ASSISTING COUNTRIES WITH CLEAN ENERGY POLICY 

THE NEXT GENERATION

OF RENEWABLE 

ELECTRICITY POLICY

HOW RAPID CHANGE IS BREAKING DOWN 

CONVENTIONAL POLICY CATEGORIES

Toby D. Couture, E3 Analytics

David Jacobs, IET – International Energy Transition

Wilson Rickerson, Meister Consultants Group

Victoria Healey, National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL)

February 2015

NREL/TP-7A40-63149
ii

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments......................................................................................................................................iv

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................................ v

1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1

2 Ensuring Investor and Project Size Diversity .................................................................................... 5

2.1 FITs and Auctions in Taiwan ........................................................................................................ 6

2.2 FITs and Auctions in France.......................................................................................................... 8

2.3 Lessons Learned ..........................................................................................................................11

3 Socket Parity and Beyond..................................................................................................................13

3.1 Policy Approaches in Europe ......................................................................................................13

3.2 Policy Approaches on Islands......................................................................................................15

3.3 Lessons Learned ..........................................................................................................................18

4 Integrating Renewable Electricity into Wholesale Markets ............................................................20

4.1 Policy Conflict in the European Union: FITs versus TGCs ........................................................20

4.2 Financing RE Projects via Spot Market Sales? ...........................................................................21

4.3 Designing Premium FITs in the EU ............................................................................................22

4.4 Lessons Learned ..........................................................................................................................24

5 Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................................25

References .................................................................................................................................................27

List of Figures

Figure 1. Distribution of PV project sizes in Taiwan (2011 – Q2:2014) ........................................................ 7

Figure 2. Breakdown of installed solar PV capacity in mainland France from 2011 to 2014 (MW).............. 9

Figure 3. Breakdown of installed solar PV capacity in mainland France by project size (%) (Sept 30, 

2014).....................................................................................................................................................10

Figure 4. Development of FIT payment levels and retail electricity rates in Germany................................14

Figure 5. Share of fixed versus variable costs of selected power generation technologies .......................22

Figure 6. Functioning of planned contracts for differences in the UK .........................................................23

List of Tables

Table 1. Traditional Renewable Electricity Policy Categories ....................................................................... 2

Table 2. Taiwan’s FIT Rates and Tariff Ceilings (H2:2014) .......................................................................... 7

Table 3. Project Size and Applicable Policy in France.................................................................................. 8

Table 4. Purchase Prices under FITs and Tendering in France (Q3:2013)................................................10

Table 5. Summary of On-site Generation Policies in the Cayman Islands, Grenada, and the Seychelles. 16
iii

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, Chinas, South Africa 

CORE customer-owned renewable energy 

CRE French Energy Regulatory Commission 

DSIRE Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency

EIA Energy Information Agency 

ERDF Électricité Réseau Distribution France

EU European Commission 

FIT feed-in tariff

GDP Gross Domestic Product 

GRENLEC Grenada Electricity Services Ltd

GW gigawatt

IEA-RETD International Energy Agency Renewable Energy Technology Deployment 

IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency 

kW kilowatt

kWh kilowatt-hour

LCOE levelized cost of electricity

MW megawatt

MWh megawatt-hour 

PV photovoltaic 

REDA Renewable Energy Development Act 

REN21 Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century

RET renewable energy targets

RPS renewable portfolio standard

TGC tradable green certificate

USD United States dollar
iv

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

Acknowledgments

This report was prepared for the Clean Energy Solutions Center (Solutions Center). The 

Solutions Center is an initiative of the Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM), a global forum to 

share best practices and promote policies and programs that encourage and facilitate the 

transition to a global clean energy economy. As the operating agency of the Solutions Center, 

the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is responsible for publications of the 

Solutions Center. The authors acknowledge Dr. Ian Lloyd of the United States Department of 

Energy; Ron Benioff, Terri Walters, and Dr. Jaquelin Cochran of the National Renewable 

Energy Laboratory; and William Becker of the Center for the New Energy Economy for their 

reviews.
v 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

Abstract

A number of policies have been used historically in order to stimulate the growth of the 

renewable electricity sector. This paper examines four of these policy instruments: 

competitive tendering (sometimes called renewable electricity auctions), feed-in tariffs, net 

metering and net billing, and tradable renewable energy certificates.1

 In recent years, 

however, a number of changes to both market circumstances and to policy priorities have 

resulted in numerous policy innovations, including the emergence of policy hybrids. With no 

common language for these evolving policy mechanisms, policymakers have generally 

continued to use the same traditional policy labels, occasionally generating confusion as many 

of these new policies no longer look, or act, like their traditional predecessors. In reviewing 

these changes, this paper makes two separate but related claims: first, policy labels themselves 

are breaking down and evolving. As a result, policy comparisons that rely on the conventional 

labels may no longer be appropriate, or advisable. Second, as policymakers continue to adapt, 

we are in effect witnessing the emergence of the next generation of renewable electricity 

policies, a change that could have significant impacts on investment, as well as on market 

growth in both developed and developing countries.

 

1 A number of additional policies have been used in order to stimulate the growth of the renewable energy sector, 

including incentives, rebates and the streamlining of administrative and grid connection procedures. However, 

this paper focuses on these four policy instruments, as it is here where the changes in definitions are most 

notable. 
1 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

1 Introduction

Renewable sources of electricity have grown significantly within the global power sector 

during the past decade. Total installed renewable electricity capacity increased from 800 

Gigawatts (GW) in 2004 to 1,560 GW by the end of 2013, and renewable energy sources now 

supply 22.1% of global electricity demand of which 5.8% is from sources other than large 

hydro (REN21 2014). 

Renewable energy market growth has been driven by a combination of factors, including 

government policy, rising energy prices, and rapidly declining renewable energy costs. By 

2013, 144 countries around the world had adopted specific targets for renewable energy 

development, up from only 48 countries in 2004. The growth in renewable energy targets 

(RETs) has been accompanied by a far-reaching international debate as to which 

mechanism(s) should be used to help achieve these targets. In the United States, many statelevel renewables portfolio standard (RPS) policies are due to expire in the years ahead, a fact 

that is likely to spur further debate about the best policy pathways forward. 

While the majority of renewable energy market growth to date has occurred in Europe and 

North America, a greater share of renewable electricity investment is moving toward 

developing countries (REN21 2014): 

• China now leads the world in terms of installed renewable electricity capacity, and the 

BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) collectively account 

for 29% of global non-hydropower renewable electricity capacity. 

• Approximately 43% of global renewable electricity investment (i.e., USD $93 billion) 

occurred in developing countries in 2013. 

• Top countries in terms of new renewable electricity investment relative to annual 

gross domestic product (GDP) in 2013 included Uruguay, Mauritius, Costa Rica, 

South Africa, and Nicaragua. 

As developing countries craft renewable electricity policies, they should consider whether 

traditional policies make sense in their own market or whether new policy innovations may

better meet their needs or better respond to their policy priorities. 

Policy Best Practices?

Europe and North America have had vigorous debates about the comparative merits of 

specific policies, and many experts elsewhere in the world have looked to these debates for 

policy guidance. In the United States in the 1990s, for example, policymakers puzzled over 

whether to adopt RPSs (i.e., mandatory targets for renewable electricity) or public benefits 

funds (i.e., surcharges on electricity bills used to support grants, rebates, and other incentives) 

(Wiser et al. 1996). In the 1990s and 2000s in Europe, policymakers debated whether to use 

feed-in tariffs (FITs) or tradable credits (Butler & Neuhoff 2008) or whether to move to 

auction mechanisms instead. In the United States, there are now several ongoing debates 

between net metering and FIT regimes (Trabish 2014), as well as about how to combine 

elements of different policies in new ways (Krasko and Doris 2012, Kreycik et al. 2011). 

Although these best practice debates have been well documented, policy definitions are 

increasingly fluid, the competitive environment is continually evolving, and policymakers are 

increasingly required to innovate in order to reconcile different policy objectives. As a result, 

“best practice” may be less about adopting policy ‘A’ or policy ‘B’, but rather about 

combining a wide range of policy design elements into a flexible and well-adapted policy 
2 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

framework. In some cases, this may involve abandoning the traditional policy categories 

altogether, and pushing out in new directions. 

Policy Definitions Are Increasingly Fluid

Table 1 summarizes a number of widely used renewable electricity policies and provides 

simplified traditional definitions. The table focuses specifically on how the remuneration that 

power producers receive is determined and structured.2 

Table 1. Traditional Renewable Electricity Policy Categories 

Policy Instrument How Prices Are Typically 

Determined

How Compensation Is Typically Structured 

Tendering or 

Reverse Auctions

Competition among 

generators 

Long-term fixed price contracts

Feed-in Tariffs Set administratively Long-term fixed price contracts

Net Metering Pegged to the retail 

electricity rate

System output offsets retail electricity purchases 

Excess generation can be applied as a credit to 

future electricity purchases 

Tradable 

Certificates

Short-term fluctuations in 

credit and spot market

prices

Variable pricing, depending on supply and 

demand conditions, and ability of generators to 

secure short-term contracts 

It is important to note that the “traditional” policy toolkit described above in Table 1 was 

largely developed when the cost of renewable energy technologies was significantly higher 

than both conventional electricity prices and utilities’ avoided generation costs. As renewable 

technology costs continue to fall and conventional fuel prices continue to rise, these policies 

are being adapted to these new power sector economics. In Germany, for example, the 

levelized cost of solar energy is now significantly below the retail price of electricity

(Ferroukhi et al. 2014). In other regions such as in the Caribbean and the Pacific Islands, 

renewable electricity sources are increasingly competitive at the wholesale level as well, 

undercutting the avoided cost of generation from diesel or heavy fuel oil (Rickerson et al. 

