J-A15003-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES S. WILLIAMS II 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1048 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 25, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0003482-2016

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED DECEMBER 20, 2018

James S. Williams II appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed 

after his jury trial conviction for simple assault and his bench trial conviction 

for driving without a license.1 We affirm.

The facts underlying this appeal are as follows:

On May 15, 2016, while driving . . . , Karen Macintosh observed 

commotion in the vehicle behind hers. [N.T., Trial, 5/24-25/17,

at] 39 . . . As her vehicle approached a stop light, the other vehicle 

pulled beside hers to make a left hand turn. [See id., at] 40. As 

she looked into the other vehicle, Ms. Macintosh was alarmed to 

see the male driver, sometimes taking both hands off the wheel, 

repeatedly striking the female passenger. [See id., at] 41-42. The 

female cowered against the passenger side window, with hands 

raised. [See id., at] 47. Fearing for the passenger’s safety, Ms. 

Macintosh called police. [See id., at] 41-42. She followed the car 

for several minutes until she reached an intersection where the 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1) and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501(a), respectively.
J-A15003-18

- 2 -

police had arrived. [See id., at] 44. At no time did she see the 

passenger strike the driver. [See id., at] 47.

Officer Brian Egli of the Lower Paxton Police Department received 

a dispatch of a domestic assault occurring against a passenger in 

a blue Volkswagen Jetta. [See id., at] 70. Based upon that report, 

fellow officer Dhenin Brock, driving a separate police vehicle, 

initiated a traffic stop of the Volkswagen Jetta. [See id., at] 71.

The driver, [Williams], was belligerent and confrontational toward 

Officer Brock. [See id., at] 78. [Williams] made no statement that 

the passenger, Sharia Hunter, struck him. [See id., at] 79.

Officer Brock did not observe any injuries on [Williams]. [See id.,

at] 76-79.

When Officer Egli arrived, Ms. Hunter was in the passenger seat 

of the Volkswagen Jetta, crying and visibly upset. [See id.] Officer 

Egli and Officer Brock spoke to Ms. Hunter and [Williams] 

separately. [See id.] Officer Egli observed a quarter-sized welt on 

the right side of Ms. Hunter’s head and scratches on her right 

forearm. [See id., at] 72. Officer Egli obtained Ms. Hunter’s audio

statement. [See id.] Ms. Hunter did not state that she was the 

aggressor. [See id., at] 73.

However, at trial, Ms. Hunter and [Williams] testified that 

[Williams] did not strike her but rather, that the two argued and 

that he merely pushed her away to regain control of the vehicle 

as she kicked him. [See id., at 56,] 58-59[,] 92-97.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/11/17, at 2-3 (some formatting).

When asked if she and Williams were “aggressive[,]” Ms. Hunter 

testified that she was “more [aggressive] than him.” N.T., Trial, 5/24-25/17, 

at 61. She also stated that, when Williams “pushed” her, she hit her head on 

the top of the seat belt, where it “connects with the molding of the car,” 

causing an injury. Id., at 63-64.

After the evidentiary phase of trial, Williams requested a jury instruction 

on self-defense, which the trial court denied. See id., at 99. The trial court 

explained its reasoning on the record, as follows:
J-A15003-18

- 3 -

I don’t believe [Williams’s] testimony. And what I’m basing that 

on is an independent witness’s testimony who had nothing to gain 

from this at all. And although we can argue over how many times 

she may have said he struck or struck at her versus hit her, 

whatever, I don’t believe that the testimony rises to the level to 

grant that. One, because I don’t believe him. Two, because 

I believe the independent witness.

Id., at 100.

During the final jury charge, the trial court gave the following 

instructions about credibility:

Now, as judges of the facts, you are the sole judges of the 

credibility of the witnesses and their testimony. This means you 

must judge the truthfulness and accuracy of each witness’s 

testimony and decide whether to believe all, part, or none of that 

testimony.

The following are some of the factors that you may and should 

consider when judging the credibility of witnesses and their 

testimony: Was the witness able to see, hear, or know the things 

about which they testified? How well could the witness remember 

and describe those things? Was the ability of the witness to see, 

hear, know, or remember or describe those things affected by 

youth, old age, or by any physical, mental, or intellectual 

deficiency? Did the witness testify in a convincing manner? How 

did they look, act, and speak while they testified? Was their

testimony uncertain, confusing, contradictory, or evasive? Did the 

witness have any interest in the outcome of the case, any bias, 

prejudice, or other motive that may have affected their testimony? 

