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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Ljave 8Lah¶) 2. REPORT CATE 3 1EPORT TYPE ANO DATES COVERED

21 December 92 Historical/190-1991

4 TITLE ANO SUBTTLE Legacy in the Sand The United S FUNDING NUM8ERS

States Army Armament,Munitions and Chemical

"ommand in Operations Desert Shield/Storm N/A

6 AUTHOR($)I

Porter, Kimberly K. and Herbert P.

LePore

7 REAFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME;S) AN ACCRES.iE S) 6 2S.rCQPANG OBRGANIZATION

Historical Office, United States Army

Armament,Munitions and Chemical Command

Rock Island, Illinois 61299-6000 N/A

9 S;NSCPING,.-ACTOPIN AGE•CY .%&AMES) AND ADCPES.i,ES) 10 SPCNSORIPG %aCNTORING AGENCY

Historical Office, United States Army EVORT Nm.•EA

Army Armament, Munitions. and Chemical N/A

Command, Rock Island, Illinois 61299-6000

A•M 5APd "io . ... ..

11 SUPoEI4ENTARY .orES

Copies may be obtained from above oftfice and organization

12a OIST";RlI38I AVAILABILmTY S'A"EVLNT •,5 DIS"•,8LT•CN COCE

Approved for Public Release; distribution PRIMARY Code#1

is Unlimited.

1"3 A8.S7ACT (M4Bu,. ,o.v 

This is a broad historical sweep of the role of the U.S.

Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command in Operation Desert Shield/Storm. This command was responsible for the

distribution of all the coný,entional ammunition used by

American forces during the gulf War. It was also

responsible for the management of materiel including

Chemical Defensive Equipment for all American troops. The

command had the responsibility of shipping materiel and

ammunition into the theater of operation and deployment

of personnel and repair parts and equipment.

"14 S,&EC7Z,,--4.,S AIMCCOM, Operation Desert Shield/Storm , ",,WE,, CF*G 231

ODS) Southwest Asia (SWA) Deployment, Materiel 231

Ammunition, Loaistics, Procurement, Shipping

Unclassified flnclassifind "'nc!,a ssifieid u nlim .. e•(-I 5N "10,4 -5.
LEGACY IN THE SAND:

THE UNITED STATES ARMY ARMAMENT,

MUNITIONS AND CHEMICAL COMMAND

IN

OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

DTIC QJAL:-T,' i:6,PzrcrED

Accesion For

l~imbrfy . Poter Justification

Herbert P. LePore - ....

Distribution I

Availability Codes

Ava~il andlIor

Historical Office United Stales Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command

R o-.k island, IL 61299-60001 

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COMMANDING GENERAL'S INTRODUCTION

From 6 August 1990 to 6 March 1991, the 17,000 men and women of AMCCOM, along

with countless thousands of other military and civilian personnel from throughout the Department

of Defense community, were involved in the largest mobilization of American forces since World

War II.

Known as Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the mobilization entailed the

movement of over 500,000 fighting men and women 8,000 miles to the deserts of Saudi Arabia.

There, final preparations were made for the eventual invasion of occupied Kuwait to expel Saddam

Hussein's Iraqi arro1y, which had without provocation invaded the tiny nation and stood menacingly

poised upon the border of Saudi Arabia. Under the aegis of the United Nations Charter, the United

States and a coalition of some 30 other nations created a most formidable fighting force to

challenge, and eventually defeat, Saddam Hussein's troops in just 100 hours of ground warfare.

The men and women of AMCCOM played a most significant role in the success of

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. They selflessly worked long, hard hours to ensure

the movement of some 500,000 short tons of conventional ammunition; administered over 500,000

materiel requisitions; and accelerated over 300 procurement actions, contracts, and purchase

orders. Customer needs were more than met, aided not only by command's direct employees,

and its vital, support contractors, but also in large measure by the deployment to Southwest Asia

of over 240 AMCCOM military and civilian personnel.

To capture the role of the command in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and

to apply it to the military history venue is no easy task. However, the staff of the AMCCOM Historical

Office has skillfully used the tools of the trade--papers, photographs, charts, maps, etc.--to

assemble an insightful, yet definitive chronicle of the selfless and dedicated contributions made

by all the men and women of the AMCCOM family in bringing about the successful conclusion of

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. This history is a written testimony to all the men and

women of AMCCOM and their role in what to many will be considered "their finest hour."

PAUL L. GREE

Major GeneralU

Commanding

iii
iv
`7 7 71

FOREWARD

In the Spring of 1991, the AMCCOM Historical Office was tasked by the Department of the Army and

the Army Materiel Command to write a history of the command's role in Operations Desert Shield and

Desert Storm.

The staff of the historical office decided that a broad historical sweep of the command's activities,

contributions, and problem areas should be undertaken with emphasis being placed on significant activities

suci" 3s deployment, logistical support, movement of conventional ammunition, production and procurement, and personnel. In order to capture the above, the historians engaged in v riting the history examined

in depth primary sources such as messages, after action reports, memos, and daily briefing reports. A

relatively large number of oral interviews were also done with important AMCCOM personnel who affected

the command's activities and performance during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. These men

and women provided the historical office staff with a most incisive and revealing look at the human and

corporate elements which comprised Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Secondary sources

such as summaries, Lessons Learned documents, and articles wera also freely utilized in writing this ODS

history.

Ms. Kimberly K. Porter wrote the majority of the history, and the undersigned wrote the unit detailing

the command's deployment of materiel, ammunition, and personnel in support of Operations Desert Shield

and Desert Storm. Mr. Thomas J. Slattery made extensive contributions to the portion dealing with Rck

Island Arsenal's involvement in 00S. Mrs. Marguerite A. Brown edited the history and provided attendant

clerical support.

At this time, appreciation is extended to Ms. Porter for her invaluable contributions to the writing of the

history, and for her most lucid, yet definitive style of historical chronicling. Thanks are also extended to Mr.

Slattery for taking time from his busy schedule to obtain oral interviews from important Rock ;sland Arsenal

personnel concerning the arsenal's contributions to ODS. He deftly incorporated these interviews into a

short, but significant treatise used in the ODS history. Recognition and thanks are extended to Mrs.

Marguerite A. Brown for her much appreciated editorial and clerical support. Thanks are also offered to

Ms. Linda M. Baeza for her applied editorial skills.

Warm thanks are extended to those people who allowed the undersigned to capture by oral interviews

their observations about Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Much was learned and chrunicled

from these interviews. Finally, in closing, corporate recognition is given to the 17,000 men and women of

AMCCOM for their selfless sacrifices and contributions during ODS. What they did will be hopefully indelibly

inscribed by this history. It is theirs to remember.

HERBERT P. LEPORE

Chief, Historical Office

V
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter One: Prelude to W ar ............................................................................ 1

Chapter Two Deployment to the Desert ..................................................... 9

Chapter Three: Prodt!ction and Procurem ent ............................................... 33

Chapter Four: Logistics and Logistics Assistance

Representatives .................................................................... 87

Chapter Five: Am m unition ............................................................................ 123

Chapter Six: Observations .......................................................................... 183

Chapter Seven: Conclusions ............................................................................ 211

Glossary: ............................................................................................. 227

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Chapter One

Preklde to War

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's 2 August 1. 990 invasion of the Em;rate of Kuwait did not take the

world by storm. Even in the perpetually turbulent Middla East, observers noted his bellicosity towards the

tiny nation and wondered both aloud and in print to its end. In late July, with troops po'36d upcn the IraqiKuwaiti border, Hussein specifically charged that Kuwait had violated Iraq's territorial borders by tapping

its portion of the Ar Rumaylah (Rumaila) oil field. In compensati:n for this lleged violation, he . 'manded

$2.6 billion, the relinquishment of Kuwait's k-aim upon the disputed oil fir?!a, and long-term leaes on the

tiny islands of Bubiya and Warbah. The islands were to provide Hussein with neeot; .neaports in the Persian

Gulf.

Hussein also attempted to utilize the 26 July 1990 meeting of OPEC (Oil Producing Ex r rting Countries)

to further his ends. At the meeting, he proposed th.e OPEC ministers impose more stringent pr;,.e floors

and production ceilings or) the member statos. His demands reiected, Hussein turned 100,000 of his

chemically offensive, war-weary soldiers-of an army est!mated at .55,000 and the tourth or fifth largest

in the world-against the 20,500 man army of the Emirate. By nightfall of the first day of conflict, the Kuwaiti

government fell to Iraq's aggression.

Hussein's motives for the unprovoked attack on the nation of Kuwait do not appear exceedingly

complex. In light of his eight-year war with Iran, his thirst for cash was extreme, and by taking control of

Kuwait's 97 billion barrel oil reserve and with dreams of further conquests in the region, it could presumably

be slaked. Beyond simple economics, however, Hussein's foray into Kuwait has been compared to Benito

Mussolini's efforts to claim Ethiopia in the 1930s: territorial aggrandizement thinly veiled by de':larations

of ethnic unity in the pale light of Baathist ideology. Others have suggested Hussein's motives could be

attributed not so much to pan-Arabism, but a distinct anti-Westernism.

It Hussein had presumed that the world would stand i;ack and s-llow him to simply take Kuwait in the

style of Mussolini in Ethiopia, he was mistaken. The Kuwait of 19GI was not the Ethiopia of 193';, and

as "JFD" in November 1990's Strategies a ctics notes, "... Saddam missed a critical bit of information:

Ethiopia wasn't in the oil business. Saddam raised a dagger-an economic, political, and military daggerto the world's petroleum artery." And "he was stupid ,3ncugh to think he could get away with it."'

But Hussein was not destined to "get awav with it." On the day of the Iraqi invasion, the United Nations

Security Council condemned the attack and demanded that Iraqi forces be immediately and unconditionally withdrawn from Kuwait. It also esolved that Iraq and Kuwait begin r.agotiations to settle their

differences. Hussein chose to defy Uaiited Nations Resolution 660, as well as the numerous ones which

followed it.

The premeditated invasion of Kuwait, population 2.1 million, by its nine-fold larger, chemically offensive,

norihern neighbor also attracted the attention of the United States. Upon learning of the invasion, President

George Bush immadiately ordered additional naval forces to the troubled gulf region. In addition, he issued

an embargo of all trde with Iraq and, along with numerous other nations, announced sanctions to both

freeze Iraq's assets in the United States and protect Kuwait's financial interests. A tense week followed

as the world awaited Hussein's response to not only the United Nations' resolution and the addition of United

States naval vessels to the Gulf, but also to the nearly universal outcries against his depredations.
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SAUDI ARABIA

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2
Despite the public outcry, Hussein remained determined to continue his efforts. By 6 August 1990,

he had arrayed his formidable forces along the Kuwaiti-Saudi AraDian border and appeared poised to

continue his Middle Eastern strike. In turn, the United Nations Security Council issued arther of its

condemnations. With Resolution 661 of 6 August, the U.N. imposed trade and financial sanctions against

Iraq and occupied Kuwait. Simultaneously, the United Nations Sanctions Committee came to frLition.

The 6th of August 1990 also bore witness to President Bush's announcement of the deployment of

U.S. land, sea, and air forces to the Persian Gulf region in order to deter and defend against an Iraqi invasion

of Saudi Arabia. Regardless, just two days following the declaration of deployment issued by President

Bush, Hussein escalated world tension by publicly declaring Kuwait to be the 19th provinco of Iraq.

On that same day, President Bush addressed the nation from the floor of the United States House of

Representatives to announce the arrival of elements of the 82nd Airborne Division to their defensive

positions in Saudi Arabia. Before the nation, President Busi declared that the invasion of Kuwait was much

more than "an Ame-ican problem or a European problem or a Middle Eastern problem." Indeed, he intoned,

"it is the world's problem."2 Noting the world's effort to contain Hussein, President Bush thundered not only

that "a puppet regime imposed from the outside" upon Kuwait was unacceptable, but so was "the acquisition

of territory by force."I Urging that no nation or individual should underestimate the United States

determination to confront aggression, President Bush enunciated four simple guiding principles for United

States policy. First, the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait

must be accomplished. Second, he declared Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored to replace

the usurping puppet regime. Third, he repeated this nation's historic commitment, dating from the administration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and continuing to his own, to the security and stability of

the Persian Gulf. And finally, President Bush noted his determination to protect the lives of American

citizens abroad. 4

In his address to the nation, President Bush continued by noting that such public censure coupled with

economic sanctions might not serve to wholly rid Kuwait of Iraq's presence with appropriate dispatch.

Indeed, Iraq might continue its efforts at pan-Arabism in the pale of Baothist ideology or, perhaps more

correctly, financially motivated territorial aggrandizement irto the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia. The presumption that iraq's thirst had been slaked and its appetite sated with the taking of Kuwait,

President Busn deemed "unwise and unrealistic."5 Therefore, in response to consultations wit[ Saudi

Arabian King Fahd, he had just two days prior deployed United States air and ground forces to the Kingdom.

Indeed, the first of these forces arrived in Southwest Asia (SWA) just hours before the president addressed

the nation.

The aeployment of these troops had not been lightly undertaken. Taken into consideration had been

the fact thiat the sovere'gn independence of Saudi Arabia was of vital interest to the United States, that

the two nations had maintained a lengthy friendship including a security relationship, and that King Fahd

had requested a United States presence in the region. Through U.S. commitment couupled with that of the

emerging coalition of nations, the preservation of Saudi integrity, as well as the deterrence of further Iraqi

aggression, was intended.

President Bush continued that the United States mission in SWA should be considered "wholly

defensive."" United States forces wouid "not initiate hostilities, but [would] defend themselves, the Kingdom

of Saudi Arabia, and other friends in the Persian Gulf."7 Seeking to stand by its friends, the United States

government also sought a negotiated end to the crisis and consulted with numerous foreign officials,

including those of the NATO bloc, the Soviet Union, Turkey, Egypt, and Morocco, among others. Oil

producing nations were encouraged to increase production to prevy 1 Iraq'o depredations from disrupting

3
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AbdaltSuab

SAUDI ARABIA Burgarg 0

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Source: Embassy of Kuwait
the world's economy unduly. Domestic oil companies were also exhorted not to take advantage of the

world's uncertainty by raising prices but rather by illustrating restraint. Furthermore, President Bush urged

all Americans to conserve energy.

Concluding his remarks, the president declared:

Standing up for our principles will not come easy. It may take time and possibly cost

a great deal. But we are asking no more of anyone than of the brave young men and

women of our armed forces and their families. .

Standing up for our principles is an American tradition. As it has so many times

before it may take time and tremendous effort, but most of all it wil take unity of

purpose. As I've witnessed throughout my life in both war and peace, America has

never waivered when her purpose is driven by principle. And on this August day, at

home and abroad, I know she will do no less.

Thank you, and God bless the United Statet of America.'

The ensuing efforts by the United States-led, U.N.-authorized coalition force of 37 member nations to

unconditionally rid Kuwait of the Iraqi presence by "all necessary means* became known as 'Operation

Desert Shield," and after the initial day of offensive action. 17 January 1991. as ^Operation Desert Storm."

Coalition actions were sanctioned by the 11 November 1990 United Nations Security Council Resolution

678 which declared that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991 or face the consequences.

The actual efforts of the United States during these turbulent days have been briefly chronir.fed by both

civilian and military authors, However, the effols have only, thus far, been broad overviews. What specific

commands and individuals contributed to the containment of Saddam Hussein remains to be told. For

example, the endeavors of the United States Army Chemical Research, Development and Engineering

Center (CROEC), the United States Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM), the United StatPs

Army CommunicationElectronics Command (CECOM). the United States Army Forces Command

(FORSCOM), the Miltary Traffic Management Command (MTMC), etc., remain to be explicated

In an effort to shed !igh, on one of the dark corners of America's bright and shining effort in Operations

Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this work explores the United States Army Armament, Munitions and

Chemical Command. It focuses on not only armarrei'nt, munitions, and chemicals, but also on the

individuals who endeavored to make such items available to the men and women of the United States

armed forces serving in Southwest Asia.

Thus materiel management, communication, transportation, fogistics, croduction, procurement. quality

assurance, readiness, personnel, etc., will be examined from an unclassified standpoint.

5
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NOTES

""JD", "The 1990 Crisis in the Persian Gulf," Strategies and Tactics. November 1990, p. 6.

2

Extracted from "President Speaks to Nation: The Deployment of US Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia,"

Mil•1R..e•i•w, November 1991, p. 82.

3lbid.

'Ibid.

5 blid.

$Ibid., 83.

?Ibid.

Ibid,

9"UN Resolutions," hdilt etie,. November 1991, p. 79.

7
Many of AMCCOM's LA~s and QASAS passed through this qate, or similar ones, on the Kuwait-Saudi Arabian border

eroute to their assignments.

ALA

4 , 14 ' . .

" N-1
Chapter Two

AMCCOM's Deployment to the Desert

Though the United States and its coalition allies prepared for the air and land phases of the Persian

Gulf War for six months, the actual war itself was ephemeral, spanning only a period of seven weeks of

military action. However, the AMCCOM role in this war was an expansive one with a myriad of functions

endemic to its mission. The command's 17,934 civilian employees and 633 military personnel performed

a multiplicity of duties during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, all of which merit comment.

AMCCOM managed research, development, engineering, product assurance, logistics support, industrial preparedness, procurement, production, security assistance, and materiel readiness for assigned

systems. The command was also the Single Manager for Conventicnal Ammunition for the Department

of Defense (DOD) and managed the Production Base Modernization Expansion Program. It also

maintained a technical base to accomplish the development, pocurement, and life cycle support of

conventional and nuclear weapons and ammunition. The above mentioned support included infantry, guntype air defense, surface and aircraft mounted weapons, and chemical weapons systems. AMCCOM was

responsible for the maintenance of the ammunition, chemical, and production base during peacetime and

mobilization. This, of course, included the sources of production such as ammunition plants and arsenals.'

The deployment of AMCCOM personnel, logistical, and materiel support began on 7 August 1990 with

the full-time staffing of the Readiness Directorate's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) on a three shift,

around the clock basis. AMCCOM was one of the first major subordinate commands (MSC) to implement

around the clock coverage. The EOC was a most significant player in the deployment venue; it combined

planning, coordinating, reporting, and directing functions in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert

Storm. Staffed mostly by men and women from the Readiness Directorate (RD), the EOC performed a

multitude of important duties such as tracking significant activities, reviewing message traffic, responding

to message and telephonic taskers, and providing a secure conference room where daily classified

briefings took place. Some significant issues addressed at these briefings included the current status of

ammunition, weapons, chemical defensive equipment, spare parts, and the transportation of these items.

Personnel deployment to Southwest Asia (SWA) of senior command representatives (SCR), logistics

assistance representatives (LARs), and quality assurance specialists-ammunition surveillance (QASAS)

from AMCCOM were other items examined at the EOC briefings.

The Emergency Operations Center also contained the Worldwide Military Command and Control

System (WWMCCS), a teleconference system for classified discussions used by the Joint Chief of Ste:.

(JCS) to communicate with various commands in the DOD. AMCCOM was a diurnal participant in the

WWMCCS teleconferences. The activity in the EOC was generally at a pace so frenetic that it necessitated

the utilization of people who could work under pressure. These individuals were normally the ones who

put out all types of fires and made sure that everything went smoothly or as smoothly as could be expected.

Ironically, when the EOC was activatea on 7 August 1990, it was done bereft of a standard operating

procedure (SOP) which meant that people working in the confines of the EOC had to learn in a hurry and

in many instances through what could be termed as on the job training (OJT). What also took place was

the augmentation of an office staff with Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA), Individual Ready

Reservists (IRR), and civilian personnel from other AMCCOM offices. This caused a great deal of time

to be spent by in house EOC employees to train the'e individuals to perform functions for only a short period

of lime. Energy no doubt could have been better soent utilizing augmentees nnd dpt!;il'd n*rqnnnP1 in

performing work relative to their mission or retaining these individuals in the Operations Center for a longer

period of time. There was also the belief that much time, effort, and emotions were expended in deciding

9
•J .,/

what directorates/offices could afford to detail personnel to work in the EOC, and that the Readiness

Directorate should have established staffing requirements for the Operations Center with directorates and

other AMCCOM organizations. This caused some ruffled feelings, however the polemic was relatively sh-ort

lived and the staffing problem was ameliorated to everyone's satisfaction. AMCCOM was fortunate,

however, in that most, if not all, EOC employees deftly used common sense and their wits to get them

through the difficult or confusing times. Throughout all facets of ODS, individuals such as MAJ Denton

G. (Hank) Snow, the EOC's first Army Operations Officer, Mr. Hygie Reynolds, Ph.D., the first chief of the

AMCCOM EOC, COL David 0. Lindsay, Director of Readiness Directorate, Mr. Alfred (Al) N. Bradley,

Deputy Director of Readiness Directorate, Ms. Chris Schumacher and Ms. Delphia Woods, shift leaders,

and Mr. Les Wilcox and Mr. Jerry Isom, also shift leaders, and Mr. Ron Hollimon, subsequent chief of the

EOC, along with many others kept the EOC functioning smoothly, no matter what time of day. The

Emergency Operations Center staff tendered exemplary, dedicated, and thoroughly professional support

throughout the entire desert deployment.'

The deployment of AMCCOM personnel and assets for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

(ODS) was unique in that such a deployment had never been undertaken, though a number of AMCCOM

people and assets had been involved in Operation Just Cause in Panama almost a year earlier. Mooilization

exercises (MOBEX) had been implemented numerous times and military equipment had been prepositioned in designated areas around the world for contingency purposes as part of DOD policy. However,

there had not been the "tolling of the fire bell" until August 1990. Prior to that time, it was business as usual

for AMCCOM and its attendant units, though in house a great deal of perturbation was taking place due

to a forthcoming reduction in force (RIF) of AMCCOM personnel at Rock Island Arsenal due to severe fiscal

constraints. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was enough of a diversion however to attenuate, at

least somewhat, the ominous specte..r of a RIF. Obvious:y, there were now more pressing matters, one

of which was the preparation for an ostensible conflict in the Middle East.

President George Bush's pronouncement of Operation Desert Shield and concomitant call up of

American combat and support units along with support personnel served notice that the command and

subordinate organizations would have to go on an a:ound the clock staffing. In essence, it would not be

business as usual. It was almost immediately after the notification of deployment that AMCCOM

directorates such as Logistics, Procurement and Production, and Maintenance and their subordinate units

went on a 24-hour a day work day. This entailed approximately 17,000 employees at 36 locations such

as army ammunitiun plants (AAP) to be on a wartime footing. The two research and development centers

on the East Coast, Edgewood and Picatinny Arsenals, were also included in the deployment, as were Pine

Bluff, Watervliet, and Rock Island Arsenals-all of which made significant contributions. Certainly, this was

no easy task, but eventually all the significant organizations and personnel were duly notified. As with any

massive deployment, particularly this one for AMGCOM, there was initially a great deal of bewilderment

and frustration getting people in place, policies and missions defined, and the deployment implemented.

After all, many AMCCOM employees had not ever been involved in a deploment, and had no idea as what

was expected from them in such an action. However, it was of a relatively short duration before things

began happening. AMCCOM employees began receiving definitive guidance on their mission, and were

able to begin working to meet the needs of the customer.'

Initially, decision making and prioritization appeared to be in conflict with one another. Questions

regarding which AMCCOM employees would be deployed and to where were difficult to initially answer.

As with most people, AMCCOM personnel were no less inclined to believe their individual mission and/

or job was of the ultimate importance. Every so often, the desire to serve got in the way of realistically

, •iýity d u I/ii p•tfurmirng iine mission(s). if no!hing else, the ODS deployment illustratec the presence

10
f Slp - - -

of human frailties, yet simultaneously, the quantitative and qualitative strengths and forebearance of the

AMCCOM men and women during ODS. Everyone from the AMCCOM Commander on down unconsciously and unobtrusively became involved in a crash course in ergonomics-the study of people working

in environs or situations somewhat unusual or antithetical to their normal work milieu. It was an interesting

revelation. People found they could challenge themselves to go the proverbial extra mile and accomplish

significant activities. It must also be remembered however that the United States, since the inception of

the Cold War, had militarily and psychologically prepared to fight the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact

on the plains of Central Europe. The Unitad States had done its homework on how to fight a war in Eurmpe,

which it believed would be fought according to the edicts of the Airland Battle Doctrine. Tactically,

strategically, and logistically it was prepared to fight a European scenario war. However, it was not prepared

to fight what might possibly have been a protracted war in the desert. AMCCOM was going to have to

take somewhat of a different approach to providing support for the American and coalition forces-4

AMCCOM's preparation for Operation Desert Storm was not as smoothly organized as one might have

desired. For one thing, though not readily admitted, it took time to get a feel for what was happening

throughout the government, DOD, DA (Department of the Army), and AMC (United States Army Materiel

Command). Not to suffer from impetuosity or improper decision making in regard to its deployment role,

the AMCCOM management team, comprised of military and civilian leaders, learned to Jse task

organizations. These organizations served to give participants the opportunity to identify means and

methodology necessary to make the AMCCOM mission and functions work. The reason for task

organizations was that there was not really a viable Operation Plan (OPLAN) for Southwest Asia that could

have been taken off the shelf, so to speak, and used. The Department of Defense had implemented an

OPLAN forthe Middle East during the 1960s and 1970s predicated upon a possible Soviet incursion against

Iran, which during that time period had been a close ally of the United States. That Operation Plan however

was no longer feasible. The United States had maintained prepositioned stores of military equipment in

Southwest Asia, particularly on three ships off of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The maintenance of

these military stores, which included ammunition, had been in effect since 1981. However, on the grounds

of appearing to be redundant, it must be remembered that American political, strategic, and tactical

interests lay in Europe, and had done so for four decades. This also meant that before August 1990,

AMCCOM's support mission had been focused primarily in USAREUR (United States Army, Europe) and

on a smaller scale in Korea, while the likelihood of military activity in SWA, if it did happen, was thought

to be predicated upon a "brushfire war" scenario employing relatively few troops and a limited amount of

equipment. Few AMCCOM personnel had spent much, if any, time in Southwest Asia; so it was readily

agreed by the powers to be that deployment of support personnel and mission functions to SWA would

not be easy.5

AMCCOM, as other major subordinate commands (MSC), received ongoing directives and guidance

from higher headquarters on a daily basis throughout ODS. The command, itself, had to promulgate a

game plan re. arding deployment of personnel, materiel, and ammunition into the theater of operations.

Established deployment procedures that could be used were used and expanded upon. However, the ODS

deployment would serve to be somewhat different since it was to an area of the world, which though having

had exercises such as Bright Star (in Egypt), there had never been the massive deployment of United States

military personnel, supporting civilians, materiel, and ammunition. Men and women throughout the

AMCCOM community found, if not by choice but by edict, that it was not to be very long before they would

know where Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Arab nations were along with their principal cities. The

deployment made many people within the command who had a parochial view of life and their jobs realize

in short order that they and what they did for a living were to have a direct effect upon the success of ODS

in more ways than one. As previously mentioned, at the onset of ODS, the command had to deal with

a reduction in force (RIF), which to say the least had a debilitating effect on morale. However, though a

11
number of command employees were to lose their positions, these men ano women put aside their ow.,

anxieties and bewilderment, and worked with a vigcr and determination until now not seen or expected.

In late September and early October 1990, the demands brought about by Operation Desert Shield

provided a buy back of 132 of the positions identified to be eliminated through the RIF. Besides buying

back the above positions, Rock Island Arsenal's Office of Civilian Personnel (CPO) administered the hiring

of 1,035 temporary employees for ODS, and the command activated 141 ruservists who served in various

capacities during the Gulf War. It was not only the AMCCOM men and women at Rock Island Arsenal who

acquitted themselves masterfully in providing support to ODS; it was also other individuals who deployed

from other AMCCOM units to CONUS (continental United States) areas or to SWA who were significant

contributors to the success in the Gulf War.6

Over two hundred military and civilian employees within the hegemony of AMCCOM deployed to

CONUS facilities and/or Southwest Asia during the period from 7 August 1990 to 1 March 1991. This

included 17 individuals from the Rock Island Arsenal element of the command. The composition of

AMCCOM personnel deployed to SWA included personnel from Pine Bluff Arsenal, logistics assistance

representatives (LARs), some of whom were deployed with their units; other LARs deployed from CONUS,

and some from Europe and Korea. Deployed also were quality assurance specialists-ammunition

surveillance (QASAS) who served in CONUS, Europe, and in Korea. Additional individuals were deployed

from ARDEC (United States Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center) and

CRDEC (United States Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center) during the abovementioned time period.

As with any major deployment, the assigning and movement of personnel was not without its shortfalls

and frustrations. The command had done its homework as far as written preparation for such deployment

of individuals; however, it had to deal with the fact communication between and among both indigenous

AMCCOM units and extraneous DA units was at times obtuse and vacillating, especially at tho onset of

ODS. One reason for this was the suddenness of the initiation of the deployment. President Bush's

response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and subsequent call for mobilization was alacritous,

which did not provide much time to prepare for effective deployment of personnel. AMCCOM did however

accomplish sending its first senior command representative (SCR) to Southwest Asia in August 1990 as

part of AMC Forward. The senior command representative served as the liaison between the command

and higher headquarters in the theater, and also had the function as the facilitator for LARs in SWA. Mr.

Terry Spurrier, an AMCCOM LAR, was the first SCR, and served in Saudi Arabia from 23 August 1990

until 7 November 1990; he was replaced by MAJ Denton Snow of the AMCCOM Readiness Directorate.

MAJ Snow represented the command in SWA from 28 October 1990 until 24 February 1991. COL David

0. Lindsay, Chief of Readiness Directorate then became the AMCCOM SCR on 28 February 1991 and

was the SCR until his return stateside on 7 June 1991. COL Lindsay had a previous tour of duty in Saudi

Arabia having served there from 1980 to 1983, so he knew the region and its people well.7

Along with the previously mentioned LARs, a fairly large contingent of QASAS was deployed during

ODS. The QASAS were sent to CONUS United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) units and

ports such as MOTSU (Military Ocean Terminal-Sunny Point), Concord, Houston, Savannah, and

Jacksonville to assist with the movement and loading of conventicnal ammunition destined for Southwest

Asia, and to ensure the safety and quality of ammunition being moved. Other QASAS were in USAREUR

assisting the 7th Corps with its deployment to Southwest Asia, and, of course, QASAS were sent to SWA

to move the ammunition from the ports to ammunition supply points (ASP) in the interior of Saudi Arabia

and near the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. OASAS also dealt with problems such as climatological variants

affecting ammunition, its movement, and storage. Other AMCCOM employees; such as, gas mask repair

personnel from Pine Bluff Arsenal, were sent to the gulf area along with other civilians and military from

12
ARDEC and CRDEC. A most significant adjunct of the ODS deployment was the command support given

to not only the families of AMCCOM personnel who deployed to SWA, but also to the families of military

personnel from the area who were sent to Saudi Arabia. The Rock Island Arsenal Commander, COL

Richard W. Bregard, and the AMCCOM Chaplain, LTC Robert L. Pearson, along with Mrs. Marva Gaten,

an employee of the Army Community Services (ACS), provided the nucleus of what became known as

the Waiting Families Support Group. The group provided ongoing support to the friends, families, and loved

ones of the men and women deployed to SWA from the Quad Cities and surrounding area on a 24-hour

basis, and throughout the duration of ODS, and into the early stages of the retrograde period. The Waiting

Families Support Group personified the highest ideals, the greatest compassion and concern, and an

unparalleled commitment of service and dedication to the loved ones of those who served in SWA.8

Deployment of personnel is never an easy task, particularly moving individuals a distance of 8,000 miles

to a country and culture of which little is known. AMCCOM found out only too soon that deployment was

no easy endeavor, and was hard pressed to work this issue. Personnel exigencies were an ongoing issue.

LARs and QASAS logically should have been in country or on station to provide the logistical and

ammunition-related support needed. However, it was not unusual for AMCCOM personnel to be delayed

in reaching their assignments, particularly as the mobilization became expanded after the first of November

1990.

It became apparent that the AMC War Plan and the associated Mobilization and Operations Planning

and Execution System (MOPES) were not responsive or applicable to ODS. It appeared the industrial base

was not fully mobilized to support ODS because AMC tended to maintain a global look as opposed to dealing

with a contemporary regional crisis. This meant that AMC had to institute a more definitive MOPES which

could and would be disseminated to the MSCs. This was slow to happen. An example, of this was the

delay in the movement of essential civilian personnel such as LARs, QASAS, and others which was at

times vexatious, though fortunately not having an adverse impact on the final outcome of ODS. An example

of a rather irksome delay was when some AMCCOM civilian personnel deploying to SWA had to fly to

Washington, D.C., in order to get Saudi visas instead of Saudi officials being at ports or stations of

debarkation to process passports or visas. Fortunately this problem was in large measure eventually

rectified.9

AMCCOM dealt with other personnel deployment problems during ODS, some of which begged

clarification or at least satisfactory answers. A cardinal example of this was the nebulous policy known

as the emergency essential agreement. Headquarters, Department of the Army stated that all individuals

deployed to Saudi Arabia were considered to be emergency essential and had to sign the emergency

essential agreement. Conversely, HQ, AMC said that persons deployed to SWA were to be assigned there

on a voluntary basis and therefore did not have to sign the above agreement. AMCCOM's policy however

was the same as HODA. What happened subsequently was significant confusion, inconsistency, and

consternation regarding whose policy should prevail. The emergency essential agreement ensured that

the DA civilian was fully aware of the army's expectations regarding his or her deportment, job performance,

or whether or not he or she could be assigned to a work area contiguous to a hostile zone or in a hostile

zone itself. The Department of Army ostensibly waivered however because it said in a message that all

people deployed to Saudi Arabia, no matter if they had signed an emergency essential agreement or had

volunteered or were detailed, were required to do the army's bidding. This meant an army commander

could require a deployed individual to perform duties essential to the military mission, no matter where

or when. HODA and AMC were unable to ;esolve to anyone's satisfaction, the designation of "emergency

essential" vis-a-vis "volunteers." Fortunately, this pervasive problem had no discernible impact upon

AMCCOM's or AMC's mission requirements.' 0

13
7 4-W 7

Though AMCCOM was quite successful in the deployment of personnel to Southwest Asia during ODS,

it learned some invaluable lessons. For example, the AMCCOM Emergency Operation Center warranted

pre-arranged planning concerning staffing during mobilization. The command also learned that as with

other MSCs, it needs definitive guidance from higher headquarters regarding the deployment of individuals

to a battle area or theater. In future deDloyments, the command should maintain more stringent supervision

at the home station of its preparation for deployment of its personnel. Medical examinations and issuance

of shots, issuance of proper clothing and equipment including chemical defensive equipment, updating of

personnel and pay records, and movement of personnel to debarkation points needed closer monitoring

during ODS. Another significant lesson learned was that LARs and QASAS required more definitive

support in areas of transportation, billeting, and security. Also, guidance concerning the issuance of

weapons to civilians warranted clarification. In essence, the LARs and QASAS demanded a support

package which included accessibility to military vehicles, weapons, work tools and accessories, and tents

and toiletries. This was lacking during Desert Storm.

Though AMCCOM had to deal with what may have seemed to have been an inordinate number of

problems in regard to deployment of its personnel to SWA, there were noteworthy accomplishments. First,

in spite of the previously mentioned problems and/or concerns, AMCCOM successfully deployed over 200

people bereft of any opportunity to rehearse or plan in depth for the movement of personnel. Second, the

command and its subordinate units strove in a most determined fashion to work through or around

problems. This did not necessarily mean everything was resolved; but what was not resolved or

ameliorated, was at least duly noted from observations. Third, AMCCOM personnel in spite of dealing with

problems associated with a firsttime tactical deployment, still performed magnificently in theater throughout

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

As with all wars, this war entailed the providing of materiel and ammunition to combatants, in this

instance, this being the American fighting men and women involved in Operations Desert Shield and Desert

Storm. AMCCOM had not ever undertaken such a deployment of ammunition andmatere. as seen during

ODS. It would go down in the annals of ccnteroporary military history as one of the truly great logistical

endeavors. The command's logistical role and support in ODS was most significant just in the fact

AMCCOM moved much equipment and ammunition to SWA, which will be covered later in this unit. The

organization responsible for the deployment of materiel and ammunition was the Deputy for Logistics

Readiness under the most capable leadership of Mr. Perry C. Stewart.

To be brought out in another part of the manuscript is the fact the AMCCOM Transportation and Traffic

Management Directorate was tasked to be the DOD single man3ger for munitions movement, planning,

and execution, and was assis,,,d by the Defense Amminition Directorate. This meant AMCCOM had the

responsibility for providing logistical munitions support to all branches of the armed forces. This tasking

also included the loading, assembling, and packing (LAP) at the army ammunition plants (AAPs) of all

conventional munitions, including bombs, and the Cruise and Tomahawk missiles. The Materiel

Management Directorate also had a most important mission in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

which will subsequently be discussed.

From the onset of ODS, the men and women of the Materiel Management Directorate became

responsible for supplying Class 11 (individual equipment), Class VII (major items), and Class IX (repair

parts) along with other materiel to its customers in SWA. The deployment of ammunition and materiel was

one that involved the men and women of these directorates working 24-hours a day, 7 days a week to meet

the needs of the military involved in ODS. 11

14
First to be discussed will be the role of the Materiel Management Directorate and its involvement in

the deployment of materiel goods and services to its customers in Southwest Asia. The first action taken

by the directorate upon notification of U.S. troop deployment was to provide for 24-hour staffing, in order

to quickly respond to any exigency. Endemic to this activity was the establishment of an ongoing

communication system replete with telephones and Catafax service to handle customer requisitions. The

Management Directorate also managed 2,000 major items, and during ODS, had the dubious task of

handling 20,000 pieces of correspondence concerning the deployment of much needed items to Southwest

Asia. By the time hostilities on the ground had ended in Kuwait and Iraq on 28 February 1991, the directorate

had successfully processed over 508,000 requisitions.

It also was responsible for the fielding of over 317,000 M1 7 gas masks and over 25,000 M25A1 tank

gas masks to the soldiers in ODS. No commercial mail order house likely had to deal with as much materiel

and correspondence as did AMCCOM between the middle of August 1990 and the first of March 1991.

Combat Support Services (CSS) were also provided to SWA as part of the logistical deployment to Saudi

Arabia, because most logisticians believed that such support should be in country or in theater with the

arrival of the first troops or shortly thereafter. Realistically, such units often did not get into theatre until

several months had gone by since the presidential call up. 12

Mr. Deane L. Warnecke, ably assisted by Mr. Roger Reinitz, directed the activities of the Materiel

Management Directorate during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. With over thirty years of

professional experience as a logistician and manager, Mr. Warnecke parlayed successfully the talents and

enthusiasm of the over 600 men and women in his organization to go the extra mile under circumstances

in which few of them had worked. These men and women, who worked ever unobtrusively, as did their

cohorts in the Transportation Directorate, during ODS were going to haveto overcome adversity; be subject

to frustration and failure; and to use their corporate and individual skills to meet the needs of American

warfighters in SWA.

One of the initial activities undertaken by the Materiel Management Directorate was to establish a

prioritization of customer requirements. This certainly was not easy because units tended to presuppose

what they perceived to be exigencies were of paramount importance and thusly should be met post haste.

It seemed everybody needed something, Le it an individual item, a major item, or a repair part. The

command learned tactical units in SWA believed basic loads-be it ammunition or materiel-were not

sufficient and expected that war stockage distributed to them should be bountiful, if not perpetual. This

mindset caused a myriad of problems for the command and the Materiel Management Directorate. The

directorate, using guidance both from the command and higher headquarters, and coupled with its visceral

reaction to customer needs created a systemic method of prioritizing customer requirements. Hence, some

unsatisfied customers became ever apparent. Some of the earliest units to deploy to SWA did so without

their total TO&E (Table of Organization and Equipment) support. Conversely, other units deployed

believing they had all of their materiel needs accounted for, only tu find out once in country, such was not

the case. Units would have to submit requisitions for equipment and parts as soon as possible. These two

problems were to be be somewhat portentous of what was going to happen to the command's efforts to

fill requisitions .i;nific;ntissueswere thedentif!ictic fthczcdcp;oyingunits, timeframe of depoyment,

and organizational relationships. The primary source to accomplish this was the Time-Phased Force

Deployment Data (TPFDD). Only one person in AMCCOM was familiar with this system, so access to it

was certainly limited., In addition, the TPFDD had to be extracted from the Worldwide Military Command

and Control System (WWMCCS), which also was predicated upon limited accessibility. The TPFDD was

programmed to normally examine the sequencing of units into a theater or country to support an operation.

By the second day of ODS, it became apparent that the existing OPLAN was not feasible and would have

to be replaced. Yet, units being deployed had to be identified, along with, their materiel needs. What

15

- m ~ m - m "
AMCCOM finally did to rectify this problem was to better staff the TPFFD system so that deploying units

could be identified more rapidly.13

The American military buildup and preparation for Operations Desert Shie!d and Desert Storm was one

which defied description. It incorporated the best of high technology in weapons and weapons delivery

systems, the best trained military fighting force in the world, and the best military logistical system ever

seen. The American military establishment decided in no small measure to guarantee that when and if

hostilities took place in Southwest Asia [Kuwait and Iraq], America and its coalition allies would be totally

prepared for war. For seven months, United States forces and coalition units trained relentlessly to prepare

for war with Saddam Hussein's purportedly invincible military forces. This meant thai in the materiel support

arena, the Department of Defense would ensure an never-ending supply pipeline into Saudi Arabia. No

American tactical unit was to go into battle unprepared and unsupplied. AMCCOM was tasked to make

sure it did its role to guarantee that materiel such as Class II, VII, and IX items would get to the warfighting

units prior to and during any hostile engagement with the minions of Saddam Hussein.

Central to the providing of materiel to units and organizations in SWA by AMCCOM Materiel

Management Directorate employees was the presence and/or establishment of a viable requisitioning

system. At the onset of ODS, AMCCOM believed its existing requisitioning system was mission capable,

and would in all likelihood be able to meet most, if not all, demands placed upon it. However, during the

early stages of ODS, the existing retail supply system, the Standard Army Intermediate Level Supply

(SAILS) system was being replaced by the Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS). Normally, this

transitioning or upgrading would have caused few if any problems. The transition period of the systems,

however, was not fortuitous. There was not sufficient time to correct deficiencies or problems relative to

the SARSS. As a result, accountability and visibility of assets received in theater was almost nonexistent;

therefore, materiel was taken by units on a first come basis. What this meant was that the supply system,

including the requisitioning capability, was inundated because of the difficulty by the command to govern

the actions of requesting units. Some initially deployed units issued multiple requisitions for materiel

because they either did not receive their original order, as the result of not having gone through the proper

channels, or simply ordered more than they needed. The demands of mobilization brought about unusual

actions and reactions by both the Materiel Management Directorate and the user. In most instances,

required and/or requested materiel was available, from depots on up through the system. However, the

imprecision of the requisitioning system, served to challenge AMCCOM as it had not been challenged

before. For example, customers in SWA bypassed their supply support activities and went directly to the

National Inventory Control Point (NICP) by datafax or telephone to order excessive amounts of materiel.

[The NICP was the supply management function for all weapons and chemical defensive equipment for

the army and other branches of the service]. AMCCOM attempted to get the customers to use the

requisitioning system, but often to little avail. Fictitious non-mission capable supply (NMCS) requisitions

with 02 priority codes [the highest priority within the supply and transportation system] were sometimes

sent to the NICP thus diverting assets from valid NMCS requirements and flooding the distribution and

transportation systems. Because of the materiel demands placed upon the requisitioning system,

AMCCOM was hard pressed to enforce strict supply discipline. 4

The Gulf War brought about other problems concerning the deployment of materiel to Southwest Asia.

Materiel often became lost upon arrival in Saudi Arabia, either at the port or at an airport. Materiel misplaced

or missing purportedly got lost in what became known as the "blpck hole." This was the alleged nevernever land of misplaced equipment. It was the apocryphal bottomless pit or abyss wher3 all lost and/or

unclaimed materiel ended, hence, thought never to be retrieved. In actuality, what often happen was that

requisitioned materiel arrived at its destination unbeknownst to the receiving unit; and when not claimed,

was moved to another area for storae or simply taken by another unit. Much of the impediment of supplies

16
M a o s m t m f l i i c fa tt h e p o r t w a s t e m p o r a r i l y s t o r e d i n c o v e r e d , t r a n s ie t s h e l t e d f to m p r th e t i t fo m t h e e fe t o

the sun while it awaited transpofl inland. P r o g sin ocs~~ l eutd ti)te~ otg ta albe

Commercial vehiclOS$.

LrAA

P.44

17
and equipment to SWA was as the result of the absence of a definitive supply infrastructure in place to

receive and process materiel. What this did was to cause supply personnel in country difficulty in identifying

and locating materiel which had arrived at either the seaports or airports. In some instances, materiel was

diverted to customers who had not requisitioned it; ard who upon opening the packing, and seeing it was

not what they ordered, would simply keep it because it was easier to do this than to repack and return it.

Also, customers who knew their orders were somewhere in country, in lieu of looking for their lost stocks,

would summarily submit new requisitions for the same equipment because it was more expedient than

attempting to find the original shipment. This quandary subsequently inflated the demand data and

deprived customers of timely support. As an example, command representatives would often go to where

they believed their AMCCOM-requisitioned materiel was only to find it was not there, and realize the

likelihood was that someone else had it. Another iteration of the "black hole" scenario was when shipments

were sent to SWA prior to the establishment of an operational receiving activity. The 321st Materiel

Management Center (MMC), a reserve unit from the southeastern part of the United States, and under

the hegemony of the XVIII Airborne Corps, arrived in Saudi Arabia in October 1990, several months after

tons of unaccounted equipment had already arrived. The 321 st began its automated bookkeeping system

and attempted to eliminate the backlog of materiel accountability already accrued as the result of the

buildup. Unfortunately, this was never accomplished, and AMCCOM kept filling requisitions for its

customers while possibly not being apprised of the lack of combat supply services support in SWA. The

800th MMC, which represented the VII Corps, encountered many of the same problems which beset the

321st, though somewhat to a lesser degree because it did not need to requisition as much materiel. This

was bacause the VII Corps was able to draw down a large amount of its prepositioned materiel in USAEUR

and bring it to SWA. Meanwhile, shipments moved not only by ship, but also by air, which of course was

a faster means of transportation. Because of the under-utilized bookkeeping process in SWA, materiel

then underwent a fate similar to that of losing luggage as the result of traveling on an airliner. The passenger

arrives at one destination; the luggage at another. This is similar to what took place in SWA. Units arrived

at one place, the requisitioned equipment arrived at the same place earlier by a.r and was moved, or arrived

at a different destination. AMCCOM also found that tracing shipments moved by air was difficult. Once

the equipment was in air force transportation channels, visibility was lost, coupled with the fact that there

was an obvious unmanageable backlog of supplies and equipment at Dover Air Force Base, DE, awaiting

shipment. The air force, in order to mitigate the effects of the backlog, fragmented army shipments to

cznform to space available/air pallet configuration. This further reduced any audit trail of goods moving

by air. Another problem relating to this dilemma was the air force numbering shipments by pailets as

opposed to the army's use of a different tracking system known as the DOD Activity Address Code

(DODAC).' 5

The Materiel Management Directorate strove assiduously to meet all of its customers' needs during

ODS as it was normally able to do in a peace time milieu. This however was not to be the case as the

frenetic military activities along with the diplomatic perturbations seemingly precluded orderly, consistent

logistical support. As previously mentioned, customers in SWA, for whatever reason, attempted to bypass

the requisitioning system in order to obtain what stockage they believed they warranted or needed. Written

or verbal justification for additional materiel by the customer seemingly was out of the question. There

were two categories of multiple requisitions addressed by the Materiel Management Directorate. In the

first category were attempts to bypass maximum quantity checks and/nr justify stockage by meetirng a

number of demands per timeframe criteria. This was often apparent because of the sequential document

numbers. The second category was less obvious and morm inadvertent than the first. The retail supply

system contained checks that forwarded and subsequently canceled customers' requisitions if they did not

have a requirement loaded into the system. What happened was that AMCCOM received and processed

a requisition on one day •nd received a cancellation the next day. Upon receipt of the AMCCOM

cancellation, customers summarily thought the MSC was cancelling so they simply "esubmi~ted their

18
requisitions. Duplication of orders became commonplace, total confusion and frustration sometimes

reigned along with a breakdown in both the requisition and delivery systems. AMCCOM became aware

of the problem, and in order to rectify what seemed to be an interminable situation, agreed to accept and

process all requisitions. A number of customers continued to resubmit requisitions with inflated demands.

All of this lent itself to the situation of requisitioned materiel being delivered to Saudi Arabian seaports or

airports while customers who requested the supplies and equipment were still sending requisitions to

AMCGOM for the materiel they were already receiving, As one AMCCOM employee who spent time in

SWA during ODS said rather wryly concerning the plethora of requisitions submitted and equipment in

country, "No one went to war broke." The change in the force structure in November 1990 by the inclusion

of the VII Corps from USAREUR into SWA caused the command to implement a materiel bypass system

to expedite orders for major parts items whi'h did reduce the above-mentioned backlog.'

What happened as described in the above paragraph indicated that the requisitioning system was not

totally on track during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The culpability concerning the problems

attendant with the above system lay with no one. What apparently happened was that this system became

overworked and over extended because of the demands placed upon it. The requirements the customer

placed on the NICP were predicated in large measure by the belief that the unpredictability of events in

Southwest Asia dictated being totally prepared for any tactical or strategic contingency, ergo, thp proclivity

to overreact and thus ask for more equipment than actually needed.

The Materiel Management Directorate and thtd customer In SWA were having to deal with the fact that

ongoing communications between CONUS and Southwest Asia often left much to be desired. This meant

rectification of problems concerning the submission of requisitions and the receiving of materiel was often

difficult, frustrating, and taxed the patience of everybody concerned. It often took too much time to use

the pipeline or system the way it should have been used. Units then out of frustration tried to take matters

into their own hands to meet their needs. This oid nothing but set the system back and cause redundancy

of effort and misunderstanding. Though the requisition issue caused exacerbation. AMCCOM was able

to fill 95 percent of all the ;equests issued because its Management Directorate employees were working

around the clock to meet the customers' neoe1 ,;. The directorate ha.. people stiffing telephones at all hours

of the day to receive telephonic requisitions from SWA, and other employees in turn issued Materiel

Release Orders (MROs) to the depots to have the materiel sent to the customer in SWA. AMCCOM

even went so far as to get mjteriel from USAREUR ind Korea to send to the Gulf; and when necessary.

even cannibalized equipment for parts for the customer. It w3s discerned that AMCCOM provided their

customers with between 180 to 250 percent of their materiel requirements by the time the ground war began

on 24 February 1991.1

During the period of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, authorization was given to issue war

reserve assets to meet the demands of deploying units, especially in the chemical defensive equipment

arena because of the possible chemical threat from Iraq. As the SWA buildupoccurred, it became apparent

that chemical defensive items were in short supp!y, This entailpd the usage of war reserve assets which

became depleted well before production delivcries were able to support the level of demands beirng

experienced. AMCCOM had the responsbility of issuing chemical defensive equipment for the men and

women in theater. Some units, prior to leaving CONUS or USAREUR for SWA, had exchanged worn out

or irreparable equipment for new equipment. Others had not accomplished this prior to deployment, so

upon arrival in theater, these units had to have new Mi 7 gas masks issued to them. However, a number

of problems surfaced concerning the acutoistion of these masks. One of tho most apparent prob:ems dealt

with the need to produce more chemical defensive equipment. Some production linos of this oquipment

had been laid away or reduced as far as production, Manufacturers then had to restart production lines,

which certainly was no easy matter. AMC( OM at the same time drew stores from reserve and National

19
Guard units to fill inventory stores. By the beginning of the ground war in Southwest Asia on 24 February

1991, the Materiel Management Directorate had sent over 317,C00 M17 gas masks, 25,000 M25A1 tank

gas masks, 4,000 M24 aviation masks, and 600 M43 masks for Apache helicopter crewmen. The likelihood

of tactical operations in Kuwait heightened the DOD's determination to get its fighting men and women

the masks they needed. To meet the needs for chemical defensive equipment, AMCCOM deployed a repair

unit from Pine Bluff Arsenal whose function it was to test, repair, refurbish, and replace gas masks and

other chemical defensive equipment such as filters, detection devices, and protective equipment in the field

rather than waiting for orders of new masks to arrive in country. By the beginning of the ground war, just

about all, if not a9l, gas masks had been tested and, as necessary, replaced.'$

Finally, one area that had to be addressed throughout the deployment of materiel to Southwest Asia

was that of priority of shipments. Class II, VII, and IX items were sent by both sea and airlift. During the

initial phase of Operation Desert Shield, the command had a treasure trove of ideas as far as how and

when to send big package items such as howitizer recoil mechanisms, M1Al turret rings, vehicles, etc.

However, it was sometimes difficult to get other organizations such as the air force and the Military Traffic

Management Command (MTMC), which was the primary allocator of sealift resources, to respond as

rapidly or as thoroughly to AMCCOM's materiel deployment needs. This was ronic because the command

had attempted to meet the needs of its customers in SWA by prioritizing requisitions in order to facilitate

the fulfillment of customer requirements; expedite the shipment of critical materiol; and safeguard the arrival

of equipment to its assigned destination, However, as the frenzy of activity was expanded both in CONUS

and OCONUS, getting critical items from depots to organizations in SWA became anything but easy. The

DOD instituted an airlift program known as Desert Express. Its primary mission was the movement of

critical repair parts and medical items to Saudi Arabia in order to mitigate the backlog of materiel at aerial

ports of embarkati'- !f POEs). These items were to be 'highest priority non-mission capable" supply items

(NMCS). AMCCOM Pia.. to make sure that its critical materiel be at either Dover or Charleston AFB when

scheduled or the flight would leave without it. The Transportation and Materiel Management Directorates

worked in concert whenever possible to bring about the movement of priority parts and items. It was not

an easy task. Initially, there was only one flight a day from either Dover AFB or Charleston AFB. After the

air war commenced in SWA on 16 January 1991, the Desert Express flights were increased to two per

day. The army was allocated 15,000 pounds of equipment or five pallet positions or 2,500 square feet

for each daily flight predicated on what was being shipped. Every branch of service deluged Military Airlift

Command (MAC) with its own list of critical items that had to be moved to SWA. This meant that sometimes

the air force had to decide whose narrative about materiel needs was most cogent among the service

representatives, and then would decide whose requirements warranted priority shipping to SWA. The

Materiel Management Directorate dealt with a Desert Express shipping restriction which caused some

concern, that being the exclusion of essential Class II items such as binoculars and chemical defensive

equipment. These items were excluded because they were not repair parts. However, the criticality of

these items was apparent. Fortunately, the above mentioned Class II items were finally sent to SWA by

other aircraft in time to meet mission requirements.'

The Materiel Management Directorate learned some significant lessons concerning the deployment

of materiel in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. One of the most important observations was

that the requisition system needed to be reexamined, and in all likelihood revised. Though meeting the

needs of its customers, the command learned it was inundated with the inordinate number of requisitions

which taxed the response capabilities of AMCCOM. Better supply discipline and coordination between

the customer and NICP was necessary. AMCCOM also learned the requisition and supply system lacked

the flexibility necessary to make it more effective during ODS because it had been geographically narrow

in scope, dealing primarily with Oe use of war reserve stockage, and prepositioned materiel in USAEUR

and Korea. The system had to become more global in its focus, yet be able to meet matetiel demands

20
in any part of the world. Still another observation was that of the need for better means of accountability

of materiel once it left CONUS and arrived in country. This meant that both the sender and the customer

had to become more involved in the policing of the supply system. Too many items were lost, misplaced,

stolen, or sent to the wrong units because the wholesaler and retailer did not follow up on equipment once

it left CONUS. An apparent awareness was that if the customer did not receive his order, in lieu of looking

for it, he would summarily issue more requisitions for the same materiel. The customer had to be better

tracked as far as what happened to his materiel. Wholesale and retail automated systems had to be

improved upon and tied into a single net to reduce redundancy and ineffective logistical support and

accountability. This could best be accomplished by a single DOD automated logistical system, as opposed

to each service having its own system which lacked conformity. Finally, determination of priority shipping

of critical items or equipment was not well defined, thus causing some problems between the air force and

other branches of the armed forces concerning what items were sent on Desert Express. This problem

could have been resolved by better coordination between the respective branches and the air force

regarding what items should have priority.

The 600 men and women of the Materiel Management Directorate worked 7-days a week, and 24 hours

a day to meet the inordinate number of materiel needs requests by the customer in Southwest Asia during

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The directorate filled over 500,000 requisitions including

sending approximately 300,000 M17 gas masks; 25,000 M42A1 tank gas masks; 4,000 M24 Helicopter

gas masks; and 600 M43 Apache helicopter crew gas inasks. AMCCOM also fielded a chemical defensive

equipment repair facility to SWA staffed by personnel from Pine Biuff Arsenal. The Materiel Management

Directorate overcame a number of logistical and administrative problems [already mentioned] to

accomplish its broad-based mission. The directorate in fact met between 180 to 250 percent of the

customers' needs in SWA, and played a most significant role in the successful military accomplishments

of ODS.

Ammunition was no doubt the most crucial commodity fielded by AMCCOM to the American and allied

fighting forces in the Gulf War. It drew the most attention concerning its deployment to SWA from depots,

prepositioned stores, from army ammunition plants (AAPs) or wherever it was drawn. And the role of the

AMCCOM Transportatior Directorate in the fielding of conventional ammunition was and will be much

heralded in the annals of military history and tactical logistical support.

Approximately 500,000 short tons of conventional ammunition were sent by sealift to SWA during ODS.

Forty-five ships were used to move the majority of the ammunition. Of the above figure, 5,361 short tons

of conventional ammunition, weapons, and chemical defensive equipment were airlifted to Saudi Arabia.

The total tonnage moved to SWA was the equivalent of 23,000 semi-truck loads. Responsible for this

most auspicious endeavor were the men and women of the Defense Ammunition Directorate and the

Transportation Directorate. COL Scott W. Hull was the Director of the Defense Ammunition Directorate

and Mr. Gary L. AiJerson served as the Director of the Transportation and Traffic Management Directorate-

-hereafter to simply be referred to as the Transportation Directorate. The importance of their respective

missions was apparent from day one of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and the fact they were

able to use what resources they had, to accomplish the herculean feat of moving the much needed

conventional ammunition to Southwest Asia was certainly unequaled. President George Bush's first

utterances about the American and allied support for Operation Desert Shieldwere hardly completed when

the United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) tasked the Transportation Directorate to be the

single manager for the planning of movement and tran,,portation of conventional ammunition for all

branches of the armed forces. As with other AMCCOM directorates and staffs, both the Defense

Ammunition and Transportation Directorates were on a 7-day a week, 24 hour a day footing. Deployment

of ammunition was to be no less arduous, frustrating, or exciting for these two organizations than the

21
activities of other AMCCOM organizations during ODS. The logistical elements surrounding the supplying

of conventional ammunition to the warfighters in SWA was of paramount interest and concern from the

highest headquarters down to the user. 0

As with other AMCCOM organizations, the Transportation and Defense Ammunition Directorates were

to find that preparation of ammunition for deployment and its subsequent deployment took a great deal

time, energy, and even at times emotion. As mentioned previously, the United States had for four decades

primarily prepared to fight a major war with what once was known as the Soviet Union and the Warsaw

Pact in Central Europe. Its prepositioning of ammunition stocks throughout Europe far exceeded any

endeavors of conventional ammunition prepositioning in the Persian Gulf or contiguous areas. The Marine

Corps had three prepositioned supply ships in the Indian Ocean at the onset of ODS. However, the amount

of ammunition these ships had was minuscule as opposed to ammunition stockage in Europe. This meant

that COL Hull's and Mr. Anderson's directorates were going to have to think and prepare for their missions

within a relatively new venue, that of possible military activity in the Persian Gulf. It could be safely said

that many people throughout AMCCOM were probably not very knowledgeable about the geography and

politics of the Persian Gulf region on 7 August 1991 when President Bush issued the clarion call for

mobilization. It was not long however until all of the men and women of the two directorates were keenly

aware that they were going to be very mucn involved in what took place in that part of the world in the ensu•, g

months .

2

The basic question or questions that were apparent to AMCCOM was how much ammunition was there

to ship and how much was needed? Where was the ammunition to come from, and how was it going to

get to SWA were also other questions that had to be answered. Also, what about units that took their unit

basic load (UBL) of ammunit~on with them to the theater? Did they actually have enough? The answer

was apparently no. Some units which deployed early did not have their full complement of ammunition

which meant that once they arrived in Saudi Arabia, commanders had to make sure they were able to obtain

their proper stockage. The first units to deploy, the 82d Airborne, 101 st Airborne, and the 24th Mechanized

Divisions, took most of their basic loads with them. However, some ammunition stockage had to be sent

from the wholesale base to the unit. These stocks were identified and shipped either to the unit or to the

port, depending on the disposition the particular unit wanted made. If they were shipped to the port, the

stocks were marked for pick up at that port by the requesting unit. Subsequent deploying tactical units,

in many instances, deployed rapidly, and were not able to take all of their UBL with them, or simply planned

to have the ammunition shipped to them. The initial phase of Desert Shield began with the offloading of

the previously mentioned three Near Term Prepositioned Fleet (NTPF) ships in country with approximately

60,000 short tons of Class V ammunition. All of the ships had been restocked with new ammunition, thereby

placing new ammunition in country at the time of the first troop arrivals. The quick response of these

logistical assets corroborated the efficacy of the NTPF program. 22

Fortunately for the United States and its coalition allies, they not only had time to train ground, air, and

naval forces prior to Desert Storm, but AMCCOM also had time to load, assemble, and pack (LAP) its

conventional ammunition requirements, and then move the ammunition to ports or airfields for further

transfer to SWA. Sudden surges concerning requests for ammunition were an ongoing problem for the

command. As done by the Materiel Management Directorate, the Defense Ammunition Directorate upon

receipt of requisitions from SWA or CONUS, issued Materiel Release Orders (MROs) to the United States

Army Depot System Command (DESCOM) and AMCCOM depots for whatever ammunition was needed

and then had those facilities send it to the customer. This capability was most important because the need

for ammunition became established even in the initial period of the deployment, thereby necess;taling quick

response to demands by commanders in the field. The Defense Ammunition and Transportation

Directorates met quite often to coordinate efforts, discuss problems, and resolve issues in order to facilitate

22
C?.

the expeditious movement of ammunition to the theater of operations. The directorates made a concerted

effort to meet the total requirements for ammunition movement as outlined by the Military Traffic

Management Command (MTMC). This meant scheduling the right number of trucks and trains required

at each location, and this was not easy because of the somewhat greater reliance on truck transportation

than had been planned. There was also a shortage of trucks in the western United States, which

necessitated issuing some over-the-road waivers in regard to the number of drivers and how long vehicles

could be driven during a certain period of time. The two AMCCOM directorates also found they had to

monitor the movement of ammunition to ports such as Concord on the West Coast, Houston and New

Orleans on the Gulf of Mexicc sand Military Ocean Terminal-Sunny Point (MOTSU), Earle, Savannah, and

Jacksonville, all on the East ;oast.3

To move 500,000 short tcns of ammunition was certainly no pedestrian undertaking; in fact, in some

ways it was mindboggling! The command and the 13 ammunition plants involved in the manufacturing

and shipping of much of the anmmunition certainly did not work within the "business as usual" mindset during

ODS. The requirements were pressing, personnel needs at the plants were apparent and somewhat

difficult to fill, and addressing the problems associated with the deployment of conventional ammunition

to SWA was challenging. Though computer technology was used in regard to the logistics of moving

500,000 tons of ammunition a distance of 8,000 miles, it was human logic, perseverance, and eclecticism

that really brought about the above accomplishment. No required delivery date (RDD) was missed, and

ammunition got to where it was supposed to be-be it tactical units or ammunition supply points (ASPs).

However, if problems ever existed for the command during ODS, it was in the area of deployment of

ammunition. The problems to be subsequently discussed will illustrate that they were not the result of

ineptness, lack of vision, or logistical skills; but that they happened because of the plethora of demands

placed on meeting the needs of the customer in Southwest Asia.

In order to fight a conventional war, a nation or coalition of nations usually has some opportunity to

develop, refine, and enhance fighting and tactical skills preparatory to armed conflict. ODS was no

exception; however as in Vietnam, a major problem was that of distance. One could no longer think of

the relative contiguity of the Central European forests and plains as spelled out in the NATO/Warsaw Pact

tactical scenario. Thirty-two hundred miles to a well-known, well-reconnoitered Europe was easier to

provide logistical support than the relatively unknown expanses of the Persian Gulf, 8,000 miles away from

the continental United States. The first problem was dealing intellectually with the fact that the command,

as the nation, and its coalition allies, would be fighting in a part of the world not fought in by western nations

since World War II. The French had fought in Algeria for a brief stint during the early 1960s; however no

large scale operations by European nations and the United States had taken place there since 1943. Iran

and Iraq, however, militarily knew the region, having fought an inconclusive eight-year war of attrition, which

literally and figuratively bloodied the sands of the Persian Gulf. As referred to earlier, movement and

delivery of materiel to SWA had meant a new mindset for everyone involved, and this was to be no less

true for conventional ammunition.

AMCCOM took the initiative to improve planning for efficient and effective use of strategic use of sealift

assets in conjunction with TRANSCCM and MTMC in support of the CINC (commander in chief), service

components, shippers, and ammun4,on ports. The Transportation Directorate began the Desert Shield

phase by focusing on supporting XVIII Airborne Corps with its unit basic load (UBL) and ammunition basic

load (ABL) followed by shipments of supply, otherwise known as initial sustainment. This meant of course

that UBL and ABL had to be met by the movement of ammunition from depots and ammunition plants to

the deploying units. Trucks had to be located to move the required ammunition, which amounted to

approximately 40,000 tcns. There tended to be a shortage of trucks or sometimes, just the opposite, that

being a plethora of over-the-road vehicles inundating installations. What happened was that prioritization

23
became a much sought after commodity, especially in light of the proclivity for units to attempt to get their

UBLs and ABLs delivered to the home station and then forwarded to the port of embarkation before other

units. Upon receipt of ammunition trom depots and AAPs, units would offload the carriers of this ammunition

and have to reload it on the same vehicles or on to other trucks for further movement to ports. This took

a great deal of time, and much to the surprise of deploying units, they found in many instances that they

had more ammunition than could be carried by their organic equipment. DOD intransit security rules and

rising fuel prices also affected the availability and movement of trucks to transport ammunition. DOD

regulations requiring two drivers per truck, and on occasion an escort vehicle, had to be somewhat

amended due to the shortage of trucks and drivers. AMCCOM asked MTMC for the opportunity to hire

additional carriers; MTMC acquiesced to this request. Fuel prices also were adjusted to compensate the

carriers for having to deadhead many miles to pick up a loads of ammunition. National Guard and Reserve

support, whenever possible, supplemented commercial carriers. 2

'

Relative to the UBL and ABL was the tendency for nascent units deploying to fail to properly load or

restrain ammunition on combat vehicles. QASAS who worked at either the ports of embarkation, ports

of debarkation, or at the installations complained that tactical units often did not adhere to proper loading

and blocking/bracing standards. This meant that ammunition had to either be repackaged, reloaded, or

restrained before it could either be shipped to the port of debarkation or placed aboard ship, which in turn

"affected the Icading scheduie. Some combat units arrived in SWA with unpackaged and unrestrained

ammunition. This became less of a problem as ODS became further implemented thanks in large measure

to the protest by port cperating personnel and the assignment of QASAS personnel to installations to

provide much needed technical assistance to units. Due in large measure to the support rendered by

QASAS personnel, the ! st Infantry Division from Fcrt Riley, KS, left for Southwest Asia with its UBL and

ABL requiremerts and uploaded unit veh;cles properly prepared. However, what was apparent was the

obvious lack of overall training of military personnel in the areas of loading, blocking, and bracing of

ammunition aboard vehicles.2

"

An area of serious concern which arose at ports in both CONUS and OCONUS dealt with the shortage

of properly trained stevedores and ship crews to handle the loading of ammunition. At times, ammunition

was not properly tied down, palletized, or loaded in the proper holds of the ships. This meant that QASAS

detailed to the ports, had to spend time correcting the situation or in some instances, do some of the loading

of the ammunition in order to guarantee proper sturage. QASAS related the fact that in one port in Germany,

a number of crew members of foreign vessels refused to work with the loading of ammunition outbourd

from the VII Corps, and demanded to be given an airline ticket to their home, which, in accoicdance with

maritime law, they were. Comments were also made to the fact that at a number of ports, both in CONUS

and in OCONUS, there was a shortage of forklifts capable of lifting and moving ammunition in ships holds.

Most forklifts were able only to handle 4,000 pounds of ammunition while most individual loads in the hold

exceeded 7,000 1: -,unds. What was done to alleviate this problem was to make the forklift loads lighter in

order to facilitate case of loading. In spite of taking longer to load ships, most of these ships were loaded

on time and made their scheduled departure time.2 6

The Transportation Directorate also dealt with port reception capability and congestion, particularly

during the early stages of ODS. A significant example of this concerned MOTSU which encountered an

almost gridlock type of congestion due in large measure to the large number of ammunition shipments sent

to the port by truck. During the first three weeks of ODS, MOTSU received 1,100 truck shipments of

ammunition. The port had limited storage facilities, thus necessitating the offloading of ammunition from

trucks onto rail cars for temporary storage. This materiel then had to be subsequently located and loaded

aboard ship which strained required delivery dates (RDD). However, when the emphasis switched to rail

shipments, there was a noticeable easing of congestion and ammunition moved from the AAP, depot, and/

24
or station to the ports, then aboard ship, and subsequently to SWA. Transportation control and movement

documentation (TCMD) of ammunition from shipping installations to the ports was also a problem in the

beginning stages of ODS, due primarily to the initial in-port delivery requirements to the respective ports

by MTMC. This confused sending units on how shipments should be coded for delivery, and akin to this

was the variance in shipment sizes and identification which precluded discernible movement control and

documentation. In essence, there was little if any conformity concerning TCMDs, especially in ligt t of the

fact that overseas ports were often not identified at the time of early shipments. The Transportation

Directorate finally resolved this issue by requiring TCMDs by shippers for all shipments being transported

to ports for further transfer. In fact, the movement of ammunition eventually became unfettered once ships

left port, and many units arrived in theater to find that their initial ammunition shipment had already arrived

and was waiting for them. 27

The exigencies of ODS certainly put a strain on AMCCOM subordinate installations, particularly army

ammunition plants (AAPs) and depots. In turn, HQ, AMCCOM managers found it extremely difficult to

correctly gauge installation capabilities such as the ability to load and transport ammunition. The inability

to accurately assess requirements and capabilities was due in no small measure to the inconsistencies

of what constituted outload capabilities as defined by the master mobilization plan (MMP) and the plant

contract. The lack of conformity between the MMP and the plant contract regarding requirements and

capabilities prevented AMCCOM planners from distibuting the ammunition shipping workload in an

efficient manner. Hawthorne AAP served as a cardinal example of the above problem. It found that it had,

or was able to get, the required number of warehousemen and truck drivers. Conversely, however,

Hawthorne AAP was unable to obtain experienced supervisors and blockers from the civilian sector.

Outloading capabilities were thus unable to be expanded which meant that loading dock activity often came

to a standstill as loaded railcars awaited blocking and bracing from what experienced personnel the AAP

had. The contractor was forced into longer work shifts which brought about worker fatigue and numerous

minor injuries. A number of AAPs experienced such problems and found it difficult to overcome them during

ODS.2 8

An area of great concern regarding the deployment or movement of ammunition dealt with depot

outload capability. The massive ammunition requirements of ODS caused depots to adopt extraordinary

measures. The work force at a number of depots had been reduced in October 1990. This meant that

outloading capabilities were adversely affected for a while due to the reduced personnel staffing. Matters

became further complicated as the esult of certain ammunition items being stored at only a few depots.

This brought about great pressure to quickly load and ship ammunition to meet tight port dates. CONUS

ports requested rail shipments in order to expedite the movement of ammunition and to avoid depot and

dockside congestion. However, rail capability at a number of depots was limited with certain storage igloos

and magazines accessible only by truck. This resulted in double handling of ammunition at the rail transfer

facility thereby impeding the loading of ammunition. To correct this problem, AMCCOM directed work force

shifts in order to keep pace with outloading requirements, which entailed the shifting of workers,

occasionally between depots. Fortunately, the ammunition surges were met as the result of distribution

of workload between depots and the ports, and the flow of ammunition to support vessel loading operations

was unimpeded. For some unexplained reason, GOGO (government-owned, government-operated)

depots seemed able to accommodate the double loading and surges better than the GOCOs (governmentowned, contractor-operated).2 9

Possib!y the most significant issue or problem besetting AMCCOM in regard to the deployment of

ammunition to SWA was the need to maintain ongoing coordination between all of the AMCCOM elements,

higher headquarters, and supporting organizations, such as the MTMC and commercial carriers.

AMCCOM implemented the Movement Control Center (MCC) to supervise the coordination between

25
IL 77

depots and ports, distribute the ammunition workload, adjust the port windows, and ensure the uninterrupted flow of ammunition to support vessel loading operations. However, this was easier said than done.

As earlier mentioned, massive requirements overwhelmed depot out!oad, port reception, and transportation asset capabilities. This was coupled with the fact that initial port dates often did not account for depot

capability and means of transportation of the ammunition from the depots to the ports. Port reception and

capability were issues constantly being addressed by the MCC, and shipping schedules frequently had

to be revised to get the ammunition to the port on time for its scheduled loading and transport to SWA.

Truck and rail analysis were implemented for each ship planning increment which was no easy task.

Constant telephonic coordination between the MCC, depots, MTMC, and carriers was undertaken to

address issues such as port dates, workload analysis, the prevention of depot and port congestion, and

shipping schedules, all of which seemed to be frequently insurmountable, but fortunately were not. Though

effective, the MCC suffered from the fact that it had to transmit its action in the manual mode which took

a great amount of time. The command would have been able to expedite its actions if an automated assist

program was available. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, AMCCOM was without such a system

to prioritize and control transportation assets between competing MTMC area commands. Consequently,

area commands competed for the same trucks and railcars, thereby facilitating unwarranted redundancy,

some delays, and frustrationA°

Because of the massive amount of ammunition being shipped to SWA during Operations Desert Shield

and Desert Storm, it was imperative that the command have an effective plan for scheduling the departure

of ammunition vessels from ammunition ports of debarkation. Incremental to this planning was the

scheduling of ammunition items or components to be placed on the same ship to ensure that all end items

or components would arrive as one package in theater. However, this desired action often did not get

implemented because the individuals handling vessel scheduling ignored or forgotAMCCOM ship planning

actions, especially when a replacement ship was used. This often caused the loss of identity of the

ammunition components by the command, especially prior to receipt of the ship's manifest. This impacted

negativeiy on intransit visibility and upon the ammunition end items arriving intact at their destination."

The Transportation Directorate and the Defense Ammunition 'Directorate functioned extremely well

during ODS in spite of the apparent problems besetting them. They learned some invaluable lessons. Both

directorates learned the need for closer and more extensive coordination between the customer and

AMCCOM, not only during mobilization, but also during peacetime. They both learned that thp customer

also has the responsibility of working closely with the command in all facets of logistical support given to

the movement of conventional ammunition from knowing how to load, block, and brace ammunition to

knowing how to move it safely to the ports. In essence, AMCCOM cannot, and should not be expected

to do all of the preparation for shipment of unit basic loads (UBL) for the customer. AMCCOM learned

that its ammunition mobilization plans must undergo constant scrutiny and revision, and that all contingencies must be addressed. The Military Traffic Management Command and the two directorates should

undergo constant coordination and review of logistical doctrine. Training of personnel who handle

ammunition, be they military or civilian, must be ongoing, especially in the areas of ammunition movement,

storage, and loading. Also, AMCCOM and other government agencies dealing with the handling and

movement of conventional ammunition should have an integrated computerized networking system by

which to enhance efficient logistical support to the customer. Another significant lesson the command

learned is the need to have prearranged ammunition ports of debarkation and the right mix of vehicles to

move the ammunition from the plants and depots to the ports. The Movement Control Center (MCC) should

be implemented at the onset of any contingency to maximize effective depot and port workload and

operations. The DOD, TRANSCOM, and MTMC must be able to prioritize and implement viable plans and

policies concerning the movement of ammunition by both commercial carriers and the military. AMCCOM

civilian and military personnel who deal with conventional ammunition should undergo periodic training and

26
exercises during peacetime to hone their required skills for any contingency. And finally, AMCCOM learned

it was able to do the job given to it by the Department of Defense concerning the deployment of ammunition

to a combat zone, and do it well. The command also learned it could not and must not rest on its laurels

but continue to be ever more effective in providing the customer the very best conventional ammunition

support-both in peacetime and in war.

The Transportation and Defense Ammunition directorates performed in a most exemplary manner

during ODS. They met the needs of the customer without any significant delays, and exceeded the required

conventional ammunition reouirements. The men and women of these two directorates worked assiduously to move more than 500,UOO short tons of ammunition to SWA in a record time. This meant working

often long and arduous hours, but with a corresponding sense of elan. AMCCOM more than met the

challenge in regard to the movement of large quantities of conventional ammunition. It overcame a myriad

of excruciating problems, and provided the very best of service and support to the fighting men and women

who relied so very much or, the timely deployment of ammunition to SWA. It could be said of these

directorates, "To so few, so much was owed."

27

JL
C--

NOTES

'AMCCOM 10-1 Mission Statement.

2After Action Report, HQ, AMCCOM, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 1 June 1991, Exetiv

Summary, Ia.• 14 September 1990, p3B; Intvw, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO with COL D.O. Lindsay,

AMSMCRD, 27 June 1991; Intvw, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO with MAJ D.G. Snow, AMSMC-RD, 11 March

1991; After Action Report, HO, AMCCOM, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 1 June 1991, v-1; Msg

(U), CDR, DESCOM to CDR. AMCCOM, AMSMC-OC, Subj: Activation of HQ. DESCOM Depots/Depot

Activities Emergency Operation Centers, 091400Z August 1990; Memo, AMSMC-OC to ASONC-ARICAC, Subj: Message Traffic Regarding Current World Situation (Operation Desert Shield), 9 August 1990;

Msg (U), DRAMCCOM, AMSMC-OC to DRAMCCOM, AMCOC-RE, Subj: AMCCOM Sitrep No.0001,

092100Z August 1990; Intvw, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO with MG P.L. Greenberg, AMSMCGG, 31 July

1991; Lessons Learned, 52347-16710 (00169) (U), AMSMC-MGO, Title: Staffing Requirements for the

AMCCOM Center, 20 May 1991; Lessons Learned, 72222-55877 (00282) (U), AMSMC-RDPO, Title: V

of IMA and IRR in Operation Centers, 2' June 1991; Lessons Learned, 72318-61534 (00283) (U), AMSMCRDP-O, Title: Staffing of Emergency Operations Center, 21 June 1991; Lessons Learned, 73139-03076

(00286) (U), AMSMC-RDP-O, Title. Civilian/Military Deployments, 21 June 1991.

3 Greenberg Intvw, 31 July 1991; Intvw, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO with COL D.T. Morgan Jr., AMSMCCS, 14 March 1991; Intvw, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO with D.L. Warnecke, AMSMC-MM, 19 March 1991;

Intvw, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO with P.L. Stewart, AMSMC-DL, 23 April 1991; Intvw, H.P. LePore,

AMSMC-HO with D.M. White, AMSMCPCL, 22 July 1991; After Action Report, HQ. AMCCOM, Commander's Assessment, 1 June 1991.

4Lindsay Intvw, 27 June 1991; HO, AMCCOM, Commander's Assessment, 1 June 1991; Intvw, H.P.

LePore, AMSMC-HO with T. Lighthiser, SMAC-AV, 7 November 1991; After Action Report, HO, AMCCOM,

Historical Analysis, 1 June 1991, iv-1-3; Stewart lntvw, 23 April 1991; Morgan Intvw, 14 March 1991;

Warnecke Intvw, 19 March 1991.

5

Lighthiser Intvw, 7 November 1991; Greenberg Intvw, 31 July 1991; Stewart Intvw, 23 April 1991; Morgan

Intvw, 14 March 1991.

8

Greenberg Intvw, 31 July 1991; Warnecke Intvw, 19 March 1991; After Action Report. HQ, AMCCOM,

Commander's Assessment, 1 June 1991; White Intvw, 22 July 1901; Stewart Intv, 23 April 1991; Lighthiser

Intvw, 7 November 1991; Information Paper, AMSMC-PTE, Subj:Ooeration Desert Shield, 17August1990.

'Lessons Learned, 52358-71848 (00175) (U), AMSMSC-RD, Title: LAR Deoloyment. Communication,

Transoortation. Life Supoort, 23 May 1991; Intvw, H.P. LePore with T. Spurrier, AMSMC-RD, 19 February

1991; Snow Intvw, 11 March 1991; Lindsay Intvw, 27 June 1991; Memo, SMCRI-HD to SMCRI-APP, Subj:

Operation Desert Shield Situation Report, 30 October 1990; Memo, SMCRI-PCR-R to eLaI, Subj: AMC

Personnel Deoloyed or Scheduled to Deploy to SWA in Support of Operation Desert Shield, 15 January

1991.

8Spurrier Intvw, 19 February 1991; Lighthiser Intvw, 7 November 1991; Intvw, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO

with with D. Rogers, AMSMC-RD, 1 November 1991; Intvw, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO with S. Lovely, et

aL, SMAC-AV, 4 April 1991; Intvw, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO with 0. Wasmoen, etal, AMSMC-QAS, 24

September 1991; Stewart Intvw, 23 April 1991; Lessons Learned, 32143-01264 (0089) (U), AMSMC-PT,

Title: Su2oQort to Waiting Families. 19 March 1991; Intvw, T.J. Slattery, AMSMC-HO with LTC R.L. Pearson,

AMSMC-CH, 31 October 1991.

