IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA

MARIO RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY,

Respondent;

THE PEOPLE,

Real Party in Interest.

S272129

Sixth Appellate District

H049016

Santa Clara County Superior Court

C1647395, C1650275

December 14, 2023

Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in 

which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and 

Evans concurred.
1

RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT

S272129

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

A criminal defendant cannot be tried while mentally 

incompetent. (Pen. Code, § 1367, subd. (a).)1 Although such 

defendants may be involuntarily committed for the purpose of 

restoring their competency (see § 1370; Jackson v. Superior 

Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 100–101), the commitment may not 

last indefinitely (§ 1370, subd. (c)(1); Jackson v. Indiana (1972) 

406 U.S. 715, 720; In re Davis (1973) 8 Cal.3d 798, 801 (Davis)). 

The statutory scheme governing competency proceedings limits

the term of commitment. For individuals like defendant Mario 

Rodriguez charged with offenses that carry a maximum 

sentence exceeding two years, the period of commitment due to 

incompetency is limited to two years. (See § 1370, subd. (c)(1).) 

In this case, Rodriguez was adjudged incompetent, 

committed to a state hospital, and then returned to court when 

a medical director of the hospital filed a certificate indicating he 

was restored to competency. (See § 1372, subd. (a)(1).) The 

certificate was filed within the two-year time limit specified by 

section 1370, subdivision (c)(1) (section 1370(c)(1)). By statute, 

the court was supposed to determine whether to approve the 

certificate — that is, decide “whether or not” Rodriguez has 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 

unless otherwise specified.
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2

“recovered competence.” (§ 1372, subd. (c)(1).) However, 

primarily because of restrictions on court operations due to the 

COVID-19 pandemic, Rodriguez did not receive such a hearing 

within the two-year period of section 1370(c)(1). Claiming the 

time for commitment had run out, Rodriguez moved to dismiss

the charges against him. The Court of Appeal rejected his claim. 

It held that time had not run out because a commitment ends 

when a certificate of restoration is filed, not when the court 

determines whether the defendant has been restored to 

competence. (Rodriguez v. Superior Court (2021) 

70 Cal.App.5th 628, 652 (Rodriguez).)

The parties ask us to resolve a question of statutory 

interpretation: For purposes of calculating the maximum 

commitment period under section 1370(c)(1), does an 

incompetency commitment end when the medical treatment 

provider informs the court that the defendant has regained 

competency by filing a certificate of restoration, or does the 

commitment end only when the court has determined whether 

the defendant has been restored to competency? We resolve this 

question by determining whether the period between the filing 

of the certificate, and the court’s ruling on that certificate, is 

covered by section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year limit. And we conclude 

this period is not excluded from the two-year limit.

Because we reject the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that an 

incompetency commitment ends with the filing of a certificate of 

restoration, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. We 

remand with instructions for the Court of Appeal to consider

issues that remain outstanding, including whether Rodriguez’s 

aggregate commitments have exceeded the limit set by section 

1370(c)(1) and what remedy he may be entitled to if the limit 

has been exceeded. (See, e.g., Camacho v. Superior Court (2023) 
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3

15 Cal.5th 354, 382–390 & fn. 5 (Camacho); Jackson v. Superior 

Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 106.)

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In December 2016, the Santa Clara County District 

Attorney charged Rodriguez with several felonies, each carrying

a maximum sentence in excess of two years imprisonment. The

charged offenses included assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, 

subd. (a)(1) [maximum punishment of four years in state 

prison]); oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or 

fear (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A) [maximum punishment of eight years 

in state prison]); rape by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear

(§§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 264, subd. (a) [eight years]); and infliction 

of corporal injury on a present or former spouse, or a present or 

former cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a) [four years]). Rodriguez 

was held to answer on all charges. 

In late 2017, the court declared a doubt as to Rodriguez’s 

competency, ordered a hearing regarding his competency, and 

suspended all proceedings. In May 2018, the court found 

Rodriguez not competent to stand trial. On May 24, the court 

issued its commitment order, directing that Rodriguez “be 

committed to the [State] Department of State Hospitals for 

placement in a locked psychiatric facility.” The order specified 

that “[t]he Sheriff shall redeliver the patient to the Court upon 

receiving from the state hospital a copy of the certification of 

mental competency.” (See §§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C), 1372, subd. 

(a)(2).) The court also ordered the State Department of State 

Hospitals (Department) to “provide a placement for defendant 

for treatment of his mental illness and restoration of 

competency by 5:00 p.m., June 29, 2018” and that Rodriguez be 

transported to his placement by that date. The record does not 
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4

indicate when Rodriguez was actually transported or admitted 

to a state hospital.

On September 7, 2018, the medical director of Atascadero 

State Hospital certified Rodriguez as restored to competency. 

The parties stipulated that the certificate of restoration was 

filed with the superior court the same date. On September 20, 

the court found Rodriguez had been restored to competency and 

reinstated criminal proceedings.

In early January 2019, the court declared a new doubt as 

to Rodriguez’s competency to stand trial and again suspended 

criminal proceedings. In April, the court found Rodriguez not 

competent.

On May 16, 2019, the court issued a second commitment 

order, once more directing that Rodriguez be committed to the 

Department. As before, the court specified a date by which the 

Department was to provide a placement for Rodriguez, setting 

that date as June 14, 2019. The court further noted in its 

commitment order that it found Rodriguez did “not have the 

capacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication,” 

and it ordered the involuntary administration of antipsychotic 

medication.

On January 9, 2020, the medical director of Atascadero 

State Hospital certified that Rodriguez was restored to 

competency. The parties stipulated the certificate of restoration 

was filed with the superior court the same date. Among the 

documents transmitted to the court, the medical director 

included a letter stating that Rodriguez was “being returned to 

court on psychotropic medication.” “It is important,” continued 

the director, “that [Rodriguez] remain on this medication for his 

own personal benefit and to enable him to be certified [as 
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5

competent] under Section 1372 of the Penal Code.” The date 

when Rodriguez was discharged from the state hospital does not 

appear in the record. (Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 638.)

On January 24, 2020, the court set May 21 as the date for 

a contested hearing on Rodriguez’s competency. In March, the 

court suspended almost all its operations due to the COVID-19 

pandemic. As a result, the competency hearing set for May 21 

did not take place.

On July 17, 2020, the parties returned to court following 

the relaxation of certain COVID-19 restrictions. The court 

rescheduled the competency hearing for August 24, a date later

reset to September 21 at the request of both parties. The 

hearing did not occur on that date either. Instead, the court 

continued the hearing to November 2 “due to the COVID-19 

pandemic and the lack of courtrooms and court resources 

available.” The court subsequently continued the competency 

hearing several times due to the “pandemic and the [s]uperior 

[c]ourt’s limited trial capacity.”

In March 2021, Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss. Even 

though the Department had timely determined that he was 

competent to stand trial, Rodriguez argued that he was entitled 

to a dismissal because his commitment had lasted more than 

two years. Rodriguez contended a commitment must be 

measured based on “dates from one judicial decision until a 

second judicial decision” — in this case, from the date when the 

court issued the commitment order to the date when it 

eventually approved or rejected the certificate of restoration. 

Rodriguez thus argued his total commitment period — counting 

days from his first and second commitments — exceeded two 
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6

years and was ongoing. (See In re Polk (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 

1230, 1232 (Polk) [holding that the limit on a commitment term 

“applies to the aggregate of all commitments under the same 

charges”].)

On March 16, 2021, the trial court denied the motion to 

dismiss, reasoning that it had to first determine whether 

Rodriguez had regained competency before it could ascertain 

whether the statutory two-year limit had been reached. The 

court explained, “the days between the restoration certificate 

and the restoration hearing [would] only count towards the twoyear maximum commitment if, in fact, it is determined that the 

defendant is not restored to competence.” If instead “the 

defendant is [judicially determined to be] restored to 

competence,” the court continued, “then the date on the 

certificate of restoration will serve as the date of restoration for 

purposes of counting the days towards the maximum 

commitment.” After the court announced its decision, 

Rodriguez’s counsel asked for a continuance, requesting that the

court sign an order so that counsel could receive Rodriguez’s 

updated mental health records related to his recent placement 

on “24-hour hold” and “suicide watch” while in county jail.

Between the date of the second commitment order and the 

court’s decision on March 16, 2021, a total of 670 days had 

elapsed. When combined with the period between the first 

commitment order and the court’s decision on September 2, 

2018, finding Rodriguez restored to competency, 789 days — or 

more than two years — had passed. In contrast, if a 

commitment were deemed to begin with a commitment order 

and end upon the filing of a certificate of restoration, Rodriguez 

had been committed for a total of 344 days — or less than one 

year — during the two commitments.
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Rodriguez challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion 

to dismiss by filing a petition for writ of prohibition in the Court 

of Appeal, raising the same argument he presented in the trial 

court. The Court of Appeal rejected the argument, agreeing with 

the People that Rodriguez’s commitment ended when the 

certificate of restoration was filed. (Rodriguez, supra, 

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 636.) Unlike the trial court, the Court of 

Appeal concluded that the filing of the certificate of restoration 

terminates a commitment regardless of whether the court 

subsequently approves or rejects the certificate. (See id. at 

pp. 635–636.)

In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal disagreed 

with People v. Carr (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1136 (Carr), which 

held that a judicial determination of competency, “not a health 

official’s certification of competency that initiates court 

proceedings to consider whether the defendant has regained 

competency, terminates the defendant’s commitment.” (Id. at 

p. 1140; Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 652.)

We granted review to resolve the split in authority. We 

now reject the Court of Appeal’s holding that the two-year clock 

set by section 1370(c)(1) stops with the filing of a certificate of 

restoration. 

II. DISCUSSION

To determine whether the running of the clock set by

section 1370(c)(1) continues past the filing of a certificate of 

restoration, we provide an overview of the relevant statutory 

framework, and then analyze the text of the governing statute 

and the context, history, and purpose of the competency scheme.
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A. The Competency Statutory Scheme

1. Pre-1974

A defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial if “as a 

result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability, 

the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal 

proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a 

rational manner.” (§ 1367, subd. (a).) Prior to 1974, “California 

law provided that persons charged with criminal conduct but 

found incompetent to stand trial were committed to state 

hospitals until they became ‘sane’ (i.e., competent). Because 

attainment of competence was the sole standard for release the 

commitments were indefinite, even permanent, so long as 

incompetence persisted.” (Conservatorship of Hofferber (1980) 

28 Cal.3d 161, 167 (Hofferber).)

In 1972, however, the United States Supreme Court held 

that “indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant solely on 

account of his incompetency to stand trial” offends 

constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process. 

(Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 731.) The court 

explained, “[A] person charged by a State with a criminal offense 

who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed 

to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time 

necessary to determine whether there is a substantial 

probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable 

future.” (Id. at p. 738.) “If it is determined that this is not the 

case” — that is, the defendant is not likely to soon regain 

competency — “then the State must either institute the 

customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required 

to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the 

defendant.” (Ibid.)
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The following year, our court “adopt[ed] the rule of the 

Jackson [v. Indiana] case.” (Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 801.) 

We further accepted that “the duration of commitments to state 

hospitals must bear some reasonable relation to the purpose 

which originally justified the commitment” (id. at p. 805), which 

is to “provide observation, care and treatment of [the committed 

individuals’] mental condition, with a view toward restoring 

their capacity to stand trial” (id. at pp. 805–806). Accordingly, 

we instructed trial courts to direct hospital authorities to 

examine the persons committed and periodically report to the 

courts on their progress toward recovery of competency. We 

delegated to trial courts the discretion to “decid[e] whether, in a 

particular case, sufficient progress is being made to justify 

continued commitment pending trial” but imposed no specific 

time limits on how long a person may be held in “continued 

commitment.” (Id. at p. 807.) Consistent with Jackson v. 

Indiana, however, we specified that if “there exists no 

reasonable likelihood that the person will recover his 

competence to stand trial in the foreseeable future, then the 

court should either order him released from confinement or 

initiate appropriate alternative commitment proceedings under 

the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et 

seq.),” California’s civil commitment scheme. (Ibid.)

2. 1974 to the Present

In response to Davis, the Legislature enacted Assembly 

Bill No. 1529 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) in 1974. (Stats. 1974, 

ch. 1511.) Sponsored by Assemblyman Frank Murphy, the bill 

was designed to “bring California’s statutory provisions into 

accord” with the guidelines in Davis and Jackson v. Indiana. 

(Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 16, p. 3324; see also Parker, California’s 

New Scheme For The Commitment Of Individuals Found 
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Incompetent To Stand Trial (1975) 6 Pacific L.J. 484, 489

(Parker).) The Legislature specified that a defendant found 

incompetent to stand trial cannot be committed for more than 

three years. (See Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, p. 3319.) The 

Legislature also provided for the return of a defendant to court 

if “ha[ving] been committed for 18 months” — half of a 

maximum three-year commitment term — the defendant is still 

hospitalized as incompetent. (Ibid.) Upon returning to court, a 

hearing is held to determine the defendant’s competency. (Ibid.)

As part of the same enactment, the Legislature created a 

new type of conservatorship, referred to as a “Murphy” 

conservatorship after the sponsor of Assembly Bill No. 1529 

(1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) (see, e.g., Jackson v. Superior Court, 

supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 102). This allows for a one-year, 

renewable commitment of qualifying mentally incompetent 

defendants who have reached the maximum time for a

commitment under section 1370(c)(1). (See Stats. 1974, 

ch. 1511, §§ 6, 12, pp. 3319, 3322; see also, e.g., Conservatorship 

of Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1096–1097; Hofferber, supra, 

28 Cal.3d at pp. 169–170.) This new civil commitment 

procedure, together with the imposition of a maximum 

commitment period and additional periodic reporting 

requirements, sought to “integrate and resolve the conflicting 

concerns of protecting society from dangerous individuals who 

are not subject to criminal prosecution . . . and safeguarding the 

freedom of incompetent criminal defendants who present no 

threat to the public.” (Parker, supra, 6 Pacific L.J. at p. 485; see 

also, e.g., People v. Waterman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 565, 568

(Waterman); Hofferber, at pp. 176–177.)

The 1974 statutory scheme has been amended numerous 

times. Particularly relevant for our purposes are amendments 
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enacted in 1980 and 2018. In 1980, the Legislature amended 

section 1372 to add procedures following the filing of a certificate 

of restoration of competency. As added, section 1372, 

subdivision (a)(2) specified that “[u]pon the filing of a certificate 

of restoration, the defendant shall be returned to the committing 

court.” (Stats. 1980, ch. 547, § 14, p. 1516.) The Legislature also 

added subdivisions (c) and (d) to section 1372 at that time. 

Subdivision (c) requires the court to provide notice of “the date 

of any hearing on the defendant’s competence and whether or 

not the defendant was found by the court to have recovered 

competence” when a defendant is returned to court. (Stats. 

1980, ch. 547, § 14, p. 1517.) Subdivision (d) specifies the court’s 

responsibilities regarding the defendant’s custodial status if it

approves the certificate of restoration. (Stats. 1980, ch. 547, 

§ 14, p. 1517.)

In 2018, the Legislature reduced the maximum term of 

commitment from three years to two years. (Stats. 2018, 

ch. 1008, § 3.) The author of the bill explained that the 

legislation was motivated by (1) the need to reduce “[w]ait lists

for placements in state-operated treatment facilities,” and (2) a 

reassessment of the maximum period of time reasonably 

necessary “for restoring a person to competency, or for 

determining that he or she is not restorable” in response to 

advancements in “modern medical science.” (Sen. Com. on 

Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1187 (2017–2018 Reg. 

Sess.) as introduced Feb. 15, 2018, p. 4.) As part of the same 

bill, the Legislature eliminated the requirement that a 

defendant who remains committed for 18 months be returned to 

court for a redetermination of competency. (Stats. 2018, 

ch. 1008, § 3.)
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3. Current Law Governing Competency

As it now stands, the statutory scheme governing 

competency works as follows: When a doubt arises in the trial 

court judge’s mind regarding the mental competency of a 

criminal defendant, the judge may order a hearing to determine 

the defendant’s competency.2 (§ 1368, subds. (a), (b).) All 

criminal proceedings are suspended once the order issues. (Id., 

subd. (c).) At the competency hearing, the defendant is 

presumed competent and incompetence must be proved by a 

preponderance of the evidence. (§ 1369, subd. (f); see also 

Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437, 446–449, 452–453.) If 

a defendant is found incompetent, criminal proceedings remain 

“suspended until the person becomes mentally competent,” and 

the court issues a commitment order. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B).) 

Specifically, “[t]he court shall order that the mentally 

incompetent defendant be delivered by the sheriff to a State 

Department of State Hospitals facility, as defined in Section 

4100 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, as directed by the 

State Department of State Hospitals, or to any other available 

public or private treatment facility, including a communitybased residential treatment system approved by the community 

program director, or their designee, that will promote the 

2 The judge must order such a hearing if defense counsel 

also declares a doubt regarding a defendant’s competency. 

(§ 1368, subd. (b).) Even where counsel believes the defendant 

is competent, however, the court “may nevertheless order a 

hearing.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58, 

82 [explaining that our court has construed section 1368 “ ‘in 

conformity with the requirements of federal constitutional law’ ” 

to mean that “[i]f the court is presented with substantial 

evidence of mental incompetence . . . the court must declare a 

doubt about the question and initiate an inquiry”].)
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defendant’s speedy restoration to mental competence, or placed 

on outpatient status as specified in Section 1600.” (§ 1370, subd. 

(a)(1)(B)(i).) After the issuance of the commitment order, a 

defendant who is ordered “delivered . . . to a . . . State Hospitals 

facility” is to be admitted to a state hospital or a facility under 

contract with the Department. (Ibid.)

Whether admitted to a state hospital facility, delivered to 

a community-based residential treatment program, or placed on 

outpatient status, a defendant is returned to court when any of 

the following occurs: (1) a medical director or comparable 

personnel certifies to the court that the defendant has been 

restored to competency;3 (2) an appointed psychiatrist or 

psychologist opines that the defendant has regained 

competency;

4 (3) the court determines that “treatment for the 

defendant’s mental impairment is not being conducted” (§ 1370, 

subd. (b)(4)); (4) a medical director or comparable personnel 

reports to the court that there is no substantial likelihood the 

3 Section 1372, subdivision (a).

4 Section 1370, subdivision (a)(1)(G) (“If, at any time after 

the court has declared a defendant incompetent to stand trial 

pursuant to this section, counsel for the defendant or a jail 

medical or mental health staff provider provides the court with 

substantial evidence that the defendant’s psychiatric symptoms 

have changed to such a degree as to create a doubt in the mind 

of the judge as to the defendant’s current mental incompetence, 

the court may appoint a psychiatrist or a licensed psychologist 

to opine as to whether the defendant has regained competence. 

If, in the opinion of that expert, the defendant has regained 

competence, the court shall proceed as if a certificate of 

restoration of competence has been returned pursuant to 

paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 1372”).
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defendant will regain competency in the foreseeable future;5 or 

(5) the maximum commitment period set by section 1370(c)(1) 

has been reached.6 For ease of reference, we sometimes use the 

term “designated medical professional” through the remainder 

of this opinion to include the medical director of the Department 

or any relevant designee under the competency statutes. 

5 Section 1370, subdivision (b)(1)(A) (specifying the 

reporting obligations of medical personnel and stating “[i]f the 

report [filed by the medical director of the State Department of 

State Hospitals, the person in charge of a treatment facility, or 

outpatient treatment staff] indicates that there is no substantial 

likelihood that the defendant will regain mental competence in 

the foreseeable future, custody of the defendant shall be 

transferred without delay to the committing county and shall 

remain with the county until further order of the court. The 

defendant shall be returned to the court for proceedings 

pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) no later than 

10 days following receipt of the report. The court shall not order 

the defendant returned to the custody of the State Department 

of State Hospitals under the same commitment”).

6 Section 1370(c)(1) (“At the end of two years from the date 

of commitment or a period of commitment equal to the 

maximum term of imprisonment provided by law for the most 

serious offense charged in the information, indictment, or 

complaint, or the maximum term of imprisonment provided by 

law for a violation of probation or mandatory supervision, 

whichever is shorter, but no later than 90 days prior to the 

expiration of the defendant’s term of commitment, a defendant 

who has not recovered mental competence shall be returned to 

the committing court, and custody of the defendant shall be 

transferred without delay to the committing county and shall 

remain with the county until further order of the court. The 

court shall not order the defendant returned to the custody of 

the State Department of State Hospitals under the same 

commitment. The court shall notify the community program 

director or a designee of the return and of any resulting court 

orders”).
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Regarding the first path back to court, under section 1372, 

if the designated medical professional “determines that the 

defendant has regained mental competence,” that person “shall

immediately certify that fact to the court by filing a certificate 

of restoration.” (§ 1372, subd. (a)(1).) Within 10 days of the 

filing of the certificate of restoration, the defendant “shall be 

returned to the committing court.” (§ 1372, subd. (a)(3)(C).) 

