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S. HRG. 112–937 

HOLDING CRIMINALS ACCOUNTABLE: EXTENDING 

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION TO GOVERNMENT

CONTRACTORS AND EMPLOYEES ABROAD 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 25, 2011 

Serial No. J–112–24 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

CHUCK SCHUMER, New York 

DICK DURBIN, Illinois 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

AL FRANKEN, Minnesota 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

CHUCK GRASSLEY, Iowa, Ranking Member 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

JON KYL, Arizona 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

MICHAEL S. LEE, Utah 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

KOLAN DAVIS, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

MAY 25, 2011, 10:04 A.M. 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page 

Grassley, Hon. Chuck, a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa ............................ 3 

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont .................... 1 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 106 

WITNESSES 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 29 

Breuer, Hon. Lanny A., Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. 

Department of Justice, Washington, DC ............................................................ 21 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 30 

Corn, Prof. Geoffrey S., Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College 

of Law, Houston, Texas; Lieutenant Colonel, USA, Retired ............................ 7 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 38 

attachment to prepared statement .................................................................. 42 

Edney, Michael J., Of Counsel, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Washington, DC .. 9 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 92 

Lee, Tara, Partner and Global Co-Chair, Transnational Litigation, DLA Piper 

LLP (US), Washington, DC ................................................................................. 5 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 102 

QUESTIONS 

Questions submitted to Hon. Lanny A. Breuer by Senator Grassley .................. 109 

Questions submitted to Michael J. Edney by Senator Grassley .......................... 108 

ANSWERS 

Responses of Hon. Lanny A. Breuer to questions submitted by Senator Grassley .. 112 

[Note: At the time of printing, the Committee had not received responses 

from Michael J. Edney.] 

MISCELLANEOUS SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Aegis LLC, Kristi Rogers, Chief Executive Officer, Arlington, Virginia, statement ...................................................................................................................... 116 

Balderas, Ignacio, Chief Executive Officer, Triple Canopy, Inc., Reston, 

Virginia, May 24, 2011, letter and online editorial post ................................... 124 

Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Michael J. 

Thibault, Co-Chair, Commissioner, and Christopher Shays, Co-Chair, Commissioner, May 24, 2011, letter ........................................................................... 128 

Franken, Hon. Al, a U.S. Senator from the State of Minnesota, and Ranking 

Member Chuck Grassley, a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa, letter 

to Hon. Gene L. Dodaro, Acting Comptroller General, U.S. Government 

Accountability Office, Washington, DC, May 26, 2011 ..................................... 131 

Huffington Post, The, Op-Ed, ‘‘Laying Down the Rules for Private Security 

Contractors,’’ Ignacio Balderas, Chief Executive Officer, Triple Canopy, Inc., 

May 24, 2011 ........................................................................................................ 135 

Triple Canopy, Inc., Ignacio Balderas, Chief Executive Officer, Reston, 

Virginia, May 24, 2011, letter ............................................................................. 133 

(1) 

HOLDING CRIMINALS ACCOUNTABLE: EXTENDING CRIMINAL JURISDICTION TO GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS AND EMPLOYEES 

ABROAD 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 25, 2011 

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in Room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Leahy, Whitehouse, Franken, Blumenthal, and 

Grassley. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, 

A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT 

Chairman LEAHY. I know Senator Grassley is on his way, but we 

have Senators who have to be going in and out with all the other 

hearings. I will start. 

What I want to do in this hearing is to consider the need to ensure accountability for crimes committed by Government contractors and employees abroad. President Obama has been working 

hard to improve America’s credibility in the world, our reputation 

for justice, and our commitment to the rule of law. But a key component of that important mission is ensuring accountability for 

those who represent us overseas. Accountability is crucial, not just 

for our image abroad and our diplomatic relations, but for ensuring 

our national security. 

To promote accountability, Congress must make sure that our 

criminal laws reach serious misconduct by American Government 

employees and contractors wherever they act. I introduced in the 

last Congress the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, and I 

will be introducing similar legislation this year. 

Tragic events in Iraq in 2007 made clear the need to strengthen 

the laws providing for jurisdiction over American Government employees and contractors working abroad. In September 2007, 

Blackwater security contractors working for the State Department 

shot more than 20 unarmed civilians on the streets of Baghdad, 

killing at least 14 of them, and caused the obvious rift in our relations with the Iraqi Government. 

Efforts to prosecute those responsible for these shootings have 

been fraught with difficulties. Our ability to hold the wrongdoers 

in this case accountable remains in doubt. Had jurisdiction for 
2 

these offenses been clear, FBI agents likely would have been on the 

scene immediately, which could well have prevented the problems 

that have plagued the case. 

Other incidents have shown that this Blackwater case was not 

an isolated incident. Private security contractors have been involved in violent incidents and serious misconduct in Iraq and Afghanistan, including other shooting incidents in which civilians 

have been seriously injured or killed. In these cases, too, there 

have not been prosecutions. 

In the last Congress, the Senate Judiciary Committee heard testimony from Jamie Leigh Jones, a young woman from Texas who 

took a job with Halliburton in Iraq in 2005 when she was 20 years 

old. In her first week on the job, she was drugged and then she was 

gang-raped by co-workers. Remember, 20 years old. When she reported this assault, her employers moved her to a locked trailer, 

where she was kept by armed guards and freed only when the 

State Department intervened. 

Ms. Jones testified about the arbitration clause in her contract 

that prevented her from suing Halliburton for this outrageous conduct, and Congress has moved to change the civil law to prevent 

that kind of injustice. Criminal jurisdiction over these kinds of 

atrocious crimes abroad, however, remains complicated, depending 

too greatly on the specific location of the crime, making prosecutions inconsistent and sometimes impossible. In this case of this 

gang rape, the only person who got locked up was the woman who 

got raped. We must fix the law to help avoid arbitrary injustice and 

ensure that victims will not see their attackers escape accountability. 

I worked with Senator Sessions and others in 2000 to pass the 

Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act and then again to amend 

it in 2004 so that U.S. criminal laws would extend to members of 

the U.S. military, to those who accompany them, and to contractors 

who work with the military. 

The next step is to establish clearly that all U.S. Government 

employees and contractors who commit crimes while working 

abroad—whether they work with the military or not—can be 

charged and tried in the United States. As the military withdraws 

from Iraq and Afghanistan, the American presence in those countries will consist largely of civilian employees and contractors. 

There has to be accountability. If they are going to represent our 

Government overseas, then they ought to be bound by the same 

laws that you and I everybody in this room are bound by. And in 

those instances where the local justice system may be less fair, this 

explicit jurisdiction will also protect Americans by providing the option of prosecuting them in the United States rather than to be in 

hostile local court. 

So we have to ensure criminal accountability to improve our national security. Our allies, including those countries most essential 

to our counterterrorism and national security efforts, have to work 

with us. Moreover, the talented men and women we need to advance our national security efforts will be more likely to step forward and serve if we stamp out the lawless atmosphere that we 

see in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. That is why the Civilian 
3 

Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act is supported by people like Ignacio 

Balderas, CEO of security contractor Triple Canopy. 

In the past, legislation in this area has been bipartisan. I hope 

it will be again. I have been working with the Justice Department 

to make this legislation better, and I hope we can move forward 

with it. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Leahy appears as a submission for the record.] 

We have been joined by Senator Grassley, and I will yield to him. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK GRASSLEY, 

A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF IOWA 

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a very important hearing. I am glad you are having it. And without a doubt, 

extending criminal law to Government contractors and employees 

serving overseas is something that we ought to keep on top of. 

It is an important topic given the increased use of Government 

contractors by Federal agencies in overseas operations. Particularly 

it has been highlighted in Afghanistan and Iraq, although it would 

not be limited to those two countries. Holding any individual accountable for crime is an important part of our Committee’s jurisdiction. I think we all would agree that anyone who commits a 

crime should be held accountable and that bringing criminals to 

justice is one of the most important roles of our Government. However, extending the long arm of American criminal law is an issue 

that should not be done without significant consideration and caution. 

Now, Chairman Leahy and I have worked together in the past 

to ensure that Government contractors are not given a free pass to 

commit crimes or to defraud the Government through resources 

that are entrusted to our country by other Nations because we 

worked together in 2008 on the Wartime Enforcement of Fraud Act 

that would have tolled the statute of limitations on fraud offenses 

that occurred in a war zone. We also worked together to amend the 

False Claims Act to ensure that funds that were under the trust 

and administration of our own Government were protected from 

fraud and abuse. That fix was necessary to address a loophole created by the courts in the Custer Battles decision where Iraqi funds 

administered by the U.S. Government were subject to fraud. This 

was a damaging loophole because it essentially said that contractors were free to defraud the Government as long as the money 

was from a foreign country that entrusted the U.S. Government to 

administer it. Ultimately, we closed that loophole in the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, which was signed into law by President Obama. 

