## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### NOV 25 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. VERNOIL CANTLEY, aka Joe Joe Cantley, Defendant-Appellant. No. 96-6290

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma (D.C. No. CR-95-169-A)

Joseph L. Wells, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appel lant. Leslie M. Maye, Assistant United States Attorney (P atrick M. Ryan, United States Attorney, with her on the brief), United States Att orney’s Office, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellee.

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, McKAY and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

MURPHY , Circuit Judge.-2-

Appellant Vernoil Cantley was convicted of conspira cy to distribute cocaine base (“crack”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; use of a wire transfer to facilitate possession with intent to distribute coc aine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b); being a felon in possession of a f irearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); five counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and si x counts of distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)

. The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) calcul ated Cantley’s base offense level at 38, premised on approximately seve n kilograms of cocaine base and 174 grams of marijuana. The PSR recommended th e district court apply a two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm p ursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) and a four-level enhancement for Cantle y’s leadership role in the conspiracy pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). Based on a total offense level of 44, the district court sentenced Cantley to life impris onment and five years supervised release on the conspiracy count and each of the pos session and distribution counts; to imprisonment for a term of forty-eight m onths and one year supervised release on the use of a wire transfer to facilitate possession count; and to imprisonment for a term of 120 months and three years supervised release on the felon in possession of a firearm count, all to be s erved concurrently.1 Cantley was convicted of armed robbery in 1985 and was paroled in 1991. -3- On appeal, Cantley contends the district court erre d by (1) denying his motion to suppress certain evidence; (2) sentencing him under the crack cocaine guideline; (3) applying a four-level enhancement fo r his role as an organizer or leader; and (4) failing to require the government t o assume the burden of proof on contested sentencing issues. This court affirms. A. Motion to Suppress Cantley argues the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during searches of his residence an d the hotel room in which he was arrested. At the suppression hearing, Cantley’s parole office r, Arnold Nelson, testified as to the events surrounding the search o f Cantley’s residence. While on parole 1 in March 1992, Cantley tested positive for marijua na use, but parole revocation proceedings were not initiated at that t ime. On July 26, 1993, Officer Nelson received a telephone call from a DEA agent, who advised him that Cantley was under investigation by both the DEA and Oklahom a Bureau of Narcotics (“OBN”) for drug trafficking. That same day, Offic er Nelson left messages with two OBN agents to get additional information about the investigation, but they never returned his call.2 In violation of his parole agreement, Cantley faile d to inform Officer

Nelson that he was arrested on the firearms charge. -4- On August 11, 1993, Officer Nelson received an anonymous telephone call informing him that Cantley was in court that day on a firearms possession charge. He later verified this information with the clerk’s office and district attorney’s office. Officer Nelson immediately began preparing a parole violation report based on Cantley’s arrest for the firearm charge, f ailure to report the arrest, 2 and possession of marijuana based on the March 1992 pos itive drug test. On August 16, Officer Nelson submitted the violation report t o the Department of Corrections Executive Revocation Officer, and on Au gust 25, an arrest warrant was issued. The day Officer Nelson received the arrest warrant, August 30, he contacted OBN to let them know he was going to exec ute the warrant. OBN asked Officer Nelson to “sit on it for a while” bec ause they were afraid Cantley would make bond and flee. Officer Nelson then aske d OBN to update him on their investigation. Based on the new information he received, Officer Nelson requested and received authorization from his distr ict supervisor to conduct a warrantless search of Cantley’s residence.3 Officer Nelson testified that it was the department ’s policy to have agents

from another law enforcement agency present as backup.