2012). Partly in response to these changing cost dynamics, policymakers in certain 

jurisdictions are beginning to introduce policies that do not fit neatly into the “traditional” 

policy categories. 

The conversation has been further complicated by the fact that the traditional policy labels are 

no longer applied in a standard or uniform manner. As renewable energy policies have spread

internationally during the past decade, the labels have been applied and interpreted in a wide 

variety of different ways. For example: 

• In the United States in 2009 and 2010, for example, California was debating whether 

to adopt a FIT or an auction, while in the neighboring state of Nevada some 

commentators were arguing that auctions were in fact a type of FIT (Carmichael 2010, 

Nimmons 2009). 

• In Australia, many states used the term “feed-in tariffs” to refer to policies that paid a 

fixed tariff only for excess generation (e.g., Tasmanian Government 2013) in contrast 

to traditional FITs, which compensate producers for their full output. These Australian 

 

2 Note that each involves a wide range of other design considerations beyond remuneration structure. See: Barnes 

et al. 2013, Couture et al. 2010, Maurer & Barroso 2011, Rader & Hempling 2001, Rickerson et al. 2012. 
3 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

policies are arguably closer in design to traditional net metering policies than to 

European FITs. 

• Grenada’s “Renewable Standard Offer” policy (which is also referred to as “net 

billing”) more closely resembles a traditional FIT because all of the generated power 

is purchased under a long-term agreement, and none of it can be used to offset on-site

load (GRENLEC 2011). 

• In Kenya, the national FIT law establishes a price ceiling under which contracts must 

be negotiated on a case-by-case basis (Ministry of Energy 2010). Kenya’s FIT 

represents a departure from European FITs, under which a minimum price is typically 

guaranteed on a standard offer basis.

As these examples and many other examples illustrate, the same policy labels are frequently 

used to mean different things. These inconsistent definitions can make it difficult for 

policymakers to compare the experiences of one jurisdiction with those of another. For 

instance, it may be challenging to compare the impact of FITs in Australia to the impact of 

FITs in Germany because the two policies are designed quite differently. In some cases, 

different policies sharing one common label differ from one another so fundamentally that 

using the same labels is no longer appropriate, or advisable. Instead, this paper argues that 

policymakers should focus on the underlying policy design elements, rather than comparing 

policies using the traditional labels. A focus on policy structure is also helpful as it can help 

highlight new ways in which policymakers can combine the various elements of different

policies together to better meet their objectives. 

The “Next Generation” of Renewable Electricity Policy

There have been a number of recent studies that attempt to characterize what the “next 

generation” of renewable electricity policy will look like (Miller et al. 2013; Kreycik et al. 

2011). This paper seeks to build on this literature by exploring specific examples of recent 

policy innovation.3

 

The following three sections of the paper focus on three emerging policy trends, 

including the: 

• Desire to support a diversity of investors and project sizes 

• Need to design new policy approaches to deal with markets that have reached (or 

surpassed) socket parity4

• Push to integrate non-hydro renewable electricity technologies into wholesale spot 

markets. 

 

3 The focus here is specifically on renewable electricity policies, but the authors acknowledge that the future of 

policymaking will require approaches that take into account issues such as grid integration, electricity market 

reform, and the ongoing evolution of utility business models.

4 Socket parity is defined as the point at which the cost of generation from on-site renewable energy systems is 

lower than the cost to purchase retail electricity from the grid, including taxes and fixed charges. 
4 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

It is in response to these and other related trends that the distinctions between the traditional 

policy categories are beginning to break down. The following sections examine each of these

three trends in greater detail. Section 2 takes a closer look at efforts to combine FITs and 

auctions together in Taiwan and France in order to improve cost-efficiency, while maintaining 

access to a wider range of market participants than typically possible under auctions alone. 

Section 3 examines how policymakers in both Europe and in a number of island regions 

around the world are attempting to regulate the development of distributed RETs in markets

beyond socket parity. And, Section 4 analyzes efforts in Germany to integrate variable 

renewable electricity technologies into wholesale spot markets as the share of renewable 

electricity in the market grows. 
5 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

2 Ensuring Investor and Project Size Diversity

In recent years, policymakers have been attempting to strike the right balance between a 

number of different, and some would argue competing, policy priorities. 

On one hand, policymakers have been seeking (or have been required by statute) to obtain the 

lowest possible price for electricity from renewable electricity projects. This is reflected in the 

design of many RPS policies in both the U.S. and Canada and in the growing interest in 

competitive tendering (e.g., reverse auctions) globally (Cozzi 2012). The number of 

developing countries that utilize auction mechanisms has increased significantly during the 

past several years. Auctions have the advantage of encouraging price competition. However, 

they also “tend to favour large players that are able to afford the associated administrative 

and transaction costs (Lucas et al. 2013)” and may only favor certain types of renewables 

over others (e.g., large wind plants will likely beat out small biogas projects if the two

compete against one another).5 

On the other hand, policymakers have realized that focusing on price alone can leave other 

priorities or values insufficiently reflected. One such priority is the desire to encourage a 

wider diversity of investors to participate in renewable energy investment, including citizens, 

farmers, communities, small businesses and local governments. 

In order to balance the objective of price competition with the objective of investor diversity, 

policymakers have attempted to combine policies in a range of different ways, including using 

policies such as auctions and FITs in parallel to encourage projects of different sizes.

6

 Under 

this approach, auctions are typically used to procure larger systems (e.g., >1 MW) while FITs 

are used to procure smaller projects (e.g., <100 kW). The aim in both of the cases examined 

here is to encourage investor diversity by keeping the barriers to entry low for certain kinds of 

market participants, while at the same time encouraging competition among larger project

developers to secure lower prices for consumers. 

Taiwan and France have been selected for a few key reasons: France was one of the first 

countries in the world to combine the use of both FITs and auctions for different project sizes

starting in 2001, using FITs for all projects under 12 MW and a form of tendering for all 

projects above 12 MW. Taiwan followed suit in 2011, combining FITs and auctions together 

in a slightly different way, and remains one of the leading examples of the two being used 

together outside of Europe. Moreover, both Taiwan and France have used the policies to 

achieve similar objectives, including encouraging a wider diversity of investors, and reducing 

the barriers to entry for certain project sizes. As such, both countries provide valuable insights 

into the various ways in which these policies have been combined in recent years, and 

demonstrate clearly that the two can be combined to achieve specific objectives.

7

 

 

5 One example of attempting to encourage technological diversity can be seen in Brazil, where efforts have been 

made to increase technological diversity by holding technology-specific auctions. A number of European 

researchers have suggested that encouraging a broad mix of RE technologies, while potentially costlier in the 

short-term, remains the least-cost option in the long-term to achieve more ambitious RE targets, primarily as it 

allows a number of technologies to come down the cost curve simultaneously (Huber et al. 2004). This view, 

once quite controversial, has arguably been vindicated by the recent declines in solar PV costs, which are now 

broadly competitive with wind power in certain markets.

6 Another approach to encourage project size diversity can be found in certain RPS, where technology specific 

targets, or carve-outs, have been introduced (Hurlbut 2008). 7 Other approaches designed to encourage investor diversity include streamlined grid interconnection procedures 

for smaller projects, and targeted funds or grants for energy entrepreneurs. 
6 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

2.1 FITs and Auctions in Taiwan 

In 2009, the Taiwanese government enacted a national Renewable Energy Development Act 

(REDA). At the time, Taiwan anticipated achieving a target of 75 MW of new solar 

photovoltaic (PV) projects. Since then, however, Taiwan had significantly expanded its PV 

target to procure a total of 6.2 GW of solar PV by 2030.8 Due primarily to constraints over 

access to land, Taiwan had chosen to place a higher priority on rooftop solar PV systems. By 

the end of 2014, Taiwan is likely to have a total installed solar PV capacity of over 600 MW.9

In order to achieve its target, Taiwan is using both a FIT policy and a competitive tendering 

scheme.10 Under the competitive tendering scheme, bidders must submit their project 

proposals with their bid price. Winning bidders are then allowed to sell electricity to TaiPower at the same rate for twenty years under fixed price contracts (Ming-Zhi Gao 2014). 

However, Taiwan allows certain project categories to be formally exempted from the 

tendering process, offering a twenty-year FIT contract instead. FITs are currently offered, at 

different tariffs, in the following cases:11 1) projects between 1 kW and 10 kW that are owned 

by individual residents; 2) projects smaller than 30 kW; 3) projects up to 5 MW in size that 

are owned directly by local governments, or by state-owned enterprises, and 4) projects on 

government buildings that are rented to private owners and receive formal approval from local 

governments (Ming-Zhi Gao 2014).12 This means that PV projects of less than 30 kW in 

Taiwan can technically apply to participate in the tendering scheme, or apply to participate in 

the FIT, provided they qualify. More flexibility is also given to particular project types, such 

as those owned by local governments. This increases investor choice, while lowering the 

barriers to entry for certain project types. 

It is important to note that in Taiwan the administratively set rates offered under the FIT 

policy act as “tariff ceilings.” In order words, bid prices under its tendering policy are 

implicitly capped: bids higher than the current FIT rates will not be accepted. This means that 

the projects that qualify for exemptions from the tendering scheme are effectively given

preferential treatment: they benefit from higher tariff values, and a less burdensome 

administrative process to obtain a contract. They also face a lower risk that their project 

proposal will fail to result in a contract to build. In this way, Taiwan has attempted to make it 

both easier, and more attractive, for certain project types, most notably small projects under 

30 kW and those owned by local governments, to participate. 

