alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 440.166 Nurse practitioner services. ( a ) *Definition of nurse practitioner services.* Nurse practitioner services means services that are furnished by a registered professional nurse who meets a State's advanced educational and clinical practice requirements, if any, beyond the 2 to 4 years of basic nursing education required of all registered nurses.
( b ) *Requirements for certified pediatric nurse practitioner.* The practitioner must be a registered professional nurse who meets the requirements specified in either paragraphs (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this section. ( 1 ) If the State specifies qualifications for pediatric nurse practitioners, the practitioner must— ( i ) Be currently licensed to practice in the State as a registered professional nurse; and
( ii ) Meet the State requirements for qualification of pediatric nurse practitioners in the State in which he or she furnishes the services.
( 2 ) If the State does not specify, by specialty, qualifications for pediatric nurse practitioners, but the State does define qualifications for nurses in advanced practice or general nurse practitioners, the practitioner must— ( i ) Meet qualifications for nurses in advanced practice or general nurse practitioners as defined by the State; and
( ii ) Have a pediatric nurse practice limited to providing primary health care to persons less than 21 years of age.
( c ) *Requirements for certified family nurse practitioner.* The practitioner must be a registered professional nurse who meets the requirements specified in either paragraph (c)(1) or (c)(2) of this section. ( 1 ) If the State specifies qualifications for family nurse practitioners, the practitioner must— ( i ) Be currently licensed to practice in the State as a registered professional nurse; and
( ii ) Meet the State requirements for qualification of family nurse practitioners in the State in which he or she furnishes the services.
( 2 ) If the State does not specify, by specialty, qualifications for family nurse practitioners, but the State does define qualifications for nurses in advanced practice or general nurse practitioners, the practitioner must— ( i ) Meet qualifications for nurses in advanced practice or general nurse practitioners as defined by the State; and
( ii ) Have a family nurse practice limited to providing primary health care to individuals and families.
( d ) *Payment for nurse practitioner services.* The Medicaid agency must reimburse nurse practitioners for their services in accordance with § 441.22(c) of this subchapter.
[60 FR 19861, Apr. 21, 1995]
#### Cathy KELLNER, Appellant, v. Peter A. KELLNER, Appellee.

No. 78-2640.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Sept. 24, 1980.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 7, 1980.

*1275H. T. Maloney of Patterson, Maloney, Blyler & Feigs, Fort Lauderdale, for appel-an^'

Haiman Long Clein, North Miami, for appellee.

DOWNEY, Judge.

Appellant poses two points for our consideration in an appeal from a final judgment of dissolution. The first point suggests error in awarding the husband 85% interest in realty which had been jointly owned. The second point complains of the denial of rehabilitative alimony.

The parties were married for six years. The wife holds a Master’s Degree in Library Science and currently earns approximately $10,000 per year. The parties jointly owned the marital residence and the Sunflower Shopping Center. The evidence reflects that the husband furnished over $100,000 from funds unrelated to the marriage. In addition, he obtained loans used in the shopping center, some of which ultimately were paid off by using other of his assets. The wife’s contribution to the property was minimal, particularly in view of her testimony that she took back from the parties’ joint savings account the $3,000 that she had put into the shopping center. The wife also testified that she never knew the title to the shopping center was in her name also until her lawyer told her when these proceedings commenced. The husband testified that no gift was ever intended, and the wife did not rebut that.

Our scrutiny of the record convinces us that there is substantial competent evidence in the record to support the trial judge’s determination of the value of appellee’s special equity in the shopping center. In fact, it would appear the trial judge was generous in the determination of the wife’s interest. In addition, we find no error demonstrated in the refusal to award rehabilitative alimony to the wife.

Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

ANSTEAD and HURLEY, JJ., concur.
§ 423.46 Late enrollment penalty. ( a ) *General.* A Part D eligible individual must pay the late penalty described under § 423.286(d)(3), except as described at § 423.780(e), if there is a continuous period of 63 days or longer at any time after the end of the individual's initial enrollment period during which the individual meets all of the following conditions: ( 1 ) The individual was eligible to enroll in a Part D plan;
( 2 ) The individual was not covered under any creditable prescription drug coverage; and
( 3 ) The individual was not enrolled in a Part D plan.
( b ) *Role of Part D plan in determination of the penalty.* Part D sponsors must obtain information on prior creditable coverage from all enrolled or enrolling beneficiaries and report this information to CMS in a form and manner determined by CMS.
( c ) *Reconsideration.* Individuals determined to be subject to a late enrollment penalty may request reconsideration of this determination, consistent with § 423.56(g) of this part. Such review will be conducted by CMS, or an independent review entity contracted by CMS, in accordance with guidance issued by CMS. Decisions made through this review are not subject to appeal, but may be reviewed and revised at the discretion of CMS.
( d ) *Record retention.* Part D plan sponsors must retain all information collected concerning a creditable coverage period determination in accordance with the enrollment records retention requirements described in § 423.505(e)(1)(iii).
[70 FR 4525, Jan. 28, 2005, as amended at 73 FR 54251, Sept. 18, 2008; 74 FR 1543, Jan. 12, 2009]
#### § 441.590 Increased Federal financial participation.

