### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs D ec em be r 16, 200 3 LEON TER REL L P HILLIP S v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE
Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Bedf ord County No. 8330 Charles Lee , Judge

No. M2002- 02090-CCA -R3-P C - F iled May 19, 2004

The pe titioner, L eon Te rre ll Phi llips, pl ed g uilty in the Be dford County Circuit Court to attempted first deg ree murder and rec eived a sentenc e of

thirty y ear s incarc eration in the Tennessee Depa rtment of Corre ction, which sentence was t o be served at thirty perc ent. Subsequently , the petitioner filed a pe tit ionfo r pos t- c on vic tio n re lie f, a lle g ing that he re c e ive d th e ine ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l. The post-c onviction court di smissed the petit ion, and the petitioner a ppeals. F inding no e rror , we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt

. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t i s A ffirm e d.
N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which J OE G. R I L EY and T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J J ., joined.
He rs he ll D . K og e r, Pul a ski, T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, L e on Te rre ll Ph ill ips

. Paul G

. Sum me rs , Attorne y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; Re ne e W. T urne r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam Michael McCown, D istri c t A tt o rn e y G e n e r al; an d

M ic h a e l D av id

Ra n d le s , Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee .

OP IN ION
I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound The pe titioner entere d his guilty plea to attempted first deg ree murder on Ma rch 1, 1999. O n Fe bruary 29, 200 0 , he filed a

petition for post-conviction re lief, alleg ing ine ffe ctive assistanc e of counsel. Spec ifically , the petitioner a lleg ed that counse l failed to a dvise him that if he went to trial on the indicted cha

rg e of e speci al l y ag g ravated robbe ry , a jury could consider

the lesser -included offe nses of the c harg ed off ense. The petitioner maintained that if he had be en properly advised, he would not have pled g uiltybut would have procee ded to trial. Additionally , he conte nded thatT h is c la im ha s b e e n a b a n d o n e d o n a p p e a l. 1
-2- counsel should have asked f or a c hang e of ve nue, ci t ing the extensive publicityg ener ated by the offe nse. 1 On May 25, 2000, the post-conviction court conducted a hearing. Following the testimony of the pe titioner, the post-conviction c o u rt gra nted the State’s motion to dismi ss the petition, c on c lud ing that th e iss ue inv olv e d a que sti on of la w as to w he the r a le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e wo uld have be en cha

rg ed if the petitioner had elec ted to pr ocee d to trial. The post-convic tion court, without making any

finding s of fa ct, conc luded that the evide nce would not have supporte d a cha rg e on the lesser- included off

enses a nd dismiss ed the pe tition. The pe titioner appea led the post-convic tion c ourt’s decision. On appea l, this court noted that the post-conviction court, by dismiss ing the petition in the manner it did, rotely acc redited the pe tit ion e r’ s te sti mon y , the re by a g re e ing that th e pe tit ion e r h a d p ro ve n p re jud ic e . L e on Te rr e ll Phill ips v. St ate, No. M2000- 02383-CCA-R3-PC, 2001 W L 717358, at *3 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, June 27, 2001)

. Howeve r, the post-conviction court’s actions left ope n the question of the de fi c ie nc y

of c ou ns e l’ s p e rf

orma nc e . I d. Ul tim a te ly , this c ou rt c on c lud e d th a t th e po stconviction court ’s ruling was ba sed upon an ina ppropriate standard r eg arding the validity of the pe ti tio ne r’ s g uil ty

ple a . I d. a t *2 . A c c or din g ly , th is c ou rt re ve rs e d th e jud g me nt o f the po stc on vic tio n c o u r ta n d r e m a n d e d f o r f u r t h e r e v i d e n t i ar y

h e ar i n g s a n d t h e e n tr y

o f t h e ap p r o p r i a te finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law. I d. at *3. Following this c ourt’s rema nd, the post-conviction court conducte d another ev i d en tiary hearing. T he post-convic tion court, with the ag ree ment of the petitioner and the State, a llowed the tr a ns c ri pt of the pe tit ion e r’ s tes tim on y fr om h is i nit ia l po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng to b e int ro du c e d in to e vid e nc e . T his c ou rt

pr e vio us ly su mm ari zedthepe tit ion e r’ s te sti mon y re g ard ing the e ve nts su rr ou nd ing the of