 

8 See: http://web3.moeaboe.gov.tw/ECW/english/news/News.aspx?kind=6&menu_id=958&news_id=3769 9 Ibid. 

10 Projects can also be supported directly via grants or cash incentives by local or national governments. 11 Note that the number and scope of the exemptions have been growing since the combined policy was 

introduced in March 2011. 12 Ming-Zhi Gao 2014b. See also http://web3.moeaboe.gov.tw/ECW/english/news/

News.aspx?kind=6&menu_id=958&news_id=3769 . 
7 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

Table 2 provides a snapshot of the tariff ceilings offered as part of Taiwan’s FIT policy 

in 2014.

Table 2. Taiwan’s FIT Rates and Tariff Ceilings (H2:2014) 

System Capacity H2:2014 Tariff Rates

≥1 – <10 kW USD $235.0/MWh

≥10 – <100 kW USD $210.7/MWh

≥100 – <500 kW USD $198.4/MWh

≥500 kW USD $171.7/MWh

≥1,000 kW USD $161.6/MWh

Source: Million Rooftop PVs 2014

By comparison, the average retail electricity price in Taiwan in 2011 was USD $0.09/kWh or 

USD $90/MWh (Economist Intelligence Unit 2013). 

Outcomes 

The results from Taiwan to date suggest that despite efforts to retain the FIT in parallel with 

the tendering scheme, and the efforts to streamline the process for certain project types, there 

has been little project development in the smallest project size categories. As the Figure 1 

demonstrates, the majority of the total installed capacity has been developed in the larger size 

categories, in particular in the commercial project size segment from 100 kW–499 kW. Note 

that this includes both larger FIT projects owned by local governments, as well as projects 

that have participated in the tendering scheme.

Figure 1. Distribution of PV project sizes in Taiwan (2011 – Q2:2014)

Source: Ming-Zhi Gao 2014b
8 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

The data from Taiwan suggest that while the combined FIT and tendering scheme has proved 

quite successful at encouraging both new investment, and a diversity of project sizes, the 

overall policy framework has not been as successful as hoped at fostering projects <10 kW in 

particular. A number of reasons have been advanced to explain this observation, including the 

legal and administrative difficulties associated with installing PV systems on multi-unit 

residential buildings, which are common in Taiwan, and the limited availability of personal 

loans to finance small-scale solar PV systems in the country.13 Partly in response, the 

government has begun to encourage financial institutions to increase their lending to the 

sector, a move that could help drive more project development in the smallest project sizes in 

the years ahead.14 

2.2 FITs and Auctions in France

During the early 2000s, France utilized a FIT system for a range of renewable energy 

technologies, while also procuring some technologies such as biomass and offshore wind 

through tenders. The FIT applied mostly to smaller systems (under 12 MW), while the 

tendering scheme was used to procure larger projects (>12 MW). France’s national strategy 

included a number of technology-specific program-size caps. The technology-specific caps 

were related to national targets, as determined by the multi-year investment plans for the 

French electricity system. If the technology-specific targets specified within the investment 

plans were not reached, the government retained the option of tendering out the remaining 

capacity (J.O. 2000, J.O. 2003). 

In March 2011, France expanded the use of tenders to smaller projects and introduced a 

tender for rooftop solar PV projects between 100 kW and 250 kW in size (the “simplified” 

tendering approach), and a tender for rooftop projects between 250 kW and 12 MW in size 

(the more “complex” tendering approach).15 Systems below 100 kW remain eligible for fixed 

FIT rates. 

Table 3. Project Size and Applicable Policy in France

Solar PV Project Size Applicable Policy

0 to 100 kW Feed-in Tariff

100 to 250 kW Simplified Tendering

>250 kW Complex Tendering

As seen above, France demonstrates a highly layered policy approach, where different 

policies are combined together to target different project size segments. Beyond providing 

better control over market growth, such a layered approach also enables policymakers to 

ensure that project development is occurring across all project size categories. Moreover, it 

also enables policymakers to choose the policy deemed most appropriate to encourage 

development in that particular size segment. 

What is also noteworthy about France is that a number of additional levers are used to 

encourage actor diversity or to facilitate the process for smaller participants. First, in order to 

 

13 Yueh-Hsun Tsai 2014. Personal communication with Professor Yueh-Hsun Tsai, Associate Professor of Law 

at National Yunlin University of Science and Technology in Taiwan (September 9 2014). Note that this report 

has not evaluated whether the FIT level is sufficient to fully recover project development costs. 14 This includes a target of “at least seven (7) billion Taiwan Dollars (TND) (USD $230 Million) in loans” to the 

sector. See: http://web3.moeaboe.gov.tw/ECW/english/news/News.aspx?kind=6&menu_id=958&news_id=3769. 15 Note that the scheme was modified in 2013, but the basic distinction between projects from 100 kW to 250 kW 

and those above remains. Moreover, the effort to simplify the process for smaller projects is also present in both. 
9 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

ensure that individual actors do not string several 250 kW projects together on the same roof, 

the policy includes a limit of 250 kW per legal entity. Second, in order to prevent one 

developer from developing many projects in the same region, the policy includes a minimum 

distance of 500 meters (approximately 1,650 feet) between projects owned by the same legal 

entity. This prevents one developer, or legal entity, from owning several smaller systems in 

one cluster, or geographic area. Third, the simplified tendering approach significantly reduces 

the overall pre-qualification requirements imposed on project proponents, as well as the 

amount of documentation that they must provide. This makes the simplified tendering scheme 

closer to a feed-in tariff in certain key respects, as a far greater number of contract design 

elements are standardized at the outset for all project proponents. The primary functions of the 

simplified tendering process are therefore mostly limited to price discovery, and contract 

allocation. In contrast, the process for larger projects requires a significantly greater and more 

onerous set of application forms, including a much more detailed description of the project 

(manufacturer, location where the components were manufactured, etc.), as well as a thorough 

independent environmental assessment. 

Outcomes

As seen below, France has managed to encourage a wide range of both project sizes as well as 

investor types to participate in its RE policy. It has accomplished this in part by retaining a 

simple FIT for small projects (under 100 kW), with differentiated rates for a wide range of 

project size categories, and by introducing size-differentiated tenders for projects between 100 

and 250 kW and between 250 kW and 12 MW in size (see Figure 2). 

Figure 2. Breakdown of installed solar PV capacity in mainland France from 2011 to 2014 (MW)

Sources: Commissariat général du développement durable 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

≤3kW 3 to ≤9kW 9 to ≤36kW 36 to ≤100kW 100 to 

≤250kW

>250kW

MW

Sept 30 2011 Sept 30 2012 Sept 30 2013 Sept 30 2014
10 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

Figure 3 shows the breakdown of project development in each category as a share of total 

installed capacity as of September 30 2014. 

Figure 3. Breakdown of installed solar PV capacity in mainland France by project size (%)

(Sept 30, 2014)

Source: Commissariat général du développement durable 2014 

As can be seen above, the installed capacity under France’s FIT policy represents 

approximately 38% of the total, while the various tendering schemes implemented by France 

over the years represent the remaining 62%. While the share of the total installed capacity 

represented by the largest projects (greater than 250 kW) remains the largest, there continues 

to be significant development across all project sizes. 

With regard to price efficiency, the results in France are also instructive. 

Table 4. Purchase Prices under FITs and Tendering in France (Q3:2013) 

Solar PV 

System Size

System Type16 Applicable 

Policy

Applicable Tariff in Q3: 2013

0–9 kW 

Fully building-integrated (where 

the PV system physically 

constitutes the roofing 

structure)

Feed-in Tariff EUR 296,9/MWh

(USD $378/MWh)

0–36 kW Roof-mounted systems (where 

the PV system can be mounted 

on either the roof or wall 

structure)

Feed-in Tariff EUR 152,1/MWh

(USD $193/MWh)

36–100 kW Feed-in Tariff EUR 144,5/MWh

(USD $184/MWh)

100–250 kW

Roof-mounted solar PV 

systems, as stipulated in the 

tender documents 

Simplified 

Tendering

EUR 168/MWh

(USD $214/MWh)

(July – September 2013)

Source: Photovoltaique Info 2014b and CRE 2014

 

16 For a more detailed description of the difference between simplified and fully building-integrated PV systems, 

see http://www.photovoltaique.info/Aujourd-hui-arrete-du-4-mars-2011 (in French) and Rickerson et al. 2014.

≤3kW

14%

3 to ≤9kW

5%

9 to ≤36kW

7%

36 to 

≤100kW

12%

100 to 

≤250kW

17%

>250kW

45%
11 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

There are a number of points to highlight here. First, the current purchase prices (in 

EUR/MWh) offered to fully building-integrated solar PV projects between 0 kW and 9 kW is 

approximately two times higher than the tariff offered to roof or wall-mounted projects up to 

100 kW. This price differential represents a significant premium for fully building-integrated 

projects, and a clear incentive for smaller project sizes.

17 Partly as a result of this significant 

price incentive, France has been successful in attracting considerable investment in smaller 

project categories – in fact, by far the single largest number of projects in France (over 

246,000 individual installations) have been installed in the 1-kW to 3-kW project size 

category (ERDF 2013). 

Based on the concurrent tendering results (Q3:2013), the average weighted purchase price of 

tendered projects between 100 and 250 kW (namely, EUR 168/MWh) is significantly higher 

than the tariffs offered to smaller projects (0–100 kW) under the FIT policy (EUR 

144.5/MWh to EUR 152,1/MWh). This value is also higher than average retail prices in 

France, which are currently EUR 0.147/kWh (~USD $0.19/kWh) when all taxes are included 

(Rickerson et al. 2014). This result suggests that a significant premium is being paid for 

projects developed under tendering versus projects developed under the FIT in the same 

project size category. These results, which have been corroborated by independent analyses 

conducted elsewhere in Europe (Hauser et al. 2014, Frontier Economics 2014), run counter to 

conventional arguments that competition between developers under tendering should result in 

lower prices. 

