A RESEARCH PAPER FROM THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

by Assis Malaquias

July 2011

Stress-Testing South Africa: 

The Tenuous Foundations of 

One of Africa’s Stable States
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies supports the development of 

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programs, undertaking policy-relevant research and analysis, and 

fostering awareness of and open dialogue on U.S. strategic priorities and 

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building networks of African, American, European, and international 

military and civilian leaders and articulating African perspectives to U.S. 

policymakers.
Washington, D.C.

Stress-Testing South Africa: 

The Tenuous Foundations of 

One of Africa’s Stable States

by Assis Malaquias

Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Research Paper No. 3

July 2011
For additional publications of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, visit the 

Center’s Web site at http://africacenter.org.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied 

within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the 

Federal Government.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, 

provided that a standard source credit line is included. 

First printing, July 2011.
iii

Contents

Executive Summary ............................................................... 1

A Paradox of Rising Influence and Violence ........................ 3

Political Violence as a Source of Destabilization..................18

The Security Sector’s Capacity to Manage Unrest .............. 22

Recommendations............................................................... 29

Notes.................................................................................... 35

About the Author................................................................ 38

Stress-Testing South Africa

1

Executive Summary

South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy in 1994 

was expected to usher in a new era of peace, stability, and accelerated 

development. However, despite widespread optimism, political violence 

has persisted. Although a fraction of that experienced under apartheid, 

levels of political violence are worsening and indicative of the country’s 

potential fragility. They also map out the fault lines along which South 

Africa may yet stumble. 

Political violence in South Africa is primarily driven by poverty, 

inequality, and patronage. Limited economic growth, institutional 

incapacity, and restricted educational opportunities have resulted in a 

post-apartheid democratic state that has been slow to create jobs or supply 

housing, water, sanitation, and other services that many South Africans 

expect. Although overall levels have decreased since 1994, poverty 

remains both endemic and acute across the country. Simultaneously, 

and even more problematically for stability, inequality has risen steadily, 

leaving society deeply divided between a wealthy minority and a poor 

majority. Within this context, frustration with the slow and uneven pace 

of service delivery often ignites into violent protest. 

While growing poverty and inequality are key sources of discontent, 

political violence is triggered by competition for financial and political 

resources available through the state. This competition is further fueled by 

perceptions of the post-apartheid state as a source of personal enrichment 

and power. At the elite level, access to the state allows for personal 

and professional gain through corruption, political favors, and business 

opportunities secured through ties with strategically placed individuals. 

Elite competition for such access drives violence within and between 

competing political parties, usually at the local level using intimidation 

and assassination to ensure electoral success. Much political violence thus 

exists in a grey area where the distinction between politics and crime is 

blurred.
ACSS Research Paper, No. 3

2

While popular frustration mounts due to unfulfilled expectations 

regarding the speed of socioeconomic transformation, South Africans still 

overwhelmingly support the democratic process and view the government 

as legitimate, providing the state a strong foundation from which it can 

contain political violence. South Africa’s capable though diminished 

security apparatus, similarly, provides the state the capacity to enforce its 

authority when needed. Consequently, political violence poses a low to 

moderate threat to the country in the short term and constitutes a mostly 

disruptive force rather than one with the potential to seriously jeopardize 

the state.

In the medium and long term, however, catastrophic political violence 

may be triggered by a generalized sense that many of the promises of the 

anti-apartheid struggle remain at least a generation away. This realization 

– coupled with growing socioeconomic and political gaps between elites 

and the average citizen – poses the greatest threat to stability and security 

in South Africa. 

To avoid this scenario, fundamental changes to the status quo 

are needed. Citizens must again come to see tangible evidence that 

government is interested in the socioeconomic priorities of ordinary 

citizens. In other words, the South African government must regain public 

trust. This will require breaking up the current intertwining of political 

authority and economic opportunity. To do so will entail reducing the 

patronage value political office currently affords and establishing a more 

significant and institutionalized role for independent watchdog groups. 

Rebuilding the public order capacity of the South African Police Service 

will simultaneously enhance efforts to tamp down on the use of violence 

for political advantage while improving the state’s effectiveness to 

maintain stability in the face of popular protests. 
Stress-Testing South Africa

3

A Paradox of Rising Influence and Violence

South Africa is one of the most violent countries in the world. 

Comparative global crime statistics regularly place it in the highest 

quartile for violent crimes, including reported rapes, murders, kidnappings, 

drug-related crimes, robberies, burglaries, and motor vehicle thefts.1 In 

important respects, the crime statistics reflect a society traumatized by 

various forms of violence – physical and structural – perpetrated over 

generations by elites who controlled power and wealth: British, Afrikaners 

and, now, Africans, who, ironically, at the beginning of the 20th century 

set out to overthrow the inherently violent system of apartheid.

Notwithstanding this violence, South Africa is arguably the most 

important country in Africa. It is the continent’s economic giant. Its 

formal economy – based on mining, banking, and diversified services 

and supported by extensive modern infrastructure – is Africa’s largest. 

At $527.5 billion (2010 purchasing power parity), its GDP is larger and 

more robust than its nearest rivals on the continent, Egypt ($500 billion) 

and Nigeria ($369 billion). Since the transition to majority rule in 1994, 

South Africa has also reestablished its political credentials in Africa and 

has often played – albeit at times reluctantly and not always successfully – 

a leading role in continental political affairs. Additionally, despite massive 

military restructuring and downsizing since the end of apartheid, South 

Africa retains a competent and professional security sector. 

These factors have helped give South Africa a relevant position on 

the wider world stage. It was recently invited to join the BRICs (Brazil, 

Russia, India, and China), a group increasingly regarded as one of the 

most influential in the world. South Africa is also viewed as a strong 

candidate to represent Africa at the United Nations Security Council as 

a permanent member, if this global body undergoes its much-expected 

reorganization. South Africa’s stability, accordingly, has profound 

implications for continental progress. This analysis, based on in-country 

interviews with over several dozen leading South African military and 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 3

4

intelligence officials, analysts, scholars, and civil society representatives, 

assesses the depth of stability in this African anchor state. 

The Legacy of Politics and Violence 

Although South Africa is one of the most violent countries in the 

world, political violence is relatively low and heavily overshadowed by 

high levels of criminal violence in the country. The nature of political 

violence that does occur overwhelmingly follows norms forged during 

years of armed resistance to apartheid. 

In 1960, the African National Congress (ANC) declared armed 

struggle against the apartheid state. Along with the South African 

Communist Party (SACP), it established an underground guerrilla army, 

Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in 1961. However, without a secure rear base 

and control of rural areas to sustain an insurgency, effective military 

action proved problematic. MK’s difficulties notwithstanding, in the early 

to mid-1980s a general effort aimed at making South Africa ungovernable 

through mass resistance got underway. In 1983, a number of civil society 

groups came together under the umbrella organization, the United 

Democratic Front (UDF). Spearheaded by the UDF and trade unions 

and fanned by poor conditions in schools, rent increases by community 

councils, rising unemployment, inflation, and poor municipal services, 

urban revolt against the state ensued in 1984. Rolling, often spontaneous, 

mass action rather than guerrilla insurgency steadily overwhelmed the 

apartheid state. A stagnating economy, international sanctions, and 

increasing white casualties in the Border War with Angola, further 

contributed to a political and economic crisis for white power. The state 

was eventually forced to negotiate a transition to majority rule. And so, an 

enduring culture of protest in South Africa was entrenched.

The struggle against apartheid also established a tradition of 

assassination – a method used both between and within warring sides as 

a way of dealing with traitors and dissenters. As is widely known, the 

apartheid security forces used assassination to eliminate ANC and MK 
Stress-Testing South Africa

5

leaders and other opponents of white minority rule. But assassination was 

also a means to settle power struggles and personal rivalries within ANC 

and MK leadership. It was not uncommon for those who were critical 

of, betrayed, or abandoned the ANC to be murdered. For example, when 

Chris Hani, former MK chief of staff and later head of the SACP, openly 

criticized the MK leadership in the late 1960s then MK head (and later 

South Africa’s first black Minister of Defense) Johannes Modise ordered 

his assassination. The assassination failed and Hani was subsequently 

protected by ANC leader, Oliver Tambo.2

 

Nonetheless, the pattern persisted. Township leaders and local 

councilors who opposed the ANC were also targeted, as were those 

seen to be collaborating with the state, such as black police officers 

and soldiers. Assassination was also used by both ANC and Inkatha 

Freedom Party (IFP) hit squads in their clashes around KwaZulu-Natal 

Province and the Johannesburg townships in the 1980s. Between 1976 

and 1994, approximately 10,700 people were killed in violent clashes and 

assassinations in KwaZulu-Natal. Ninety percent of these deaths occurred 

between 1989 and 1994 as a power struggle got underway for control 

over the province during the post-apartheid transition.3 Intimidation 

and assassination were used to eliminate competition for government 

positions, thus setting a violent tone for intra- and inter-party rivalries in 

the post-apartheid era.