Beginning October 1, 2011, the FMAP applicable to the State will be increased by 6 percentage points, for the provision of Community First Choice services and supports, under an approved State plan amendment.
§ 456.160 Certification and recertification of need for inpatient care. ( a ) *Certification.* ( 1 ) A physician must certify for each applicant or beneficiary that inpatient services in a mental hospital are or were needed.
( 2 ) The certification must be made at the time of admission or, if an individual applies for assistance while in a mental hospital, before the Medicaid agency authorizes payment.
( b ) *Recertification.* ( 1 ) A physician, or physician assistant or nurse practitioner (as defined in § 491.2 of this chapter) acting within the scope of practice as defined by State law and under the supervision of a physician, must recertify for each applicant or beneficiary that inpatient services in a mental hospital are needed.
( 2 ) Recertification must be made at least every 60 days after certification.
[46 FR 48561, Oct. 1, 1981]
HomePolicy Issues…Treaties and International Agreements

Policy Issues

# Treaties and International Agreements

Treaties and other international agreements are written agreements between sovereign states (or between states and international organizations) governed by international law.  The United States enters into more than 200 treaties and other international agreements each year.

The subjects of treaties span the whole spectrum of international relations: peace, trade, defense, territorial boundaries, human rights, law enforcement, environmental matters, and many others. As times change, so do treaties. In 1796, the United States entered into the Treaty with Tripoli to protect American citizens from kidnapping and ransom by pirates in the Mediterranean Sea. In 2001, the United States agreed to a treaty on cybercrime.

Read more about what specific bureaus are doing to support this policy issue:

**Office of Treaty Affairs (L/T):** The Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, within the Office of the Legal Adviser, provides guidance on all aspects of U.S. and international treaty law and practice. It manages the process under which the Department of State approves the negotiation and conclusion of all international agreements to which the U.S. will become a party. It also coordinates with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on issues involving the Senate’s advice and consent to ratification of treaties.**Read more about the Office of Treaty Affairs**

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## U.S. Department *of* State

#### The Lessons of 1989: Freedom and Our Future
T he Honorable Jerry W. Cavaneau, United States Magistrate Judge for th e 1 Eastern District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition b y consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).



## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 98-2164

___________ Willie James Henderson, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Arkansas. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of * [UNPUBLISHED] Social Security, * * Appellee, * * State of Arkansas, * * Defendant. *

___________ Submitted: November 4, 1998 Filed: November 17, 1998

___________ Before WOLLMAN, HANSEN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Willie James Henderson appeals the district court & s dismissal of his actio n 1 against the Secretary o f Health and Human Services. Henderson, acting pro se and in-2-

forma pauperis, filed a complaint naming the Secretary as the only defendant.
This court reviews de novo the district court & s dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction bas ed on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See United State s v. Dico, Inc. , 136 F.3d 572, 575 (8th Cir. 1998). To the extent thi s lawsuit seeks review of a

disability claim currently pending before the Social Security Ad ministration(SSA) we agree with the district court that Henderson had no t exhausted his administrative remedies, as evidence submitted by the SSA showed that Henderson’s request for reconsideration was pending when h e filed this action. See 20 C.F. R. § 416.1400(a) (1998) (listing steps of administrative review leading to fina l dec ision). Even assuming that Henderson is attempting to bring an action for a disa bility claim other than the one addressed by the Commissioner, he failed to show that he exhausted his remedies with the SSA. Accordingly, his complaint was properly dismissed. See42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) (claimant may seek judicial review only after final decision by Commissioner following hearing); Rowden v. Warden , 89 F.3d 536, 537- 38 (8th Cir. 1996) (court must dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if plaintiff fails to exhau st administrative remedies without cause); Titus v. Sullivan , 4 F.3d 590, 59 3 (8th Cir. 1993) (plaintiff must allege elements necessary for subject matte r jurisdiction).
Consis tent with exhaustion principles, however, we modify the dismissal to be without prejudice. Cf. Calico Trailer Mfg. Co. v. Insurance Co . of North America , No. 97-335 5, 1998 WL 569128, at *2 (8th Cir. Sept. 9, 1998); Seniority Research Group v. Chrysler Motor Corp. , 976 F.2d 1185, 1189 (8th Cir. 1992). A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### Succession of Jesse TAYLOR.

