Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 83A05-1612-CR-2765 | May 25, 2017 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kimberly A. Jackson

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Caryn N. Szyper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Barbara Jo Woolley,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

May 25, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

83A05-1612-CR-2765

Appeal from the Vermillion Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Bruce V. Stengel, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

83C01-1510-F3-6

Baker, Judge.
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[1] Barbara Jo Woolley appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court after 

Woolley pleaded guilty to four counts of Level 3 Felony Neglect of a 

Dependent. Woolley argues that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive 

sentences and by finding an improper aggravating factor. Finding no error, we 

affirm.

Facts

[2] In September 2013, Woolley lost her job as a licensed practical nurse at a 

nursing home. Because of the loss of income, she and her ex-husband, Gordon, 

moved in with her son, John; John’s wife, Danielle; and John and Danielle’s 

four children—J.W. (age eight), C.W. (age five), S.W. (age four), and A.W. 

(age two).

[3] On October 16, 2015, the Department of Child Services (DCS) received a report 

alleging that the Woolley home was dirty. When DCS workers and law 

enforcement entered the residence, they encountered a scene that was described 

as “the worst neglect case” they had ever seen. Sent. Tr. p. 32-43, 54. Police 

officers documenting the scene required respirators, disposable foot covers, and 

gloves for their safety, especially in the upstairs of the home.

[4] The home had a strong odor of urine and feces. S.W. and A.W. were found 

upstairs in cribs in the master bedroom. The room was cluttered, dark, and 

dirty. Feces were smeared on the wall behind S.W.’s crib. A.W. appeared 

dirty. Four-year-old S.W. had wrist bones as small as an infant’s and his skin 

had a yellow tint. Five-year-old C.W. was in the adjacent room, which 
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contained only a toddler mattress on the floor. She appeared to be very 

malnourished. Eight-year-old J.W. was found in another room that was locked 

from the outside. He slept in a wooden bed frame with no mattress, box spring, 

or pillows. Everything in the room—including every wall, the ceiling, the 

“bed,” the blankets, and the floor—was smeared with feces. The feces on the 

floor had been there so long that they were smoothed over from being walked 

on over time. Even the items that J.W. used to eat—his bowl, plate, and sippy 

cup—were covered in feces. The room had no toys, and the windows were 

boarded up with plywood.

[5] All four children lacked proper hygiene and were suffering from varying degrees 

of malnutrition and dehydration. None of the children were potty-trained, 

none of them could communicate, and none of them even recognized one 

another. Their physical condition was appalling: J.W. had fecal matter on his 

legs, under his fingernails, and under his toenails; S.W. had fleas and fecal 

matter on his body; C.W. had head lice and fleas on her; and J.W. and A.W. 

had bug bites on their bodies. All the children were pale, had yellow-tinted 

skin, and would not eat normal food for their ages. Only J.W. could eat solid 

food; the other children ate only baby food because they did not know how to 

chew or swallow solids. S.W. was so emaciated that his ribs and hip bones 

were visible. At the age of four years, he weighed only 22.3 pounds.

[6] None of the children had seen a doctor since they were born except for J.W., 

who had been to a doctor once when he was three years old. None of the 
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children had been outside in over a year. Some of the neighbors did not even 

know that children lived at that residence. 

[7] The children’s guardian ad litem, an attorney who had been serving as a 

guardian ad litem for twenty-two years, later described C.W. and S.W. as 

looking “like Holocaust survivors” and said that the children “were all like no 

other children that [she] had ever seen.” Sent. Tr. p. 17-19. The guardian ad 

litem summarized their condition as follows:

All the children suffer from health issues along with indescribable 

mental and functional impairments . . . . These children never 

saw the sunshine, the grass, felt the snow, experienced the 

warmth of loving arms. Instead they were kept in rooms and 

cribs like caged animals. Diapers, sewage and filth was 

throughout the house. The children didn’t even have the 

consolation of each other. None expressed any recognition of 

their siblings. They were deprived of food, health care, love and 

stimulation. They don’t even cry when upset, likely because it 

has never elicited a response so why bother.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 203.

[8] While Woolley’s grandchildren were confined upstairs, she regularly left the 

home to attend classes at Ivy Tech Community College, where she was enrolled 

in the education program. As part of her coursework, she learned about child 

and adolescent development and the duty to report child abuse and neglect. 

Woolley went upstairs daily to see the children and babysat the children more 

than once. She admitted that the children had been downstairs only two or 

three times in the two years she had lived in the residence.
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[9] On October 30, 2015, the State charged Woolley with four counts of Level 3 

felony neglect of a dependent. She pleaded guilty as charged on July 20, 2016. 

On August 11, 2016, the trial court sentenced Woolley to consecutive terms of 

sixteen years for the neglect of J.W. and nine years each for the neglect of the 

other three children—an aggregate term of forty-three years imprisonment. She 

now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Consecutive Sentences

[10] Woolley first argues that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive 

sentences. Trial courts may only impose consecutive sentences within the 

bounds of the statutory sentencing scheme. Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2; Wilson v. 

State, 5 N.E.3d 759, 762 (Ind. 2014). Because neglect of a dependent is not 

listed as a “crime of violence,” Woolley’s offenses are subject to a statutory cap 

if they arise from a single episode of criminal conduct. I.C. § 35-50-1-2. 

Whether multiple offenses constitute a single episode of criminal conduct is a 

factually sensitive inquiry to be made by the trial court. Schlichter v. State, 779 

N.E.2d 1155, 1157 (Ind. 2002). In conducting this analysis, the focus is on the 

timing of the offenses and the simultaneous and contemporaneous nature of the 

crimes. Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1200-01 (Ind. 2006).

