war 

tax” to expand the military to combat domestic violence. This included 

“additional funds for the intelligence services of the armed forces, the 

d The People’s Liberation Army is a smaller communist insurgency in Colombia that 

was not a participant in the talks.
Chapter 10. Government Countermeasures

347

creation of two new ‘mobile brigades’ of fifteen hundred soldiers, as 

well as patrol companies to protect pipelines, oil fields and mines.”74

In addition to specialized units to combat the guerrillas, the military’s 

strategy also included increasing its aerial capabilities. The military 

acquired new aircraft, including A-37s, Phantom combat planes, and 

Black Hawk helicopters. New weapons were also added to the arsenal, 

such as night vision lenses, lasers, and M-60 machine guns.75

During the early 1990s, the mobile brigades became one of the 

cornerstones of Colombian counterinsurgent efforts. The public was 

ready for the about-face from negotiations to a military-centric approach 

after a decade of fruitless peace processes. The mobile brigades were 

designed and equipped to quickly penetrate the rugged countryside in 

which most insurgents operated. These brigades also had the advantage of professional, as opposed to draftee, soldiers. Mobile brigade 

leadership reported not to regional commanders but to the army high 

command in Bogotá. This facilitated quick pursuit of guerrillas across 

department lines, whereas previously soldiers were required to request 

permission to enter adjacent regional commands. The typical mobile 

brigade strategy was softening target areas with aerial bombardment 

by the Colombian Air Force, then forcing the guerrillas to flee along 

corridors already covered by troops. However, despite clear direction 

to protect civilian populations, according to the Human Rights Watch, 

the mobile brigades were regularly charged with human rights violations, including indiscriminate killing, rape, and other atrocities. Identifying and punishing the perpetrators was especially difficult as the 

soldiers’ uniforms included no identifying ranks or symbols.76

Ernesto Samper Pizano (1994–1998)

President Ernesto Samper Pizano’s administration had notably inauspicious beginnings. After being elected, he was charged with accepting 

campaign money from the Cali cartel. The accusations undermined 

the legitimacy of his administration, limiting his ability to effectively 

govern. Samper’s subsequent efforts to combat drug cartels aligned 

with the United States’ efforts. While Samper’s policies bore fruit in 

the decapitation of the Cali cartel, his efforts undermined the struggle against leftist guerrillas. In the absence of effective military forces, 

Samper enabled paramilitaries to continue fighting the guerrillas.

Early in 1994, Samper’s Conservative Party opponent, Andrés Pastrana, claimed to have evidence of Samper’s cooperation with drug traffickers to fund his campaign. The evidence against Samper included 

the so-called “narco-cassettes,” tapes that Pastrana claimed had hours 

of recorded conversations between Liberal Party representatives and 

contacts in the Cali cartel. The Prosecutor General’s Office launched 
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Part III. Government Countermeasures

an investigation, unofficially called the “Proceso 8,000.” Samper, of 

course, denied the accusations. At the conclusion of the investigation, 

Samper was still standing, but his attorney general, defense minister, 

and campaign treasurer were convicted in relation to the case. The 

charges, however, complicated Samper’s relationship with the United 

States. He earned the dubious distinction of being the second democratically elected president to be denied a United States visa. Regardless 

of this troubled relationship, Samper was an ally in the United States’ 

war against Colombian drug cartels.

Despite the corruptness in Samper’s regime, under direction from 

United States’ guidance, his administration actively targeted Colombian drug traffickers. The government supported coca spraying in 

south, combating drug cartels, and replacing National Police commander General Octavio Vargas Silva. The appointment of General 

Serrano in his place allowed the United States to work directly with the 

commander, effectively bypassing Samper’s administration. After citing lack of progress, the United States decertified Samper’ efforts but 

granted the government a national security waiver to continue receiving aid. In response, Samper initiated a raid that led to the arrest of the 

Cali cartel leaders.

Like the many-headed hydra, however, Samper’s success against 

the Cali cartel was a boon for FARC. The arrest of the Cali leaders 

fragmented the drug industry, making it easier for FARC to extort 

the small-time entrepreneurs. The result was substantially increased 

revenue for the guerrillas. With assistance from the influx of funds, 

the FARC expanded its influence in Colombia. Samper redoubled his 

efforts in light of the United States’ rebuff to prove his earnestness in 

combatting narcotics. His administration, citing the close ties between 

guerrillas and narcotraffickers, targeted illicit crop production.77

The resulting repression against the peasants that relied on the 

coca economy negatively impacted the legitimacy of the government in 

affected areas. By mid-1996, reports surfaced of soldiers forcibly removing farmers and burning down their homes. Large-scale protests against 

the government, sometimes attended by hundreds of thousands of people, ignited in Guaviare Department, the site of many of the abuses. 

Soldiers killed several protesters. By 1997, this region experienced an 

uptick in massacres, the deaths of agrarian leaders, and paramilitary 

violence. The FARC, which had a robust presence in the region associated with its drug trafficking activity, successfully filled the governance 

vacuum left by the delegitimized state. The guerrillas were the only 

line of defense against government assaults on their livelihood. FARC 

guerrillas attacked fumigation planes, offered judicial proceedings, 
Chapter 10. Government Countermeasures

349

and expressed solidarity with the struggling peasants.e The government’s destruction of illicit crops left an army of unemployed youth in 

its wake, a good number of whom turned to the guerrillas for gainful 

employment. The FARC developed a plan to increase its number of 

recruits by specifically targeting areas such as Guaviare Department.78

The National Police were at the front lines of the counternarcotic campaigns, while initially the military had little involvement. This emphasis 

helped to professionalize and train the police forces but failed to prepare 

the military, Colombia’s most capable security force institution, against 

a growing guerrilla threat fueled by narcotrafficking.79 The transition of 

guerrillas from protectors of cocaine processing plants to producers of 

narcotic products precipitated increased military involved in counternarcotic operations.f

 Despite acknowledged human rights abuses, by 1996 

the flow of US military aid to Colombia had resumed. The Colombian 

military’s counternarcotic efforts were not aligned so much with diminishing levels of raw manufacturing products for illicit drugs so much 

as sabotage of guerrilla finances. In its efforts, the military focused on 

hotbeds of guerrilla narcoactivity in Putumayo, Guaviare, Caquetá, and 

Meta Departments. In the mid-1990s, the military’s sorties with guerrilla 

combatants decidedly favored the latter. During this period, the military 

suffered its worst military defeats against the guerrillas.81

This period was the beginning of a new era for the FARC, one in 

which they were eventually recognized as a viable threat to Colombian 

sovereignty. Several developments materialized, starting in 1997, which 

contributed to this perception.82 The FARC’s effectiveness as a fighting 

force dramatically improved due to increased funding from the drug 

trade. The rise in capital allowed the group to purchase more sophisticated weapons and equipment, pay for foreigners to come and train 

their guerrillas, and offer those who joined the ranks higher pay. This 

in turn led to the FARC’s ability to mass large forces, up to 1,500 to 

2,000 fighters at a time, which meant that it could conduct larger, conventional engagements with the Colombian military.83 In some cases, 

the FARC’s weaponry was even more sophisticated than that of the military.84 The ineptness of the Colombian military was an additional factor 

that enabled the FARC to present a greater threat to the government.85

The rank and file of the Colombian military was conscripts. Moreover, 

in a country where the financial dichotomy between the cartels and soldiers and police is so great, much of the leadership became corrupted. 

The military’s frontline strategy in handling the FARC expansion was 

e Notably, however, the FARC, like the government, lacked viable economic alternatives to illicit crop production.

f Interestingly, however, Vargas notes that at the time the FARC was not involved in 

international drug trafficking or “bringing cocaine and heroin into the United States.”80
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allying with paramilitaries and large landowners to do the heavy lifting. The paramilitaries committed gross human rights abuses, including terrorizing and murdering civilians with impunity.86

Samper’s policy toward the paramilitaries reflected tension between 

reliance on the groups and international pressure directed against the 

paramilitaries’ human rights abuses. Evidence provided by the testimony of civilians and nongovernmental organization (NGO) leaders 

points to collusion among paramilitaries, local government officials, 

and the police. Reportedly, the paramilitaries also received logistical 

and materiel support from the military, large landowners, cattle ranchers, and businesses.87 Gaviria had first legalized the self-defense groups 

with Decree 356. Samper expanded the mission of the groups under 

Resolution 368 in 1995, establishing the Servicios Especiales de Vigilancia y Seguridad Privada (CONVIVIR), or Special Vigilance and Private 

Security Services. CONVIVIR groups were ostensibly to provide intelligence and security in rural areas. The considerable weaponry that 

CONVIVIR groups were allowed to field by law suggests more lethal 

missions—mini-Uzi machine guns, repeating rifles, and revolvers. In 

many cases, CONVIVIR groups acted much like paramilitaries, murdering families and terrorizing citizens. Moreover, known paramilitary 

members migrated to the CONVIVIR groups. The constitutionality 

of the groups was challenged, but confirmed, in 1997, although the 

groups were prohibited from being issued military-grade weapons.88

As human rights abuses perpetrated by the paramilitaries mounted, 

so too did pressure on the Samper administration to forcefully address 

the groups. He established special human rights investigative units and 

brought some paramilitary members to justice. Decree 2895 also proposed forming a national police bloc with the express intent to seek out 

and destroy paramilitary squads. Other measures included a $500,000 

reward for information leading to the capture of paramilitary leader 

Carlos Castaño. The international ramifications of the paramilitaries’ abuses were not inconsequential. US law, under the Leahy Amendment, precludes the American government from providing assistance 

to forces involved in human rights abuses.89 The Samper administration considered, and then rejected, negotiations after continued paramilitary massacres.90

Plan Colombia

Andrés Pastrana Arango (August 7, 1998–August 7, 2002)

Colombia entered a different era at the time of Pastrana’s election. 

Increasingly, the United States exercised its strategic and economic 

interests in the region through the Colombian government. Colombia’s 
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351

ongoing economic troubles, escalating drug trafficking, and widespread 

insurgency presented an opportunity for expanded US influence in the 

country. The result was Plan Colombia, a multi-billion-dollar aid package designed to increase security in the country. Initially, Plan Colombia 

directed aid toward counternarcotic efforts but within several years transitioned to include counterinsurgent support as well. Internally, the Pastrana administration and the military adopted different postures toward 

combating organized political violence in the country. Pastrana sought 

peace through a novel mechanism in Colombian peace negotiations—a 

demilitarized zone for FARC. The Colombian military, meanwhile, operated in the absence of policy guidance from the Pastrana administration. 

As the security force responsible for combatting the violence, the military reassessed its posture toward FARC, adopting a counterinsurgent 

model that brought some gains against the group. To support its efforts, 

the military also initiated institutional reforms that helped set the state 

for the relative success of Pastrana’s predecessor, Uribe, against FARC.

Negotiations and Zona de Despeje

The initial proposals for the demilitarized zone, or zona de despeje, 

began in an unlikely setting.g During the 1998 presidential campaign, 

three candidates faced a runoff. To break the deadlock, Andrés Pastrana Arango, the former mayor of Bogotá, engaged with FARC.91 He 

hoped to begin a series of peace talks, perhaps reminiscent of the 

demilitarization of M-19. Pastrana sent an envoy, Victor Ricardo, to 

meet with Marulanda and Mono Jojoy. Ricardo informed them that if 

Pastrana won the election, he would engage in peace talks and would 

create the demilitarized zone that the FARC previously requested.92

Shortly thereafter, FARC spokesman Raúl Reyes announced their support for Andrés Pastrana. Pastrana subsequently won the election.93

On July 9, 1998, less than a month before his inauguration, President-elect Pastrana met with FARC leaders Marulanda and Mono Jojoy. 

They agreed to five points:

1. Four municipalities in the department of Meta and one in 

Caquetá would be demilitarized.

2. The government of Colombia would fight the paramilitaries, 

which represented a significant threat to the FARC.

3. Protests and demonstrations would no longer be criminalized.

4. Alternative crops would be developed for coca farmers.

5. The government would stop employing wanted posters and 

financial incentives to obtain information on FARC leaders.94

g The demilitarized zone is also known colloquially as Farclandia.
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The demilitarized zone was officially established on November 

7, 1998. Originally agreed upon for a period of only ninety days, the 

FARC would ultimately maintain control of this region, an area the size 

of Switzerland, until February 20, 2002.95

The FARC, believing they had the advantage in the subsequent 

peace talks, agreed to participate but refused to initiate a cease-fire. 

After only eighteen days, the FARC walked away from the table after 

demanding that the Pastrana administration clamp down on Colombia’s paramilitaries.96 Shortly after the talks began, the paramilitaries 

mounted an offensive, killing 140 civilians over a period of several days. 

In response, the FARC demanded government action against the paramilitaries before the guerrillas would return to the talks. Pastrana dismissed two generals involved in paramilitary activity in April 1999. Two 

more were discharged or resigned during the coming year.97

At the outset, a trend emerged in the peace process that would 

continue through the despeje period. Peace talks would be preceded by 

FARC attacks in an attempt to strengthen the FARC’s position while 

weakening the government’s. Some argue that the FARC was not serious about engaging in peace but used the despeje as a sanctuary to build 

its operational capacity.98

Nevertheless, the two parties agreed to reinitiate dialogue in Switzerland in February 2000. As in the past, each side’s vision of peace 

was notably dissimilar. For the government’s part, it simply wanted 

guerrilla violence to end. FARC negotiators, by contrast, demanded 

greater employment, education, and health care for Colombians as 

part of their vision of peace.99 In an amusing, if ill-fated tactic, government negotiators arranged a trip outside of Colombia for the hardened 

FARC leadership to alter their perspective. However, they underestimated Marulanda’s dedication. Not only had “Sureshot” been living in 

the jungle since the 1940s, he had not been to the movies since World 

War II and had never seen the ocean.100 More importantly, he had not 

forgotten the UP debacle that was the FARC’s last attempt at a political solution. After twenty-three days of fruitless talk and tourist shopping, the guerrillas burned their clothes to ensure that they could not 

be followed with embedded tracking devices.101 Then, they returned to 

the jungle.

While talks stuttered with the FARC, a separate track also engaged 

the ELN. A month before Pastrana’s inauguration, German civil society groups arranged talks between the president-elect and the ELN. 

The original intent of the talks was to discuss the government transition and the status of peacemaking. During the course of the talks, 

the ELN forthrightly stated that it could not halt its kidnapping activities without developing economic alternatives. Although the discussion 
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353

concluded without any substantive agreements, the ELN made a symbolic gesture by agreeing to halt kidnapping of pregnant women or 

those seventy-five and older. The talks gained little momentum, especially after Pastrana became involved in the peace talks with FARC. 

Ricardo admitted to affording scant attention to the ELN, believing 

that the ELN would follow the FARC’s lead in any peace agreement 

the latter made with the government.102 Portions of the Colombian 

population were staunchly opposed to Pastrana’s approach. When he 

attempted to establish a despeje for the ELN, the citizenry in the affected 

area vigorously protested.103

Counterinsurgency and Intragovernmental Divisions 

One of the challenges in crafting effective countermeasures during 

the Pastrana administration was the rift between Pastrana and the military. While the Pastrana administration was invested in peace negotiations with FARC, the military continued an armed campaign against 

the group. The Pastrana administration gave little policy guidance to 

the military on combating the violence. Most security issues were left to 

the army, the Ejército Nacional, or COLAR; the navy; and the air force. 

Part of its campaign included new assessments of FARC’s vulnerabilities.

Military leadership identified two key FARC vulnerabilities to 

exploit, insurgent units and its sources of support. Popular support for 

FARC continued to decline, making the mobility corridors and base 

areas especially important for moving needed supplies to insurgents. 

The military’s successes included halting FARC’s attempt to transition 

to a conventional force.104 The despeje was central to this attempted 

transition as FARC used it as a staging ground for attacks by “strategic 

columns comprised of multiple battalion-strength units.” In part, the 

military’s gains against the FARC resulted from a key trio of military 

leaders learned in counterinsurgency strategies. Together, they were 

responsible for developing annual military campaign plans that put 

FARC on the defensive. However, until the military’s efforts were nested 

in a broader national plan under Uribe, they had limited efficacy.105

The basic framework for Colombia’s counterinsurgency efforts during this period included the geographical assignment of five COLAR 

divisions and a joint task force with a division-strength national reaction force. Around 20,000 of the 145,000 soldiers belonged to volunteer 

counterguerrilla units part of the brigades and divisions. The allvolunteer units made up forty-seven counterguerrilla battalions (batallones contraguerrillas, or BCG) and three mobile brigades (brigades movile, 

or BRIM), each composed of four additional BCGs. The regular formations that accounted for the rest of the COLAR were mostly draftees.106
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A cornerstone of the military’s campaign against the FARC, a clearand-hold strategy, was hampered by institutional constraints. When territory was cleared of insurgents, holding the territory was difficult. The 

BCG and BRIM were used to strike targets. Both units were manned 

with volunteers, increasing the professionalization of the force. However, once the territory was cleared, regular draftee units were used to 

hold territory. These regular units were frequently rotated to keep FARC 

off balance. The military lacked local, home guards to hold cleared territory as legal restrictions had dissolved previous local forces.107

Military Reform

Military leadership also reflected on its institutional shortcomings. 

The difficulties the Colombian military experienced at the hands of 

the guerrillas under Samper had galvanized a new generation of officers to rethink and restructure the institution. The officers, trained 

alongside Colombia’s other armed groups, initiated a study of the 

force.108 The study highlighted a number of important deficiencies. It 

found that the armed forces rarely coordinated with one another. Most 

of the military’s efforts concentrated on protecting infrastructure, a 

favorite FARC target, such as power lines, bridges, and dams.109 Most 

damning was the observation that, although it faced an insurgency, the 

Colombian military had almost no intelligence, especially no operational intelligence capability.110 When captured, FARC guerrillas were 

often either executed or thrown in prison and forgotten.111 The military had no operatives inside the FARC and had no real understanding 

of its organizational structure.112

The institutional assessment led to reforms initiated by senior military leadership that helped set the stage for Pastrana’s successor. The 

reforms included transitioning the forces to include greater numbers 

of volunteer, as opposed to a draftee, soldiers. Eventually, a third of the 

military’s soldiers entered as volunteers, not draftees. Moreover, units 

considered key to defeating insurgents transitioned to a one-hundredpercent volunteer force. Military education was also revitalized, helping to professionalize the force and also capture lessons learned into 

operational and organizational modifications. The reforms cultivated noncommissioned officer (NCO) leadership to enhance smallunit leadership. Other reforms included greater attention to human 

rights instruction, information operations, and joint and special 

forces operations.113

Plan Colombia

One of the most important developments during Pastrana’s administration was the onset of Plan Colombia. The plan, originally designed 
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355

internally by the Colombian government, was meant to address the 

country’s security and socioeconomic problems.114 Shortly thereafter, 

with the support of the Clinton administration in United States, Plan 

Colombia transitioned to a bilateral assistance program. The US stance 

altered during the Clinton administration after FARC murdered three 

American citizens in March  1999. FARC military successes led US 

observers to believe that the FARC was a serious threat to Colombian 

sovereignty. A weakened or defeated government would only exacerbate the drug problem.115

 Initially, due to domestic political considerations, the United States 

restricted its support solely to counternarcotic efforts.116 The artificial 

separation between the insurgency and drug trafficking severely hindered the efficacy of the plan. The measures of effectiveness used to 

track the utility of Plan Colombia provide ample evidence of this failure. Rather than using measures that directly tracked the impact of 

operations on insurgent capabilities, officials instead tracked the hectares of coca fields that were eradicated. It is unclear what impact, if any, 

eradication efforts had on insurgent capabilities.117 The United States, 

alongside Pastrana officials, pressured military leadership to adopt 

a counternarcotics-driven strategy. Colombian military leadership 

refused, instead continuing to focus on the insurgency as the center of 

gravity. After 9/11, the United States shifted its counternarcotic policies in Colombia to policies that recognized the insurgent component 

of the conflict.