“When a defendant is returned to court with a certification that 

competence has been regained,” the court shall notify the 

appropriate personnel “of the date of any hearing on the 

defendant’s competence and whether or not the defendant was 

found by the court to have recovered competence.” (§ 1372, 

subd. (c)(1).)

Although section 1372 refers to a “hearing on the 

defendant’s competence” (§ 1372, subd. (c)(1)), it does not “set 

forth any . . . procedures” for such a hearing. (People v. 

Rells (2000) 22 Cal.4th 860, 867 (Rells).) We have held, 

however, that “section 1372 allows its gaps to be filled by Penal 

Code section 1369,” which establishes the procedures for the 

initial hearing on the issue of a defendant’s mental competence. 

(Id. at p. 868.) Thus, when a defendant returns to court after a 

certificate of restoration has been filed, the defendant is 

presumed competent and bears the burden of proving otherwise

at a hearing. (See id. at pp. 867–868.) “If the committing court 

approves the certificate of restoration” (§ 1372, subd. (d)) — thus 

finding the defendant has recovered competency — criminal 

proceedings resume (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(A)) and the court “shall 

hold a hearing to determine whether the person is entitled to be 

admitted to bail or released on own recognizance status pending 

conclusion of the proceedings” (§ 1372, subd. (d)). The court

may, however, “reject[] a certificate of restoration” based on a 
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medical evaluation (§ 1372, subd. (c)(2)), at which point a

defendant may be returned to a treatment facility if the 

maximum commitment period has not yet been reached. (See 

§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B); Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 

4 Cal.5th at p. 106.)

Different procedures apply if the maximum commitment 

term has been reached. As mentioned, section 1370(c)(1) 

prohibits commitments lasting more than two years. If the 

defendant has not regained competency, the statute does not 

provide for a hearing to redetermine a defendant’s competency 

at this point. (Accord, In re Taitano (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 233, 

239, 246 (Taitano) [holding that trial courts are not authorized 

to hold competency hearings after the maximum statutory 

commitment period has expired where the court “had not 

received a certification that [the defendant] has been restored to 

competence by certain mental health officials (including the 

county medical health director) or the conservator”]; People v. 

Quiroz (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1375 (Quiroz) [holding that 

a trial judge has no power “to convene a competency hearing 

after a state hospital certifies that a defendant, who has been 

involuntarily confined for three years due to incompetence to 

stand trial, is not likely to regain competency”].) Instead, 

section 1370 directs the committing court to “initiate 

conservatorship proceedings for the defendant” if “it appears to 

the court that the defendant is gravely disabled.” (§ 1370, 

subd. (c)(3).)

A defendant is gravely disabled if, “as a result of a mental 

health disorder,” the defendant “is unable to provide for his or 

her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter.” (Welf. & 

Inst. Code, § 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) Alternatively, a defendant 

is gravely disabled — and subject to a Murphy 
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conservatorship — if the defendant “has been found mentally 

incompetent” (id., subd. (h)(1)(B)) and certain facts obtain, 

including that “[t]he person represents a substantial danger of 

physical harm to others by reason of a mental disease, defect, or 

disorder” (id., subd. (h)(1)(B)(iv)). If the defendant is deemed 

gravely disabled under either definition, the defendant may be 

confined as long as “conservatorship is still required.” (Welf. & 

Inst. Code, § 5361, subd. (b).) On the other hand, “If the 

defendant is not gravely disabled, the defendant must be 

released [citation], and the trial court may dismiss the action in 

the interest of justice pursuant to section 1385 [citations]. Such 

a dismissal is ‘without prejudice to the initiation of any 

proceedings that may be appropriate’ under the [LantermanPetris-Short] Act.” (Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th 

at p. 102.)

To summarize the steps in the commitment process most 

relevant to the issue before us: A defendant found mentally 

incompetent to stand trial shall be committed by court order. 

(See § 1370.) If the designated medical professional finds that 

the defendant’s competency has been restored, the person files 

a certificate of restoration, triggering the defendant’s return to 

court. (See §§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C), 1372.) Following the 

defendant’s return, the court holds a hearing to determine 

whether to approve or reject the certificate. (See § 1372.) If a 

defendant has not regained competency within two years of the 

date of commitment, the defendant is either released or subject 

to civil conservatorship proceedings. (See § 1370, subd. (c); 

Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 102.)
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

18

B. Determining Whether a Commitment Continues 

Past the Filing of a Certificate of Restoration

Because it involves a pure question of law, we review de 

novo the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the filing of a 

certificate of restoration terminates an incompetency 

commitment. (See, e.g., Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 870.) In 

interpreting the competency statutory scheme, “ ‘[O]ur task is to 

ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the 

purpose of the enactment. [Citation.] We look first to the words 

of the statute, which are the most reliable indications of the 

Legislature’s intent. [Citation.] We construe the words of a 

statute in context, and harmonize the various parts of an 

enactment by considering the provision at issue in the context 

of the statutory framework as a whole.’ ” (Kim v. Reins 

International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 83 (Kim).) If 

“ ‘the [statutory] language supports more than one reasonable 

construction, then we may look to extrinsic aids, including the 

ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.’ ” 

(Ibid.)

1. The Statutory Text Is More Consistent with

Rodriguez’s Position than the People’s 

“The relevant statutes do not explicitly state the point at 

which an incompetency commitment ends” when a certificate of 

restoration has been timely filed. (Carr, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 1144.) That is, section 1370(c)(1) does not expressly specify 

when a commitment ends for a defendant who has been certified 

as restored to competence. Likewise, section 1372 — the 

provision pertaining to certificates of restoration of 

competence — is silent regarding how the issuance of the 

certificate affects the running of the two-year maximum period 

of commitment. 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

19

Nonetheless, as we explain below, the crucial competency 

assessments before and after the filing of the certificate of 

restoration require judicial action and approval. The “legal 

force and effect” of the “filing of the certificate” is simply to 

“cause[] the defendant to be returned to court for further 

proceedings” (Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 868; see also § 1372, 

subd. (a)), and even that return occurs pursuant to a court order. 

(See § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C); § 1372, subd. (a)(2).) When the 

court’s central role in competency proceedings is juxtaposed 

against the limited significance of a certificate of restoration, we 

conclude the Legislature did not intend for the filing of a 

certificate to “fix[] . . . the end date for calculation of the 

commitment treatment period under section 1370(c)(1),” as the 

court below concluded. (Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 652.)

a. The statutory text suggests that the two-year 

clock of section 1370(c)(1) does not stop with the

filing of a certificate of restoration

We begin, “as always, with the text” of the relevant 

statutes. (Villanueva v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2021) 

11 Cal.5th 104, 114.) 

Section 1370(c)(1) provides that “[a]t the end of two years 

from the date of commitment . . . but no later than 90 days prior 

to the expiration of the defendant’s term of commitment, a 

defendant who has not recovered mental competence shall be 

returned to the committing court.” Even when a certificate of 

restoration of competency has been filed, it is the court’s decision 

whether to accept a certificate that determines whether criminal 

proceedings may resume, or whether — if the two-year 

timeframe has not elapsed — further treatment is required 

instead. A finding that a defendant has recovered mental 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

20

competency requires a court order, and the court must act to 

approve the certificate of restoration even when not contested

by the parties. (See § 1372, subds. (c), (d).) Moreover, before the 

court adjudicates a defendant competent, the defendant cannot

seek bail or otherwise challenge the underlying charges because 

criminal proceedings remain suspended. (See §§ 1372, subd. (d),

1370, subd. (a)(1).) This array of procedures suggests that until 

the court decides whether to accept a certificate, the two-year 

clock on an incompetency commitment (§ 1370(c)(1)) has not 

stopped.

Section 1370(c)(1) also requires the defendant’s return to 

court 90 days before the expiration of the maximum two-year 

commitment period. The reservation of a 90-day period cannot 

be wholly explained by the time it should take to transport the 

defendant. Section 1370 makes clear that the defendant must 

be transported “without delay” (§ 1370(c)(1)), “immediate[ly]”

(id., subd. (c)(2)(A)), and most concretely, “within 10 calendar 

days” (id., subd. (c)(2)(B)). The statute thus allows time for 

necessary subsequent judicial proceedings to be completed 

before reaching the maximum period of commitment.

It is true the Legislature did not appear to have the issue 

before us specifically in mind when it amended section 

1370(c)(1) in 2014, effective January 1, 2015, to include this

90-day period. (See Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of 

Assem. Bill No. 2625 (2013–2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended 

Apr. 24, 2014, p. 1 [indicating that the language was added with 

the aim “to reduce the backlog of patients awaiting a state 

hospital placement in county jails by ensuring defendants found 

incompetent to stand trial (IST) who cannot be restored to trial 

competency are returned to their original county of commitment 

in a timely manner”].) Nonetheless, the 90-day window is 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

21

consistent with Rodriguez’s general position that some judicial 

action is necessary to end a commitment period. 

b. The People’s interpretation of the statutory text

is unpersuasive

The People’s arguments do not persuade us that “the plain 

language of the statutory scheme” requires courts to exclude the 

period following the filing of a certificate of restoration from the 

two-year maximum commitment period. 

i. Section 1372

First, the People rely heavily on section 1372’s provisions 

regarding the certification of restoration to competence. Yet it 

is not clear how this section supports the People’s 

interpretation. As previously summarized, section 1372

specifies that “[i]f the medical director of a state hospital [or 

other appropriate personnel] determines that the defendant has 

regained mental competence, the director or designee shall 

immediately certify that fact to the court by filing a certificate 

of restoration with the court.” (§ 1372, subd. (a)(1).) Because 

the court’s initial commitment order must have directed the 

sheriff to “redeliver the patient to the court . . . upon receiving 

from the state hospital or treatment facility a copy of the 

certificate of restoration” (id., subd. (a)(2)), “the patient shall be 

returned to the committing court no later than 10 days following 

the filing of a certificate of restoration” (id., subd. (a)(3)(C)). 

