2 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 1 / Thursday, January 2, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

withdrew and rescinded the notice of 

revocation and final rule amending 

Appendix A to part 2641 of title 5. See 

78 FR 70191. In the withdrawal notice, 

OGE indicated that it planned to 

republish this notice and final rule in 

January 2014. 

Accordingly, OGE is now 

republishing that notice and final rule. 

OGE hereby gives notice that the abovereferenced post-employment 

exemptions, granted on October 29, 

1991; November 10, 2003; and 

December 4, 2003, respectively, will 

expire and are revoked effective on 

April 2, 2014. As of the effective date, 

a person occupying any one of these 

positions will become subject to the 

post-employment restrictions of 18 

U.S.C. 207(c) and (f) if the rate of basic 

pay for the position is equal to or greater 

than 86.5 percent of the rate of basic pay 

payable for level II of the Executive 

Schedule. 

As stated in 5 CFR 2641.301(j)(3)(ii), 

the Director of OGE is required to 

‘‘maintain a listing of positions or 

categories of positions in Appendix A to 

[5 CFR part 2641] for which the 18 

U.S.C. 207(c) restriction has been 

waived.’’ As such, Appendix A of this 

part is being amended to remove 

references to those SEC positions that 

are no longer exempt from the 

restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 207(c) and (f). 

These positions include: Solicitor, 

Office of General Counsel; Chief 

Litigation Counsel, Division of 

Enforcement; Deputy Chief Litigation 

Counsel, Division of Enforcement; SK– 

17 Positions; SK–16 and lower-graded 

SK positions supervised by employees 

in SK–17 positions; and SK–16 and 

lower-graded SK positions not 

supervised by employees in SK–17 

positions. 

II. Matters of Regulatory Procedure 

Administrative Procedure Act 

Pursuant to the Administrative 

Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 553(b), 

OGE finds good cause to waive the 

notice-and-comment requirements of 

the APA, as the codification of OGE’s 

revocation of exempted positions is 

technical in nature, and it is important 

and in the public interest that the 

codification of OGE’s revocation of 

exempted positions be published in the 

Federal Register as promptly as 

possible. For these reasons, OGE is 

issuing this regulation as a final rule 

effective 90 days after publication. 

Regulatory Flexibility Act 

As Director of the Office of 

Government Ethics, I certify under the 

Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 

chapter 6) that this final rule would not 

have a significant economic impact on 

a substantial number of small entities 

because it primarily affects current and 

former Federal executive branch 

employees. 

Paperwork Reduction Act 

The Paperwork Reduction Act (44 

U.S.C. chapter 35) does not apply 

because this regulation does not contain 

information collection requirements that 

require approval of the Office of 

Management and Budget. 

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

For purposes of the Unfunded 

Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 

chapter 5, subchapter II), this final rule 

would not significantly or uniquely 

affect small governments and will not 

result in increased expenditures by 

State, local, and tribal governments, in 

the aggregate, or by the private sector, of 

$100 million or more (as adjusted for 

inflation) in any one year. 

Executive Order 12866 

In promulgating this final rule, the 

Office of Government Ethics has 

adhered to the regulatory philosophy 

and the applicable principles of 

regulation set forth in section 1 of 

Executive Order 12866, Regulatory 

Planning and Review. This rule has not 

been reviewed by the Office of 

Management and Budget under that 

Executive order since it is not 

‘‘significant’’ under the order. 

Executive Order 12988 

As Director of the Office of 

Government Ethics, I have reviewed this 

final rule in light of section 3 of 

Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice 

Reform, and certify that it meets the 

applicable standards provided therein. 

List of Subjects in 5 CFR Part 2641 

Conflict of interests, Government 

employees. 

Approved: December 18, 2013. 

Walter M. Shaub, Jr., 

Director, Office of Government Ethics. 

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth 

in the preamble, the Office of 

Government Ethics is amending part 

2641 of subchapter B of chapter XVI of 

title 5 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations as follows: 

PART 2641—POST-EMPLOYEMENT 

CONFLICT OF INTEREST 

RESTRICTIONS 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 2641 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 5 U.S.C. App. (Ethics in 

Government Act of 1978); 18 U.S.C. 207; E.O. 

12674, 54 FR 15159, 3 CFR, 1989 Comp., p. 

215, as modified by E.O. 12731, 55 FR 42547, 

3 CFR, 1990 Comp., p. 306. 

Appendix A to Part 2641 [Amended] 

■ 2. Appendix A to part 2641 is 

amended by removing the listing for the 

Securities and Exchange Commission 

(and all positions thereunder). 

