Intelligence 

Analysis for 

Problem 

Solvers

John E. Eck and Ronald V. Clarke

with contributions by Gohar Petrossian
This project was supported by cooperative agreement # 2008CK-WX-K004 awarded by the Office 

of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions contained 

herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies 

of the U.S. Department of Justice. References to specific agencies, companies, products, or services 

should not be considered an endorsement of the product by the author(s) or the U.S. Department 

of Justice. Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement discussion of the issues.

The Internet references cited in this publication were valid as of the date of this publication. Given 

that URLs and websites are in constant flux, neither the author(s) nor the COPS Office can vouch 

for their current validity.

© 2013 Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, Inc. The U.S. Department of Justice reserves a 

royalty-free, nonexclusive, and irrevocable license to reproduce, publish, or otherwise use, and 

authorize others to use, this publication for Federal Government purposes. This publication may 

be freely distributed and used for noncommercial and educational purposes.

ISBN: 978-1-935676-55-3 

Published 2013 
Intelligence 

Analysis for 

Problem 

Solvers

John E. Eck and Ronald V. Clarke

with contributions by Gohar Petrossian

Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 1

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) for commissioning this 

manual, which is intended to be a companion volume to our earlier publication, Crime Analysis for Problem 

Solvers: In 60 Small Steps, which was also commissioned and published by the COPS Office. We thank our 

many colleagues and friends on whose work we have drawn. Special thanks are due to those who supplied 

material for inclusion: Christopher Bruce (Step 41), Mangai Natarajan (Step 20), Jerry Ratcliffe (Step 4), and 

Rashi Shuhkla (Step 43). Daryn Beauchesne, Leonard Miranda, Kristen Miggins, Andy Mills, Nanci Plouffe, 

Karin Schmerler, John Stedman, and Julie Wartell took part in a meeting, graciously hosted by the Chula Vista 

Police Department, to discuss our plans for the manual. Finally, we are grateful to Christopher Bruce and 

Andy Mills for their detailed commentary on the first draft of the manual. 

John E. Eck

Ronald V. Clarke

Contents

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Read This First . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

What is this manual about and who is it for? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

How is the manual organized? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Part 1: Intelligence Analysis for Solving Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Understand the Role of Intelligence Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

1. Know What Intelligence Analysis Comprises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

2. Know That Intelligence Analysis Must Look Beyond Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . 12

3. Understand the Intelligence Analysis Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

4. Recognize How Intelligence Analysis Fits Into Crime Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

5. Appreciate How Intelligence Fits in Policing Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Know the Fundamentals of Criminal Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

6. Recognize that Offenders Choose to Commit Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

7. Pay Attention to How Crime Opportunities Arise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

8. Distinguish between Criminal Groups and Problem Gatherings . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

9. Tell Apart Organized Crime and Organized Criminals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

10. Modify the Conditions that Facilitate Organized Crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

11. Study the Modus Operandi Step-by-Step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

12. Look for Convergent Settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

13. Disrupt Recruitment and Replacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Assemble the Key Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

14. Interview Offenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

15. Tap the Knowledge of Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

16. Work with Businesses, Private Security, and the City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

17. Work the Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Produce Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

18. Create Intelligent Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

19. Use Network Analysis to Connect the Players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

20. Undertake Conversational Analysis of Wire Tap Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

21. Compare Competing Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

22. Find Ways to Share Vital Information with Other Jurisdictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

Create Effective Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

23. Diagram the Crime Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

24. Apply Situational Prevention to Each Stage of The Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

25. Work with Gatherings and Crowds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

26. Pull Levers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Never Compromise Ethics and Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

27. Be Accountable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

28. Do Not Delude Yourself . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

29. Be Principled in Your Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

30. Don’t Unnecessarily Beat Yourself Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Part 2: Case Studies of Criminal Groups and Problem Gatherings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

31. How to Read the Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Criminal Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

32. Retail Drug Dealers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

33. Terrorists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

34. White Supremacists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

35. Animal Rights Extremists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

36. Internet Pedophile Rings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

37. Graffiti Crews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

38. Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

39. Street Gangs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

40. Auto-Accident Fraud Rings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

41. Organized Shoplifters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

42. Organized Car Thieves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

43. Clandestine Methamphetamine Labs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Problem Gatherings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

44. Cruising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

45. Illegal Street Racing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

46. Spring Breaks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

47. Political Demonstrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

48. Student Party Riots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 5

Read This First

Read This First 

The 9/11 Commission famously criticized the country’s intelligence agencies for failing to “connect the dots” 

before the attack—that is, for failing to detect a pattern in the scattered items of information about the hijackers 

that had come to the attention of various federal and state agencies. The resulting calls for intelligence reform 

were at first confined to the nation’s security agencies, the FBI and the CIA. Soon police leaders began to argue 

that their agencies, too, had a vital role in addressing terrorism and that they must be included in the loop. 

Terrorism may have raised the profile of police intelligence, but it is not the main reason for improving its use. 

Police intelligence has a far wider role in public safety, crime reduction, and order maintenance. This wider role 

is explored throughout this manual. Unfortunately, the word “intelligence” also raises public fears that secretly 

collected police information will be used to subvert individual liberties and democratic institutions. We will 

touch on these concerns later; here, we should explain why we wrote the manual, who it is for, and what it covers.

What is this manual about and who is it for?

As we discuss in Step 1, intelligence analysis is “a process for making sense of a diverse array of information about 

crime problems created by offender groups, with the goal of reducing crime.” Numerous books and manuals for 

crime analysts are available that describe how to process data to guide police anti-crime tactics and strategies. 

In contrast, most writing on police intelligence focuses on data gathering and sharing, administration, and legal 

requirements. These are all important topics, but they do not help the analyst analyze, i.e., make sense of the data 

in order to glimpse behind the veil of a criminal enterprise. 

Our manual fills this gap by providing a practical guide to intelligence analysis, much like our earlier manual on 

crime analysis written for the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing. In writing this manual, it soon became clear 

that police intelligence has a much larger mission than simply finding out who is up to no good, who they hang 

out with, what they are about to do, and where they can be found. These are the sorts of questions we normally 

expect police intelligence to address. However, there are other questions that intelligence analysis can effectively 

address, such as: How do offenders commit their crimes? What circumstances help them commit their crimes? 

And, what countermeasures might prevent them from doing so? In short, we look beyond the “who” to address 

“how,” “when,” “where,” and “what.”

This manual fuses aspects of intelligence analysis with Problem-Oriented Policing. The links between the two 

have been ignored in the past, with the exception of Jerry Ratcliffe’s book referenced below. However, knowing 

how intelligence analysis can help solve problems and how problem solving can improve the effectiveness of 

intelligence analysis will aid any police practitioner interested in reducing crime or disorder.

This manual is not intended to serve the entire law enforcement community. Nor does it describe all facets of 

intelligence. Rather it focuses on the analysis of intelligence, and we wrote it for three groups in local policing 

agencies: (1) intelligence officers and analysts, (2) crime analysts who might need to use intelligence information 

and, (3) police managers who supervise crime and intelligence analysts. If you are such a manager, and you find 

that the work of analysts is something of a mystery, then we hope this manual can demystify their work and help 

you make better use of your analysts.
6 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

Read This First

The coverage of this manual 

The central focus of this manual is the analysis of data: making sense of the variety of bits of information describing 

criminal groups or problem gatherings . This manual does not cover:

◾ Federal, state, and local intelligence organizations, groups, and networks

◾ How to set up or manage an intelligence unit within a police organization

◾ All the sources of data and information available

◾ Security requirements for those with access to intelligence data

◾ Legal requirements for obtaining and sharing intelligence information

There are other documents, books, and resources that cover these topics .

Three key assumptions 

1. In preparing to write this manual, it quickly became apparent that (1) there is considerable overlap in the 

analytic techniques employed and the skills needed by intelligence analysts and crime analysts and, (2) most 

police agencies would have insufficient resources to employ separate groups of both specialists. We have 

therefore assumed that intelligence analysis and crime analysis are broadly similar and will generally be 

undertaken by the same group of analysts.

2. In our early discussions with crime and intelligence analysts, they were able to identify only one important 

difference between their roles: That intelligence analysis focuses mainly on criminal groups and problem 

gatherings. Examples of the former would be terrorists, street gangs, outlaw motorcycle gangs, and organized 

shoplifters, and of the latter would be illegal street races, political demonstrations by extremist groups, and 

student crowds at spring break. Consequently, this manual focuses on analyzing information about criminal 

groups and problem gatherings.

3. The third assumption derives from our backgrounds in community policing and problem-oriented policing. 

The purpose of intelligence analysis should be to find ways of altering the “facilitating conditions” that permit 

these groups and gatherings to create harm. In other words, intelligence analysis can contribute both to longterm and immediate reductions in crime. 

How is the manual organized?

The first part of the manual consists of 30 “Steps” organized under six sections. Each step covers a discrete topic 

and each one stands on its own. So there is no need to read the manual straight through from beginning to end; 

you can dip into it at any point. Nevertheless, topics do connect with each other and follow a logical order. Where 

these connections are vital, we reference other steps. At the end of most steps, we include some references to 

written materials that give more details about the topic. 

The second part of the manual contains case studies of various criminal groups and problem gatherings that 

we undertook in order to assist our thinking about the uses of intelligence analysis. These case studies provide 

useful examples of the kinds of information that might be collected and ways in which it might be used.
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 7

Read this First

Policing agencies and law enforcement

◾ Throughout this manual, we use the term “police agencies” to refer to agencies of local government 

whose primary business is policing . As well as municipal and town agencies, this includes sheriff 

agencies that provide police services to county residents and businesses, but not those that only provide 

correctional, warrant, or court services . We do not include federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 

and Explosives (ATF) . 

