alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2006092EN.01001101.xml

| 20.4.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 92/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.4.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 92/11

---

Notice inviting applications for authorisation to prospect for hydrocarbons in block B14 of the Dutch continental shelf

(2006/C 92/04)

The Minister for Economic Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands hereby gives notice that an application has been received for authorisation to prospect for hydrocarbons in block B14 as indicated on the map appended as Annex 3 to the Mining Regulation (Mijnbouwregeling) (Government Gazette (Staatscourant) 2002, No 245).

Mijnbouwregeling

Staatscourant

With reference to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons and the publication required by Article 15 of the Mining Act (Mijnbouwwet) (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees (Staatsblad) 2002, No 542), the Minister for Economic Affairs hereby invites interested parties to submit an application for authorisation to prospect for hydrocarbons in block B14.

Mijnbouwwet

Staatsblad

The Minister for Economic Affairs is the competent authority for the granting of authorisations. The criteria, conditions and requirements referred to in Articles 5(1), 5(2) and 6(2) of the Directive are set out in the Mining Act (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2002, No 542).

Applications may be submitted during the 13 weeks following the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union and should be sent to the Minister for Economic Affairs, for the attention of the Director for the Energy Market, Prinses Beatrixlaan 5, The Hague, Netherlands, and marked ‘personal’.

Official Journal of the European Union

Applications submitted after the expiry of this period will not be considered.

A decision on the applications will be taken not later than twelve months after the period has expired.

Further information can be obtained from the following telephone number: (31-70) 379 72 98.

---
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

September 15, 2009 

Order 

 

September 15, 2009 

136956(45) 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 SC: 136956 

v COA: 278189 

St. Joseph CC: 06-013718-FC 

LARRY EUGENE WILCOX, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

___________________________________ 

 On order of the Chief Justice, the motion by defendant-appellant for extension of 

the time for filing his brief and appendix is considered and, it appearing the brief and 

appendix were filed September 9, 2009, the time for filing is extended to that date.
§ 442.119 Duration of denial of payments and subsequent termination of an ICF/IID. ( a ) *Period of denial.* The denial of payments for new admissions will continue for 11 months after the month it was imposed unless, before the end of that period, the Medicaid agency finds that— ( 1 ) The facility has corrected the deficiencies or is making a good faith effort to achieve compliance with the conditions of participation for ICFs/IID; or
( 2 ) The deficiencies are such that it is necessary to terminate the facility's provider agreement.
( b ) *Subsequent termination.* The Medicaid agency must terminate a facility's provider agreement— ( 1 ) Upon the agency's finding that the facility has been unable to achieve compliance with the conditions of participation for ICFs/IID during the period that payments for new admissions have been denied;
( 2 ) Effective the day following the last day of the denial of payments period; and
( 3 ) In accordance with the procedures for appeal of terminations set forth in subpart D of part 431 of this chapter.
[51 FR 24491, July 3, 1986, as amended at 59 FR 56236, Nov. 10, 1994]
# C_2006128EN.01002401.xml

| 1.6.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 128/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.6.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 128/24

---

Prior notification of a concentration

(Case COMP/M.4226 — DSGI/Fotovista)

(2006/C 128/09)

(Text with EEA relevance)

| 1. | On 23 May 2006 the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which DSG International plc (‘DSGI’, UK) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Council Regulation control of the whole of Fotovista S. A. (‘Fotovista’, France) by way of purchase of securities. |
| --- | --- |

1.

On 23 May 2006 the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which DSG International plc (‘DSGI’, UK) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Council Regulation control of the whole of Fotovista S. A. (‘Fotovista’, France) by way of purchase of securities.