Recent evidence from France therefore does not support the argument that tendering 

necessarily results in lower procurement prices: the outcomes ultimately depend on the 

specific design of the policy as well as on the overall implications for investment risk, and

transaction costs. 

2.3 Lessons Learned 

FITs and tendering policies are beginning to be used in combination with one another in order 

to meet different objectives. 

The case of Taiwan suggests that even though an FIT (at over USD $0.28/kWh) is offered to 

small solar PV projects (<10 kW), this incentive does not necessarily mean that a jurisdiction 

will be able to encourage investor participation in the project-size class. But there may also be 

a range of other factors, which may limit uptake in the size segment. The results in Taiwan 

suggest that while FITs may in theory reduce a barrier to entry, they may not be enough to 

ensure robust market development. Thus, more attention needs to be paid to related 

factors, such as the availability of debt financing, administrative barriers, the full costs of 

project development, as well as practical challenges such as the ease of accessing roof space. 

The case of France demonstrates that retaining a FIT for smaller project sizes can help 

drive significant investment in projects typically owned by individual citizens or 

residents. In contrast with Taiwan, France has experienced more success in attracting interest 

in smaller projects, and has achieved more balanced project development across all project 

size classes. More research is recommended to determine the particular drivers behind 

France’s success in this area. 

 

17 More specifically, for rooftop systems in which the solar PV system fully replaces (or constitutes) the roof 

structure itself, fulfilling the key criteria of both air- and water tightness. France has made encouraging these 

“fully building-integrated” PV systems a key component of its solar policy, a set of criteria and incentives that is 

unique in the world for building-integrated systems. 
12 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

In addition, it is noteworthy that the more standardized the tendering requirements 

become, the closer auction schemes become in certain respects to traditional feed-in 

tariffs: bidders are effectively bidding to obtain the rights to a long-term power purchase 

agreement, the same kind of standard contract commonly allocated on a first-come-first-serve 

basis under FIT policies. In such cases, the primary functions of an auction become twofold: 

price discovery, and contract allocation. 

Finally, the cases of Taiwan and France both demonstrate that policy outcomes are not always 

as expected. For instance, in the case of France the move to auctions resulted in higher 

per kWh payments for generators, rather than lower prices. Further analysis and policy 

experimentation is recommended in order to better understand the reasons for this result. In 

this process, such analysis may yield new insights into how FITs and auctions can be 

combined in a more effective and impactful way in the future. 
13 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

3 Socket Parity and Beyond

Historically, renewable electricity policy has been motivated in part by the need to “close the 

gap” between the costs of renewable electricity and the costs of conventional generation. As 

the cost of renewable energy technologies has continued to decline and the cost of fossil and 

nuclear energy has continued to rise, however, important questions have emerged about how 

current policy frameworks might need to be adjusted or reimagined (IEA 2014; Wirth 2014). 

In particular, the attainment of “socket parity” – the point at which the levelized cost of 

electricity generation (LCOE) from on-site renewable systems is equal to, or less than, the 

price of purchasing electricity from the wall socket – is challenging conventional policy 

models for on-site generation. 

This section first reviews current experience in the European and then explores how island 

jurisdictions are providing a laboratory for policy innovation in this area. Both Europe and 

island regions have been chosen primarily due to the fact that retail electricity prices in both 

tend to be significantly higher than the LCOE of distributed renewable electricity 

technologies such as solar. In some cases, customer-sited generation is more cost-effective 

than power generation from larger, centralized units. This makes both islands and certain 

European countries valuable testing grounds, as they demonstrate some of the ways in which 

both utilities and regulators are adapting to a world where the cost of customer-sited 

generation is lower than the cost of power from the grid. As the section shows, one of the 

consequences of this trend is that policymakers are moving beyond traditional FITs and net 

metering policies, and beginning to develop innovative policies that are strictly neither FITs 

nor net metering. 

3.1 Policy Approaches in Europe

During the 2000s, much of Europe enacted FITs that guaranteed long-term fixed prices for 

electricity generation, with pricing based on each technology’s generation cost (Couture et al. 

2010, Jacobs 2012). Generators would typically sell 100% of their power into the electricity 

grid – even if their systems were located on-site (e.g., a PV system mounted on the roof). FIT

payments for on-site generation, and for PV in particular, were historically higher than retail 

electricity prices in most countries. However, decreases in the cost of renewable electricity 

have led to decreased rates. Using Germany as an example, Figure 3 illustrates, the FIT 

payment levels for new, small-scale PV in Germany (purple line) are now less than half the 

current residential retail rate (green line). The levelized cost of energy for solar PV in 

Germany is projected to continue to decline from ~$0.12-$0.18/kWh and to ~$0.08-

$0.13/kWh by 2030 (Kost et al. 2013). These declines will continue to move Germany 

significantly beyond the point of “socket parity,” leading a greater number of households and 

businesses to begin installing behind-the-meter solar systems to reduce the amount of power 

they consume from the network. This change is likely to require further policy innovation in 

the years ahead to better accommodate the rise of these so-called “prosumers”18 (Rickerson 

et al. 2014). 

 

18 Prosumers are consumers who also produce their own power from a range of different on-site generators, 

including PV systems.
14 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

Figure 4. Development of FIT payment levels and retail electricity rates in Germany 

Source: Ferroukhi et al. 2014

Germany is currently debating how to appropriately govern on-site renewable energy 

consumption in response to these changing dynamics. In 2009, Germany actively encouraged 

on-site consumption by paying generators a bonus to utilize their own electricity.19 In 

response to this policy – and to rising retail prices – an increasing number of on-site

generators now consume their own power, rather than exporting 100% of their output to the 

grid, as under the FIT. While the government does not currently monitor how much solar PV 

generation is consumed directly on-site, estimates suggest that most new projects being 

installed in Germany are being configured to maximize their on-site consumption, due in 

large part to the growing disparity between the LCOE of on-site PV and retail prices. These 

estimates in turn suggest a self-consumption ratio in the range of 30% for residential projects

(see Rickerson et al. 2014). 

 

19 Note that this bonus payment is no longer offered. 
15 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

On-site generation is beginning to cause national policy challenges, however. The abovemarket cost of historical FIT payments is currently recovered through a surcharge that is 

included in retail electricity rates. This surcharge is currently USD $0.08/kWh 

(EUR0.0624/kWh). By consuming their own output, on-site generators purchase less power 

from the grid and therefore avoid paying this surcharge. In response, the latest amendment to 

Germany’s national FIT law requires on-site generators to pay 30% of this surcharge (rising 

to 40% as of 2017) for each kilowatt-hour of electricity they consume on-site. Installations 

below 10 kW are exempt from the regulation.20 Other European countries are exploring how 

to balance support for on-site energy consumption with decreased retail electricity purchases

in their markets. An increasing number of U.S. states are also grappling with similar questions 

since most U.S. states allow on-site generators to engage in some form of net metering 

(Barnes et al. 2013). 

The issues related to supporting and managing on-site energy consumption are highly 

complex, and raise questions such as how to value the benefits that on-site generation creates 

for other stakeholders, how to recover or allocate the costs that on-site generators avoid 

paying for (such as grid costs), and how to amend existing regulatory frameworks as on-site

generators scale up in the future (Bird et al. 2013; Hansen et al. 2013; Rickerson et al. 2014). 

3.2 Policy Approaches on Islands

This section looks specifically at island jurisdictions. Most islands depend primarily on liquid 

fuels such as diesel for electricity generation and have some of the highest retail electricity 

prices in the world as a result (Rickerson et al. 2012). With increasing demand from their 

citizens for renewable electricity generators, island policymakers are evaluating whether to 

adopt traditional feed-in tariffs or net metering, or whether to introduce innovations that are 

more adapted to their specific contexts. In the absence of appropriate, off-the-shelf terms to 

describe their new policies, they have often simply adopted the policy labels from the existing 

toolkit, occasionally generating confusion as the new policies no longer resemble their 

traditional predecessors. 

When island jurisdictions face high retail electricity costs, which can exceed USD $0.50/kWh, 

the cost to produce on-site renewable electricity can be lower than the retail rate of electricity 

and even below the utility’s cost of generation. In such environments, offering to purchase (or 

credit) on-site generation at the full retail rate, or even at the full avoided generation cost, may 

result in on-site producers being over-compensated. At the same time, renewable electricity 

that is below utility avoided cost may create opportunities for ratepayer savings rather than 

incurring additional ratepayer costs. 

In reaction to these challenges and opportunities, island jurisdictions have been developing 

policies that combine elements of FITs and net metering in innovative ways. This section 

briefly reviews current practice in four island jurisdictions to highlight the different 

approaches that policymakers are taking. These jurisdictions include the Cayman Islands, 

Grenada, and the Seychelles. These islands were chosen in order to reflect a diversity of 

current policy approaches, although there are currently many other innovations taking place

around the world. 

Table 5 provides a summary of the key policy elements, and more detailed descriptions of 

each policy follow the table. 

 

20 Even though the effects of this new regulation are not yet entirely clear, it can be expected that investment into 

new solar PV systems will remain financially attractive due to the large gap between the retail electricity price 

and the LCOE of solar PV. However, this depends on the self-consumption ratio and the size of the PV system.
16 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

Table 5. Summary of On-site Generation Policies in the Cayman Islands, Grenada, and the Seychelles

Country Policy 

mechanism

On-site 

Consumption? 