The issue remains particularly prevalent in KwaZulu-Natal Province, 

with an increase in incidents of political violence also reported in the 

Mpumalanga and North West Provinces in recent years (see map). 

Incidents take place at the local level involving wards and municipal 

councilors, mostly before and during election periods. To be clear, although 

political violence is distinguished by a political objective or agenda on 

the part of the perpetrator, many instances of political violence in South 

Africa heavily blur the line between criminal and political. In short, while 

political violence in South Africa stands at a fraction of the scale, scope, 

and intensity during apartheid, it persists nearly two decades later. 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 3

6

Weakening Legitimacy and Other Drivers of Political 

Violence

Recent empirical evidence suggests a substantial decline in confidence 

in public institutions, the judiciary, elected officials, and government as a 

whole. According to a 2008 survey, roughly 54 percent of South African 

citizens felt that the country was headed in the wrong direction while only 

36 percent believed it was headed in the right direction.4 This contrasts 

sharply with a 2005 survey, which found that 65 percent of South Africans 

thought the country was headed in a positive direction while 23 percent 

believed conditions were worsening.5 

Corruption, incompetence, and a lack of transparency and 

accountability have left ordinary citizens feeling that elected officials are 

not interested in the concerns of common people. There is a growing 

popular feeling that the current system is dysfunctional at the local level 

Provincial Map of South Africa

Source: Statisitics South Africa. Modified by author.
Stress-Testing South Africa

7

and unable to deliver the benefits promised to the population by the 

liberators. Fully 72 percent of South Africans believe some, most, or all 

local government elected officials are involved in corruption.6

 However, 

while the failure of local government has resulted in people no longer 

having faith and trust in their local officials, this has not yet led to a 

complete loss of faith and trust in national government or the ANC. 

The vast majority of South Africans still believe that democracy is the 

preferred and most appropriate form of government.7 The ANC is still 

seen as the party that brought democracy to the country and therefore 

its support remains high. This partly explains that while citizens express 

unhappiness with government, most still vote for the ANC.

South Africa is midway between the optimum and the unstable. Its 

trajectory will largely depend on the government’s willingness and ability 

to address the causes of current discontent over the short to medium 

future. This entails making tangible progress on core issues to the South 

African public, like poverty, growing inequality, and patronage politics.

Poverty and Inequality. Democracy in South Africa is understood 

mainly in terms of social and economic rights. In fact, this is popularly 

viewed as the cornerstone of the country’s post-1994 democracy.8

 However, 

the realization of these same rights has been uneven and inadequate. The 

majority of citizens still struggle to gain access to employment, housing, 

transportation, clean drinking water, electricity, and quality education. 

The delivery of basic services is essential in alleviating poverty and 

inequality. The failure to do so has created the perception that the postapartheid state lacks the will to deliver. A sense of marginalization and 

exclusion from the political system has compelled some citizens to take 

actions outside of these structures, fuelling unrest and violence – from 

protests over service delivery to xenophobic attacks. 

Overall, poverty in South Africa has decreased moderately since 

1994 in both absolute and relative terms. The government has attempted 

much in terms of poverty alleviation. Recipients of social grants increased 

from 2.5 million persons in 1999 to 12 million in 2007, and more than a 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 3

8

million temporary jobs were created between 2004 and 2007.9

 However, 

93 percent of black South Africans (comprising 79 percent of the 

population) continue to live on less than R322 (under $50) a month. 

In comparison, only one percent of white South Africans (comprising 

less than 10 percent of the population) live under the poverty line. After 

more than 15 years of democracy, little has changed for the majority of 

South Africans. Poverty remains high, with the overall rate standing at 48 

percent according to the latest income and expenditure survey conducted 

by the South African government.

Income inequality in the country has increased significantly since 

1994, making South Africa one of the world’s most unequal countries. This 

is reflected in the country’s GINI coefficient, which increased from 0.64 

to 0.69 (on a scale of 0-1) between 1995 and 2005.10 Although all South 

Africans have experienced positive growth in their levels of expenditure 

since the end of apartheid, including those at the very bottom and at the 

very top, growth among the wealthy has exceeded that of the poor. Social 

grants comprised 50 to 60 percent of household income of poor families 

in 2005. In general, the widening of the state’s social security system since 

1994 rather than job creation accounts for much of the modest growth 

in expenditure of poor black South Africans. By comparison, there has 

been sharp growth in expenditure among individuals at and above the 

80th percentile income group, with the highest returns registered for white 

and mixed-race or “colored” South Africans.11

Although government policy has prioritized high economic growth 

as a means of reducing poverty, the growth that has taken place has not 

benefited the poor. Instead, it has induced a significant maldistribution 

of income. Post transition, the economy experienced one of the longest 

periods of positive growth in the country’s history. However, averaging just 

3 percent during the first 10 years, growth was neither robust nor focused 

enough on poorer South Africans to offset a rise in inequality. Economic 

policies have generally neglected labor-intensive growth, perpetuating 

post-apartheid distributional regimes. Although the country’s labor market 
Stress-Testing South Africa

9

and welfare policies were deracialized during the late apartheid period, 

little change was made to the economic growth path. Accordingly, race 

merely gave way to class as the primary driver of stratification. Economic 

policies continued to encourage firms to employ fewer but more skilled 

workers. Wages and profits rose, but so too did unemployment as lessskilled workers were no longer needed and the economy was unable to 

absorb a large part of the country’s work force. This was especially acute 

in the mining and agricultural sectors, which had traditionally served as 

major employers of less-skilled people. Compounding the problem, poor 

public education in black communities has not significantly improved 

despite greater expenditure since 1994. Thus, despite implementing 

various progressive policies and initiatives, the post-apartheid state has 

failed to alter the distributional regime and inequality that emerged in the 

late apartheid period.

The poverty-inequality mix is becoming steadily more combustible 

thanks partly to an unresponsive and increasingly dysfunctional civil 

service. In 1994, the ANC government inherited a civil service structure 

that was outdated and inefficient, providing limited and discriminatory 

services to the majority of South Africans. Years of official neglect resulted 

in serious deficiencies in service provision and major backlogs in terms of 

housing, water, electricity, and sanitation delivery. Despite new legislation, 

policy, structures, and an injection of resources following transition, local 

government capacity to deliver services steadily deteriorated even further 

– often due to an emphasis on racial diversity over merit and efficiency, 

and political loyalty over ability.

Reform after apartheid saw local government boundaries redrawn. 

The ten Bantustans, or black self-governed but marginalized regions, 

were reintegrated, with their capitals and administrations dismantled. 

The four provinces became nine, and 843 municipalities were reduced 

to 284. In the years that followed, whole towns “virtually fell to pieces, 

with pavements crumbling, sewerage and electricity breakdowns and 

rubbish uncollected.”12 Affirmative action saw skilled white civil servants 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 3

10

resign, relieved, or not considered for employment. Key posts were often 

reassigned to friends and relatives of ANC political figures or remained 

vacant due to a lack of suitable black candidates to fill them.13 Over time, 

this resulted in a dramatic loss of municipal capacity, soaring personnel 

costs, and shrunken capital budgets. Local government departments 

either underspent or were in arrears due to mismanagement. According 

to a 2009 federal government report on the state of local government, 

there was an overall vacancy rate of 12 percent for senior managers 

and a perception that “patronage and nepotism is now so widespread in 

many municipalities that the formal municipal accountability system is 

ineffective and inaccessible to many citizens.”14

By 2005, 203 of the 284 municipalities were unable to provide 

sanitation for 40 percent or more of their residents. Twenty-five percent 

of all towns had no garbage removal, residents in more than 50 percent 

of municipalities were without piped water, and 70 percent of towns did 

not have flushable toilets. Rent rates and defaults rose and municipal 

debt soared into the billions, in some cases bankrupting municipalities. 

Regardless, many municipal managers continued to receive basic salaries 

higher than that of the president. In 2004-2005, South Africa’s president 

received a salary of R1.05 million (over $152,000). At the same time, the 

highest municipal manager’s salary stood at more than R1.2 million (over 

$174,000), in Ehlanzeni in Mpumalanga Province, where 73 percent of 

residents had no garbage removal, nearly 60 percent no sanitation, and 

a third no access to water. Many of these managers had neither formal 

qualifications nor expertise, with 74 of the biggest municipalities in the 

country lacking a single qualified civil engineer and 36 percent of all 

municipal managers having no tertiary education. More broadly, only 

eight percent of government workers or civil servants were highly skilled 

and 90 percent were considered low skilled or unskilled.15 While the 

impact of these shortages has been felt across the country, the hardest hit 

has been the already poor, outlying, and rural municipalities, especially in 

the former Bantustans.
Stress-Testing South Africa

11

The lack of properly functioning local government has not only 

stifled delivery of basic services but also hindered central government 

initiatives to address problem areas. This has left citizens with little to no 

access and even less capacity to demand and realize their rights. There 

is a growing sense that democracy does not work equally for all citizens. 

Rather, it benefits the rich and powerful more than the poor and powerless. 

General frustration has increased and the willingness of citizens to resort 

to violence has risen. Meanwhile, officials have failed to sufficiently 

communicate to citizens why expectations have not been realized for the 

majority. For many average citizens, the sense is that the only way to get 

the attention of government is by burning tires, barricading roads, and 

engaging in other forceful displays of frustration. Expectedly, these actions 

often devolve into violence, sending potent impressions to all citizens 

regarding the utility of violence. In turn, there has been a significant rise 

in low-level violence, including political violence across the country. 

Patronage. Local South African politics “at the sites of violence is 

consumed by struggles for state patronage.”16 Political violence is driven 

in part by competition for state resources at the local level, which, in turn, 

is rooted in an understanding of the economy as a consumable good, not 

unlike a cake that can only feed a determined number of people. This 

view fuels conflict at both the elite and citizen level as it assumes that 

access to resources is a zero-sum game.

African political elites have traditionally seen government as a source 

of personal enrichment. The ruling ANC elite is no exception in that it 

behaves much like post-colonial African elites elsewhere on the continent 

since the early 1960s. Notably, ANC leaders are neither a propertyowning nor capitalist or entrepreneurial elite. Rather, bureaucratic in 

inclination, they see politics as the fastest and surest mode of wealth 

accumulation. This has been encouraged by South Africa’s abundance of 

natural resources that provides the ruling elite with revenues to distribute. 

The poor have benefited through the distribution of social welfare 

grants. But a disproportionately large share has been distributed to the 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 3

12

middle and upper classes through affirmative action and Black Economic 

Empowerment (BEE) schemes, which include large equity transfers and 

procurement policies that reserve government and parastatal contracts 

for black-owned contractors. Those who have benefited from such 

transfers and contracts are well connected to the ANC and constitute a 

remarkably small group of individuals, including both elected and nonelected officials.17 These individuals simultaneously sit on the boards of 

banks, parastatals, various foundations, and universities, and hold shares 

and directorships in an array of industries.18

The ANC’s practice of cadre deployment has also created a fertile 

breeding ground for patronage politics in that it rewards party loyalty 

with appointments in the state and parastatal sectors. Cadre members 

then seek to advance their own interests in a manner that is indifferent or 

even hostile to the needs of citizens. At its most crude level, money, gifts, 

influence, and favors are used to gain a privileged position that is then 

used to gain more money, gifts, influence, and favors. 

This practice is enabled by South Africa’s proportional representation 

electoral list system in which citizens vote for a party rather than individual 

candidates. Parties are then able to appoint members of parliament from 

pre-established slates of candidates in proportion to the percentage of 

votes received. As party leaders decide which individuals are included 

on the electoral lists, it is the parties that select which candidates will 

represent the voters. This has resulted in a strong sense of political and 

personal allegiance to ANC leaders, which has enabled the party to build 

and sustain a formidable political machine. However, since party and 

personal loyalty – not fitness for the position – are the key determining 

factors for appointments, this has also resulted in dramatic reductions in 

effectiveness of state institutions at all levels of government.19 Even in 

cases where party members are blatantly corrupt or incompetent, they 

remain in key and lucrative positions, often openly protected by more 

senior party members. Despite evidence of graft, nepotism, and gross 

misconduct, few face any consequences. In fact, of nearly 8,000 cases of 
Stress-Testing South Africa

13

corruption forwarded by the National Anti-Corruption Hotline program 

to relevant government departments for follow-up, only 245 have resulted 

in direct prosecutions.20 Most often members are merely redeployed to 

a new position or location. This is especially the case at the local level. 

Indeed, disciplinary hearings by a municipality in KwaZulu-Natal Province 

where the wife of South Africa’s Minister of State Security worked as the 

director of health services continued inconclusively for months, even 

after she received a 12-year sentence for trafficking cocaine into South 

Africa from Brazil.21 She even received her salary for five weeks following 

the conviction, at which point a suspension went into effect. 

Municipal and ward governments are often the primary entities 

awarding government contracts and allocating public spending. Positions 

on municipal councils have become part of this wider spoils system 

and are highly sought. They are enviable in terms of salaries and fringe 

benefits, as well as the ability to award contracts to local companies so 

as to benefit their own business interests and those of their friends or 

families. Violence has ensued as individuals compete for these low-level 

local positions between and within political parties. Rivals are threatened 

or murdered, with political competition often being won by the candidate 

with the most money and muscle. Mob tactics are also used. There is 

increasing anecdotal evidence that local leaders and political candidates 

manipulate existing social tensions and mobilize supporters so as to gain 

political advantage.

Beyond the jostling for political office among elites, there is a wider 

perception among ordinary citizens that political support and loyalty is 

something that is acquired by patronage. Apartheid’s legislated inequalities 

of resources and opportunities created a climate in which all forms of 

social services were highly politicized. Post transition, citizens assumed 

that the government would prioritize provision of those services – such 

as welfare benefits, grants, jobs, and land reform – to friends and allies. 

This consciousness then fuels hostility towards those seen to be benefiting 

unfairly from state resources via corruption or personal contacts as well 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 3

14

as towards those seen to be prospering with no inherent connections to 

the state, such as foreign migrants. Violent citizen action is in part an 

expression of frustration at these inequities.

This sense of elite entitlement is closely related to the character 

of the country’s “pork barrel politics.” Local political violence then is a 

product of this deepening culture in which everyone wants to be a winner 

no matter the cost or means to get there. 

In important ways, then, the ANC is using state power to enrich 

itself, with the public sector treated as a giant spoils system up for grabs. 

The abuse of schemes like BEE, or “black elite enrichment” as a former 

vice chancellor of the University of Cape Town coined it, is illustrative.22

Such activity promotes politics as a source of easy money rather than an 

avenue for public service. Equally detrimentally, it reinforces the message 

to all citizens that the path to riches involves access to state resources. 

Given the limited avenues to access those resources, the incentives for 

political competition to devolve into violence are high.

Emerging Dynamics of Political Unrest and Violence

Service delivery protests are not new. Between 2004 and 2005, some 

881 illegal and 5,085 legal protests against weak service delivery were 

recorded throughout the country’s nine provinces.23 A growing number 

have occurred in poor rural communities and are increasingly violent 

and destructive. Protests often focus on basic services such as housing, 

water, or sanitation that people believe have not been delivered or been 

delivered unevenly. Protests are also directed towards local government 

structures, institutions, or representatives. This usually involves members 

of the community demanding a local councilor, ward committee, or 

municipal manager resign due to their perceived failure to deliver services, 

corruption, nepotism, financial mismanagement, or general aloofness and 

poor engagement with the community.

While protests are widespread across the country, they remain 

localized and contained in rural townships and informal settlements on 
Stress-Testing South Africa

15

the margins of towns and cities with unrest rarely spilling over into city 

centers. Protests are sporadic. Though uncoordinated, demonstrations are 

sometimes emulated by other communities who feel empowered by what 

they see happening nearby through the media.

Compounded by worsening living conditions caused by the global 

economic crisis, protests have escalated in frequency and intensity since 

2009. This period coincides with the election of Jacob Zuma as president. 

After years of increasing centralization under former President Thabo 

Mbeki, expectations rose at the prospect of a more pro-poor regime 

under Jacob Zuma. In the run-up to the 2009 elections, the ANC also 

made extensive promises that all or most service delivery issues would be 

addressed once the Zuma government was in place. Thus, protests will 

likely escalate further with the continued absence of concrete measures 

to address problems around service delivery, inequality, and poor local 

governance. 

Inter- and intra-political party violence has also been common 

across the country. Such violence involves organizing protests and 

demonstrations to intimidate political rivals, rally support against rivals, 

and gain political advantage in a particular community. It also involves 

verbal and physical threats and attacks on low-level and would-be 

political leaders. Killings, stabbings, hit-and-runs, vehicles being driven 

off the road, and petrol bombings of homes and offices by anonymous 

perpetrators occur sporadically but spike prior to and during elections. 

Additional police are deployed to monitor and patrol known and possible 

hotspots for outbreaks of clashes or unrest. Problematically, however, local 

police are often accused of partisanship and colluding with local political 

leaders, including intimidation, murder, or selective enforcement and 

investigation.24

Violence between the Xhosa-dominated ANC and the predominantly 

Zulu IFP in KwaZulu-Natal has a long history. It came to a head during the 

1980s when the apartheid regime fomented tensions and reinforced Zulu 

nationalism by arming and training members of the IFP from 1985 to fight 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 3

16

and contain the ANC in urban townships in Gauteng Province. Interparty violence persisted throughout the 1990s, especially during elections, 

as the two sides struggled to establish dominance over the province. 

Following ANC ascendance, the 2004 elections witnessed a 

significant decline in inter-party violence and the 2009 elections were 

the most peaceful yet, due in part to the inclusive policies pursued by 

the ANC government and the rise of Jacob Zuma, a Zulu. Although this 

violence may subside further over the short to medium term as a result of 

the conciliatory position held by the president, there is some concern as 

to how the dynamics in KwaZulu-Natal Province, particularly at the local 

level, will be affected when Jacob Zuma is no longer president. Should 

Zulus feel under-represented or sidelined following his departure, there 

could be a resurgence of Zulu nationalism and IFP support, possibly leading 

to renewed inter-party tensions and violence in the province. At best, this 

will remain localized, limited, and centered around election periods. At 

worst, violence could begin to occur between elections, eventually spilling 

over into civil strife, destabilizing the province and possibly the nation. 

The process could see Zulu nationalists seek autonomy or even secession 

for KwaZulu-Natal, as was done in the past. 

Far more significant in recent years has been the increase in intra-party 

violence within the ANC. This is particularly evident in KwaZulu-Natal, 

Mpumalanga, and, to a lesser extent, Gauteng and the Western Cape. 

There is growing concern that weakening party discipline could undermine 

democracy in those areas.25 Open dissent, disagreement, or contestation 

for seats within the party is strongly discouraged. Consequently, would-be 

councilors resort to organizing direct violent action against fellow party 

members in a bid to gain political or financial advantage.26 

Whereas protests and demonstrations are usually used against already 

unpopular local leaders, more direct intimidation and assassination often 

target strong or reformist leadership at the local level. Mpumalanga, which 

has been described as “without doubt the most treacherous province in 

the country for activists with principles,” is considered to be increasingly 
Stress-Testing South Africa

17

susceptible to these tactics.27 The provincial and local governments 

there have become paralyzed as a result of violent patronage politics. 

Currently, the internal affairs office of the South African Police Service 

are investigating allegations that the police illegally detained and then 

tortured and intelligence officers interrogated ANC members who openly 

demonstrated against the Zuma administration.28 Several councilors who 

have stood between fellow political leaders and business tenders have been 

murdered, and leaders who have spoken out against the misuse of public 

funds reportedly fear for their lives.29

No serious outbreaks of race-related violence have occurred since 

1994. However, a recent spike in racial tensions in early 2010 when a 

white farmer and leader of a white supremacist group was hacked to death 

by two black farm hands suggests that race relations remain fragile. Two 

months before the murder, the head of the ANC Youth League, Julius 

Malema, led students at a University of Johannesburg rally in singing a 

song including the lyrics “shoot the boer [farmers], they are rapists.” The 

controversial incident made its way into the courts, which eventually 

deemed it hate speech. Just two days before the murder, Malema visited 

the ZANU-PF political party in Zimbabwe. During a subsequent press 

conference in which Malema praised ZANU-PF’s policy of seizing land 

from white farmers, he called a white BBC journalist a “bloody agent” 

with a “white tendency” and had him removed. In other words, the state 

of race relations remains such that incidents that are racial or appear racial 

in nature can spark larger unrest or clashes. 

Race also continues to texture land-related violence, and militant 

action by the white right wing cannot be ruled out entirely over the long 

term. However, there have been no serious white right wing attacks in 

recent years and there is no viable, militant organization currently in place 

in South Africa to carry out such a campaign. The most notable violent 

group since transition has been the Boeremag (Boer/Afrikaner Force), who 

called for the establishment of an independent Boer republic and used 

terror as a means of achieving their goals. Comprised of young white men as 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 3

18

well as middle-aged professionals, the group conducted eight simultaneous 

attacks on Soweto, outside of Johannesburg, targeting commuter railway 

lines and a mosque in October 2002. The group suffered a serious blow 

to its capacity after 22 leading members – including three then current 

mid-level officers in the South African National Defence Forces – were 

charged with terrorism, sabotage, and high treason following the attacks 

in 2002.30

More recently, the Boerevolk Vryheid Stigting (Boer/Afrikaner Freedom 

Establishment) claims to have a fair following. While also calling for an 

independent state, the group has so far advocated only peaceful means. 

There are also many small white power groups and factions located across 

the country. However, these concentrate on community defense and 

reflect the change in mindset within the white right, which seeks to attain 

its goals via the country’s existing political legal system. In general, “there 

is no organization that has any idea or any intention to overthrow the 

government.”31 What militant activity does take place is on the margins 

and overwhelmingly involves lone operators unaffiliated to any meaningful 

organization.

Political Violence as a Source of Destabilization

At present, violent protests are motivated by local concerns and 

are symptomatic of a decline in state legitimacy. Perpetrators are local 

community members, unconnected to any wider organization, demanding 

government responsiveness, not revolution. There is no significant 

leadership at either a provincial or national level spearheading these 

activities, and, as such, there are few indications that the scale and scope 

of violence will escalate in the short to medium future. Although incidents 

of popular unrest are on the rise and occur across the country, the areas in 

which violence erupt are located on the margins of towns and cities, and 

are easily contained by the security forces.

In short, citizen violence constitutes more of a disruptive force that is 

limited in magnitude. At best, protests will remain localized and will see a 
Stress-Testing South Africa

19

steady decline in frequency and intensity of violence as local governments 

and officials respond to dissatisfaction. However, this could change in 

the medium to long term should service delivery protests become more 

organized across communities, violent, and frequent – and the state 

respond with more forceful measures, including the police and eventually 

the military, to suppress the unrest. This, in turn, would likely lead to more 

violence and raises the likelihood of widespread revolt. 

The longer the status quo persists – that is, continued poor service 

delivery, failure to better manage popular expectations, and patronage 

politics – the less likely people will feel they can participate by constructive 

and peaceful means. In contrast, should the state implement strong 

interventions to improve governance, institutional functionality, and 

capacity, perceptions of legitimacy should improve and incentives for 

violence ebb.

Should local protests become organized across communities and 

provinces, then it is conceivable that these could amplify into broader 

instability at the national level. However, as long as grievances remain 

localized, citizen violence is unlikely to escalate beyond the control of the 

state. Current levels of violence may even persist for the foreseeable future, 

but the state is not in imminent risk of succumbing to it. Moreover, given 

widespread support for the democratic system, should actors emerge to 

provide national leadership to the demands of local protesters, there will 

be pressures on these individuals to achieve resolution through negotiation 

and compromise. 

Alternatively, there is a fair chance that unrest could be triggered 

by a single incident that gets out of hand, such as the 2008 xenophobic 

attacks against foreigners. Violent protests in the past easily and quickly 

mushroomed. What starts in one part of the country soon spills over to 

other regions. If civilians are killed when police attempt to control such 

situations, citizens may react violently, setting in motion a chain of events 

that would be difficult to stop. The “Sharpeville massacre” in 1960, which 

prompted the ANC to take up arms against the apartheid regime, as well 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 3

20

as the 1976 Soweto uprising provide important historical examples. 

Elite-driven violence poses a similar if more direct risk to the state. 

The persistence of elite violence erodes legitimacy by encapsulating 

the extremes of corrupt, patronage-driven politics and unaccountable 

governance. However, while it poses a serious threat to certain 

municipalities and possibly even some provincial governments, elite 

violence occurs overwhelmingly at the local level. Accordingly, the risk to 

the national government at present is limited.