1

| 2. | The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:






  — | DSGI: retailing of electrical consumer goods; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—

DSGI: retailing of electrical consumer goods;

| — | Fotovista: retailing of electrical consumer goods. |
| --- | --- |

—

Fotovista: retailing of electrical consumer goods.

| 3. | On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. |
| --- | --- |

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. However, the final decision on this point is reserved.

| 4. | The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.
  Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (No (32-2) 296 43 01 or 296 72 44) or by post, under reference number COMP/M.4226 — DSGI/Fotovista to the following address:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Competition DG |
| Merger Registry |
| J-70 |
| B-1049 Brussels |

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (No (32-2) 296 43 01 or 296 72 44) or by post, under reference number COMP/M.4226 — DSGI/Fotovista to the following address:

European Commission

Competition DG

Merger Registry

J-70

B-1049 Brussels

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

1

---
41155.

#### SAXE v. THE STATE.

Eberhaedt, Judge.

Proof that the defendant, fully clothed and engaged in no activity beyond the drinking of a can of beer while sitting in the living room of her home with two adult men, likewise fully clothed and engaged, and four other women who were dressed in “shorty pajamas” and “peek-a-boo” bras—though exposing no parts of their person except the legs—who were also drinking beer while all carried on a general conversation which was neither boisterous nor profane will not support a conviction under *Code*§ 26-6102 for maintaining a lewd house. There was no evidence of any adultery or fornication being committed in the house other *132than proof of the circumstance that it bore the reputation of being a place where lewd people stayed. That is not enough. *Frazier v. State,*93 Ga. App. 204 (2) (91 SE2d 85); *Line-barker v. State,*74 Ga. App. 262 (39 SE2d 730); *Ward v. State,*14 Ga. App. 110 (80 SE 295).

Decided February 4, 1965.

*Sullivan, Herndon & Smith, John J. Sullivan,*for plaintiff in error.

*Andrew J. Ryan, Jr., Solicitor, Sylvan A. Garjunkel,*contra.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Pannell, J., concur.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1994
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1994
<CASH>                                       1,033,717
<SECURITIES>                                    36,978
<RECEIVABLES>                                   59,398
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (14,558)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,083,141
<PP&E>                                         458,482
<DEPRECIATION>                                (74,626)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,503,975
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          541,172
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     50,000
<COMMON>                                     3,144,102
<OTHER-SE>                                 (2,231,299)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,503,975
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                63,036
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  108,003
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               406,457
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              12,844
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (327,418)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (327,418)
<DISCONTINUED>                               (201,060)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (201,060)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.82)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
§ 424.7 General limitations. ( a ) *Utilization review finding on medical necessity.* When a QIO or a UR committee notifies a hospital or SNF of its finding that further services are not medically necessary, the following rules apply: ( 1 ) *Hospitals subject to PPS.* Payment may not be made for inpatient hospital services furnished by a PPS hospital after the second day after the day on which the hospital received the notice.
( 2 ) *Hospitals not subject to PPS and SNFs* — ( i ) *Basic rule.* Except as provided in paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section, payment may not be made for inpatient hospital services or posthospital SNF care furnished after the day on which the hospital or SNF received the notice.
( ii ) *Exception.* Payment may be made for 1 or 2 additional days if the QIO or UR committee approves them as necessary for planning for post-discharge care.
( b ) *Failure to make timely utilization review.* Payment may not be made for inpatient hospital services or posthospital SNF care furnished, after the 20th consecutive day of a stay, to an individual who is admitted to the hospital or SNF after CMS has determined that the hospital or SNF has failed to make timely utilization review in long stay cases. (This provision does not apply to a hospital or SNF for which a QIO has assumed binding review.)
[53 FR 6635, Mar. 2, 1988; 53 FR 12945, Apr. 20, 1988]
#### Ralph Douglas MOSBY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 81-268.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Oct. 21, 1981.

Richard S. Rhodes, Orlando, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and James Dickson Crock, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. *Pope v. State,*56 Fla. 81, 47 So. 487 (1908); *Ivey v. Eastmoore,*402 So.2d 1248 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).

