It i s th e p o licy o f th is c o u rt to d e c lin e to re fe r to m in o r v ic tim s o f se x u a l o ff e n se s b y n a m e

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### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON O ct obe r 5, 200 4 S es sio n
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . RONALD JO SEPH REE CE
Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Madison Cou nty No. 02-725 Roge r P age, Judge

No. W2004-01130-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Fe bruary 25, 2005

Ronald J oseph Reec e plea ded g uilty to statutory

rape for whic h he re ceive d a two-y ear probationar

y se nte nc e

. A g g r i e v e d o f t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s r e f u s a l t o g r an t j u d i c i a l d i v e r s i o n , h e n o w a p p e a ls h is sentenc e. After a thoroug h revie w of the rec ord and applica ble law, we aff

irm the sentenc e imposed by the low e r c ourt

.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uitCo ur t i s A ffirm e d.

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and D AVI D G. H AYES , J J ., joined.

Patrick Mar

tin, J ackson, Te nnessee , for the A ppellant, Ronald J oseph Reec e.

Pa ul G . Summe rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Mic ha e l Ma rk ham, A ssi sta

nt A tto rn e y

Gene ra l; Jer ry Woo da ll, Di str ic t Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l; and Jim Th omp so n, As sis tant D istri c t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, for the A ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

The de fenda

nt, Ronald J oseph Reec e, p le a d e d g u il ty in M a d is o n Co u nty Ci r c u it Court to one count of statutory

rape

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-506 ( 2003). The de fenda nt entere d a “blind” plea with the sentenc e to be de termined by the trial cour

t. Pursuant to the reque st made by de fe ns e c ouns e l a t th e de fe nd ant’ s se nte nc ing he ari ng , the c ourt bif ur c a te d the he ari ng ; th e c ourt fi rs t addre ssed and de nied the def endant’ s reque st for judicial diver s i o n and sec ond sentenc ed the defe ndant to serve a two-y ear probationar

y sentenc e.

Duri ngthe he ari ng , th e vic tim ’s mot he r t e sti fi e d o n b e ha lf

of th e s t a t e , a nd the vic tim 1 testified on beha lf of the de fense . The defe ndant taug ht the victim at he r high school, and the two be g an the ir se xua l re la tio ns hip wh e n the vic tim wa s sev e nte e n y e ars old . T he vic tim ’s mot he r f ir st-2-

lear ned of the relationship by rea ding some e-ma il corre spondence s betwee n the victim and the defe ndant. The victim’s mother confr onted the victim, and the victim admitted to her mother that she had a relationship with the defe ndant. Shortly there afte r, the de fenda

nt approa ched the victim’s mother to disc uss the relationship. At that time, the victim’s mother promised the def endant that she
wo uld no t r e po rt

the re la tio ns hip to t

he a uth or iti e s p ro vid e d th e de fe nd ant c e a se d all c on ta c t w ith the victim. Nonetheless, the vic tim’s mother did report the relationship to the authorities, and the defe ndant and the vic tim resumed communications t here afte r. The victim ’s m other fur ther testified that as a re sult of the crime, both he r re lationship with t he victim and her job perfor

mance had suffe red, a

nd she eve ntually

lost her job.

The victim testified that she initiated her sexual relationship with the defenda nt and fe lt ba dly that the re la tio ns hip ha d c a us e d su c h pe rs on a l los s fo r him

. Th e de fe nd ant i ntr od uc e d h is pre- sentenc e re port, which include d a stateme nt indicating that he ca red f or the victim but faulted his own weakness for suc cumbing to the victim’s initi ation of a sexual relationship. The de fenda nt also introduced nume rous letters wr itten by various individuals besee ching the court to g rant judicial diversion in his case.