28
.P- -. ° FI 

4 7 -. ,.. ri ,,

9

Memo, AMSMC-CP for Distribution, Subj: General Travel Restriction, 16 January 1991; Spurrier Intvw,

19 February 1991; Msg (U), CDR, USATSG/AMXTM-C to AIG 11537, Subj: Desert Shield Guidelines for

Deploying DA Civilian Employees to SWA, 260800Z October 1990, hereafter referred to as USATSG Msg;

Msg (U), CDR, AMC to AIG 12113, Subj: Preparation for Overseas Replacement (POR), 042350Z October

1990; Msg (U), SDSSG-R to AIG 11738, Suhj: Preparation of Travel Orders, 141210Z November 1990;

Msg (U), AMCPE-AT to AIG 865, Subj: Passpj.rt/Visa Requirements for Desert Shield, 191400Z November

1990; Msg.(U), AMCPE-AT to AMCCOM-CG, Subj: Passport/Visa Requirements for Desert Shield,

191500Z November 1990; Lessons Learned, 32136-04853 (00081) (U), Title: AMC War Plans and

MOPES, 21 March 1991.

I 0Msg (U), DAPE-CPP to AIG 9130, Subj: Desert Shield Personnel Policy Message No.38: Guidelines for

Assianment. Utilization and Protection of Army Civilians in Southwest Asia, 042200Z January 1991,

hereafter referred to as Policy Message No.38; Lessons Learned, 52247-07252 (00152) (U), AMSMC-RD,

Title:Civilian Volunteers Versus Emergency Essential Statements, 17 May 1991; Msg (U), AMCPE to AIG

12383, Subj: Volunteers ,or Service with AMC Forward, 232030Z October 1990.

"Warnecke lntvw, 19 March 1991; Greenberg lntvw, 31 July 1991; Stewart Intvw, 23 April 1991; Morgan

Intvw, 14 March 1991; After Action Report (U), HQ, AMCCOM, Subj: Operation Desert Shield/Desert

Storm, 1 June 1991, Historical Analysis, iv-6.

1

2Stewart lntvw, 23 April 1991; Lighthiser lntvw, 7 November 1991; Warnecke Intvw, 19 March 1991;

Greenberg Intvw, 31 July 1991; Lessons Learned, 40939-14391 (00095) (U), AMSMC-MMP, Title: QM

Telephone/Datafax Requisition Abuse, 5 April 1991, hereafter cited as Datafax Requisition Abuse.

"1Lessons Learned, 91847-80204 (00003) (U), AMSMC-MM, Title: Identification of Deploying Units, 29

August 1990; Lessons Learned, 60533-71672 (00220) (U), AMSMC-RDA, Title: Readiness Rating, 23 May

1991; Warnecke Intvw, 19 March 1991; Lessons Learned, 91847-40535 (0002) (U), AMSMSC-RDA, Title:

Determining Unit Shortages, 12 December 1990; Lessons Learned, 52360-16406 (00178) (U), AMSMCMM, Title: Identification and Prioritizing of Deploying Units, 23 May 1991, hereafter cited as Priority of

Deploying Units; Lessons Learned, 61148-60823 (00234) (U), AMMCOM-SWA, Title: Seauence of

Activation and Arrival of Units into Theater, 11 June 1991.

'

4

Stewart Intvw, 23 April 1991; Rogers Intvw, 1 November 1991; After Action Report (U), HQ, AMCCOM,

Subj: Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 1 June 1991, Summary Supply Analysis, n.p.; Warnecke

Intvw, 19 March 1991; Lessons Learned, 11156-07832 (00027) (U), AMSMC-MMP, Title: Supply: Abuses

of the Supply System, 11 November 1990; Lessons Learned, 40939-86168 (00096) (U), AMSMC-MMP,

Title: Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm Priority Abuse, 4 May 1991; Lessons Learned, 40942-02920

(00097) (U), AMSMC-MMP, Title: Abuse of Requisition Modifiers, 4 May 1991.

"

15

Lessons Learned, 40943-30100 (00099) (U), AMSMC-MMP, Title: ODS Frustration of Shipments, 5 April

1991; After Action Report (U), HQ, AMCCOM, Subj: Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 1 June 1991,

Executive Summary, 1-7; Lessons Learned, 50236-47371 (00121) (U), AMSMC-MM, Title: Loss of Identity!

Ability to Trace Shipments From Origin to Destination, 1 May 1991, hereafter cited as Loss of Ability to

Trace Shipments; Warnecke Intvw, 19 March 1991; Lighthiser Intvw, 7 November 1991; Stewart Intvw,

23 April 1991; Lessons Learned, 50237-16319 (00123) (U), Title: TrackinqNisibility/Accountability of

29
'

6Rogers Intvw, 1 November 1991; Lighthiser Intvw, 7 November 1991; Greenberg Intvw, 31 July 1991;

LL, Priority of Deployina Units, 23 May 1991; Stewart Intvw, 23 April 1991; Warnecke Intvw. i 1 March 1991;

Loss of Ability to Trace Shipments, 1 May 1991.

"

1 Stewart Intvw, 23 April 1991; Warnecke Intvw, 19 March 1991; Loss otf Aiity to Trace Shigments, 1 May

1991; Lindsay lntvw, 27 June 1991; Snow Intvw, 11 March 1991; HJ, AMCCOM, 1 June 1991, Historical

Analysis.

1

8Warnecke lntvw, 19 March 1991; Rogers 4ntvw, 1 November 1991; HQ, AMCCOM, Subj: £12raiIn

Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 1 June 1991, Executive Cjmmary, 1-6-7; Historical Analysis, V-5; Commander's Assessment. V-3; White Intvw, 22 July 1991; Stewart Intvw, 23 April 199 ; Lessons Learned,

32214-19305 (00,094) (U), AMSMC-MMP, Title: Sufficiency of War Reserve Assets, 19 March 1991;

Lindsay Intvw, 27 June 1991.

1

9Lessons Learned, 50237-46281 (00124) (U), AMSMC-HO, Title: Restrictions on Desert Exoress

Shigments, 1 May 1991; FONECON, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO with T. Burke, AMSMC-MM, 21 February

1992; Warnecke Intvw, 19 March 1991; Lessons Learned, 11165-46355 (00045) (U), AMSMSC-MAW,

Title: M1 02 Howitzer Tire Problems, 11 Novembe," 1990; Rogers Intvw, 1 November 1990; Snow Intvw,

11 March 1991; Morgan Intvw, 14 March 1991.

20FONECON, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO with MAJ (USAF) Cynthia Moura, AMSMC-TM, 26 February 1992;

Intvw, H.P. LePore, AMSMSC-HO with COL S.W. Hull, AMSMC-DS, 27 March 1991; Morgan lntvw, 14

March 1991; Stewart lntvw, 23 April 1991; Greenberg Intvw, 31 July 1991; HO, AMCCOM, Subj: Operation

Desert Shield/Deset Storm, 1 June 1991, Commander's Assessment, V-2.

21Stewart lntvw, 23 March 1991; Hull Intvw, 27 March 1991; Lighthiser Intvw, 7 November 1991; Snow

Intvw, 11 March 1991; Lovely lntvw, 4 April 1991; Wasmoen Intvw, 24 September 1992.

22HQ, AMCCOM, Subj: Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 1 June 1991, Commander's Assessment,

V-2; Wasmoen lnt,,w, 24 September 1924; Stewart Intvw, 23 March 1991; Hull Intvw, 27 March 1991;

Lovely Intvw, 4 Apiil 1991; HQ, AMSMC, Subj: Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. 1 June 1991,

Ammunition Cover Sheet, AMSMCDSP-L, n.p., hereafter cited as AMSMC-DSP-L Report.

2'Lighthiser Intvw, 7 November 1991; Stewart Intvw, 23 March 1991; Hull lntvw, 27 March 1991; Lovely

Intvw, 4 April 1991; HO, AMCCOM, Subj: Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 1 June 1991, Summary

Analysis, n.p.; Wasmoen Intvw, 24 September 1991; Rogers Intvw, 1 November 1991.

24 Lessons Learned, 11152-16125 (00023) (U), AMSMC-TM, Title: Shipment of Ammunition Basic Load

(ABL) Reguirements, 11 November 1991, hereafter cited as ABL Reouirements; Hull lntvw, 27 March 1991;

Lighthiser Intvw, 7 November 1991; AMSMC-DSP-L Report; Lovely Intvw, 4 April 1991. Lessons Learned,

80824-47276 (00291) (U), AMSMC-TM, Title: Adequacy of Commercial Carrier Support for Class A & B

Ammo & Explosives, 21 June 1991

25Hull lntvw, 27 March 1997; ABL Recuirements; Wasmoen lntvw, 24 September 1991; Lovely lntvw, 4

April 1991; Stewart Intvw, 23 March 1991.

2Lovely lntvw, 4 April 1991; Wasmoen Intvw, 24 September 1991; Lighthiser Intvw, 7 November 1991;

AMSMC-DSP-L Report; Hull Intvw, 27 March 1991; HQ, AMCCOM, Subj: Coeration Desert Shield/Desert

Sm 1 June 1991, Summary Analysis, n.p.

30
27L-essons Learned, 80930-6409 (00294) (U), AMSMC-TM, Title: Port Receotion Capability, 21 June 1991;

Lessons Learned, 80932-35842 (00295) (U), AMSMC-TM, Title: Ammunition. Transportation Managem~entLPac, 21 June 1991; Hull lntvw, 27 March 1991.

28Lessons Learned, 71150-87567 (00279) (U), AMSMC-TMD, Title: Mcbiliza~on/Outloadina!Capabilities.

21 June 1991; Hull intvw, 27 March 1991; Lighthiser lntvw, 7 November 1991.

29Lessons Learned, 80940-73609 (0030 1) (U), AMSMC-TM, Title: Depot pUtfoad Capabilitv, 21 June 199 1;

Stewart lntvvv, 23 March 1991; Hull lntvw, 27 March 1991; Morgan lntvw, 14 March 1991; AMSMC-DSPL Report; Lighthiser lntvw, 7 November 1991; Wasmoen lntvw, 24 September 1991; Lovely lntvw, 4 April

1991.

3'Lessons Learned, 80945-34687 (00303) (U), AMSMC-TM, Title: Movement Control Center, 21 June

1991; Stewart lntvw, 23 March 1991; Hull Intvw, 27 March 1991; Lighthiser lntvw, 7 November 1991.

"

3Lessons Learned, 80937,16830 (00299) (U), AMSMC-TM, Title: Iripact of Vessel Scheduling on Ship

Planning, 21 June 1991; Lovely lntvw, 4 April 1991; Wasmoen lntvw, 214 Scpl,.tcmber 1991.

31
32
Chapter Three

Production and Procurement

"The Gulf War wasn't won by aircraft. It wasn't won by tanks or missiles or bombs," observed an

anonymous author in the December 1991 AMC Newa. Indeed, the "miracle in the desert" could be traced

to one source: people. "War and Pieces: The Logistics Story of Desert Stonn" further noted that these

people were a varied lot; they were not just the soldiers who had served so valiantly in the sands of

Southwest Asia (SWA). They were the shipping clerks, office workers, mechanics, scientists, and

engineers. They worked on the docks, in the factories, as well as in the laboratories, and in the warehouses.

Furthermore, the people behind the success of Operation Desert Storm were fathers, mothers, sisters.

wives, brothers, husbands, children, and simply concerned citizens who waited patiently and courageousiy,

toiling all the time in their own ways, to return their loved ones and fellow countrymen and women to safety.1

From the beginning days in August 1990, the products of AMCCOM's laboratories, arsenals, depots,

maintenarnce shops, proving grounds, and contractors began to flow into Saudi Arabia. 'What started as

a trickle ended as a flocd," the author of the AMC News piece noted, "as thousands of tons of supplies,

ammunition, weapons-big things, small things-arrived incountry." And as the journalist continued,

"Nothing has ever happened quite like this before. A logistical nightmare became a miracle in the desert."

The journalist's reflections took into consideration the innovations oevised by a nation preparing for war:

the fast freight and overnight express deliveries, the prioritization and super-prioritization of shipments that

allowed units preparing for deployment to requisltion supplies one day and have them the next, sitting on

their loading docks awaiting further instructions.'

The Persian Gulf campaign resulted in victory because the people behind, as well as in front of, the

scenes cared enough to prepare for any exigency which might befall their nation. And ultimately because

such organizations as the United States Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM)

were in place, with the appropriate skills and foresight, flexibility and responsiveness, to guide the goodwilled citizenry of the United States, the successful attainment of the nation's goals was possible. Because

of such prepositioning, AMCCOM was able to fulfill its mission of "providing the firepower" as well.

As noted, the requisite structure did not simply spring forth in full bloom with the 2 August 1990 Iraqi

invasion of tiny Kuwait, nor with its subsequent threats upon the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia. Indeed,

it had existed in a variety of permutations for decades. And accordingly, due to its presence, many of the

parts and supplies needed for Operations Desert Shield ard Desert Storm (ODS) were already on hand.

Yet not all the implements of war that kept the soldiers of the United States armed services, as well as

a significant number of their allies, fed, clothed, armed, transported, reasonably safe from chemical attack,

and offensively prepared were on hand, or even in existence. And in order to properly attend to the

perceived needs of the soldiers in the sand, AMCCOM had to rapidly initiate production and procurement

efforts.

During ODS, the AMCCOM Procurement Directorate accelerated 149 actions, 53 contracts, 96

purchase orders, and awarded 503 contracts in support of America's efforts. Consequently, the directorate

administered a total of 1,434 procurement requirements during the war at a dollar value of $895,169,286.

Many of these actions were executed with little or no additional cost to the government, or accordingly,

the taxpayer, as they represented icceleration-, not unhiicieted purchases. Such efforts contributed

mightily to the iron mountain of rnmterWel ;hipped to SWA by AMCCOM. Indeed throughout the conflict,

AMCCOM, aiided in part by its predecessor's 1977 designation as the Single Manager for Conventional

Ammunition operations, as well as its own endorsement by the Military Traffic Management Command

33
(MTMC) and Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) as the single focal point for ammunition ship

planning, deployed a myriad of supplies to SWA. By the war's conclusion, AMCCOM had shipped $97

million worth of Class II supplies (individual equipment), $356 million worth of Class IX supplies (repair

parts), and a t-t'l of $4 billion worth of Class V supplies (ammunition), constituting 620,000 short tons.3

Included in the t.ategorios of items shipped in support of ODS by AMCCOM were 314,585 M17

protective masks, 27,500 M25A1 tank crewman protective masks, 4,529 chemical agent alarms, 3,962

M24 aviation gas masks, and 680 M43 chemical protective masks for Apache helicopters. Other major

items shipped in support of the American effort in the Persian Gulf War by AMCCOM included 45,896

M16A1 rifles, 10,770 M9-9mm pistols, 600 M17 lightweight decontaminating apparatuses, 282 M12AI

decontaminating units, 9,420 M16A2 rifles, 1,183 M203 grenade launchers, 1,792 M240 machine guns,

and 1,076 of the M60 variety. Nearly 1,500 smoke grenade launchers (M239/M250/M243/M257/M259)

were also shipped to SWA under the direction of AMCCOM'

AMCCOM supervised the shipment of smaller quantities of nonetheless essential items to Saudi Arabia

as well. For example, AMCCOM arranged for the transport of eleven M24A1 4.2inch mortars, six M29A1

81mm mortars, and seven M224 60mm mortars to SWA. Additionally, 34 mine clearing line charge

(MICLIC) launchers and trailers were shipped under the guidance of AMCCOM, as were 500 Canadian

chemical agent monitors, 18 engineer air assault tool kits, 19 lathe engines, 109 steam cleaners, 39

telescopes, and 10 M578 recovery vehicles. AMCCOM also oversaw the transport of 274,000 short tons

of bombs, 245,000 short tons of artillery munitions, 34,000 short tons of small arms ammunition, 36,000

short tons of mortar, tank, and navy gun shells, and 31,000 short tons of other assorted ammunition.8

Much of what AMCCOM shipped to SWA had been produced prior to the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam

Hussein and his army-reputedly the fourth largest in the world. Yet not all the called for materiel had been

produced or procured prior to the onset of deployment, and emergency operations were undertaken at the

command's numerous subordinate facilities to fill the voids ascertained. Assisting AMCCOM in what

L,ecame a success story were its supporting research centers, arsenals, and assorted facilities: the United

States Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC), Picatinny Arsenal, NJ;

the United States Army Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center (CRDEC). Aberdeen

Proving Ground, MD; Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Islatl,, IL; Watervliet Arsenal, Watervliet, NY; Pine Bluff

Arsenal, Pine Bluff, AR; Crane Army Ammunition Activity, Crane, IN; the United States Army Defense

Ammunition Center and School (USADACS), Savanna, IL: McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, McAlester,

OK; Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plant, Hawthorne, NV; Holston Army Ammunition Plant, Kingsport, TN;

Indiana Army Ammunition Plant, Charlestown, IN; Iowa Army Ammunition Plant, Middletown, IA; Kansas

Army Ammunition Plant, Parsons, KS: Lake City Army Ammunition Plant, Independence, MO; Lone Star

Army Ammunition Plant, Texarkana, TX; Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, Marshall, TX; Louisiana Army

Ammunition Plant, Shreveport, LA; Milan Army Ammunition Plant, Milan, TN; Radford Army Ammunition

Plant, Radford, VA; Scranton Army Ammunition Plant, Scranton, PA: and Sunflower Army Ammunition

Plant, DeSoto, KS.0

Behind the primarily government-owned, contractor-operated ammunition plants-the McAlester and

Crane plants are governmentowned and operated-and assorted support facilities were a total of 17,934

civilian employees and 633 military personnel, albeit augmented duiring Operations Desert Shield and

Desert Storm by approximately 700 temporary employees. Working together, frequently on lengthened

shifts, these employees were responsible for the loading, assembling, packing, shipping, delivery, etc., of

all conventional ammunition utilized in ODS by the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S.

Air Force, as well as much of that needed by coalition allies. A total of 1,619,552 civilian, government

employee hours were extended in support of AMCCOM's mission in SWA with a concomitant expenditure,

of $52 million.'

34
CDC

-3 0

o 3

z

0w

C-0U VI

00

Z 35
As noted earlier, AMOCOM's mission did not end with simply supplying the needed ammunition to the

field. According to its mission statement, the command's charge included the duty to:

exercise total Life Cycle Management over research, development, engineering, product

assurance, logistics, support, industrial preparedness, procurement, production, security

assistance, and material readiness, for assigned systems; Singie Manager for Conventional

Ammunition for DOD; manage Production Base Modernization Expansion Program;

maintain a technical base to accomplish development, procurement; production and Life

Cycle support of conventional and nuclear weapons and ammunition (art~llery, infantry, guntype airdefense, surface vehicle mounted and aircraft mounted); certain weapons systems/

subsystems and chemical systems/materiel; related components and conventional ammunitlion as assigned; peculiar equipment, test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment: and

tools maintenance equipment, command and control assigned centers, activities, and

installations. Maintain the Ammunition Chemical and Armament Production base which

includes initial production facilities programs, modernization, expansion projects, facilitization to satisfy peacetime surge and mobilizrition.8

To fulfill this mission in the environment termed Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm required

AMCCOM not simply to locate, package, load, and ship materiel, but also, on occasion to produce, or

otherwise procure it.

Perhaps the best known, and arguably the most vital of AMCCOM's production efforts during the war

came from eastern New York's Watervliet Arsenal. The primary mission of the facility is to perform

procurement, fabrication, industrial engineering, and product assurance of assigned materiel; and to

provide administrative and logistical support services to tenant activities. In the case of Watervliet Arsenal,

the assigned materiel is mortars, recoilless rifles, cannons for tanks, towed and self-propelled artillery,

components for these end items, and special tool sets, training devices and simulators relating to assigned

materiel. Slightly over 2,000 civilian employees and eight military personnel comprised the arsenal's

workforce during the war in the Persian Gulf.'

During ODS, Waterviet, founded in 1813 and now the nation's oldest govern ment-operated arsenal,

was called upon to provide a bomb the likes of which had never been seen before, and which would be

capable of penetrating the Iraqi command cadre's bunker, encased in concrete and buried to a depth of

100 feet. Despite the U.S. military's use of huge 2,000-pound bombs designed to slice through 6-foot- *

thick bunker walls, the military bunker complex at Al Tapi Air Base, to the north of Baghdad at Abu Ghurab,

remained secure. Secure, that is until on the evening of 27 February 1991, when, a mere four days into

the ground offensive against Iraq, two U.S. Air Force F-i 11 F fighter-bombers streaked north across the

Saudi desert bound for Al Taji. Guided by lasers, two long, cylinder-like devices fell f, orm the jets' wings.

Then from far below on !he desert floor, a small puff of black smoke suddenly shot from the entrance to

Taji Bunker No. 1; one bomb had hit its target. (The second bomb, misdirected by the weapon systems

officer aboard the jet, hit an un-targeted bunker instead, destroying it.) A few moments later, a huge

secondary explosion ripped through the targeted command post, reducing the bunker, according to air force

personnel, to a jumble of broken steel and concrete."0

,he mission marked the spectacular battlefield debut of the GBU (glide bomb unit ')-28, called the

"bunker buster"s, which had been developed, tested, and fielded with unprecedented speed by the combined

effort of the air force, Texas Instruments, Inc., Lockheed Missiles and Space Company. Wright Laboratories, Cameron Forge, and last, but certainly not least, Watervliet Arsenal. It also marked the denouement

of the Persian Gulf War. For although the actual psychological impact of the GBU-28 on Iraqi President

Saddam Hussein and his military commanders ensconced within bunkers similar to the one destroyed may

36
• .

never been known, less than twelve hours after the destruction of the Al Taji command post, the nation's

leadership indicated their readiness for a cease-fire. The success of the super-penetrating bombs may

also be inferred from the relatively low rank of Iraqi military off ice•3 who attended the capitulation meeting

with GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf marking the end of the war."

Watervliet Arsenal's involvement in the creation of the nowfamous bunker-busting GSU-28 began

shortly after the commencement of the air war against the forces of Saddam Hussein. Although United

States military strategists were concerned throughout the build-up to war with Iraq, the passing of the United

Nations Security Council Resolution 678 deadline for the unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from

Kuwait brought the dogmatic threat to "use all necessary means" to achieve the end into sharper focus.

And when the air bombardment of Iraq began on 17 January 1991, the worst fears of the United States

military commanders were realized. Air force reconnaissance photographs showed that a number of Iraqi

bunker complexes had withstood direct hits by bombs that could destroy typical concrete bunkers. The

Iraqi command posts, presumed to be frequented by Hussein and his fellow military strategists, apparently

were either too deep or too well-protected by reinforced concrpte to be penetrated by existing means,

primarily BLU (bomb, live unit)- 109. BLU- 109 had made direct contact with bunkers, but as it was designed

to penetrate between six and twelve feet of reinforced concrete, had inflicted only minimal damage.

Obviously, "all necessary means" would need to be produced or procured, not simply drawn from existing

stores if the underground lair of Hussein and his commanding generals was to be penetrated.12

Around 21 January 1991, air force officials contacted aerospace companies around the nation asking

for ideas on how to destroy the deep, reinforced targets. One call went to Texas Instruments Defense

Systems and Electronics Group, Dallas, TX, in consideration of its previous engineering of laser-guided

bombs capable of delivering-with pinpoint accuracy-a 2,000-pound bomb that could punch through six

feet of concrete. Simultaneously, Mr. Al Weimorts, an engineer at the Air-to-Surface Guided Weapons

Systems Program Office at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, began sketching designs for a longer, heavier

bomb. Yet his efforts quickly hit a snag."

It was this snag that ultimately led to Watervliet's involvement in the production of the bunker buster.

A key element in Mr. Weimorts's plan was to use off-the-shelf air force materials to construct the bomb;

manufacturing components from scratch would consume months of precious time that the current situation

did not luxurously provide. The primary problem facing Mr. Weimorts involved the need for a steel tube

long and strong enough to serve as the bomb's body. While pondering the issue, Mr. Weimorts shared

his problem with a retired army veteran at the Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Sunnyvale, CA.

(Lockhee.d had been tapped by the air force to produce the GBU-28's warhead.) The veteran recalled that

the army stockpiled old gun barrels that might serve the purpose Mr. Weimorts required. The barrels just

happened to consist of the same hardened steel needed for the bomb body. A few minutes work located

the gun barrels at Letterkenney Arsenal in eastern Pennsylvania."

Without waiting for Pentagon approval, the Eglin weapons lab asked Letterkenney Arsenal to ship

several of the 8-inch M201 howitzer barrels to Watervliet Arsenal. On 1 February 1991, just days after

the realization that the existing bomb units, BLU- 109, were incapable of penetrating the bunkers of Hussein

and his generals, Watervliet personnel started shaping the first bomb bodies from the gun barrels.

Transforming gun tubes into bomb bodies involved removing the hoops and rails, shortening the barrel

from 17 feet to the required length of 12 feet, 7 inches, and removing the chrome plating from the bore.

As the work progressed, additional gun tubes arrived at Watervliet from Ingersol Rand located in Texas.' 5

Despite having overcome one obstacle in the creating of a super-penetrating bomb, several others

remained. Texas Instruments was called upon to reassemble the engineering team that had previously

37
designed and built the Paveway laser-guided weapons system. Time was critical, and Texas Instruments

was asked to compact the normal 18 months to two year development process, involving wind-tunnel and

simulation tests, into a single week. Simultaneously, engineers sought to discover how different speeds

and altitudes would affect the bomb they had not yet created. In Lewisville, TX, a Texas Instruments'

defense plant team of 18 engineers labored in absolute secret, 20-hour marathons to find the solutions

to the mind-numbing challenges which had been set before them. On Saturday, 16 February 1991, less

than a month after their first contact with air force officials concerning the possible construction of a

bunkerbusting super-penetrator, wind-tunnel testing began under the close eye of engineers. Texas

Instruments, however, did not face the only problems in the construction of the bunker buster.16

Lockheed engineers, along with Watervliet Arsenal personnel, faced the problem of assembling the

nose of the body. The traditional method of performing this operation on hard target penetrators was to

utilize the inertia welding process which would not be possible in the case of the GBU-28 due to its increased

bore size-ten inches compared to the original gun-tube of eight inches. Eventually, Lockheed and

Watervliet staffers explored a multitude of attachment processes: thread, pin, shrink, weld, and various

combinations among them. An error in this decision would seriously affect th6 ability of the program to

meet its required deadline. Ultimately, the decision was made to proceed with a combination shrink and

weld process. After examining test pieces of the so-joined material, the results were declared to be even

better than expected. Watervliet staffers became proficient at the process of joining the nose and body

portions of the penetrator. Although the union initially absorbed twelve hours from the shrink process to

initially join the implements to the preheating with special torches, and the final welding, innovation and

skill reduced the procedures to eight hours. Time was always a factor in the production of the bunker buster,

and all involved knew that every minute could be the critical one. Indeed, the machining operation

conducted at Watervliet to create all of the threaded holes for the multiple aircraft stabilizing wing

configurations was reduced by one half, from fourteen to seven hours, as all sought to hasten the

process.I1

On 17 February 1991, Watervliet Arsenal and Lockheed personnel put the finishing touches on the first

two penetrators. The penetrators were completed at 0600 and by 0700, still wet with paint, they were

enroute via New York Air National Guard C130 transport to Eglin Air Force Base, FL. On 21 February,

a pair of bomb guidance units engineered at the Dallas laboratories of Texas Instruments arrived there

via T1 Lear jet. At Eglin, the vital components were united, and explosive was added. 8

The process of loading the GBU-28 with explosives also challenged the men and women of the United

States defense community. Of primary concern to the men and women of the United States Air Force

Munitions Systems Division at Eglin were the units' dimensions. Previous to the arrival of GBU-28, the

largest unit handled was but half its size. Accordingly, the technicians could not pour explosives straight

from the melting kettle into the warhead inside their facility as was the usual case. Thus a makeshift, outside

facility was created, allowing the units to be loaded in the upright position by a "bucket brigade" of

technicians. From the usual melting facility inside the division, TNT flakes were carefully melted in a 30-

pound kettle. The molten Tritonal thus created was then poured into buckets for transfer to the penetrator.

Two varieties of molten material were needed to fill each penetrator. A special load was used that contained

two different explosives. The first explosive poured was insensitive Tritonal so that the bomb could survive

the impact without detonating. The second pouring was regular Tritonal. Once filled with its cargo of

explosives of over 600 pounds, the penetrator was capped and prepared for curing.19

The curing process was also made more difficult by the penetrator's size. As it was fur too large for

any of the facility's ovens, the loading crew wrapped it in copper tubing and surrounded it with felt insulation.

A hot water circulator kept the unit warm. Mr. Art Spencer, chief of the High Explosive Research and

38
Development (HERD) Processing Laboratory at Eglin, noted in retrospect that the curing process was so

critical that he had individuals watching the process around the clock to assure that the unit retained its

heat. Just two days from the initial delivery of the penetrators, the facility had loaded its first penetrators;

they would not be the last.-

Before the units were fully cool, they had been loaded for shipment to Nevada's Nellis Air Force Base.

There they were fitted with improved laser guidance units. On 24 February 1991, the weapon's only

operational flight test occurred at the Tonopah Test Range, NV. Testing demonstrated at the F- 111 aircraft

could fly in a stable fashion with the super-penetrator in place under one wing and balanced by a 2,000-

pound MK-84 unguided bomb under the other. After being released from the aircraft, the penetrator buried

itself so deeply in the ground that it appears uneconomical to even attempt to recover it. MAJ Dick Wright,

Air-to-Surface Guided Weapons Systems Program Office, declared after the testing that, "As it turned out,

our bomb worked so well, it went even beyond their [Tonopah Test Range's] ability to recover it and remains

more than a hundred feet underground."21

While the flight testing proved that the adaptive laser guidance devices did indeed work, it took the use

of a sled test to prove that the GBU-28 could penetrate several feet of reinforced concrete with little damage

to its bomb case. On 26 February, the second penetrator was subjected to just such a rigorous challenge

at Holloman Air Force Base, NM. After being placed on a sled track and attached to a "pusher", the device

shot down the track towards a target. Designated as the target was 22 feet of concrete in several slabs

of varying grades. After piercing the steel-reinforced concrete, the bomb skipped once and continued down

range for approximately another half mile before coming to a rest. The casing remained intact.=

After successfully testing the first and second iterations of the GBU-28, the third and fourth received

final preparations for shipment to SWA at Eglin Air Force Base. They were each loaded with approximately

670 pounds of Tritonal, and fitted with laser guidance units and tail assemblies which brought their total

weight to nearly 5,000 pounds. They began their flight to SWA still warm from loading processes and still

secret. At least one machinist, however, correctly guessed the primary target of the bomb he had labored

upon. On one he wrote: 'The Saddamizer."2

Mr. Gerald L. Yarter, Chief of the Production and Planning and Control Division at Watervliet Arsenal,

stood justifiably proud of that facility's efforts at the close of the war. Because the arsenal was in place

with its varied capabilities and capacities, he noted, it could be responsive with its manufacturing expertise

and could accordingly provide American troops with quality products and confidence on the battlefield. 2

"

Also providing soldiers in the field with quality products and concomitant confidence was Pine Bluff

Arsenal, Pine Bluff, AR. Throughout the Persian Gulf War, the Arkansas facility sent a plethora of protective

devices to SWA. While Pine Bluff Arsenal was not responsible for the entire effort of outfitting America's

fighting men and women and their supporting staff of civilians and military personnel with chemical

protective devices, it did field a considerable proportion of them. This was in accordance with the facility's

primar,' mission to operate and maintain production facilities for the manufacture of assigned materiel;

store, :urvey and ship supplies and equipment; manufacture chemical systems/materiel; operate a

calibralon laboratory; perform demilitarization of chemical munitions; and produce binary munitions. The

primary, materiel responsibility of Pine Bluff Arsenal is chemicals, smoke, incendiary agents, and other

pyrotechnic mixes, as well as defensive chemical matýriel. A staff of 1,151 civilians and 62 military

personr:el aided in the fulfillment of Pine Bluff Arsenal':. mission during ODS.25

The special abilities of Pine Bluff Arsenal wou!d have been called upon in any conflict facing the United

States in the summer of 1990. However, given aiA understanding of Saddam Hussein's use of chemical

39
/ A' -.-- ° .' -' r

warfare in his recently concluded foray against Iran, it played a somewhat larger role than it might otherwise

have been expected to do.

Hussein's familiarity with the agents of chemical warfare was rather extensive. During the early 1980s,

Iraq's State Enterprise for Pesticide Production purchased several million of dollars worth of modern

Western chemical production equipment from international brokers. Installed at the chemical production

plant at Samarra, to the north of Baghdad, the equipment utilized legitimately obtained thiodiglycol and

phosphorous trichloride to churn forth mustard gas and nerve agents. In their more legitimate iterations

the chemicals can be used to print textiles, develop photographs, and create ink for ball-point pens. In

their less legitimate, lethal forms the chemicals were initially tested on camels and sheep, as a prelude

to humans, in the desert.2

Despite the fact that Iran first reported to the United Nations Security Council in November 1983 the

use of chemical warfare agents by Iraq, experts believe their first use occurred in early 1984. Earlier reports

have been relegated to histcry's dust bin as propaganda on the part of Iran to elicit world sympathy. Yet

in the early months of 1984, the use of chemical warfare was documented by Iran's dispatch of 30 chemical

casualties to hospitals in Tokyo, Vienna, Stockholm, and London. The medical evidence gathered at the

hospitals supported Iran's claims, resulting in a United Nations investigation. The investigative team,

escorted to the battlefront by Iranian authorities, quickly concluded, based upon an examination of the

casualties, soil samples and even samples of mustard agent from an unexplo6ed 250-kilogram bomb, that

the nation had not cried "wolf". While the report stopped just short of flatly stating that Iraq had used

chemical agents, and did not acquit Iran of wrong-doing, it left little doubt as to who had broken the 1925

Geneva Convention outlawing chemical weapons which both nations, as well as a host of others, had

signed. Following the report, the United States, France, Britain, Japan, and, a few months later, Australia

banned the export-to both Iraq and Iran--of chemicals which could be utilized to make nerve or mustard

agent.2

This lack of a true international response to the Iraqi use of chemical weapons did nothing but encourage

their further use as the desperate nation grasped at its deadly arsenal in an attempt to secure victory. And

the incidence of chemical casualties incurred by Iran rose. In 1981, when few if any believed that Iraq had

begun to utilize the weapons, Iran reported eleven casualties due to them. The number reported rose to

29 in 1982, and precipitiousiy to 564 in 1983. By 1984, Iran reported 2,237 chemical casualties, and by

1985 3,267. In 1986, Iran blamed Iraq's chemical agents for the deaths of 11,141 of its soldiers, and for

13,496 in 1987. Obviously, Iraq gained a degree of boldness overtime regarding the use of chemical agents

in light of world non-reaction. Where chemical weapons had once been used only as a last resort technique

to forestall routs of its forces against the human-wave assaults of Iran's Revolutionary Guards and offered

with the most experimental of tactics, Iraq began to gain a degree of finesse. Rather than simply dumping

mustard agent from helicopters and cargo planes as it had done in the early portion of the 1980s, Iraq's

chemical arsenal included aerial bombs, artillery and 122mm rockets launched from the Soviet-made BM21. Uniquely Iraqi was the 90mm helicopter-launched air-to-surface rocket.2 '

As Mr. Lee Waters, a threat analyst at the United States Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, AL,

noted in "Chemical Weapons in the Iran/Iraq War," Iraq's attack on the oil-rich Majnoon

Islands may have been typical of the threat faced by American and allied troops.

The artillery preparation began at 0300. Chemical rounds were mixed with high

explosives. Front-line Iranian o•.ensive positions were attacked with a mix of cyanide,

nerve agent, and high explosive. The bombardment lasted two hours. Iranian defenders were killed and injured, but the contamination dissipated by the time advancing

4,]
Iraqi forces reached the positions. Iran reported 2,000 chemical casualties in the main

battle area. Then, Iraqi helicopters and fighter aircraft joined the attack, dropping mustard

and nerve gas in the Iranian rear--on command and control centers, logistic sites and

reserves to break up counterattacks. 9

Iran lost control of its defense, and when the smoke cleared, Iraq had retaken its territory, lost since 1984.

Such was the foe the United States and its allies faced when the need arose to defend the territorial integrity

of the Kingdom of SaL-". Arabia with Iraq's refusal to remove itself from Kuwait by 15 January 1991 as per

United Nations Security Council Resolution 678.0

But American troops did not enter the fray without an understanding of chemical warfare. Despite not

having fought on a chemically-oriented battle field since the close of World War I, the nation's military

leaders thoroughly understood the dangers inherent in the challenge. This understanding came in part

from observations gathered during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. They came to realize that light forces,

of the variety frequently used in adverse terrain, were particularly susceptible to the perils of chemical

attack. They could carry little in the form of protection, and were inviting targets to chemical strike planners.

Furthermore, the fox hole, the perennial friend of the foot soldier as protector against shrapnel and artillery

rounds, could become his deadliest foe in chemical warfare scenarios. Chemical agents, heavier than air,

frequently collected in the holes, suffocating or otherwise incapacitating those taking shelter in them.31

Additionally from the Iran-Iraq War, certain United States observations were reaffirmed. It was

recognized that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard had no professional chemical force training. They,

therefore, despite the availability of resources, frequently did not promptly don their chemical defense

equipment nor did they always keep it in place until the threat had subsided. Additionally, the facial hair

of the Guardsmen did not allow for a proper mask fit. 32

From observations concerning the failures of Iran to properly prepare for the known chemical threat,

as well as the successes of the Iraqi military machine in mounting the threat and defending itself from

inadvertent self-contamination, the United States forces gained valuable lessons. From the Iraqis, the

United States learned that trained chemical specialists to administer the army's chemical defense system

were invaluable; this was simply an affirmation of its own theories. Further, the analysts of the United States

noted the capability of the Iraqis to use collective protection systems to exploit the effects of their chemical

strikes against the Iranians. The Soviet-made armor and infantry fighting vehicles used by the Iraqis had

the systems, but it was unknown whether or not they were used.33

Mr. Waters concluded his examination of the use of chemicals in the Iran-Iraq War with a brief comment

on the capacity of the United States to wage just such a war. He observed that the United States, in both

its light and heavy forces, had concentrated on individual protection and had invested in the creation of

an air-permeable NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) overgarment, as well as chemical agent detectors.

This, according to Mr. Waters, denoted a key philosophical variance between United States forces and

those of probable threat nations. Protective overgarments and chemical warfare agent detectors focused

on the survivability of the individual, whereas chemical reconnaissance and collective protection, whether

in vehicles or on shelters, concentrated on the survivability ol the force. Mr. Waters did not offer an opinion

on the observation, but did note that chemical warfare agents and delivery systems, including short-range

ballistic missiles, had proliferated throughout the Third World where "balances of power, as understood

in a European scenario, do not exist." And, "as new missions point our I'ght and contingency forces toward

the world's trouble spots, our current capabilities to fight on a chemical battlefield appear increasingly at

risk."3

41
The United States military had understood the risk of chemical warfare for quite some time, however,

for the age of chemical warfare had begun on 22 April 1915 with the German release of chlorine gas at

Ypres, Belgium. With the release of the cloud of chlorine came the rapid effort to deploy soldiers with some

form of protection against the insidious fumes. Assorted masks were fielded by Allied as well as Central

Power forces during the war in an attempt to protect soldiers from not only chlorine gas, but mustard gas,

phosgene, and tearing agents. Indeed, under the auspices of the United States Army Medical Department,

over 1.5 million British-designed Small Box Respirator (SBR) masks, utilizing activated coconut charcoal

as a filter, had been produced before the Armistice in November 1918. Additionally, over three million RFK

(Richardson, Flory, and Kops-the designers) masks had been produced for the army, as well as 197,000

Akron Tissot masks, 330,000 Kops Tissot masks, and 2,000 Kops Tissot Monro masks before the German

surrender.35

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, a number of improvements and modifications were made to the basic

Kops Tissot Monro mask. It remained in production as the army's standard mask up to the beginning of

World War II. The outbreak of hostilities in Europe in the late summer of 1939 stimulated a rush to prepare

the United States for involvement. The rush included the creation and manufacture of a new protective

mask, as well as the heightened focus on the development of lightweight, tightly sealing, non-fogging mask

which was not reliant upon rubber components. Nearly 22.5 million gas masks were produced for the

training of and field use by American troops during the World War II period. 6

In consideration of the rising threat of nuclear, as well as biological and chemical, warfare, the Chemical

Corps officially changed the name of the "gas mask" to the "protective mask" in the initial days of the Korean

Conflict. As Mr. Jeffrey K. Smart notes in his fascinating history, "Preparing for Chemical Warfare: The

History of the Infantry Protective Mask," the name change was deemed to be "more reflective of the purpose

of the mask, to defend against biological agents and radiological particles, as well as traditional chemical

agents." In the process of pursuing this goal, the M1 7 mask came to fruition. Canisterless, the mask utilized

replaceable filters in the cheek pouches which reduced breathing resistance. In addition, the M17 mask

came in three sizes, and provided greater vision and improved speech transmission. Over the course of

several years, the mask was further improved with the addition of a drinking tube which enabled a soldier

to avoid dehydration during lengthy exposures by allowing him to use a canteen; a resuscitation devise

was also added. This mask constituted the greatest proportion of those utilized by American servicemembers and their civilian support staff during ODS.17

Other soldiers and civilians deployed to SWA were issued the M40 protective mask. Standardized in

May 1987, the mask incorporated the latest in technology, included a cheek-mounted NATO (North Atlantic

Treaty Organization) interchangeable canister and voicemitter, to enhance communication, that can be

worn on either side of the facepiece. The mask also provides increased protection, improved fit and

comfort, and comes in three sizes: small, medium, and large. Although currently in production, only a small

proportion of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm deployees carried the M40 mask.3

Every American civilian and servicemember deployed to SWA during ODS carried a full complement

of new chemical defensive equipment. From the suzerainty of AMCCOM, a total of 314,585 M17 series

field protective masks were sent to SWA. Other varieties of protective masks shipped include 1,202 M9A1

gas masks, 680 M43 aircraft masks, 3,962 M24 aircraft gas masks, and 27,585 M25A1 tank gas masks.

Not insignificantly, approximately 400 of the newly designed M40 protective masks were provided to "hard

to fit" American soldiers deployed to the desert. Additional chemically oriented equipment sent to SWA

in support of ODS by AMCCOM included 282 M12A1 decontaminating apparatus, 600 M17 lightweight

decontaminating apparatus, 15 M87 gas particular filter units, 10 M56 0as particulate filter units, and 25

M59 gas particulate filter units. Other AMCCOM-supported chemical defense items shipped to the deserts

42

-I •" , 4
'1 J

of SWA worthy of mention include 4,529 M841 chemical agent alarms (CAA), 66 chemical agent monitors,

348 M20 simplified collective protection units, 46 M51 shelter systems, and 22 protective entrances, 2 of

the M12 variety and 20 of the M10 style. Five hundred Canadian chemical agent monitors were also

shipped to SWA.A9

Supplying the most sign ficant number of the chemical protective devices enumerated was Pine Bluff

Arsenal, Pine Bluff, AR. Inoeed, to handle the increased number of requisitions it received during ODS,

the facility hired an additional 85 workers. Not all of the new laborers, however, aided in the assembly of

new protective devices. Some of the newly hired served their nation by refurbishing masks and filters. The

refurbishing process consisted of testing and repairing masks ard filters. Specifically, Pine Bluff refurbished

M1 7, M24, and M25 protective masks, and upgraded as well as modified the M1 0 filter canister for M24

and M25 masks. Prior to the onset of Operation Desert Shield, Pine Biuff Arsenal had been refurbishing

approximately 1,100 masks per week. But with the preparations for war in the early autumn, however,

the number rose to 3,500 M1 7 masks per week. Additionally, during the last week cf September 1990,

4,000 masks were reworked for the Marine Corps.'0

The refurbishing of masks, as opposed to solely manufacturing new ones, was necessitated by a

number of factors. Chief among the reasons was the lack of a M1 7 production base. With the decision

to replace the M1 7 with the M40 had come the concomitant decision to cease production of the M1 7. Until

the M40 was in full production capable of sustaining any conceivable American demand, M1 7 masks would

simply be supplied to those requ;sitioning protective masks, or repaired, through existing stocks. Prior to

the start of the waiting game in the sand, the demand fcr standard protective masks had stood at 5,150

per month, a number rapidly surpassed in the early autumn of 1990. Yet the M40 production capacity could

not, on its own, meet this demand. The result was the massive refurbishing of M17 masks.4

'

Ultimately, the decision to cease production of one mask variety before the full-scale production of its

replacement style had begun, came under fire. According to personnel from AMCCOM's Weapon Systems

Management Directorate, 155mm, Chemical, Nuclear Division, the initial supplies of M1 7 masks and spare

parts were insufficient to sustain the demands made upon them. The shortage eventually precipitated the

need to procure additional spare parts for the M17, M24, and M25A1 masks. In many cases, the

government could look to Mine Safety Appliances (MSA), headquartered in Pittsburgh, PA, for assistance.

MSA was both the designated mobilization producer for the M1 7 mask, and also had existing army

production contracts for the M40, M42, and M43 protective masks, air force contracts for the MCU-2A/

P protective masks, and ongoing foreign military sales of the M1 7 mask. Such a workload, plus additional

spare parts contracts, exceeded MSA's production capacitles and resulted in the eventual prioritization

of production decisions.' 2

The problems caused by the need to secure great numbers of protective masks and the limited

production base were aggravated by several factors. Upon type classification of the M40 and M42

protective masks in 1987, protective mask and protective mask spare part mobilization requirements

started to be stated in terms of the standard "A" M40 series protective mask. Unfortunately, however, the

M40 and M42 protective mask production facilities had not attained full production capacity at the start of

4' ODS mobilization due to the original contractor defaulting, and its initial supplies were rapidly depleted.

Simultaneously, the M1 7 series production base was slowly being dismantled and had limited quantities

of both masks and spare parts available. The most acute situation occurred with the Ml 3A2 filter element

production equipment package which was in the final stages of being closed out when ODS began."3

During ODS, the serviceability of both protective masks and their spare parts became recurring issues.

Teams were dispatched to Saudi Arabia to verify that the equipment in the hands of the troops was of

43
acceptable quality. During the war, over 200,000 Ml 7 series protective masks' outlet valves were declared

unserviceable and over one million M6A2 protective hoods were suspe'nded from use. Accordingly, the

greatly increased demands and stresses placed upon fielded equipment resulted in the necessity to

substitute where possible. For example, M40 protective mask carriers were issued in lieu of the M15AI

carrier for use by soldiers and civilians equipped with Ml 7 protective masks."

From these experiences, AMCCOM staffers felt several lessons had been gained. Accordingly, they

noted that the production base for a system being replaced should not be dismantled until such time as

the fielr'ing of the new, replacement system had begun, and that the impact of mobilization and the

consequential effect on new item fielding should be evaluated and included in the system management

plan of all new systems. Furthermore, Weapons Systems Management Directorate personnel offered that

components, accessories, and spare parts should be standardized to the fullest extent possible. As an

example, they noted that preliminary engineering analysis indicated that a singular outlet valve could be

adopted for a majority of the protective masks within the Department of Defense (DOD) inventory, and a

universal carrier could be developed for the field protective masks (M17 and M42/43). They also

recommended that the specifications for older equipment should be continually updated to take advantage

of the state-of-the-art options; e.g., cotton duck-a heavy plain-weave fabric-should be replaced by nylon

duck, etc.45

In consideration of the frailties of the protective mask supply and spare parts structure, the refurbishing

of masks, particularly M! 7s, became paramount. And Pine Bluff Arsenal, the facility primarily charged with

overseeing the production of the masks found itself repairing and refurbishing them in record quantities.

Prior to the onset of ODS, Pine Bluff personnel were refurbishing approximately 1,100 masks per week.

While AMCCOM hoped that the facility could increase this to 9,000 units refurbished per week, the actuality

was approximately 3,500 per week at the Arkansas site. 8

In August, as deployment commenced, the Pine Bluff facility refurbished 10,009 Ml7 protective masks.

In September the number rose to 15,797, but fell in October to 10,065. November and December 1990

witnessed rebuild rates of 11,588 and 14,914, respectively. Projections for 1991, made in its opening days

and after the initial days of the air war against Saddam Hussein, relied upon slightly higher refurbishing

rates: 5,000 perweek. With 48,000 voicemitters available, projection analysts felt that during January 1991,

15,000 refurbished masks could be made available for distribution. During February 1991, it was projected

that with the additional funding which was being processed-$2 million-a total of 20,000 masks could

be rebuilt. By March, however, even with additional funding, problems would start to appear in the effort

to provide sufficient, effective masks. During March, the current on-hand supply of rebuildable facepieces

would be depleted and insufficient quantities of carriers would be available. April rebuild rates were to be

wholly dependent upon the number of field returns and the receipt of additional spare parts. The analysts'

projections, fortunately, proved considerably more bleak than the reality, in part due to refurbishing efforts

undertaken in the desert. 47

Additional refurbishing operations were conducted by Pine Bluff Arsenal personnel at a chemical

maintenance facility located with the United States Army Material Command's (AMC) 3upport Group on

the outskirts ofDhahran, Saudi Arabia. The concept for the Saudi Arabian facility was nearly as old as

President George Bush's order for the initial deployment of American forces to the desert. Early in the

conflict, it was observed that a repair facility in the desert could not only save tremendous amounts of time

and transportation costs, but could also provide soldiers and civilians in SWA with considerable peace of

mind while they were deployed to a potential!y chemicaloriented theater. Specifically, the desert facility

was charged with receiving unserviceable gas masks from theater general support units, and then

inspecting, cleaning, testing, rebuilding or repairing them, and sending them back to theater stock for

44
reissue. Only masks in need of minor repairs were intended to be serviced at the facility. Protective masks

needing massive repairs or refurbishing still ne3ded to be transported to the Pine Bluff Arsenal for more

costly, as well as time-consuming, repairs.'8

Initially, the Pine Bluff facility had been intended to directly serve theater general support units by

receiving, repairing, and returning protective masks to them for reissue; individuals and their specific ne:eds

did not originally fit into the facility's mission. However, even before the mask "service station" officially

opened a technician put up a sign reading "mask testing walk-ins welcome". The intention was that soldiers

bringing in equipment for tank and automotive repair could have their chemical defensive items tested

simultaneous to achieving other tasks. But news of the service rapidly spread, and the lines of soldiers

awaiting mask testing lengthened. CPT John Murphy, facility commander from CRDEC (United States

Army Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center), noted that, 'We had bunch of walk-ins

with lines of 500 soldiers in front of the door. They would start forming at 3 or 4 a.m. The look of relief

on soldiers' faces knowing they would have comidence in their protective equipment was phenomenal.

Their gratitude was really unbelievable. I can't say enough about the work the guys who work for me did.

They put in long hours and maintained a can-do attitude. They know the service provided was exceptionally

important to soldiers in the field--possibly life or death." With the exception of CPT Murphy, all of the

facility's employees originated from the Pine Bluff Arsenal.49

The facility also sent out contact teams to travel to forward units that could not visit the Dhahran site

for necessary repairs and confidence building. According to CPT Murphy, such contact teams provided

an essential sense of confidence to forward-placed units; he would recommended providing even more

mobile services in future deployments.m

Testing conducted at the facilities, either at Dhahran or in the field, did indicate some deficiencies in

the equipment carried by American soldiers and support personnel. Yet few of the deficiencies constituted

failures. According to CPT Murphy, "Maybe a nose cup disc didn't pass, but that wasn't a catastrophic

failure like a large leak in a drink tube or a high percentage of penetration through a face biank. They build

a certain delta into those tests-a safe area. A mask may not meet specs like one right off the production

line, but it will still protect and it's still safe. Just because it didn't meet production standards doesn't mean

it isn't safe." Product assurance assessments of the mask testing illustrated field readiness rates in SWA

were at least as good as rates in peace time. This perhaps came as the result of the exceptional care

and preventive maintenance most sotdiers gave their chemical defense equipment.5'

In addition to the approximately 14,0C0 masks the SWA facility service-d between December 19C0 and

April 1991, it fulfilled a number cf other missions as well. It was the SWA issue point for the 350-400 solders

provided with the M40 mask due to fitting problems with the M1 7. Additionally, the chemical maintenance

facility had the task of inspecting, repairing, and recertifying Toxicological Agent Protection (TAP) suits used

by the 30 explosive ordinance disposal teams located in SWA. To do this, the suits were filled with air,

maintained at a constant pressure, covered with a high emulsion soap to find microscopic leaks, and the

leaks patched.Y

Beyond such production, and re-production, both in Arkansas and Saudi Arabia, the Fine Bluff Arsenal

provided a number of further services during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Chief among

these was its production of 81mm smokegenerating red phosphorous mortar rounds designed for

screening or masking soldiers' activitie-. Although the 81 mm mortar round had not been produced at Pine

Bluff in quite some time, and start-up plans had been f.., iulated, impending hostilities in SWA caused its

production line to be more rapidly reconstituted. Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, Marshall, TX, equipped

the rounds produced at Pine Bluff with tail fins and fuzes. Additionally, the arsenal produced and shipped

45

~i
155mm white phosphorus smoke projectiles to the Persian Gulf, and had begun to gear up for the

production of 60mm white phosphorous mortars, and 40mm smoke markers.5

While Watervliet Arsenal aided in the construction of the bunker buster, and Pine Bluff Arsenal

refurbished in excess of 100,000 chemical protective masks, AMCCOM's remaining arsenal did not remain

idle in the effort to contain Saddam Hussein. Located on a Mississippi River island (known as Arsenal

Island), nestled between Illinois and Iowa, Rock Island Arsenal has been in continuous operation since

its establishment in July 1862. Although the arsenal's mission has undergone distinctive changes since

its founding, the onset of Operation Desert Shield found its 2,441 civilian employees and 23 military

personnel prepared to fulfill their assigned mission. The primary mission of Rock Island Arsenal (RIA) is

to manufacture assigned materiel, including engineering and product assurance; perform tool set and basic

issue item assembly for AMCCOM, TACOM (United States Army Tank Automotive Command), and other

national inventory control points; and provide administrative, logistical and facility support services to HO,

AMCCOM, and tenants, which are co-located on Ars inal Island. Its primary materiel responsibility also

includes aircraft weapons, infantry weapons, artillery and air defense weapons, gun mounts and recoil

systems for tanks, selfpropelled and towed artillery personnel and cargo carriers, as well as scout and

reconnaissance vehicles. Additionally, RIA offers the nation's primary materiel responsib'ity for recoil

simulators for proofing and testing, basic issue items, common and special tools and tool sets, kits, and

outfits, shop sets and maintenance equipment. It also produces gymnasticators and functional fire

simulators. The arsenal has justifiably earned the reputation as being a stellar performer for the production

of job lot quantities which private industry has traditionally been unable, or unwilling, to supply. And it was

i• this realm that Rock Island Arsenal distinguished itself during the deployment of American sbrvicemembers to the Persian Gulf.1

RIA's Commander COL Richard W. Bregard commented on the installation's job-lot role in relation to

ODS in an end of tour interview granted in June 1992. He noted that as ODS could be considered *a come

as you are war," and as the arsenal had been quietly doing its job well over the previous decade, there

was neither the time nor the need to turn all of the facility's resources to emergency weapons production.

The army held a sufficient stuck of M198 155mm towed howitzers, as well as oth,3r RIA-supplied items,

to stand prepared in SWA. Therefore, the arsenal's most significant contribution to the victory in SWA came

not in the realm of newly constructed weapons, but rather in the fabrication of spare parts and job lots.

And as the military trained for several months in the desert prior to the start of hostile actions, a significant

number of parts were required.55

Accordingly, during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, RIA's Operations Dire,:torate

processed 2,123 materiel release orders (MROs), accounting for 41,265 items valued at $12.696.961.

Transportation costs for the shipment of this 1,088 tons of equipment totalled $468,408. Such blanket

listings of orders and items provide little information on their own. More precisely, RIA's Operations

Directorate supplied 7,000 ammunition spacers for the M1 09 self-propelled howitzer, 418 obturator pads

for the M 198 towed howitzer, 2,191 obturator pads for the M I09 self-propelled howitzer, and an assortment

of approximately 4,000 spare parts in support of ODS. The majority of the spare parts sustained operations

involving the M1 98 towed howitzer, including recoil rails, replenishers. recuperators, etc. The balance of

RIA's spare parts maintained the 8" Ml10 self-propelled howitzer, the 155mm M109 self-propelled

howitzer, the 120mm M 1A l tank, and the 105mm M1 02 towed howitzer. Other materiel shipped from RIA

to SWA included such diverse items as microcircuits, telephone sets, hoisting units, chemical and

decontam"nation equipment, huge glass and canvas shelter sets, engine lathes, explosive ordnance

demolition tool kits, small arms repair kits, tank track tool kits, radiator test and repair shop equipment.

5 1/2 ton truck-mounted shop sets. boresights, water testirg k:ts. we!ders, and spacers. The Directorate

of Logistics expended 6,549 scheduled hours and 1,857 overtime hours of labor suppcrting ODS,'

46
Much of RIA's production for ODS involved the simple reclassification of long-term, ongoing efforts. For

example, if production had already begun on an order ior 20 recoil mechanisms, and an ODS-related order

then arrived for ten of the mechanisms, the first ten off the line would be used to support the ODS order.5 7

Chief among arsenal contributions was the fabrication of tool sets. Tool sets enable servicemembers

to make field-level repairs and maintain weapons systems. As such, each tool set must be custom prepared

to include not only all commonly utilized touls, but also the special ones needed for a particular weapons

system. Thus tank tool sets contain not only standard items, but also turret, track, and engine repair

equipment, as well as minor spare parts. Each kit, with its sets and subsets could easily have several

hundred components. Making certain that each set had been properly configured, packed, and directed

became the role of RIA's Directorate of Logistics during ODS.8

At the onset of Operation Desert Shield, Rock Island Arsenal received the call to supply 278 assorted

tcol sets with a value of $1.9 mi:!ion. Ideally, all service units were to be provided the appropriate, detailed

tool sets they would need prior to their deployment, although do to the rapidity of the deployment, some

sets did catch up with their units in the Persian Gulf region. Upon receiving the call to mobilize for the

deployment, RIA's Directorate of Logistics activated its emergency call-in program. Accordingly, key

personnel were called at their residences by the staff duty officer. These people in turn called others to

inform them of the need to report. Thus warehouse workers who did the stock selection in the storage

areas, as weli as preservation and packing personnel arrived to prepare the tool kits needed by the desert

defenders. As the components of these tool sets could range upwards from several hundred items per

kit, the process of selecting items from stock, placing them in a consolidation area, and properly packing

them could n-t be considered a modest one. A frequently prepared kit for ODS consisted of eleven separate

containers, and included not only tool cabinets, but also an engine analyser, oxygen and acetylene tanks,

and numerous small parts. Supporting the operation by attention to quantity, quality, an( packing format

stood a number of quality assurance personnel.19

Praparing the tool kits for shipment required tha use of overtime on a call-in basis. During the height

of preparations for deployment, the Directorate of Logistics utilized a three shift operation that had

individuals overseeing operations, controlling documentation, selecting material for shipment, packing the

tool ,its, and ultimately shipping them. RIA's tool kit shipments constituted approximately half of all service

too) set requirements during ODS.640

Similar to its role in supplying the Desert Shield and Storm forces with "col sets, RIA aiso provided the

troops with organizational shop sets. During the earliest days of the deployment, RIA's Directorate of

Logistics modified and prepared for shipment a total of 43 trailer-mounted general purpose shop sets, 241

'ive-ton truck-mounted shop sets, and a number of tNo-and-a-half ton truck-mounted sets. More detailed

and complete than tool kits organizational shop sets serve as mini-machine shops containing equipment

such as a lathe, welder, power vise. and a complete basic set of tools. The rolling machine shops could

be driven to the front lines during battle to aid in the performance of field level repair and maintenance."

Modifying the truck-mounted organizational shop sets involved repositioning the lathe from an interior

mount to one which provided the operator with not only a more convenient location, but also a safer one.

The modifications also entailed the add'lion of a few tools, altering the electrical system, and nstalling an

exhaust system in each organizational shop set. Additionally, the spare tire mounting machine was modified

to eliminate operator hazard.

One potentially -ignificant problem with the trailer-mounted shop set was averted due to the soiarpeyed and quick-thinking personnel of RIA's Directorate of Logistics. Logistics staffers had been told to ship

47
the trailer-mounted shop sets upon the completion of their stocking and physical modification. Yet, in

consideration of their forest green paint, this order did not appear correct. Accordingly. Mr. Leslie H. Black,

Director of the Directorate of Logistics, contacted AMCCOM's International Logistics Directorate for further

guidance, and with the suggestion that RIA personnel paint the shop sets the appropriate desert sand color

with CARC (chemical agent resistant coating). Praised for their alertness, the directorate received the order

to paint the sets.6

Wearing special clothing and air packs, second shift arsenal employees completed the painting in a

single night's labor, 15 August 1991. Just two days iater, after the paint had had time to cure, the shop

sets left Rock Island, bound for the Saudi desert. Later in the deployment effort, RIA's Directorate of

Logistics employees painted approximately 240 truck-mounted organizational shop sets which had been

modified and stocked at RIA the appropriate desert sand CARC, covering the forest green that

presupposed a woodland-oriented conflict.64

Beyond the modification and painting of numerous organizational shop sets for the Persian Gulf War,

RIA personnel prepared a significant number of National Guard unit vehicles to field in the desert. In early

November 1990, the arsenal's Directorate of Logistics became aware of two Iowa reserve medical units

whose vehicles needed to be painted with sand-colored CARC. These vehieies had previously been painted

in the familiar camouflage green for the presumed western European land battle that had guided American

military thinkers since the dawn of the Cold War. The units-the 209th Medical Company (Clearing), Iowa

Army National Guard, Iowa City, IA, and the 134th Medical Company (Ambulance), Iowa Army National

Guard, Washington, IA,-should have been repainted at Fort McCoy, WI, which served as the units' point

of deployment. However, Fort McCoy had a very limited production capacity, as well as exceptionally

limited CARC painting capabilities. Therefore, the two units needed to find a painting facility, and find it

rather rapidly. RIA's Directorate of Logistics became aware of the problem, and volunteered to take on

the extra mission. 5

Accordingly, the National Guard units' vehicles began arriving in Rock Island on the evening of Friday,

16 November 1990, and continued to arrive in small convoys through mid-day Sunday, 18 November 1990.

Driven to the island from their home station. by members of the medical units, the vehicles arrived with

a coating of road grime. Thus, the vehicles needed to be power washed and driven a bit to remove any

excess water. They were then dried, and warmed up in the production facility's craneway to allow masking

tape to adhere to parts-wheels, hubcaps, windows, lights, canvas, etc.-which were not to be painted.

Then, working in ten to sixteen hour shifts RIA's Directorate of Logistics laborers, aided by its Arsenal

Operations Directorate, commenced the painting. By the close of business on Monday, 19 November 1990,

all 105 vehicles-ambulances, trailers, five-ton wreckers, and two-and-a-half ton trucks-had been painted,

as well as stenciled. And within days, the vehicles were enroute to SWA.'"

Spare parts, tool sets, and CARC painting, however, mark but a portion of RIA's contribution to the

desert victory. Shortly after the deployment had begun, AMCCOM called upon Rock Island Arsenal to

pt'-duce the spacers necessary to properly secure projectiles in the M 109 self-propelled howitzer's buslie

rack and prevent their inadvertent damage. The army's newly designed M864 white phosphorous smoke

projectile and M825AI projectile, containing small multiple bomblets, were simply too short to safely and

quietly stow Yet despite the fact that the projectiles rattled in the howitzers' storage bustles, in

cor5ideration of 'he emergency that constituted Operation Desert Shield, the M864 and M825A1 were

fielded without 1,-s. benefit of spacers."'

The United St.,",; government had suppliers manufacturing the spacers for the army, but they could

not produce them rapidly enough to have the army feel secure that a sufficient quantity existed to satisfy

48
its deadline for total combat preparedness in SWA. The army urgently needed 13,000 M864 spacers and

4,000 M825A1 spacers. Accordingly, the government contacted Rock Island Arsenal to ascertain if the

facility could produce the small units. Having previously not seen or produced spacers, RIA engineers

immediately inspected the technical data package to assure that they could indeed produce the needed

items. Its ability to comply was the direct result of newly acquired, stateof-the-art, highly technical

equipment like the numerically controlled Behrens Lazer which was capable of cutting pieces of metal at

the rate of 200 inches per minute.8

Given the strictures of time, Rock Island Arsenal exercised options on drawings prepared elsewhere,

foregoing the usual formal correspondence required by deviations from design. With the concurrence of

engineers examining, marking, and signing off, the arsenal was able to provide a welded assembly that

was produced in the same time frame that it took the necessary funding to arrive, approximately two weeks.

The rather short turn around of the project came in part as a result of the arsenal having the appropriate

equipment, an able, innovative crew, and readily available material.

Although relatively unassuming in design, the actual production of the spacers became surprisingly involved. Using the latest state-of-the-art technology, arsenal employees laser cut the shank of the spacer

to 4.45" +/-015". This was then inspected in accordance with the Quality Assurance Standard Improvement

Program. Next, both sides of the shanks were deburred, blanchard ground to lay flat, inspected, and

stamped with the part number. The surface of the shank was then filed flat, and inspected once again. Once stamped and inspected, the shank was bent to fit flush against the side of a projectile, inspected,

and heat-tr.ated to RC 28-32. The shank was then annealed to make the metal more pliable, less brittle,

and yet stronger. A sample shank was then inspected, after which, the remainder were glass bead-blasted

to remove any heat treatment scales remaining on the metal. Finally, the shanks were chamfered to remove

any stress cracks resulting from the bending process.

For their part in the manufacturing process, arsenal machinists used numerical-controlled lathes to

produce the spacer's disk base from tubular rod stock. The face of the stock was chucked, and the outside

diameter turned down to 1.25" +/.015". The rod was then cut off to .54" +/- .03" in length, and had its sharp

edges removed. The disks were then inspected, heat-treated to RC 28-32, inspected again, glass beadblasted to remove heat treatment residue, and once again inspected.

Prior to the welding process, the two components, the shank and the disk base, were heat treated in

accordance with engineering specifications. At this juncture, a minor problem developed but was readily rectified by Rock Island Arsenal tooling personnel. The dies utilized during the heat-treatment process

proved to be too straight for both components, causing the spacer shank to twist during the treatment.

Tooling developed a die which kept the shank of the spacer straight.

Working with the heat-treated shank and disk, welders initially tack welded the components into their

proper positions. After this, they were continuous welded with fillet weld angles, and then, as per usual,

sample inspected. From this point, the spacers were placed under stress relief temperatures not to exceed

950 degrees Fahrenheit in order to relieve stress caused by the welding p-ocess, and, once again, inspected to verify the RC 28-32 hardness of each heat-treated item. After the welding and follow-up inspection, the spacers were super heat-treated austenitized for an hour to 1,600 degrees Fahrenheit, then

quenched in Uncon C water at 70 degrees Fahrenheit. The quenching cooled off th'n spacers quickly and

also hardened the carbon which was then removed by breaking off the scales. The heating and rapid

cooling process left the spacer brittle. To alleviate the brittle condition, tho spacers were slowly reheated

to 1,025 degrees Fahrenheit, which returned the steel to its origina; strength.

49
T 7

Following the de-brittlization, Rock Island Arsenal inspectors conducted magnetic particle examinations to verify that the welds had been thoroughly performed. The spacers were then degreased and glass

bead-blasted clean in preparation to receive a cadmium finish, a dull, heavy metal which would be plated

to the spacer. Once the cadmium finish was applied, the spacers were baked to relieve hydrogen

embrittlement, and a supplementary chromate treatment was applied. Quality Assurance Specialists then

inspected the spacers for a final time, and presented them to the Rock Island Arsenal's Directorate of

Logistics to prepare them for flight shipment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The first 4000 spacers, all of the

M825A1 variety, were packed and enroute by 14 February 1991. The final order, consisting of 3,000 M864

spacers, was completed and started towards the desert on 22 February 1991, just days before the

commencement of the ground war against the forces of Saddam Hussein.

From the initial contact to shipment of the second order of spacers, a mere three weeks elapsed, offering

substantial testimony to, and greatly enhancing, Rock Island Arsenal's reputation as the army's "job shop".

Since the close of the war, the spacers have been declared Basic Issue Items (BII), meaning they are now

official components of the M109 self-propelled howitzer, and therefore, like the tool kit, the crew is

accountable for them during inspection. Although the RIA maintains the capacity to produce the spacers,

it has not been called upon to create spacers for peacetime use. Y0t, the urgent production of these spacers

has added another item to the already long list of ordnance weapons and equipment that the arsenal could

produce at a moment's notice.

Not only Rock Island Arsenal, Pine Bluff Arsenal, and Watervliet Arsenal concerned themselves with

the production of materiel for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm; other organizations under the

hegemony of AMCCOM did so as well. For example, the United States Army Chemical Research,

Development and Engineering Center (CRDEC) exerted prodigious efforts in the manufacture of special

marking rounds. In response to an urgent request from the Marine Corps, innovative CRDEC scientists

developed, in scarcely a week, a special marking round for employment in SWA in Febnwary 1991. The

USMC needed a projectile to mark the terrain, a point, or a number of points in a line, so that a Forward

Air Coordinator (FAC) could orchestrate close air support to minimize fratricide by creatirig a sate zone.

The USMC wanted a system for both daylight and nighttime and needed it in SWA ,sjtt' rapidly. This

allowed CRDEC scientists a mere nine days to conceive a concept, fabricate it, and tt!n e.a3t prototypes,

as well as produce and package the system.69

The time constraint forced the scientists to consider only a payload that was commercially available

and a carrier that already existed in the army's inventory. The scientists selected the M687 binary 155mm

projectile due to its point detonating disseminating characteristics, availability, and liquid payload capability.

An existing contract to produce the necessary quantities of M20 and M21 binary canisters, which carry

the payload in the binary projectile, was modified to contain the marking materials. A single long canister

was selected for the daytime marking payload, which was "Day-Glo" fluorescent blaze orange paint,

because no flight mixing was necessary. A dual component chemiluminescence system, requiring ihe use

of the two binary canistars, was selected for the nighttime projectile. The two chemical cormponents mixed

upon firing. When disseminated, the mixture was visable in the 400nm-700nm (nanometer) spectrum of

optical sensing devices and did not produce heat, flame, or sparks. Furthermore, it could be seen with

standard night vision goggles. These chemicals so!utions were non-toxic, thus complying with healthy

hazard assessment and environmental considerations. Testing and evaluation of the special marking

projectile was performed in parallel with prototype developments.`0

On 19 February 1991, the first operational use of the projectiles was conducted in SWA. The FAC,

wearing night vision goggles, sighted the dissemination pattern approximately 500 meters distant and

asked, "What the hell are you shooting? It's as bright as day ovar here!" What the FAC had observed

50
was the impact pattern of three nighttime projectiles, which were launched simultaneously from three Mi 98

* m155mm towed howitzers. Earlier that day, three daytime projectiles had been fired from the same howitzers.

This observation by the FAC indicated that the projectiles had arrived on time and worked rather well.

Additionally, the experience illustrated that field units should continue to submit tactical requests for new

and innovative techniques to the R&D centers. A potential requirements for future use study is currently

underway based upon the observations that the specially designed marking round appears to have great

value in a combat arena to create a night and day visual recognition symbol for attack aircraft.',

CRDEC also created a new power source for the CAM. The CAM (chemical agent monitor) is a

lightweight, hand-held, soldieroperated monitor used to detect chemical contamination on personnel and

equipment, It is ordinarily powered by a 6-volt lithium battery. The battery, however, tends to 6,- rather

expensive and requires special handling due to its status as hazardous waste. Units in SWA also expressed

concern that replacement lithium batteries would not be available if the CAMs were used for training.

Accordingly, CRDEC received the tasking to engineer an in-house design and development effort that

provided the CAM with an alternate power source for training. Ultimately, working from November through

December 1990, CRDEC designed and built an alternative battery pack for training which incorporated

D-size flashlight alkaline batteries. Of a 5,000 battery pack order, CRDEC employees managed to ship

2,000 of them to SWA by 1 January 1991, less than two months after having received the charge to develop

an alternative to the lithium power source. Reports from SWA indicated that the battery packs were a "huge

success".12

The effort by CRDEC to rapidly conceptualize, fabricate, and test prototypes, as well as produce and

package the system, while a quite stellar feat, was not unusual among AMCCOM subordinates during ODS.

Other facilities worked just as diligently to assure the victory. For example, Crane Army Ammunition Activity

(CAAA), in order to meet urgent, initial required delivery dates accelerated shipments of ammunition. Some

employees worked 25 hours straight, although 16 to 18 hour shifts were more common. While such

prodigious, bone-wearying efforts enabled the facility to deliver 7,546 short tons of ammunition in a mere

ten days, as well as load 66 semi-trucks, and 52 railcars in 23 days, they did not allow as easily for the

more painstaking efforts required to increase production. Yet in terms of production, as well as shipping,

the government-owned, government-operated facility demonstrated itselT not only as extraordinary, but

also as exceptionally innovative. 3

Tucked away in southern Indiana's farm country at the Naval Weapons Support Center, the activity

center's 700 civilian employees manage a 350,000-ton stockpile of conventional ammunition for the army,

navy, and Marine Corps. Additionally, it manufactures everything from smoke and illumination signals,

signal flares, assorted shock test charges ranging up to 40,000 pounds, 2,000-pound MK84-4 Tritonal

bombs for the air force, and 155mm M804 practice rounds. Furthermore, the ammunition activity is charged

with the production of marine location markers MK254/MK58-1, assorted 76mm cartridges, demolition

charge MK133-2, 16"/50 projectiles for battleships, and 5"/38 projectiles, as well as 5"/54 projectiles for

the navy. During ODS, Crane iJso received the tasker to produce and ship 2,000-pound bombs for tne

Kuwaiti Air Force and to rr ,ry 1,500 linear demolition charges.74

Although Crane Army Ammunition Activity met the exigencies of the initial hectic days of ODS with great

skill, coupled with long and tiring hours, it had some difficulty maintaining the pace as the standoff in the

desert continued. As MSG Roger Fadroski, CAAA's Marine Corps liaison, noted the facility simply did not

have sufficient blue-collar employees to work around the clock for an extended period of time. Yet the

facility did not suffer unduly from the shortage of blue-collar labor. Due to a grassroots-type of management

program that had begun at Crane AAA only months before the war started, the center was able to continue its mission without great difficulty. In the Quality Management Program instituted at Crane AAA a mere

51
month before the onset of ODS, white-collar workers, including engineers, analysts, and department

directors who had designed work stations for blue-collar employees had been given the chance to labor

in the conditions they had designed and to labor by the rules they had instituted. Thus just weeks before

the invasion of Kuwait and the threats upon the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia, Crane AAA's

management team had gained valuable practical experience in the manufacturing and depot operations

of the facility. And when American troops deployed to SWA, design and management personnel took their

positions along side, and in place of, exhausted production and depot workers, frequently after their own,

normal eight-hour day had been completed. Other administrative personnel volunteered to work on

Saturdays to give blue-collar laborers badly neided respites, or to allow the manually skilled tradesmen

and women to be utilized in the more taxing arenas where training requirements did not permit the whitecollared to share in the toil.75

LTC Ken Rhylander, Crane AAA Commander, noted of the enhanced operations, "You [had] to see

the teamwork to believe it. This [was] a magnificent work force. They [were] selfless and totally dedicated

to supporting servicemembers in the field and at sea." Regardless of the selflessness and dedication

demonstrated by Crane employees, and those of so many installations, in the production of the implements

of war, as well as the shipping, the need to utilize white-collar employees in production and depot service

positions when they quite obviously could have been better employed in their chosen career field while

working fewer hours was addressed in the official AMCCOM Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action

Report. AMCCOM's Personnel and Training Directorate staff noted that the Department of Defense hiring

freeze in place at the onset of ODS prohibited installations, such as Crane AAA, from hiring the civilian

personnel required to perform essential war work. The submitted observation noted that in particular Crane

AAA worked employees in double and triple shifts, and detailed white-collar personnel in a variety of

operations due to the lack of authority to hire. It further noted that even with expedited procedures to obtain

hiring authority, the short delay caused significant problems which jeopardized mission performance. In

view of the problems incurred, the Personnel and Training Directorate recommended thatcurrent and future

hiring limitations should contain a provision for local commanders to unilaterally hire temporary employees

required to meet operation and mobilization mission requirements. The directorate thus recommended that

AMCRM (Army Material Command Resource Management) work with the Department of the Army (DA),

as well as with DOD, to obtain the required provision.7

"

Beyond the efforts of Crane Army Ammunition Activity, other ammunition facilities worked with great

effort to supply American and allied soldiers and civilians deployed to SWA with the very best materiel

possible. AMCCOM's ODeration Desert Shield/Storm After Action Repor recognized a number of army

ammunition plants for their "extraordinary accomplishments" in the realm of production during ODS.

Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant, Shreveport, LA, for example, produced 2.75mm rockets as fast as

rocket motors were received from the vendor, and Kansas Army Ammunition Plant, Parsons, KS, built in

excess of 10,000 155mm projectiles. Additionally, Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, Marshall, TX,

accelerated the production of 80,000 M721 60mm illuminating rounds, and Milan Army Ammunition Plant,

Milan, TN, similarly expedited the production of the M853 81mm illuminating round. Other ammunition

plants were cited in the report for their efforts in the packing and shipping of large quantities of munitions."

Yet problems also resulted from the effort to maximize the production of ammunition during ODS.

Planning for the maximum rate of ammunition production revealed to assorted army ammunition plant

staffers, as well as product managers, that the United States production base for mortar fuzes significantly

restricted the production capability for most mortar ammunition rounds. Through varying discussions, it

was observed that one objective in the ammunition development-use community had been to reduce the

proliferation of fuzes used on mortar ammunition to achieve a "three-fuze" family. By using the same fuzes

on many ammunition rounds, and by striving for commonality of components among different types of

52
fuzes, e.g., on the M734 multioption fuze and the M745 point detonation fuze, a large bottleneck of demand

for the same fuzes, which are produced by a very limited production base had been created. The production

capacity for M734s and M745s combined is constrained at approximately 35,000 to 40,000 per month. This

capacity must be allocated among six 60mm, 81mm, and 120mm high explosive (HE) and smoke mortar

rounds.7 8

Likewise, four 60mm, 81 mm, and 120mm smoke and illumination rounds all depend on the availability

of mechanical time fuzes produced in Germany at a maximum rate of approximately 90,000 per month.

There is no production base for MTFs (mechanical time fuzes) in the United States; a recent effortto identify

a domestic electronic time fuze for use on these rounds revealed that even the electronic component production base predicted to exist in the U.S. was rapidly disappearing in favor of overseas producers.

Apparently, ammunition procurement quantities in the 1980s have discouraged fuze producers from

entering, investing, or remaining in the production base.7 9

From the experience of charting the potential for fuze shortages, mortar specialists recommended that

the United States break out critical electronic components of mortar fuzes, and invest in the establishment

of a production base for them. It also urged the development of a new electronic time fuze for mortars

and the creation of a production base for it. Such efforts should prove to keep army ammunition plants

properly supplied and producing without constraint in future deployments.w

Beyond the lack of an assured mortar fuze production base, alert AMCCOM personnel noted and

commented upon the absence of adequate data on foreign ammunition production capabilities. According

to staffers, the lack of adequate information on ammunition capabilities in allied and friendly nations became

evident during ODS. And, as they observed, it is essential to have accurate and complete information on

foreign ammunition production in order to augment United States capabilities for U.S. requirements, or to

be able to provide information to allies on sources of required ammunition which (he United States does

not produce. Some staffers recommended the funding, establishment, maintenance and operation of an

international ammunition production information system, although its adoption in fiscally limited times

appears improbable.81

While AMCCOM's subordinate commands endeavored to supply it with the needed materiel either from

on-hand stocks or via production efforts, not all necessary items could be so obtained. In some instances,

items were procured from commercial production facilities. At the onset of Operation Desert Shield,

members of AMCCOM's procurement community composed and presented a list of the significant actions

they feltneeded to be taken to ensure the successful completion of their mission. In order that procurement

actions might be expedited, they recommended that the Head of Contracting Authority (HCA) delegate

authority to the appropriate deputy commanding general for the release of production funds prior to the

completion of a firm's first article test (FAT) or initial production test (IPT). Additionally they recommended

that high priority (DX) be given to "surge" procurements, recognizing that restructuring or delays might be

necessary for lower priority programs. Accordingly, procurement personnel urged that needs be identified

by analysis, that technical data packages (TDPs) be prepositioned throughout the directorate, and that

source control components be overbuilt. 2

Furthermore, at the dep!oyment's onset, procurement personnel recommended that local authority be

granted permitting letter contracts for engineering services, as well as blanket purchase authority for

selected equipment. They also requested additional funding and the authority to reprogram existing funds

to support accelerated acquisition strategies.a

53
0 ! .7 .. -- "

As in the case of in-house production, as well as off-the-shelf provisioning, problems could and did

occur. Chief among the problems faced by AMOCOM's Procurement and Production Policy and

Management Directorate were those imposed upon it by federal regulatory requirements. For example,

members of AMCCOM's Competition Management Office observed that the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) had been written to govern the acquisition process based on peacetime circumstances.

Accordingly, the process was one designed to be ultimately fair, achieve the best good or service, and to

do so at the best possible cost. Unfortunately, the process could also be exceptionally time-consuming.

