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[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3489 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 3489

 To protect the United States and its Armed Forces, wherever engaged, 
 from ballistic missile attack, to state the policy and priorities of 
the United States for developing and deploying more effective defenses 
          against ballistic missiles, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 16, 1996

  Mr. Spratt (for himself, Mr. Gephardt, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Dicks, Mr. 
  Skelton, Mr. Ortiz, Mr. Browder, Mr. Abercrombie, Mr. Edwards, Mr. 
   Meehan, Mr. McHale, Mr. Peterson of Florida, Mr. Kennedy of Rhode 
 Island, Ms. Harman, Mr. Fazio of California, Mr. Hoyer, and Mr. Reed) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
 National Security, and in addition to the Committee on International 
 Relations, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, 
 in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the 
                jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To protect the United States and its Armed Forces, wherever engaged, 
 from ballistic missile attack, to state the policy and priorities of 
the United States for developing and deploying more effective defenses 
          against ballistic missiles, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Ballistic Missile Defense Act of 
1996''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Short-range theater ballistic missiles threaten United 
        States Armed Forces wherever engaged abroad. Therefore, the 
        expeditious deployment of theater missile defenses to intercept 
        ballistic missiles at greater ranges and higher altitudes is 
        the highest priority among all ballistic missile defense 
        programs.
            (2) The United States is developing defensive systems to 
        protect the United States against the threat of limited 
        ballistic missile attacks. Ground-based defensive systems are 
        attainable, compliant with the ABM Treaty, more affordable than 
        spaced-based interceptors or space-based lasers, and can 
        protect all of the United States from limited ballistic missile 
        attack.
            (3) Defending against ballistic missile attacks upon our 
        national territory requires not only missile defenses but arms 
        control agreements and nonproliferation measures that lower the 
        threat and curb the spread of ballistic missile technology.
            (4) The massive retaliatory capability of the United States 
        deterred the Soviet Union, and any other nation, from launching 
        an attack by intercontinental ballistic missiles throughout the 
        Cold War. The Nuclear Posture Review conducted by the 
        Department of Defense affirms the effectiveness of deterrence 
        now and into the future. While the threat of intentional attack 
        upon the United States has receded, the risk of an accidental 
        or unauthorized attack by Russia or China remains but is 
        remote.
            (5) United States arms control agreements (notably the 
        START I Treaty and the START II Treaty, once implemented) will 
        lower the threat to the United States from large-scale nuclear 
        attack. The START I Treaty, when fully implemented, will reduce 
        deployed warheads by over 40 percent below 1990 levels. By the 
        end of 1996, only Russia, among the states of the former Soviet 
        Union, will deploy nuclear weapons. The START II Treaty, if 
        implemented, will reduce warheads deployed in Russia by 66 
        percent below their levels before the Start I Treaty.
            (6) As strategic offensive weapons are reduced, the 
        efficacy and affordability of defensive systems increases, 
        raising the possibility of deterrence based upon effective 
        defenses rather than deterrence based solely upon threat of 
        massive retaliation.
            (7) Countries hostile to the United States (such as Iraq, 
        Iran, North Korea, and Libya) have manifested an interest in 
        developing ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United 
        States. These countries may accelerate the development of long-
range missiles if they receive external support, but in the absence of 
outside assistance, newly emerging threats may take as long as 15 years 
to mature, according to recent intelligence estimates.
            (8) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Missile 
        Technology Control Regime, the Biological and Chemical Weapons 
        Convention, and continuing United States efforts to enforce 
        export controls will prevent or delay external assistance 
        needed by those countries to develop intercontinental ballistic 
        missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
            (9) The ABM Treaty has added to strategic stability by 
        restraining the requirement on both sides for strategic 
        weapons. At the summit in May 1995, the President of the United 
        States and the President of Russia each reaffirmed his 
        country's commitment to the ABM Treaty.
            (10) Abrogating the ABM Treaty to deploy a noncompliant 
        system will not add to strategic stability if it impedes 
        implementation of the START I or START II Treaty. Without the 
        removal of strategic weapons scheduled by both treaties, the 
        consequences and risks of unauthorized or accidental launches 
        will remain undiminished, as will the potential threat of a 
        large-scale attack capable of overwhelming any defenses 
        deployed.
            (11) If the nuclear arsenal of the United States must be 
        maintained at START I levels, significant unbudgeted costs will 
        be incurred, encroaching on funds for ballistic missile 
        defenses and other defense requirements.
            (12) Should arms control, nonproliferation efforts, and 
        deterrence fail, the United States must be able to defend 
        itself against limited ballistic missile attack.
            (13) Missile defense systems consistent with the ABM Treaty 
        are capable of defending against limited ballistic missile 
        attack. Should a national missile defense system require 
        modification of the ABM Treaty, the treaty establishes the 
        means for the parties to amend the treaty, which the parties 
        have used in the past.

SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.