By 2009, under Plan Colombia, the United States had provided more 

than eight billion dollars in aid. A common misperception is that Plan 

Colombia bankrolled the Colombian military. In fact, the plan represented only about six percent of Colombia’s defense budget.118 After the 

United States altered its policies to include counterinsurgent support, 

funding was supplied to the Colombian military in its fight against 

the insurgents. However, with links between the military and the paras

clearly established, it is inevitable that some of this money found its way 

into the AUC’s hands. Foreign companies operating in Colombia also 

contributed to the funding of the paramilitaries. For example, Cincinnati-based Chiquita, the banana grower, admitted to paying illegal 

armed groups in Colombia for security purposes. US court documents 

indicate that the Justice Department had known about the Chiquita 

paramilitary link since April 2003, yet the banana growers continued 

payments for another ten months.119

Aid packages to the Colombian government under Plan Colombia 

helped the government to address a number of pressing issues. For 

instance, the initial aid package allocated $519 million for military assistance, $123 million for police assistance, $68.5 million for alternative 
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development, $51 million to bolster respect for human rights, $45 million for law enforcement, $37.5 million to aid to the displaced, $13 million for judicial reform, and $3 million for peace objectives. Around 

$417 million of the military assistance was channeled toward the strategic southern Colombia region. Around $328 million of the total military assistance also purchased helicopters, including sixteen UH-60s 

Blackhawks and thirty UH-IH-Hueys. However, Plan Colombia placed 

a cap on United States’ forces at five hundred plus three hundred contractors, except in the case of intense hostilities. With the addition of 

the funds under Plan Colombia, the country became the second largest 

recipient of U.S. military assistance after South Korea.120

While the funds from Plan Colombia rolled in, Pastrana was still 

pursuing peace with the FARC in the despeje. He was perhaps the last 

person to concede that neither the peace talks nor the despeje were 

working. Until 2002, he held out hope that an agreement could be 

reached. Several events signaled the death knell of the peace process, 

beginning with the FARC hijacking of a civilian aircraft. Pastrana also 

received intelligence that the FARC was growing coca in the despeje. 

And, finally, the FARC kidnapped Senator Eduardo Gechem, president 

of the Senate’s Peace Commission.121 After these revelations, Pastrana 

dismantled the despeje on February 20, 2002.122 The military’s repossession of the despeje in February 2002 would not have occurred without 

Plan Colombia.123

Democratic Security and Defense Program and Integrated 

Action (2002–2009)

Álvaro Uribe Vélez (August 7, 2002–August 7, 2010) 

Uribe ran his presidential campaign on a political platform that 

prescribed tougher measures against illegal armed groups. His election 

signaled that the Colombian population supported a tougher stance 

against the guerillas, even if it meant introducing emergency powers 

and the erosion of basic political rights. Like many allies of the United 

States at the time, Uribe couched his security strategy in the new “waron-terror” framework.124 The main thrust of Uribe’s security policies 

included increasing the scope, strength, and legitimacy of Colombian 

state institutions to deprive FARC of the advantages weak states offer 

insurgents. Uribe needed resources and a legal framework to bring 

his policies to fruition. Ultimately, the countermeasures taken under 

Uribe’s leadership seriously hampered FARC’s operational capabilities, 

but critics continue to question the “success” of the efforts.

Uribe’s election signaled support from political elite to take a hardine approach against the FARC. While the FARC enjoyed sanctuary in 
Chapter 10. Government Countermeasures

357

the despeje, it developed the operational capability to bring the fight 

to major urban centers such as Bogotá. FARC also kept wealthy families imprisoned in urban centers, fearful of kidnapping extortion. This 

Colombian political class makes up about thirty-seven percent of the 

population and is primarily of European descent. Throughout much 

of the conflict, just as it had been during La Violencia, this class was 

shielded from much of the violence. After being more exposed to the 

violence under Pastrana, the elite became a “credible partner” in the 

struggle against FARC after supporting Uribe’s election. Most importantly, the wealthy elites opened their pocketbooks. To finance his campaigns, Uribe levied a war tax against the wealthy, who paid nearly four 

billion dollars over a four-year period. That is about half of assistance 

provided by the United States under Plan Colombia.125

Uribe, along with the military,126 unveiled a comprehensive program in 2003, the Democratic Security and Defense Policy (DSP), to 

defeat leftist insurgents.127 The FARC had laid out the welcome mat for 

Uribe at the beginning of his tenure as president. The group attacked 

the presidential palace the day before his inauguration in August 2002. 

Twenty people were killed and sixty were wounded in the attack.128 In 

contrast to Pastrana’s countermeasures, Uribe’s policy united efforts 

across the whole of government to focus efforts on the diverse conditions underlying the long-running insurgency in Colombia. The policy 

rested on three central tenets:

1. Lack of personal security is the root of Colombia’s social, 

economic, and political ills.

2. This lack of personal security stems from the state’s absence 

from large swaths of national territory.

3. Therefore, all elements of national power need to be directed 

toward ending this lack of national integration.

Notably missing in the DSP is any language regarding peace negotiations. Instead, the DSP requires insurgents to cease all hostilities 

before any negotiations or demobilizations can be discussed.129 However, these policies did not apply to the paramilitary groups, with whom 

Uribe did negotiate and provide a legal framework for demobilization.

The plan also recognized the threat as stemming from combined 

dynamics of terrorism; drug trafficking; illicit finance; traffic of arms, 

ammunition, and explosives; kidnapping and extortion; and finally, 

homicide. Uribe’s policy first and foremost identified Colombia’s insecurity problems originating from FARC’s revolutionary insurgency, not 

from the tactics adopted by the group to fulfill its strategic goals, such 

as drug trafficking. FARC was an insurgency that used drug trafficking 

to finance its operations, not the other way around.130
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At the heart of Uribe’s policy was the protection of the population 

from violence perpetrated by leftist insurgents and the paramilitaries. 

It defines security as “the permanent and effective presence of the democratic authorities across the national territory as a result of a collective effort of the whole society.”131 One of the key strategies to achieve 

this goal was the consolidation of national territory. Uribe’s plan called 

for the state to gradually restore its presence and the authority of its 

institutions in strategically important areas. It began with the military 

clearing territory of insurgents, then local forces and police holding 

the territory from further incursions.132

Unlike the military’s similar efforts under Pastrana, executive guidance from Uribe under the DSP provided a framework to streamline 

security efforts. The Ministry of Defense, for instance, did not draft 

plans unilaterally as it had under Pastrana. Instead, the Ministry of 

Defense drafted a plan designed to implement Uribe’s policy. In turn, 

the Ministry of Defense’s plans informed those of the military’s Joint 

Command and the national police. The products streamlined the 

efforts of all security forces against the FARC and other leftist insurgents throughout Uribe’s term in office.133

Uribe’s plan recognized that a lasting victory over the guerrillas 

required more than a military solution. As part of the DSP, Uribe 

sought to incorporate “institutional protection of citizens’ rights, guarantees of justice, and the rule of law.” These protections and guarantees were expected to strengthen the confidence of the public in state 

institutions, thereby bolstering state legitimacy while discrediting the 

nondemocratic alternatives the guerrillas represented. However well 

intentioned, Uribe’s policies privileged security over human rights at 

times, leading critics in many corners to cite government abuse. Moreover, security forces were charged with gross human rights violations 

that some argue pointed to systemic, not incidental, issues.134

Resourcing the Counterinsurgent Campaign

 Uribe needed additional resources to carry out his policies, which 

he acquired through two avenues: a war tax and Plan Colombia. The 

war tax, levied on the liquid assets of the wealthy, contributed about 

four billion dollars to the defense budget over a four-year period.135

The revenue from the tax was used to increase the number of soldiers 

available for the resource-intensive counterinsurgent campaign. By 

2004, the military expanded to 202,000.136

Uribe also required a revised legal framework to carry out his policies. He first addressed this issue by allowing government forces to 

make arrests without warrants and established other measures of control where and when they were needed.137 The 1991 constitution allowed 
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for three successive ninety-day periods of a state of emergency during 

which the government could exercise additional powers.138 To supplement these measures, the Uribe administration enacted new legislation 

in April 2003 modifying the constitution, granting the government the 

ability to tap phones and conduct warrantless searches as needed.139

Implementing the DSP

When it came time to implement the plan, Uribe benefited from 

trends began under Pastrana. Military reforms, initiated internally 

by senior military leadership, had left the military more prepared to 

undertake an intensive counterinsurgent campaign. Due to educational 

efforts, the existing officer corps had greater professional knowledge of 

the general operational and tactical components of warfare, but also a 

more robust insight into the strategic components of insurgent warfare. 

In general, members of the military were more apt counterinsurgent 

strategists then they had been in the past. The operational plan guiding the military’s counterinsurgent activities was the Joint Command’s 

Plan Patriota (Plan Patriot).140

The military had already started to craft a counterinsurgent 

campaign in the previous administration. Uribe simply brought the 

resources and political will necessary to carry out existing strategies. 

Plan Patriot sought to take the fight to the guerillas, targeting highvalue FARC targets and pushing guerrillas from their strongholds in 

southern and eastern Colombia. After securing the area, the military 

was to hand over control of the area to civilian leadership to help consolidate the state’s presence. The tactics developed to achieve the goals 

included laying down a “grid” over the area and coordinating efforts 

among various forces to stifle insurgent activity.141 Security forces first 

gathered intelligence on FARC camps and leaders. Once a target was 

identified, fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters bombed the site “to 

soften defenses, disorient the defenders and kill as many guerrillas 

as possible.” After the initial sortie, special operations soldiers were 

deployed to the area to kill and capture remaining combatants. Computers, flash drives, cell phones, and other types of intelligence were 

also gathered and analyzed.142

Additional unfunded, but planned, changes were executed after 

Uribe secured revenues with the war tax. Part of the plan was manning new BCG and BRIM units, giving every division a BRIM. Urban 

special forces were also developed to complement existing rural special 

forces. The FARC’s use of mountainous terrain also necessitated additional high-mountain battalions situated and equipped to block insurgent mobility corridors. The plans bolstered infrastructure and special 

transportation network units.143
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Under Pastrana, the military lacked local forces necessary to hold 

cleared territories. They were disbanded after a constitutional court 

found them illegal. Uribe, however, made use of a forgotten loophole 

that allowed a portion of conscripted soldiers to fulfill service obligations in their hometowns. The local forces Uribe was able to marshal 

under this law became the linchpin of the grid system. By the mid2000s, the local forces were present in around six hundred locales 

around the country.144 Although assigned and trained with a battalion 

or brigade, after three months of basic training the soldiers returned 

to their local villages or towns. Initially, the soldiers served by day and 

returned home at night. Shortly after forming the local forces, leftist 

insurgents targeted the soldiers and their families for retaliation. As a 

result, many were eventually stationed in hastily constructed military 

bases in the village areas and commanded by NCOs.145 By August 2004, 

more than eight thousand of these campesino soldiers were recruited 

and trained. While the plan called for the recruitment and training of 

32,376 campesino soldiers by 2006, in 2009 the actual number hovered 

around 25,202.146

Police forces also supplemented the manpower needed to hold 

cleared territory. In many areas controlled by the insurgents, the police 

were entirely absent. The government was able to expand police presence to every municipo (county) in the country by 2006, installing them 

in fort-like police stations if necessary.147 The police patrol rural areas 

and disrupt mobility corridors used for gun and drug running. Police 

were trained in counterinsurgency tactics and to coordinate with the 

army. In part, the expansion of the police was driven by thousands 

of new recruits. Others claim, however, that in some cases the expansion resulted from dispersing existing police officers over greater areas 

of jurisdiction.148

The government’s security efforts also involved recruiting civilians 

to act as an informant network. Many of the collaborators in the network report suspicious activity to the military without compensation. 

Informants, on the other hand, are paid for information on insurgent 

activity that leads to the capture of insurgents or interdiction of hostile 

activity. Not surprisingly, many of these informants are former insurgents or members of irregular armed groups. The military keeps lists 

of the network with no supervision by civilian state institutions.149

Consolidation Phase and Integrated Action

In 2004, the Colombian government, with support from the United 

States, developed a plan combining military and development projects 

carried out in the same areas. The primary thrust of the plan was to 

consolidate military gains through developing more robust civilian 
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361

state institutions in the territory. It has gone by a number of different 

names, including Integrated Action, Plan Colombia 2, and Strategic 

Leap. Hereafter, the plan will be called Integrated Action. In part, the 

plan originated in the frustrations of both the Colombian government 

and the United States in its seeming inability to effectively hold territory after clearing it of insurgents, whether in the Colombian countryside, Iraq, or Afghanistan. The Colombian Ministry of Defense and 

the civil affairs section of the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), 

part of the US Military Group in Bogotá, recommended that the Ministry of Defense establish an interagency group “capable of synchronizing national level efforts to reestablish governance.”150 Uribe accepted 

the proposal, creating the Coordination Center for Integrated 

Action (CCAI).151

The initial planning sessions later in 2004 developed a threepronged approach addressing security, economic, and development 

in conflicted areas to improve governance. In 2009, the strategy was 

implemented in thirteen zones throughout the country. After Uribe’s 

election for a second term in 2006, the plan gained momentum. His 

new minister of defense, Juan Manuel Santos, described the overall 

strategy of Integrated Action:

It means state institutions’ entry or return to 

zones affected by violence to satisfy the population’s basic needs, like health, education and public service, as well as justice, culture, recreation and 

infrastructure projects.152

While the security forces are initially important for security, civilian 

state institutions must quickly, and in a coordinated fashion, move into 

affected zones to consolidate a state presence. The CCAI, on paper, follows a sequenced-phased strategy that moves from military operations 

to quick social and economic assistance to gain popular support then 

lastly to a functioning civilian government. The CCAI outlined different phases of consolidation, each associated with a different color for 

ready identification:

• Territorial control phase (red): areas with presence of armed 

groups

• Territorial stabilization phase (yellow): areas under state control 

but still in institutional recovery

• Territorial consolidation phase (green): areas stabilized and 

continuing intense effort to establish state institutions and 

public services.153

The nonmilitary efforts of Integrated Action seek quick wins alongside long-term development. Initially, a great deal of effort goes to 
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small development projects with noticeable results such as soccer fields, 

playground renovations, and repainting infrastructure. The idea of the 

quick win is to rapidly build trust between local communities and their 

governments. However, the quick wins do not necessarily address the 

long-term socioeconomic needs of the community.154

The CCAI coordinates the activities of fourteen state institutions. 

These institutions include the military, judiciary, cabinet departments, 

and others. The CCAI is under the leadership of the Consejo Directivo 

(Directive Council), composed overwhelmingly of members from the 

security forces. However, the Comité Ejecutivo (Executive Committee) 

established to coordinate and advise, but without any real leadership 

role, includes staff from the full spectrum of government, including 

from the ministries of agriculture, social protection, interior and justice, 

education, mines and energy, transportation and environment, housing and development, and others. After security forces clear an area of 

illegal armed activity, the interagency board enters the area, although 

a heavy military leadership and presence is usually still required. The 

CCAI attempts to ease the interagency activity from its office in Bogotá, 

fielding requests for resources from various ministries, for instance. 

The United States supports Integrated Action through SOUTHCOM 

and the US Agency for International Development (USAID).155

By 2009, the CCAI established satellite offices in five regions targeted for Integrated Action efforts. These small offices were first 

called “fusion centers” because they sought to fuse the many agencies 

involved in the areas. Each center has a military coordinator, a police 

coordinator, and a civilian manager. The civilian manager is ultimately 

responsible for administering the efforts in coordination with local 

and regional authorities.156

While the Colombian government and USAID declared success in 

areas with fusion centers, other reports suggest more mixed results. 

In 2009, the Center for International Policy visited fusion centers in 

La Macarena (located in close proximity to Bogotá) and the Montes 

de  María (located near the Caribbean coast outside Cartagena). In 

La Macarena, once a booming narco-town, security gains were not as 

dramatic as had been reported by government officials.h While FARC 

had been driven from the immediate town, travel even three miles outside it on tertiary roads was highly discouraged.158

h In 2008, Minister of Defense Santos claimed of the La Macarena zone, “The people 

now reject the FARC in all of its manifestations, defend the state and support the security 

forces. They are seeing that after being submitted for so long to FARC’s violence, now, 

hand-in-hand with the state, progress and development is arriving.”157
Chapter 10. Government Countermeasures

363

Within the area, some peasants who were interviewed shared stories of government behavior that led to the community’s increased distrust of the state. Some families, for instance, had signed agreements 

to voluntarily eradicate their coca crops in exchange for development 

assistance. The day the agreements were to be implemented, fumigators eradicated the coca crops, leading the families to cease contact 

with state institutions. In other examples, promised assistance simply 

failed to materialize. Some families resorted to sending their children 

to the guerrillas still hiding out in the mountains to secure a stable 

food source for them. An unexpected government agency, the National 

Park Service, has made good headway in encouraging voluntary crop 

eradication efforts in La Macarena, although these efforts have been 

hampered by inadequate infrastructure in delivering promised aid.159

The security environment in the Montes de María differed from 

that in La Macarena. While the latter had been a FARC stronghold and 

part of the despeje, conflict between paramilitaries and leftist guerillas 

had torn apart the area in the Montes de María. The high levels of violence there led many local residents to flee to safer locales. After the 

military made headway in calming the violence, displaced residents, 

mostly farmers of small farms, began to return. After returning, many 

had difficulties making their holdings productive. The violence had 

forced some to abandon their land for years. As a result, many sold their 

land or suffered foreclosure. Land grabs by wealthy businessmen, narcotraffickers, and others proceeded at such a rapid pace that President 

Uribe himself urged the farmers to stop selling their land. The CCAI 

and the fusion centers in the Montes de María focused their efforts on 

preventing further degradation to land ownership, the foundation for 

survival of many, in the area. However, the Center for International 

Policy reports that the efforts of the CCAI have been ineffective in correcting the conditions leading to land sales and preventing illegal sales 

in the Montes de María.160

AUC Negotiations

Uribe had made a hard-line approach to the FARC the signature 

platform of his election campaign. His policy toward the right-wing 

paramilitaries differed considerably. This is not surprising as the paramilitaries are not a direct threat to the security of the state. Paramilitary 

violence is directed primarily at guerrilla groups themselves and especially the civilian population that supports them. However, the insecurities arising from the paramilitaries’ scorched earth tactics, such as 

civilian massacres, provided ample justification for the continuation of 

FARC’s armed struggle.
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Part III. Government Countermeasures

Early in his tenure, Uribe made a series of decrees and laws designed 

to incentivize the demobilization of paramilitaries.161 He refused to 

negotiate with groups that had not first agreed to a cease-fire. The 

combination produced results for Uribe. In December 2000, the AUC 

declared a cease-fire. By July 2003, the Uribe government and the AUC 

signed the Sante Fe de Ralito Accord, which committed the paramilitary to a cease-fire and demobilization.

The cornerstone of paramilitary demobilization was the Justice and 

Peace Law. The law, passed by the Colombian congress at the urging 

of Uribe, gave paramilitary fighters conditional amnesty. The conditions required demobilized fighters to document their crimes, forfeit 

any illegally acquired assets, and make reparations to their victims. In 

exchange, the former paramilitary members received no more than 

eight years in prison, a shorter term than usually granted for murder, 

kidnapping, and other crimes. Opponents of the law argued that the 

lenient sentences amounted to impunity, but Uribe countered that it 

was likely that harsher sentences would be insufficient incentive for the 

paramilitaries to demobilize and disarm.162

By 2007, more than 31,000 AUC soldiers had demobilized under 

the auspices of the Justice and Peace Law.163 But, the numbers of demobilized soldiers far outstripped previous estimates of paramilitary 

numbers. Some believe that drug traffickers and other criminals took 

advantage of the legal demobilization process to escape prosecution. 