Thus when AMCCOM, or any iimilar command, was tasked with the acquisition mission to either ramp

up to meet a threat or the actual support of a full-scale war, there arose a critical need to streamline the

acquisition process. The Comr.etition Management Office felt that relief from certain regulatory requirements, such as delegations of authorities, elevation of existing thresholds, and additional authority granted

to the respective Heads of the Contracting Activities (HCAs), must be granted automatically with the onset

of hostilities, or their imminent threat. Accordingly, the office recommended that the FAR council should

be tasked with the development of an auxiliary regulation for use during wartime. And in consideration of

the time which would be involved in modifying the process, it urged the exploration of amendments to FAR

begin immediately. 4

Of particular concern regarding FAR was the requirement that the approval of all justifications and

approvals (J&As) over $10 million be made at the Department of the Army level. As AMCCOM's Materiel

Management Directorate had identified, even before the start of the ground war, a minimum of twelve

AMCCOM J&As that would require DA auihorization, the probability of a stultifying backlog loomed. In

order to attempt to hasten the approval process, the local J&A Signing Board determined that all J&As

requiring DA approval should have urgency statements attached which specifically addressed the item

being procured. Furthermore, all Procurement Directorate personnel were advised that regardless of the

sense of emergency, no contracts for actions over $10 million could be awarded until the J&A had received

concurrence from DA.5

Guided as they were by the FAR and its assorted rules concerning J&As, AMCCOM's procurement

personnel spent considerable time and effort, and encountered numerous difficulties, attempting to adhere

to the acquisition regulation. One problem involved the issue of the Surge Production Readiness Program.

The program could not be utilized to its full potential during ODS due to conflicting implementation guidance

personnel received from HQ, AMCCOM, AMC (United States Army Materiel Command), and the Office

of Counsel. It became evident to the Production Directorate that a lack of uniform/unified guidance, as

well as the absence of a universal understanding and compliance with the "Surge Program", were issues

that required attention and resolution. The question of a "surge" clause in a commercial contract had

resulted in a residual undermining effect to the total "Surge Program". This was recognized when the

procurement community, who did not have, in their opinion, justification In accordance with the FAR and

Defense Federal Acquisition Requisition (DFAR), and would not "surge" commercial contracts without first

soliciting cost estimates from the individual contractors. 6

This action was in direct opposition to the Surge Program initiatives and demonstrated an inherent

reluctance on the part of the government to unilaterally exercise the contract surge clause. Such actions

were not without predication, however, since DA and HO, AMC decisions on unevaluated options, the use

of emergency statements, and J&As had molded a systematic approach to contracting that ignored the

implementation of surge contracting methods. In fact, the contracting agency was the strongest proponent

for undefinitized contract actions (UCAs) as a substitute for accelerated acquisition.17

ODS demonstrated that the Surge Program was not totally effective in the transition period between

peacetime and what could have developed into a full-scale mobilization scenario. The primary cause

54
I"

appeared to be the lack of a total commitment to the Surge Program on the part of certain elements of

HQ, AMC and AMCCOM which resulted in conflicting and inconsistent guidance, utilization, and

implementation of surge initiatives that could have been avoided had a cohesive, "all on board" attitude

been in place when Operation Desert Shield began.8

In consideration of the problems incurred with the effort to implement the surge program, members

of AMCCOM's procurement community urged that a program be developed which could fill the void

between peacetime production and mobiiization of the industrial base, and could serve as a vehicle by

which the government could unilaterally enforce an acceleration of the production schedule of a contractor,

as well as exercise an option for additional quantities in order to meet national emergencies. Procurement

personnel felt that the failure to develop a surge-type program would ensure that the issue of surge

production remained open only to face them again in future Desert Storms.•

One solution to the problems presented by the J&A process, and accordingly the FAR, r.ceived

additional attention in the Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report in a submission prepared by

the Procurement and Production Policy and Management Directorate. Its personnel noted in their

submission that class, as well as standard, J&As for ODS were developed to enhance the J&A process

and to reduce processing time. Class J&As were written with dollar values under $10 million to allow for

local approval instead of Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition) (SARDA)

"approval. The use of class J&As was intended to allow statements of applicability to be processed rather

than requiring the preparation of a new J&A.90

Just as the class J&A had been prepared to save time, so had the standard language J&A. Via the

Sperry system, a standardized J&A form had been provided to all ODS contract specialists. Rather than

devising a new J&A, the contract specialist had only to fill in information in some paragraphs and provide

more extensive information as it pertained to their particular action in other paragraphs. 9

1

Yet the efforts of the Procurement and Production Policy and Management Directorate did not flow as

smoothly in the processing of J&As as its personnel had hoped. In regard to class J&As, the dollar limitation

had been set too low. Funds ran out early and individual J&As had to be written in their stead. Therefore,

the class actions saved the procurement community work on some of the smaller dollar actions, but not

the larger quantity or higher dollar requirements. Similarly, all did not flow smoothly with the standard

language J&As. While most of these J&As could be used simply as fill-in-the-blank approvals, others

required extensive tailoring by contract specialists to fit the specific action.92

The procurement community's effort tc 6ecure secretarial level class J&As did not succeed. At the

onset of Operation Desert Shield, staffers ppealed to higher headquarters for authorization to permit other

than full and open competition for urge cy buys. This request was denied by higher headquarters with

the explanation that the FAR allow, after-the-fact individual J&As to be utilized. Thus rather than

processing a small number of sec-&-carial level class J&As during the war that would have covered all ODS

requirements, procurement personnel posted hundreds of individual J&As during and after the war.9

"

As others before and after them would note, the procurement community offered that higher

headquarters should have taken into account the wartime situation and not tried to conduct business as

usual during the war. They observed that the urgent situation required an innovative approach that would

have allowed the necessary supplies/support to reach the crisis area in the most expeditious manner. And

by inference, they suggested that the innovation had not always been apparent. Accordingly, Procurement

and Production Policy and Management Directorate specialists had a number of suggestions as to how

the process might have been expedited, and, indeed, how it might be better handled during future engage55
9 A

ments. They suggested that relief or special consideration from regulatory requirements pertaining to

approval levels of J&As over $10 million from SARDA. This would allow the use of class J&As and

statements of applicability which would reduce the workload for the procurement community and expedite

the approval process.9'

Procurement personnel also recommended that local class J&As be limited to three to six months in

length. Since the duration of a conflict cannot be known at its onset, a time-phased class J&A can allow

the establishment of another class J&A to provide purchasing authority for new/additional wartime requirements. Additionally, they urged that in the future, some form of relief from the Competition in Contracting

Act be obtained. They suggested that under urgent circumstances that a memorandum documenting the

file in lieu of standard J&A procedures could suffice.9

Problems also occurred for the procurement community in connection with acquisition plans (APs).

During ODS it was discovered by the community that there existed no clear guidance for complying with

AP requirements for urgent situations. A request for deviation was thus submitted to HQDA (Headquarters,

Department of the Army) requesting the Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplemernt (AFARS)

requirement to submit a formal written AP, and its update, be waived. As an intermediary step, AMCCOM

received permission from the Army Defense Acquisition Regulatory Council that a compressed format of

the standard acquisition plan could be utilized during the emergency. The Head of Contracting Activity

(HCA) also gained the authority to approve a modified AP. As a result, the Procurement and Production

Policy and Management Directorate gained permission to write procedures which reduced the detail and

formality of APs. Only after the war did the HCA approve minimum requirements for acquisition planning

to meet urgent conditions. And in order to avoid awaiting such an HCA pronouncement in the future, the

directorate undertook action to have the AP policy contain contingency options.A

Not only the Federal Acquisition Regulation along with its detailed commentary concerning assorted

justifications and approvals consumed the time of Procurement and Production Policy and Management

Directorate personnel. The matter of market surveys, also under the domain of the FAR, filled hours of

their valuable time. Yet in tne matter of market surveys, the directorate had an ally in the acquisition

regulation. According to FAR 6.302-2, and in accordance with 10 USC (United States Code) 2304 (c) (2):

Unusual and Compelling Urgency, the procurement had an ally. Through the regulation's provisions, a

waiver was obtained permitting chemical detection equipment, decontamination equipment, gas masks,

artillery, small arms, armor, aircraft, fire control equipment, training devices, and Direct Support Electronic

System Test Set items, as well as their components to be acquired without the conducting of a market

survey. The waiver applied only to ODS actions. 97

By the conditions of the waiver, competition for ODS production and procurement would be limited to

the current and/or past producers who had been determined by the federal government as being capable

of meeting the required delivery time frames. In their request for the waiver, members of the procurement

community had succinctly stated their goal for ODS, 'Troops have already been deployed and the safety

of our personnel is affected by our ability to provide adequate support. Failure to procure these

requirements will result in the potential loss of soldiers' lives. Available assets are currently being released

for issue in support of this operation. Continued sustainability requires immediate stock replentishment."

By inference, the request suggested that only by the attainment of the market survey waiver could the

constant "replentishment" be assured.98

Although the market survey waiver did become a reality during ODS, problems, quite naturally, arose

over the action. One involved the Office of Counsel's observation that by the restriction of procurement

operations to current and past producers of necessary acquisitions, the Procurement and Production Policy

56
V ,j

7

and Management Directorate had not assured itself that any given past producer, especially one that had

not supplied the item for nu'mber of years, could more rapidly supply an item than a producer responding

to open competition. Despite the fears of the Office of Counsel, the directorate did not anticipate that such

problems would be frequent. They noted that there are usually excellent reasons for the restriction of

procurement, such as first articles being waived, the contractors being the only ones with government or

special tooling, or the contractor being in production, or just recently in production as a subcontractor, for

the same item. This could serve as the basis for the waiver of the first article. Other reasons could also

provide the rationale for restricting competition and could be stated in the J&A to show how the restrictions

proposed would result in faster delivery than in the case of a full and open competition. While the staff

of the directorate had no doubt that the case limited competition procurements could be justified, they felt

obligated to spell the reasoning out clearly in the attendant J&As.9

The need to avoid time-consuming market surveys continued to gamer the attention of of the

Procurement and Production Policy and Management Directorate even after the successful conclusion of

ODS. An observation included in AMCCOM's Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report noted

* a generic market survey waiver had been developed for most items being procured for ODS. Contract

Specialists had been able to submit a generic waiver with each J&A processed under Desert Storm. All

"concurring offices simply accepted the waivers. Yet during the war, it had been discovered that not all

* ODS requirements were covered under the generic market survey waiver. As a result, some individual

waivers still had to be processed. Accordingly, to save time in future engagements, directorate personnel

recommended that at the onset of a declared national emergency a DA waiver could be issued to permit

the larger-scale use of market survey waivers.'00

Justifications and approvals, as well as market surveys, did not constitute the whole of the restrictions

placed upon AMCCOM's procurement personnel. A number of other statutes and regulations existed,

which in times of peace served the r-3tion well, but which, however, in times of national emergency proved

to be impedimentiary. The community was constrained in its acquisition of high value automatic data

processing equipment (ADPE) by 40 USC (United States Code) 795, also known as the Brooks Act.

According to the code, the procurement authority fur all high value ADPE purchases rested with the General

Services Administration (GSA). This only servad to slow down the acquisition process in times when it

most probably should have been speeded up. Additionally, exemptions to the acquisition code, via SARD88-2, the Warner Amendment, had to pass through ISSAA (United States Army Information Systems

Selection and Agency). 10'

Section 805, Public Law (PL) 101-189, the FY90 Authorization Act, further limited AMCCOM's response

to the exigencies of ODS. It required that the Secretary of Defense certify support costs for any proposed

multi-year contract. Additionally, 10 USC 2326 placed funding limitations on UCAs (unpriced contractual

actions) and 22 USC 2770, as well as other statutes, limited AMCCOM, and other commands, authority

to sell materiel to contractors. Another statute, 15 USC 637-the Small Business Act, granted the Small

Business Administration (SBA) authority to grant certificates of competency to small businesses attempting

to win government contracts.'0 2

Further statutory limitations were imposed by 42 USC 6961, the Resource Conservation Recovery Act.

The act placed restrictions on the processing and disposal of waste and hazardous material. Other

restrictions on the ability of AMCCOM came in the form of 50 USC, the Defense Prcduction Act. According

to its strictures, AMCCOM could not compel a contractor to accept a contract. The act also placed the

approval authority for seeking indemnification from defaulting contractors with the Secretary of the Army. A final statutory impediment to the actions of AMCCOM as concerned the industrial community came in

the form of 10 USC 2319. It placed limitations on the establishment and fulfillment of qualification

57

*"
requirements for materiel to be procured, e.g., qualified products lists (QPLs) and source controlled items.

Other regulations restricted the freedom of AMCCOM to fulfill its mission as well.'0

However, throughout the course of ODS, AMCCOM's production and procurement community

received relief from a considerable number of the regulations which had constrained them at the war's

onset. Within a week of the start of the air offensive in SWA, and in accordance with DA instructions,

AMCCOM staffers received relief from the strictures of 10 USC 2336. By the authority of the DA, the Head

of Contracting Activity (HCA) was authorized to approve unpriced contractual actions which were in direct

support of Operation Desert Storm. The power could not be re-delegated and expired, unless sooner

terminated, on 31 December 1991, but in the interim served to speed the acquisition process.'x

Other bits of regulatory relief came throughout Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Prior to

the outbreak of hostilities, AMCCOM, as well as other commands within the military structure, were required

by the terms of the FAR 5.303 (A), DFARS (Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation System) 205.303 (A)

to notify the Congress of the United States prior to awarding any contract in excess of $5 million. The

requirement for prior notification was waived, and Congressional notification to be made within four days

of the award. Briefly, a 20-hour, post-award notification requirement had stood.105

Additionally, the procurement community received relief from the requirement to perform Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) checks on contracting firms prior to the making of production awards. AMC

ruled, in accordance with FAR 22.805 (A) (7), that in the case of an urgent or critical contract being at stake,

and in a situation where the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), Department of

Labor cannot complete a preaward review of by the required date, the HCA, after informing the OFCCP

region office, could approve the award without the preaward clearance. Preaward EEO clearances need

not be obtained at all, according to AXmy Deviation 88-DEV-24 (Acquisition Letter 88-16) if the proposed

prime contractor and subcontractors anticipated receiving contracts of at least $1 million had received

clearances within the twelve months prior to the awarding of the ODS-oriented contract. AMCCOM

procurement personnel simply needed to document the particulars of the earlier clearance in their later

award.1

06

Procurement personnel also had concerns regarding AMC reviews of Business Clearance Memorandums for non-competitive procurement over $50 million and competitive procurements over $100. They

felt that AMC involvement delayed the awarding of contracts by a minimum of two days. AMC did not feel

its participation had an impact on the award process as it conoucted their reviews on site as part of the

MSC (major subordinate command) review. Yet AMCCOM staffers did feel that AMC participation

adversely impacted the process in terms of time absorbed. This seemed particularly annoying considering

that AMC did not have approval authority, but rather simply review and recommendation powers.

Ultimately, AMCCOM received the right of deferring Business Clearing Memorandums on UCAs, but still

had to have them completed prior to the definitization of contract awards.107

Other bright spots of relief in the acquisition process came for AMCCOM procurement specialists with

the raising of the small purchases threshold for OCONUS (outside continental United States) to $100,000.

Also, Desert Storm requirements could be placed ahead of other, previously contracted, defense orders

at civilian production facilities.10

Despite efforts to the contrary, AMCCOM Procurement and Production Policy and Management Directorate staffers could not eliminate all of the regulatory restrictions which cc. nstrained them. For example,

the effort to raise HCA's authority to approve J&As above the $10 million mark did not meet with success.

While AMC officials recognized that the sought-for $50 million procurement ceiling had potential value in

58
77 7/ _, 

the 'unusual and compelling urgency" that constituted ODS, they did not allow the petition. Nor did AMC

waive the requirement for J&As when unevaluated options were exercised."

AMCCOM procurement specialists felt further stymied by their failure to gain relief from small business

regulations. They sought to have the equal employment opportunity clearance requirement waived when

seeking to offer a contract to a small business. At other times, they sought to avoid the goal instituted by

FAR 19.302 that small businesses be utilized as frequently as possible in the procurement of the sinews

of war. AMCCOM's Small Business Office, which had at cne point disagreed with limited or sole source

procurements when competitive technical data pac;iges were available, rallied to the side of Procurement

and Production Policy and Management and appealed for a waiver concerning the limitations attempts to

comply with small business goals were placing on AMCCOM. And although AMCCOM's procurement

personnel did manage to work through ODS with small business goals intact, they recommended in the

Opration Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report that such goals be abandoned when wartime status

had been declared."0

Regardlesi of AMCCOM's Small Business Office's fears concerning the ability of small firms to meet

that challenges of a wartime scenario, at the close of the war it could proudly announce that the goods

and services procured from such businesses had played a large role in the successful attainment of the

nation's goals in ODS. Accordingly, the Small Business Office published a truncated listing of the minorityowned firms, as well as a workshop for people with severe disabilities, that provided items in direct support

of the Southwest Asian deployment. As Mr. Bruce M. Myers, Chief, AMSMC-SB. noted, the list was by

no means all inclusive of AMCCOM's small business program. Furthermore, he explained in a [Rock Island

Arsenal] Tame article, small businesses hold over 85 percent of the command's commercial contracts,

and traditionally have shown themselves capable of producing critically needed items while meeting tight delivery schedules, yet maintaining high quality standards."'

Among the small businesses contributing to the success of the United States in Operations Desert

Storm and Desert Shield were Nomura Enterprise, Inc., Rock Island, IL, producing maintenance

publications for troops; Viny! Technology, El Monte, CA, manufacturing waterproof bags for chemical

protective masks; Witter Manufacturing, Grand Prairie, TX, making electrical transformers; and S&K

Electronics, Ronan, MT, building specially designed heaters. Other small business producers utilized

during ODS included Sandik Manufacturing, Passaic, N.J., built cover assemblies for the Vulcan Air

Defense System (VADS) and the Product Improved, Vulcan Air Defense System (PIVADS); Infinite

Creations, Bamberg, S.C., produced the M8 bandoleer; and Mohawk Valley Workshop, Utica, N.Y., made

a head harness for the M1 7A1 gas mask." 2

Regardless of their apparently needless fears concerning the required use of small businesses,

AMCCOM's Production and Procurement Policy and Management personnel did not hesitate to voice other

concerns, and seek further regulatory relief, during the war. Their appeals to AMC and assorted higher

authorities concerning a moratorium on the fulfillment of socioeconomic p-ograms, and permission to

continue work despite labor protests did not meet with success." 3

At the close of the war, and for inclusion in the official Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action

Report. procurement and production personnel had numerous comments concerning the regulatory

conditions under which they had operated during ODS. They noted that regulations which had served them,

as well as the nation, well during peacetime could prove overly restrictive in times of conflict. They

commented that during the war when HQ, AMCCOM sought immediate relief that AMC insisted on specific

examples of regulations and processes causing delays. Examples of existing problems were plentiful, but

unacceptable to higher headquarters. AMCCOM's attempt at a proactive stance often met with AMC and

59
higher headquarter's reactive stance, resulting in a rather high degree of frustration as the war progressed.

Deviations to procurement regulations frequently arrived in increments scattered throughout Operations

Desert Shield and Desert Storm."4

Indeed, the incremer.tal method of obtaining regulatory relief came to special attention in the war's

wake. Members of the Pr(curement Directorate noted in their submission to the Op;ao Deer Shield/

Storm After Action Report ',at receiving incremental deviations to procurement regulations throughout the

progression of ODS proved to be both inefficient and confusing. Some deviations did not arrive until Desert

Storm had concluded. In consideration of the flaws they discerned in the acquisition variance process,

procurement staffers recommended that a preestablished list of deviations, lowering of approval authorities, elimination of requirements, keyed to specific DEFCONs (Defense Readiness Conditions), and

published in a booklet available to all contracting offices. Additionally, they felt that field contracting offices

shouid be authorized to implement the deviations automatically upon the establishment of a specific

DEFCON. They also noted that, if necessary, appropriate statutes could be revised to permit the essence

of legality." 5

To bolster their argument, Procurement Directorate (PC) officials provided a detailed example of preestablished deviations that could prove valuable in wartime. They noted as a base for their discussion that

the dual requests they had been subjected to during ODS had been time consuming as well as confusing.

For example, conflicting guidance had been received from the Deputy for Procurement and Production

(DP) staff versus the materiel managers on such issues as surges and options. Similarly requirements for

reports had been submitted by the DP and the ARDEC Emergency Operations Center through AMCCOM's

Production Management Division. When such dual tracking occurred, it generated considerable confusion

as well as delays. Also, when issues of duality occurr3d, the Procurement Directorate was obligated to

respond to the procurement authority, i.e., DP, rather than any other authority.""

Accordingly, the members of the Procurement Directorate devised a revised approval schedule for use

In times of changing DEFCON. In the case of seeking approval for UCAs, the extension of UCAs, and

obligations of 100% of government estimates, the PC recommended that in DEFCONs 1 and 2 that any

procuring contracting officer (PCO) with unlimited dollar obligation authority )e deemed to have sufficient

signing capacity. In DEFCON 3, they recommended that the approval of the Chief Contracting Office be

obtained, and in the case of DEFCON 4 the Principal Assistant Responsible for C3ontracting (PARC) have

authority. Similarly, PC had recommendations for business clearance approval currently settled at HCA

or AMC level. In the case of DEFCONs 1 and 2, they urged that any PCO with unlimited authority have

approval capacity, and in the case of DEFCON 3 that the Chief Contracting Office again have permission

to approve. And in DEFCON 4, PARC was once again to be v., 3ted with approval capacity. The PC

recommended the same standards be used in the approval and use of abbreviated J&As and the approval

and use of abbreviated APs. ",

Furthermore, PC urged that at DEFCON 3 or higher that the AP process be eliminated. Similarly at

the activation of DEFCON 2 or higher, PC recommended that policy be deviated from to eliminate all

contracting requirement,.ý ralow .. the FAR and DFARS level. At DEFCON 3 or 4, PC felt that this deviation

should be held to the dis-,retion of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development and

Acquisition)."'

Additional thoughts regarding• regulatory relief as concerned th.? Procurement Directorate were also

voiced in the after action report. Procurement personnel felt that on site competition advocates with

appropriate J&A approval authority could be established to expedite matters. Other J&A commentary from

procurement folks included a waiver from the requirement that urgency J&As be written in the past tense

60
if they were being processed after the award had been made, providing that the J&A included the actual

date of award. Additionally, they recommended that the PARC determine whether or not production J&As

should include 100 per cent options and should be evaluated, that the "changes clause" be utilized to

accelerate deliveries under existing contracts, regardless of cost impact, and that the extension of letter

contract definitization should be considered in periods of crisis. In the latter case, they felt that approval

should be automatically granted by HCA without a request from the field. And finally, in regard to their

submission to the Coeration Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report. PC boldly recommended that a "hard

Icok should be taken as to guidance in the use of SURGE CLAUSES, OPTIONS FOR PRODUCTION and

SPARE PARTS as well as PRIORITIES and URGENCY." They also felt that a mechanism for verification

or validation of priority and urgency was required as potential existed for the abuse of the priority designation

particularly on low dollar items. Many of PC recommendations for the easing of regulatory requirements

flowed from their own confusing, time-consuming experiences during ODS.'1

1

AMCCOM's Procurement and Production Policy and Management Directorate could justifiably congratulate itself on its efforts during ODS. And it did so in its contribution to the formal after action report.

Its personnel noted that over 2,500 new Procurement/Work Directives (PWDs) had been initiated at

AMCCOM during ODS. None of these had been for ammunition as those particular demands were filled

by accelerating existing contracts and PWDs already in process. And while AMCCOM staffers reacted

in an outstanding manner to a critical situation, they felt that AMC, higher headquarters, and the Congress

of the United States should be apprised of the turmoil and wasted effort, as well as dangerous delays to

procurement, which their inability to act more quickly, created at the working level. They concluded their

submission to the after action report with the intonation, "Now is the time to preposition for the future."'2

'

Regarding the need for deviations from peacetime acquisition processes in times of national

emergency, not all Procurement and Production Policy and Management Directorate felt assured that the

federal government could be relied upon to affect the changes they believed necessary. This belief flowed

from their observation that the formal acquisition process had been built with the assumption that the United

States would be at war, possibly on a global basis, with the Soviet Union or China. However, the reality

is that Panama, Grenada, and Southwest Asia are the types of conflict the United States will face. The

three most recent conflicts were of high intensity, but short duration. Such "come as you are" conflicts rely

on the established stockpile and the logistical stockpile to fight. This means that the acquisition system

must react using existing tools; e.g., there will not be time available to build up the work force, have statutory

or regulatory changes, etc. Indeed, even when time is available to build up such supporting devices, events

of the Persian Gulf War proved that it was not always used. The staffers noted that in the case of SWA,

the United States had a substantial time between initial deployment in August 1990 and the time of actual

engagement in mid-January 1991, yet little or nothing had been done to give the acquisition team of the

logistics system relief from peacetime constraints. Only after the hostilities began, claimed procurement

personnel, did higher headquarters become sensitive to the need to remove regulatory, as well as statutory,

roadblocks to acquisition. '

While the Procurement and Production Policy and Management Directorate did all things within its

power to streamline and accelerate the acquisition process, it still felt that it was capable of doing more,

had the federal government allowed ,t to do so. For examnle the directorate considered that expanded

delegations of authority in the areas of award approval, usi of unpriced contractual actions, and other

review processes could be initiated by the Head of Contracting Activity if higher headquarters regulatons

permitted such actions. And expedited processes could be irmpemented to obtain formal review/approvals

if the regulations precluded such delegations. Additionally, dass documents could be developed covering

urgency statements, justifications and approvals, and unpr;ced contractual actions. Further, and most

significantly, reallocation of personnel to high priority, dlrect war-related activities would permit expeditious

61
handling of the high volume of procurement work directives generated by an emergency footing. Many

of these actions were undertaken during ODS.1'

In consideration of the efforts undertaken by the Procurement and Production Policy and Management

Directorate to process the over 2,500 ODS procurement work directives, its personnel had several

recommendations for future action. It observed that in order to be properly prepared for deployments that

it must effect "self-help" efforts and have a periodic review of contingency clauses and policies to ensure

that they are up-to-date and supportable so that fatal flaws do not appear in the midsts of a conflict.

Contingency clauses were to be annually reviewed to ensure that were legal. The report, contained within

the Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Reort. received the Lessons Learned Task Force's

designation 'significant". "3

Also receiving the designation *significant" was the Procurement Directorate's similar submission.

They noted that the entire range of mobilization planning needed to be rethought minus the present political

restrictions, regulations, and policies which have rendered it "useless". The directorate's staff further noted

that there could be little doubt that the setting aside of a company, or even part of a company, for the

exclusive use in support of a Department of Defense peculiar items, costs money. But they noted that,

"If the price of liberty is eternal vigilance, part of that price is MOB (mobilization)." Furthermore, to artificially

restrict production to an equally artificial MSR (main supply route) impacts the cost to produce and restricts

the production capability of the manufacturer; i.e., minimum operation curtails surge ability and seriously

impacts the contractor's ability to rapidly meet expedited requirements.' 24

Furthermore, uncoordinated MOUs (memoranda of understanding) by the State Department also

eroded the base for critical components, principally in areas of co-production. For example, the Secretary

of Commerce inadvertently gave priorities to foreign nations to procure charcoal filters for gas masks from

the United States MOB producer to the detriment of American forces. The SARDA (Secretary of the Army

for Research, Development, and Acquisition) had bartered unity vision devices around with MSRs until

several acrylic producers have pulled out of the American market and only one producer remains. The

remaining producer is barely able to support peacetime production requirements.'25

From the experience, Procurement Directorate personnel gathered that MOB items and their critical

components should all be procured from United States or Canadian manufacturers, and should be made

exempt from MOUs, unless they are coordinated with the mobilization's command. Accordingly, the

directorate recommended that DOD reexamine MOB and issue policy and direction that strengthens and

enhances MOB as a necessary cost of readiness.'1

A further restriction upon procurement came in the form of environmental constraints. Members of the

Production Directorate took note of the fact that there is no known, established, and approved procedure

for the disposal of "red water", or plan for dealing with the issue in the event that surge or mobilization plans

would be required in order to respond to a national emergency or joint national effort, as was experienced

in ODS.'27

The directorate noted that if ODS had continued at length and the need for explosives, particularly TNT,

had become an acute issue, as it was projected to be, the production process would have resulted in the

generation of a hazardous waste known as "red water". Although the TNT could have been produced,

the resulting "red water" would have been a constraint without resolution. The essential lesson garnered

from this observation was that there was no plan for dealing with the issue, and the need for explosives

and propellants that generate hazardous material as a result of the respective production processes to

support any war time scenario must be accompanied by a plan for dealing with the hazardous waste that

62
will negate the vilification of the producer through fines and restrictions levied by the Environmental

Protection Agency under the current law.'2

It has been the experience of commercial chemical producers such as DuPont and Hercules, as an

example, that permits for storage of such hazardous waste products are limited to 90 days on site. After

that time, a penalty of $1,000 per day is imposed. Quite recently, DuPont, while producing TNT for the

Canadian government, was fined for retention of "red water" waste. Currently, no provision exists for "red

water" disposal that has total Environmental Protection Agency approval. The only known incineration

technique for this material is continually fined by the agency, and thus, it is readily obvious that any producer

would display reluctance to make TNT, or any other hazardous material by-product producing explosives

or propellants, due to the situation they are placed in Ly currer,t Environmental Protection Agency

constraints. 12

Additionally, it is thought to be the agency's position that their environmental regulations are without

alleviation during war time, short of a direct order from the president. Such information led the Production

Directorate to comment that an obvious need existed to develop a resolution that would pave the way for

surge or mobilization of the explosive and propellant base that would not be inhibited by environmental

constraints and thus preclude a rapid response to the nation's need for readiness. For no plans were in

place which would allow ;or the manufacture of explosives which resulted in the production of "red water"

in the event of a national crisis. Accordingly, Production Directorate staffers recommended that the impact

of current Environmental Protection Agency laws on the production of potentially critical explosives be

brought to the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Congress, and the president.1

3°

Further hindrances upon AMCCOM's procurement community came in the form of questions concerning the manner in which PWDs (procurement/work directives) could be expedited for ODS. While

procurement personnel apparently attempted during the initial days of the deployment to continue their

standard form of PWD, by the early days of October 1990 other means had to be applied in order to hurry

materiel to the desert. On 11 October 1990, production and procurement staffers received the guidance

that all PWD in support of Desert Shield should have the code "DS" entered upon them in the SP-PRI

(Special Priority Designator) block, in addition to including the necessity of expedited action in the "remarks"

portion of PWD forms 825-1, 825-2, 825-3 with the simply notation DESERT SHIELD. COPS (contingency

plans report) operators were to assure that DS had been properly entered by the manager in the SP-PRI

block if DESERT SHIELD appeared in the remarks section. If it did not appear, the COPS operator was

to contact the manager to ensure the proper processing of the document. The use of the DS code was

to result in a message printed at the top of the PWD indicatirg its status as a Desert Shield requirement.

It would also provide a means for the Procurement and Production Policy and Management Directorate's

Systems Division to automatically pull a report of Desert Shield PWDs, thus eliminating the time consuming

but, current, manual tracking effort."' 1

As the threat of a ground war and its inherent requirements loomed ever larger, further directions were

received on how best to expedite the delivery of materiel to the desert of SWA. Production and procurement

personnel were informed that as of 11 February 1991, two new codes would be utilized in conjunction with

PWDs directed in support of ODS. DU (Desert Storm Urgent) would be applied to PWDs which were

intended to fill a shortfall in SWA. The code was to indicate that the directive should be handled as being

of the highect procurement priority. Only items whose acquisition could be accelerated were authorized

to use the DU designation. Alternatively, the code DR (Desert Storm Routine) was to be filled in for items,

which although an ODS requirement, should be processed using normal acquisition procedures. Specifically, materiel purchased to replenish the stockpile received the DR status. Furthermore, DR was to be

utilized for urgent acquisitions which due to assorted obstacles could not be accelerated. The goal was

63
7 `/

to keep DLI requirements at the bare minimum. Requirements previously coded DS (see above) did not

ned to be recoded unless an amendment needed to be attached. Additionally, for ammunition PWDs,

.arminat",ns of DR or DU status were to be made on the basis of the recently conducted Ammunition

Laydcwv; E,.,efings. And as in the case of the DS system, it had replaced the DR and DU structure allowed

#or sharp -eycd COPS operators to assure, by manager verification, that the proper code had been utilized

ii the 'remr.ks" portion of the form noted DESERT STORM."12

"Trackir4g' the effort to follow, on paper, work processes and physical items, provided procurement

personnel with a number of difficulties during ODS. Such difficulties were reported, with proposed solutions,

in tho official INMCCOM Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report. In one such submission, the

Management and Analysis division of the Procurement and Production Policy and Management Directorate

noted that pro-L,, rement work directives frequently became "lost" in the system. The problem arose when

PASS (Procur ,ment Aging and Staging System) numbers which had been assigned during the initial stages

..' a pro.uremr:nt operation by procurement personnel were not appropriately forwarded to the Central

Prucess&ng Poiit (CPP) as well as the Procurement and Production Policy and Management Directorate's

Management and Analysis Division's Procurement Package Input Branch. Thus, beyond the initial

procuremTent stage, offices could not follow the effort to acquire materiel for ODS. Yet, simultaneously

procurerr.ent personnel were hand-carrying the packages necessary to continue the acquisition process

rather th•in stopping actions until PASS numbers had been forwarded. On some occasions, technical data

packagc -procurement package input processing had been completed before it oecame apparent that the

package. were three or four steps ahead of the transference of the PASS number. Some offices, however,

returned document packages, refusing to accept them until the appropriate numbers had been electronically advanced to their processing point. Due to the volume of PWDs, hand-carries, and failures to report

PASS transactions in a timely fashion, a significant number of procurement procedures were rejected and

forced time-consuming, investigative work. Accordingly, procurement personnel stressed that in future

states of emergency action a memorandum of understanding between affected organizations be established to encourage the proper handling of hand-carried PWDs, as well as the correct method of transferring

reference numbers.1 33

Keeping track of obligations kept procurement staffers at their closest attention throughout Operations

Desert Shield and Desert Storm. And the Procurement and Production Policy and Management

Directorate's Systems Division felt the need to comment on their observations, as had the directorate's

Management and Analysis Division. In a submission to the Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action

Ro the division noted that as a result of efforts in support of ODS it became apparent that the

Commodity Command Standard System (CCSS) data base should have been implemented at the onset

of the deployment. If it had been, according to the Systems Division staffers, a considerable amount of

confusion could have been saved, and more accurate reporting from the very beginning instituted. They

observed that a designator should have been assigned to identify procurement acticns from the onset of

Operation Desert Shield. Unfortunately, this designator was not established until well into the operation.

When it was found necessary to implement a data base, AMCCOM's Information Management Directorate,

Application Development Division created one which easily allowed for the sorting of CCSS data into a

variety of report formats. 34

From the experience, procurement personnel noted that the early use of a designator would have saved

considerable time, effort, and confusion in reporting their actions to higher headquarters. Additionally, they

observed that the data base which u;timately was established was time-consumingly developed through

trial and error. Once the data elements had been identified, however, it proved to be quite useful, and

provided most of the data needed for reporting purposes. In.consideration of the lessons they had garnered

from their experiences tracking procurement processes, staffers recommended that in future deployments

64
a designator should be assigned to identify procurement actions from the initiation of the operation. Additionally, they urged that the data base established for use in ODS should be kept readily available for

immediate implementation at the onset of an operation.135

Further commentary concerning the process of properly tracking procurement information during ODS

came from AMCCOM's Command Surety Office. Their staff realized early in Operation Desert Shield that

the finances behind procurement activities needed to be separately tracked for reporting purposes.

Ultimately, AMCCOM's Competition Management Office established a data base to identify pertinent information allowing for the identification of actions, dollars, class J&A's threshold monitoring, and the TDP

(technical data package) status on each ODS obligation or requirement. The data base developed served

many purposes but the Competition Management Office had a difficult time of recording the actual awarded

dollars and associated dates. This reflected that fact that the data base had been developed from the

information on the J&As and the statements of applicability. However, if the dollars proposed on the J&As

or statements of applicability there was no simple way to capture the change. Therefore, the recorded

total dollars spent would nct accurately reflect the total dollars spent on ODS acquisitions. To try to alleviate

the problem, contract specialists were contacted by telephone for award information. Unfortunately, this

procedure was extremely labor intensive and continually left doubts concerning the accuracy of the

reporting. 36

In consideration of the difficulty procurement and financial officers had keeping tabs on the total flow

of dollars spent in support of ODS, it was recommended that during periods of war, a Central Tracking

Office be developed within AMCCOM. Furthermore, personnel urged that a special automated program needed to be instituted to not only track the procurement awards but also to assure that the threshold(s)

on the class J&As had not been exceeded. The recommended program would also have the capacity to

segregate wartime obligations from routine ones. Accordingly, the suggestion was offered that the

Information Management Directorate and Competition Management Office coordinate on the development

of just such a program.'3 7

Segregating costs gathered further attention from the procurement community, as well as members of the

Competition Management Office staff. In a submission to the Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action

Reprt. they observed that the Department of the Army, in coordination with the Army Materiel Command,

assigned each command with a yearly competition goal. The competitive goal is determined by the dollars

awarded competitively each year. Yet in order to support Desert Shield and Desert Storm expedited sole

source contracts had to be awarded in lieu of utilizing full and open competitive acquisition procedures.

In order for AMCCOM to receive credit for their competitive efforts, meet the urgent requirement to support

ODS, and still meet the FY 91 Competition Goal, the dollars awarded due to ODS had to be segregated

from the competitive base and tracked/reported separately. Formal authorization from the Department

of the Army, and with the consideration of the Army Materiel Command, permitted the utilization of this

form of reporting procedure. 1

3

At the conclusion of the war, Competition Management personnel recommended in the event of an

operation similar to ODS that AMCCOM must have in place the ability to track and report tMe sole source

obligations utilized in support of the war. Furthermore, a formal submission needed to be generated by AMCCOM to secure approval from the Army Materiel Command, as well as the Department of the Army,

to segregate the wartime costs and obligations from the competitive base. Without initiating these two

initiatives, the office warned, AMCCOM could not be expected to meet its assigned competition goals.13 9

Concerning the regulatory requirements of procurement processes during ODS, Ms. Donna White,

former branch chief of the Procurement Directorate's Chemical Branch, noted that some of the regulations

65
which she labored to fuifill during the war need reexamination, and either exceptions or abbreviations for

wartime conditions created. She felt this to especially be the case concerning the J&A process. Regarding

the J&A process she noted that although the general peacetime process requires competition, wartime

conditions did not allow for such a luxury. Accordingly, wartime regulatory relief allowed her branch, as

well as others, to procure the accouterments of war, under a limited basis or sole source basis. Yet, as

she observed, even this relief from the regulatory juggernaut did not truly allow sufficient time to process

documents and pass them on to the Department of the Army."40

In consideration of such an unwieldy trail of paper, Ms. White recommended, as had others both before

and after her, that the Congress of the United States needed to delegate the authority for the preparation

of a new, less cumbersome, set of regulations granting exceptions to the J&A process for periods of national

emergency. Such new regulations could take into consideration her branch's diligent efforts in arriving at

"*quick fixes" so, for example, anything costing under $10 million could be signed off by the Commanding

General rather than taking a longer route to approval by the pursuit of higher level signatures. Additionally,

she urged that AMCCOM should be provided with an ombudsman to sign for the Commanding General

should he not be available.'41

Indeed, she observed that it was not the actual buying that held up the processes of procurement, but

rather all of the paperwork accompanying it. "Before anybody even picks up the telephone to discuss with

a contractor what has to be procured or negotiated, a great amount of paperwork has to be done." And

she plaintively commented that, "... we have to find a way to reduce this [paper]work; we need to streamline

the acquisition process." However, AMCCOM could not undertake the process of streamlining procurement practices of its own accord. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Committee, under direction

of the United States Congress, and with the support of the Department of the Army, as well as that of the

Department of Defense, is responsible for making changes in procurement procedures."

Despite the problems Ms. White and her associates encountered, she felt that all had worked together

quite well, and that the ordinary bickering that one might expect between offices and directorates during

stressful times had not occurred. According to her observations, little proprietary behavior concerning

functions and input to the war effort existed, giving her reason for pride in AMCCOM's efforts. Additionally,

Ms. White noted in an after action interview, that all individuals concerned with procurement "hit the ground

running" and performed responsively with a minimal amount of complaints and grumbling. Freely working

overtime, and with '."hat Ms. White perceived to be patriotism, procurement personnel accomplished their

tasks with almost non-existent absenteeism.'43

Yet she was not as certain of the supply system which she toiled to keep running at its full capacity.

She noted in an after action interview that tracking problems in the production and procurement processes

often spillEd over to become legitimate supply system concerns. "Because it is often only a paper trail

a computer could not keep up with it. This meant you were not absolutely positive where the materiel

you wanted or needed was located." Accordingly she observed, that goods often arrived in SWA faster

than they could be inventoried. Consequently, it could not be ascertained if the items were sitting in a Saudi

Arabian depot, or if they had been distributed to the troops. As Ms. White noted, "you assumed everything

was being distributed, . . sent to the proper units and given to the soldiers or whoever."' 4

'

Ms. White was not the only individual to note, or be concerned with the frailties of the supply system.

Indeed AMCCOM's official Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Reoort offered that the most

significant supply lessons garnered during ODS dealt with the absence of a functioning retail supply system,

particularly during the early months of the deployment. A prime contribution to this deficiency was that the

Standard Army Intermediate Level Supply (SAILS) system was in the process of being replaced by the

66
Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS). As a result, accountability and visibility of assets received

in SWA was practically nonexistent and in some cases materiel was taken by units on a first come basis.

This resulted in an excessive number of requisitions as units cor.tinually ordered that which was not

received, and, in turn, placed undue stresses upon the efforts of production and procurement personnel.

Various workarounds were developed to resolve this situation. These included push packages, push

shipments of specific items, and telephone/fax requisitiors worked through logistics assistance representative (LAR) channels. Other retail problems included the use of ODS project codes by non-deploying units,

improper use of non-mission capable supply (NMCS) requisitions, and the requisitioning of excessive

quantities by deploying units. Ultimately, each supply issue became a production and procurement issue

as the term of deployment lengthened.145 The various work arounds utilized in circumventing this problem

resulted in push packages, telephone and datafax requisitions, "priority" code abuse, supply discipline,

Desert Express, etc.

While the problems with properly supplying soldiers and civilians in SWA could be traced to the failure

to have SARSS operational before SAILS fell from use, other issues also contributed to the confusion. In

a mature theater, supply and distribution facilities are in place to ensure an unimpeded flow of supplies

to the requisitioner. This situation cannot exist when combat troops are the first deployees to a possible

combat area. In the case of SWA, no established supply infrastructure was in place to receive and process

materiel. As a result, supply personnel had problems identifying and subsequently locating materiel which

had been received. In some cases it was diverted to, or by, customers who had not requisitioned the items.

In other cases it simply went to a holding area. Command representatives spent many hours in these areas

searching for AMCCOM items and locating customers. In the meantime, customers who knew their stocks

were in country "somewhere" submitted new requisitions for the same requirement as it was deemed more

expedient than trying to find a shipment. This frustration of shipments inflated the demand data, deprived

customers of timely support, and kept production and procurement personnel continually striving to

maintain stocks of materiel.' 46

Personnel from AMCCOM's Materiel Management Directorate's Policy, Plans, and Programs Division

commented in a submission to the after action report that while it could not be considered logical to deploy

supply personnel to a combat zone ahead of combat troops. Therefore, they observed, that the problems

encountered in the attempt to properly supply the fighting women and men of ODS would undoubtedly

reoccur, perhaps with more disastrous results than experienced in SWA when stock availability stood at

over 90 percent. Accordingly, they recommended that plans should be made to deploy Materiel

Management Center (MMC) personnel as early as possible so that supply problems might be brought under

control. The proffered plan included the deployment of supply personnel familiar with the various

commodities to assist units and the MMCs in getting stocks to customers.147

Other issues concerning the visibility and accountability of supplies in SWA also rose to the fore in

submitted after action reports. Members of AMCCOM's Materiel Management Directorate noted that

during ODS significant ranges and quantities of AMCCOM-owned stocks had been released to wholesale

storage activities in SWA. As these storage facilities had no direct interface with the Commodity Command

Standard System (CCSS). This resulted in an almost complete loss of accountability and vi:-bility of

wholesale stc -ks stored in SWA and a commensurate degradation in the ability of HQ, AMCCOM to provide

materiel support to depot storage.'14

In a discussion of the problem, materiel management personnel noted that the shipment of AMCCOMowned assets to the United States Army Support Group (ASG) in Dammam, Saudi Arabia, in accordance

with an HO, DESCOM (United States Army Depot System Command) proposal of 4 October 1990. The

Materiel Management Directorate subsequently released critical secondary items and line replaceable

67
. ... .. i • L ~~~~~~.. ..:•; 

units via inter-depot transfer actions to the ASG while raising concerns about the potential for the loss of

accountability to HO, DESCOM. HO, DESCOM subsequently reported problems in ASG transaction

processing and clarified ASG stock distribution procedures in late December 1990. In early February 1991,

the ASG again reported problems in implementing systems linuks with NICPs (national inventory control

points), and provided revised operating procedures. By early May 1991, receipt processing by the ASG

did not reflect the receipt of all items released to chem in October 1990.149

As a result of the linmited visibility of assets released to the ASG, the Materiel Management Directorate

released critical aviation weapon system support items to the AVSCOM (United States Army Aviation

Systems Command) wholesale storage activity in Abu Dhabi, the United Arab Emirates, at a contractoroperated storage facility. The memorandum of understanding staffed through HO, AMCCOM provided

for daily transaction reporting to be datafaxed by the activity to HO, AMCCOM for items released from

CONUS depots as well as items repaired by contractor special repair activities in SWA. Items had bp.r, released to this activity from both CONUS depots and contractor special repair activities. By earl* r,3y

1991, no receipt transaction had been forwarded to HO, AMCCOM. Additional ranges and quqnr,::;es of

critical parts/assemblies had been released to the 321st Materiel Management Center, -,ail level

organization with'n the theater of operations.15 0

From the experience attempting to keep track of all materiel deployed to SWA, Materiel Management

personnel gathered that fast moving operations, limited communication channels, and the complexly of

"the CCSS encouraging the transfer of accountability from the CONUS-based wholesale activity to the

theater of operations. Accordingly, they recommended that all assets shippea in support of the theater

of operations be managed and accounted for by the logistics community within the theater of operations.s11

The visibility of materiel in transit to SWA, as well in the theater of operations, became further clouded

by the fact that items traveled there via air force tr.4nsportation channels. Once the equipment was in air

force control, army visibility and accountability decreased precinitiously. Within the army supply system

all items are tracked from wholesale to retail by the unit's Department of Defense Activity Addressing Code

(DODAAC). However, during ODS most of the army's sparo/repair items were moved OCONUS via U.S.

Air Force aircraft. The air force tracks its items by pallet number; therefore, when an item reached the

point of departure at the airfield and was loaded aboafd an aircraft, it lost its DODAAC identity and took

on the air force's pallet number. The problem was accentuated by the fact that Dover Air Force Base was

thoroughly inundated with shipments for the Desert Express. Additionally, problems of tracability were

compounded when consolidated army shipments were fragmented in order to conform to the space

available and air pallet configurations. The NICP thus lost control and visibility of nearly all items. This

created a problem for both the NICP and the user. The NICP was unable to tell the user when an item

would arrive in country. Furtlermore the NICP did not know which aircraft and pallet the itern was on. The

NICP could only tell the user that the item had left CONUS on a particular date. Where it went remained

unknown. Unable to locate the item, the user could requisition another item and the same events would

repeat themselves.'5 2

In consideration of the pro 3lems encountered attempting to maintain contact with materiel shipped to

SWA, materiel management personnel recommended that a uniform visibility and accountability system

to track items from the depot to the user be developed. The system should be capable of incorporating

the unit's DODAAC along with the air force pallet number.'5 3

Materiel management pers;onnel also observed that shipments to SWA during ODS were frustrated

by the lack of operational receiving activity at the commencement of the deployment. At times, materiel

68
management staffers received instructions to direct shipments to the ASG, the 321st MMC, or King Khalid

Military City. The shifting of staging sie destinations was reportedly due to a lack of resources. Items

were shipped from CONUS depots to assorted sites in the theater of operations. AMCCOM transportation

personnel traced all shipments from point of origin to air force receipt for flight to SWA. Yet, as previously

noted, visibility and accountability were frequently lost in flight. Additionally, upon arrival in SWA materiel

became backlogged as adequate resources were not available that could receive equipment, establish

audit and accounta'bility trails, research discrepancies, and coordinate the issue of equipment to combat

forces. Limited transportation available to move supplies away from air and sea ports to theater storage

units also contributed to the inability to properly track items. Accordingly, materiel management personnel

recommended that transportation authorities be enabled to trace equipment from the point of origin to its

final destination utilizing a single TCN (transportation control number). They also suggested that the

responsibility for the rapid establishment of a receipt, storage, and issue capabilities in a hostile theater

should be preordained. Additionally, they recommended, that operational plans should be in effect that

facilitate the immediate mobilization of vital resources; i.e., manpower and equipment, wholesale level

staging activities.'•

The presence of supply-oriented LARs might also have helped maintain the visibility and accountability

of American materiel in ODS, or so believed members of AMCCOM's Readiness Directorate. They believed

that the lack of commodity-dedicated supply LARs had adversely impacted unit readiness. The Readiness

Directorate's Logistics Assistance Division officers believed that supply LARs were not adequately

distributed at the unit or MMC levels to properly support wholesale or retail supply requirements in SWA.

AMCCOM elected to deploy supply personnel from the AMCCOM Materiel Management Directorate to

serve as supply LARs in SWA. The maintenance LARs were adversely impacted by having to carry the

supply burden at the units and could not devote needed time to perform their assigned maintenance

mission. Accordingly, the Readiness Directorate commented that "generic" AMC supply LARs are not as

effective as commodity-dedicatea supply LARs. Therefore, the directorate urged, commodity-skilled LARs

should be deployed to assist field users in carryirg out fieli supply operations. 1

•

The Materiel Management Directorate's Light Weapons Division also recommended that supply and

distribution problems in SWA might have been eased with the presence of a greater number of specialists.

They noted that the failure to provide appropriate supply and distribution specialists had contributed to the

development of an enormous backlog or "iron mountain" of materiel at air and sea ports, as well as theater

storage areas, that soon overwhelmed the capabilities of the distribution system. Accordingly, the division's

personnel recommended in future deployment scenarios that a significant increase in the numbers of depot

supply and receiving personnel, NICP supply logistic assistance representatives, and other assorted

logistics personnel be affected. The division concluded their submission to the AMCCOM Operation Desert

Shield/Storm After Action F jpgr with the stern comment that headquarters must "recognize that sufficient

numbers of logistics specialists must be in place before resupplies begin arriving within the theatre."1•

Additional supp!y-oriented problems focused on reporting ammunition stockages. Indeed, the lack of

accountability of ammunition supplies became the object of an observation deemed "significant" in the after

action report. That document stated that Class V (ammunition) supplies could not be properly accounted

for without ammunition personnel present early on in the theater of operations. Also, accountability could

not occur without a uniform accounting system such as TACCS (Tactical Army Combat Service Support

Computer System) or SAAS (Standard Army Ammunition System) in place and operational. Accordingly,

AMCCOM's SWA detachment urged that before future deployments were undertaken these matters be

considered and planned for. Indeed, the topic was presented and discussed at September 1991's OMMCS

(Ordnance Missile and Munitions Center and School) Conference as the "intransit visibility of ammunition

is a systematic problem within the army and would have occurred within any theater." The problem was

thus not limited simply to AMCCOM.'5 7

69

S - - II
`77

Additional accountability and visibility issues were caused by the failure of AR 700-22's (WARS-World

wide Ammunition Reporting System) reporting requirements to include ammunition already in the

possession of troops. The only ammunition accounted for via the system included basic load assets stored

in ASPs (ammunition supply points) which had been created after the arrival of logistical personnel. Thus

any ammunition carried in by troops, or which arrived prior to logistics specialists concerned with recording

its presence was not accounted for in the system. In order to better grasp the ammunition in theater,

AMCCOM staffers recommended that the WARS structure be modified to require that those basic load

items already in the possession of troops be accounted for. They also recommended that an ammunition

support group should arrive in theater to plan support operations prior to units establishing storage sites.'5

Such incorrect and delayed information caused a never-ending stream of headaches for production

and procurement personnel, as it did for all subordinate command elements, throughout the course of ODS.

Indeed, the lack of communications support became an issue reported in AMCCOM's Operation Desert

Shield/Storm After Action Reoort. Inadequate supplies of essential communication equipment and

personnel degraded the flow of information, as did improperly managed electronic forms of communication.

Accordingly, theater support activities were unable to establish the necessary communication links with

command elements; several units that relied upon the communication network were unable to retrieve or

dispatch quality information.'5 9

The numerous problems encountered (regulatory relief, communication crises, tracking troubles, environmental issues, contractual concerns, etc.) in the realm of production and procurement though were

readily outweighed, however, by the number of successful efforts. The AMCCOM Procurement Directorate

accelerated 149 actions, 53 contracts, 96 purchase orders, and awarded 503 contracts in support of the

American effort in the Persian Gulf War. Consequently, the directorate administered a total of 1,434

procurement requirements during the war at a dollar value of $895,169,286. Many of these actions were

executed with little or no additional cost to the government, or accordingly, the taxpayer, as they

represented accelerations, not unbudgeted purchases.'6

One of the more unusual attempts at acquiring the accouterments of war came under the direction of

the Product Assurance and Test Directorate's Weapons Quality Operations Division. During Operation

Desert Storm, they attempted to buy back short supply items that had passed into the hands of army surplus

dealers. Significant procedural and policy problems became evident immediately as none of the functional

elements, including procurement, engineering, quality assurance, and maintenance had any guidance on

how to proceed with this effort. The main problems encountered in the re-acquisition included: the degree

of conformance to technical requirements that should be expected and/or required; the ability to trace the

item to a manufacturer; the amount of inspection and testing to be performed as well as when and by whom;

and the contractual requirements to be included in the procurement documentation.' 6

'

In consideration of such issues, no purchases were made. But AMCCOM personnel determined that

if army surplus dealers were to be considered a valid source of materiel, a buy-back policy and general

guidance regarding policy and procedures for this type of procurement action had to be in place and

available to the procurement, engineering, and quality assurance communities in order to expedite actions.

Accordingly, the Weapons Quality Operations Division recommended that a working group representing

AMCCOM's Procurement Directorate, Product Assurance and Test Directorate, Maintenance Directorate,

and Office of Counsel, as well as SMCAR's Engineering Support Directorate, should be convened to

establish policy and procedures for buying back army surplus materiel, if higher headquarters indeed

determined that army surplus dealers could be considered as a viable source of supply for future conflicts

and operations.182

70
More traditional efforts at procurement included the awarding of the XM951 leaflet round to Norris Industries

on 19 October 1990. Delivery of the first 115 rounds was scheduled for early December 1990 at Dugway

Proving Grounds, western Utah, for loading, assembling, and packing (LAP). The remaining 85 rounds

arrived in early January 1991 for the same processing procedures. Approximately one and a half days were

required to prepare the rounds for shipment to SWA after their arrival in Utah. Each round contained

"standard surrender leaflets" prepared by the army's psychological operations group. Throughout the

Persian Gulf War, a total of 29 tons of the 3" X 6" leaflets were dropped on Iraqi forces. While some were

scattered by hand from helicopters, the majority fell upon the forces of Hussein by leaflet bomb. Carrying

such messages as "Flee and live, or stay and die!", or "Yesterday, we demonstrated the power of the

Multinational Forces. Once again, we offer you survivors the chance to live", as well as line drawings

illustrating the solidarity of the coalition forces and their overwnelming power. The leaflets also contained

surrender instructions. As evidenced by the large numbers of POWs who surrendered carrying leaflets,

the bombs should be considered tremendously successful. This is particularly true if the premise that every

enemy soldier who surrenders equals at least one less bullet fired at friendly forces is embraced.16 3

Additional noteworthy procurements included the acceleration by Alliant Techsystems, Edina, MN, and

Aerojet Ordnance Company, Downey, CA, of the 25mm M791 cartridge used bythe Bradley fighting vehicle

in response to the needs of a nation at war. In less than 90 days, they went from a dead start to a monthly

production rate of 270,000 rounds. Aerojet personnel also successfully maneuvered simulated Search

and Destroy Armor (SADARM) with an explosive warhead during the war. The development represented

a major step in support of the future Preplanned Product Improvement (P31) SADARM effort and could

lead to the creation of inexpensive "footprint" enhancements for a maneuverable SADARM. Also, in

anticipation of the demands to be placed upon it, Alliance Techsystems purchased additional equipment

in advance of receiving the contract-at no charge to the government-so they could increase their

capacity for producing the rounds. Both Alliance Techsystems and Aerojet Ordnance received special

certificates of recognition for the support they offered the nation during ODS.'6

Also in support of ODS, Olin Corporation, St. Petersburg, FL, inserted into their December 1990

production schedule the manufacture of 5,000,000 rounds of 5.56mm M193 10-round clip. In addition,

they were capable of fulfilling 3 request for 2,000,000 rounds of 7.62mm 4/1-1,500 round link belts and

50,000 5.56mm M14 links for shipment to SWA. Olin set aside regular business to complete the effort,

demonstrating that they, as well as so many other of America's corporations, supported Operations Desert

Shield and Desert Storm. Olin Corporation also received a certificate of recognition from AMCCOM's senior

cadre.1 6

S

Sabre Industries, Mount Clemons, MI, received the contract for 2,000 SCRAMS, technical manuals,

training, and spare/repair parts to support the urgent needs of ODS. The SCRAM (selfcontained respiratory

assist mechanism) is a small air cylinder to be used by the gunner in an M1AI Abrams tank in case of a

fire within the turret. It provided an ,;xtra level of protection for the gunner, allowing him time to depart

from his position at the bottom of the turret. As a result of Sabre Industries' accelerated production, the

initial delivery of 1,000 SCRAMs arrived approximately six months prior to the scheduled date.'16

Nor were the aforementioned contracts the only acquisition projects undertaken by AMCCOM's

procurement community. During ODS, AMCCOM officials negotiated for the fabrication of 10,000 100

round reusable assault packs for the M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW) which were to be produced

in less than ten weeks, for the emergency buy of 900 laser protective visors (LPVs) for the AH-64 Apache

helicopter, and for the manufacture of M16 series rifle protective covers and experimental 30 round

magazines. Nearly 900,000 experimental "followers" were purchased from the Colt Manufacturing

Company when ones ordered from a competing firm became unavoidably delayed. Testing showed that

71
1,7777 , A ~

the experimental followers from the Colt Manufacturing Company, Hartford, CN, significantly improved the

performance of the rifles' magazines.' 17

Further procurement efforts focused on KDI Precision Products, Incorporated, Cincinnati, OH. On 31

January 1991, t,'e firm delivered, after the successful completion of the required lot acceptance tests

(LATs), 79 safety and arming devices for the Patriot M143E1 missile. The delivery completed Contract

DAAA-2189-C-0427 a full five months ahead of the original delivery schedule. This enabled KDI to

accelerate the delivery schedule on a remaining contract, DAAA09-90-C-0179, for safety and arming

devices by five months, allbwing for an initial February 1991 delivery of 60 devices.IM

Additionally, AMCCOM estabiished two new sources for M72/M73 weapon systems cable assemblies

to replace a decimated mobilization base. Mid-South Electronics, Annville, KY, produced the cables

throughout the deployment; Star Glo Industries, East Rutherford, NJ, began contractual deliveries in midNovember 1990 and accelerated production thereafter.16 -

Such efforts were not singular in the effort to provide America's fighting women and men with the

materiel of warfare. Indeed, as previously noted, during ODS, AMCCOM's procurement community

accelerated 149 actions, 53 contracts and 96 purchase orders, while awarding a total of 503 new contracts

directly in support of the Persian Gulf War. In consequence, the Procurement Directorate administered

a total of 1,434 procurement requirements reaching a dollar value of $895,169,286. While no firm sought

to disrupt the effort of AMCCOM to .,"-iply the needs of Americans ir. the desert, a significant number did

go out of their way to ensure a dese. victory. Eleven such firms were recognized by AMCCOM's senior

leadership cadre for their contributions to the success named ODS. In addition to recognizing the previously

mentioned Aerojet Ordnance Corporation, Downey, CA, for its accelerated production of 25mm ammunition, one of the most urgently required items in the war, Alliant Techsystems Incorporated, Edina, MN,

was also recognized for 25mm ammunition production. Staffers at its New Brighton, MN, division increased

production ten fold. BEI Defense Systems Company, Fort Worth, TX, was also lauded for its contributions

to the campaign in SWA. Employees at its Camden, AR, division toiled to meet increased orders for Hydra

70 rocket systems.170

Other firms recognized by AMCCOM for their commitment to excellence during ODS include BGI

Incorporated, Waltham, MA, for accelerating the development and production of an aerosol sampling

system to meet the potential chemical and biological threat, and Day & Zimmerman/Basil Corporation,

Philadelphia, PA, for accelerating the shipment of ammunition from Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plant,

shipping 72,501 tons o' ammunition during the war, and having processed 31,602 tons of retrograded

ammunition after the war's close. Also recognized for excellence was Lau Technologies, Acton, MA, for

speeding the production of A4 deck circuit cards for the Bradley fighting vehicle, and Manufacturer's Gasket

Company, North Royalton, OH, for expediting the production of parts kits containing gaskets, seals, and

washers for the manual turret drive of Mi-series tanks. New Horizons Diagnostics, Columbia, MD,

accelerated the development and production of biological detection test kits, and was duly commended

for doing so. Similarly, Olin Corporation, St. Petersburg, FL, was honored for its production and shipment

of critically needed 5.56mm and 7.62mm ammunition from Lake City Army Ammunition Plant, Independence, MO. Also recognized by AMCCOM officials was Spectra Physics, Mountain View, CA, for designing,

in less than two months, a laser with sufficient energy to meet army requirements for remote sensing of

chemical and biological agents.17'

Such suppliers to AMCCOM could not be called rare. AMC, AMCCOM's parent organization, as well

as AMCCOM could have commended dozens of firms that demonstrated teamwork and outstanding

cooperation in the effort not only to fully equip the men ar.d women fighting the forces of Saddam Hussein,

72
7 . ..-.................... ...................... ... ...................... ': • !J '; : : • " • !• • ; i• ,:i! :• ''!•r•: i,: '" i

but also those supporting the fighting forces. For example, in a fine commentaryon corporate contributions

to the success of ODS, AMC News noted that hundreds of firms contacted military units asking for the

opportunity to do their part. During ODS, firms sent their employees to the desert to offer advice, doubled

shifts, surged production, set aside union problems, and demonstrated American ingenuity in prob!em

solving. Detroit Diesel stopped its commercial production and worked multiple shifts to produce the engines

required by the army's heavy equipment tansporters (HETs). Within a week of contacting Detroit Diesel,

57 engines had been delivered.' 72

Perhaps no weapons system is as associated with the victory in the desert as the Patriot. Flickering

television images made every school child aware of the damage wreaked upon the Iraqi mcrale and mission

by the Patriot's interception and destruction of each inbound Scud. Yet at the time of deployment, the United

States Army did not have a single Patriot missile capable of knocking down a Scud, or any other incoming

ballistic missile. And had it not been fully operational at the onset of the air war, the mind must wonder

at the effect of Scuds raining down unhampered on the populations of Israel and Saudi Arabia. How might

the coalition have been affected? Would Israel have acted independently? Yet the questions are moot.

The Patriot missile did exist, and did have the capability of intercepting inbound missiles. That such

capacities existed at the start of the air war provides significant testimony to the skill and dedication of

American industry.'7 3

The Patriot's prime c-ntractor, Raytheon, Andover, MA, built the missile guidance system and front

end. Martin Marietta, Orlando, FL, bui;t the launchers and control sections, as well as completes the final

assembly of the missile sections. AMC's Harry Diamond Laboratory provided the fuzes. At the onset of

the deployment, each of the prime subcontractors was asked to accelerate production. Each readily

agreed, with Martin Marietta stepping up operations to include three shifts per day, seven days per week.

Twice more during hostilities, the contractors were asked to expedite deliveries; they did so, as did their

vendors. Production of the Patriot rose from zero to 400 missiles in less than six months, and by midFebruary 600 per month. Nor did quality suffer with the increased focus on quantity. During the height

of ODS, the operational readiness rate of the Patriot stood at 96 percent.'7 4

Meanwhile, at the Harry Diamond Laboratory work progressed on helping the Patriot kill Scuds,

specifically. The lab is responsible for the production of fuzes; the fuze recognizes targets and directs the

warhead to explode at the precise instant necessary. As there is only one chance at recognition, the fuze

must be capable of rapidly 6etermiring the target, and detonating. Mr. David Rodkey, chief of the Missile

Systems Branch at the Laboratory Command, explained, "It's sort of like name that tune in one note...

in order to say that's really a target and I've got to blow up the warhead now.* Accordingly, Mr. Rodkey

and his associates had to teach the Patriot what Iraqi Scuds looked like. To do so, the team built a facsimile

of a Scud in order to make radar signature measurements of it. They mounted a Patriot fuze atop and

instrumented van and drc ie it past the dummy missile about ten miles per hour. Returning to the laboratory,

using a computer, they speeded up the Scud's movement to real time. It worked."'

But it was not only corporate giants that affected the course of Operation Desert Storm. Little guys

also served to make a difference. For example, one Saturday morning during the deployment Mr. Ken

Oliver, General Tire, Waco, TX, noticed a couple of tire orders from the military in his basket for Monday's

shipment. While orders from the military for tires did not seem unusual, the telephone call from an item

manager in Detroit did. She asked Mr. Oliver if he could possible deliver the tires to Tinker Air Force Base

that day. After checking the carriers he was familiar with, Mr. Oliver made the decision to rent a truck and

drive the nearly 300 miles to the Oklahoma base himself. But in .leepy, Saturday afternoon Waco, not

only was a carrier not available, neither was a truck rent3l agency open. Ultimately, Mr. Oliver convinced

the owner of a rental agency in another town to open his shop. Through his untiring efforts, Mr. Oliver and

73
his 74 HET tires reached Tinker Air Force Base late that night, and a few hours later, the tires were on

a plane bound for SWA. And while tires may not seem like going to such difficulty for, consider that without

HET tires, tanks could not be transported or positioned for GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf's now famous

end run. 176

Similar to Mr. Oliver's extraordinary efforts, Mr. Tom Bolick also went the extra mile. An employee of

Magnum Power Systems, a battery manufacturer in rural North Carolina that want from producing a

thousand units a month to producing ten thousand units per month, Mr. Bolick filled his truck to the brim

with batteries and headed out to Tobyhanna Army Depot, Tot,. anna, PA. He got as far as the first weigh

station, where troopers found his truck to be overweight and threatened to pull him off the road. Mr. Bolick

explained the urgency of his mission and who the batteries were for to the trooper, who considered the

problem before him and slowly responded. "Saudi Arabia, you cay? My oldest boy is over there. I'll tell

you what I'm gonna do. I'm gonna give you a warning iiet and then I'm gonna call up north and clear

you through all the weigl t-a"icr;, h'ýween here and Tobyr, anna. Now get on outta here. And God bless

you,"1

Such effort' by srpyat_ , nd the nation's assorted citizenry could not be termed rare during

the war to pr.:.-t t;e ,erritcr~a. n!.-xr.v •f the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Many examples of the American

spirit came in t.c !o-m of vciuntaar, non-contractual gifts to the soldier in the field, and cannot truly be

considered in the realm Y p oduction and procurement, but neither can they properly be left out of a story

detailing the effort to supply Poldiers and their supporting civilians in the sands of SWA. Among the

donations: 150,000 boxes of k cnmer's Cockle,, hjndrd3 ol cases of pickled peppers from the Bruno

Pepper Company; 1,000 casec- of notakeic .uer; i 2,000 pounds of pretzels; thousands of radios and

audio cassettes, hundreds of camccrdafs; trio, 'ia,,.-: -1 portions of dehydrated ice cream, 2,000 pounds

of Dustpro dust control chomica's, unMtc,d nurn-. -i Wham-O and Wilson sporting goods, Bicycle playing

cards, Milton Bradley games, and K-M•r, st ',:ý:,ery, rnitýzines, books, sporting equipment, games, e•,.

Also aiding the soldiers: 2,100 cases cf Washington -,, 7,000 i cartons of Slim-Fast, 40,000 pounds

of Colgate-Palmolive soap and toothpaste, 70cs %t - f.(;ýw Jersey firm's rinseless shampoo and shaving

cream; 103,000 boxes of Nabisco Oreos (with 5,7 ` ';,j boxes being sent to soldiers' families in the United

States); and 170,000 packages of Hershey chocolate kisses. Thi.s was in addition to the untold millions

of Americans who on theirown sent baseballs, footballs, dartboards, comic books, pantyhose (used to keep

sand out of weapons), skin lotion, lip balm, and assorted toile 'ries. Additionally, 300 tons of mail arrived

in SWA every day."'

AMCCOM, working togetherwith associated commands, provided American soldiers, as well as many

allied ones, and their deployed, supporting citizenry with all the accouterments of war necessary to secure

victory, Never 'n the course of the Persian Guif War did American servicemembers lack the sinews to stand

for what the nation knew was right. Indeed, Mr. Perry C. Stewart, AMCCOM's Deputy for Logistics

Peadiness, has estimated that soldiers were provided with 180 to 250 percent of the actual required

materiel. Of course, as noted, such a flood of materiel in 3n otherwise arid coition of the world represents

a distinct problem. The supply system, as one logistics assistance reprewentative (LAR) succinctly stated,

was "broke" and resulted in undue efforts to fill an already full pipeline. Such elforts placed unnecessary

strains upon not only transportation assets, but also materiel management personnel, and production and

procurement staffers. As a result, CONUS materiel was both cannibalized aod disassembled for spare

parts, fabrications and acquisitions occurred, and surmlus dealers frequently found the army on the line."'

Such a scramble for spare parts illustrated a lesson to AMCCCM's Commander, Major General Paul

L. Greenberg. He observed in an after action interview that mate,'el must be extant, primed and ready

for deployment. The industrial base simply should not be relied up,'n to mobilize quickly enough to support

74
a war similar to that fought in SWA. He urged that ways must be developed to store materiel with the units

which will be the first called upon to fight, and that ways must also be developed to ensure that units have

materiel readily available to them to meet any contingency. especially in light of a down-sized military

structure. Ms. Donna White, former branch chief of the Procurement Directorate': Chemical Branch,

echoed MG Greenberg's concerns in a post-war interview. She commented that the Congress must not

give its support to stripped down defense bills which do not provide the financing to keep products in the

supply line. "If we had not had products in the supply line, we would not have been able to respond," she

warned. 180

Regardless of MG Greenberg's and Ms. White's concerns about the industrial base's capacity in high

intensity, limited time and geographical space warfare conducted by a down-sized military, AMCCOM

served the nation exceedingly well in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Although noting a

significant number of problems with supply and LAR support, LAR Deborah Rogers commented ir, an after

action interview, based upon her seven months in SWA, that American soldiers had gone to war well

equipped. Similarly, Ms. White, could proudly note that, "when each member cf the military--be they man

or woman---deployed to Southwest Asia, they were completely outfitted with all the chemical protection

and detection types of equipment.... Our primary job was to get the soldiers provided with everything

they needed for war," all the while staying within the rules outlined by the United States Congress.""1

The AMCCOM motto states "Firepower-We Make the Difference," and during ODS, the command,

production and procurement personnel included, most certainly did make a difference. And it was only

because the system was already in place, only because so many of the needed parts and supplies were

already on hand, only because an incredible number of ordinary folks did an extraordinary job that an

operation of the magnitude of Ooerations Desert Shield and Desert Storm could be carried out with

unprecedented speed and effectiveness.

75
NOTES

"

1

"War and Pieces: The Logistics Story of Desert Storm," AMC News, December 1991, 5-11.

'Ibid.

'United States Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, Operation Desert Shield/Storm After

Action Rep=t Commander's Assessment, v-5; United States Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical

Command, "Logistic Issues and Lessons Learned from Operation Desert Storm (ODS) and Southwest Asia

(SWA)," "Support to Desert Storm," n.d., n.p.; United States Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical

Command, Army Ammunition Plants and Activities. AMCCOMP 360-3, February 1990; Lessons Learned,

52348 94169 (00170) (U), AMSMC-TM, Title: Single DOD Focal Point for Ammunition Ship Planning. 20

May 1991; Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report. Executive Summary, 1-10, 1-14.

'Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report. Executive Summary, '-11-14.

5

Ibid.

'United States Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, AMCCOM Facts. AMCCOMP 5-1,

1 October 1991.

7

Ooeration Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report. Executive Summary, I-1, 4; ibid., Commander's

Assessment, V-2; ibid., Executive Summary, 1-9.

$Ibid., I-1.

9Ibid., 1-3.

10

Rodrigo Lazo, "Cannon-Maker Updates to Survive Cutbacks," Federal Times, 30 March 1992; Gregg

Jones, "Home-Front Technology Furnished Key Bomb for Persian Gulf War: Air Force, Companies

Combined on Crash Project for Bunker-Killer," The Washington Post. 6 July 1991, A14; and John D.

Morrocco and David A. Fulghum, "USAF Developed 4,700-Lb. Bomb in Crash Program To Attack Iraqi

Military Leaders in Hardened Bunkers," Aviatlon Week and Spaco Technology, 6 May 1991, 67.

"Jones; and Mark S.R. Suchecki, "Arsenal reveals its role in bunker-busting bomb," newspaper article

without publication n,..me, date, or page.

1

2

Jones. Military Review published a comprehensive listing of pertinent United Nations Security Council

Resolutions in its September 1991 issue, page 79, entitled "UN Resolutions".

"1bid.

"Ibid., Gerald L. Yarter, "A Proud Heritage Continues," Watervliet Arsenal, Watervliet, N.Y., n.d., 2-3.

1

5

lbid.; and CPT Leah M. Bryant, "Big bomb digs deep," Lang.Edge June 1991, 20.

"

6Yarter, 2-4.

76
"Yarter, 4-5.

"

1 Yarter, 5; and Jones.

19CPT Leah M. Bryant, "Bake a bomb," _LeadhaEdL June 1991, 26.

20Ibid.

21 Bryant, "Big bomb digs deep,* Ledn de June 1991, 20; and *The last-gasp effort to get Saddam,"

U.S. News and World Report, 20 January 1992.

22Bryant, "Big bomb digs deep," Le ~ingEdge, Jurie 1991, 21; Yarter, 6.

2"The last-gasp effort to get Saddam," U.S. News and World Report, 20 January 1992.

24Yarter, 7.

250peration Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report. Executive Summary, 1-3.

26Lee Waters, "Chemical Weapons in the Iran/Iraq War," Mifial Reiw October 1990, 59. I

27 Ibid.

28lbid., 60-61.

"

2 Ibid., 61-62.

30"UN Resolutions," Milita~tRyeview., September 1991, 79.

31

Waters, 62-63.

32

Ibid.

33Ibid., 63.

34Ibid.

"

3 Jeffrey K. Smart, "Preparing for Chemical Warfare: The History of the !ntantry Protective Mask", ORDEC

r Special Study #11. This paper was prapared while Smart served as a historian for the United States Army

Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMOCOM), and is not dated. See pages 2-6.

3

6lbid.

3

7

IbiC., 9.

3 9

0gertion Dertaid/Storm After Action Rep.E. Executive Summary, 1-10-13; and Jan Finegan,

'Soldiers gain confidence in equipment: Desert facility gives customer satisfaction," AMCCOMQM.uart!:iiy,

April 1991, 1.

77
V7

40"P8A Supports Desert Shield," [Pine Bluff] Arsga Accents. September/October 1990, 1; and AMSMCAS, Historical Feeder Report, FY 90.

*4' 1Lessons Learned, 32138-45668 (00085) (U), AMSMC-ASN, Title: Protective Masks Production Base.

21 June 1991.

42Ibid.

* ~ 43Ibid., interview, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO, with MG P.L. Greenberg, AMSMC-CG, 31 July 1991.

"4Lessons Learned, 32138-45668 (00085) (U), AMSMC-ASN, Title: Protective Masks Production Base.

21 June 1991.

* ~ Ibid.

4OLetter (U), MG Paul L. Greenberg, AMSMC-CG to GEN Williamr G.T. Tuttle, AMC-CG, 21 August 1990;

and AMSMC-AS, Historical Feeder Report, FY 90.

* 47Harry J. Schmidt, Fielded Mask Weapon Systems Matrix Manager AMSMC-ASN-C, *M17, M24, M25

* Chemical/Biological Mask,' 23 January 1991.

4OJan Finegan, "M1 7 mask "service station" is a popular stop for desert soldiers," AM es April 1991.

'

9

lbid.

5Ibid.

52Ibid.

"'David S. Robinson, "Desert Shield Pushed Production at PB Arsenal," Pine Bluff Commercial. 14 January

* 1991, 1.

51

40pration Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report. Executive Summary, 1-2, 3; United States Army

Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, AMOCOM Facts. AMOCOJMP 5-1, 1 October 1991; and

Interview, Thomas J. Slattery, AMSMC-HO, with Ronald E. Sikorski, SMCRI-AP, 31 October 1991.

"I5nterview, Thomas J. Slattery, AMSMC-HO, with COL Richard W. Bregard, SMCRI-CO, 9 June 1992.

"M~emorandum (U), MI.F. Montford, SMCRI-DL, for AMSMC-IN, Subject: Desert Storm/Desert Santa. 6

March 1991; Information Paper (U). SMCRI-DL, Subject: AMCCOM Commander's Conference. 5 March

12~9i, 1 March 1991; and statistics presented by Mr. Ronald E. Sikorski, SMCRI-AP, at FMA meeting, 5

February 1991.

"

5Paul Levesque, "Arsenal shifts its production priorities," Targe~t. 8 February 1991, 1 B, 38.

"Ilnterview, Thomas J. Slattery, AMSMC-HO, with Michael F. Montford, SMCRI-DL, 26 November 1991.

78
"•Statistics presented by Ronald E. Sikorski, SMCRI-AP, at FMA meeting, 5 February 1991; and Montford

Intvw., 26 November 1991.

6 lnterview, Thomas J. Slattery, AMSMC-HO, with Leslie H. Black, SMCRI-DL, 21 October 1991; and

Montford lntvw., 26 November 1991.

61

Memo (U), through Fred R. Dearborn, Civilian Executive Assistant, from COL R.W. Bregard, SMCRI-CO,

to Leslie H. Black, SMCRI-DL, Subject: Status of HOT Shipments. 15 August 1990.

uMontford Intvw., 26 November 1991.

•Memo (U), through Fred R. Dearborn, Civilian Executive Assistant, from COL R.W. Bregard, SMCRI-CO,

to Leslie H. Black, SMCRI-DL, Subject: Status of HOT Shipments. 15 August 1990.

"'Routing and Transmittal Slip, through Fred R. Dearborn, Civilian Executive Assistant, from Michael

Montford, SMCRI-DL, to COL R.W. Bregard, SMCRI-CO, 16 August 1991; and "Shop sets bound for

Persian Gulf," Taget. 11 January 1991.

6Montford Intvw., 26 November 1991.

•Ibid.

"87Thomas J. Slattery, "M864 and M825A1 Spacers." This brief assessment of Rock Island Arsenal's

production of spacers was prepared by Mr. Slattery, AMSMC-HO, as a feeder report to this volume and

for his own concerning the role of the arsenal in Operations Desert Shield/Storm. Unless otherwise noted,

all discussion of spacer pioduction is from this source.

"Sikorsi Intvw., 31 October 1991.

"

6 Lessons Learned, 52356-58715 (00173) (U), AMSMC-RT, Title: Special Artillery Marking Round for

Friendly Troop Positions. 23 May 1991.

70

Ibid.

71Ibid.

72

-Message 111 (U), COL David T. Morgan, Jr., AMSMC-CS, for MG Paul L. Greenberg, AMSMC-CG, to

GEN William G.T. Tuttle, AMC-CG, 25 February 1991.

"

37

Heike Hasenauer, "Bullets and Bombs," S , February 1991, 1r; Operation Desert Shield/Storm

After Action ReBL.Lt Executive Summary, 1-8; and "Crane accelerates ammunition shipments," Tgra~eL 14

September 1990, 2B-3B.

74

Hasenauer, 18; United States Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, AMCCOM Facts.

AMCCOMP 5-1, 1 October 1991; and Operation Desert Shield/Storm AftrLActjio..BprL Executive

Summary, 1-8.

7

'Hasenauer, 18-20; and "Crane accelerates ammunition shipments," Taropt 14 September 1990, 2B-3B.

79
78

"Crane accelerates ammunition shipments,'%Targ.e. 14 September 1990; and Lessons Learned, 52359-

69829 (00177) (U), AMSMC-PT, Title: Hiring Authority for Operation Desert Storm. 23 May 1991.

77Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report. Executive Summary, 1-8; and "Surge Items,"

AMSMC-PD, 1 November 1990. For additonal information on the role and accomplishments of army

ammu~iition plants during Operation Desert Shield/Storm see Chapter Five: Ammunition.

78 L-essons Learned, 621 37-53602 (00257) (U), AMCPMi-MO, Title: Fuze Production for Mortar AmmunibIi-r 21 June 1991.

79Ibid.

80Ibid.

81

.Draft of Lessons Learned, 52951-01271 (00200) (U), ARDEC SMOIARAST, Title: World Ammunition

Production Data Base. 23 May 1991.

82AMSMC-RT (?), 'Proposed Actions-Procurement", 28 September 1990.

81Ibid.

841essons Learned, 51 753-1 8830 (00140) (U), AMSMC-SP, Title: Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).