[11] Woolley’s offenses do not constitute a single episode of criminal conduct. First, 

her crimes involve four separate children. See, e.g., Pittman v. State, 885 N.E.2d 

1246, 1259 (Ind. 2008) (holding that “[c]onsecutive sentences reflect the 
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significance of multiple victims”). Furthermore, the children each suffered 

daily neglect over a period of two years. In other words, an individual crime 

was committed against each child victim every day for two years. It is readily 

apparent that these crimes do not constitute a single episode of criminal 

conduct.

[12] The trial court articulately explained its reasons for imposing consecutive 

sentences:

[Woolley] was in the household for a little over two years, about 

25 months. This conduct was not closely related in time. It was 

not closely related in circumstances. This was an individual 

crime committed each day and repeated each day such that the 

episode of criminal conduct just not—does not apply. This is not 

a single episode. The probable cause and plea—or probable 

cause and charging information encompass evidence of multiple 

acts of neglect, depravity, cruelty and confinement that occurred 

over multiple years. This did not occur in one single incident 

over two hours, four hours, six hours, but, in fact, occurred for 

the vast majority of the childrens’ lifetime and for the [entire]

lifetime of the youngest child, [A.W.]. So the Court does not feel 

that . . . our legislature[] intended this [to] apply and there are 

several cases . . . that indicate this is not considered to be an 

episode of criminal conduct.

Sent. Tr. p. 79-80. We agree, and find no error with respect to the imposition of 

consecutive sentences.

II. Aggravating Factor

[13] Woolley also argues that the trial court found an improper aggravating factor. 

One of the ways in which a trial court can err in the sentencing process is by 
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finding aggravators or mitigators that are unsupported by the record or 

improper as a matter of law. E.g., Laster v. State, 956 N.E.2d 187, 193 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2011).

[14] Woolley was a licensed practical nurse during the years she lived with the 

children. The trial court found this to be an aggravating factor, explaining its 

reasoning as follows:

All nurses, registered nurses, your licensed practical nurses, at the 

time they are pinned, when they get their authority to practice 

take a pledge and that pledge is known as the Florence 

Nightingale Pledge. I had told the attorneys that I was going to 

take judicial notice that she was a practical nurse and that pledge 

is as follows: “I solemnly pledge myself before God and in the 

presence of this assembly to pass my life in purity and to practice 

my profession faithfully. I will abstain from whatever is 

deleterious and mischievous and will not take or knowingly 

administer any harmful drug. I will do all in my power to 

maintain and elevate the standard of my profession and will hold 

in confidence all personal matters committed to my keeping and 

all my family affairs coming into my knowledge in the practice of 

my calling. With loyalty I will endeavor to aid the physician in 

his work and to devote myself to the welfare of those committed 

to my care.” I want to emphasize and repeat the last phrase of 

the Florence Nightingale Pledge which nurses in Indiana, and I 

think, in fact, all nurses across the country take. The last phrase 

is “Devote myself to the welfare of those committed to my care.” 

That does not say to the patients committed to my care but it just 

says to the welfare of those committed to my care. I think that is 

an aggravating factor that she’s a nurse, that she’s taken a pledge 

to devote herself to those committed to—to devote herself to the 

welfare of those committed to her care. Also as a nurse she has a 

legal duty to report evidence of suspected abuse to law 

enforcement officers. Also as a nurse she has received 
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specialized training to recognize the situations, to know how 

devastating it is on youngsters to not have a proper diet, to not 

get exercise, to not be in the sunlight, to not have cleanliness. 

She knows all those and she’s received special training, although 

it doesn’t take any special training. I once again have to look at 

these pictures, pictures that have been introduced 1 through 11 to 

see those to know that this is just a horrible situation, particularly 

the pictures from 4 through 11 that depict the children.

Sent. Tr. p. 82-83. Woolley argues that this aggravator was inappropriate 

because the nurse’s pledge was evidence outside the record and because her 

nursing background was irrelevant, inasmuch as “no special training was 

necessary to detect the inappropriate conditions of the children.” Appellant’s 

Br. p. 13.

[15] Initially, we note that Woolley did not object to this aggravating factor, either at 

the beginning of the sentencing hearing when the trial court indicated its 

intention to take judicial notice of her nursing background and the pledge or at 

the end in the passage set forth above. Consequently, she has waived this

argument. Angleton v. State, 714 N.E.2d 156, 158 (Ind. 1999).

[16] Waiver notwithstanding, we note that Woolley’s nursing background is 

supported by the record. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 173. Furthermore, we 

cannot say that the trial court erred by finding that her nursing background is 

particularly aggravating given the nature of these offenses. Woolley is correct 

that even a lay person would have recognized that the conditions these four 

children were forced to live in were unconscionable. Appellant’s Br. p. 23-24. 

Therefore, it is even more egregious when a nurse—a person trained in an 
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occupation that focuses solely on the health and well-being of other people—

takes no action to help her four obviously suffering grandchildren. She had a 

greater awareness than an average lay person of the physical, mental, and 

developmental needs of children, but did nothing.

[17] As for the trial court’s acknowledgement of the nurse’s pledge, it is apparent 

that the trial court was merely using the pledge to emphasize its point that 

nurses are in the business of caring for others and, as a nurse, Woolley fell 

woefully short of what is commonly expected of those in her profession. In 

other words, the trial court used the pledge to highlight the reason that

Woolley’s training and experience in the nursing profession was aggravating. 

We find no error in this regard or in any regard with respect to this aggravating 

factor.

1

[18] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Barnes, J., and Crone, J., concur.

 

1 Even if we did find error in the recitation of the nurse’s pledge, it would not render the aggravator itself 

improper. We are confident that the trial court would still have found Woolley’s nursing background to be 

an aggravator even if it had not been aware of or recited the nurse’s pledge.