The trial c ourt denied the defe ndant’s re quest for judicial diversion on the basis that (1) the defe ndant’s relationship with the vi ctim involved continual contact over an extended period of time; (2) the de fenda

nt knew the victim was a minor and ac tually

discussed her

ag e; (3) the defe ndant was more than 20 y ear s the victim’s senior; (4) the ne ed to deter this ty pe of be havior; (5) the def endant wa s the victim’s teac her; a nd (6) the de fenda

nt contacte d the vi ctim at least once afte r he ag ree d not to do so. The court fur t h er found that althoug h mitigation fa ctor (1) , that the defe ndant’s criminal conduct neither cause d nor threatened serious bodily injury , Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113( 1) (2003) , was a pplicable to the de fenda

nt’s case , it should be give n littl e we ight.

The c ourt subsequently

imposed the maxi mum sentence in his sentenc ing rang e, two y ear s, based upon the applicability of enhanc ement fac tor (16), that the defe ndant abused a position
o f p u blic trust. Id. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 1 4 ( 1 6 )

. T h e c o urt a ls o f o u n d f a c to r s ( 1 ) an d ( 4 ) a

p p li c a b le to the defe ndant’s case but g ave the m litt le weig ht. Id. § 40-35-113( 1), (4) . The c ourt rec og nized that the defe ndant was a

favor able c andidate for alternative sentencing beca use he was being se ntence d for
a Cla ss E fe lony

and be c a us e he ha d n o p ri or

c ri min a l hi sto ry . A c c or din g ly , th e c ourt pr ob a te d h is
se nte nc e . T he c ourt

fu rt he r o rd e re d th e de fe nd ant t o r e g ist e r h ims e lf a s a se xua l of

fe nd e r a nd to
c e a se a ll c on ta c t w iththe vic tim

.

Th e de fe nd ant n ow a

pp e a ls the low e r c ourt ’s re fu sa l to g ra nt j ud ic ia l di ve rs ion

in h is
case . Specifica lly , the def endant a rg ues that the trial court err ed by g iving imprope r we ight to one of the fa ctors re levant to the cour t’s analy sis. The defe ndant posits that t h e t ri al court placed ina pp ro pr ia te w eight on th e c ir c ums tanc e s o f t he c ri me , n a me ly

the le ng th o f t

he re la tio ns hip betwee n the victim and the def endant a nd the age differ ence betwee n the two. The de fenda nt arg ues that the trial cour

t improperly

ignor ed seve ral fa ctors applica ble to its decision-making , such as the
remorse ful statements m ad e b y t h e defenda nt in the presente nce r eport, the nume rous supportive letters that re counted the de fenda nt’s remorse , and the victim’s testimony

. T h e d ef en d ant further-3-

complains that the trial cour t did not fully

explain it s rea s o n i n g o n the re cord; it stated that it was g iving g reater we ight to certain factors and littl e weight to other s, but it di d not expl ain why it was doing so a s require d by

law. F urthermor e, the de fenda nt takes issue with the trial cour t’s disapproval of judicial diversion for

statutory rape offe nders be cause Tenne s s ee la w classifie s these off

ender s as s ex u al o ffe nders a

nd beca use no other se x ual offe nders a re e ligible f

or diversion. De spite the court’s c omments to the contrar y , the def endant a sserts that the trial c ourt relied upon the defe ndant’s classification as a sexual offende r whe n den y i n g h i s request for judicial diver sion. Finally , the d e f e n dant ar g ues that an a

naly sis of Tennesse e law r evea ls that the application of e nhance ment fac tor (16), that the de fenda

nt a bused a position of public trust, doe s not support denying judicia l diversion in the defe ndant’s ca se. The state counter s that the defe ndant has not demonstra t ed that the cour t abused its discre tion when deny ing diversion and that the record supports the trial court’s de cision.

The Sentenc ing Re fo rm Act of 1989 a llows a sentenc ing c ourt to “def er f urther proce eding s . . . and plac e such de fenda nt on probation upon such re asonable conditions a s it may req u i re without entering a judg ment of g uilty and with the conse nt of the qualified de fenda nt,” provided that the candidate has not, int e r a lia , previously pleade d g uilty

to or bee n convicted of

a felony or Class A misdemeanor . Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-313(a )(1) (A), ( a)( 1)(B )(i )(a) (2003)

. This proce dure, c ommonly known as judi ci al diversion, is simil ar to pre trial diversion; howeve r, judicial diversion follows a de termination of g uilt, and the decision to g rant diversion rests with the trial court, not the pr osecutor. See State v . Anderson , 857 S.W .2d 571, 572 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)

.