17 May 1991.

86Memorandum (U), Jean L. Robinson, Acting Director, AMSMC-PC, to AMSMC-PCA, -POG, -P05, -PCW,

Subject: Urec Stlr t frOel1OM Desert Storm J&As. 12 February 1991.

"~Lessons Learned, 91 843-37389 (00001) (U), AMSMC-PDJ-O, Title: 1 HO. AMCCOM Surge Production

Program. 11 September 1990.

87

1bid.

88Ibid.

89 Ibid. -

91Lessons Learned, 52827-92516 (00185) (U), AMSMC-PPA, Title: Secretarial Level J&As. Implementation f lass j&Asi Standard Language J&As, 23 May 1991.

91 Ibid.

92Ibid.

93

Ibid.

94Ibid.

"

9 Ibid.

96Lessons Learned, 52835-67224 (00190) (U), AMSMVC-PPA, Title: Streamlining of Accuisitior Plians. 23

May 1991.

80
97

Memorandum (U), Jim Walden, AMSMC-PPA, to AMSMC-DP, -GC, -SP, Subject: Request for Waiver

of Market Survey for Items in Support of Operation Desert Storm. 13 February 1991.

9lbid.

9Message (U), Randy Bartholome, Chief, Acquisition Strategies Division, AMSMC-PPA, to LTC William

R. Pulscher, AMSMC-PC, Subject: Restricting Desert Storm J&As to Past Producers. 21 February 1991.

10 6

Lessons Learned, 52844-82875 (00191) (U), AMSMC-PPA, Title: Implementation of Generic Market

Survey Waiver, 23 May 1991.

101Undated document from AMSMC-GC (R), "Statute/Regulation, Impediment to AMCCOM".

1021bid.

103 Ibid.

0

14Message 98 (U), LTC Gerald Abbott, AMSMC-PCA, to Marshall F. Collins, AMSMC-PCA-A, et al,

Subject: Delegation of Authority (DOA) to Aporove Unoriced Contractual Actions (UCAs) in Support of

Operation Desert Shield. 4 February 1991.

°

05

Memorandum (U), HODA to AIG 9127,12143, and 7406, Subject: Deviation from FAR 5.303 (A). DFARS

205.303 (A) and (S-70). Announcement of Contract Awards. 1109357Z February 1991; and AMSMC-PPC,

"Point Paper", Subject: Status of Relief from Regulations for Desert Storm-Related Procurements. 18

January 1991.

106 AMSMC-PPC, "Point Paper", Subject: Status of Relief from Regulations for Desert Storm-Related

Procurements. 18 January 1991.

'

07Ibid.; and Memorandum (U), CDRAMC to CDRAMCCOM, et al, Subject: Deviations and Delegations

of Authority (DOAs) for Operation Desert Storm (ODS) Procurements. 011700Z February 1991.

10

8Memorandum (U), CRDAMC to CDRAMCCOM, et al, Subject: Deviations and Delegations of Authority

(DOAs) for Operation Desert Storm (ODS) Procurements, 011700Z February 1991.

191bid.; and Lessons Learned, 52361-37989 (00179) (U), AMSMCPPC, Title: Regulatory Relief. 23 May

1991.

"0Lessons Learned, 52361-37989 (00179) (U), AMSMC-PPC, Title: Regulatory Relief, 23 May 1991; and

Lessons Learned, 52832-79304 (00188) (U), AMSMC-PPM, Title: Small Business 8(a) Goals. 23 May

1991.

"

1'"Small business plays large role in Desert Storm," Target. 12 April 1991, 9.

'

121bid.

"3Lessons Learned, 52361-37989 (00179) (U), AMSMC-PPC, Title: RegulatoryRelief 23 May 1991.

114 /bid.

81
"ILe.-ons Learned, 52950-76642 (00199) (U), Dover AMSMC-PC, Title: Incremental Deviations to

Procurement Regulations. 23 May 1991.

""Ibid.

1171bid.

118 bid.

1191bid.

1

21Lessons Learned, 52361-37989 (00179) (U), AMSMC-PPC, Title: Regulator Relief, 23 May 1991.

1

2'Lessons Learned, 52833-20592 (00189) (U), AMSMC-PPC, Title: Modification of Acquisition Process.

23 May 1991.

12Ibid.

1'2 Ibid.

124Lessons Learned, 52447-17232 (00181) (U), AMSMC-PCW, Title: Mobilization. 23 May 1991.

125 Ibid.

12Ibid.

1

27Lessons Learned, 40944-10412 (00100) (U), AMSMC-PDJ, Title: Environmental Constraints on "Red

Water. 5 April 1991.

1281bid.

'2Ibid.

"130 ibid.

1

31 PWD form 825-3 serves to start a new procurement effort; it assigns a schedule, and generates a national

stock number (NSN). Form 825-1 allows for amendment of a 825-3, and form 825-2 is utilized for serjices,

as opposed to tangible items. Memorandum (U), AMSMC-PDP to AMSMC-PDA, -PDM, -PDQ, Subject:

Desert Shield Designation on Procurement Work Directives (PWD). 11 October 1990.

1

32Memorandum (U), AMSMC-PD to AMSMC-PDA, -PDM, Subject: Desert Shield Designation on

Procurement Work Directives (PWD). 11 February 1991. Members of AMCCOM's Production Directorate

offered a suggestion similar to the format adopted in an October 1990 document submitted to the Lessons

Learned Task Force. See Lessons Learned, 01971-23298 (00010) (U), AMSMC-PD, Title: Designation

on Procurement Work Directives (PWDs), 19 October 1990.

133

Lessons Learned, 52847-93699 (00194) (U), AMSMC-PPM, Title: Procurement Aging and Stagin'

Sstem (PASS). 23 May 1991.

82
1

341Lessons Learned, 52846-23479 (00193) (U), AMSMC-PPS, Title: Commodity Command Standard 1

InformnationaSystem (COSS) Data Base. ý3 May 1991.

'Ibid.

1

36Lessons Learned, 51749-49797 (00138) (U), AMSMC-SP, Title: DesrtStgrm Requirements/Oblicato- 17 May 1991.

137

1bid.

1

38Lessons Learned, 51751-91261 (00139) (U), AMSMC-SP, Title: Segregating Desert Shield/Desert

Storm Obligations Fm fsic) the Competitive Base. 17 May 1991.

"19

lbid..

143lnterview H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO, with D.M. White, AMSMC-PCS-W, 22 July 1991.

1

41 Ibid.

1

42lbid.

143 Ibid.

V"bd.

1450 1eration Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report. Summary Analysis-"Supply".

146Lessons Learned, 40943-30100 (00099) (U), AMSMC-MM P, Title: ODS Frustration of Shipments. 5 April

1991.

'

47

Ibid.

'"L1essons Learned, 50231 -6J364 (00114) (U), AMSMC-MM, Title: Wholesale Accountability of Assets in

SWL&.1 May 1991.

149 Ibid.

150 Ibid.

151Ibi

112 Lessons Learned, 50237-16319 (00123) (U), AMSMC-MM, Title: Tracking/VisibilityAcco unta bilily of

Ases 1 May 1991.

1'3Ibid.

I'~Lessons Learned, 5C236-47371 (00121) (U), AMSMC-MM, Title: Loss of Identity/Ability to Trace

Shipmenis from Origin to Destination. 1 May 1991.

83
'1Lessons Learned, 61235-53789 (00245) (U), AMSMC-RDL, Title: Supply Logistics Assistance Representatives (LAR) in Southwest Asia (SWAM. 12 June 1991.

""Lessons Learned, 32143-87959 (00093) (U), AMSMC-MML, Title: Identification of Logistical Suoport

and Supported Customers within Theatre. 19 March 1991.

'

57

Lessons Learned, 61227-74231 (00237) (U), AMCCOM-SWA, Title: Accountability of Class V. 11 June

1991; and Lessons Learned, 12731-14731 (00058) (U), PM AMMO, Title: Theater Feedback and

Reporting. 26 November 1990.

'"Lessons Learned, 11167-86808 (00051) (U), HO, AMCCOM, Title: Asset Reporting through WARS. 11

November 1990; Lessons Learned, 61148-60823 (00234) (U), AMCCOM-SWA, Title: Seguence of

Activation and Arrival of Units into the Theate.r. 11 June 1991; and Lessons Learned, 32143-87959 (00093)

(U), AMSMC-MML, Title: Identification of Logistical Support and Supoorted Customers within Theatre. 19

March 1991.

1

5Lessons Learned, 61228-19600 (00238) (U), AMCCOM-SWA, Title: Insufficient Communications to

Support Mission. 11 June 1991.

IwUnited States Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, Ooeration Desert Shield/Storm After

Action Report, Commander's Assessment, v-5; United States Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical

Command, "Logistics Issues and Lessons Learned from Operation Desert Storm (ODS) and Southwest

Asia (SWA)," "Support to Desert Storm," n.d., n.p.

161Lessons Learned, 52252-36223 (00155) (U), AMSMC-QAG, Title: Buy-Back of Army Surolus Materiel,

20 May 1991.

162Ibid.

16 AMSMC-PD, "Production Directorate-Surge Items", 1 November 1990; and SSG William H. McMichael,

"Mind Games," Soldiers. May 1991, 6-8.

1 4Alfred N. Bradley, deputy, for LTC Melvin A. Miller, Acting Director, Readiness, to GEN William G.T.

Tuttle, AMC-CG, Subject: Data Call for Command and General Staff College Briefing. 28 February 1991,

18; "Good News," a computer mail service bulletin produced during ODS, point 91; and "Army Materiel

Command Praises Industry," National Defense. September 1991, 19.

1,'5Alfred N. Bradley, deputy, for LTC Melvin A. Miller, Acting Director, Readiness, to GEN William G.T.

Tuttle, AMC-CG, Subject: Data Call for Command and General Staff College Briefing. 28 February 1991,

S18; and "Army Materiel Command Praises Industry," Nat!onal Defense. September 1991, 19.

1,6Alfred N. Bradley, deputy, for LIC Melvin A. Miller, Acting Director, Readiness, to GEN William G.T.

Tuttle, AMC-CG, Subject: Data Call for Command and General Staff College Briefing. 28 February 1991,

14.

'

67

"Good News," points 172, 156, 162, and 221.

16l1 bid., point 195.
Si/7 ° /' //" /

, //

1691bid., point 53.

"l•°QatQ-lesert Shield/Storra After Action Report. Commander's Assessment, v-5; United States Army

Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, "Logistics Issues and Lessons Learned from Operation

Desert Storm (ODS) and Southwest Asia (SWA),""Support to Desert Storm," n.d., n.p.; and "Army Materiel

Command Praises Industry," Nationai Defense. September 1991, 19.

"'e"Army Materiel Command Praises Industry," National Defense. September 1991, 19.

"12'War and Pieces: The Logistics Story of Desert Storm," AMC News. December 1 J91, 6.

"173lbid., 7.

"17 41bid.

7. "751bid.

"

8

7l1bid., 7-8.

"1'Ilbid., 8.

"178Heike Hasenauer, "Corporate America Supports Desert Storm Troops," Soldiers. April 1991,14-15; and

Donna Miles, "Through Rain or Sleet ... or Desert Sand," Soldiers. April 1991, 34-36.

"17lnterview, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO, with P.C. Stewart, AMSMC-DL, 23 April 1991; interview, H.P.

LePore, AMSMC-HO, with D. Rogers, AMSMC-RD, 1 November 1991; interview, H.P. LePore, AMSMCHO, with D.L. Wa,'necke, AMSMC-MM, 19 March 1991.

'80interview, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO, with MG P.L. Greenberg, AMSMC-CG, 31 July 1991; and

interview, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO, with D.M. White, AMSMC-PCS-W, 22 July 1991.

18'Rogers Intvw., 1 November 1991; and White Intvw., 22 July 1991.

85d
Nkm

86
Chapter Four

Logistics and Logistics Assistance Representatives

The closing months of 1990 and !he opening ones of 1991 :- tw the largest and fastest military

mobilization of all time as the armed forces of the United States deployed to the deserts of Southwest Asia

(SWA). Beyond the 540,000 troops which ensured that after only one hundred hours of ground warfare

the Iraqi Army was left shattered, tattered, and burning (that which t ad not surrendered), a multitude of

other resources had made possible the victory: food, ammunition, vehicles, water, petroleum, oil and

lubricants, chemical defense equipment, communication systems, rr edical supplies, and so much more.

Indeed, the logistical preparations for the brief conflict can be liken•d to transporting the entire city of

Atlanta--people and all things movable-and not only setting it up again in an uninhabited desert halt a

world away, but also sustaining it for six months. In all, 21 billion pounds of equipment and supplies were

shipped.'

Overstating the logistics operation that began on 2 August 1990 is nearly impossible. In the first three

weeks of Operation Desert Shield (ODS), as much materiel arrived in the Persian Gu0f region as had arrived

in Korea during the first three months of that war. Indeed more materiel was airlifted to the area in the first

six weeks than during the entire Berlin Airlift of 1948. When Operation D3sert Shield became Operation

Desert Storm, 103,000 wheeled vehicles, 12,000 tracked vehicles, 26,000 conta~ners and 400,000 tons of

ammunition were in place. Ready.2

Behind-and sometimes along side-the 540,000 American troops, assuring that the multitude of

vehicles and myriad of materiel was where it needed to be, when it needed to be there, and in the condition

it needed to be was an army of civilian, logistics personnel. Over 2,000 United States Army Materiel

Command (AMC) civilians, nearly 600 of whom were logistics assistance representatives (LARs), helped

to rmake the desert miracle possible by their presence in SWA. And of those nearly 600 LARs present in

SWA at the height of Desert Storm, 44 were United States Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical

Command (AMCCOM) civilians and eight were AMCCOM military LARs.3

By definition, AMCCOM LARs are traditionally assigned to a particular unit and work beside that unit

in the field, providing hands-on assistance and advice on maintenance, supply, and other logistical aspects of command-managed items. While their mission remained much as it would have had their particular unit

undertaken a stateside task, the LARs quickly understood that theirs was nc ordinaey assignment. And

while some AMCCOM LARs had time to adjust their thoughts and lives to the possibility of an extraordinary

autumn in the Gulf, others were forced by circumstances to adapt their lives quite rapidly. Ms. Deborah

Rogers, for example, AMCCOM's 1991 LAR of the Year, assigned to the 82nd Airborne of Fort Bragg, NC,

followed her unit to the desert on rather short notice. Although she had made her willingness to deploy

known shortly after Hussein's Kuwaiti take over, she had but six hours to prepare for transfer to SWA after

AMCCOM's Readiness Directorate's Logistics Assistance Division received assurances from SWA that

LARs would be well tended in matters of security, housing, and basic support. She left the continental

United States (CONUS) from Fort Bragg on 24 August 1990 and, after a brief stop over in Spain, arrived

in Dhahran on 25 August 1990 to become the first wornaib LAR deployed to SWA.4 Although, Ms. Rogeis

deployed from Fort Bragg's Green Ramp staging area, Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), MD, later served

as the primary Preparation for Overseas Rotation/Mobilization (PORIM) center for deploying United States

AMC pe.-sonnel.5

Considerable effort was extended to assure that AMCCOM's deploying personnel, including LARs, had

all the information and equipment needed to function in the Kuwaiti theater of operations. Information

87
v- V .- _

packets were provided and individuals briefed upon their contents, chemical and biological defensive

equipment (CDE) training was completed and CDE was issued, along with two uniforms, and other clothing

and items deemed necessary for forward deployment to the desert. Each forward deploying individual was

entitled to two two-quart canteens with covers, a helmet with cover, hat, belt, suspenders, mess kit, first

aid pouch with dressing, parka with liner, poncho, two blankets, sleeping bag, mattress, two waterproof

bags, and a duffel bag. Individuals deploying to rear positions were issued CDE. The designation of forward

or rear deployment status was to be determined by HO, AMC based upcn the individual's mission and area

of operations.6 In addition, medical appointments were completed and fiight arrangements to SWA were

scheduled.7

Yet, problems occurred despite the fact that APG's staff did an exceptional job of procJssing in excess

of 200 deploying AMC civilians per week during their peak periods of operation. Among the problems was

the fact that APG could not issue weapons, and AMCCOM did not have weapons avaiiable to issue their

front-line civilian personnel prior to leaving for APG. Whi.a weapons were not considered mission essential

to all personnel, individuals entitled to carry one felt deprived and civilian morale as a whole was damaged.

Weapons were ultimately issued on a case-by-case basis from a variety of other sites.8

Of greater importance to LARs was the failure of APG to stock sufficient quantities of desert clothing

and equipment. LARs were frequently deployed not in desert camouflage battle dress uniforms (BDUs),

but rather in APG-substituted green camoutl3ge BDUs. Similarly, some LARs found themselves in transit

to SWA wearing ill-fitting boots which had been issued on an emergency "fill or kill" basis when supplies

of common sizes had been exhausted. Employees were told that boots and uniforms were not deemed

mission essential. The unintentional result of these substitutions and shortages was frustrated personnel.

When a few deploying individuals acquired their own clothing and equipment, reimbursement problems

occurred.9

Looking back on the problems which occurred at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, AMCCOM Readiness

Directorate (RD) officials noted that AMC had the responsibility to properly equip AMCCOM personnel. But

AMCCOM's RD personnel were not without suggestions as to how best to avoid equipage problems in

future endeavors. Specifically, they noted that for future POR/M deployments to an imminent combat zone,

shortages of equipment and clothing contravened by POR/M centers using substitute articles of uniforms,

boots and other authorized items should be back-ordered for direct delivery to the LAR (or other civilian)

who departed for the theater of operations without their full complement of equipment. And in order that

civilians might not need to deploy in a "fill or kill" equipment status, AMCCOM personnel urged that AMC

mobilization regulations and standards should be altered to authorize the use of non-traditional imprest

funds for the proper outfitting of LARs from local, nongovernmental sources, including 3ears, Gander

Mountain, Cabelas, and similar retailers. AMCCOM did recommend that requests to retailers be handled

via their usual free 1-800 telephone numbers.' 0

Observations concerning the processing of LARs through APG did not oniy make their appearance at

the conclusion of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Indeed, as early as 4 October 1990 problems

with LAR, as well as other civilian, deployment became apparent. The AMC Commander noted on that dat,'

that too many individuals were reporting to APG without sufficient credited funds."

Without sufficient credited funding, personnel deploying for SWA found themselves in constrained

circumstances when they discovered that their home station was responsible for their billeting and cost of

meal5 at APG, just as if the employee was on TDY (temporary duty) assignment. Message traffic reminded

HO, AMCCOM that it, as well as all sponsoring AMC units, were responsible for ensuring thai their contract

covered all expenses and that APG was properly reimbursed for the services rendered to their deploying

88
personnel. The sponsoring activity was expected to provide sufficient funding for adequate clothing and

equipment to be issued to deploying personnel so that their job could be perbrmed safely.'2

LARs could find themselves in uncomfortable individual financial straits if they expected APG to provide

them with personal items for their trek to the desert. The same message which prompted AMCCOM tc

provide sufficient credit to its deploying personnel for their billeting and dietary needs at APG reminded

AMCCOM employees that the movement and replacement center was rot responsible for supplying

deployees with such items as toothbrushes, sunglasses, sunscreen, lip bakn, shoes, boots, underwear,

socks, towels, and other sundry items. It would, however, make opportunr, es available for personnel to

purchase personal items at either APG's clothing sales store or commercial stores.13

In order that APG was not overrun with individuals attempting to ceploy at all dates and times, AMC

decreed that personnel would be batch processed through the facility. All rotations through APG would

begin on Monday, with late arrivals being held over for processing the following Monday. And in order that

APG might run smoothly, spcnsoring activities were to provide time-phaseJestimates of the numbers of

their personnel expected to be processed through APG. Indeed, to ensure the smooth flow of personnel

through APG, only the Emergency Operations Center of AMCCOM's Readiness Directorate was authorized to make the necessary reservations for AMCCOM personnel passage ftrough the Maryland facility."4

Prccessing through APG was in actuality one of the final steps of deploymnt to SWA. Prior to arriving

at APG for travel to the theater of operations, deploying civilians, LARs as well as quality assurance

specialists-ammunition surveillance (QASAS), and senior command representatives (SCRs), had numerous requirements to meet and obligations to fulfill. And in order that no steps might be omitted in the

processing of deployees for SWA, AMCCOM ultimately issued a circular detailing tho necessary

progression of events for travel and transport to SWA.' 5 The circular declared its purpose to be the

prescription of "policies and procedures" as well as the assignment of 'respnsibilities for preparing for

travel to Saudi Arabia in support of Operation Desert Shield."16 The circular appRed to all military and civilian

personnel assigned to AMCCOM, including the U.S. Army Armament Research, Development and

Engineering Center (ARDEC), the U.S. Army Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center

(CRDEC), Project/Product/Program Managers (PMs) reporting to HO, AMOCOM, and subordinate

installations and activities.17

The circular noted that the Deputy Director, Readiness Directorate (AMSMC-RD) was the sole

individual authorized to sign travel orders as the approving cfficial for all travel pertaining to Operation

Desert Shield, and ultimately Desert Storm. And although the circular was designed to focus upon

OCONUS (outside continental United States) travel, it commented that the Deputy Director's signature/

approval was also required for supportive CONUS travel.'3 The Commanding General, AMCCOM bore

responsibility for the approval of all OCONUS travel; his signature, or that of his designated alternate, was

therefore required with that of the Readiness Directorate Deputy Director's on DARCOM (U.S. Amy

Materiel Development and Readiness Command) Form 1297 (a form requiring detailed iustification for

travel abroad) and on the AMC Clearance Sheet (a prescribed form required by AMC to obtain theater

clearance for Saudi Arabia). The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) segment of the Readiness

Directorate was responsible for onsuring that the proper signatures adomed the travel orders and

DARCOM Form 1297.1

The circular assigned numerous responsibilities to AMSMC-RD beyond that of its Deputy Director's

authori2 ation of all travel orders. In addition to this, the directorate was requiredto ensure that all necessary

forms were accurate ano included in the travel packet. The EOC had special duties in conjunction with the

deployment of civilians to SWA beyond the acquisition of signatures. Its staff was required to monitor the

89
travel of all AMCCOM personne! in support of ODS, to ensure that the appropriate approvals had been

obtained, and that the necessary notifications had been made. Additionally, it maintained the records

needed to determine when to initiate and terminate the deployees' foreign post differential (FPD) pay.

Furthermore, the EOC was charged with the maintenance and routing of AMC Clearance Sheets, notifying

AMC of estimated personnel requirements and identifying all AMCCOM deployees by name for POR

qualification at APG. 0

The Comptroller (AMSMC-CP) was tasked with the processing of all financially oriented paperwork in

support of civilians deploying to SWA. Advances were to be processed, whenever aoplicable, through the

appropriate seivicing Finance and Accounting Office, and civilian pay was to be dispersed based upon an

appropriately filed SF 1190, "Foreign Allowances Application, Grant, and Report."21

AMCCOM Circular 55-1 was also quite specific in detailing the actions LARs, as well as other deploying

civilians, were to undertake before travel to APG could commence. The circular noted that LARs not

attached to a specific unit were required to obtain their own visas while LARs attached to a particular unit

were to obtain their visas in accordance with the unit's procedures. All deploying civilians were to prepare

DD Form 1610, "Request and Authorization of TDY Travel for DOD Personnel" in quadruplicrate, and

forward all four copies of these cfficial travel orders to the appropriate Readiness Directorate Logstics

Assistance Division. And to ensure that the form was properly prepared and thus avoid any delays in

processing, AMCCOM personnel devoted Appendix F of AMCCOM Circular 55-1 to this task. Later,

AMCCOM officials amended DD Form 1610 to specifically address issues of Operation Desert Storm. rhe

amended form addressed primarily the "remarks" portion of the form and included information on rental

cars, excess baggage of up to 200 pounds, statements of nonavailability while at APG, corrective lens

inserts for gas masks, and the authorization for medical care. Also in preparation for travel to SWA,

deploying civilians were to ensure that their supported unit was prepared to provide billeting, mess facilities,

etc. Additionally, deploying LARs were to notify the AMCCOM Senior Command Representative (SCR)

at their return from detail, check their Leave and Earnings Statement upon return from detail to ensure that

FPD pay had been terminated, as well as prepare and submit DD Form 1351-2 "Travel Voucher" to the

appropriate servicing Finance and Accounting Office within 15 days of return. 22

Appendix A of AMCCOM Circular 55-1 was specifically devoted to "Preparation for OCONUS Travel."

Al! AMCCOM personnel preparing to travel to Saudi Arabia were responsible for reading and heeding the

material it contained. Of special notice to LARs preparing for travel to SWA was paragraph 3, subsection

"d." It noted that a fund cite would be forwarded by AMSMC-RDL (Readiness Directorate, Logistics

Assistance Division) to the LAR located with a unit for preparation for travel orders. The LAR, in turn, was

to return four copies of his/her travel orders to the Readiness Directorate where the responsible official in

the directorate's Logistics Assistance Division would assist in the preparation of DARCOM Form 1297, SF

1190 (for civilian LARs only) and the AMC Clearance Sheet.23

Civilian traveler-, other than LARs were to prepare DD Form 1610, SF 1190, DARCOM Form 1297, and

the AMC Clearance Sheet. These were to be forwarded to the Readiness Directorate for review, approval,

and signature. The Readiness Directorate was responsible for forwarding approved orders to the EOC for

notification of the AMCCOM Senior Command Representative (SCR) and the Chief, AMC-SWA.14

The EOC was !asked, according to Appendix A, with maintaining a list of personnel who would be

traveiing to Saudi Arabia and was to notify HO, AMC weekly of the deploying individuals who would be

arriving at APG for preparation for overseas rotation (POR) qualification the following Sunday. This tasking

became the object of criticism by the close of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Indeed,

Readiness Directorate's Policy, Plans, and Programs Division personnel noted in the required Operation

90
Desert ShiiedLStorm After Action Report that "Management made a wrong decision when they decided that

the Operations Center staff should be responsible for controlling, tracking, and ensuring [that] civilian/

military individuals received all the proper processing prior to deploying to SWA. The Operations Center

staff is not a tasking organization." Indeed, the submitted observation continuedthatthe EOC was to ensure

the proper organizations were assigned taskers. It further noted that "Handcarrying documents from one

end of the installation to the other to obtain required signatures by student aids or anyone who happens

to be passing by is ridiculous and leaves a large chance for documentation to be misplaced or lost."25

Readiness Directorate personnel recommended in future engagements that the Personnel and Training

Directorate in coordination with the Transportation and Traffic Management Directorate should be

responsible for all civilian/military deployment to OCONUS locations. The included rationale was that tese

organizations possessed the expertise in tracking, and that ultimately the EOC and Readiness Directorate

were not functional tracking facilities.

The result of the EOC and Readiness Directorate being tasked with the tracking of deploying civilians

was a bit of confusion, as well as consternation. For at no time during Operations Desert Shield and Storm

was there ever a list of deployed personnel available which anyone felt was accurate. !n order that accurate

records might be available during further deployments, the staff of the Readiness Directorate recommended that a clerk position be established, to go into effect immediately whenever there was an operation

such as ODS, in the Emergency Plans and Initiatives Branch to log in all travel orders as they arrived in that

office for approval. Names of travelers could then be entered into a computer program outlining required

information and kept up-to-date by the clerk daily. The ODS experience indicated that this position would

need to be a full time job with all on-duty time being devoted to maintaining the status of deploying personrel.

Due to the many levels of interest in such a listing, and its accuracy, the mission warrants the sole attention

of the responsible individual. This individual would need to begin these duties as soon as an emergency

was declared to assure that all deploying individuals were on the list. 6

Part of the trouble in maintaining an accurate listing of deployed civilians, regardless of career

classification, came from the shortage of employees available to staff the EOC. The thought of giving up

resources, even in the case of a temporary, emergenny scenario, was difficult for some directorates to

contemplate. The brief advance time the deployment presented accentuated the confusion and resentment. Indeed, the Organization and Force Management Division of the Management Directorate noted

somewhat dejectedly that "Much time, effort, and emotion was expended in a'juing over which directorates/offices would or could afford to detail personnel in the Operations Center."7 The office recommended

tf at the Readiness Directorate should establish staffing requirements for the Operations Center and have

pre-positioned agreements between Deputies/Organizations to streamline or simplify getting the Operations Center operational.

The problem of staffing had not been mitigated by the assignment of Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs), Individual Ready Reservists (IRRs), or other activated'reservists to the command Operations

Center. Indeed, the Readiness Directorate's Mobilization and Operations Branch referred to such

assignments as "a waste of resources which could be better utilized in other areas."5 The office's personnel

noted that the Operations Center had a full-time staff and did not have any IMA or IRR slots; the OC stafl

was to be augmented, whcn necessary, with civilian and military personnel already working full time for the

command. These people are familiar with the overail mission of the command and the detailed functions

of the organizations to which they are assigned. These understandings are essential to be a productive

asset to the EOC.

Army reservists (IMAs, IRRs, etc.) called to active duty to work at a predomi.nantly "civilian" installation

are not knowledgeable of the inter-workings of the command. These individuals are usually sent to their

91
mobilization station (ir this case a commodity command) for one to two weeks per year to meet the annual

training requirements. Often, the office/directorates they are assigned to do not want to take the time, or

are reluctant, to assign anything meaningful to the reservists since they are only around for such short

period. Frequently their "training" consists of being assigned to write or rewrite an interoffice Standard

Operating Procedure (SOP). Or, they are told to report to the Operations Center, simply to get the reservists

out of their assigned directorates' paths, without prior approval or knowledge of the Operations Center. 9

The Readiness Directorate Mobilization and Operations Branch further noted that it was "neither the

wish nor the responsibility of the Command Operations Center to train or find something for these

'unwanted' reservists to do. During times of crisis no one has the time to train individuals on areas that

should already be basic knowledge to all who work for the command. The design and structure of the

Operations Center is not conducive to having military officers miiling around the center. The nature of the

beast (officers) is to be a 'boss' and the Operations Centers already have too many bosses." The office

also noted that individuals frequently made demands upon the EOC staff that it had no obligation to meet,

then complained to superiors that the EOC staff wa. "unresponsive."30

Taking their cue from the problems encountered with the presence of reservists in their midsts, the EOC

staff urged that augmentees be functionally knowledgeable of the organization they were to work for and

understand the interrelationships of other directorates within the command. Furthermore, Readiness

Directorate personnel advised that Individual Mobilization Augmentees should be required to remain at

their MOBTDA (Mobilization Table of Distributions and Allowances) slot and not shunted off to other offices.

And to avoid problems with IMAs, IRRs, and other activated reservists in future deployments, the EOC

recommended that positions located CONUS army commodity commands should be reviewed for possible

elimination. Offices currently with these positions on their MOBTDAs were encouraged to review their need

for these individuals. If truly needed for a job in their organization, then effective training should be provided.

If the requirement did not exist for these individuals, the Readiness Directorate recommended that tI ie slots

be dropped from the MOBTDA. The Management Directorate was recommended as the instigator of office

MOBTDA updates."

Regardless of the fact that EOC occasionally felt overwhelmed by their tasking, that an accurate list of

deployed personnel seemed never to be available, as well as the absence of Pny official augmentation

policies and procedures for the staffing of the EOC to support a long-term contingency, work was

accomplished at the facility and with a relative degree of effectiveness. This occurred in p&rt, initially, due

to employees working overtime, but ultimately due to the assignment by the Command Group of various

offices to detail personnel to the EOC for a minimum of 120 days. Despite the adhocsuccess of the EOC's

detailed personnel, its officials did encourage the preparation and coordination of a staffing pla.n for the

augmentation of the Operations Center in the event of a crisis/emergency. This document would be a

regulatory document and would be necessa, to ensure th-al d-signated -fices, of do, In "act, p..OV1i le

personnel required by the plan, without the usual squabbling encountered otherwise. According to EOC

personnel, the preferred plan would include samples of each form necessary to detail an employee to the

Operations Center. It should also include job descriptions, shift hours and days to be worked so no

unnecessary overtime was entailed, meaning regular days off other than Saturdays and Sundays to keep

a seven day, around the clock vigil) 2

Also to avoid unnecessary confusion, misdirection, wasted time and effort, frustration and low morale

in the EOC, its permanent personnel recommended a formalized chain of command. During times of peace,

the chain was straight forward: Branch Ch;ef, Division Chief, Deputy and Director. How6,er, during ODS

the chain of command became clotted with chiefs: Chief, Operations Center; Chief, Programs, Plans and

Initiatives Division: Deputy Director Readiness; Director, Readiness; Chief of Staff; Deputy Commanding

92U
General, ProcCLrement and Readiness; Commanding General. From such an array of "chiefs", it was not

surprising that the "Indians" were frequently given conflicting tasks, guidance, and orders. The EOC staff

proposed two variant plans in the chain of command. In one scenario, the Operations Center would come

directly under the Command Group and be divorced from the Readiness Directorate in times of national

crisis or emergency. The Chief, Operations Center would then report directly to the Command Group for

the duration, returning to its peacetime standing at the cessation of hostilities. Alternatively, the Mobilization

and Operations Branch would become a staff office, reporting directly to the Command Group at all times.

It would retain its standing mission and functions in this proposed format.*

Beyond providing information concerning the role of the EOC in the deployment of civilians, listing the

forms needed for deployment and their disposition, Appendix A set guidelines for telephonic and datafax

communication of authorizations and approvals, and referred employees to later portions of AMCCOM

Circular 55-1 so that they might be familiar with preparation for overseas rotadion (POR) qualifications. Tab

C of Appendix A, for example, clearly stated the "Actions to be Accomplished at Home Station Prior to

Movement to Aberdeen Proving Ground." Actions to be accomplished by civilians prior to travel to the

Maryland facility included obtaining copies of their orders, as well as passports and visas (when

appropriate), their Geneva Convention cards and identification cards. Deploying civilians were also

reminded that they must prepare their wills and powers of attorney, arrange for transportation home of any

vehicles taken to APG, and prepare to report to the facility on the designated Sunday.

The circular also contained information directed towards military personnel and civilian contractors in

the process of deploying. It concluded with the notations that APG POR training was not applicable to

personnel then assigned, attached, or under the operational control of another major army command, and

that LARs, QASAS, and Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) personnel deploying with

their assigned unitwould be processed in accordance with the unit's procedures. Additionally, emergencies

could be handled on a case-by-case basis, and excessively heavy baggage/equipment was to be mailed

to SWA prior to the individuals departure for APG.C

Arguably the most time consuming, but most important "actions to be accomplished" by personnel

before thei; movement to APG invo!ved the status of their health. Deploying personnel were required to

contact their local health clinic as soon as possible for medical screening. They were required to take their

immunization record, a list of current medications, and their most recent eye glass prescription to the

appointment in order that a decisico might be made as to their serviceablity 'n SWA. Physicians were

reminded that their assessme'-t ol deploying individuals' capacity to serve in SWA should take into

consideration that occupational health services were very limited in SWA and that any job-related or

periodic tests/examinations necessary during the expected 180-360 day rotations should be completed

prior to departure.35

In addition, a memorandum generated for distribution to potentially deploying personnel and their

physicians noted that all individuals deploying should be assessed for ability to wear full chemical protective

equipment. A thorough and proper screening for this abi;!ty would include the past history of heat injury

and any medical condition that would preclude wearing a mask or protective clothing. Selective

examinations were to focus on cardiovasc,;lar. pulmonary, dermatologic, and neurologic systems.

Baseline ECG or pulmonary function tests, f not available were to be performed before deployment as

well.2

Additionally, physicians and their deploying clients were advised thst hearing should be adequate to

ensure reaction to chemical agent alarms, that perishable medications (e.g., insulin, allergy desensitization

shots) could not be guaranteed refrigeration or replacement in SWA, that personnel should be capable of

93
lifting and carrying 50 pounds on a daily basis, without restriction, and that newly diagnosed or unstable

medical conditions might be adversely affected by the stress of deployment. Furthermore, physicians and

deployees were to be aware that immunizations-typhoid, tetanus, immune globulin (hepatitis) and

meninnococcal (meningitis)-should be assessed and completed in acccrdance with regulations, that HIV

testing might be required of civilian personnel, but that a "current test"-one conducted within three yearswas required of military personnel, that personnel should leave for SWA with a six month supply of chronicneed medications, and that personnel who required specialty care in a medical center might not find that

care available in SWA and might therefore not be accepted for volunteer service. Concerning vision,

potential deployees and their physicians were advised that contact lens wearers should be prepared to

leave their contacts at home and to wear their spectacles, and that all individuals dependent upon glasses

should have prescription mask inserts prepared by APG personnel prior to their departure. Deploying

individuals dependent upon glasses were encouraged to take two pairs with them to SWA. Potentially

deploying women were to discuss the possibility of pregnancy with their physician with the understanding

that it might preclude their departure for SWA.37 Information gathered from testing was to be forwarded to

APG on HSC Form 621; regular medical records were not to accompany deployees. And while not of a

truly medical nature, male employees were advised by the same memorandum that beards would need !o

be removed in order that an air-tight seal could be obtained with protective masks.

Information was also provided concerning the health risks of deployment to SWA. Deployees were

warned that the greatest risks to their health came from the intense heat they would experience. Jet lag,

psychological stress, physical exertion, and the lack of acclimatization, all coupled with the heat, would

significantly compromise performance during their first three days in SWA. Acclimatization, which,

dependent upon the individual, could take 10-14 days, proper work-rest cycles, and adequate hydrationup to two quarts per hour of liquid--were touted as the keys to vitality in the desert.3 8

In the case of jet lag, deployees were informed to expect fatigue, irritability, headaches, reduced

efficiency, and early morning wakefulness within the first 24 hours, extending up to five days after landing.

This, exacerbated by the need upon arrival to establish contacts and familiarize themselves with the area

would result in exhaustion and impaired judgement deployees were warned. In order that they might avoid

the worst features of jet iag, all personnel were encouraged to schedule sleep before deployment to

coincide with Middle Eastern time zones, avoid alcohol and caffeinated beverages, maintain adequate

hydration (two to three glasses of water during every four hours of flight), and refrain from overeating. Jet

lag could also be countered by the ingestion of a small dose Halcion at departure, while simultaneously

avoiding alcohol and sleep interruption.3 9

The uncertainty which accompanies deployments, the unknown threats in enemy strength and

capabilities (e.g., chemical warfare), the foreign environment, the threat of strange diseases, the unknown

duration of deployment, and the threat cf personal harm, compounded by jet lag, were anticipated to affect

sleep patterns, the ability to rest, and hence the performance of the mission. Physical exercise, adequate

rest (when possible twelve hours on duty, twelve hours off duty and away from the work environment), and

information concerning their mission were advocated as means of countering stress.40

Deploying individuals also had to face a rather unpleasant environment. The heat of SWA is worsened

by dry breezes in some areas and high humidity in others, making it a significant factor even for indigenous

people. Unacclimatized personnel, under stress. suffering jet lag, dealing with the logistical problems and

physical exertions of their deployment were particularly susceptible to heat injuries. Heat injuries such as

cramps, exhaustion, and stroke were expected by medical personnel to be the dominating initial threat to

deployed individuals. Other sun-related probiems like sunburn, vision disturbances, and lip chapping were

also to be expected and prepared for by deploying individuals, civilian and militaryA1

94
Typically, individuals deployed to desert conditions could also expect increased bouts with colds, flu,

allergies, and respiratory/sinus/ear infections due to the dusty, sandy environment. Deployees were

encouraged to wear a cloth around their neck to cover their nose and mouth in exceptionally dusty

conditions.4 2

Deployees could also expect to suffer during their first few weeks of residence in SWA with diarrheal

diseases of variant sources. These diseases could spread rapidly and lead to tactically significant

performance loss. Fluid loss due to diarrhea could greatly worsen the effects of the heat. Acute respiratory

diseases could also be expected to surface due to the dusty environment. In consideration of these factors,

a sorious emphasis was to be placed upon food and water sanitation as well as personal hygiene.4 3

Insects and animal pests indigenous to SWA also presented deploying individuals with health risks.

While some creatures served as vectors for disease spread, others were capable of inflicting bodily harm

entirely on their own. The wolf spider, also known as the hairy tarantula, and a variety of black widow spider

are found in the Gulf region. Their bites, as well as those of the scorpion, have been known to be fatal to

individuals camped in the desert. Such creatures have a reported fondness for hiding in bedding and boots.

Snakes also abound in the region and many can prove fatal: puff adders, desert black snakes, cobras,

horned vipers, saw-scaled vipers, false horned vipers, etc. Additionally, deploying individuals were warned

against the packs of feral dogs which inhabit the region. In order that rabies might be avoided by these

individuals, they were urged not to attempt to make camp pets cf the canines."4

While the deployees were advised concerning contact with animals which could in and of themselves

be dangerous to health, they were also warned of disease-carrying creatures as well. Insects were

specifically to be avoided. Mosquitoes can carry malaria, dengue fever and other arboviral diseases. Filth

flies spread cholera, dysentery, and typhoid. Fleas can pass along murine typhus and be responsible for

small, sporadic outbreaks of plague. Lice could also be a problem in the desert. By contact with local

populations, new deployees could contract "relapsing fever." Ticks cculd also carry the malady, as well as

typhus, and Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever. Leeches are present in the region as well and presented

deployees with physical and well as psychological concern. 45

Perhaps the greatest concern regarding a creature came with a knowledge of the sand fly. Sand fly

fever is a self-limiting but debilitating flu-like febrile illness, and is the most widespread vector-borne disease

in the Middle East; incidence peaks in August. The sand fly is also responsible for leishmaniasis. SWA

is the classical region of the world for the cutaneous variety of this disease. This condition results in nodular

skin lesions which evolve into painful, but occasionally painless, slow- or non-healing ulcers several

centimeters in diameter. While leishmaniasis is not an acutely debilitating disease, its presence can be

psychologically disturbing, and its inpatient treatment may be prolonged. Visceral leishmaniasis, an often

fatal, albeit rare, disease, also occurs in this area48

Deployees were advised in preventive action against the dangerous sand fly. The use of personal protective measures such as repellent, clothing, impregnated bed netting, staying off the desert floor,

checking all articles of clothing before donning them, shaking out bedding before entering, and "buddy"

inspections, were all recommended in limiting the threat of sand fly bites, as well as other insect threats.

The army's current approach to insect repellents involves use of two products, a DEET-containing repellent

lotion for skin and a clothing repellent called permethrin. Proper wearing of the uniform issued in conjunction

with the use of insecticides was deemed a "nearly complete protection from vector-borne diseases."4 7

Deploying civilians were also adviqed how to apply repellent. The lotion was to be applied to exposed

skin including ears, face, and neck. Its area of application was to extend two to three inches under the edge

95
of the uniform to prevent sand flies from crawling under clothing. The permethrin repellent was to be directly

applied to the uniform until it appeared wet. It was also to be applied to bed netting because the mesh was

too large to prove a barrier to the small sand flies. The clothing impregnate was to be applied prior to

deployment if possible and again after the fifth washing. Individuals were also warned that personal

hygiene, effectively disposing of garbage and human waste, and keeping foods and water sources covered

and fly-proofed, was of paramount importance in the struggle against sand flies, as well as other desert

pests.

48

Deploying individuals needed to be aware, as well, that the deserts of SWA were kind hosts to numerous

bacterial viruses, hepatitis A, schistosomiasis (a fever induced by contact with many local water sources),

Q fever, meningitis, brucellosis, trachoma, and the usual assortment of sexually transmittcd diseases

regardless of residence in a strict Muslim region. Stress-related problems might also be expected in the

tensionridden area.'9

An additional risk of deployment was termed post-traumatic stress disorder. Known in previous conflicts

as combat fatigue and shell shock, deployees came to understand that developing the disorder did not

mean that they had become unbalanced, but rather had reacted rationally to the life-threatening conditions

in which they found themselves. Problems would arise, however, if upon return individuals continued their

crisis responses in the relatively peaceful United States. Burying feelings would do no good declared

counselors; for many the feelings would need to be talked through.1s

Military personnel perhaps would have a somewhat easier time coping with the psychological rigors of

deployment. Military personnel would have frontline faci!ities available for their counseling needs iti SWA,

as well as the advantage of the services offered by military hospitals and veterans' centers CONUS. In

addition, many civilians deploying to SWA had no combat experience and had not received military training

and thus were not prepared to face the terrors of warfare: Scud missile attacks, chemical warfare alerts,

need deprivation, fear, and human suffering. Vietnam veterans traveling to SWA as civilians might expect

a return of once-vanquished demons.5

'

Discussed symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder that returning civilians and their families could

be alert for included mentally r3living the psychological trauma over and over again, especially when

triggered by a once-familiar sound. Thus a Fourth of July firecracker could suggest small-arms fire and a

police siren splitting the night could recall a Scud missile attack. Psychic numbing could also occur with

post-traumatic stress disorder. Individuals with the disorder frequently withdraw into themselves and avoid

situations in which they might be called upon to discuss their stressful experiences. This could be a painful

issue when families prepared to reunite after months of separation. Additionally, the disorder causes its

victims to remain constantly on guard and to exercise their "flight or fight" response at inappropriate times.

A constant sense of impending doom haunts many and leaves them feeling as if constantly on the f,'ontlines.

A final sign of post-traumatic stress disorder that deployees and their families were warned to watch for was

a sense of survivor guilt. Returning civilians, as well as military personnel, might feel they did not deserve

the good fortune of living . 2

Even with a c!ean bill of health and a thoroughgoing understanding of the health risks of deployment,

civilian deployees could not simply be sent to APG for trave! to SWA. Before undertaking the health

screening process, LARs and their fellow civilians had to obtain the proper documentation for foreign travel.

Personnel alerted for deployment were urged to begin the process of obtaining passports immediately,

even if their deployment status was undetermined. Official passports were required for travel to SWA in

support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm for civilian deployees; the use of regular, or tourist,

96
passports was not authorized. While LARs were to obtain visas through their supported units, QASAS,

SCRs and other deploying civilians were to commence the process of obtaining visas by visiting either the

Rock Island Passport Office or their local Passport Office if located at a subordinate installation or activity.,

If a visa was not needed immediately, AMC officials recommended that the request for one be delayed

until after the passport had t. -en received. This delay would allow for the previous processing of the

passport request (a necessary step in obtaining a visa) and would also lengthen the period of the visa's

validity. If the receipt of a passport or visa was time critical, the process could be expedited through the

use of express mail, although at least five days could still be expected before even essential employees

might expect their travel documentation. Of special concern to individuals deploying to the United Arab

Emirates was the requirement to obtain a Saudi Arabian visa; all Military Airlift Command (MAC) flights were

scheduled to land in that nation before proceeding to the UAE. In concluding his comments on the pursuit

of travel documentation, AMC's commanding officer charged employees to "do it by the book," and "do it

early" for AMCCOM personnel were not welcome at APG until their Department of the Army (DA) approval,

passport, and visa were in hand.14

Civilian personnel traveling by military or militarycontracted aircraft to the United Arab Emirates, Oman,

and Bahrain did not necessarily require a passport or visa. Travelers to Saudi Arabia or Qatar by military

transport did, as did all Gulf country travelers on regularly scheduled commercial aircraft.•

The concerns of civilians deployed, or alerted for deployment to SWA, were plentiful and the AMC

officials attempted to answer them before they clogged the channels of communication. Civilians deploying

to SWA with AMC could expect to return to the United States after only 179 days of service, in consideration

of the harsh working conditions: seven days per week, twelve to fourteen hour work days, tent dwelling,

high temperatures, etc. AMC believed it had sufficient depth of personnel to manage this relatively brief

TDY status for its civilians.-6

As concerned the matter of a per diem for deployed personnel, AMC remarked that as all civilians in

support of Operations Desert Shield and Storm were considered to be TDY and that as such they were

operationally entitled to take their meals at military dining facilities. As such, the subsistence portion of their

per diem was not to be authorized. And as most LARs, as well as other civilian employees, were living in

central activity compounds, the taking of meals in military dining facilities was not a problem. Nor was it

a problem for civilian personnel deployed to quarters in close proximity to their supported military activity.

Civilians given a per diem were not allowed to take their meals in military dining halls.5 7

Life insurance also became an issue of concern for individuals facing the possibility of deployment to

SWA. AMC officials noted that with Federal Employees Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) coverage that death

benefits were payable regardless of cause of death. Double indemnity benefits would not be payable,

however, if accidental death occurred under circumstances related to acts of war, declared or undeclared,

nuclaar weapons, or actual combat. The commander encouraged employees to consult their servicing

civilian personnel office for eligibility questions and evidence ot insurability issues.8

Employees who had purchased commercial life insurance were urged to review their policies to

ascertain if they contained a war clause or nuclear/combat exclusions. Deployees without life insurance

were gently prodded to consider purchases before their departure for SWA.5 9

Deployed civilians to SWA, LAR, QASAS, or SCR, had a multitude of questions (hat the commander

of AMCCOM, and subordinate commands as well, sought to answer. Concerning workers' compens ation,

potential deployees were reassured that any injury incurred during a TDY experience would "normally" be

97
covered by the standards of the Federal Employees Compensation Act. Pre-existing injuries and illnesses

would not be compensated unless the worker could medically prove that the conditon had been aggravated

by the TOY experience.6

As concerned pay for deployed personnel, LARs and other civilians were informed that the United

States Code, Title 5, Section 5928, authorized the Secretary of State to determine where a danger pay

allowance for civilians would be paid and the amount to be paid. The amount of danger pay allowance was

to be determined by the level of danger not to exceed an amount equal to 25% of a civilian's base pay. This

pay was not immediately available to deploying civilians as the Secretary of State did not perceive that the

initial deployees were in inordinate danger.6

" Indeed, the war had started by some seven days before

danger pay was authorized by the Secretary; it would not be paid retroacitively to the start of the war.62

Foreign post differential (FPD), however, was payable to civilian deployees based in Saudi Arabia from

the start of Operation Desert Shield. The rate of pay was set at 20% of base pay. Approximately 10% of

this pay differential was associated with the threat of political violence and the remainder with the varied

costs of living abroad as compared to the United States. While FPD was payable to civilian employees

involved in a permanent change of station (PCS) on their first day of residence in SWA, AMCCOM personnel

for the most part were more concerned with the fact that TOY deployees initially became eligible for FPD

funds only after serving 42 days abroad.6 Effective 24 February 1991, however, FPD payments were

authorized for the first 42 days of in country service, but only after these days had passed would payment

be made.64 For purposes of calculating pay, each deployee's supervisor was required to furnish a daily

report to the AMCCOM Operations Center listing the "wheels down" and "wheels up" schedule for the

individual.65

The issue of the timely and proper pay of AMCCOM civilians deployed to SWA, regardless of status

as LAR, QASAS, or SCR, became the subject cf an information paper generated by the Personnel and

Training Directorate, Civilian Employment and Compensation Management Division. Personnel officials

noted .hat the State Department authorizations required to instigate both FPD and danger pay did not occur

quickly enough to properly compensate civilians deployed to SWA. Danger pay was not retroactively

authorized, and some civilians received FPD for all days of their deployment, even if paid after the fact, while

others did not receive differential payment for the initial 42 days of service. Additionally, the pay of General

Service/General Management (GS/GM) employees was capped at the GS-1 ý step 10 level, both in a pay

period and an annual basis during the majority of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The

regulation was not to be contravened by the offer of compensatory leave in the place of wages. The

biweekly pay cap, however, was lifted effective 24 March 1991 for personnel in support of SWA, well after

the mo.ýt critical period and the return of many civilians to the United States.6

In their after ac'ion analysis of civilian compensation during Operations Desert Shield and Desert.Storm,

AMCCOM's Personnel and Training Directorate officials urged a reconsideration of statutes and regulations affecting the pay structure for depioyed personnel. Specifically, the officials recommended that

legislation be enacted for the retroactive authorization and payment of FPD and danger pay, and for

retroactive payments after the removal of a pay cap.17

Personnel and Training Directorate personnel noted that such actions would require Congress to enact

legislation to authorize the recommended retroactive payments. They commented that the Office of

Personnel Management and the State Department were the appropriate agencies to propose such

legislation, based on a HODA (Heauquarters, Department of the Army) recommendation.M

98
Early arrivals in the desert, as well as those preparing to depart for SWA, raise,:' numerous questions

concerning their entitlements to overtime and compensation. Employeec -ere informed that their

entitlement to overtime and its ensuing compensation derived frcm thei ,I •., :er exempt or

nonexempt employees. Employees, who were expected to know their z-wr ýiatus, ,ove;,J by the Fair

Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and/or Titie 5 United States Code, were termed ioc 'x. i le those not

covered by the act and/or code were termed exempt. Employees with c,,'uc-ity ,rJ tne ordinary

concerning the FLSA and Title 5 had references provided to presumably s'.at v,, ýnquisitiveness.

Information on FLSA rules is to be found in the 5 Code of Federal Regulations (C--'F 1 7 551, Subpart E,

and Federal Personnel Manual Letters in the 551 series. Regulatory requiremeaots '.-! :, eitime under Title

5 are found at 5 CFR 550; Federal Personnel Manual Book 550, Subchapter S$; Fed.. Personnel Manual

Supplement 990-2, Book 550, Subchapter S; Army Regulation 690-990-2, Book 550, Subchapter S; and

AMC Regulation 616-4.69

The matter of status as exempt or ri.nexempt employee was not simply a moot one. Once an employee

became entitled to compensation for overtime worked, compensatory time might be granted in its stead for

certain employees. Wage grade employees, however, could not be granted compensatory time in lieu

overtime wages. Also, for nonexempt employees, Federal Personnel Manual Letter 551-6 made clear that

no statutory provision exists under the FLSA for the granting of compensatory time off in lieu of overtime

pay. In other sources, overtime was defined as work performed by an employee in excess of eight hours

in a day or 40 hours in an administrative workweek, including regular overtime work and occasional or

irregular overtime. Wage grade employees were to receive compensati-n at one and a half times their

normal hourly rate, not to exceed GS-1 0, step one, in lieu of compensatory hours.70

A separate AMCCOM publication laid forth the ground rules for GS/GM-13 through 15 employees.

These employees could be paid overtime in direct support of ODS as an exception to standing Commanding

General Policy 5-41, May 1989. AMCCOM Circular 55-1 noted that"while overtime dollars may be available

fo, Operation Desert Shiold workload, prudence is necessary for subject employees and should be limited

to that considered absolutely essential after considering all other options.'7' Furthermore, GS/GM-13

through 15 employees serving their nation in SWA should remain aware of the rules and regulations

governing use or lose annual leave, and the requirement to use compensatory time within 13 pay periods,

should the inclination arise to utilizo such measures for compensation.

In addition to making deployees aware of their status as either exempt or nonexempt employees, AMC

fielded numerous questions from both deployed and deploying civilians concerning their compensation

rights. Exempt employees were informed that in the majority of cases overtime was not to be authorized

for time spent traveling a considerable distance from quarters or residence to a work site outside their

normal tour of duty. Exempt employees were authorized to obtain the benefits of overtime when it was

defined ano justified in terms of "mandatory, discretionary, or emergency overtime" with one of the following

situations: 1.) the travel involved the performance of work that could only be accomplished while traveling,

2.) the travel was incident to travel that involved the performance of work, 3.) the travel was to be carried

out under such arduous and unusual conditions that the travel became inseparable from the work itself, or

4.) the travel resulted from an event that cou!d not be scheduled or controlled administratively. 72

In the majority ot cases, nonexempt employees faced the same standards for claiming compensatory

time in regard to travel time and their position. Under FLSA standards, the kind of trave! involved would

determine wirether time spent traveling would be considered in hours of work performed. A nonexempt

employee could claim compensatory overtime garnered from travel if: 1.) she/he performed work while

traveling, including travel as the driver of a vehicle, 2.) traveled as a passenger to a temporary duty station

and returned during the same day, or 3.) traveled as a passenger on nonwork days ouring hours which

corresponded to his/her regular working hours.7

"

99
Potentially deploying civilians also learned that they were not entitled to overtime if awakened in the

night by a supervisor and told to put on their gas mask and report to a shelter. They were informed that

as the basic premise of overtime was to ensure that an employee received compensation for work

performed, and that reporting to a shelter was to ensure personal safety, not the performance of work, so

the time spent in the she!ter could not be justifiably counted as overtime. 74

Additionally, AMCCOM Circular 55-1 provided deploying civilians with information concerning their

specific entitiements whiie in SWA, as weii as basic definitions of work schedules and terminology. All

AMCCOM civilians deploying to SWA were expected to read and understand the circular's Appendix E,

"Rules, Procedures, and Policies Affecting Pay." Employees required to work on Sunday, in a non-overtime

capacity, were informed oi their entitlement to receive double their normal wage for the day. Work

performed by an employe6 between the hours of 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. was regarded as nightwork and wqs

compensated with a ten percent pay premium. The circular attempted to clearly spell out the instances in

which the night pay differential would be applicable. For example, employees learned that they would be

entitled to nignt pay differential regardless of whether or not they were actually performing assigned duties

if they had been properly excused from their regularly scheduied night work on a holiday or other non-work

day. Employees were also entitled to receive night pay differential regardless of work performed if in an

official travel status. Also, an employee was entitled to a night pay diferential for periods of paid leave only

when the total amount ot leave taken in a given pay period, including both night and day hours, was less

than eight hours. Employees were further informed by the circular that they were entitled to a night pay

differential when they were temporarily assigned during the administrative workweek to a daily tour of duty

that included night work. This period of temporary change in a daily tour of duty within the employee's

regularly scheduled administrative workweek was distinguished from a per~od of irregular or occasional

overtime work in addition to the employee's regularly scheduled administrative workweek. In all cases,

however, night pay differential was in addition to overtime, Sunday, or holiday pay and was not to be

included in the rate of basic pay used to compute these premiums."

Lunch periods were also covered by AMCCCM Circular 55-1 and provided LARs, as well as other

deploying civilians, with guidance concerning whct was to be considered duty time. The circular noted that

lunch periods during which the employee was entirely free of duty were not to be considered duty time and

must be scheduled outside the hours established for the daily tour.of duty. Where three eight-hour shifts

were in operation, however, and overlapping of shifts to permit time off for lunch was not possible, a lunch

period of 20 minutes or less was acceptable and could be counted as compensable time worked. Where

the on-the-job lunch period was in effect, however, employees were expected to remain close to their work

stations. Where the lunch period was free time, or was longer than 20 minutes, the entire period could not

be included in the daily schedule of working hours so that the employee was paid for the lunch period.78

For deploying civiians still rot satisfied with their understanding of the regulations concerning overtime and

compensatory time, AMCCOM provided an example:

An employee has a regularly scheduled administrative workweek of 48 hours, Monday through

Saturday, 4:00 to 12:00 midnight. The manager has specified that the work between 4:00 p.m.

and 12:00 midnight on Saturday is regularly scheduled overtime work. If the employee works

his or her entire regularly scheduled weekly tour of duty, he or she is entitled to 36 hours night

pay differential for nightwork performed between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., Moiday

tnrough Saturday and 8 hours of overtime pay for the reu•!arly scheduled overtime work

performed between 4:00 p.m. and midnight on Saturday. In this example, the employee is

entitled to night pay differential and overtime pay for the nightwork performed during regular

overtime hours on Saturday.7

100
To ensure adherence to the circular's guidelines, it also tasked specific responsibilities. The traveling

employee's supervisor was responsible for ensuring that the necessary controls were in place to provide

an accurate accounting of the time worked. The deploying civilian was to familiarize him or herself with the

contents of the appendix to ensure that the labor performed was accurately captured, and the timekeeper

was not only to keep a tally of the quantity and variety of hours worked but also to annotate the time and

attendance card with the travel order number from the first day of travel until the deployee's return to

CONUS.78

Continuing along the line of compensation and employment concerns, deployees received information

on how their performance in the desert would b,, assessed. Deployees were informed that while in SWA

if they continued to pe, form their regular duties as if at their usual post, albeit with additional responsibilities,

that no special ratings system would be applied to their efforts. Their SWA supervisor was simply to prepare

a letter for inclusion in the employee's record listing the tasks assigned and describing how well the tasks

were performed. A, - despite the difficulties in proper recognition of jobs well done, message traffic urged

that outstanding contribuions made by civilians should also be noted through the use of the Army's

Incentive Awards Program. 7

9

Deploying civilian personnel received considerable additional information concerning their finances

during the build-up to their inoividual departures for the deserts of SWA. Concerning the matter of pay

checks, regardless of their altered state due to FPD or danger pay, deployees were informed that they must

make arrangements for the disposition of their checks prior to their deployment. In addition, they were urged

to utilize traveler's checks while in SWA with the notation that the cost of obtaining the checks was a

reimbursable one. They were, however, encouraged to take personal checks to the desert so that they

might take care of personal business in the United States via the mail, and on occasion obtain small

amounts of cash for use in SWA. Financial support would tIe available in country for the cashing of small

personal checks and currency conversion. And, despite the hopes of deployees, their salaries did not

become tax free while on TDY in SWA.80

Potentially deploying civilians, regardless of career classification, were also required to familiarize

themselves with the laws and customs of their host nation, Saudi Arabia. As an understanding of Saudi

Arabia's governing code of Islamic law could prove vital to the United States mission, all involved-DA, AMC, AMCCOM-sought to prevent inadvertent violations. Accordingly, deployees were presented with

Desert Shield General Order 1, "Prohibited Activities for U.S. Personnel Servicing the USCENTCOM AOR

(Area of Responsibility)." The order sought to make deploying personnel aware of the salient features of

Saudi culture."

Despite the presence of an estimated 3.5 to 4 million practicing Muslims in the United States, primarily

located in Detroit, New York, Toledo, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Chicago, many

deployees did not realize the impact of Islam on Saudi Arabiarn society. LARs, QASAS, SCRs and others

learned that it was much more than the religion of 90% of all Arabs. Indeed, :slam, they came to realize,

is a complete social, political, legal, and cultural system that prescribes a way of life ror one of every eight

people in the world.

Muslim daily life is prescribed by the Koran, the dictated word of God, given to the prophet Mohammed

and his small band of followers early in the seventh century. The Koran establishes the five basic pillars

of Islam: 1.) belief in God, 2.) prayer five times per day, 3.) a fast of one month per year, 4.) the gift of alms

to the poor, and 5.) at least one pilgrimage to Mecca, the birthplace of Mohammed. During the month of

fasting, Ramadan, believers must abstain from food, drink, smoking, and sexual intercourse between

sunrise and sunset. Work hours are shortened during Ramadan to encourage meditation and intensive

101
77

self-evaluation. The end of Ramadan is marked with special ceremonies, sporting events, and parades

while children receive gifts, money, and sweets.

While only Muslims are held to the dictates of Ramadan, all, visitors and residents alike, are subject to

the Koran's meticulous code of moral and ethical behavior. This code, known as Shari'ah, is the official law

of the land in Saudi Arabia, as well as other Arab nations and prohibits gambling, the consumption of pork

products and alcohol, fraud, slander, perjury, hypocrisy, corruption, extravagance, and arrogance. In

addition, it prescribes strict punishments for adultery, murder, and theft. Thus while an understanding of

Islam was important as an aspect of cultural respect for the host nation, deploying U.S. civilians were also

made aware of the legal aspects of Islamic society.

For civilians potentially en route to SWA, their crash course in Islam undoubtedly sounded like a list of

"don'ts." Mosques, Muslim places of worship, as well as the holy cities of Mecca and Medina were off limits

to non-believers. To avoid separating a believer from Mecca during the period of prayer, prayer rugs were

not to be passed in front of during daily services. Crucifixes and Stars of David were not to be worn or

displayed in public, even on the uniforms of military chaplains when outside U.S. areas of operation. There

was to be no distribution of non-Muslim religious literature and no criticism of Islam in any fashion. Nor were

non-Muslim religious senrices to be overtly conducted. The latter was in actuality a concession of sorts to

the U.S. forces; Saudi law forbids all non-Muslim forms of religious expression.

Additionally, Americans could not drink any alcohol while in Saudi Arabia or use questionable language

in the presence of Saudis. They were also prohibited from mailing or receiving "obscene" or "pornogtaphic"

material, including seemingly unoffensive photographs of women in bathing suits. The respect for women

hinted at by this restriction, as well as a rigid interpretation of their place in society, would later prove

problematic for fema!e LARs, as well as other female civilians.

Respe::t for Saudi customs and law was also apparent in the guidelines deploying civilians received

concerning clothing. Deployees were informed by November message traffic, as well as by a 25 January

1991 Travelers Update, that while civilian clothing had to be worn for off duty shopping tours or sight seeing,

neither shorts nor t-shirts could be worn in public. Neither males or females would be permitted to wear

blouses or shirts what were see-through or sheer. Their blouses and shirts were required to have collars

and could not glamorize alcohol or in any way promote activities considered offensive by Saudi custom.

Women's skirts-no pants or pant suits were permitted outside U.S.-only areas-were to fall well below the

knees. Clothing which revealed the torso-defined as the area below the neck, above the knees, and inside

the shoulders--could also not be worn in public by either sex. As a general guideline, the Travelers Update

offered, "clothes should be loose fitting and concealing rather than revealing." Within the confines of U.S.-

only areas, individuals were free to wear attire appropriate for the activity in which they were engaged31

Beyond informing deploying civilians as to the appropriate attire for their forays into the socially and

culturally opaque world of Saudi Arabia, Travelers Update 8 suggested that deployees take two to five

civilian clothing changes, as well as sufficient undergarments to last two weeks. It also made numerous

recommendations as to particu!ar items the deploying civilian would need to be somewhat comfortable

which the army was not prepared to provide. The Update encouraged deployees to take disposable razors

or a shaving kit, personal hygiene items including toothpaste, shampoo, and soap in sufficient quantity to

last several months, lotions and talcum power, sunscreen, lip balm, and petroleum jelly, Additionally,

travelers were recommended to include moist towelettes, foot powder, insect repellent, and. either baking

soda or corn starch if the individual was prone to skin problems in their personal kits. The Update also urged

deployees to take towels and wash cloths as well as self-sealing plastic bags in various sizes. These were

to prevent sand from entering and damaging small items. A battery-powered FM or short wave tadio with

102
plenty of extra batteries was also recommended by the Travelers Update, as were lap games. These

devices would fill the relatively few leisure hours of deployed civilians, for as the Update declared, "There

is no entertainment there (SWA)."83 Deployees preparing for overseas rotation just days later had a few

additional suggestions to take into consideration. Via message traffic from SWA, they were encouraged

to take mosquito netting and a weapon cleaning kit, if they expected to be issued a weapon. And in

consideration of the problems which were occurring at Aberdeen Proving Ground with the outfitting of

deployees with desert BDUs, the message urged the purchase of these garments elsewhere.4

Even though deploying individuals had received seemingly endless quantities of information regarding

passports, visas, life insurance, overtime, foreign pay differential, chemical defense training, Aberdeen

Proving Ground, health care in SWA, etc., they were still not cleared for travel to Saudi Arabia. Before

receiving authorization to fly out, deployees still had information to receive, and give. For example, all

commanders were to ensure that their deploying DA civilians had in their possession a Geneva Convention

identity card. This card identified its holder as a noncombatant entitled to special treatment if captured. In

conjunction with their status as DA civilians serving their nation in a theater of war, deployees also received

dog tags with two identifying plates. The tags were to provide the wearer's name, Social Security number,

blood type. and religious preference. In consideration of their area of deployment, Jewish deployees were

urged not to iJentify themselves as such on their tags. Chains and silencers for the government-provided

dog tags could be purchased a* ;ocal post exchanges if a civilian deployee's office provided him or her with

a memorandum authorizing the purchase.6

Commanders were also required to inform deploying civilians about the services available to their

families while they were abroad. Recommended points of reference included who to contact regarding pay

problems and employment assistance, as well as how family members could contact the deploying

employee, and information concerning provisions for emergency powers of attorney. Commanders were

also to advise their deploying civilian and military personnel of emotional support facilities available to their

waiting families. In some instances, the Family and Communities Activities Office, through Army

Community Services, provided a "Waiting Spouses" group for not only husbands/wives of deployed

individuals, both military and civilian, but also for local parents. Assistance in addressing loneliness,

finances, and stress was offered to deployee families as were social opportunities. Rock Island Arsenal,

home of HO, AMCCOM, offered a 24-hour hotline for concerned family members as well as free childcare

during "Waiting Family" support program meetingsA6 Information of a general nature concerning ODS

could be obtained by waiting families through a variety of toll-free national hotlines whose numbers

commanders provided their deploying civilians for disseminationY

After the war, the success of the family support structure was lauded by AMCCOM's Personnel and

Training Directorate. In the Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Reoort. they noted that the existing

agencies of Army Community Services (ACS) were capable of being modified to handle local dependents

of the total deployed force. The ACS had been augmented by state and local agencies. 8

Perhaps the stark reality of the danger into which the LARs, and indeed all deployees to the deserts

of SWA, were venturing became most clear when they were required to till out forms directing AMCCOM

whom to contact in case of casualties. The Emergency and Next of Kin Information sheet was considered

a part of the travel package and was to be forwarded by the AMCCOM Operations Center to the Civilian

Personnel Office for close hold retention. A memorandum entitled "U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and

• Chemical Command (1⁄2~lfytv Rportinn/Notification Procedures and the Civilian Survivor Assistance

Program for Civilian Employees, Operation Desert Storm," detailed the use of the sheet and defined the

responsibilities and taskings to be undertaken in the reporting, notification, and assistance provided for

civilian employee casualties, and employees declared missing in action.9

103
!n the unfortunate event of a casualty, notification to next of kin was to be made by a designated

Notification Casualty Officer. The individual was to have been appointed by the Casualty Area Command,

and was to be a member of the uniformed service. Attending the ufficer at the time of notification was to

be the military chaplain, if available. While the memorandum noted that at many AMCCOM sites this would

not be possible, it did recommend that the employee's or next of kin's minister/priest/rabbi could be called

upon for presence and support during the notification. The notification was not, however, to be made by

the cleric. Nor was notification of death, serious injury, or missing status to be made by the employee's coworker or supervisor although that person might be called upon as well as the cleric for emotional support.

In the case of a co-worker or supervisor, the action was to be voluntary on their part, not directed.

Additionally, the memorandum recommended that while at least one person should accompany the

Notification Casualty Officer, not more than two should do so. The notifying officer was to advise the next

of kin that someone woul!d be in touch within 24 hours to explain and subsequently assist in the application

for various entitlements and benefitsA9

In their presumably detailed and sobering reading of the memorandum, deploying civilian employees

learned that equally important to the timely and compassionate notification made to the ;amily was the

requirement to assist the next of kin in understanding the myriad of entitlements and benefits which might

be applicable. Deploying civilians also learned that the civilian survivor assistance counselor was not to

be the same person as the notifier, nor would the notification visit be made with both individuals present.

This would help the family/next of kin to disassociate the counselor from the impact of the tragic news of

the notification. Conversely, however, the next of kin might request that the notifier or one of the others

described in the notification procedures above accompany or be present when the civilian survivor

assistance counselor called upon the next of kin."

Sources of information which the survivor's family might rely upon, or so the deploying civilian was told,

included the civilian personnel offic3 retirement section, the Social Security Administration, and the

Veterans Administration, if applicable. And while most funeral directors were well aware of routine

entitlements, they might not be fully conversant with ',he benefits accruing to civil servants, and thus

counselors were to intercede in behest of the family. Additionally, in dealing with their survivors,

government counselors were to be proactive in assisting the grieving family by making the contacts; they

were not simply to provide a list of whom to call.92

And closing with a somber reference for the deploying personnel, the memorandum noted that

deceased civilian employee remains would be handled as they were for active military personnel until the

remains arrived CONUS at Dover Air Force Base, Dover, DE. The Casualty and Memoria! Affairs

Operations Center would at that point obtain disposition instructions from the next 3f kin and so advise the

entry mortuary at Dover. The entry mortuary would then advise the next of kin and the receiving funeral

home of shipment details.93

For whatever comfort it provided deploying civilians, they learned that "the firm AMCCOM policy is that

the responsible persons ... will exercise the utmost courtesy, sympathy, and assistance to lighten the

burden for the next of kin.""'

The surviving next of kin of employees covered by the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) or the

Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS) were to be provided packets containing, at the minimum,

an application for death benefits, a claim for the unpaid compensation o, the deceased employee, a claim

for FPdPrqrl FmnlnyPs3' Grn.n LifHe Insurance, and _ reqiiest for the deceased's taYayer identificatien

number. Beneficiaries were aiso to be advised on the thrift savings plan. The account balance, if any, would

be provided to the designated individual, and otherwise in the standard order of precedence s

104
Deploying civilian employees could take minimal comfort in the knowledge that not only would their

families be notified of their deaths, serious injuries, or missing status with compassion, that they would be

aided in pursuit of the benefits due them as survivors, but also that they would be aided in acquiring the

documentation necessary to successfully pursue their rights. Beneficiaries were to be advised as soon as

possible to obtain certain documentary evidence to assist them in settling estates and other claims. The

necessary evidence recommended included a certified copy of the death certificate for each benefit being

claimed, copies of designation of beneficiaries filed by the deceased. certificate of the deceased's

honorable discharge from military service, if applicable, and the birth certificates of minor children.9

And, with the hope that no step or bit of information might be inadvertently omitted in the process of

aiding survivors, AMC's Commander noted that "perhaps the most important preparatory action CPOs

(Civilian Personnel Offices) conduct is training for potential Civilian Survivor Assistance Counselors."

Based upon the number of civilian employees serving their nation in the deserts of SWA, AMC Commanding

General GEN W.G.T. Tuttle, Jr., urged installations to designate a number of potential Civilian Survivor

Assistance Counselors and train them in survivor assistance procedures. Training was to parallel that

conducted for Military Casualty Assistance Officers and include, as a minimum, familiarity with forms and

rules governing their use, procedures employed by local agencies, i.e., Social Security, Veterans'

Administration, sensitivity training, local rules on remaining in government quarters as applicable, post

exchange/commissary privileges, etc. Tapes used to train Military Casualty Assistance Officers were made

available to Civilian Survivor Assistance Counselors. That "training will produce confidence in the Civilian

Survivor Assistance Officer and a uniform approach to survivor assistance" presumably offered a little

comfort to employee preparing for travel to SWA. Similariy, deployees could take minimal comfort in the

knowledge that their next of kin, both primary and secondary, would be notified of their death, serious injury,

or status as missing before s:.'ct, information was released to the media.91

Unfortunately, the training was not in vain.

While contemplating the possibility of their deaths in the deserts of SWA while in service to their nation,

LARs, as well as other deploying civilians, undoubtedly thought of ways to mitigate the level of danger to

which they would be exposed. For some, the attempt to preserve themselves came with the attempt to

acquire a sidearm. To the question, "Can an Army civilian member be issued a weapon for personal

defense?," the Department of the Army replied a qualified "yes." Civilians who took part in hostilities might

reasonably be regarded by the enemy as combatants and subjected to attack or even injured incidental to

an attack on military objectives. In the law of war, "taking part in hostilities" has not been fully defired, but

it is generally not regarded as limited to the civilians who engage in actual fighting. Since civilians were now

augmenting the army in areas in which technical expertise was not available or was in short supply they,

in effect, became substitutes for military personnel who would normally be combatants. As such, the

civilians in SWA were considered to be at the risk of direct attack, injury incidental to an attack, or capture.

Therefore, the DA decreed that "if the circumstances dictate," the theater commander might authorize the

issuance of sidearms to civilians members for their personal self defense, subject, of course, to appropriate

regulations regarding training and the safe handling of weapons.Y

At war's end, AMCCOM's Readiness Directorate took up the question of defensively arming civilians.

At one point, as noted in an observation submitted for inclusion in the officialQOpraton1ebrt Shield/Storin

After Action Report. LARs in SWA were issued Mi6 rifles for self defense. Then they were disarmed as

the determination was made that a M16 rifle was a bit more than simply a means of self defense. LARs

then went unarmed as pistols were not availabie. The lesson suggested ihat the quesiiur ous ain-ji-g civilians

in military areas should be taken up by the Department of the Army and resolved as it had been a question

during at least the last two conflicts and civilian employees deserved an answer..

105

,iI'

/

which case the threat of removal from federal service would be appropriate. In all instances of unauthorized

absence, the deploying civilian would be considored as absent without leave (AWOL). The deployee's

signature on an Emergency Essential Statement of Understanding could serve to support and strengthen

any adverse action proposed, but was not a prerequisite to disciplinary action, or travel to SWA.105

'The whole issue of ihe Emergency Essential Statement of Understanding became problematic during

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. HQDA stated that all individuals deplcyed to SWA were

emergency essential and were therefore required to sign statements to that effect. HO, AMC stated that

persons to be deployed to Saudi were to be assigned there on a voluntary basis and did not have to sign

Emergency Essential Statements of Understanding. AMCCOM's policy followed that of HODA. This

difference in policy resulted in much consternation and a myriad of telephone calls. Since risciplinary action

could be taken depending on which policy was in effect, it became imperative that a ccordinated decision

be made. Inconsideration of this confusion, an information paperwas generated by AMCCOM's Readiness

Directorate for inclusion in Ogeration Desert Shield/Storm After ActionReort. Readiness Directorate

personnel recommeded that prior to future deployments the Office of the Secretary of Defense,

HQDA,and AMC resolve the identification of "emergency essential" designations vis-a-vis "volunteers."1

'0

While the Readiness Directorate could with the benefit of hindsight recommend better communication

and coordination, during the deployment of civilians to the deserts of SWA the issue of the Emergency

Essential Statement of Understanding was a vald one warranting considerable papervork. In response

to the question "Must an army civilian have signed an Emergency Essential agreement before he/she can

be required to perform TDY or accept permanent assignment to SWA, or to remain there in either status

in [the] event of hostilities?", DA message traffic noted that an army civilian could be directed to perform

duties essential to the military mission in SWA either before or during hostilities. Similarly, a civilian

deployee who was already on TDY, or even permanently assigned, to SWA when hostilities broke out could

be directed to remain at that location. While a signed Emergency Essential Statement of Understanding

was preferable, it was not an absolute requirement if a commander needed to direct an individual to perform

duties essent'al to the military mission. DA believed that a signed statement of the employee's role as

essential helped in ensuring that the deployee was fully aware of the army's expectations and the possible

consequences of not living up to the conditions of the understanding.01 7

By signing the Emergency Essential Statement of Understanding, deploying AMCCOM civilians, regardless of status as LAR, QASAS, or SCR, agreed that they would be excluded from the plan of evacuation

of noncombatants from the danger zone until relieved by proper authority. They also agreed that by

accepting assignment to the position that they would continue to perform the duties and responsibilities of

the position until properly relieved of it. Their signature on the statement acknowledged their understanding

that failure to adhere to the duties of their assignment could result in their sep~aration for the efficiency of

the Federal Service by the Department of the Army under the authority contained in Federal Personnel

Manual, chaptar 752. Adherence to the statement's guidelines was not entirely without its rewards. By

affixing their signature. deployees became eligible for danger pay allowance, if applicable by the decree

of the Secretary of State, foreign post differential pay, overtime pay, Government Quarters, it available or

Living Quarters Allowance if not, and field ration mess privileges. In addition, the Emergency Essential

Statement of Understanding allowed that signatories were eligible for the issuance of appropriate protective

equipment, a noncombatant identification card, protection and treatment under the Geneva Convention if

taken prisoner, and unaffected employment and pay status if captured or missing in action. Addit,,onally,

the signatory became aware that his/her needs would be treated with equal priority with those of active duty

military personnel for medical treatment in the area of operations. As these entitlements also were granted

to the majority of individuals not asked to sign the statements, the primary benefit of the document would

seem to accrue to the DA. By signing the statement, the deploying individual simply agreed to stand firm

in his position regardless of circumstances until properly relieved.

107
When finally allowed to travel to SWA, presumably with the majority of their questions asked and

answered, LARs faced formidab!e challenges. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as printed in their

Department of Defense Dictionary of MilitaU and Associated Terms. logistic assistance may be defined as

a "generic term used to denote types of assistance between and within military commands both in peace

and war." And it offers the definition of logistics as "the science of planning and carrying out the movement

and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which

deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance,

evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c.

acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or

furnishing of services."10°

And while AMCCOM's LARs were not responsible for all logistical aspects of the American foray into

the deserts of SWA, they were well occupied. Specifically, AMCCOM LARs tended to the needs of such

groups as the 24th Infantry, the 1st Cavalry, the 82nd and I 01st Airborne, the III Corps Artillery, the 75th,

196th, and 210th Field Artillery, the 6th Air Defense Artillery, the 197th Mechanized Infantry, the 5th

Battalion of the 332 Brigade, the XVIII Airborne Corps, and the 1st Infantry Division. Other LARs were not

assigned to specific units, but rather to specific locations. For example, some LARs were located at King

Khalid Military City, and others at Dhahran. A senior command representative (SCR) also attended the

deployed LARs and attempted to solve problems in country. A few LARs were assigned to float a circuit

of support. And while in support of their assigned units, the LARs offered expertise on specified weapon

systems. AMCCOM LARs, for example, were expected, as assigned, to aid their units with combat

vehicles, artillery systems, aircraft armaments, the AH64 Apache and Cobra helicopters, as well as VADS/

PIVADS (Vulcan Air Defense System/Product Improved Vulcan Air Defense System). The few military

LARs associated with AMCCOM had somewhat different areas oi expertise. They frequently found

themselves assigned to cover chemical materiel, as well as testing and evaluation (T&E), test, measurement and diagnostic equipment (TMDE) and the Fox vehicle. 1 9

Such dry recitations cannot do justice to the work that the civilians in the deserts did to support their

assigned units, and indeed their nation, in wartime. SCR Terry Spurrier related the duties of a LAR to the

Rock Island Arsenal's Iar in an article published before the Shield turned to a Storm. He noted that LARs

were doing the same things in the desert that they would have done stateside, primarily. "They're seeing

that spare parts are getting to where they're needed; providing hands-on advice on repair and maintenance;

reporting problems to heaJquarters for resolution and passing information from headquarters on to the

troops; and helping out in any other way they can."110

LAR Deborah Rogers, assigned to the 82nd Airborne throughout its deployment, defined her work in

an oral interview conducted uoon her return from the desert. Being one of the first civilian deployees to the

desert, and, indeed, the first woman LAR to SWA, her initial task was to help establish a supply system to

support her unit. Traveling from unit to unit of the 82nd Airborne, Ms. Rogers provided technical assistance

for inoperable, or malfunctioning, weapons systems-in her case the M551 "Sheridan" tank and PIVADs.

