UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ CHARLES KENZELL CARTER, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. STATE OF WYOMING; WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL; NEICOLE MOLDEN, in her official capacity as Wyoming Department of Corrections State Penitentiary Warden; RICK WHITE, in his official capacity as Red Onion State Prison Warden, Respondents - Appellees. No. 23-8062 (D.C. No. 2:22-CV-00253-ABJ) (D. Wyo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER DENYING CERTIFIC ATE OF APPEALABILITY *

________________ _________________ Before TYMKOVICH , McHUGH , and CARSON , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Petitioner Charles Carter, appearing pro se , requests a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to challenge the district court’s dism issal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application. For the reasons stated below, we deny his request for a COA and dismiss the matter.

* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### May 24, 2024 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 23-8062 Document: 010111055091 Date Filed: 05/24/2024 Page: 12 I. On April 19th, 2017, Petitione r pled no contest to one charge of second-degree murder in Wyoming state court. Pursuant to the plea agreem ent, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a term of incarceration of forty-to -eighty years. Petiti oner did not appeal his sentence, but in 2022 he unsucc essfully sought post-convictio n relief in Wyoming district
court. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursu ant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court fo r the District of Wyoming, raising seven grounds for relief. The district court gr anted Respondents’ motion to dismiss, finding that the petition was untimely, and that Petiti oner was not entitled to equitable tolling. The district court also denied Petitioner a COA. Petitioner requests from us a COA to appeal the district court’s dismissal.
II. To receive a COA, Petitioner must make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003 ) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). “[W]hen the district court de nies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue . . . if the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reas on would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of th e denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whet her the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 52 9 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). When we can rule Appellate Case: 23-8062 Document: 010111055091 Date Filed: 05/24/2024 Page: 23 based on the procedural ques tion without addressing the merits, we may do so. Id. at
485. The relevant statute establishes a one-year limitations period on applications for writs of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Because Petitioner admitted he did not meet this requirement, we will only grant a COA if Petitioner establishes equitable tolling entitlement. We review for abuse of discreti on a district court’s determination that a defendant is not entitled to equitable tolling. Fleming v. Evans, 481 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Burger v. Scott, 317 F.3d 1133, 1137 (10th Cir. 2003)). Therefore, “we will vacate the District Cour t’s determination that equitable tolling is inapplicable only if reasonable jurists could deba te whether the [district] court’s refusal to toll the statute of limitations was an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 1254–55. A petitioner must “show specific facts to support his cl aim of extraordinary circumstances and due diligence” to be entitled to equita ble tolling. Yang v. Archul eta, 525 F.3d 92 5, 928 (10th Cir. 2008). Petitioner has not established that his delay was because of extraordinary circumstances despite due d iligence—even affording “so licitous construction” to Petitioner’s pro se filings. See Van Deelen v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007). Of the seven issues Petitioner ra ises, only his ineffective assistance of counsel claim even conceivably concerns the circumstances of his delay. But we have held that ineffective assistance is “not ge nerally a basis for equitable tolling,” and the missteps that Petitioner alleges are not egre gious enough to create an entitlement to equitable tolling. Fleming, 481 F.3d at 125 5–56 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. Appellate Case: 23-8062 Document: 010111055091 Date Filed: 05/24/2024 Page: 34 722, 752 (1991)). Thus, we hold that the di strict court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to equitably toll the limitation period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 1
We DENY Petitioner’s COA request.
DISMISSED.

Entered for the Court

Joel M. Carson III Circuit Judge

1 Because we deny Petitioner’s COA request for procedural reasons, we also deny Petitioner’s Motion to Supplement Appellant ’s Substantial Constitutional Violation Asserted in Its Certificate of Appealability for Good Cause. Appellate Case: 23-8062 Document: 010111055091 Date Filed: 05/24/2024 Page: 4