COBB, SHARP and COWART, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 10.14

AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO THE

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AGREEMENT

This amendment (Amendment) is effective as of the date signed by ADPT (formerly Adaptec, Inc.) (Effective Date) and amends that
certain Independent Contractor Agreement effective as of January 4, 2010 (Agreement) between ADPT (formerly Adaptec, Inc.) and John J. Quicke (Contractor). Unless expressly stated to the contrary herein, all capitalized
terms in this Amendment shall have the meaning ascribed to them in the Agreement.

I. The term of the Agreement is hereby extended for another
one (1) year term to January 3, 2012.

II. Exhibit A is amended by extending the Anticipated Ending Date in line (b) to
December 31, 2011.

Except as expressly amended by this Amendment, the Agreement shall continue in full force and effect in accordance
with its terms. This Amendment may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which together shall constitute one instrument.

IN WITNESS THEREOF, the parties have caused this Amendment to be executed by their duly authorized representative as of the date set forth below.



|                     |  |  |  |                     
|-------------------- |  |  |  | --------------------
|ADPT CORPORATION     |  |  |  | JOHN J. QUICKE      
|                     |  | 
|/s/ Mary L. Dotz     |  |  |  | /s/ John J. Quicke  
|Authorized Signature |  |  |  | Authorized Signature
|                     |  | 
|Mary L. Dotz         |  |  |  | John J. Quicke      
|Printed Name         |  |  |  | Printed Name        
|                     |  | 
|CFO                  |  |  |  | Interim CEO         
|Title                |  |  |  | Title               
|                     |  | 
|Dec 7, 2010          |  |  |  | Dec 8, 2010         
|Effective Date       |  |  |  | Date
§ 438.228 Grievance and appeal systems. ( a ) The State must ensure, through its contracts, that each MCO, PIHP, and PAHP has in effect a grievance and appeal system that meets the requirements of subpart F of this part.
( b ) If the State delegates to the MCO, PIHP, or PAHP responsibility for notice of action under subpart E of part 431 of this chapter, the State must conduct random reviews of each delegated MCO, PIHP, or PAHP and its providers and subcontractors to ensure that they are notifying enrollees in a timely manner.
EXHIBIT 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



The undersigned hereby certifies that, to his knowledge, (i) the Form
10-K filed by First Citizens Bancorporation, Inc. (Bancorporation) for the year ended December 31, 2004, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and (ii) the
information contained in that report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition at December 31 2004 and December 31, 2003, and the results of operations of Bancorporation for the years ended December 31, 2004, December 31,
2003 and December 31, 2002.



|                     |  |                        
|-------------------- |  | -----------------------
|Date: March 15, 2005 |  | /s/ Jim B. Apple       
|                     |  | Jim B. Apple           
|                     |  | Chief Executive Officer
|                     | 
|Date: March 15, 2005 |  | /s/ Craig L. Nix       
|                     |  | Craig L. Nix           
|                     |  | Chief Financial Officer
# C_2006010EN.01000501.xml

| 14.1.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 10/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.1.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 10/5

---

ORDER OF THE COURT

ORDER OF THE COURT

(Sixth Chamber)

of 15 September 2005

in Case C-112/04 P: Marlines SA v Commission of the European Communities (1)

1

(Appeal - Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty (now Article 81(1) EC) - Competition - Agreements, decisions and concerted practices - Agreements between undertakings - Proof of an undertaking's participation in business meetings with an anti-competitive purpose)

(2006/C 10/09)

Language of the case: Greek

In Case C-112/04 P: Marlines SA (lawyers: D. Papatheofanous and A. Anagnostou) against the Commission of the European Communities (Agents: R. Lyal and T. Christoforou) — an appeal under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice brought on 3 March 2004, the Court (Sixth Chamber), composed of A. Borg Barthet, President of the Chamber, A. La Pergola and J.-P Puissochet (Rapporteur), Judges; D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Advocate General; R. Grass, Registrar, made an order on 15 September 2005, the operative part of which is as follows:

Marlines SA

Commission of the European Communities

| 1. | The appeal is dismissed as being in part clearly unfounded and in part clearly inadmissible. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The appeal is dismissed as being in part clearly unfounded and in part clearly inadmissible.

| 2. | Marlines SA is ordered to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Marlines SA is ordered to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 106, 30.04.2004

1

---
#### E. M. REIZEN, Appellant, v. FLORIDA NATIONAL BANK AT GAINESVILLE, etc., Appellee.