Upon a defendant’s return to court, all further proceedings occur

at the court’s discretion. (See § 1372, subds. (c)–(e).) In short, 

section 1372 specifies what the filing of a certificate of 

restoration accomplishes: It causes the sheriff to “redeliver the 

patient to the court” pursuant to the court order. (§ 1372, 

subd. (a)(2).) Section 1372 contains no hint that the time 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

22

between the filing of a certificate of restoration and a court’s 

ruling on the certificate is excluded from the commitment

period.

The People maintain that “[n]othing in the plain language 

of the statutory scheme suggests that the discretionary hearing 

contemplated by section 1372 falls within the commitment time 

enumerated in section 1370, subd. (c)(1).” The Court of Appeal 

reached the same conclusion. (See Rodriguez, supra, 

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 650 [“Section 1372 does not explicitly state 

any timeframe within which the restoration hearing must be 

held and does not reference section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year 

maximum for an incompetency commitment”].)

As we have recognized, however, section 1372 “does not set 

forth any . . . procedures whatsoever” to govern the hearing on a 

defendant’s recovery of mental competency. (Rells, supra, 

22 Cal.4th at p. 867; see also People v. Murrell (1987) 

196 Cal.App.3d 822, 826 [observing that “section 1372 does not 

directly provide for a hearing where the defendant may 

challenge the medical director’s certification of competence” and 

the legislative intent to provide for such a hearing must be 

inferred].) Thus, the fact that section 1372 does not mention 

section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year limit is neither surprising nor 

illuminating.7

7 We also note that section 1370, subdivision (a)(3)(C)(ii) 

specifies that “[i]f a certificate of restoration of competency was 

filed with the court pursuant to Section 1372 and the court 

subsequently rejected the certification,” the court shall provide 

“a new computation or statement setting forth the amount of 

credit for time served, if any, to be deducted from the 

defendant’s maximum term of commitment based on the court’s
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

23

ii. The statutory presumption of competence

Second, the People rely upon the presumption of 

competence (see § 1369, subd. (f)), which applies at a section 

1372 hearing at which a judge determines whether to approve 

or reject a certificate of restoration. (See Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th 

at p. 862.) The court below likewise relied on this presumption, 

reasoning that the absence of further treatment together with

the presumption of competence meant that a defendant could no 

longer be regarded as subject to a commitment after the 

certificate’s filing. (Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 653, 

655–656.) But there is reason to question this analysis.

8

The presumption of competence applies at every trial and 

retrial of a defendant’s competency, even where there is reason 

to doubt a defendant is competent. As we have previously noted, 

“[t]he presumption that the defendant is mentally competent . . .

rejection of the certification.” (§ 1370, subd. (a)(3)(C)(ii), italics 

added.) This language appears to contemplate that when “a 

certificate of restoration of competency was filed with the court 

pursuant to Section 1372 and the court subsequently rejected 

the certification,” the period in between the filing of the 

certificate and the court’s rejection thereof is relevant for 

purposes of computing the maximum period of commitment 

allowed by section 1370(c)(1). (§ 1370, subd. (a)(3)(C)(ii).)

8 The Court of Appeal relied on Rells in concluding that “the 

filing of the certificate triggers a presumption of mental 

competency under section 1372.” (Rodriguez, supra, 

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 652.) But Rells merely stated that the 

filing of the certificate of restoration “trigger[s] a hearing on a 

defendant’s recovery of mental competence.” (Rells, supra, 

22 Cal.4th at p. 868, italics added.) At this hearing, as 

explained post, the presumption of competence operates as a 

principle of law as in any competency proceeding. It is a 

misreading of Rells to conclude that a restoration certificate 

itself creates the presumption of competence.
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

24

is applicable at a trial of the defendant’s mental competence” 

when a court first declares doubt as to the mental competence of 

the defendant. (Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 867.) The 

presumption therefore applies “in spite of the fact that it may

run counter to any doubt expressed by the court and supported 

by the opinion of [the defendant’s] own counsel.” (Ibid.) When 

the statute provided for a defendant’s return to court if the 

defendant was still incompetent after an 18-month commitment

(see Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, p. 3319; former § 1370, subd. 

(b)(2)), the presumption of competence was likewise applicable 

at the retrial of the defendant’s competence “in spite of the fact 

that it is inconsistent with his apparent nonrecovery of mental 

competence.” (Rells, at p. 867.)

In light of the foregoing, it appears that the Legislature

simply intended for the presumption of competence to operate 

as a principle of law that a court applies in making a competency 

determination at any stage. (See Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 

p. 862 [stating that the presumption of competence “operates to 

impose the burden of proof on the party, if any, who claims that 

the defendant is mentally incompetent, and fixes the weight 

thereof at preponderance of the evidence”]; Medina v. 

California, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 449 [explaining that the 

presumption of competence has limited legal effect, “affect[ing] 

competency determinations only in a narrow class of cases 

where the evidence is in equipoise; that is, where the evidence 

that a defendant is competent is just as strong as the evidence 

that he is incompetent”].) It goes too far to conclude that the 

presumption reflects the Legislature’s understanding that a 

commitment ends upon the filing of a certificate of restoration.

Furthermore, even when the presumption of competence 

does not run counter to doubts regarding the defendant’s 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

25

competency — and instead “conforms in fact with the certificate 

of restoration filed by the specified mental health official” (Rells, 

supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 867, italics omitted) — the court has the 

statutory authority to reject the certification and find a 

defendant incompetent (see § 1372, subd. (c)(2)).

9

 Yet, under the 

People’s interpretation, even an erroneous certificate of 

restoration terminates an incompetency commitment. The 

People offer no persuasive explanation why the Legislature 

would intend that an incompetent defendant — who like 

Rodriguez may be moved between a state hospital and the 

county jail, all the while remaining confined and involuntarily 

medicated — should not have such time counted toward the 

maximum term of commitment merely because his doctor 

mistakenly concluded that he has regained competency.

iii. The asserted primacy of location

The People’s third textual argument is based on section 

1370. The People assert that section 1370 uses the words 

“delivered” and “committed” synonymously in arguing that a 

commitment consists only of that period “wherein the defendant 

is physically placed in the care and custody of the state hospital 

for restoration treatment.” (See § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i) 

[specifying that once a defendant is found incompetent, “[t]he 

9 This contrasts with previous versions of the law, in which 

a designated medical professional’s certification that a 

defendant has recovered mental competency served to render a 

person competent as a matter of law. (See Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, 

§ 7, p. 3320; People v. Ashley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 339, 359 (Ashley) 

[after a superintendent of a state hospital certifies that a 

defendant has regained competence, “[t]he defendant is then to 

be tried”]; In re Phyle (1947) 30 Cal.2d 838, 843–844 (Phyle); 

People v. Superior Court (Contra Costa County) (1935) 4 Cal.2d 

136, 145 (Contra Costa County).)
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

26

court shall order that the mentally incompetent defendant be 

delivered by the sheriff to a State Department of State Hospitals 

facility . . . or to any other available public or private treatment 

facility . . . or placed on outpatient status”]; id., subd. (a)(2) 

[referring to the order made under subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i) as 

“the order directing that the defendant be committed to the 

State Department of State Hospitals or other treatment facility 

or placed on outpatient status”].) Because a defendant is 

“committed” only upon being “delivered” to a treatment facility, 

the People maintain, “the definition of the ‘commitment’ . . .

should not be conflated with the period of court-adjudged 

incompetency.” Instead, according to the People, this language 

signifies that it is a defendant’s presence at a treatment facility 

that constitutes a commitment. And because a defendant is 

transferred back to county custody after being certified as 

having been restored to competency, the People contend, the 

defendant is no longer committed for purposes of calculating the 

two-year time limit. 

There are significant problems with the People’s argument 

that commitment only occurs when the defendant is physically 

present at a treatment facility. First, if location is 

determinative of whether a defendant is committed, then a 

commitment should end with a defendant’s actual transport 

from the treatment facility back to county custody — not with 

the filing of a certificate of restoration, as the People claim. 

Section 1372 makes clear that such transport may take as long 

as 10 days from the filing of the certificate. (§ 1372, 

subd. (a)(3)(C) [“In all cases, the patient shall be returned to the 

committing court no later than 10 days following the filing of a 

certificate of restoration”].) The People’s position that a 

commitment ends with the filing of a certificate of restoration is 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

27

therefore inconsistent with their own assertion that a 

commitment consists of the period when a defendant is 

physically in a treatment facility.10

Second, the People’s position is inconsistent with various 

statutory provisions relating to competency determinations and 

proceedings that treat “commitment” as distinct from events 

such as “admission,” “transfer,” or “confinement.” For example, 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 4335.2 “establish[es] a 

program for the [D]epartment to perform reevaluations 

primarily through telehealth evaluations for felony incompetent 

to stand trial (IST) individuals in jail who have been waiting for 

admission to the [D]epartment.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4335.2, 

subd. (b).) Among the stated goals of allowing for such 

telehealth evaluations is “[t]o permit the [D]epartment to 

conduct reevaluations of IST defendants committed to the 

[D]epartment and awaiting admission to [D]epartment 

facilities.” (Id., subd. (b)(1), italics added; see also id., subd. (c) 

10 In this case, the dates of the trial court’s orders of 

commitment are not the dates of Rodriguez’s transport to a state 

hospital or the dates of his admission to such a facility — i.e., 

they are not when Rodriguez was “physically placed in the care 

and custody of the state hospital for restoration treatment.” The 

record does not reflect when Rodriguez was transported to or 

from a state hospital for either of his two commitments (see 

Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 636–638), making it 

impossible to evaluate how long Rodriguez has been committed 

under the People’s reading of the statutes. This gap in the 

record may be explained by the fact that the parties below 

agreed that the dates of the transports were not legally 

significant. Before the Court of Appeal, the People “apparently 

concede[d] that Rodriguez’s ‘commitment’ under section 

1370(c)(1) began on the date of the trial court’s order of 

commitment.” (Id. at p. 650, fn. 14.) 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

28

[“The [D]epartment, or its designee, have the authority and sole 

discretion to consider and conduct reevaluations for IST 

defendants committed to and awaiting admission to the 

[D]epartment”], italics added.) This provision suggests that a 

defendant is deemed committed upon having his or her place of 

treatment judicially determined, not when the defendant 

actually enters a treatment facility.

Along the same lines, section 1370 requires the 

Department to “make a written report to the court . . . 

concerning the defendant’s progress toward recovery of mental 

competence” “[w]ithin 90 days after a commitment made 

pursuant to subdivision (a).” (§ 1370, subd. (b)(1).) 