She additionally provided a great deal of instructional training when conditions permitted and reported on

ma!functions which occu;red during training sessions she witnessed. When breakdowns did occur, she

was responsible for checking, and indeeo double-checking, the proper part to order. Ordinarily her

responsibility for an ordered part ended when the requisition was submitted and resumed when the part

arrived. In the case of SWA, however, this division of duties did not occur. While deployed to SWA she was

also required to react for a supply system which has been referred to as "broke." Rather than waiting for

confirmation that datafaxed requisitions to CONUS had not been received, she would travel to her division

materiel management center (DMMC) and seek to discover what was leaving there on a specific document

number. By attentiveness to duiy, Ms. Rogers would then track the document, and more importantly its

108
Members of the 787th Maintenance Battalion, Bravo Company, performed recoil mechanism repair and replacement on a M102

105mm towed howitzer under the watchful eye of LAR (and photographer) Deborah Rogers. During Operations Desert Shield

and Desert Storm, AMCCOM LARs provided hands-on assistance and advice on maintenance, supply and otherlogisticalaspects

of command-managed items.

'I,7

W14 ,€

contents, to AMCCOM and all the way tack to the desert. As she noted, "I would not wait for the system

to react when it became an 02 NIMSC (nonconsumable items materiel support code) requisition. I would

react for that system. Now supply is not supposed to be a big portion of our job. In Saudi Arabia, it became

a major portion of our job."''

Another major portion of her job was to determine the validity of requisitions received. She, as well as

other LARs, scrutinized materiel orders t ) discern whether or not an item truly was of significant priority to

warrant the 02 NIMSC. If a part was needed to keep the appropriate system from becoming non-mission

capable, it received the 02 NIMSC designator. Considering that a commander could never be certain how

close to the supply line he was going to be, a significant number of somewhat larger than necessary orders

were processed."' 2

The life of a LAR in the field was not an easy one. Mr. Terry Spurrier, AMCCOMs SCR in the initial days

of Operation Desert Shield noted tnat a LAR could expect to work up to 1 '4 hours per day, seven days per

week during the early phases of the conflict. One hundred hour wcrk weeks were common and sleep could

be a rarity, especially during the early weeks of the build-up. Only with the passage of a few months could

a LAR expect to enjoy a single day per week away from his/her duties. The early days of ODS also offered

numerous Scud alerts. Replacoment SCR Jesse Trent, stationed in Dhahran, commented that the alerts

were doubly fear inducing. Beyond the general fear of attack was the knowledge that he had no place to

seek safety. He, and other LARs, could only don their chemical protective gear and wait for the alert to

pass.

113

109
The days were hot and tiring for LARs deployed to SWA. Mr. Terry Spurrier noted as the conflict

heightened that, "They're right out there in the field, wearing fatigues, eating MREs [meals, ready to eat]

and living in tents." LARs assigned to port areas frequently found themse!ves sleeping in open warehouses,

exposed to the scorching heat of the Arabian desert.'14

Yet the experience was not without its sense of romance for some of the deployed individuals. LAR

Rogers recalled that life in Saudi Arabia was "fun, exciting and challenging." During her seven months in

the desert, she had "sweated in the heat of September, shivered in the cold of February, and saw the sky

darkened at noon by oil well fires." She had also "heard the sounds of war and witnessed its devastating

results."115

While LAR Rogers remained in the Persian Gulf region responding to the needs of the 82nd Airborne

throughout the entirety of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, many LARs did not and rotated in

and out of SWA as necessity commanded. Thus the number of LARs in SWA varied over the course of the

conflict. When LAR supervisor and SCR Terry Spurrier arrived in Saudi Arabia on 23 August 1990 only one

other LAR was in country, Mr. Darrell Bast. Yet within days of his own arrival, a small contingent of additional

LARs made their appearance in SWA. By the date of his departure, 7 November 1990, 15 LARs had been

deployed to the desert. And as the deadline set by United Nations Security Council Resolution 678

demanding the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait by 15 January 1991 approached, the number of LARs

working in SWA increased. Approximately 25 AMCCOM LARs spent Christmas in the Gulf, and nearly 40

were in country as Hussein's deadline came and went. By the opening of the ground war, 24 February 1991,

44 civilian AMCCOM LARs were present in SWA, and during the brief war the number of AMCCOM LARs

rose to nearly 60. And as the Iraqi threat subsided and Hussein's depredations were, at least momentarily,

contained, the number of LARs present in country dropped off dramatically. By early April 1991 only 22

AMCCOM LARs were deployed and by late in the month a mere 15 were still present in SWA.116

Unfortunately, not ail LARs who traveled to SWA in support of their nation returned safely to the United

States. Tragically, Mr. James F. Neberman, a LAR in support of the 2nd Armored Division's tank and

howitzer armament systems, became the first American civilian to be killed in the Gulf War, the victim of

an ordnance accident." 7

Other safety factors also came to the fore for LARs deployed to SWA. Among their natural concerns,

in consideration of the area to which they were deployed and the conditions of their deployment, was the

threat of chemical/biological contamination. As noted, all deploying civilians were instructed how to use,

and provided with, chemical defense equipment before leaving CONUS. And upon observing that not all

deployed individuals were properly attending to their chemical defensive equipment, AMCCOM issued a

dictum regarding this inattentiveness. It noted that some individuals, especially those in support positions

were not performing adequate preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on their chemical

defense equipment. Individuals equipped with the M1 7 series mask were informed that a proper check of

their mask required that the voicemitter cover be removed to confirm the assembly was not bent and that

there were no cracks in the metal, especially around the drink tube lever. They were also to ascertain the

serviceability of their headharness on a regular basis as the hot, dry environment of SWA quickly reduced

its elasticity.."8

Individuals with the M24 or M25A1 protective masks were warned to be attentive to their lenses. They

were not to be discolored or debonded from the facepiece. More recent iterations of both protective masks

had polyurethane lenses which were susceptible to cracking at elevated temperatures. All deployees were

warned against keeping tneir protective equipment in the bottom of duffel bags with the simple comment,

"they are fragile."' 9

110
Such warnings were not lost on the LARs. LAR Rogers noted that masks were heavily used in drills

and that the sand and dust created maintenance problems, especially in regard to filters and airways.

Accordingly she endeavored to keep her mask's filters clean and properly changed, and its airways

unplugged. She also offered a commendation to thosp who had arranged for the p!ethora of protective

equipment which arrived in SWA. For she noted that had an actual chemical/biological attack occurred that

all devices would have been called into service. She also noted the presence of a mask refurbishing facility

in SWA operated by the Pine Bluff Arsenal which would not only repair or replace damaged masks but would

also test masks for serviceability.1'

Pre-deployment chemical defense training was vital to a proper response to gas alerts, yet regardless

of training, the experience could be frightening. LAR Gladys Balough recalled of one such experience,

"When you first hear over the radio the words 'gas, gas, MOPP (mission oriented position posture) 4,' that

is so frightening. And you're struggling, and all of a sudden you feel yourself breathing, and you have to

count one thousand one, one thousand two, so you don't lose it."'21

Beyond the threat of chemical/biological attacks in the desert, LARs also understood the risk of

terrorism. One LAR referred to terrorism as "the biggest feat' that we had." With units widely dispersed,

LARs frequent!y traveled early in the morning and late at night to rather isolated destinations. Yet the fear

was mitigated by the option of military escorts in trans-desert treks, although not the requirement, and the

presence of military personnel standing guard throughout the compounds. A demeanor of caution was also

frequently assumed.1'-The attitude of caution assumed by some LARs caused them to request the privilege

of carrying a weapon for their personal defense. T'he problems associated with the issuance of sidearms

to deploying civilians for the self-defense, as well as the outspoken desire of some individuals to acquire

them has been discussed in a previous passage.

Weapons were but one item on which returning LARs expressed an opinion. Based upon their

experiences in the deserts, LARs, as well as numerous others, recommended that better channels of

ccmmuriication be implemented before future deployments were undertaken. !ndeed, that the strained

communications system had held up as well as it had was deemed little less than a miracle and noted as

a "potential weak point" that might have proven disastrous had the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia not had a

relativeiy substantial commercial telephone system in place. Yet despite the Kingdom's significant in'ernal

telephone structure, an Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report observation warned against

relying upon a host nation's telephone system. Doing so created a false sense of security and relative ease

of operation although initial struggles with MCI trunk lines caused difficulties and forced an expansion to

other carriers. An aftertaste of the potential for confusion with the delicate telephone structure occurred

when the commercial circuits went out on 15 May 1991. Likewise, had the staging areas been elsewhere,

e.g., Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Iran, the luxury of a sophisticated commercial telephone structure would not

have been available to resolve the deployment and supply issues. If the communication system had been

successfully targeted by enemy military, terrorists, or long range artillery/missiles, the disruption could have

been extremely serious.'2 3

For LARs, the potential frailties of the Kinqdom's telephone structure were twofold. Not o-.i-, were their

,iu,,,erous contacts watn tne mz)s, cepois, aria *tne Nau;ona: inventory Conroi Points (il•CP) concerning

the resolution of repair parts and supply issues conducted on a system whose central focus could easily

have been destroyed, but the placement of the telephones was problematic as well. The desert

environment with its widely dispersed population and nomadic peoples did not promote the placement of

telephone booths which LARs, isolated in enclaves with their units, could readily access. Upon return to

CONUS, LARs reported traveling up to 70 Kilometers to use a standard telephone hook-up. Some LARs

were provided with AT&T credit cards for use in contacting AMCCOM and other mission-oriented centers.

111 Hi

- - , : " ii J i ii ii i Ha
Mobile telephones could be utilized in the selected regions of SWA which were in range of a communications satellite. Additionally, the satellite communications as well as AT&T lines were only useful in making

contacts outside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Local lines connecting points within SWA were nearly

nonexistent. In some cases, CONUS Operations Centers served as informational relay stations between

Saudi elements. 124

In consideration of this frailty, AMCCOM's Readiness Directorate, at the close of the war, recommended that LARs and other logistics support teams be equipped with satellite telephone communications

to permit dii ect down-links to CON US and LAR-to-LAR in theater, as well as permitting datafax capabilities.

The recommended package was a suitcase style, portable unit that could be set up in 15-20 minutes and

access CONUS/European dial tones. The Readiness Directorate noted that such units would be "essential"

in theaters with !imited or no telephone communications. Several devices were recommended for each

deployed unit.'2 Communication issues remain a paramount consideration in the evaluation of the

performance of the United States in the Persian Gulf War.

Not all individuals sought heightened communication avenues for LARs. It was observed at the war's

conclusion by members of AMCCOM's Materiel Management Directorate, Policy, Plans, and Programs

Division that abuses in the requisition system had occurred. The division's personnel noted that the system

in place allows for off-line processing of urgent requirements and immediate status. In this usually

computer-automated procedure, the requisition, as well as the materiel release order (MRO), were

manually processed with entries made in the automated system after the fact. While the office recognized

that telephone requisitions had been on occasion necessary, it felt that their use by LARs had been

excessive, especially at the onset of Operation Desert Shield. The over-use of the telephone, as well as

datafax, requisition structure required HQ, AMCCOM to staff three shi"s, seven days per week, to receive

and process off-line orders."'

For use in future requisition-from-the-field situations, Materiel Management personnel recommended

that control channels be instituted. In the case of ODS, personnel began asking telephone submitters if

they were a stock record account, and thus already financially provided for, or if they had approval to

requisition from their supply support activity. If the answer was affirmative, the o, der was processed. And

despite the problems caused by the call-in form of requisitioning, the diiectorate grudgingly recognized that

it "became a valid method of expediting requisitions and circumventing existing problems.",2 7

The "existing problems" which came to consume so much of the LARs time and energy included lost

and misdirected requisitions and an ineffectual inventory tracking system. Briefly stated, LARs were called

upon to overcome the absence of a functioning retail supply system, particularly in the early days of ODS.

A prime contribution to this deficiency was that the Standard Army Intermediate Level Supply (SAILS)

system was being replaced by the Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS). As a result,

accountability and visibility of assets received in SWA was practicplly nonexistent and in many cases

materiel was taken by units on a first come basis. This resulted in an excessive amount of requisitions as

units and their su-porting LARs continually reordered what was not received. Various workarounds were

developed to resolve this problem, including the ultimately necessary telephor e requisitions decried by the

Materiel Management Directorate, as well as push packages. The issue of supply visibility and the ensuing

problems caused to LARs might also have been mitigated by the presence of a significant number of supplyoriented LARs in country before the arrival of ;arge quantities of supplies.1 28

A further issue of communication/information also caused problems for AMCCOM's civilian LARs,

albeit in the form of technical documentation for equipment which had not initially been available for fielding

in support of ODS. AMCCOM's Integrated Logistic Support Office noted that at the time of deployment a

112
serious deficiency existed in the U.S. Army's ability to detect and identify threatening nuclear, biological,

and chemical (NBC) agents. The solution to this problem was to provide a system that used a combination

of commercially available kits and government hardware developed during the early 1980s. The

government program had been terminated prior to type classification and the developmental hardware was

placed in storage. It was there, waiting for refurbishing, at the onset of ODS. However, no single, 3ccurate

maintenance manual was available for issuance with the hardware. With the invaluable assistance of the

AMCCOM Historical Office, logistics documentation personnel rapidly developed a new manual specifying

for both military and civilian personnel essential maintenance procedures, maintenance allocations, and

repair parts and special tools listings.'9

Additional communication iss,,es for AMCCOM's LARs included learning to report equipment that

required non-mission capable maintenance (NMCM) with an explanation of the reported status. As

Maintenance Directorate personnel noted, it was difficult to react to NMCM items reported when the

rationale for the status was not included in the SITREP (situation report). Yet AMCCOM personnel were

reminded not to burden individuals deployed to SWA with needless requests for information and

feedback. 1 0

Communication capacities were not the only problem faced by LARs deployed to the deserts of SWA.

Transportation also provided the individuals with a myriad of problems, primarily obtaining it. LARs

returning to the United States following their deployment commented without fail on the difficulty of obtaining

efficacious transportation in SWA. And as the units in need of support were frequently a great distance from

one another--up to 150 miles in some cases-efficacious transportation was a necessity.13

LARs were not automatically provided military transportation and initially had to seek rental vehicles,

at government expense, on their own. Accnrding to one returning civilian, fees for four-wheel drive rental

vehicles ranged in cost from $3;000 to $4,500 during the height of ODS, although automobiles were

available at lesser fees. Rental vehicles of any sort were hard to come by; hundreds of repoiters, as wall

as other individuals on the scene, were vying for the limited supply. Only when civilians traveled close to

Iraq and as the deadline for Hussein's withdrawal from Kuwait approached were civilians offered the

opportunity to travel in military vehicles.1 32

For LAR Deborah Rogers the matter of transportatirn was somewhat more problematic. In consideration of the fact that Saudi women are not permitted to drive, special efforts had to be made to obtain a vehicle

for her use. When, in the initial days of her deployment, she rented an automobile it was accomplished by

listing her assigned male driver, a Sergeant First Class, as the primary driver and her as an additional one,

albeit by using her credit card. This continued for two months until the rental agency allowed her to rent

a vehicle on her own and be listed as the primary driver. However, while driving the vehicle, she had to be

dressed in a military uniform, with sleeves which reached her wrists and wearing a hat, and act accordingly

conservative. She also believed that by wearing her hair relatively short, she avoided the excessive

attention an obviously female driver might have attracted. Despite the problems obtaining a vehicle, she

believed that in consideration of her support role, it was in her best interest to drive. During the course of

her deployment, she drove rental automobiles and four-wheel drive vehicles, and ultimately was provided

a HMMWV (high mobility, multi-purpose wheeled vehicle) to cover the terrain.'3

"

Other problems arose for LAR Rogers due to her gender. On occasion she felt over-protected by her

male, fellow LARs and military personnel. And while she recognized that the surrounding men had her best

interests in mind, she refused to allow them to hinder the performance of her duty. Somewhat more

problematic for Ms. Rogers was her treatment by Muslim-oriented males. According to Islamic dictates,

it is not proper for a female to speak to a male until spoken to or make eye contact, let alone instruct him.

113

7. ,..7
As her job frequently required her to provide instruction on the function and maintenance of equipment, the

usual societal mores had to be contravened. While the King's order that all women in military uniforms were

to be regarded as male eased her position somewhat, other methods ware more effective. For example,

while performing maintenance procedures for Arabic allies at the 82nd A'rborne Division's SWA installation

at Safah, Champion Main, she frequently utilized a male warrant officer assigned to the facility to relay

information, and continually asked permission of her Saudi hosts to allow her to perform a function. As she

noted, "I stayed very guarded and was careful. I tried not to offend them."'3

Beyond the issues of communication, transportation and gender was the ma.'er of basic life support.

When SCR and LAR Supervisor Terry Spurrier returned CONUS, he noted that R -.!as not realistic to expect

the troops supported by a LAR to take responsibility fcr that individual in terms of billeting, communication,

transportation, food, etc. Indeed, he con imented that during hostilities "warfighters have enough to concern

themselves with," and that the role of a LAP is not to be a "hindrance."'3 s

And in consideration of the need for LARs not to be a hindrance to soldiers in the field, and also for them

to effectively accomplish their mission, AMCCOM's Readiness Directorate recommended the creation of

LAR support packages (LSPs). In the recommended format, such support packages would be fully

uploaded expandable mobile maintenance vans, or perhaps simple maintenance vans and would ideally

contain cots, tents, communications equipment (datafax, computers, radios, etc.), generators, light sets,

first aid kits, tools, MREs, bottled water, NBC gear, etc. Constantly maintained and periodically checked,

the vehicles would be shipped when LARs deployed and provide the individual with both living quarters and

a work site and ultimately make the LAR both self-supporting and selfcontained. Each deploying LAR would

ideally be provided his or her own vehicle to facilitate the accomplishment of their mission. Some individuals

recommended making the LSP a fourwheel drive vehicle and including a weapon.13 6

The development of such vehicles in troubled budget times remains questionable, however. What does

not remain questionable though is the invaluabie service provided by AMCCOM's Logistic Assistance

Representatives. Their unflinching, selfless service to their nation and its soldiers undoubtedly saved lives

arid in turn aided in the subdual of Saddam Hussein.

114
.. . " i• . ... .- •÷ 1

NOTES

'"War and Pieces: The Logistics Story of Desert Storm," AMC News. December 1991, p. 5.

2

Ibid.

'United States Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command handout, "Deployed to SWA:

AMCCOM Personnel," February 27, 1991.

"Interview H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO, with D. Rogers, AMSMC-RD, 1 November 1991.

5Lessons Learned, 52242-46234 (00150) (U), AMSMC-RD, Title: Preparation for Overseas Rotatior,

Movement (POR/POM)-ODS. 17 May 1991.

6

Messaye (U), Commander AMC to AIG 12113, Subject: Preparation for Overseas Replac Ient (POR

042350Z October 1990; and Message (U), Alfred N. Bradley, Acting Director, AMSMC-RD, Travelers

Update: Operation Desert Storm, Update 11, 'POR Qualifications," 8 February 1991.

'Lessons Learned, 52242-46234 (00150) (U), AMSMC-RD, Titie: Preparation for Overseas Rotation/

Movement (POR/POM)-ODS. 17 May 1991.

81bid.

91bid. After the close of the ground war, deploying civilians were informed that APG was then in a position

to properly outfit all civiiians enroute to SWA. As a result, AMCCOM would no longer authorize individual

purchases of equipment and clothing for persons headed to SWA. See Message (U), COL. David 0.

Lindsay, Travelers Update: Operation Desert Storm, Update 6, "Travelers Update Changes," 6 March

1991.

10Ibid.

"+Message (U). Commander AMC to AIG 12113, Subject: Preparation for Overseas Replacement (FOR).

042350Z October 1990.

1

2

fbid.

Ibid.

"Ibid. and E-MAIL Directive (U), Emergency Operations Center, Subject: SWA Deoloyment Guidance. 2

December 1990.

'

5Department of the Army, He2dquarters, U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command.

AMCCOM Circular 55-1, Trans.ration and Travel for Ooeration Desert Shield. 20 December 1990.

"Ibid., 1.

1

7

Ibid.

115
18Ibid., 2.

191bid., 3.

201lbid., 3-4.

•Ibid., 4.

2Ibid., 5.

mIbid., 7.

24

Ibid.

-Lessons Learned, 73139-03076 (00286) (U), AMSMC-RDP-O, Title: Civilian/Military Deployments. 21

June 1991.

2Lessons Learned, 52244-53842 (00151) (U), AMSMC-RD, Title: Travel Orders. 17 May 1991.

27Lessons Learned, 52347-16710 (00168) (U), AMSMC-MGO, Title: Staffing Requirements for the

AMCCOM Opgeations Center, 20 May 1991.

2Lessons Learned, 72222-55877 (00282) (U), AMSMC-RDP-O, Title: Use of IMA and ;RR in Operation

Centers. 21 June 1991.

nlbid.

30Ibid.

311bid.

12

Lessons Learned, 72318-61534 (00283) (U), AMSMC-RDP-O, Title: Staffing of Emergency Ooeratoin

Center..21 June 1991.

"•Lessons Learned, 72424-77831 (00284) (U),AMSMC-RDP-O, Title: Emergency Operations Center

Chain of Command. 21 June 1991.

34Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command,

AMCCOM Circular 55-1, Transportation and Travel for Operation Desert Shied. 15.

35Message (U), MAJ Donald T. Bodeau to "Plant", Subject: Medical Clearance for Travel to Southwest Asj,

(SWA). 26 December 1990.

•Ibid.

37 Ibid. This information was ultimately updated to require an HIV antibody test to have been conducted

within six months of military personnel deployment. See Message (U), COL David 0. Lindsay, Travelers

Update: Operation Desert Storm, Update 3, "Medical," 22 January 1991; Message (U), Alfred N. Bradley,

Acting Director, AMSMC-RD, Travelers Update: Operation Desert Storm, Update 11, "POR Qualifica116
tions," 8 February 1991; and Message (U), COL David 0. Lindsay, Travelers Update: Operation Desert

Storm, Update 8, "General," 25 January 1991.

3Department of Advanced Preventive Studies, Division of Preventive Medicine, Walter Reed Army Institute

of Research, The Threat of Disease and Non-Battt InWury to US Military Personnel on Operation Desert

5hLQ1working draft, 16 August 1990. This document was not directly provided to individuals deploying to

the Gulf, but they, through their physicians, were expected to be familiarwith the health risks of deployment.

391bid., 7.

40Ibid.

411bid.

421bid.

4Ibid.

"

4 Ibid., 9.

4

51bid., 9-11.

"81bid., 13-14. Approximately 22 individuals of the over half million did indeed contract leishmaniasis while

deployed to the deserts of SWA. Although complete recovery was expected from the afflicted individuals,

the nature of the parasitic disease required that soldiers and civilians who had been to Saudi Arabia, Oman,

the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Iraq, Oman, Yemen, Qatar, or Bahrain after 1 August 1990 refrain from

blood donation until 1 January 1993. See "New Blood Donation Policies are Announced," Targe.t_

December 13, 1991, p. 3; and Message (U), Michael Finnegan, AMSMC-OB to LTC Eric T. Evenson,

AMSMCSG, Subject: Medical Information for Desert Shield/Desert Storm Vte!tans-Military and Civilian,.

14 November 1991.

47

1bid., 21.

4Ibid.

49

1b/d., 12-22.

1"Paul Levesque, "EAP is here to help Persian Gulf Veterans," T 9 August 1991, 10.

5 Ibid.

52

1bid.

"SDepartment of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command,

AMCCOM Circular 55-1, Transportation and Travel ior Ooeration Desert Shield 20 December 1990, 22;

and Message (U), CDRFORSCOM to AIG , Subject: EassQort/Visa Requirements for ODe.r. esert

Shield-Update 6,18 December 1990.

117
&4

Message (U) Commander AMC to AIG 12113, Subject: Pregaration for Overseas Re l#aement (POF)

042350Z October 1990; Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Armament, Munition and

Chemical Command, AMCCOM Circular 55-1, Transpooration and Travel for Ooeration Desert Shield, 20

December 1990; and Message (U), CDRAMC to AIG 865, AIG 12383, and AIG 8876, Subject: Passpo

Visa Requirements for Desert Shield. 191400Z November 1990.

"5Message (U), CDRUSATSG Redstone Arsenal to AIG 11537 and AIG 12159, Subject: Desert Shield

Guidelines for Deploying DA Civilian Employees to Southwest Asia (SWA'. 260800Z October 1990.

5lbid.

57

Ibid.

1lbid.

5Ibid.

60Ibid.

81 Ibid.

82

Lessons Learned, 51755-09944 (00141) (U), AMSMC-PTE, Title: Pay for Deoloyed Civilian Personnel,

17 May 1991.

6Message (U), CRUSATSG Redstone Arsenal to AIG 11537 and AIG 12159, Subject: Desert Shield

Guidelines for Deploying DA Civilian Employees to Southwest Asia (SWA). 260800Z October 1990.

"•Lessons Learned, 51755-09944 (00141) (U), AMSMC-PTE, Title: Pay for DeDloyed Civilian Personnel.

17 May 1991.

"85Message 85 (U), Joseph L. George to all AMCCOM Headquarters Elements, Subject: Post Differential

Pay for Travel to SWA. 28 January 1991.

6Lessons Learned, 51755-09944 (00141) (U), AMSMC-PTE, Title: Pay for Deoloved Civilian Personnel.

17 May 1991.

67

1bid.

SIbid.

1

9Memorandum (U), AMCPE-CE-L Memorandum for Distribution, Subject: Overtime for Civyian Employ--

e.j n.d.

70Ibid.; Department of the Army, Headquarters. U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command,

AMCCOM Circular 55-1, Irans ortation and Travel for Operation Desert Shield, 28.

"71Department of the Army, Headquarters. U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command,

AMCCOM Circular 55-1, Transportation and Travel for Operation Desert Shield, 28.

118
/

7Memorandum (U), AMCPE-CE-L Memorandum for Distribution, Subject: Overtime for Civilian Employae& n.d.

7ulbid.

74

Ibid.

7

5Department of the Army, Headquarters. U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command,

AMCCOM Circular 55-1, Transportation and Travel for Ooeration Desert Shield. 29.

76

1bid.

7 lbid., 28.

78 Ibid., 27.

79

Message (U), Department of the Army to AIG 9150 and AIG 9893, Subject: Desert Storm Personne-eiE2jz

Message-,Performance Aqoraisals for Civilians Temporarily Assigned to SWA during Desert Shield!

Desert Storm. 011420Z April 1991.

9Message (U), CRUSATSG Redstone Arsenal to AIG 11537 and AIG 12636, Subject: Desert Shie_

Guidelines for Deploying DA Civilian Employees to Southwest Asia (SWA). 260800Z October 1990.

"31Desert Shield General Order 1. This document has not been properly archived and is seemingly

unavailable. Muslim dictates are discussed in by Donna Miles in "Islam Observed," Soldiers, December

1990, pp. 20-21.

8Message (U), CDRAMC to AIG 12113, Subject: Civilian Attire for Desert Shield. 011600Z November

1990; Message (U), COL David 0. Lindsay, Travelers Update: Operation Desert Storm, Update 8,

"General," 25 January 1991.

8Message (U), COL David 0. Lindsay, Travelers Update: Operation Desert Storm, Update 8, "General,"

25 January 1991.

'Message (U), COL David 0. Lindsay, Travelers Update: Operation Desert Storm, Update 10, "General

Lessons Learned," 25 January 1991.

"•Message (U), CRUSATSG Redstone Arsenal to AIG 11537 and AIG 12159, Subject: QjL.Shi"

Guidelines e9oa DA Civilian Emolovees to Southwest Asia (SWAY 260800Z October 1990; and

Message (U), COL David 0. Lindsay, Travelers Update: Operation Desert Storm, Update 4, "ID Tags," 22

January 1991.

"•Message (U), CRUSATSG Redstone Arsenal to AIG 11537 and AIG 12159, Subject:Desert ShiLd

C0ja*-r DA Civilian Employees to Southwest A S...A_ 260800Z Octobsr 1990; and

Message 1U), COL David 0. Lindsay, Travelers Update: Operation Desert Storm, Update 5, "Waiting

Families Support Group," 22 January 1991.

1

7

Message (U), Alfred N. Bradley, Acting Director, AMSMC-RD, Travelers Update: Operation Desert Storm,

Update 12, "Desert Shield Hotlines," 20 February 1991.

119
1

8Lessons Learned, 32143-01264 (00089) (U), AMSMC-PT, Title: Sugport to Wailing Families, 19 March

1991.

8Message (U), LTC Melvin A. Miller, Travelers Update: Operation Desert Storm, Update 15, 'Casualty

Reporting/Notification," 26 February 1991.

90Ibid.

91 Ibid.

92

1bid.

9Ibid.

91lbid.

"•Ibid.

9Message (U), CDRAMC to AIG 865, AIG 7459, AIG 8876, AIG 12383, Subject: The Civilian Survivor

Assist3nce Program, 161600Z January 1991.

97

1bid.

•Message (U), DA to AIG 9150, AIG 9893, AIG 9158, AIG 7406, Subject: Desert Shield Personnel Policy

Message No. 38-Guidelines for Assignment. Utilization and Protection of Army Civilians in Southwest Asia.

042200Z January 1991,

•Lessons Learned, 52249-99356 (00153) (U), AMSMC-RD, Title: LARs. DA Civilians Issued Weapons in

Combat Zone, 17, May 1991.

1 ORogers Intvw, 1 November 1991.

101

Message (U), DA to AIG 9150 AIG 9893, AIG 9158, AIG 7408, Subject: Desert Shield Personnel Policy

Message No. 38-Guidelines for Assignment. Utilization and Protectioq of Army Southwest Asia. 042200Z

January 1991

102 Ibid.

,10 Ibid.

104Ibid.

105 Ibid.

1

0ILessons Learned, 52247-07252 (00152) (U), AMSMC-RD, Title: Civilian Volunteers versus Emergency

Essential Statements. 17 May 1991.

107

Message (U), DA to AIG 9150, AIG 9893, AIG 9158, AIG 7408, Subject: Desert Shield2Pern_ Dk

Message No. 38-Gui 'defines for Assignment. Utilization and Protection of Army Civilians in SouthwestAsia.

042200Z January 1991.

120
"1Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. JCS

Publication 1, 1 June 1987, 213-14.

"19Materiel collected and reproduced from a variety of AMCCOM sources, most undated and without a point

of origin. For a partial listing, see "Deployed to SWA: AMCCOM Personnel," 27 February 1991 and a similar

document for 28 February 1991.

"0Quoted in Paul Levesque, "Employee brings good news from Saudi Arabia,"ar.g..L 14 Dece-mber 1990,

1 and 12.

"'Rogers Intvw., 1 November 1991.

"12

Ibid.

"113For the human side of LAR life in SWA see Paul Levesque, "Employee brings good news from Saudi

Arabia," Trarge, 14 December 1990, 1 and 12; "Senior LAR experiences war's triumph, tragedy," Thra.'i.

8 March 1991, 5; "Command's support provided in person," Target, 14 September 1990, 1 B; "Anywhere,

anytime: LAR stays with 82nd Airborne throughout desert deployment," Target. 11 October 1991, 1 and

7.

114 Ibid.

"

1

1lbid.

"

11

6Rogers Intvw., 1 November 1991; interview, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO, with Terry Spurrier, AMSMCRD, 19 February 1991; Paul Levesque, "Employee brings good news from Saudi Arabia," . 14

December 1990, 1 and 12; "UN Resolutions," Military Review. September 1991, 79; Memorandum (U),

SMCRI-PC-R (500-5c), Subject: AMC Personnel Deployed or Scheduled to Deplo. to SWA in Suportos

Operation Desert Shield, 15 January 1991; United States Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical

Command, handout (U), "Deployed to SWA: AMCCOM Personnel," 27 February 1991; Memorandum (U),

A!vin M. Schwartz, Chief, AMSMC-IN, Subject: Statement Concerning Civilian Empl1oy..- 27 February

1991; United States Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command, handout (U), "Total AMCCOM

Personnel Deployed," 19 April 1991 (?).

"17 Paul Levesque, "Employees pay honor to fallen colleague," Target. 8 March 1991,1; and "GIs hurt, killed

by bomblets," The [Rock Island, Illinois] A 19 September 1991. Mr. Neberman lost his life when

apparently transporting a series of cluster bomblets from the field for study elsewhere. He was buried at

Rock Island [Illinois] National Cemetery with the full military honors due him as an air force veteran. The

Rock Island Arsenal's flag flew at half mast on the day of his burial, 6 March 1991, and the island's staff

lined its main artery, Rodman Avenue, as the funeral procession of their slain colleague passed by. The

death of Mr. James F. Neberman and the use of cluster bomblets by the United States forces in the Persian

Gu!f remains an issue of contention. That the bomblets failed to detonate as designed leaving a plethora

of unexploded ordnance and that soldiers and civilians in the Gulf were not properly trained to recognize

and handle the devices has sparked Congressional hearings. Beyond Mr. Neberman, at least 19 U.S.

soldiers were killed by the bomblets.

"'Lessons Learned, 11158-74841 (00032) (U), HQ, AMCCOM, Title: Protective M Pree__. iv

MaintenanLce Checks and Services (PMCS). 11 November 1990.

121
1191bid.

120 Rogers Intvw., 1 November 1991.

121 "War and Pieces: The Logistics Story of Desert Storm." AMC News December 1991. Ms. Gladys

Balough is an AMC civilian LAR.

1

22Rogers lntvw., 1 November 1991; Spurrier lntvw., 19 February 1991.

1

2102eration Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report. Summary Analysis-"Communication*; and Lessons Learned, 52357-67995 (00174) (U), AMSMC-RD, Title: Commercial Telephgna Communication

Dependency. LAR. 23 May 1991.

'-"'Rogers lntvw., 1 November 1991; Lessons Learned, 52357-67995 (00174) (U), AMSMC-RD, Title:

Commercial Teleohone Communication Dependency. LAR. 23 May 1991.

'21Lessons Learned, 52357-67995 (00174) (U), AMSMC-RD, Title: Commercial Telephone, Communication Dependency. LAR. 23 May 1991.

"12Lessons Learned, 40939-14391 (00095) (U), AMSMAC-MMP, Title: ODS Telephone/Datafax Requisition

Abuse,5 April 1991.

1

27Ibid.

1280peration Desert SHi eld/Storm After Acton Reoort. Summary Analtysis-"Supply"; Lessons Learned,

32143-87959 (00093) (U), AMSMC-MML, Title: Identification of Logistical Support and Supported

Customers within Theatre. 19 March 1991; and Lessons Learned, 61235-53789 (00245) (U), AMSMCRDL, Title: Supply Logistic Assistance Representatives (LAR) in Southyiest Asia (SWYA). 12 June 1991.

1

29Lessons Learned, 12149-81901 (00076) (U), AMSMC-LS, Title: Technical Documentation for Surge

Equ~pment in Support of Desert Storm. 24 January 1991.

""L01essons Learned, 22130-90278 (00068) (U), AMSMC-MA, Title: Not Mission Capable Maintenance

IL4MCM).. 14 December 1990; Lessons Learned, 10744-89461 (00073) (U), AMSMC-M1A, Title: Lack of

SWA eedbak~. 7 January 1990.

"'Interview, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO, with Steve Lovely, Rich Albrecht, Rick Relfe, Jim Wagner, and Dick

Thissen, SMAC-AV, 4 April 1991; Rogers lntvw., 1 November 1991; Spurnier lntvw., 19 February 1991.

132 Ibid.

'33Rogers lntvw., 1 November 1991.

I34bid.

13

1S purrier lntvw., 19 February 1991.

136Operation Desert Shield/Storm A~fter Action R~eport. Summary Analysis-"Logistics Assistance/LAO";

Lessons Learned, 5235871848 (00175) (U), AMSMC-RD, Title: LAR Deployment. Communication.

Transportation. Life Support. 23 May 1991; Rogers lntvw., 1 Novemoer 1991.

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Chapter Five

Ammunition

The largest Class V supply movement in history b.>gan with President George Bush's 6 August 1990

order for the deployment of United States land, sea, and air forces to the Persian Gulf to protect the territorial

integrity of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia after the invasion and take-over of tiny, neighboring Kuwait by the

Iraqi troops of Saddam Hussein. The massive movement of Class V supplies thus begun continued

throughout Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and only drew to a close with the retrograde

movement of ammunition in the spring of 1992. Class V supply, broadly defined, includes "any device

charged with explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics, initiating composition, or nuclear, biological, or

chemical material for use in connection with defense or offense, including demolitions."1

In consideration of its prescribed mission to:

exercise total Life Cycle Management over research, development, engineering, product

assurance, logistics support, industrial preparedness, procurement, production, security assistance, and material readiness for assigned systems; Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition for DOD; manage Production Base Modernization Expansion Program; maintain a

technical base to accomplish development, procurement, production and Life Cycle support of

conventional and nuclear weapons and ammunition (artillery, infantry, gun-type air defense,

surface vehicle mounted and aircraft mounted); certain weapons systems/subsystems and

chemical syster- 'materiel; related components and conventional ammunition as assigned;

peculiar equipment, test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment; and tools maintenance

equipment; command and control assigred centers, activities, and installations. Maintain the

Ammunition Chemical and Armament Production base which includes initial production facilities

programs, modernization, expansion projects, facilitization to satisfy peacetime surge and

mobilization 2

the United States Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) was intimately involved

in fulfilling the ammunition needs of the American servicemember. Increasing AMCCOM's level of

responsibility in the supply of ammunition was its bureaucratic predecessor's 1977 designation as the

Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition operations. And adding to this vital responsibility during

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was AMCCOM's endorsement by the Military Traffic

Management Command (MTMC), as well as its designation by the Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), as the single focal point for ammunition ship planning. The designation provided for both enhanced

movement control and total visibility over all ammunition and missile shipments, both for Single Manager

Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) and non-SMCA, albeit with significant additions to AMCCOM's work

load)

AMCCOM's "Fast Release" database system was not the only contributing factor to the triumphant

fulfillment of the Department of Defense's designation. Assisting AMCCOM in this success story, as well

as the whole of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, were its supporting research centers, arsenals,

ammunition plants, and assorted facilities: the United States Army Armament Research, Development and

Engineering Center (ARDEC), Picatinny Arsenal, NJ; United States Army Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center (CRDEC), Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island,

IL; Watervliet Arsen'il, W'atervliet, NY; Pine Bluff Arsenal, Pine Bluff, AR; Crane Army Ammunition Activity,

Crane, IN; United States Army Defense Ammunition Center and School (USADACS), Savanna, IL:

McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, McAlester, OK; Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plant, Hawthorne, NV;

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Holston Army Ammunition Plant, Kingsport, TN; Indiana Army Ammunition Plant, Charlestown, IN; Iowa

Army Ammunition Plant, Middletown, IA; Kansas Army Ammunition Plant, Parsons, KS; Lake City Army

Ammunition Plant, Independence, MO; Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant, Texarkana, TX; Longhorn Army

Ammunition Plant, Marshall, TX; Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant, Shreveport, LA; Milan Army Ammunition Plant, Milan, TN; Radford Army Ammunition Plant, Radford, VA; Scranton Army Ammunition Plant,

Scranton, PA; and Sunflower Army Ammunition Plant, DeSoto, KS.4

Behind the primarily government-owned, contractor-operated ammunition plants-the McAlester and

Crane plants are government-owned and operated-and assorted support facilities were a total of 17,934

civilian employees and 633 military personnel, albeit augmented during Operations Desert Shield and

Desert Storm (ODS) by approximately 700 temporary employees. Working together, frequently on

lengthened shifts, these employees were responsible for the loading, assembling, packing, shipping,

delivery, etc., of all conventional ammunition utilized in ODS by the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine

Corps, and the U.S. Air Force, as well as much of that needed by coalition allies. A total of 1,619,552 civilian

hours were expended in support of AMCCOM's mission in ODS with a concomitant expenditure of $52

million.5

At the onset of the war, only ten ammunition items were considered to be in short supply. All other

ammunition items were at 100 percent of the requirement, either on hand or in transit to Southwest Asia

(SWA). A relatively strong inventory, acquired and maintained over a significant period of years, made this

major accomplishment a possibility. No inactive production facility was brought into operation during the

relatively brief Persian Gulf War, and, indeed, it is doubtful that given the exigencies involved that any further

production lines could have been made operational during the span of the conflict. Once again, the price

of liberty was shown to be eternal vigilance.6

In the initial hectic days of deployment, HQ, AMCCOM worked at a frenetic pace. Among the activities

undertaken in the opening days of Operation Desert Shield by the command was the rapid identification

of the units designated for deployment. From that point, AMCCOM ascertained the needs of the deploying

units with an eye to the weapon systems and ammunition for which it carried responsibilty. This included

activating prepositioned requisitions prepared in peacetime and stored at ammunition depots and army

ammunition plants in crder to round out deployees' basic ammunition loads. The initial units supported

included the 82nd Airborne, the 101st Airborne, and the 25th Mechanized Division.

Identifying the deploying units, processing requisitions, packing MILVANs (military vans), arranging for

transportation, and scheduling shipments to avoid overwhelming depots, units, ports, army ammunition

plants, etc., meant placinig AMCCOM on a 24 hour, seven day per week schedule. This included, of course,

the directorates most centrally involved with providing the firepower: the Defense Ammunition Directorate,

headed by COL Scott W. Hull; the Transportation and Traffic Management Directorate, headed by Mr. Gary

L. Anderson; the office of the Deputy for Logistics Readiness, headed by Mr. Perry C. Stewart; the Materiel

Management Directorate, headed by Mr. Deane L. Warnecke; and the Readiness Directorate, headed by

COL David 0. Lindsay, among notable others. Also placed on initial, 24 hour, seven day per week

schedules were the nation's active aimy ammunition plants.

Of the fourteen active army ammunition plants (AAP), thirteen participated in the supplying of munitions

during ODS. Government-owned and operated, the McAlester AAP and thle Crane Army Ammunition

Activity (AAA), greatly accelerated their production efforts. The McAlester AAP dramatically increased its

U.S. Navy bomb program. To do so, the plant hired 200 temporary workers and activated a process by

which orders for practice bombs were converted to orders for tactical bombs. Over 45,000 short tons of

bombs were shipped from the facility in support of ODS.7

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Other significant accomplishments included Hawthorne AAP's switch from one to three shifts, placing

it on a twenty-four hour, seven day status, With such a schedule, its employees were able to ship 65 short

tons in a mere 90 days, as well as, in a herculean effort, prepare 258 semi-truck loads and 138 railcars for

shipment in a single week. Additionally, Indiana AAP shipped 235,000 propelling charges during the course

of ODS, and loaded 63 MILVANs and 15 railcars in a single week. The low',i AAP managed, during ODS

to ship over 80 railcars and 190 truck loads, amounting to 8,500 short tons, of tank ammunition, mines,

demolitions, and missile warheads.a

Elsewhere within the AMCCOM AAP structure, Kansas AAP produced over 10,000 155mm projectiles,

and in one five day period managed to load 77 semi-trailers. Additionally, Lake City AAP shipped over 320

million rounds of small arms ammunition, and Lone Star AAP shipped 60 railcar loads over the Christmas

holidays. Louisiana AAP produced 2.75mm rockets as fast as rocket motors were received from the vendor,

meanwhile conducting the first e-/er ammunition container shipment for U.S. Army requirements. Milan

AAP shipped over 30,000 short tons of ammunition during the war, including 105 MILVANs and 24 truck

loads in a single week. And Mississippi AAP shipped over 60 short tons of support equipment and assisted

in moving over 119 MILVANs in a ten-day period.9

Crane Army Ammunition Activity demonstrated itself as an extraordinary facility with the efforts of its

700 civilian employees. Tucked away in southern Indiano's farm country at the Naval Weapons Support

Center, the activity center's employees manage a 350,000 too stockpile of conventional ammunition for the

army, navy, and Marine Corps. They also manufacture everything from hand-held flares to 16-inch

projectiles for battleships and 40,000-pound shock charges. Of the conventional ammunition stored in the

United States, the Crane AAA holds 25 percent of all the army's supply, nearly 50 percent of the navy's

ammunition supplies and approximately 20 percent of the Marne Corps'.10

With the onset of conflict in the Middle East, Crane AAA swept rapidly into action. Five days after

Saddam Hussein overran Kuwait, depot employees began working around-the-clock to !oad crates of

ammunition for shipment to forces deploying to the Persian Gulf region. In the ensuing ten days, 72 railcars,

141 semi-trailers, and 20 shipping containers were prepared for shipment, reoresenting nearly 7,546 tons

of ammunition, much of it destined for the desert. To meet the urgent, initial iquired delivery dates, some

employees worked 25 hours straight, although 16 to 18 hour voluntary: shifts were more common. But not

all of Crane AAA's efforts supported the forces of the United States; it aiso produced and shipped 2,000-

pound bombs to the Kuwaiti Air Force."

Although Crane AAA met the exigencies of the initial hectic days of GDS with great skill, coupled with

long and tiring hours, it had some difficulty maintaining the pace as the standoff in the desert continued.

As MSG Roger Fadroski, Crane AAA's Marine Corps !iaison, noted the facility simply did not have sufficient

blue-collar employees to work around the clock for an extended period of time. Yet the facility did not suffer

unduly from the shortage of blue-collar labor. Due to a grassroots-type of management program that had

begun at Crane AAA only months before the war started, the center was able to continue its mission without

great difficulty. ln the Quality Management Program instituted at Crane AAA a mere month before the onset

of ODS, white-col!ar employees who designed work stations for blue-collar employees had been given the

chance to labor in the conditions they had designed and to labor by the rules they had instituted. Thus just

weeks before the invasion of Kuwait, Crane AAA's management team had gained valuabie practical

experience in the manufacturing and depot operations of the facility. And when American troops deployed to SWA, design and management personnel took their positions along side, a-d in place of, exhausted production and depot workers, frequently after their own, normal eight-hour day had been completed.12

125 f
LTC Ken Rhylander, Crane AAA Commander, noted of the enhanced operations, "You [had] to see the

teamwork to believe it. This [was] a magnificent work force. They [werel selfless and totally dedicated to

supporting servicemembers in the fie!d and at sea." Regardless of this selflessness and dedication, the

need to utilize white-collar employees in production and depot service positions when they quite obviously

could be best employed in their chosen career field was addressed in great detail within the official

AMCCOM Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report. AMCCOM's Personnel and Training

Directorate staff noted that the Department of Defense (DOD) hiring freeze in place at the onset of ODS

prohibited installations, such as Crane AAA, from hiring the civilian personnel required to perform essential

war work. The submitted observation noted that in particular Crane AAA worked employees in double and

triple shifts, and detailed whitecollar personnel to shipping operations due to the lack of authority to hire.

It further noted that even with expedited procedures to obtain hiring authority, the short delay caused

significant problems which jeopardized mission performance. In view of the problems incurred, the

Personnel and Training Directorate recommended that current and future hiring limitations should contain

a provision for local commanders to unilaterally hira temporary employees required to meet operation and

mobilization mission requirements. The directorate thus recommended that AMCRM (Army Materiel

Command Resource Management) work with the Department of the Army (DA), as well as with DOD, to

obtain the required provision.'3

And despite the success of the army ammunition plants, the problems at Crane AAA with the hiring of

sufficient workers were not the only ones deemed worthy of inclusion in the Operation Desert Shield/Storm

After Action Report. Crane AAA also voiced what became a frequent refrain in the post-war period

concerning MILVANs and commercial containers. The AAA noted that it could have been more responsive

to emergency wartime required deliveries of ammunition if MILVANs or commercial containers were kept

on hand instead of at remote locations. The activity's personnel felt that having to order the containers after

the request to ship material had been received hampered their effecti•cz. !-,- response,

AMCCOM recommended that Crane AAA, as well as all AAPF, b.a stocked in anticipution of future

requirements with 200 to 500 commercial containers."'

Lake City AAP (LCAAP) also had difficulty handling the MILVANs needed to ship ammunition. In the

After Action Report, AMCCOM's Transportation and Traffic Management Directorate's Defense Munitions

Distribution Traffic Division noted that irrespective of LCAAP's tasking during ODS to ship sm-ll caliber

munitions in MILVAN containers, it did not have this capacity. After several discussions with AMCCOM

regarding the constraints imposed by ihe lack of a container handling facility, LCAAP attempted to devise

safe procedures for the inspection, staffing, and loading of MILVAN containers utilizing existing facilities

on a one time or short-term basis. However, the requirement was cancelled before any shipments were

actually mede,'5

Determining that MILVAN handling was a surge or mobilization contingency for which there was not

adenuate planning, Lake City AAP personnel set about rectifying the problem. They reccmmended that

AMCCOM's Transportation and Traffic Management Division as well as its Industrial Readiness Directorate, in conjunction with additional army planners, should re-examine the need for MILVAN shipments during

surge or mobilization, and define probable requirements-ship quantities, frequencies, container handling

capacity, etc. Lake City AAP should then prepare a construction project or define a mobilization deficiency

for a container handling facility of the required capacity. Deliberation should also be given to providing

limited container handling capability which could be economically used during peacetime.' 6

Indeed, Lake City AAP personnel noted in their submitted observations to the Operation Desert Shield/

Storm After Actic-n -R&. that a container handling facility had been planned for and desiqned in a

modernization program of the early 1980s. The container handling facility was to be located adJacent to

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. . ., • . ..,. • . ., : • . .• , • • L • :

the existing warehouse area. The planned facility included a concrete pad forcontainer loading and storage

and extension of roads, rail, security fencing, and utilities to the new area. The facility's estimated cost was

in excess of $1 million. A 50,000-pound capacity container handler was provided to Lake City AAP at that

time under an army-wide contract, although it has never been used for a single MILVAN shipment. Periodic

maintenance having been performed, the Lake City AAP submitting personnel did not perceive that

completing the proposed facility would prove too onerous. AMCCOM's Transportation and Traffic

Management Division apparently held the same beliefs. 7

Longhorn AAP similarly suffered from MILVAN problems. During ODS, the plant was unable to load

ammunition into MILVANs when required to do so. Although Longhorn AAP has apparent MILVAN loading

capacity, when it was called upon to utilize this potential during December 1990 and February 1991 to ship

155mm projectiles, it was unable to comply. In consideration of the fact that the port of Sunny Point, NC,

had become congested and could no longer accept non-containerized ammunition, the need to prepare

MILVANs for expeditious transshipments became great. Yet the facility could not comply with the urgent

request due to the inability of the dock and/or pad surface to withstand the weight of a container handler

with a loaded MILVAN. Additionally, safety-oriented "quantity distance" factors limited the efficacy of

Longhorn AAP's MILVAN loading facility. Reflecting upon these issues, Longhorn AAP personnel

encouraged the funding of construction which would allow for pads and/or loading docks at their own, as

well as other, facilities with the true capability to handle MILVANs. Limited port facilities for noncontainerized ammunition transshipment in a contingency situation commanded that AAPs be prepared to

load MILVANs.18

The issues of port congestion and containerization of ammunition became paramount in ODS. Despite

the fact that since the Vietnam era efforts had been extended to convert the Defense Transportation System

(DTS) to predominantly containerized ammunition movement, as opposed to breakbulk, the Conta-ierized

Ammunition Distribution System (CADS) was not used during the Persian Gulf War. The effort to impose

a containerized system was taken to allow the DTS to be more conducive to perceived commercial shipping

capabilities. Regardless of the efforts undertaken years before, the onset of ODS, very few requirements,

ammunition or otherwise, were moved using commercial containers or MILVANs. The Military Sealift

Command and the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) were able to procure vessels with

limited or no container capabilities. The effort to determine theater capabilities and desires regarding

containerized ammunition was in vain. Only at thp conclusion of ODS was it discovered that theater support

systems were not in place early enough in the Operation to handle containerized ammunition. Container

handling equipment, including variable reach forklifts, were needed but unavailable.19

From the experience, AMCCOM's Transportation and Traffic Management Directorate discerned that

containerized ammunition shipment desires, capabilities, requirements, and plans need to be discussed

and documented with Commander in Chief (CINC) logistics representatives during the deliberate planning

process. They also noted that the mix of containerized versus breakbulk ammunition needed to be

determined in advance, as well as in requisitions, with attention to the suppo:t facilities available in the

theater of operations. In regard to the identified needs and issues, the directorate's personnel recommended that actions be taken to include MILVAN/container handling equipment in the flow of material as

early as possible. If container movement became an authorized mode, the MTMC and MSCs (major

subordinate commands) must then consider container ship capabilities when procuring vessels for use in • I

mobilization.2 0

Further discussion of the use of containerized ammunition shipments occurred with the observation by

United States Army Defense Ammunition Center and School (USADACS) personnel that port congestion

could be reduced by the increased use of containerized ammunition shipments. Container capability would

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not only reduce build-ups at port by permitting throughput to storage area, but would also aid in retrograde

operations. Before containerized ammunition could be utilized in any theater, however, USADACS

personnel noted, an assessment would need to be conducted which included the ability of the area's

facilities to receive, transport, and unload containers. Additionally, new technology and methods to improve

containerization capability would warrant exploration. Indeed, USADACS personnel quickly undertook this

exploration, and concluded that recently improved methods for stuffing containers that used less costly load

restraining and dunnaging methods made containerization a better option than ever before, albeit in the

intermodal form. 21

Yet the capacity to use containerized ammunition shipping was not the only issue of transportation

facing the thirteen AAPs and one AAA in the AMCCOM structure. Also causing the AAPs and Crane AAA

difficulties, as well as HQ, AMCCOM, was the lack of timely and accurate information in the hands of HO

management in regard to installation capabilities. During CDS, it was discovered that the command had

no means to accurately determine the current shipping capabilities of subordinate installations. Further,

there was absolutely no correlation between outloao capabilities required by the Master Mobilization Plan

(MMP) and the plant contract, or those capabilities stated in AMCCOM file reports. For example, after

approximately six weeks of shipping munitions, hiring and training additional personnel, and leasing

additional equipment, Hawthorne AAP was outloading about 3,000 tons per day, the equivalent 150 trucks

per day. This was in comparison to a MMP requirement for 5,269 tons from the first day forward, a contract

requirement for 5,200 tons per day, and a file report stating the capacity to prepare 263 trucks per day. 2

Noting that without timely and accurate information concerning a plant's actual capabilities, HO

planners could not distribute the shipping workload to utilize its shipping capabilities in the most efficacious

manner, Hawthorne AAP sought to rectify the situation. Part of the effort to properly channel accurate

information came as a result of that AAP's 21 February 1991 outstanding materiel release order (MRO)

backlog of 52,000 short tons of high priority ammunition. Even had adequate transportation assets been

available to support outloading, it would have taken a minimum of 18 days to fill the MROs. Given that other

installations could have filled some of the orders, Hawthorne AAP personnel considered the situation

"unacceptable.""

In regard to the situation which had developed at Hawthorne AAP, and other installations as well, its

personnel recommended that a solution must be predicated upon the development of a method to

accurately determine each installation's outload capability. The capability was at optimum to be defined

in tons and reflect the total lift capability so that double handling could be given consideration. Secondly,

a capability report should be filed monthly, and whenever a significant change occurred in the interim.

Finally, the new capability report should be used to control the dissemination of MROs to installations.

Ultimately, by using standard required delivery dates and realistic capability reports, HO planners could be

expected to readily determine when an installation had reached its maximum outloading capacity.14

Hawthorne AAP submitted several observations, most ultimately cut from the final draft of the Operation

Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report, which helped to explain its difficulty in meeting the demands

placed upon it. Personnel of the AAP noted that their capabilities were hampered by their inability to acquire

additional, experienced supervisors, as well as blockers and bracers, from the civilian sector. LTC O.B.

McCane, Hawthorne AAP's commander, observed in his submission that the lack of experienced

supervisors forced the facility's contractor to use two twelve hour shifts as opposed to the anticipated three

eight hour shifts. And since the AAP operated seven days per week for approximately five weeks, he felt

that the situation contributed to numerous minor injuries due to fatigue, and represented a major long-term .

safety concern. The lack of additional bracers and blockers also proved to be the primary constraint to

rapidly expanding the facility's loading capacity. And although Hawthorne AAP was, indeed, able to expand

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/

I TM9'

its outloading, the actual number of shipments was limited to its ability to block and brace loaded vehicles.

Loading dock activity would often arrive at a standstill as loaded railcars stood for several hours awaiting

blocking and bracing.2 5

Considering the difficulty arranging for the proper blocking and bracing of ammunition loads, plant

officials urged a review of load drawings to reduce and simplify the blocking and bracing requirements. They

also offered that delibe,'ation should be given to the development of emergency requirements which reduce

manpowet needs while retaining the same level of restraint through the use of large-size coarse lumber.

Secondly, the plant's personnel suggested the need for the command to establish an affiliation program

with Reseive Component Ammunition units who could train at the plants during peacetime and be partially

activated during emergencies to provide critically short skills, such as blocking and bracing, and

transportation assets. AMCCOM's Transportation and Traffic Management Directorate offered to explore

the issue as did CRDEC. CRDEC personnel noted that vehicles arriving at ports, particularly the Port of

Wilmington, were frequently not in compliance with transporation regulations as outlined bythe Department

of Transportation (DOT) and the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).2

The issue of blocking and bracing was not the only one which Hawthorne AAP officials felt hampered

their performance during ODS. The plant's commanding officer noted in a submitted lesson learned that

the primary storage area for 1.1 explosive material, the south magazine grouping at the facility, was a

shipping bottleneck due to a lack of rail structure. Commander LTC O.B. McCane observed that in addition

to having the largest number of magazines, the south magazine area also had the highest explosive limits

per storage location. As a result, munitions with high net explosive weight (NEW), such as bombs are

normally stored in this area to maximize storage space. Unfortunately, the area only has rail service to the

four loading docks. And while the extensive use of the south magazine storage area greatly enhances the

plant's storage capability, it degrades the plant's rail outload capability by necessitating the double handling

of all rail shipments from the area. All rail shipments from the south magazine area had first to be loaded

on a truck at the magazine, transported to a loading dock, and transloaded into railcars, representing an

unacceptable waste of limited manpower during emergencies. 7

Hawthorne's personnel recognized that in times of budget cutting, their chances of a rapid rectification

of the identified problem were slim at best, impossible in probability. They fius urged, as a "reasonable

solution", the construction of a previously proposed container handling facility in the southern portion of the

contral magazine area. This would largely eliminate the double handling of individual pallets of munitions

whiie deriving the benefits of rail transport and storage in the south magazine area.28

Yet MILVAN/containerized ammunition shipments, loading facilities, and the availability of laborers

were not the only problems encountered in providing the firepower to America's servicemembers in the

desert. One additiorp! issue was that of the availability of commercial transportation assets. Hawthorne

AAP noted that during the emergency situation which constituted ODS that it had inadeq,.ate transportation

assets to accomplish its shipping mission in a timely, efficient, and cost-effective manner. Due in part

undoubtedly to its isolated location, Hawthorne AAP discerned that the major cause of its shipping delays

during ODS was the nonavailability of transportation assets. Of particular concern was the limited number

of trucks available even at exorbitant rates, guaranteed loads, and considerable deadhead payments. After

expending valuable resources to expand the plant's loading capability, on several occasions it was forcad

to send loading crews home because there were no trucks to load. Secondly, due to the lack of

transportation assets, CONUS (continental United States) customers requiring training munitions were

placed on indefinite hcld or had only a limited portion of their requirements satisfied."

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-U

As it had with the need for qualified blockers and bracers, Hawthorne AAP suggested that their problems

could be mitigated with the establishment of an affiliation program between the plant and specific reserve

component transportation units. Its personnel felt that a reserve unit capable of transporting munitions 350

miles would allow it to satisfy the training needs of the majority of its customers, while providing an in house

capability to move limited quantities of munitions to the port at Concord, CA, in a matter of hours, thereby

enhancing item managers' ability to respond to unprogrammed requirements from the field. Additionally,

Hawthorne personnel suggested that a project should be instituted to improve that facility's ability to

consolidate MROs to better utilize available transportation assets. AMCCOM's Transportation and Traffic

Management Directorate took the suggestions under advisement.30

Yet isolated Hawthorne AAP was not alone in its difficulty securing adequate transportation. HQ,

AMCCOM personnel noted that commercial carrier (truck) capability for the transportation of class A and

B ammunition and explosives appeared to be inadequate to support the shipment requirements. This was

particularly true during the first few days of Operation Desert Shield when spot shortages of trucks occurred

at key plants and depots, jeopardizing their ability to meet stated required delivery dates (RDDs) for unit

ABL (ammunition basic load) requirements to installations and shipments to the ports. 3

'

Indeed, during the initial days of Operation Desert Shield, AMCCOM was literally inundated with orders

for ABL requirements. RDDs of one to three days were common as units sought to prepare themselves

for the coming conflict. Material Release Orders (MROs) were phoned out to both depot and ammunition

plant supply and transportation managers simultaneously, thus giving the transportation managers

advance information to determine the truck requirements and seek assistance from AMCCOM and MTMC.

Yet spot shortages of trucks occurred at key plants and depots almost immediately. AMCCOM coordinated

these shortfalls with MTMC and the munitions carriers to obtain the trucks needed.3 2

Additionally, two other factors affected the number of available trucks: Department of Defense (DOD)

intransit security rules and rising fuel prices. For security purposes, two drivers are required when

transporting class A and B ammunition and explosives. Certain items require one of these drivers to be

armed with a shotgun, while some items require an escort vehicle as well for additional protection. Whi!e

these rules are important security measures, there were simply not enough drivers to accompiish all the

shipments.33

The issue of fuel prices became critical in view of the number of deadhead miles truckers were required

to travel to pick up their loads when the fixed rate structure was too low to cover the costs incurred.

AMCCOM asked MTMC to take immcdiate action to seek class A and B hauling authority to additional

carriers, review intransit security rules and seek authority for a general rate increase from the Interstate

Commerce Commission. These problems were rather rapidly overcome with the 10 August 1990 granting

of temporary hauling authority along with the relaxation of intransit security rules. By 14 August 1990, the

MTMC had taken action to streamline procedures for filing fuel-related tenders. AMCCOM personnel also

recommended National Guard and reserve unit support be obtained to supplement commercial carrier

capability. Additionally, AMCCOM Transportation and Traffic Management Directorate personnel urged

that the MTMC establish procedures for quickly obtaining additional carriers-perhaps to include class A

and B carriers on a standby list under a civil reserve air fleet (CRAF) type program.-4

Further easing AMCCOM's commercial carrier woes during future engagements, according to some

staffers, would be the wiser utilization of vehicles designated to transport small shipments. Louisiana AAP

personnel suggested the consolidation of small shipments when possible for geographically colocated

plants. The plant recommended that AMCCOM's Transportation and Traffic Management Directorate

scrutinize MROs closely for shipments outbound from Louisiana AAP, Longhorn AAP, Lone Star AAP, and

Red River Army Depot with an eye to the possible consolidation of transportation assets.3

"

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Iowa AAP noted a further transportation problem incurred in the effort to supply America's fighting men

with sufficient ammunition. Plant personnel observed that they experienced difficulty meeting all

suspenses for the shipment of munitions. This occurred in part due to the rather short suspense dates on

orders. To meet these, the AAP was forced to utilize commercial trucking assets despite the fact that rail

service was both readily available and the most cost efficient. In consideration of the noted difficulty in

obtaining commercial trucks to transport ammunition, Iowa AAP observed that strict attention to required

delivery dates, as well as sailing dates for ammunition vessels and the priority of shipments could save the

federal government significantly and reduce the number of difficulties experienced by AAPs and depots.-6

Individuals from the United States Army Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center

(CRDEC) noted additional problems with the transportation of ammunition, beyond locating and loading vehicles. CRDEC personnel noted that some vehicles arriving at the Port of Wilmington were not in

compliance with 49 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) and Department of Transportation Exemption

(DOT-E) 3498 in regard to packaging and restraint of ammunition loads. As it stands DOT-E 3498 does

not give relief from two key safety factors during road transportation: 1.) ammunition must be in standard

packagings, and 2.) loads must be secured in accordance with procedures established by the DOD. Yet

many loads arrived in Wilmington without regard to the letter of The law concerning packaging and restraint

requirements. Alert to the frequent violations of packaging requirements, CRDEC personnel recommended the review of DOT-E 3498 by DA (Department of the Army) officials with the purpose of seeking

the true intent of the exemption, and the possibility of gaining a waiver.37

The DA did obtain a waiver concerning the need for United Nations performance oriented packaging

(UN/POP) markings. Requirements for such markings exist for ammunition shipments intended for

OCONUS (outside continental United States) destinations. Due to short suspense times, however, in filling MROs and the ,1ecessity of breaking down pallets to accomplish marking applications, DA did obtain the

authority to waive UN/POP markings for ODS ammunition. Noting that the DA was quite responsive to

easing restrictions that prevent expedited delivery of ammunition shipments to troops, McAiester AAP

urged continued research on the absolute necessity of UN/POP markings in light of budget shortfalls.38

Ammunition plants were not the only ones concerned, however, with federal regulations regarding the

transportation of ammunition. Production Base Modernization Activity personnel from Picatinny Arsenal,

NJ, observed that during the early stages of deployment, limited liaison existed between inspection

personnel at the ports and combat units loading tactical/combat vehicles at home stations. And what

communication did exist between the MTMC and localized transportation services did not adequately

address ammunition peculiar requirements or issues according to Picatinny sources. Thus vehicles arrived

at ports improperly prepared for transport to SWA. In order that future deployments might be made both

more safe and efficient, Picatinny ammunition logisticians urged that communication between ammunitionknowledgeable personnel at the ports of debarkation and home stations be established early, preferably

in person, but acceptably via telephone.39

A further concern for AMCCOM concerning the initial movement of ammunition involved the ABL

(ammunition basic load), its transportation from depots and AAPs to the deploying units, and the site to

which it was called forward. indeed, as the troops departed for the deserts of SWA, the issue arose

regarding the manner in which their ammunition basic load was to be made available to them. Prior to 0DS,

approximately 90 percent of prepositioned FORSCOM (United States Army Forces Command) Class V

ABL requisitions at HO, AMCCOM were for rounds that were not intended to accompany troops. This

ammunition was stored at dopots to be shipped directly to the theater of coerations and picked up there

by deploying troops, in accordance with FORSCOM regulations. However, during ODS most FORSCOM

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units called forward their requisitions to be shipped to their mobilization stations. H0, FORSCOM w2s

aware of this acFon, but did not intervene, resulting in undue port congestion and transportation problems

at mobilization stations due to the unplanned receipt and shipping of ammunition. AMCCOM personnel

suggested in future engagements that FORSCOM should reassess the need to assign such , large portion

of tneir ABL as TAT (to accompany troops). Otherwise, FORSCOM was encouraged to resubmit their

prepositioned requisitions to AMCCOM with a TAT deployment code.4 0

The size of ABL shipments aiso came under scrutiny as ODS materialized. Defense Ammunition

Oirectorate personrel observed that the current HQ, AMCCOM ABL files contained prepositioned

requisitions for the quantity of required basic load not on hand at the unit. However, in most cases, this

quantity was too sn all to economically transport, two or three grenades, four signals, etc., as basic load

awaiting supply dist:ibution. In consideration of such small requisitions, AMCCOM urged that the NICP

(national inventory control point) ABL files be changed by the mobilization stations or internal procedures

to reflect an economic disbursement of ammunition by the elimination of small quantity requisitions.4'

Additionally, AMCCOM personnel urged the consolidation of small unit ABL requisitions. It observed

thatcduring the initial deployment phase of Operation Desert Shield that it received numerous orders for ABL

destined for the same mobilization station that had to be consolidated by HQ, AMCCOM to lessen the

quantity of ammunition overshipped due to the need to ship complete unit packs. The many requisitions

for company level units increased te need and difficulty of consolidating requisitions as well as the time

that was needed to process the orders. To avoid such problems in future engagements, AMCCOM's

Defense Ammunition Directorate suggested that prepositioned and other basic load requisitions should be

consolidated at mobilization stations to the level of the smallest deployable unit prior to submission to HO,

AMCCOM. They additionally recommended that existing prepositioned ABL requirements should be

changed to reflect deployable unit sizes.4 2

On the opposing side, some FORSCOM units called forward ABL requirements in excess of their

organic transportation capacities. This occurred when units requisitioned ABL for movement to home

installations for loading on or in unit vehicles and equipment for subsequent movement to sea ports of

embarkation (SPOE). These ABL requisitions apparently exceeded unit capability to transport, requiring

a number of shipments of excess materiel from home stations to MOTSU (military ocean terminal-Sunny

Point). This situation may also have contributed to congestion at home stations resulting from delivering

commercial carrier trucks. Certain home stations were inundated with trucks, resulting in delayed

offloading. And at the same time these units were offloading delivered materiel, they had to load unit

vehicles with ammunition and prepare to go to their designated SPOEs.13

To combat this problem, AMCCOM's Transportation and Traffic Management Directorate personnel

urged FORSCOM to explore and implement the use of Army Reserve and National Guard units to assist

offloading trucks delivering unit ABL. Simultaneously, it was encouraged to take action to review unit ABL

requisitions to ensure that they were limited to only the ammunition which could be transported in or on unit

organic equipment and vehicles, while encouraging units to evaluate RDDs for requisitioned ABL to

determine installation capability to receive the materiel within the stated time frame."

AMCCOM personnel also perceived that unauthorized quantities of ABL had been shipped to some

deploying units. They noted that as prepositioned basic load requirements maintained by FORSCOM had

no automated means of validating the accuracy of the requisitioned quantities and items against

authorizations, it was entirely possible that some units had requested and received more than their allotted

ABL. Beyond the initial shipments, problems also occurred in validating the additional basic load

requisitions received during Operation Desert Shield. Validation was accomplished on a case-by-case

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basis with FORSCOM ascertaining that the units making requisitions were actually deploying, but not

examining the quantity and variety of items requisitioned. In the future, AMCCOM Defense Ammunition

Directorate personnel recommended the creation of a validation system for prepositioned requisitions

which involved not only AMCCOM and FORSCOM, but also AMC (Army Materiel Command) and

ODCSLOG (Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics). 5

ABL also garnered the attention of AMCCOM personne; in conjunction with bracing and blocking. The

need, as well as the ability, to properly restrain ABL aboard tactical/combat vehicles was apparently not

properly articulated to deploying units. At several ports of embarkation-Wilmington, NC, Houston, TX,

Beaumont, TX, - the United States Coast Guard, together with the assigned quality assurance specialistammunition surveillance (QASAS), determined that minimally acceptable standards had been employed

in the process of blocking and bracing uploaded vehicles, and indeed that DOT-E3498 which states that

"loading and stowage of military explosives... on unit vehicles shall be in accordance with procedures

established by DOD" had been violated. In order that such violations would not occur in future exercises

and engagements, AMCCOM urged the clarification of standards, as well as their clear and emphatic

communication to units and U.S. Coast Guard members. QASAS would also be made available to

deploying units as needed.' 6

Bracing and blocking, MILVANs and commercial containers, the shortage of semi-trucks and railcars,

and ABL were not the only issues affecting the deployment of ammunition to the fighting men and women

in the Persian Gulf. Perhaps more important than any of these factors was the condition of the stockpile.

At least one AAP noted that due to a number of seemingly unrelated cost-saving decisions made in

response to fiscal constraints in the years prior to ODS a significant portion of the stockpile being in a "not

ready for issue" status at the onset of preparations for the conflict. For example, at Hawthorne AAP,

thousands of bombs received as part of BRAC (base realignment and closure) were known to have bad

pallets, but were not repaired due to a lack of funding. Additionally, the condition of a substantial portion

of the stockpile was unknown due to a backlog of thousands of lots requiring periodic inspections. Until the

plants were able to determine the actual condition of required munitions, the HQ's ability to determine what

to ship and when to ship it was greatly impaired. At the plant level, limited resources were stretched to the

breaking point. The need to inspect a backlog of 60,000 750-pound bombs, 24,000 of which required

repalletization, during a shipping surge jeopardized Hawthorne AAP's ability to meet RDDs.'7

After deliberating the issue, AMCCOM personnel noted that funding shortages affected everyone

across board, and that such shortages were "typical of the function." Yet it offered that as fiscal constraints

were not likely to lessen in the immediate future, and that accordingly the entire stockpile could not be

maintained in a "ready for issue" status, that contingency plan requirements be reviewed and that a

specified quantity of selected munitions be designated as deployment/contingency stocks. These stocks

would have the highest priority for the command's limited inspection and COSIS (care of supplies in

storage) funding and receive intense management. Illustrating their idea with an example, AMCCOM

personnel suggested that Hawthorne AAP coula be assigned responsibility for maintaining 50,000 750-

pound bombs and 50,000 155mm projectiles in a "ready to issue" status. Then Hawthorne would be

expected to use whatever surveillance and COSIS funding that was provided tW ensure that those stocks

were ready for issue prior to inspecting or maintainir,. noncontingency stocks. This would guarantee the

command's ability to satisfy initial customer demand while providing a buffer per'od during which additional

munitions could be inspected, repaired, and shipped.' 8

Regardless of the initial problems securing sufficient trucks, railcars, blkckers, bracers, MILVAN/

containerized ammunition equipment, properly inspected ammunition, and accur ite information, AMCCOM

ultimately directed 620,000 short tons of ammunition to the Persian Gulf before the war's end. Of this

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tonnage, bombs comprised 274,000 short tons, artillery shells made up 245,000 short tons, small arms

rounds totalled 34,000 short tons, mortar, tank, and navy gun ammunition made up 36,000 short tons, and

all other classes of munitions totalled 31,000 short tons. The total dollar value of ammunition shipped by

AMCCOM during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm amounted to $4 billion.' 9

This tonnage did not include the approximately 60,000 shorttons of assorted Class V ammunition stores

carried on three Marine Corps Near Term Prepositioned Fleet (NTPF) vessels-the Green Island, the

Green Harbor, and the Austral Rainbow. Each of the vessels had been restocked with fresh ammunition

within the previous two years, and was prepared for rapid deployment. Indeed, the first prepositioned

vessel departed the British Indian Ocean Territory port of Diego Garcia on 7 August 1990, just one day after

President George Bush ordered the first U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf. A mere ten days later it arrived

in Saudi Arabia. Such a quick response appears to prove the worthiness of the NTPF program. Additionally,

given the problems with determining resupply requirements, the program seems to have shown that by its

expansion ammunition can be made readily available when, and wherever needed.1s

Also proving its worth during the Persian Gulf War was the designation of AMCCOM as the single focal

point for ammunition ship planning. While AMCCOM's bureaucratic predecessor had been declared the

Single Manager for Conventional Anmmuniticn (SMCA) in 1977 when the army assumed control of all the

nation's ammunition facilities, it was not until the opening of Operation Desert Shield that AMCCOM's responsibilities expanded to include ammunition ship planning."I

The designation came about after a significant amount of chaos in the intial days of ODS. During the

opening stage of the operation, some ammunition shipments were "free flowing" into the ports without the

prior knowledge of the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) through Export Traffic Release

Requests (ETRRs). Heavy depot workloads contributed to a backlog in their capabiiity to submit separate

ETRRs with the result being inefficiencies, delays and a distinct lack of visibility over all ammunition moving

to port. Noting the problem, AMCCOM proposed that by using a single data system-its "Fast Re.ease"--

as a focal point, some of the confusion could be eliminated and the servicemember more effectively served.

Persuaded by the argument, MTMC endorsed AMCCOM's proposal and TRANSCOM designated

AMCCOM as the single focal point for ammunition ship planning.52

AMCCOM then took action to document both AMCCOM and Single Manager for Conventional

Ammunition (SMCA) ammunition ship requirements to MTMC, the customer services, and the CINC using

its "Fast Release" system. Defense Standard Ammunition Computer System (DSACS) transportation

modules provided automated assistance and management report capability. Using these formats,

AMCCOM's designated duties were performed and a knowledge of AMCCOM and SMCA capabilities

attained, including the consolidation of all AMCCOM and SMCA requirements into shipload segments

ser ting as both the cargo offering and the ETRR. The unity of action reduced and eliminated workload for

plants and depots. Such ship planning messages also provided complete visibility over what was planned

for each vessel. They were sent to the MTMC, customer services, CINC, depots, plants, ports and the

overseas theater.53

AMCCOM also generated advance reports of shipments, comparing the vessels' planned versus actual

ammunition shipped, utilizing the ship's manifest. Such messages were provided to all members of the

team and provided visibility support for prioritization decisions by the CINC and/or customer services,

flexibility for diversions as necessary, and preparation for reception and onward transportation in theater.

The services do not currently have a similar system covering non-SMCA ammunition and missiles. This

requires depots and plants to work with two systems and prevents total visibility over non-SMCA items."'

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Indeed, this factor was the tangential concern of an observation included in AMCCOM's QQeration

Desert ShieldlStorm After Action Report. AMCCOM personnel hinted at the value of including non-SMCA

ammunition and missiles in the "Fast Release" system. They also recommended that regulatory changes

be initiated which would ensure that the role AMCCOM played in coordinating ammunition shipments would

be continued for peacetime requirements just as it was used for contingency, mobilization and wartime

requirements. 5

And although AMCCOM managed to maintain pipeline visibility in CONUS at a remarkable level, it, as

well as other commands, was unable to sustain the visibility in SWA. As a submitted observation noted,

no system similar to AMCCOM's "Fast Release" was in place for ammunition shipments from Europe or

other theaters. The result was a distinct lack of accurate information regarding ammunition on vessels

1oaded OCONUS. This lack of information impaired decision makers' abilities to prioritize flow from all

theaters and the warfighters' capability to plan the war based on accurate data concerning the receipt of

required ammunition. In view of such frailties, AMCCOM took action to upgrade its reports, tailoring them

to meet user demands. Yet it was handicapped by the DSACS. That system provides the baseline

automated assist but does not have an interactive data base for tailored reports. Procedures were

implemented to download data in the DSACS data base to PC Dbase software to enable manipulation as

required to generate the reports. However, additional data to the currently available DODIC (Department

of Defense Identification Code), quantity, tons, etc., was required by storage planners. Specificaliy, they

desired lot numbers, NEW (net explosive weight), and condition codes. AMCCOM was able to supply some

of this information, but only via manual manipulation with extremely limited automated assist. Complete

automation is required, along with interactive data bases and full interlinking capabilities between

AMCCOM, MTMC area command, port, and depot automated systems on a worldwide basis, and for

purposes of storage planning must include lot number and condition codes.6 The price of liberty thus

requires not only vigilance, but visibility as well.

Regardless of the problems with visibility encountered OCONUS, AMCCOM managed its role as the

single focal point for conventional ammunition and ammunition ship planning in stellar fashion, safely

coord:nating the movement of ammunition from AAPs, depots and home stations to ports of embarkation,

across the turbulent sea, to points of debarkation, and onward to ammunition supply points (ASPs)

scattered throughout the Saudi Arabian desert, ultimately placing it in the capable hands of American and

allied combat units. An important step in that process was that of port operations, both CONUS and

OCONUS. In the United States, AMCCOM ,riented ammunition port activities were undertaken at the

military ocean terminal-Sunny Point (MOTSU), Southport, NC, Wilmington. NC, Beaumont, TX, Houston,

TX, Jacksonville, FL, Bayonne, NJ, Naval Weapons Station (NWS) Earle, NJ, NWS Concord, CA, and

Savannah, GA. Vital CONUS vehicle uploading operations in preparation for port movement were

conducted at Fort Campbell, KY, Fort Hood. TX, and Fort Riley, KS. In each of these locations, as well as

a number of OCONUS ones, AMCCOM personnel were on site assurirg that few problems arose, and that

those which did arise were addressed with celerity. In consideration of the size of the operation unoei taken

by AMCCOM in support of ODS, however, the problems encountered, with few exceptions, seemed

relatively minor.

At the onset of Operation Desert Shield, AMCCOM made tentative plans for 60 ammunition-carrying

vessels to leave CONUS in support of the territorial integrity of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Of these planned

vessels, 24 were intended to support the needs of the army, in terms of SMCA, with the transport of 222.5

thousand short tons. Twenty-two vessels were intended to carry 226.4 thousand short tons for the use of

the air force, and 14 ships were scheduled to move 117 thousand short tons for the Marine Corps. Yet

before all scheduled vessels could depart CONUS, or even be loaded, Operation Desert Storm had ground

to a close. By the war's conclusion, however, only 49 of the planned 60 vessels had been loaded and

135
otherwise prepared for transit to SWA. Of the prepareJ vessels, 23 were loaded with army ammunition,

17 with air force conventional ammunition, and nine with Marine Corps ammunition. The loaded vessels

carried an ammunition total of 477,000 short tons. A total of 44 ships actually sailed toward SWA under

the suzerainty of AMCCOM during ODS. Of the vessels actually leaving CONUS ports, 23 carried army

ammunition, 12 bore air force supplies, and nine transported Marine Corps conventional ammunition. The

total tonnage of ammunition the vessels bore was 434,000 short tons. The remaining ammunition provided

Americans in the desert was supplied from OCONUS facilities.