No. 10186.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

June 5, 1979.

Rehearing Denied July 12, 1979.

*754Edmond R. Eberle, New Orleans, for appellant.

John J. Dolan, New Orleans, for appel-lees.

Frank W. Lagarde, Jr., New Orleans, for absentee-appellees.

Before SAMUEL, BOUTALL and BEER, JJ.

BEER, Judge.

Decedent, Jesse Taylor, was born in Mississippi in 1949. In 1953, his mother, Lulia Scott (“Lula”) Taylor, died, at which time her sister, appellant here, Fannie Scott Atkins, brought Jesse home with her. Thereafter, he was raised with the other children of Fannie Scott Atkins.

He joined the U. S. Army when he was 21 years of age and, while on active military service, suffered injuries which led to his intestate death on January 1, 1975.

Escarb Taylor and Jacob Taylor have alleged that they are the natural brothers of decedent and, accordingly, his closest living relatives. As such, they have successfully opposed a tableau of distribution which would recognize appellant Atkins’ claim as a creditor of the estate for services which she allegedly rendered to decedent from the time that he was 4 years of age until the time that he was approximately 21 years of age. She appeals.

In essence, Jesse Taylor’s entire estate consists of the proceeds of certain government life insurance policies and interest accrued thereupon totalling approximately $35,000.

Appellant Atkins here seeks reversal of the trial court’s judgment of May 26, 1978, exempting the above noted proceeds from her claim as decedent’s creditor based upon her allegations of the care and attention he received during the period of approximately 17 years when he was raised in her home (i. e., from the time that he was 4 until the time that he was approximately 21 and joined the U. S. Army).

The proceeds of two insurance policies with which we are here concerned have been paid, properly we are convinced, to the estate of Jesse Taylor.

Pretermitting any conclusion as to the overall validity of appellant’s claim as a creditor of decedent’s estate for the services that she rendered to him from the time that he was 4 until the time that he was 21, we conclude that the able trial judge has correctly relied upon the applicable provisions of LSA-R.S. 22:647 by exempting all proceeds of the insurance policies hereinabove described from appellant Atkins’ claim as a creditor of the estate.

The judgment is affirmed.

*AFFIRMED.*
[.)r)\zr

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) 

39 

F¡lx No.: (302) 739 3106

CERTIFICATION

April20,2015

I hereby certify that a public hearing was held June 26,2014, on a revision to the State of

Delaware's State Implementation Plan (SIP) entitled ooDelaware 2011 Base Year StateImplementation Plan (SIP) Emission Inventory under the 2008 Ozone National Ambient AirQuality Standard (NAAQS)". The effective date of this revision is August 11,2014.

According to Section 1S2(aX1) of CAA and EPA's implementation rule for the 2008 ozone

standard (Proposed Rule, June 6,2073,78 FR 34178), Delaware is required to submit to EPA in

July 2014 a SIP revision which compiles f)elaware 201 1 emissions of volatile organic

compounds (VOC), oxides of nitrogen QllOx), and carbon monoxide (CO) from five source

sectors: stationary point sources, stationary non-point sources, on-road mobile sources and nonroad mobile sources.

The subject document contains Delaware's base year emission inventory State ImplementationPlan (SIP) revision under the 8-hour ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standard QTIAAQS) setforth by US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2008.

I further certify that the hearing was held in accordance with the notice required by Subsection

51.102 of 40 CFR 51.