System size cap Program Cap Compensation 

structure 

Compensation amount (USD)

Cayman 

Islands

CORE Tariff Yes* Residential: 20 kW, or 

peak load

Commercial: 100 kW, or 

peak load 

2 MW Cash payment for 

metered output of 

PV system

~USD $0.47/kWh for 20 years

Grenada Renewable 

Standard 

Offer

No 100 kW 2.5% of annual 

electricity demand

Cash payment for 

100% of power

$USD 0.17/kWh for 10 years, or

Average avoided cost of fuel for 

previous 12 months

Seychelles Net-Metering 

Program

Yes Commercial: 50% of onsite energy consumption 

for

None Cash payment for 

excess generation

88% of the avoided fuel cost

* Power can be consumed on-site but does not offset retail electricity purchases.
17 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

Cayman Islands. The Cayman Islands have adopted a unique on-site generation policy with 

the Customer-Owned Renewable Energy (CORE) tariff program. Generators can choose 

whether to connect in front of the meter (as under a traditional FIT) or behind the meter (as is 

typically done with net metering). Under both configurations, however, generators are billed 

at the retail rate for 100% of the power that is consumed on-site. This arrangement applies 

whether that electricity is purchased from the grid or generated by the on-site PV system. 

Electricity generated by the PV system is then compensated at a rate of ~$0.47/kWh for 

residential systems for a 20-year period, whether or not that power is consumed on-site or 

exported directly into the grid. For comparison, the residential retail rate was USD $0.44/kWh 

in the first quarter of 2014. This arrangement provides generators with the flexibility to use 

their PV system to charge a battery for back-up power (i.e., in the behind-the-meter 

configuration), while also ensuring that on-site generators pay the retail rate for all the power 

they consume. At the same time, the policy creates an incentive for customer-sited renewable 

energy since the CORE tariff is higher than the retail electricity rate. System size is limited 

either by a size cap or by on-site peak load, whichever is less, and the total amount of capacity 

installed that can utilize the CORE tariff is limited to 2 MW. At the end of 2013, there were 

27 systems totaling 234 kW installed, with an additional 15 projects totaling 373 kW under 

design or construction (Caribbean Utilities Company 2014). 

Grenada. Grenada instituted a net metering policy in 2007, which allowed generators to 

receive credit for excess generation at the full retail rate of electricity. The retail rate in 

Grenada was USD $0.37/kWh, and it was determined that generators were likely capturing 

excess profits while the utility lost an estimated $500,000 in revenue each year. In order to 

limit excess profits and reduce utility revenue loss, the utility switched to a net billing policy 

under which generators must purchase 100% of their power at the full retail rate and export 

100% of their power to the grid.

21 The program is currently limited to 2.5% of annual 

electricity demand. Generators can choose to export at either a fixed rate of USD $0.17/kWh 

(XCD.45/kWh) for ten years or at the utility’s average avoided cost (which is adjusted 

annually) (GRENLEC 2011). Of note, the switch to avoided cost has slowed market growth at 

the residential level significantly.

While island policymakers and much of the literature often refer to Grenada’s policy as net 

billing, it should be noted that in this instance, the term “net billing” is used differently than it 

is in the United States (where the term originated). In the United States, net billing policies 

allow on-site generators to offset retail electricity purchases – the key difference between net 

metering and net billing being that under net billing, the rate at which generators are 

compensated, or credited, differs from the retail rate they pay. The policy in Grenada, by 

contrast, does not allow any on-site consumption. In addition, the requirement that 100% of 

power be exported also distinguishes Grenada’s policies from feed-in tariffs in countries such 

as Australia (where generators can choose to consume some of their power on-site). 

Seychelles. The Seychelles introduced a “Net-Metering Program” for on-site generators in 

January 2014. Under the program, generators can offset their retail electricity purchases from 

the grid. Excess power, however, is then sold at a “net feed-in tariff” rate equal to 88% of the 

utility’s cost of fuel. Excess power is not compensated at 100% of the avoided fuel cost in 

order to account for electricity grid losses (Ministry of Environment and Energy 2014). At 

present, the avoided fuel cost equates to approximately $0.19/kWh. System sizes are capped 

at 50% of on-site energy consumption for commercial systems larger than 10 kW. Systems 

smaller than 10 kW are not capped. The Seychelles is currently exploring whether to institute 

 

21 Note that the program is officially called the Renewable Standard Offer. 
18 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

a policy under which 100% of power would be sold into the grid, similar to the policy 

currently in place in Grenada. 

3.3 Lessons Learned

There are a number of lessons that emerge from the case of Germany. In recent years, the 

LCOE of solar PV has fallen far below the retail price of electricity, making it possible for 

both residential and commercial customers to offset their own consumption using on-site PV. 

After incentivizing on-site consumption for a few years, Germany has now reversed course, 

and has started to require these prosumers to share in the costs of the EEG surcharge. This 

dynamic highlights the challenges that policymakers face in the years ahead in controlling the 

rate of uptake of customer-sited solar PV in an environment of decreasing PV costs, and 

rising retail rates. Germany’s decision to require PV prosumers to share in the costs of the 

EEG surcharge is merely the beginning, as more jurisdictions around the world design new 

ways either to slow the pace of growth in this market segment, or to require prosumers to 

contribute more to cover fixed electricity system costs. It is too early to say whether and to 

what extent these attempts will be successful. 

The emerging experience on islands, however, highlights a number of important lessons:

• No “right” or “best” policy. The islands have generally opted not to implement 

traditional net metering or FIT policies. Instead, they have introduced policies that 

combine elements of FITs and net metering in new ways. In some cases, such as the 

Cayman Islands, these policy structures represent unique approaches globally. On the 

other hand, a clear common practice, let alone a “best” practice, has not yet emerged 

and additional research into the pros and cons of different policy approaches within 

island contexts would be useful. 

• Utilities are designing polices to address revenue loss. Grenada’s utility has shifted 

from a net metering policy to a policy that requires 100% of PV output to be sold into 

the grid. Part of the intent behind this shift is to require generators to pay the full retail 

rate and limit the impact of reduced electricity sales on both other ratepayers and 

utility shareholders. The Seychelles is considering a similar approach, while the 

Cayman Islands have created a globally unique solution to this issue. Restricting the 

amount of power that can be consumed on-site, however, raises legal, moral, as well 

as philosophical questions as to whether utility customers have the “right” to consume 

their own power on-site. This issue is contentious in Grenada and similar debates may

occur elsewhere as other countries contemplate “100% sale” requirements. 

• Avoided cost is emerging as a cost benchmark. Grenada and the Seychelles have 

linked generator compensation to costs that the utility avoids, such as fuel costs, when 

it does not have to generate the power. The use of avoided cost in islands – and 

eventually in non-island countries – could serve as an attractive payment rate as 

renewable energy costs continue to fall below retail rates. At present, however there is 

not sufficient evidence about the performance of these policies to draw broad 

conclusions about their effectiveness. At least in the case of Grenada, the switch to 

avoided cost has slowed market growth at the residential level significantly. 

• Terminology is not applied in a standard manner. The policy names used within 

these island jurisdictions illustrate how traditional policy labels are being used 

inconsistently. As discussed above, the term net billing in Grenada has significant 

design differences from net billing policies in the United States. The Net-Metering 

Program in the Seychelles, meanwhile, describes its crediting arrangement a “net 

excess feed-in tariff,” thus borrowing terminology from both policy traditions 
19 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

simultaneously. These uses of terms can make cross-comparisons using the standard 

labels challenging. Policy comparisons instead require more detailed consideration of 

policy structure (see Table 5) in order to be useful. 

Many island jurisdictions are entering periods of transition for customer-sited renewable 

electricity policy as fuel costs rise and renewable energy technology costs fall. Many 

mainland jurisdictions are not far behind. As the LCOE of customer-sited renewable 

electricity technologies continues to fall below retail electricity prices in jurisdictions like 

Germany, the Caribbean region, the Indian Ocean, as well as the Pacific Islands region,

policymakers are beginning to respond by developing policies that lie somewhere between 

traditional net metering and FITs.
20 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

4 Integrating Renewable Electricity into 

Wholesale Markets

Many countries around the world have started to liberalize their electricity markets over the 

past decades. More recently, an increasing number of developing countries are taking steps 

towards market liberalisation in order to attract foreign investment and meet increasing 

electricity demand (Wamukonya 2003; Gratwick and Eberhard 2008). 

With shares of renewable electricity sources increasing, several jurisdictions around the globe 

have started to better integrate renewables into the existing power sector structure, i.e., 

integrating renewables into wholesale markets. Until recently, this policy challenge has

primarily concerned decision makers in Europe and in certain parts of the United States. 

However, policymakers in emerging economies and developing countries will be facing 

similar design issues once their share of renewable electricity rises and if, or when, wholesale 

competition is more fully introduced. In this section, we focus on the European debate 

because the policy innovations under consideration were first implemented in the European 

Union. As highlighted above, the examples from Europe may be valuable to emerging 

markets that are considering, or that are in the process of, introducing wholesale electricity 

markets. 

The basic rationale for exposing electricity producers to (spot) market prices is to encourage 

the alignment of power generation with electricity demand. Traditional power producers can – 

at least theoretically – react to price signals from wholesale power markets by increasing or 

decreasing their power output and by designing their power plant in order to better align 

power output with typical demand patterns. This is much more difficult with non-dispatchable 

generation such as traditional solar PV and wind power.22 In addition, spot market prices in 

fully liberalized markets should indicate whether investment in new power generation 

capacity is needed (based on current prices and predictions of future spot market price 

evolution). Any investor will need to decide on whether the expected prices will allow the 

recovery of costs over the lifetime of a power plant. 

Aspects of this discussion can be seen in the debate between FITs and tradable green 

certificates (TGCs) in the EU over the last decade. 