How well did the witness’s testimony square with the other 

evidence in the case including the testimony of other witnesses? 

Was it contradicted or supported by the other testimony and 

evidence? And, finally, did it make sense?

If you believe some part of the testimony of a witness to be 

inaccurate, you must consider whether that inaccuracy casts 

doubt about the rest of their testimony. This may depend on 

whether they have been inaccurate in an important matter or a 

minor detail and a possible explanation for that. For example, did 

the witness make an honest mistake, simply forget, or deliberately 

lie?
J-A15003-18

- 4 -

While you are judging the credibility of each witness, you are likely 

to be judging the credibility of other witnesses and evidence. If 

there is a real irreconcilable conflict, it is up for you to decide 

which conflicting testimony or evidence you believe. You are the 

sole judges of credibility and the facts, and you are responsible to 

give the testimony of every witness and all other evidence 

whatever credibility and weight you believe it deserves.

Now, the Defendant took the stand as a witness. In considering 

the Defendant’s testimony, you are to follow the general 

instructions I just gave you for judging the credibility of any 

witness. You should not disbelieve the Defendant’s testimony 

merely because he’s the Defendant. In weighing his testimony, 

however, you may consider that he has a vital interest in the 

outcome of the trial. You may take the Defendant’s interest into 

account just as you would the interest of any other witness along 

with all the other facts and circumstances bearing on credibility in 

making up your minds what weight his testimony deserves.

Now, you should not decide this case on the basis of which side 

presented the greater number of witnesses or the greater amount 

of evidence. Instead, you should decide which witnesses to believe 

and which evidence to accept on the basis of whether or not the 

testimony or evidence is believable.

Id., at 113-115.

Following his conviction and his sentencing, on June 2, 2017, Williams 

filed a post-sentence motion requesting a new trial on the basis that the 

verdict was against the weight of the evidence, which was denied on June 8, 

2017. This timely appeal follows.

Williams presents the following issues for our review:

1) Whether the verdict was against the weight of evidence that

it shocked one’s sense of justice?

2) Whether the trial judge abused his discretion by not issuing 

a self-defense jury instruction as requested by counsel?

Appellant’s Brief, at 5.
J-A15003-18

- 5 -

Williams first contends that “[t]he verdict was so far against the weight

of the evidence so as to shock one’s sense of justice.” Id., at 10.2

We do not review challenges to the weight of the evidence de novo on 

appeal. See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1225 (Pa. 2009). 

Rather, we only review the trial court’s exercise of its discretionary judgment 

regarding the weight of the evidence presented at trial. See id. 

The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who 

is free to believe all, none or some of the evidence and to 

determine the credibility of the witnesses. Resolving contradictory 

testimony and questions of credibility are matters for the 

factfinder. It is well-settled that we cannot substitute our 

judgment for that of the trier of fact.

... [A] defendant will only prevail on a challenge to the weight of 

the evidence when the evidence is so tenuous, vague and 

uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.

Commonwealth v. Cramer, ___ A.3d ___, ___, 2018 WL 4232479, *2-*3

(Pa. Super., filed 9/6/18) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). ). 

A verdict is said to be contrary to the evidence such that it shocks one’s sense 

of justice when “the figure of Justice totters on her pedestal,” or when “the 

jury’s verdict, at the time of its rendition, causes the trial judge to lose his 

breath, temporarily, and causes him to almost fall from the bench, then it is 

truly shocking to the judicial conscience.” Commonwealth v. Davidson, 860 

A.2d 575, 581 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).

____________________________________________

2 Williams preserved his challenge to the weight of the evidence in his postsentence motion for a new trial. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(3).
J-A15003-18

- 6 -

Although Williams does not specify which verdict he is challenging, we 

presume that he is only contesting his simple assault conviction, because his 

brief to this court makes no mention of his conviction for driving without a 

license. The jury convicted Williams of simple assault pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2701(a)(1): “[A] person is guilty of assault if he attempts to cause or 

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another[.]”