◾ We use the term “law enforcement” to refer to a procedure or tactic that police agencies can use, but we 

do not use the term “law enforcement agency” because law enforcement is only one of many tools police 

can use . Intelligence analysis should help police decision makers choose among the available tools .

READ MORE:

Jerry Ratcliffe . 2008 . Intelligence-Led Policing. 

Cullompton, Devon: Willan Publishing . 

Ronald V . Clarke and John E . Eck . 2005 . Crime Analysis 

for Problem Solvers. In 60 Small Steps. Washington, D .C .; 

U .S . Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services .

rt 1

Intelligence 

Analysis 

a

for Solving 

P

Problems

Part 1: Intelligence Analysis for Solving Problems
10 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

KNOW WHAT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS COMPRISES

TERRORIST THREATS HAVE DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE VITAL ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE. However, the threats have also 

promoted inflated expectations and confusion regarding this role. This is particularly true in local policing. One source of 

confusion is that “intelligence” is used to refer both to raw information collected from some source and to the result of 

systematically analyzing this information. Many writings on intelligence analysis do little to clarify the term because they 

provide limited guidance as to what actions comprise analysis and the purposes these actions are supposed to serve. 

National intelligence and criminal intelligence 

While there are substantial differences between 

national intelligence (as conducted by federal agencies 

involved in international affairs) and criminal 

intelligence, we found Robert Clark’s book (referenced 

below) on national intelligence helpful in defining the 

scope and objectives of police intelligence analysis. 

Clark asserts that intelligence analysis has five 

characteristics: orientation, target, goals, inputs, and 

methods. For policing, the first three characteristics 

are far more important and we discuss orientation, 

targets, and goals below.

Orientation – proactive 

Intelligence analysis has a future orientation. It tries to 

determine what criminal activity is likely to happen if 

police do nothing to prevent it. In short, intelligence 

analysis is proactive. Consequently, reactive uses of 

information, such as to solve crimes that have already 

occurred, are not generally included in intelligence 

analysis. Solving crimes helps to redress past events, 

and though vital, this is not designed principally to 

prevent future incidents. Investigative information can 

be converted to intelligence when it is analyzed for the 

purpose of preventing future crimes. 

Targets – groups 

Intelligence analysis is directed against offenders 

operating in groups. Groups may facilitate offending, 

thus making them more serious than individual 

offenders acting alone. More importantly, intelligence 

can exploit the special vulnerabilities of groups, which 

are as follows: 

◾ Keeping Secrets. Benjamin Franklin said, “Three 

can keep a secret if two are dead.” While this is 

rather extreme, it illustrates an important point: 

the more people who need to keep a secret, the 

less likely it is that the secret will be kept. This is 

why criminal groups often enforce secrecy with 

threats, and perhaps it is also the reason the Hell’s 

Angels quote Benjamin Franklin. But, offender 

groups are not necessarily good at keeping their 

members compliant. 

◾ Visibility. A related vulnerability is that the larger 

the group of offenders, the greater the difficulty 

of keeping a low profile. The danger is especially 

great when group members gather. Establishing 

secret meeting places helps them overcome this 

difficulty. But establishing such a place often 

requires group members to work with nonoffenders (e.g., landlords) and this also increases 

their risk of detection. Groups that ostentatiously 

promote themselves create more information that 

intelligence analysis can exploit.

◾ Coordination. Unlike individual offenders 

operating alone, groups of offenders have to 

coordinate their activities with one another. 

Coordination difficulties rise as the group 

increases in size. Consequently, while groups 

have greater capacities than individuals, they are 

also less flexible, which, at least in the short run, 

makes them more predictable. In the long run, 

groups may have a greater chance to innovate than 

individuals, but this takes time.

In short, groups leak information that can be gathered 

and analyzed and, as we note below, the variety of 

information sources makes analysis mandatory. 

Goal – prevention 

The fundamental purpose of intelligence analysis is to 

prevent group crimes from occurring. This is consistent 

with the first two elements: a future orientation and 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 11

group offending. Intelligence analysis targets groups 

in order to reduce crime. To serve this purpose, the 

detection, arrest, and prosecution of group offenders 

are important, but intelligence analysis is not limited 

to these actions. Going beyond law enforcement is 

critical to achieving crime reduction goals. Consistent 

with community and problem-oriented policing 

strategies, intelligence analysis can serve a wide 

range of preventive activities. In subsequent steps, 

we describe how intelligence analysis can expand the 

range of prevention activities by applying principles 

derived from environmental criminology. 

Inputs – many

Intelligence analysis uses information from a wide 

variety of sources. It is not restricted to covert sources. 

Standard police records, available to the public, and 

other data collected by private and public agencies 

are often extremely useful. We examine some of the 

most obvious sources in this manual, but the sources 

available are only limited by imagination, resources, 

and technology. If intelligence analysis were restricted 

to a single source, the need for analysis would be 

much reduced. It is the need to make sense of multiple 

information sources, including data from other 

jurisdictions (see Step 22), each with its own strengths 

and weaknesses, that makes analysis important. 

Consequently, we do not define intelligence analysis 

by the type of information used: variety is what is 

important. 

Methods – varied 

Intelligence analysis methods involve processes 

to sort, interpret, and compare information from 

multiple sources in order to determine what offending 

groups are likely to be operating, how they commit 

crimes, and what can be done to keep these groups 

from being successful. Just as there are many sources 

of information, police can use many analytical 

methods. We will discuss some of the most important. 

We do not define intelligence analysis by the use of 

any particular method; any systematic approach that 

helps provide an accurate assessment can be part of 

intelligence analysis.

Understand the Role of Intelligence Analysis

Lone wolves

What about the threat of “lone wolf” terrorists? Are 

their actions not susceptible to intelligence analysis? 

Practically speaking, no . Although the harm they can do 

is extreme, this does not mean that intelligence analysis 

can do any more for the lone wolf terrorist than it could 

do for the lone wolf bank robber, the isolated drug dealer, 

or the stand alone fraudster . If individual offending 

creates patterns, crime analysis can help . Controlling 

access to explosive materials, for example, helps thwart 

isolated terrorists as well as organized ones. However, 

without a group or a pattern of behavior, police have to 

rely on isolated and unpredictable reports of community 

members, chance encounters, and investigative work.

This might happen when lone wolves “reach out” 

to others for assistance (e.g., obtaining weapons, 

information, or other support). When they mistakenly 

reach out to individuals with connections to police, this 

presents the police with an opportunity to identify and 

remove them.

In summary, intelligence analysis is just a specialized 

form of crime analysis that focuses on problems created 

by groups of offenders. It is a process for making 

sense of a diverse array of information about crime 

problems created by offender groups, with the 

goal of reducing crime. Intelligence is just a form 

of information that describes groups. Sources and 

methods do not define it. 

READ MORE:

Robert M . Clark . 2007 . Intelligence Analysis: A TargetCentric Approach. 2nd Edition . Washington, D .C .: CQ 

Press .
12 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

KNOW THAT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS MUST LOOK BEYOND ENFORCEMENT

WE HAVE SAID THE GOAL OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS IS TO REDUCE THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY OFFENDER GROUPS.

Gathering, analyzing, and sharing data might assist in making arrests and prosecutions and could result in breaking up a 

group. However, this can only be considered effective action if the problems created by the group decline. 

For example, breaking up a group that steals catalytic 

converters may not be productive, under the following 

circumstances: 

1. The group was never responsible for an important 

proportion of the problem

2. The wrong members of the group are removed

3. Those arrested are quickly replaced by others, thus 

reestablishing the group

4. Other groups move in to take advantage of the 

now vacant opportunity

Unless there is a reduction of theft of catalytic 

converters, the actions were not effective. To ensure 

that they are effective, intelligence analysis should 

focus on the complete problem. In our example, 

the analysis should examine the catalytic converter 

theft process from beginning to end—from the 

characteristics of vehicles and victims to the reentry 

of the stolen converters into the legitimate market. 

In short, the problem is not the group stealing the 

catalytic converters, but the entire theft process, of 

which the group is an integral part. 

These points can be illustrated by police attempts to 

disrupt street drug dealing, particularly in the late 

1980s through the early 1990s when police targeted 

the most highly visible drug groups. Unfortunately, 

the most visible were not necessarily the most 

active in dealing or the most violent. In addition, 

informants sometimes directed police operations to 

serve their own needs; a difficulty that is made worse 

when there is little or no effort to gather systematic 

information on the problem so the informant’s data 

can be evaluated in a larger context. Even when 

the group was a major contributor to the problem, 

the enforcement sometimes focused on those most 

easily replaced—retail dealers. Such easily replaced 

individuals are not critical to the functioning of the 

organizations.

Several randomized experiments conducted in the 

1990s show the difference between an enforcement 

approach and an intelligence, problem-focused 

approach. (All these studies are reviewed in the 

National Research Council book referred to below.) 

First, let us consider Sherman and Rogan’s experiment 

to determine the effectiveness of crack house raids 

in Kansas City. Possible raid targets were randomly 

allocated to receiving a raid and not receiving a raid. 

Though some crime reductions were observed at 

the raided houses relative to the other houses, these 

reductions were relatively minor. 