Other scenarios include individuals demobilizing to acquire the social 

and monetary benefits afforded to demobilized fighters.164

Most worrisome is the failure of the demobilization program to successfully dismantle paramilitary organizational infrastructure. In 2007, 

an estimated three thousand demobilized soldiers were recruited by 

as many as twenty-two new paramilitary organizations. Furthermore, 

the low proportion of weapons decommissioned to demobilized fighters implies that paramilitaries are caching weapons for future use.165

Paramilitary revenues also continue to increase, mostly from drug 

trafficking. Analysts speculate that before the negotiated amnesty, 

the paramilitaries exported massive quantities of stockpiled cocaine 

knowing that whatever was sold prior to the conditional amnesty would 

escape prosecution. Since the demobilization, the Colombian government has done little to halt paramilitary violence.166

ELN Negotiations

In addition to talks with the AUC, Uribe also initiated formal peace 

talks with ELN in 2005. The talks, held in Havana, were preceded by 

the release from prison of ELN leader Gerardo “Francisco Galán” 

Bermúdez. Bermúdez was confined to a casa de paz or peace house, 
Chapter 10. Government Countermeasures

365

established by the government in Medellín. The peace house served as 

the site for peace discussions with civil society leaders and the international community. A total of eight rounds of talks followed, with Mexico acting as a facilitator. More formal dialogues also included Norway, 

Switzerland, and Spain. During the talks, ELN continued its military 

operations, although as in the case of the FARC, Uribe’s security initiatives degraded the group’s operational capabilities. As has been the 

case for many of failed peace talks over the past forty years, the conditions for a cease-fire stymied the talks, producing no tangible gains for 

either side.167

Counterinsurgency Success?

The Uribe administration’s concerted counterinsurgent efforts 

against the FARC did severely degrade the group’s operational capabilities. The group’s membership halved, diminishing from seventeen thousand to about nine thousand.168 The military campaigns led 

to a thirty-five  percent reduction in attacks against infrastructure.169

Nationwide murders fell from a high of thirty thousand in 2002 to 

around sixteen thousand in 2008.170 In the same period, kidnappings 

in Colombia declined by eighty-three percent and terrorist attacks by 

seventy-six percent.171 It was also during Uribe’s administration that the 

military pulled off one of its biggest coups against the group, the 2008 

assassination of Raúl Reyes, who had been hiding out in a sanctuary in 

Ecuador. The special forces, disguised as humanitarian workers, also 

embarrassed FARC by freeing the group’s highest profile hostages, 

including former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt.172

It is also apparent that the government’s security efforts made it less 

attractive to be a FARC insurgent hiding out in the jungle. Uribe implemented programs in tandem with the military strategy that aimed to 

create incentives for individual guerrillas to voluntarily demobilize, 

such as the legal protections offered to demobilized guerrillas under 

the Justice and Peace Law. The programs produced significant results. 

In 2007, for the first time in the history of the conflict, more FARC guerrillas deserted than were killed in combat. By the following year, 14,781 

guerrillas voluntarily demobilized.173 Hunger drove many insurgents to 

flee, under threat of death, and surrender to the military. Moreover, 

many of those who voluntarily demobilized had been in FARC for ten 

to fifteen years, signaling that even the “diehard revolutionaries” were 

losing heart. Security forces made judicious use of these deserters, reinserting them back into FARC ranks without guerrilla commanders noticing they had gone missing. The guerrillas-cum-informants provided 

the military with crucial on-the-ground intelligence.174 Drug trafficking, the financial mainstay of the insurgents, experienced significant 
366

Part III. Government Countermeasures

setbacks as well. Security officials seized 153 tons of cocaine, eradicated 

223,000 hectares of illicit plantations, and destroyed two  thousand 

coca-processing laboratories.175 Reportedly, FARC’s annual drug revenues decreased from $500 million to about $250 million.

ENDNOTES

1 Dennis M. Rempe, The Past as Prologue? A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia, 1958–1966 (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub17.pdf, 4–11.

2 Ibid., 11.

3 Ibid., 12.

4 Ibid., 14–15.

5 Ibid., 16.

6 Norman Offstein, “An Historical Review and Analysis of Colombian Guerrilla Movements: FARC, ELN and EPL,” Desarrollo Y Sociedad no. 52 (2003), 135.

7 Ibid., 18–19.

8 Ibid., 18.

9 David Edison Mallot, “Military Civic Action in Colombia” (master’s thesis, University of 

Florida, August 1985), http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=ht

ml&identifier=ADA158207, 75–76.

10 Rempe, The Past as Prologue? A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia, 19–20.

11 Mallot, “Military Civic Action in Colombia,” 66–67.

12 Ibid., 110–111.

13 Rempe, The Past as Prologue? A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia, 19–23.

14 Ibid., 24–27.

15 Robin Kirk, More Terrible than Death: Violence, Drugs, and America’s War in Colombia (New 

York: Public Affairs, 2004), 56.

16 Rempe, The Past as Prologue? A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia, 18.

17 Kirk, More Terrible than Death: Violence, Drugs, and America’s War in Colombia, 56.

18 Ibid.

19 James F. Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia and Mexico

(Lynne Rienner Publishers: London, 2003), 103.

20 Richard Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia (Lexington, MA: Lexington 

Books, 1973), 79.

21 Rempe, The Past as Prologue? A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia, 27–30.

22 Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia, 77.

23 Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia and Mexico, 104.

24 Rex Hudson, Colombia: A Country Study (Baton Rouge: Claitor’s Publishing Division, 

2010), 341.

25 Ricardo Vargas, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the 

Illicit Drug Trade,” Transnational Institute, June 7, 1999, http://www.tni.org/briefing/

revolutionary-armed-forces-colombia-farc-and-illicit-drug-trade.

26 Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia and Mexico, 104.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.
Chapter 10. Government Countermeasures

367

29 Steven Dudley, Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerilla Politics in Colombia (New York and 

London: Routledge, 2004), 118.

30 Ibid.,118–119.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Jorge P. Osterling, Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (New 

Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction Publishers, 1989), 282–283.

34 Hudson, Colombia: A Country Study, 339.

35 Harvey F. Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986–1994 (Tuscaloosa, 

AL: University of Alabama Press, 1999), 15.

36 Ibid., 16–17.

37 Ibid., 15.

38 Ibid., 16.

39 Ibid., 15.

40 Kirk, More Terrible than Death: Violence, Drugs, and America’s War in Colombia, 53.

41 Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986–1994, 19–20.

42 Ibid.

43 Osterling, Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla, 282–283.

44 Ibid., 284.

45 Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986–, 33–34.

46 Ibid., 20.

47 Osterling, Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 286.

48 Ibid., 284–285.

49 Ibid., 285–286.

50 Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986–1994, 20.

51 Osterling, Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 287.

52 Ibid., 288–289.

53 Ibid.

54 Carlos Nasi, “Colombia’s Peace Processes, 1982–2002: Conditions, Strategies, and Outcomes,” in Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War, ed. Virginia M. Bouvier (Washington, 

DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 54.

55 Henry Lawrence Boudon, “New Party Persistence and Failure: A Comparative Analysis 

of Colombia’s M-19 Democratic Alliance and Venezuela’s Radical Cause” (dissertation, 

University of Miami, 1997), fn. 5, 109.

56 Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986–1994, 35.

57 Ibid., 38.

58 Ibid., 79.

59 Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency 

and Its Implications for Regional Stability (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 71.

60 Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986–1994, 40.

61 Boudon, “New Party Persistence and Failure: A Comparative Analysis of Colombia’s M-19 

Democratic Alliance and Venezuela’s Radical Cause,” 105–110.

62 Nasi, “Colombia’s Peace Processes, 1982–2002: Conditions, Strategies, and Outcomes,” 

54–55.

63 Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986–1994, 42–43.

64 Nasi, “Colombia’s Peace Processes, 1982–2002: Conditions, Strategies, and Outcomes,” 

55.

65 Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986–1994, 84.
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Part III. Government Countermeasures

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid., 94.

68 Ibid., 87.

69 Ibid., 88.

70 Ibid., 89.

71 Ibid., 94–98.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid., 109–116.

74 Ibid., 86.

75 Ibid., 114–115.

76 Human Rights Watch, State of War: Political Violence and Counterinsurgency in Colombia, New 

York: Human Rights Watch, 1993, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/colombia/statetoc.

htm.

77 Vargas, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Illicit Drug 

Trade.”

78 Ibid.

79 Arturo Herrera Castano and Shane Tarrant, “Are the Guerrillas Gone? A Historical Political Economy and Social Analysis of the Rise and Demise of the Fuerzas 

Armadas Revolucionarias Colombians (FARC), 1964–2010” (master’s thesis, Naval 

Post-Graduate School, December 2009), http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/

handle/10945/10390/09Dec_Castano.pdf?sequence=1, 27.

80 Vargas, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Illicit Drug 

Trade.”

81 Ibid.

82 Douglas Farah and Glenn Simpson, Ecuador at Risk: Drugs, Thugs, Guerrillas, and the Citizen’s Revolution, 1st Ed. (Miami: Interamerican Institute for Democracy, 2010), 49.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid., 5.

86 Ibid., 49.

87 Claire Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior on 

the Front Lines with the FARC, SPLA, and PKK (New York: New York University Press), 2010, 

104.

88 Winifred Tate, “Paramilitaries in Colombia,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 8, no. 1 (2001): 

166–167.

89 The text of the legal code can be found at the Legal Information Institute, http://www.

law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/2378d.

90 William Aviles, Global Capitalism, Democracy, and Civil-Military Relations in Colombia (New 

York: State University of New York Press, 2007), 117–118.

91 Paul E. Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army 

(FARC-EP): Marxist-Leninist Insurgency or Criminal Enterprise?” (master’s thesis, The Naval Postgraduate School, December 2005), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/

GetTRDoc?AD=ADA443390, 76.

92 Ibid., 77.

93 “Profile: Andres Pastrana,” BBC News, World Americas, January 15, 2002, http://news.bbc.

co.uk/2/hi/americas/1759419.stm.

94 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP),” 

77.

95 Ibid., 79.
Chapter 10. Government Countermeasures

369

96 Ibid., 73.

97 Cynthia J. Arnson, Phillip Chicola, William D. Delahunt, Jan Egleland, Benjamin A. Gilman, Caryn C. Hollis, Luis Alberto Moreno, Augusto Ramírez-Ocampo, Alfredo Rangel 

Suárez, The Peace Process in Colombia and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars, May 2002), http://wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/

files/ACF362.pdf, 6–7.

98 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP),” 

78.

99 John Otis, Law of the Jungle: The Hunt for Colombian Guerrillas, American Hostages, and Buried Treasure (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2010), 368, 95.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid., 96.

102León Valencia, “The ELN’s Halting Moves Towards Peace,” in Colombia: Building Peace in 

a Time of War, ed. Virginia Marie Bouvier (Washington, DC: United States Institute of 

Peace, 2009), 107–108.

103Thomas A. Marks, “A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe’s Colombia (2002–2006),” Stability Ops in the Western Hemisphere, February 2011, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/

docs/11-15/11-15.pdf, 42–43.

104 Ibid.

105 Ibid., 6.

106 Ibid., 47.

107 Ibid., 47–48.

108Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia and Mexico, 50.

109 Ibid.

110 Ibid.

111 Ibid.

112 Ibid.

113 Marks, “A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe’s Colombia (2002–2006),” 42–45.

114 Connie Veillette, Plan Colombia: A Progress Report (Washington, DC: Congressional 

Research Service, 2005), 1.

115 Jon-Paul N. Maddaloni, An Analysis of the FARC in Colombia: Breaking the Frame of FM 

3-24 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States 

Army Command and General Staff College, 2009), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/

GetTRDoc?AD=ADA505601, 19.

116 Thomas A. Marks, Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for “Democratic Security,” July 2005, Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.

mil/pdffiles/pub610.pdf, 6.

117 Thomas A. Marks, “A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe’s Colombia (2002–2006),” 42–46.

118 Russell Crandall, “Colombia’s Catastrophic Success,” The American Interest, 

December 19, 2013, http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2013/12/19/

colombias-catastrophic-success/.

119 Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior on the Front 

Lines with the FARC, SPLA, and PKK, 106–107.

120Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia and Mexico, 152.

121 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP),” 

86.

122 Ibid.

123Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia and Mexico, 153.

124 Hudson, Colombia: A Country Study, 346–346.

125Russell Crandall, “Colombia’s Catastrophic Success.”
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Part III. Government Countermeasures

126 International Crisis Group, Colombia: President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy, November 

2003, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/06_colombia__uribe_dem__security.pdf, 3.

127 Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP),” 

87.

128 Ibid.

129 International Crisis Group, Colombia: President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy, 4.

130Thomas A. Marks, “A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe’s Colombia (2002–2006),” 50.

131As quoted in International Crisis Group, Colombia: President Uribe’s Democratic Security 

Policy, 4.

132Thomas A. Marks, “A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe’s Colombia (2002–2006),” 42–46.

133 Ibid., 50.

134Hudson, Colombia: A Country Study, 346–347.

135 International Crisis Group, Colombia: President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy, 5, fn. 25. 

Crandall, “Colombia’s Catastrophic Success.”

136Marks, Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for “Democratic Security,” 10.

137Veillette, Colombia: Issues for Congress, 5.

138 Ibid.

139 Ibid, 6.

140Marks, “A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe’s Colombia (2002–2006),” 53.

141 Ibid., 51–52.

142Colby Martin, “Colombia’s New Counterinsurgency Plan,” Security Weekly, March 29, 

2012, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/colombias-new-counterinsurgency-plan.

143Marks, “A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe’s Colombia (2002–2006),” 51.

144 Ibid., 51–52.

145 International Crisis Group, Colombia: President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy, 4–5.

146Hudson, Colombia: A Country Study, 347.

147 Marks, “A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe’s Colombia (2002–2006),” 51–52.

148 International Crisis Group, Colombia: President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy, 4, fn.21.

149 Ibid., 5.

150As quoted in John T. Fishel, “The Interagency Arena at the Operational Level: The Cases 

of Known Stability Operations” in ed. Gabriella Marcella, Affairs of State: The Interagency 

and National Security (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

December 2008), http://ccai-colombia.org/files/primarydocs/InteragencyArenaAtTheOperationalLevel.pdf, 435.

151 Ibid.

152As quoted in Adam Isaacson and Abigail Poe, After Plan Colombia: Evaluating ‘Integrated 

Action,’ the Next Phase of U.S. Assistance,” International Policy Report, December 2009, 

http://www.ciponline.org/research/entry/after-plan-colombia, 6.

153 Ibid., 6–7.

154 Ibid., 9.

155 Ibid., 8–9.

156 Ibid., 8.

157 Ibid., 12.

158 Ibid., 12–17.

159 Ibid.

160 Ibid., 23–25.
Chapter 10. Government Countermeasures

371

161Arturo J. Carrillo, “Truth, Justice, and Reparation in Colombia,” in Colombia: Building 

Peace in a Time of War, ed. Virginia Marie Bouvier (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 134.

162 June S. Beittel, Colombia: Background, U.S. Relations, and Congressional Interest. Congressional Research Service RL32250 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

November 28, 2012), 22–23.

163 Ibid.

164 June S. Beittel, Colombia: Background, U.S. Relations, and Congressional Interest, 22–23.

165Hudson, Colombia: A Country Study, 348.

166Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior on the Front 

Lines with the FARC, SPLA, and PKK, 106.

167 Hudson, Colombia: A Country Study, 349–350.

168Martin, “Colombia’s New Counterinsurgency Plan.”

169Hudson, Colombia: A Country Study, 347.

170 Martin, “Colombia’s New Counterinsurgency Plan.”

171Beittel, Colombia: Background, U.S. Relations, and Congressional Interest.

172Crandall, “Colombia’s Catastrophic Success.”

173 Hudson, Colombia: A Country Study, 349–350.

174 Crandall, “Colombia’s Catastrophic Success.”

175 Hudson, Colombia: A Country Study, 347.

Conclusion

373

CONCLUSION TO PART III

In many regards, Uribe’s countermeasures brought the Colombian 

government full circle. The early efforts of Plan Lazo sought to address 

the socioeconomic conditions underpinning the grievances and legitimacy of violent challengers to the Colombian government. However, in 

this early period, the Colombian government failed to complement military strategies with widespread reforms that sought to fundamentally 

restructure institutional inequality and government abuse. For many 

years the restrictions on political participation under the National Front 

formed a key part of insurgents’ narratives to mobilize Colombians to 

take armed action against the government. The constitutional reforms 

of 1990, prompted by the M-19 guerrillas, detracted from the validity 

of these arguments. Yet, inequality and government abuses continue 

to lend some credence to societal grievances. Under Plan Colombia, 

Plan Patriot, and later Integrated Action, the government reduced the 

operational capacity of armed challengers. In part, this achievement 

is due to the development of credible partnerships among key stakeholders in the struggle against political violence in Colombia. It is less 

clear, however, if the government has made strides on other conditions 

contributing to violence, such as weak state presence, lack of trust for 

civilian institutions, and poor human development.

One failure of the Colombian government’s responses to armed 

challengers has been its inability to isolate extremist elements from the 

moderate citizenry. It is unlikely that any countermeasures can expect 

to win the “hearts and minds” while simultaneously carrying out illegal executions, torture, and widespread arrests. Professionalization 

of security forces responsible for carrying out countermeasures is an 

important part of any plan. As the example of Colombia illustrates, it 

is also a painstakingly slow process at times. Reforming institutional 

culture should form part of those efforts, but also a reform of any institutional incentives aggravating unacceptable behavior. An emphasis 

on guerrilla body counts encouraged gross abuses against the civilian population in the “false positives” murders perpetrated by soldiers 

seeking promotion.a Even when the Uribe Administration pursued a 

measure of judiciary reform through the Fusion Centers, its efforts 

harmed community support. Judicial and prosecutorial authorities 

arrived in former guerilla strongholds, a positive step in consolidating 

civilian institutions there. Upon arrival, the authorities heavily focused 

on suspected guerrillas and supporters. In a region of the FARC’s former despeje, many within the local community had some connection 

a For a thorough discussion of the false positives scandal, please see Chapter 11.

Conclusion.
374

Part III. Government Countermeasures

with the guerrillas. As a result, authorities initiated mass arrests of local 

townspeople. Many would scatter when any government official entered 

the area.1 Human rights groups and others in the international community continue to pressure the country to curb its human rights abuses.

Effective countermeasures also require good partnerships. Too 

often, governments and states are characterized as singular entities. 

But, governments are comprised of many different individuals, agencies, and alliances, sometimes acting on behalf of their own interests. 

In some periods, the civilian institutions and the military in Colombia appeared to be working at odds rather than united under a concerted strategy. The executive administration’s decision to negotiate 

with insurgent groups at different junctures was not always supported 

by the military. On occasion, this difference of opinion led to collusion between military and paramilitary forces that further deteriorated the security environment. The military also acted as a spoiler in 

the peace process, launching attacks against insurgents that derailed 

negotiations.

In part, Uribe’s effectiveness was his ability to unite disparate elements of the national government in a singular vision for a secure 

Colombia. His election signaled the onset of another crucial partnership missing from government efforts—the population. In this case, 

especially the support of the upper strata of Colombian society that had 

been shielded from much of the violence. This was also the case during La Violencia, the country’s mid-twentieth century war, when most 

of the Colombian elite were ensconced in urban centers far from the 

intense violence in the countryside. In the early twenty-first century, 

privileged Colombians began to feel the pinch of leftist violence. Leftist 

insurgents effectively imprisoned them in cities where they remained 

fearful of extortion kidnappings. The FARC also began to increase its 

urban operations, setting off bombs in major urban centers. Uribe’s 

election platform emphasized a military, not a political, solution to 

the endemic insecurity problems in the country. With their vote, elite 

Colombians granted Uribe a broad mandate, and funding through a 

war tax, to execute his strategic vision. In 2006, the country re-elected 

Uribe to continue his efforts.