4.1 Policy Conflict in the European Union: FITs versus TGCs

For many years, the policy discourse in the European Union was dominated by a 

confrontation between proponents of tradable green certificates and proponents of FITs 

(Lauber 2004; Ringel 2006; Fouquet and Johansson 2008; Jacobsson et al. 2009). This 

confrontation was driven by the apparent trade-off between two seemingly contradictory 

policy objectives: 

• Creating a high degree of investment security to drive renewable electricity producers 

through fixed, long-term prices 

• Ensuring compatibility with a fully liberalized European electricity market and its 

short-term trading requirements. 

FITs were argued to be more consistent with the former objective, whereas tradable credits 

were argued to be more consistent with the latter. 

 

22 Options may include, for instance, facing solar PV systems east or west instead of south. While this could help 

avoid the daytime PV supply peak, and the associated wholesale market price trough, it would also reduce 

overall output from the PV system.
21 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

The European Commission had called for the introduction of tradable green certificates at the 

national level in the mid-1990s (EU Commission 1996). Under this scheme, power producers 

would sell their electricity directly on the spot market. On top of the revenues from spot 

market sales, power producers would be given the right to sell “green electricity” certificates. 

It was assumed that tradable credit prices would be determined in short-term markets in 

response to supply and demand, similar to the manner in which electricity is traded (Sovacool 

2011; Jacobs and Sovacool 2012). The concept of tradable credits was first introduced in the 

United States as part of state-level electricity liberalization and restructuring efforts (Rader & 

Norgaard 1996). 

Despite the European Commission’s call for tradable credits, policymakers in the European 

Union, such as Denmark, Spain and Germany, were already successfully promoting 

renewable electricity market growth with instituted long-term, fixed price FITs. These 

policies explicitly shield renewable electricity producers from the fluctuations of the 

wholesale spot market by providing suppliers with both a purchase guarantee, as well as a 

fixed long-term price for their output. This trend led to the emergence, in effect, of two 

electricity markets, one for renewable electricity sources and the other for every other 

generation technology. However, the preference for FITs persisted as policymakers prioritized 

investment security over the desire to foster so-called “market integration” by forcing 

renewable producers onto the spot markets. As of 2013, FITs remained the dominant 

renewable electricity policy instrument in 20 out of 28 EU member states.

4.2 Financing RE Projects via Spot Market Sales? 

Spot markets establish a uniform price per kilowatt-hour paid to all power producers – the socalled “clearing price” – irrespective of their individual generation costs. This price is 

determined via anonymous bids. Spot market prices are usually auctioned on an hourly basis, 

meaning that potential revenues for power producers change hourly and in some cases even 

on a sub-hourly basis (Borenstein 2000; Joskow 2008). Such a volatile pricing environment 

creates a substantial risk for all power producers that need to finance their investment via spot 

market sales of electricity over the lifetime of their power plant. This volatility, in turn, 

generally increases the cost of capital. 

In addition, renewable electricity technologies, especially solar PV and wind energy, face 

relatively high shares of capital expenditures in relation to operation expenditures. In fully 

liberalized markets, all power producers need to re-finance their capital expenditures and their 

operating expenditures via surplus revenues from market sales. This implies a higher risk for 

technologies with high shares of capital expenditures. Short- and long-term price volatilities 

of the spot-market are a bigger risk for wind and PV producers than for gas-fired power 

producers. Put simply, an operator of a gas-fired power plant can still decide not to operate 

the plant if market prices are below the costs for fuel (and carbon dioxide). Therefore, refinancing power plant via spot market sales creates a bias towards technologies with a low 

share of capital costs (and a high share of fuel costs) (2015). 
22 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

Figure 5. Share of fixed versus variable costs of selected power generation technologies

Source: Authors based on EIA 2013

Moreover, an increasing share of wind energy and solar PV with very low marginal costs 

reduces the spot-market price. This so-called “merit-order-effect” has been observed in many 

jurisdictions with a high share of variable renewables in the system (Sensfuß and Ragwitz 

2007; Sáenz de Miera et al. 2008; Ray et al. 2010). Increasing shares of wind and solar PV on 

the market results in lower spot market prices during windy or sunny hours and thus erode the 

basis for financing these power plants via spot market sales in the future. Partly as a result, it 

has become extremely difficult to finance new electricity generation capacity of any kind 

(whether fossil, nuclear, or renewable) by relying solely on the spot market. 

4.3 Designing Premium FITs in the EU 

In the past years, policymakers in several European countries have tried to reconcile both 

policy objectives: investment security and wholesale market integration. They have come up 

with policy instruments that require renewable electricity producers to sell their electricity on 

wholesale markets but which allow for higher revenue security than usual spot market sales. 

These instruments have been given different names: contracts for differences in the United 

Kingdom (UK), market premiums in Germany and premium FITs in Spain.23 As of 2014, six 

European countries made use of this type of hybrid support mechanism. However, the specific 

design differs from one country to another. 

The first premium FITs in Spain consisted of a fixed premium payment on top of the 

wholesale market prices. For instance, wind power producers would receive additional 2.9 

EURcent/kWh on top of the wholesale market price. This payment was determined 

administratively. However, this design led to overcompensation for wind producers in years 

of high wholesale market prices and a substantial risk for power producers in the case of 

falling wholesale prices. Therefore, Spanish policymakers implemented a cap and floor price 

(Bechberger 2009; Jacobs 2012). 

 

23 Spain was the first country to establish premium feed-in tariffs in 1998 (Jacobs, 2012). However, it abandoned 

this financing mechanism in 2013 because of its higher costs in contrast to fixed tariff payment. 

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

CCGT Coal Nuclear Wind PV

OPEX

CAPEX
23 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

Contracts for differences, as they are currently planned in the UK, guarantee renewable 

electricity generators a fixed “strike price” for their electricity, after participation in the 

wholesale market. Consequently, revenue security is similar to that under traditional FIT

arrangements, although the strike price is determined as a monthly average payment 

benchmark and power producers need to find their own buyer of renewable electricity (instead 

of a single buyer under standard FIT contracts). Generators sell electricity competitively into 

the spot market, and then receive an ex post defined premium payment to “close the gap” 

between the (usually) above-market strike price and the wholesale market price. The incentive 

payment therefore fluctuates depending on the competitive electricity price. This is also why 

this type of finance mechanism is sometimes called “spot market gap” model (Couture and 

Gagnon 2010). It should be noted that premium payments are not necessarily above the spot 

market electricity price. The planned contracts for differences scheme in the UK obliges 

power producers to pay in case spot market prices are above the strike price (i.e., the defined 

premium payment level) (UK Government 2014) (Sherry 2013). This mechanism was 

introduced in order to reduce costs for final electricity consumers. 

Figure 6. Functioning of planned contracts for differences in the UK

Adapted from Department of Energy and Climate Change 2011

In Germany, a technology-differentiated approach was implemented in order to take the 

specific characteristics of weather-dependent renewables (wind and solar PV) and 

dispatchable renewables (biomass, biogas) into account. Similar to the contracts for 

differences mechanisms in the UK, the premium payment is determined ex-post (i.e., at the 

end of each month). 

In the case of biomass and biogas, power producers receive the hourly changing wholesale 

market price as one payment component, which is later topped up by the ex-post defined 

premium payment. The rational for this regulation is that these power producers can react 

towards short-term price fluctuations by turning their power production up or down. Since 

wind and solar PV producers have only very limited capacity for this type of dispatch (they 

produce power when the sun is shining and when the wind is blowing), they are not 

confronted with hourly price fluctuation but instead receive a monthly average wholesale 

market price. The regulator determines a benchmark price based on the hours when solar PV 

was produced and fed into the grid. This so-called “market price solar PV” and “market price 

wind energy” is generally below the average monthly wholesale price because of the 

aforementioned merit-order-effect. Spot market prices are usually lower than average when a 

lot of wind energy and solar PV is sold in the spot market. 
24 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

4.4 Lessons Learned

The case of premium FITs illustrates the extent to which policymakers have managed to 

reconcile different policy objectives though hybrid policy design. Policymakers have 

attempted to design policies that maintain a relatively high degree of revenue security for 

renewable electricity producers while simultaneously requiring producers to interact with 

wholesale spot markets. It is difficult to determine which share of fluctuating renewables will 

require these kinds of policy measures, or others like them, because this depends on a host of 

factors, including the existing grid infrastructure (e.g., the size of the grid and 

interconnections with neighbouring countries) as well as the flexibility of the electricity 

system (e.g., the potential for balancing the fluctuations with readily dispatchable resources 

such as hydro power or gas turbines, or with dispatchable loads, such as desalination plants).

The design of premium FITs differs from one country to the next and confronts renewable 

electricity producers with different levels of risk. For instance, pre-determined premium 

payments as they have existed in Spain confront renewable electricity producers with higher 

revenue risk than premium payments defined after the fact (i.e., after the electricity is sold on 

the spot market), as found in Germany and in the UK. The case of Germany also illustrates 

that technology-specific approaches can take the different characteristics of renewable 

electricity technologies into account. 

Premium FITs have managed to increase the share of power sold on the wholesale market. 

Increasing liquidity on wholesale markets is critical in liberalized power markets. In addition, 

renewable energy producers are being incentivized to curtail during hours of negative 

electricity prices, for instance, if power supply exceeds demand. 

From a policy perspective, policymakers need to weigh the benefits of including renewable 

energy producers in wholesale spot markets against the potential impacts on renewable energy 

development. 

• Wholesale spot markets were designed around traditional electricity generation. Since 

renewable energy technologies are capital intensive, reliance on spot markets for 

financing significantly impacts project development and financing. 

• Wholesale markets treat all electrons the same. In other words, they provide no 

financial benefit to electricity with positive environmental attributes. In addition, 

wholesale markets in general can put intermittent resources at a disadvantage against 

dispatchable resources since spot markets often are combined with future contracts for 

services that are more complicated for intermittent generation. 