[FR Doc. 2013–30668 Filed 12–31–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6345–03–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Office of the Secretary 

6 CFR Part 5 

[Docket No. DHS–2013–0041] 

Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of 

Exemptions; Department of Homeland 

Security Transportation Security 

Administration, DHS/TSA–021, TSA 

Pre✓TM Application Program System 

of Records 

AGENCY: Department of Homeland 

Security. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland 

Security is issuing a final rule to amend 

its regulations to exempt portions of a 

newly established system of records 

titled, ‘‘Department of Homeland 

Security/Transportation Security 

Administration–021, TSA Pre✓TM

Application Program System of 

Records,’’ from one or more provisions 

of the Privacy Act because of criminal, 

civil, and administrative enforcement 

requirements. 

DATES: Effective January 2, 2014. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

general questions please contact: Peter 

Pietra, TSA Privacy Officer, TSA–036, 

601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 

20598–6036; or email at TSAprivacy@

dhs.gov. For privacy questions, please 

contact: Karen L. Neuman, (202) 343– 

1717, Chief Privacy Officer, Privacy 

Office, Department of Homeland 

Security, Washington, DC 20528. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

The Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS)/Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) published a 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) 

in the Federal Register, 78 FR 55657 

(Sept. 11, 2013), proposing to exempt 

portions of the newly established ‘‘DHS/ 

TSA–021, TSA Pre✓TM Application 

Program System of Records’’ from one 

or more provisions of the Privacy Act 

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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 1 / Thursday, January 2, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 3 

1The TSA Pre✓TM Application Program performs 

checks that are very similar to those performed for 

populations such as TSA Transportation Worker 

Identification Credential (TWIC) and Hazardous 

Material Endorsement (HME) programs. 

Accordingly, TSA proposed most of the same 

Privacy Act exemptions for the TSA Pre✓TM

Application Program that are claimed for the 

applicable System of Records Notice for the TWIC 

and HME programs. The Privacy Act exemptions 

claimed from the Transportation Security Threat 

Assessment System of Records strike the right 

balance of permitting TWIC and HME applicants to 

correct errors or incomplete information in other 

systems of records that may affect their ability to 

receive one of these credentials, while also 

protecting sensitive law enforcement or national 

security information that may be included in other 

systems of records. 

because of criminal, civil, and 

administrative enforcement 

requirements. The DHS/TSA–021 TSA 

Pre✓TM Application Program System of 

Records Notice (SORN) was published 

in the Federal Register, 78 FR 55274 

(Sept. 10, 2013), and comments were 

invited on both the NPRM and SORN. 

Public Comments 

DHS received 12 comments on the 

NPRM and five comments on the SORN. 

NPRM 

Several comments exceeded the scope 

of the exemption rulemaking and chose 

instead to comment on TSA security 

measures. DHS/TSA will not respond to 

those comments. 

DHS/TSA received a few comments 

that objected to the proposal to claim 

any exemptions from the Privacy Act for 

the release of information collected 

pursuant to the SORN. As stated in the 

NPRM, no exemption will be asserted 

regarding information in the system that 

is submitted by a person if that person, 

or his or her agent, seeks access to or 

amendment of such information. 

However, this system may contain 

records or information created or 

recompiled from information contained 

in other systems of records that are 

exempt from certain provisions of the 

Privacy Act, such as law enforcement or 

national security investigation or 

encounter records, or terrorist screening 

records. Disclosure of these records 

from other systems, as noted in the 

NPRM, could compromise investigatory 

material compiled for law enforcement 

or national security purposes. DHS will 

examine each request on a case-by-case 

basis and, after conferring with the 

appropriate component or agency, may 

waive applicable exemptions in 

appropriate circumstances and when it 

would not appear to interfere with or 

adversely affect the investigatory 

purposes of the systems from which the 

information is recompiled or in which 

it is contained.1

DHS/TSA received one comment from 

a private individual recommending that 

foreign service employees and their 

families be automatically included this 

program. The comment misapprehends 

the program for which the NPRM was 

published. The NPRM was published in 

association with the SORN for the TSA 

Pre✓TM Application program, which is 

designed to allow individuals to apply 

to be included in the program. 

Separately, DHS/TSA continues to 

evaluate populations that may otherwise 

be eligible for TSA Pre✓TM screening. 