Likely outcomes of elite violence include intensified dysfunction 

of government and the political system, discontent, and, subsequently, 

violent protests. Elites are adept at capitalizing on and deliberately 

manipulating discontent and citizen unrest for their own political 

advantage. Furthermore, they have the capacity to provide leadership and 

orchestrate mass citizen violence, from protests to disorder to xenophobic 

attacks. Although elite violence currently remains local and limited, 

conditions may take a turn for the worse in the medium to long future if 

emerging opportunistic and exploitative tendencies are not reversed.

Under a scenario of escalating elite violence, elections will continue 

to take place but diminish in legitimacy. The country will be characterized 

by a small, affluent, political elite propped up by mineral revenues, 

increasingly prepared to use state structures to maintain their hold on 

power. Security institutions will become more politicized and actively 

involved in elite-level violence in terms of assassinations and unlawful 

surveillance of opposition voices, whether they be politicians, members 

of civil society, or the media. Civil liberties and press freedoms will be 

encroached upon, the independence of the judiciary and criminal justice 

system will be progressively compromised, the civil service corrupted, the 

health and educational services ever more limited, and the vast majority 

of people increasingly poor and disaffected.32

Such circumstances provide opportunities for the emergence of more 

political entrepreneurs like Julius Malema, the controversial populist 

president of the ANC Youth League who has become a lightening rod 
Stress-Testing South Africa

21

in South African politics by tapping into lingering racial resentment 

and impatience with the pace of socioeconomic transformation. Such 

entrepreneurs will seek to mobilize mass support by exploiting longstanding 

grievances over poverty, inequality, race, and land at the national level in 

a bid to control assets and resources, and advocate violence as a means by 

which to do so.33 These entrepreneurs could come to prominence prior to 

or following an election, either at the local, provincial, or national level. 

Should these individuals gain sufficient influence, they may split from 

the ANC. If successful in a national or provincial level election either 

from within or apart from the ANC framework, such divisive figures could 

ultimately lead to a dismantling of the democratic order. Should they lose 

an election, widespread violence could erupt, perhaps with an ethnic and 

racial character.

Although possible, there is a sense that most South Africans 

believe that there is too much at stake to allow any single individual or 

organization to destabilize the country to such an extent. There is now 

a pattern of established, vested interests – including among nationalist 

elements – where everyone wants a piece of the cake too much to risk 

either political or economic collapse. Were the ANC to become wholly 

unable to contain and control party members and the differences between 

them, elite violence could destabilize the nation. While a possibility, 

given intra-ANC struggles between loyalists of former President Thabo 

Mbeki and current President Jacob Zuma as well as brewing disagreements 

between Julius Malema and the Zuma administration, this is unlikely in the 

medium to long future. The nature of the ANC as an organization is fairly 

resilient and tensions between members have consistently been contained 

over many years. If a rift were to open within the ANC, moreover, it would 

not be the first time, with earlier splits resulting in the creation of the Pan 

Africanist Congress in 1959 and more recently the Congress of the People 

in late 2008. Neither split led to instability or violence. Should it happen 

again, it will not result in catastrophe, and may in fact signify a maturation 

of South Africa’s multiparty system.34
ACSS Research Paper, No. 3

22

The Security Sector’s Capacity to Manage Unrest

The social, economic, and political drivers of citizen violence 

necessitate multi-sector, civilian-led solutions. Recognizing this, as part of 

this assessment of the stability of the South African state, a review of the 

elements of South Africa’s security sector is provided.

South African Police Service. The South African Police Service (SAPS) 

is the primary recourse for the state when responding to political violence. 

In recent years, the police have made great improvements in terms of 

force levels and equipment. By mid-2010, total force strength stood at 

approximately 190,000, up from 130,000 in 2003 with an overall level 

of 204,000 set to be achieved by 2012. At present there are three South 

African police officers for every 1,000 citizens, while the international 

average is two per 1,000. Training in general remains of a fair to good 

standard, and recent acquisitions in terms of equipment have been 

sophisticated and on par with international standards.35 Despite these 

ratios and growing force strength, there are insufficient numbers of officers 

with the requisite skills and expertise, particularly in management and 

command and control. This has hampered the efficiency, effectiveness, 

and performance of the SAPS. Without strong leadership, the force risks 

evolving into a huge, unwieldy mass of individuals authorized to use 

weapons but not properly organized or disciplined.

Recruiting policies have adversely impacted efforts to remedy this 

deficit. Appointments and promotions are heavily subject to affirmative 

action, as well as political allegiance and affiliation at more senior levels. 

This has alienated good police officers of all race groups, with many 

leaving the SAPS feeling that their experience and expertise are better 

rewarded in the private sector. Key management and technical positions 

are also left vacant due to a lack of qualified black applicants, which has 

impacted severely on overall police performance, including the capacity 

to respond to political violence. For example, a decision was recently 

made to reequip the police air wing and purchase a fleet of new aircraft. 
Stress-Testing South Africa

23

The police air wing is a key tool when responding to violent protests and 

unrest. However, an insufficient number of black pilots applied to join the 

air wing once the aircraft were acquired. Instead of appointing applicants 

from other race groups, Minister of Police Nathi Mthethwa decided in 

May 2010 to employ only four new pilots and four student pilots, despite 

there being 120 applications to fill 54 advertised positions.36 The minister 

decided that to appoint pilots from minority race groups would not 

enhance diversity and, as a consequence, the posts were left vacant and 

the newly acquired aircraft effectively grounded.

In spite of these challenges, the police remain well placed to address 

urban domestic violence with certain specialist units. The SAPS has 

an organized, experienced, and well-established team of negotiators at 

both the provincial and national level. Based in Pretoria, Cape Town, 

and Durban, the SAPS Special Task Force (STF) trains abroad and is 

widely regarded for its skill and expertise. Complementary to the STF 

are National Intervention Units (NIUs), which are based in all major 

urban centers and deal with medium- to high-risk situations. Members 

are trained in a variety of scenarios, including terror-related incidents, 

and also train with the STF. Both the STF and NIUs can be moved fairly 

quickly with the assistance of the air wing or the South African Air Force, 

which has a formal agreement with the SAPS for rapid deployment of 

specialized units, especially if those units need to be deployed over a long 

distance.

More generally, police capacity to address local protests and unrest is 

mixed. The public order policing units, known as Crime Combat Units 

(CCUs), are primarily tasked with managing protest marches and unrest 

as well as performing crime combating functions. Following a restructuring 

process in 2006, they were reduced in size, resources, and capacity despite 

a 50 percent increase in the number of protests in the country between 

2002 and 2005. Known as Riot Units in the 1980s, the restructuring 

process reduced manpower from 7,227 members across 43 units to 2,595 

members in 23 units. Prior to restructuring, the units’ ability to respond 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 3

24

both quickly and effectively to spontaneous incidents and unrest was 

considered fairly good. However, by the time of the 2008 xenophobic 

attacks, both the total number of units and the number of members in 

each unit had been halved, equipment was in disrepair, and vehicles 

were poorly maintained. Grossly short of manpower, public order units 

were unable to cope with the unrest once it escalated and the SAPS was 

forced to request the assistance of the South African Army. In response 

to the crisis and in anticipation of South Africa’s hosting the 2010 FIFA 

World Cup, the SAPS began rebuilding, re-training, and re-staffing 

the public order units. By December 2009, CCUs had grown to 5,661 

members and 29 units. In 2008, the CCUs received assistance from the 

French gendarmerie, which trained the units in French techniques and 

crowd control. The French also helped replace inappropriate and poorly 

maintained gear and purchase new equipment, including water cannons.

Although the public order units are considered capable of responding 

quickly and effectively to sudden, localized protests, there remain serious 

concerns as to the units’ capacity to address unrest on a wider scale over 

a longer duration. Should reinforcements be required, provincial public 

order capacity can be called upon, as well as the respective NIU, which 

is also trained in public order policing. Unrest at a provincial level of a 

medium duration could also be managed with the support of public order 

units from other provinces and the STF. However, once any violence 

escalates to a national scale, the SAPS is unlikely to be able to cope for 

more than three to four days, and the army would have to be called in to 

assist. There is also some uncertainty as to whether resources, improved 

levels of training, and equipment acquired ahead of the FIFA Football 

World Cup will be maintained in the future.

