PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________

No. 12-1635

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TERA KNOLL,

 Appellant

v.

CITY OF ALLENTOWN

________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 5-08-cv-04692)

District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

February 12, 2013

Before: HARDIMAN, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges

and STARK*, District Judge

 

 

*

 The Honorable Leonard P. Stark, District Judge for the 

United States District Court for the District of Delaware, 
2

(Filed: February 21, 2013)

Donald P. Russo

Suite 42

35 East Elizabeth Avenue

Bethlehem, PA 18018

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant

Edward J. Easterly

Steven E. Hoffman, Esq.

Tallman, Hudders & Sorrentino

1611 Pond Road

The Paragon Centre, Suite 300

Allentown, PA 18104-0000

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee

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OPINION OF THE COURT

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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

In Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 

863 (3d Cir. 1984), we held that a district court must consider

six factors before it may dismiss a case as a sanction before trial 

on the merits. This appeal requires us to decide whether Poulis

applies in the post-trial context. We hold it does not.

 

sitting by designation.
3

I

In February 2008, Tera Knoll filed suit against the City of 

Allentown in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, 

Pennsylvania following her termination from the City‘s Parks 

Department. Knoll alleged claims of gender discrimination, 

harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the 

Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 

§ 951 et seq. Allentown removed the case to the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

After the District Court granted in part and denied in part 

Allentown‘s motion for summary judgment, a jury trial on the 

remaining claims commenced in June 2010. At the close of 

Knoll‘s case, the District Court granted in part Allentown‘s 

motion for judgment as a matter of law and dismissed Knoll‘s 

gender discrimination claim. The jury later returned a verdict in 

favor of Allentown on the harassment and retaliation claims.

On July 21, 2010, Knoll filed a motion for a new trial. 

On August 4, 2010, Allentown filed a response, arguing that the 

motion was meritless and also noting that Knoll had failed to 

comply with Eastern District of Pennsylvania Local Rule of 

Civil Procedure 7.1(e), which requires a litigant either to order a 

trial transcript or to file a verified motion showing good cause to 

be excused from that requirement within fourteen days of filing 

a post-trial motion. On September 9, 2010, the District Court 

dismissed Knoll‘s motion for a new trial for lack of prosecution, 

citing Knoll‘s noncompliance with Local Rule 7.1(e), as well as 

Knoll‘s failure to correct that noncompliance even after 

Allentown raised the issue in its response to the motion for a 

new trial. Knoll then filed a motion for reconsideration on 
4

September 17, 2010. On September 27, 2010, Allentown filed a 

response to the motion for reconsideration along with a motion 

for sanctions, arguing that Knoll‘s motion for a new trial and 

motion for reconsideration were frivolous. Knoll responded to 

the motion for sanctions on October 7, 2010.

On December 7, 2010, the District Court held a hearing 

on Allentown‘s motion for sanctions. On September 30, 2011, 

the District Court denied the motion for sanctions and issued a 

memorandum opinion. Therein, the District Court noted that it 

believed Knoll‘s motions were frivolous but declined to order 

sanctions both because Allentown did not comply with Rule 

11‘s safe harbor provision, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2), and 

because it was not convinced that Knoll‘s conduct was 

sanctionable under the law of this Court. On February 9, 2012, 

the District Court denied Knoll‘s motion for reconsideration. It 

found both that Knoll had failed to comply with Local Rule 

7.1(e) and that her motion for a new trial was frivolous, citing 

the reasons it discussed in the memorandum opinion addressing 

Allentown‘s motion for sanctions.

II1

Knoll appeals the District Court‘s dismissal of her motion 

for a new trial and subsequent denial of her motion for 

 

1

The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction 

over Knoll‘s federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The 

District Court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over Knoll‘s 

state claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Removal from the Court 

of Common Pleas was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. We have 

appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
5

reconsideration. She argues that the District Court erred when it 

failed to consider the factors set forth in Poulis before 

dismissing and denying the motions, respectively, pursuant to 

Local Rule 7.1(e). Because we hold that review of the Poulis

factors is not required when a district court dismisses a post-trial 

motion for noncompliance with procedural rules or court orders, 

we will affirm.