    (a) In General.--It is the policy of the United States to develop 
by the year 2000 a National Missile Defense System that can be deployed 
in 2003.
    (b) Capability of System.--The National Missile Defense System to 
be developed pursuant to subsection (a) shall be capable, when 
deployed, of providing a highly effective defense of the United States 
against limited ballistic missile attacks.
    (c) Testing Before Deployment.--The system developed pursuant to 
subsection (a) shall be rigorously tested during development.
    (d) Improvements.--If a decision to deploy the system developed 
pursuant to subsection (a) is not made by the end of the year 2000, the 
Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the system is improved by 
incorporation of evolving technology to increase effectiveness and 
reduce costs of a subsequent deployment, and that rigorous testing 
continues.

SEC. 4. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PRIORITIES.

    The following, in the order listed, shall be the policy of the 
United States with respect to the priority for development and 
deployment of ballistic missile defense programs:
            (1) First, maintaining the operational readiness of the 
        Armed Forces, including a good quality of life for 
        servicemembers and their families, and modernization of weapons 
        systems to ensure mission effectiveness in the future.
            (2) Second, as part of such modernization, completing the 
        development and deployment of essential theater missile defense 
        (TMD) systems as soon as practicable.
            (3) Third, developing by the year 2000 for deployment in 
        the year 2003 the system referred to in section 3 and section 
        5(b) and developing for deployment as soon as practicable the 
        space-based sensors described in section 5(c).

SEC. 5. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE.

    (a) Requirement for National Missile Defense Program.--To implement 
the policy established in section 3, the Secretary of Defense shall 
initiate a National Missile Defense Program, which shall position the 
United States, by the end of the year 2000, to be capable of deploying 
a National Missile Defense system, as described in section 3(b), within 
three years.
    (b) Elements of the NMD Program.--The National Missile Defense 
Program shall include the following elements:
            (1) A ground-based interceptor system that provides 
        coverage of the continental United States (including Alaska) 
        and Hawaii.
            (2) Fixed ground-based radars.
            (3) Space-based sensors.
            (4) Battle management, command, control and communications 
        (BM/C<SUP>3).

SEC. 6. IMPLEMENTATION OF NMD PROGRAM.

    The Secretary of Defense shall--
            (1) initiate plans and actions necessary to meet the 
        deployment readiness goals specified in section 5(a);
            (2) conduct rigorous integrated system testing using 
        elements representative of the National Missile Defense 
        architecture referred to in section 5(b);
            (3) prescribe and use streamlined acquisition policies and 
        procedures, in accordance with existing law, to reduce the cost 
        and increase the efficiency of developing the system referred 
        to in section 5(b); and
            (4) develop technologies that have the potential of 
        improving the National Missile Defense system prescribed in 
        section 5(b).

SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

    Not later than March 15, 1997, the Secretary of Defense shall 
submit to Congress a report on the Secretary's plan for the National 
Missile Defense Program required by this Act. The report shall include 
the following matters:
            (1) The Secretary's plan for carrying out this Act, 
        including--
                    (A) a detailed description of the system 
                architecture selected for development under section 
                5(b); and
                    (B) a justification of the architecture selected 
                and reasons for the rejection of the other candidate 
                architectures.
            (2) The Secretary's estimate of the amount of 
        appropriations required for research, development, test, 
        evaluation, and for procurement, for each of fiscal years 1997 
        through 2003 in order to achieve an initial operational 
        capability in 2003.
            (3) A description of promising technologies to be pursued 
        in accordance with the requirements of section 6(4).
            (4) A determination of the point at which any activity that 
        is required to be carried out under this Act would conflict 
        with the terms of the ABM Treaty, together with a description 
        of any such activity, the legal basis for the Secretary's 
        determination, and an estimate of the time at which such point 
        would be reached in order to meet an initial operating 
        capability in the year 2003.

SEC. 8. POLICY REGARDING REDUCTION OF THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES 
              FROM WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