fe ns e a s f oll ow s: Mario Star n es asked the petitioner to help him rob a restaur ant. The pet i t i o ner r efuse d at first, but ag ree d to help afte r Sta rnes ask ed him a g a in. Th e y a g re e d th a t no on e wo uldbe hu rt , only bound with duct tape. How ever , the petitioner c arried a loade d sawe d-off shotgun and Starnes had a loaded pistol. They went to the restaur ant at nig ht in St arne s’s sister’s ca r and pa rked ne ar the back door of the r estaurant. The petitioner wor e two sets of c lothing, the ou te r c on sis tin g of

da rk c olo rs . He a lso wo re a

tob og g a n w itha

pa ir of dar k panty hose over

his head, a nd Starnes wor e a ski mask.
After they enter ed the r estaurant, Starnes we nt to ge t the money – ap p ea ri n g to know its location – while the petitioner wa s de a lin g wi th s ome e mpl oy e e s. At so me po int , St arn e s h a d s ho t in to the ce iling. The petitioner made the employ ees sit on the floor, and-3- he told the victim’s wife to a pproac h. Howeve r, s h e we nt around a corne r andre turne d w ithhe r h us ba nd , th e vic tim . T he vic tim approa ched the petitioner and pushe d the shotg un away . He pushe d the pe tit ion e r i n th e c he st andsc re a me d f or him to l e a ve . The vic tim pushed the pe titioner out the back door

. Th e p e t i t i o n e r

t h r e w t h e s h o t g u n d o w n a n d l e f tt h e p r o p e rt y beca use he w as “throug h” with it. He re moved the toboggan and panty h o s e, crossed some bank pr operty , and wa s heade d toward a Wendy ’s re staurant whe n he looked ba ck and sa w Starnes a nd the victim outsi de. The petitioner hea rd or sa w a shot o r t wo. The p e t i t i o n e r o b t a i n e d h i s s h a r e o f

th e r o b b e r y p r o c e e d s s e v e r a l d a ys later and spent some of i t. After his arre st, the petitioner g ave ataperec orded state ment of the e vents to the police. The pe titioner testified that his attorney t o ld him that on the streng th of the state’ s case , she believe d that he would probably g et a sente nce of twenty -four to twenty -five y ear s and ser ve eig hty -five pe rc e nt. She e xpla ine d to him ho w he cou ld b e c ri min a lly responsible for

Starnes’s shooting the victim. H e also a dmitted that they discussed the diff

ere nce be tween e specia lly ag g ravated robbe ry a nda g g ra vate d r ob berya ndthat he tol d h is atto rn e y that he wo uld a c c e p t a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y a te i g h tt o t w e l v e ye ar s w i t h a t h i r t yp e r c e nt relea se elig ibilit y

date. The petitioner also ac knowledg ed that his prima ry c on c e rnwa s g e tti ng a

th ir ty -p e rc e nt r e le a se e lig ibi lit y date. The petiti oner testified that his attorney did not tell him that the jury could consider lesser included off enses, suc h as ag g ravated ro bb e ry . He sa id if he ha d kn ow n of su c h a po ssi bilit y , h e woul d have g one to trial. The p et i t i oner a g ree d that at the g uiltyplea he ari ng , h e ha d tol d the tr ia l c ou rt that he ha d b e e n s a tis fi e d w ithhis attorney and had d iscussed all def enses a nd options with her. He e xpla ine d, tho ug h, that he d id n ot kno w at th a t ti me of he r f a ilu re to dis c us s w ithhim le sse r inc lud e d of fe ns e s in the c on te xt o f a

jury tr ia l. Upon questi o n ing at the evidentiary hearing by

the trial court re g ard ing the pr e tr ia l ne g oti a tio ns , the pe tit ion e r sa id that if the state ha d n ot o ff

e re d a re du c tio n h e wo uldha ve g on e to tr ia l, n oti ng that it wo uld , at le a st, c os t th e state the e xpe ns e of a tr ia l.
I d. at *2.-4-

Trial counse l testified at the hea ring following rema nd that she and the petitioner discussed at leng th the petitioner’s options a nd what could happen at trial. Although c ounsel did not have a n independe nt rec ollection of using the term lesse r-include d off en s e, s h e st ated that they discussed what a jury

might do and w hat a jury might convic t the petitioner of unde r the fa cts of his ca se. On direc t examination, t he following collo q u yoccur red be tween the State and the pe titioner’s trial c ou ns e l: Q: Was there ever any discussion about whether a jury might convic t him of the c ha rg e of a g g ra vate d r ob be ry

a s o pp os e d to e sp e c ia lly a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y?
A: Ye s, I be lie ve the re wa s, y e s. Ye s, the re wa s. Q: So was Mr. Phill ips ex plained, and may be didn’t use the te rm lesser inc luded offe nse, that a jury possiblywould have the option of co n v i ct i n g h i mo f s o m e c h ar ge o f l es s s ev er e t h an t h e i n d i ct ed ch ar ge o f e s p e c i a l l y a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y?
A: Yes, like I

said ea rlier it was pr obably

more in the c ontext of when we wer e discussing try ing to e nter into a plea of ag g ravated ro bb e ry a ndit wa s in that c on te xt that, y ou kn ow , w e mig ht b e able to ge t the State to agr ee to this beca use there is a cha nce that y ou could be f ound g uilty of agg ravated robbery beca use he was not the shooter in this incident . . . .