Today’s hearing is no less important because criminal acts committed by U.S. citizens and contractors abroad could threaten our 

foreign relations. As such, it is right for us to examine the ways 

we can bring these criminals within the reach of our law. Legislation extending the reach of U.S. criminal law to contractors was introduced in the last two Congresses. Both times that legislation 

failed to clear both chambers and was never signed into law. 

Chief among the concerns at that time was the lack of clear exception for contractors that were employed by the intelligence com-
4 

munity. In 2007, President Bush issued a statement of administration policy citing concerns with legislation expanding 

extraterritorial jurisdiction over contractors and citing concerns 

with the impact on national security activities and operations. 

Similar concerns held up legislation in the last Congress. 

I think there is a lot of merit to extending our criminal law to 

civilian contractors and employees abroad. However, we must make 

sure that this is done in a manner that is narrowly tailored to specific problems and is not overly broad. Further, we must ensure 

that we do not harm critical national security and intelligence operations. 

Those concerns should be addressed in a proper forum and not 

necessarily aired in public. However, in the limited scope that we 

can address that topic in this public forum, I intend to ask some 

questions about what a carve-out for the intelligence community 

would look like. I also want to know about how many new resources the Department of Justice will require to implement investigations and prosecutions under a proposed expansion of 

extraterritorial jurisdiction. 

Given the current fiscal situation of the Federal Government, I 

am concerned that reallocating resources from one side of Justice 

to another could limit other investigations and prosecutions. 

I look forward to the hearing today and, most importantly, I look 

forward to continuing my working relationship with the Chairman 

on this very important topic. And I wanted to inform the Chairman 

that at 11:10 I have an opportunity to speak on the floor, so I will 

probably miss in part or maybe the rest of this Committee hearing. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. There is a lot of that going on 

today, as you know. I appreciate it. I share your concern about resources, but I also share your concerns about how we define somebody. I would hate to think we would set up a thing where the people who—the gang rape I referred to could say, well, part of our 

duty is to guard some part of the intelligence service here and escape a crime like that. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Sure. 

Chairman LEAHY. But we can write that. 

Our first witness is Tara Lee, co-chair of DLA Piper’s global 

transnational litigation practices focusing on cross-border disputes. 

She has worked extensively in defense and Government contract 

issues abroad, has argued a variety of related cases in both State 

and Federal court. A former military lawyer, taught battlefield accountability at the U.S. Naval Academy. A member of the International Stability Operation Association, served on several committees of the ABA, addressing the expansion of the Uniform Code of 

Military Justice and the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 

to cover contracts on the battlefield. Received her bachelor’s degree 

from the U.S. Naval Academy and her law degree from the University of San Diego School of Law. 

Ms. Lee, please go ahead. We will put your full statement in the 

record, but please go ahead. 
5 

STATEMENT OF TARA LEE, PARTNER AND GLOBAL CO-CHAIR, 

TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION, DLA PIPER LLP (US), 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Grassley, Senator Franken, other distinguished Members of the Committee that are not present, I want to 

thank everyone for the opportunity to appear before you today. I 

know that each of you shares the deep respect and appreciation 

that I feel for the men and women of the defense contracting community, and as someone who has served in the Navy, been the 

spouse of an Army soldier, and is now a member of the contracting 

community, I want to thank you all not just for the opportunity to 

speak today but for the work you do for each of those communities. 

The issue today—extraterritorial jurisdiction and accountability 

for contractors—is not and should not be a partisan issue. I think 

we all share a commitment to serving the national security objectives of the United States and a desire for there to be clarity in the 

accountability mechanisms that reach our citizens. When that accountability mechanism is focused on those individuals who serve 

in harm’s way on our behalf, whether they be uniformed or not, the 

obligation to provide them with clarity is especially strong. I am a 

Naval Academy graduate, a former military lawyer, and a former 

fellow at the Center for the Study of Professional Military Ethics 

at the U.S. Naval Academy, where I studied and taught battlefield 

accountability. In my current legal practice, I both advise companies on mitigating their risks and training their employees to operate in conflict environments, and I represent companies when they 

face Government investigations and civil or criminal litigation. I 

have also devoted several thousand hours of pro bono legal work 

to the representation of victims of war crimes that occurred in Somalia in the 1980s, victims who, because no jurisdiction had the capacity or will to take criminal action, had no hope of achieving redress other than through the civil courts of the United States. Each 

of these experiences contributes to my very broad perspective on 

the importance of clarity in criminal accountability mechanisms. 

I speak today from the perspective of an attorney who currently 

manages a law practice group that specializes in representing Government contractors, and I can tell you that in my experience the 

Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act standing alone and as 

currently drafted has not quite provided that clarity. 

As you know, the Act has been subject to legal challenge as to 

the breadth of its jurisdiction as it applies on its face only to those 

contractors who are ‘‘employed by or accompanying the Armed 

Forces outside the United States.’’ Arguably, MEJA by its plain 

text does not apply to those contractors working for the State Department or for Government agencies except and unless it can be 

established that they are supporting the mission of the Defense Department. 

Clarity and certainty are as important to the contracting community as they are to the Government. Companies have an obligation 

to their employees to properly advise them of the legal rights, 

risks, and accountability mechanisms to which they are subject 

when serving overseas. A continued absence of clarity on whether 

MEJA applies to civilian employees working on non-DOD contracts 
6 

does not serve the interests of the contracting community or its employees. For example, a company with both DOD and State contracts might, under the current statutory framework, accurately 

advise employees working on its Defense contracts that they ‘‘are’’ 

subject to MEJA jurisdiction, while advising employees doing similar work in the same location but on a State Department contract 

that they ‘‘might be’’ subject to MEJA jurisdiction. Neither the statute itself nor the limited number of available judicial interpretations makes the effective reach of MEJA completely clear. Thus, 

the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act that is discussed has 

the potential to provide more certainty regarding the application of 

U.S. criminal law to overseas contractors. 

Not only might CEJA provide more jurisdictional certainty, it 

could also enable the prompt and professional investigation of potential criminal incidents. Contractors, as you know, often operate 

in unstable environments where the host nation capacities for 

criminal justice functions are limited or developing. Those companies are much better served, in my opinion, if adequate U.S. Government resources are available to assist with or provide the criminal investigation function. CEJA also potentially authorizes the 

personnel and resources to address that need. 

I believe you have received or will receive written statements of 

support from several companies directly, and as the Chairman 

noted this morning, Iggy Balderas, the CEO of Triple Canopy and 

the former command sergeant major of Delta Force, has an op-ed 

in the Huffington Post discussing the need for CEJA-type legislation, and he argues very persuasively that the absence of effective 

accountability for contractors puts our country’s ability to achieve 

our goals at risk. 

Additionally, CEJA-type legislation also has support from the 

International Stability Operations Association, a trade organization 

representing stability operations contractors, as well as from organizations in the human rights community. The Commission for 

Wartime Contracting also recently called for clarification in criminal jurisdiction over civilian agency contractors. This diverse recognition of the need for an appropriately crafted CEJA reflects, I 

think, the universal recognition that accountability for criminal 

wrongdoers is a critical component of securing our Nation’s foreign 

policy goals. No one wants to operate in an environment of uncertain legal clarity, least of all companies who are already operating 

in often unstable environments. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss this important 

topic with you today, and I do look forward to answering any questions that you all might have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lee appears as a submission for 

the record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, thank you very much, Ms. Lee. 

I am going to have each one testify, and then we will go to the 

questions. The next person to testify is Geoffrey Corn, Associate 

Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law in Houston, Texas, 

retired Lieutenant Colonel, served with the U.S. Army’s Judge Advocate General Corps. Prior to his retirement, he served as special 

assistant to the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General for Law of War 

Matters, acting as the Army’s senior law of war expert. He also 
7 

served as the chief of international law for the U.S. Army-Europe, 

chief prosecutor for the 101st Airborne Division, and a professor of 

international and national security law at the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General School. He has been extensively published on national security law, criminal procedure, law of armed conflict. Professor Corn received his law degree from George Washington University School of Law, his LLM from the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General School. 

Professor, it is good to have you here and thank you for coming. 

We will put your full statement in the record, but please go ahead, 

sir. 

STATEMENT OF GEOFFREY S. CORN, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR 

OF LAW, SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW, HOUSTON, TEXAS; 

LIEUTENANT COLONEL, USA, RETIRED 

Professor CORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

Committee, for offering me the opportunity to share my perspective 

of the importance of enacting the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. 