DHS/TSA received one comment from 

a private individual concerned that 

exemptions under the Privacy Act 

would allow TSA to engage in 

discriminatory conduct based on race 

and appearance, and that an individual 

whose application is denied would have 

limited recourse because TSA would 

not provide enough information. The 

security threat assessment involves 

recurrent checks against law 

enforcement, immigration, and 

intelligence databases. TSA does not 

make decisions regarding eligibility for 

the TSA Pre✓TM Application Program 

based on race or appearance. Eligibility 

for the TSA Pre✓TM Application 

Program is within the sole discretion of 

TSA, which will notify individuals who 

are denied eligibility in writing of the 

reasons for the denial. If initially 

deemed ineligible, applicants will have 

an opportunity to correct cases of 

misidentification or inaccurate criminal 

or immigration records. Individuals 

whom TSA determines are ineligible for 

the TSA Pre✓TM Application Program 

will continue to be screened at airport 

security checkpoints according to TSA 

standard screening protocols. 

DHS/TSA received one comment from 

a public interest research center that 

asserting Privacy Act exemptions 

contravenes the intent of the Privacy 

Act. DHS does not agree that asserting 

exemptions provided within the Privacy 

Act contravenes the Privacy Act. As 

reflected in the OMB Privacy Act 

Implementation Guidelines, ‘‘the 

drafters of the Act recognized that 

application of all the requirements of 

the Act to certain categories of records 

would have had undesirable and often 

unacceptable effects upon agencies in 

the conduct of necessary public 

business.’’ 40 FR 28948, 28971 (July 9, 

1975). 

The same commenter recognized the 

need to withhold information pursuant 

to Privacy Act exemptions during the 

period of the investigation, but also 

stated that individuals should be able to 

receive such information after an 

investigation is completed or made 

public, with appropriate redactions to 

protect the identities of witnesses and 

informants. This commenter stated that 

such post-investigation disclosures 

would provide individuals with the 

ability to address potential inaccuracies 

in these records, and noted that the TSA 

Pre✓TM Application Program will 

provide applicants an opportunity to 

correct inaccurate or incomplete 

criminal records or immigration records. 

As stated above, DHS will consider 

requests on a case-by-case basis, and in 

certain instances may waive applicable 

exemptions and release material that 

otherwise would be withheld. However, 

certain information gathered in the 

course of law enforcement or national 

security investigations or encounters, 

and created or recompiled from 

information contained in other exempt 

systems of records, will continue to be 

exempted from disclosure. Some of 

these records would reveal investigative 

techniques, sensitive security 

information, and classified information, 

or permit the subjects of investigations 

to interfere with related investigations. 

Continuing to exempt these sensitive 

records from disclosure is consistent 

with the intent and spirit of the Privacy 

Act. This information contained in a 

document qualifying for exemption does 

not lose its exempt status when 

recompiled in another record if the 

purposes underlying the exemption of 

the original document pertain to the 

recompilation as well. 

While access under the Privacy Act 

may be withheld under an appropriate 

exemption, the DHS Traveler Redress 

Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP) is a single 

point of contact for individuals who 

have inquiries or seek resolution 

regarding difficulties they experienced 

during their travel screening at 

transportation hubs, and has been used 

by individuals whose names are the 

same or similar to those of individuals 

on watch lists. See http://www.dhs.gov/ 

dhs-trip. 

SORN 

DHS/TSA received five comments on 

the SORN. One commenter asked if TSA 

Pre✓TM Application Program applicants 

would be advised as to the reasons for 

a denial of that application. As 

explained in the SORN and NPRM, TSA 

will notify applicants who are denied 

eligibility in writing of the reasons for 

the denial. If initially deemed ineligible, 

applicants will have an opportunity to 

correct cases of misidentification or 

inaccurate criminal or immigration 

records. 

Consistent with 28 CFR 50.12 in cases 

involving criminal records, and before 

making a final eligibility decision, TSA 

will advise the applicant that the FBI 

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4 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 1 / Thursday, January 2, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

2As TSA developed its known traveler program 

under the Secure Flight rule, it determined that it 

would require a security threat assessment similar 

to the threat assessment used for the TWIC and 

HME programs. The threat assessments for the 

TWIC and HME programs compare applicant names 

to watch lists and to law enforcement records to 

determine whether applicants pose a terrorist threat 

or other security threat. As part of this assessment, 

certain criminal convictions (e.g., espionage) are 

determined to be permanent bars to receiving a 

TWIC or HME, while other convictions (e.g., 

smuggling) require a period of time to have passed 

post-conviction or post-imprisonment before the 

applicant will be considered for the program. See 

49 CFR 1572.103. The TWIC and HME programs 

thus consider not only whether an applicant poses 

a terrorist threat, but also whether the applicant 

otherwise poses a security threat. 