. . . . Q: Di d y ou dis c us s w ithhim if the State wa sn ’t g oin g to ag re e to i t that th a t w o u ldb e h is o n ly r e main in g o p ti o n to g e t an a g g r a v a te d ro bb e ry c on vic tio n w ou ld b e a t a jury tr ia l?
A: Ye s. Counsel rec alled that the pe titioner’s primary conce rn wa s that he not plead to an off ense that re qu ir e d h im t o s e rv e e ig hty -f ive pe rc e nt of his se nte nc e . She e xpla ine d th a t th e pa rt ie s a g re e d to allow the petitioner to plea d g uiltyto attempted first deg ree murder and rec eiv e a s entence with a thirty perc ent re lease elig ibilit y date in a “ hy

brid” ty pe of ple a. Following the conc lusion of the hearing, the post-conviction enter ed an or der dismissing the petition. T h e post-conviction court made extensive finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law. Specifica lly , the court found that trial counse l was an experience d trial attorney who investigated the State’s ca se and discusse d with the petitioner the various defe nses which wer e available to him. The court a ccr edited the testimony of counse l, finding that the petitioner wa s fully informed of

the-5-

options available to him if he proce eded to trial. The c ourt found that the pe titioner’s testimony was not cre dible and that the pe titioner had fa iled to prove his alleg ati o n s b y cl ear and convinc ing ev i d en ce . On ap p ea l , t h e p et i t i o n erco n t es t s t h i s ru l i n g. II. Ana lys is
A c la im o f i ne ff

e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of c ou ns e l is a mixe d que sti on of la w an d fa c t. See State v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999) . We will review the post-c onviction court’s finding s of fac t de novo with a pre sumption t hat t hose finding s are corr ect. See Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 45 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) . H ow e ve r, we wi ll r e vie w the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt ’s c on c lus ion s o f l a w p ur e ly de novo. I d.
“To e stablish ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, the petitioner be ars the bur den of pr oving both that counsel’s pe rformance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudice d the def ense. G oad v. State, 938 S.W .2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996 ) (c iting Strickland v. Washing ton, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984))

. I n evaluating whe ther the pe titioner has met this burden, this court must determine whe ther c ounsel’s perfo rm ance was w ithin the rang e of c ompetence require d of a tto rn e y s in c ri min a l c a se s. Se e B a xter v. Ros e , 52 3 S. W.2 d 9 30 , 9 36 (T e nn . 1 97 5) . M or e ov e r, in the context of a g uiltyplea , “t he petitioner must show ‘pr ejudice’ by demonstrating that, but for counsel’s e rror s, he wou l d n o t h ave ple aded g uiltybut would have insisted upon g oing to tria l.” Hi c ks v. State , 983 S.W. 2d24 0, 24 6 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 98 ); se e a lso Hi ll v . L oc kh art , 4 74 U. S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct . 366, 370 (1985).
I n the instant c ase, the petitioner’s trial counsel testified that she and the petitioner discussed the opt i o ns available to him and the possible results if he proc eede d to trial. The petitioner w as awa re of the distinctions in t he proof require d to find him g uiltyof espe cially ag g ravated robbe ry

as o p p o s e d t o a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y. A f t e r f ru i t l e s s n e g o t i at i o n s r e g ar d i n g a p l e a t o a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y, counsel a dvised the petitioner that his only chanc e of obt ai n i n g an ag g ravated robbe ry conviction would be as a result of a jury trial. Counsel noted that the petitioner’ s primary conce rn wa s that he not rec eive a

sentenc e that re quired him to serve eig hty -five per ce n t

. Acc ording ly , counsel neg otiated a plea ag ree ment allowing the petitioner to plead g uiltyto attempted first deg ree murder, wi th h is s e nte nc e to b e se rv e d at th irty pe rc e nt. Th e e vid e nc e , in our vie w, do e s n ot p re po nd e rate ag ainst the finding s of the post-convic tion court.
III. Conclusi on Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt

.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE