alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4360

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

DONNELL MANN, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District 

Judge. (1:07-cr-00444-WDQ-2) 

Submitted: August 10, 2009 Decided: August 25, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Sapna Mirchandani, Staff 

Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. 

Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Michael C. Hanlon, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Donnell Mann pled guilty to a Hobbs Act conspiracy, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2006) (Count 2); to possession 

of a firearm by a convicted felon and aiding and abetting, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 

(2006) (Count 3); and to possession of firearms in furtherance 

of a crime of violence and aiding and abetting, in violation of 

18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c) (West Supp. 2009) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 

5). Despite the fact that Mann’s advisory Sentencing Guidelines 

range was 262-327 months, the district court sentenced him to 

240 months of imprisonment: 180-month concurrent sentences for 

Counts 2 and 3 and a 60-month consecutive sentence for Count 5. 

On appeal, Mann alleges that his sentence was procedurally and 

substantively unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we 

affirm. 

 We review sentences under a deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, __, 

128 S. Ct. 586, 590 (2007). We find no significant procedural 

or substantive error. Id. at 597; United States v. Pauley, 511 

F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007). We note that we may apply a 

presumption of reasonableness on appeal to a within-Guidelines 

sentence. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007); see

Nelson v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 890, 892 (2009) (emphasizing 

that the presumption of reasonableness accorded a within2 
3 

Guidelines sentence is an appellate court presumption rather 

than a presumption enjoyed by a sentencing court). Thus, we 

decline to find an abuse of discretion in this instance where a 

district court exercised its discretion to sentence a defendant 

below that range. See United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 

434-36 (4th Cir. 2006). 

 Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

ZAKUON A. BINAIRD, §

§ No. 270, 2016

Defendant Below, §

Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware

v. §

§

STATE OF DELAWARE § No. 1410000295

§

Plaintiff Below, §

Appellee. §

Submitted: January 18, 2017

Decided: January 18, 2017

Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VAUGHN and SEITZ, Justices.

O R D E R

This 18th day of January 2017, it appears to the Court that the judgment of 

the Superior Court should be affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons assigned 

in its decisions dated January 22, 20161and April 26, 2016.2

NOW, THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 

Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Chief Justice 

 

1

State v. Binaird, 2016 WL 358990 (Del. Super. Jan. 22, 2016).

2

State v. Binaird, 2016 WL 1735504 (Del. Super. Apr. 26, 2016).
# Sri Lanka

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        -    Media Note  		Over 170 Business and Community Leaders from 49 Countries Convene in Washington, D.C. for the Spring Professional Fellows Congress, Advancing Governance and Society, Economic Empowerment, and Civic Engagement	  June 6, 2023 

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Exhibit
32.1




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Capital Gold Corporation (the “Company”)
on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended October 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Gifford A.
Dieterle, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.





/s/ Gifford A. DieterleGifford
      A. DieterleChief
      Executive Officer, Chairman of the Board
                and
      Treasuer(Principal
      Executive Officer)December
      10, 2009
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Earnest CULPEPPER and Douglas Coody v. Warden Frank BLACKBURN, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 66468.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 14, 1980.

In re Earnest Culpepper and Douglas Coody, applying for writ of certiorari. Parish of Winn. No. 18849.

Denied.
#### State v. Derr

*[Cite as 3 AOA 116]*

*Case No. 89-CA-43*

*Knox County, (5th)*

*Decided May 17, 1990*

*James M. Ronk, Knox County Prosecutor, 114 East Chestnut Street Mt Vernon, OH 43050; John W. Baker, Assistant Prosecutor, 114 East Chestnut Street Mt Vernon, OH 43050, for Plaintiff-Appellee.*

*117
      *David L. Remy, 51 West First Street, Mansfield, OH 44902, for Defendant-Appellant*

HOFFMAN, J.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Knox County dismissing appellant Stephen Derr's post conviction relief petition. The trial court rendered findings of fact and conclusions of law filed September 25, 1989, a copy of which is attached to this opinion.

Derr was found guilty of and convicted on the charge of aggravated trafficking, a felony of the first degree. (R.C. 2925.03(A) (7). Being a first time drug offender, appellant was sentenced to serve a term of not less than seven (7) nor more than twenty-five (25) years with the first five (5) years to be actual incarceration as defined in R.C. 2929.01(C). On appeal before this court in Case No. 87-CA-21 that conviction was upheld.