Of course, the Colombian government also received a great deal of 

support from the United States in Plan Colombia. By 2009, the Colombian government had received around $8 billion in support for first 

counternarcotic efforts then counterinsurgent efforts. Domestic politics, not an analysis of Colombia’s operating environment, drove these 

decisions. The external support provided by the United States represented a double-edged sword for the Colombian government. While 

the funds and training generally benefitted the military, it also came 
Conclusion

375

with heavy pressures to adjust strategies to accommodate U.S. political 

interests. These pressures contributed to the strategic rift between the 

civilian government and the military under Pastrana. While Pastrana’s 

administration pursued negotiations and counternarcotic operations, 

the military’s analysis led them to the conclusion that the key destabilizer was the insurgency, not the drug trafficking tactics FARC used to 

fund its operation. It is arguably not the sheer volume of U.S. dollars 

provided under Plan Colombia that helped the country gain ground 

against the FARC. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly what made the difference. But, it is clear that along the way Colombians became capable 

actors in their own right. External assistance means little in the absence 

of willing and able counterparts.2

Colombia’s countermeasures against illegal armed violence also 

demonstrate the difficulty in assessing the effectiveness of counterinsurgent campaigns. Most often, the measures of effectiveness used to 

benchmark the success of Colombia’s countermeasures are statistics of 

insurgent numbers, insurgent attacks, and homicide and kidnapping 

rates. Those statistics, included in the preceding section, do provide 

insight into the security situation in Colombia. Drops in homicides, 

kidnappings, and the number of insurgents certainly point to FARC’s 

decreased operational capacity.

Yet, many of the efforts, such as the CCAI and Fusion Centers, 

address more intangible conditions that also contribute to continued 

violence in the country. These efforts, and others, have aimed to consolidate civilian government institutions in areas formerly dominated 

by guerrillas and paramilitaries; rebuild trust between communities 

and the government; and augment human development of Colombians 

in lesser developed regions of the country. Statistics on homicide and 

kidnapping commonly repeated by the media, military, and politicians 

cannot capture achievements, or lack thereof, on the more qualitative 

conditions underlying ongoing insurgencies and conflict.

The FARC has made good use of the intangibility of success in counterinsurgent campaigns. The group altered its tactics from countering 

conventional forces to targeting the political will of the government 

and population to continue on its course. In part, FARC’s course of 

action resulted from the paucity of its supporters. Rather than relying 

on a mass base to confront the government, it identified a “shortcut” in 

the form of political will. According to one analyst, the perception of 

the FARC threat far outpaced the group’s actual strategic threat during Uribe’s campaign: “It could be argued that this is the very stuff 

of insurgency, where every action is intended to have a political consequence.” The media, alongside Uribe’s political enemies, probably 
contributed as much to the perception of threat of FARC as the insurgents themselves.3

Yet, it is difficult to ascertain what a return to “normalcy” can look 

like in a country riddled with violence for the past seventy years. Despite 

curtailing violence perpetrated by leftist insurgents and paramilitaries, 

rampant criminality remains a problem in the country. Officials have 

noted an increase in emerging bandes criminales (BACRIM or bacrim), 

or criminal bands involved in drug trafficking and criminal extortion. 

Some routinely collaborate with FARC and ELN. Demobilized paramilitary members, and less often leftist insurgents from FARC or ELN, 

frequently transition to criminal activity in these groups.

Colombia has many advantages that other war torn countries lack. 

The World Bank ranks Colombia as an “upper middle income” country. As of 2009, its literacy rate among the adult population ranked in 

the ninetieth percentile. A majority of Colombians, even in the countryside, have access to potable water, electricity, and education. Despite 

these ample resources, Colombia continues to have one of the highest 

rates of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the world. The daunting 

challenge facing lesser developed countries with intractable conflict 

is apparent in comparison to Colombia. In many of these countries, 

such as Somalia, the international community has few, if any, credible 

partners with which to engage. Many programs, designed to augment 

economic and human development, are hampered by populations with 

generations of individuals who have experienced interrupted education and workforce training. And, perhaps most importantly, have no 

experience of effective governance administered by their state.

ENDNOTES

1 As quoted in Adam Isaacson and Abigail Poe, After Plan Colombia: Evaluating ‘Integrated 

Action,’ the Next Phase of U.S. Assistance,” International Policy Report, December 2009, 

http://www.ciponline.org/research/entry/after-plan-colombia, 17.

2 Russell Crandall, “Colombia’s Catastrophic Success,” The American Interest, 

December 19, 2013, http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2013/12/19/

colombias-catastrophic-success/.

3 Thomas A. Marks, “A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe’s Colombia (2002–2006),” Stability Ops in the Western Hemisphere, February 2011, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/

docs/11-15/11-15.pdf, 51–52.
CHAPTER 11.

CONCLUSION

Chapter 11. Conclusion

379

The internal armed conflict in Colombia, which began when Nikita 

Khrushchev still ruled the Soviet Union, remains stubbornly resistant 

to a lasting resolution. Many of the underlying conditions that formed 

the bedrock of insurgent grievances against the Colombian state have 

not been effectively addressed. However, in the early 1990s, several 

insurgent groups did successfully demobilize and integrate into the 

legal, public sphere.

A recent study of the socioeconomic conditions in Colombia indicates that, despite gains, many Colombians still suffer under poor living conditions. Statistics released by the government show a sharp drop 

in absolute povertya among Colombians, down from forty-nine  percent in 2002 to thirty-four percent in 2011. Likewise, extreme poverty 

decreased from eighteen percent to eleven percent in the same period. 

While these decreasing measures of poverty point to progress, acute 

disparity remains between rural and urban populations. Colombians in rural areas are twice as likely to be mired in poverty as their 

urban counterparts. Another more comprehensive indicator used by 

Colombian authorities to measure poverty also shows gains. This multidimensional indicator includes measures of education, employment, 

housing, and infrastructure variables, among others. According to this 

indicator, the number of poor Colombians decreased by half, from 

sixty  percent in 1997 to twenty-nine  percent in 2011. Like the basic 

income poverty measure above, the multidimensional indicator shows 

a disparity between urban and rural populations. Rural Colombians 

are more likely to be poor than those in urban areas because of a lack 

of critical infrastructure, particularly for water and sewage; low educational achievement; and low levels of formal employment.2

Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 10. Government Countermeasures, 

the ongoing violence has contributed to the cycle of poverty in the 

country. The violence disproportionately affects those in rural areas. 

To finance their operations, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 

Colombia (FARC), the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), and 

paramilitary groups forcibly expropriate resources from civilian populations in their areas of operation. These methods have significantly 

deincentivized civilian investment, trapping many rural households 

into a cycle of “low productivity activities and poverty.” Furthermore, 

the violence has forced millions of Colombians, many of them poor 

peasants, to relocate to areas less affected by the violence. Often, these 

a There are many ways to measure poverty. Recently, Colombia adopted a refined 

methodology to define what constitutes poverty in the country. In this case, the government defines poverty as individuals or families unable to afford basic services and a basket 

of basic foods. Extreme poverty is defined as those unable to afford sufficient food to meet 

minimal caloric intake needs.1
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refugees leave behind their income and land. The overall loss is estimated to be three percent of Colombia’s total gross domestic product 

(GDP). Once the refugees relocate, usually to urban areas, many do not 

have the necessary skills and qualifications to find gainful employment 

in their new environments. As a result, most refugees live in conditions 

of extreme poverty.3

Recently, the Colombian government enacted one of its first policies intended to address the issue of victims’ reparations. In June 2011, 

President Santos signed into law the Victims and Land Restitution Law, 

or Ley de Víctimas Restitución de Tierras. The law is intended to facilitate the return of land to the civilians from whom it was illegally seized 

by numerous armed actors. The paramilitary groups, formerly united 

under the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) umbrella before 

that group’s demobilization in 2006, were the most egregious perpetrators of land seizures, sometimes working in collusion with state security 

forces. In addition, civilians abandoned a great deal of the land after 

being forcibly displaced by leftist guerillas. Under the law, millions of 

hectares of land are slated to be returned to their lawful owners. However well intentioned the law, it is not without its detractors. Critics, 

including the United Nations High Commissioner, are concerned that 

the law could be used to deny many victims effective reparation, as 

well as to legalize occupation by questionable tenants and the profits 

accrued from those illegally seized assets.4 The law has also provoked 

violent opposition by armed groups calling themselves “anti-restitution armies” in some regions. In September 2012, the Constitutional 

Court declared some portions of the law unconstitutional, including 

provisions that excluded many victims of paramilitary violence from 

land restitution.5

Throughout the five decades of internal conflict, Colombian authorities have perpetrated human rights violations. In response to domestic 

and international opposition to their questionable policies, the government has taken measures to address these systemic violations. One of 

the most notorious of these violations included the so-called “false positives” scandal. The scandal involved extrajudicial killings of civilians 

by security forces that presented the innocent victims as guerrillas to 

inflate body counts. During his presidency, Uribe adamantly denied the 

army’s involvement in the practice. However, in late 2008, investigators 

from the prosecutor general’s office uncovered damning evidence that 

security officers were involved in such incidents. After its investigations, 

the office identified 2,997 civilian victims of the practice. As many as 

one in five of the guerillas deaths reported by security forces in 2007 

was in fact an executed civilian. The office found that the perpetrators 

first killed civilians then dressed their corpses as guerrillas, presenting 
Chapter 11. Conclusion

381

them as “combat kills” to increase their chances for promotion.6 As of 

August 2012, of the 1,700 cases of extrajudicial killings by state agents 

under investigation, less than ten percent resulted in convictions. As 

part of those convictions, 539 army members, including two colonels 

and two lieutenant colonels, were convicted.7 Furthermore, despite 

promises from Uribe that the cases would be tried in civilian courts, 

in mid-2013 the Colombian legislature was debating a bill that would 

move the false-positive cases to the military court justice system. Opponents of the law argue that it will protect the military from prosecution 

of human rights violations. The current Santos administration countered that the law is necessary to address the legal insecurity facing 

the military, fearing that security forces will face prosecution for lawful 

combatant killings.8 While the Colombian government has sought to 

improve its human rights record in recent years, many perpetrators 

continue to act with impunity.9

As the above discussion demonstrates, the objectives of leftist insurgent groups the FARC and the ELN remain largely unfulfilled. Through 

force of arms, the insurgents sought to address issues related to social 

inequality, the concentration of power in the hands of a small elite, and 

the installation of a socialist regime. Yet, for millions of Colombians, 

the ongoing conflict has only increased the fragility of human security 

and justice in the country.

However, Colombia’s current political system does differ from 

the system that governed the country when the insurgents first took 

up arms. Of the seven insurgent groups that emerged in the wake of 

La Violencia, five of those groupsb demobilized in the early 1990s, representing around 5,000 combatants. The transition of the most notable 

of these groups, Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19), is discussed in detail 

in the Public Component and Political Operations sections of Chapter 8.

Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19). Their efforts were vital in securing democratic and human rights reforms in a new constitution ratified in 1991. 

In this regard, M-19, alone among the insurgencies discussed in this 

study, accomplished the goals for which it fought.

All of the public components established by the demobilized groups, 

including the Alianza Democrática M-19 (AD-M19), were defeated in 

open political competition in the years after the demobilization agreements. Despite their failure to create a viable political movement, many 

of the former guerrillas successfully reintegrated into political and public life, “[participating] in policy-making and public debate through 

think tanks, NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], journalism and 

b In addition to M-19, the Movimiento Armado Quintin Lame (MAQL), the Ejército 

Popular de Liberacíon (EPL), the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT), and 

the Corriente de Renovacíon Socalista (CRS) successfully demobilized during this time.
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jobs in the public sector.”10 The former guerrillas’ participation in these 

sectors has “contributed to [strengthening] the liberal political ideas 

and human rights norms in Colombia.”11 Several former guerrilla leaders are now influential members of the Polo Democrático (PD), a leftwing party founded in 2003 that enjoys popular support. Others have 

participated in politics at both the national and the local levels.12

Currently, amidst ongoing conflict, the Colombian government 

is facing the challenge of reintegrating nearly 48,000 former guerrillas into civilian life. Around 31,671 armed combatants demobilized as 

part of the government’s agreement with the AUC in 2003 and 2006. 

Since 2002, an additional 15,800 combatants from the FARC, ELN, 

and AUC demobilized voluntarily. The barriers to reintegrating these 

combatants are much more significant than those experienced by the 

demobilized groups in the 1990s.c The groups’ human rights records, 

especially in the case of the AUC, have prompted both domestic and 

international outcry over their reintegration, even leading to outright 

social rejection in some cases. By contrast, the demobilized groups of 

the 1990s laid down their weapons before succumbing to the “degradations of war” that dog today’s insurgents—civilian massacres, drug 

trafficking, and extensive kidnappings.14

CURRENT FARC NEGOTIATIONS

At the time of writing, the Colombian government, under President 

Juan Manuel Santos Calderón (elected in 2010), is negotiating a peace 

agreement with the FARC in Havana, Cuba.d Santos issued a statement 

announcing the talks in September 2012. The talks officially began in 

Havana the next month.15 There is great support for the talks among 

Colombians, with seventy-seven percent of the population in support.16, e

In a departure from previous peace talks, the FARC entered the negotiations at a distinct military disadvantage, in part due to the military 

countermeasures orchestrated by Santos’s predecessor, Uribe, under the 

US-funded Plan Colombia.17 The peace talks proceeded amidst ongoing conflict between the two parties. Despite repeated FARC requests 

c One researcher identifies four critical factors that either facilitate or bar the reintegration of armed groups: “the international and domestic political and normative 

contexts; the nature and behavior of the illegal armed group . . .; the terms of the peace 

negotiations; and the practical dimensions of exercising political interlocution.”13

d Representatives from Norway are also mediating the negotiations.

e However, Colombians’ support for the talks fluctuated throughout the initial stages 

of the talks.
Chapter 11. Conclusion

383

for a cease-fire,f Santos is adamant that a cease-fire will be forthcoming 

only after a comprehensive peace agreement is reached.18 The six-point 

agenda agreed upon by both parties includes land reform, political 

participation, disarmament, solutions to the problems associated with 

illicit drugs, rights of the victims, and peace deal implementation.19

Initial negotiations addressed the issue of land reform and rural 

development. In accordance with an agreement reached by both sides, 

the United Nations Development Program and Colombia’s National 

University hosted a forum in Bogotá that sought input on the issue 

from civil society. More than thirteen hundred individuals representing four hundred organizations participated in the event, producing 

546 proposals for consideration in the negotiations.20 The final accord 

on land reform, reached in May  2013, called for fair access to land 

and rural development programs to benefit rural poor. The accord 

also includes stipulations for a “land bank” as a way to reallocate land 

illegally seized during the course of the five-decade-long conflict. The 

FARC contends that most of that land was seized by far-right paramilitary groups on behalf of cattle ranchers and drug traffickers. While the 

government does not deny those claims, it has argued that the FARC 

itself is responsible for up to a third of all illegal land seizures. Nevertheless, the land reform accord, the first ever such accord reached 

during the conflict, signals an important milestone in efforts to reach 

a peace settlement.21 Most of the content of the land reform accord 

remains under close wraps as both sides continue to negotiate.

After reaching an accord on land reform, the FARC and government negotiators began discussing the second item on the agenda, 

the thorny issue of political participation. At the outset of this round 

of talks, the FARC issued a “ten minimal proposals” list that includes 

deep structural reforms to the Colombian political system. Included on 

that list, for instance, is the abolishment of presidentialism, the abolishment of the House of Representatives, and the establishment of a 

new branch of government called “Popular Power.” In addition, the 

FARC has demanded a constitutional convention to rewrite the existing 

Colombian constitution, ostensibly similar to the mechanism granted 

to the smaller, weaker M-19 in the 1990s. The government, in turn, initially refused to entertain this possibility. It remains unclear what the 

FARC hopes to gain through such an assembly, as it is a “risky move.” 

Unlike its M-19 counterparts in the 1990s, the FARC is very unpopular 

in dense urban regions and would likely receive few elected seats in the 

assembly, giving the group little leverage over the process. By contrast, 

M-19 enjoyed significant elected representation in the Constituent 

f The FARC voluntarily initiated a two-month unilateral cease-fire that ended in late 

January 2013.
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Assembly in 1991. In response, the government has offered the FARC 

the opportunity to present the eventual peace agreement in a popular referendum that would sanctify the agreement into law. After some 

back-and-forth disagreement in the media over the issue, the government has indicated that it retains some flexibility on the matter of a 

constitutional convention.22

ENDNOTES

1 Isabelle Joumard and Juliana Londoño Vélez, “Income Inequality and Poverty in Colombia – Part 1. The Role of the Labour Market,” OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1036, OECD Publishing, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/

download/5k487n74s1f1.pdf?expires=1377622345&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=

4E4DB8250F2DC8C9A226C454AC53F9D1, 7. 

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., 8.

4 Amnesty International, “Colombia: The Victims and Land Restitution Law,” Amnesty 

International Publications, April 2012, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/

AMR23/018/2012/en, 5.

5 Amnesty International, “Annual Report: Colombia 2013,” http://www.amnestyusa.org/

research/reports/annual-report-colombia-2013?page=show.

6 Adriaan Alsema, “False Positives,” Colombia Reports, August 14, 2012, http://

colombiareports.co/false-positives/.

7 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2013: Colombia, http://www.hrw.org/world 

-report/2013/country-chapters/colombia?page=1.

8 Human Rights Watch, Colombia: Military Justice a Blow to Human Rights, June 18, 2013, http://

www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/18/colombia-military-justice-law-blow-human-rights.

9 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2013: Colombia.

10 Alexandra Guáqueta, “The Way Back In: Reintegrating Illegal Armed Groups in Colombia Then and Now,” in Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict: Politics, Violence, and Transition, ed. Mats Berdal and David H. Ucko (New York: Routledge, 2009), 10.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., 11.

14 Ibid., 16.

15 ColombiaPeace.org, “Peace Timeline 2012 and Earlier,” Washington Office on Latin America, http://colombiapeace.org/timeline2012/.

16 ColombiaPeace.org, “Peace Timeline 2012 and Earlier.”

17 “Colombia and FARC: The Price of Peace,” Economist, June 1, 2013, http://www.

economist.com/news/leaders/21578682-understandable-thirst-justice-should-not-blockdeal-would-save-lives-price.

18 Marc Frank, “Colombia Peace Talks Resume in Cuba as Conflict Rages,”

Reuters, July 28, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/28/colombia 

-peace-idUSL1N0FY06820130728.

19 “Colombia and FARC Rebels Reach Agreement on Land Reform,” BBC News Latin American 

& Caribbean, May 27, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22676049.

20 ColombiaPeace.org, “Peace Timeline 2012 and Earlier.”
Chapter 11. Conclusion

385

21 “Colombia and FARC Rebels Reach Agreement on Land Reform.”

22 Washington Office on Latin America, “Colombia Peace Process Update (July 16, 2013),” 

http://www.wola.org/commentary/colombia_peace_process_update_july_16_2013.

APPENDICES

Appendices

389

APPENDIX A. ELN MANIFESTOS

Camilo Torres Manifesto

This manifesto is Torres’s public resignation from the church and a 

distillation of the speeches and letters he had been writing throughout 

1964–1965. The manifesto was published in newspapers throughout 

Colombia in June 1965.1

When circumstances exist which make it impossible for 

people to give themselves to Christ, a priest is called 

upon in a special way to make war on those circumstances, even if this leads him to forfeit the celebration 

of the Eucharist; for the Eucharist, if it is not accompanied by the self-giving of Christians, is a ritual devoid 

of meaning. In the present structures of the Church 

it has become impossible for me to continue exercising my priesthood as far as external worship is concerned. However, the Christian priesthood does not 

consist only in the celebration of external rites. The 

Mass, chief goal of all priestly activity, is fundamentally 

a community action. Now the Christian community 

cannot offer the sacrifice of the Mass with authenticity if that same community has not been practicing 

beforehand, and in an effective way, the love of neighbor which the gospel talks about.