As a soldier and a military staff officer, I was taught to express 

my ‘‘bottom line up front,’’ and my bottom line is that Congress 

should enact CEJA because it is in the best interest of our national 

security, our Armed Forces, and potential criminal defendants. 

Prior to 1970, trial by court-martial was the primary mechanism 

by which we held accountable civilians accompanying the military 

during operations abroad. However, as a result of an opinion by the 

Court of Military Appeals in 1970, in the case of United States v. 

Averette, that jurisdiction was severely restricted when the Court 

held that it only applied during periods of formally declared wars. 

As a result of this opinion, an entire generation of judge advocates learned that it was almost inconceivable that civilians would 

ever again be subjected to trial by court-martial. But this created 

a Federal jurisdictional gap, and the impunity for civilian misconduct created by this gap became apparent as the U.S. military 

focused increasingly on expeditionary operations in the decade following the end of the cold war. In response, Congress enacted 

MEJA, a law that reflected a clear preference for Article III criminal trials when civilians accompanying the military committed misconduct while operating abroad. 

However, the perception of contractor impunity arose during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and these perceptions were in 

large measure the result of a jurisdictional gap that existed in 

MEJA. Partially in response to this perception, Congress in 2006 

amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice to reverse the opinion of United States v. Averette and resurrect military jurisdiction 

over civilians accompanying the Armed Forces in the field during 

any contingency military operation. 

This resurrection of military jurisdiction caught military experts 

by surprise. While the resurrection of military jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the Armed Forces is likely constitutional, I 

believe that it does pose some serious constitutional questions, 

most significant of which is whether or not it is legitimate to try 

a U.S. civilian by court-martial when that is not a requirement of 
8 

absolute necessity, when an alternate option of Article III jurisdiction is viable. 

Now, this is not to suggest that I believe that a court-martial is 

not a fair tribunal. In fact, I think courts-martial are fundamentally fair. But the fact remains that a court-martial does not afford 

the full range of constitutional rights to a defendant as are afforded 

in an Article III criminal tribunal. 

It is because of this that I believe it was critically important to 

enact MEJA. However, MEJA was based on an assumption that 

has become increasingly stale: that civilians present in areas of 

military operations will be connected to the military by employment or contract. Civilians supporting the complex missions of 

today, although often operating in close proximity to the military, 

are routinely connected to other Government agencies. 

CEJA is, therefore, necessary to complement MEJA. Its enactment will ensure all civilians present in operational areas are subject to Federal civilian criminal jurisdiction. 

CEJA would also provide a means for prosecuting acts of serious 

misconduct committed by civilians associated with U.S. Government activities in more mature theaters or areas, not necessarily 

in countries where we have ongoing military operations. And I believe the ability to exercise such jurisdiction would be beneficial to 

the United States because it would give us the opportunity to leverage the host nation to forgo criminal prosecution of American citizens who commit serious misconduct and give us the opportunity 

to prosecute them in the United States, which I believe is often in 

the best interests of the Nation and the criminal defendants. 

Ultimately, I can see no good reason not to enact CEJA. I believe 

enhancing the scope of Federal civilian jurisdiction over civilians 

abroad is an important means of limiting resort to military jurisdictions to only those situations of genuine necessity. MEJA was 

the first step to achieve this goal; CEJA will be the next step. Unless Federal criminal jurisdiction is comprehensive, pressure to resort to the broad grant of military jurisdiction over civilians resurrected by the 2006 amendment to the Uniform Code of Military 

Justice is almost inevitable. It is, therefore, in the interests of the 

Nation, the military, and potential civilian defendants to enact 

CEJA. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Professor Corn appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Colonel, Professor. I appreciate 

your perspective. 

Our next witness is Michael Edney, Of Counsel at the law firm 

of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, where he specializes in appellate and 

constitutional law, criminal and regulatory defense, and complex 

civil litigation. From 2000 to 2009, he provided legal advice to the 

National Security Council and senior White House advisers. Prior 

to his time at the White House, Mr. Edney worked in the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel. Bachelor’s from the University of Notre Dame, law degree from the University of Chicago 

Law School. 

It is good to have you here, sir. Please go ahead. 
9 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. EDNEY, OF COUNSEL, GIBSON, 

DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. EDNEY. Thank you, Chairman Leahy, Ranking Member 

Grassley, and distinguished Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify on this important subject. 

With troops deployed in two foreign theaters of combat, holding 

accountable representatives of the United States who engage in serious misconduct abroad is a recurring and complex matter. Current Federal criminal law leaves a gap for U.S. Government employees and contractors unassociated with the Department of Defense. This gap has raised serious foreign policy problems and problems with the uniform administration of justice. So the Congress 

and the executive branch have struggled with whether and how to 

fill that gap through at least two administrations. That is because 

it is a difficult question and caution is very necessary in addressing 

it. Expanding wide bands of Federal criminal law abroad to employees and contractors of all Federal agencies, including our intelligence community, could threaten vital national security operations if not done with exceptional care. 

I want to make three points, my written testimony aside. 

First, the Congress—— 

Chairman LEAHY. And your written testimony will be part of the 

record in full. 

Mr. EDNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, the Congress historically has been very careful in assigning relevant criminal laws’ extraterritorial effect, in part to protect 

national security operations. Instead, the Congress has extensively 

studied, often after lengthy classified briefings and hearings, the 

procedures and restrictions to be placed on overseas intelligence operations. The Congress should continue that practice. Proposed legislation addressing the problems such as security contractor misconduct abroad ought not have unintended side effects on authorized national security activities. 

The solution has been laid out by the Assistant Attorney General 

for the United States, Lanny Breuer, in his forthcoming testimony, 

and I agree with it. Any legislation expanding general criminal law 

abroad should have a strong exception for intelligence or other national security operations. Whatever additional restrictions should 

be placed on intelligence activities, we should wait for a setting 

where the Congress is exclusively focused on that issue. 

Notably, finding an appropriate intelligence exception was the 

sticking point when this type of legislation came up in the 110th 

Congress during the last administration. The current administration’s position appears no different from the last. Creating an appropriate intelligence exception would be an important step forward in moving this legislative project. 

Second, ambiguity in criminal laws applicable to our intelligence 

officers should be avoided. Using criminal offenses created for what 

is called the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the 

United States creates particular concerns in this regard, and this 

is a common theme in legislation that has been designed to solve 

these problems from MEJA to some of the current legislative proposals. This is a body of law that Congress created for when the 

Federal Government is the only authority for foreign military bases 
10 

and embassies where there is no U.S. State Government. In a city 

here at home, these are the public order offenses that we would expect, but they were never meant for intelligence operations, and we 

have no tradition that would assist us in applying them to this new 

field. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act avoided this 

problem by keeping the Uniform Code of Military Justice and its 

long history of governing violent armed conflicts as the primary 

regulator of the military itself. There is no such easy solution for 

the intelligence community, which does not have this tradition. 

The result of such potential ambiguity is the chilling of intelligence operations and the delay required to obtain clarity. Intelligence officers will not and should not have to rely on after-thefact prosecutorial discretion to carry out necessary operations. They 

will seek the opinion of the Justice Department in advance. How 

those legal questions should be resolved is not clear, and that process will take time while national security operations wait. 

Third, if legislation imposes new criminal restrictions on intelligence operations, any cases that follow likely will involved classified information. Such cases will place additional strain on the 

Classified Information Procedures Act. That Act was enacted in 

1980 to prevent graymail in espionage cases. Senators on this Committee have proposed changes to update CIPA for the last 30 years. 

The expansion of Federal criminal law that CEJA contemplates 

and CIPA reform have to go hand in hand. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on this topic again, and 

I look forward to the Committee’s questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Edney appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, thank you very much. 

Let me begin. This question I will actually ask to Ms. Lee and 

then to Professor Corn. You talked about the fact that the U.S. has 

more Government contractors working overseas than ever before. 

We know the legal framework is unclear. It is outdated. When the 

military mission in Iraq winds down, and Afghanistan for that 

matter, the American presence there will no longer be primarily 

military or DOD contractors, but we will have thousands of civilian 

contractors and employees, so our criminal jurisdiction will no 

longer extend to these contractors and employees. 

Does that military wind-down in Iraq create urgency to pass 

CEJA, Ms. Lee? 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is a very valid point. 

It is very timely, and it is one that I can tell you that the contractors operating in that environment are very attuned to. You know, 

how is this going to work in the absence of the Department of Defense? In what ways should we adjust the advice that we give our 

employees? In what ways do we need to be aware that this will 

change the legal universe in which we operate? 