Subsequently, appellant filed a motion for post conviction relief based upon newly discovered case law interpreting the sentence statutes of R.C. 2929.11 and 2925.03. The trial court denied this relief and appellant appeals, raising one assignment of error:

*"ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I.*"THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE THAT THE SENTENCING PROVISIONS OF R.C. 2929.11 DO NOT APPLY TO INDIVIDUALS CONVICTED OF VIOLATING R.C. 2925.03."

Appellant argues that *State v. Russo*(February 25, 1988), Cuyahoga App. No. 53571, unreported, stands for the proposition that a conviction under Chapter 2925 of Revised Code is not subject to the general sentencing provision of R.C. 2929.11.

In its conclusions of law, the trial court held that *State v. Smith*(1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 60 addresses the sentencing provisions of R.C. 2925.03(C) and controls the instant case The trial court also stated that the reasoning in *Smith*is in conflict with the reasoning in *Russo,*but that it is not bound by Ohio Appellate decisions rendered outside the Fifth District by courts subordinate to the Supreme Courts of Ohio. (Conclusions of Law 8 and 9).

As stated by the trial court, when the Ohio Supreme Court decision controls, this court cannot apply a decision of another Appellate Court, even if that were its choice. There can be no "conflict" as a matter of law between any Supreme Court decision and the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Based upon the authority of *Smith*cited *supra,*Derr's sole assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Knox County, Ohio is affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed*

PUTMAN, P.J., and MILLIGAN, J., concur.
§ 438.102 Provider-enrollee communications. ( a ) *General rules.* ( 1 ) An MCO, PIHP, or PAHP may not prohibit, or otherwise restrict, a provider acting within the lawful scope of practice, from advising or advocating on behalf of an enrollee who is his or her patient, for the following: ( i ) The enrollee's health status, medical care, or treatment options, including any alternative treatment that may be self-administered.
( ii ) Any information the enrollee needs to decide among all relevant treatment options.
( iii ) The risks, benefits, and consequences of treatment or non-treatment.
( iv ) The enrollee's right to participate in decisions regarding his or her health care, including the right to refuse treatment, and to express preferences about future treatment decisions.
( 2 ) Subject to the information requirements of paragraph (b) of this section, an MCO, PIHP, or PAHP that would otherwise be required to provide, reimburse for, or provide coverage of, a counseling or referral service because of the requirement in paragraph (a)(1) of this section is not required to do so if the MCO, PIHP, or PAHP objects to the service on moral or religious grounds.
( b ) *Information requirements: MCO, PIHP, and PAHP responsibility.* ( 1 ) ( i ) An MCO, PIHP, or PAHP that elects the option provided in paragraph (a)(2) of this section must furnish information about the services it does not cover as follows: ( A ) To the State— ( 1 ) With its application for a Medicaid contract.
( 2 ) Whenever it adopts the policy during the term of the contract.
( B ) Consistent with the provisions of § 438.10, to enrollees, within 90 days after adopting the policy for any particular service.
( ii ) Although this timeframe would be sufficient to entitle the MCO, PIHP, or PAHP to the option provided in paragraph (a)(2) of this section, the overriding rule in § 438.10(g)(4) requires the State, its contracted representative, or MCO, PIHP, or PAHP to furnish the information at least 30 days before the effective date of the policy.
( 2 ) As specified in § 438.10(g)(2)(ii)(A) and (B), the MCOs, PIHPs, and PAHPs must inform enrollees how they can obtain information from the State about how to access the service excluded under paragraph (a)(2) of this section.
( c ) *Information requirements: State responsibility.* For each service excluded by an MCO, PIHP, or PAHP under paragraph (a)(2) of this section, the State must provide information on how and where to obtain the service, as specified in § 438.10.
( d ) *Sanction.* An MCO that violates the prohibition of paragraph (a)(1) of this section is subject to intermediate sanctions under subpart I of this part.
#### William T. ROBERTS as Pinellas County Sheriff, et al., etc., Appellants, v. Brenda STOKLEY, etc., Appellee.