I chose Christianity because I believed it to be the purest way of serving my neighbor. I was chosen by Christ 

to be a priest for all eternity, and I was urged on by 

the desire to dedicate myself twenty-four hours a day 

to the love of my fellow-man. As a sociologist I have 

tried to make that love genuinely efficacious by means 

of scientific research and technical advances. Analyzing Colombian society I have come to realize that the 

country needs a revolution in order to feed the hungry, give drink to the thirsty, clothe the naked and provide well-being for the majority of our people. I believe 

that the revolutionary struggle is a Christian struggle, 

and a priestly one. Indeed, in the present specific conditions of Colombia, participation in that struggle is 

the only way men can show love for their neighbors as 

they should.

Ever since I became a priest I have tried in a hundred 

different ways to encourage laymen, whether Catholic or 
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia

not, to join the revolutionary struggle. However, as these 

laymen’s actions have drawn forth no response from the 

masses, I have resolved to dedicate myself to the cause, 

thus fulfilling part of my priestly mission of leading men 

to the love of God by the sure path of love of neighbor. 

As a Colombian I consider this activity to be of the very 

essence of my Christian life and of my priesthood.

As things stand at present in the Church mine is a mission at odds with the hierarchy’s will. I do not wish to 

disobey that will, nor do I wish to be untrue to my own 

conscience. For that reason I have asked His Eminence, 

the cardinal, to relieve me of my clerical obligations in 

order to serve the people in the temporal sphere. I am 

giving up one of the privileges I hold most dear (the 

celebration of the Church’s ritual) in order to create 

conditions which will give to that ritual a more authentic meaning.

If I make this sacrifice I do so in the belief that my 

commitment to my fellow-countrymen obliges me to 

it. The ultimate criterion on human decisions is love, 

supernatural love; I am prepared to run all the risks 

that that love may ask of me.

ELN Simacota Manifesto

This manifesto was published after first ELN incident, January 7, 

1965.2

The reactionary violence unleashed by a succession 

of oligarchic governments and continued under the 

corrupt regime of Valencia, Ruiz Novoa and Lleras, 

has been a powerful weapon used to squash the revolutionary peasant movement, a powerful weapon of 

domination for the last fifteen years.

Education is in the hands of traders who grow rich on 

the ignorance in which they maintain our people.

The soil is tilled by peasants who own nothing and who 

waste away their strength and their families’ health for 

the benefit of oligarchs who live like kings in the cities.

The workers receive starvation wages and are subjected to the misery and humiliations of big industry, 

both foreign and national.
Appendices

391

Democratic young intellectuals and professionals are 

obliged to place their talents at the service of the dominating class, or perish.

Small and medium-sized producers, both in the country and in the city, are ruined by ruthless competition 

and credit monopoly in the hands of foreign capital 

and its local flunkies.

The riches of the Colombian people are looted by 

American imperialists.

But the people, who have felt the scourge of exploitation, of misery, or reactionary violence, have risen up 

and are ready to fight. The revolutionary struggle is 

the only path open to the people in order to overthrow 

the present regime of violence and deceit.

We form the Army of National Liberation and fight for 

the freedom of Colombia.

The people, whether they be Liberals or Conservatives, will make common cause with us to overthrow 

the oligarchy of both parties.

LONG LIVE THE UNION OF PEASANTS, WORKERS, STUDENTS, PROFESSIONALS AND ALL 

HONEST MEN WHO WANT TO MAKE OF COLOMBIA A LAND WORTHY OF THE COLOMBIANS!

LIBERATION OF DEATH!

ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

José Antonio Galan Front

[signed by assumed names of Vásquez and Medina]

Carlos Villarreal

Andres Sierra

ENDNOTES

1 Walter J. Broderick, Camilo Torres: A Biography of the Priest Guerrillero (Garden City, NY: 

Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975), 253–254.

2 Ibid., 213–214.
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APPENDIX B. M-19: THE GUERRILLA POSITION 

PAPER AND OUR REVISION

1. We of the Guerrilla Column Jorge Marcos Zambrano, 

members of the politico-military organization M-19 believe 

that in these long talks, we have tried to focus on the issues 

under discussion while you have tried to digress and delay. 

Consequently, a common interest in achieving a rapid 

solution does not exist. We have had thirty-five days without 

any clear solutions being presented by the Government.

2. We believe that there is no need to express doubt because 

we have none. The Government, during the length of the 

negotiations has not been telling the truth as the following 

examples will show:

A. At the beginning of the negotiations, when we asked for 

the release of Comrade Cuenca Cortes Montegranario, 

the response was that we were asking for the release of 

a delinquent condemned to eighteen years in prison for 

murder. This was done with the intent of impressing 

the Ambassadors since Comrade Montegranario has 

already served most of his sentence and should regain 

his freedom at the end of the year.

B. A similar thing happened when we asked for the release 

of Comrade Coqueco Marco Aurelio.

C. The Government has issued press bulletins which it has 

had to retract at the request of the Ambassadors.

3. Since our beginnings as an organization, we have behaved 

correctly with the people, to power with arms! Our 

organization has kept its promises. During the operation 

“Democracy and Liberty,” Commander One has kept his 

promises and this can be verified by His Excellency the 

Apostolic Nuncio, the Ambassadors, the Consuls, and the 

rest of the hostages.

4. You have produced frustrations that have demoralized the 

hostages, because on the telephone you speak of concrete 

answers and at the negotiations you equivocate.

5. We are aware of the release of Mrs. Fals, of Mrs. Torrado and 

of the ex-magistrate Tony López Ozuela. This give us great 

satisfaction because their release would not have been possible 

without our action and because it serves to show the injustices 

and arbitrariness of Military Justice, which finds itself obliged 

to release innocent persons after more than fourteen months 
Appendices

393

of torture and prison. Meditate upon the words spoken by 

Mrs. Fals on television concerning Military Justice.

6. With regard to the previous meeting at which our departure 

with the 311 political prisoners was discussed, we believe that 

there is “no one blinder than he who will not see.” There 

is nothing on the record about our travelling with persons 

absolved by the courts martial.

7. If no one has been detained for belonging to the M-19, how 

do you explain to the people that your principal objective 

is to destroy our organization; the eager search for our 

leaders who are free; that prisoners are obliged by torture 

to confess that they are members of the M-19; that there 

are hundreds of our comrades under sentence for having 

distributed our propaganda. Why do you offer rewards 

to those who turn over our comrades? As you must know, 

the law states that a person is innocent until proven guilty; 

however, in Colombia unfortunate1y the “law of the jungle” 

prevails. It is considered preferable to condemn the innocent 

than to absolve the guilty. Proof of this are the hundreds 

of thousands of prisoners in our country who have not had 

their juridical situation defined.

8. If, as you say, our country is democratic and free and military 

judges are just and honest, lift the state of siege so that the 

biased courts-martial will be replaced by ordinary justice 

and so that civilians in Colombia might be judged by civilian 

judges and not the current situation where the military 

accuse, torture, defend, prosecute and pass judgment, 

which is a function reserved to God. In other words, we do 

not accept the trials in progress against our revolutionary 

and popular fighting comrades because they should not be 

judged by murderous torturers. The solution does not lie in 

shortening the processes in order to end them sooner. It is 

not a race with the clock. We are not desperate. The problem 

is that the military cannot judge civilians in courts-martial. 

The problem is that we have some diplomatic hostages who 

we are prepared to release for the popular fighters you 

maliciously call “delinquents” just as, in their time, Bolívar, 

San Martin and many other heroes were called.

9. Up until this moment we have released twenty-nine hostages 

without expecting any gift from the Government. We have 

done this, not because of “pressure,” but for humanitarian 

reasons and to show by example that we wish a dialogue and 

a peaceful solution.
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Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia

10. It is very significant that political prisoners in Colombia be 

acknowledged to be judged unjustly and not be treated in 

full dignity as human beings.

11. We agree that it is those prisoners who remain behind and 

those imprisoned in the future that require our greatest 

attention and it is through our operation “Democracy and 

Liberty” that we have shown that political prisoners exist in 

Colombia and that they are savagely tortured and abandoned 

to their fate because military justice does not offer any 

guarantees.

12. You say you have no interest in prolonging the present 

situation indefinitely but, in practice, you are demonstrating 

the contrary to us and to the hostages. We believe that 

the Government has within its means the possibility of a 

decorous and legal solution, and we have demonstrated this 

in the document presented to the Government delegates for 

the President of the Republic.

13. With regard to the persons interested in the ransom 

negotiations, we wish first the freedom of our comrades and 

then the money. We do not want to “mount the saddle before 

we have the horse.”

14. On invitations to international organizations, we wish to 

inform that we accept the International Red Cross, the 

Human Rights Commission of the OAS, and Amnesty 

International as assistance to get you out of the muddle you 

find yourselves in and so that they may make clear that the 

international concept of human right does take precedence 

over national rights.

15. We propose that your documents and ours be made public, 

so that public opinion might be the judge of our actions.

Hostage Version

We of the Guerrilla Column Jorge Marcos Zambrano, 

members of the politico-military organization M-19, 

have made a detailed study of the document that 

was delivered to us by the Government delegates on 

April  1st and, before entering into specifics, wish to 

indicate our desire to avoid the polemic tone evident 

in your document since we consider that this could 

obstruct or delay the negotiations. The Command 
Appendices

395

accepts that, since the taking of the Dominican 

Embassy, it achieved the following gains:

1. Initiation and continuation of the negotiations.

2. Withdrawal of the troops and the Government’s promise of 

not attempting to take the Embassy by force unless there was 

an attempt against the lives of the hostages.

3. Publication of our communique and national and 

international publicity demonstrating that in Colombia 

there are tortures and political prisoners.

4. Measures taken by the Government to accelerate the trials by 

creating a Commission of Jurists for this purpose.

5. From the beginning of the negotiations, the Government 

has offered to invite international institutions to observe 

the courts-martial and accelerate investigations concerning 

abuse of authority, torture and murder of persons linked 

with revolutionary organizations, syndicates and labor 

unions; a promise which was complied with only a few days 

ago as we learned from radio and television. In addition, in 

our view, the positive points of the Government’s document 

are as follows:

A. The Government’s Indication that it is those comrades 

in prison and those that will be imprisoned in the 

future that require the greatest protection; therefore, 

we reiterate as one of our accomplishments in 

operation “Democracy and Liberty” that our comrades 

will not be abandoned to the military but that their 

trials will be under the surveillance of international 

organizations.

B. Similarly, we accept that said organizations will be 

permitted to investigate charges of abuse of authority 

and torture committed against political prisoners.

C. We share the Government’s desire for maintaining the 

dialogue, but we make clear that dialogue for the sake 

of dialoguing is fruitless. The negotiations must be 

directed toward a decorous and peaceful solution.

D. The expressed hope on the part of the Government 

that those prisoners in which we are interested could 

be exonerated by the courts and be able to travel with 

us. Finally we wish to be very clear about the following 

points which are proposals pending from the beginning 

of the negotiation:
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1. From the beginning we have indicated that we have a 

negotiable list of 311 comrades; what is not negotiable or 

subject to debate are those on the list who are members of 

our High Command.

2. Our demand for money is equally negotiable in proportion 

to the number of released comrades. We accept that progress 

could be made in this aspect without this signifying any 

compromise on our part.

3. If, as you say, our country is democratic and free, permit 

justice to be served and the state of siege to be lifted so as 

to end the biased courts-martial and that civilians might be 

judged by civilian judges and not as in the present situation 

where the military, accuse, torture, defend, prosecute and 

pass judgment.

4. We propose that your document and ours be made known 

to the public so that public opinion might judge our actions.

Bogotá

April 1, 1980

By the High Command

Commander One.

Reprinted with permission from Diego Asencio and Nancy Asencio, Diplomats 

and Terrorists—Or: How I Survived a 61-Day Cocktail Party, ed. Manuel Asencio 

(San Francisco: Manuel Asencio Publishing, 2011).
Appendices

397

APPENDIX C. ACRONYMS

ACCU Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá

ACDEGAM Asociación Campesina de Ganaderos y Agricultores 

del Magdalena Medio

ACI Andean Counterdrug Initiative

AD M-19 Alianza Democrática M-19

ANAPO Alianza Nacional Popular

ARIS Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

AUC Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia

BCG Batallones Contraguerrillas

BRIM Brigades Movile

CCAI Coordination Center for Integrated Action

CGSB Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CNG Coordinadora Nacional Guerrillera

COCE Central Command

CODHES Consultaría par los Derechos Humanos y el 

Desplazamiento

COLAR Colombian Army, the Ejerctio Nacional

CONVIVIR Servicios Especiales de Vigilancia y Seguridad 

Privada

CRS Corriente de Renovacíon Socalista

CTC Confederation of Workers of Colombia

DDR Desarme, Desmovilización y Reintegración

DMZ Demilitarized Zone

DSP Democratic Security and Defense Policy

ELN Ejército de Liberación Nacional

EMC Estado Mayor Central

EPL El Ejército Popular de Liberación

ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna

FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

FEDECAFE Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia/

National Federation of Coffee Growers

FN Frente Nacional

GDP Gross Domestic Product

IDP Internally Displaced Person

IED Improvised Explosive Device

ISI Import Substitution Industrialization
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JAC Juntas Accion Communal

JUCO Juventudes Comunista

M-19 Movimiento 19 de Abril

MAQL Movimiento Armado Quintin Lame

MAS Muerte a Secuestradores

MIR Movimiento de Integración Revolucionaria

MLN Movimiento de Liberación Nacional

MMT Mobile Training Team

NCO Noncommissioned Officer

NGO Nongovernmental Organization

OAS Organization of American States

PCC Partido Comunista Colombiano

PCCC Colombian Clandestine Communist Party

PD Polo Democrático

PEPES People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar

PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army

PRT Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores de 

Colombia

PSR Partido Socialista Revolucionario/Revolutionary 

Socialist Party

SORO Special Operations Research Office

SOUTHCOM US Southern Command

UC-ELN National Liberation Army–Camilist Union

UNIR Unión Nacional Izquierdistat Revolucionaria

UP Unión Patriótica/Patriotic Union Party

USAID US Agency for International Development
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399

APPENDIX D. TECHNICAL APPENDIX

Methodology of the Study

All ARIS Tier 1 Insurgency Case Studies are presented using the 

same framework. While not a strict template, it is a method used by the 

team to ensure a common treatment of the cases, which will aid readers 

in comparing one case with another.

All of the sources used in preparation of these case studies are 

unclassified and for the most part are secondary rather than primary 

sources. Where we could, we used primary sources to describe the 

objectives of the revolution and to give a sense of the perspective of 

the revolutionary or another participant or observer. This limitation to 

unclassified sources allows a much wider distribution of the case studies while hindering the inclusion of revealing or perhaps more accurate information. We selected sources that provide the most reliable 

and accurate research we could obtain, endeavoring to use sources we 

believe to be authoritative and unbiased.

These case studies are intended to be strictly neutral in terms of 

bias toward the revolution or those to whom the revolution was or is 

directed. We sought to balance any interpretive bias in our sources and 

in the presentation of information so that the case may be studied without any indication by the author of moral, ethical, or other judgment.

While we used a multi-methodological approach in our analysis, 

the analytical method that underpins these case studies can most accurately be described as “contextual social/political analysis.” Research 

in the social sciences is often done from one of two opposing perspectives. The first is a positivist perspective, which looks for universal laws 

to describe actions in the human domain and considers context to be 

background noise. The second is a postmodernist or constructivist 

perspective, which denies the existence of general laws and attributes 

of social and political structures and processes, and as a consequence 

focuses almost entirely on local factors. Contextual analysis is “something in between,” in which context is used to facilitate the discovery 

of regularities in social and political processes and thereby promote 

systematic knowledge.1 In practice, contextual social/political analysis 

balances these two perspectives, combining a comparative understanding of the actors, events, activities, relationships, and interactions associated with the case of interest with an appreciation for the significant 

role context played in how and why things transpired.

“Context” includes factors, settings, or circumstances that in some 

way may act on or interact with actors, organizations, or other entities within the country being studied, often enabling or constraining 
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actions. It is a construct or interpretation of the properties of a system, organization, or situation that are necessary to provide meaning 

beyond what is objectively observable.2

Although we have applied this methodology throughout these case 

studies, the section entitled Context and Catalysts of the Insurgency focuses 

heavily on contextual aspects. Examples of elements of context often 

used in this type of analysis include culture, history, place (location), 

population (demography), and technology. Within these studies, we 

present the primary discussion of context as follows:

Physical Environment

Social scientists often cite features of the physical environment as 

a risk factor for conflict—whether it is slope elevation, mountainous 

terrain, or rural countryside. Rough terraina is a typical topographical feature correlated with rebel activity, as it provides safe havens and 

resources for insurgents. Insurgent groups such as the Afghan Taliban 

have benefited from mountainous terrain, making pursuit and surveillance by countervailing forces difficult. Likewise, the Viet Cong in 

Vietnam benefited from dense forest cover despite American attempts 

at defoliation.3 Less clear are the reasons behind the correlation that 

researchers have found between rough terrain and conflict. Most theories for this relationship center on insurgent viability and a state’s capacity to govern. In short, rough terrain is correlated with conflict, but that 

does not mean it causes conflict or that rough terrain is necessary for a 

conflict to emerge.b

Other geographic features, such as location and distance, have an 

impact on conflict patterns and processes. Generally, regions farther 

from the capital are at higher risk for conflict, as are those closer to 

international borders. Another important consideration when analyzing the impact of geography on conflict patterns and processes is the 

expanse of the conflict. While it is common to speak of entire countries 

embroiled in conflict, actual conflicts generally occur only in a small 

percentage of a state’s territory, typically fifteen percent. Despite that 

a Most researchers use mountains (or slope elevation) and forests as a proxy for 

“rough terrain.” Little attention has been paid to other topographical features, such as 

swamps, that impede government access or surveillance.

b The relationship between terrain and conflict can be described as follows: “rebels 

who seek refuge in the mountains are better able to withstand a militarily superior opposition . . . that rebel groups will take advantage of such terrain, whenever available. We do 

not believe that terrain in and of itself is a cause of conflict, nor does the rough terrain 

proposition anticipate such a relationship.”4
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401

low figure, however, internal conflicts can sometimes encompass nearly 

half of the territory of the host country.5

Historical Context

Revolutions or insurgencies do not emerge from formless ether but, 

rather, take their shape from accumulated layers of historical experience. Not only are actors in insurgent movements important participants in history, but they are also its end users. That is, insurgent 

movements are not only shaped by historical experience, but they also 

actively seek to understand and manipulate the key components of 

those experiences—whether historical events, persons, or narratives—

to accomplish their objectives. Thus, sustained, organized political violence cannot be adequately explained without analyzing the historical 

context in which it developed. Some of the themes analyzed in this 

section are the legacies, whether organizational, political, or social, of 

conflict over time; the formation of group and organizational identity 

and its attendant narrative; the development of societal and political 

institutions; and the changing relationships, and perceptions thereof, 

that balance national, local, and/or group interests.6

Charles Tilly, a pioneering sociologist studying political conflict, 

made important observations about the relationship between social 

movements and historical context. Several of these are described below:

• Social movements incorporate locally available cultural materials 

such as language, social categories, and widely shared beliefs; 

they therefore vary as a function of historically determined local 

cultural accumulations.

• Path dependency prevails in social movements as in other political 

processes, such that events occurring at one stage in a sequence 

constrain the range of events that is possible at later stages.

• Once social movements have occurred and acquired names, both 

the name and competing representations of social movements 

became available as signals, models, threats, and/or aspirations 

for later actors.7

While Tilly’s observations address social movements, usually understood as nonviolent political movements, he and his collaborators 

argued that contentious political activity belonged on a continuum, 

not in separate categories.8 Violent and nonviolent groups belonged 

to the same genus but used different “repertoires of contention.” Thus, 

the same methodologies used to explain nonviolent political activity 

could also be useful in explaining violent political activity. Our extensive research on nearly thirty insurgencies supports this theory. The 
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insurgencies, but also the individual participants themselves, often 

began their careers by engaging in nonviolent political activity, transitioning to violence sometimes only after many years. To connect the 

observations described above more explicitly with revolutionary and 

insurgent activities, we examine each of these general observations of 

social movements and apply them to the specific activities associated 

with an insurgency or revolution. Revolutions and insurgencies typically begin as local or regional movements, and as such they include 

all of the aspects of local cultural material, which, as mentioned above, 

contributes to the ontology of a social movement.