3 In developing its known traveler program, TSA 

relied on its expertise in aviation security to 

determine that a ‘‘threat’’ includes a declaration of 

intent to cause harm, or something likely to cause 

harm. Furthermore, TSA determined that a ‘‘risk’’ 

only represents a chance of something going wrong 

or a possibility of danger. Therefore, TSA deemed 

that ‘‘low risk’’ individuals ‘‘do not pose a security 

threat’’ to aviation security. 

criminal record discloses information 

that would disqualify him or her from 

the TSA ✓TM Application Program. 

Within 30 days after being advised that 

the criminal record received from the 

FBI discloses a disqualifying criminal 

offense, the applicant must notify TSA 

in writing of his or her intent to correct 

any information he or she believes to be 

inaccurate. The applicant must provide 

a certified revised record, or the 

appropriate court must forward a 

certified true copy of the information, 

prior to TSA approving eligibility of the 

applicant for the TSA ✓TM Application 

Program. With respect to immigration 

records, within 30 days after being 

advised that the immigration records 

indicate that the applicant is ineligible 

for the TSA Pre✓TM Application 

Program, the applicant must notify TSA 

in writing of his or her intent to correct 

any information believed to be 

inaccurate. TSA will review any 

information submitted and make a final 

decision. If neither notification nor a 

corrected record is received by TSA, 

TSA may make a final determination to 

deny eligibility. 

One advocacy group stated that 

records of travel itineraries should be 

expunged because, as the commenter 

claimed, they are records of how 

individuals exercise their First 

Amendment rights. The TSA Pre✓TM

Application Program neither requests 

nor maintains applicant travel itinerary 

records, so this comment is 

inapplicable. 

Contrary to some commenters’ 

assertion that the TSA Pre✓TM

Application Program infringes upon an 

individual’s right to travel, this program 

will provide an added convenience to 

the majority of the traveling public. 

A public interest research center 

noted that according to the SORN, 

Known Traveler Numbers (KTNs) will 

be granted to individuals who pose a 

‘‘low’’ risk to transportation security, 

while the Secure Flight regulation (see 

49 CFR 1560.3) provides that when a 

known traveler program is instituted, 

individuals for whom the Federal 

government has conducted a security 

threat assessment and who do ‘‘not pose 

a security threat’’ will be provided a 

KTN. This commenter stated that DHS 

thus used the SORN to amend the 

Secure Flight regulation. DHS disagrees 

that the use of these two phrases 

constitutes a change in the Secure Flight 

regulation for who may receive a KTN. 

In response to comments on the Secure 

Flight proposed rule, TSA stated that it 

intended ‘‘to develop and implement 

the Known Traveler Number as part of 

the Secure Flight program. . . .’’ and 

that a KTN will be assigned to 

individuals ‘‘for whom the Federal 

government has already conducted a 

terrorist security threat assessment and 

has determined does not pose a terrorist 

security threat.’’ See 73 FR 64018, 64034 

(Oct. 28, 2008). 

TSA will compare TSA Pre✓TM

Application Program applicants to 

terrorist watch lists to determine 

whether the individuals pose a terrorist 

threat, but its threat assessment also will 

include law enforcement records checks 

to determine whether applicants in 

other ways pose a security threat.2

Applicants who are found to present a 

low risk to security, i.e., they do not 

pose either a terrorist security threat nor 

a more general security threat, will be 

provided a KTN.3

The use of the phrase ‘‘low risk’’ is 

neither an expansion nor a contraction 

of the population that was anticipated to 

receive KTNs under the Secure Flight 

rule; rather, as the TSA Pre✓TM program 

was developed, the use of the term ‘‘low 

risk’’ was employed to more accurately 

describe who will receive a KTN. The 

TSA Pre✓TM Application Program is a 

trusted traveler program, not a program 

open to all except those who present a 

terrorist threat. This standard also is 

consistent with the statutory 

authorization TSA received from the 

Congress to ‘‘[e]stablish requirements to 

implement trusted passenger programs 

and use available technologies to 

expedite security screening of 

passengers who participate in such 

programs, thereby allowing security 

screening personnel to focus on those 

passengers who should be subject to 

more extensive screening.’’ See sec. 