No. 80-430.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Sept. 17, 1980.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 20, 1980.

Chris W. Altenbernd, Tampa, James B. Thompson and Mark E. Hungate of Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal & Banker, St. Petersburg, for appellants.

o Edwin J' *Brafe**of ^ & Henniger’ St. Petersburg, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Stokley’s husband committed suicide in the Pinellas County jail. Stokley sued Roberts, the Pinellas County Sheriff, contending that the Sheriff “negligently, recklessly or willfully, failed to take the precautions or make the supervision necessary in the exercise of reasonable care to prevent Mark Stokley from injuring himself when [the Sheriff] knew or should have known that he was likely to commit suicide.” Subsequently, Stokley moved for summary judgment as to liability contending that the Sheriff’s violation of an administrative rule of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services applicable to the jail constituted negligence per se. The trial court granted the motion and the Sheriff filed this appeal.

We have some reservations over whether the violation of the administrative rule constituted negligence per se; we need not reach that issue, however. Stokley submitted several affidavits in support of her motion for summary judgment. These established that the Sheriff was negligent in failing to follow a physician’s instructions on precautions designed to prohibit Stok-ley’s husband from committing suicide, and that the Sheriff’s negligence was a legal cause of Stokley’s death.

The Sheriff failed to contravene these affidavits. As stated in *Perry v. Langstaff,*383 So.2d 1104, 1105 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), “[o]nce the movant for summary judgment has met his initial burden of tendering competent evidence demonstrating the nonexistence of any genuine issue of material fact, the opposing party must come forward with counter-evidence sufficient to reveal a genuine issue.” Therefore, no genuine issue of material fact remained for the trier of fact.

*1268Consequently, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Stokley. We affirm.

SCHEB, C. J., and GRIMES and OTT, JJ., concur.
#### JEFFERSON NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI BEACH, as Executor of the Estate of Lillian Rubin Newman, Deceased, Petitioner, v. Leonard FELDMAN, as successor Executor of the Estate of Samuel S. Newman, Deceased, Respondent.

No. 74-364.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 14, 1974.

PER CURIAM.

Certiorari dismissed.
# Oman

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        -    Report  		2020 Investment Climate Statements: Oman	  September 8, 2020 
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        -    Report  		2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Oman	  June 10, 2020 
        -    Report  		2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Oman	  March 11, 2020 
        -    Report  		Oman	  July 11, 2019 
        -    Report  		Oman	  June 21, 2019 
        -    Report  		Oman	  June 20, 2019 

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<PAGE>


                                  Exhibit 99.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Systems & Computer Technology
Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending September
30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Michael D. Chamberlain, President and Chief Executive Officer
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to
ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

/s/ Michael D. Chamberlain

Michael D. Chamberlain
President and Chief Executive Officer
December 23, 2002
§ 423.1092 Revision of reopened decision. ( a ) Revision based on new evidence. If a reopened decision is to be revised on the basis of new evidence that was not included in the record of that decision, the ALJ or the Departmental Appeals Board— ( 1 ) Notifies the parties of the proposed revision; and
( 2 ) Unless the parties waive their right to hearing or appearance— ( i ) Grants a hearing in the case of an ALJ revision; and
( ii ) Grants opportunity to appear in the case of a Board revision.
( b ) *Basis for revised decision and right to review.* ( 1 ) If a revised decision is necessary, the ALJ or the Departmental Appeals Board, as appropriate, renders it on the basis of the entire record.
( 2 ) If the decision is revised by an ALJ, the Departmental Appeals Board may review that revised decision at the request of either party or on its own motion.
I

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 3363

To establish within the Department of the Navy a mission to enhance and

increase knowledge of the oceans.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 30, 1996

Mr. MCDADE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on National Security

A BILL

To establish within the Department of the Navy a mission

to enhance and increase knowledge of the oceans.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW MISSION OF DEPART4 MENT OF THE NAVY RELATING TO OCEANS.

5 (a) ESTABLISHMENT OF MISSION.—One of the mis6 sions of the Department of the Navy shall be to enhance

7 and increase knowledge of the oceans. The Secretary of

8 the Navy shall take such actions as he considers appro9 priate to carry out such mission.
2

•HR 3363 IH

1 (b) AUTHORIZATION.—There are authorized to be ap2 propriated to the Department of the Navy such sums as

3 may be necessary to fulfill the mission established by sub4 section (a).