Insurgent activities frequently cross borders and have an influence 

on the societies and movements in adjacent regions. Actions taken 

by an insurgent organization at one point in time can eliminate or 

enable possible future options for furthering the insurgency. Groups 

associated with revolutions and insurgencies usually seek recognition 

for their actions, so it is important for them to have names and symbols (emblems, flags, etc.) that can be easily associated with them and 

their causes. These representations then become the public branding 

of the organization and are used by supporters and detractors alike to 

further the narrative or counter-narrative of a movement. Given these 

factors, the historical context within which any insurgency, revolution, 

or other internal conflict takes place is a critical element in analyzing 

these events.

Socioeconomic Conditions

How do socioeconomic conditions affect insurgencies? One important socioeconomic variable to consider is per-capita gross domestic 

product (GDP), and the high correlation of this variable with political 

stability is among one of the most robust findings in the analysis of 

conflict dynamics. In general, some of the relevant socioeconomic factors that impact political violence include poverty, relative deprivation, 

opportunity costs, and ethnic nationalism.

With respect to poverty, some political scientists argue that countries with lower levels of economic development are more likely to witness political violence.9

 Poverty describes the poor material wealth of 

individuals or societies, but it also tells researchers that the country 

is likely suffering from a host of other ills. Rather than just a simple 

measure of wealth, a country’s low GDP per capita is also a proxy measure for poor state capacity. States with poor capacity feature a central 

government with a limited ability to project power across their territory 

to enforce laws, policies, and regulations.10 Often, the governments in 

these states have weak institutions, poor governance, and widespread 
Appendices

403

corruption, all factors that enable insurgents to more easily recruit 

and operate. For instance, in Colombia, a relatively wealthy developing 

country, limited resources made it difficult for the government to build 

road infrastructure in rural areas. As a result, the security forces found 

it difficult to access remote areas where insurgents found sanctuary. 

However, poverty by itself is not enough to predict an insurgency. It is 

best understood as a risk factor for political conflict.11

Researchers also look at additional factors that are closely related 

to poverty, such as the presence of a large landless population. In many 

countries, including Iran and Colombia, land reform was a prominent 

feature of the demands of resistance movements in the twentieth century.12 Poverty can also introduce “selective incentives” to participate in 

insurgencies. These incentives are the advantages that accrue to participants, whether economic gain or enhanced social status and political power, gained by participating in a successful rebellion.13 Other 

research has also indicated that countries with extensive patron–client 

networks, large agricultural sectors, and highly uneven patterns of land 

ownership are also at risk for political conflict.c

Another branch of research related to poverty looks at how a government’s efforts to modernize society and the economy can lead to 

increased tensions.15 More specifically, this perspective argues that 

the modernization process is inherently conflictual since in practice 

it is often uneven, as greater emphasis is usually placed on economic 

and social uplift of downtrodden groups without developing a political 

framework for adequately incorporating them in the political process. 

Elite members of the ancien régime may see their fortunes decline relative to newly empowered classes, yet the latter remain disenchanted as 

the former may still control the levers of political power. This dynamic 

was present in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in 

Sri Lanka, as rising members of the karavas caste in Sinhalese society 

attempted to challenge the political power of the govigama, the highest 

group within the Sinhalese constellation of castes.

Another proposed socioeconomic factor theorized to contribute to 

conflict is relative political, social, and economic grievances. In Why 

c In such an environment, patron–client relations may suppress the desire of the 

peasantry to offer support to reformist parties that seek to reduce extreme levels of economic and land inequality. Specifically, a small oligarchic land-holding elite may use its 

economic power over the peasantry to compel the latter to vote for parties that oppose 

land redistribution (which would involve the breakup and sell-off of large estates). Joshi 

and Mason14 found that Maoist insurgents in Nepal who supported land reform were more 

successful in mobilizing peasants to support an insurgency than to support their candidates for parliament. They found that patron–client relationships prevented the peasantry 

from offering their political support, and that the insurgents had greater support in 

areas where they were able to disrupt clientelist dependency between the landed elite and 

the peasantry.
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Men Rebel, Ted Gurr argued that political violence can be explained 

by relative deprivation, which occurs when individuals or groups feel 

deprived of resources or opportunities in comparison with others in 

society.16 If political allegiance is based on ethnicity and one ethnic 

minority group experiences deprivation relative to the ethnic majority 

group (as happened with the Tamils in Sri Lanka vis-à-vis the Sinhalese in the early 1970s), then the minority may give up hope for satisfying its aspirations within a unitary state and seek to detach itself from 

the nation.

Other related important indicators for grievance are political exclusion and economic inequality. In Colombia, for example, following the 

country’s mid-century civil war, La Violencia, political elites established 

a closed political system that disenfranchised several groups, especially 

communist and socialist ones. This reinforced Colombia’s historical 

inability to include all its citizens in a political process, leading to political exclusion and the economic space and motivation for insurgency by 

both political and criminal groups.

Social scientists also link poor economic development to reduced 

opportunity costs for potential rebels. People mired in poverty have 

few opportunities for economic gain. For these individuals, joining an 

insurgency is not a sacrifice of resources in other, more lucrative fields. 

Instead, joining an insurgency may offer economic benefits, making recruitment easier for insurgent groups.17 Lowered opportunity 

costs are magnified in areas with “lootable” resources such as drugs 

or diamonds that can be used to finance an insurgency and enrich 

its participants.

The analysis of the socioeconomic factors underlying political conflict also includes examining the dynamics between different ethnic 

groups in a state. After the Cold War, the incidence of wars motivated by 

identity grievances proliferated. Social scientists refer to these conflicts 

as ethnic wars. Ethnic wars may also be influenced by additional factors, 

such as relative deprivation and political exclusion, but the fulcrum of 

these conflicts is identity. The clash of ethnic identities and fears of cultural extinction can be the animus motivating these conflicts. Political 

scientist Benedict Anderson defined a nation as “an imagined political community” in which “members of even the smallest nation will 

never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of 

them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”18

Anderson’s seminal concept highlights how groups, whether nations 

or ethnicities, together construct a common identity through shared 

linguistic, regional, or religious attributes, among others.

These dynamics are also present in ethnic groups. In Sri Lanka, 

the ethnic Tamil Tigers battled the Sinhalese government for decades 
Appendices

405

to secure an independent state. The Tamils and Sinhalese communities constructed their identities based on both facts and distortions of 

the historical record. Thus, while separate south Indian and Sinhalese 

communities have resided on the island for several thousand years, during the recent conflict some participants may have “read history backwards.”19 The communities began to view past conflicts through the 

prism of an identity paradigm, irrespective of whether the participants 

of the conflicts in the distant past were motivated by ethnic grievances.

The social science research on ethnic identity and political conflict 

can be divided into three primary perspectives. Despite a burgeoning 

research program, social scientists do not agree on how ethnic identity 

impacts the dynamics of insurgency. Early research identified the extent 

of ethnic heterogeneity as a motivating factor for conflict. Ethnic heterogeneity refers to the diversity of different ethnic groups in a country. 

It was thought that the more ethnic groups resided in a country, the 

more likely it was to experience political conflict.20 Another school of 

thought argued that other risk factors, such as low levels of economic 

development and weak institutions, were more important contributors to political conflict than the ethnic makeup of a country.21 The 

third and final perspective developed more nuanced arguments. These 

scholars argued that ethnic groups which were excluded from political 

power were most likely to rebel. A widely used data set, the Minorities at Risk database, tracks disenfranchised ethnic groups all over the 

world.22 In the same vein, other research has added to arguments based 

on political exclusion. This research looks at how the distribution of 

power in the political system among competing groups affects conflict. 

Ethnic groups are more likely to rebel when the center of power in the 

country is segmented among competing groups and when a smaller 

ethnic majority rules over and excludes a larger ethnic majority.23

In addition to the long-running ethnic insurgency in Sri Lanka discussed above, numerous ARIS case studies were driven by ethnic politics. The decades-long conflict in Northern Ireland pitted Catholics and 

Protestants against one another. The conflict was fueled by the political 

exclusion of Catholics by the Protestant-dominated government. Protestants largely ruled the country even though the Catholic community 

comprised the majority of the population. Similarly, an ethnic Albanian 

insurgency erupted in Kosovo after Slobodan Milosevic gained control 

of the Serbian government in 1989. While in office, Milosevic dissolved 

the political autonomy of Kosovo, rendering it subordinate to the Serbian national government. Combined with his policies of exclusion targeted against ethnic Albanians, Kosovo declared its independence and 

mounted an armed insurgency against Milosevic’s government.
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Government and Politics

When considering government and politics in the contextual analysis of insurgency, it is helpful to begin by focusing on the impact of 

ideas and institutions on the decisions and actions of stakeholders in 

the conflict. An analysis of the impact of ideas requires understanding the political discourses within state and society and the dynamics 

between the state and challengers to its authority. When looking at how 

institutions influence decisions and actions, researchers consider the 

type of government and the capacity of the state to govern. Together, 

these factors help explain how insurgent groups are able to mobilize 

and operate in a state.

Civil society groups independent of the government contribute to 

the political context in which insurgencies emerge. Indeed, such groups 

may be among the main actors within a rebellion. More specifically, 

we have discussed insurgency or revolution as a specific instance of a 

social movement. Social movements have been defined as “networks 

of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups, or 

associations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of 

a shared collective identity.”24 Government and politics is one of the 

primary means through which ideas are enacted within society. Social 

movements (such as insurgencies) are another. The key difference 

between social movements and other means within society is that social 

movements (1) exhibit strong lines of conflict with political or social 

opponents, (2) involve dense interorganizational networks, and (3) are 

made up of individuals whose sense of collective identity exists beyond 

any specific campaign or engagement.25

Social scientists often look at how different regime types shape patterns of political violence in a country. Regime types are broad categories, such as democratic and autocratic, used to describe the political 

structure of a government. Currently, social scientists favor these institutional factors over the socioeconomic factors discussed above for 

their efficacy in explaining political violence in a country. Simply put, 

“most states have potential insurgents with grievances and resources, 

but almost always possess far greater military power than do insurgents.” With these advantages, competent regimes are usually capable 

of defeating armed challenges to their authority. Weak and divided 

regimes, however, are less capable of defending their authority.26

As a result, social scientists often look at a state’s regime type as 

a significant factor for explaining the emergence of political conflict. 

Many of the initial studies on this topic used a simple categorization 

of regimes as either democratic or autocratic, but researchers have 

also adopted a three-way categorization that includes democracy and 
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407

autocracy as categories, as well as a middle category of “anocracy,” 

which characterizes a government that has both democratic and autocratic elements. Although the findings have recently been challenged, 

anocracies are thought to be at higher risk for insurgencies than fully 

democratic or autocratic regimes.27

Most researchers agree that developed, mature democratic states are 

the least vulnerable to political conflict. Secure democracies provide 

pressure valves for the release of societal discontent through well-trod 

legal-institutional channels. In the United States, for instance, citizens 

are able to vote leaders out of office, contribute to groups lobbying for 

their interests, or engage in civil resistance to voice their discontent. If 

radicalized resistance movements were to opt to use violent or illegal 

means to achieve their political objectives in the United States, they 

would have difficulty raising support. For the average citizen, the costs 

are simply too high and the expected payoff too low.

In highly repressive regimes, the situation is nearly a mirror opposite of the situation facing open democratic societies. Highly repressive 

regimes provide no legal channels for political opposition or dissent. In 

these authoritarian states, it is difficult for political dissenters to form 

an organized political opposition to the regime. These regimes usually 

have highly refined secret police and other intelligence-gathering capabilities. Before the Syrian civil war and the Arab Spring, for instance, 

the Assad regime kept dissent in check through its secret police, the 

Mukhabarat. The police had an extensive intelligence apparatus supplemented by ordinary civilians encouraged to inform on family, friends, 

and colleagues. As a result, most Syrians were highly suspicious of voicing dissent against the Assad regime.28 In such regimes, any attempts 

at opposition are usually met with arbitrary arrests, interrogations, and 

detentions. Political opposition is usually stillborn, crushed by the overwhelming force of the state’s security apparatus. For the average citizen 

in these repressive regimes, such as North Korea, the costs of resistance 

are simply too high.

However, in today’s world, many states fall somewhere in between 

these two extremes. Social scientists call these states, which combine 

democratic and authoritarian features, hybrid regimes, or anocracies. These states might, for instance, have nominally democratic elections but might rig or otherwise corrupt election results. As a result, 

the ruling party or political leaders never face serious challenges to 

their authority.

Researchers find that political conflict is more likely to arise in 

these anocracies than in truly democratic or repressive states.29 This 

finding is referred to as the “inverted U-curve” because the concentration of political conflict on the authoritarian–democratic scale falls in 
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the middle. These states typically allow just enough political and civil 

liberties that political opposition is able to form. The inherent contradictions in these states, which claim to be democratic but engage in 

activities that do not support these claims, also fuel societal grievances. 

When the political opposition mounts a challenge to the state, security 

forces often violently suppress it, leading some resistance movements to 

adopt violence as a strategy to achieve their political objectives.30

In the preceding sections, we have already discussed how political exclusion fueled political conflict in Colombia. In many ways, the 

state resembled an anocracy. After its mid-century war, the government 

altered its constitution to rotate the presidency between the two major 

parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, in control of the government. 

The National Front government, as it was called, made it very difficult 

for the emerging middle and lower classes to be incorporated into the 

political process. Additionally, a small elite sector controlled both parties. In 1970, one outside contender for the Liberal presidential candidacy, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, ran for office but lost the election. Many 

believed that electoral fraud perpetrated by the political elite prevented 

Rojas’s victory.

This event was the trigger for the formation of an important insurgent group in Colombia, the M-19, which took its name from the date 

of the alleged fraudulent election, April 19. In its propaganda, the M-19 

disparaged the Colombian regime for failing to live up to its democratic 

ideals. The M-19 was instrumental in a 1991 constitutional reform process that eliminated some of these barriers to political participation.

Some researchers, however, consider these categorizations (democracy, anocracy, and autocracy) to be overly simplistic or ambiguous. 

Recent work has developed a more detailed set of parameters to determine what researchers call “the institutional character of the national 

political regime.” These parameters explain the degree to which elections for leaders of countries (i.e., presidents, prime ministers, etc.) are 

open, competitive, and institutionalized (i.e., rule based), and whether 

opposition and other political groups can compete for political power 

and influence. After considerable research, experts found these attributes to be the most significant indicators or predictors of conflict.31

ENDNOTES

1 Charles Tilly and Robert E. Gordon, “It Depends,” in The Oxford Handbook of Contextual 

Political Analysis, eds. Robert E. Gordon and Charles Tilly (Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 2006), 6, 9.
Appendices

409

2 W. B. Max Crownover, “Complex System Contextual Framework (CSCF): A GroundedTheory Construction for the Articulation of System Context in Addressing Complex Systems Problems” (PhD diss., Old Dominion University, 2005).

3 Nathan Bos, “Underlying Causes of Violence,” in Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, ed. Nathan Bos (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special 

Operations Command, 2013), 27.

4 Halvard Buhaug and Jan Ketil Rød, “Local Determinants of African Civil Wars, 1970–

2001,” Political Geography 25, no. 3 (2006): 316.

5 Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, “Introducing 

ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset: Special Data Feature,” Journal 

of Peace Research 47, no. 5 (2010): 652.

6 Charles Tilly, “Why and How History Matters,” in The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, ed. Robert E. Gordon and Charles Tilly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 

2006), 423.

7 Ibid., 425.

8 Doug McAdam, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, The Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

9 Bos, “Underlying Causes of Violence,” 15.

10 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American 

Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.

11 Bos, “Underlying Causes of Violence,” 15.

12 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic 

Papers 56, no. 4 (2004): 576-77.

13 Mark Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

14 Madhav Joshi and David Mason, “Between Democracy and Revolution: Peasant Support 

for Insurgency versus Democracy in Nepal,” Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 6 (2008): 

765–782.

15 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University 

Press), 1968.

16 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 571.

17 Jeffery Paige, Agrarian Revolution (New York: The Free Press, 1975).

18 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 2006), 6.

19 Bryan Pfaffenberger, “Introduction: The Sri Lankan Tamils,” in The Sri Lankan Tamils: 

Ethnicity and Identity, eds. Chelvadurai Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger (Boulder, 

CO: Westview Press, 1994), 20.

20 Tanja Ellingsen, “Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches’ Brew?: Multiethnicity and 

Domestic Conflict during and after the Cold War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 2 

(2000): 228–249.

21 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.”

22 Minorities at Risk Project, “Minorities at Risk Dataset,” Center for International Development and Conflict Management (2009), http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/.

23 Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min, “Ethnic Politics and Armed 

Conflict,” American Sociological Review 74, no. 2 (2009): 316–337.

24 Mario Diani, “The Concept of Social Movement,” Sociological Review 40, no. 1 (1992): 

1–25.

25 Mario Diani and Ivano Bison, “Organizations, Coalitions, and Movements,” Theory and 

Society 33, no. 3–4 (2004): 281–309.

26 Jack A. Goldstone, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael B. Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward, “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability,” American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 1 (2010): 190–208.
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27 Edward N. Muller and Erich Weede, “Cross-National Variation in Political Violence: A 

Rational Action Approach,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, no. 4 (1990): 624–651; 

James Vreeland, “The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy,” The 

Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 3 (2008): 401–425.

28 Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

29 Håvard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992,” American 

Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (2001): 33-48.