The SAPS’ capacity to police any political violence in rural and 

outlying areas is extremely low, including rural terror, insurgency, or 

citizen protests and unrest. A rural protection program was in place until 

2003, though it was built largely around the South African Army’s Area 

Defence System or commandos, a territorial component of the army. In 
Stress-Testing South Africa

25

2003, President Thabo Mbeki ordered the phasing out of the commandos 

and by 2009 they had been disbanded. However, a security vacuum 

subsequently emerged in rural areas and along South Africa’s borders. 

The SAPS units intended to replace the commandos failed to provide 

sufficient safety and security to local communities, and in many areas 

were entirely absent. This has resulted in rural communities organizing 

themselves, often using illegal means and employing private security 

companies. By 2008, there was a personnel deficiency of 71 percent on 

the borders alone, rendering border security totally ineffective. In 2009, 

the government ordered the army to redeploy to the country’s borders 

given the incapacity of the police. Although the SAPS proposed a new 

Rural Safety Strategy in 2010, the strategy has yet to be implemented, 

has been heavily criticized, and is expected to only be functional in the 

coming two to three years. Meanwhile, should any violence break out in 

rural, outlying or border regions, or a violent political group or movement 

emerge in such areas, the police would most probably be incapable of 

responding meaningfully.

South African National Defence Force. The capacity of the South 

African National Defence Force (SANDF) to respond to political 

violence in South Africa rests primarily with that of the Special Forces 

Brigade and the South African Army. In this, the SANDF acts very much 

in support of the police or as a backup in cases of extreme unrest, terror, or 

insurgency. The Air Force and the Military Health Service would deploy 

mostly in support of the army in this regard.

The army’s role in addressing political violence is part of an agreement 

between the police and the military that allows for the police to request 

that the army be deployed when the police finds it can no longer cope 

with a given situation or crisis. Per the Constitution, the president must 

first authorize its deployment and place the army “in service.” As was seen 

in the response to the xenophobic violence in 2008, once authorized, the 

army deployed almost immediately to crisis hotspots, less than 24 hours 

after the president signed the order. Readiness to deploy at short notice is 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 3

26

enabled through the existence of a Joint Operations Intelligence Structure 

(JOINTS), which enables the military to meet with representatives 

from both the police and the intelligence services on a monthly basis 

and obtain an indication as to whether there are any possible threats 

against which their assistance will be required. Once deployed, joint 

command structures at the national, provincial, and local level allow for 

coordination of operations.

The Special Forces Brigade is trained in counterterrorism operations 

and can be used in support of the police STF in this regard. Reasonably 

well resourced, the Special Forces Brigade is also the only structure 

within the military that is formally trained in unconventional or 

counterinsurgency warfare. All other special operations units involved 

in counterinsurgency under the apartheid regime were disbanded 

following the transition to democracy in 1994. There is no real light force 

capability within the army structure at present, other than paratroopers.

The overwhelming focus of training is on conventional threats and 

peacekeeping training for deployment in regional and international 

peace missions in Africa. Given the nature of the operational 

environments to which the army is deployed in Africa, troops are trained 

in select rural and urban counterinsurgency-type drills, including crowd 

control, patrols, observation posts, roadblocks, and cordon-and-search 

operations. This training renders troops suited and able to assist the 

police in dealing with unrest on a wide scale over a short to medium 

duration.

However, these drills are taught in isolation of wider 

counterinsurgency principles and are generally considered to be 

insufficient for both current peace operations and for countering a 

meaningful insurgent threat should it emerge in South Africa. Of 

greatest concern is the serious decline and loss of skills and expertise 

around tracking, small unit tactics, intelligence gathering skills by 

regular troops, map reading and navigation, communication skills, and 

nighttime operation skills. In addition, leadership at lower levels is 
Stress-Testing South Africa

27

often poor.37 Junior leaders have struggled in operations abroad because 

they are not well trained to deal with threats and scenarios common in 

insurgent environments, especially when working in small groups. This 

is a critical skill in any counterinsurgency operation where low-level 

leaders are required to show initiative and make decisions constantly, 

and consequently demand a high level of skill and flexibility.38

The disbanding of the army commandos left a gap in capability for 

addressing other rural-based dangers. The commandos were lightly armed 

detachments comprised of members of local communities in rural and 

outlying areas. The units were charged with the protection of interior 

assets and landward borders, and were the forces primarily involved 

in law-and-order tasks in support of the police. The commandos were 

trained in counterinsurgency and provided the bulk of the SANDF’s 

rear area defense. Each commando had two substructures: area-bound 

units and non-area-bound units. The former gathered information and 

tactical intelligence and had a rapid response capacity. The non-areabound units acted as an auxiliary force to the police, and assisted in 

crime prevention operations and participated in manning observation 

posts, patrols, roadblocks, vehicle checkpoints, and cordon-and-search 

operations. 

Domestic Intelligence. Civilian intelligence services are currently 

undergoing a restructuring process. Until 2009, these services were 

comprised of the South African Secret Service (SASS), responsible 

for foreign intelligence, and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) 

which was responsible for domestic intelligence. Following his election, 

President Zuma ordered that the two agencies be brought together as 

the Foreign Branch and the Domestic Branch under the newly created 

State Security Agency (SSA), which is overseen by the Minister 

for State Security and a Director General. Also part of this ongoing 

restructuring is a redefinition and reorientation of roles, functions, and 

tasks. However, there is very little indication as to how this process will 

affect domestic intelligence capacity.
ACSS Research Paper, No. 3

28

Although it is difficult to evaluate performance and capabilities 

given the nature of the intelligence community, what is certain is that 

there is a capacity for early warning with regards to possible threats. 

The National Communications Centre conducts mass communications 

interception, primarily of foreign origin unless authorized by a judge. 

Monitoring operations are ongoing, and provincial divisions make use of 

large numbers of collectors at ground level, observing situations and then 

passing information up the relevant channels.

Overall, training and tradecraft of intelligence operatives is considered 

to be poor, analytical skills dubious, and the service subject to a general 

lack of resources. A great deal of operational capability was lost in 1994, 

when some 10,000 former intelligence officers were demobilized as the 

apartheid-era National Intelligence Service (NIS) was downsized and 

integrated with the intelligence structures of the liberation movement, 

the then newly-formed NIA, a process fraught with infighting.39 The 

NIA has also suffered a series of scandals that have severely damaged 

its reputation, most controversial of which were seemingly politically 

motivated investigations of politicians and journalists. Integrating the 

existing intelligence agencies under SSA is intended to address such 

problems and boost capacity by pooling resources.

In terms of unrest and intra- and inter-party violence, the NIA’s 

function has centered on monitoring and reporting so as to ensure 

domestic stability. It is not tasked with responding to political violence, 

but rather to monitor, watch, listen, and develop reports on the status 

of situations and possible scenarios that could develop. Importantly, it 

has not been permitted to act at all. Analysis is passed to the National 

Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC), comprised of the heads 

of the intelligence services, representatives from Defence Intelligence, the 

SAPS’ Directorate for Crime Intelligence, and the directors-general of 

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency. NICOC then decides 

how to proceed given the information provided and tasks any action back 

down to the police. This could change with the new SSA taking on a 
Stress-Testing South Africa

29

more operational role. However, this is as yet uncertain.

Concern has been raised over the NIA’s capacity to make the 

information it gathers more useful in terms of timeliness so as to facilitate 

possible preventive action. For example, it was monitoring xenophobia in 

the country for some two years prior to the 2008 violence and the issue 

had been discussed at the cabinet level for some time. Yet the outbreak 

of violence and the speed with which it spread still took government and 

those in the intelligence community by surprise. 

Insufficient oversight of the NIA’s application of its mandate for 

counterintelligence and counterterrorism allows the service extreme 

flexibility to counter subversion, treason, sabotage, and terrorism. Its 

broad mandate was devised in 1994 and has remained largely unchanged 

since. Its breadth has opened the NIA to politicization and spying on 

domestic political opponents. For instance, even a member of the ANC 

National Executive Committee has been subjected to communications 

interceptions and harassment by the NIA.40 Oversight and guidelines 

exist but are in general weak and vague.

Although a process is underway to develop a new national security 

strategy to more narrowly define what constitutes South Africa’s national 

security concerns and the NIA’s tasks, it remains unclear as to what its 

outcome will be or by when it will be complete. In the meantime, the 

potential for abuse is significant. At worst, instead of subduing political 

violence, domestic intelligence structures and operations are open to 

being misused to further elite political violence at the highest level.