4 In April 1993, Officer Nelson had conducted a “resi dence verification” of Cantley’s home. During this interview, Cantley exp lained which bedroom he shared with his wife and which bedrooms belonged to others in the household. -5- The next day, August 31, Officer Nelson, along withtwo OBN agents 3 and four Corrections officers, went to Cantley’s reside nce to conduct the warrantless search. Sharon Cantley, defendant’s wife, answeredthe door, let the officers in, and told them Cantley was not home. The officers r equested Ms. Cantley’s permission to search the entire residence. When sh e refused, they went forward with the warrantless search. After the officers co nfirmed that Cantley was not present, they searched his bedroom and the common areas of the residence. 4 Among other things, the officers found crack cocain e, digital scales which tested positive for cocaine, and a loaded pistol. The district court determined that in light of the information known to Officer Nelson, there was a reasonable basis for se arching Cantley’s residence. Additionally, the district court concluded that eac h of the requirements for conducting a warrantless search were satisfied. Th e district court therefore denied Cantley’s motion to suppress. “On appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress, w e view the evidence in a light most favorable to the government and acceptthe district court’s findings of historical fact unless clearly erroneous.” United States v. Lewis , 71 F.3d 358,-6-

360 (10th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. McCarty , 82 F.3d 943, 947 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 257 (1996). “The reasonableness of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law we review de novo.” McCarty , 82 F.3d at 947; see also Lewis , 71 F.3d at 360. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Generally, law enforcemen t officials should conduct searches pursuant to a warrant suppo rted by probable cause.”
Lewis , 71 F.3d at 361. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement for certain “special nee ds” of law enforcement, including a state’s parole system. See Griffin v. Wisconsin , 483 U.S. 868, 873-75 (1987); see also Lewis , 71 F.3d at 361. Accordingly, a warrantless searc h of a parolee’s residence “will satisfy the Fourth Amendm ent’s reasonableness requirement to the extent parole agents [carry] it out pursuant to state law which itself satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s reasonablen ess requirement.” Lewis , 71 F.3d at 361. According to the Oklahoma Probation and Parole Manu al (“Manual”) in effect as of the date Cantley’s residence was searc hed, a parole officer was allowed to conduct a warrantless search if four req uirements were met and the district supervisor approved the search. See Probation and Parole Manual ch. 3, at 4 (Dec. 1, 1992). The four requirements were:5 The Manual requirements in effect at the time of th e Corgan decision were

identical to the Manual requirements in effect for purposes of this case, except that in Corgan , the Manual included a fifth requirement: that “t he supervising officer’s experience with the offender has document ed a need for close supervision.” Corgan , 868 P.2d at 746. The district court did not make any findings with respect to this requirement. Because we conclude that even in the absence of this additional requirement, the Manual requirements are reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes, we do not address Cantley’s argument that this requirement was not met. -7- (a) There are reasonable grounds to believe that th e offender is keeping contraband on the property. (b) Failure to search may result in an immediate threat to the public, employees, oroffenders. (c) The search is not the result of an assistance request f rom other law enforcement officers who have been unable to obtaina search warrant. (d) Officers are not authorized to break a nd enter at an offender’s residence . . . to conduct a warrantless search. Id. The Manual also provided that “[s]earches [shall] not invade the privacy of a third party.” Id.
In State ex rel.Corgan v. King , 868 P.2d 743 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994), the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals considered for the first time what constitutes a “reasonable” warrantless search of a parolee’s residence and concluded that a search which complies with the Man ual 5 is reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. See id. at 746. We agree that the prerequisites to a warrantless search of a parolee’s residence in Oklahoma comply with the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See Griffin , 483 U.S. at 870-71, 880 (holding Wisconsin Supreme Court’s inte rpretation of regulation requiring “reasonable grounds” for warrantless sear ch of probationer’s residence-8-