Now, consider another experiment designed to look 

at the effectiveness of going beyond enforcement. In 

San Diego, Eck and Wartell looked at what happens 

if, after a raid, the landlord was compelled to improve 

apartment management practices. Raided addresses 

were randomly assigned to three groups: those 

that received no further treatment (control group); 

addresses where police sent the landlord a letter 

describing the raid and offering assistance (letter 

group); and addresses where police compelled the 

landlord to meet with narcotics detectives and city 

code inspectors and form a plan to improve the 

property (meeting group). All places had less drug 

dealing after the raid than before, but the meeting 

group places had a 60 percent reduction in crime 

relative to the control group (the letter group had 

outcomes between the control and meeting groups). 

Finally, let us consider another drug experiment 

comparing problem-solving efforts at drug hot spots 

with enforcement crackdowns. Weisburd and Green 

randomly assigned street drug markets hot spots in 

Jersey City to either of these conditions. The problem 

solving approach showed far greater reductions in 

drug dealing and other forms of disorder than the 

standard enforcement approach.
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 13

Understand the Role of Intelligence Analysis

These and other studies point to a consistent picture 

of the kinds of police strategies that work to reduce 

crime. In 2004, a National Research Council report 

described four policing strategies and their relative 

effectiveness (see Figure 1). The more focused the 

strategy and the wider array of tactics used, the more 

effective the strategy. In the lower left of Figure 1, the 

standard model of policing (relying predominately 

on random patrol, follow-up investigations, and rapid 

response) is the least effective strategy. It does not 

focus on specific places, people, or times and uses a 

predominately law enforcement approach. 

Somewhat more effective is community policing (in 

the absence of problem solving). Community policing 

gains effectiveness by adding considerably more 

tactics, but it is still relatively unfocused. Focused 

policing, on the lower right in Figure 1, is far more 

effective than standard policing, because it narrows 

policing efforts to “hot” people, places, or times. 

Instead of spreading resources thinly, like standard 

policing, it concentrates resources. Intelligence 

analysis fits very well into this strategy. Evidence 

and theory suggest that combining the focus with a 

wider array of tactics improves police effectiveness 

more. That is the form of policing in the upper right 

part of Figure 1. The three experiments described 

above illustrate this point. All experiments involved 

focusing on hot places, but when police coupled law 

enforcement with other tactics they further increased 

their effectiveness at reducing crime and disorder.

The role of intelligence analysis in addressing 

problems is to shed light on how offenders behave 

so police can craft a solution. In short, intelligence 

analysis is an integral part of Problem-Oriented 

Policing. Often this will involve some sort of 

enforcement, but the enforcement will be highly 

targeted to have the greatest impact on the problem, 

and will often be part of a larger set of actions 

designed to make it harder for any remaining or new 

offenders to perpetuate the problem. 

READ MORE:

National Research Council . 2004 . Fairness and 

Effectiveness in Policing. Washington, D .C .: National 

Academies Press .

Figure 1. Policing strategy effectiveness
14 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

UNDERSTAND THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS PROCESS

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS IS NOT SIMPLY THE COLLECTION OF COVERT DATA, nor is it making sure it is shared 

appropriately. Although collection and sharing receive considerable attention, and for very good reasons, this attention 

has obscured the simple fact that they are merely parts of a larger process illustrated by Figure 2. Our discussion of the 

process follows the numbered stages in the diagram.

1. Targets create data. Offender groups are the 

targets. Citizens might see them. They might act 

in ways that provoke police stops and arrests. 

They might write graffiti or create social network 

pages. They may have bank accounts. They may 

be recorded by closed circuit television (CCTV). 

In each of these examples, a person or machine 

captures data describing group members. In 

isolation and in these raw forms, these data are 

relatively meaningless. 

2. Police gather data. Data from an informant, or 

on a digital recording device, or in a database 

needs to be collected to be analyzed. There are 

data capture processes that are obvious (e.g., 

police databases of offenders or CCTV footage 

from cameras near a crime site, confederates of 

members of an offender group) while other data 

capture processes require some creative thinking 

to recognize (see Steps 6–13).

3. Analysts interpret data and 4. Analysts produce 

information. Once police or others collect the 

data, analysts need to combine it with other data 

and interpret it to produce useful information. 

An important part of the analysis is determining 

the validity of the data (for example, is one piece 

of data consistent with other pieces of data from 

other sources). Another important aspect of 

analysis is organizing valid data into a coherent 

story. Organizing data requires analysts to use 

two sets of tools. One set of tools comprise 

analytical techniques: maps, network charts, 

statistical programs, and so forth. However, 

theories of groups and how they produce crime 

are more important than analytical techniques. 

Theories suggest what data is important and 

how it should fit with other data. Theories also 

provide hypotheses that you can test with the 

data (see Step 21). All good analysts have one 

or more theories of how they can organize the 

data to produce a meaningful and valid story. We 

will discuss several such theories in later Steps 6 

through 13. This analysis—with techniques and 

theories—creates information.

5. Information helps police to decide what to do. 

Information assists decision makers who choose 

actions. Decisions based on this information 

create actions whose purpose is to alter that target 

(for example, arresting members of the group) or 

the environment in which the target operates (for 

example, preventing group members from having 

access to key places, denying them weapons or 

other tools, or freezing their assets). 

6. Actions change the target and produce new 

data. If your analysis has accurately described 

the offending group and its behaviors, and if the 

decision maker has used this information, then 

the actions will change the target. They may 

remove members of the group, or force the group 

to alter its behaviors. Ideally, this results in less 

crime or disorder. Such outcomes are known 

because the data emitted by the group changes—

there are fewer attacks, less graffiti, less drug 

dealing, and so forth. The new data enters the 

cycle and helps police adjust their understanding 

of the group. 

In fact, the cycle is more complex than just these six 

stages described. An intelligence process also consists 

of a series of feedback loops (2a, 3a, 5a) dependent 

on the target, information, and the decisions being 

considered. 

◾ 2a. Analysts can seek more data and 3a. Analysts 

can revise their initial analysis. As an analyst, 

you should not passively accept any data that 

comes your way. You can request the collection 

of additional data—for example asking that 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 15

Understand the Role of Intelligence Analysis

new questions be put to an informant. This new 

data might help test the reliability of previously 

collected data. It might fill in critical gaps about 

a group; it might be used to determine how the 

group makes use of its environment; or the new 

data may be needed to help determine which of 

several alternative hypotheses is more likely to 

be true (see Step 21). New data might require 

further analysis or the original analysis may have 

produced contradictory results so further analysis 

is needed, for example. The additional data would 

then have to be analyzed in light of the earlier 

information.

◾ 5a. Decision makers can ask for more 

information or analysis. While decisions 

are being formulated you might be asked for 

additional information that could help refine the 

choice of actions. If the information is readily 

available, you can pass it on to other decision 

makers. This might require going back further 

and conducting additional analysis. Or it might 

even require obtaining additional data.

The analysis process does not end with action against 

a target. You still need to determine if the actions had 

the desired effect. Does the group still exist? Have the 

group’s criminal activities slowed down or stopped? 

Has the group changed its tactics to circumvent police 

actions? Have other groups moved in to replace the 

original group? Were there unintended consequences 

from the actions? Evaluating actions helps decision 

makers decide whether they should move on to other 

targets, make adjustments in how they handle this 

target, or whether their actions failed and they need to 

start over.

Figure 2. Intelligence analysis process

1

5

2

36

4
16 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

RECOGNIZE HOW INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS FITS INTO CRIME ANALYSIS

CRIME ANALYSTS USE THE TERM “ANALYSIS” TO REFER TO SPECIFIC TECHNIQUES THEY USE, SUCH AS GEOGRAPHIC

analysis (i.e., crime mapping) or statistical analysis (to explore relationships among the variables in a data set). But 

the police use “analysis” in many other ways as well. This creates confusion about the meaning of the term and how 

“intelligence analysis” fits with other forms of analysis. Here we describe how intelligence analysis is related to other 

kinds of analysis used by local police agencies. 

Perhaps the commonest use of the term by police 

relates to the type of decision it serves. Strategic 

analysis typically describes enquiries conducted to help 

long-term broad decisions—such as determining the 

appropriate approach for addressing repeat offenders. 

Tactical analysis serves shorter term decisions, having 

a narrower scope. So patrol commanders might ask 

for a tactical analysis of how best to allocate officers to 

handle a political demonstration. Intelligence analysis 

can be used at either level.

Analysis is also sometimes used by police to describe 

the “customers” for the analytical work, as in the 

following: 

◾ Investigative analysis helps investigators solve 

particular crimes, or a pattern of crimes. 

◾ Patrol analysis is designed to serve the needs of 

patrol officers and supervisors. 

◾ Traffic analysis helps police focus resources on 

vehicle traffic (though sometimes the term is used 

to describe drug trafficking or communications 

traffic). 

◾ Problem analysis is used by police and others 

involved in problem-oriented policing projects to 

reduce specific forms of crime and disorder. 

A crime analysis unit may conduct any combination 

of these forms of analysis. As we will describe below, 

intelligence analysis overlaps investigative analysis and 

problem analysis.

Since crimes involve offenders, targets, and places, 

there can be analysis that focuses on all three of these 

elements. Offender analysis focuses on offenders, and 

is closely related to investigative analysis. In contrast, 

place and geographic analysis focuses on various 

geographic concentrations of crime—such as crime 

hot spots, repeat crime places, and risky facilities 

(see the POP Center’s Risky Facilities Guide for more 

details). And target analysis focuses on the people 

or things offenders attack. Forms of target analysis 

include repeat victim analysis, virtual repeat victim 

analysis, and hot product analysis. These and other 

forms of target analysis are used in problem analysis.

