### RONALDANDERSON, Plaintiff,
v. 

### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 09-521 (RJL) EDWARD F. REILLY, et aI., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION PlaintiffRonald Anderson,l a prisoner in federal custody under sentence imposed by the Superior Court for the District ofColumbia, has filed a pro se complaintunder 42 U.S.C. 

### § 1983 against a Commissioner and Examinerofthe United States Parole Commission, as well as unidentified John and Jane Does, for allegedly violating the ex post facto clause ofthe Constitution. Const. Art. 1, § 9. Anderson seeks money damages as well as prospective injunctive and declaratory relief. The defendants' motion to dismiss, opposed by Anderson, will be granted. 

### I. BACKGROUND Anderson is currently incarcerated under sentence imposed on him for a murder committed in 1989. At that time, the D.C. Parole Board operated underregulations that were codified in 1987 ("1987 Guidelines"). Nearly a decade later, parole authority for felons under sentence by the Superior Court for the District ofColumbiatransferred from the District of ColumbiaParole Boardto the United States Parole Commission. National Capital Revitalization

1 This plaintiffis distinguished from several otherpersons ofthe same name inthe custody ofthe Federal Bureau ofPrisons by Reg. No. 12904-007.and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 712, 734-37 (1997) ("D.C. Revitalization Act") (codified at D.C. Code §§ 24- 101 et seq.) (2001 & Supp. 2009). That transfer obligated the Commissionto apply D.C. law and regulations to the D.C. Code offenders, but it also gave the Commission "exclusive authority to amend or supplement any regulation interpreting or implementingthe parole laws ofthe District ofColumbiawith respect to felons." D.C. Code § 24-131. The Commission adopted new regulations in 2000 ("2000 Guidelines"). Anderson was considered for parole in 2002 and 2007, and denied release both times. 

### Itis undisputed that Anderson's parolehearings were conducted under 2000 Guidelines. Anderson alleges that the defendants violated his constitutional protection against ex post facto laws when they applied the 2000 Guidelines to him instead ofthe 1987 Guidelines. He asserts that for their "use ofparole guidelines that were implemented after commission of plaintiffs criminal offense on March 8, 1989,"the defendants are liable to him in their personal capacities for money damages, and are amenable to prospective injunctive and declaratory relief in their official capacities. Compl. at 4; PI.'s Opp'n at 9. He seeks $110,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. Compl. at 11. The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint on multiple grounds, including absolute quasi-judicial immunity. In addition, the defendants report that on November 10,2009,the Parole Commission reconsidered Anderson's parole application underthe 1987 Guidelines, thereby rendering moot Anderson's claim for injunctive relief. See Defs.' Status Report (Mar. 2, 10 1 0) (reporting that the Commission ordered action making Anderson's parole effective date August 30, 2010).

-2-II. DISCUSSION A court may dismiss all orpart ofa complaintthat fails to state a claim upon which relief maybe granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A court considering such a motion to dismiss must
assume that all factual allegations are true, even ifthey are doubtful. BellAtlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Kowal v. MCICommunications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that a court must construe the complaint "liberallyin the plaintiffs' favor" and "grantplaintiffsthe benefit ofall inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged"). A court need not, however, "accept inferences drawn by plaintiffs ifsuch inferences
are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint. Normust [a] court accept legal conclusions cast in the form offactual allegations." Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276. In deciding a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a court is limited to considering "the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters about which [a court] may takejudicial notice." Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2002) (citations omitted). Apro se complaint is entitledto liberal construction and is not held to the same standards as is a formal pleading drafted by a persontrained in law. Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). As an initial matter, a courtmust satisfy itselfthat it may properly exercisejurisdiction
over a case. This Courthas subject matterjurisdiction over a claim for money damages against a federal agent acting under federal authority who is sued in his orher personal capacityfor alleged constitutional violations. Bivens v. Six UnknownAgents of Fed Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). When a CommissionerorExaminer ofthe United States Parole Commission is acting pursuantto his or her authority under the D.C. Revitalization Act, he or she is acting under
-3-color ofa statute ofthe District ofColumbiaand, therefore, is subjectto suitinhis official capacity for prospective injunctive and declaratory reliefunder42 U.S.C. § 1983. Fletcher v. District of Columbia, 370 F.3d 1223, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("Because the D.C. Revitalization Act is
... a statute [ofthe District ofColumbia], we have no doubtthe defendant members ofthe United States Parole Commission are amenable to suit under 

### § 1983 for actions taken pursuantto that Act."); Fletcher v. District of Columbia, 481 F. Supp. 2d 156, 162 (D.D.C. 2007) ("[P]laintiffmay pursue prospective injunctive and declaratoryreliefagainst the present individual Commissioners in their official capacities."); Sellmon v. Reilly, 551 F. Supp. 2d 66,83 & n.12 (D.D.C. 2008) (same). Accordingly, this Courthas subject matterjurisdictionoverthe claims presented here. There canbe no genuine debate thatthis Courthas long-arm personal jurisdictionoverthe defendants involving disputes arising withrespect to theirduties underthe D.C. Revitalization Act, and that venue in this district iroper. See Fletcher v. District of Columbia, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 169-71 (finding venue proper and that ithad long-armpersonal jurisdictionover Commissioners in theirpersonal capacities). Anderson's claims for injunctive and declaratory reliefare moot because his request for parole has nowbeen considered under the 1987 Guidelines, in accord with the Parole Commission's regulation

- adopted in the wake ofthe decision in Sellmon v. Reilly, 551 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D.D.C. 2008)

- grantingprisoners in his situation a parole reassessment and/or reconsideration hearing. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.80(0). Anderson's claim for money damages is barred because the defendants, as federal agents performing a quasi-judicial function in making a parole determination in Anderson's specific case, are protectedby absolute quasi-judicial immunity from such a suit. Fletcher v. District of Columbia, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 166 (findingthat
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### the United States Parole Commissioners are entitled to absolute immunity from aBivens 

### claim based a specific parole decision relating plaintiff); Fletcher v. UnitedStates Parole Comm 'n, 550 

### F. Supp. 2d 30, 43 (D.D.C. 2008) (reaffirming the grant ofabsolute quasi-judicial immunityfrom suit). A separate order ofdismissal accompanies this memorandum opinion.

Date: 

# J/1' United States District Judge

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