satisfies Fourth Amendment reasonableness requireme nt); Lewis , 71 F.3d at 362 (concluding Utah prerequisites to warrantless searc h of a parolee’s residence satisfies Fourth Amendment reasonableness requireme nt). We must next determine whether the officers in this case carried out the search of Cantley’s residence in accordance with th e Manual. Cantley argues the search did not comply with the Manual because (1) there was no immediate threat; (2) the search was the result of a request from oth er law enforcement officers; and (3) the officers invaded the privacy of Ms. Cantley . This court concludes the Manual requirements were satisfied. First, although Cantley apparently concedes there w as an immediate threat to the public, employees, or offenders prior to con ducting the search, Cantley argues the threat subsided once the officers determ ined he was not present at the residence. In Corgan , the court determined there was no immediate threat given that the “search was not conducted until almost a m onth after it was requested and authorized, and more notably, not until after [the defendant] was arrested [at his residence prior to conducting the search]. An ‘imm ediate’ threat would have required swifter action.” Corgan , 868 P.2d at 747. In this case, Officer Nelson conducted the search the day after receiving authorization, and, unlike the defendant in Corgan , Cantley was not arrested until approximately two weeks after the search. Given th e evidence of Cantley’s drug6 In Oklahoma, the State may rely on a conviction as a basis for parole

revocation if the judgment is final. See Pickens v. State , 779 P.2d 596, 598 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989). -9- dealings, his recent charge for illegal possession of a firearm, and the fact that he was not yet in custody, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that failure to search may have resulted in an immediate threat to both the public and the law enforcement officers. Second, Cantley argues that Officer Nelson was acti ng at the behest of law enforcement officers, namely OBN and DEA agents, wh o could not themselves obtain a search warrant. In Corgan , the court held that parole officers may not use their authority “to assist the police in evadin g Fourth Amendment warrant requirements.” Id. Approximately six months prior to the date of the warrantless search and while on parole, the defendant in Corgan pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and possession charges. See id. at 744-45 & 745 n.2. The court noted these convictions “were sufficient to c ause revocation” of the defendant’s parole 6 and therefore concluded “[t]he [warrantless] searc h was not conducted for a parole purpose, as [the parole offi cer] did not need to search for additional evidence to justify revocation of [the d efendant’s] parole.” Id. at 747. The court thus held the search was not conducted incompliance with the Manual. See id.In this case, however, Cantley had only been charge d with illegal7 The violation report did include two other bases fo r revoking Cantley’s

parole, marijuana use (almost a year-and-a-half ear lier) and misrepresenting the truth. Because, however, the decision to revoke pa role lies within the discretion of the trial court, see Robinson , 809 P.2d at 1322, the parole officer had reason t o search Cantley’s residence for contraband to bolste r the State’s argument that Cantley’s parole should be revoked. -10- possession of a firearm and had not yet been convic ted of the offense. At a parole revocation hearing, Oklahoma law requires the State to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that the terms of the accused’s suspension [have] been violated.” Fleming v. State , 760 P.2d 206, 207 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); see also Robinson v. State , 809 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991). Bec ause Cantley had not been convicted of the firearms char ge, the State had to put forth other evidence to prove that Cantley had violated t he terms of his parole in order to prevail at the revocation hearing. 7Accordingly, there was a parole purpose for the search. Finally, although Cantley claims there was “subterfuge” among the parole officer and the OBN and DEA agents, he does not present any concrete evidence to support his claim but rather relies on innuendo and speculation. This court therefore agrees with the district court thatthe warrantless search of Cantley’s residence was not the result of a requestfor assistance from other law enforcement officers who were unable to obtain thei r own search warrant. Third, Cantley argues the officers invaded the priv acy of Ms. Cantley without her consent when conducting the warrantless search. According to the-11-

Manual, “When conducting a search where the offende r is a cohabitant, the search will entail only the offender’s assigned area of th e residence, unless the third party agrees to a search of their area by signing [ a consent form].” Probation and Parole Manual ch. 3, at 4 (Dec. 1, 1992). The offi cers searched only the common areas of the residence and the one bedroom Cantley had previously identified as his. Ms. Cantley’s consent was not needed to searc h those areas. See, e.g. , State
v. West , 517 N.W.2d 482, 491 (Wis. 1994) (“[T]he parole se arch may extend to all parts of the premises to which the probationer or p arolee has common authority, just as if it were a consent search.”); State v. Johnson , 748 P.2d 1069, 1073-74 (Utah 1987) (holding warrantless search of common areas of parolee’s apartment, which he shared with his mother, was lawful even th ough parolee’s mother may not have consented to the search); see also 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 10.10(d), at 778 n.89 (3d ed. 1996) (“If the . . . parolee is sharing living quarters with someone else . . . the [warrantless] search may nonetheless extend to all parts of the premises to which the . . . parolee has common authority.”); cf. United States v. Davis , 932 F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting co-defendant’s argum ent that officers exceeded scope of warrantless search of probationer’s reside nce when they searched safe which was under the apparent joint control of probationer and co-defendant, and stating item must be “owned, controlled, or possess ed” by probationer in order for-12-