I think the departure of the Department of Defense limits the application of any UCMJ good order and discipline type authority to 

the environment and does make it particularly important not just 

for the contractors to understand what jurisdiction will apply to 

them in the absence of the Department of Defense, but also for the 

host country perceptions. 
11 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, let me ask you on this, you would be in 

all likelihood called upon to advise some of these companies. With 

the passage of a very clear CEJA, would that make your job easier 

to say, okay, these are the bright lines, this is what you can do, 

this is what you cannot do? And I realize that is kind of a leading 

question, but also make it easier to tell the host country. 

Ms. LEE. There are two parts of it, and I smiled when you asked 

the question because it does sort of work counter to my interests, 

right? As a lawyer of the defense contractors, if statutes are unclear I am in business all day long. That is what we do. If you have 

got some—— 

Chairman LEAHY. I was thinking that. 

Ms. LEE. Yes. If there is lack of clarity in a statute, I stay busy 

all day. But on behalf of the companies that I represent, I think 

you do have an opportunity to clearly articulate your intent here, 

and that is always a good thing. 

I also think it is a good thing from the host country perspective 

because I think what we have seen is that if there is just the perception of a culture of impunity, then that is a very dangerous 

thing for the countries that have to operate in that environment, 

for the military members that have to operate in that environment, 

and for the furtherance of our bigger national security objectives. 

Chairman LEAHY. Professor Corn, how do you feel about that? 

Professor CORN. Senator, my concern is that although we draw 

down in these missions, the military will still have some presence 

in these locations, and if there is no viable civilian criminal jurisdiction for acts of serious misconduct, the military may be pushed 

into the role of becoming the primary prosecutorial response to 

such misconduct, and I think that would be unfortunate. 

I am not willing to say that the exercise of military jurisdiction 

over a civilian is per se unconstitutional, but I think that it is in 

the interests of the military and civilian defendants to have a jurisdictional scheme that ensures that such jurisdiction is exercised 

only as a measure of true last resort. 

I think the other factor that goes into this, which dovetails with 

what Ms. Lee mentioned, is that if we do not enact MEJA, there 

really will be an inconsistency between the method of dealing with 

military misconduct and civilian misconduct, unless the military is 

the primary prosecutorial authority. And by that I mean if there 

is an act of serious misconduct in Iraq by a contractor where there 

is no Federal civilian jurisdiction, the military member who commits the same misconduct will be tried in an American court—a 

military court but an American court. That civilian may have no 

option other than to be turned over to the host nation authorities 

for prosecution, and that could create a perception of disparate 

treatment. 

I saw this once when I was the legal adviser, the international 

law adviser in Heidelberg, Germany, for U.S. Army-Europe with 

the allegation of a rape by a contractor in Bosnia—or it was 

Kosovo, I think, prior to the implementation of MEJA, and the 

military commander had a very difficult dilemma because if we did 

not allow the local authorities to assert jurisdiction, there was no 

jurisdiction to assert. 
12 

Now, ultimately the case was disposed of because the allegation 

fell apart, but I can remember the debates with the commanding 

general over, ‘‘What am I going to do? If this is true, I do not want 

this person to have impunity for it.’’ And so having CEJA would 

create a viable, credible alternative, which would be trial in Federal district court. 

Chairman LEAHY. Mr. Edney, do you agree or disagree? 

Mr. EDNEY. I do not disagree with that. I think, Senator, as you 

point out, the more civilian contractors and employees we have 

overseas in these operations and in these difficult areas, the more 

poignantly the gap in current Federal criminal law will be raised. 

The question is: How do we go about filling it? 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, I understand that. I also, though, worry 

about we also do not want to give blanket immunity. I obviously 

talked about a serious case with Halliburton at the beginning of 

my statement, but I hate to see something like that just be ignored. 

My life was easy, the 8 years I spent as a prosecutor. In the United 

States, when a crime is committed, you go and prosecute people 

you think committed the crime. Here you have a real difficulty. 

How do you approach it? As Professor Corn just mentioned, you 

also have the thing—and Ms. Lee has, too—that sometimes in situations where there is going to be prosecution, the defendant might 

much prefer it is going to be before an American court with our 

usual experience. We have seen some highly publicized cases 

abroad where you wonder how in heaven’s name those are done, 

even close allies of ours. I think of one that has dragged on for a 

couple of years in Italy on a case where a young woman is accused 

of murder, and when her parents pointed out the fact that the 

prosecutor had been involved in ethical misconduct, something that 

even the courts there had said, then the prosecutor wanted to prosecute them for defamation. I think I would much rather be having 

the trial here in the United States. But that is my view. 

Senator Grassley. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Edney, you described how a carve-out for 

intelligence was important. What are the potential pitfalls that we 

face if we pass legislation extending Federal criminal law to contractors abroad without a carefully crafted carve-out for intelligence and national security? 

Mr. EDNEY. Thank you, Senator Grassley. One of the problems 

is that it is difficult here and it is, I think, difficult period to really 

account for all the many ways that the criminal laws that we draw 

up for the United States might apply to otherwise authorized national security operations. So that has to be very carefully studied. 

That is why the previous administration and I believe this one supports leaving those questions for another day and finding an intelligence carve-out that protects those activities. 

If you had an intelligence carve-out that focused on authorized 

intelligence activities or authorized national security operations, 

you would avoid the situation that Chairman Leahy pointed out in 

his initial statement where a security contractor that claims he 

was protecting somebody in the intelligence community but went 

off the reservation on a frolic, and clearly serious misconduct would 

not be covered by that. That is the key. The key is it has to be sufficiently simple that the intelligence community continues only to 
13 

worry about the authorities they are currently working under and 

any further authorities or restrictions that this Congress decides 

are warranted in the specific context of regulating the intelligence 

community. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, do you have any idea what steps should 

be taken in crafting a carve-out or exemption since it has got to be 

carefully done? 

Mr. EDNEY. Yes, I think the first issue is that it needs to be very 

simple. If it were to become too specific, it would provide points to 

our adversaries about what is authorized and what is not authorized. It needs to focus on current authorizations. Also, it needs to 

have an allowance for the reasonable belief of intelligence officials 

that they are engaging in authorized conduct. And, finally, the important key is that it be drafted in a way that keeps these potential 

criminal laws off the table because their application to these activities, again, is extraordinarily complicated. 

Senator GRASSLEY. You discussed including special maritime and 

territorial jurisdiction of our country as a basis for applying criminal law abroad. That statute was designed to place the Federal 

Government in a position of State and local governments and cover 

general crimes when no State and local government existed. This 

approach is similar to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 

utilizing special territorial jurisdiction. You mention in your written testimony a concern that the use of this special jurisdiction is 

different for civilian contractors as opposed to military members 

prosecuted under MEJA. What is that distinction? And why is it 

important? 

Mr. EDNEY. Yes, I think this is an important point that the Committee should keep in mind as it turns again to crafting legislation 

in this area because it is tempting to follow the Military 

Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act model, which looked to crimes that 

would be applicable in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. And as a man from Nebraska, this would 

be the type of laws that I would expect to govern my activities 

while I am living in Omaha and that would be supplied by the 

State legislature to keep me safe. But their application to intelligence activities—and military activities for that matter—are very 

complicated. 

The way that MEJA dealt with this problem was to maintain the 

primacy of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. That happens in 

3261(d) of Title 18. It says that if you are subject to the UCMJ, 

it is the UCMJ alone that will govern you. And after a long history 

of dispensing justice to members of the military while they are 

abroad conducting combat operations, we have a lot of case law 

that in a sophisticated manner deals with violent combat operations. But we do not have that outlet for the intelligence community. There is no substitute that you can resort to. So the impulse 

to look at to the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction set of 

criminal offenses would be a difficulty if you are expanding the 

criminal law beyond the Department of Defense to all Federal Government agencies, including the intelligence community. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Could I ask one more question? 

Chairman LEAHY. Of course. 
14 

Senator GRASSLEY. If Congress failed to include an intelligence 

exemption in the legislation and relied upon the prosecutorial discretion of the Justice Department, would that have an impact on 

the intelligence community? For example, would they have to ask 

the Justice Department to provide legal opinions? And if the intelligence community became reliant on the Justice Department to 

pre-approve intelligence operations, would it have a chilling effect 

on that community? 