30 Ibid.

31 Goldstone et al., “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability,” 190–208.
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INDEX

Index

439

A

Abductions; See Kidnapping/hostagetaking

Administrative operations

AUC, 304–305

ELN, 195–196

FARC, 148–151

M-19, 247–250

African National Congress (ANC), 322

Afro-Colombians (blacks), 55, 56, 113

Agencia Bolivariana de Prensa 

(Bolivarian Press Agency), 151

Agency, 104

Agriculture, 59–61; See also specific 

agricultural products, e.g.: Coffee

ALBA alliance, 139

Alfaro Vive, 249

Alfonso Cano; See Sáenz Vargas, 

Guillermo León

Alianza Democrática M-19 (AD M-19, 

M-19 Democratic Alliance), 223, 

232–233, 254–256, 324–325, 

381–382

Alianza Nacional Popular (ANAPO, 

National Popular Alliance), 210–

211, 213, 223–224, 251

Almarales, Andrés, 213

Alternación, 93–94

Alvárez, Carlos Jader, 258

Americas Battalion (M-19), 257

Amerindians, 55, 56

Amnesty laws, 338, 339

Andes mountains, 20–22

Arenas, Jacobo; See Morantes Jaimes, 

Luis Alberto

ARIS Tier 1 Insurgency Case Studies, 

399–408

Armed component

AUC, 289–292

ELN, 180–181, 188–189

FARC, 131–132

M-19, 221–223

Armed forces; See Military, Colombian

Armed groups; See also individual groups

ideologies of, 109–110

paramilitary operations of, 110–111

physical environment and, 26–29

political visions of, 110

Armed violence; See also specific conflicts;

specific conflicts and groups

areas impacted by, 27

character and motivation of, 88

impact of, 111–113

Army Cadet School, 89

Army War College, 89

Arroyave Ruiz, Jose Miguel (Arcángel), 

286, 299

Artisan class, 47, 48

Asociación Campesina de Ganaderos 

y Agricultores del Magdalena 

Medio (ACDEGAM), 259–260

Assassinations

and 1988 peace negotiations, 253

AUC, 286, 292, 297, 300, 306

Communist Party members, 133

by FARC, 143

Gaitán, 80–82

by paramilitaries, 254

UP members, 133, 152–153

Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent 

Strategies (ARIS) series, 3–5

Australia, 155

Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba 

y Urabá (ACCU, Peasant SelfDefense Forces of Córdoba and 

Urabá), 274, 277, 278, 280, 289, 

291

Autodefensas de Cundinamarca 

(Cundinamarca Self-Defense 

Group), 281

Autodefensas de la Sierra (Mountain 

Self-Defense Group), 280

Autodefensas del Sur del César 

(Southern César Self-Defense 

Group), 280

Autodefensas del Tolima (Tolima SelfDefense Group), 280
440

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia

Autodefensas de Puerto Boyacá 

(Puerto Boyacá Self-Defense 

Group), 280

Autodefensas de Ramón Isaza (SelfDefense Group of Ramón Isaza), 

281

Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 

(AUC, United Self-Defense 

Forces of Colombia), 269–312, 

323

administrative operations, 304–305

armed component, 289–292

and cease-fire zones, 190

command and control, 287

communications, 311–312

criminal activity, 309–310

external actors and transnational 

influences, 308–309

finances, 309–311

government countermeasures, 355, 

363–364

ideology, 109–110, 278, 282, 294–

295

leadership, 280–287

legitimacy, 295–297, 306–307

logistics, 311

membership and recruitment, 280, 

290–291, 304–305

motivation and behavior, 297–299

organizational structure, 275–280

origins of, 86, 279–275

paramilitary operations, 111, 300–

304

political operations, 307–308

political vision of, 110

psychological operations, 305–307

public component, 292–294

reintegration of guerrillas from, 

382

timeline, 271

training, 284

underground and auxiliary 

components, 287–289

Auxiliary component

AUC, 287–289

ELN, 186–188

FARC, 129–130

M-19, 220–221

B

Bananas, 59

Banana strike (1928), 50

Banco de Comercio (Commerce 

Bank), 128–129

Bandit groups, 86, 279–280, 332

Barco Vargas, Virgilio, 274, 341–344

Barrera, Daniel (El Loco), 286

Bateman Cayón, Jaime (El Flaco), 211, 

213, 214, 228, 236, 238, 240, 242, 

247, 249–252, 258, 260

Bautista, Nicolás Rodríguez 

(Gambino), 182, 186–189, 195, 

202

Behavior; See Motivation and behavior

Benitez, Morales, 340

Bermúdez, Gerardo (Francisco Galán), 

364–365

Betancourt, Ingrid, 160, 164, 243, 365

Betancur Cuartas, Belisario, 215, 242, 

252, 338–341

Birth rates, 57

Bitterman, Charles, 227

Blacks (Afro-Colombians), 55, 56, 113

Bloque Sur de Guerrilla (Southern 

Bloc), 121, 123

Bogotá, Federico; See Palmera Pineda, 

Juvenal Ricardo

Bogotazo, 81

Bolívar, Simón, 33–35, 38–40

Bolívar, sword of, 226–227, 236

Bolivarianism, 154

Bolivarian militias, 130

Bolivarian Movement for a New 

Colombia, 153, 154

Bolivarian Revolutionary Army, 157

Bolivarians, 33, 35–39, 40, 44
Index

441

Bombing attacks, 111, 113

AUC, 300

ELN, 196–197

FARC, 146, 147, 158

M-19, 233–234

Briceño Suárez, Jorge; See Suárez Rojas, 

Victor Julio

C

Caicedo, Domingo, 40, 42, 51

Caicedo family, 42

Caldera, Rafael, 157

Cano, Alfonso; See Sáenz Vargas, 

Guillermo León

Capitalism, 62

Caribbean coast region, 23, 56

Castaño, Jesus, 284, 336

Castaño, José (El Profe) Vicente, 

282–284

Castaño family, 336

Castaño Gil, Carlos, 112, 215, 272–279, 

282–285, 289, 294, 296–297, 302, 

305, 307–308, 310, 312, 336, 350

Castaño Gil, Fidel, 274, 275, 277, 282–

284, 289

Castro, Fidel, 81, 177–178, 197–198, 240

Castro, Jaime, 246

Castro, Raúl, 177–178, 198

Casualties

civilian, 111–112, 136, 146–147, 302

of La Violencia, 85

Catholic Church, 33, 49

Catholicism, 55

Caudillos, 42

Cease-fire zones; See Demilitarized 

zones (zona de despeje)

Central government, 67–68

1949 near collapse of, 84–85

legitimacy of, 103

under Olaya, 71

and protectionism policies, 58

Los Chamizos, 286

Chávez, Hugo, 154, 156–157, 198, 309

Chavista regime (Venezuela), 138

Children, FARC’s enlistment of, 135, 

150

China, 139

Chiquita company, 310, 355

Christianity, 190, 191

Church, 36–37, 47–48; See also Catholic 

Church

Cifuentes Águila, Luis Eduardo (El 

Águila), 287

Civic action projects (Simpatico), 

333–334

Civilian casualties

AUC, 302

FARC, 111–112, 136, 146–147

Civil wars, 33, 321–322

1840-1842, 44

dynamics of, 86–87

following 1946 elections, 69

La Violencia, 59, 67

War of a Thousand Days, 33–34, 49

Classes; See also Social inequality; 

individual classes

alliance between Liberals and 

popular classes, 46–48

in colonial era, 56

proletariat, 50

urban/professional, 72–73

Clientelism, 55, 67, 68, 105

Climate, 22–23

Coca, 61, 309, 356, 363

Codfish, 336

Coffee, 58, 59, 61–62

Cold War, 321, 322

Colombian Air Force, 347

Colombian Army (COLAR, Ejército 

Nacional)

AUC as satellites to, 291

counterinsurgency, 353–354

FARC communications 

compromised by, 164

FARC defeats of, 144

Jojoy killed by, 127
442

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia

M-19 invasion of Colombia, 241–242

and police, 89, 91

salaries of FARC vs., 149, 150

Colombian Clandestine Communist 

Party (PCCC), 153

Colombian Navy, 89

Colonial era, 56

Command and control

AUC, 287

ELN, 178–182

FARC, 121–125

M-19, 216–217

Communication infrastructure, 25

Communications

AUC, 311–312

FARC, 163–164

Communism, 51, 56

AUC opposition to, 294

and ELN recruits, 195

and labor unions, 72

lack of support for, 88

and M-19 ideology, 225

as recruiting influence, 230

Congress, 68, 95, 97–98

Connolly, Niall, 158–159

Conservatives

1930 split presidential ticket, 69–74

1946 split presidential ticket, 69, 

74–80

conflict over right to govern, 33

constitutionalist alliance with 

Liberals, 48

early split with Liberals, 35–39

mobilization of followers by 

Rodríguez, 47

and National Front, 93

partisan identity, 41–46

partisan violence, 81–85

patronage networks, 55

return in 1946, 74–80

and role of church, 47–48

Consociational democracy, 93

Constitutional conventions, 40, 93

Constitutional Court, 99–100

Constitutions, 49

1821, 34, 38, 39

1853, 48

1886, 49, 67

1991, 94–100

proposed by Bolívar, 38–39

Cooper, Donald, 257, 260

Coordinadora Guerrilla Simón Bolívar 

(CGSB), 344–346

Coordination Center for Integrated 

Action (CCAI), 361–363, 375

Correa, Rafael, 156

Corriente de Renovación Socialista 

(CRS), 186, 195

Costa Rica, 198

Counterfeiting, 310

Coups, 48, 59, 91–92

Courts, 99–100

Criminal activity; See also specific 

activities, e.g.: Drug trade

AUC, 279, 308–310

ELN, 181, 182

excluded under amnesty law, 338

FARC, 160–163

M-19, 257

Criminal bands, 103

Cuba

ELN ties with, 197–198

FARC ties with, 139

M-19 invasion of Colombia, 240–242

M-19’s ties with, 237

M-19 ties with, 260

M-19 training in, 249

Cuban Revolution, 177–178, 180, 191, 

225

Cúcuta Constitution (1821), 34, 38, 39

Cultural differences, regional, 24
Index

443

D

Daly, Sarah Zukerman, 28, 29

“Dance of the millions,” 50

Declaration of Cauca (199), 343–344

De facto sovereignty, 103

Demilitarized zones (zona de despeje),

351–353, 356

ELN, 181, 190

FARC, 134, 145, 153–154

Democracy

consociational, 93

as M-19 goal, 251

and violent pluralism, 67

Democratic Security and Defense 

Policy (DSP), 357–360

Democratic societies, 47

Demographics, 57

Depression (1930s), 58–59

Desarme, Desmovilización 

y Reinserción (DDR, 

Disarmament, Demobilization, 

and Reintegration)

AUC, 279

FEDCAFE partnership in, 62

Devia Silva, Luis Edgar (Raúl Reyes), 

110, 127–128, 150, 155, 351, 365

Displacements, 112–113, 278–279, 292, 

376

Dominican embassy siege, 223, 225, 

226, 236–240, 338

Drug trade, 61

AUC, 279–280, 286, 308–310

during Barco administration, 

341–342

DDR approach to, 279

ELN, 182, 191, 196, 201

FARC, 124, 161–162, 348, 357, 

365–366

and growth of paramilitaries, 277

paramilitary groups in, 274, 289

during Samper administration, 

347–349

Drug traffickers (narcotraffickers)

in current cycle of violence, 103

and M-19, 259–260

Mancuso, 285

MAS threats against, 259

E

Eastern Europe, 163

Eastern region, 23, 24, 56, 57

Economic inequality, 56

Economic policy, 57–62

Economic sabotage, 141–142

Economy

during 1930s, 71–72

ELN support of foreign investment, 

190

free commerce, 42

natural resources, 61–62

in Pax Conservadora, 49–50

Ecuador, 39, 41, 155–156, 163

Education; See also Training

military, 89, 354, 359

of urban population by M-19, 219

Ejército de Liberación Nacional 

(ELN), 173–202, 323

administrative operations, 195–196

armed component, 180–181, 188–

189

attacks by, 111–112

Camilo Torres Manifesto, 389–390

civilian casualties of, 111

external actors and transnational 

influences, 197–199

FARC and, 141, 193

finances, 199–201, 379

government countermeasures, 335, 

336, 340, 343, 344, 352–353, 

364–365

ideology, 109, 190, 196

leadership, 182–186

legitimacy, 190–191

logistics, 201–202

M-19 training with, 246, 249
444

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia

membership and recruitment, 195

motivation and behavior, 191

organizational structure and 

command and control, 178–182

origins of, 177–178

paramilitary operations, 111, 191–

194

and physical environment, 28

political operations, 196–197

psychological operations, 196

public component, 189–190

reintegration of guerrillas from, 

382

Simacota Manifesto, 390–391

strategic attacks by, 104

strategies exploiting rural lands, 20

timeline, 175–176

training, 188–189

underground and auxiliary 

components, 186–188

Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL), 

331, 340, 344, 346

Elections

1832, 44

1837, 44

1875, 48–49

1930 split presidential ticket, 70–74

1946 split presidential ticket, 74–80

1949, 82–84

1970, 210–211

1998, 145

intensity surrounding, 43

legislative, 97

Elites

in anti-FARC struggle, 357

AUC’s influence on, 293–294

exposure to violence, 374

Gaitán’s danger to, 72

Liberal, 48

and National Front system, 94

and politicization of police, 89

El Salvador, 163

Empujemos (Let’s Push), 230

Enlightenment, 37, 46–47

Escobar, Pablo, 227, 244, 258, 259, 

277–278, 283

ETA, 154

Ethnicity, 55–56

Europe, 159–160

Exaltados, 43, 44

Executive offices, 67–68, 95

External actors and transnational 

influences

AUC, 308–309

ELN, 197–199

FARC, 154–160

M-19, 257

Extortion

AUC, 310

ELN, 191–193, 196–197, 201

FARC, 357

by FARC, 160–162

M-19, 257–259

Extraditions, 99, 138, 285, 286, 309

F

Fayad Delgado, Álvaro (El Turco), 

213–215, 243, 246, 247

Federación Nacional de Cafeteros 

de Colombia (FEDECAFE, 

National Federation of Coffee 

Growers), 62

Federico Bogotá; See Palmera Pineda, 

Juvenal Ricardo

Finances

AUC, 309–311, 355

ELN, 199–201, 379

FARC, 160–163, 379

M-19, 257–260

paramilitary groups, 379

Foco model of warfare, 177, 178, 180, 

181, 191

“Foreign ideas,” 37

France, 155

Franco, Captain, 88

Freemasonry, 37
Index

445

French Revolution, 46

Frente, Ricardo Franco, 252–253

Fuerzas Armadas Revolusionarias de 

Colombia (FARC), 115–164, 

325–326

administrative operations, 148–151

armed component, 131–132

attacks by, 111–112

AUC pact with, 287

Bateman expelled from, 214

civilian casualties of, 111–112

communications, 163–164

criminal activity, 160–163

current negotiations with, 382–384

ELN collaboration with, 193

external actors and transnational 

influences, 154–160

Facebook campaign against, 136–

137

finances, 160–163, 379

and formation of M-19, 211

government countermeasures, 

335–336, 339–340, 342–344, 

348–357, 365–366, 374–376

government’s goals for, 58

ideology, 55, 109, 133–134

and land reform, 58

leadership, 125–129

legitimacy, 134–137

logistics, 163

membership and recruitment, 136, 

148–151

motivation and behavior, 137–139

“new method of operating,” 122–

123, 143

oil pipeline attacks, 62

organizational structure and 

command and control, 121–125

origins of, 120–121

paramilitary operations, 110, 139–

148

and physical environment, 28

political operations, 152–154

in political process, 110

political vision of, 110

psychological operations, 151–152

public component, 132–133

reintegration of guerrillas from, 

382

roots in La Violencia, 85–86

Seventh Guerrilla Conference, 131

strategic attacks by, 104

strategies of, 20, 138–139

timeline, 117–119

underground and auxiliary 

components, 129–130

Fusion centers, 362–363, 373–375

G

Gaitán Ayala, Jorge Eliécer, 72, 74–75, 

79, 80

Gaitánistas, 81

Galan, José Antonio, 180

Galan, Luis Carlos, 253

García Fernández, Carlos Mauricio 

(Rodrigo), 284

Gas; See Oil and gas

Gaviria Trujillo, César, 140, 142–143, 

256, 274, 344–347

Gechem, Eduardo, 356

Generational imprinting, 229–230

Geography, 20–22, 103

Germany, 199

Gómez, Álvaro, 247, 253, 342–343

Gómez, Laureano, 74, 78, 79, 83, 84, 92

Gonsalves, Marc, 129, 160

Gonzalez Pacheco, Fernando, 250

Gota-a-gota displacement, 113

Government

communities’ distrust of, 363

legitimacy of, 76, 103

structure of, 95–100

Government and politics, 65–100

1930 split presidential ticket, 70–74

1946 split presidential ticket, 74–80

under 1991 constitution, 94–100
446

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia

assassination of Gaitán, 80–82

Conservative return in 1946, 74–80

institutional context, 67–70

legitimacy of government, 76, 103

Liberal ascendancy, 70–74

political deterioration in late 1940s, 

82–85

structure of government, 95–100

La Violencia and aftermath, 85–94

Government countermeasures, 329–

366, 373–376

AUC negotiations, 363–364

Barco presidency, 341–344

Betancur presidency, 338–341

Borrero and López presidencies, 

335–336

Camergo, Valencia, and Lleras 

presidencies, 331–335

Coordination Center for Integrated 

Action, 361–363

counterinsurgent efforts against 

FARC, 365–366

counternarcotics, 

counterinsurgency, and end of 

M-19, 341–350

Democratic Security and Defense 

Policy, 357–360

ELN negotiations, 364–365

Gaviria presidency, 344–347

negotiations, 338–341

partnerships for, 374

Pasrana’s presidency, 350–356

Pizano presidency, 347–350

Plan Colombia, 350–356

Plan LAZO, 331–335

and reform of security forces 

culture, 373–374

Turbay presidency, 336–338

Uribe presidency, 356–366

war tax, 358

Government diplomatic targets, 235

Government general targets, 235

Governors, 68, 71, 91

Gran Colombia, 34, 39–41

Guerrilla groups, 109; See also

individual groups

during 1960s and 1970s, 69

in current cycle of violence, 103

and land rights, 88

origins of, 67

recruitment into, 87–88

rivalry between, 137–138

Rojas’s amnesty for, 92

strategic attacks by, 104

in La Violencia, 85–86

Guevara, Ernesto (Che), 177–178, 229

Guillot Lara, Jaime, 260

Gutiérrez, President of Ecuador, 156

H

Historical context, 31–51

Bolivarians-Santanderistas split, 

35–39

collapse of Gran Colombia, 39–41

ethnic groups, 56

Gran Colombia, 34

Liberal and Conservative identities, 

41–46

Liberal ascendancy, 46–51

Liberal-Conservative split, 35–39

partisanship, 41–46

Historical institutionalism, 105

Hobbes, Thomas, 37

Homicides, 76–78, 85, 374

Hormoza, Aurelio Iragorri, 346

Howes, Tom, 129, 160

Human rights violations, 349

by AUC, 292

by Colombian authorities, 358, 

380–381

DDR approach to, 279

by FARC, 146–147

by paramilitaries, 350

Hyde, Henry, 159
Index

447

I

Ideology

of armed groups, 109–110

of AUC, 278, 282, 294–295

of Conservatives, 44–46

of ELN, 190, 196

of FARC, 109, 133–134

of Liberals, 45–46

of M-19, 224–226

of major insurgent groups, 55

Import substitution industrialization 

(ISI), 59–60, 138

Income inequality, 60

Income ranking (Colombia), 376

Independent Republics, 120, 137, 153

Independents, 49

Indian peasant rebellion (1914), 58

Indigenous populations, 56, 113

Industrialization, 58, 61

Informant networks, 360

Information operations (FARC), 

151–152

Infrastructure sabotage

ELN, 193–194, 196–197

FARC, 141–142, 146

Initiative for Peace, 343

Inside Rebellion (Jeremy Weinstein), 105

Institutional context of political 

violence, 103–106

Insurgencies; See Revolutions

Integrated Action, 360–363, 373

Intelligence capabilities

civilian informant networks, 360

Colombian military, 164, 334–335, 

354

ELN, 187–188

FARC, 144, 150

from FARC guerrillas-cuminformants, 365

Internally displaced persons (IDPs), 

112–113, 376

Internet, 151

“Intrepid Action” strategy, 74

Iran, 139, 158

Isaza, Ramón (El Viejo), 286–287

Isthmus of Panama, 89

J

Jacobo Arenas; See Morantes Jaimes, 

Luis Alberto

Jesuits, 47–48

Jojoy, Mono; See Suárez Rojas, Victor 

Julio

Jordan, 163

Judiciary branch, 99–100

Justice and Peace Law (2005), 299, 308, 

323, 364, 365

Juventudes Comunista (JUCO, 

Communist Youth Movement), 

248

K

Kidnapping/hostage-taking, 194, 357, 

365, 374

AUC, 279, 300

ELN, 191–193, 196–197, 201, 352–

353

EPL, 346

FARC, 129, 137, 143, 160–162, 277

of Gómez, 342–343

of Hormoza, 345–346

M-19, 227, 236–240, 247, 250, 253, 

257–260, 341

Palace of Justice siege, 243–244

Kin-based networks, 87

L

Labor

and land reform, 58

political standing and positions on, 

51

and rise of proletariat class, 50

Labor conflicts (1919), 58

“Land invasions,” 72

Land ownership, degradation of, 363
448

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia

Land reform, 57–58, 295, 383

Lara Sánchez, Augusto, 247

Law 200, 72

Lawyers, relations of military and, 37

Leadership

AUC, 280–287

ELN, 182–186

FARC, 125–129

M-19, 213–216

Lecompt, Juan Carlos, 161

Legislative offices, 68, 95, 97–98

Legitimacy

AUC, 295–297, 306–307

ELN, 190–191

FARC, 134–137

of government, 76, 103

M-19, 226–227

León Valencia, Guillermo (presidential 

candidate 1930), 70

Leyva, Camacho, 337

Liberals

1930 split presidential ticket, 69–74

1946 split presidential ticket, 69, 

74–80

ascendancy of, 46–48, 70–74

conflict over right to govern, 33

early split with Conservatives, 35–39

exclusion from government under 

Núñez, 49

Independents splinter, 49

and National Front, 93

partisan identity, 41–46

partisan violence, 81–85

patronage networks, 55

protectionism policies of, 58

Radicals splinter, 48–49, 51

split in, 43–44

during La Violencia, 85–88

Liberation theology, 190, 191

Libya, 249–250, 260

Life expectancy, 57

Literacy rate (Colombia), 376

Lleras Carmago, Alberto, 73, 331–335

Local governance, 68

Logistics

AUC, 311

ELN, 201–202

FARC, 163

M-19, 260–261

López, José Hilario, 46, 47

López Michelsen, Alfonso, 335

López Pumarejo, Alfonso, 72–74

M

MacAuley, Martin, 158–159

Maduro Moros, Nicolás, 198

Magdalena River, 25–26

Mancuso Gómez, Salvatore (Triple 

Cero), 282–285, 293, 307, 308, 

311

Maneuver warfare, FARC transition to, 

143

Marín, Pedro Antonio; See Marulanda, 

Manuel (Sureshot)