item to fall within scope of warrantless search). As such, the search did not invade Ms. Cantley’s right to privacy. This court therefore holds the warrantless search o f Cantley’s residence was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, as it co mplied with all four of the Manual requirements, which are themselves reasonabl e. See Griffin , 483 U.S. at 880; Lewis , 71 F.3d at 363. Cantley also contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of the h otel room where he was arrested approximately two weeks after the search o f his residence. The arresting officers received a tip from a confidential informa nt that Cantley was staying at the hotel. The evidence presented by the governmen t at the suppression hearing showed that the hotel room was registered to “Darre ll Rhone” and that Cantley was not a registered occupant of the hotel. Cantle y presented no evidence whatsoever as to Rhone’s identity, his relationship with Rhone, or why he was staying in Rhone’s hotel room. The district court concluded that because Cantley failed to show he had a reasonable expectation of p rivacy in the hotel room, he lacked standing to challenge the search of the room

. In his brief, Cantley does not address the districtcourt’s conclusion that he lacked standing. Instead, he argues the search exc eeded the allowable scope of a search incident to arrest. “It is fundamental law that a person desiring to have8 We note the district court’s conclusion regarding s tanding of an

unregistered hotel occupant is in accord with TenthCircuit case law. See Deninno , 29 F.3d at 575-76 (noting defendant had not estab lished reasonable expectation of privacy in motel room, which was reg istered in another’s name); Carr , 939 F.2d at 1446 (same). -13- evidence suppressed must first show he has standing to object to the search.” United States v. Deninno , 29 F.3d 572, 576 (10th Cir. 1994). The burden wa s thus on Cantley “to show by a preponderance of the evidence that [he] was personally aggrieved by the alleged search and seiz ure because it invaded [his] subjective expectation of privacy which society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” United States v. Carr , 939 F.2d 1442, 1444 (10th Cir. 1991). Because Cantley does not dispute the district court ’s finding that he lacked standing, we affirm the district court’s denial of standing and do not address his argument that the search exceeded the allowable sco pe of a search incident to

arrest. 8 See Deninno , 29 F.3d at 576 (affirming district court’s denial of motion to suppress because defendant failed to address dis trict court’s conclusion that he lacked standing).
B. Crack Cocaine Enhancement Cantley next argues that the district court imprope rly sentenced him under the crack cocaine guideline. The PSR calculated Ca ntley’s base offense level of 38 based on its determination that the “cocaine bas e” involved in the offenses was9 The Sentencing Guidelines punish “crack cocaine” 10 0 times more harshly

than other forms of cocaine. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c).

10Note (D) to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) provides: “‘Cocain e base,’ for the purposes of this guideline, means ‘crack.’ ‘Crack’ is the street name for a form of cocaine base, usually prepared by processing coc aine hydrochloride and sodium bicarbonate, and usually appearing in a lumpy, rock like form.” The Sentencing Commission added this language, effective November 1, 1993, to explain that, for purposes of sentencing, “‘forms of cocaine base oth er than crack ( e.g. , coca paste, an intermediate step in the processing of coca leav es into cocaine hydrochloride, scientifically is a base form of cocaine, but it is not crack) [should] be treated as cocaine.’” United States v. Kissick, 69 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 487 (Nov. 1, 1993)). -14- “crack cocaine.” 9 Cantley objected to the PSR, arguing that “cocain e base” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) 10 means only “crack cocaine” and that the government had not met its burden of proving the co caine base in question was in fact “crack cocaine.” At the sentencing hearing, t he district court specifically found that the substances in question were crack co caine based on “[t]he chemical analysis; the observation of witnesses as to what they saw, [including] actually rocking up cocaine; and . . . the testimony of peop le who made purchases of crack cocaine.” We review the district court’s factual findings forclear error and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. See United States v. Kissick, 69 F.3d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 1995). At sentencing , the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the amounts and types of controlled substances related to the offense. See Deninno , 29 F.3d at 580.11 The chemical analysis reports do, however, identifyall the substances as