As shown in Figure 3 on page 17, target, place, 

and offender analysis overlap and all are forms of 

crime analysis (the examination of information 

to help prevent crime). For example, Joe Combs, 

a detective for the Cincinnati Police Department, 

discovered that a single apartment complex had an 

extraordinarily high number of burglaries (both 

compared to its previous history, and compared to 

other apartment complexes). Within the complex, 

several households were burgled multiple times, 

and most burglaries during this spike in crimes 

were committed by a small group of offenders (the 

burglaries declined following their arrest). He had 

discovered a combination of repeat places, repeat 

victimization, and repeat group offending.

It is useful to link forms of analysis to the types 

of problems the analysis is supposed to examine. 

That is why we define police intelligence analysis as 

focused on problems created by groups of offenders. 

Intelligence analysis is related to offender analysis (and 

investigative analysis) because of its focus on offender 

groups. Intelligence analysis also overlaps both place 

and target analysis. Consequently, intelligence analysis 

is a form of crime analysis as well.

Another way to see how intelligence analysis fits within 

crime analysis is to compare analysis used in reacting 

to crime patterns and those forms of analysis that 

attempt to understand the causes of crime patterns 

and to develop prevention initiatives. The first we will 

call reactive and the second proactive. We can also 

distinguish between analysis focusing on offenders and 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 17

Understand the Role of Intelligence Analysis

those focusing on crime patterns (such as geographic 

analysis). This gives us a simple way of organizing 

some of the most important forms of analysis (see 

Table 1). Intelligence analysis is a proactive form of 

offender analysis. It shares this proactive status with 

place analysis. Both place analysis and intelligence 

analysis are forms of problem analysis. Also, they 

stand in contrast to reactive analysis of crime patterns, 

such as simple hot spot detection and other forms of 

geographic analysis. This view of intelligence analysis 

underpins Jerry Ratcliffe’s 3-i model, which portrays 

the role of intelligence analysis as an essential, actionoriented, decision support function (see The 3-i Model 

on page 18). 

In conclusion, there is no standard way of classifying 

analysis types and many forms of analysis overlap. 

Intelligence analysis shares many features with 

many types of crime analysis. We believe that the 

distinguishing feature of intelligence analysis concerns 

not techniques but the fact that intelligence analysis 

focuses attention on offender groups. 

Figure 3. Overlapping forms of crime analysis

Repeat offender analysis

Intelligence analysis

Social Networks

Intelligence analysis is one of several 

overlapping forms of crime analysis

Social networks

Street groups

Organized crime

Terrorist groups

Intelligence

Analysis

Offender

Analysis

Place

Analysis

Target

Analysis

Repeat victimization

Virtual repeat victimization

Hot products

Hot spot analysis

Place management

Risky facilities

Table 1. Reactive and proactive forms of crime analysis

REACTIVE AND PROACTIVE FORMS OF CRIME ANALYSIS

Reactive Proactive

Offenders Investigative analysis – the analyst examines 

databases to assist investigators solve a crime 

or crime series.

Intelligence analysis – the analyst pulls 

together information on problems created 

by offender groups to help craft methods for 

reducing that problem.

Locations Patrol analysis – the analyst examines 

databases to help determine when and where 

police should allocate patrol resources.

Place-analysis – the analyst pulls together 

information from databases, targeted 

information gathering and other sources to 

reduce problems at particular locations.
18 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

Understand the Role of Intelligence Analysis

Jerry Ratcliffe’s 3-i model redefines the role of analysis in an intelligence-led policing environment . 

Instead of viewing intelligence analysis as simply understanding the criminal environment, the 3-i 

model demands that intelligence analysts also identify decision makers and influence their thinking . 

Decision makers are people who have the power and resources to have an impact on the criminal 

environment . Thus, intelligence analysts have a leadership role within policing, guiding priorities, and 

resource decisions . 

Ratcliffe’s 3-i model begins with an arrow from analysis to the criminal environment . This emphasis 

is deliberate . Analysts can’t wait for data to come to them: they have to actively seek out the 

information they need . Creating and disseminating an intelligence product is not a sufficient 

outcome in the 3-i model . Instead analysts must identify a decision-making framework they 

can influence and actively work to help decision makers have a direct impact on the criminal 

environment . Making recommendations to guide decision makers (both inside and outside policing) 

to prevent, disrupt or reduce criminal activity is a vital role of the analyst . Learning the theory and 

practice of what works to reduce crime is crucial . 

Ratcliffe’s 3-i model challenges analysts and decision makers to work closely together . It rethinks 

the role of intelligence analysis as an essential, action-oriented, decision support function . 

Source: Ratcliffe, J. H. (2008) Intelligence-Led Policing, Willan Publishing. For further information see 

www.jratcliffe.net.

The 3-i model

Criminal Environment

INFLUENCE

INTERPRET IMPACT

Intelligence Analysis Decision Maker
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 19

APPRECIATE HOW INTELLIGENCE FITS IN POLICING STRATEGIES

AS MENTIONED IN STEP 2, IN 2004 THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL PUBLISHED A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT

of police research and policy. It showed how all policing strategies fall into four groups, depending on the degree to 

which they focus on specific crime problems and the range of tactics they employ. These four groups are standard 

policing, community policing, focused policing, and problem-oriented policing (see Table 2). Intelligence analysis plays 

somewhat different roles in each strategy.

LOW FOCUS HIGH FOCUS

Limited tactics Standard policing

Very little influence on crime

Very little use of intelligence 

analysis

Focused policing

Strong influence on crime 

Intelligence data from limited sources which 

is used to target enforcement on crime groups 

Mostly Law Enforcement

Wide variety of tactics

Including Some Law 

Enforcement

Community policing

Modest influence on crime 

Improves the flow of intelligence 

data from community members

Problem-oriented policing

Highly effective against crime

Intelligence from variety of sources is used to 

craft interventions that curtail crime group 

activities

Standard policing makes the least use of intelligence 

analysis. Standard policing is relatively unfocused and 

employs a limited number of law enforcement tactics 

generically across a wide variety of circumstances. 

The principal tactics are patrolling, reactive follow-up 

investigations, and rapid response to calls. To improve 

effectiveness, the main approach is to add more police 

and do more of the same. Research has shown that 

at best this has very limited effects on crime, fear of 

crime, or disorder. Standard policing uses very little 

information and makes little use of crime analysis 

to assist in making critical decisions. Intelligence 

analysis, when used, is the province of highly 

specialized units that often communicate poorly with 

standard patrol operations. 

Standard policing is ineffective for several reasons. 

First, it does not use information to focus resources on 

the relatively few people, places, and circumstances that 

need the most attention. Consequently, it spreads its 

resources too thin where they are most needed. Further, 

the lack of information makes it difficult to develop 

innovative tactics that exploit the vulnerabilities 

of offenders. Finally, standard policing puts more 

emphasis on following routine law enforcement and 

arrest practices than on preventing crime. 

Community policing seeks to bridge the gap between 

police and community. It places far less emphasis on 

law enforcement and uses a wider repertoire of policing 

tactics. However, community policing is relatively 

unfocused unless it includes a strong component of 

problem solving. Research evidence suggests that it can 

be somewhat more effective at reducing crime than 

standard policing, but the results are ambiguous. Like 

standard policing, most community policing makes 

limited use of information technology, crime analysis, 

and intelligence. 

The strength of community policing is that it 

provides the foundation for the two-way exchange of 

information between members of the public and the 

police. This is particularly critical in neighborhoods 

suffering from high levels of crime and when dealing 

with crime groups hidden within communities, or 

Table 2. Intelligence in policing strategies
20 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

Understand the Role of Intelligence Analysis

intimidating community members. In the absence 

of community policing, developing intelligence on 

these groups can be extremely difficult. For these 

reasons community policing is a necessary condition 

for effective intelligence analysis. It is a foundation 

strategy on which other strategies can be built. 

Focused policing strategies are a collection of 

approaches that build on the law enforcement tactics 

used in standard policing by making much greater 

use of information. Information is used to identify 

offenders and places that are disproportionately 

involved in crime. There is strong evidence that 

targeting very high crime places can reduce crime 

considerably, but evidence about the usefulness of 

targeting persistent offenders is much less clear. This 

can increase the chances of arresting the most prolific 

offenders, but existing studies have failed to examine 

whether crime declined as a result of such targeting. 

Because focused policing places information analysis 

at the forefront of policing, intelligence is more 

important for this strategy than for the standard 

policing or community policing. However, in 

the absence of community support, only limited 

intelligence is available. Furthermore, when limited 

to law enforcement tactics, focused policing does 

not address the facilitating conditions that allow 

criminal groups to operate. So focused policing, like 

community policing, is a foundation for effective use 

of intelligence. But neither is sufficient on its own and 

we need to combine community and focus.

Problem-oriented policing, which was developed 

to address the limitations of standard policing,

succeeds in combing community and focus. 

It was specifically designed to be highly focused—

thus capturing the advantages of focused policing—

and to use a variety of tactics with the community—

thus building on community policing. It addresses 

any and all aspects of crimes, including the places 

involved, the targets and victims affected, and the 

offenders.

Research into problem-oriented policing practices 

has shown that it is highly effective at reducing crime 

and disorder. Though there are few head-to-head 

comparisons between focused policing and problemoriented policing, the research that is available 

shows that following a problem-oriented approach 

has greater benefits than simply focusing on crime 

hotspots. 