The process of arranging for vessels to transport ammunition abroad after AMCCOM's designation as

the single focal point for Department of Defense ammunition ship planning was complex. The process of

delivery simply to a port in SWA was expected to consume a minimum of 55 days. Approximately two days

were spent in the receipt and examination of the requisition. Another two days were spent processing the

materiel release order (MRO). Arranging land transportation from the AAP or depot to the port absorbed

nearly five days, some of which overlapped the loading process at the installations. Thus by the eleventh

day after receiving a requisition, AMCCOM had the ordered ammunition loaded and enroute to a port. On

average, depending on the locations of the stored ammunition and the port utilized, the process of overland

transportation consumed another eleven days. Port activities took, on average, ten days, while ocean

transport absorbed 20 days. And before ammunition could be passed on to the soldier, port activities in

SWA usually required eight days.8

With such advanced and detailed planning, there is little wonder to be found in the fact that a great deal

of ammunition was in transit at the time of President George Bush's 6 March 1991 announcement before

a joint session of the United States Congress that "aggression is defeated.... The war is over." Indeed,

from all sources, CONUS and OCONUS, AMCCOM directed and otherwise, an estimated 50 vessels were

either loaded and prepared for transit, or enroute to SWA on 7 March 1991. Two vessels had CONUS

loading suspended at the declaration of peace, and five had the offloading process begun immediately.

Four loaded ships at MOTSU awaited instructions, 14 vessels were enroute to SWA and 19 were at ports

of safe haven on 7 March 1991. At Saudi Arabia- ports, 13 vessels were at anchor awaiting further

directions and three were in the process of offloading.5 9

Obviously, such large amounts of ammunition were of limited value in SWA at the conclusion of the

conflict. Although a variety of recommendations were made as to its best dispe-qition, it ultimately resulted

in the largest Class V retrograde movement in United States military history. According to AMCCOM

statistics, 270,909 short tons of ammunition were returned to inventory, both CONUS and OCONUS,

11,486.2 short tons were destroyed in theater, and 2,891 short tons were given to the nation of Kuwait for

its defense. The contractor team, Brown and Root Saudi Ltd., overseen by the United States Army,

comp'eted the mission without significant accident and ahead of the initial schedule.0

The initial shipments, as well as the retrograde action, tcompassed a variety of conventional

ammunition types. For example, Filips departed CONUS ca" ying 30mm cartridges, 155mm projectiles,

12 gauge cartridges, 50 caliber cartridges, demcoition charges, proximity fuzes, both M532 and M732,

5.56mm rounds, both tracing and ballistic, 40mm cartridges, 7.62mm rounds, grenades, both smoke and

violet, Cruise, Tomahawk and Hydra missiles, signals, flares, blasting caps, 120mm training cartridges,

demolition cratering charges, assorted bombs, mines, rockets, and projectiles. In all, AMCCOM was

responsible for some 181 varieties of corventional ammunition conceivably needed in SWA. In

consideration of safety factors, some varieties of ammunition could not be shipped in close proximity to

other varieties. Thus, vessel planning with regard to the safe combinations and the needs of the soldier

had to be carefully undertaken. AMCCOM's "Fast Release" data system aided considerably in the

scheduling process.6

"

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Part of AMCCOM's success came from its implementation of the Movement Control Center (MCC). The

MCC accomplished coordination between depots and the ports to distribute the workload, adjust port

windows, and ensure an uninterrupted flow of ammunition to support vessel loading operations. Massive

requirements inundated depot outload, port reception, and transportation asset capabilities. Initial port

dates did not account for depot capability to ship, truck and rail capability to transport, or port capability to

receive and process. As AMCCOM was responsible for sourcing ammunition requirements and providing

movement direction to the depots, it established a MCC to coordinate the actions between MTMC area

commands, depots, ports, and commercial carriers. AMCCOM MCC took action to coordinate port

windows recognizing depot and port workload issues as well as truck and rail asset requirements. Truck

and rail analyses were implemented for each ship planning increment. This enabled AMCCOM to conduct

intensive telephone coordination with MCC, depots, ports, MTMC, and carriers, and was critical to

establishing port dates based on comprehensive movement plans which reduced congestion and facilitated

the smooth, on time, flow of ammunition. However, many of these actions were accomplished in a manual

mode, with little computer-driven assistance. 2

At the war's conclusion, reflecting upon the role of the MCC, AMCCOM personnel noted that the center

had indeed worked and should be implemented at the onset of any contingency to prioritize or synchronize

depot and port workload through ammunition sourcing actions and coordinating port windows. Automated

assistance, however, would greatly enhance the facility's ability to support truck/rail!container analyses and

depot workloadii,,j decisions to ensure that requirements were met. Thus, AMCCOM transportation

managers recommended the formalization of AMCCOM MCC into TRANSCOM policies, plans, and

procedures. Accordingly, the automation facet of the MCC needed upgrading to provide decision support

models for depot selection, port windows, and transportation mode decisions. A central control agency

should also be designated to manage and prioritize competing requirements for commercial transportation

assets during peak demands.3 Despite AMCCOM's call for improvements in the methods of managing

transportation assets, the actions undertaken allowed for the largest, most successful Class V operation

in world military history.

Yet given the complexity of port operations, problems did occur. One such issue at MOTSU, as well

as other port facilities, was the congestion encountered due to large numbers of truck shipments and

virtually ncne by rail. The use of trucks over railcars resulted from the contingency nature of the operation.

As shippers struggled to meet their initial short-notice required delivery dates most contracted truck

transportation rather than the more port-efficient, albeit slower, rail service. And as the initial RDDs were

not based on pre-coordinated in-port dates, congestion occurred as semitrailers flooded the facilities in an

effort to meet the tight schedules. During the first three weeks of ODS, MOTSU received over 1,100 trucks.

Considering that MOTSU's optimum mode mix is 80 percent rail versus 20 percent truck, not to exceed 100

trucks per week on a continuing basis, the port and its facilities were strained to their maximum extent.

Causing additional difficulty was the fact that these trucks had to be immediately offloaded and released

for other priority shipments. As MOTSU's storage capabilities are somewhat limited, materiel offloaded

from trucks was placed in railcars for temporary storage. Later, this materiel had to be !ocated and loaded

aboard SWA-bound vessels."4

MOTSU's burden was not eased by shippers who failed to properly and successfully prepare

transportation documentation. Cargo initially shipped to MOTSU arrived there under domestic releases

and was not address labeled or identified with transportation control number (TCN) markings. This cargo

freeflowed into the port without Export Traffic Releases and was thus not scheduled for a given vessel. The

demand for fast truck turn around was also placed on the port which occasioned the transfer of cargo to

DOD and leased commercial railcars. MOTSU being a transshipment terminal did not have warehouse or

long-term storage capabilities. When vessels were then available, ammunition was loaded directly from

137
the railcars, trucks, and containers. This format created a serious problem as no vessel load integrity could

be maintained with such a loading procedure.6

Even as MOTSU recognized that it was receiving munitions shipments from 35 separate, ever-worked

facilities, it noted that the adherence of those facilities to Military Standard Transportation and Movement

Procedures (MILSTAMP) documentation regulations was obligatory and their failure to do so a hindrance

to the process of properly arming the services. Thus, MOTSU reminded shippers that they v',ere required

by MILSTAMP to provide Advance Transportation Control and Movement Documents (ATCMDs) for all

shipments entering the Defense Transportation System (DTS) to the clearance authority who in turn would

enter it in the manifest system. Such information was necessary to provide clearance authorities, ports,

receivers, and interested transportation personnel with advance notice of shipments and the information

necessary to process the shipments through the DTS. Yet throughout the course of ODS, MOTSU

prepared 58% of 13,010 ATCMDs required by the port, greatly burdening the facility.6

Shippers were also required by MILSTAMP to provide Reports of Shipment (REPSHIP) as soon as

possible but not later than 24 hours after the load left its point of origin. The stringent time frame ensured

the REPSHIP's receipt at the port .mdor to the shipment's arrival. Failure to provide REPSHIPs could cause

undue delays in planning and resulted in valuable personnel time being absorbed tracing cargo with

shippers and carriers. When the status of cargo was unknown, v": ;el loading could easily be delayed.67

While MOTSU managed to survive the onslaught of semitrailers loaded with undesignated ammunition

and to successfully transship all received materiel, AMCCOM endeavored to assist it in doing so by

challenging RDDs and coordinating extended in-port dates to allow shipments by rail. It also launched a

concerted effort with the customer services to submit their requirements as early as possible to provide the

lead times necessary for rail shipment. AMCCOM also sought to prevent repeat problems in the advent

of future mobilizations. To do so, AMCCOM urged the better management of shipment flow into the ports.

Noting that a key element of movement control is the coordination of in-port days for shippers, AMCCOM

transportation personnel recommended the planning of in-port dates lu ensure adequate attentiveness to

port reception, as well as shipper capabilities and the proper mode mix. Such planning and coordination

should ensure the optimum mode mix is used and thus maximize throughput, and minimize the possibility

of a port bottleneck. Also, AMCCOM suggested that services should identify their requirements as early

as possible and as far into the future as possible to provide the lead times necessary for rail shipment.

Additionally, transportation managers at HO, AMCCOM urged the full coordination of in-Port dates among

AMCC.OM, MTMC, and the port. Further, they recommended AMCCOM's designation at Movement

Control Center (MCC) to develop the movemert plans in coordination with the depots and ports, providing

movement direction to the depots and AAPs."

Also of concern to AMCCOM personnel regarding the port facilities available to them was the

ammunition throughput capability. The massive requirements of ODS exceeded the peacetime capacities

of all three--MOTSU. NWSs Eade, and Concord-ammunition ports. Net Explosive Weight (NEW)

waivers were requ;red to process the huge volume of ammunition which passed through each facility.

Additionally, each ammurition port had its own special problems. Earle had insufficient capability to

process rail shipments. MOTSU could initially use only four of its six available berths. Also, the MOTSU

channel was not deep enough to handle fully loaded LASH (lighter aboard ship) vessels. MOTSU later

expanded to six ships at a time with an average load time of only eight days. NWS Concord could initially

handie only one ammunition vessel at a time even though it technically had six berths available. (This was

later expanded to two vessels at a time.) Staging areas and container capability at Concord also appeared

to be quite limited. its loading time averaged approximately 15 days per vessel. Based on MOTSU's

capability to respond and expand its capability as well as its location, 3,000 miles closer to SWA, it became

the preferred port, ultimately handling the great bulk of ammunition requirements and ships.69

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MOTSU was, indeed, the hero of the ammunition ports. It was abie to fully utilize its total expanded

capability, e.g., receiving and processing ammunitUon to enable loading six ships ata time and in the process

compiling an excellent record of meeting requirements. If containerized ammunition had been fully

available for utilization, MOTSU's reccrd would stand even better. An estimated S0 percent of AMCCOM's

ammunition shipments passed through MOTSU. Other ports' rec)rds, white impressive given the

contingency nature of the operation, were not as stellar as MOTSU's.7°

In spite of MOTSU's successes, AMCCOM observed that it, as well as the remaining ammunition ports,

could be improved upon. AMCCOM transportation personnel noted that all three ammunition plants could

more efficiently gear up to meet massive srge requirements. In order to accomplish a more efficacious

mobilization, transportation managers suggested that rail shipments to both Concord and MCTSU would

be greatly preferred to truck shipments for improvsd ship loading opeiations. Rail use would eliminate

considerable port congestion and the build up of truck assets at the ports. Transportation personnel noted

that beyond congestion, truck assets focused at ports reduced responsiveness for the entire transportation

system due to a lack of sufficient trucks for other high priority shipments. Truck shortages, as we!l as

congestion, were of particular interest to NWS Earle. Earle lacks rail capability. A bridge to its pier needs

to be upgraded to handle railcars. 7

'

Beyond the three designated ammunition ports, AMCCOM also utilized commercial ports in its effort

to supply ammunition to America's fighting force. And it occasionaily received ammunition requisitions

specifying direct delivery of unit basic load ammunition to a commercial port. Yet AMCCOM had no waivers

in its control to authorize such shipments. Waivers in its control corcarning shipments allowed only the

shipment of ammunition loaded on unit vehicles and equipment. Commanders of deploying units d~d not

seem to understand this distinction and frequently sought to unite their entire ammunition basic load and

unit equipment in commercial ports. When requisitioned ammunition exceeded a unit's organic capacity

to transport it, AMCCOM immediately raised the issue with the Military Traffic Management Command

(MTMC) for clarification. In each case, the issue was elevated to HODA level for a decision based on the

MTMC's position that commercial port waivers did not apply either to bre.akbulk or containerized

ammunition but only to what was loaded on or in unit vehicles. As the HODA sided with the MTMC in all

cases, AMCCOM transportation personnel recommended that in the future time not be wasted on

attempting to obtain a waiver to unite troops and their excess basic load. Instead, they suggested that

FORSCOM should make certain that the issue was thoroughly addressed with unit commanders on a

continuing basis to ensure that shipment expectations and ammunition basic load requirements to

accompany troops were adjusted accordingly.72

Yet congestion, commercial port waivers, and truck shortages were not the only concerns of AMCCOM

and port officials. MOTSU reported that their work was complicated, as well as delayed, by the need to

repallelize ammunition. Despite the fact that it was not staffed to do so, and did not have the appropriate

facilities, the port was on occasion forced to repair, repack, and repal!etize ammunition before shipping it.

AAPs and depots could have saved ports considerable time and effort, and were reminded oý their

responsibility to do so near war's end, by adequately packaging and packing munitions to withstand

handling and transportation through to the intended destination, either CONUS or OCONUS.13

Regardless of vroblems with pallets and packaging, railcar and truck availability, and port throughput

capacity, perhaps the greatest issue arising from the faci'ities during the mobilization for ODS came to be

visibility. In order to track ammunition shipments, three documents were to be prepared. Hardcopy ship

m2.nifests were generated by the applicable HQ, MTMC, dependent upon east or west coast shipment.

Magnetic tapes of the manifests were dissemirnated by AMCCOM, as were REPSHIFs. The purpose of

139
preparing manifest messages grew from concern over the accuracy of the data received in Saudi Arabia

on incoming ammunition shipments. In addition, NEW (net explosive weight), hazard classification

information, and packaging data was needed to assist personnel with storage and handling concerns in the

theater of operations. This was provided by USADACS.74

Notwithstanding the effort to maintain clear and correct records, difficulties appeared in the attempt. Receipt of the manifest, magnetic tape, and REPSHIP frequently did not arrive in Savanna, IL, home of

USADACS, the facility charged with maintaining and transmitting manifests, until two, or more, weeks after

the sailing date of a vessel. This caused a savere time problem in the preparation and transmittal of

documents before the arrival of the vessel at its fina! destination as sailing time to SWA was approximately

20 days. At least eight ships arrived in SWA without any of the throe documents having been received at

USADACS for forwarding.75

Data accuracy in the manifest documents also became an issue of no mean significance. In order that

a set criteria might be available for judging tha accuracy of a manifes,, the total quantity (round count) per Department of Defense Identification Code (DODIC) became the yardstick for comparing the manifest,

magnetic tape, and REPSHIP. In comparison, all three documents matched 53 percent of the time. The

hardcopy and magnetic tape indicated 68 percent uniformity. This appears rather strange considering that

the two documents should contain the same information, simply in variant formats. A comparison of the

manifest to the AMCCOM-prepared REPSHIP revealed an accuracy of 72 percent and the magnetic tape

agreed with the REPSHI P just 61 percent of the time. Additional~y, an examination of the three documents

revealed problems concerning the total quantity of an ammunition type shipped, the national stock number

(NSN), and the DODIC. In some instances, items were identified on final REPSHIPs as shipped which did

not appear on the manifest or magnetic tape. Thus, false information was transmitted to the ultimate

consignee on a number of occasions. Such false information undouLted!y caused ports in SWA to make

unnecessary prepe rations for some items and instilled a general lack of confidence in the accuracy of other

itformation contained the REPSHIP.76

Quite naturally, such discrepancies disturbed USADACS personnel for they were responsible for

gathering and forwarding such documents to SWA. After examining the information they had assembled,

the facility's Logistics Review and Assistance Office concluded that Southwest Asian consignees needed

to be informed about what they were to receive as soon as possible in order to make necessary preparations

for movement and storage. This data in turn needed to have a high degree of accuracy to be of any real

benefit. Inattention to detail appeared to be the biggest problem in achieving the necessary accuracy.

Accordingly, USADACS personnel felt that more attention needed to be placed on the quality of the reports

submitted and perhaps a little less on the speed of transmitting the information, although within appropriate

constraints They also pondered the possibility of too many organizations expecting too much from the

documents, and using them beyoiid their intended scope. In consideration of their ruminations, USADACS

staff recommended that the scope and applicability of the documents be reviewed. If their use had

expanded beyond the original intent, thought should be given to filling unmet customer information needs

from other sources. Regardless, a rncre diligently applied quality control program seemed warranted.77

USADACS was not the only organization concerned with manifest variations; AMCCOM's Transpor

tation and T,affic Management Directorate was interested as well. Its personnel suggested that the Transportation Command (I"RANSCOM) should establish an action plan to review manifesting procedures and

identify improvements -which would help to ensure the reflection of accurate data. This, in turn, would be

part of a total systems approach which would integrate ship planning, stow planning, movement planning,

and provide updates to the plans as actual movements took place. Ultimately, bar coding technology should

be applied to facilitate both the accuracy and the ease of tracking information. 78

140
Further vessel-oriented confusion arose for transportation planners of AMCCOM. In the official

AMCCOM Operation Desert _held/Storm After Action Reroort. they noted that changes in vessels

nominated against ship plans led to a Irss of visibility of assets in the logistics pipeline. Although vessel

substitutions might be expected in any large operation, the alternate ships frequently had totally different

stowage characteristics and capacities than the originally planned vessels. Thus on occasion, items

planned for shipment on the first scheduled vessel hdd to be delayed until a considerably later one. In one

particular instance, three sailings were consolidated to travel on a single vessel. Then in reversal, the new,

planned single shipment was broken into three. Obviously, such operations made it extremely difficult •o

provide tota! visibility of requirements until well after vessei departure dates.9

From the experiences of ODS, AMCCOM transportation personnel learned that ship-planning actions

must be integrated with vessel scheduling and stow planning. And that in order to provide accurate and

timely visibility of ammunition by item and quantity, that it must be able to track ship plans against scheduled

vessels. AMCCOM was not alone in its desire for visibility; all involved-MTMC, CINC, theater ammunition

managers, and customer services-recognized the value. Yet all rea!ized as well that visibility was

possible, however, only to the extent that major changes in ship type and stow plans did not occur. Close

coordination regarding ship type was necessary upfront and continuously to ensure planning efforts were

fully synchronized and capable of providing the desired level of visibility."

Accordingly, AMCCOM managers determined that procedures emphasizing close and continued coordination be extended, and that replacement vessels be consistent with the characteristics of the originally

nominated vessel whenever possible to maintain the integrity of the ship plan and facilitate intransit

visibility.8

"

Assisting AMCCOM with port operations were pnumber o! qurglity assurance specialists-ammunition

surveillance (QASAS) personnel. These inrdividuals were on site to ensure that ammunition was properly

uploaded on tactical and ccmbat vehicle3 for transpc o to the Persian Gulf. They also provided explosives

technical guidance. AMCCOMi's QASAS offered support to port operations at the Military Ocean Terminal;

Sunny Point, Southport,SC: Wilroington, NC; Beaumcnt, TX; Houston, TX; Jacksonville, FL; Bayonne, NJ;

and Savannah, GA; butwere not called upon to ass;st at the ammunition-only ports of Earle, NJ, or Concord,

CA. They also provided support to troops making preparations for deployrnent at Fort Campbell, KY; Fort

Hood, TX; and Fort Riley, KS. Approximately 20 QASAS served AMCCOM at these sites. Other QASAS

provided expertise at a variety of points in SWA.8 2

Initially providing the expertike at the port of Beaumont, TX, was Rock Island Arsenal-based QASAS

Owen Wasmoen. Temporarily assigned to the port from 24 August to 26 September 1990, Mr. Wasmoen's

mission entailed providing technical assistance to the port's commander during the receipt, temporary

storage, staging, and shiploading of uploaded miltary vehicles bound for the Persian Gulf, and to provide

such se-vices as rapidly and safely as possible. More specifically, he provided techn',cal assistance to the

individuals responsible for loading the 13 vessels which had been prepared for sailing at the time of his

departure. The vessels carried over 5,00C0 uploaded vehicles all of which required inspection for the

adequacy of their b!ocking, bracing, and tiedown procedures. Deficiencies were corrected prior to loading

the vehicle aboard a vessel. The operations were monitored for safety with violations brought to the

attention of MTMC oersonnel for correction. Few vio!atiens, and no significant damage or injuries occurred

during Mr. Wasmoen's tenure at Beaumont.83

In a post-effort trip report, Mr. Wasmoen delineated observations made during his temporary duty

assicnment. He noted that port operations were conducted in accordance with 46 and 49 Code of Federal

Regulations (CFR), as well as DOT (Department cf Transportati xemption 3498, which permitted the

i

141
DA

otherwise prohibited shipment of vehicles uploaded with unit basic load ammunition and other hazardous

material. Yet his attempt to verify the existence of an explosive safety waiver or even that a safety survey

of the port had been conducted failed. Additionally, he wrote, violations of mandatory provisions contained

in Army Regulaticn 385-64 concerning "Ammuoiition and Explosives Safety Standards" had been 1dentified.

Most notable among these was the nonobservance of regulations concerning the distance which must fall

between inhabited buildings in Beaumont and the port installation boundaries. 4

Mr. Wasmoen further noted the presence of problems with vehicles prepared for vessel transport at unit

home stations. Initial shipments received at Beaumont from Fort Bliss, he commented, had a major problem

with ammunition stowage in vehicles. Basic load ammunition had been 1laced in vehicles on top of other

equipment just prior to or even following vehicle loading onto railcars. No tiedown or blocking and bracing

procedures had been adhered to. Accordingly, in the name of safety procedures unit personnel at

Beaumont removed all equipment from the vehicles and completely restowed ammunition and equipment.

And in order to prevent restowing each arriving ',ehicle, discussions were instigated among MTMC, Coast

Guard, and QASAS personnel, and relayed to various points of deployment, to assure that home stations

would learn to properly secure ammunition and equipment in vehicles, making port operations more safe

and efficient.A

The failure to properly secure vehicles at home stations did, indeed, cause problems beyond the simple

inconvenience of repetitive actions. As Mr. Wasmoen noted in his trip report, and as ultimateiy gained

inclusion in AMCCOM's OeaesShij;d/Storm After Action Reoort M1Al tanks from Fort Bliss

were improperly prepared for transport. As tie tanks had not been provided with environmental covers at

their home station, the driving rainstorm encountered enroute to Beaumont permitted water to enter the

vehicles. At least 129 of the tanks actually contained standing water. And although unit personnel dried

out the compartments, but again fai~ed to utilize environmenta! covers, a second storm recreated the

problem. As there was not time available before the sailing date, unit logistics representatives instructed

military personnel traveling aboard the vessel to once again dry the tank interiors. Yei the time-consuming

burden of drying tank interiors was not the only problem to arise from the lack cf environmental covers. Due

to the flooded interiors, stowed 120mm ammunition, that with cornbustible cartridge cases, received water

damage, and in some instances became unserviceable. QASAS estimated that up to 20% of the

ammunition involved was thus rendered. The transporting units were accordingly advised that uploaded

rounds were to be inspected, and future deployees were instruc:ed to inspect tanks for water in their

ammunition compartments before uploading.16

The failures,. however, proved to be learning experiences, and later deploying units frequently sent

perscnnel to the port of Beaumont to observe and !earn. Other units, discovering the enormity of their

mission, requested and received valuable technical ass!stance from AMCCOM QASAS. Fort Hood and

Fort Riley, in particular, benefitted from the guiding presence of QASAS. Thus as the deployment of men,

materiel, and munitions passed fiom the initial days, the effort became more routine, and less fraught with

difficulty.al

Regardless of the decreasing number of incorrectly stowed, braced, blocked, and tied down vehicles

and ammunition. Mr. Wasmoen could still point to valuable improvements, and make insightful comments,

regarding port operations. He urged the continued partir pation by QASAS at port facilities, noting they

were essential to safety and quality as the assigned MTMC and transportation units he had come into

contact with had no ammunition experience. Nor did most deploying units have the necessary experience

to properly ship uploaded vehicles.Y

He further observed that eari~er coordination at decisionmaking levels appeared necessary to permit

142
timely notification and deployment of QASAS. By the time of his arrival ai the port of Beaumont, a number

of trains had already been received. His late arrival prevented his participation in planning for the operation

to the degree of his preference. His immediate involvement in the process of inspecting and restowing

ammunition further delayed his investigation of explosive safety issues as did the absence of security

clearance information in his orders.89

Other absences hindered Mr. Wasmoen's work as well. He felt that essential information was riot

provided to him prior to leaving on TDY (temporary duty) concerning the type of operations with which he

would be involved. Information concernirg the applicability of DOT-E-3498, the layout and capability of the

port, the status of the explosive safety survey, basic guidance on tiedown of ammunition in vehicles, the

lifting of vehicles, and the tiedown of vehicles on railcars and in vessels was not readily available. MTMC

restricted the flow of infoimation in an awareness of security classifications. But accordingly, work was

impeded by the nonavailability of valuable planning information before his arrival in Beaumont. The

selection of the port of Beaumont for the deployment of uploaded vehicles had been based primarily upon

its proximity and capability. Mr. Wasmoen suggestea in the case of future eng.gements, that other factors

be taken into deliberation, primarily the port facility's available space to provide quantity distance separation

for ammunition and explosives. A waiver would be necessary if Beaumont were to be used solely as an

ammunition, as opposed to an upioaded tactical/combat vehicle, port.9

Concerning the variation in port facilities needed for each type of ammunition shipment, Mr. Wasmoen

stopped to ponder the need for uploading basic load ammunition. He noted that it could and "probably

should" be shipped separately from deploying soldiers and their tactical/combat vehicles. The rationale for

uploading ammunition in vehicles could be questioned in light of increased hazard to operations as well as

the shipment itself and the vessel. Considering that most shipments of basic load ammunition are relatively

small, positioning them for unit pick-up at arrival should not prove an overwhelming problem. This method

of shipment would also reduce security problems at the ports and enroute, as well as reduce the potential

for damage to ammunition due to handling or intransit storage conditions. Additionally, given the Coast

Guard's unfamiliarity with handling ammunition, uploaded or otherwise, Mr. Wasmoen noted the totally

different standards applied, despite the DOT exemption which specified tiedown using army standards.

Accordingly, he recommended that QASAS dealing with the uninitiated have vehicle and weapon manuals

available, and that they closely coordinate with port officials i,; nip potential problems in the proverbial

bud.91

And in a comment 'hat was to become the refra'n of deployed civilians, Mr. Wasmoen noted the minimal

level of supoor; available for Port-based ammunition inspectors QASAS effectiveness was limited by the

lack of office space. commercial telephone capabilities, the absence of portable communications

equipment, continually changing personnel, the variable level of support furnished by deploying units, and

the lack of accurate and timely information. Also hindering QASAS performance was the chang.ng focus

of responsibility for operations. At the port of Beaumont, power initially rested with MTMC, but rapidly

devolved to the 1192nd Terminal Transit Unit. Port conditions did not vary considerably throughout CONUS.9 2

Port activities were also conducted OkONUS, most notably in Germany. From the port of Nordingham,

Germany, QASAS assisted the deploying VII Corps by loading their ammunition as well as uploaded

tactical/combat vehicles aboard vessels hound for SWA. QASAS serving the port noted that due to the

number of vessels to be loaded, and the duration of the loading activities, the stevedores and dock crews

became quite skilled, resulting in relative speed as well as safety. On occasion, however, crews had to be

cautioned against their tendencies to load ammunition in a hurry by short-cutting bracing and blocking

procedures or simply trying new, ineffective tecrhniques. Beyond the effcrt at speed, the most problematic

143
occurrence at the port of Nordingham appears to be organic ship crews. Many crew members had not been

told of their mission before they arrived in Nordingham. And when they realized their cargo and mission,

many of the crewmen, frequently of Korean, Japanese, or Greek origin, would refuse to work with the

ammunition. It seemed that the crews were afraid of their cargo, and had not properly had their fears allayed

by an explanation of ammunition safety factors. According to maritime law, if a crew is not informed of their

intended cargo upon starting to sail to pick it up, they receive paid tickets back to their port of debarkation.

Thus, many of the crew members asked German police to take them to airports so they could arrange flights

home. And obtaining new crews in such circumstances was not always easyY1

Yet little delay occurred in the movement of vessels from port. Working on a 24-hour schedule,

Nordingham personnel could load a large, three-hold cargo vessel in two and a half to three days. Some

delays did occur, however, in correcting the stowage of uploaded vehicles before their transport to SWA.

As in the case of CONUS activities, some commanders apparently suspected they would need to fight their

way ashore in Saudi Arabia and sought the munitions preparations to do so. Thus, they frequently ordered

tactical/combat vehicles excessively uploaded, an order :;,at QASAS had to rectify and explain against to

avoid the continuation.94 Overall, however, QASAS deployed to OCONUS ports of ammunition embarkation noted a relative smoothness of operation.

And while safety, celerity, and visibility were always concerns of dock crews, QASAS, AMCCCM, AAPs,

arsenals, and HQDA, truck, railcar, and ship were not the only means of transporting ammunition to SWA.

In limited instances, ammunition and explosives were transported via aircraft. And as might be expected,

the federal government had voluminous instructions on its proper handling. When deploying individuals

had been issued their basic issue load at their home station, they were permitted to transport it in their ruck

sacks, field packs, duffel bags, etc., when flying in support of ODS on cargo aircraft or passenger-carrying

aircraft operated by the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), U.S. civil aircraft not in the CRAF program but

operated by a carrier identified to the DOT by the DOD, or foreign aircraft made available to the U.S.

government to support the deployment. Such baggage, however, had to be stored in the aircraft's baggage

compartment and cou!d not be personally transported in the passenger compartment. Doing such,

obviously, creates the potential for a serious incident. Furthermore. not all anticipated problems concerned

passenger safety. Noncompliance with briefing requirements makes it difficult for loading personnel to

identify incompatible hazardous material, places crew members at risk, and makes it impossible to brief air

traffic control personnel on the hazards aboard a given aircraft.P5

To enhance safety, troop commanders were required to brief aircraft commanders, or their designated

representatives, on all hazardous materials placed aboard SWA-bound aircraft. Yet, this safety procedure

was frequently omitted in the race to get men and materiel into theater. To counter this omission, the

commander of FORSCOM (United States Army Forces Command) issued troop commanders a message

detailing the need for the briefing and setting forth a statement format for use in the brief. Troop

commanders were instructed to prepare a hazardous material statement for both himself and the aircrafts'

commander. The commander's statement declared simply, "I certify the following hazardous material(s)

and quantity(ies) are contained in the baggage of personnel for whom I am the troop commander:," followed

by a listing of the material, its class, and quantity. He was to sign and date this statement as well as providg

a similar one for the aircraft's commander which declared that, "1 certify that I have been briefed in

accordance with AFR (Air Force Regulation) 71-4, paragraph 2-1, on the class(es), quantity(ie3), and

!ocation(s) of hazardous material contained in troop baggage." This statement was also to be signed either

by the aircraft commander or a designated representative thereof. The statements could be prepared on

plain bond copy, could be legibly handwritten or typed, and were to be prepared in duplicate for each flight.

Loading agencies were to attach one signed copy of the statements to !he aircraft commander's manifest

and retain a signed copy for station fiNes. Units were reminded by the commander's message that failure

144
to comply with the directions could result in severe civil penalties against personnei involved and

suspension of the waiver which allowed the use of commercial aircraft. This, of course, could severely

impact the ability to support troop movement.9

In actuality, a very limited quantity of AMCCOM-directed conventional ammunition arrived in SWA via

commercial flight, carried by deploying servicemembers. The majority of AMCCOM's 620 thousand short

tons of ammunition deployed to the Persian Gulf reached its destination in the hold of a vessel. A most

significant, albeit limited, quantity of ammunition was air freighted there as part of the Desert Express. High

priority shipments, especially those called forward by ARCENT (Army Central Command), which had lost

their placement in the holds of vessels bound for SWA in the ship shuffle of the docks frequently arrived

in the desert via a government-owned and operated aircraft. Operating from either Dover or Charleston

Air Force Bases, thf Desert Express flights departed CONUS at the rate of one per day until the

commencement of the air war in mid-January 1991 when they increased to two per day. Ammunition air

freighted to SWA on government-owned and operated planes, and not in the specific possession of

deployees, did not face the same rigorous procedures prior to departure that commercially carried troops

and ammunition did. However, AMCCOM and HQDA in genera! faced a potentially more rigorous

challenge. As Desert Express space was quite limited, ARCENT-initiated orders from AMCCOM competed

with other commands, and, indeed, other services for space. Ultimately, the army was allocated 15,000

"pounds of equipment, five pallet positions, or 2,500 square feet for each daily flight, all predicated upon the

general nature of the shipment. The air force accepted responsibility for discerning whose requests

warranted priority.97

Regardless of the numerous, delineated problems in preparing ammunition for shipment, arranging for

proper transportation from AAPs and depots to deploying units, both at ports and home stations, and to

ammunition ports, as well as in finding adequata skilled laborers to load vessels, and in scheduling ship

transportation, not a single required delivery date (RDD) for ammunition shipment from CONUS was

missed during the entirety of ODS.6

From the ammunition ports of MOTSU at Southport, NC; Earle, NJ; and Concord, CA; as well as the

commercial ports of Beaumont and Houston, TX; Wilmington, NC; Jacksonviile, FL; Bayonne, NJ; and

Savannah, GA; and numerous OCONUS sites, and the Dover and Charleston Air Force Bases; a plethora

of ammunition traveled to the seaports, and occasionally airports, of SWA. Al Jubayl and Ad Dammam

served as the only two Saudi Arabian ports of debarkation, although the air force on occasicn used ports

in the United AraL Emirates and Behrain. Frcm the ports of debarkation, as well as the assorted air facilities,

ammunition was transferred to inland, desert theater storage areas (TSAs). King Khalid Military City

(KKMC), Al Artawiyah, Al Jubayl, and Dhahran all served the allied coalition as TSAs. And from the TSAs,

ammunition was forwarded to ammunition supply points (ASPs), and from there to the deployed units

arrayed against the minions of Saddam Hussein.9

Just as they had served their nation at the home stations of deploying units, at commercial as well as

ammunition ports in CONUS, and assorted OCONUS ports, QASAS toiled to make the process of

unloading ammunition from vecseis and transshipping it to TSAs and ASPs for storage and future dispersal

as safe and efficient as possible. Approximately 60 QASAS served in SWA; many QASAS provided

expertise at CONUS facilities either before or after their Southwest Asian tours. And just as they did at the

CONUS sites, OASAS observed and commented on the proceedings, seeking to praise that which was

efficacious, and improve that which was deficient. One observation made by 3 number of the men and

women deployed to SWA concerned the quality of the Saudi ports. The consensus noted that security

problems were non-existent at Ad Dammam and Al Jubayl, and that the ports were wel!-appointed, even

over-constructed in consideration of the pre-war requirements of the ports. Notwithstanding the quality of

145
/V

Ujbt 71' 

Southwest Asian oorts frequent.y d~d rot pocssess sufficient crare ca ' acity for the hýeavy cOars of armun~ton they vvere called

uoon to move. Dy raintorcing thýe hor znltal suc port of this sing. se". icemeri be's we.-& able to "Pcrease its lift Capacity by 5010oc,

cent.

During Operations Desert Shepld and Cesprt Storm, AMCCDM dispatched 620, CC1 .hort tons of arrmunitobn to Southwsest Asia.

All oce-an transported a3mm uniio n pass ed hronqi 'ie corts ci Damrr-im. as 'lustrated. ordubayl, Local 'amoiers r'equentiy aided

nr the downfloading of esl

-~~.. - - ---. -i-------

A~
the ports and their security, the facilities did not always have sufficient quantities or varieties of unloading

equipment and thus backlogs of vessels awaiting unloading occasionally developed.1'0

Problems, however, in the Scuthwest Asian theater of operations occurred for the QASAS when they

realized that initially only third-world nationals with contractor vehicles were available to transport munitions

from the ports of Ad Dammam and Al Jubayi to the TSAs and ASPs. The United States military

transportation assets in SWA had all been diverted to carry equipment and supplies, and the vehicles

available for ammunition transport did not approach the U.S. standards. A major problem involved the lack

of strapping to hold ammunition pallets on truck beds. In at least one instance, a nationalist-loaded truck

had not even left the port area when its entire load of bombs shifted, and its pallets skidded across the metal

truck bed, nearly failing to the ground. And even with the purchase of tie-down straps from Saudi sources,

and the importation of even more from U.S. zuppliers, there never seemed to be quite enough to ensure

that trucks would arrive at their off-road locations, intact. Additionally, trucks frequently had tires so bald

that their cording was exposed to the multitudinous hazards of desert travel.",

At the onset of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, QASAS did not have the luxury of always

adhering to the letter of the regulation concernir.g ammunition transport. Given ideai conditions, they would

simply have refused to utilize the third-world nationals and their vehicles, preferring to wait for allied military

transportation assets. or the correction of contractor trucks to code. Yet in the early hectic days, this option

did not exist. Thus in order to achieve the delivery of needed training and defensive rounds with some

degree of safety in the urgent days of late 1990, QASAS bent the rules of ammunition transport. Bending

the rules included arranging for the initial ill-tied truck convoys to be headed and trailed by a Saudi security

force with an American !n each vehicle. Contractors were also provided with fire extinguishers. And in the

case of extremeiy worn tires, QASAS determined that if tread still existed on the tires the contractors could

still hab! ammunition. They simply lessened the load to 45,000 pounds. 2

Third-world contractor personnel also provided the QASAS with difficult moments in their race to the

desert. Frequently GASAS would discover, much to their consternation, that drivers of ammunition trucks

cooked pots of food and smoked in the shade of their trailers. Prior to the war, many of the contracted

truckers lived in their vehicles and used a large box mounted underneath their trailers to store food, cookers,

gear, etc. The QASAS faced a constant battle to get such drivers to cook and smoke away from the

ammunition. And of course, as QASAS Paul Stone noted, they oid, at least while they were being observed.

Yet once the watchful QASAS turned to other matters, most of the third-world nationals would return to their

previous practices. After discerning the problem, Saudi personnel tried to take the cookers away from the

drivers, but soon realized that this was not a viable solution: the drivers, who frequently lived in th-air

vehicles, often had to wait several days to a week to get a destination call for a specific load to carry inland,

and needed to use their cookers during the waiting period. Only when the Saudis removed several drivers

from the oort area, thereby decreasing the number of available transportation assets did the services act.

The 7th Transpcrtat;on battalion then set up tents away from the ammunition stocks, and told the drivers

to do their cooking and smoking there.""2

Due to the initial shortage of transportation assets, native and allied military, unsafe vehicles cou!d

simply not be dismissed but rather had to be carefully marshalled in an effort to relieve the tremendous port

congestion. Substantial port congestion occurred for a number reasons. One reason involved the lack of

an operations plan (OPLAN) for SWA. At the onset of ODS, the Department of Defense did not have a

functioning plan for military operations in the region. The standing plan was one drawn up in the 1960s,

and updated thrcugh the 1970s, ii, fear of Soviet aggression in Iran, tnen an a!ly of the United Staies. And

despite the presence of prepositioned military stores aboard vessels afloat in the Indian Ocean, the majority

of U.S. political, tactical, and strategic interests focused on the possibility of fighting a ground war against

147
Con,-,a ct vehicles used to transport ammunition in Southwest Asia from ports to ammunition supply points were frequently not up

to United States Army specifications. Bald tires or those missing sections of tread resulted in procedural changes to ensure

American servicemembers had sufficient supplies.

'~44

I-' -T

A- n-.

~ - - i' V-' 

148
Beyond weather conditions, balding tires, and unschooled third-world drivers, AMCCOM OASAS in SWA also faced a shortage

of fe down straps. In their absence, loads could, and did, shift dangerously enroute to forward-deployed servicemembers.

I

1J.2

149

'1II1
the Soviet Union and members of the Warsaw Pact on the broad plains of central Europe. With regard to

such a fear, DOD, DA, and AMCCOM w.'are not truly prepared to fight a war in the deserts of SWA against

the forces of Saddam Hussein. AMCCOM's support mission had focused primarily on Europe, and to a

lesser extent on Korea. The likelihood of SWA conflict was seen in a "brushfire" scenario: few personnel

and a limited amount of equipment for a short involvement. Accordingly few AMCCOM personnel had spent

time in the region, or had become otherwise familiar with it. Thus, a good timephased plan to place logistics

support staff and ancillary equipment in theater did not exist. Nor had the points placement for men,

materiel, ammunition supply points, or theater support areas been determined. 1•

Accordingly, when the first of the pre-positioned vessels arr> .d in Saudi Arabia a mere ten days after

President George Bush's declaration of troop deployment, port personnel had no idea where units were

going to be or even where they would be suppl;ed from. So from the docks, ammunition, as well as other

materiel, was transferred to nearby holding points while units got in country, picked up the;r equipment, and

then moved on to their sta'.ons to await the arrival of additional items. In the holding areas, the arriving

stockpile of ammunition, as well as other materiel, lost visibility; ultimately accountability also suffered.10 5

At the conclusion of the successful operation, with the benefit of hindsight, at least one QASAS became

quite critical of the proceedings he had witnessed. According to him, the admittedly inadequate planning

could account not only for the loss of visibility and accountability, but also in the unsafe billeting of arriving

units in too close of proximity to ammunition stores. A combat service support structure, he believed,

needed to be instituted with, or even prior to, the arrival of the fighting forces. Such a support structure might

have prevented the unsafe s'cckiiling of ammunitior at the docks by arranging for its appropriate storage

or transfer to theater supply points, ammunition supply points, and specific units, as well as kept the

voluminous collection of ordnance and ammunition visible, and accounted for. In view of the obviously

uncertain duration of the forthcoming conflict and the ill-defined term ':basic load", units had for all intents

and purposed a blank check to obtain ammunition. And accordingiy, units frequently took as much

ammunition as they could, and just as frequently improperly uploaded it in their vehicles in eliminate the

problem of carrying wooden boxes, cardboard, and fiber containers. It was not unti; the 321st Materiel

Management Center (MMC) arrived in SWA in October 1990 that accountability apparently became a

concern, according to the disgruntled QASAS. Yet even after the unit's arrival, their system of accounting

was not functional until November 1990 when it attempted to make visible the iron mountain that had been

arriving in country since mid-August. He commented that the structure was much akin to opening the doors

of a bank at 9 o'clock in the morning, but not bringing in the telle, s until noon. 1 6

Beyond the loss of accountability and visibility, as 'well as the inefficil-,; storage of ammunition on and

near the docks, the lack of an effective OPLAN also resulted in inadequate equipment, in addition to the

shortage of transportation assets. QASAS noted that the forklifts supplied by the Saudi government were

not available in sufficient quaotity or quaiity. Indeed, some of the forklifts became so overloaded in the

attempt to rapidly unload vessels and transfer pallets of ammunition that personnel occasiona!iy sat on the

back end of the vehicles to keep them in rough balance. A shortage of hand tools also existed in SWA. As

one QASAS observed, "it was difficult to even find a hammer," let alone banding gear for pallet loading and

reosir. Crews also lacked the appropriate equipment and packing to properly repalletize ammunition for

movement in country after it had arrived uploaded on combat and tactical vehicles. Additionally, as had

been the case in loading trucks, railcars, and vessels in the United States, a distinct shortage of skil!ed labor

existed. Several QASAS noted on their return CONUS that third-country nationals hired to offloua2 ships

had not been trained at all tG do the work, and so had no idea how to perform their mission bul a,!empted

to do their best with the available equipment.°0 7

150
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A more critical shortage involved safe, sufficient ammunition storage in the raging heat of SWA.

Reflective of the lack of an established OPLAN, no improved storage facilities had been provided away from

the docks. And while ammunition and other assorted materiel accumu!ated on the docks, losing visibility

and accountability bythe minute, simple flat spots in the desert, sufficiently distanced from similarly chosen

flat spots, were designated as storage sites -- TSAs or ASPs. No improvements existed, initially, and the

ammunition bore the direct brunt of the Saudi sun.108

Indeed, as the war took shape in the Persian Gulf, the rather harsh envirorment became a concern

of AMCCOM's quality assurance personnel. Of particular concern was their belief that the design and

development community did not completely understand the true c:imatic conditions and the implications of

these upon munitions in open storagad in An Nafud, the Saudi Arabian desert. Based upon information

gathered in the deserts of SWA and from testing conducted at Yuma Oroving Ground (YPG) during desert

storage testing conducted in June 1990, a data base had been constructed. From those tests, quality

assurance staffers noted that the average daily high temperatures during the period from 1 May through

30 September ran from 105 to 110 degrees Fahrenheit. During such a five month period, 70 percent of the

days could be expected to exceed 100 degrees. During the peak months of June through August, some

artas could expect to exceed the 100 to 110 degree mark 100 percent of the time. Yet the maximum

ambient temperature could not be expected to exceed 126 degrees.'°9

As a result of so!ar radiation, ground temperatures couid be expected to reach 140 to 150 degrees

Fahrenheit, and the surfaces of exposed containers and projectiles could rise to 170 to 185 degrees. Also

as a result of solar radiation, temperatures inside containers and projectiles rose to 150 to 160 degrees.

But more importantly, the duration of these high temperature conditions in the center of ammunition was

extensive; six hours at temperatures greater than 140 degrees, and twelve hours at temperatures

exceeding 120 degrees could be expected. The effects of solar radiation could be nearly eliminated by

shading suggestad the qoality assurance personnel. For the temperatures of properly shaded items would

rise only 0 to 10 degrees higher than the ambient temperature." 0

Beyond solar radiation and ambient temperatures, several other aspects of the natural environment of

SWA caused quality ascurance personnel anxious moments. Studies of the area disckised that its

temperature could fluctuate wildly during the course of a day. Variations of 40 degrees Fahrenheit are

possible with fluctuations of 20 to 30 degree-; relatively common. The maximum temperature variation

recorded was one of 20 degrees in a mere three hcurs. Coastal variation, however, is usually considerably

less with only 10 to 20 degrees difference between minimum and maximum temperatures.1

Several other naurai surprises awaited soldiers deploying to the Persian Gulf and bedeviled quality

assurance personnel concerned with ammunition stores. Static electrical charges up to 150,000 volts can

occur during dust storms, and [he highest dew points, in the wor!d occur along the Red Sea and Persian

Gulf. The region a!so sports the highest ocean salt r-ontent in the world. Subsequently, greater chloride

content in the air at coastal storage sites created a prime environment for rapid corrosion of metals and nonmetallic materials. Such were the physical burdens facing the design and development community as

concerned the environment for ammunition, and which in turn challenged the QASAS on site as well." 2

Personnel from the United States Army Defense Ammunition Center and School (USADACS) reacted

to their understanding of SWA's natural environment with celerity. By late August 1990, USADACS staffers

addressed their concerns regarding te environment in a memorandum to AMCCOM's Commanding

Genei'al MG Paul L. Greenberg. They noted that the need to deploy ammunition to Saudi Arabia and the

adverse effects tiat prolonged high storage temperatures were likely to have on the operational reliability

and the safety of the ammunition catused them concern. Their past experiences and subsequent

152
The environmentof Soulhwest.Asia caused innumer ible concerns for.4MCCOMs QASA.3 deployed to the daqsert. Heathumidity,

static electricity, high dew pcints, and ambient salt content all warranted QASAS a~tertion. Mr.Ste ' hen Oragan, United States

Army Defense Ammunition Center and School QASAS, set up this weather station in Th'eater Support Area (TSAJ -1I to c!osely

monitor conditions.

exhaustive studies had taught them that high temperatures acce!eratpd chenrical reactions as well as

physical ch-inges, most probably resulting in reduced perfor mance and safety. Particularly susceptible to

change in the harsh envirInrnent of preposittioned ship (PR EPO) holds, where the first ammuinition to arrive

in SWA had beens~tcred, were 4.2-inch cartridges and M-771 time fuzes. They also noted that Picatinny

Arsenal studies, as well as Australian A3rm-,y studies of the early 1 980s, further idlentifiedl serious probierns

associated w/ith prolonged exposure ofarnmmunition to high temperatures."1

Rueful!y, UISADACS staffers noted that due to their deploymnent, no fixes could be offered for the

ammunition which had been stored on the blistering PIREPO vessels. And. inde,,d, it was entirely conceilvable that in the unloading and movement of the PflEPO ammunition to the newly-established ASPs

that they would be exposed to even higher temreratures than they had already iLxperienced. Thus not only could personnel expect problems with PREPO ammunition. but also with supplies recently transported to

the blazinq desert. Accordingly, !JSADACS recomimended that tarps coLid be utilized as an effective

means of reducing tempe'ature-s, and offered the "best" alternative for the morment. And althou~gh any

15-3
temperature reductions were welcome and would undoubtedly buy time in the form of shelf life, storage

temperatures were going to be high, and safety, as well as reliability, problems were going to result. Armed

with such information, USADACS urged the undertaking of "prudent" actions, or at very least their planning,

to avoid potentially dangerous consequences should the ammunit~on continue to be exposed to high

storage temperatures for extended periods, and should it ultimately be needed for combat operations.'14

Accordingly USADACS personnel recommended that an adhocteam of experts be formed to develop

a detailed plan of action to overcome to the extent possible the environmental issues that would beset

AMCCOM. Specifically, they recommended the development of an intensive surveillance program for

ASPs and basic load stocks to validate condition codes, determine daterioration rates, predict remaining

service life, and make plans for resupply. In support of the objective proposed, USADACS recommended

that surveillance teams, at the bare minimum, should monitor the ASPs and selected basic loads to gather

environmen,1tal data, review inventory and identify potential problems based on PREPO and other

environmentally oriented experiences, determine the scope and frequency of the required program to

include in storage surveillance, laboratory and ballistic testing, and make initial qualitative assessments.

They were also to forwarn users of potential problem areas pending the implementation of testing, and

determine projected ammunition replacement requirernmnts. USADACS further recommended that

ammunition personnel consider and develop innovative and inexpensive storage techniques to reduce the

heat's effect on ASPs and basic load ammunition to extend its service life.' 15

USADACS was not the only organization within the hegemony of AMCCOM to concern itself with the

effects of climate upon ammunition supplies. Within weeks of the start of Operation Desert Shield, Picatinny

Arsenal, located in New Jersey, forwarded a memorandum for distribution to AMCCOM members. The

memorandum made recipients aware or the arsenal's collection of Southwest Asian climate data. The

arsenal could provide, on request, information on 119 sites in Jordan, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the United

Arab Emirates, Y(emen. Lebanon, Bahrain, Israel, Pakistan, Oman, Cyprus, and Afghanistan. It enclosed

a listing of the principai cities of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait along with the number of days that each cit/

could be expected to exceed the 100 degree Fahrenheit mark, and the 90 degree mark for the 1 May to

30 September time period. In addition, Picatinny could provid3 a comprehensive stack of refernces

(technical reports, military standards, Army Regulations, etc.) for use in characterizing and assessing the

climatic conditions in the Middie East."'

The memorandum also included open storage information for ammunition arid guided missiles in the

heat of the desert. Noting that the storege of ammunition and guided missiles at high temperatures which

would be experienced during Operation Desert Shield could have a serious effect on their functioning and

safety, the arsenal's personnel urged that every effort must be taken to reduce the temperatures at which

the ammunition was stored. And accordingly, they provided valuable information on the storage of ammunition, 7

Among the information provided b, Picatinny Arsenal personnel was their belief that the upper limits

indicated for various ammunition items in their respective TM-43 series manua!s were misleading since they

did not address the consequences of long term storage, intermittent storage, temperature rate of chanr',,

etc., regarding the upper limits specified. Some limitations speciied were qualified by stating that the

temperature shou!d not be reached or exceeded for periods of more than a given number of hours or days.

However, the consequences of exceeding the limit in terms of durat'on, frequency, and c,_'2nulative effect

were not known, or reported. Temperature limnitations specified in the TM-43 series manuals vary

significantly, noted Picatinny staffers, from 160 degrees Fahrenheit for many artillery items to 115 degrees

for certain grenades. These limits were for ambient temperatures only, and did not reflect thet dependent

upon the storage configuration, the level of solar radiation, etc., the internal tenc-,rature of the munitiori

154
item could be considerably higher than the air termperrture, thus grossly exceeding the permissible limit

specified. Unfortunately, no practical means of measuring internal temperature existed for field conditions."'

Taking such matters under advisement, the arsenal made specific recommendations regarding the

storage of ammunition in the blazing sun of SWA. All ammunition stored in the open was to be tarped or

shaded with the lightest colored tarps or nets available. The color would aid in reflecting the sun's rays.

Additionally, for the best protection of ammunition, all tarps and nets were to be erected with a minimum

of 18 inches clearance above the ammunition, and in such a manner as to allow for their quick lowering in

the event of high winds." 9

Picatinny personnel a!so outlined provisions for the safe storage of ammunition on the ground. All

ammunition on the ground wae; to be placed on pallets or dunnage to allow a minimum of three inches

clearance above the ground. Ammunition stored on sandy soil was not to be stacked over three pallets high

in order to ensure stack stability, although stack heights could be altered to meet local conditions.

Additionally a minimum of three inches of clearance on all sides of stacks was to be provided for ventilation

purposes. All white phosphorus (WP) projectiles were to oe stored with a base down orientation, as it could

melt and shift causing a ballistically unstable projectile. And concerning WP, units were reminded by the

memorandum that firing te, nperature limits existed for the D528 and 155mm SMK WP M825 varieties of

the device. Normal maximum firing temperature limits were 145 degrees Fahrenheit; however, some lots

manufactured from January i 985 through May 1986 were restricted to firing at temperatures below 110

degrees. Lot numbers beginning PB-85A through PB-86K were affected.'2

The proper covering ard shading of ammunition should be prioritized, suggested the Picatinny folks,

accordiig to the need to minimize temperature in order to ensure the serviceability and safety of the item.

Those items more susceptible- to the effects of high temperatures and humidity, e.g., propelling charges,

fuzes, pyrotechnics, guided missiles, and rockets, shou:d be given the highest priority for proper piotection.

Improper covering ammunition in the desert environment with a tarpaulin placed directly or., the ammunition

would cause the item to experience higher temperatures than if it were not covered at all. And unpalletized

ammunition should he provided with as much ventilation between indiv~dual rounds, boxes, and containers

as possible. In all cases, blown sand should be cleared away from ammunition stores:3.'2

Information was also provided for ammunition which was to he temporarily stored on vehicles. All

armored vehicles with ammunition aboard were to be left open to the maximum extent possible to ailow for

ventilation. Similarly, wheeled vehicles with closable compartments where ammunition was stored were

to be left open. Trucks with open cargo areas were to have pallets or ammunition pieced with space

between individual boxes or pallets for ourposes of ventilation. And vehicles !oaded with ammunition were

to be parked to take advantage of any shade provided by buildings, sheds, or coverae parking, providing

ihat the safety of personnel would not be violated.' ,2

And with regard to ammunition packaging, Ficatinny cersonnel recommended that as relatively high 12Ž

iumidity prevailed in the region, and varied greatly throughout the day, ammunition should remain in its

packaged configuration urt!l immediately prior to use. items opened and not used should be repacked as

soon as possible: desiccarnt NaS to be returned to boxes that originally ;ontaiied it when the ammunition

was repacked. But special ca3re was to be taken that prooelling charges, guided missiles, and rocket

containers, or items packed in barrier bags were not to be opened until the last possible moment to avoid

environmerntally induced problems. 1?

155i ..
.4;

Recommended Ammunition Strg Configuration fo

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

18 IN. TOP AIR SPACE

PALLETS____ ___

GROUND

Providing palletized small arms ammunition and fuzes with protection from

solar radiation and shifting sands involved tarps, ventilation spaces,

stacking restrictions, and stab!e foundations.

156
AMCCOM officials also realizcd that not all ammunition would rapidly reach the flat desert sites

designated as storage areas, but would rather sit for a period in MILVANS and commercial containers

awaiting forward movement. Yet the effects of solar radiation made the use of the metal devises thoroughly undesirable storage facilities of the last resort. And it was with this understanding that guidance was offered

for the storage of ammunition in MILVANS and other containers. If forced by circumstances into use, the

containers, offered DA officials, should be shaded by a cover at least 18 inches from their top, sides, and

ends to allow for the free circulation of air. In order to minimize the containers' surface area exposed to

the direct rays of the sun, they were to be positioned with the long axis oriented in an east-west direction.

In this fashion, the low angle early morning and late evening sun would strike the smallest surface of the

container, and maximum shading would be provided to the top of the container due to the very high angle

of the sun due to the low ldtitudes. Doors should also remain open to permit ventilation when conditions

and security permitted. Additionally, sand and or sand bags should be placed against the sides and rear

of a container planned for extended use, but should not cover the container. Placing sand bags around

the container would greatly limit the cover required by reducing the surface exposed to the sun. A 20 foot

by 40 foot tarp would then adequately cover an exposed container.12'

If no subsequent movement of the container was anticipated, DA officials offered that mechanical

restraints, blocking and bracing, etc., cou!d be removed. Blocking and bracing lumber could then be used

to provide separation between the too/sides of the container and the cover used for shading. It also offered

that the shading of containers should be prioritized so that the items most susceptible to heat deterioration,

e.g., guided missiles/rockets, propelling charges, pyrotechnics, white phosphorus till items, etc., were given first consideration. And as concerned the quantity distance safety factors that must always be taken into

consideration in ammunition deals, MILVANS had to be viewed as an unbarricaded above-ground

magazine. Thus separation distance among containers, and between containers and external exposures had to be determined accordingly to prevent the propagation of an unintendedexplosion from one container

to another, protect personnel from death or injury, and protect equipment and facilities from damage. Reduced distances could only increase the hazard unless terrain features or barricades between

containers were utilized to lessen the separation distance requirements.' 1

Earth-covered magazines could offer some respite for heat-stressed ammunition, when and where

available. Testing of U.S.-designed, earth-covered magazines in Saudi Arabia revealed that when the

ambient air temperature stood at 102 degrees Fahrenheit, and the temperature at ground level reached

an unpleasant 130 degrees, the magazine itself stood at 99 degrees even though the door had been open

for several hours. Yet such facilities were not readily available, or easily and rapidly constructed for the

storage of U.S. ammunition. Nor were the tarps suggested by Picatinny personnel readily available. By

the end of September 1990, some ASPs were still without tarps.11

2

In addition to the heat, high winds also became an obstacle to the safe stcrage of ammunition in SWA.

As 1990 turned to 1991, AMCCOM noted in message traffic that the season for strong desert wind storms

had arrived and must consequerntly be prepared for. Severe winds could easily displace the tarps or

camouflage netting covering ammunition, making it more susceptible to heat, and just as easily sand could

blow drifts between stacked ammunition, thus reducing accessibility and air circulation. Essential markings

might also be obliterated by the incessant "sand blasting" action. Most importantly, sand accumulated on

critical areas, or in gun tubes, could easily cause the ammunition to malfunction.1 27

!n order to enhance ammunition safety in light of such observations, AMCCOM offered a number of

suggestions. Ammunition should be left in its original packing as long as practical. Tarps and netting should

be rigged tc allow for their rapid lowering in the event of high winds as the air space created by their

suspension could easily cause damage and displacement both to tarps and ammunition. The command

157
:77'

Recommended Ammunition Storage Configuration for

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

TIE TWO 17-FT TARPS

TOGETHER FOR 34-FT

LENGTH. TIE TWO 12-FT

WIDTHS TOGETHER TO

PROVIDE 24-FT LENGTH.

SANDBAGS IN PALLET PALLET

6 PLACES TO UNIT UNIT

PROVIDE

18-IN. AIR DOOR END

SPACE

OPEN DOORS AND

SECURE TO SIDE WALLS

PALLET PALLET

UNIT UNIT

ANCHOR

3-IN. GROUND

SAND BAGS. • GROUND 3-IN. AIR

CLEARANCE SPACE

.......... ........ ...............

Properly protecting MILVAN-stored ammunnition from the harsh environment

of Southwest Asia Involved tarps, open doors, sandbags, and an

east-west long axis orientation.

158
suggested that small caliber ammunition should be stored in pouches, wraps, or sacks if the need arose

to unpack them. It also recommended that materiel should be stored in such a manner as to reduce the

effects of traditional prevailing wind direction. End-opening containers, such as those for 120mm cartrdges

orpropeiling charges, and critical markings should be protected from the direct effects of prevailing winds.

Exposed materiel, i.e., separate loading projectiles, should be stored behind barriers. berms, or other

stacks of packaged ammunition. Furthermore, AMCCOM advised that critical surfaces be cleaned with a

soft, lint-free rag prior to assembly and/or loading.12 8

AMCCOM personnel also noted that with high winds and blowing sand came the danger of static

electricity generation and dissipation. Electro-explosive initiated items, i.e., electric primed ammunition,

blasting caps, 2.75 inch rockets, or guided missiles were be packaged, shorted out, or grounded as much

as possible. Additionally, they advised that with the prudent and practical use of excess materialsdunnage, and packing-ammunition could be given even more prctection. Empty fiberboard, or wooden

or metal containers could be filled with sand and used to construct walls around exposed ammunition, or

to provide a "snow fence" against the prevailing winds. Testing continued throughout Operations Desert

Shield and Desert Storm in an effort to attain the best methods of ammunition storage possible.,: 9

Regardless of the fears expressed at the onset of operations in the desert, an adherence to the policies

rapidly set forth by Picatinny Arsenal, USADACS, and HQ, AMCCOM resulted in few weather-related,

ammunition-oriented problems during the conflict. Regardless, some individuals felt that the operation

could have proceeded somewhat more smoothly had information concerning the environment oi SWA been

available to them more readily. Accordingly, at the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War, AMCCOM's quality

assurance staff recommended that before the possibility of another deployment arose that technical

reference materials normally used by combat service support personnel be made more available to them.

Specifically, ARDEC personnel noted that the job of receiving, handling, storing, and issuing huge

quantities of ammunition had been immense, and that during the routine conduct of such activities technical

reference material had frequently been referred to in order to correctly perform such functions as shipment

and storage planning, control of ammunition suspensions and resirictions, as well as the performance of

required inspections to insure the serviceability of the stocks. The available reference material consisted

primarily of hard copy publications which could be hand carried by deploying personnel, both military and

civilian. Yet, the recommendation was offered that efforts to field an automated Ammunition Surveillance

Information System (ASIS) be continued. The need for such a portable reference information storage and

retrieval system had been identified several years previous, bui funding had never been allocated.1 1

0

Soldiers had also been handicapped to some degree in previous exercises-Bright Star and

Preposition Ammunition-by their lack of information concerning the effects of environment. In such

exercises, the degradation of equipment and ammunition performance had occurred. Product Assurance

and Test Directorate personnel sought to prevent a reoccurrence of this and at the onset of Operation

Desert Shield aided the Maintenance Directorate's Technical Publication's Division in the rapid production

of three booklets; one each focusing on ammunition, chemical defense equipment, and armament.

Approximately 179,000 copies of each booklet were printed for dispersment to deploying units. At the war's

conclusion, Product Assurance and Test Directorate staffers recommended the development of booklets

for use in other extreme conditions -- arctic and tropical, for example. It also urged that the booklets be

available for immediate issue .l

If these observations could rightly be called lessons learned from th, experience of arrmmunition handlers in SWA, a few others must be added. Some QASAS reflecting on their axperiences in ODS urged

that they be better integrated into the military structure. Some had the feeling that they were always on

the outside looking in as far as the military was concerned, and were attempting to train troops as well as

159
Recommended Ammunition Storage Configuration for

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

Tarping, as well as ventilation spacing, provided boxed artillery and

tank rounds with the best, temporary protection frmte fet

of the searing desert sun.

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their commanders in the safe storage, transportation, and use of ammunition without any authority to insist

upon configurations. Indeed some QASAS had the impression at the war's end that the military had actually

perceived them as a hindrance rather than a he;p as their insistence upon safety had on occasion slowed

down the handling of munitions, and also that as civilians they were not perceived as being fully deployable

to the forward area or fully knowledgeable in military matters. QASAS ultimately had no authority excepting

their powers of persuasion over military actions.31 2

In order to prevent the development of what some QASAS perceived as an adversarial relationship with

the military units they supported, deliberation is being given to arranging for mobilization slots for

ammunition specialists in tactical units. Advisors might also be placed on such levels as that of the division,

the corps, and the battalion. Beyond saving time by having QASAS ready to deploy with their unit at the

moment of mobilization and aiding in the development of a working relationship, such a proposal could

easily save the federal government, and ultimately the taxpayer, a considerable sum. This could be the

result if QASAS were available for mobilization TDA and could be assigned for a one year, unaccompanied

tour of duty. While expenses on assignment wou!d most probably remain much the same, funds currently

expended on processing individuals through Aberdeen Proving Ground would be saved. Continuity could

also be better maintained by the implementaticn of such a program.' 33

QASAS also suggested the implementation of a number of other programs to improve the deployment

process. A significant number of their suggestions dealt with crucial communication links. As ioted in a

previous passage, the number of individuals recommending that better lines of communication be forged

prior to future deployments was considerable. That the strained communications system had held up as

well as it had was ceemed little less than a miracle; it was noted as a "potential weak point" that might have

proven disastrous had the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia not had a relatively substantial commercial telephone

system in piace. Despite the Kingdom's s~gnificant internal telephone structure, an . ertion Desert

Shield/Storm _After iR_9,por. observation warned against relying upon any host nation's telephone

system. Doing so created a false sense of secýurity and relative ease of operation, although initial struggles

with MCI trunk lines forced an expansion to other carriers. An aftertaste of the potential for confusion with

the delicate telephone structure occurred when the commercial circuits when out on 15 May 1991.

Likewise, had the staging areas been elsewhere, e.g., Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Iran, the luxury of a

sophisticated commercial telephone structure would not have been available to resolve the deployment and

supply issues. If the communication system .had been successfully targeted by enemy military, terrorists,

or long range artilery/missiles, the disruption could have proven extremely serious.134

In observation of this frailty, AMCCOM's Readir-ess Directorate, at the close of the war, recommended

that combat support teams be equipped with satellite telephone communications to permit direct down-links

to CONUS and other support teams within the theater of operations, as weil as permitting datafax

capabilities. The recommended package was a suitcase style, portable unit that could be set up in 15-20

minutes and access CONUS/European dial tones. The Readiness Directorate noted that such unats would

be "essentia!" in theaters with limited or no telephone communications. Several devices were recommended for deployment with each support team.•'3

Yet without such devices, and perhaps evern had they been available, QASAS found reason for

complaint concerning the information available to them. Some noted that the lock of technical information

reporting channe!s, as we!l as mature ammunition logistics support, limiteJ asset visibility and an ability to

adequately disseminate suspension and/or restriction notices. This arose from the fact that the initial

inventory of ammunition occurred not at the ports when REPSHIPs (reports of shipment) could easily have

been utilized, but rather at the storage site. Thus no theater level visibility for suspensions and restrictions

was readily generated QASAS further noted that the inability to issue suspenses and restrictions could

162
be catastrophic. Given the possibility of tragedy, QASAS recommended that APCENT (United States Army

Central Command) be advised of the importance of a theater ammunition feedback and reporting system

and the urgency of establishing just such a system. 136

Indeed, the lack of accountability of Class V supplies became the object of an observation deemed

"significant" in AMCCOM's Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Regort. That document stated that

Class V supplies could not be properly accounted fcr without ammunition personnel present early on in

theater. Also, accountability could not occur without a uniform accounting system such as TACOS (Tactical

Army Combat Service Support Compuier System) or SAAS (Standard Army Ammunition System) in place

and operational. Accordingly, AMCCOM's SWA detachment urged that before future deployments were

undertaken these matters be considered and planned for. Indeed, the topic was presented and discussed

at September 1991's OMMCS (Ordnance Missile and Munitions Center and School) Conference as the

"intransit visibility of ammunition is a systematic problem within the army and would have occurred within

any theater." The problem was thus not limited to AMCCOM.137

Additonal accountability and visibiiity issues were caused by the failure of AR 700-22's (WARS-World

Wide Ammunition Reporting System) reporting requirements to inciude ammunition already in the

possession of troops. The only ammunition accounted for via the system included basic load assets stored

in ASPs which had been created after the arrival of logistical personnel. Thus any ammunition carried in

by troops, or which arrived prior to logistics specialists concerned with recording its presence was not

accounted for in the system. In order to better grasp the ammunition in theater, AMCCOM staffers

recommended that the WARS structure be modified to require that those basic load items already in the

possession of troops be accounted for. They also recornmended that an ammunition support group should

arrive in theater to plan support operations prior to units establishing storage sites.'2 ,

Beyond the generalities of accountability and visibility came the issues raised by specific types of

ammunition. QASAS noted that some difficulties arose during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

because of selected ammunition types. For example, the 30mm M789 HEDP (high explosive, dual

purpose) cartridge, which utilizes a factory-installed M759 PIBD (point initiating, base detonating) fuze.

The fuze is sealed in place with an anaerobic thread adhesive, and a sample inspection of the cartridges

is performed after the sealant has had time to cure. The inspection requires the application of 2C inchounces of reverse torque without evidence of movement netween the fuze and the projectile.139

Even with the cautionary inspections, in the field the M759 fuze kept coming lose; M789 HEDP

cartridges jammed in the Apache feed system were found to have loose fuzes. The cartridg-3 had been in

the aircraft for in excess of 100 hours of flight time. The ambient conditions in the ammunition bay were

hot, but undetermined. Field observation indicated that there was no evidence of sealant on the threads

of the'oose fuzes- After an antense engineering review, an ammunition information notice (AIN.) was issued

directing that all cartridges presently loaded in aircraft be down-loaded and inspected. Feedback was

requested on the results of the effort.14 0

After action efforts included inspections of sample inventories of the M789/M759. In 250 rounds

represeoting five ammunition lots, there were no cartridges that did not contain thread sealant. Additional

testing is ongoing tc characterize the torque and de-torque characteristics of the M789/M759 projectile/fuze

thread with and without sealant and at various assembly torque levels. This work continues to the present.

And from the e> pe-ience, a number of key observations have been gathered. First, the present production

de-torque sampling inspection is not sufficient to verify the presence of thread sealpnt on the fuzelprojectiie

thread. Second, the dp-torque level required to remove the fuze from the pro~ectile in the presence of

approved thread 2ealant was sionifican'ly higher than the de-torque value:s specified in the TDP (technical

163
data package), but quite variable. Third, attempts to gcin furthei feedback from the fie!d were relatively

fruitless; no further information was received on the occurrence of loose fuzes or the guidance provided

to the field. And from the observations, a few rcornmrendations concerning the fuze and projectile came

into being. The primary recommendations involved a 100 percent visual or gauge inspection for the

presence of thread sealant, the addition of a specific level of assembly torque, and a commensurate detorque requiiement in the production TDP. 14

'

Not all fuze-oriented experiences turned out negatively. Inte-/iews wiih user units in Saudi Arabia

revealed that during action, the combination of 4.2-inch M329A2, HIE cartridge with the M732 proximity fuze

performed well. The cartridge and fuze combination had been qualified for use only in the Southwest Asian

theater. A short, precise test program had indicated this combination should have satisfactory functioning

with expected higher lethal effects than with the authorized point detonation fuze. lrrespective of tho fact

that ammunition-oriented personnel declared that the cartridge/fuze combination had been a "definite plus"

in the battle against Saddam Hussein, and considered the pursuit of formal qualification of the combination

for worldwide use, it could not come to pass. According to other personnel, a 1989 act of Congress

prohibited such effor.s.14 2

Better luck was hoped for in the effort to achieve the adoption of a special artiilery marking round

developed especially for use in Operation Desert Storm. In respc nse to an urgent request from the Marine

Corps, innovative CRDEC (United States Army Chemical Research, Development and Engineering

Center) scientists developed a special marking round for employment in SWA in February 1 991. The USMC

needed a projectile to mark the terrain, a point, or a number of points in a line, so that a Forward Air

Coordinator (FAC) could orchestrate close air support to minimize fratricide by creating a safe zone The

USMC wanted a system for both daylight and nighttime and needed it in SWA quite rapidly. This allowed

CRDEC scientists a mere nine days to conceive a concept, fabricate it. and then test prctotypes, as well

as produce and package the system.143

The time constraint forced the scientists to consider only a payload that was commercially avaflable and

a carrier that already existed in the army's inventory. They selected the M687 binary 155mm projectile due

to its point detonating disseminating characteristics, availability, and liquid payload capability. An existing

contract to produce the necessary quantities of M20 and M21 binary canisters, which carry the payload in

the binary projectile, was modified ", contain the marking materials. A single long canister was selected

for the daytime marking payload whvich was "Day-Glo" fluorescent blaze orange paint, because no flight

mixing was necessary. A dual cora-po,ient chemiluminescence system, requiring the use of the two binary

canisters, was selected for the nig;httime projectile. The two chemical components mixed upon firing and

when disseminated, the mixture was fixable in the 400nm-700nm (nanometer) spectrum without heat,

flame, or sparks and could be seen with night vision goggles. These chemical solutions were non-toxic,

thus complying with health hazard assessment and environmental considerations. Testing and evaluation

of the special marking projectile was performed in parallel witii prototype developments."'

On 19 February 1991, the first operational use of the projectiles was conducted in SWA. The FAC,

wearing night vision goggles, sighted the dissemination pattern approximately 500 meters distant and

asked, "What the hell are you shooting? It's as bright as day over here!" What the FAC had observed was

the impact pattern of three nighttime projectiles, which were iaunched simuitaneously from three M198

155mm towed howitzers. Earlier that day, three daytime projectiles had been fired from the same howitzers.

This observation by ihe FAC indicated that the projectiles had arrived on time and worked rather well, and

that fie!d units should continue to submit tactical requests for new and innovative techniques to the R&D

centers. The pote., Ja requirements for future use study is currently underway based upon the observations

that the sceciably designed marking round appears to have great value in a combat arena to create a night

164
and day visual recognition symbol for attack aircraft. While the 4.2-inch M329A2, HE, cartridge coupled

with the M732 proximity fuze will not be included in the army inventory, the marking round might well be.14

1

Other ammunition-specific observations garnered from ODS include the DA's authorization of an

increase in the 82nd Airborne Division authorization for 81mm mortars. The new authorization for the 3/

73rd Armor. the division's armor battalion, was for M29A1 mortars. Logistics personnel felt that the DA had

erred in authorizing the division to have the older M29A1 s which are being replaced by the M252. The M252

had been handed off to the division in September 1988, along with an initial support package and new

equipmant training. The M29A1 mortars used the old 300 series ammunition, while the newer M252s use

800 series ammunition. A major safety concern was that the unit might use the 800 series ammunition. The

800 series ammunition, due to a a higher bore pressure, may be fired from M29A1 a at charge one and two

without restriction. Charge three may be fired in a combat emergency, while charge four is prohibited.

Indeed, the unit requisitioned the old mortars, which were then released and shipped. Fortunately the

MTMC, at AMCCOM request, located the mortars at Dover AFB before they were loaded on a plane bound

for SWA. The correct mortars were then requisitioned and the shipment expedited. It appears that in order

to prevent potential tragedy, the DA needs to establish a process to assure that the authorization of weapon

systems do not pose safely or operational hazards.1 46

Safety was also the concern at heart with attaining 40mm round removal tools for the MK 19 MOD3

Grenade Machine Gun (GMG). Prior to the initation of a program to provide these tools, only Explosive

Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel had proceoures to remove lodged rounds from these weapons. Their

procedures were not always completely successful and in many cases had resulted in damaged barrels

and/or weapons. There were no approved procedures for using units to remove lodged rounds from this

particular weapon systemr. 1 7

A RRT (round removal too!) program was offered by ARDEC to provide immediate assistance to the

forces of ODS and was found acceptable. It was proposed that 100 RRTs would be available for shipment

by 15 February 1991 and that a contract statement of work would be established for the procurement of

an additional 3600 tools to support fielding of tn6 MK19 GMG. This required an accelerated effort by all

the ARDEC support organizations.14 8

Coordination with USAIS (United States Army Information System) and HO, TRADOC (United States

Army Training and Doctrine Command) was essential in order to determine the projected authorized use

of RRT by the army. A position was established that the RRT could be used at the gunner/operator level

and that one ART tool would be required for each MK1 9 weapon. This would ailow its use in both a training

environment and in a combat scenario.' 4

9

The initial design of the R RT developed by ARDEC consisted of a two-piece assembly. Prototypes were

fabricated in house to this design and tested. This testing successfully demonstrated the capability of

removing lodged rounds from the barrel of the MK1 9. A test p!an was developed by TECOM (United States

Army Test and Evaluation Command) to safety certify the use of the RRT. Ultimately, testing of the RRT

was conducted and safety confirmation was received from TECOM using the RRT to remove lodged M430

F-EDP, M385A1 TP, and M918 TP cartridges. (Additional testing may ajiow the safety certification of the

ART for the removal of M383 HE cartridges.) A contract was awarded for the procurement of 100 RRTs,

and delivery was received at ARDEC on 14 February 1991, but due to the cessation of activity in SWA, they

were not shipped. A contract has al:so been awarded for an additional 3,600 RRTs, with an option on the

creation of an additional 2,500.150

165

'l,.•' ":" •''•'• "• • ! '" • -'J " • • • • * , ., . ... ... :` *• • * ` r • •* `, `1` • "• • • .........
-,.'

The initial two-piece design has been improved by ARDEC to incorporate a one piece assembly design.

This enhancement fJlitates the storage and handling of the tool while meeting all performance criteria.

The USAIS has conducted validation testing of the new design at Fort Benning and the round removal

procedures have been approved for incorporation into the operator's manual. These procedures will be

packaged with each tool to support the fielded MK19 weapons. In order to project RRT procurement needs,

the other services have been requested to identify their future RRT requirements. The unit price of the RRT

is approximately $87.00, well under the projected $100.00 item cost estimate.",

Safety factors were at the heart of many of AMCCOM's ammuiiition concerns. Yet reliability also played

a role in the command's efforts. Eady on in the conflict-November 1 990--it was discovered during testing

and demonstration that the MICLIC (mine clearing line charge) M58 would not fire. During the testing, it

came to light that when the MICLIC rocket pulled the line charge out of its carrier, the arming cablt, would

pull loose. By pulling loose, the charge did not explode; thus the already fielded M58 could not be

considered 100 percent reliable, The Marine Corps had discovered the same problem with their units, and

had accordingly devised a method of repair. The repair involved threading the arming wire through the rope

braids which helped to lock it in place during the line charge's extension. AMC and AMCCOM then turned

to the matter of identifying money and perscnnel tc repair the charges in the field and those still remaining

in depots.'5 2

Within hours of the reported difficulty with the MICLIC, HQ, AMCCOM personnel had devised a repair

schedule. MG Paul L. Greenberg, AMCCOM's Commanding General, declared that the repair of assets

in SWA would be accomplished by 15 January 1991. This would be achieved by a Director of Supply and

Maintenance 'DSM)-suppiied team with considerable input from other offices. The Product Assu-rance and

Test Directorate's Surveillance Operations Division ascertained lot numbers and quantities ;,hipped to

SWA, as well as obtained lot suffix ýs. Ultimately it was discerned that a total of 527 items in, or on their

way to, SWA needed repair proceoures. Albeit not without difficulty, the repairs were acccmplished.1'53

The MICL!C also required a team from AMCCOM to travel to Louisiana AAP in order to examine ones

which appeared to be incorrectly assembled. Through the briefing process, AMCCOM personnel

discovered that some MICLICs with rocket motor catle receptacle keyways in the six c'clock position would

not fire. Yet not all MICLICs with thusly positioned keyways misfired. Misfirings occurred only when the line

charge cable was not connected. AMCCOM staffers concluded that an inverted keyway did not in and of

itself cause misfiring, but when coupled with an apparently malfunctioning line charge receptacle connector

it was a contributirng factor to misfirings. As the problem cculd not be thoroughly discerned, 101 MICLICs

with inverted keyways were temporarily reclassified as unserviceable.'s

QASAS could, and did, classify other ammunition stores as unserviueable as well. At numerous points

throughout ODS QASAS put forth ammunition information notices (AINs). Such notices, issued throughout

the war, warned soldiers. as well as their commanders, about the use of a number of ammunition varieties.

For example, 27 August 1990 correspondence from the Product Assurance and Test Directorate's

Surveillance Operations Division concerned M21 mines. Specified lots which had been subjected to

outside storage cou!d suffer from fuze rust and units were alerted to this fact.' 5

Additionally, the Product Assurance and Test Directorate's Process Quality Engineering Division demonstrated their concern wth reported difficulties involving the M825, 155mm, WP (white phosphorous)

projectile. Based upon an Australian Ordnance Counsel Report which indicted internal components of

projectiles cot,;ld rise as much as 90 degrees above ambient temperature due to solar radiation, an

examination of the projectile's test data took place. It indicated that during solar radiation tests the

temperature of internal components could rise to approximately 140 degrees Fahrenheit, well below the

Australian projections. The projectile could be regarded as safe." 5

166
MTT

Projectiles, as well as other forms of ammunition, can be tested, among other ways, by subjecting them

to increasing temperatures in order to expand the canisters' contents anJ pinpoint leaks. The leak test is

performed on all canisters and its purpose is to check the adequacy of the closure plug weld. When the

selected lots of the M825, 155mm WP projectile were subjected to 160 degrees Fahrenheit, insufficient

internal pressure was created to 5ind any leaks. At 200 degrees, too much pressure was generated. It

swelled the canisters to the point where they could not be assembled into the projectile. Tests at 190

degrees and finaliy 180 degrees, the current specification requirement, were conducted. At 180 degrees

the generated temperature allowed for an adequate check for leaks, yet did not swell the canister to the

point where further assembly was impaired. The result of the extensive testing could be reported in capital

letters and offers testimony to the great safety precautions taken by ammunition personnel to provide a

quality productto the men and women in ODS: "TH E DIFFERENT TEMPERATURES WHICH CANISTERS

HAVE BEEN TESTED TO DOES NOT IND!CATE THAT SOME LOTS ARE BETTER THAN OTHERS.