Mr. EDNEY. I think that you seize on a very important point, 

Senator Grassley. As I mentioned, the application of these criminal 

offenses, as they would be to military operations, to intelligence operations, will be very complicated. There are a lot of common-law 

doctrines and affirmative defenses such as justification and public 

authority that the Justice Department would have to sort through, 

and as I mentioned in my initial statement, we can expect that the 

intelligence community will turn to the Justice Department first to 

sort that out. That will take time, and it will require a pretty significant exercise of discretion. And I think what you will see is that 

it would transfer a lot of responsibility about what intelligence operations occur from the senior executive branch officials that this 

Senate confirmed to oversee those operations to the Attorney General because he will have a very wide legal interpretive task in advance before he approves those operations. 

I think we can also expect that the Justice Department will not 

provide general guidance in this area, as they should not. These 

legal inquiries, if many of these Federal criminal laws were applied, require very fact-specific issues, and it would be kind of a de 

facto reorganization of the way that we conduct the international 

security operations if the Federal criminal laws that we are considering applying to intelligence agencies were not selected with great 

care. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much. 

Senator Franken. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Lee, it seems pretty obvious to me that we are going to be 

depending on private contractors who work overseas more and 

more—as we pull out of Iraq. They will be tied to the State Department, and we have to make sure they are accountable to U.S. laws. 

Unfortunately, the actions of a small number of bad actors have 

tarnished the entire reputation of the contracting community, 

which you represent. 

You said in your testimony that the companies you represent 

would welcome greater certainty and clarity on the application of 

U.S. criminal laws to their employees. I would like you to explain 

this a bit more. You talked about the culture of impunity. Now, the 

Chairman talked about Jamie Leigh Jones and KBR and Halliburton. Jamie Leigh Jones was gang-raped by KBR employees. 

What I understood was that this had happened many times before, 

and KBR insisted that she was required to go through arbitration. 

Now, KBR is no minor player in contracting. Jamie Leigh also 

formed her own foundation in the 4 years that she was trying to 

fight to get into court, and part of her foundation was finding and 

inviting women who this had happened to but who had submitted 
15 

to mandatory arbitration. She found 40 women who had been raped 

by contractors. 

You heard all kinds of stories of prostitutes being brought into 

these contractors, including prostitutes in the host country. Was 

there a culture of impunity? Is there a culture of impunity? I just 

want to know. KBR is not a small actor. It is probably the biggest 

contractor there is. So I am not terribly convinced that this community wants this, but I hope they do. 

Ms. LEE. I can tell you I believe that they do, Senator. I want 

to clarify that I do not represent KBR, never have. And when I 

speak here and talk about certain things, I am, of course, speaking 

with my own personal opinion and not on behalf of any individual 

clients anyway. But I can tell you from my experience not just representing the contracting community but also as a military prosecutor that even a perception of a culture of impunity is, I think, 

a dangerous thing. And I think that is what I referred to when I 

spoke before, and that is a potential host country perception of impunity. And that is why the clients that I work with and the trade 

organizations that represent defense contractors that I work with 

are all in support of a measure that would move forward for better, 

more effective accountability across the board, I think because it is 

fair to say that they recognize, much like you have and many other 

Senators and many members of the American public have recognized, that it is contrary to the goals of our mission overseas to 

allow even a perception of impunity to persist. 

Senator FRANKEN. KBR was contracting with DOD. As we withdraw from Iraq, more and more will be contractors for the State 

Department. We passed an amendment in the DOD appropriations 

that contractors could not exercise their mandatory arbitration 

clause in their employment contracts if they were getting paid 

through DOD. Do you think it would be wise in terms of trying to 

get rid of this culture of impunity if we did the same thing for 

State? 

Ms. LEE. You mean, Senator, specifically for civil liability and 

civil—— 

Senator FRANKEN. Yes. 

Ms. LEE. Those kinds of things. I think that is something that 

is within Congress’ power to do. I apologize, I am not as familiar 

with that bill, but I think—— 

Senator FRANKEN. Well, basically KBR took the position that in 

her contract with them they had a mandatory arbitration clause on 

any complaint about employment. They took the position that if 

she was raped, that was an employment dispute, and they had 

taken that position with evidently 40 other women. She fought 

them. 

Now, my question is: Do you think that it creates a culture of 

impunity and would continue to create a culture of impunity if people like Blackwater, or others who are under the employ of the 

State Department, are able to assert these arbitration agreements 

for their employees who come under similar circumstances? I am 

asking you your opinion. 

Ms. LEE. And I am happy to give it. I can tell you as a lawyer 

who practices civil litigation, what I often invite my clients, when 

they ask me, should we have arbitration clauses in these agree-
16 

ments—and sometimes these are contracts overseas with subcontractors; sometimes these will be arbitration clauses that not 

just in the defense contracting community but in other industries 

in the United States are very common aspects of employment contracts. I will tell you my honest experience. I tell a lot of the clients 

that I work for, most of them, it is not necessarily a guarantee that 

the proceedings will be cheaper, faster, or easier if they are done 

by arbitration. Arbitration can be just as expensive and just as adversarial as litigation. 

When I represented in a criminal justice capacity victims who 

were making rape allegations in Uniform Code of Military Justice 

proceedings, their families would also ask me the same thing. You 

know, what should we do about this? Should we sue about this? 

The confluence of those particular types of criminal acts and the 

way that they are superimposed over civil litigation is a really complicated area, and I think it is not—I do not mean to not answer 

you directly, but I think it is not pure enough to say that if nobody 

is allowed to arbitrate, that will improve the perception of impunity. I am not necessarily sure that it will, because I am involved 

in a lot of arbitrations—— 

Senator FRANKEN. I think you do not understand my question 

then, because this is mandatory arbitration. It is not that no one 

is allowed to arbitrate. You can arbitrate if you like. I would really 

appreciate an answer to my question, which is: Do you think that 

the State Department should honor mandatory arbitration? I am 

not talking about whether a woman has a right to arbitrate. Of 

course, a woman would have a right to arbitrate. That is not the 

issue. That is not what I am asking you. 

Ms. LEE. And I think I do understand. I think as the clauses 

read, what they are is arbitration in lieu of litigation. So I think 

what your objection to them is that it deprives a woman in that 

position of the ability to fully litigate her claim in a Federal district 

court or in a State court instead of going to an arbitration proceeding, and that may be an area where you and I disagree as to 

whether that necessarily means that a person going forward in an 

arbitration has given up anything that will be of benefit to them 

or rights to them. Some arbitrations might be structured so that 

that would be a reasonable conclusion. In my experience they are 

not always, and so, you know, if there is—— 

Senator FRANKEN. My time is up, but I am not satisfied with the 

answer because ‘‘not always’’ is not a satisfactory answer. 

Ms. LEE. Well, I can tell you—and I mean this very sincerely— 

the U.S. litigation process in terms of achieving redress for a claim 

much like Ms. Jones’ is entirely also likely not to be very satisfactory either. And so I think that is all I meant to express, is that 

I cannot do an either/or for you and tell you that one will definitely 

help improve a culture of immunity because I think both have 

flaws. 

Senator FRANKEN. I think the woman should have a choice. 

Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. What I am going to do, I am going to move 

now to Senator Whitehouse and then Senator Blumenthal. I am 

leaving for another hearing. I should note that the issue of arbitra-
17 

tion, I think what we are saying is we have arbitration if it is 

agreeable to both parties and not imposed on them. But I also 

agree with what Ms. Lee said, that on both civil and criminal litigations, the results are not always satisfactory. But at least to 

leave on the table the ability to have both criminal and civil litigation I think is necessary. So I thank Senator Franken. 

Senator Whitehouse, you are recognized, and I thank the members of the panel. This is a difficult thing, and your experience is 

important. I understand, Mr. Edney, you are talking about a carveout. I just do not want to make it such that somebody who happens 

to be guarding the outside of our station, our CIA station, might 

suddenly be able to go off and do whatever they want and get that 

immunity, and I am sure that is not what you are suggesting by 

any means. 

Mr. EDNEY. No, not at all, Senator. I think there are very helpful 

ways to deal with that particular problem. 

Chairman LEAHY. I agree with you. Thank you very much. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. May I proceed, Chairman? 

Chairman LEAHY. Yes. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Mr. Edney, your concerns regarding the 

consequences of application of this statute to the intelligence community will depend to a significant degree on what the offense is 

at issue, will it not? 

Mr. EDNEY. Yes, it will, Senator. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. So, for instance, our intelligence community is engaged as a matter of ordinary day-to-day business in trying to break into places, steal things, get unauthorized access to information, conspire with people to divulge secrets to us. That is 

kind of the nature of the intelligence business, to get unauthorized 

access to information, and so something like that, which is actually 

not covered by this bill, as I understand it, would be a really significant impediment into our intelligence functions. But as best I 

can tell, there is no legitimate intelligence function that involves 

rape. 