“rock-like” or “chunky,” not as powder or liquid.

12 In fact, after the first officer testified, the tri al judge addressed this very issue. The judge stated: Without objection, Mr. Nelson has looked at various exhibits and he has called the exhibits “crack cocaine” and he has said that this was tested in the lab and it was positive for crack coc aine. In the absence of any objection, I’m just assuming that somewhere there’s floating around a stipulation . . . . In response, the government noted the stipulation h ad been filed. The judge then asked whether defense counsel had discussed the sti pulation with their clients and whether the clients agreed to the stipulation. Can tley’s counsel responded in the affirmative. -15- To support his argument, Cantley relies primarily o n the chemical analysis reports, which identify the substances solely as “c ocaine base.” 11 The parties’ stipulation, which was based on the chemical analys es, uses the terms “cocaine base” and “crack cocaine” interchangeably. For exa mple, the stipulation on the substances found during the search of the hotel roo m states that the following evidence was tested: “Four clear plastic bags each containing individually wrapped rocks of cocaine base . . . .” The stipulation goes on to describe each of the bags as containing a certain number of grams of “crack cocaine.” Cantley agreed to the stipulation and did not objec t when it was read into the record. Moreover, the officers who conducted the searches all testified that the substances were “crack cocaine.” 12 Finally, all the witnesses who testified they purchased drugs from or sold drugs to Cantley described the substances in question as “crack cocaine,” testified that they wi tnessed the “rocking-up”-16-

process, or both. Cantley’s reliance on the use of the term “cocaine base” in the chemical analysis reports does not negate the officers’, the witnesses’, and the stipulation’s identification of the substances as “crack cocaine. ” Cf. United States v. Wilson , 103 F.3d 1402, 1407 (8th Cir. 1997) (“It is irrelev ant that the chemist did not specifically say ‘this substance is cocaine base wh ich is the same as crack’ or words to that effect and [the defendant] has cited no authority for the proposition that the magic word ‘crack’ must always be used ins tead of the term cocaine base.”). Further, contrary to Cantley’s assertion, the district court properly relied on the testimony of witnesses concerning their pers onal drug transactions with Cantley and their observations of the “rocking-up” process. Cf. United States v. Silvers , 84 F.3d 1317, 1327 (10th Cir. 1996) (“We have hel d countless times that if no drugs are actually seized, the government can nevertheless prove the type and quantity of drugs attributable to the defendantthrough other evidence . . . .”), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 742 (1997); United States v. Hall , 109 F.3d 1227, 1235-36 (7th Cir.) (rejecting defendants’ argument that gov ernment failed to prove cocaine base involved was crack cocaine and noting that witness testimony was “particularly persuasive given that the Guidelines define ‘crack’ with reference to how that term is used on the street”), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 153 (1997). Cantley’s reliance on United States v. James , 78 F.3d 851 (3d Cir.), cert.13 In James , the defendant pleaded guilty to possession and di stribution of