NOR SHOULD THERE BE ANY STOCKP!LE RESTRICTIONS BASED ON THE FACT THAT SOME

CANISTERS WERE NOT TESTED TO AS HiGH OF TEMPERATURES." 157

Further testimony can be offered to this concern. Nearly 4,000 155mm projectiles had been restricted

from firing in temperatures exceeding 110 degrees Fahrenheit as they carried some possibility of a flight

stability problem when filled with !iquid white phosphorous. However, this issue was considered a low risk

problem since the lots had beer tested during LAT (lot acceptance tests) at 145 degrees with no stability

problems noted. Despite believing that the projectiles could be safely used, quality assurance personnel

sought to replace the rounds.153

Yet loose fuzes, proximity fuzes, the iielding authorization for the M252 mortar, MICLICs, and RRTs

did not constitute the entirity of ammunition issues during ODS. Also of concern were 25mm cartridges.

On 2 November 1990 direction was provided by the Deputy Chief of Staff for ammunition to accelerate low

rate initial production (LRIP) of the M919 round in support of ODS. As a consequence, an undefinitized

contract action was awarded to AeroJet Ordnance Company, Downey, CA, on 6 November 1990 to

accelerate LRIP deliverables by five months, commencing in February 1991 with the completion of all due

out cartridges by August 1991. Owing to the short duration of ODS, none of the M919 cartridges produced

under the accelerated schedule wei e fielded. And since full-scale development was incomplete at the time

of LRIP acceleration initiation, the cartridges were produced on a "best effort" basis pending contract

definitization, and first article has been delayed unti: the design has been finalized. These factors may have

a potentia! negative affect on material release of the "best effort" M919 ammunition. Additionally, the

accelerated production schedule urged upon the contractor caused other projects it was facilitating for the

military to slip behind schedule causing potential budgetary prcblems due to anticipated obligations past

30 September 191.119

Dutch-manufactured 25mm APDS (arrnor-piercinq, discarding sabot) ammunition caused difficulties

as well for AMCCOM whe,, its use was attempted in the M242 cannon. Since the Dutch-manufactured

ammunition is made with nonheat-tresied cartridge cases, it is usable in the Dutch 25mm cannon which

has a fluted breech that allows for heat expansion of the cartridge cases. The M242 cannon has a constant,

tightly dimensioned breech, which will not allow for cartridge case expansion of the nonheat-treated rounds.

Cartridge jams which could iot be removed by the extractor occurred when using the Dutch-manufactured

ammunition in the U.S. M242 cannon. Consequent;v, DOD was unable to use 1.2 million rounds of 25mm

APDS ammunition manufactured by its NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) ally, the Netherlands.

Accordingly, AMCCOA staffers recommended that during future development processes, NATO allies

should test new ammunition families to assure compatibility with associated weapons systems. 6 °

167

77-7777-ý
Beyond the incompatibility of Dutch-manufactured ammunition and U.S.-manufactured cannons,

ARDEC personnel further concerned themselves with the world ammunition production base. Staffers

there felt that the U.S. Army lacked adequate data on foreign ammunition production capabilities. This lack

of adequate information on ammunition production capabilities in allied and friendly nations became quite

evident during ODS. It is essential that the United States have accurate and complete information on allied

production in order to augment U.S. capabilities for U.S. requirements or to provide sources of ammunition

which it does not produce for allied requirements. Accordingly, ARDEC personnel recommended the

funding of the cstablishment, maintenance, and operation of an international ammunition production

information system. Yet HQ, AMCCOM chose to delete this recommendation from a draft of their Operation

Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report. and urged the focus on RSI (rationalization; standardization; and

interoperability) agreements, not foreign production of U.S. ammunition . 6

'

Allied nations and ammunition garnered further concern from AMCCOM personnel with regard to a

Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) request for numerous varieties of ammunition. The request included

several ammunition types and weapons which were not United States standard and, by the title given in

the request, were obviously of foreign manufacture. As the description in the request did not provide

enough information to fully identify the ,equirements to obtained the required price and availability (P&A),

numerous telephone calls and messages had to be made in order to accurately identify the ordered

materiel. The actions took a number of weeks to complete. Indeed some actions never were completed

and, regardless of the absence of sole source justification and end user certificates, ammunition and

weaponry was issued. Upon reflection, it appears that foreign military sales (FMS) customers and their U.S.

advisors must understand that when non-standard or foreign-made materiel, especially ammunition and

weapons, is requested, they need to provide complete nomenclature of the materiel, including make,

model, and manufacturers, the end item applications, unit pack, special information such as explosive net

weight and explosive hazard codes, prior sources of procurement, justification for sole source procurement,

and end user certification. In order that this information might be passed on, AMCCOM officials

recommended that the security assistance quarterly newsletter be used to provide and reiterate the need

forthe inclusion of such data whenever non-standard/foreign ammunition is requested. A course might also

be offered to discuss the situation, and keep foreign ammunition personnel aware of ordering procedures

and requirements.' 62

And although a considerable amount of time, effort, and resources had been consumed assuring that

allied ammunition was interchangable with that of the United States, it came to the attention of ARDEC

staffers during the Persian Gulf War that information concerning compatible ammunition had not always

been exchanged with the items themselves. Soldiers must know the ballistic solution to hit the target and

this information is not in allied artillery fire ccntrol computers. For example, the United Kingdom required

the capability to fire U.S. 155mm ADAM, RAAMS, and HERA ammunition, which they do not have in

inventory. Since both nations use the M1 09A21A3 howitizer and the U.S. M1 98 and U.K. FH70 howitzers

meet the same quadrilateral 155mm ballistics memorandum of understanding specifications, then the U.S.

ammunition could safely be fired from U.K. weapons. However. it took the U.K. three months to acquire

the U.S. ballistic data, and modify the fire control computers in their howitzers. Accordingly, ARDEC

personnel recommended that before further conflicts arose, ballistic solutions be shared.'63

Production matters concerning ammunition absorbed time beyond that concerning interoperability,

loose fuzes, RRTs, and 25mm cartridge production. Planning for maximum rate ammunition production

for ODS revealed to staffers that the U.S. production base for mortar fuzes significantly restricted production

capability for most mortar ammunition rounds. Through varying discussions it was observed that one

objective in the ammunition development-user community had been to reduce the proliferation of fuz.s

used on mortar ammunition to achieve a "three-4uze" family. By using the same fuzes on many ammunition

168
ruunds, and by striving for commonality of components among different types of fuzes, ex., on the M734

multioption fuze and the M745 point detonation fuze, a large bottleneck of demand for the same fuzes,

which are produced by a very limiied production base had been created. The production capacity for M734s

and M745s combined is constrained at approximately 35,000 to 40,000 per month. And this capacity must

be allocated among six 60mm, 81 mm, and 120mm high explosive (HE) and smoke mortar rounds.164

Likewise, four 60mm, 81 mm, and 120mrr, smoke and 'ilumination rounds all depend on the availability

of mechanical time fuzes produced in Germany at a maximum rate of approximately 50,000 per month.

There is no production base for MTFs (mechanical time fuzes) in the United States; a recent effort to identify

a domestic electronic time fuze for use on these rounds revealed That even the ele:tronic component

production base predicted to exist in the U.S. was rapidly disappearing in favor of overseas producers.

Apparently, ammunition procurement quantities in recent years have discouraged fuze producers from

entering, investing, or remaining in the production base ',

From the experience of charting the potential for fuze shortages, mortar specialists recommended that

the United States break out critical electronic components oi mortar fuzes, and invest in the establishment

of a production base for them. It also urged the development of a new e!ectronic time fuze for mortars and

the creation of a production base for it.'•

Contemplating their capacity to provide an uninterupted supply of ammunition to the men and women

in the desert of SWA absorbed a significant portion of AMCCOM's time. Indeed, prior to the initiation of

the ground war, 24 February 1991, a complex and complete sustainabi~ity analysis had been conducted

laying forth the problems racing AMCCOM in terms of sufficiently supplying the forces deployed to the

deserts of SWA with conveitional ammunition. The analysis began with the United States Army Central

Command (ARCENT) requirement list of 152 items. To this listing wos added 29 items representing other

service branch requirements; 60 items with obviously sufficient assets were subtracted from the listing. The

remaining items were loaded into a data base and manipulated to generate sustainability charts for 121

items. According to the stuly, 106 items currently existed in such quantities as to be available in the desired

quantities for at least a v,,. :r after tre commencement o' actual hostilities and then to be sustained by

continuing production. Of the 106 items currently available at the full rate, 60 existed in sufficient quantity

to last tne duration of any expected war, without additicna! production.' 7

HO, AMCCOM believed that seven additional items wou!d reach fu!l-rate sustaina"bility within one to

three months, and an additiona! 12 items could r.ach this level of sustainobi;ity within four to six months.

In many instances, a single component part of a munitions devica kept it from being fullrate sustainable.

The same couid be said of the four items that could not be fully sustained until a period of seven to nine

months had elapsed. Nine items required ten to twelve months to be tully available at the rates deemed

necessary, and an additional 43 could not be considered available at full sustainment rates for in excess

of a year. In many instances, items failing into the muiti-month fuV sustainability categories represented

ammunition which had been dropped from production due to budgetary cuts, and could be considered of

reduced value to defending the interests of the United States as compared to immediately sustainable

munitions.'1

HO, AMCCOM created an ammunition base pric, .vy listing oi recommended strategic facility aciiois in

order to bring more items rito full-rate sustainability. Of the highest order, accoroirng to the repo.t, was the

need to increase domestic base capability for 25,,m tungsten penetrators by purchasing special tooling and

equipment. The action was already underlay at the time of tne report-1 February 1991. Additionally, it

was urged that Aerojet be reactivated for the production of 30rmm gajqe-8 ammunition, and that Line Eight

at Hoiston Army Amrnunition Plant, vingsport, TN, L 3 reactivated for the production of MICLIC compunents.

169

I7- _- MT1I
The production of TNT at Radford Army Ammunition Plant, Radford, VA, also was considered, as were an

additional eight prioritized recommendations for bringing AMCCOM's stock of conventional ammunition to

full sustainability rates.1 69

Some ammunition production plants accelerated their schedules to help meet full sustainability rates.

Yet this method of meeting the challenge was not without its drawbacks. If an AAP's production schedule

was compressed so that the production of a twelve month supply was met in a matter of six months, the

plant was entirely out of the wherewithal of production at the end of six months and then needed an

additional six months to a year to get the long lead time needed to start production again. According to

many, the production base must be examined in detail before the possibility of another armed conflict arises.

Regardless of this observation, the structure in place worked to such a degree that only a single production

line had to be opened for the sustainment of ODS, that for 25mm ammunition. That some 270,909 short

tons of ammunition were retrograded from SWA in the year following the Persian Gulf War provides

sufficient testimony to the stockpile and transportation management capabilities of AMCCOM, as does the

educated estimate that soldiers in the field had ammunition available to them at a rate of 180 to 250 percent

beyond actual need. This of course, as noted, had its drawbacks in terms of accountability. 7

;

And despite what problems can be dredged up-accountability, CONUS transportation, port crowding,

staff capabi!ities, third-world drivers, climatalogical woes, surge capacity, etc.-ncne negate the fact that

the combat units had more ammunition of the right kinds, in the right places, and of sufficient lethaiity to

perform their mission. AMCCOM thoroughly fulfilled its mission of providing the firepower.

[I •• 170
a0a

A~ t

77AIINw 

J' i' b ~ :

Vr`

-17
I

NOTES

'Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JCS Publication

1, 1 June 1987, 26.

20peration Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report. Executive Summary, I-1.

3United States Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, Army Ammunition PIan d

Activities. AMCCOMP 360-3, February 1990; Lessons Learned, 52348-94169 (00170) (U), AMSMC-TM,

Title: Single DOD Focal Point for Ammunition Ship Planning, 20 May 1991.

4United States Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, AMCCOM Fact., AMCCOMP 5-1, 1

October 1991.

0*Oeration Desert Shield/Storm After Action Reooprt Executive Summary, I-1, 4; ibid., Commander's

Assessment, V-2; ibid., Executive Summary 1-9.

61lbid., Summa-,y Analysis-"Ammunition".

7Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report. Executive Summary, 1-4.

"lbid. , 1-8.

91bid.

10

Heike Hasenauer, "Bullets and Bombs," Soldiers. February 1991, 18-20.

"lbid., "Crane accelerates ammunition shipments," Target, 14 September 1990, 28-3B.

1

2

"Crane accelerates ammunition shipments," Targt., 14 September 1990, 2B-3B; Heike Hasenauer,

"Bullets and Bombs," S , February 1991, 18-20.

1

3

"Crane accelerates ammunition shipments," Target. 14 September 1990, 2B-3B; Lessons Learned,

52359-69829 (00177) (U), AMSMC-PT, Title: Hiring Authoriyfr Oerati'n Desert Storm, 23 May 1991.

'

4

Draft of Lessons Learned, 60734-74498 (00229) (U), Crane AAA, Title: MILVAN/Commercial ContainS11 June 1991; Lessons Learned, 71533-39684 (00280) (U), AMSMC-TMD, Title: MILVAN Handiing. 21 june 1991.

"

5Draft of Lessons Learned, 60568-21076 (00223) (U), Lake City AAP, Title: MILVAN Handlia Facilily. 23

May 1991.

Ilsbid.

17Ibid.

"'8Draft of Lessons Learned, 52342-89983 (00167) (U), Longhorn AAP SMCLO-XC, Title: Ammo Plant

MILVAN Loading Caoability. 20 May 1991.

172
IgLessons Learned, 80933-82202 (00297) (U), AMSMC-TM, Title: otine.rized Amrnunifign Shipmeýnts,

21 June 1991.

20Ibid.

21 L-essons Learned, 12750-29983 (00060) (U), USADACS, Title: containerized Ammo Shipmfents. 26

November 1990.

2

1Dratt of Lessons Learned, 51760-07135 (00143) (U), Hawthorne AAP, Title: Int~tinCagacity. 17 May 1991.

23Ibid.

24

1bid.

2

'Draft of Lessons Learned, 51762-57546 (001,45) (U), Hawthorne AAP, Title: Expandina Installation

Outloadina Capabilities. 17 May 1991.

26Ibid.; draft of Lessons Learned, 61830-81896 (00252) (U), ORDEC, PM-AMMOLOGMCPM, Tifle:

Compliance wilth 49 QFR and Transporlation Exemo~tion (COT-E) 3498. 21 June 1991.

2

1Draft of Lessons Learned, 51 763-72082 (00146) (U), Hawthorne A.AP, Title: L ack of RqiliLn SQLilh

Magazine Area. 17 May 1991.

28Ibid.

29Draft of Lessons Learned, 51764-3 1577 (00147) (U), Hawthorne AAP, Title: Lack of Comm!.-L~il

Trfsl otto nA~sts 17 May 1991.

N 0Ibid.; draft of Lessons Learned, 11150-31186 (00020) (U), Hawthorne AAP, Title: CommercialCrre

AvilaililytoSLLpq-firt Hkihgrit Shipments, 14 November 1990.

"

3 Lessons Learned, 80824-472 76 (00291) (UJ), AMSMVC-TM, Title: Adequacy of Qommercial Q- "g-,

Support for Class A and B Ammro an xgjgajy!2ý* 21 June 1991.

1

2Ibd

SIbid.

~~ ~ "Draft of Lessons Learned, 11150-31186 (00021) (U), Louisiana AAP, Title: Ul~ization of EmotV Space on

Carrier Equipment. 11 November 1990.

1

6Draft of L essons Learned, 111511-29612 (00022) (U), Iowa AAP, Title: Outbound- Transportation. 11

November 1990.

31

'Draftof Less-ops Learned, 618230-81896 (00252) (U), ORDEC, PNIAMMOLCGMCIPM, Title: LQm-LrnS!L.V wi~ I~~T~io 4 Th E~cptin DO-E)3~8.21 June 1991.

173
WA1

38

Draft of Lessons Learned, 10239-94659 (00072) (U), McA~ester AAP, Title: tJN/Fefrmne QnLQIn

Packaging Markings. 2 Jan-,uary 1990.

39

1bid., 61724-80033 100251) (U), Picatinny, PM-ANIMOLOG, Title: Am.munition Szicnien from Posts.

5apand~ta~ti~ 211 June 1,991; and ibid., 61724-76282(020) (U), Picatinnny, PM-AMMIOLOG, Title:

Shipment of ArnmmitcBscLod 21 June 1991.

4

0 Lessons Learned, 11142-91768 (00011) (U), AIMCCOM, Title: Ammunition Basic Load IABQ, 11

November 1990.

"4Lessons Learned, 11144-78811 (00013) (U), AMOCOM, Title: Ammunition 8ai LQlaJ 1

November 1990.

4

2 lbid.

4

3 Lessons Learned, 11152-16125 (00023) (U), AMOCOM, Title: .5hipment of Ammunikin Basicga Lo(ABL,

Requirements. 11 November 1990.

"4Ibid.

4

5 Lessons Learned, 11145-13084 (00014) (U), AMOCOM, Title: Ammunition Bsic Load (AýJj, 11

November 1990.

4

6Lessons Learned, 71647-59574 (00281) (U), AMSMC-QA, Title: Shipment of Unit Vehicles ia~

A in~ai L 2 1 June 1991 ; Draft of Lessons Learned 61724-76282 (00250) (U), Picatiiiny, PM

AMMOLOG, Title: Shipment Qf Ammunition Bas~c Load 21 June 1991.

4

1Lessons Learned, 51 731 -09203 (00144) (U), Hawthorne AAP, Title: Condition of Stockpile. 17 May 1991.

"49eatin DeserlShield/51orm After Actionr Report. Executive Summary, 1- 14.

50Ibid., Summary Analysis-"Ammunition"; Wiitary Review. "Traclking the Storm," September 1991, 66-67; IMessage (U.), AMSMC-QAS-C, Subject: 1,55m-m SMIK. WP.-M325 11320-D52 1 20160OZ September

5ILessons Learned, 52348-94169 (001 70) (U), AMSMC-TM, Titleý Single 00D Fgca! Point for Amunivlf

Ship Planning. 20 May 1991.

52

1bid.

53

Ibid.

56Lessons Learned, 80943-95412 (00302) (U), AMSMC-TM, Title: Pieli Vis2Iibi i1 21 June 1991.

1'174
57

Viewgraph (UI AMSMC-TM, Title: CONUS Ammunniticn Ships Planned and Executed by AMCQC2M. n~d.

-1Viewgraph (U), AMSMC-TM, Ammunition Pipeline. n.d.

59

"Tracking the Storm," M~fltgry Review, September 1991, 77; Viewgraph (U), AMSMC-TM, Ammo Ship

Status, as of 7 Mvi.irch 1991, n.d.

6OViewgraph (U), AMSMO--TM, Ammo Ship Disoosition QaIo7 Mr h 1990 SrvicP. Recngmmenfdations.

n.d.; Viewgraph (U), AMO-MOCOM, Ammnunition Retrograde Team, CVass V Retrograde. SWA, Misson

Accomplished 231 549Z March 1991.

6IChart (U), AMVSMIC-TMVI Amm unition Ship Plan A5. aof 12 Febrruar', 19191. 12 February 1991 (?);

HO, AMOCOM, Ammunition Base us* inblity AU2y4sj.j, 1 February 19911.

1

2Lessons Learned, 80945-34687 (003103) (U), AMSMC-TM, Title: M-ovement Conirol Center, 21 June

* 'Lessons Learned, 80930-64079 (.00294) (U), AMSMC-TM, Title: Port Reception Capabily.. 21 June

1991.

* 5information Paper (U), MOTSU, Tite: MILSTAMP Documpnination-Desert Shield/Storm. I May 1991.

"I6 bid.; see also Lessons Learned, 80932-35842 (00295) (U), AMISMC-TM, Title: n~Tjarto ilmSQrtrol

and Movement Documentation (TCMD. 21 june 1991.

6

1 Information Paper (U), MOTSU. Title: MILSTAMP D~cum~ntati n-Q h...5L ~trm.1My 91

I'Lessons Learned, 809319-49939 (00300) (U), AMOSMC-TM, Title: Ammunition Port Thruput Capability- 21

June 1991.

'

0!bid.; interview, H.P. LePore, AMSMVC-HO wAith COL Scott W. Hull, AMSMC-DS, 27 March 1991.

"

7

Lessons Learned, 80939-49939 (00300) (U), AMSMC-TMk, Title: Ammunition PoqtThrupu~t Cpfibiity 21

June 1991.

"7Lessons Learneid, 80831 -38113 (00292) (U), AMSMC-TM', Title: Uso Qf Commercial Ports for Ammuninon Shipmets 21 june 1991.

'Message (U). CORAAMCCOM to AIG 56630 and 8759, Sub~ject: Animo Sho~t,-~-&n- zom

211445Z February 1991.

7

Memorandumn (U), SMCAC-AV (,Sucordinate to the Map'or Command Ammunition Ceriter-Loqistics Review and Assistance Oiffice), Sub ect: -Ar'n-i~jnj~ A ifost5D1 rmeTnqatiouni.nd.

"'"Ibid.

175
MAE= ' Z-1

"-5

Ibid.; see also Lessons Learned, 80933-77879 (00296) (U), AMSMC-TM, Title: Impact of Docume.ntation

Errors on $hips Manifests. 21 June 1991.

1

7 Mernorandumn (U), SMCAC-AV (Subordinate to the Major Command Ammunition Center- Logistics

Review and Assistance Office), Subject: Ammunition Mainifest Documentation. n.d.

78

Lessons Learned, 80950-70023 (00304) (U), AMSMC-TM, Title: Ammunition Vessel Ma ifest DocumenLtjti~o,21 June 1991.

79Lessons Learned, 80913-84750 (00298) (U), AMSMC-TM, Title: Impact of Ammu.nfiton Vessel Chanaes

onItrans~it~lahiry, 21 June 1991.

110Ibid.

8Ibid.

"I2nformatiun Paper (U), SMCAC-AO (Subordinate to the Major Command Ammunition Center-Ammunition Civilian Career Management Office), Subject: Qualitv Assuranc peciais~t(mfn. fl~n

Suvilne A Operation Desert Storm (ODS). 4 April 1991.

83Memorandurn for Record (U), Owen G. Wasmoen, QASAS, Subject: TrpReot n.d.

84 Ibid.

85Ibid.

16Ibid.; and Lesson~s Learned, 11145-94198 (00016 (U), AMSMCMG, Title- 120mm Tank Ammunition. 11

November 1990. See also Messaige (U), Hygie Reynolds, Chief, Operations Center, AMCCOM, to CDR,

AMOCOM, et al, Subject: QW!-,raticn Desert ShJg d- Insoecto n- Reg uireme it$, fir Shipments of Uploaded

Ml Al Tanks, 0521 20Z September 1990.

"I7nterview, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO, with 0. Wasmoen, et al, AMSMC-QAS, 24 September 1991.

88

Memorandumn for Record (U). Owen G. Wasmoen, QASAS, Subject: Trio Reloo~. n.d.

89Ibid,

101bid.

ý

2ibid,

9

,

3Wasmoen, etal, Interview, 24 September 1991.

1

4 Ibid,

I'Message iU), ODRFCRSCOM to AIG 74?1, Subject: Moeeno

C~L2QerMýr I a~oFr a rArr 141 745Z December 1990.

176
96Ibid.

9

1FONECON H.P. LePore, AMSIMC-HC with T. Burke, AMSMC-MM, 21 February 1992.

911-ull Interview, 27 March 1,99 1.

99

Viewgraph (U), AMC-AMCCOM, Ammunitior Retrograde Team, Class V Retrograde, SWA, Class

Locations, 231549Z March 1992.

100tnformation paper (U), SMCAC-AO (Subordin~ate ýo the Major Command Ammuniition Center-Ammunilion Civilian Career Management Off ice), Subject: ssrneSeijs (Ammunition Surveillance)

(QASAS) Support to Operation Deser Ston. 4 April 1991; Wasmoen, etal, Interview, 24 September 1991.

Information concerning the process of civilian depioyment, including such issues as pay, emergency

essential statements, preparation for overseas rotation, necessary clothing, waiting famnily suppoft

mechanisms, the appropriateness of arming civilians, life support, etc., has already been discussed in

Chapter (LARs), and interested partiles should reference it for desired mrateriatL

' 1 Wasmoen, eta!t, Interview, 24 September 1991.

102 Ibid.

"

0 I'bid.; see also Interview, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HnO,, with S. Lovely, eta!, SMCAC-AV, 4 April 1991. A

further problem with the use of third-wodd nationa's and their vehic~es arose with the multitude of languages spoken by the driviers. Communicatiog needs and wants among drivers who might speak only NepalesE,' Korean, Pakistani, Afghani, or Arabic became just another of the daily challenges of moving ammunition

* in SWA. See Interview, H.P. LePore, AMVSMC-HO, with T. Lighthiser, SMCAC-AV, 7 November 1991.

10

4Inten!iew, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO, with COL D.T. Morgan, Jr., AMSMC-CS, 14 March 1991; inter-view,

H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO, with P.L. Stewart, AMSIMC-DL, 23 Aprii 1991.

"1Lighthiser Interview, 7 November 1E91.

10

'Wasmoen. etal, Interview, 24 Srcptember 1 991; Lovely, eta!, Interview, 4 April 1991; Lessons Learned,

12733-16j95 (0,0059) (U), USADACS, "itle: ReltznJ5 26 Novemnber'1990; Lessons Learned,

12730-84000 (00057) (U), UJSADACS, Title: EEIkrvPý esentj nd Packing Aciiyitý-~~ta eroaa

26 Nvembr 190; nd Lssos Lerned I 750-4201 1 (00061) (U), USADA0S, Title: DQw~nlojg Wip=*~~ 26 November 1990. Repalleiztlo Ueam a se s issue at the conclusion of hostilities

when literally tons of forme~iy uploaded ammrunit;an needed to be. paiietized for transport to CONUS.

'

0

1!Ibid.

"Y'Lessons Learned, 52256-57232 (00158) (U), AMSMC1%-OAN, Title: Tru ClmaicQ.gdJitons. 20 May

Ibid.

177
771 77 ! =2 _7 4 7 "=7

'

1

4Ibid.

16' 13Memorandlum fo SMACAtcajorn itiuin(U), GreneaPaul, L.Grebjeg, CommatcCnditins GenraMdl, .. Am

S~aety fUS ore muito 29 August nSud 1990. rba 

K I7bid.

115 Ibid

"12 Ibid.

122lbid.

1

2

3 Ibid.

125Ibid.

12

6 Memorandmfoeecr HOD (U), oCMSNARCENT ea, Siubject: Sel~rtorae in Earntj-ioverari ud aissilesaud M 

Arabia. 25 September 1990.

12

1 Message (U), CORAMOCOM to AIG 9874 and AIG 7481, Subject: PArnMUnjjionnlnfgrmatioLnN gLAIN

28-9: Enironentl Prtectoi , imm-uni.Iign in Saudi Arabia, 0311 500Z J~anuary 1991.

18Ibid.

129 Ibid.; Memorandum for Distribution (U), SMCAC-DE-V, Subject: QperationDesert Stor~.Evrnmna

Monitorina of Ammun;tign Temloeratures 15 March 1991; Lessons Learned, 12646-72006 (00055) (U),

USA DACS, Title: Prefjictive Tech no I oy.. 26 November 1990; and Lessons Learned, 62136-71609 (00255)

(U), ORDEC, PMAMMAOLOG, Title: Solar Covers and EnvironrnqtlýP~e&ý,1in. 21 June 1991.

'1OLessons Learned. 62137-04631 (00256) (U), ARDEC, PM-AMMOLOG, Title: Availability of TrChnical

Reference Material. 21 June 1991.

"'3Lessons Learned, 11162-52602 (00038) (U), AMSMC-QAL, Title: l t AMCr

178
Equipmenf Operation in Adverse Conditions. 11 November 1990; see also Lessons Learned, 11162 02466

(00037) (U-), HO, AMOCOM, Title: Technical Publications for Unique Climatic Conditions, 11 November

1990.

1

32Wasmoen, et al, interview, 24 September 1991; Lovely, et al, Interview, 4 April 1991; and Lighthiser

Interview, '7 November 1991.

131Lovely, et al, Interview, 4 April 1 S91.

1

14Operatinn Desert Shield/Storm After Action Reoort. Summary Analysis-"Communication"; and Lessons Learned, 52357-67995 (00174) (U), AMSMC-RD, Title: Commercial Telephone Cmmun.~ictio.n

Dependency. LAR. 23 May 1991.

1

35 Ibid.

'

3

rLessons Learned, 12731-14731 (00058) (U), PM AMMOLOG, Title: Theater Feedback and Reporting.

'ý6 November 1990.

1

37 Lescons Leaned, 61227- 74231 (0023 7) (U), AMCCOM-SWA, Title: Accountability of Class V. 11 June

1991; and Lessons Lea-ned, 127311-147431 (00058) (U), PM AMMOLOG, Title: The~ater Feedback and

Reporting,26 November 1990.

138Lessons Learned, 11167-86808 (00051) (U), HO, AMOCOM, Title: Ase Rpring through WARSV. 11

November 1990; Leissons Learned, 61 148-F30823 (00234) (U), AMCCOM-SWA, Title: 3QQ;ien,-e of

Activation and Arf ival of Units into Vtg7Ljihajtfr. 11 June 1991; and Lessons Learned, 321 43-87959 (00093)

(U), AIMSMC-MML, Title: Identification of ".oo sticai Supprrt and Supported Customers within Th!eate. 19

March 1991.

1

39Drafttof Lessons Learned, 70327-77510 (00265) (U), ARDEG, Title: 30mm M789 HE DP Car tridge: L,2os

E.uzps,21 June 1991.

1

40Ibid.

'Ibid.

"'~Draft of Lessons Learned, ý0633-64823 (00228) (U), SMCARFSS-DM, Title: M,329A2. HE Cartridge!

M732 Proximity Fuze 6 June 1991.

1

43 Lessons Learned, 52356-587115 (00173) (U), AMSMC-RT, Title: Ojf53 Artillery Marking Round for

F-riendly Troop Positions. 23 May 1 99i.

1

451Ibid.- see aloo Diaft of Lessons Learned, 60537-15237 (00221) 'U), CRDEC SMCCR-OPA, Title: Use

of theM.687 Binary Round foi R)Iavp QayiNiaht MarkinD3nd Hlurnina-,jpin. 23 May 1991.

"',Lessons Learned, 52968-1)199'- (00206) (U), AMSMC-LSS, T'tle: Fieldinc uhrzto fteM5

Mortar for the 82nd Airboe 23 Mayoiato 1991e 25

W 179
147 Lessons Learned, -62743-82334 (00259) (U), ARCEIC, Title: 40mnm Round Removal Tool for IK 19

MOD3 MG.21 June 1991.

148 Ibid.

149 Ibid.

1' 5 Mes-sage (U), CDRAMC, to CDRAMCCOM, et al, Subject: MLine Ceaing Line Charge. M58. 19201 5Z

* November 1990.

1

53Memorandum of Executive Session (U), Theodore E. Hansen, Chief, Ammunition Surveillance Division,

AMSMC-QAS, Subject: Modific-ation of Mire Clearing Line Chargr; (MICLIG). M58. (11 375-M91 3). 20

November 19090. According to a memorandum from Thomas Rucker, AMC SWA, to Commander,

AMOCOM, Subject: MjI..LICModification T 3mf FipQt gn Qbagje.ý.. nitigin Linear. HE. Comp C-4

*M58A4 NSN: 1375-QL-,-Z.59U3 1375-01-287-0719 (M91 2L. n.d., problems arose during repair procedures due to rain, the lack of 'training manuals, and insufficient repair materials.

1

54Meniorandumn of Executive Session (U), Theodore E. Hansen, Chief, Ammuni~ion Surveillance Division,

AMSMC-QAS, Subject: J~e ~ oiin AAP Regar~ira Charge. Demo. Line.ar, M58 (VICL.Q). 19

February 1091. The MICLICs were later reclassified as serviceable after further testing. Se-ealso Mess~.ge

(U), CDR AMCCOM to AIG 9874 and AIG 748i1, Subject: Arnrn.-.ition Information Nj AN4.j~i

DemoLner.M58. I-eries (MICL IC). 261500Z February 1991.

"W5 emorandumn (U), AMSMC-QAS to AMSMC-QAD-P, Subject: ;g-r~ticn DESERT SH-h.L-D 27Au~gust

1

16Memorandum of Execulive Session (U), C. Carlson, AMSMC-QALA, Subject: M825, 155mm. WP

Pgecftle 18 September 1990.

"'9Lessons Learned, 62744-11000 (00250) (U), ARDEC, Title: Cartridoe. 25i-m. APFS[.PS-T. M919, 21

1

rOLessons Learned, 52261-00005 (00161) (U), AMSMC-QAM, Title: 251mm Ammunition, 20 May 1991.

161 Draft of Lessons Learned, 52951-01 271 (002-00) (U), ARDEC SMOCAR-AST, Title: World Ammun~iion

Production Bass-, 23 May 1991.

'12Lessons Learned, 32 137-48351 (00083) (U). AM-SMC-!L, Title: FMS Non-StandardlFreign Amnmurfition

Weaocns and Reqaujrprments. 19 March 1991.

163L-essons Learned, 52952-41644 '00201) (U), ARDEC SMCAR-AST, Title: ArnmuniliojnJIrcha U:H

liy- 23 May 1991.

180
1

64Lessons Learned, 62137-53602 (00257) (U), AMCPM-MO, Title: Fuze Production for Mortar Ammunitjg.21 June 1991.

1Ibid.

1

661bid.

167

United States Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, Ammunition Base Sustainability

Analysis. 1 February 1991.

1Ibid.

169 Ibid.

1

70Morgan Interview, 14 March 1991; Interview, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO, with MG P.L. Greenberg,

AMSMC-CG, 31 July 1991; Hull Interview, 27 March 1991; Viewgraph (U), AMC-AMCCOM, Ammunition

Retrograde Team, Class V Retrograde Southwest Asia, Mission Accomplished. 231549Z March 1992;

Stewart Interview, 23 April 1991.

181

/

1/
/ .

/

182

&J
Chapter Six

Observations on AMCCOM

in Desert Shield/Desert Storm

Historian George Santayana's (1863-1952) oft-quoted, but ill applied dictum "those who cannot

remember the past are condemned to repeat it" might well serve as the unofficial motto of the Center for

Army Lessons Learned (CALL) of Fort Leavenworth, KS. CALL came to fruition in order that the lessons

garnered from prior military endeavors might not be forgotten hut rather, be effectively utilized. The

realization that much of the information generated from the Natiunal Trainiog Center at Fort Irvin, CA, as

well as other combat training centers, "was simply boxed up and nearly forgutten, shelved for only top-level

officials to see" spurred the center's creation.'

With its establishment in 1985, the collection and analysis observations on tactics, plans, and policies

utilized throughout the army as well as monitoring the corrective actions became the Center's tasked

mission. It was expected that future experiences of a similar nature could be handled with greater efficiency

if past experiences could be systematically applied. Not only did CALL generate lessons learned with the

observations garnered from the National Training Center and training exercises such as the mid-1 980s'

Bright Star maneuvers in Egypt, but also 1989's Operation Just Cause. Indeed, Wartime Army Lessons

Learned Program (WALLP) observers followed closely on the heels of troops during the Panamanian

invasion to garner material for the Cenier and ultimately future troops.

Army Regulation 11-33 requires all units to submit copies of their after-action reports to CALL within

120 days following a major training exercise or combat o- iration. Furthermore. CALL may request further

information from any of the army's major command units concerning a particular piece of equipment or

system. Thus CALL remains active.

In order that the information gathered might be utilized, ALLMIS (Army Lessons Learned Management Information System) was devised so that CALL materi als could be accessed by qualified users. This

in house toot does not simply provide answers on a golden platter, notes data base manager MAJ Anne

Godsey. "Users have to work to use the data base's information," for "lessons learned don't just pop-up

at you.", Classified information is available to cleared individuals through the Joint Universal Lessons

Learned System (JULLS). And as CALL officials are quick to point out, material not available in the

computer data base might well exist in hard-copy format.

And, as with all military installations, CALL's level of activity rose dramatically with the onset of

hostilities in Southwest Asia. As per army regulation and in keeping with CALL's tasked mission, CALL

observers and wartime reinforcements sprang into action with the news of deployment. Commands from

throughout the army supplemented the early reports as did individual soldicrs. Not only were reports filed

concerning deployment and dehydration, but also logistics and loneliness, maintenance and morale, chemical detection devices and communication systems, hygiene and heat protection, among a multitude

of other observed issues.

Before war's end, CALL distributed over 350,000 cop::s of its Winning in the Desert and Winning in

the D i•er II newsletters to Desert Shield and D-ýsert Storm soldiers. The newsletters, according to CALL

executive officer MAJ Rick Bogdan, Jr., were not intended to provide dcctrine "but rather helpful hints for

conducting everyday tasks."3

Beyond the rapidly produced newsletters, CALL wus responsible for generating a formal and

183

<K- , -
comprehensive after action report of the observations gathered from Operations Desert Shield and Desert

Storm. Among the contributors to CALL's final report was the U.S. Army Materiel Command, in turn the

recipient of feeder reports from the U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM).

As with observers directly serving CALL, individuals at AMCCOM headquarters in Rock Island, IL, and its

subordinate commands intensified their search for ways to improve the response to crisis situations

immediately upon hearing of the deployment of troops to SWA. Individuals, military and civilian, from

procurement and production to security and intelligence, from logistics readiness to quality assurance, from

materiel management to transportation, from maintenance to resource system management, from

individual army ammunition plants to the Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center

(CRDEC) as well as the Ammunition Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) and

beyond sought ways to improve their performance and ultimately help the soldier in the sand so far away.

The effort to find ways to improve performance was ongoing. A 2 November 1990 AMCCOM memo

reminded "addressees" that "fortho duration of Operation Desert Shield" they would be required to examine

their dp i-to-day operations for applicable lessons. In addition to the usual lessons which dealt with "plans,

policies and procedures which were either not followed or need correction," ones which concerned

mechanical "fixes" or "experiences in the Desert Shield environment" were "highly desired" in order that

performance might be improved and the ability to wage war both at present and in the future enhanced.'

Ultimately the command's 17,934 civilian employees and 633 military personnel submitted hundreds

of observations to the Emergency Operations Center at AMCCOM's Rock Island headquarters.' Along with

their multitudinous other responsibilities, the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) categorized the

observations upon their submission as well as evaluated them for completeness. The EOC also loaded

the central data base and made initial recommendations concerning submitted lessons' disposition. The

Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) was utilized as a management tool to track the lessons

learned from the time of their submission to dissemination for action either within AMCCOM or to the United

Statos Army Materiel Command for follow-up tracking. Beyond simply creating AMCCOM's JULLS base,

the EOC managed the submissions and hosted internal working group meetings to develop taskings for

those lessons learned remaining within AMCCOM.

By early May 1991 an additional Lessons Learned Task Force had been formulated. Created to

"establish and implement local lessons learned management and evaluation processes," the task force

consisted of seven members, all from the Readiness Directorate. Appointed as members of the Lessons

Learned Task Force were LTC Bill Hannah, chief; Mr. Ed Lowenberg, deputy; SFC Leon Killens,

noncommissioned officer in charge; Ms. Jennifer Wich, emergency planning officer; Mr. Carl Smith,

technical advisor; and Ms. Chris Schumacher and Mr. Les Wilcox, EOC staff members.6 The Lessons

Learned Task Force created a multilevel flow chart to direct the myriad of submitted observations.

After compilation and initial action by the EOC, the AMCCOM Screening Board, composed of Chief

of Staff, COL David T. Morgan, Jr., and Readiness Directorate staff members, evaluated the submitted

observations and determined their disposition: AMC or higher, AMC and AMCCOM, AMCCOM, or

combination/deletion. Upon passage from the screening board, the AMCCOM Evaluation Council

examined the surviving, presumably educative, items. The evaluation council, composed of directors,

deputies, and divisional chiefs of the logistics readiness, defense ammunition, materiel management,

procurement and production, resources and management, research, test, development and evaluation

integration, readiness, product assurance and test, w'-_pons systems management, and industrial

preparedness and installations directorates, analyzed the surviv;-n observations and subjected them to a

formal review. The Evaluation Council then offered its concurrence or ordered a reworking of the submitted

lessons learned. The Evaluation Council also identified new lessons learned from the submitted material

184
LESSONS LEARNED MANAGEMENT PROCESS

AMCCOM

LESSONS

LEARNED

S~DEPUTY

READINESS DIR DIRECTOR CG/DCGPR

RD STAFF FUNCTIONALS C of S/DEPUTATES

-EOC )10 BOARD - EVALUATION CORPORATE

1 1 (6) 1 COUNCIL REVIEW

COMPLETENESS REVIEW ALL FOMLRVE

INITALLY CATEGORIZE DETERMINE: ANALYSIS

LOAD DATA BASE - AMC OR HIGHER CONCUR/REWORK

RECOMMEND -AMCCOM IDENTIFY NEW LL

DISPOSITION - AMC & AMCCOM TASKING DIRECTIVES

- COMBINE/DELETE FOR AMCCOM ITEMS

FOLLOWUP EOC

AMC FORWARD AMCs LL

TASK AMCCOMs LL LESSONS TRACK ALL

LEARNED STATUS REPORTS

COMPLETED CORRECTIVE

ACTION 4ý- ATO14

FOLLOWUP

SOP DEVELOP/REWRITE

NEW POLICIES

FEED BACK/RAP

185
and tasked directorates at AMCCOM for further information as desired. It also arranged for follow-up

procedures.7

From the AMCCOM Evaluation Council, the submissions passed to the Command Corporate

Review, composed of Commanding General MG Paul L. Greenberg, Chief of Staff COL David T. Morgan,

Jr., Deputy Commanding General for Procurement and Readiness, and a variety of directorate deputies.

After Command Corporate Review the submissions were returned to the EOC where, as designated, some

were forwarded to AMC and some were tasked to AMCCOM offices. All were tracked and had status reports

maintained. 8

A number of the submitted observations received the designation "significant" from the top management of AMCCOM during the review process. Top management also developed a number of "significant"

lessons on their own. To be declared "significant", a submitted lesson needed to:

1 .)cover major areas of interest,

2.)be comprehensive and pertain to general categories,

3.)be singularly outstanding, and

4.)reflect the direct interest of the AMCCOM Commander. 9

Forty-five of the submitted lessons received the status of "significant."

The Operation Desert Shieid/Storm After Action Report submitted to the Commander, U.S. Army

Materiel Command by AMCCOM's Commanding General MG Paul L. Greenberg in the summer of 1991

contained all the accepted observations generated by AMCCOM and its subordinates to date. It also

included a number marked "delete" but which due to time factors remained in place. The "Lessons Learned"

portion of the report was divided in 15 subsections: ammunition, chemical/biological, communications,

equipment, force structure, logistics assistance/LAO (logistics assistance office), maintenance, mobilization/logistics planning, personnel, procurement/production/quality assurance, resource management,

supply, total package fielding, transportation, and weapons.

Individuals concerned with ammunition generated 23 lessons learned which were accepted for

inclusion in the After Action Report. Of these, six were deemed significant by AMCCOM's top management.

AMCCOM officials designated the fact that manuals for unique climatic conditions were not available for

all severe operating conditions as significar.t. Information contained in operator-level maruals did not

adequately describe precautions and procedures required to achieve optimum performance in the desert

of SWA according to AMCCOM's maintenance publication personnel. And while the problem was met by

the rapid production of pocket-size reference manuals containing specific information regarding the

storage, maintenance, and use of ammunition, chemical defense equipment, and armameits in a desert

environment, the production of similar pocket-size manuals for other severe operating conc-tions (arctic oý

tropical, for example) was recommended in preparation for potential, future conflicts.10 A subsequent

significant lesson simply expanded upon this one ad urged the pre-printing of numerous climatic condition

manuals for dispersal to troops at the point of deployment."

The availability of logistics documentation such as insp'3ction criteria, quality deficiency requirements, unitization, storage and outloading drawings, and item drawings also presented AMCCOM with

difficulties during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and ultimately produced a significant lesson

learned. As the shortage of logistics documentation occurred in part due to funding inadequacies, the

recommended action involved attempting to secure adequate funding for the development of a fieldportable computer system to contain logistics documentation information. 2

A further significant observation f-orn the ammunition perspective involved the design and deveiop186
ment community's failure to completely understand the true climatic conditions of SWA and the ensuing

problems for the open storage of munitions there. To better understand the exceedingly high temperatures,

large diurnal temperature fluctuations, high dew points, high ocean salt content, and the creation of static

electrical charges of up to 150,000 volts during dust storms, it was determined that further data should be

gathered during retrograde operations in SWA and that this information be made available for the design

and development community's use in desert scenarios.13

Ammunition interchangeability was the focus of another significant submission. While the ability to

interchange allied ammunition in combat has been a high priority goal of NATO and one on which a

considerable amount of resources has been expended, ODS made it apparent that this had not been

thoroughly achieved. Even though the United States and the United Kingdom knew that their ammunition

was compatible and could be fired safely from one another's weapon systems, information concerning

ballistics had not been exchanged. It took the UK over three months to acquire the U.S. ballistic data and

modify their howitzers' fire control computers to assure properly targeted firing. In consideration of this

failing, the board screening observations recommended that computer ballistic solutions be made available

to allies. 14

Furthermore, AMCCOM's top cadre deemed it significant that an accounting of Class V items in SWA

was lost quite early on in ODS due to the rapid arrival of prepositioned ships and the lack of ammunition

personnel at points of entry. Unidentified unit basic load (UBL) and reserve Class V brought in by units also

caused inaccuracies in accountability. To counter this lack of accountability in future operations, AMCCOM

officials recommended ammunition personnel and standardized accounting systems-TACC or SAASbe in place before the arrival of Class V items.15

An additional 17 valued observations generated by ammunition personnel were included in the

Ooeration Desert Shield/Storm After Action Reoort although not with the "significant" designation. These

iessons, in general, focused on the ammunition basic load (ABL), its handling, shipment size and requisition

format, the proper care of specific ammunition types in the desert, and materiel release order (MRO)

instructions in consideration of transportation shortages.

Despite the inevitable problems incurred by ammunition personnel during ODS, the experience

provided valuable lessons for future engagements. And regardless of any problems which arose during

tf e Gulf Crisis "none of them negated the fact the combat units had more ammunition of the right kinds (and

tremendous lethality) than they needed."' The army's ability to meet the ammunition needs of a longer,

more intense war were not addressed by the study.

Similarly, the personnel of AMCCOM who concerned themselves with chemical and biological

matters took pride in their efforts to properly provide defensive equipment for the soldiers of ODS. Yet, they

too realized that problems had occurred and lessons had been learned from the experience. Overall,

chemical/biological personnel generated 18 presumably enlightening observations concerning the effort in

SWA. Of these, eleven were designated significant. One observation deemed significant dealt wvith the

use of chemical/biological protective devices in high ambient temperatures. At 110-120 degrees

Fahrenheit, fully protected personnel can perform at moderate to high rates for less than one hour. Rest,

relief, "cool down", mask filter change, etc. are essential, but remove the soldier from mission-necessary

activities. In consideration of the industrial base and the level of research and development already

underway, AMCCOM's top cadre recommended that a simple, transportable collective protection device

be fielded allowing soldiers to work for lengthy periods of time in high temperatures in relative comfort as

well as safety.17

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/

In addition to personnel collective protection devices, the After Action Report recommended the

development of a vehicular collective protection device. Uncooled, armored vehicle interiors can quickly

rise above 140 degrees Fahrenheit, or even higher when the vehicle is closed. In consideration that such

temperatures might make mission achievement impossible, AMCCOM sought the installation of collective

cooling and overprotection devices at the time of retrofiti. 8 AMCCOM personnel also noted that deploying

units needed quicker access to intelligence on the chemical/biological threat of their destination. Knowing

the specific agents, delivery systems, and enemy employment doctrine more thoroughly as well as quickly

would allow commanders to make final battle preparations and inform their troops of these with greater

dispatch, or so officials believed. The creation of a worldwide database on the threat of chemical/biological

materiel performance and the increased use of analysis on this information as well as its dissemination was

thus recommended.' 9

The After Action Report also noted that at installations where units were deployed in support of

preventive maintenance checks and services were not being conducted on chemical protective equipment

as thoroughly as at the user's level. Considering that preventive maintenance checks on such items is

critical, AMCCOM management urged that via the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the need to conduct routine checks

and maintenance be stressed30 Of particular concern in the case of the M17 series mask, chemical/

biological experts noted that the voicemitter cover must be removed to confirm the assembly's safety; the

headJ harness' elasticity must also be maintained. In the case of the M24/M25A1 protective mask, concern

focused upon the facepiece lenses. 2

'

Miscellaneous consumable chemical/biological defense materiel also attracted the attention of

AMCCOM personnel. It was noted that several items of chemical/biological defense were in short supply

during ODS: vaccines, advanced skin decontimination kits, medical treatment items, nerve agent

pretreatment and NATO standard filters. CONUS (continental United States) and OCONUS (outside

continental United States) sources were drasticaily reduced during the Gulf Crisis. While the After Action

Regor did not specifically note that a lesson had been garnered from the use of CONUS and OCONUS

materiel in SWA, it did recommend that these stocks be rapidly replaced as well as augmented in

consideration of the increasing tempo of chemical/biological training exercises. 2

During the Gulf Crisis, it became apparent that nuclear-chemical-biological (NBC) defense materiel

management readiness had not been maintained. Early ODS observations dictated that changes be

considered with the "utmost seriousness."23 Specific issues involved the reinstitution of required NBC

readiness reporting for all combat and comoat support units, and the institutionalization of a permanent

central database of NBC materiel on hand, as well as in the late stages of development or procurement.

The committee also recommended that the sale of NBC equipment to foreign nations be more carefully

explored in consideration of the shelf life of the U.S. forces' supplies, resupply rates and production base/

surge capability, and furthermore urged the institutionalization of critical considerations of NBC defense/

contamination survivability in acquisition and planning review boards. In addition, AMCCOM top

management suggested the use of defense agency or other centralized oversight of the tota! departmental

NBC defense effort, considering all-service needs and single point responsibility. Furthermore, it was

suggested that the scope of NBC training be increased in all services by funding increases to reduce unit

out-of-pocket costs for training personnel in chemical defense. Computer simulations superimposed on

chemical warfar, situations on the exercise battlefield, the increased emphasis on senior officer chemical

defense orientatioo, and exercises in all branches of the armed services, as well as embedding NBC training

in professional military education was recommended.14

The availability of chemical protective equipment and its issue to local nationals and U.S. citizens

working for the host country also became the subject of a submission deemed significant by the top cadre

188
of AMCCOM. Upon the evaluation of numerous foreign protective masks, the U.S. military made the

judgement that many did not offer adequate protection, especially for children and bearded men, and that

their use required continuous training to be effective. In consideration of this discovery, the suggestion was

offered that a stock of M1 7 masks be maintained (after its replacement by the M40 series) for issue to local

nationals and U.S. non-combatants in the theater of operations. The creation of a fund for a full and

continuing evaluation of foreign chemical protective equipment so that appropriate and timely recommendations could be made to foreign governments, and a low threat, single use mask for non-combatants that

could be quickly and properly used with little or no training also found support.25

The elimination of fratricide due to the mistaken engagement of allied aircraft with friendly vehicles

and positions also became the subject of a submission designated significant. According to JULLS 52356-

58715 (00173), in response to an urgent request from the U.S. Marine Corps, "innovative" U.S. Army

Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center (CRDEC) researchers developed a special

marking round for use in SWA. The marires needed a projectile to mark terrain so that a Forward Air

Coordinator could orchestrate close air suoport to minimize fratricide by creating a safe zone. CRDEC

scientists accomplished this assignment in a mere nine days. From this experience AMCCOM officials

noted that the understanding gained was tat CRDEC, and other installations, could rapidly respond to

requests from the field and that field units should not hesitate to submit requests for tactical assistance to

research and development centers. Furthermore, the special marking round should be thoroughly studied

for possible inclusion in the army inventory. 26

It also came to the attention of authorities and became the subject of a significant submission that

chemical detection items had not been properly inspected with regard to shelf life in the years prior to ODS.

In order to prevent the unnecessary shortage of chemical detection kits that was experienced by some field

units from reoccurring, the evaluation council recommended that periodic inspections be made to

determine serviceability and reorders initiated within a three to six month timeframe prior to the materiel's

shelf life expiration date.27

Also offered for further consideration, and marked "significant" was the need for biological detection

equipment. It had been observed during the brief Gulf encounter that there were no specific requirements

documents for biological detection samplers, and that although the XM2 sampler and SMART ticket

biological detection devices had proven highly successful, they did not provide definitive proof of biological

agents, but only offered indications of their presence. Definitive proof still required laboratory analysis. In

addition, it was noted that the XM2 sampler should be employed with a three or four man team networked

throughout the area of operations and that the development of the Point Biofluorescence Sensor (PBS)

warranted pursuit.2

A further significant observation involved th" POX NBC reconnaisaice vehicle. Fielded two years

ahead of schedule, the FOX presented its users with some difficulties: an inaccurate inertial navigation

system, an inability to determine wind direction, a profile frequently mistaken for that of the enemy, insufficient training time, the lack of FOX simulators for that training and a noncompatible radio system.

With these problems corrected, the German-built FOX is expected to prove a valuable asset in future

endeavors.-

,, The After Action Rpe•or inc!uded an additional six lessons learned generated by individuals

specifically concerned &vith chemical and biological equipment. These involved specific items of chemical/

biological equipment, technical documentation for surge equipment sent to SWA, chemical/biological

hazard assessments, the deployment of developmental hardware to the desert and the possibility of

psychologically-inJuced breathing problems by individuals using chemical protection equipment. Such

lessons provide the impetus for chemical and biological efforts for the ensuing years and future endeavors.

189
In addition to the numerous observations concerning ammunition and chemical/biological issues, the

After Action Report included six communication-oriented lessons. Of the six lessons, only one merited the

designation "significant." That lesson noted that with the deployment of thousands of troops to SWA, a large

number of support personnel had been tasked to follow. Due to the lack of alternatives, these personnel

came to rely almost entirely on commercial telephone communications to connect to the major subordinate

commands (MSCs), depots, and national inventory control points (NICPs) to resolve repair and supply

issues. The well-maintained, sophisticated and Kingdominstalled telephone system of Saudi Arabia

created a false sense of security. Had the host nation not been well equipped or had the communications

center been successfully targeted by enemy military, terrorists, or long range artillery/missiles, the

disruption could have been catastrophic2 0

In addition to CONUS-SWA communication, LARs and QASAS (logistics assistance representatives

and qua ty assurance specialists-ammunition surveillance) frequently required in country contacts. The

near impossibility of these contacts resulted in CONUS Operations Centers becc-ning information relay

stations between Saudi elements.

Upon consideration of these communication frailitias, AMCCOM management recommended that in

future engagements, LARs, logistic support teams, and QASAS be equipped with satellite telephones to

permit direct down link to CONUS and LAR-to-LAR in theater, both voice and fax capable. The desired

package would be a suitcase style portable unit that could be set up in a matter of 15-20 minutes and access

CONUS and European dial tones. It was further recommended that several satellite telephones be

provided with each unit. The packaging of communication services was deemed "essential" in theaters

without a substantial telephone structure."

Despite the designation of a single communications lesson as significant, other important information

came from the desert. Communication officials generated observations concerning the constant revision

of time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD), the need for a "smart" terminal capable of more rapid

updating, the need for a direct line of communication to establish reporting procedures, and the poor flow

of information between materiel and acquisition commands.

In the After Action Report's summary analysis of communication, a series of other issues were

addressed. In order that communication might not be seized up during times of crisis, the use of "minimize"

on the army message center system, the use of the voice conference call, and the use of the fax machine

were suggested, with the notation that they had worked quite well in the recent conflagration. Indeed, the

analysis noted, "communication during the Gulf Crisis was.., a great asset" although the potential existed

for it to be a "weak point."32

Equipment experts also submitted a number of suggestions for inclusion in AMCCOM's After Action

Report, Of the ten lessons submitted, however, a mere two warranted a "significant." AMCCOM's Materiel

Management team urged a rethinking of the standing policy, or lack thereof, concerning captured foreign

materiel. They noted that captured foreign materiel was not thought of until after the fighting was over.

Instead of utilizing Army Regulation 700-99 on the handling of this equipment, all levels wrote their own

instructions on the materiel's disposition. Unfortunately, there was no coordination between levels. The

lesson continued by noting that the end result of the lack of coordination was "chaos" as units redeployed

with war trophies upon completion of hostilities without the proper documentation. The competition among

museum representatives, units, and individuals for the control of captured Iraqi equipment as war trophies

also caused consternation for materiel management personnel.33

Concluding that "being proactive and having a current AR (Army Regulation) addressing a scenario

190
far outweighs a reactive mode of operation," and that"coordination among levels of policy makers must take

place in order to allow one good policy to be issued," Materiel Management personnel urged that the HQDA

(Headquarters Department of the Army) revise and update its regulations concerning captured foreign

materiel.14

Also of concern to AMCCOM's equipment experts was the lack of laser protection for Apache

helicopter crews. Considering that the lasers of distant Apaches could easily damage the eyesight of crews

and that laser-equipped enemy aircraft might also inflict injury, the failure to issue protective visors to

deploying crews seemed derelict. As laser protective helmet visors caught up with crews in the deserts of

SWA via the awarding of a sole source contract hurriedly prepared, a corrective action was not offered.

Officials did warn, however, that AMCCOM must "prepare for battle, under all possible conditions, and

especially for critical safety items ... .

The remaining lessons generated by AMCCOM personnel in this field dealt with specific pieces of

equipment (M102 tires, M16 serier rifles, M1/IPM1/M1A1 recovery vehicles, etc.), fire protection equipment for port operations, the proper handling of equipment, depot maintenance plant equipment, the field

evaluation of equipment, and the incorrect powder temperature corrective coefficient in the fire control

computer.

Obsen,ations generated by individuals primarily concerned with force structure did not take a great

deal of space in the After Action Regort. Of the two lessons submitted by AMCCOM staff, neither received

the designation "significant." It was observed, however, that in the interest of eliminating or at least reducing

confusion concerning deployed units, the timeframe of deployment, and organizational relationships,

changes needed to be made. Time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD), the primary data source, was

not well understood and could be accessed from the Worldwide Military Command and Control System

(WWMCCS) by only one individual at AMCCOM. In consideration of AMCCOM's stringent requirement to

keep clearances to a minimum and the necessity of TPFDD users to possess a top secret clearance, the

system came close to seizing. In order to prevent future problems, the top management of AMCCOM

recommended the expansion of the clearance ceiling and the education of further individuals in the

language of TPFDD and WWMCCS.3 6

Furthermore, defense ammunition directorate officials recommended that ammunition requirements

for deployed units be more frequently and correctly updated using numerical force as the standard, not the

presence of a threat to modify the requirements. Facing mild resistance from the Office of the Deputy Chief

of Staff--Operations and Plans, AMCCOM officials urged a review of the "requirements computation

methodology to insure logistics [were] given full consideration."37

Logistics assistance and the Logistics Assistance Office became the object of five submissions

included in the After Action Report, two of which met the criteria for "significant." The most prominent of

these lessons involved the quite difficult time LARs deploying to SWA had in obtaining the necessary level

of sul )ort and communication. Regardless of home installation-CONUS, Europe, Korea--or assigned

unit, LARs frequently had trouble arranging billeting, transportation, and communication. Due to the

significant hindrances incurred, LARs had difficulty accomplishing their missions as well as communicating

with CONUS. To alleviate such problems in future encounters, the Readiness Directorate suggested the

creation of equipment/communication packages for LARs which would allow them to "communicate,

survive and perform" in a deployment environment. The packages recommended could be containcd in

a maintenance van "fully uploaded with cots, tents, communications equipment, generators, light sets, first

aid kits, tool, MREs (meals, ready to eat), NBC gear, etc."28

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ARDEC (Ammunition Research, Development and Engineering Center) also contributed to the

logistics assistance portion of the After Action Report. Their personnel observed that no formalized plans

had been established prior to the start of Operation Desert Shield for the collection and transportation of

captured foreign ammunition to CONUS. They also noted that at least two divergent, informal plans existed

concerning the disposition of foreign ammunition. In order that the ensuing confusion might not occur in

future engagements. ARDEC officials urged the identification of a single operational element to handle the

responsibility for the collection, storage, and transportation of captured foreign ammunition of interest for

exploitation purposes.)9

Beyond these logistic issues denoted significant, lessons learned concerning ports and equipment

accountability, the necessity of deploying advance individuals to ensure the proper establishment of plans,

their coordination and execution, and the deployment of supply-oriented LARs rather than generically

trained ones were included in the After Action Report.

The After Action Report also contained a number of submissions directed towards improving

maintenance procedures in future deployments. Eleven lessons were included in the report, none,

however, with the designation "significant." Yet the included observations provided food for thought:

specific weapon system maintenance and maintenance problems incurred in a desert environment as well

as materiel readiness technical manuals and their availability.

Six of nineteen submissions concerning mobilization and logistical planning received the "significant"

designation. One involved the confusion that occurred with President Bush's callup of 200,000 National

Guard and Army Reserve soldiers. At the time of the call-up, the Readiness Directorate (RD) received the

task of determining equipment shortages in the called-up units. While in process RD discovered that similar

actions had been tasked to the National Guard Bureau and the Continental United States Armies. The

recommendation flowing from this experience was that greater efforts at coordination should be attempted

in order that wasteful duplication might be avoided.'0

Also suggested for re-evaluation was the AMC War Plan along with MOPES (Mobilization and

Operations Planning and Execution System). Accnrding to Industrial Readiness personnel, the industrial

base was not properly mobilized in support of ODS. Indeed, they noted, "the system established to

transition to mobilization does riot recognize that some MOPES actions should not be initiated if the base

is not to be mobilized." Therefore, the Industrial Readiness community spent considerable time and effort

initiating actions which were unnecessary, as well as redundant in nature, and confusing as to intent. In

addition, directions contradicted one another as well as the published, pre-figured schedule and resulted

in the generation of worthless data. To prevent such future confusion Industrial Readiness suggested an

overhaul of the AMC War Plan along with MOPES "to develop a realistic, workable plan that makes

sense.""

Preparation for Overseas Rotation/Movement (POR/POM) also became the subject of mobilization/

logistical planning lesson learned. Observers noted that during deployment the POM staff of Aberdeen

Proving Ground (APG) had done a superb job of preparing civilian AMC personnel for travel to SWA,

handling in excess of 200 individuals per week. Yet APG did suffer some problems with shortages. The

lack of sufficient and properly sized desert camouflaged Battle Dress Uniforms (BDUs) as well as boots

damaged morale and made for frustrated SWA-bound employees, as did APG's lack of authorization to

issue weapons. In order to prevent such confusion and shortages from re-occurring, the Readiness

Directorate (RD) made numerous suggestions: direct delivery of backordered clothing and boots to shorted

individuals in the field, use of non-traditional imprest funds for local purchases, and the use of catalog

suppliers (Sears, Cabalas, Gander Mountain,...) for boots for hard-to-fit civilians, making certain to utilize

192

A
the toll-free 1-800 numbers provided by most of these firms. The RD also recommended that AMC keep

civilian deployee materiels on hand to rapidly resupply APG as necessary.'2

One of the longest submissions included in AMCCOM's After Action R.t concerned the role of the

command in support of CONUS Replacement Centers (CRCs) at Forts Benning, Jackson and Knox. RD

officials noted that the role of the CRC *ocused on processing individual soldiers and civilians as

replacements to units and agencies already present in SWA. They also noted that CRC programs were

tasked to provide appropriate clothing, chemical defense equipment, and weapons, including AMCCOMmanaged materiel--rifles, pistols, and chemical protective equipment. Unfortunately, AMCCOM did not

receive notification to execute support to the CRCs nor did the actual reserves held for the CRCs fully

support processing requirements.43

From the experience RD personnel gathered the lesson that coordinated effort by HODA, TRADOC

(United States Army Training and Doctrine Command), AMC, and AMCCOM was required in peacetime

to ensure sufficient support of CRCs during wartime. To ensure the coordination of future efforts, RD urged

that AMCCOM and AMC work actively with HQDA and TRADOC in reconstituting CRC support in

consideration of force modernization items, stockage of support items, and funding and authorization

documentations."4

Also of concern to mobilization and logistical planning authorities and denoted "significant" but

directed only towards AMCCOM, rather than the usual direction of significant lessons learned to AMC, was

the observation that the skilled personnel needed to gear up for a crisis were not as readily available as

previously indicated. The shortage of skilled machinists and machine tool operators became apparent at

New York's Watervliet Arsenal. Working with the New York State Department of Labor, arsenal

management learned that many of the hundreds of applicants for their openings did not possess the skills

needed to perform satisfactorily. However, based upon earlier figures provided by the New York State

Department of Labor, ther, should have been sufficient individuals in the labor pool to fill the positions. In

consideration of this iinding, AMCCOM officials determined that an updating of the mobilization table of

distribution and allowances must occur, as well as the reexamination of skill requirements. Other

installations were to be advised accordingly of the potential hazards of utilizing old information.4 5

Readiness ratings also became a concern of AMCCOM personnel. It appeared during ODS that units

had the tendency to paint a very optimistic picture of their readiness, particularly in consideration of their

equipment capabilities. Unfortunately, the commanders of questioned units frequently included stored

equipment out of their direct control as being operations ready. The same problem occurred in

consideration of personnel specialties and the presence of non-deployables in units scheduled for SWA.

To avoid this difficulty in the future, it was recommended that commanders be required to clearly indicate

the actual percertage of equipment not under their direct control, although including a status report of

materiel in storage. And to verify the accuracy of readiness reports, it was recommended that periodic

inspections should be conducted by independent agencies.46

Beyond observations designated "significant," an additional thirteen concerning mobilization and

logistical planning were included in the After Action Report. They covered a variety of topics: the sufficiency

of war reserves, CONUS Replacement Centers, their coordination, equipment, range of equipment

supported and storace space, Class VII resupply, foreign intelligence during wartime, U.S. Marine Corps

mobilization from ARDEC, and even the generation and collection of the official after action report.

Personnel issues also found a place in the AMCCOM's After Action Report. And although individuals

concerned with personnel matters generated numerous observations, of which 21 found inclusion in the

193
report, only one of these was deemed "significant." The significant lesson concerned the hiring authority

for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Observers noted that certain installations, especially those

required to ship ammunition, found themselves severely constrained in meeting shipping requii ements for

ODS by the Department of Defense hiring freeze. For example, Crane Army Ammunition Activity (CAAA)

resorted to working employees in double and triple shifts as well as using white-collar personnel in shipping

to meet its requirements. Although expedited, the procedures to obtain hiring authority d;d not come

through fast enough to avoid jeopardizing mission performance. Personnel and Tr3ining Directorate

officials reccmmended, in light of the significant problems incurred, that current and future hiring limitations

should contain a provision for local commanders to unilaterally hire tempo, ary employees to meet operation

and mobilization requirements.47

Non-"significant" personnel submissions represented in the After Action Reporo covered a variety of

issues: the shortage of trained personnel for bracing and b;ocking ammunition shipments, support offered

to waiting families, casualty reporting, pay for deployed civilian personnel, the identification of support

materiel and customers within the theater of cperations, travel orders, staff relationships, the staffing of the

AMCCOM Emergency Operations Center, the issue of weapons to LARs and other Department of the Army

civilians in SWA, and the staffing of the Lessons Learned project.

In addition to the commentary generated concerning personnel issues, AMCCOM's After Action

eport contained 30 lessons concerning procurement, production, and quality assurance. Of these, five

warranted the designation "significant." "Red water," or environmentally hazardous water created in the

explosives manufacturing process, became the locus of one such lesson. Observers noted that no known,

established and approved plan existed for the disposal of "red water" in the event of a surge or mobilization

order associated with a national crisis. And while the explosives, notab!y TNT, could have been produced

with relative ease, the resulting "red water" would have been a "constraint without resolution" as no provision

exists for disposal that has total Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) authorization. As the only known

incineration technique for this material is continually fined by the EPA, commercial chemical producers are

somewhat reluctant to undertake government contracts for explosives. In addition, the EPA does not

perceive that environmental standards can be relaxeo during wartime without direct order from the

president. Thus, AMCCOM urged that the impact of current EPA laws on the production of critical

explosives be brought to the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Congress, and President Bush., 8

Regulatory relief also became a concern of procurement personnel and ultimately gained a

"significant" notation in AMCCOM's After Action Report. Procurement and Production Policy Division

personnel observed that regulations which serve tne nation well in times of peace can be overly restrictive

in times of conflict. They also noted that while AMCCOM took a proactive approach in gaining regulatory

relief, AMC took a reactive stance, resulting in minuscule, incremental deviance allowances to regulations.

Regardless, some alterations in regulatcry policy did occur: Congressional notification within 20 hours was

waived; the small purchases threshold for OCONUS rose to $100,000; and the processing time for afterthe-fact justification and approvals (J&As) was extended. However, not all sought for relief became reality.

For example, AMCCOM did not receive authority to continue work despite labor protests, to issue a

moratorium on socioeconomic programs, or to waive equal employment opportunity clearances required

from small business contractors. Noting that "the Department of Defense and the Congress are not going

to change statutes and regulations for ODS-level conflicts," and that "we must rely on ourselves to develop

solutions to our problems," the Procurement and Production Policy Division laid forth recommended actions

in the face of Congressional recalcitrance. Among the recommended actions were the development of

processes to expedite actions which higher authorities refused to waive, including imbedding clauses in

future regulations and statutes providing for relief to be activated in a time of conflict and the preestablishment, publication, and distribution to the contracting office a list of acceptable deviations, lowered

194
approval authorities, and eliminated requirements in the case of conflict. Surge alternatives in the case of

less-than-all-out mobilizations, periodic review of contingency clauses and policies for surge operations,

and the maintenance of a system which can efficiently shift to a high gear also found recommendation.

Regardless of the problems whicl- occurred with regulatory requirements though, the Policy Division noted

that *AMCCOM reacted in an outstanding manner to a critical situation. AMC, higher headquarters, and

the Congress should be apprised of the turmoil and wasted effort, as well as dangerous delays to

procurement, which their inability to act more quickly created at the working level. Now is the time to

preposition for the future."19

The Procurement Directorate's Major Weapons Systems Division submitted a quite similar notation

for consideration. Personnel from that division noted that the entire range of mobilization planning needed

rethinking "minus the present political restrictions, regulations and policies that have rendered it useless."

In consideration of this, the office complained that in light of cost saving measures, its mission, as well as

future missions, had been compromised as artificial production restrictions and equally artificial main supply

routes ultimately increase costs, curtail surge abilities, and seriously impact a contractor's capability of

meeting rapidly expedited requirements. In addition, State Department memorandum of under.standing

(MOU) further eroded the U.S. critical base components. The Department of Commerce inadvertently gave

priority to foreign countries to procure charcoal filters for gas masks from the main U.S. supplier, to the

detriment of the American forces. In consideration of the problems incurred, Major Weapons Systems

recommended that all mobilization iterns and their critical components be procured exclusively from the

U.S. or Canada and be made exempt from MOUs, unless otherwise coordinated, despite the cost. For as

the Procurement Directorate's Major Weapons Systems Division office noted, "If the price of liberty is

eternal vigilance, part of that price is mobilization."5

Small business goals also garnered the attention of procurement personnel and became the subject

of a "significant" observation. Officials noted that AMCCOM attempted to meet its small business utilization

goals in spite of ODS and the need to restrict competition to the current producer. On occasion this effort

by AMCCOM resulted in delays in processing justifications and approvals/awards due to nonconcurrence

by the Small Business Office. In order that unnecessary delays might be avoided on the occasion of future

cor'1 icts, procurement personnel recommended that clause 8(a) of the Small Business Goals directive be

abandoned during wartime. 5

'

Procurement personnel sought to modify the acquisition process in other ways as well. They noted

that the acquisition process is predicated upon toe assumption that the U.S. is at war, possibly on a global

basis, with the Soviet Union or China. The reality, as noted, is that Panama, Grenada, and SWA are the

types oi conflicts this nation will tfce-short in rjuration but of high intensity. In such a war, relance must

bpp oaced upon the established stockpile and the logistical pipeline. Thus the acquisition process must react

using existing tools; i.e., there will not be time tc to build up a workforce, or to have statutory or regulatory

changes. Even in the nearly six month build-up to the Persian Gulf War, little or nothing occurred on the

acquisition side of the logistics system to provide relief from peacetime restraints. Only after the actual

hostilities began did higher headquarters become sensitive to the need to remove r•. julatory and statutory

roadblocks, noted procurement personnel.52

In the Gulf crisis, procurement officials did their utmost to streamline and accelerate the acquisition

process. Expanded delegations of authority in the areas of award approval, the use of unpriced contractual

actions, and other review processes were initiated for the Head of Contracting Activity/Principal Assistant

Responsible for Contracting approval where higher headquarters regulations permitted. Additionally,

expedited processes were implemented to obtain formal review/approvals if the regulations precluded the

delegation of authority and class documents were developed covering urgency statements, justifications

195
and approvals, and unpriced contractual actions. Most significantly, however, personnel were reallocated

to high priority direct war-reiated activities which permitted the expeditious handling of the over 2,500

AMCCOM procurement work directives generated for ODS.5 3

Taking their cue from their obvious success in ODS, the personnel of p:ocurement recommended

that in preparation for future conflicts periodic reviews of contingency clauses and policies must be

undertaken to ensure tW"t they are up-to-date and supportable. Self-help must also be effected in times

of crisis so that matters migiit be dealt with expeditiously, yet appropriately.,,

Beyond the five submitted observations deemed significant concerning procurement, production,

and quaiity assurance, an additional 25 were included in the After Action Report. These dealt with a variety

of issues: the acquisition process, its streamlining and modification, procurement practices, the surge

production program, production bases, anc. materiel release orders.55

Resource management personnel submitted seven of the lessons learned included in the Aftar Action

Eport, five of which recei ted the designation "significant." Comptroller personnel noted that the financial

reporting requirements for ODS frequently changed and did not reflect use of standard Reports Control

Symbol (RCS) formats established for emergency or contingency situations. Also, the implementation of

non-standard financial reporting equirements imposed at AMCibepartment of the Army/Department of

Defense level, such as "Less Diverted Resources," and the failure .• use established reporting procedures

caused confusion and r ecluded the rapid assessment of resourue situations. Nor did the implemented

reporting requirements provide for the identification of "Cffset Credits," which are estimated amounts that

have been deferred or cancelled due to the current emergency anc ,nding limitations. Additionally, scarce

resources were strained in order to create, modify, and explain higher headquarters demands for new and

revised requirerments.5

In order that such problemL; might not reoccur, the comptrol!-: r's office urged that standard financial

reporting requirements be implemented, recognized, and used at I !eve!s to facilitate the management of

scarce resources, that templates for standard personal computer software-Lotus 1-2-3, dBase, etc.-be

developed to implement resource management, and that this be accomplished wih appropriate celerity.17

Summing its efforts aod observations up quite succinctly, resource management personnel made the

simple, boldface declaration: "A DEFINED STANDARD SYSTEM MUST BE IN PLACE READY TO PLUG IN !-M

The comptroller's cffice also made comment on, and subrmitted an observation concerning, the Civil

War statute authorizing commanders in the field to pay for feed for the troops and forage for the horses and

mules. Noting that the nature of the logistics support force had changed sineo the origination of RS 3732

Authority, the comptroller's office recommended that funding authorization documents (FADs) should be

prepared which clearly ;indicate what costs might be properly incurred in the support of a modern army.2*

The effort of the Ccmptroller of the Department of Defense to ferret out the actual cost of ODS also

resulted in the submission of a comment deemed "significant." Considering that the guidance offered by

the Comptroller of the Department of Defense sought to measure not only the obvious costs of the Gulf war

such as materiel, machinery, wages, ammunition, etc.. but also assistance-in-kind, realignments, reprogrammirgs and transfers connected to the war, AMCCOM's iccourtants were presented with the difficult

task of measuring the-se costs. Should the costs be those of replacement or original acquisition? Should

funds obligrated during ODS but not actuoliy incurred be included? How shrlud depot maintenance be

tallied? ;

196
In the computation of these figures, AMCCOM comptrollers came to the realization that higher echelon guidance and policy concerning costs of ODS concentrated on current costs and obligations and

that locally generated figures would also concentrate on these figures while ignoring those for previously

obligated funds until Congress required a tabulation.61

For future engagements, AMCCOM's comptrollers recommended that a more suitable method of

estimating, collecting, and reporting costs for assets expended and costs accrued in contingency operations, as well as operational expenses, be devised. Additionally, AMCCOM's comptrollers urged the

revision of not only the Army Field Manual (FM 14-6) Resource Management Operations, but also of the

AMC/AMCCOM Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (MOPES) and the Army

Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS). The new systems should be formulated to

implement a better means of understanding, collecting. and reporting costs for the nontheater logistics

support force, appraising operational, as weH as investment expenses, and the operating costs for forces

in the field.6

Also the subject of a "significant" observation was the tracking of costs for ODS. AMC established

requirements to report all obligations in support of the Gulf crisis against Management Decision Package (MDEP) code VKWT as well as Functional Cost Account (FCA) code 9999 The comptroller's office

observed that it appeared redundant to collect the costs of ODS against two data elements in the accounting

system. This seemed especially so in consideration of the fact that by using the MDEP code, specific

accountability for intensively managed weapon systems support was lost. While recognizing that the use

of separate codes could significantly increase the number of job orders as well as processing time required in the Standard Operations and Maintenance Army Research and Development Systems (SOMARDS),

AMCCOM comptrollers also acknowledged the imperativeness of AMC retai.,ing visibility fcr the resources

devoted to weapon systems management. Thus, AMCCOM officials recommended that the AMC Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management along with the Comotrolier of the Army, Defense Finance and

Accounting Service, and functional major subordinate commands develop and implement unique accourting project codes that would permit collection of costs to weapons system management as well as

contingency operations.63

The final "significant" submission connected with resource management contained within the A.i,,r

Action Re0Qrt specifically involved resource management within AMC. Comptrollers observed that during ODS AMCCOM received numerous requests for obligations and cost data. Redundant reporting elements,

conflicting requirements and guidance, as well as diverse data transmission requirements from different

staff elements imposed a taxing burden on resource management staff assets at the MSC level. While

much of the information requested was similar, disturbing parameter variations made a single response impossible and further hindered the system, as did the requirement for multiple copies in a "MINIM!ZE"

communication state.6'

From this experience, AMCCOM officials gathered that decentra;ized resource management does

not necessarily promote efficient operations. Conflicting guidance and multiple reporting requirements imposed an onerous burden on subordinate act'vities; separate channels of communication for resource

issues additionally hindered a unified command position. To limit the problem in the future, AMCCOM

comptrollers urged the centralization of resource management within AMC by £he Commanding General

to improve communication and interaction among appropriation managers, the use of standardized

automated reporting procedures, and the implementation of appropriate policies and procedures."5

Beyond the resource management observations deemed "significant," two others appeared in

AMCCOM's After Actt ni. One involved the separation of wartime requirements and obligations from

197
those of peacetime and the deveiooment of a tracking system for those requirements. The remaining

lesson focused upon budgetary requirements and the necessity of accelerating programs during times of

emergency.

Thirty-six supply-oriented observations were included in the AMCCOM After Action Reoort. two with

the designation "significant." One lesson deemed significant concerned the materiel release process in

emergency situations. Materiel Management noted that no procedure existed whereby the time required

to obtain a materiel release order (MRO) could be reduced. As it stood during ODS, the MRO process was

time consuming and involved numerous offices. Approval at the command level was always required, with

conditional releases needing approval from the four-star level. Ninety days could be consumed in the

process, frequently followed by transportation delays. While HO, AMC did provide some relief, further

measures appeared warranted to AMCCOM's materiel personnel. Indeed, they recommended that the

MRO process requirement be lessened by a documentary amendment providing relief in emergency

situations so that all but necessa,'y staffing might be eliminated and that approval authority might be

delegated to the lowest level possible.m

Additionally, materiel management personnel submitted that during the initial stages of ODS no

centrally accessible document existed which identified deploying units and deployment schedules. And

even though the requisitions/validations system contained authorization and asset information, its validity

became suspect duo to the volume of requisitions received and the knowledge that items were being

transferred among units.6 7

In discussions it became apparent that the problem occurred with the flood of requisitions which

Inundated MSCs when the initial deployment to SWA began. Units submitted requisitions for items they

did not need and freely used the SWA priority and project codes, and just as freely sought unnecessarily

exped'ted delivery dates. In some cases the requisitioning units did not even have orders to deploy. Yet

lacking a reliable means of validating the requisitions but desirous of fulfilling the needs of the soldier in the

sand, item managers released stocks and then attempted the validation process. These requisition

validations often resulted in the return of stocks to the depot and ultimately a decline in exaggerated materiel

orders.M

Thus supply personnel conc!uded that the traditional batch processing used to update asset and

authorization files ran too slowly and became cumbersome during mobilization. And in order that MSCs

might function efficiently and accurately, the need for a real or near-real time system, as oppcsed to a

cyclically updated one-weekly, monthly, or bimonthly-was sought. Thus, the materiel management

team of AMCCOM recommended that AMC develop a real, or near-real, time asset and authorization file

capable of interfacing with the time-phased force deployment data file and any other asset distribution file,

including direct input by TRADOC and FORSCOM (United States Army Training and Doctrine Command/

United States Army Forces Command) of items being redistributed within their commands. Materiel

Management recommended that HO AMC initiate the effort with HQDA input and invoivement due to the

multi-command nature of the implementation.i' 9

Taken individually the thirty-four" remaining supply-oriented submissions did not warrant AMCCM's

"significant" rating. Yet, taken as a whole, the remaining lessons could warrant scarcely less. As noted

in the summary analysis portion of the Aflg Action R ,r, "the most significant supply lessons learned

dealt with the absence of a furnctioning retail supp!y system, particularly during the early stages of ODS."

Contributing to this overall deficiency was the mid-stream status of the replacement process of the Standard

Army Intermediate Level Supply (SAILS) system by the Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSSI).