Mr. EDNEY. No, I think that you are right about that, Senator. 

I simply cannot think of one, although I will say that the proposed 

legislation is broader than that. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. No, but that is what I say, you need to 

start to distinguish among different offenses. 

Mr. EDNEY. That is exactly right. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And you would concede that as to rape the 

interests of the intelligence community are nil. 

Mr. EDNEY. I cannot think of any. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And as to murder, pretty much also nil, 

correct? 

Mr. EDNEY. Well, that is—I do not know that—I do not know 

that there is a productive way to talk about this, but I think that 

there are lots of complicated questions raised by lots of criminal 

statutes, some of which are included in the proposed legislation 

from last session. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. But we should be distinguishing between 

them because different statutes, different crimes will have different 

impacts, and at least as to rape you can agree that the impact 

there is nil. 
18 

Mr. EDNEY. Yes, and as you point out, you know, this is an important point. I mean, there are actually laws that apply to the intelligence community, and one of them is the War Crimes Act, 

which Congress amended in 2006 to address concerns that the Congress had, and various types of sexual conduct beyond rape are already prohibited by applicable Federal law, and that is for everybody. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Yes. Even overseas. 

Mr. EDNEY. Yes. As a matter of fact, especially overseas. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. So to the extent that there is an overlay 

between what is already prohibited by those statutes and what 

would be prohibited by this law, again, the net effect is nil in terms 

of a deterrent on intelligence colleagues. 

Mr. EDNEY. I would not raise any yellow flag about restating current Federal applicable criminal law that is already applicable to 

the intelligence community. That is exactly right. And this Committee, as well as other committees, spent a fair amount of time 

figuring out exactly what those rules are going to be in the specific 

context of national security operations. That is exactly the type of 

process that I think needs to happen and should be the practice of 

the Congress going forward. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And while I think we will all concede that 

there could be some either deterrent effect or some delay while 

legal issues get sorted through in terms of a potential subset of intelligence activities as a result of this statute, are there not also 

potentially significant national security consequences from the culture of impunity that has been referred to from the degradation of 

America’s standing in the host country from criminal acts that take 

place from the diplomatic consequences of that, from the failures 

of either military or intelligence cooperation that might ensue from 

that, so there are costs on both sides of this equation, are there 

not? 

Mr. EDNEY. There absolutely are costs on both sides. An example 

of that is—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. National security costs. 

Mr. EDNEY. National security and foreign policy costs. An example of that was when this country was trying to negotiate the 2008 

Status of Forces Agreement with the Government of Iraq, we were 

not able to achieve the immunity that we traditionally would like 

from the Iraqi criminal justice system because of some of the shortcomings in our laws. That at least was a factor, and that is a foreign policy consequence. The way to thread it is to keep these intelligence operations out and focus on the problems that this Committee has identified with security contractors and others that have 

nothing to do with authorized intelligence operations, and a carveout can leave what rules apply to the intelligence community when 

they are carrying out their work for another day in a setting 

where—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. So your carve-out—— 

Mr. EDNEY [continuing]. The implications can be fully discussed. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Your carve-out, your proposed carve-out 

for the intelligence community would be limited to sanctioned and 

approved intelligence activities. So if an agency operative, an intelligence operative, were engaged in something that had not been 
19 

specifically directed through the chain of command as an approved 

intelligence activity, that would be a different matter. That would 

not be part of your carve-out. 

Mr. EDNEY. Well, I mean, look, what is in the carve-out is a very 

complicated matter, and I could tell you from the last administration—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. But it would be authorized things, not unauthorized things. 

Mr. EDNEY. I think that focusing on authorized matters or matters that intelligence operators reasonably believe are authorized 

so they do not get caught up on technicalities would be a very productive way to start and would address the issue of frolic, detour, 

and clearly unauthorized conduct that Senator Leahy referred to in 

his opening remarks. I think that is a productive place to start. 

Now, I am 2 years removed from—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. We should leave it there because my time 

has expired, and I am now encroaching on Senator Blumenthal’s 

time, so thank you very much. 

Mr. EDNEY. Absolutely. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator FRANKEN [presiding]. Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

to the members of this panel for being here today. 

Professor Corn, reading your law review article, I was struck by 

your observation—and I think there is a lot of agreement with it— 

that essentially the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act has 

been largely ineffective. And, in fact, you observe in one of the footnotes that there have been virtually no prosecutions during the 

Iraqi era. And I wonder if you could expand on the reasons that 

you see for that lack of activity under this law, whether it is weaknesses in the law or purposeful decisions in the exercise of discretion that we just should not prosecute for whatever reasons relating to intelligence or national security. 

Professor CORN. Well, first off, I should note that the law review 

is a couple of years old, so I think there has been good movement 

on the implement of MEJA. 

As I said in my opening statement and in the statement for the 

record, I think MEJA was a critically important statute to enact, 

but I think there was a period of time where we had to ease into 

its implementation. So I think there have been two challenges with 

MEJA. One has been that it has been limited in its jurisdiction. 

That is the challenge that CEJA is motivated to respond to, to close 

that jurisdictional gap. 

The other is implementation. Any law has to be implemented, 

and MEJA was a complex law to implement because it touched on 

the interests of both the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense. And there was a period of time when the two 

agencies were working on an implementing regulation that finally 

emerged. And that is why when I was in Germany in 2001 MEJA 

was not yet really a viable response mechanism to this act of civilian misconduct. 

My understanding is that the Department of Justice has moved 

substantially in a positive direction—and I will leave that to the 

Justice representative—in implementing MEJA. I think personally 

that whether we are operating under MEJA or if you enact CEJA, 
20 

one of the important aspects of implementation is ownership. I will 

go back to, again, my military training and the importance of unity 

of effort. MEJA has a split interest and, therefore, you had the 

military responsible to initiate the case but a U.S. Attorney in the 

United States responsible to bring the case to trial and bring it to 

fruition. And I think there are creative ways that that could be 

streamlined, but, you know, as I understand it, again, much of that 

has been improved. 

I would also note that I think MEJA has been important to reach 

an issue that was not the primary objective but has been an important issue, which is to address servicemember misconduct that is 

discovered after the servicemember is separated from the Armed 

Forces, what I call the infamous Specialist Medlow case. Medlow 

was one of the participants in the My Lai massacre who went on 

‘‘60 Minutes’’ and admitted everything, and there was no jurisdiction to try him. MEJA closes that gap, and there have been very 

significant prosecutions, one in the Western District of Kentucky 

for a soldier who was involved in a brutal rape and murder of an 

Iraqi teenager and then separated from the military before we 

found out about it. 

So I am a huge fan of MEJA, and I think as we grow into MEJA, 

the implementation process will become more mature and more 

regular, and that is a very positive thing. But I think if CEJA is 

enacted, that is an issue that is going to have to be addressed because now it is going to create bifurcated interests between State 

and Justice or Department of Energy and Justice. So there really 

has to be unity of effort from the beginning to the end of the criminal investigation and prosecution process. And if there is one great 

strength of the UCMJ approach, that is it. The military initiates 

the investigation, assigns the prosecutor, prosecutes the case, et 

cetera, et cetera. 

I think it can be done under MEJA or CEJA, but it just takes 

a little bit of coordination. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. For that unity of purpose, shouldn’t there 

be a central prosecuting authority? In other words, perhaps these 

decisions ought to be elevated to the level of the Attorney General 

rather than have United States Attorneys responsible for them. 

Professor CORN. Well, again, I think I am little bit outside of my 

area of expertise. I think—and, again, I will leave it to the Justice 

representative. I think that there is something akin to that beginning now with the Department of Justice creating a team of prosecutors that focus on MEJA cases. So even if we prosecute the case 

in the Eastern District of Texas or, you know, the Western District 

of Washington, the Department of Justice can detail one of these 

special prosecutors to the case to assist with the prosecution, which 

I think is an ideal method. 

One of the suggestions I think I made in the article was even 

within MEJA perhaps you could assign judge advocates as Special 

Assistant U.S. Attorneys. We do that for civil cases, environmental 

cases, labor cases that arise in a military installation. And, you 

know, the military has very fine attorneys and very experienced 

prosecutors who could periodically be detailed to work in this special team if it would facilitate the effectiveness of the ultimate ob-
21 

jective. But I think the Department of Justice has started that 

process already. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you very much. 

Thank you. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal, and I want 

to thank these witnesses for their testimony. Thank you all. 

We will now move on to our second panel. I would like to welcome a frequent guest of this Committee, Lanny Breuer. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Mr. Chairman? 