Th e low e r c ourt ’s de nia l of jud ic ia l di ve rs ion is su

bje c t to re ve rs a l on

a pp e a l on ly

if t h at co u rt abused its discre tion. See State v . Robinson, 1 3 9 S. W. 3 d 6 6 1 , 6 6 5 ( T e n n

. Cr im

. App. 20 04 ). An

a bu se of dis c re tio n o c c ur s w he n th e tr ia l co urt ’s de nia l of jud ic ia l di ve rs ion

is unsupported by

any substantial evidence

. See State v. Parke r , 9 32 S.W. 2d 94 5, 95 8 ( Te nn . Cr im. App. 1996).

I n deter

mining whether to g rant judi cial diversion, the t rial cour t must consider (a) the acc used’s amena

bility to c orre ction, (b) the circ umstances of the offe nse, (c) the accused’ s criminal re cord, (d) t he accuse d’s s ocial his tory , (e) the ac cused’ s phy sical and me ntal health, (f ) the deter renc e value to the accused as well as others, and (g ) whe ther judicial diver sion will serve the int er es t s of the public a s well as the a ccuse d. Parker , 9 32 S.W. 2d a t 95 8; State v. Bone

stel , 871 S. W. 2 d 1 6 3 , 1 6 8 ( T e n n

. Cr im

. A pp. 1993), overruled on othe r grounds by State v. Hoope r , 29 S.W .3d 1, 9 (Tenn. 2000)

. Moreove r, t he record must ref lect that the cour

t has weig hed all of the fac tors in rea ching its det er m ination. See B onestel , 8 71 S.W. 2d a t 16 8. Th a t is , th e c ourt mus t explain o n th e r e c o r d w h y th e d e f e n d an t d o e s n o t qu a li f

y u n d e r it s an a ly s is , an d if th e c ourt has based its deter

mination on only

some of the f

actor s, it must explain why these fa ctors outweig h the others. See id.
First, we conclude t h at the trial cour t adequately

explained its reasons for de ny ing div e rs ion on the re c or d. Th e tr ia l c ourt re a so ne d, in r e le va

nt p art :-4- [W ]hen determining whether or not a de fenda

nt should ge t jud i cial diver s io n [, ] th e r e ar e s e v e r a l f a c to r s th a t I mu s t lo o k a t. N u mb e r o n e is the defe ndant’s ame nability

to corre ction.

Of c ourse, in this case Mr. Reec e has virtua lly no criminal record. I thi nk the pr e se nte nc e re po rt me nti on s so me tr a ff ic tic ke ts b ut t

hat’ s a ll. Ob vio us ly his amenability

to corre ction is good.

The c ircumstance s of the offe nse is the sec ond fac tor. I n this case we had continuing contac t.

. . . . Acc ording to th e p r e s e nte n c e re port, then, the attachment, this was not
a one- tim e s i t u at i on. This was continuing contac t. And Mr. Reec e aske d of [the vic tim ] a t on e po int

Ithi nk he mig ht k iss he r, and

the n th e re wa s so me vis its to
a pa rtme nts and

a c tua l di sc us sio ns of he r a g e and wh e the r or no t the y sh ou ld w a it t o have se x until October the 5 till s he turne d eig hteen. And t hey didn’t do that or we th wouldn’t be he re.

This relationship went on for a long time. At the time – I t’s not like some of the case s I ’ve ha d in here when the de fenda nts alleg e they

did not know that the vic timwa s [no t] e ig hte e n. I t’ s o bv iou s th a t Mr . Re e c e did kn owthat.