Ali Mirzakhalili, P.E.DirectorDivision of Air Quality

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# C_2006108EN.01000602.xml

| 6.5.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 108/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.5.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 108/6

---

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Kammergericht Berlin made on 21 February 2006 in the land registry case of Gerda Möllendorf, Christiane Möllendorf-Niehuus; joined parties: 1. Salem -Abdul Ghani El-Rafeil, 2. Dr. Kamal Rafehi, 3 Ageel A. Al-Ageel

(Case C-117/06)

(2006/C 108/09)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Kammergericht Berlin

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Gerda Möllendorf, Christiane Möllendorf

Applicants:

Joined Parties: 1. Salem-Abdul Ghani El-Rafei, 2. Dr. Kamal Rafehi, 3. Ageel A. Al-Ageel

Joined Parties:

Questions referred

| 1. | Do the provisions of Articles 2(3) and 4(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 (1) prohibit property from being conveyed in performance of a sale and purchase agreement to a natural person listed in Annex I to that regulation? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Do the provisions of Articles 2(3) and 4(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 (1) prohibit property from being conveyed in performance of a sale and purchase agreement to a natural person listed in Annex I to that regulation?

1

| 2. | If Question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative: does Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 prohibit entry in the land register necessary for transferring ownership in the property also when the underlying sale and purchase agreement has been concluded, and the conveyance declared binding, before publication of the limitation on disposal in the Official Journal of the European Communities, and the contractual purchase price to be paid by the natural person listed in Annex I to the regulation, as purchaser, has already been






  (a) | deposited on the notarial trust account or |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

If Question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative: does Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 prohibit entry in the land register necessary for transferring ownership in the property also when the underlying sale and purchase agreement has been concluded, and the conveyance declared binding, before publication of the limitation on disposal in the Official Journal of the European Communities, and the contractual purchase price to be paid by the natural person listed in Annex I to the regulation, as purchaser, has already been

Official Journal of the European Communities

(a)

deposited on the notarial trust account or

| (b) | paid to the seller? |
| --- | --- |

(b)

paid to the seller?

---

(1)  OJ L 139, p. 9.

1

---
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases...Joint Statement on the Situation in Libya

# 									Joint Statement on the Situation in Libya							

Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

June 24, 2022

The text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the United States of America, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom:

*Begin Text:*

France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America welcome the progress made in the talks between the Joint Committee of the House of Representatives and High State Council in Cairo facilitated by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).  We welcome the degree of consensus reached so far towards agreement and appreciate the work of Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General Stephanie Williams and UNSMIL.

We call on the House of Representatives, the High State Council, and their leaders to urgently finalize the legal basis so that credible, transparent, and inclusive presidential and parliamentary elections can be held as soon as possible, as set out in UNSCR 2570 (2021), the LPDF Roadmap, the Libya Stabilization Conference, the Berlin II conference conclusions, and the declaration of the Paris Conference on Libya.

The LPDF roadmap set the expiration of the transitional phase on 22 June, provided that Presidential and Parliamentary elections are held on 24 December 2021, which has not been the case.  We stress the need for a unified Libyan government able to govern and deliver these elections across the country, achieved through dialogue and compromise as soon as possible.  We firmly reject actions that could lead to violence or to greater divisions in Libya, such as the creation of parallel institutions, any attempt to seize power through force, or refusal of peaceful transition of power to a new executive formed through a legitimate and transparent process.  We urge Libyan political leaders to engage constructively in negotiations, including through the good offices of UNSMIL, to unlock the executive impasse and agree on a pathway to elections.  We continue to expect the full implementation of the 23 October 2020 ceasefire agreement.  Violence, incitement to violence, and hate speech are inexcusable and unacceptable.

We underline that Libya’s resources must be managed in a transparent, responsible, and accountable manner throughout the country, and for the benefit of the Libyan people.  We urge Libya’s leaders to agree on the country’s public spending priorities and establish a joint revenue management and oversight structure through continuing engagement with the Berlin Process Economic Working Group.

*End Text*

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Bureau of Near Eastern AffairsLibyaOffice of the Spokesperson

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#### Richard BLOUNT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 81-1671.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 16, 1982.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and Howard K. Blumberg, Asst. Public Defender and Kathleen Mahoney, Legal Intern, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Paul Mendel-son, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before HUBBART, C. J., and HENDRY and JORGENSON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *Johnson v. State,*293 So.2d 71 (Fla.1974); *Sharp v. State,*328 So.2d 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); *Gaynor v. State,*196 So.2d 19 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967).
Home1994 Treaties and Agreements...Denmark (94-1212) – Agreement Concerning the Closure of the Transmitting Station at Angissoq, Greenland

# 									Denmark (94-1212) – Agreement Concerning the Closure of the Transmitting Station at Angissoq, Greenland							

TIAS

Office of Treaty Affairs

December 12, 1994

Defense:  Greenland

Agreement signed at Copenhagen December 12, 1994; entered into force December 12, 1994.

With Annex.**
Download Agreements						 [628 KB]

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