“Commitment,” as used in this provision — i.e., “a commitment 

made pursuant to subdivision (a)” — refers to the court’s 

commitment order, and not admission to or physical placement 

in a state hospital. (Ibid.) Similarly, other subdivisions of 

section 1370 refer to “commit[ment]” and “confine[ment]” or 

“commit[ment]” and “transfer” to a facility as separate events. 

(See, e.g., § 1370, subd. (a)(5) [“When directing that the 

defendant be confined in a State Department of State Hospitals 

facility pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall commit the 

defendant to the State Department of State Hospitals”]; id., 

subd. (a)(6)(A) [specifying appropriate actions a court may take 

in the event “the defendant is committed or transferred to the 

State Department of State Hospitals pursuant to this section”].) 

A commitment thus does not necessarily coincide with actual 

presence in a state treatment facility.

11

11 We need not decide in this case whether defendants placed 

on outpatient status (see § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i), (2)(A)(ii)) are, 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

29

iv. Other textual arguments

The People also rely on section 1370(c)(1), which specifies 

that “a defendant who has not recovered mental competence 

shall be returned to the committing court” at the end of a twoyear commitment period. The People argue that the two-year

time limit in section 1370(c)(1) cannot “apply to court hearings 

after the defendant has been returned to court pursuant to 

section 1372, given that the remedy [under section 1370(c)(1)] is 

to return the defendant to the committing court — an event that 

has already occurred.” 

The People’s interpretation fails to recognize section 

1370(c)(1)’s multiple functions. This statute not only compels 

the transport of a defendant from one place to another, but also 

limits the amount of time that a defendant may be committed 

due to incompetency. (See § 1370(c)(1) [specifying that “[t]he 

court shall not order the defendant returned to the custody of 

the State Department of State Hospitals under the same 

commitment” if a defendant has reached his maximum term of 

commitment].) Rodriguez seeks the application of this limit and 

a declaration that as a defendant whose commitment has 

reached the statutorily allowed maximum, “the court should 

either order him released from confinement or initiate 

appropriate alternative commitment proceedings under the 

Lanterman-Petris-Short Act” (Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at 

in fact, committed for purposes of the two-year limit. Under the 

People’s reading of the statutes, however, defendants who are 

on outpatient status are never committed because they are never 

physically in the custody of a treatment facility. It is unclear 

what meaning, if any, section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year limit would 

have under the People’s reading.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

30

p. 807) — neither of which is “an event that has already 

occurred.”

12

The People also contend that if we were to “conclud[e] that 

a court’s competency finding is necessary to terminate [a] 

commitment,” commitments would last “indefinitely” for certain 

defendants. Specifically, the People point to defendants 

returned to court when a designated medical professional 

reports that “there is no substantial likelihood that the 

defendant[s] will regain mental competence in the foreseeable 

future” (§ 1370, subd. (b)(1)(A)) and those returned to court after 

12 The People’s argument also ignores the possibility that an 

incompetent defendant may be treated at the county jail. 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 4100 enumerates the 

types of facilities over which the Department has jurisdiction. 

Among these are “county jail treatment facilit[ies] under 

contract with the State Department of State Hospitals to 

provide competency restoration services.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 4100, subd. (g).) A defendant committed to a Department 

facility could be at the county jail treatment facility for the 

entire commitment period.

Section 1370(c)(1) therefore requires that defendants 

treated at the county jails “be returned to the committing court” 

and their “custody . . . be transferred without delay to the 

committing county” at the end of their maximum terms of 

commitment and “shall remain with the county until further 

order of the court.” (Ibid.) This means that section 1370(c)(1) 

requires defendants already in county custody be returned to 

county custody until the court takes action regarding their 

commitment status. (Ibid.) Yet, the People do not argue that 

section 1370(c)(1) is inapplicable to defendants receiving 

treatment at a county jail facility despite their county custody 

constituting “an event that has already occurred.” For such 

defendants, like those in Rodriguez’s situation, 

section 1370(c)(1) is applicable regardless of the defendant’s 

physical location.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

31

their maximum commitment term has expired (§ 1370(c)(1)). 

The People maintain that because the statutes do not provide 

for a court hearing to redetermine defendants’ competency when 

they are returned via these two paths, such hearings would 

never occur and the defendants “would remain indefinitely 

committed.” (See Taitano, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 239; 

Quiroz, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1374.) But we are 

addressing only the limited issue of whether the interval 

between the filing of a certificate of restoration and the court’s 

ruling on it is excluded from the maximum commitment time set 

by section 1370(c)(1). Our holding does not mean that 

defendants returned without such certificates will be committed 

“indefinitely.”

Finally, in their amicus curiae brief submitted in support 

of the People, the State Department of State Hospitals and the 

State Department of Developmental Services make an 

argument that relies on the timing of when a commitment 

begins. According to amici curiae, “[i]t is undisputed that the 

maximum commitment period does not include the time before 

a court conducts an initial competency hearing,” i.e., a hearing 

under section 1370. According to amici curiae, “[t]he time 

between the filing of a certificate of restoration and a 

section 1372 hearing should be treated the same way” and 

excluded from the maximum competency period.

But a defendant awaiting a competency hearing under 

section 1370 differs in important ways from a defendant 

awaiting a competency determination under section 1372. 

Before a court conducts an initial competency hearing under 

section 1370, the defendant has not been legally adjudicated as 

incompetent. In contrast, a defendant who has been certified by 

medical personnel as restored to competency necessarily has 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

32

been previously determined to be incompetent, and until a court 

makes a competency finding pursuant to section 1372, the 

defendant cannot be treated as legally competent. In addition, 

a defendant who has not been adjudicated as incompetent may 

still be released on bail. (See § 1371.) A defendant who has been 

certified as competent, on the other hand, is ineligible for bail 

consideration until the court determines the defendant has 

regained competency. (See § 1372, subd. (d).)

In short, the period prior to a competency hearing under 

section 1370 occurs before the period of commitment and thus 

tells us very little about the period of commitment itself. The 

fact that “the time before a court conducts an initial competency 

hearing” under section 1370 is not counted toward the term of 

commitment does not persuade us to likewise exclude from a 

maximum period of commitment the interval before a court 

conducts a competency hearing under section 1372.

2. Rodriguez’s Interpretation Furthers the Purposes 

of the Statute

The statutory text read in context is consistent with the 

understanding that the filing of a certificate of restoration does 

not stop the two-year clock set by section 1370(c)(1). But 

because the language of these statutes “ ‘supports more than one 

reasonable construction,’ ” we look for an interpretation of the 

statute that will best “ ‘effectuate the purpose’ ” of the 

competency statutory scheme. (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 83.) 

We conclude Rodriguez’s proposed interpretation furthers the 

purpose of the relevant competency statutes.

We have explained that “[t]he incompetence program . . . 

is a special form of pretrial detention” whose “purpose is 

restoration of a specific mental state without which the criminal 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

33

process cannot proceed.” (Waterman, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 569, 

italics omitted.) In adopting the “incompetence program” in 

1974, the Legislature clearly intended to limit a defendant’s 

time in “pretrial detention” and to suspend “the criminal 

process” so that the defendant can be restored to “a specific 

mental state.” (Ibid., italics omitted; see Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, 

§ 16, pp. 3323–3324.) The Legislature also intended to 

“eliminate uncertainty among all persons concerned regarding 

court procedures.” (Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 16, p. 3324.) This 

latter goal of providing certainty is evident in the Legislature’s 

decision to limit the maximum term of commitment to three 

years (and later two), rather than the “reasonable period of 

time” mandated under Davis and Jackson v. Indiana. (Davis, 

supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 801; Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. at 

p. 738.) As we explained in Jackson v. Superior Court, “the 

Legislature established the [then] three-year maximum in 

section 1370(c) to protect defendants’ due process and equal 

protection rights not to be committed solely because of 

incompetence for longer than is reasonable.” (Jackson v. 

Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 105.) 

Rodriguez’s proposed interpretation — specifically, not 

excluding the period between the filing of a certificate of 

competence, and the court’s ruling on the certificate — is 

consistent with the Legislature’s intent to limit the period of 

detention due to incompetency and provide certainty regarding 

the length of that detention period. Under this interpretation, 

incompetent defendants are assured that they cannot be 

confined simply on account of their inability to proceed to trial 

for more than a specified two-year period. 

By contrast, the People’s proposed interpretation runs 

counter to the legislative goal of limiting a defendant’s 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

34

confinement “solely because of incompetence.” (Jackson v. 

Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 105.) If we were to adopt 

the People’s interpretation, a defendant could be held 

indefinitely while awaiting a competency hearing, subject only 

to the limits imposed by the due process clause. As explained 

previously, after the filing of a certificate of restoration but 

before the court adjudicates the defendant competent, the 

defendant cannot seek bail or otherwise challenge the 

underlying charges because the criminal proceedings remain 

suspended. (See §§ 1372, subd. (d), 1370, subd. (a)(1).) Allowing 

defendants to remain in this state of limbo is contrary to the 

entire statutory scheme.

The People’s construction would also eliminate any 

urgency in reaching a determination of competency. This again 

runs counter to the Legislature’s intent, in imposing the twoyear limit under section 1370(c)(1), to eliminate the uncertainty 

inherent in the “reasonable period of time” standard under 

Davis and Jackson v. Indiana and ensure that individuals who 

may never regain competence are not indefinitely detained with 

the criminal process suspended. 

Furthermore, the fact that a defendant may continue to 

receive treatment even post-certification means that some of the 

period following the filing of the certificate is reasonably seen as 

a part of the process of treatment to determine whether 

competence can be, and ultimately is, regained — which is what 

the statute generally aims to expedite. (See Stats. 1974, 

ch. 1511, § 16, pp. 3323–3324; see also, e.g., Davis, supra, 

8 Cal.3d at p. 801; Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th 

at p. 105.) Including this period within the limit of section 

1370(c)(1) furthers the legislative intent underlying the 

competency statutes for this reason as well.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

35

3. The Statutory Background Cuts Against the 

People’s Position

Our interpretation of the relevant statutes is bolstered by 

the evolution of the competency scheme, which since 1974 has 

progressively moved control of incompetent defendants away 

from designated medical professionals at facilities providing 

competency restoration services, and toward supervision by the 

courts. 

a. The evolution of the competency statutory 

scheme

In ending the indefinite commitment of mentally 

incompetent defendants in 1974, the Legislature imposed on the 

Department (and other facilities) the obligation to provide

periodic reports to the court. Specifically, the Legislature 

mandated that “[w]ithin 90 days of a commitment . . . , the 

superintendent of the state hospital or other facility to which the 

defendant is committed shall make a written report to the court 

concerning the defendant’s progress toward recovery of his 

mental competence.” (Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, pp. 3318–3319.) 

