No. 86-321 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1987 

RONALD S. HETLAND, 

Claimant and Appellant, 

-vsMAGNUM PETROLEUM, Employer, 

and 

STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: The Workers' Compensation Court, The Honorable 

Timothy Reardon, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

John L. McKeon, Anaconda, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Allen B. Chronister, Assistant Attorney General, 

Agency Legal Services, Helena, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: Nov. 13, 1986 

Decided: February 23, 1987 

z2zL */L 8 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Ronald S. Hetland appeals a Workers' Compensation Court 

ruling that Hetland was not acting within the course and 

scope of his employment at the time of his automobile 

accident and therefore was not eligible for workers' 

compensation benefits. The issue on appeal is whether there 

is substantial evidence to support the Workers' Compensation 

Court's ruling. We affirm. 

In January 1982, Hetland was hired by Magnum Petroleum 

as a convenience store clerk in Anaconda, Montana. The store 

manager instructed Hetland that his duties included cleaning 

the store, stocking shelves, logging the gasoline and making 

night deposits. The store clerks took turns working morning 

shifts on the weekends. The clerk working this shift was 

responsible for getting the keys and money from the clerk who 

closed the store the previous night. The manager left the 

details of the transfer to the clerks involved; the morning 

clerk could come to the store at closing time (10:OO p.m.) to 

retrieve the keys and money from the night clerk or the night 

clerk could bring the keys and money to the morning clerk's 

home after closing the store, or to the store the next 

morning. The clerks were not given any compensation for 

undertaking this transfer and the store furnished no 

vehicles. 
Hetland was scheduled to work a morning weekend shift 

on January 16, 1983. Hetland stopped by the store the night 

before to tell the clerk of his out-of-town entertainment 

plans for the evening, and that he would return to pick up 

the keys and money at 10:OO p.m., which was closing time. 

Hetland and his wife then departed for a nightclub in Rocker, 

Montana, a town approximately twenty-five miles east of 

Anaconda, where they met Hetland's mother-in-law. As closing 

time for the store approached, Hetland borrowed his 

mother-in-law's new car, drove back to Anaconda, picked up 

the keys and money at the store and took them to his 

apartment located ten to twelve blocks from the store. 

Hetland then drove to Fairmont Hot Springs since his wife and 

mother-in-law had indicated that they might move to that 

location. Hetland did not find his wife or mother-in-law at 

Fairmont and was returning to Rocker when he had an 

automobile accident at the Gregson interchange on Interstate 

90. 

Hetland testified that he felt the keys and money 

pickup was part of the job but further testified that once 

the keys and money had been accounted for, he was back on his 

own personal time. The Workers' Compensation Court held that 

at the time of the accident, Hetland was not acting within 

the course and scope of his employment and therefore was not 

eligible for workers' compensation benefits. 
The applicable standard for determining whether an 

employee is entitled to workers' compensation benefits is 

stated in 5 39-71-407, MCA: 

Every insurer is liable for the payment 

of compensation . . . to an employee of 

an employer it insures who receives an 

injury arising out of and in the course 

of his employment or, in the case of his 

death from such injury, to his 

beneficiaries, if any. 

"Our function in reviewing a decision of the Workers' 

Compensation Court is to determine whether there is 

substantial evidence to support the findings and conclusions 

of that court." Steffes v. 93 Leasing Co., Inc. (1978), 177 

Mont. 83, 86, 580 P.2d 450, 452-53. Hetland argues that at 

the time of his automobile accident he was on the last leg of 

a "special assignment" or "special errand" on behalf of the 

employer. 

The Steffes case, 580 P.2d at 453, addresses the going 

and coming rule, and its exceptions: 

Generally, an injury sustained in going 

to or coming from work does not arise out 

of and in the course of employment within 

the meaning of the Workers' Compensation 

Act. Hagerman v. Galen State Hospital 

(1977), Mont., 5n P.2d 893, 34 St.Rep. 

1150. However in Hagerman this Court 

recognized two exceptions to the rule: 

(1) where employee travel pay was covered 

under the employment contract, and (2) 

where the travel was for the special 

benefit of the employer. 
The second exception stated above is the basis of 

Hetland's argument and was recently discussed by this Court: 

"[tlhis exception applies where an employee is required to 

travel away from home on his employer's business." Correa v. 

Rexroat Tile (Mont. 1985), 703 P.2d 160, 163, 42 St.Rep. 

1075, 1078. 

We agree with the Workers' Compensation Court that 

Hetland was not acting within the course and scope of his 

employment at the time of the accident and therefore is not 

eligible for compensation benefits. Three reasons support 

our conclusion. First, Hetland testified at least three 

times that after the keys and money were secured from the 

night clerk, he was free to resume his activities for the 

evening. Hetland based his understanding in part on what the 

'manager had told him. Therefore when the keys and money 

arrived at Hetland's apartment, Hetland's subsequent actions 

no longer served any business purpose of his employer. 

Second, the employer was not exerting a right of control over 

Hetland at the time of his accident. The right to control 

may exist if the employee is acting for the benefit of the 

employer. Courser v. Darby School Dist. No. 1 (Mont. 1984) , 

692 P.2d 417, 420, 41 St.Rep. 2283, 2287. The clerks were 

responsible for carrying out the transfer. Hetland chose to 

drive back from Rocker that evening instead of requesting the 

night clerk to bring the keys and money to the store the next 
morning. The travel Hetland undertook, save for the ten to 

twelve block ride from the store to his apartment with the 

keys and money, cannot be said to have been for the special 

benefit of the employer under Steffes. 

Third, public policy precludes a finding of injury 

within the course and scope of employment in this case. The 

employer is not an insurer of his employees at all times 

during the period of employment, Griffin v. Industrial 

Accident Fund (1940), 111 Mont. 110, 117, 106 P.2d 346, 348, 

but only during the time the employees are discharging 

business responsibilities on his behalf. 

As the Griffin Court noted: 

[Claimant's] employment did not require 

him to be at the place where he sustained 

the injuries. Those injuries did not 

arise out of and in the course of his 

employment. To hold that claimant is 

entitled to compensation here we would be 

obliged to say that the employer was an 

insurer against accident for the full 

twenty-four hours of a day, no matter 

what the employee may have been doing 

during the . . . hours when his regular 

services were at an end. 

Accordingly, we find substantial evidence to support 

the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court. 

Affirmed. 
We concur: ,A 

Justices 

Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., dissenting: 

I dissent. 

When employee Hetland left his job after completion of 

his regular hours, he was still under a duty to perform a 

service for his employer. In the performance of that duty, 

he suffered severe injuries. I would reverse the Workers' 

Compensation Court.