Senator FRANKEN. Yes? 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. While we are waiting for the witness to 

come to the table, I wanted to mention that I think one of the reasons that this hearing is so important is the size of our contractor 

footprint overseas. I do not know if that has been discussed already, but the last time that I was in Iraq, last year, our contractor 

population was far greater than our military population and our civilian population combined. I do not have the numbers off the top 

of my head, but I want to say it was 2 or 3 times as great in terms 

of contractors compared to civilian government employees and uniformed military. So it is a really big piece of what the host country 

sees out of our American presence there. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And will increase, Mr. Chairman, even 

further under the strategy that has been outlined by the United 

States. So I think Senator Whitehouse’s remarks are very apt. 

Senator FRANKEN. Very, very good point. 

I would like to welcome Lanny Breuer. Lanny Breuer is the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the United 

States Department of Justice. Mr. Breuer started his career as an 

Assistant District Attorney in New York City where he prosecuted 

offenses ranging from violent crime to white-collar crime. He later 

joined Covington & Burling, LLP, where he served as co-chair of 

the white-collar defense and investigations group. Mr. Breuer 

served as Special Counsel to President Clinton from 1997 to 1999, 

an eventful period. Mr. Breuer received his undergraduate degree 

from Columbia University and his law degree from Columbia Law 

School. 

Thank you for testifying, and go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LANNY A. BREUER, 

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. BREUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to speak with 

you today about the proposed Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 

Act, or CEJA. 

I am honored to appear before you on behalf of the Department 

of Justice, where, as you mentioned, I am privileged to lead the 

Criminal Division’s nearly 600 lawyers in enforcing the criminal 

laws. Together with the Nation’s 94 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, the Division’s Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section, HRSP, investigates and prosecutes individuals under the existing Military 

Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, or MEJA, for crimes those individuals commit overseas. 
22 

Our commitment to bringing prosecutions under MEJA is evidenced by our record. Since MEJA was enacted, the Justice Department has used it to prosecute numerous Department of Defense 

employees, contractors, or individuals accompanying them overseas 

who have committed serious crimes. In United States v. Steven 

Green—and I noticed that the witness right before me alluded to 

that case—for example, we convicted a former Army soldier for the 

brutal rape and killing of a 14-year-old Iraqi girl and the murders 

of three of her family members while the soldier was on active duty 

in Iraq. In United States v. Rico Williams, the Department convicted a former Air Force senior airman for a gang initiation beating that ended in the death of an Army sergeant in Germany. And 

just this year, in United States v. Christopher Drotleff, we convicted 

two Department of Defense contractors for involuntary manslaughter of a civilian in Afghanistan. 

In addition, we have also been able to prosecute individuals for 

acts committed abroad when MEJA does not apply, in particular, 

if the conduct occurs within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or falls under a Federal criminal 

statute with extraterritorial application. We successfully prosecuted, for example, former CIA official Andrew Warren for committing abusive sexual contact while on U.S. Embassy property in 

Algiers, Algeria. 

Although we have accomplished a great deal using our existing 

laws, MEJA leaves significant gaps in our enforcement capability. 

The criminal statutes with clear extraterritorial application make 

up only a subset of the Federal criminal laws, and the special maritime and extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States is limited. Consequently, a U.S. Government employee who rapes a foreign national in the employee’s diplomatic residence may be prosecuted for his crime, while the very same person might not be able 

to be prosecuted if he commits the exact same crime in the victim’s 

apartment. 

Additionally, MEJA applies only when the defendant’s employment relates to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense overseas. Therefore, a civilian Government contractor whose 

employment is unrelated to the mission of the Department of Defense but is related to another agency’s mission cannot currently be 

prosecuted under MEJA, even if he or she clearly committed a serious crime. 

Moreover, whether any particular defendant falls within the 

scope of MEJA depends upon highly specific facts and circumstances relating to his or her employment, and the statutory 

language has proved in those cases very difficult to apply. 

The proposed CEJA legislation would address these gaps by extending U.S. jurisdiction to all non-Department of Defense employees and contractors and those who accompany them who commit 

crimes overseas. We believe this legislation is critically important. 

In addition to permitting us to prosecute U.S. Government employees who are currently beyond our reach, the legislation would also 

show our international partners that we take seriously the conduct 

of U.S. Government employees within their borders. 

Mr. Chairman, we are pleased that you are introducing and this 

Committee is introducing new legislation to close the gaps in the 
23 

law. We fully support the goal of passing a robust and comprehensive CEJA statute that provides clear and unambiguous jurisdiction to prosecute non-Department of Defense personnel for their 

overseas misconduct without curtailing lawfully authorized intelligence activities. 

We look forward to continuing to work with the Committee on 

such legislation. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today, and, of course, I would be pleased to take any questions 

you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Breuer appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Breuer. 

Mr. Breuer, you suggest in your testimony that CEJA closes a 

large gap in the law and would make it much easier for the Department of Justice to prosecute egregious criminal acts committed 

by all U.S. contractors, regardless of the agency that they work for 

and regardless of whether the crime was committed on a military 

base or elsewhere overseas. But I am struggling to get my head 

around how large a gap in the law we are talking about. 

How many cases has the Department investigated or issued indictments on that ended up being dropped because of jurisdictional 

problems? Are we talking about 10 or 20 or 30 or more than 100 

cases in the last several years? 

Mr. BREUER. Mr. Chairman, I think we have brought probably 

around 50 or so cases that have been indicted and that we have 

pursued. I think the real challenge is twofold: 

One, I think there are an enormous number of cases or there are 

probably a good number of cases that are not referred, because 

from the very start those who hear about the underlying conduct 

cannot find any kind of Department of Defense nexus. And so I 

suspect that we just do not hear about them in the first instance. 

And the second very troubling issue is in each of the cases where 

we have gone after some contractor who is not directly working for 

the Department of Defense, we can spend literally thousands of 

hours on one case trying to establish that nexus. So instead of investigating the underlying criminality, we have to investigate—and 

these are very difficult cases—that contractor’s nexus to the mission of the Department of Defense. That becomes very burdensome 

and takes a lot of our resources away. And that is what we hope 

CEJA will completely eliminate. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you. When it was first reported back 

in 2007 that Blackwater security guards allegedly shot and killed 

a number of Iraqi civilians—the number is somewhere in the 

teens—in Baghdad’s Nisour Square, it seemed like it would only be 

a matter of time before those guards were tried and convicted. I realize the Department has been hard at work on this case for quite 

some time, and I want to ask you about some of the jurisdictional 

hurdles that you encountered. We are preparing to massively increase our reliance on State Department contractors, as Senator 

Blumenthal was referring to, as we continue to draw down our 

forces in Iraq. 

Given your experience with Nisour Square and similar cases, can 

you explain how it can be difficult to establish jurisdiction under 

MEJA, how CEJA might make it better, and relate that to Nisour? 
24 

Mr. BREUER. Absolutely. Let me be careful about Nisour Square. 

It is under active litigation. We just won in front of the court of 

appeals on an unrelated issue, and so now it is before Judge 

Urbina here in the district court again. There it was on an unrelated issue, and so I just wanted to be careful. But there is no question even in that case we will be litigating the nexus between those 

contractors and their mission with the Department of Defense. 

Just taking a step back, because we have to relate it to the Department of Defense mission. In any case that we bring with a contractor the first thing that the defense is going to do is say, ‘‘Look, 

we were a contractor for the State Department,’’ or ‘‘We were a contractor for the Department of Agriculture. We do not have the sufficient nexus to the Department of Defense.’’ That becomes an incredibly fact-specific inquiry, and it also becomes a very burdensome inquiry in looking at all of the aspects of the underlying contract. And when you assume these cases are halfway around the 

world, we have to bring our investigators over there. We have to 

find out what your specific role was. This becomes a very difficult 

issue to then describe to a district court judge in the United States. 

And, frankly, I think at least half of our time, if not more, is spent 

on that very issue. 

Senator FRANKEN. As I understand it, part of this legislation is 

to have investigators in place, right? 

Mr. BREUER. Well, I mean, with respect to that, I think we would 

like to have as much flexibility as we can. But, yes, we will have 

investigators abroad, and we will have investigators here who we 

will bring abroad. But if we do not have to litigate the issue of the 

nexus to the Department, because it is enough that you committed 

a crime and you were a contractor for the Department of Agriculture, then we are more than halfway where we need to be. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you. 

Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Senator Franken. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. You may have heard some of the remarks as you 

were coming to the table from me and Senator Whitehouse about 

the importance of this issue in light of the fact that the United 

States is withdrawing its military forces from Iraq and, in effect, 

substituting a civilian force, whether it is characterized as military 

or not. And so the importance of this issue will only increase, and 

I think your testimony is very, very important in support of these 

proposed changes, and I want to thank you for that and also for 

your service to the Nation and to the Department of Justice now. 