The re lationship actually continued and did not stop until [ the vic tim ’s ] pare nts be c a me awa re of it. Ac tua lly

Ithi nk that qu ote fr om M r. Re e c e is that, “She’s e ncounter ed har dships because of my indiscretions,” talking about her
ru nn ingwi th a

ba d c ro wd

and pe rh a ps us ingdr

ug s. Also, this is not a situation where I have a twenty -two y ear old a nd a
s e v e n te e ny e ar

o ld

. H e is mo r e th antw e n ty y e ar s o ld e r

th an[th e v ic ti m]

. The nex t fac tor Imust consider is [t he] defenda nt’s criminal re cord, which I ’ve alrea dy said is there ’s vi rtually none. His social hist ory ; acc ording to the p re s en t en ce re p o rt M r. R ee ce l o s th i s fa t h er an d m o t h er an d t wo s i b l i n gs b y

t h e a ge of thirteen. I

have taken that into consideration.

The ne x t fac tor is the status of his phy sical and me ntal health, which is good.

The ne x t fac tor is deter rence – de terre nce va lue to others, to the
a c c us e d a s w e ll a s o the rs in s imi lar c ir c ums tanc e s.-5- This is a big f

actor in this case. We must, in my opinion, not allow this ty pe of b eh av i o r to be tolerated in our community . What would it s ay to the public if Iallowed Mr. Re ece to ge t diversion in this case?

Imust consider the public and the a ccuse d’s intere sts. And also the
e nd s o f j us tic e is a

no the r f a c tor , a nd a lso a dd iti on a l be havio r s inc e the arr e st.

Of c ours e , M r. Re e c e wa s n ot i nd ic te d unti l Nove mbe r o f ‘ 02 . T his
case didn’t appea

r on my docket until June of ‘03. But I will note f or the re cord he made c ontact at lea st once a fter he ag ree d not to.

. . . . Havingsaid all that, consider ed eve ry thing a nd weig hed all t

h e f a c to rs I ’m supposed to weig h, Icannot find that in this case Mr. Ree ce should be g rante d judicial diversion.

I d o n ’ tt h i n k

t h a tw o u l d

b e a p r o p e r s t a t e m e n t t o t h e c o m m u n i t y

. It would not provide proper deterre nce. There fore , I ’m g oing to f ind for the r easons se t forth that the r equest for

judicial diversion will not be g rante d.

The c ourt set forth its reas oning f or ac cordingmore we ight to ce rtain fa ctors: The fac ts of the ca se indicate that the def endant a cted pur

posefully , as demon s t rate d by the ong oing
natur e of the de fe nd ant’ s r e la tio ns hip wi th s ome on e he kn e w wa s a mi no r; mor e ov e r, so c ie ty e xpe c ts
more re sponsible conduct fr om someone of the defendant’s ag e and position, and thus to serve the g reater n ee d to deter this ty pe of c onduct, the cour

t denied the de fenda

nt’s reque st for diversion. Acc ording ly , we f

ind that the court’s r easoningwas suff iciently rela y ed. Turning next t o the defe ndant’s conte ntion that the trial court er red by applying inappropriate weig ht to the fac ts and circumstance s surrounding the defendant’s crime and by failing to adeq u at el y ex plain its reasoning on the re cord, w e conc lude that the re cord suppor ts the trial court’s denial of diversion and that the tria l court ade quately explained its reasoning on the re cord. When it denied the defe ndant’s request for judicial diversion, t he trial court first outlined the litany of fa c tor s to be c on sid e re d wh e n makin g thi s de te rm inatio n. Th e c ourt did re ly pr ima ri ly on the fa c ts and circ umstances surrounding the offe nse as the basis for its de cision. I t c ited the ong oing nature of the re lationship, the fact that the de fenda nt was aware of the victim’s ag e, the a g e diffe renc e betwee n the def

endant a nd the victim, the teac her- student relationship betwe en the de fenda nt and the victim, and the re n ewed contac t betwee n the def endant a nd the victim after

the def endant ha d ag ree d not to do so. The rec ord supports these f actua l f indings, and we hold that the se fa cts, coupled with the need to de ter sexual relationships between tea cher s and their minor students, ar e suff icient to support the court’s fi n d i ng . Acc ording ly , the cour t did not abuse its discretion when de ny ing diversion.-6- Next, the defenda

nt takes issue with the trial court’s comments reg ardingits belief that th e de fe nd ant s ho uld no t be e lig ibl e for ju di cia l di ve rs ion . T he c ourt ma de the se state me nts immediately

prior to announc ing its dec ision to deny diversion:

An d th e re ’s on e oth e r t

hin g Iwa nt t o s ta te fo r t

he re c or d. I thi nk – A nd

thi s is not a fac tor in my

decision. B ut we do have statutes set t i n g fo rt h t h at s tatutory rape is a sex offense. H e’s a sex offe nder and, y ou know, at the end of this, assuming he ’s c on vic te d o f i t and it’ s up he ld on a pp e a l, he wi ll have to be mon ito re d and wi ll be calle d a r e g is te r e d

s e x o f f e n d e r

. A n d

it s o me h o w f

li e s in th e f a c e o f the
e xpun g e me nt s ta tut e to h a ve a statut or y ra pe de fe nd ant e lig ibl e fo r e xpun g e me nt. But the la

w say s he’s e ligible a

nd I ’m, as I s ai d , co n s idering it and Iam not consideringthe fa ct th at

– o f t h e re porting require ments when one is convicted of statutory rape

. Whil e the de fenda

nt asserts that the tria l court improper ly relied o n his sex ual offe nder status whe n denying dive rsion, the trial court’ s comments direc tly contra dict that asser

tion. Moreove r, bec ause w e find that the rec ord supports the trial cour t’s denial of judicia l diversion, we
c on c lud e that any

e rr or in r e fe re nc ingthe de fe nd ant’ s se xua l of fe nd e r s ta tus is h arm le ss.

F in a ll y , th e d e f

e n d an t ar g u e s th a t th is c o u rt’ s o p in ion in S t a t e v. Robinson , 139 S.W .3d 661 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2 0 0 4 ), sug g ests that enhanc ement fa ctor (16) , that the def endant abused a position of public trust, was improperly applied to the defendant’s case. I n Robinson , th is court a ffirme d the trial cour t’s denial of the defe ndant’s re quest for judicia l d i v er sion. Id. at 665. The de fenda

nt argues that the fa cts of Robinson are distinguishable f rom the fa cts of the instant ca se. Specifica lly , the Robinson tr ia l c ourt de nie d th e de fe nd ant’ s re qu e st fo r jud ic ia l di ve rs ion be c a us e the def endant, who was a pharma cist, illega lly distributed pr escr iption drugs to a w oman with whom he wa s romantically

involved and thus ab u sed his position of public trust. Id. The de fenda nt contends that the misuse of authority , prese nt in Robinson , is no t pr e se nt i n h is c a se ; he e ng a g e d in no such “tra deoff

,” such a s the pharma cist’s exchang e of r omantic involvement for pr escr iption dr ug s. Ho we ve r, we fi nd

thi s d ist inc tio n irr e le va

nt an d rul e that the tr ia l c ourt pr op e rl y a pp lie d th is enhanc ement fa ctor whe n deter mining whe ther the de fe n d an t should rece ive judicial diversion. When determining the applicability of t his enhanc ement factor, the rele vant i nquiry is whether the defe ndant violated a soc ietal expectation that an individual in the def end an t ’s position would not abuse the power entrusted to him or her

. Se e, e. g. , Stat e v . W ill iam Blain e Cam

pb e ll , No. E1999- 02208-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 3 (T enn. C rim. App., Knoxvi lle, Sept. 29, 2000) (upholding the lower c ourt’s finding of an abuse of publ ic t rust when de ny ing the defe ndant’s re quest for judicia l diversion and pr obation; the defe nd a nt a b u s e d h is position of public trust when he distributed alcohol to his mi nor hig h school students). I n the i nstant case , the defendant was the vi ctim’s high sc hool teac her, a nd as such , s o ciety

expected him to refr ain from e ng ag ing in se x ual ac tivity with her. Acc ording ly , we f

ind that the trial court’ s application of e nhance ment fac tor (16) to the de fenda nt’s
c a se wa s a

pt.-7- I n light of the fore g oing, w e hold that the def endant’ s sentencing ch alleng e lac ks
me ri t and a c c or din g ly

a ff ir m th e de c isi on

of the low e r c ourt

.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE