1

Filed 5/28/21 P. v. W alker CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. ROY LEE WALKER, JR., Defendant and Appellant. E074727 (Super.Ct.No. FVI18002016)
OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Cara D. Hutson, Judge. Affirmed. Eric S. Multhaup , under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for D efendant and
A ppellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Stephanie H. Chow, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and R espondent.2 I. INTRODUCTION Defendant and appellant Roy Le e Walker was convicted by a jury of six offenses involving sexual conduct with three different minors. Following a contested restitution hearing on February 7, 2020, the trial court ordered defendant to reimburse the California Victim Compensation Board (the b oard) in the amount of $2,162.50, reflecting the amounts paid by the b oard to reimburse two of the victims for mental health services

. Defendant appeals from this order arguing there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the expenses were required as a direct result of his criminal conduct. We affirm the order.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Defendant was convicted by a jury of six offenses involving sexual conduct with three different minors. Defendant requested a formal restitution hearing at the time of sentencing , and the restitution hearing was eventually held on February 7, 2020. At the time of the hearing, the prosecutor presented the trial court with original, certified documents from the b oard. The documents included a written request for restitution by the b oard , which indicated the b oard had paid a total of $4,162.50 in claims made by defendant’s three vict ims. Specifically, the documents indicated that the b oard had reimbursed one victim for 13 sessions of counseling; reimbursed a second victim for seven sessions of counseling; and reimbursed the third victim for relocation expenses. The correspondence fr om the b oard stated: “ In accordance with Government Code Section 13950 et seq., expenses have been verified as incurred because of [defendant ’ s]3

crime , ” and it included certifications by a custodian of records under penalty of perjury supporting the docum ents detailing each of the itemized expenses

. The trial court concluded that the counseling services obtained by two of the victims were supported by the evidence, but that the relocation expenses paid to the third victim were not related to defendant ’ s cr ime. As a result, the trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution in the amount of $2,162.50 to the b oard , reflecting the

amount the b oard paid to reimburse the two victims for the counseling services.
III. DISCUSSION Defendant’s only argument on appeal is that the trial court erred when it ordered him to pay $2,162.50 in restitution to reimburse the b oard for the cost of counseling services received by two victims because there was no evidence that the counseling servi ces were related to his underlying crimes. We disagree. Penal Code s ection 1202.4 authorizes restitution payments to victims , as well as the imposition of restitution fines, paid either to the state restitution fund or a direct victim of a defendant ’ s cri mes . ( Id. at subds. (e), (f).) “ Crime victims may apply to the
R estitution F und as one avenue to recover monetary losses caused by criminal conduct. ” ( People v. Holman (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1452.) However, where a victim has received direct assi stance from the state restitution fund, the amount s a defendant is ordered to pay as direct victim restitution are instead paid to the restitution fund to the extent the victim has received assistance from the fund. ( I bi d. )

“ ‘ The standard of review of a restitution order is abuse of discretion.

. . .

“ ‘Where there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the4

trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing court.’ ” [Citation s .] ’

. . . ‘ In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence [to support a factual finding], the

“ ‘power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,’ to suppor t the trial cou rt’s findings. ” [Citations.] Further, the standard of proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] “ If the circumstances reasonably justify the [trial court ’ s] findings, ” the jud gment may not be overturned when the circumstances might also reasonably support a contrary finding. [ C itation.] We do not reweigh or reinterpret the evidence; rather, we determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the inference drawn by th e trier of fact.’ ” ( People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26.) Here, the record contains substantial evidence in support of the trial court ’ s $2,162.50 restitution order. At the time of the restitution hearing, the prosecution presented a written request from the b oard , which represented that payments had been made to two victims for counseling services; such expenses had been verified by the b oard as incurred because of defendant ’ s crimes in accordance with Government Code

s ection 13950; and the a mount of expenses for counseling services added up to $2,162.50. The request was accompanied by receipts and invoices for those specific
services , and a certification under penalty of perjury by the b oard ’ s custodian of records stating , that the bills and invoices were true and accurate reproductions of the bills submitted to and paid by the b oard.5

Defendant argues that the certified records of payment by the b oard are insufficient to support the trial court ’ s restitution order because the documents do not detail how the b oard determined that the services claimed were related to the defendant ’ s crimes or the factual basis for the b oard ’ s determination. However, this court has previously held that documents in dicating that the b oard has already reimbursed a victim for the cost of counseling services constitutes substantial evidence in support of a finding that the services received were directly related to the defendant ’ s underlying crimes. ( People v. Cain (20 00) 82 Cal.App.4th 81, 89.) More recently, our colleagues in the Fifth District Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion in In re S.E. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 795. Specifically, the Court of Appeal observed that the b oard is an agency within the Califor nia state government; the Legislature has established detailed statutory procedures that govern when a claimant is eligible for compensation; in accordance with those statutes, the b oard itself has developed administrative procedures for processing claims; and th o se statutes and regulations both authorize reimbursement only after the b oard ha s been able to verify that the costs claimed were incurred as a direct result of the qualifying crime and for no other reason. ( Id. at pp. 810

- 811.) It then explained that , “ [i]n light of the foregoing statutes and regulations, we conclude the certified documents before the court were inherently
reliable. [Citation.] Because they required that causation be established as a prerequisite to payment, they furnished an a dequate factual basis for the claim [, and] the court could rely on them as evidence of the amounts paid, and as prima facie evidence the victims ’ counseling was directly related to [ the defendant ’ s] conduct. [Citation.] By law, the6

board could not have m ade the payments otherwise, and we presume the board followed the law and its own regulations. ” ( Id. at p. 811.) We agree with the prior decision of this court and the reasoning expressed in In re
S.E. , supra , 46 Cal.App.5th 795, that a trial court is entitled to presume the b oard followed the law and its own regulations when reviewing evidence that the b oard has alr eady made payment on a claim brought by a victim. (See Evid. Code , § 664 [“It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed.”].) Moreover, the relevant statute dealing with payments made by the board from the “Restitution Fund” provides
tha t “the amount of assistance provided shall be presumed to be a direct result of the defendant’s criminal conduct and shall be included in the amount of the restitution ordered.” ( Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)(4)(A).) Thus, the certified documents from t he
b oard reflecting payments made to two of the victims to reimburse them for the cost of counseling services in this case constituted substantial evidence upon which the trial court could rely to conclude that the amounts paid were directly related to the defendant’s
criminal conduct. Defendant failed to rebut this presumption. Where the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, defendant has not shown an abuse of discretion warranting reversal.7 IV. DISPOSITION The or der is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS Acting P. J. We concur:

RAPHAEL J.

MENETREZ J.