### GENERAL

Hon. Hollis D. Garmon Opinion No.M-472 District Attorney 8th Judicial District Re: Whether the terms of the grand P. 0. Box 111 juries impaneled in the 8th Greenville, Texas 75401 Judicial District are concurrentwith the District Court terms set forth inArt. 199, Subdiv. 8,V.C.S., orwith the District Court terms set forth Dear Mr. Garmon: inArt. 199, Subdiv. 62,V.C.S.

Your letter ofAugust 27, 1969, requesting the opinion of this department concerning the referenced matter, states, in part, as follows:

"UnderArticle 199, the law appears tobe that the term of the Grand Jury is from January toJuly and July toJanuary. However, conflicting statements aremade under terms of Court for the 8th District, inparticular Hunt County, wherein it shows the 8thDistrict begins on the 5thMonday after the 4th Monday, in January and the 6thMonday after the 4thMonday inAugust for 8weeks. "If the Court term and the Grand Jury term do not run concurrently, then itputs the District Attorney at a great disadvantage of having tohold grand jury session in one county while the term of Court is in session inanother county. We need to get thismatter resolved."
A grand jury for each county within a judicial district may be impaneled at or during any term of the district court sitting therein. Art. 19.01, V.C.C.P.

The 8thJudicial District is composed of the Counties of Rains, Hunt, Delta, and Hopkins. The 62nd Judicial District is



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composed ofthe Counties of Hunt, Delta, Hopkins, Franklin, and Lamar. Thus, both the 8thand the 62nd District Courts have concurrent jurisdiction inHunt, Delta, and Hopkins Counties.

Article 199, Subdivision 8,Vernon's Civil Statutes, sets forth the respective terms of the 8thDistrict Court in Delta, Hopkins, Hunt, and Rains Counties as follows:

"DeltaCounty: On the first Monday in January and may continue threeweeks: and on the second Monday in June and may continue until thebusiness isdisposed of. "Hopkins County: On the fourth Monday in January andmay continue fiveweeks: on the fifteenth Monday after the fourth Monday inJanuary andmay continue up to and including the last Saturday preceding the second Monday inJune: and on the fourth Monday inAugust and may continue six weeks.

II

. . . "HuntCounty: On the fifth Monday after the fourth Monday inJanuary andmay continue eight weeks: and on the sixth Monday after the fourth Monday inAugust andmay continue eight weeks. "Rains County: On the thirteenth Monday after the fourth Monday inJanuary andmay continue twoweeks; and on the fourteenth Monday after the fourth Monday inAugust andmay continue until the business isdisposed of." However, Article 199, Subdivision 62, Section l(b), Vernon's Civil Statutes, setting forth the terms of the 62nd District Court in the three counties where ithas concurrent jurisdiction with the 8thDistrict Court, states:

"There shallbe two (2)terms of each District Court in each County of the district each year, onebeginning on the first Monday inJanuary and continuing until the convening of the next regular term, and the other beginning on the first Monday inJuly and continuing until the

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Hon. Hollis D. Garmon, page 3 (M-472)

convening of the next regular term." (Emphasis added.) The above language, while not only stating the terms of the 62nd District Court inHunt, Delta, and Hopkins Counties, also clearly brings the terms of the 8thDistrict Court therein within itspurview. It is thus apparent thatArticle 199, Subdivision 8, enacted in 1939, andArticle 199, Subdivision 62, enacted in 1955, are inconsistent and contradictory as to the term of the 8th District Court inHunt, Delta, and Hopkins Counties and, consequently, as towhen the 8thDistrict Court may impanel grand juries in those counties.

House Bill Number 857 (Acts 54th Leg. R.S. 1955, ch. 473, p. 11981, which isArticle 199, Subdivision 62, states in its caption that it is:

"AnAct to amend Subdivision 62ofArticle 199 of the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, as amended soas toprovide that Hopkins County shall bewithin the 62nd Judicial District; changing the terms of the District Courts of Hunt, Lamar, Delta, Franklin, and Hopkins Counties; providing for thejurisdiction of such Courts and the functions of the judges thereof: providing procedure for transfer of cases and proceedings; providing procedure for transferred cases and proceedings: providing for the exchange of benches and for judges to sit for each other; providing fordistrict clerks and sheriffs to serve the Courts; validating and continuing all process issued or served before this Act takes effect: making such process returnable to the next term of the Court: validating the summoning of grand andpetit juries under this Act; repealing all laws in conflict: and declaring an emergency." (Emphasisadded.) Both from the language of the caption and the language of the Act itself, itappears the Legislature intended to set the terms ofboth the 8th and the 62nd District Courts inHunt, Delta, and Hopkins Counties inaddition to repealing all legislation inconsistent therewith, though the inconsistent provisions of Article 199, Subdivision 8,are not expressly repealed.