A

Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and a court‘s 

inherent authority to control its docket empower a district court 

to dismiss a case as a sanction for failure to follow procedural 

rules or court orders. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 

629–30 (1962). Nevertheless, because we recognized that 

―dismissals with prejudice . . . are drastic sanctions,‖ Poulis, 747 

F.2d at 867, in Poulis we enumerated six factors2a district court 

must consider before it dismisses a case pursuant to such 

 

2

The factors are: 

(1) the extent of the party‘s personal 

responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary 

caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders 

and respond to discovery; (3) a history of 

dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party 

or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the 

effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, 

which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; 

and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or 

defense.

Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868 (emphasis deleted).
6

authority. See id. at 868. We have required consideration of the 

Poulis factors when a district court dismisses a case pursuant to 

Rule 37(b) for failure to respond to discovery, e.g., United 

States v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d 141, 145, 

161–62 (3d Cir. 2003); Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 155–56

(3d Cir. 1988), when a district court dismisses a case pursuant to 

Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute, e.g., Dunbar v. Triangle 

Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 128–29 (3d Cir. 1987), and

when a district court enters a default judgment pursuant to Rule 

55(b) as a sanction for failure to plead or otherwise defend, e.g., 

Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1148 (3d Cir. 1990). 

In addition, we have required a Poulis analysis when a district 

court imposes sanctions that are tantamount to default judgment

because they inevitably lead to liability for one party. E.g., Ali 

v. Sims, 788 F.2d 954, 957 (3d Cir. 1986).

Our application of Poulisin those contexts comports with 

the underlying concern Poulis sought to address, namely that 

dismissal as a sanction before adjudication of the merits 

deprives a party of her day in court. This concern resonates 

throughout our precedents. See, e.g., Adams v. Trs. of N.J. 

Brewery Emps. Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 870 (3d Cir. 

1994); Livera v. First Nat’l State Bank of N.J., 879 F.2d 1186, 

1194 (3d Cir. 1989); Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 

875 (3d Cir. 1984); cf. Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 

116, 131 (3d Cir. 2012) (Garth, J., dissenting) (citing the Poulis

test as an example of the ―length to which we have gone in 

preserving cases for a merits determination‖).

Likewise, the fact that we extended Poulis beyond cases 

in which there was an explicit order of dismissal to those cases 

in which alternative sanctions were tantamount to dismissal 

highlights our primary concern: to preserve the ability of the 
7

parties to try their cases on the merits. Thus, when sanctions 

effectively dictate the result, Poulis applies. The converse is 

equally true; when sanctions do not preclude all claims or 

defenses such that a party still has her day in court, Poulis does 

not apply. Compare Ali, 788 F.2d at 957–58 (requiring 

consideration of the Poulis factors because the sanction of 

deeming certain material allegations of plaintiff‘s complaint 

admitted led inevitably to liability for the defendant and thus 

was tantamount to default judgment), with Hagans v. Henry 

Weber Aircraft Distribs., Inc., 852 F.2d 60, 66 (3d Cir. 1988) 

(not requiring consideration of Poulis because, despite stiff 

sanctions, ―plaintiffs in this case still may establish liability on 

at least some, if not all, of their theories . . . . Unlike the 

defendants in Ali, plaintiffs here will still have their day in 

court.‖).

In this appeal, Knoll implicitly urges us to extend Poulis

to the post-trial context. We decline to do so. The concern 

animating Poulis—that dismissal will deprive a party of her day 

in court and preclude review of potentially meritorious claims—

does not apply in the post-trial context. After all, the parties 

have already received an adjudication on the merits. 

Furthermore, although we acknowledge that, for instance, a 

dismissal of a motion for a new trial due to noncompliance with 

a procedural rule may deprive a party of an adjudication of that 

particular motion before the district court, it does not deprive 

that party of further review of the claims of error presented in 

such a motion. Those claims, so long as they have been 

properly raised and preserved, would be ripe for review on 

appeal to our Court. See Hewlett v. Davis, 844 F.2d 109, 115 

n.3 (3d Cir. 1988).
8

Moreover, in the post-trial context, other elements of 

sound judicial administration assume greater significance: the 

inherent authority of courts ―to manage their own affairs so as to 

achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases,‖ Link, 

370 U.S. at 630–31, and the existence of a final judgment that 

may be appealed, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) (discussing the 

effect of a post-trial motion on a notice of appeal).