• Many countries have created hybrid versions of FITs or other policies to enable 

participation of renewable energy in spot markets while ensuring renewable energy 

production is a viable economic option. 

• The gradual integration of higher shares of renewable electricity sources into spot 

markets may eventually require making structural changes to electricity spot market 

design (e.g., shorter intra-day markets in order to increase the accuracy of wind and 

solar forecasts, as well as shorter gate closing times).
25 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

5 Conclusion

This paper has shown that the distinctions between the traditional policy labels such as 

FITs, auctions, and net metering are beginning to break down as policymakers adapt 

policy frameworks to new market realities. As a result, policy comparisons that rely on the 

conventional labels may no longer be appropriate, or advisable. The recent policy innovations 

surveyed in this paper may therefore point the way toward the next generation of renewable 

electricity policies. 

These innovations have been driven by a number of factors, including the decreasing costs of 

renewable energy technologies, the difficulty in adjusting policies to rapidly changing market 

conditions, and by the growing share of renewable electricity in some countries’ overall 

electricity mix. Collectively, these factors are leading policymakers to develop new 

frameworks that are better adapted to changing market circumstances. In some cases, this has 

meant creating new policies that lie somewhere between traditional FITs and net metering or 

auctions, while in others, it has meant exposing renewable electricity producers to spot market 

signals while attempting to retain some minimum level of revenue certainty by adopting socalled premium FITs. 

This paper has examined several cases of innovative renewable electricity policies around the 

world. First, it demonstrated that FITs and auctions are not mutually exclusive; they can in 

fact be combined together in a variety of ways. By looking at both France and Taiwan, the 

paper showed that the two procurement strategies are being combined to reconcile two 

seemingly contradicting policy objectives: cost efficient renewable energy support on one 

hand, and ensuring investor and project size diversity on the other. While Taiwan was 

successful in combining FITs and auction schemes together, it continues to have difficulties 

attracting investment in the smallest project sizes. The experience in Taiwan indicates that a 

FIT alone, despite offering streamlined administrative procedures, does not ensure robust 

market development in smaller project sizes and that related factors can significantly restrict 

development, as well as investor participation. 

In comparison with Taiwan, France has experienced greater success at encouraging 

investment in the smaller project sizes, in particular those typically owned by individual 

citizens or residents (<9 kW). Moreover, results from France in 2013 suggest that tendering 

does not necessarily result in lower prices for consumers. This result suggests that further 

experience and policy improvement may be required in order to combine FITs and auction 

schemes in more effective and impactful ways. 

Second, we analysed both island regions and Germany for insights into how policies are being 

adapted when the LCOE of on-site solar PV systems is below the cost of power from the grid. 

The achievement of so-called “socket parity” is causing FITs, net metering, and selfconsumption to be revisited both in Germany and in island regions around the world. 

Where the LCOE of solar PV has fallen below the retail electricity rate, it creates a strong 

incentive for direct on-site PV consumption among both residential and commercial 

customers in particular. In this environment, policymakers are seeking to balance enabling

on-site renewable electricity while limiting disproportionate benefits to prosumers. 
26 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

In island regions, new policies are emerging that compensate prosumers for the power they 

export to the grid at a rate that is below the retail price of electricity, as well as below the 

avoided cost of generation (or fuel). In the process, islands are giving rise to a range of 

policy innovations that lie somewhere between traditional FITs and net metering 

policies. Such hybrid policies could become more widespread as the cost of distributed 

generation options continues to fall in markets around the world. 

Third, the paper looked at the implementation of premium FITs in the EU as a strategy to 

reconcile different policy objectives, namely maintaining a high degree of revenue security 

for renewable electricity producers while simultaneously requiring such producers to interact

with wholesale spot markets. Currently, several European member states are 

experimenting with different design features, exposing renewable electricity producers 

to different levels of price risk. This signals a decisive shift away from traditional FIT 

policies, which provided both a fixed price and a purchase guarantee over a pre-determined

period of time, and a further example of the breakdown of the traditional policy definitions 

and the rise of hybrid policy designs. 

This paper has argued that the breakdown in the conventional policy labels represents an 

important shift in renewable electricity policy, one that policymakers, analysts, 

government officials, and investors around the world need to better understand. By 

cracking open the conventional toolbox and combining different policy design elements in 

innovative ways, policymakers are beginning to create a new policy kit, one that is arguably 

better adapted to the new market realities. 
27 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

References

Barnes, J., Culley, T., Haynes, R., Passera, L., Wiedman, J., Jackson, R. (2013). Freeing the 

grid 2013: Best practices in state net metering policies and interconnection procedures. Latham, 

NY and San Francisco, CA: Interstate Renewable Energy Council and the Vote Solar Initiative.

Bechberger, M. (2009). Erneuerbare Energien in Spanien, Erfolgsbedingungen und 

Restiktionen. Stuttgart, Germany, ibidem-Verlag.

Bird, L., McLaren, J., Heeter, J., Linvill, C., Shenot, J., Sedano, R., Migden-Ostrander, J. 

(2013). Regulatory considerations associated with the expanded adoption of distributed solar 

(NREL/TP-6A20-60613). Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory. 

Borenstein, S. (2000). Understanding competitive pricing and market power in wholesale 

electricity markets. The Electricity Journal 13(6); pp. 49–57. 

Butler, L., Neuhoff, K. (2008). Comparison of feed-in tariff, quota and auction mechanisms to 

support wind power development. Renewable Energy (33); pp. 1854–1867. 

Caribbean Utilities Company. (2014). 2013 annual report. Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands. 

Carmichael, A. (2010). Comments of Vote Solar in response to the Notice of Request for 

Comments (Investigation regarding feed-in tariffs, Docket No. 09-11004) (p. 20). Carson 

City, NV: Public Utilities Commission of Nevada.

Commissariat general au développement durable. (2014). Tableau de bord éolienphotovoltaïque: Troisième trimestre 2014 - Service de l’observation et des statistiques. 

Available at: Commissariat général du développement durable 2014 

http://www.statistiques.developpementdurable.gouv.fr/fileadmin/documents/Produits_editoriaux/Publications/Chiffres_et_statistique

s/2014/chiffres-stats584-eolien2014t3-novembre2014.pdf. 

Commissariat general au développement durable. (2013). Tableau de bord éolienphotovoltaïque: Troisième trimestre 2013 - Service de l’observation et des statistiques. 

Available at: Commissariat général du développement durable 2014 

http://www.statistiques.developpementdurable.gouv.fr/fileadmin/documents/Produits_editoriaux/Publications/Chiffres_et_statistique

s/2013/chiffres-stats469-eolien2013t3-novembre2013.pdf. 

Commissariat general au développement durable. (2012). Tableau de bord éolienphotovoltaïque: Troisième trimestre 2012 - Service de l’observation et des statistiques. 

Available at: Commissariat général du développement durable 2014 

http://www.statistiques.developpementdurable.gouv.fr/fileadmin/documents/Produits_editoriaux/Publications/Chiffres_et_statistique

s/2012/chiffres-stats373-eolien-photovoltaique2012T3-novembre2012.pdf. 

Commissariat general au développement durable. (2011). Tableau de bord éolienphotovoltaïque: Troisième trimestre 2011 - Service de l’observation et des statistiques. 

Available at: Commissariat général du développement durable 2014 

http://www.statistiques.developpementdurable.gouv.fr/fileadmin/documents/Produits_editoriaux/Publications/Chiffres_et_statistique

s/2011/Chiffres%20et%20stats%20267%20Eolien%20photovol%202011T3%20-

%20novembre%202011.pdf. 
28 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

Couture, T., Cory, K., Kreycik, C., Williams, E. (2010). A policymaker’s guide to feed-in 

tariff policy design. NREL/TP-6A2-44849. Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy 

Laboratory. 

Couture, T., Y. Gagnon (2010). An analysis of feed-in tariff remuneration models: 

Implications for renewable energy investment. Energy Policy 38(2); pp. 955–965. 

Cozzi, P. (2012). Assessing reverse auctions as a policy tool for renewable energy 

deployment (No. 007). Medford, MA: Center for International Environment & Resource 

Policy (CIERP), The Fletcher School at Tufts University.

CRE. (2014). Coûts et rentabilité des énergies renouvelables en France métropolitaine: Éolien 

terrestre, biomasse, solaire photovoltaïque. Available at: 

http://www.cre.fr/documents/publications/rapports-thematiques/couts-et-rentabilite-des-enren-france-metropolitaine/consulter-le-rapport. 

Del Río González, P. (2008). Ten years of renewable electricity policies in Spain: An analysis 

of successive feed-in tariff reforms. Energy Policy (36); pp. 3345–3359. 

Department of Energy and Climate Change. (2011). Planning our electric future: A white 

paper for secure, affordable and low-carbon electricity. London: Stationery Office. 

DSIRE. (2014). Available at: 

http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=VI07F&re=0&ee=0. 

Economist Intelligence Unit. (2013). Turning on the lights. Available at: 

http://www.eiu.com/industry/article/1670907751/taiwan-electricity-turning-on-thelights/2013-09-02. 

EIA. (2013). Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 

2013. Washington DC U.S. Energy Information Administration. 

ERDF. (2013) Available at: 

http://www.erdfdistribution.fr/medias/Donnees_prod/parc_prod_decembre_2013.pdf. 

EU Commission. (1996). Energy for the future – Renewable sources of energy. Greenpaper 

for a community strategy. COM(96)576 final. European Commission. Brussels. 

Ferroukhi, R., Gielen, D., Kieffer, G., Taylor, M., Nagpal, D., Khalid, A. (2014). RE-thinking 

Energy: Towards a new power system. Abu Dhabi, UAE: International Renewable Energy 

Agency (IRENA). 