The applicable rule of construction has been stated as

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follows: "(W)here irreconcilably conflicting acts are passed at the same time, orwhere parts or sections of the same act are in irreconcilable conflict, the act orprovision later inposition prevails as the latest expression of the legislative will, and repeals the other in so far as there is irreconcilable conflict." 53Tex.Jur.2d 150, Statutes, Sec. 101.
Indiscussing the law of implied repeal, the Supreme Court of Texas, inState v. Easley, 404 S.W.2d 296 (Tex.Sup. 19661, recently stated atpage 300 that:

"The rule of law applicable is stated in the case of Commercial Credit Co., Inc.v. American Mfg. Co. et al. (Tex.Civ.App., 19411, 155 S.W.2d 834, 839,writ refused, as follows:
"'We are not unaware of the general rule of law in this Statewhich holds that repeals by implication are not favored. But as early as Rogers v. Watrous, 8Tex. 62, 58Am.Dec. 100, andby numerous cases ondown to recent dates, itwas announced that subsequent statutes revising the subject matter of former ones, and evidently intended as a substitute for them, although containing no express words to that effect, must operate to repeal those going before. This rule was followed by the Commission ofAppeals in First Nat. Bank v. Lee County Cotton Oil Co., 274 S.W. 127,where the authorities are collated over aperiod of seventy-five years. See also Meek v. Wheeler County, 135Tex. 454, 125 S.W.Zd 331, approved by the Supreme Court, 135Tex. 454, 144 S.W.2d 885.' See also Gaddis v. Terrell, Land Commissioner, 101 Tex. 574, 110 S.W. 429 (19081."
Inview of the foregoing authorities, itwill be seen that in case of repugnancy between twoprovisions of a statute, whether ornot the earlier of theprovisions has been expressly repealed, the more recent provision of the statute must be given effect as being the true intendment of the Legislature.

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The legislative intent in this matter can also be ascertained by noting some of theprovisions of Subdivisions 8and 62ofArticle 199,which indicate that the two Subdivisions are very much interrelated. See, e.~., the lastparagraph of Subdivision 8and Sections l(c), l(e), 2, 4, and 7of Subdivision 62of that Article, all ofwhich advert extensively to the concurrent jurisdiction of the two District Courts andprovide for the interaction and exchange of various forms of judicial machinery between them.

As the statutory conflict in thismatter relates only to the grand jury terms of the 8thDistrict Court inHunt, Delta! and Hopkins Counties, the grand jury term of the 8th District Court in Rains County remains asprovided in Subdivision 8ofArticle 199. However, it should be noted that the terms of the District Court inRains County, as set forth in Subdivision 8,are not consecutive as required by law. Article 1919,Vernon's Civil Statutes, provides, inpart, that:

"Alldistrict courts in this State
. . . whenever and however created, shall hold at least two (2)terms of court oer vear ineach countv

Therefore, it is the opinion of this department that: (1)The terms of the grand juries of the 8thJudicial District impaneled inHunt, Delta, and Hopkins Counties shall be two each, respectively; that is, one term beginning on the first Monday inJanuary and continuing until the convening of thenext regular term, and the other term beginning on the first Monday in July and continuing until the convening of the next regular term: and (2)The terms of the grand jury of the 8th Judicial District impaneled inRains County shall be two; that is, one term beginning on the-thirteenth Monday after the fourth Monday inJanuary and continuing until the convening of the next regular term, and the other termbeginning on the fourteenth Monday after

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the fourth Monday inAugust and continuing until the convening of the next regular term.
SUMMARY

The terms of grand juries of the 8thJudicial District impaneled in the Counties of Hunt, Delta, and Hopkins shall be concurrent with the terms of the District Courts sitting in said counties, such terms being set forth inArticle 199, Subdivision 62, Section l(b),Vernon's Civil Statutes. The terms of the grand juries of the 8thJudicial District impaneled inRains County shall be concurrent with the terms of the 8thDistrict Court inRains County, such terms being set forth in Article 199, Subdivision 8,Vernon's Civil Statutes, and being modified as to their continuity by Article 1919,Vernon's Civil Statutes.

C. MARTIN General of Texas Prepared by Austin C. Bray, Jr. Assistant Attorney General
APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE
Kerns Taylor, Chairman George Kelton, Vice-Chairman Howard Fender James McCoy James Quick Alfred Walker
MEADE F. GRIFFIN Staff Legal Assistant
HAWTHORNE PHILLIPS Executive Assistant
NOLA WHITE First Assistant

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