Finally, although we are mindful that Poulis operates in

some cases to protect innocent parties from bearing the 

consequences of their attorneys‘ mistakes, see Poulis, 747 F.2d 

at 868 (factors one and four), we also acknowledge that parties 

cannot always ―avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions 

of this freely selected agent,‖ Link, 370 U.S. at 633–34. Indeed, 

the gravity of an attorney‘s errors in the post-trial context is

mitigated because the parties have already received a merits 

determination on their claims and defenses. Furthermore, we 

are confident that our Court will ensure that claims of error 

made in post-trial motions will receive appropriate review on 

appeal even when the post-trial motion itself is dismissed 

without consideration of the Poulis factors.

For these reasons, we hold that a district court need not 

engage in a Poulis analysis when it dismisses a post-trial motion 

for noncompliance with procedural rules or court orders.

B

Although we hold that an analysis of the Poulisfactors is 

not necessary in the post-trial context, we continue to adhere to 

the view that ―[d]ismissal must be a sanction of last, not first, 

resort.‖ Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869. We review dismissal of a post-
9

trial motion as a sanction for abuse of discretion. See Hewlett, 

844 F.2d at 114.

In this case, we cannot say that the District Court abused 

its discretion in dismissing Knoll‘s motion for a new trial and 

denying her subsequent motion for reconsideration. First, the 

dismissal sanction was specifically authorized by Local Rule 

7.1(e), the validity of which Knoll does not challenge. We have 

previously recognized that ―local rules play  ̳a vital role in the 

district courts‘ efforts to manage themselves and their dockets.‘‖ 

Smith, 845 F.2d at 1184 (quoting Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 

757 F.2d 557, 570 (3d Cir. 1985)). They ―facilitate the 

implementation of court policy, both by setting norms and 

putting the local bar on notice of their existence,‖ and ―serve to 

impose uniformity on practice within a district.‖ Id.

Second, Knoll had ample time to comply with Local Rule 

7.1(e). She was notified of her noncompliance by Allentown‘s 

response to her motion for a new trial on the fifteenth day after 

she filed the motion, and she still had not complied with the rule 

by the time the District Court dismissed the motion thirty-six 

days later. Indeed, in dismissing the motion, the District Court 

specifically noted the fact that ―plaintiff did not order a 

transcript or file a verified motion showing good cause [to 

excuse that requirement] after the defendant cited the rule in its 

response to the motion for new trial.‖ Knoll‘s motion for 

reconsideration then remained pending for one year, four 

months, and twenty-three days before it was denied. At no point 

did Knoll comply with the rule or even address why she had not 

complied. Given Knoll‘s inaction, the District Court was well 

within its discretion to dismiss the motions.

III
10

In an act of apparent desperation, Knoll accuses the 

learned trial judge of bias. She points to two comments made in 

the District Court opinion denying Allentown‘s motion for 

sanctions as evidence of this bias: the opinion calls Knoll‘s case 

a ―silly case‖ and characterizes her motion for a new trial as 

―patently frivolous.‖ Knoll v. City of Allentown, 2011 WL 

4528336, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2011).

These comments are patently insufficient to support a

claim of bias. ―[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of 

facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current 

proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis 

for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated 

favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment 

impossible.‖ Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). 

Knoll has failed to demonstrate the ―deep-seated favoritism or 

antagonism‖ that is required by Liteky. The District Court‘s 

comments do not arise from an extrajudicial source and are 

―assessments relevant to the case, whether they are correct or 

not.‖ United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 220 (3d Cir. 2007). 

As such, they do not demonstrate bias, even if they are 

―expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, [or] annoyance.‖ 

Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555; see also Wecht, 484 F.3d at 220–21.

IV

For the reasons stated, we hold that a district court is not 

required to engage in an analysis of the Poulis factors before it 

dismisses a post-trial motion for noncompliance with procedural 

rules or court orders. We will therefore affirm.