“cocaine base,” but was sentenced under the crack c ocaine guideline. See James , 78 F.3d at 852-53. The chemical analysis report identified the substance as “cocaine base.” See id. at 855. At the plea colloquy, both the defendant and court referred to the substance as “cocaine base,” whereas the government referred to the substance as “crack cocaine.” See id. at 856. On appeal, the Third Circuit held the sentence was improper because the government did not prove the cocaine base was crack cocaine. See id. at 858. -17- denied, 117 S. Ct. 128 (1996), is thus misplaced. 13 In James , the government offered no evidence to prove that the type of cocai ne base possessed by the defendant was crack cocaine. In this case, however , there was ample evidence that Cantley dealt in crack cocaine. Finally, thou gh we recognize the burden is on the government to prove the substances were crack c ocaine, Cantley has presented no evidence whatsoever to show that the substances were not crack cocaine. This court concludes the government’s evidence was sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Cantley dea lt in crack cocaine. Accordingly, the district court did not err by sent encing Cantley under the crack cocaine guideline.
C. Role in the Offense Cantley next argues the district court erred by app lying a four-level enhancement for his role in the offense pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), which provides: “If the defendant was an organizer or le ader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4-18-

levels.” This court reviews the district court’s factual fin dings as to the defendant’s role in the offense under a clearly erroneous stand ard. See United States v. Lacey , 86 F.3d 956, 967 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 331 (1996). Questions of law regarding application of the Sentencing Guideli nes are reviewed de novo. See id.An application note to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 specifies s everal factors the district court should consider in determining a def endant’s role in an offense, including the exercise of decision making authority, the natu re of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment o f accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of th e crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense , the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of co ntrol and authority exercised over others. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 application note 4. “These factor s are intended only to guide the analysis of the sentencing court, and the [G]ui delines do not require that each be satisfied for § 3B1.1 to apply.” Lacey , 86 F.3d at 967. As justification for the four-level enhancement of Cantley’s sentence, the trial judge stated: [T]his was an operation that went over a year and n ine months approximately, it went on in at least three differe nt locations. It went on as a -- as an operation of considerable complexi ty that required the Houston source, some differentiation by the participants in their roles . . . .-19- Now, I’ll specifically find that the trial testimony was such that it’s established by a preponderance of the evi dence that Mr. Cantley identified the people to be brought into th is operation and recruited them into the operation; that he had an a lmost paternal role to play in it thereafter by supplying accommodation s, clothing, food, refreshment, entertainment and a cash allowance to these people; that there’s abundant evidence that what money changed h ands, it ultimately made its way back to Mr. Cantley or to S haron Cantley, who held it for Mr. Cantley; that Mr. Cantley gave advice and direction to other people as to how to run a drug b usiness. . . . I see no reason to count beyond five, but the five- person aspect of this is certainly satisfied by Mr. Cantley himse lf, who can be counted, Monica Carter, the two Mr. Warners, and Sh aron Cantley, whose participation as members of the same operatio n is clear. And this is not a case in which the evidence establishe s a few discrete, entirely separate, almost coincidentally separate s ales to people. It was a business . . . . Cantley apparently challenges both the district cou rt’s factual findings and its application of those findings to the Sentencing Guidelines. After carefully reviewing the record, we cannot say the district co urt’s factual findings were clearly erroneous. For example, several of the gov ernment’s witnesses testified that others in the conspiracy worked for Cantley; that Cantley paid his “crew” with cash and drugs and supplied them with lodging, clothes, and food; and that the crack cocaine sold at the various crack houses was all supplied by Cantley. Further, we agree with the district court’s assessm ent of Cantley’s leadership role based on those findings. There is ample evidence that Cantley “‘exercised some degree of control over others invo lved in the commission of the offense [and was] responsible for organizing others for the purpose of carrying-20-

out the crime.’” Lacey , 86 F.3d at 967 (quoting United States v. Reid, 911 F.2d 1456, 1464 (10th Cir. 1990)). We therefore conclud e the district court did not err by applying a four-level enhancement for Cantley’s role in the offense.
D. Burden of Proof Cantley’s final argument is that the district courterred by failing to require the government to assume the burden of proof with r espect to contested sentencing issues. Cantley specifically argues the government did not meet its burden of proving the bases for sentence enhancements, namely the four-level enhancement for Cantley’s role in the offense and t he applicability of the crack cocaine guideline. Because this argument is subsum ed by Cantley’s previous arguments directly challenging these enhancements, we need not address this argument separately. The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED

.