The basic principles of problem-oriented policing 

are simple to state. First, problem-oriented policing 

places far greater emphasis on what the police are 

to accomplish—the ends of policing—than on the 

means of policing. As long as the policing practices 

are constitutional and legal, are acceptable to the 

community, are affordable, and have a high likelihood 

of being effective, problem-oriented policing does 

not specify what should be done. Instead, problemoriented policing states that the goals of police are 

to reduce community problems. Second, problemoriented policing claims that information needs to 

be examined to determine how specific problems 

arise and to determine what sorts of actions can be 

done to reduce or eliminate these problems. Third, 

problem-oriented policing calls for a thorough 

search for solutions to the problem, not limited to 

law enforcement options. Finally, since the goal of 

problem solving is to solve the problem, problemoriented policing requires evaluation of the outcomes 

of the intervention.
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 21

Understand the Role of Intelligence Analysis

These principles have been codified in the wellknown SARA process (see Figure 4). SARA 

stands for Scanning, Analysis, Response, and 

Assessment. This is a cyclical model that starts 

with the identification and definition of a problem 

(Scanning), followed by detailed analysis (Analysis). 

Intelligence analysts can play important roles at 

these initial stages by helping to identify groups 

that are generating serious crime problems and 

producing information that describes how they 

operate. Response is the third stage, where solutions 

are developed and implemented. Intelligence analysis 

can help identify possible interventions based on 

information describing group vulnerabilities. 

The last stage (Assessment) is the evaluation of the 

intervention. Again, intelligence analysis can help 

determine if the interventions worked by looking at 

the impact on the targeted group and whether their 

crimes have declined. In Figure 4, the large clockwise 

arrows show the standard cycle. The smaller, inner 

arrows indicate that often a problem-solving process 

needs to revisit earlier stages as new questions arise 

or evidence suggests that interventions are not 

working as expected.

READ MORE:

David Weisburd and John Eck . 2004 . “What Can Police 

Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder and Fear?” The Annals of 

the American Academy of Political and Social Science 

593:42–65 .

Figure 4. Stages of the SARA process
22 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

RECOGNIZE THAT OFFENDERS CHOOSE TO COMMIT CRIME

A USEFUL STARTING POINT FOR APPROACHING INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS is to assume that offenders choose to take 

advantage of limited crime opportunities. They take advantage of situations where crime is easy, low risk, rewarding, 

socially encouraged, or provoked. There is considerable evidence that focusing on offender choices can reduce crime, 

and there are many ways to address crime by blocking opportunities.

“Choice” means that offenders select actions they 

think will help them achieve their purposes. In 

making these choices, offenders have limited and 

sometimes confusing information. They also often 

have limited time and competing objectives. To 

address these limits, they use rules of thumb and 

habit to reduce the information they need and to 

increase the speed of their decisions. “Do what others 

in my group do,” is one such rule of thumb. “Do what 

worked before,” is another such rule.

Understanding offender choice is critical to 

intelligence analysis. This is because the principle 

method of reducing crime is to change these choices. 

We do this by manipulating the physical and social 

environment surrounding offenders. There are five 

choice criteria offenders use: effort, risk, reward, 

excuses, and provocations. The less effort or risk, 

the greater the likelihood the offender will commit a 

crime. The more reward, greater the excuses, or higher 

the provocations, the more likely the offender will 

choose crime.

These five criteria influence all people—not just 

offenders—in all choices—not just offending. 

Features of the immediate environment signal the 

individual as to whether a particular set of actions 

will be useful or counterproductive. The individual 

then makes a choice. This environment includes the 

physical setting and the social arrangements. One 

very important social environment for intelligence is 

the offenders’ group. 

An offender in a group may make a very different 

choice than the same offender outside a group but 

facing the same circumstances. Groups provide a 

context that influences individual choice (see Table 3 

on page 23): 

1. Group members can make crime easier by 

supplying tools, providing transportation, sharing 

information, and taking on some of the work. A 

crime that one person cannot do, may be feasible 

with a group. 

2. Groups can make it safer (fewer risks) by mutual 

protection and sharing information about possible 

risks. Identifying suspects may become harder 

if witnesses cannot distinguish among several 

confederates. 

3. Groups also make crime excusable for their 

members by justifying the behavior and providing 

stories as to why the crime is “really necessary.” 

4. Groups make crime enticing to their members 

through peer pressure, and by providing examples 

to follow. 

5. Groups make crime rewarding by giving 

individual members a sense of belonging, 

providing an audience to celebrate successful 

crimes, and other intangible, but important, 

psychological rewards, in addition to the more 

familiar tangible rewards of crime. 

These attributes, which we collectively call ESEER, 

correspond to standard choice criteria we all use when 

selecting actions: effort, risk, excuses, provocations, 

and rewards. These are so critical to understanding 

crime and its prevention, we will return to them 

repeatedly throughout this manual.
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 23

Know the Fundamentals of Criminal Groups

To an outsider, considering the individual offender 

in the abstract, the choice may seem inexplicable and 

even irrational. When examined in the context of a 

group of offenders, the same choice appears reasonable 

(even though objectionable). However, groups do not 

inevitably increase crime. Offender groups can control 

their members’ behaviors so that individuals only 

choose crimes when it is more likely to aid the group. 

As we will discuss later (Step 26), it is sometimes 

possible to exploit the group to reduce offending.

Because individuals seldom have complete knowledge 

about other members of their group, they may 

misinterpret the circumstances. One example is called 

“pluralistic ignorance.” This describes circumstances 

where each member of a group believes other 

members value something when in fact few if any 

other members actually value it. However, to please 

the others, each group member professes that they 

too hold that value, thus justifying what the others 

believed. As a result, the group members express a 

preference that no individual alone would prefer. 

Within an offender group, no individual may want 

to get involved in a fight with another group, but 

thinking that the other members do want to get into a 

fight, and believing they will lose face if they refuse, all 

members of the group jump into the fight. 

A commonly held misconception is that people in 

large crowds lose their self-identity and become 

“irrational.” However, considerable research on crowds 

shows that this is not the case. People make choices 

in crowds just as they do outside of crowds. The 

difference is that within a crowd, an individual will 

also take into account what other people are doing 

and what is happening to them. From an outsider’s 

perspective, the crowd may seem as a single entity 

that transcends the individuals that make it up. 

However, from inside it is clear that a crowd, of any 

size, comprises individuals and small groups, often 

with very different interests. Intelligence analysis can 

play an important role in helping to maintain orderly 

crowds by providing information on the diversity of 

interests within a crowd and helping to separate the 

few troublemakers from the many other individuals.

While offenders take advantage of existing 

opportunities for crime, they can also manipulate 

situations to extend opportunities and make new 

ones. An organized crime group that bribes a local 

politician creates opportunities for taking public 

funds. A terrorist group that infiltrates a member 

into security forces opens up opportunities for 

further terrorist activities that did not exist before. 

Street gang intimidation of witnesses expands the 

ability of the gang to engage in criminal activity. 

Intelligence analysis should look at how offending 

groups manipulate their environments to extend 

their opportunities.

READ MORE:

Ronald Clarke . 2008 . “Situational Crime Prevention .” 

In Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis, ed . 

Richard Wortley and Lorraine Mazerolle . Cullompton, 

Devon: Willan Publishing .

Table 3. How groups influence choices

CHOICE CRITERIA INFLUENCE OF GROUP EXAMPLES

Effort Makes crime easier Dividing a complex task or spreading effort among 

several offenders

Risks Makes crime safer Providing protection, sharing information, or 

intimidating witnesses

Excuses Makes crime more excusable Claiming crimes are permissible or desirable, and 

denigrating victims

Provocations Makes crime more enticing Pressuring, encouraging, or guiding members 

Rewards Makes crime more rewarding Providing an audience, status, and reputation
24 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers

PAY ATTENTION TO HOW CRIME OPPORTUNITIES ARISE

THE MOST ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR CRIME IS OPPORTUNITY. Regardless of a person’s motivations, if there is no 

opportunity there can be no crime. Further, a tempting opportunity may entice a person to commit a crime they would 

not ordinarily consider. Offender groups can develop to exploit specific opportunities. Human traffickers and smugglers 

take advantage of two opportunities: the desire of people to leave impoverished countries and the demand for cheap 

human labor in other countries. Internet commerce created the opportunities that cyber gangs exploit. Drunken bar 

patrons provide opportunities for youth groups to commit robberies. 

Opportunities are situations that offenders can exploit 

for their gain (e.g., material reward, social dominance, 

revenge, relief from threat, and so forth). The basic 

structure of opportunities is often depicted by the 

problem analysis triangles (see Figure 5). The inner 

triangle shows the three elements required for a crime 

to occur: a ready offender or group of offenders, a 

desirable target (person, animal, or thing), and a 

place for the two to interact. At minimum, crime 

opportunities occur when offenders are at places with 

desirable targets. Removing any one of these three 

required elements can eliminate the opportunity. 

Standard law enforcement focuses on offender 

removal. This can be useful, if the offenders are not 

easily replaced (Step 13), but there are other ways to 

reduce crime that also must be considered, either for 

use with enforcement or as stand-alone options.

Figure 5. The problem analysis triangles

There is more to crime opportunities than these three 

basic elements: a crime opportunity also requires 

absence or ineffectiveness of any of the three outer 

elements of the triangle. 

◾ Guardians are people who protect the target—

owners of things the offender wants to take or 

damage, friends of people the offender would 

like to attack, or security guards hired to protect 

buildings from terrorist attack. 

◾ Handlers are people who try to keep the potential 

offender out of trouble. They can be parents, 

siblings, spouses, friends, coworkers, teachers, 

clergy, and others with whom the potential 

offender is positively socially connected. They can 

even be other offenders. 

◾ Finally, managers are people who control spaces: 

owners of locations (private or public), hired 

employees who work at the location, or others 

to whom the owner has delegated authority to 

regulate conduct at the place. 