Æ
§ 435.116 Pregnant women. ( a ) *Basis.* This section implements sections 1902(a)(10)(A)(i)(III) and (IV); 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(I), (IV), and (IX); and 1931(b) and (d) of the Act.
( b ) *Scope.* The agency must provide Medicaid to pregnant women whose household income is at or below the income standard established by the agency in its State plan, in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section.
( c ) *Income standard.* The agency must establish in its State plan the income standard as follows: ( 1 ) The minimum income standard is the higher of: ( i ) 133 percent FPL for the applicable family size; or
( ii ) Such higher income standard up to 185 percent FPL, if any, as the State had established as of December 19, 1989 for determining eligibility for pregnant women, or, as of July 1, 1989, had authorizing legislation to do so.
( 2 ) The maximum income standard is the higher of— ( i ) The highest effective income level in effect under the Medicaid State plan for coverage under the sections specified at paragraph (a) of this section, or waiver of the State plan covering pregnant women, as of March 23, 2010 or December 31, 2013, if higher, converted to a MAGI-equivalent standard in accordance with guidance issued by the Secretary under section 1902(e)(14)(A) and (E) of the Act; or
( ii ) 185 percent FPL.
( d ) *Covered services.* ( 1 ) Pregnant women are covered under this section for the full Medicaid coverage described in paragraph (d)(2) of this section, except that the agency may provide only pregnancy-related services described in paragraph (d)(3) of this section for pregnant women whose income exceeds the applicable income limit established by the agency in its State plan, in accordance with paragraph (d)(4) of this section.
( 2 ) Full Medicaid coverage consists of all services which the State is required to cover under § 440.210(a)(1) of this subchapter and all services which it has opted to cover under § 440.225 and § 440.250(p) of this subchapter.
( 3 ) Pregnancy-related services consists of services covered under the State plan consistent with § 440.210(a)(2) and § 440.250(p) of this subchapter.
( 4 ) *Applicable income limit for full Medicaid coverage of pregnant women.* For purposes of paragraph (d)(1) of this section— ( i ) The minimum applicable income limit is the State's AFDC income standard in effect as of May 1, 1988 for the applicable family size converted to a MAGI-equivalent standard in accordance with guidance issued by the Secretary under section 1902(e)(14)(A) and (E) of the Act.
( ii ) The maximum applicable income limit is the highest effective income level for coverage under section 1902(a)(10)(A)(i)(III) of the Act or under section 1931(b) and (d) of the Act in effect under the Medicaid State plan or waiver of the State plan as of March 23, 2010 or December 31, 2013, if higher, converted to a MAGI-equivalent standard.
[77 FR 17204, Mar. 23, 2012, as amended at 78 FR 42302, July 15, 2013]
#### Ex parte James Hamby WEBB. (Re: James Hamby WEBB v. STATE of Alabama).

80-52.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Jan. 30, 1981.

ALMON, Justice.

WRIT DENIED — NO OPINION.

TORBERT, C. J., and FAULKNER, EM-BRY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
Order entered June 11 , 2014

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 13
- 01647
- CR JATHAN MEWBOURN, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2

Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 002
- 80569
- 2013



### O RDER
The Court REINSTATE S the appeal. On May 9, 2014, we ordered the trial court to make findings regarding why appellant’s
brief has not been filed. We ADOPT the trial court’s finding that appellant desires to pursue the appeal. B ecause the Court has received appellant’s motion to substitute counsel signed by both newly retained counsel Cody Cofer and appointed counsel William Schultz, we DO NOT
ADOPT the remainder of the findings.
We GRANT the June 5, 2015 motion to substitute cou nsel. We DIRECT the Clerk to substitute Cody Cofer as appellant’s retained attorney of record in place of William Schultz.
We ORDER appellant to file his brief within FORTY
- FIVE DAYS of the date of this
order.We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this o rder, to William Schultz, Cody Cofer, and

the Collin County District Attorney’s Office.
/s/ LANA MYERS JUSTICE