As a result, accountability and visibility of as:Pts received in SWA became practically non-existent. Visibility

198L
was further hampered by Lhe pirating of materiel on a first come rather than requisition basis. This ultimately

resulted in an excessive number of requisitions as units continually reordered what had not been

received. 70 The various work-arounds utilized in circumventing this pr&,lem resulted in a variety of lessons

learned: push pa:Kages, telephone and datafax requisitions, "priority" code abuse, supply discipline,

Desert Express, etc.

Remaining observations developed in conjunction with supply, but not warranting the designation "significant" involved the validation and visibility of supplies as well as the use of Prepositioned Materiel

Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS).

The United States Army's Total Package Fielding (TPF) program also warranted space in the Afte•

Action Report, Six lessons learned submitted in conjunction with the program were included in the report;

none, however, earned the designation "significant." Regardless, the emergency fielding of new equipment

did cause HO, AMCCOM concern. When equipment was fielded without the benefit of a fielding team,

AMCCOM frequently was unable to locate the materiel upon its arrival in theater. As a result, units could

not locate materiel in a timely fashion and duplicate shipments wpre required to correct instances of end

items received without necessary support equipment. Individuals involved in Integrated Logistics Support

urged the creation of procedures and controls to ensure that during future operations of the ODS nature,

limited resources were not wasted in an effort just to get the latest equipment in theater but without the

proper support.71

Beyond issues of supply and total package fielding, the After Action Report included submissions

concerning transportation. The report contained thirty of the observations generated involving transportation issues, only two of which carried the designation "significant." One involved the use of containerized

ammunition. USADACS (United States Army Defense Ammunition Center and School) officials observed

that in theater port congestion could be reduced by the increased utilization of containerized ammunition

shipments. Containerized ammunition, the observers noted, could be removed immediately upon

offloading to storage areas. The containers could also be beneficially used to aid retrograde. In

consideration of this observation, USADACS personnel urged that they be allowed to perform an

assessment of containerization capability.7 2 •

The conclusions drawn from the study suggested that containerizing ammunition resulted in

excessive costs when compared to the use of MILVANs (military vans), and that alternative freight

containers needed to be developed for future activities, and perhaps tested in the retrograde from SWA.'"

A second "significant" transportation lesson drawn from ODS involved the initial lack of a single focal

point for ammunition ship planning and the resultant irefficiencies, delay and lack of visibility by the Military

Traffic Management Command (MTMC) over all ammunition moving to port. A heavy depot workload

contributed to MTMC's inability to maintain separate Export Traffic Re!ease Requests (ETRR) for each

item. AMCCOM's Transportation Directorate took note of the difficulties experienced by MTMC and urged

the use of its "Fast Release" system to track ammunition ship, and shipments. By using the Defense

Standard Ammunition Computer System (DSACS), transportatico, modules automated assistance was

provided and maragement report capability enhanced. The ship messages generated provided complete

visibility over what each vessel was to carry, with reports sent to MTMC. customer services, the

Commander in Chief, depots, plants, ports, arid SWA. The e,-htinced visibi;ity provided support for

prioritization decisions, flexibiity for necessary diversions, and •r'paration for rbý..,ption and onward

transoortation, The modified structure was applied to AMCCOM and Single Manager tt., Cnnventional

Ammunition (SMCA) shipments only.:

199
From this experience, AMCCOM's transportation managers identified the need for a single focal point

for all ammunition ship planning actions using a single system, perhaps the "Fast Release" one. MTMC

endorsed the proposal and the Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) designatzcd AMCCOM as the

single focal point for ammunition ship planning upon discovery of its efforts. The system will provide for both

enhanced movement control and total visibility over all ammunition and missile shipments, both SMCA and

non-SMCA, and will be used for peacetime as well as contingency, mobilization, and wartime requirements.7

"

Other observations included in AMCCOM's After Action Report focusing on transportation involved

the ammunition basic load (ABL), ammunition visibility, documentation, the h-st utilizatioi, of space, and

depot, as well as port, facilities.

Three of the submitted and included observations involving weapons received the designation

"significant" in the final draft of AMCCOM's Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Re=ort. Concerning

weapons, AMCCOM's personnel noted that existing design processes did not always place adequate

emphasis on assuring that life cycle requirements-safety, reliability, availability, storability--could be met

for desert storage and operational use conditions. While ODS was a success and ammunition did perform

well, long-term storage under desert conditions would have exacted a high toll on performance and

storability had the war continued at great length. Developmental emphasis had been placed too firmly on

fighting a western European battle against the forces of the Soviet Union rather than in the deserts of

southwestern Asia. 76

Accelerated testing and modeling techniques revealed a number of potentially dangerous problems.

Glue joints on combustible cartridge cases were found to be drastically affected by high temperatures and

humidity with resulting reduced availability. Further, extensive exposure to open storage could reduce the

reliability of LX14 shape charge warheads, cause premature activation of glass battery ampules, and

reduce the reliable life of M577 mechanical time fuzes due to lubricant dissipation. Also, ballistic computers

utilizing "off-th,"-shelf" hardware appeared to perform reliably up to 129 degrees Fahrenheit. However,

there were soerv algorithm errors for extreme propellant temperatures resulting in unreliable ballistic

solutions.

77

Furthermore, studies of the M74 detected a safety hazard in high tempelature and humidity

conditions, as well as reduced electronic clock accuracy. The sand and dust of the Saudi desert also caused

problems with weapons systems and requires further testing and field user feedback. Affected weapons

systems include the M9 pistol, the M1911 pistol, the M14 rifle, the M249 machine gun, the M60 machine

gun, and the M2 machine gun."8

In consideration of these issues, AMCCOM personnel recommended that the design and development processes be modified to emphasize the life cycle requirements that must be met for desert storage

and operation.7 '

Fuither, weaponry personnel noted that ODS had overwhelmingty proven the value of management

by weapon system, The keystone to AMCC'JM support for ODS became the existence of an organized,

trained, and experienced teom for operationally critical ammunition items and weapon systems. The

system provided the ability to quickly react to user issues and problems as well as offering the visibility

requisite for the command to provide direction, redirect res-ources and immediately respond to inquiries and

taskers by higher authorit'es. The system also facilitated communication between weapon-responsible

commands, as well as between LARs in the field and HQ, AMCCOM.W"

200
In a note of self-congratulations, AMCCOM's weapons system personnel reiterated the success of

weapon systems management not only during development, production, and fielding of systems, but

especially during a wartime scenario where rapid adjustments and reactions are required in order to

maintain high operational readiness, regardless of operational constraints and the environment. Indeed,

the recommended action concerning weapon system management simply stated, "maintain current

systems."8"

The final "significant" weapon-oriented observation included in the After Action Report concerned the

accidental discharge of an 84mm:M136 (AT4). A cocked AT4 accidentally discharged when a corporal

attempted to improperly safe the weapon. While no lives were lost in the ensuing explosion, 14 soldiers

were injured when the AT4 projectile went through a tent, struck a single soldier, bounced past a portable

shower unit and entered a second tent where it struck a ruck sack containing a Claymore mine and other

assorted ammunition be!ore detonating. The insight gained concerning this accident was simple according

to Defense Ammunition Directorate personnel. They noted, "If instructions, either in training or as decals

on weapons, can be misinter-preted, they will be."12

In order to prevent future incidents, the dire,.torate recommended more intense safety training,

improved and clarified safety decals, the emphasis in training on safing weapons, not just firing them."3

Further submissions concerned with weapons, but not designated "significant," primarily involved

specific weapon maintenance issues in a desert environment, and life cycle requirements for desert

storage.

Approximately seventy observations which appeared in the initial listing for AMCCOM's required

report did not appear in the final iteration of that document. (Others had been cut from individual directorate

office submissions, but du not survive for analysis.) The elimination of the required commentary occurred

for a number of reasons: duplication, lack of appiicability, the obviousness of the lesson, consolidation with

other lessons, the need for further exploration and the declaration if illegality. Some observations were

apparently eliminated from the final draft of the After Action Report due to their local nature as well as the

possibility of consolidation. For example, material submitted by the Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plant

dealt with the facility's somewhat isolated Nevada location and its difficulty in obtaining sufficient

commercial carriers to support the h:gh priority shipments required by ODS. Hawthorne also had difficulty

outloading large numbers of vehicles with requisitioned ammunition. The difficulty stemmed from

inadequate numbers of experienced supervisors, blockers, and bracers, insufficient internal rail structures

and crowded loading conditions.11 As the problems with Hawthorne's outfloading capacity seemingly

appeared to AMCCOM officials to he a localized one, the submitted lessons were jointly deleted upon the

decision that direct action should be taken and a missing, larger-scoped summation generated for inclusion

in the final JULLS report.

Beyond Hawthorne's local issues, other material found internal resolution rather than spots in the

-ft-Action Report. Thus a "smart" terminal capable of rapidly analyzing tlme-phased force deployment

data was ordered, received, and installed at AMCCOM as recommended, and the Iowa Army Ammunition

Plant gained control over its outbound transportation via the institution of stricter dead-read mileage rules

and more resolute attention to priorities and required delivery dates. Independence, Missouri's Lake City

Army Ammunition Plant prepa, ed a construction project to meet mobilization-oriented MILVAN shortages,

and Indiana's Crane Army Ammur'.tion Activity undprtook to build up a supply of MILVANs and commercial

containers."

Other submissions were cut due to their lack of applicibility. Thus submitted lessons concerning the

201
foreign production of United States ammunition, the proper manner to support borrowed weaponry despite

its return, and the need to conduct an already completed study were eliminated. 6 The Executive Counci'

also eliminated repetitive observation files and those with a seemingly over-obvious message. Thus,

submissions which encouraged the clear and concise formulation of procedures and guidance, the

handling of matters expeditiously, an effort at up-front coordination, and honest communication were cut

from the final Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report as apparently being too general or too

obvious.87

In addition to the deletion of these lessons, the overview committee also struck down the proposal

that the 4.2" M329A2, HE, cartridge be used in combination with the M732 proximity fuze. Although the

combination had worked well in Operation Desert Storm, members of the Defense Munitions Directorate

noted that an 1989 Act of Congress prohibited this action.8 The Executive Council -also disagreed with the

United States Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center's (ARDEC) desire to make

M1 28 GEMSS mine dispenser readiness availability a factor in the report cards of those units equipped with

the device. Despite the fact that a high percentage of the M128 dispensers deployed in Europe were not

operational when the decision came to field them in support of ODS and that ARDEC engineers declared

it obvious that there had been no sense of urgency in maintaining the dispensers in operational condition,

the reviewers apparently did not believe the suggested action warranted.8 9

Several other proposed lessons "disappeared" between the first draft of the report and the finished

After Action Report. While some were simply combined to form broader-based lessons as in the missing

ones directed to arise from Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plant's problems and the need for clear directions

in the bracing and blocking of ammunition, the final disposition of several submitted observations remains

in question.90 While apparently forwarded to AMC as required by AMCCOM's compliance with 10 October

1989's AR 11-33, they do not appear in the After Action Reoort9t These submissions vary from support

arrangements for the M1 2A1 decontamination apparatu.-: and the servicability of the mask, cannister, and

filter elements of chemical defense equipment to the availability of qualified quality assurance personnel

and the contact team of the Fort Riley M109 self-propelled howitzers. Observations concerning the

availability of publications in support of ODS, the total package fielding schedule and the need to utilize the

United Nations/performance oriented packaging markings when ammunition shipments directed toward

SWA were filled also disappeared from AMCCOM's f'nal report. Other disappearing commentary dealt with

the need to review and update AMCCOM's mobilizi'ig temporary duty assignments (TDA) to prevent future

delays in facilitating callups as well as mobilizing the foreign intelligence office.

While these observations dropped from the system after being forwarded to AMC for inclusion at the

After Action Report, a small number of lessons fell to the simple "delete per Executive Council meeting of

.... The reasons did not always appear obvious.

Not since World War II had the United States mobilized so many men or so much materiel in the name

of war. And while the continual, vigiliant training conducted in dread of wc- had been helpful in support of

ODS, the experience was not without its problems, frailtiez, and disappointments. From these less than

halcyon moments, observations were gathered, notes were perhaps taken, analyses were made, and

lessons were learned. And beyond the containment of the forces of Saddam Hussein along with the

preservation of Kuwaiti integrity, these garnered lessons were the most important outcome of the war.

Indeed, Army Chief of Staff GEN Gordon R. Sullivan has noted that the lessons learned program, in the

form of after-action reviews, is "one of the most important training innovations ever."'3 For only with the

honest appraisal and consideration of the shortcomings experienced in one endeavor can soldiers, as well

as administrators, learn and improve their future performance.

202
If broad categories may be drawn from the observations gathered during Operations Desert Shield

and Desert Storm, and if the lessons extracted are appropriately applied, future endeavors will find an army

better prepared for whatever climate it finds the necessity of engagement. With the declining threat from

the Soviet Union, the nation must prep, re for warfare not in western Europe as anticipated and prepared

for, but rather for small, highly intense conflicts around the world. Men and materiel must be ready for any

scenario, backed by research and development.

Similarly, the nation must devote more energy to training and equipping for a battle fraught with the

potential for nuclearbiological-chemical combat. While these factors did not appear to be great threats

during the period of a bipolar world, their use possibility has risen greatly in the new world order and must

be piepared for accordingly. Soldiers and civilians must have equipment which is not only safe, but

comfortable in a variety of climatic conditions.

A further broad category which demands attention is that of communication. For as noted in the After

Action Report, "Communication during the Gulf Crisis was both a great asset and a potential weak point."94

AMCCOM relied upon commercial telephone lines and datafax resources to communicate not only in

country, but also out of country. Had the system failed due to overload, terrorism, direct Iraqi attack, or

friendly fire, the effect might have been disastrous. In order to prevent such over-reliance in future

endeavors, AMCCOM, as well as higher headquarters, must develop a transportable communication

package for their personnel.

Along with better communication support, LARs, QASAS, and SCRs (senior command representatives) need physical support that they did not receive in SWA. These civilians, for efficacious future action,

must receive adequate billeting, clothing, transportation, and authority or their mission may be severely

impaired. The creation of a containerized support package maintained within a van gained support as ODS

wound down.

A further broad category of observations that will assuredly alter future endeavors is that of regulatory

relief. AMCCOM personnel felt stymied during ODS by both statutory and regulatory restrictions guiding

socioeconomic programs, competition requirements, and environmental protection, as well as other

factors. AMCCOM, and others, must be able to respond in times of emergency without hindering delays.

Perhaps the most significant category of information to be generated by the ODS experience,

however, involves the absence of a functioning retail supply system. Caught in mid-stream replacement

of the Standard Army Intermediate Level Supply (SAILS) system by the Standard Army Retail Supply

System (SARSS), the visibility and accountability of assets received in SWA was practically nonexistent

The system's failure resulted in unitstaking ordered materiel that was not their own simply to ensure a

supply, the build-up of requisitions as units reordered that which was not being received, and work-arounds

to resolve the problems engendered.

These observations provide challenges to future training so that those who remember the past are

not condemned to repeat it. George Santayana should be pleased.

203
NOTES

1

MM Donald Wolff, chief of data base management at CALL, "Center for Army Lessons Learned," Soldie

May 1991, p. 28.

2 MAJ Anne Godsey, CALL data base manager, "Center for Army Lessons Learned," Soiers, May 1991,

p. 28.

3 MAJ Rich Bogdan, Jr., CALL chief executive officer, "Center for Army Lessons Learned," agd:LŽra, May

1991, P. 30.

4 Message (U), CORAMO to AIG 12113, Subject: Operation Desert Shiel~d Lessons Learned, 151 715Z

November 1990.

5

0oeration Desert Shield/Storm After ActiQn Ble.ort. June 1991, iv-1. Hereafter cited as After Action

6United States Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, Lessons Learned Task Force, 7 May 1991,

'Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report Figure 11-1, 11-3.

8lbid.

9lbid., 11-2.

"

1 Lessons Learned, 11162-02466 (00037) (U), HQ, AMOCOM, Tiile: Technicý.aI Publicat ions for Uniu

Qlimatic Conditions, 11 November 1990.

"Lessons Learned, 11162-52602 (00033) (U), AMSMC-QAL, Title: Information Related to AMCCOM

EgUjipmrt Operation in Adverse, Conditions. 11 November 1990.

"

2Lessons Learned, 1 2730-21506 (OOCý,6) (U), USADACS, Title:Av~aJIability of Logistics Documentation, 26

November 1990.

"13Lessons Learned, 52256-57232 (00158) (U), AMSMC-QAN, Title: True Climatic Conditions, 20 May

1991.

1

4 Lessons Learned, 52952-4 1644 (00201) (U), ARDEC, SMCAR-AST, Title: Ammunition Interchangability, 23 May 1991.

"

1 Lessons Learned, 61227-74231 (00237) (U), AMVCCOM-SWA, Title: .- c~unlability of Class C. 11 June

1991.

"~Ooeration Desert Shield/Storm After ActiQn Repo t, Summary Analysis-"Ammunition".

17Lessons Learned, 11156-81 427 (00028) (U), ORDEC, Title: Simple. Transportable CollectiveQ Protection.

11 November 1990.

204
"

1 Lessons Learned, 11159-50402 (00034) (U), ORDEC, Title: Vehicle Collective Protection/Cooling, 11

November 1990.

"'Lessons Learned, 11157-40472 (00029) (U), CRIDEC, Title: Realistic and Timely Intellig~ence, 11

November 1990.

2OLessons Learned, 11157-95549 (00030) (U), CRDEC, Title: Chemical Protective Equipment, 11

November 1990.

2

' Lessons Learned, 11157-95540 (00032) (U), HO, AMC COM, Title: Protective Masks Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS), 11 November 1990.

22Lessons Learned, 11159-81578 (00035) (U), CRIDEC, Title: Miscellaneous Consumable CS Defense A

.Equ~ipment 11 November 1990.

23Lessons Learned, 11160-08074 (00036) (U), CRIDEC, Title: Chemical/Biological Defense Materiel

M_ naem~en , 11 November 1990.

24Ibid.

"

2 Lessons Learned, 321 38-07116 (00084) (U), ORIDEC, SMCCR-OC, Title: Chemical Protective Equip--

ment (OPE) for Non-Combiatants. 14 March 1991.

26Lessons Learned, 52356-58715 (00173) (U), AMSMC-RT, Title: Speial Artillerv Marking Round1~

E~snl ro2Pstos 23 May 1991.

27 Lessons Learned, 52359-34842 (00176) (U), AMSMC-QA, Title: Shelf Life of Chemical Detection Items,

23 May 1991.

"~Lessons Learned, 60563-59509 (00222) (U), ORIDEC, SMCCR-DD, Title: Biological Detection Equipment, 23 May 1991.

29Lessons Learned, 61236-40384 (00247) (U), CPDEC, PM NCBDS AMCPM, Title: Fox NBCRS Operations in SWA. 12 June 1991.

30Lessons Learned, 52357-67995 (00174) (U), AMSMC-RD, Title: Commercial Telephone Communication

Dependency. OAR, 23 May 1991.

31f

SIbid.

120peration Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report. Summary Analysis-"Communication".

33Lessons Learned, 50233-99344 (00117) (U), AMSMC-MM, Title: Handling of Captured Foreign Matex-rief

1 May 1991.

3

4 Ibid.

"

3 Lessons Learned, 52255-19852 (00157) (U), AMSMC-OAL, Title: Lasb;. Protection for Apache Helicopter Crews. 20 May 1991.

205
-Lessons Learned, 91847-80204 (00003) (U), AMCCOM, Title: Identification of Deploying Units. 29

August 1990.

37Lessons Learned, 60468-67213 (00217) (U), AMSMC-DS, Title: Ammunition Requirements, 23 May

1991.

mLessons Learned, 52358-71848 (00175) (U), AMSMC-RD, Title: LAR Deployment. Communication.

Transportation. Life Support, 23 May 1991.

-9Lessons Learned, 53143-09305 (00212) (U), ARDEC SMCAR-FSM, Title: Foreign Ammunition Exploitation Program, 23 May 1991.

4OLessons Learned, 91847-40536 (00002) (U), AMCCOM, Title: Determining Unit Shortages. 12 September 1990.

4'Lessons Learned, 32136-04853 (00081) (U), AMSMC-IR, Title: AMC War Plan and MOPES. 21 March

1991.

42Lessons Learned, 52242-46234 (00150) (U), AMSMC-RD, Title: Preparation for Overseas Rotation/

Movement (POR/M)-ODS. 17 May 1991.

4Lessons Learned, 52350-31933 (00171) (U), AMSMC-RD, Title: AMCCOM Equioment S2QI4Qo~ r

CONUS Replacement Centers (CRC) OPS Proiect. 23 May 1991.

"44Ibid.

45Lessons Learned, 53048-32685 (00209) (U), WVA SMCWV-PCP-R, Title: Skills Needed. 23 May 1 9,1.

",Lessons Learned, 60533-71672 (00220) (U), AMSMC-RDA, Title: Readiness Rating, 23 May 1991.

47

Lessons Learned, 52359-69829 (00177) (U), AMSMC-PT, Title: Hiring Authority for Operation Desert

Storm. 23 May 1991.

"4Lessons Learned, 40944-10412 (00100) (U), AMSMC-PDJ, Title: Environmental Constraints on "Red

Wate" 5 April 1991.

"4Lessons Learned, 52361-37989 (00179) (U), AMSMC-PPC, Title: Re Relie 23 May 1991.

5°Lessons Learned, 52447-17232 (00181) (U), AMSMC-PCW, Title: Mobilizatio 23 May 1991.

5

'Lessons Learned, 52832-79304 (00188) (U), AMSMC-PF M, Title: Small Business 8(a) Goýl., 23 May

1991.

1

2

Lessons Learned, 52833-20592 (00189) (U), AMSMC-PPC, Title: Modification of Acquisition Process, 23

May 1991.

53 Ibid.

5Ibid.

206
55Ibid.

-'Lessons Learned, 00438-93789 (00008) (U), AMSMC-CP, Title: Financial Reporting Reguirements. 4

October 1990.

57

Ibid.

580peration Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report. Summary Analysis-m"Resource Management".

19Lessons Learned, 01969-89422 (00009) (U), AMSMC-PC, Title: RS 3732 Authority, 19 October 1990.

wLessons Learned, 50827-57627 (00135) (U), AMSMC-CP, Title: .tL 1 May 1991.

61 Ibid.

62

Ibid.

"~Lessons Learned, 50828-84121 (00136) (U), AMSMC-CP, Title: Tracking Costs by MIDEP. 1 May 1991.

641essons Learned, 50829-36745 (00137) (U), AMSMC-CP, Title: Resource Manaaement Operations

within AMC. 1 May 1991.

65Ibid.

'Lessons Learned, 52254-35311 (00156) (U), AMSMC-QAL, Title: Materiel Release Process during

Emergency Operations. 20 May 1991.

67

Lessons Learned, 52360-16406 (00178) (U), AMSMC-MM, Title: Identification and Prioritizing of

Deploying Unt. i23 May 1991.

68Ibid.

"~Ibid.

7

1

0

Operation Desert Shield/Stoim After Action Report, Summary Analysis-"Supply".

"

7 1 Qerat on Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report. Summary Analysis-"Total Package Fielding".[

"7Lessons Learned, 12750-29983 (00060) (U), USADACS, Title: Containerized Ammo Shipments. 26

November 1990.

73

Ibid.

"7

Lessons Learned, 52348-94169 (001 70) (U), AMSMC-TM, Title: Single D0O0 Focal Point for Ammunition

Ship Planning. 20 May 1991.

75

Ibid.

207
"76

Lessons Learned, 52258-59226 (00159) (U), AMSMC-QAN, Title: Life Cycle Requirements for Desert

Storage and Operational Use Conditions, 20 May 1991.

"Ibid.

78

Ibid.

7lbid.

8OLessons Learned, 52353-76942 (00172) (U), AMSMC-AS, Title: Weapons Systems Management, 20

May 1991.

81 Ibid.

8Lessons Learned, 52961-33513 (00203) (U), ARDEC AMSMC-DSM, Title: Launcher and Cartridge.

84mm: M136 (At4W. Accidental Discharge. 23 May 1991.

"•Ibid.

1Draft of Lessons Learned, 11150-31186 (00020) (U), Hawthorne AAP, Title: Commercial Carrier

Availability to Suoport High Priority Shioments. 11 November 1990; 51760-07135 (00143) (U), Hawthorne

AAP, Title: Installation Shipping Capacity. 17 May 1991; 51762-57546 (00145) (U), Hiwthorne AAP, Title:

Exoanding Instatlation Outloading Capabilities. 17 May 1991; 51763-72082 (00146) (U), Hawthorne AAP,

Title: Lack of Rail in South Magazine Area, 17 M3y 1991; and 51764-31577 (00147) (U), Hawthorne AAP,

Title: Lack of Commercial Transoortation Assets. 17 May 1991.

"•Ibid., 92864-28496 (00007) (U), AMCCOM, Title: Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD)

Accessib Mi, 28 September 1990; 11151-29612 (00022) (U), Iowa AAP, Title: Outbound Transpr.taign. 11 November 1990; 60568-21076 (00223) (U), Lake City AAP, Title: MILVAN Handling Facility. 23 May 1991; 6073474498 (00229) (U), Crane AAA, Title: MILVAN/Commercial Containers. 11 June 1991.

Although the drafters of the Lessons Learned estimated that the "smart" terminal would be in place within

five years, it was actuaily installed within a single year. See Lessons Learned, 928e4.28496 (00007) (U), AMCCOM, Title: Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) Accessibility, 28 September 1990.

6Draft of Lessons Learned, 52951-01271 (00200) (U), ARDEC SMCARAST, Title: World Ammunition

Production Data Base. 23 May 1991; 61135-16862 (00231) (U), AMSMC-LSP, Title: Shoulder Launched

Multi-Purpose Assault Weapon (SMAW). 11 June 1991; 52968-52883 (00207) (U), ARDEC AMSMC-LSA,

Title: Shcrtage of Replacement/Spare Parts. 23 May 1991.

871bid., 92863-71412 (00006) (U), AMCCOM, Title: HQ. AMCCOM SurCe Production Program. 28

September 1991; 41019-15724 (00106) (U), AMSMC-CA, Title: Obiigation Reoortin_ 10 April 1991; 52342-89983 (00167) (U), LHAAP SMCLO-XC, Title: Ammo Plant MILVAN Loading Capabiliy 20 May

1991; 52468-61649 (00183) (U), AMSMC-RDP, Title: Segregation of ODS Suppon Funds. 23 May 1991; 52827-48372 (00184) (U), AMSMC-PPM, Title: Desert Storm Budget, 23 May 1991; 52830-33551 (00186)

(U), AMSMC-SP, Title: Federal Acguistion Regulation (FAR). 23 May 1991; 52957-93815 (00202) (U), ARDEC SMCAR-ASF, Title: Return of Captured Enemy Eguipment. 23 May 1991; 52966-33121 (00204) (U), AMSMC-LSL, Title: M109 Howitzer Parts Shortages. 23 May 1991; 52969-31520 (00208) (U), WVA

SMCWVPP, Title: Chief. Purchasing and Contracting Division, 23 May 1991; 60537-15237 (00221) (U), CRDEC SMCCR-OPA, Title: Use of the M687 Binary Round for Prototvyoe Day/Night Marking and

208
Illumination 23 May 1991: 60629-79642 (00224) (U), AMSMIC-DS, Title: Receint of Sustainment

Requirements from DA. 23 May 1991:61234-12251 (00242) (U), AMCCQM-SWA, Title: LaCiqfMoverment

.Cotrol MC uipport as TSAs 11 June 1991; b2769-80722 (00262) (U), CROEC PM-AMMOLOG, Title:

Acceleration of Ammrrunlt-on Srvplliýnce Information. 21 June 1991, 70950-74923 (00270) (U), ARDEC,

Title: AMCCOM Materiel Release Coordinator, 21 June 1991: and 91855-16051 (00004) (U), AMSMC-PD,

Title: Problem Areas in Price and Availability (P3 A). 20 August 1990; 91855-68456 (00005) (U). AMOCOM,

Title: PMMras 24 August 1990; 31427-54563 (00080) (U), AMSMC-LS, Title: Ei~Teg~ ýtn N2-5Lnd.ýuj

EgpJir~ment for Coeration Desprt Storm. 11 March 1991; 53049-39262 (00210) (U), WVA SMGWV-IN, Title:

Public Affairs Office, 23 May 1991; 61228-23087 (03239) (U), AMCCOM-SWA. Title: Co~mbatUnits

Attempino to Aain Ex~cessive Amount of Supplie-, under UBI- (Ujnit BasicLoad) A ibhgrit.' 11I June 1991,

61288-58157 (GC240) (U), AMCOOM-S WA, Title: Theter Ammo Units Tasked to Provide DietS

to Kuwi~~LCity- 11 June 1991; 61234-41378 (00243) (U), AMCCOM-SWA, Title: C.Qnflicti a Irnstruclions

ederpIQvmrent.!RetrooradQ Procedures. 11 June 1991;:61235-93851 (00246) (U), Picatinny, Title: -ChLrC

Conditions, 12 June 1991; 70225-36882 (00263) (U), ARDEC, Title: Enhanced Performance throb

Improved Coordination and Communication. 21 June 1991; and 70926-18248 (00267) (U), ARDEC, Title:

Proiectile 155mm Artillery Delivered Exoendable Jammer (AD/EXJAM) VA867. 21 June 1991.

wIbid., 60633-6-1823 (00228) (U). SMCAR-FSS-DM, Title: M329A2. HE Cartrido!2/M732 Proximity uze.

"~Ibid., 60456-50833 (00213) (U), ARDEC SMCAH-FSM, Title: M128 GEM.SS Mine Oispenser. 23 May

1991.

91Ibid, 51760-07135 (00143) (U), Hawthorne AAP, Title: Instalati.I1n Shipping Cacability. 17 May 1991;

51762-57546 (001 45) (U), Hawthorne AAP, Title: Expanding Installation Outfoading (,_a=j~ 17 May

1991; 51 764-31577 (C0147) 1tU), Hawthorne AAP, Titie: Lack of Commercial TransprqajbDnAcsts 7 a

1991; 61724-76282 (00250) (U). Picatintiy, Title: Shorment of Ammunition Basic.Load, 21 June 1991:

61830-81896 (00252) (U), CROEC, PM-AMMOLOGMCPM, Title: Corrpliance with 49 CRF and Transportation Exemption (DOT-E) 3498. 21 June 1991; and 6191933860 (00253) LU, RDEC, PM NBCDS

AMCPM, Title: Ammuntion Blocking and Qracinr' Requirements. 12 June 1991.

91 Ibid., 11158-26677 (00031) (U), HO. AMOCOM, Title: M1 2A I Decontamninat on Apparat

us, 11 November 1950; 11159-15508 (00033) (U), 110, AMOCOM, Tile: Serviceab~ity of fvMak~s, C an~iisters. and Filter

Elements 11 November 1991;:11166-61358 (,00048) (U), McAlester AAP, Title: Personnel. 11 Novemnber

1991: 20435-73902 (00064) (U), AMSMC-MA, Title: M109 Self-ProuelldHwtesLctda tRly

KS. M1 09 Contact Team. 30 November 1990; 21 049-57344 (00065) (U), AMStMC-MA, Title: Ptbig ig

for Op2eration Desert Shield. 7 December 1990; 10238-59433 (00071) (U). ORDEC, Title: Total Package

Fe±ldin.ciShedule, 2 January 1990 (1991?); 10239-94659 (00072) (U), McAlester AAP, Title: UJ.~

Performance Orien ted Packaging Ma rkingis. 2 January 1990 (199 !?); 32143-4710-6 (00091) (U), AMSMCPT, Title: AMCCQM Individual Mobilization Ajcrnentee (IMA) CciL- 19 March 1991; 50350-50684

(00132) (U), AMSMC-Sl, Title: Wartime Motilization of the E~~jgjn Inteiligence Office. 1 May 1991: 52241 -

18626 (00149) 11U), AMSMCRD, Title: Deployment. Weapons. E-ijipment, and Reimbur¶'ement, 17 May

1991; and 52263-25554 (00163) (U), AMSMC-QAVV, Title: SheaI Life of ChemnicalýQ Decion Itenms, 20 May

1991.

921bid., 52241-18626 (00149) (U), AMSMC-RD, Title: Deploymcnan. Weapons. Equipment, and Reimbursemet 17 May 1991; 60631-11045 (00225) (U), SMCAR-ISO-F, Title: Unsokici Donations from the

American Pepole. 6 June 1991; 61135-09068 (00230) (U), CRDEC AMCPM-SK, Title: Foo Oil for Large,

AreaSmnoke Generation. 6 June 1,991; 61151-73102 (00235) (U), AMCCOM-SWA, Titla: Reception of Unit, [

209
11 June 1991; 61224-39856 (C0236) (U), AMCCOM-SWA, Title: TACCS for DISPERS Management, 11

June 1991; and 61230-05671 (00241) (U), AMCCOM-SWA, Title: Downloading of Corp Weapon Systems.

11 June 1991.

9GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, "A Trained and Ready Army: The Way Ahead,"Military Review, November 1991,

p. 6.

94

Ooeration Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report. Summary Analysis-"Communication".

210
Chapter Seven

Concluding Commentary on AMCCOM's Role

in

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

On the evening of 27 February 1991, President George Bush addressed not only America, but the

world as well, from the Oval Office of the White House. With the world's full attention, he announced:

America and the world drew a line in the sand. We declared that the aggression

against Kuwait would not stand, and tonight, America and the world have kept their

word.'

Kuwait is liberated. Iraq's army is defeated. Our military objectives are met ....

(This) is a time of pride in our troops.... Ano soon we will open wide our arms to

welcome back home to America our magnificent fighting forces. 2

Beyond announcing the suspension of offensive combat operations in Iraq and Kuwait, President Bush also

laid down the requirements that the defeated Saddam Hussein would have to meet for the suspension of

hostilities to become a permanent cease-fire. The conditions specified that Iraq must immediately release

all prisoners of war (POWs), third-country nationals, Kuwaiti detainees and the remains of those killed.

Furthermore, President Bush ordered that the Iraqi government disclose the location of all deployed land

and sea mines. Additionally, he disclosed that before the temporary cease-fire could be considered

permanent that Iraq must agree to comply with all United Nations resolutions, including rescission of the

annexation of Kuwait and payment of compensation for damages caused by its aggression. The Iraqis were

also called upon to designate military commanders to meet with a coalition delegation within 48 hours to

arrange for military aspects of 'he cease-fire.'

Heading the coalition delegation, GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf, United States Army, met with senior

Iraqi military representatives in a tent beside the gravel runway at Safwan, Iraq, on Sunday, 3 March 1991.

Emerging irom the two-hour session, GEN Schwarzkopf reported that both sides had agreed on all matters

discussed. Within hours of the meeting, the Iraqis released ten POWs, including six Americans. The

remainder of the POWs held by Saddam Hussein were freed over the course of the nex, four days. The

process of releasing the over 100,000 Iraqis who had sui rendered to coalition forces was also begun with

dispatch.4

Ironing out the details of the formal cease-fire agreement at the United Nations took another month.

That mission was accomplished on 3 April. 1991, with Saddam Hussein pronouncing his acceptance on

6 April, and the official cease-fire being proclaimed on 10 April. Included within the United Nations

agreemeiit was the authorization of a 1,440-member cbserver team to oversee the newiy created

demilitarized zone separating Kuwait and Iraq.i

Even as the two delegations were meeting in Safwan, Iraq, Islamic fundamentali.;ts in the southern

Iraqi city of Basra were rising in revo!t agiinAt the rule cf Saddam Hussein. The arrival of thousands of !iaqi

troops and vehicles driven out the Kuwaiti ieserl by the Desert Storm blitzkrieg addo.d to the chaos and

confusion in the nation's second largest city. The arriving remnants of the Iraqi Republicain Giard, many

apparently still loyal to Saddam Hussein, turned their few remaining tanks and guns on ,he irbels and in

a iew days crushed the revolt in Basra and nearly a dozen other southern cities. Thvu)ýArnds of rebels

211
escaped, fleeing southward toward the American-occupied regions of southern Iraq. Similar uprisings were

underway in the predominantly Kurdish regions of northern Iraq, near the borders with Turkey and Iran. In

these instances, Hussein unleashed his remaining helicopter gunships against the lightly armed Kurds, and

again it took only a few days to turn nearly a million rebels into refugees, fleeing to the mountainous regions

along the Turkish and Iranian borders. In the melee, Operation Desert Storm (ODS), born of Operation

Desert Shield, became Operation Provide Comfort as approximately 13,000 coalition military personnel,

including about 9,000 American soldiers, turned their full attention upon providing food, si ,elter and medical

care to the refugees. 6

While the uprisings continued in the nation of Iraq, and coalition warriors struggled to "provide

comfort," the foremost thought in the minds of most Americans, and the troops deployed to the desert in

particular, was a simple, "Wnen do we go home?" President Bush provided the first hint that U.S. troops

would soon be returning when he addressed Congress just three days after the 3 March 1991 Safwan

agreements. To the joint session, the president pronounced:

Soon our troops will begin the march we've al! been waiting for -- their march home.

I have directed Secretary (of Defense Richard B.) Cheney to begin the immediate

return of American combat units from the Gulf. Less than two hours from now, the

first planefhad of American soldiers will lift cff from Saudi Arabia, headed for the

U.S.A. T1hat plane will carry men and women of the 24th Mechanized Infantry

Division bound for Fort Stewart, Georgia. This is just the beginning of a steady flow

of American troops coming home 7

With that initiative, the redeployment of U.S. forces became the next major effort of USCENTCOM

(United States Central Command). Within just a few days, a daily average of 5,000 troops was being airlifted

back to the United States. Those not engaged in monitoring the cease-fire in Iraq and Kuwait or providing

comfort to refugees turned their attention to the repair, cleanup, repacking and loading of the mountains

of supplies and equipment which had taken seven months to deliver. As the Association of the United States

Army's Special Report The U.S. Army in Oop._on ,'Li esrrt observed, "Not even the oldest soldier

in Desert Storm had ever witnessed a 30-mile square ammunition supply point like the one established in

Saudi Arabia."'

Quoting President George Bush's 27 February 1991 address to the nation, MG Paul L. Greenberg,

commander of the United States Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, could note with

pride that, "No small part of the success of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm [lay] with the

employees of ... AMCCOM." Not only had the command's employees worked diiigently to ensure that

American troops had received the equipment, munitions and supplies needed to maintain superiority in the

desert, but many had volunteered to travel to Southwest Asia (SWA) personally. Following a listing of

AMCCOM's major accomplishments during the deployment, including the output of assorted army

ammunition plants (AAPs), the filling of 210,300 requisitions valued at $6.62 billion, the shipment of more tj

than 453,000 short tons of ammunition to support the troops in SWA, the refurbishing of hundreds of

thousands of chemical protective masks, and the development and shipment of over 78.000 cop~es of three

technical manuals covering armament, munitions and chemical defense equipment. MG Grrenbcrg could

offer, "By working togcther you have brought hope and encouraqement to our young men and woiren in

the field. Your efforts have made the victory in the Persian Gulf a total success.,,

MG Greenberg's comrments on AMCCOM contributions to the victory in the desert, due to their F

212
format, touch but the tip of the sand dune. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, AMCCOM

employed 17,934 civilian employees and 633 military personnel. During the deployment, the command was

authorized to hire 1,035 temporary employees in support of the operation. Approximately 700 temporary

employees, scattered amongst the various locations under the hegemony of AMCCOM, were actually

hired. Installations utilizing temporary employees included McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, McAlester,

OK; Crane Army Ammunition Activity, Crane, IN; Pine Bluff Arsenal, Pine Bluff, AR; Rock Island Arsenal,

Rock Island, IL; U.S. Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC),

Picatinny Arsenal, NJ; U.S. Army Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center (CRDEC),

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; and a few selected headquarters elements, Rock Island, IL. During the

war, the command deployed over 240 military and civilian employees to the desert. Additionelly, miliary

Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) were activated to predetermined positions on the AMCCOM

Mobilization Table of Dist, ibutions and Allowances (TDA). A total of one hundred forty-one reservists were

activated. They filled mobilization TDA positions at HQ, AMCCOM, CRDEC, Pine Bluff Arsenal, and

McAlester Army Ammunition Plant. Of the total activated, five served their nation in SWA.' 0

The personnel of AMCCOM and its subordinate units had been further augmented during ODS by

the authorization it received to buyback 132 civilian positions it had lost in the August ! 990 reduction-inforce. All told, the civilian workload undertaken by AMCCOM and its subordinates in support of ODS from

6 August 1990 through 28 February 1991 constituted 1,619,552 hours with a concommitant expenditure

of $52 million."

Working together, AMCCOM's personnel administered 508,100 materiel requisitions in support of

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Prior to the onset of the deployment, its offices had filled an

average of 50,000 requisitions per month, but with the deployment this number rose to approximately

73,000 requisitions per month. AMCCOM's Procurement Directorate accelerated 143 actions, 53

contracts, 96 purchase orders, arid awarded 503 contracts in support of 0DS. Consequently the directorate

administered a total of 1,434 procurement requirements during the war at a dollar value of $895,169,286.

Many of these actions were executed with litkle or no additional cost to the government, or accordingly, the

taxpayer, as they represented accelerations, not unbudgated purchases. By the war's conclusion,

AMCCOM had shipped $97 million worth of Class II supplies (individi jal equipment), and $356 million worth

of Class IX supplies (repair parts). Such efforts contributed mightily to the iron mountain of materiel shipped

to SWA by AMCCOM.12

Major items shipped by AMCCOM to SWA in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

by AMCCOM included the foliowirg:"

MAJOR ITEM QUANTITY

M240 machine gun 1,792

M240C machine gun 381

M60 machine gun 1,076

M60D machine gun 150

Mr tripod M1 22 793

M249 machine gun 929

M2 machine gun, flex 372

M3 tripod 569

M2 meachine gun, fixed 277

M85 machine gun 228

MK19 grenade machine gun 395

M9, 9mm pistol 10,770

213
A/

MAJOR ITEM QUANTITY

M1911 Al, 45 caliber pistol 9,254

38 caliber, 4' barrel revolver 490

38 caliber, 2" barrel revolver 90

M3A1 45 caliber submachine gun 316

M1200 12 gauge shotgun 203

Pyrotechnic AN-M8 pistol, without mount 36

M16A1 rifle 45,896

M16A2 rifle 9,420

M203 grenade launcher 1,183

M24 sniper weapon system 180

M21 sniper rifle 5

M41 armament subsystem 28

M24 armament subsystem 13

M23 armament subsystem 17

M130 general dispenser 454

M197 20mm machine gun 13

M230 30mm automatic gun 19

M24A1 4.2" mortar 11

M29A1 81mm mortar 6

M224 60mrm mortar 7

M23 computer ballistics 35

M252 81mm mortar 81

M67 90mm recoilless rifle 31

M12A1 decontaminating apparatus 282

M17 lightweight decontaminating apparatus 600

M87 gas particulate filter unit 15

M56 gas particulate filter unit 10

M59 gas particulate filter unit 25

M10 protective entrance 20

M12 protective entrance 2

M20 simplified collective protection equipment 348

M51 shelter system 46

M9A1 gas mask 1,202

M43 aircraft mask 680

M24 aircraft gas mask 3,962

M25A1 tank gas mask 27,585

M17 series field gas mask 314,585

M3A41/M157 smoke generators 99

M239/Mk.250/M243/M257/M259 smoke grenade launchers 1,462

M841 chemical agent alarm (CAA) 4,529

M 140 test set 35

M81 simulator 342

chemical agent monitor (CAM) 66

mine clearing line charger (MICLIC) launchers 34

mine clearing line charger (MICLIC) trailers 34

M33A1 disperser 22

Canadian chemical agent monitors 500

battery servicing she;ter mounted shop set 6

2'i 4
MAJOR ITEM QUANTITY

fire control mechanic tool kit 17

field ordnance tool set 

4

automotive maintenance tool kit #2 

5

aircraft armam( It repairman tool kit 42

small arms rep .'r shelter mounted shop set 

2

automotive mai, tenance tool kit #1 22

field maintenan,'e machine shop 

2

canvas and gla.,,s repair, shelter mounted shop set 10

spare parts stor •ge shop set 29

special weapons tool kit 

3

engineer air assault tool kit 18

artillery repair shop, shelter mounted 

3

artillery shop set, field maintenance 

4

tracked vehicle maintenance shop set 

2

electronic systems maintenance tool set 

8

electronic maintenance tool kit 

8

instrument and fire control tool kit 5

robot explosive ordnance device 28

M122 firing device 36

lathe engine 19

welding machine 35

torch outfit 21

power hacksaw 

2

MK36 tool set, explosive ordnance device 15

MK37 tool set, explosive ordnance device 20

container cavity 15

lathe brake drum 

9

steam cleaner 109

tool outfit hydraulic test and repair kits 

6

electrical repair shop set, semi-trailer mounted 

6

tool set, injection explosive MK MODS 8

tool set, fiberscope, MK 1, MOD 0 34

shop equipment. general purpose kits 

2

shop equipment, contact maintenance kits 405

back-up computer system, general 90

shop equipment, organizational repair kit 20

back-up computer system, special 42

M102 howitzer 8

M163A1 self-propelled VADS 3

M65 periscope 52

telescope 39

M109A2 howitzer 3

M109A3 howitzer 3

M578 recovery vehicle 10

M 198 howitzer 1

M 138 mine dispenser (flipp3r) 114

M2A2 aiming circle 174

M90 radar chronograph 49

215
Major systems supported by AMCCOM during ODS, primarily with items manufactured at the

command's Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island, IL, facility, included the M1 02 105mm towed howitzer, the

M198 155mm towed howitzer, the M109 155mm self-propelled howitzer and Ml10 8" self-propelled

howitzer. Additionally, AMCCOM supported the M1 67A1 towed Vulcan, the Ml 2 decontaminating unit, and

the M163A1 self-propelled Vulcan. Parts supplied to the forces in SWA in support of these major weapon

systems included recoil rails, replenishers, recuperators, obturator pads, and spacers to prevent inadvertent damage to the army's newly designed M864 white phosphorous smoke projectile and M825A1

projectile, containing small multiple bomblets. Without the spacers, the projectiles rattled dangerously in

the howitzers' storage bustles.' 4

Aiding HQ, AMCCOM in supporting the deployed troops were its three ar'enals: Pine Bluff Arsenal,

Pine Bluff, AR; Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island, IL; and Watervliet Arsenal, Watervliet, NY. As noted, Rock

Island Arsenal served primarily as a job lot shop during the war, providing numerous spare parts, as well

as spacers for the effort. Additionally, its staffers assembled and shipped quantities of tool kits and shop

sets, as well as painted deploying National Guard unit vehicles the appropriate desert camouflage CARC

(chemical agent resistant coating). Pine Bluff Arsenal refurbished tens of thousands of chemical defense

masks both at their Arkansas site and at a Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, facility. Additionally, Pine Bluff Arsenal

provided contact teams to travel into the desert to refurbish the masks, and build the confidence of units

that could not travel to Dhahran. Pine Bluff Arsenal also aided the cause of liberty in SWA by its increased

production of 81mm smoke-generating red phosphorous mortar rounds designed to screen or mask

soldiers' activities. And, of course, Watervliet Arsenal had provided crucial boring and welding input on the

creation of the infamous "bunker-buster" that helped to bring the war to a successful close.15

Also helping to bring the Persian Gulf War to a successful conclusion was the designation of

AMCCOM as the single focal point for ammunition ship planning. While AMCCOM's bureaucratic

predecessor had been declared the Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) in 1977 when

the army assumed control of all the nation's ammunition facilities, it was not until the opening of Operation

Desert Shield that AMCCOM's responsibilities expanded to include ammunition ship planning.1

The designation came about after a significant amount of chaos in the initial days of ODS. During

the opening stage of the operation, some ammunition shipments were "free flowing" into the ports without

the prior knov,'edge of the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) through Export Traffic Release

Requests (E RRs). Noting that heavy depot workloads contributed to a backlog of delayed ETRRs,

resulting in inefficiencies, delays and a distinct lack of visibility over all ammunition moving to port,

AMCCOM proposed a solution. The command proposed that by using a single data system, its "Fast

Release" structure, some of the confusion could be eliminated at id the servicemember more effectively

served. Persuaded by the argument, MTMC endorsed AMCCOM's proposal and TRANSCOM (United

States Army Transportation Command) designated AMCCOM as the single focal point for ammunition ship

planning.1 7

Using the Fast Release system, AMCCOM made tentative plans for 60 ammunition carrying vessels

to leave the continental United States (CONUS) in support of the territorial integrity of Kuwait and Saudi

Arabia. Of the planned vessels, 24 were intended to support the needs of the army, in terms of SMCA, with

the transport of 222.5 thousand short tons. Twenty-two vessels were intended to carry 226.4 thousand

short tons for the use of the air force, and 14 ships were scheduled to move 117 thousand short tons for

the Marine Corps. Yet before all scheduled vessels could depart CONUS, or even be loaded, Operation

Desert Storm had ground to a close. By the war's conclusion, however, only 49 of the planned 60 vessels

had been loaded and otherwise prepared for transit to SWA. Of the prepared vessels, 23 were loaded with

216
army ammunition, 17 with air force conventional ammunition, and nine with Marine Corps ammunition. The

loaded vessels carried an ammunition total of 477,000 short tons. A total of 44 ships actually sailed toward

SWA under the suzerainty of AMCCOM during ODS. Of the vessels actually leaving CONUS ports, 23

carried army ammunition, 12 bore air force supplies, and nine transported Marine Crops conventional

ammunition. The total tonnage of ammunition the vessels bore was 434,000 short tons. The remaining

ammunition provided to Americans and coalition members in the desert was supplied from facilities based

outside the continental United States (OCONUS).' 8

During the course of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the command directed shipments

of ammunition to the desert totaling $4 billion. This included 274,000 short tons of bombs, 245,000 short

tons of artillery, 34,000 tons of small arms ammunition, 36,000 tons of mortar, tank, and navy gun munitions,

and an assortment of 31,000 additional tons. The total shipments directed by AMCCOM constituted

620,000 tons. And while this tonnage includes that shipped from OCONUS facilities, it does not include

the approximately 60,000 short tons of assorted Class V (ammunition) stores carried on three Marine Corps

Near Term Prepositioned Fleet (NTPF) vessels-the Green Island, the Green Harbor, and the Austral

Rainbow.'9

Aiding AMCCOM in supplying America's fighting men and women, as well as many coalition

members, with ammunition were its thirteen government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) army

ammunition plants (AAPs) and two government-owned, government-operated (GOGO) facilities. Falling

into the former category are: Hawthorne Army Ar munition Plant, Hawthorne, NV; Holston Army

Ammunition Plant, Kingsport, TN; Indiana Army Ammunition Plant, Charlestown, IN; Iowa Army Ammunition Plant, Middletown, IA; Kansas Army Ammunition Plant, Parsons, KS; Lake City Army Ammunition

Plant, Independence, MO; Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant, Texarkana, TX; Longhorn Army Ammunition

Plant, Mamhall, TX; Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant, Shreveport, LA; Milan Army Ammunition Plant,

Milan, TN; Radford Army Ammunition Plant, Radford, VA; Scranton Army Ammunition Plant, Scranton, PA;

and Sunflower Army Ammunition Plant, ..eSoto, KS. GOGO facilities include McAlester Army Ammunition

Plant, McAlester, OK, and Crane Army Ammunition Activity, Crane, IN.3

Several of the plants were cited in the official after action report for their extraordinary accomplishments in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Crane Army Ammunition Activity, for

example, received commendation for their modification of 1,500 linear demolition charges, the delivery of

7,050 short tons of ammunition in a seven day period, and the loading of 52 railcars and 66 trucks in 23

days. Loading 258 trucks and 138 railcars in a week, as well as moving from a single work shift to a three

shift rotation covering a 24 hour, seven day per week schedule, and shipping 65 short tons of ammunition

in a mere 90 days earned Hawthorne AAP notice. Indiana AAP earned notice as well for its accomplishments during ODS. During the war, the plant shipped 235,000 propelling charges. Additionally, it loaded

63 MILVANs (military vans) and 15 railcars in a single, arduous week."

Iowa AAP, working from Middletown, IA, despite a brief work stoppage, shipped 8,500 short tons of

tank ammunition, mines, demolitions, and missile warheads, constituting 80 railcars and 190 truck loads,

during the deployment. Kansas AAP produced over 10,000 155mm prcjectiles for shipment to SWA during

the war, and at one frenetic point loaded 77 trucks with ammunition in a five day period. Lake City AAP

received notice in the after action report for shipping over 320,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition

during the war. Also receiving notice was Lone Star AAP for shipping 60 railcars of munitions over the

Christmas holiday.2 1

AMCCOM's top cadre also observed the diligence of Louisiana AAP in the after action report. That

facility produced 2.75mm rockets as fast as rocket motors were received from the vendor, and conducted

217
the first ever ammunition container shipment for United States Army requirements. Additionally, Milan AAP

shipped over 30,000 short tons of ammunition during the deployment, and loaded 105 MILVANs and 24

trucks in a single week. Also gaining the attention of the command were the efforts of the Mississippi AAP.

During the deployment the plant shipped over 60 shot tons of support equipment to American servicemembers and assisted in moving over 110 MILVANs in a ten day period.23

In addition to arranging for the creation and transportation of nearly 311 of the ccnventional ammunition

used by American servicemembers, and much of that used by coalition members as well, AMCCOM

provided copies of over 600 different technical publications to deployed or deploying units. AMCCOM

personnel prepared over 865,000 pages of extant, techrical information for use in the Persian Gulf.2 4

Furthermore, at the onset of Operation Desert Shield, AMCCOM realized that its armament,

munitions and chemical defense equipment would be severely tested in the environment of the Persian

Gulf. It also recognized that troops deployed there would need to be alerted to the best manner in which

to use and maintain the materiel. The command, therefore, assembled a team and developed three

technical manuals: Armament, Chemical Defense Eauim.ment. and Ammunition. Information for the

manuals was gathered from users and experts worldwide and then documented in pocket-sized, desertcamouflaged manuals that could be used as a quick reference for soldiers serving in SWA. The manuals

spelled out, in layman's language, protective measui es which needed to be taken to minimize the damaging

effects of high temperatures, high humidity, sand, and dust. The manuals also identified operation and

maintenance limitations in the severe SWA climate, and spelled out ways to compernsate for the

limitations. 25

Printed in numerous editions, at least four of the chemical defensive equipment manual, and two of

the ammunition and armament booklets, a total of over 78,000 copies, constituting several million pages,

were published and distributed to the deploying troops. The first set was airlifted in October 1990 to forces

already in the desert. AMCCOM subsequently shipped manuals to units preparing for travel to SWA and

to the various mobilization station sites in CONUS. Soldiers responded to the manuals with appreciation,

and, more importantly, use. Requests for additional copies arrived at HO, AMCCOM almost daily. With

reference to the manuals during a briefing to his battalion commanders, the commander of the 75th Field

Artillery noted that if his soldiers had not read the booklet on amr;.unition they should do so for it was one

of the best pieces of information he had seen on the topic in years."

Other substantial efforts by AMCCOM during the deployment to the desert included the emergency

fabrication of a wheel extension parts package for the M102 howitzer by its Maintenance Directorate's

Maintenance Operations and Procedure (MOP) Branch. In the early stages of the deployment, the 101st

Airborne Division reported that their M1 02s bogged down in the soft sand. They felt that larger, wider tires

on the howitzer carriage would remedy the problem. However, once the larger tires had been added to the

carriage, the increased width interfered with the proper use of the hand brakes on the wheels. Mr. Jerry

Ward, chief of the MOP shop, and his crew responded to the problem with a wheel extension kit. A metal

spacer placed on the axle provided the necessary extension for proper clearance between the tire and hand

brake. Upon their completion, fifty-five extension kits were immediately shipped to the descrt."7

Further proof of AMCCOM's skill, as well as preparation for any situation which might arise, came in

the form of weapons system management. The value of weapons system management within AMCCOM K

was repeatedly demonstrated during ODS. An organized, trained, and experienced team, headed by a

weapons system manager, for operationally critical ammunition items and weapon systems was a keystone

to AMCCOM support tn ODS. Because this organizational structure existed, logistic and technical

requirements emanating from the operational forces received through the Emergency Operations Center

218

I ! I l l l I I II I I i I i •/
were immediately routed for action to the appropriate weapon systems manager. The ability to quickly

concentrate functional expertise on logistical and technical issues enabled AMCCOM to maintain

exceptionally high technical Operational Readiness (OR) rates for mission materiel. Not only did weapon

system management provide the ability to quickly react to user issues and problems, it also provided the

necessary visibility for the command staff to quickly assess its own overall pulse, provide direction, redirect

resources, and immediately respond to inquiries by higher authorities. The system also facilitated

communication between weapon-responsible commands, as well as between LARs (logistics assistance

represent atives) in the field and HQ, AMCCOM.28

Despite the successful role played by AMCCOM in supporting weapons systems, shipping ammunition, refurbishing gas masks, building spacers, contributing to the fabrication of the bunkerbuster,

scheduling % essels, acquiring materiel, filling requisitions, and preparing manuals, problems did, of course,

occur for hsh command in the frenetic months of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Chief among

the problems, and the one which beset the entire military structure not simply AMCCOM, was the inability

to rroperty track materiel sent to the desert due to the absence of a functioning retail supply system,

particularly in the early months of the deployment. A prime contribution to this deficiency derived from the

fact that the Standard Army Intermediate Level Supply (SAILS) system was in the process of being replaced

by the Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARRS). As a result, accountability and visibility of assets

received in SWA was initially practically nonexistent and in some cases materiel was taken by units on a

first come basis. This resulted in an excessive number of requisitions as units continually ordered that which

was not received, and, in turn, placed undue stresses upon the efforts of AMCCOM personnel. Various

work-arounds were developed to resolve this situation. These included push packages, push shipments

of specific items, and telephone/fax requisitions worked through LAR channels? 9

Contributing to the difficulty of properly supplying soldiers and civilians in SWA was the absance of

established supply and distribution facilities. In a mature theater, supply and distribution facilities are in

place to ensure an unimpeded flow of supplies to the requisitioner. This situation cannot exist when combat

troops are the first deployees to a possible combat area, as in SWA. As a result, supply personnel had

problems identifying and subsequently locating materiel which had been received. In some cases, it was

diverted to, or by, customers who had not requisitioned it. In other cases, it simply went to a holding area.

Command representatives spent many hours in these areas searching for AMCCOM items and locating

customers. In the mean time, customers who knew their stocks were in country "somewhere" submitted

new requisitions for the same requirement as it was deemed more expedient than trying to find a shipment.

As an antidote, AMCCOM staffers recommended that in future deployments the attempt be made to place

supply personnel more rapidly in the theater of operations and to assure that a nun-,er of the LARs sent

to the theater had also received specialized supply-oriented training.30

However, in the future, LARs, supply-oriented or otherwise, need better support mechanisms. Based

upon their experiences in the deserts, LARs as well as numerous others, recommended that if at all

possible, better channels of communication be implemented before future deployments were undertaken.

Indeed, that the strained communications system had held up as well as it had was deemed little less than

a miracle and noted as a "potential weak point" that might have proven disastrous had the Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia not had a relatively substantial commercial telephone system in place. Yet despite the Kingdom's

significant internal telephone structure, an Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Recort observation

warned against relying upon a host nation's telephone system. Doing so created a false sense of security

and relative ease of operation although initial struggles with MCI trunk lines caused difficulties and forced

an expansion to other carriers. An aftertaste of the potential for confusion with the delicate telephone

structure occurred when the commercial circuits went down on 15 May 1991. Likewise, had the staging

areas been elsewhere, e.g., Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Iran, the luxury of a sophisticated commercial telephone

219
system would not have been available to resolve deployment and supply issues. If the communication

system had been successfully targeted by enemy military, terrorists, or long range artillery/missiles, the

disruption could have been extremely serious.3

For LARs, the potential frailties of the Kingdom's telephone structure were twofold. Not only were

their numerous contacts with the major subordinate commands (MSCs), depots, and the national inventory

control points (NICPs) concerning the resolution of repair parts and supply issues conducted on a system

whose central focus could easily have been destroyed, but the placement of the telephones was

problematic as well. The desert environment with its widely dispersed population and nomadic peoples d~d

not promote the placement of telephone booths which LARs, isolated in enclaves with their units, could

readily access. Upon return to CONUS, LARs reported traveling up to 70 kilometers to use a standard

telephone hook-up. Some LARs were provided with AT&T credit cards for use in ccntacting AMCCOM and

other mission-oriented centers. Mobile telephones ccutd be utilized in the selected regions of SWA which

were in range of a communications satellite. Additionally, the satellite communications as well as AT&T

lines were only useful in making contacts outside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Local lines connecting

points within the SWA were nearly nonexistent. In some cases, HQ, AMCCOM served as an informational

relay station between Saudi elements. 32

In consideration of this frailly. AMCCOM's Readiness Directorate, at the close of the war, recommended that LARs and other logistics support teams be equipped with satellite telephone communications

to permit direct down-links to CONUS and LAR-to-LAR in theater, as well as permitting datafax capabilities.

The recommended package was a suitcase style, portable unit that could be set up in 15-20 minutes and

access CONUS/European dial tones. AMCCOM's Read'ness Directorate noted that such units would be

"essential" in theaters with limited or no telephone communications. Several devices were recommended

for each deployed unit.33

Other LAR issues involved the proper level of support. Transportation also provided the LARs, and

accordingly AMCCOM, with a myriad of problems, primarily obtaining it. LARs returning to the United States

following their deployment commented without fail on the difficulty obtaining efficacious transportation in

SWA. And as the units in need of support were frequently a great distance from one another-up to 150

miles in some cases--efficacious transportation was a necessity.34

LARs were not automatically provided military transportation and initially had to seek rental vehicles,

at government expense, on their own. According to one returning civilian, fees for four-wheel drive rental

vehicles ranged from $3,000 to $4,500 during the height of ODS, although automobiles were available at

lesser fees. Rental vehicles of any sort were hard to come by; hundreds of reporters, as well as other

individuals on the scene, were vying for the limited supply. Only when civilians traveled close to Iraq, and

the deadline for Hussein's withdrawal from Kuwait approached, were government civilians offered the

orportunity to travel in military vehicles."

Beyond the issues of communication and transportation was the matter of basic life support. When

AMCCOM's Senior Command Representative (SCR) and LAR Supervisor Mr. Terry Spurrier returned

CONUS, he noted that it was not realistic to expect the troops supported by a LAR to take responsibility

,. for that individual in terms of billeting, communication, transportation, food, etc. Indeed, he commented that

during hostilities "warfighters have enough to concern themselves with," and that the role of a LAR should

not hinder operations.3 6

In consideration of the need for LARs riot to be a hindrance to soldiers in the field, and also for them

to effectively accomplish their mission, AMCCOM's Readiness Directorate recommended the creation of

220
' I : • -. %

LAR Support Packages (LSPs). In the recommended format, such support packages would be fully

uploaded expandable mobile maintenance vans, or perhaps simple maintenance vans and would ideally

contain cots, tents, communications equipment (datafax, computers, radios, etc.), generators, l•§ht sets,

first aid kits, tools, MREs (meals, ready to eat), bottled water, NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) gear, etc.

(Some individuals urged that LSPs also include a weapon.) Constantly maintained and periodically

checked, the vehicles would be shipped when LARs deployed and provide the individual with both living

quarters and an amply appointed work site, and ultimately make the LAR both self-supporting and selfcortained. Each deploying LAR would ideally be provided his or her own four-wheel drive vehicle to

facilitate the accomplishment of their mission. In troubled economic times, the development of such

vehicles remains questionable."

"Further difficulties arose in AMCCOM's effort to properly provide for America's deployed servicemembers and their supporting civilian staff in the realm of procurement. Regulations which served the

United States well during peacetime were discovered to be overly restrictive in times of conflict. AMCCOM

personnel felt stymied during ODS by both the statutory and regulatory restrictions which guided

socioeconomic programs, competition requirements, and environmental protection, as well as other

factors. HO, AMCCOM needed immediate relief which, due to AMC's insistence upon specific examples

of regulations and processes causing delays, were not forthcoming. Instead, the command obtained

permission for incremental deviations to procurement regulations as ODS progressed, resulting in

inefficiency and confusion. Accordingly, AMCCOM's procurement personnel recommended that as the

Department of Defense and the Congress of the United States had not gone out of their way during the war

to change statutes and regulations concerning the acquisition process, that the command must take the

burden upon itself to effect relief. Plans have been outlined to bring relief in the areas of justifications and

approvals (J&As), delegations of authority, statute and regulatory provisions, surge production, etc.38

Yet despite the problems and pitfalls encountered in supplying American servicemembers half a

world away with the accouterments of war, AMCCOM fulfilled its mission, and delivered the ammunition,

weapons, chemical defensive equipment, and spare parts to the right place at the right time. According

to AMCCOM's Commander, Major General Paul L. Greenberg, the credit for this success must go to the

individual AMCCOM employees whose dedication to duty, patriotism, and support of the men and women

of the United States Armed Forces made possible a difficult task. It was the'"welders, machinists, painters,

item managers, stock clerks, food service workers, warehousers, temporary hires, and volunteers ... who

pulled together to accomplish and support this great military victory.' 3 9

Also making possible the victory was the very fact of AMCCOM's existence. As an anonymous author

in December 1991's AMC News observed:

You can't do what was done with Kelly Girls. The requisite structure didn't suddenly

spring up overnight. It's only because the system was already in place, only because

so many of the needed parts and supplies were already on hand, only because the

military and industry were already working together as partners, and cnly because

an incredible number of ordinary folks did an extraordinary job that an operation of

this magnitude could be carried out with unprecedented speed and effectiveness.40

The AMCCOM slogan declares "Firepower--Make the Difference'. And during Operations Desert

Shield and Desert Storm, it most certainly did.

221

.,
NOTES

'Memorandum to "All AMCCOM Employees" (U), MG Paul L. Greenberg, AMSMC-CG, Subject: Suppo

to Ooeration Desert Shield/Desert Storm. 19 March 1991.

2

Quoted in Association of the United States Army, The U.S. Army in OQprition Desert Storm: An Overview

(Arlington, Virginia: Association of the United States Army, 1991), 21.

31bid.

"lbid.: Mark S.R. Suchecki, "Ars'en,•l reveals its role in bunkerbusting bomb," (newspaper article without

name, date, or page) noAtes that the super-penetrating, bunker-busting bombs developed in part by

AMCCOM's Wateviiet Arsenal, Watervliet, NY, had apparently reached the upper echelon of the Iraqi

military leadership. He drew this inference from the relatively low rank of Iraqi military officers who attended

the capitulation meeting with GEN Schwarzkopf at the war's conclusion. An interesting, informative

discussion of the psychological aspects of preparing the negotiation site at Safwan is presented by LTC

Peter S. Kindsvatter, "VII Corps in the Gulf War: Post-Cease-Fire Operations," Military Review, June 1992,

2-19.

'Association of the United States Army, The U.S. Army in Ooeration Desert Storm: An Overview (Arlington,

Virginia: Association of the United States Army, 1991), 21.

6lbid., 22.

7

Quoted in Ibid.

8Ibid.

9

Memorandum to "All AMCCOM Employees" (U), MG Paul L. Greenberg, AMSMC-CG, Subject: Su~po

to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. 19 March 1991.

"•Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Reoort, Executive Summary, I-1, 4; United States Army

Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, "Logistic Issues and Lessons Learned from Operation

Desert Storm (ODS) and Southwest Asia (SWA)," n.d., n.p.

" O p eration Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report, Executive Summary, 1-4, 9.

"

2United States Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, "Logistic Issues and Lessons

Learned from Operation Desert Storm (ODS) and Southwest Asia (SWA)," n.d., n.p.; Operation Desert

Shield/Storm After Action Refort. Executive Summary, 1-10.

131Ibid., 1-10, 11, 12, 13.

"'United States Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, "Logistic Issues and Lessons

Learned from Operation Desert Storm (ODS) and Southwest Asia (SWA)," n.d., n.p.; memorandum (U),

M.F. Montford, SMCRI-DL, for AMSMC-IN, Subject: Desert Storm/Desert Santa. 6 March 1991; Information Paper (U), SMCRIDL, Subject: AMCCOM Commander's Conference, 9 March 1991. 1 March 1991;

and statistics presented by Mr. Ronald E. Sikorski, SMCRI-AP, at FMA meeting, 5 February 1991; and

Thomas J. Slattery, AMSMC-HO, "M864 and M825A1 Spacers." This paper is a brief assessment of Rock

222
Island Arsenal's production of spacers and served as a feeder report for this volume, as well as his own

concerning the role of the arsenal in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

"1S5ee Chapter Three: Production and Procurement for a more detailed discussion of the production efforts

of AMCCOM's arsenal elements during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

"

16

United States Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, Army Ammunition Planti and

Activitie AMCCOMP 360-3, February 1990; Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action RePort. Lessons

Learned 52348-94169 (00170) (U), AMSMC-TM, Title: Single DOD Focal Point for Ammunition Ship

Planning, 20 May 1991.

171bid.

18

Viewgraph (U), AMSMC-TM, Title: CONUS Ammunition Ships Planned and Exec'uted by AMCCOM, n.d.

'gUnited States Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, 'Logistic Issues and Lessons

Learned from Operation Desert Storm (ODS) and Southwest Asia (SWA)," n.d., n.p.; Ogeration Desert

Shield/Storm After Action Report. Summary Analysis-"Ammunition".

"'United States Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, A.CQM Facts. AMCCOMP 5-1,

1 October 1991.

21

Oopration Desert Shield/Storm After Action Re.ort. Executive Summary, 1-8.

"2Ibid.

Ibid.

24

United States Ar:,,y Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, "Logistic Issues and Lessons

Learned from Operation Desert Storm (ODS) and Southwest Asia (SWA)," n.d., n.p..

"•Ibid., Alfred N. Bradley, deputy, for LTC Melvin A. Miller, Acting Director, Readiness, to GEN William G.T.

Tuttle, AMC-CG, Subject: Dqta Call for Comman and General Staff College Briefing. 28 February 1991,

18-19;

-lbid. See also the assorted editions of the manuals. QOeration Desert Shield Materiel Readiness:

Ammunition, AMCCOM TM 9-1 300-DS-1, September 1990 and AMCCOM TM 9-1000-DS-1; Ozraation

Desert Shield Materiel Readiness: Armament. AMCCOM TM 9-1000-DS-3, 12 October 1990 and

AMCCOM TM 9-1000-DS-3, 21 November 1990; Operation Desert Shield Materiel Readiness: Chamical

Defensive Eguipment. AMCCOM TM 9-1000-DS-2, 21 September 1990, AMCCOM TM 9-1000-DS-2, 28

September 1990; AMCCOM TM 9-1000-DS-2, 3 October 1990, and AMCCOM TM 9-1000-262-DS,

January 1991.

2

1Ray Gall, "Desert Sh:eid keeps MOP Shop on the hop," Target. November 1990, 5; "Good News," a

computer mail service bulletin produced durirg ODS, point 47.

"

2 Lessons Learned 52353-76942 (00172) (U), AMSMC-AS, Title: Weanorns System Management, 20 May

1991.

223

a
-"Operation Desert Sh eld!Stcrm After Action Rep=I Summary Analysis-*Supply*.

"'"Ibid.; Lessons Learned, 40943-30100 (00099) (U), AMSIMC-MMP, Title: 005 Frustration of Shipments.

5 April 1991; Lessons Learned 611235-53789 (00245) (U), AMSMC-RDL, Title: Sucoglv Logistics Assistance

Reoresentatives (LAR) in Southwest A2La (SWA). 12 June 1991.

31 Ibid.; Summary Analysis-"Communication"; and Lessons Learned, 52357-67995 (00174) (U), AMSMCRD, Title: Commercial Telephone Communication Dependency. LAR. 23 May 1991.

321nterview, H.P. LePore, AMS.MC-HO, with D. Rogers, AMSMC-RO, 1 November 1991; Lessons Learned,

52357-67995 (00174) (U), APSMCRD, Title: Cmeria'rl phon Conm orpr

23 May 1991.

33

Ibid.

'Intervew, H.P. LePore, AMSMC-HO, with Steve Lovely, R*ch Albrecht, Rick Relfe, Jim Wagner, and Dick

Thissen, SMAC-AV, 4 April 1991; Rogers lntvyw., 1 November 1991; and Interview H.P. LePore, AMSMCHO, T. Spurrner, AMSMC-RD, 19 February 1991.

35Ibid.

mSpurrier lntvw., 19 February 1991.

"3Operation Desert Sh&!,Id/Sorm After~ Action RUoQr, Summary Analysis-"logistics Assistance!LAO",

Lessons Learned, 5235871848 (00175) (U), AMSMC-RD, Title: LAR Deployment- Co-mmunication

Transportation, Life Support 23 May 1991; Rogers lntvw., 1 November 1991.

18Lessons Learned, .52361-37989 (00179) (U), AMSMIC-PPC, Title: Beuitr eif 23 May 1991.

"'Operation Desert Ship~d/Storm AftrAcio~n.QDBg Commander's Assessment, v-6.

'OWar and Pieces: The Logistics Story of Desert Storm," AMC Nyt December 1991, 5.

224
41(

qhtflv Inul intiut It con fro t'Oese na lluf it scw~ocv-; som"' SWA mi tion: h, I e cor, fqufi d cI, r,,der

piler to limit the powver of thre weitd, a,id vrCLd fecr as weus f fitted camels wfth ccrrfract'pt~ve tharrne,'sszs to limit the herds;

of wild dromedarIies

LA/7s aod QASAS1, 11 we'll is1 other depfoyroq Ariner'xin servicoemteib'rs ard cv'ncould r"ot holo but volone the w~ondroor

;U Y , po!;'tion Of tho' now, I'dc tto old nr Southwe?!,t As~ia fecn ad.e h e;r1w,~erhrsccu~;a h~h;~

titile irr,,imeflro',a yet s/rae ed the sands w~t i.ed' ;,;,: t~o trac-AS. Powe'r litos, Itnd PUir*Peii Oil we/IS

t4

225
226
GLOSSARY

AAA army ammunition activity

AAP army ammunition plant

ABL ammunition basic load

ACS Army Community Services

ADPE automatic data processing equipment

AFARS Army Federal Acqu~sition Regulation Supplement

AFR Air Force Regulation

AIN ammunition information notice

ALLMIS Army Lessons Learned Management Information System

AMC United States Army Materiel Command

AMCCOM United States Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command

AMCRM Army Materiel Command Resource Management

AMOPS Army Mobilization and Planning System

AMSMC Army Materiel, Subordinate to the Major Command

AOR area of responsibility

AP acquisition plans

APDS armor-piercing, discarding sabot

APG Aberdeen Proving Ground

APOE aerial ports of embarkation

AR army regulation

ARCENT United States Army Central Command

ARDEC United States Army Armament, Research, Development, and Engineering Center

ASG United States Army Support Group

ASIS Ammunition Surveillance Information System

ASP ammunition supply point

ATCMD advance transportation and control movement documents

AVSCOM United States Army Aviation Systems Command

AWOL absent without leave

BDU battle dress uniform

BII basic issue items

BLU bomb, live unit

BRAC base realignment ard closure

CAA chemical alarm agents

CAAA Crane Army Ammunition Activity

CADS Containerized Ammunition Distributicn System

CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned

CAM chemical agent monitor

CARC chemical agent resistant coating

CCSS Commodity Command Standard System

CDE chemical and biological defense equipment

CECOM United States Army Communications and Electronics Command

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CINC commander in chief

CONUS continental United States

COPS contingency plans report

COSIS care of supplies in storage

CP comptroller

CPO Office of Civilian Personnel

CPP central processing point

CRAF civil reserve air fleet

CRC CONUS replacement center

CRDEC United States Army Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center

CRF Code of Federal Regulations

CSRS Civil Service Retirement System

CSS combat support services

DA Department of the Army

DARCOM United States Army Development and Readiness Command

DD Department of Defense

DEFCON defense condition

DESCOM United States Army Depot System Command

DFAR Defense Federal Acquit.ition Regulation

DMMC division materiel management center

DMZ demilitarized zone

DOD Department of Defense

DODAAC Department of Defense Activity Addressing Code

DODIC Department of Defense Identification Code

DOT Department of Transportation DOT-E Department of Transportation-Exemption

DP Deputy for Procurement and Production

DR Desert Shield/Storm routine

DSACS Defense Standard Ammunition Computer System

DSM 6iroctor of supply maintenance

DTS Defense Transportation System

DU Desert Shield/Storm urgent

DX Desert Shield/Storm high priority

EGG electrocardiogram

EEO equal employment oppcrtunity

EOC Emergency Operations Center

EOD explosive ordnance disposal

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

ETRR export traffic release request

FAC Forward Air Command

FAD funding authorization document

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation

FAT first article test

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7"

FCA functional cost account

FEGLI Federal Employee Group Life Insurance

FERS Federal Employee Retirement System

FLSA Fair Labor Standards Act

FMI field manual

FMS foreign military sales

FORSCOM United States Army Forces Command

FPD foreign post differential

GBU glide bomb unit

GMG grenade machine gun

GOCO government-owned, contractor-operated

GOGO government-owned, government- operated

GSA General Services Administration

GS/GM general service/general management

HCA head of contracting authority

HE high explosive

HEDP high explosive, dual purpose

HERD high explosive research and development

HET heavy equipment transporter

HIV human immunodeficiency virus

HMMWV high-mobility, multi-purpose wheeled vehicle

HO headquarters

HODA Headquarters, Department of the Army

IMA individual mobilization augmentee

IPT initial production test

IRR individual ready reserve

ISO3AA United States Army Information Systems Selection and Agency

J&A justification and approval

JCS joint chief of staff

JULLS Joint Universal Lessons Learned System

KKMC King Khalid Military City

LAO Logistics A3sistance Office

LAP load, assemble, pack

LAR logistics assistance representative

LASH lighter aboard ship

LAT lot acceptance test

LCAAP Cityake Army Ammunition Plant

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LPV laser protective visor

LRIP low rate initial production

LSP LAR support package

MAC Military Airlift Command

MCC movement control center

MDEP management decision package

MICLIC mine clearing line charge

MILSTAMP military standard transportation and movement procedures

MILVAN military van

MMC materiel management center

MMP master mobilization plan

MOB mobilization

MOBEX mobilization exercises

MOBTDA mobilization table of distributions and allowances

MOP maintenance operations and procedures

MOPES Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System

MOPP mission-oriented position posture

MOTSU military ocean terminal-Sunny Point

MOU memorandum of understanding

MRE meal, ready to eat

MRO materiel release order

MSA Mine Safety Appliances

MSC major subordinate command

MSR main supply route

MTF mechanical time fuzes

MTMC M;litary Traffic Management Command

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC nuclear, biological, chemical

NEW net explosive weight

NICP national inventory control point

NM nanometer

NIMSC non-consumable items materiel support code

NMCM non-mission capable maintenance

NTPF near term prepositioned fleet

NWS naval weapons station

OCONUS outside the continental United States

ODCSLOG Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

ODS Operation Desert Shield/Storm

OFCCP Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs

OJT on the job training

OMMCS Ordnance Missile and Munitions Center and School

OPEC Oil Producing Exporting Countries

OPLAN operations plan

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OR operational readiness

P&A price and availability

PARC principal assistant responsible for contracting

PASS Procurement Aging and Staging System

PBS point biofluorescence sensor

PC Procurement Directorate

PCO procuring contracting officer

PCS permanent change of station

PIBD point initiating, base detonating

PIVADS Product Improved Vulcan Air Defense System

PL public law

PM project/program/product manager

PMCS preventive maintenance checks and services

POMCUS prepositioned materiel configured to unit sets

POR/POM preparation for overseas rotation/mobilization

POW prisoner of war

PREPO prepositioned

PWD procurement/work directive

QASAS quality assurance specialist-ammunition surveillance

QPL qualified products list

RCS reports control symbol

RD Readiness Directorate

RDD required delivery date

RDL Readiness Directorate, Logistics Assistance Division

REPSHIP report of shipment

RFK Richardson, Flory, Kops

RIA Rock Island Arsenal

RIF reduction in force

RRT round removal tool

RSI rationalization; standardization; interoperability

SAAS Standard Army Ammunition System

SADARM simulated research and destroy armor

SAILS Standard Army Intermediate Level Supply (system)

SANG Saudi Arabian National Guard

SARDA Secretary of the Army, Research, Development and Acquisition

SARSS Standard Army Retail Supply System

SAW squad automatic weapon

SBA Small Business Administration

SBR small box respirator

SCR senior command representati'e

SCRAM self-contained respiratory as'sist mechanism

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SITREP situation report

SMCA Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition

SOMARDS Standard Operations and Maintenance Army Research and Development System

SOP standard operating procedure

SPOE sea ports of embarkation

SP-PRI special priority designator

SWA Southwest Asia

TACCS Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System

TACOM United States Army Tank Automotive Command

T&E testing and evaluation

TAP toxicological agent protection

TAT to accompany troops

TCMD transportation control and management document.

TCN transportation control number

TDA temporary duty assignment

TDP technical data package

TDY temporary duty

TECOM United States Army Testing and Evaluation Command

TMDE test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment

TO&E table of organization and equipment

TPF total package fielding

TPFDP time-phased force deployment plan

TRADOC United States Army Training and Doctrine Command

TRANSCOM United States Army Transportation Command

TSA tneater storage area

UBL unit basic load

UCA unpriced contractual action

UN/POP United Nations performance oriented packaging

USADACS United States Army Defense Ammunition Center and School

USAIS United States Army Information Service

USAREUR United States Army Europe

USC United States Code

USCENTCOM United States Central Command

VADS Vulcan Air C,3fense System

WALLP Wartime Amy Lessons Learned System

WARS Worldwide Ammunition Reporting System

WP white phosphorous

WWMCCS Worldwide Military Command and Control System

YPG Yuma Proving Ground

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