Collectively, we call handlers, guardians, and 

managers controllers, as they control their 

corresponding elements on the inner triangle. 

Consequently, in addition to removing one or more 

of the inner elements, adding one or more controllers 

helps to reduce crime. 

The convergence of offenders with targets at 

accessible places, in the absence of controllers, 

makes crime possible. When this happens repeatedly, 

a crime pattern emerges. Why does this occur? The 

normal routines of everyday life create most crime 

opportunities. These include commuting and school 

schedules. Street drug dealers often locate near 

commuter routes and when they do so their daily 

activity patterns follow the routines of commuters 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 25

Know the Fundamentals of Criminal Groups

and students. Armed robbery groups can exploit 

the regular patrons of entertainment districts and 

drinking routines. The routines of the internet allow 

fraudsters to exploit users. Natural disasters disrupt 

some routines, but create other routines that offenders 

can exploit, including the routines of insurance 

companies and government aid agencies. Car and 

suicide bombings by terrorist groups are feasible 

because people routinely gather at particular places: 

markets, hotels, and transportation hubs, for example. 

A peaceful political march creates a routine that small 

groups of offenders can exploit to create disturbances. 

Driving routines leave some stretches of highway 

largely vacant for periods, thus allowing street 

racing groups to use them. Knowing the spatial and 

temporal patterns of crime is not just important for 

allocating law enforcement, it is critical for identifying 

the routines the crime group is exploiting so that 

sustainable prevention can be introduced.

Opportunity is in the eye of the offender. Offenders, 

singly or in groups, judge reward, effort, risk, excuses, 

and provocations (see ESEER in Step 6) by the 

presence and absence of the six elements described 

by the problem triangle. The presence of a target at 

a place reduces effort while suggesting reward and 

perhaps providing a provocation. Guardians and 

managers influence risk and effort. Other offenders 

can increase excuses and provocations as well as 

reduce effort and risk. Handlers reduce excuses and 

provocations, and sometimes rewards.

Offenders, however, can manipulate situations to 

increase the crime opportunities. Manipulation of 

opportunities—creating new ones or improving 

existing ones—is easier for offenders in groups than 

those operating singly. 

Targets and their guardians

Groups enhance the ability of offenders to manipulate 

targets. A group of offenders has an easier time 

finding targets because they have more people 

looking. Sheer numbers can overwhelm a target’s 

defenses and overcome guardians. A group of 

offenders has greater ability to intimidate victims, thus 

reducing the chances of effective police involvement. 

Specialization within a group allows it to undertake 

complex offenses, from con games to terrorist attacks. 

A large group, with sufficient resources, can bribe 

guardians to gain access to targets. Similarly, it can 

infiltrate a legitimate organization.

Offenders and their handlers

Groups promote offending through recruitment of 

members and allies. A large group can isolate its 

members, thus reducing outside influences—such 

as from parents—and increasing the influence of 

other group members. In this way, they replace 

outside handlers with inside handlers. Groups can 

also promote offender learning. Members of the 

group learn about what works and what does not to 

successfully pull off a crime. This information can be 

disseminated throughout the group and passed down 

to future members. Importantly, groups produce both 

excuses and provocations for committing crimes. 

However, in some circumstances you may be able to 

take advantage of how offenders in groups handle each 

other to reduce group violence (Step 26).

Places and their managers

Offender groups can seize control of places that an 

individual offender cannot. A drug-dealing group 

can hold a street corner against other dealers more 

easily than a dealer can on his own, for example. 

Terrorist organizations in some countries hold large 

swaths of territory. Offender groups can use places 

for meetings; for stashing weapons, drugs, and other 

goods; for prostitution and other human exploitation; 

for safe houses; and other purposes. Whether seized 

or purchased, once a place is controlled by the group 

it can organize the physical space to facilitate its 

activities. These methods can result in reduced risk or 

effort, or increased rewards.

Even if the group does not completely take over 

a location, they can bribe, intimidate, or replace 

managers so that the group can be sure that the place 

operates in a manner that helps their activities. 

READ MORE:

Marcus Felson . 2008 . “Routine Activity Theory .” In 

Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis, ed . 

Richard Wortley and Lorraine Mazerolle . Cullompton, 

Devon: Willan Publishing .

Marcus Felson and Ronald V . Clarke . 1998 . Opportunity 

Makes the Thief. Police Research Series Paper 98 . 

London: Home Office .
26 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

DISTINGUISH BETWEEN CRIMINAL GROUPS AND PROBLEM GATHERINGS

YOU SHOULD DISTINGUISH CRIMINAL GROUPS (such as pedophile rings and outlaw motorcycle gangs) from problem 

gatherings (such as juveniles involved in cruising or who meet for street racing). In both cases, you need to analyze the 

conditions that permit them to operate in your jurisdiction and ultimately work to remove these conditions. An important 

distinction between groups and gatherings concerns their internal structure: 

◾ Groups are composed of offenders connected 

by some form of internal structure. Examples of 

structure include routine communications links, 

hierarchy, chains of command, and recruitment 

and expulsion practices. These and other forms of 

structure can be clear, strong, and enduring (area 

C in Figure 6), but often they are vague, weak, and 

transitory (Step 9). 

◾ Gatherings are collections of individuals at 

particular places and time. Gatherings have 

little or no structure. Many gatherings are 

only collections at a place and time of separate 

individuals with no other connections (area A), 

but some gatherings have weak internal structures, 

thus overlapping with groups (area B). Typically, 

many participants have no intent to offend.

Here are three examples illustrating these distinctions: 

1. A local bus system efficiently transports students 

to and from their schools by routing busses 

through a downtown hub where passengers can 

transfer. Students from many different schools 

congregate at the transit hub. If there are no 

other connections among the students, this is an 

example of a gathering. Within this gathering, a 

few individual students may bully and steal from 

other students, but they do not coordinate their 

activities in any way. Some of the non-offending 

students, nevertheless, may provide cover for the 

offenders. Here, the environment (the school, bus 

systems, the transit hub, gathering of students) 

provides an external structure and a set of crime 

opportunities for individual offenders. 

2. Some youths from the same school may travel 

together so they can intimidate and steal from 

other students at the transit hub. They target 

students from a rival school waiting for particular 

busses at particular times. Here we see the 

overlap of gathering and group: the offending 

students have a rudimentary internal structure 

that helps them exploit their environment, but 

the environment is still providing most of the 

structure. 

. A neighborhood street gang robs pedestrians 

and runs a protection racket for merchants. It 

has a leader, rules for entry and conduct, and a 

hierarchy. Members use vehicles to get around 

and find likely targets. The internal structure 

here is strong, and allows the group to make use 

of the environment. Further, the group members 

can manipulate the environment to further their 

criminal activities. For example, they may alter 

the physical environment by using a meeting 

place and adapting it to their use (e.g., destroying 

streetlights). Intimidation alters the social 

environment to reduce their risks of apprehension. 

3

Figure 6. Groups and gatherings
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 27

Know the Fundamentals of Criminal Groups

While participants in a gathering are extremely 

dependent on the physical and social environment, 

members of a criminal group use their internal 

structure to control their environment. Internal 

structure can protect a group’s core members from 

the physical and social environment within which it 

operates. This means that leaders of criminal groups 

are exposed to fewer risks from the police and from 

rival groups. The downside of a group organization is 

that it is costly—senior members need to compensate 

junior members and others for the risks they run. 

Further, as groups become more organized they are 

likely to grow, and the larger they become, the greater 

attention they attract from the police. Finally, a tightly 

organized criminal group is less flexible in adapting to 

changes in the environment.

Sometimes it will be difficult for you to determine 

if you are dealing with an organized group or an 

unstructured gathering. If individual offenders perceive 

the physical and social environment in the same way, 

these offenders may behave in the same way and appear 

more organized than they really are. Here are some 

hypothetical examples of how this confusion can arise: 

◾ Copper thieves can independently learn that 

vacant buildings in a particular neighborhood 

are good targets. Here thieves take advantage of 

the environment provided. Since each thief sees 

the same environment, each behaves the same 

way, even though they are not coordinating their 

actions. In contrast, an owner of a recycling 

business might recruit thieves, direct them to 

vulnerable targets, provide transportation, settle 

disputes among thieves, and provide guarantees 

that they are paid. In this case, the owner is 

creating an organization that is not completely 

dependent on the environment. To you, the two 

scenarios may look the same. You could mistakenly 

believe that in the first instance the thefts were 

organized or in the second instance that the 

thieves were disorganized individuals merely 

taking advantage of an obvious opportunity. Your 

intelligence analysis can help avoid such mistakes.

◾ Speeding may be highly concentrated along 

a particular stretch of highway at particular 

times, because each driver perceives the same 

opportunity to speed. Drivers only take into 

account the road in front of them and the cars 

in their immediate vicinity, but do not follow 

instructions from a “head” driver. The stable 

environment creates recurrent patterns of 

congestion and speeding. Intelligence analysis 

is not helpful with such collections (though 

crime analysis is). Let us contrast this speeding 

example to illegal road racing. An illegal roadracing gathering needs some organization, but 

not much because the relevant environment—the 

street system—is highly predictable and well 

understood by its members. Members know that 

on certain nights, particular stretches of road will 

be highly suitable for racing. The gathering only 

needs to be organized enough for members to 

know that others will show up at advantageous 

times and places and will obey the same rules of 

conduct. Such a gathering can operate because the 

environment provides much of the information 

necessary to coordinate activities. Such a group 

is highly dependent on this environment—if 

it changes then the group may have difficulty 

adapting. Nevertheless, a rudimentary 

organization facilitates the races.