Fouquet, D., Johansson, T.B. (2008). European renewable energy policy at crossroads: Focus 

on electricity support mechanisms. Energy Policy 36(9); pp. 4079–-4092. 

Frontier Economics. (2014). Technologieoffene Ausschreibungen für Erneuerbare Energien –

Studie für EFET Deutschland. London, Frontier Economics Ltd. Available at: http://efetd.org/Cms_Data/Contents/EFETDeutschlandDatabase/Folders/Documents/Verschiedenes/EF

ET-Veroffentlichungen/~contents/QF3JSK3Z48MN9KDY/EFET-Deutschland-Studie-26-06-

2014.pdf. 

Gratwick, K. N., Eberhard, A. (2008). Demise of the standard model for power sector reform 

and the emergence of hybrid power markets. Energy Policy 36(10); pp. 3948–3960. 
29 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

GRENLEC. (2011). GRENLEC’s renewable standard offer (Version 1.1). St. George’s, 

Grenada. Available at: http://www.grenlec.com/Portals/0/StandardOffer/

Grenlec%20Renewable%20Standard%20Offer.pdf.

Hansen, L., Lacy, V., Glick, D. (2013). A review of solar PV benefit & cost studies. Boulder, 

CO: Rocky Mountain Institute, Electricity Innovation Lab (e-Lab).

Hauser, E., A. Weber, et al. (2014). Bewertung von Ausschreibungsverfahren als 

Finanzierungsmodell für Anlagen erneuerbarer Energienutzung Saarbrücken, Institut für 

ZukunftsEnergieSysteme (IZES gGmbH). Available at: http://www.beeev.de/Publikationen/IZES2014-05-20BEE_EE-Ausschreibungen_Endbericht.pdf. 

Huber, C., Faber, T., Haas, R., Resch, G., Green, J., Ölz, S., et al. (2004). Green-X: Deriving 

optimal promotion strategies for increasing the share of RES-E in a dynamic European 

electricity market. Vienna, Austria: Vienna University of Technology Energy Economics 

Group. 

Hurlbut D. (2008). State slean energy practices: Renewable portfolio standards. TP-670-

43512. Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory. 

International Energy Agency. (2014). Energy technology perspectives 2014: Harnessing 

electricity’s potential. Paris, France.

Jacobs, D. (2012). Renewable Energy Policy Convergence in the EU – The evolution of feedin tariffs in Germany, Spain and France. Farnham, Ashgate Publishing. 

Jacobs, D. (2015). Designing financing mechanisms for electricity from renewable energy 

sources – the role of the European Commission as an agenda shaper Building the Agenda - 

Energy Policy Making in the EU. J. Tosun, S. Schmitt and K. Schulze. London, Springer . 

Jacobs, D., Sovacool, B. (2012). Feed-in tariffs and other support mechanisms for solar PV 

promotion: case studies from Germany, Spain, Singapore and the US. Comprehensive 

Renewable Energy. W. v. Sark and L. Kazmerski. New York, Elsevier. 1: 73-109. 

Jacobsson, S., A. Bergek, et al. (2009). EU renewable energy support policy: Faith or facts? .

Energy Policy 37(6); pp. 2143–2146. 

Joskow, P. L. (2008). Lessons Learned from Electricity Market Liberalization. The Energy 

Journal (Special Issue); pp. 9-42. 

Kost, C., Mayer, J. N., Thomsen, J., Hartmann, N., Senkpiel, C., Philipps, S., et al. (2013). 

Levelized cost of electricity renewable energy technologies study. Freiburg, Germany: 

Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems ISE.

Krasko V. A., Doris, E. (2012). Strategic sequencing for state distributed PV policies: A 

quantitative analysis of policy impacts and interactions. NREL/TP-7A30-56428. Golden, CO: 

National Renewable Energy Laboratory. 

Kreycik C. E., Couture T. D., Cory K., (2011). Procurement options for new renewable 

electricity supply. NREL/TP-6A20-52983. Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy 

Laboratory. 
30 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

Lauber, V. (2004). REFIT and RPS: Options for a harmonised community framework. Energy 

Policy 32(12); pp. 1405-1414. 

Lucas, H., Ferroukhi, R., Hawila, D. (2013). Renewable energy auctions in developing 

countries. Abu Dhabi, UAE: International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). 

Maurer, L. T. A., Barroso, L. A. (2011). Electricity auctions: An overview of efficient 

practices. Washington, DC: World Bank, Energy Sector Management Assistance Program.

Miller, M., Bird, L., Cochran, J., Milligan, M., Bazilian, M., Denny, E., et al. (2013). RES-ENEXT: Next generation of RES-E policy instruments. Paris, France: International Energy 

Agency Renewable Energy Technology Deployment (IEA-RETD).

Million Rooftop PVs. (2014). Solar PV generation wholesale rates. Available at: 

http://mrpv.org.tw/about.php?id=8. 

Ming-Zhi Gao, A. (2014). A more sustainable way to promote PV: Transformations from FIT 

to FIT/FIT tendering schemes in Taiwan and France. Legal issues of renewable energy in the 

Asia Region: Recent development in a post-Fukushima and post-Kyoto Protocol rra. The 

Netherlands, Kluwer Law International: 38. 

Ming-Zhi Gao, Anton. (2014b). Personal communication (August 18 2014), Anton Ming-Zhi 

Gao Assistant Professor, The Institute of Law for Science and Technology (ILST), National 

Tsing Hua University, Taiwan. 

Ministry of Energy. (2010). Feed-in-tariffs policy on wind, biomass, small-hydro, geothermal, 

biogas and solar resource generated electricity (1st Revision). Nairobi, Kenya. 

Ministry of Environment and Energy. (2014). Net-metering program for grid-tied renewable 

energy generation in Seychelles. Victoria, Seychelles: Seychelles Ministry of Environment 

and Energy. 

Nimmons, J. (2009). Comments of Recurrent Energy on Administrative Law Judge’s Ruling 

Regarding Pricing Approaches & Structures for a Feed-in Tariff (Rulemaking 08-08-009). 

San Francisco, CA: California Public Utilities Commission.

Photovoltaique Info. (2014). Procédures d’appels d’offres. Available at: 

http://www.photovoltaique.info/Procedures-d-appels-d-offres.html. 

Photovoltaique Info. (2014b) Aujourd’hui : arrêté du 4 mars 2011. Available at: 

http://www.photovoltaique.info/Aujourd-hui-arrete-du-4-mars-2011. 

Rader, N., Hempling, S. (2001). The renewables portfolio standard: A practical guide. 

Washington, DC: National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners. 

Rader, N., Norgaard, R. (1996). Efficiency and sustainability in restructured electric utility 

markets: The renewables portfolio standard. The Electricity Journal (9); pp. 37–49. 

Ray, S., J. Munksgaard, et al. (2010). Wind energy and electricity prices: Exploring the 'merit 

order effect'. Brussels, Belgium, European Wind Energy Association. 

REN21. (2014). Renewables 2014 global status report. Paris, France: REN21 Secretariat. 
31 

This report is available at no cost from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) at www.nrel.gov/publications.

Rickerson, W., Couture, T., Barbose, G., Jacobs, D., Parkinson, G., Chessin, E., Belden, A. 

(2014). Residential prosumers: Drivers and policy options (RE-PROSUMERS). Paris, France: 

International Energy Agencey Renewable Energy Technology Deployment (IEA-RETD).

Rickerson, W., Uppal, J., Glassmire, J., Lilienthal, P., Sanders, E., Colson, C., Couture, T., et 

al. (2012). Renewable energies for remote areas and islands (REMOTE). Paris, France: 

International Energy Agency Renewable Energy Technology Deployment (IEA-RETD). 

Ringel, M. (2006). Fostering the use of renewable energies in the European Union: The race 

between feed-in tariffs and green certificates. Renewable Energy (31:1); pp. 1-7. 

Sáenz de Miera, G., P. Del Río González, et al. (2008). Analysing the impact of renewable 

electricity support schemes on power prices: The case of wind electricity in Spain. Energy 

Policy 36(9); pp. 3345-3359. 

Sensfuß, F., Ragwitz, M. (2007). Analysis of the price effect of renewable electricity 

generation on spot market prices. Karlsruhe, Germany, Fraunhofer Institut System- und 

Innovationsforschung. 

Sherry, P. (2013). UK contracts for difference: Risks and opportunities. London, UK: Baringa 

Partners.

Sovacool, B. (2011). The policy challenges of tradable credits: A critical review of eight 

markets. Energy Policy (39:2); pp. 575-585. 

Tasmanian Government. (2013). Feed-in tariffs: Transition to full retail competition - Issues 

paper. Hobart, Tasmania.

Trabish, H. (2014, January 13). Solar’s faceoff: Feed in tariff versus net energy metering. 

TheEnergyCollective.com. Retrieved from 

http://theenergycollective.com/hermantrabish/326831/solar-s-faceoff-feed-tariff-versus-netenergy-metering. 

UK Government. (2014). Contract for Difference: Draft Allocation Framework. London, UK 

Government, Department of Energy and Climate Change. 

Wamukonya, N. (2003). Power sector reform in developing countries: Mismatched agendas. 

Energy Policy (31); pp. 1273–1289. 

Wirth, H. (2014). Aktuelle Fakten zur Photovoltaik in Deutschland. Freiburg, Germany: 

Fraunhofer ISE. 

Wiser, R., Pickle, S., Goldman, C. (1996). California renewable energy policy and 

implementation issues. LBNL-39247. Berkeley, CA: Lawrence Berkeley National 

Laboratory. 

Yueh-Hsun Tsai. (2014). Personal communication (September 9 2014), Professor Yueh-Hsun 

Tsai, Associate Professor of Law at National Yunlin University of Science and Technology, 

Taiwan.