Recommendations

There is a degree of unpredictability about political violence in 

South Africa and where the nation is headed. There is ample reason 

to be confident in the country’s stability and progress – its increasingly 

modern economy, widespread support for democracy, and relatively 

capable state institutions suggest a vibrant and dynamic future. 

Conditions on the ground, however, sometimes paint a different 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 3

30

picture. Counterproductive and frequently violent infighting among 

opportunistic and exploitative politicians at the local level effectively 

paralyzes some municipal governments, leaving them unable to serve 

their communities. With such political channels undermined, citizens 

turn to other, sometimes violent, means to express their frustrations 

with persistent poverty, lack of basic social services, and an unresponsive 

political system. A mounting sense that modest economic growth and 

opportunities only benefit the rich at the expense of South Africa’s 

millions of poor further fuels grievances and violent unrest. While not 

discounting the dramatic turning point that 1994 represents, in certain 

respects the post-apartheid state shares many flaws – albeit in different 

forms – with the one it replaced. Whereas the former was unwilling to 

provide social services and economic opportunities to all, the latter has 

proven unable. 

Similarly, security-centered approaches did not reverse political 

violence during apartheid and will not resolve South Africa’s current 

problems. A reliance on the use of force to address contemporary violence 

will further alienate communities. Nor would it address any of the drivers 

of the country’s current challenges. Therefore, more fundamental course 

corrections are needed to steady South Africa’s current trajectory and 

extinguish the slow-burning fuses that threaten long-term stability: 

Expand Socioeconomic Opportunities. To build healthier relations 

between citizens and the state in South Africa, a primary priority for 

the state should be to facilitate socioeconomic progress. Since 1994, the 

government’s efforts have produced some benefits but these have tended 

to be shallow and patchy. South Africa’s numerous poor, unemployed, 

and underemployed increasingly depend on social grants and temporary 

government work programs that produce few sustainable improvements. 

More fundamental changes are required. Sustained investments in 

building effective health, education, housing, and sanitation service 

institutions are vital, especially as South Africa’s population becomes 

more urbanized. 
Stress-Testing South Africa

31

Likewise, private sector job creation must be a more central element 

of any economic development strategy. Programs and assistance that 

promote entrepreneurship and innovation are needed to support small 

and midsized businesses. This includes simplifying and facilitating access 

to business licenses, credit, and land. A greater focus on fulfilling basic 

social and infrastructural needs, particularly in townships, semi-urban 

areas, and rural regions, will free up the productive potential of many 

South Africans to advance their own and their communities’ interests. 

Similarly, broadening educational opportunities will serve long-term 

growth and well-being, and continue to muffle those few but sometimes 

potent voices that still seek to stir racial tensions. 

Reduce Patronage Opportunities. Socioeconomic programs, on 

their own, however, won’t counterbalance the political economy drivers of 

inequality that have favored elites.41 If citizens see avenues to wealth and 

advancement restricted to the already well-connected and well-heeled, 

their anger will be directed at a government they deem complicit. This is a 

scene many South Africans already perceive. Accordingly, positive statecitizen relations – and, by extension, domestic stability – will depend on 

the state’s ability to intervene strongly, responsibly, and effectively to 

improve accountability. To do this, the government must eliminate the 

notion that the state is a spoils system up for grabs. Loyal but incompetent 

functionaries whose main preoccupation is often to usurp power and use 

their positions of influence for self-aggrandizement and financial gain are 

severely harming the image of the state and fuelling resentment. State 

resources are not “a cake” to be sliced and divided. 

The current political culture in South Africa, with the opportunities 

for wealth and influence that accrue to politicians, attracts candidates 

more interested in self-enrichment than public service. To reverse this, 

the nature of political office must be reconceived. The role should be 

remodeled so that it is not perceived as a wealth-leveraging position. 

Salaries and benefits for public office should be reduced. Politicians should 

have highly limited discretionary spending authority. Greater oversight of 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 3

32

the allocation and procurement of government services, especially at local 

levels, is sorely needed. In other words, there needs to be a separation 

between political authority and economic opportunity. The Prevention 

and Combating of Corrupt Activities Bill of 2004 has thus far proven 

insufficient to achieve its stated ends. Independent (public-private) 

authorities with investigative powers, involving civil society watchdogs, 

must also be created. Corrupt behavior should be treated as criminal acts 

and perpetrators punished accordingly. 

End Tolerance for Political Violence. In order to achieve the 

stability necessary and avoid future violent eruptions with unpredictable 

consequences, the South African government should institute measures 

that deter political opportunists from using violence to achieve political 

ends. Currently, inter- and intra-party violence regularly spikes as local 

government elections and appointments approach. Electoral competition 

should be regulated in ways that reduce incentives for such violent 

competition and decisively intervene when this dynamic emerges. The 

South African Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) should review 

electoral laws and make recommendations that hold parties accountable 

for violence and intimidation. As in other African countries the IEC 

should have the authority to direct specialized police forces to prevent 

such violence, enforce electoral laws, and investigate incidents of such 

violence.

Reform Electoral Party List System. At present, citizens vote for 

their preferred political party and party leaders assign officials from a 

slate of party candidates to a given constituency. While party leaders like 

this system for the party loyalty it generates, it adds unnecessary layers 

between citizens and their political leaders – enabling abuses of power and 

stoking dangerous intra-party rivalries. Instead, citizens should elect their 

political representatives directly. By knowing precisely for whom they 

are voting, citizens will be in a stronger position to hold their legislative 

representative accountable. In other words, politicians will serve the 

people who elect them rather than those (in the party structures) who 
Stress-Testing South Africa

33

select them. Pressure to eliminate the party list system is unlikely to come 

from within the ANC or other political parties. Therefore, it will be 

necessary for civil society groups to take the lead in enacting this change.

Elevate Non-Violent Political Norms. Civil society organizations 

should also work with all political parties and youth groups to create a 

more democratic civic culture. This would be a long-term process with 

an aim of enhancing understanding for the importance of tolerance and a 

level playing field in a functioning democracy. Particular attention should 

be given to areas prone to political violence such as KwaZulu-Natal and 

Mpumalanga Provinces.

A “zero-tolerance” campaign against abuse of office should be 

combined with a consistent message supporting constructive performance. 

Positive examples of responsible and effective efforts to serve the public 

interest at the community and local level should be lauded and rewarded, 

regardless of political party affiliation. Respected, independent foundations 

committed to good government in South Africa can highlight exemplary 

behavior with annual award ceremonies to deserving politicians, akin to 

the Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership. 

Invest in Public Order Policing Capacity. While political and 

economic reforms can address the root drivers of South Africa’s increasing 

political violence, improvements in the security sector can also enhance 

deterrence, prevention, and trust and confidence in security institutions 

and the state. The creation of the SSA and ongoing intelligence reforms 

are steps in the right direction. Perhaps most importantly, the new 

service’s mandate should be clarified and focused so as to avoid abuse and 

politicization. Rebuilding the capacity of the SAPS Crime Combat Units 

and the South African Army’s Areas Defence System would further support 

this effort and ensure that the state’s response to unrest is professional and 

restrained rather than inflammatory. General performance and legitimacy 

of the security sector will be further boosted if oversight by both civilian 

government and nongovernmental civil society entities is seen as genuine 

and credible. 
ACSS Research Paper, No. 3

34

At the community and local level, inequality and patronage-driven 

violence and corresponding state security responses are undermining trust 

in the police and security sector at large. From the perspective of many 

South Africans in townships, semi-urban, and rural areas, the state and 

police are seen as entangled in partisan disputes while rising crime and 

safety concerns are seemingly neglected. The increasing degree to which 

many communities rely on self-help security initiatives is testament to a 

widening security gap. This need offers a potential opportunity for the 

security sector to engage communities constructively. South Africa’s 

security sector should network with citizen safety initiatives in extraurban and rural areas to collaboratively identify security threats and devise 

methods of response. Such innovative local-level partnerships have shown 

promise in Nigeria, Uganda, and even some locales in South Africa.42

Conclusion

Although the vast majority of South Africans continue to support the 

democratic system, there is evidence of a decline in state legitimacy. While 

not unusual among countries consolidating relatively new democratic 

institutions and practices, the decline in South Africa is undeniably 

linked to the government’s persistent failure to address the underlying 

causes of political violence. There is a high probability that if meaningful 

inroads addressing poverty, inequality, and the delivery of basic services 

are not made and opportunistic tendencies among political elites are not 

stifled, state legitimacy will weaken further. People will lose faith in the 

system and a steady increase in political violence is probable. In this, there 

is a risk that violence will become more frequent and organized.43 There 

are still opportunities to address the core problems behind contemporary 

political violence. However, this will become increasingly difficult the 

longer the status quo persists. South Africans have shown that they will 

endure hardships and support potentially disruptive reforms as long as 

citizens are included in a meaningful way and the process is seen as fair 

and legitimate.
Stress-Testing South Africa

35

Notes

1 S. Harrendorf, M. Heiskanen, and S. Malby (eds), International Statistics on Crime 

and Justice, (Helsinki: European Institute of Crime Prevention and Control, 2010).