◾ A group must be organized if it is to export 

stolen cars on a routine basis. The environment 

still produces opportunities (e.g., being near a 

port city), but to select the types of vehicles the 

export market wants, in the volume necessary, 

and coordinate the thefts with the shipping, 

the offenders must be far more organized than 

the street racers. Though these offenders are 

exercising more control over their environment, 

changes in the environment (e.g., tighter controls 

over who is allowed into the port facilities) can 

reduce the ability of this organization to function.

You can reduce the ability of organized groups to 

commit crimes by breaking them up or by changing 

the physical or social environment on which they rely. 

The importance of these two approaches will vary 

by the internal structure of the organization you are 

analyzing. The rare extremely organized crime groups 

will require far more law enforcement effort, though 

changing the environments can help undermine their 

capabilities. The more frequently encountered loosely 

structured organizations will be more vulnerable 

to environmental changes and less responsive to 

enforcement. Problematic gatherings, being more 

dependent on their environments, are best addressed 

by altering these environments.
28 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

TELL APART ORGANIZED CRIME AND ORGANIZED CRIMINALS

THE POPULAR IMAGE OF “ORGANIZED CRIME” IS THAT OF LARGE, ENDURING MAFIA-TYPE SYNDICATES, often with 

international reach, which are involved in a variety of criminal enterprises including extortion, racketeering, drug sales, 

and human trafficking. These syndicates have strict hierarchies of authority and demand extreme loyalty from their 

members, who might perform specialist roles. When necessary, they will seek to corrupt officials and they will use 

violence to enforce obedience from those they exploit or victimize.

While such organizations still exist, their prominence 

has faded and they now comprise only a minority 

of organized criminal groups. Far more common 

are small, organized networks of entrepreneurial 

offenders, often transitory in nature, that develop to 

exploit particular opportunities for illegal profit. These 

groups vary from temporary associations created to 

commit a time-limited series of offenses, to enduring 

businesses that invest in on-going criminal activities 

(see Table 4). 

The formal definitions of organized crime recently 

adopted by the national police forces in the U.K. and 

Germany, as well as by the European Union, reflect 

this new reality. In all cases, the definitions try to 

include the entrepreneurial groups, principally by 

stating that the organized group can be composed 

of as few as two individuals. For example, the 

German federal crime intelligence office, the 

Bundeskriminalamt (or BKA), defines organized 

crime as follows: 

“The planned violation of the law for profit or to 

acquire power, where offences are each, or together, 

of a major significance, and are carried out by more 

than two participants who co-operate within a division 

of labor for a long or undetermined time span using: 

a) commercial or commercial-like structures, or b) 

violence or other means of intimidation, or c) influence 

on politics, media, public administration, justice and 

legitimate economy.” 

Many of the crimes committed by organized 

criminals—for example; human smuggling, drug 

trafficking, sex trafficking, and money laundering—

depend on overseas contacts. Opportunities for 

these crimes have expanded in line with increased 

globalization and developments in technology. 

Thus, the growth in international trade has made 

it easier to import drugs and to export stolen 

motor vehicles. The rise of the Internet and cell 

phone technology has made it easier to coordinate 

transnational crimes. The expansion of air travel 

has facilitated migration, legal and illegal, which 

brings with it increased opportunities for crime. 

Table 4. Types of criminals

Source: Bullock, Tilley, and Clarke 2010.

ORGANIZED CRIME 

SYNDICATES

NETWORKS OF CRIMINAL 

ENTREPRENEURS

Few in number Many

Large Small

Regional/national Local

Stable, enduring Unstable, temporary

Outside normal society Integrated in society

Structured Loosely knit

Hierarchical “Flat” organization

Static membership Fluid membership

Differentiated roles Undifferentiated roles

Entrenched leadership Changing leadership

Formal rules/regulations Informal agreements

Criminal identity Business identity

Full-time illegal 

operations

Part-time operations

Ties of loyalty Business relationships

Use of violence Avoidance of violence

Crime generalists Crime specialists

Abundant resources Limited resources

Sophisticated 

technology

Everyday technology

Seek opportunities Respond to opportunities
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 29

Know the Fundamentals of Criminal Groups

This is because recent immigrants still have ties in 

their home countries, which enable those so inclined 

to find the partners needed for transnational crime. 

Given the wider definition of organized criminal 

groups, it is likely that several such groups, involved 

in quite different crimes, might independently 

be operating within your jurisdiction. One group 

might be specializing in home invasions, another in 

carjacking, a third in sex trafficking, and so forth. This 

considerably complicates the role of your department 

in respect of organized crimes and also provides 

difficult challenges for you in helping your police 

colleagues deal with the groups. 

The purposes of intervention 

In subsequent steps of the manual, we discuss in detail 

a number of organized groups. We will show that each 

group is different, that you must acquire different data 

about each one, and you will need to create tailormade interventions. The purpose of intervening will 

vary with the nature of the group, as follows: 

1. Some of the criminal groups, terrorist cells for 

example, are so dangerous that the principal 

objective of police action must be to remove 

them—i.e., identify and arrest the group members 

as soon as possible. As in the case of terrorists, this 

task would often be handed over to the federal 

authorities. 

2. In many other cases, say an organized burglary 

ring, the prime responsibility for identifying and 

arresting the group would fall to your department, 

using largely the same approach when identifying 

and arresting individual criminals. 

3. In a third group of cases, taking out the group 

might not be realistic or even particularly 

desirable. In dealing with street gangs, for 

example, the principal objective will usually 

be to restrict their capacity, or opportunity, to 

engage in behavior that is harmful to them or to 

the community. In other words, when dealing 

with organized groups, local police will often be 

involved in preventive action. 

4. Even when the primary objective is to identify 

and arrest a dangerous group, an important 

additional objective should always be to prevent 

the formation of new groups to take the place of 

those arrested. Essentially, this involves applying 

principles of situational crime prevention 

to identify and modify the opportunities, 

or “facilitating conditions,” favorable to the 

formation or operation of these groups. This 

task, discussed in the next step, puts intelligence 

analysts in a central role. 

Marcus Felson has applied his routine activity 

theory to develop the following “Rules for 

nderstanding and Reducing Organized Crimes” 

 . Divide organized crimes into very specific types .

 . Focus on the acts, not the group engaged in them .

 . Expect considerable variation among groups in 

organization .

 . Assume that such crime is seldom ingenious .

 . Monitor and thwart the opportunity for small-time 

crime

 . Closely study the modus operandi in committing 

the crimes

 . Find out how crime feeds off legitimate and 

marginal activities .

 . Tease out the sequence of events for ongoing 

criminal cooperation .

 . Interfere with that sequence, access to the 

customer, or modus operandi .

0 . Use situational prevention to reduce crime 

opportunities that feed organized crime, directly 

and indirectly .

Adapted from: Felson 2006

U

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1

READ MORE:

Karen Bullock, Ronald V . Clarke, and Nick J . Tilley . 2010 . 

Situational Prevention of Organized Crimes. Cullompton, 

Devon: Willan Publishing . 

Marcus Felson . 2006 . The Ecosystem for Organized 

Crime, United Nations European Institute for Crime 

Prevention and Control (HEUNI), Paper No . 26 .
30 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers

MODIFY THE CONDITIONS THAT FACILITATE ORGANIZED CRIMES

THE FACILITATING CONDITIONS THAT ALLOW A PARTICULAR ORGANIZED GROUP TO FORM AND OPERATE include both 

the physical conditions of the immediate situations in which the offenses occur and the wider social arrangements that 

make the crime possible. We can illustrate these by assuming that your jurisdiction harbors a group involved in stealing 

cars for export. Some of the facilitating conditions in your jurisdiction might include the following: 

1. You are close to the Mexican border, to a deepwater port, or to a ferry terminal that serves 

Caribbean or South American countries. 

2. You have substantial immigrant communities with 

ties to these countries, or temporary immigrant 

workers from these countries.

3. Local businesses trade with these countries. 

4. The SUVs and pick-ups favored by local residents 

fetch high prices in these countries.

5. Young immigrant men have been thrown out of 

work by the recession and have become involved 

in crime. 

6. Nearby border crossings are very busy and 

vehicles are subject to minimal checks. Ditto for 

the ports.

7. Too few officers in your department have 

the language skills to police the immigrant 

communities effectively.

8. Senior officers do not assign a high priority to 

vehicle theft.

Not all of these facilitating conditions can be 

modified—you cannot change the geographic 

location of your town—but you should focus on 

those conditions that are potentially modifiable. For 

example, your department could assign a higher 

priority to vehicle theft and could recruit more 

bilingual officers to allow more effective community 

policing of immigrant neighborhoods. Or your chief 

could lobby for more effective vehicle checks at border 

crossings. Not only should you be identifying the 

scope for these kinds of actions, but you should be 

arguing the case for their adoption. 

How facilitating conditions make crime ESEER

Like much of the guidance in this manual, the 

framework for analyzing facilitating conditions is 

drawn from the field of situational crime prevention, 

specifically from the five principal techniques of 

opportunity reduction. These consist of techniques that: 

1. Increase the effort needed to commit a particular 

kind of crime 

2. Increase the risks of the crime 

3. Reduce the rewards 

4. Remove excuses for committing the crime 

5. Remove specific temptations or provocations 

These opportunity-reducing techniques correspond to 

five categories of facilitating conditions described in 

Step 6—those that make crime Easy, Safe, Excusable, 

Enticing, and Rewarding, or ESEER. With regard to 

the list of facilitating conditions for theft of cars for 

export laid out above, it could be said that: 1–3 make 

it easy; 7 and 8 make it safe; 5 makes it excusable; 6 

makes it tempting; and 4 makes it rewarding. ESEER 

should make it easier for you to think about and 

identify the facilitating conditions for any kind of 

crime. 