    (a) Measures To Address Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction.--
In order to defend against weapons of mass destruction by preventing 
the spread of fissile materials and other components of weapons of mass 
destruction, the President shall--
            (1) enhance efforts, both unilaterally and in cooperation 
        with other nations, to prevent terrorist organizations from 
        obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction;
            (2) expedite United States efforts to assist the 
        Governments of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, and 
        Kazakhstan, as appropriate, in improving the safety, security, 
        and accountability of fissile materials and nuclear warheads;
            (3) undertake additional steps to prevent weapons of mass 
        destruction and their components from being smuggled into the 
        United States, through the use of improved security devices at 
        United States ports of entry, increased numbers of Border 
        Patrol agents, increased monitoring of international borders, 
        and other appropriate measures;
            (4) seek the widest possible international adherence to the 
        Missile Technology Control Regime and pursue to the fullest 
        other export control measures intended to deter and counter the 
        spread of weapons of mass destruction and their components; and
            (5) enhance conventional weapons systems to ensure that the 
        United States possesses effective deterrent and counterforce 
        capabilities against weapons of mass destruction and their 
        delivery systems.
    (b) Measures To Address Threats From ICBMs.--In order to reduce the 
threat to the United States from weapons of mass destruction delivered 
by intercontinental ballistic missiles, including accidental or 
unauthorized launches, the President shall--
            (1) urge the Government and Parliament of the Russian 
        Federation to ratify the START II Treaty as soon as possible, 
        permitting its expeditious entry into force;
            (2) pursue with the Government of the Russian Federation, 
        after START II entry-into-force, a symmetrical program of early 
        deactivation of strategic forces to be eliminated under START 
        II; and
            (3) work jointly with countries possessing intercontinental 
        ballistic missiles to improve command and control technology 
        and operations to the maximum extent practicable.
    (c) Department of Defense Program.--Consistent with, and in order 
to compelement, the steps to be taken by the President under subsection 
(a)(3), the Secretary of Defense shall carry out a program to enhance 
the capabilities of the United States relating to the threat to the 
United States of a chemical or biological weapons attack inside the 
United States by unconventional means. In carrying out such program, 
the Secretary shall take into consideration the assessments and 
recommendations of the task force established under subsection (d). The 
activities to be carried out by the Secretary under the program shall 
include the following:
            (1) Research, development, test, and evaluation of 
        technologies relating to any of the following:
                    (A) Detection of chemical or biological weapons.
                    (B) Interception of such weapons.
                    (C) Protection against such weapons.
                    (D) Response to an attack inside the United States 
                using such weapons.
                    (E) Decontamination of areas affected by an attack 
                using such weapons.
            (2) Training of personnel for the activities specified in 
        subparagraphs (A) through (E) of paragraph (1).
            (3) Identification of Federal equipment and technologies 
        that can be transferred from one Federal agency to another 
        agency or to State and local agencies consistent with the 
        purposes of the program under this subsection.
    (d) Interagency Task Force.--(1) There is hereby established in the 
executive branch an interagency task force to assess, and make 
recommendations concerning, the capabilities of the United States 
relating to the threat of a chemical or biological weapons attack 
inside the United States by unconventional means.
    (2) The task force shall on an ongoing basis assess the current 
state of the United States with respect to each of the following and 
shall identify and recommend potential improvements:
            (A) The nature of the threat to the United States of a 
        chemical or biological weapons attack inside the United States 
        by unconventional means.
            (B) Capabilities related to detection and interception of 
        such weapons or the possibility of such an attack.
            (C) Capabilities related to protection against the effects 
        of such an attack.
            (D) Capabilities related to preparedness for, and response 
        to, such an attack.
            (E) Capabilities related to decontamination following such 
        an attack.
            (F) Public education concerning the dangers of such an 
        attack and the appropriate response to such an attack.
    (3) Membership of the task force shall include representatives of 
the following departments and agencies:
            (A) The Department of Defense.
            (B) The Central Intelligence Agency, but only with respect 
        to assessment of the nature of the threat.
            (C) The Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau 
        of Investigation and the Immigration and Naturalization 
        Service.
            (D) The Federal Emergency Management Agency.
            (E) The Department of the Treasury, including the Customs 
        Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.
            (F) The Department of Health and Human Services, including 
        the Centers for Disease Control.
    (4) In carrying out its activities, the task force shall consult 
regularly with, and shall seek the views of, representatives of--
            (A) State and local government law enforcement authorities; 
        and
            (B) State and local government emergency planning 
        authorities.
    (5) Administrative support for the task force shall be provided by 
the Secretary of Defense.
    (e) Annual Report.--The President shall submit to Congress an 
annual report on actions by the United States to comply with the 
provisions of this section. The first such report shall be submitted 
not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 9. POLICY REGARDING THE ABM TREATY.

    (a) In General.--The President shall--
            (1) carry out the policies, programs, and requirements of 
        this Act in a manner consistent with the ABM Treaty or through 
        processes specified within the ABM Treaty;
            (2) at an appropriate time, seek amendments to the ABM 
        Treaty, as provided in Articles XIII and XIV of the Treaty, if 
        such amendments are required to deploy the National Missile 
        Defense system prescribed in section 5; and
            (3) treat any negotiated amendment to the ABM Treaty as 
        having entered into force only if such amendment is made in the 
        same manner as a treaty (including the requirement that 
        ratification by the United States is subject to the advice and 
        consent of the Senate).
    (b) Modifications Restricting TMD Systems.--The United States shall 
not be bound by any amendment or other substantive modification to the 
ABM treaty that restricts theater ballistic missile defense systems 
unless--
            (1) that system is actually flight-tested against a 
        ballistic missile that exceeds (A) a range of 3,500 kilometers, 
        or (B) a velocity of 5 kilometers per second; or
            (2) the agreement for such modification is made pursuant to 
        the requirements of section 235 of the National Defense 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106; 110 
        Stat. 231).

SEC. 10. ABM TREATY DEFINED.

    For purposes of this Act, the term ``ABM Treaty'' means the Treaty 
between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed at Moscow 
on May 26, 1972, and includes Protocols to that Treaty signed at Moscow 
on July 3, 1974, and all Agreed Statements and amendments to such 
Treaty in effect.
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