2 R.W. Johnson, South Africa’s Brave New World. The Beloved Country Since the 

End of Apartheid (London: Penguin Books, 2009), 25-51.

3 David Welsh, The Rise and Fall of Apartheid (Johannesburg and Cape Town: 

Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2009), 331.

4 “Summary of Results: Round 4 Afrobarometer Survey in South Africa,” 

Afrobarometer, 2008, 7, available at <http://www.afrobarometer.org/index.

php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=643>.

5 Summary of Results: Round 3 Afrobarometer Survey in South Africa,” 

Afrobarometer, 2005, 5, available at <http://www.afrobarometer.org/index.

php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=644>. 

6 Afrobarometer, 2008, 35.

7 Kate Lefko-Everett, “Participation and Democracy,” in Neeta Misra-Dexter and 

Judith February (eds.), Testing Democracy: Which Way is South Africa Going? (Cape Town: 

IDASA, 2010), 151 and 161-162. 

8 Justin Sylvester and Nonhlanhla Chanza, “Human Dignity and Democracy,” in 

Neeta Misra-Dexter and Judith Februrary (eds), Testing Democracy: Which Way is South 

Africa Going? (Cape Town: IDASA, 2010), 257.

9 Ibid., 266.

10 Haroon Bhorat and Carlene van der Westhuizen, “Poverty, Inequality and 

the Nature of Economic Growth in South Africa,” in Neeta Misra-Dexter and Judith 

February (eds.), Testing Democracy: Which Way is South Africa Going? (Cape Town: 

IDASA, 2010), 54.

11 Ibid., 63-67. Interview with Kate Lefko-Everett, project leader of the South 

African Reconciliation Barometer at the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.

12 Johnson, 494.

13 Ibid.

14 Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, State of Local 

Government in South Africa: Overview Report (Pretoria: COGTA, 2009), 11.

15 Johnson.

16 Jonny Steinberg, South Africa’s Xenophobic Eruption, ISS Paper 169 (Pretoria: 

Institute for Security Studies, 2008), 1.

17 Moeletsi Mbeki, “A Growing Gap Between the Black Elite and the Black 

Masses? Elites and Political and Economic Change in South Africa Since the Anglo-Boer 

War,” Vrye Afrikaan, 2005, available at <http://vryeafrikaan.co.za/lees.php?%20id=267>.

18 Johnson, 48.

19 Implementing the APRM: Views from Civil Society, South Africa Report, 

(Johannesburg: South Africa Institute for International Affairs, June 2011), 33-35.

20 Ibid., 29-30.
ACSS Research Paper, No. 3

36

21 “Cwele disciplinary hearings not yet concluded: Official,” South African Press 

Association, June 30, 2011.

22 Mamphela Ramphele, “House of Freedom is Open to All,” Mail & Guardian, 12 

August 2010.

23 “Voices of anger. Phumelela and Khutsong: Protest and conflict in two 

municipalities,” Centre for Development and Enterprise, May 8 2007, available at < 

http://www.cde.org.za/article.php?a_id=252>. 

24 Interview with Mary de Haas, KwaZulu-Natal Violence Monitor.

25 Peter Kagwanja, “Introduction: Uncertain Democracy – Elite Fragmentation 

and the Disintegration of the ‘Nationalist Consensus’ in South Africa,” in Peter 

Kagwanja and Kwandiwe Kondlo (eds.), State of the Nation. South Africa 2008, (Cape 

Town: HSRC Press, 2009), xxix.

26 Interview with Douglas Racionzer, Political and Governance Facilitator for the 

Community and Citizen Empowerment Programme, Institute for Democracy in South 

Africa.

27 Jane Duncan, “If They Come for You, Who Will Speak Out?” The South 

African Civil Society Information Service, July 7, 2011, available at <http://allafrica.

com/stories/201107071416.html>.

28 Ibid.

29 Interview with Professor John Daniel, Academic Director, SIT Study Abroad. 

Interview withProfessor Steven Friedman, Director of the Centre for the Study of 

Democracy, Rhodes University/ University of Johannesburg. See also Steven Friedman, 

“Malema Just a Pawn in the Battle for the ANC’s Soul,” Business Day, May 19, 2010.

30 Martin Schönteich and Henri Boshoff, “Chapter 4: Rise of the Boermag: A 

Case Study,” in Martin Schönteich and Henri Boshoff (eds.), ‘Volk’ Faith and the 

Fatherland: The Security Threat Posed by the White Right (Pretoria: Institute for Security 

Studies, 2003), 57.

31 Interview with Henri Boshoff, Head of Training for Peace Programme and former 

Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria.

32 Interview with Justin Sylvester, Political Researcher with the Political 

Information and Monitoring Service, Institute for Democracy in South Africa. See also 

Mamphela Ramphele, “House of Freedom is Open to All,” Mail & Guardian, August 12, 

2010, available at <http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-08-12-house-of-freedom-is-opento-all>. 

33 Interview with Professor Ben Cousins, DST/NRF Chair in Poverty, Land, and, 

Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape. Interview with Racionzer.

34 Interview with Andile Sokomani, Researcher, Corruption and Governance 

Programme, Institute for Security Studies.

35 Interview with Johan Burger, Senior Researcher, Crime and Justice Programme, 

Institute for Security Studies.
Stress-Testing South Africa

37

36 “Police ‘grounded’ as white pilots are passed over.” DefenceWeb, May 18, 2010, 

available at < http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=artic

le&id=8020:d&catid=35:Aerospace&Itemid=107>. 

37 Interview with CWO W. van Onselen, SA Army Doctrine and Policy. 

Interview with Col. Thinus van Staden, Chief of Staff of 46 SA Brigade. Interview 

with Henri Boshoff, Head of Training for Peace Programme, Africa Security Analysis 

Programme, Institute for Security Studies.

38 Helmoed Heitman, Optimizing Africa’s Security Force Structures, Africa Security 

Brief No. 13 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, May 2011).

39 Interview with Lauren Hutton, Researcher, Security Sector Governance 

Programme, Institute for Security Studies.

40 “Intelligence Governance And Oversight In South Africa: Submission To The 

Ministerial Review Commission On Intelligence,” Institute for Security Studies, May 11, 

2007, available at <http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/INTELSUBMITMAY07.PDF>.

41 Jessica Hagen-Zanker, Jenny Morgan, and Charles Meth, “South Africa’s 

Cash Social Security Grants: Progress in Increasing Coverage,” Overseas Development 

Institute, 2011, 16.

42 Bruce Baker, Nonstate Policing: Expanding the Scope for Tackling Africa’s Urban 

Violence, Africa Security Brief No. 7 (Washington, DC: National Defense University 

Press, 2010).

43 Cyril Ramaphosa, as quoted in Alec Russell, After Mandela: The Battle for the 

Soul of South Africa (London: Hutchinson, 2009), 23.
ACSS Research Paper, No. 3

38

About the Author

The author is a faculty member at the Africa Center for Strategic 

Studies where he oversees curriculum and program development in the 

area of defense economics and researches the political economy of security 

in central and southern Africa. He has served as a professor at several 

universities internationally, including at the University of Western Cape 

and Stellenbosch University in South Africa. Dr. Malaquias holds a PhD 

in Political Science from Dalhousie University, Canada. He is the author 

of various journal articles, book chapters, and other publications, including 

“Angola’s Foreign Policy: Pragmatic Recalibrations” (South Africa 

Institute for International Affairs, 2011); Rebels and Robbers: Violence in 

Post-Colonial Angola (Nordic Africa Institute, 2006); and “Thirsty Powers: 

The United States, China and Africa’s Energy Resources” in Portugal, 

os Estados Unidos e a Africa Austral (Instituto Português de Relações 

Internacionais, 2006). 

Among the help of many others, Dr. Malaquias thanks Ms. Anita 

Grossman for her diligent research and assistance in support of this paper. 


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