The trial court, in its opinion, disposed of Williams’s weight challenge as 

follows:

The weight of the evidence well supports the jury’s findings that 

[Williams] attempted to cause or intentionally, knowingly or 

recklessly caused, bodily injury to Ms. Hunter. The jury accepted 

the testimony of the independent eye-witness, Ms. Macintosh, 

that [Williams] repeatedly struck Ms. Hunter as she cowered in 

the passenger seat. Ms. Hunter’s statements at the scene and the 

officers’ observations of a welt on her head and scratches on her 

arm support the jury’s conclusion that [Williams] struck her and 

caused injury.

The jury was free to reject the trial testimony of [Williams] and 

Ms. Hunter, as a story apparently created after the two resolved 

their differences.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/11/17, at 4.

As such, the trial court concluded that the verdict did not shock its sense 

of justice. Our review of the record does not demonstrate the court abused its 

discretion in finding the jury’s verdict reasonable. Therefore, Williams’s first 

issue on appeal merits no relief.

Next, Williams argues that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion in 

denying [his] request for a self-defense jury instruction after testimony was

heard that the victim struck the [him] first[,]” including testimony from Ms. 
J-A15003-18

- 7 -

Hunter that she argued with him and that she was more aggressive than him. 

Appellant’s Brief, at 15-16 (citing N.T., Trial, 5/24-25/17, at 56, 61). Williams 

continues that “[t]he issue of self-defense is not subject to the opinion of the 

trial court[,]” including that “the personal opinion of credibility by a trial judge 

is not the determinative factor in the reading of a self-defense instruction.” 

Id., at 15, 17. And he concludes that “the jury, not the judge, [should] have 

decided whether [he] acted in self-defense.” Id., at 18.

“[O]ur standard of review when considering the denial of jury 

instructions is one of deference—an appellate court will reverse a court’s 

decision only when it abused its discretion or committed an error of law.” 

Commonwealth v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1022 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation 

omitted; brackets in original).

When requested by a defendant, a self-defense instruction must be 

given if there is any evidence to support it. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 

Mayfield, 585 A.2d 1069, 1070-1071 (Pa. Super. 1991) (en banc).

Here, both Williams and the victim, Ms. Hunter, testified that Williams 

acted in self-defense when attacked by Ms. Hunter. See N.T., Trial, 5/24-

25/17, at 56, 58-59, 61, 63-64, 92-97. So, there was evidence to support

Williams’s claim that he acted in self-defense. Thus, the trial court erred when 

it refused to give Williams’s requested self-defense charge.

And, a trial court should not make credibility determinations when 

deciding whether to give an instruction on self-defense, because any such 

determination would usurp the jury’s role as fact-finder. See Mayfield, 585 
J-A15003-18

- 8 -

A.2d at 1071 (stating it is improper to refuse to give self-defense instruction, 

“even though the evidence of self-defense may appear to the trial court as not 

credible”).

Ergo, the reason given by the trial court on the record during trial for 

denying Williams’s request for a self-defense instruction—that the court did 

not find his testimony to be credible but, instead, believed Ms. Macintosh’s 

testimony—was inappropriate. See N.T., Trial, 5/24-25/17, at 100.

While Williams is correct that the trial court should have given his 

requested charge and should not have based its denial on its own assessment 

of witnesses’ credibility, a court’s “refusal to give a requested charge does not 

require reversal unless the appellant was prejudiced by that refusal.” 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 176 A.3d 298, 314 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal 

denied, 187 A.3d 908 (Pa. 2018).

The trial court gave thorough and extensive instructions to the jurors 

about their roles as “sole judges of the credibility of witnesses,” including that 

they were free to accept or to reject any of the witnesses’ accounts and to 

“judge the truthfulness and accuracy of each witness’s testimony[.]” N.T., 

Trial, 5/24-25/17, at 113. Jurors were also instructed that they alone must 

“decide whether to believe all, part, or none” of each witness’s testimony and 

were given specific instructions on how to assess Williams’s credibility. Id., at 

113-15. 

Pursuant to these detailed instructions about evaluating the credibility 

of witnesses, the jury understood that it could consider the testimony of each 
J-A15003-18

- 9 -

witness, including the testimony of Williams and of Ms. Hunter, and whether 

there were inconsistencies amongst them. The trial court therefore instructed 

the jury that it could accept or reject Williams’s and Ms. Hunter’s assertions, 

including their claims that Williams acted in self-defense. Williams thus 

suffered no prejudice from the trial court’s refusal to give the requested selfdefense charge, and, accordingly, we will not reverse the judgement of 

sentence. 

Based on the foregoing, Williams is not entitled to relief on either of his 

issues. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/20/2018