Only if “the report discloses a substantial likelihood the 

defendant will regain his mental competence in the foreseeable 

future” will the defendant “remain in the state hospital or other 

facility.” (Id. at p. 3319.) After the initial report, “at six-month 

intervals or until the defendant becomes mentally competent, 

the superintendent of the hospital or person in charge of the 

facility shall report to the court regarding the defendant’s 

progress.” (Ibid.) Should a report at any point indicate that 

“there is no substantial likelihood that the defendant will regain 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

36

his mental competence in the foreseeable future, the committing 

court shall order him to be returned to the court.”

13

 (Ibid.)

In 1980, the Legislature extended the courts’ role in 

overseeing competency procedures by making them responsible

for determining whether a defendant has regained competency 

when the defendant is returned to court following the filing of a 

certificate of restoration. (See Stats. 1980, ch. 547, § 14,

p. 1517.) Before this amendment, once the designated medical 

professional certified a defendant as restored to competency, 

“[t]he defendant [was] then to be tried.” (Ashley, supra, 

59 Cal.2d at p. 359; see also Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, p. 3319.) 

13 These reporting requirements have remained 

substantially unchanged since 1974, although the statutory 

language has been amended to take into account placement 

options not previously available. (See § 1370, subd. (b).)

Relying on passages from various Court of Appeal 

decisions, the People argue that “[t]he evil remedied by In re 

Davis and later addressed by the Legislature in enacting section 

1370, subd. (c)(1) [in 1974], was the languishing of incompetent 

defendants in treatment facilities, not delays in judicial 

determinations of competency or other court business when 

defendants are within the court’s direct control.” Davis makes 

clear, however, that we were also concerned with the lack of 

court supervision over defendants “confined in state hospitals.” 

(Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 806.) It was with an eye toward 

imposing more judicial oversight that we directed “the hospitals’ 

authorities [to] report [to the superior courts] . . . regarding 

the . . . progress toward competence” of “all persons . . .

committed as incompetent to stand trial.” (Ibid.) These 

reporting requirements, designed to help courts determine 

whether progress was made in restoring competency, were then 

enacted into law when the Legislature overhauled the 

competency statutory scheme in 1974. In other words, our court 

in Davis and the Legislature in 1974 both sought to put 

incompetent defendants more “within the court’s direct control.”
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

37

That is, “the final determination” of a defendant’s restoration of 

competency rested with the designated medical professional. 

(Phyle, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 849.) The Legislature took away 

the power to make this “final determination” when it required a 

court to approve or reject a certificate of restoration. (Ibid.) 

Now, a court may accept a certificate of restoration, finding the 

defendant competent and allowing criminal proceedings to 

resume. (See §§ 1372, subd. (c), 1370, subd. (a)(1).) Or, a court 

may reject a certificate of restoration, finding that the defendant 

remains incompetent. (See § 1372, subd. (c)(2).) In other words, 

the court may disagree with the designated medical 

professional, and it is the court’s judgment that carries legal 

significance.14

14 The courts in Carr and Rodriguez touched on this point as 

it relates to the question before us. The Carr court reasoned 

that “if the commitment terminates when a health official files 

a certification of competence, [no] plausible purpose [would be] 

served in requiring [a] court to approve the certification as 

expressly contemplated in section 1372, subdivision (d).” (Carr, 

supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1145.) The court below responded to 

Carr by positing that “[t]he issuance of the restoration 

certificate and the subsequent court hearing have distinct 

statutory objectives.” (Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 652.) According to Rodriguez, “[t]he certificate of restoration 

to competence by the designated health official and prompt 

return to the trial court vindicates the defendant’s right not to 

remain longer than two years in the treatment facility,” whereas 

“[t]he judicial determination of restoration of competency 

ensures that the defendant is not tried if incompetent.” (Id. at 

p. 655.) The fact remains, however, that the designated medical 

professional and the court are making the same 

determination — whether the defendant is competent — and 

the court’s decision controls.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

38

In addition, courts are empowered to remove defendants 

from their commitment placement without input from the 

designated medical professional. In the 1974 enactment, the 

Legislature declared that a defendant “shall be returned to the 

committing court” if the court determines that “treatment for 

the defendant’s mental impairment is [not] being conducted.” 

(Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, p. 3319; see also § 1370, subd. (b)(4).) 

In 2018, the Legislature specified that “[i]f, at any time after the 

court has declared a defendant incompetent to stand trial,” the 

court receives “substantial evidence . . . as to create a doubt in 

the mind of the judge as to the defendant’s current mental 

incompetence,” the court may appoint an expert to examine the 

defendant. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(G), added by Stats. 2018, ch. 34, 

§ 25.) If the expert opines that the defendant has regained 

competency, “the court shall proceed as if a certificate of 

restoration of competence has been returned,” although no such 

certificate has been filed by the designated medical professional. 

(Ibid.)15 Neither of these procedures requires the state 

hospital’s involvement. 

15 Likewise, “the court shall proceed as if a certificate of 

restoration of competence has been returned” if the Department 

elects to conduct a telehealth reevaluation of a defendant 

adjudicated mentally incompetent when the defendant is still in 

county custody and “in the opinion of the department’s expert, 

the defendant has regained competence.” (§ 1370, subd. 

(a)(1)(H)(ii).) If the filing of a certificate ends a commitment as 

the People argue, it follows that an opinion of restored 

competency rendered under section 1370, subdivision (a)(1)(G) 

and (a)(1)(H) should also automatically end a commitment. It 

seems unlikely the Legislature would have intended for multiple 

events, potentially happening on different dates, to mark the 

end of a commitment, as that would sow conflict and confusion.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

39

To summarize: Through a series of enactments

concerning competency proceedings, the Legislature has vested 

courts with responsibility for overseeing the progress of 

defendants committed for the purpose of restoring their 

competency. Much of this responsibility previously rested with 

the Department and related entities. The Legislature, however, 

has shifted this authority to the courts to ensure that “a person 

charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed 

solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be 

held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to 

determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will 

attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.” (Jackson v. 

Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 738.) This sequence of 

amendments cuts against the People’s argument and suggests 

that the Legislature did not intend a certificate of restoration 

filed by a designated medical professional to unilaterally stop 

the two-year clock.

b. The People’s reliance on the 2018 amendment

As mentioned, in 2018, the Legislature shortened the 

maximum commitment term from three years to two years. 

(Stats. 2018, ch. 1008, § 3.) The People point to a summary 

provided by the Legislative Counsel, which stated that the 2018 

bill “would reduce the term for commitment to a treatment 

facility when a felony [is] committed to the shorter of 2 years or 

the period of commitment equal to the maximum term of 

imprisonment provided by law for the most serious offense 

charged.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1187 (2017–2018 

Reg. Sess.).) Relying on the phrase “to a treatment facility”

within this summary, the People argue that the Legislature did 

not intend “the maximum commitment to include court hearings 

that occur when the defendant is no longer receiving restoration 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

40

treatment and is no longer in the care and custody of the state 

hospital.”

To the extent the People are focused on a defendant being 

in a “treatment facility” or in the “custody of the state hospital,”

the People are again arguing that physical presence in a facility 

is determinative of commitment. The legislative history of the 

2018 amendment does not support this claim. For example, the 

Senate Committee on Public Safety’s analysis of the measure

simply stated, “The bill changes the maximum commitment 

term for a felony from three years to two years.” (Sen. Com. on 

Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1187, supra, as 

introduced Feb. 15, 2018, p. 5.) The analysis thus repeated the 

Legislative Counsel’s Digest statement regarding the reduction 

in the maximum term, but omitted the phrase “to a treatment 

facility.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1187, supra.) 

Similarly, another analysis explained that the bill “reduces the 

maximum term of commitment to a treatment facility to restore 

a defendant’s competency from three years to two years.” (Sen. 

Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of 

Sen. Bill No. 1187 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 25, 

2018, p. 1.) Yet the same analysis also stated that the bill 

“[r]educes the maximum term of commitment for purposes of 

restoring a defendant’s mental competency from three years to 

two years,” again without mentioning treatment facilities. (Id.

at p. 3.) The varying language found in the legislative materials 

does not establish that the legislators understood that only time 

at treatment facilities would be impacted by the bill. The 

Legislature instead could have referred to time spent in a 

facility as a shorthand for the entire time of commitment, 

without intending to exclude other time intervals from counting 

toward the maximum commitment period.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

41

c. The People’s argument that treatment is 

determinative

Based largely on their reading of the legislative history, 

the People argue that the provision and termination of 

treatment for incompetency marks the beginning and end of an 

incompetency commitment.16 

Underlying the People’s equation of treatment with 

commitment are the assumptions that (1) incompetent 

defendants always receive treatment while committed to 

facilities like a state hospital, and (2) incompetent defendants

never receive treatment when they leave the facilities. Both 

assumptions are unsupported. 

First, the statutory scheme allows for the possibility that 

even after a judge or jury finds a defendant incompetent to stand 

trial and the court orders the defendant committed to the 

Department, the Department can certify the defendant as 

restored to competency — without providing any treatment. 

Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 4335.2, the 

Department has the “authority and sole discretion to consider 

and conduct reevaluations for IST defendants committed to and 

awaiting admission to the department.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 4335.2, subd. (c).) Such reevaluations are done “primarily 

through telehealth evaluations.” (Id., subd. (b).) If “the 

16 As various amicus curiae point out, the People’s position 

would mean that commitment does not encompass “the period 

of time while an individual is awaiting treatment even where 

the current average wait time for placement in a state hospital 

competency restoration program” is significant. As discussed 

ante, such an interpretation runs counter to the legislative 

intent to limit the period of detention due to incompetency and 

provide certainty regarding the length of the detention period.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

42

department clinician or contracted clinician” (see id., subd. (d)) 

conducting the evaluation concludes that the defendant has 

regained competency (id., subd. (d)(1)), the clinician’s opinion 

obligates the court to “proceed as if a certificate of restoration of 

competence has been returned” (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. 