109(a)(3) of the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 

Public Law 107–71 (115 Stat. 597, 613, 

Nov. 19, 2001, codified at 49 U.S.C. 114 

note). 

TSA promulgated the Secure Flight 

rule under the Administrative 

Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 553, and 

clearly indicated that TSA was still 

developing its KTN program. The 

method that TSA selected to determine 

who receives KTNs under the TSA 

Pre✓TM Application Program does not 

substantively affect the public to a 

degree sufficient to implicate the policy 

interests underlying notice-andcomment rulemaking requirements. As 

noted in the SORN, the TSA Pre✓TM

Application Program does not impose 

any impediment on any individual 

traveler that is different from that 

experienced by the general traveling 

public, and individuals who TSA 

determines to be ineligible for the 

program will continue to be screened at 

airport security checkpoints according 

to TSA standard screening protocols. 

See 78 FR 55274, 55275. Specifically, a 

traveler denied admission into a TSA 

Pre✓TM lane because he or she does not 

have a KTN will face no greater 

screening impediment than anyone in 

the standard screening lane. Thus, 

notice-and-comment rulemaking is not 

required because the Secure Flight 

regulation notified the public that TSA 

would retain the ability to determine 

who might receive a KTN, and also 

because no new substantive burden or 

impediment for any traveler has been 

created. As such, the use of the phrase 

‘‘low risk’’ does not constitute an 

amendment to the Secure Flight 

regulation. 

The same commenter also suggested 

that TSA should make public its 

algorithms or thresholds for determining 

which TSA Pre✓TM; Application 

Program applicants are approved. If 

TSA were to make its algorithms public, 

it would be possible for individuals who 

seek to disrupt civil aviation to 

circumvent the algorithms. Such 

disclosure would be contrary to TSA’s 

mission and might endanger the flying 

public. 

Other commenters suggested that 

applicant information should be 

destroyed immediately after providing 

eligible individuals a KTN. For those 

individuals granted KTNs, TSA will 

maintain the application data while the 

KTN is valid and for one additional year 

to ensure that the security mission of 

the agency is properly protected. 

Without the application data, TSA 

would be unable to identify instances of 

fraud, identity theft, evolving risks, and 

other security issues. Moreover, 

destruction of the underlying 

application information will hinder 

TSA’s ability to assist KTN holders who 

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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 1 / Thursday, January 2, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 5 

have lost their numbers and could cause 

them to have to reapply for the program. 

TSA also will retain application data to 

protect applicants’ right to correct 

underlying information in the case of an 

initial denial. 

Two commenters questioned whether 

applicant information should be shared 

both within and outside DHS. TSA 

follows standard information-sharing 

principles among DHS components in 

accordance with the Privacy Act. In 

addition, TSA has narrowly tailored the 

routine uses that it has proposed to 

serve its mission and promote efficiency 

within the Federal Government. 

A public interest research center 

objected to three of the routine uses 

proposed for the system of records, 

arguing that the routine uses would 

result in blanket sharing with law 

enforcement agencies, foreign entities, 

and the public for other purposes. DHS 

has considered the comment but 

disagrees. The exercise of any routine 

use is subject to the requirement that 

sharing be compatible with the purposes 

for which the information was collected. 

Several commenters objected that the 

TSA Pre✓TM Application Program 

violates the U.S. Constitution or 

international treaty. DHS disagrees with 

the commenters as to the 

Constitutionality of the program, and 

notes that the treaty cited by an 

advocacy group expressly contradicts 

the position taken by the commenter by 

excluding requirements provided by law 

or necessary for national security from 

the treaty’s proscription. 

After careful consideration of public 

comments, the Department will 

implement the rulemaking as proposed. 

List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 5 

Freedom of information; Privacy. 

For the reasons stated in the 

preamble, DHS amends Chapter I of 

Title 6, Code of Federal Regulations, as 

follows: 

PART 5—DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS 

AND INFORMATION 

■ 1. The authority citation for Part 5 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.; Pub. L. 

107–296, 116 Stat. 2135; 5 U.S.C. 301. 

Subpart A also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552. 

Subpart B also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552a. 