I wonder to what extent the barriers here related to confidentiality, security, intelligence, especially in light of what the U.S. 

Supreme Court basically had to say on this issue just in the past 

few days. 

Mr. BREUER. Sure. Well, Senator, that is a great point. First, let 

me begin by saying I absolutely agree with you that with the drawdown this will only become that much more important because of 

the role of civilians. But right now, without CEJA, Senator, even 

in cases where we try to establish this military nexus, we often actually face the issue that whatever program the contractor may 

have been involved in is classified. And so we have the very difficult balance with maybe some other aspects of the Government in 
25 

determining how much are we willing to reveal about the classified 

program. And even CIPA, the procedure that the courts have for 

this, may not be sufficient. 

So what CEJA will do is it will eliminate all of that. We will 

never have to go into the classified aspect of the undertaking, and 

that is why we think so strongly this will make a very, very big 

difference. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And in terms of contractor responsibility, 

just thinking about the civilian liability of a contractor, to what extent does it now and should it extend to the conduct of employees? 

In other words, where there are criminal acts, where there are 

other kinds of misconduct, the focus is on the individual who works 

for the contractor, for example, in the case of a rape. But should 

the contractor itself be responsible for the criteria it uses to hire 

people, train them, and so forth, supervise that kind of activity? 

Mr. BREUER. Well, Senator, I guess my view on that would be 

that the same principles of corporate criminal liability that apply 

in other contexts I would think should apply here. We hold in all 

kinds of contexts companies responsible for the criminal acts of 

their employees. It is very fact specific. But just the other day in 

a totally other area, in the FCPA, we convicted the first company 

ever in that context because of the conduct of its employees. So it 

would be fact specific. I think we would want to look at how high 

level the conduct was. But, absolutely, it should apply as it does, 

I think, in other settings. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And in making these decisions and others, 

is the top level, such as yourself, the Attorney General of the 

United States, increasingly involved in making these prosecutorial 

decisions because they involve such important discretion—as all 

prosecutorial decisions do, but especially so since the national interest and national security are involved? 

Mr. BREUER. Absolutely, Senator. It absolutely gets our attention. Under my tenure I am proud with the help and support of the 

Congress we combined two sections to create the Human Rights 

and Special Prosecution Section, HRSP, and we did it because of 

our commitment in this area. It absolutely gets my attention and, 

as appropriate, the Attorney General’s as well. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BREUER. Thank you. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator Whitehouse. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. Breuer, does the Department have a position on Mr. Edney’s 

recommendation that there should be a carve-out for intelligence 

activities? And, more specifically, should that carve-out include the 

crime of rape? Can you identify any situation in which rape is an 

approved intelligence activity? 

Mr. BREUER. No, Senator, I cannot, so rape is off the table. We 

do think that there should be an intelligence carve-out. We think 

that authorized intelligence activity has to be permitted to continue, and we do not want our intelligence community feeling as if 

they are being second-guessed. So we do think there is an appropriate role for the carve-out, but rape absolutely cannot and would 
26 

not be a part of that. And, indeed, we will continue to pursue unauthorized activity. If anything, the carve-out makes it that much 

clearer, the lanes are that much more clear as to what we will pursue, and we will absolutely pursue unauthorized activity. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And the focus on authorization allows the 

intelligence agency or agencies itself themselves to make it very 

clear internally how to provide the necessary legal protection for 

those authorized activities. That does not require other agencies to 

get involved. They can take care of their own in that sense by being 

clear about what is authorized. 

Mr. BREUER. I think that is right. I think also, as we know, there 

is a body of law with respect to what is authorized. Congress has 

a fair bit to say about that. But I think we do owe it to the intelligence community to give them clear directions, so when they are 

serving the American people that they do not have to feel that they 

are being second-guessed, as long as they are working on conduct 

that is authorized. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. In your organization’s experience dealing 

with these types of situations, are there considerations that we 

should be alert to that depend on whether the victim is an American or a host country national? Is that a distinction that pertains 

in any dimension here that we should be paying attention to? Or 

is that irrelevant? 

Mr. BREUER. So I need to think about that more. I have not 

made that in my own thinking particularly relevant. My view is if 

you are abroad and you are a contractor and you are working for 

us, you should be held liable if you commit a crime. 

I will say, of course, if you are a foreign national and you have 

been living in the host country irrespective of the contract and you 

have just been living there for a long time, then we would not have 

jurisdiction for you because you would be there. But if you are 

working for a country, you are in the host country because of the 

work you are doing for the Government, and you commit a crime— 

and I would say—the one thing I would say about this is we do 

think that we should limit CEJA to serious crimes. I think we want 

to be thoughtful about how we are using our resources. But with 

respect to serious crimes, I cannot see much of a reason why we 

have to distinguish your nationality. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Are there additional resources that would 

be required for crimes against a host country national in order to 

permit the host country national themselves as the victim or, if not 

a surviving victim, their family to participate in the supports that 

we provide to victims’ families in the American criminal justice system? 

Mr. BREUER. I think that that is the case, Senator. What we 

have found in all of the cases we have—we prosecute human rights 

violators around the world. We deal with these extraterritorial jurisdiction matters. There is just no question that our commitment 

is very strong, but that these are resource-intensive matters. Getting our witnesses, supporting the victims, all of this is exponentially harder, because we are doing these things across the globe, 

often. But we are committed to doing it, and we do it, and our lawyers at HRSP and the lawyers in the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices are 

doing an excellent job despite the challenges. 
27 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Very good. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Senator Whitehouse. 

Senator Blumenthal, do you have any other questions? 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I have just one question. We do not have 

any of our Republican colleagues here today, but I can anticipate 

that one of the issues that may be raised is that this kind of proposal, CEJA, would ‘‘discourage’’ or ‘‘deter’’ contractors from wanting to be involved in doing business and working for the United 

States. 

You are not in the business of contracting, but I wonder if you 

could address that issue on behalf of the Department. 

Mr. BREUER. Of course. I would hope that is not the case, Senator. I would hope that our contractors are wanting to serve, because they want to fulfill their contracts in service of the work for 

the United States. All we are saying here is that if you are a contractor for the United States and you commit a serious crime in the 

host country, wherever you are, we need a way to reach you, and 

that is very important. 

I should clarify one point. If you are a citizen of the host country 

and you are working for us, CEJA would not apply to you. We 

would rely on the host country. But I cannot imagine that fairminded people think that this will be a deterrent to working for a 

contractor. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I would agree. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BREUER. Thank you. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. 

Mr. Breuer, I want to thank you and the other witnesses for coming here today to talk about this very important issue, and I look 

forward to supporting Senator Leahy in marking up CEJA and getting it to a vote on the Senate floor as soon as possible. 

I also want to take this moment to thank Senator Grassley for 

working with me on a GAO request I am planning to file later 

today related to contractors who have been convicted or found liable for procurement fraud and other misconduct. Mr. Breuer, you 

may recall that I asked you a number of questions related to suspension and debarment back in January, and I also pressed Attorney General Holder on those issues when he was before the Committee earlier this month. I am very concerned that U.S. taxpayer 

dollars are being funneled to contractors who have repeatedly been 

shown to have been irresponsible or, even worse, have been convicted of serious criminal acts. GAO needs to take a comprehensive 

look at how Federal agencies are investigating and, when appropriate, suspending and debarring contractors that we know cannot 

be trusted. 

The Department of Defense often gets criticized for this issue, 

but it is not just them. As we have mentioned, we are going to be 

pouring more and more money into the pockets of private contractors who protect State Department personnel in Iraq, and we need 

to know that those dollars are not going to contractors who pay 

bribes to foreign officials or perpetrate other frauds on the U.S. 

Government. 

I will add our request to the GAO to the hearing record. 
28 

[The information referred to appears as a submission for the 

record.] 

Senator FRANKEN. We will keep the record open for the next 

week for any additional questions or statements by other Senators. 

Thank you again for your time today. This meeting stands adjourned. 

Mr. BREUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

[Additional material submitted for the record follows.] 
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A P P E N D I X 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LANNY A. BREUER
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF PROF. GEOFFREY S. CORN
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF TARA LEE
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PATRICK J. LEAHY
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO MICHAEL J. EDNEY BY SENATOR GRASSLEY

[Note: At the time of printing, the Committee had not received responses from Michael J. Edney.] 
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO HON. LANNY A. BREUER BY SENATOR GRASSLEY
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