(a)(1)(H)(ii)). In other words, defendants may be returned to 

court as if they have been certified as restored to competency 

without any restoration treatment being extended. (See also 

Medina v. Superior Court (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1197, 1225 

(Medina) [“it was not necessary for Medina to have first been 

provided care and treatment for a certificate of restoration to be 

filed”]; Carr v. Superior Court (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 264, 272 

[similar]; Contra Costa County, supra, 4 Cal.2d at p. 146 [“The 

medical superintendent of the Stockton state hospital [informed 

the court] that he believed from the first that the defendant was 

simulating insanity” and so requested that the defendant be 

returned to court].)

Second, also contrary to the People’s assertion, treatment 

may continue even after a defendant has been certified as 

restored to competency. Section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(B)(iii),

permits continued “involuntary administration of antipsychotic 

medication to the defendant . . . when the defendant returns to 

county custody” after a certificate of restoration has been filed. 

This is precisely what happened in this case. When Rodriguez 

was certified as competent, the medical director of the state 

hospital informed the court that Rodriguez was “being returned 

to court on psychotropic medication.” The director stressed that 

Rodriguez needed to “remain on this medication . . . to enable 

him to be certified” as competent. The record therefore 

demonstrates it was contemplated that Rodriguez’s treatment 

would continue even after he left the state hospital.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

43

There are also practical problems with the People’s 

approach. It would be difficult to calculate exactly how long a 

defendant has been committed if the provision of treatment 

determined the length of a commitment. The provision of 

treatment does not necessarily coincide with where the 

defendant is located (e.g., in or outside a treatment facility) or 

what part of the competency proceedings the defendant is in 

(e.g., after a commitment order issues but before transport, or 

after a certificate is filed but before transport). Given these 

circumstances, it is unlikely that the Legislature intended for 

the provision or cessation of treatment to delineate whether the 

two-year clock set by section 1370(c)(1) is running.

4. The Decisions Cited by the People Do Not Support 

Their Interpretation of the Statutory Text 

We are unconvinced that the decisions cited by the People 

support their position that only time spent at a treatment 

facility counts as part of a commitment period. 

The court in Medina stated in dicta that “[i]n the usual 

case, only days actually spent in commitment at a mental 

institution or treatment facility are applied to the maximum 

commitment period.” (Medina, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 1203.) The statement, however, was made without any 

support or elaboration, and the court emphasized it found the 

case before it “unusual.” (Ibid.) Specifically, the defendant in 

Medina had not received required treatment due to what the 

Court of Appeal characterized as a “standoff” between the trial 

court that issued a commitment order and the authorities 

responsible for providing treatment, who refused to accept him. 

(Id. at p. 1201.) The Court of Appeal resolved this impasse, and 

the defendant’s resulting claim of a due process violation, by 

including “all days since the date of the commitment order in 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

44

which [the defendant] has been in jail, prison, or treatment” (id. 

at p. 1203; see id. at p. 1230) as part of the commitment period. 

The Medina court was not asked to decide whether a certificate 

of restoration or a court’s subsequent order finding the 

defendant restored to competency marks the end of a 

commitment period, because no certificate of restoration was 

ever filed in that case. (Id. at p. 1229.) Furthermore, that 

court’s assessment of the “usual” calculations regarding the time 

of commitment (id. at p. 1203) was inconsequential in light of 

the remedy the court ultimately adopted.

Similarly distinguishable are People v. G.H. (2014) 

230 Cal.App.4th 1548 (G.H.) and People v. Reynolds (2011) 

196 Cal.App.4th 801 (Reynolds). Those courts held a 

defendant’s precommitment custody credits did not apply when 

calculating the then-applicable three-year maximum statutory 

limit for a commitment. (See G.H., at p. 1553; Reynolds, at 

pp. 803–804, 808–809.)17 The People and the Court of Appeal 

17 In doing so, G.H. and Reynolds distinguished In re Banks

(1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 864. Banks held equal protection and due 

process principles mandated application of precommitment 

custody credits when the maximum commitment period is 

measured by the maximum term of imprisonment for the most 

serious offense charged because “the denial of credit[s]

necessarily results in longer confinement for indigents unable to 

post bail bonds. This discriminatory treatment is 

constitutionally forbidden.” (Id. at p. 869, fn. omitted.) 

However, when the maximum commitment period is set to the 

statutory maximum limit, G.H. and Reynolds held that there are 

no potential equal protection or due process violations and the 

statute controls because similarly situated defendants are not 

deprived of the benefit of the precommitment jail time if 

convicted. (See G.H., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1557–1558; 

Reynolds, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 808–809.)
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

45

relied on G.H. and Reynolds in support of the notion “that a 

defendant’s days in custody in which he or she is not being 

treated for restoration to competence do not count toward the 

maximum commitment period.” (Rodriguez, supra, 

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 654.) But here again, G.H. and Reynolds

were focused on an issue different from the one before us. The 

analysis in G.H. and Reynolds centered on how to treat a 

defendant’s time in custody prior to the issuance of a 

commitment order when calculating the maximum commitment 

period under section 1370(c)(1). By contrast, the court is here 

asked to address the treatment of custodial time after a trial 

court has ruled a defendant incompetent but before ruling on a 

certificate of restoration. As we have explained, this distinction 

is significant and counsels against relying on G.H.’s 

characterization of the commitment period.18

5. We Are Not Persuaded by the People’s Remaining 

Arguments 

The People contend that “absurd and unintended 

consequences” would result if we were to adopt Rodriguez’s

interpretation. (See, e.g., Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. 

18 In the course of its decision, G.H. stated that “[s]ection 

1370, subdivision (c)(1)’s three-year statutory limit applies to 

the total period actually spent in commitment at a mental 

institution. ([Polk, supra,] 71 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 1238 . . . .)” 

(G.H., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1558–1559, italics added.) 

As amicus curiae have observed, Polk in fact makes no mention 

of any distinction between time spent postcommitment at a 

treatment facility versus time spent postcommitment in county 

custody awaiting judicial proceedings following submission of a 

certificate of restoration. Polk held that the maximum statutory 

period under section 1370(c)(1) applies to “the aggregate of all 

commitments on the same charges.” (Polk, at p. 1238.) Nothing 

in our decision contradicts this holding.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

46

Gore (2010) 49 Cal.4th 12, 27 [“we may reject a literal 

construction that is contrary to the legislative intent apparent 

in the statute or that would lead to absurd results”].) We 

address each of the People’s arguments in turn.

a. “Arbitrarily truncated” time for treatment

The People contend that if a commitment does not 

terminate with a filing of a certificate of restoration, time “to 

provide necessary restoration treatment would . . . be arbitrarily 

truncated” because medical personnel would need to “predict[] 

whether the defendant will contest the hospital’s certification in 

the future” and “how much time the defense will require to 

prepare for such a hearing.”

The People’s argument implies that medical personnel 

would take into account the time available until the maximum 

term of commitment is reached in deciding when and how to 

provide treatment, instead of expeditiously restoring defendants 

to competency. But the Department denies it considers such 

factors when providing treatment, and the People offer no 

evidence to the contrary. 

According to the Department, “[t]he focus of [the 

Department’s] treatment is on restoration of competence in the 

most expeditious manner possible.” (See § 1370, subd.

(a)(1)(B)(i) [specifying that the defendant shall receive 

treatment “that will promote the defendant’s speedy restoration 

to mental competence”].) If the Department is providing 

services to restore competency “in the most expeditious manner 

possible,” then it should not matter for purposes of treatment if 

a defendant may be committed for a maximum of two years or a 

maximum of two years minus the time it takes to conduct the 

competency hearing under section 1372. In either case, the 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

47

Department is extending the treatment necessary to restore

competency as soon as possible; it is not basing its treatment on 

“predict[ions]” of whether the defendant will contest the 

certification of competency or how much preparation time will 

be needed if the matter is contested.

b. “Delays predicated on defense counsel’s needs”

The People further contend that contested competency 

hearings following the filing of a certificate of restoration are 

often delayed by defense counsel’s need to prepare for the 

hearings. According to the People, “[i]f this court adopted 

[Rodriguez’s] position, the trial court would have no . . . 

discretion or control in balancing the needs of defense attorneys 

to adequately prepare on behalf of their clients with concerns of 

delay.” 

An important premise underlying the People’s argument 

is that the time defense counsel need to “adequately prepare” 

would often push the competency hearings past the time limit 

set by section 1370(c)(1). The People, however, have not 

provided any persuasive evidence that a two-year maximum 

term is likely to be routinely exhausted even when 

postcertification judicial proceedings are taken into account. 

Indeed, the available evidence suggests the contrary is true. 

When the Legislature reduced the maximum period of 

commitment permitted under section 1370(c)(1) from three 

years to two years, it noted that “the vast majority (80–90%) [of 

persons committed as mentally incompetent] becomes trialcompetent within six months of starting treatment, and nearly 

all who attain competency do so within a year.” (Sen. Com. on 

Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1187, supra, as 

introduced Feb. 15, 2018, p. 4.) The Department likewise 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

48

acknowledges that average “treatment time in a state hospital 

operated by [the Department is] 270 days before return to 

court” — well below the two-year limit.19

The Department states that “[i]n [its] experience, 

competency hearings under section 1372 following a certificate 

of restoration are often delayed, sometimes for a significant 

length of time.” The only examples of delays that the 

Department offers are those occurring in this case and in Carr. 

But the proceeding here and in Carr demonstrate how unusual 

these delays were.

This case involved extraordinary circumstances relating 

to the COVID-19 pandemic. As the People themselves 

acknowledge, “the continuances in th[is] case [including] the 

final continuance past the two-year mark from the date of 

commitment, were not due to gamesmanship by either party, or 

institutional negligence like in Carr . . . but rather because of an 

unprecedented national emergency and the consequences on 

court capacity that resulted therefrom.”

19 To the extent the Department is concerned about running 

out of time to provide treatment, its concerns appear to be based 

on defendants who have been certified as competent and yet are 

“returned to the hospitals for additional competency services.” 

Defendants “returned to the hospital for additional competency 

services” are those defendants whose certifications of 

competency have been rejected by a court, or who had again 

become incompetent in short succession. Although we do not 

lightly dismiss the Department’s concerns that for these 

defendants the Department will not have a full two-year period 

in which to provide treatment, ultimately, in setting a maximum 

term of commitment, the Legislature has accepted that there 

will be some individuals for whom the allotted time is not 

enough to restore competency. It is not the role of the courts to 

second-guess these legislative choices.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

49

As for Carr, the defendant there (Carr) spent almost a 

year in jail waiting to be transported to a state hospital. (See 

Carr, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1140–1141.) Then without 

ever being transported or receiving any treatment, Carr was 

certified as competent by a Department psychiatrist. (Id. at 

p. 1141.) Carr petitioned for a writ of mandate, claiming that 

“ ‘the certification of his competency was employed as a 

subterfuge to circumvent the state’s obligation to place him in a 

state hospital.’ ” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal rejected the claim. 