No. 43239.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 24, 1975.

Appeal dismissed.
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-19-0000187 15-OCT-2019 09:23 AM
#### Leonard COOPERMAN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 80-1568.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 21, 1981.

Steel, Hector & Davis and Sheila A. Hal-pern and Talbot D’Alemberte, Miami, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Steven R. Jacob, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Paul Morris, William A. Clay, Robert Ro-senblatt, Miami, for Florida Criminal Defense Attorneys’ Association as amicus curiae.

Before HENDRY, SCHWARTZ and NESBITT, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Cooperman’s adjudication of indirect contempt of court for spoken words published in The Miami Herald is reversed. The remarks concerned what Cooperman perceived as an excessive sentence which was imposed upon his former client. The comments were made at a point in time when all judicial labor had been concluded. The state failed to prove that the intemperate remarks constituted an imminent and serious threat to the administration of justice. *Wood v. Georgia,*370 U.S. 375, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962).

Reversed.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED June 22, 2005 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-30226 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus SHEMIKA NICOLE SCROGGINS, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 5:03-CR-50037-1

-------------------- Before WIENER, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Shemika Nicole Scroggins appeals the sentence imposed following her guilty-plea conviction for conspiracy to defraud various insurance companies through the use of the United States mails in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. For the first time on appeal, she argues that the district court erred in enhancing her sentence based on her relevant conduct that was neither admitted by her nor found by a jury in violation of the Sixth Amendment under Blakely v. Washington , 124 S. Ct. 1531 (2004).No. 04-30226 -2- Because Scroggins did not raise this issue in the district court, this court reviews the argument for plain error. See United States v. Mares , 402 F.3d 511, 520-21 (5th Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed (Mar. 31, 2005) (No. 04-9517). Thus, Scroggins must show: (1) an error; (2) that is clear or plain; (3) that affected her substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of her judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 732-35 (1993); United States v. Vasquez , 216 F.3d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 2000). Scroggins argues generally that she did not admit the relevant conduct on which the district court based her sentence and, therefore, the district court improperly sentenced her under Blakely . Scroggins makes no showing, as required by Mares , that the district court would likely have sentenced her differently under the Booker advisory scheme. Similarly, there is no indication from the court’s remarks at sentencing that the court would have reached a different conclusion. Thus, Scroggins has not met her burden to show that the district court’s increase of her sentence based on its findings concerning her relevant conduct was plain error. See Mares , 402 F.3d at 520-21. Accordingly, Scroggins’s sentence is AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 32.1

         CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED
          PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Annual Report of Union Bankshares, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2003 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), the undersigned Chief Executive Officer of the Company hereby
certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. [SECTION]1350, as adopted pursuant to
[SECTION]906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of his
knowledge; 1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and 2) the information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for
the periods covered in the Report.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to Union Bankshares, Inc. and will be retained by Union
Bankshares, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or
its staff upon request.


/s/ Kenneth D. Gibbons
-----------------------------
Kenneth D. Gibbons
Chief Executive Officer


March 30, 2004


<PAGE>
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. J. P. ROUYEA v. C. Murray HENDERSON.

No. 55276.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 8, 1974.

In re: J. P. Rouyea applying for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Writ granted. Evidentiary hearing ordered, unless within fifteen days of date this court is furnished record evidence other than the minutes, (such as the transcribed colloquy at the time of the plea) of the free and voluntary character of the plea.

SUMMERS, J.,

is of the opinion that the minutes of this case evidence the fact that applicant was aware of the consequences of his plea, and, although an inference that the plea was free and voluntary arises from the presence of defense counsel at the plea, the record must affirmatively record that the plea was free and voluntary or that fact must be shown by other evidence. See McChesney v. Henderson, 5 Cir., 482 F.2d 1101.