Marino Ospina, Iván (Felipe 

Gonzalez), 213, 215, 220, 221, 

247, 259

Márquez, Gabriel García, 50, 219

Márquez, José Ignacio de, 44

Martínez, José Manuel, 336

Martz, John, 68

Marulanda, Manuel (Sureshot), 120–

121, 123, 125, 127, 130, 155, 161, 

214, 335, 351, 352

Marxism, 190, 225

Marxist-Leninist ideology, 133–134, 

272–273

Massacre attacks, 111, 113

AUC, 278–279, 292, 303, 306

in Guaviare Department, 348

Mass displacement, 113

Mass politics, 46–47

Mass self-defense, 120

Mayors, 68, 91

Media, 134–136, 189–190
Index

449

Medina Moron, Victor, 180, 183, 189

Membership and recruitment

AUC, 280, 290–291, 304–305

ELN, 195

FARC, 148–151

M-19, 247–248

Mercado, José Raquel, 227, 248

Mestizos, 55, 56

Mexico, 365

Migration patterns, 42, 71, 84, 86

Military, Colombian

abuses perpetrated under Turbay, 

337–338

Air Force, 347

Army, 89, 91, 127, 144, 149, 150, 164, 

241–242, 291, 353–354

and AUC, 296

Betancur’s relationship with, 341

campesino soldiers, 360

Casa Verde attack, 344–345

counterinsurgent actions of, 146

development of, 89

education of, 89, 354, 359

ELN attacks on, 194

against FARC, 144–145

FARC attacks on, 145–146

M-19 theft of weapons from, 260, 

337

and mid-1996 protests, 348

and narcotrafficking, 349

Navy, 89

under Pastrana, 351, 353–354, 360

Plan LAZO, 332–335

politicization of, 89

relationship with United States, 

287–288

roles of police and, 90, 91

Security Statute, 337

under Uribe, 359–360

US military aid, 349, 355–356

and war tax, 346–347

Military courts, 100

Military dictatorship, 91–93

Military officers

relations between lawyers and, 37

training for, 89

Military victory, 322

Moderate liberals, 43–44

Monaghan, Jim (Mortar), 158–159

Moncayo, Gustavo, 161

Monetary policies, 59

Mono Jojoy; See Suárez Rojas, Victor 

Julio

Morantes Jaimes, Luis Alberto (Jacobo 

Arenas), 120–121, 123, 124, 126, 

130, 140, 161, 188, 211, 214, 325

Moreno, Samuel, 224

Mosquera, Tomás Cipriano, 44

Motivation and behavior

AUC, 297–299

ELN, 191

FARC, 137–139

M-19, 228–233

Mountains, 20–22

Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19), 207–

261, 323–324, 381

administrative operations, 247–250

armed component, 221–223

command and control, 216–217

elected representation from, 383–

384

ELN criticism of, 197

external actors and transnational 

influences, 257

finances, 257–260

government countermeasures, 337–

338, 340–341, 343–344

Guerrilla Position Paper, 392–396

ideology, 109, 224–226

leadership, 213–216

legitimacy, 226–227

logistics, 260–261

membership and recruitment, 

247–248

motivation and behavior, 228–233
450

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia

organizational structure, 212–213

origins of, 210–211

paramilitary operations, 110–111, 

233–247

and physical environment, 28

political operations, 251–256

in political process, 110

political vision of, 110

psychological operations, 250–251

public component, 223–224

and redesign of political system, 95

timeline, 209–210

underground and auxiliary 

components, 217–221

urban-based strategy of, 20

Movimiento Continental Bolivariano 

(Bolivarian Continental 

Movement), 151

Movimiento de Integración 

Revolucionaria (MIR), 186

Movimiento de Liberación Nacional 

(MLN), 211

Muerte a Secuestradores (MAS, Death 

to kidnappers), 258–259

Municipal councils, 68

N

Naranjo, Oscar, 155

National Army, 90

National Financial Commission, 

162–163

National Front (FN, Frente Nacional), 

80–81, 86, 93–94, 210

Nationalism, 225–226, 230

National Park Service, 363

National Police, 73, 78–79; See also

Police

appointment of chief, 90

counternarcotic campaigns, 349

politicization of, 89

National Union, 75

Natural resources, 55; See also

individual resources

coca, 61

coffee, 61–62

ELN support of foreign investment 

in extractive sector, 190

oil and gas, 62

“resource curse,” 60–61

Naval School, 89

Navarro Wolff, Antonio, 213, 216, 225, 

254–256, 324, 325, 348

Negotiated settlements, 321–322

Negotiation and Dialogue commission, 

339

Neoliberalism, 190, 191

New Granada, 39, 40

Nicaragua

ELN ties with, 198

FARC weapons from, 163

M-19 ties with, 260

M-19 training in, 249

ties to FARC, 155

Nicaraguan revolution, 229–230

Nieves Ochoa, Marta, 258, 259

Norway, 365

Nova, Ruiz, 334

Los Núcleos de Solidaridad (Solidarity 

Nuclei, Juntas Patrioticas), 129, 

148–149

Núñez, Rafael (the Regenerator), 49

O

Obando, José María, 44, 48

Ochoa, Fabio, 259

Ochoa family, 258

Oil and gas, 62

ELN pipeline attacks, 193

FARC pipeline attacks, 136, 142

in post-World War II period, 59

Olaya Herrera, Enrique, 70, 71, 73

One Hundred Years of Solitude (Gabriel 

García Márquez), 50, 219

Operation Colombia, 248, 260

Operation Marquetalia, 120, 335

Operation Wasp, 141
Index

451

Organizational structure

AUC, 275–280

ELN, 178–182

FARC, 121–125

M-19, 212–213

Organization of American States 

(OAS), 80–81

Orientales Llanos, 286

Ortega, Daniel, 155

Osorio, Luis Camilo, 159

Ospina Pérez, Mariano, 75, 78, 79, 82

Otero Cifuentes, Luis, 247

P

Pabón, Rosemberg (Commander One), 

236, 247

Pacto Pólitico por la Paz y le 

Democracia (Political Pact for 

Peace and Democracy, 253

Páez, General, 39

Palace of Justice siege, 226, 242–245, 

252, 341

Palmera Pineda, Juvenal Ricardo 

(Simón Trinidad, Federico 

Bogotá), 128–129, 151, 156

Panama, 163

Paramilitary groups, 272–275; See 

also Autodefensas Unidas de 

Colombia (AUC, United SelfDefense Forces of Colombia)

in current cycle of violence, 103

evolution of, 104

against FARC, 138

finances, 379

human rights abuses by, 350

and Justice and Peace Law, 364

M-19 leaders murdered by, 213

in response to kidnappings, 258

Paramilitary operations, 110–111

AUC, 300–304

casualties of, 112

ELN, 191–194

FARC, 139–148

M-19, 233–247

against UP, 152–153

Parapolitical Scandal (2006), 285, 294, 

308

Pardo, Rafael, 307

Pardo Leal, Jaime, 133, 152

Paridad, 93–94

París Lozano, Gonzalo, 81, 82

Partido Comunista Colombiano (PCC, 

Colombian Communist Party), 

120, 123–124, 126, 133, 336

Partido Socialista Revolucionario 

(PSR, Revolutionary Socialist 

Party), 58

Partisan identity, 41–46, 88

Partisanship, 41–46, 75–76

Partisan violence, 75–76, 81–85; See also

specific conflicts, e.g.: La Violencia

Pastrana Arango, Andrés, 145, 347–38, 

350–356

Pastrana Borrero, Misael, 211, 335

Patronage networks, 33, 42, 55

Patron–client relations; See Clientelism

Pax Conservadora (1904–1930), 49–50

PDA, 197

Peace camps (M-19), 218, 219, 221, 

243, 246

Peace Commission, 339

Peace negotiations

AUC, 299, 363–364

under Barco, 341, 342–344

under Betancur, 338–341

and demilitarized zones, 351–353

ELN, 142, 181, 190–191, 336, 340, 

343, 352–353, 364–365

EPL, 340

FARC, 140, 142, 145, 152, 285, 

339–340, 342, 343, 351–353, 356, 

382–384

under Gaviria, 344–346

M-19, 242, 248–249, 253, 340–341, 

343

Plan Colombia, 351
452

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia

Los Pepes (People Persecuted by Pablo 

Escobar), 277–278

Pérez, Carlos Andres, 157

Pérez Martínez, Manuel, 185, 197, 201

Peron, Juan Domingo, 59

Physical environment, 17–29

and armed groups, 26–29

geography, 20–22

political boundaries, 19

weak central state and regionalism, 

22–26

Pizarro Leongómez, Carlos (Antonio 

or Caballo Loco), 213, 215, 221, 

233, 247, 252–254, 324

Plan Colombia, 159–160, 309, 350–356, 

358, 373–375

Plan LAZO, 139, 288, 331–335, 373

Plan Patriota (Plan Patriot), 359, 373

Plazas Vega, Alfonso, 243

Police, 70, 73, 78–79

abuses perpetrated under Turbay, 

337–338

appointment of chiefs, 90

as branch of military under Rojas, 

92

counternarcotic campaigns, 349

FARC attacks on, 145–146

geographic distribution of, 89

López’s nationalization of, 73

politicization of, 74, 78–79, 83, 89, 

91, 106

roles of military and, 90, 91

Security Statute, 337

during state formation period, 70

under Uribe administration, 360

Political antagonism, regional, 24–25

Political authority, 67–68

Political boundaries, 19

Political capital model, 296

Political climate, following La 

Violencia, 178

Political culture, War of a Thousand 

Days and, 49

Political inequality, 56

Political operations

AUC, 307–308

ELN, 196–197

FARC, 152–154

M-19, 251–256

Political parties, 323; See also

Conservatives; Liberals

collapse of two-party system, 98

M-19 transition to, 253–254

and National Front system, 94

and partisan violence, 75–76

politicization of police, 74, 78–79

two-party system, 67

Political realism, 190

Politics; See also Government and 

politics

after insurgency/civil war, 322–323

mass, 46–47

organized actors in, 50–51

patronage networks, 33

violence and partisan identification, 

43

Polo Democrático (PD), 382

Popular militias, 130

Popular Power branch, 383

Popular Society for Mutual Instruction 

and Christian Fraternity, 47

Population, 57, 60

Populism, 72, 295

Populist, 72

Poverty, 113, 379

Powell, Colin, 278

Power-sharing agreements, 322

Presidency, 68, 95; See also individual 

presidents

1930 split ticket, 70–74

1946 split ticket, 74–80

value of office, 69

Proletariat class, 50

Propaganda campaigns

ELN, 189–190

FARC, 134–136

M-19, 219, 250–251
Index

453

Property rights, 72, 88

Protectionism, 138

Provisional Irish Republican Army 

(PIRA), 154, 155, 158–159, 217, 

321

Psychological operations

AUC, 305–307

ELN, 196

FARC, 151–152

M-19, 250–251

Public component

AUC, 292–294

ELN, 189–190

FARC, 132–133

M-19, 223–224

Public services

AUC, 292, 293

FARC, 132–134

Pupo, Rodrigo Tovar (Jorge 40), 285

Q

Qadhafi, Muammar, 155, 260

Quintero, Argelino, 346

Quintín Lame Group, 56, 246

R

Racial groups, 55

Radicals, 48–49, 51

Ramirez, Fabian, 162

Raúl Reyes; See Devia Silva, Luis Edgar

Recruitment; See Membership and 

recruitment

Red Urbana Antonio Nariño (RUAN), 

146

Refugees, 112–113

Regionalism, 22–26, 89

Reintegration of guerrillas, 62, 279, 

382

Religious toleration, 37

Republica de la Gran Colombia; See

Gran Colombia

Republicanism, 39

Republic of New Granada, 40

“Resource curse,” 60–61; See also

Natural resources

Restrepo, Carlos Lleras, 331, 338

Revolutionary climate, 229

Revolution on the March, 72

Revolutions (insurgencies, 

revolutionary warfare)

causes/bases of, 3, 321–322

defined, 3

summary of, 5–8

transition to legitimate process, 

323–324

Reyes, Rafael, 49

Reyes, Raúl; See Devia Silva, Luis Edgar

Ricardo, Victor, 351, 353

Ríos, John Aguedelo, 339

Riots, 81

Roa Sierra, Juan, 80

Rodríguez, Mariano Ospina, 47

Rojas Pinilla, Gustavo, 59, 91–93, 210–

211, 223–224

Rojas Pinilla, María Eugenia, 224

Romany gypsies, 56

Rural areas

displacements from, 113

ELN control in, 191, 195

ELN support in, 186

FARC recruits from, 149–151

and land reform, 57–58

M-19 in, 212, 221–222

personal security in, 104

poverty in, 379

settlement lands in, 71–72

Russia, 163

S

Sáenz Vargas, Guillermo León 

(Alfonso Cano), 127, 128

Safe houses (M-19), 220–221

Samper Pizano, Ernesto, 144, 347–350

Sandinistas, 229–230

Santamaría, Israel, 213
454

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia

Santander, Francisco de Paula, 33, 35, 

36, 38–40, 44

Santanderistas, 33, 35–40, 44

Santos Calderón, Juan Manuel, 361, 

380–383

Santos Montejo, Eduardo, 73

Security forces; See also Military, 

Colombian; Police

configuration during La Violencia, 

70, 88–91

M-19 leaders murdered by, 213

makeup of, 88

politicization of, 90, 91, 106

reforming institutional culture of, 

373–374

technology used by, 104

Self-defense groups, 104, 124, 137, 331, 

335, 350; See also Paramilitary 

groups

Serna, Herná Giraldo (El Patrón), 283, 

285–286

Servicios Especiales de Vigilancia 

y Seguridad Privada 

(CONVIVIR), 274–275, 289, 

296–297, 350

Settlement patterns, 22–26

Simacota Manifesto, 390–391

Simón Trinidad; See Palmera Pineda, 

Juvenal Ricardo

Slaves, 56

Social cleansing (AUC), 295, 306

Social identity, 33, 41

Social inequality, 56–62, 92, 230

Socialism, 50, 51

Socialist Party, 120

Social media, 164

Social networks, 51, 228–229, 333

Social reforms, 332

Society, 1930s shift in, 71

Socioeconomic conditions, 53–62, 379

and Conservative-Liberal split, 45

demographics, 57

economic policy and social 

inequality, 57–62

ethnicity and, 55–56

Soviet Union, 131, 341

Spain, 198, 365

Spanish culture, 56

Spanish language, 55

Spanish rule, 34, 56

Stansell, Keith, 129, 160

State assemblies, 68

State formation, 49, 89

State governance, 68–69

Strikes, 50

Suárez Rojas, Victor Julio (Jorge 

Briceño Suárez, Mono Jojoy), 

126–127, 351

Suffrage, 49

Sugar, 59

Supreme Court, 83, 99, 226, 243–245

Sweden, 155

Switzerland, 155, 365

T

Las Tangas, 274, 277, 278, 283

Taxes

AUC, 286, 293, 296, 309–311

ELN, 194, 199

FARC, 131–134, 163

war, 346–347, 358

Territorial government, 98–99, 365

Terrorism, 357; See also specific activities, 

e.g.: Bombing attacks

Timelines, 9–13

AUC, 271

ELN, 175–176

FARC, 117–119

M-19, 209–210

Tobacco, 59

Toledo Plata, Carlos, 213, 240–242, 348

Torres, Camilo, 109, 180, 182, 184–185, 

187, 188, 229

Torrijos, Omar, 240
Index

455

Trade, 25

coca, 61

drug, 61 (See also Drug trade)

in post-World War II period, 59

Training

AUC, 284

ELN, 188–189, 195

FARC, 123, 124, 131, 153–154

M-19, 218, 219, 246, 248–250

for military officers, 89

Plan LAZO, 334

Transportation, 25, 26

Trinidad, Simón; See Palmera Pineda, 

Juvenal Ricardo

Trujillo, Ciro, 214

Turbay Ayala, Gabriel, 75, 250

Turbay Ayala, Julio César, 336–338

Turgurios, 60

U

Underground component

AUC, 287–289

ELN, 186–188

FARC, 129–130

M-19, 217–220

Unión Nacional Izquierdistat 

Revolucionaria (UNIR, National 

Leftist Revolutionary Union), 75

Unión Patriótica (UP, Patriotic Union), 

110, 128, 133, 136, 140, 152, 301, 

325, 339, 342

Unions, 50–51, 58, 72

United Fruit Company, 50

United States

AUC on terrorist group list, 290

and banana strike of 1928, 50

and Colombian oil companies, 62

Constitution of, 105

counternarcotic policies, 355

ELN position on, 190

extraditions to, 99, 285, 286, 309

foreign policy of, 341–342

and human rights violations, 350

influence in Colombian economy, 

138

Integrated Action, 361, 362

M-19 attacks of businesses of, 235

military aid, 349, 355–356

military personnel in policing 

functions in, 90

military’s relationship with, 287–

288

and Palace of Justice siege, 244–245

Plan Colombia, 309, 355, 374–375

Plan LAZO, 331–335

Samper’s relationship with, 348

support against FARC, 159

Trinidad trials in, 129

Urban areas

criminal activities in, 60

ELN in, 186–188

ethnic groups in, 56

FARC in, 146, 150–151, 159

and land reform, 58

M-19 in, 212, 218–219, 221, 246

migration to, during La Violencia, 

86

population density in, 57

Urbanization, 20, 60, 71, 82, 84

Urdaneta, Rafael, 40

Urdaneta Arbeláez, Roberto, 92

Uribe, Mario, 294

La Uribe agreement, 339–340

Uribe Vélez, Alvaro, 95, 136, 151, 158, 

194, 285, 356–366, 373–376, 

380–381

V

Valencia Muñoz, Guillermo León, 59, 

120, 335

Vargas Silva, Octavio, 348

Vásquez, Antonio, 183

Vásquez, Manuel, 183

Vásquez Castaño, Fabio, 109, 177, 180, 

182–183, 185–187, 190
456

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia

Vásquez Perdomo, María Eugenia, 222, 

230–231

Vázquez Cobo, Alfredo, 70

Venezuela, 39–41

AUC smuggling in, 309

ELN ties with, 198

FARC ties with, 139, 156–158, 163

Venezuelan separatist movement, 39

Verification Commission, 339

Vice president, 95

Victims and Land Restitution Law, 380

Vietnam, 131

La Violencia, 59, 67, 85–94

cruel practices during, 82

and military dictatorship, 91–93

and National Front system, 93–94

phases of, 86

and policiá chulavita, 79

security force configuration during, 

70, 88–91

Violent pluralism, 67

W

War of a Thousand Days (1899–1902), 

33–34, 49

War tax, 346–347, 358

Weak central state

and FARC recruitment, 149

and political violence, 103–104

and topography of country, 20, 

22–26

Weapons smuggling

AUC, 308–309

FARC, 163

Weapons sources, for M-19, 219–220, 

337

Weinstein, Jeremy, 105

Western region, 23, 24, 56

Whites (racial group), 55, 56

Women, in FARC, 135

Y

Yarborough, William P., 288, 332