■ 2. Add new paragraph 71 to Appendix 

C to Part 5 to read as follows: 

Appendix C to Part 5—DHS Systems of 

Records Exempt From the Privacy Act 

* * * * * 

71. The Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS)/Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA)-021 TSA Pre✓TM

Application Program System of Records 

consists of electronic and paper records and 

will be used by DHS/TSA. The DHS/TSA– 

021 Pre✓TM Application Program System of 

Records is a repository of information held 

by DHS/TSA on individuals who voluntarily 

provide personally identifiable information 

(PII) to TSA in return for enrollment in a 

program that will make them eligible for 

expedited security screening at designated 

airports. This System of Records contains PII 

in biographic application data, biometric 

information, pointer information to law 

enforcement databases, payment tracking, 

and U.S. application membership decisions 

that support the TSA Pre✓TM Application 

Program membership decisions. The DHS/

TSA–021 TSA Pre✓TM Application Program 

System of Records contains information that 

is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, 

or in cooperation with DHS and its 

components and may contain PII collected by 

other federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, or 

foreign government agencies. The Secretary 

of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 

552a(k)(1) and (k)(2), has exempted this 

system from the following provisions of the 

Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1); 

(e)(4)(G), (H), and (I); and (f). Where a record 

received from another system has been 

exempted in that source system under 5 

U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) and (k)(2), DHS will claim 

the same exemptions for those records that 

are claimed for the original primary systems 

of records from which they originated and 

claims any additional exemptions set forth 

here. Exemptions from these particular 

subsections are justified, on a case-by-case 

basis to be determined at the time a request 

is made, for the following reasons: 

(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for 

Disclosures) because release of the 

accounting of disclosures could alert the 

subject of an investigation of an actual or 

potential criminal, civil, or regulatory 

violation to the existence of that investigation 

and reveal investigative interest on the part 

of DHS as well as the recipient agency. 

Disclosure of the accounting would therefore 

present a serious impediment to law 

enforcement efforts and/or efforts to preserve 

national security. Disclosure of the 

accounting also would permit the individual 

who is the subject of a record to impede the 

investigation, to tamper with witnesses or 

evidence, and to avoid detection or 

apprehension, which would undermine the 

entire investigative process. 

(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) 

because access to the records contained in 

this system of records could inform the 

subject of an investigation of an actual or 

potential criminal, civil, or regulatory 

violation to the existence of that investigation 

and reveal investigative interest on the part 

of DHS or another agency. Access to the 

records could permit the individual who is 

the subject of a record to impede the 

investigation, to tamper with witnesses or 

evidence, and to avoid detection or 

apprehension. Amendment of the records 

could interfere with ongoing investigations 

and law enforcement activities and would 

impose an unreasonable administrative 

burden by requiring investigations to be 

continually reinvestigated. In addition, 

permitting access and amendment to such 

information could disclose security-sensitive 

information that could be detrimental to 

homeland security. 

(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and 

Necessity of Information) because in the 

course of investigations into potential 

violations of federal law, the accuracy of 

information obtained or introduced 

occasionally may be unclear, or the 

information may not be strictly relevant or 

necessary to a specific investigation. In the 

interests of effective law enforcement, it is 

appropriate to retain all information that may 

aid in establishing patterns of unlawful 

activity. 

(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) 

(Agency Requirements) and (f) (Agency 

Rules), because portions of this system are 

exempt from the individual access provisions 

of subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, 

and therefore DHS is not required to establish 

requirements, rules, or procedures with 

respect to such access. Providing notice to 

individuals with respect to the existence of 

records pertaining to them in the system of 

records or otherwise setting up procedures 

pursuant to which individuals may access 

and view records pertaining to themselves in 

the system would undermine investigative 

efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses, 

potential witnesses, and confidential 

informants. 

Dated: December 20, 2013. 

Karen L. Neuman, 

Chief Privacy Officer, Department of 

Homeland Security. 

[FR Doc. 2013–31183 Filed 12–31–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9110–9M–P 

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 

Food and Nutrition Service 

7 CFR Part 271, 272, 274, 276, and 277 

RIN 0584–AD99 

Automated Data Processing and 

Information Retrieval System 

Requirements: System Testing 

AGENCY: Food and Nutrition Service, 

USDA. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The Food and Nutrition 

Service (FNS) is adopting as a final rule, 

without substantive changes, the 

proposed rule that amends the 

Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 

Program (SNAP) regulations to 

implement Section 4121 of the Food, 

Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 

(the Farm Bill), which requires adequate 

system testing before and after 

implementation of a new State 

automated data processing (ADP) and 

information retrieval system, including 

the evaluation of data from pilot 

projects in limited areas for major 

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