(Ibid.) More than a year later, the trial court concluded that

Carr remained incompetent. (Ibid.) The court again committed 

Carr to the Department, and he once more waited for transport 

to a facility. (Ibid.) Three months later, while still waiting for 

transport, “Carr moved for release on the ground he had 

completed the maximum three-year commitment [then] 

authorized by law.” (Ibid.) This procedural history makes it 

difficult to infer that delays in holding competency hearings are 

often so lengthy that the two-year limit is likely to be exceeded 

in the normal course.

More generally, neither the facts of this case nor those in 

Carr support the assertion that defendants have the incentive 

to, and routinely, engage in dilatory tactics. As mentioned, the 

People acknowledge that the delays that occurred in this case 

were not attributable to “gamesmanship” by Rodriguez. The 

court in Carr likewise noted that “there is no basis in this case 

to infer Carr’s efforts to oppose the certification contributed to 

his commitment exceeding the three-year maximum.” (Carr, 

supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1146.) If a trial court is concerned 

that a defendant is requesting continuances for the sole purpose 

of exhausting the two-year period, the court may take that into 

consideration when determining whether to grant a 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

50

continuance. (Cf. Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 368 

[“underscor[ing] the vital role of trial courts in safeguarding the 

timely trial right of alleged [sexually violent predators]”].)

Finally, the People’s argument assumes that litigation 

delays attributable to the defense cannot be excluded when 

determining whether the two-year period has run out. We do 

not decide whether that assumption is correct. (See pt. II.C., 

post.)

c. “Competent defendants evading prosecution”

The People contend that adopting Rodriguez’s 

interpretation would “result in presumptively competent 

defendants evading prosecution” because once section

1370(c)(1)’s limit has been reached, a defendant must be 

conserved or released. In its amicus curiae brief, the San Diego 

County District Attorney goes further, arguing that “dangerous 

criminals” will be released “to the streets.” The statutory 

scheme, however, provides safeguards against these results.

Individuals whose commitment terms have expired need 

not be released to the community. Instead, they may be civilly 

committed, including to long-term conservatorships. (See 

§ 1370, subds. (c)(3), (e); Waterman, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 568 

& fn. 1.) Specifically, a Murphy conservatorship is available to 

keep in custody a criminal defendant who is incompetent to 

stand trial and who may not be further committed under 

section 1370. (See § 1370, subd. (c)(3).) An incompetent 

defendant may be conserved under a Murphy conservatorship 

if, among other criteria, the defendant “represents a substantial 

danger of physical harm to others.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5008, 

subd. (h)(1)(B)(iv).) The conservatorship may last as long as the 

conditions supporting conservatorship persist. (See Welf. & 
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

51

Inst. Code, § 5361, subd. (b); Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at 

p. 170; Parker, supra, 6 Pacific L.J. at pp. 485, 497.) 

Accordingly, it is not the case that “dangerous persons” are 

simply released “to the streets” if they are not committed under 

section 1370. Even when an incompetent criminal defendant is 

not conserved and felony charges are dismissed, the People may 

refile charges if they believe the defendant has regained 

competency. (See Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 

p. 106 [holding that “a defendant may be rearrested, and a trial 

court may order a new competency hearing, following the 

prosecution’s dismissal and refiling of felony charges pursuant 

to section 1387 even if the defendant was previously committed 

for three years”].)

Finally, the People’s argument assumes that when the 

two-year period runs out, even a defendant who has been 

certified as restored to competence must be released. We do not 

decide whether that assumption is correct either. (See pt. II.C., 

post.)

C. Issues to Address on Remand

As previously noted, Rodriguez was initially returned to 

the trial court pursuant to a timely-filed certificate of 

restoration to competency. (See § 1372, subd. (a)(1), (3).)

We have decided the issue of statutory interpretation 

presented, concluding that section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year 

maximum commitment period continues past the filing of the 

certificate, through the court’s decision whether to accept the 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

52

certificate.20 We are not deciding, however, whether the twoyear maximum commitment period was reached here as a result 

of Rodriguez’s aggregate periods of commitment. We instead 

leave that question for the Court of Appeal to address on 

remand. 

Because the Court of Appeal concluded that section 

1370(c)(1)’s two-year period had not run out, it did not need to 

reach whether Rodriguez was otherwise entitled to his

requested remedy. It did not need to decide whether Rodriguez 

would have been entitled to dismissal if the period had run out. 

It did not need to decide whether expiration of the maximum 

commitment period under section 1370(c)(1) mandates release 

where the defendant is competent to stand trial. The issue of 

what remedy is available when section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year 

period has run out — including whether release or 

conservatorship are the only appropriate remedies — was not 

briefed here.

We therefore conclude these issues merit consideration on 

remand to the Court of Appeal. The appellate court may decide 

in the first instance what remedy exists if the two-year time 

limit has been reached — either as a matter of statutory 

interpretation or as a constitutional matter. (Cf. Jackson v. 

Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 106; Camacho, supra, 

15 Cal.5th at pp. 378–379, 382 & fn. 5 [noting that courts in 

other contexts have suggested there may be other possible 

20 Because we reach this conclusion based on a reading of the 

statutes, we do not address Rodriguez’s argument that a holding 

for the People here would violate constitutional principles of 

“due process, equal protection, effective assistance of counsel, 

and proscriptions on cruel and unusual punishment.”
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

53

remedies for unconstitutional delay, such as an order that 

proceedings commence forthwith].)

Similarly, we remand to the Court of Appeal to address 

whether section 1372 hearings may be continued upon good 

cause such that the period between continuances is tolled for 

purposes of calculating whether the maximum commitment 

term under section 1370(c)(1) has been reached. Stated 

differently, we do not address here whether the two-year clock 

of section 1370(c)(1) can be paused by good cause continuances 

that may arise during the period between a defendant’s return 

to court and the trial court’s determination of competence. 

Although the issue is mentioned in the parties’ briefing before 

us, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeal ruled on it.21 

This issue is best addressed in the context of the other issues 

that remain to be decided in the first instance by the Court of 

Appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.516(b)(3).) 

We express no view on whether Rodriguez has reached the 

maximum two-year commitment period; whether Rodriguez is 

entitled to the remedy of dismissal he seeks; or whether and how 

21 We briefly acknowledge the arguments the parties have 

made for and against the availability of such tolling in this 

context. Rodriguez argues that “[c]ontinuances and waivers are 

not authorized by sections 1370 and 1372, so the courts cannot 

read into the statutes what has ‘been omitted.’ ” The People, on 

the other hand, counter that tolling, like many of the procedures 

governing a section 1372 hearing, may be considered “implied” 

by the statutes. 
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

54

the issue of tolling may affect Rodriguez’s entitlement to any 

relief.

22

 

III. CONCLUSION

We hold that an incompetency commitment does not end 

with the filing of a certificate of restoration. Instead, the twoyear maximum commitment period set by Penal Code 

section 1370(c)(1) continues past the filing of the certificate and 

includes the time between such filing and the court’s decision 

whether to accept the certificate. Accordingly, we reverse the 

judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Upon remand, the court shall consider whether the twoyear limit of section 1370(c)(1) was exceeded in this case. To 

answer that question, the court may consider whether good 

cause continuances can toll the limit of section 1370(c)(1). (Cf. 

Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 378–379.) If the court finds 

that the two-year statutory period has indeed been exceeded, it 

shall further consider the nature of the remedy Rodriguez is 

entitled to at this point. In particular, the court should examine 

whether Rodriguez is entitled to dismissal of the charges 

pending against him or whether other relief is appropriate. (Cf.

Camacho, at p. 382, fn. 5; Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 

4 Cal.5th at p. 106 [holding that “a defendant may be rearrested, 

and a trial court may order a new competency hearing, following 

the prosecution’s dismissal and refiling of felony charges 

pursuant to section 1387 even if the defendant was previously 

22 This court’s decision to issue a stay in connection with 

granting Rodriguez’s petition for review should not be 

understood to resolve the question whether Rodriguez is entitled 

to the relief he seeks.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

55

committed for [the statutory maximum period permitted by 

section 1370(c)(1)]”].)

GUERRERO, C. J.

We Concur:

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

JENKINS, J.

EVANS, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Rodriguez v. Superior Court

__________________________________________________________ 

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted (published) XX 70 Cal.App.5th 628

Review Granted (unpublished) 

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________ 

Opinion No. S272129

Date Filed: December 14, 2023

__________________________________________________________ 

Court: Superior

County: Santa Clara

Judge: Eric S. Geffon

__________________________________________________________ 

Counsel:

Brian C. McComas, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 

Petitioner.

Ellen McDonnell, Public Defender (Contra Costa), and Diana Garrido, 

Deputy Public Defender, for Contra Costa County Public Defender 

Office and California Public Defenders Association as Amici Curiae on 

behalf of Petitioner.

Emi MacLean and Kim Pederson for American Civil Liberties Union 

Foundation of Northern California and Disability Rights California as 

Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

DLA Piper and Justin R. Sarno for Silicon Valley De-Bug as Amicus 

Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.
Jeffrey F. Rosen, District Attorney, Alexandra W. Gadeberg, Crystal 

Tindell Seiler and Barbara A. Cathcart, Deputy District Attorneys, for 

Real Party in Interest. 

Summer Stephan, District Attorney (San Diego), Linh Lam and 

Jennifer Kaplan, Deputy District Attorneys, for the San Diego County 

District Attorney as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Assistant Attorney 

General, Gregory D. Brown and Kevin L. Quade, Deputy Attorneys 

General, for State Department of State Hospitals and State 

Department of Developmental Services as Amici Curiae on behalf of 

Real Party in Interest.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 

publication with opinion): 

Brian C. McComas

The Law Office of B.C. McComas, LLP

PMB 1605, 77 Van Ness Avenue, Suite 101 

San Francisco, CA 94102

(415) 814-2465

Emilou MacLean

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California

39 Drumm Street

San Francisco, CA 94111-4805

(929) 375-1575

Alexandra W. Gadeberg

Deputy District Attorney

70 West Hedding, West Wing

San Jose, CA 95110

(408) 792-2757