Police efforts to prevent the repetition of a tragic 

drowning of illegal immigrants in the U.K.

In February 2004, a group of 23 illegally trafficked 

Chinese nationals drowned while digging for cockles 

(a shellfish) in Morecambe Bay, Lancashire. The 

resulting police investigation took 18 months. It 

required evidence to be collected in China and from 

European cockle processing plants, it accumulated 1.5 

million pages of documentation (many in Mandarin, 

Spanish, and French), and it involved many different 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 31

Know the Fundamentals of Criminal Groups

government agencies in the U.K. and elsewhere. The 

six-month trial led to manslaughter convictions of 

three individuals responsible for illegally bringing the 

Chinese workers to the U.K. and for putting them to 

work in hazardous conditions. 

Despite the enormous cost and effort of prosecuting 

the case, the Lancashire Constabulary realized that the 

conditions for a repeat of the tragedy were still in place: 

◾ The scope for vast profits remained. The price of 

cockles had increased by 400 percent in the four 

years prior to the tragic drowning. 

◾ Harvesting cockles is simple and relies only on the 

availability of cheap labor. Chinese networks were 

still open for recruitment and transportation. 

◾ Illegal immigrants were willing to pay organized 

criminals up to £20,000 to enter the U.K., this 

money being deducted weekly from their pitiful 

wages. Profits were increased by accommodating 

them in cramped housing and giving them 

minimal safety equipment. 

◾ Numerous ways to access the vast shoreline 

provided anonymity to cocklers and their 

controllers. 

◾ The official permit scheme for harvesting cockles 

was still lax. On a single day, eight months after 

the tragedy, 61 Chinese nationals were working 

illegally on the sands, 48 with fraudulently 

obtained permits. 

◾ The enforcement of safety regulations had also 

remained lax. The organized crime group had 

little interest in the safety of their workers of 

whom only about 10 percent carried lifejackets, 

GPS devices, or flares. 

◾ About 100 vehicles transporting as many as 400 

cocklers visited the shoreline daily and 80 percent 

of the vehicles were un-roadworthy, overloaded, 

or carried roof-riding passengers. 

◾ An estimated 30 percent of cocklers were 

fraudulently claiming welfare benefits, at an 

estimated cost per year of £1,200,000. 

◾ U.K. Border controls remained open to 

exploitation, and the risk of deportation was low. 

Immigration authorities had insufficient resources 

to detain potential illegal immigrants, who were 

released and asked to report to the immigration 

office at a later date. 

Fearing a repeat of the tragedy, the Lancashire 

Constabulary decided to modify as many of these 

facilitating conditions as possible. An important 

priority was to reduce the anonymity of the organized 

crime group and the exploited workers. The permit 

scheme was strengthened, but the real innovation 

was to use existing legitimate workers to assist in 

identifying illegal workers. This was accomplished 

through the provision of a “muster point” (a catering 

van) in a safe location on the sands to communicate 

legal, procedural, and safety issues. A notice board 

displayed vehicle and contact details of workers on the 

sands, tide times, cockle bed information, as well as 

agency details. 

This brought various benefits. Twelve hundred 

regulated workers were recorded in the new permit 

scheme and fraudulent unemployment benefit claims 

were reduced by 20 percent in the first year. Unroadworthy vehicle usage reduced by 84 percent, 

with roof-riding eradicated. All workers started to 

carry personal life-saving equipment. Sea rescue 

deployments to save cocklers dropped from 34 in 2004 

to 1 in 2005. The workforce went on to form their own 

shellfish association which met weekly and performed 

a self-policing function.

Detectives uncovered new information about migrant 

trafficking between China and the U.K., including 

who were the criminals and associates, how the profits 

were made, and how money was laundered. This 

information was insufficient to prosecute offenders, 

but shining a spotlight on them meant that they 

were operating in a more hostile environment with 

associates becoming worried that police attention 

might be drawn to their businesses. This helps explain 

why the criminals involved could not simply displace 

their illegal cockling activities elsewhere in England. 

READ MORE:

Stuart Kirby . 2010 . “Policing Mobile Criminality: Towards 

a Situational Crime Prevention Approach to Organised 

Crime .” In Situational Prevention of Organised Crimes, 

ed . Karen Bullock, Ronald V . Clarke, and Nick Tilley . 

Cullompton, Devon: Willan Publishing . 
32 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

STUDY THE MODUS OPERANDI STEP-BY-STEP

CRIMINOLOGISTS HAVE BEEN PREOCCUPIED BY THE QUESTION OF CRIMINAL MOTIVATION—why is that certain people, or 

kinds of people, become involved in crime and delinquency? In trying to answer this question, they have used hundreds 

of studies to probe into the backgrounds of offenders and have identified a vast range of possible contributory factors of 

upbringing, biology, personality, and social circumstances. 

These theories are of limited practical value in 

your work as a crime analyst. This is because 

police can do nothing to alter an offender’s history 

and little to change society. In any case, at a more 

down to earth level, motives for crime generally 

derive from common human failings such as 

greed, anger, covetousness, and the wish for such 

things as excitement, revenge, respect, and sexual 

release. Although some understanding of these 

commonplace motives may be helpful in analyzing 

particular categories of crime, knowing why crimes 

are committed is usually less useful than knowing 

how they are committed. This is because a detailed 

understanding of the modus operandi

for a specific category of crime reveals 

many points for opportunity-reducing 

interventions. This is evident from 

Table 5, adapted from an analysis by Derek 

Cornish, formerly of the London School 

of Economics, showing steps in stealing 

a car from a parking lot and associated 

interventions. 

Apart from showing a range of possible 

interventions, the table reveals a little 

appreciated fact: even a crime as simple as 

taking a car from a parking lot is not over 

in a flash, as we tend to think. In fact, it 

can take quite long to plan, prepare for, and 

execute—and this table does not even show 

what happens after the car is taken, how it 

might be used, sold, or concealed. 

If we assume the car has been stolen to 

order for export, we would need to include, 

as a preliminary; receiving the instructions 

about which kind of car to steal, where best 

to find such a car, and where to deliver it. 

After the car has been removed from the 

lot, we would need information about the subsequent 

stages in getting the car to the ultimate buyer in 

another country. These include:

1. Bringing the car to a secure location where 

its identity may be changed and it might be 

disassembled 

2. Storing it until ready to transport across border

3. Loading it in a sealed container onto a ship, either 

whole or disassembled

4. Or simply driving it across the border

5. At the destination handing it over to a local 

contact

Table 5. Stealing a car from a parking lot and possible 

interventions

STEPS POSSIBLE INTERVENTIONS

Hook-up with co-offender Use informants in convergent 

settings (see Step 12)

Get tools (screwdriver, slidehammer, duplicate keys)

Control sales of duplicate keys 

and slide-hammers

Enter parking lot Parking lot barriers; attendants; 

few entrances 

Loiter unobtrusively Cameras and/or regular patrols 

to deter loiterers

Reject alarmed cars 

Choose suitable vehicle

Visible protection of tempting 

vehicles

Enter car (duplicate keys, use 

screwdriver)

Cameras to monitor suspicious 

behavior; improve natural 

surveillance of lot

Break ignition lock (slidehammer) or hot-wire ignitionVehicle alarm to alert security; 

vehicle immobilizer

Exit parking lot in car Attendants or other exit barriers; 

Vehicle-tracking system activated

Source: Cornish 1994. 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 33

Know the Fundamentals of Criminal Groups

6. Or having it collected at the dock by such person

7. If necessary having it reassembled 

8. Legally registering it if necessary

9. Selling it on the open market or to private buyer

A detailed understanding of these stages would 

reveal many other possible interventions, though you 

might be interested primarily in the first four of them 

because they occur locally and you might therefore be 

in a better position to impede them, than stages 5–9 

that take place overseas. 

Laying out the sequence of stages for a problematic 

gathering can also reveal many intervention points. 

This is illustrated in Table 6, taken from a POP Guide 

on dealing with five sequential stages of student party 

riots: Initial planning; Preassembly preparation; 

Assembly; Assembled gathering; and Dispersal. The 

several steps falling under each of these stages yield 

many possible points of intervention. 

READ MORE:

Derek Cornish . 1994 . “The Procedural Analysis of 

Offending and its Relevance for Situational Prevention .” 

Vol . 3 of Crime Prevention Studies, 151–196 . Monsey, 

New York: Criminal Justice Press . 

Table 6. Intervening to prevent a student party riot

INTERVENTION HOW IT WORKS

Stage 1: Initial planning

1 Create a multiagency task force Assembles community resources, and clarifies the roles and 

responsibilities of the groups involved

2 Require students to obtain a permit Gives advance notice of a gathering, sets standards for the event, 

and holds hosts responsible for meeting the standards

3 Assign police to assist the hosts Officers help students to meet legal requirements for a gathering

4 Increase penalties for rioting Deters students from destructive behavior at the gathering

5 Partner with the media to influence 

student and community perceptions

Increases positive perceptions of the event and perceptions of risk 

for those interested in causing a disturbance

6 Work with landlords to ensure renter 

compliance

Creates more risk for hosting disruptive gatherings on rented 

property; encourages landlords to assist in preventing these

7 Control alcohol distribution Reduces student alcohol consumption, underage drinking and 

purchasing of alcohol, and drunken driving

8 Provide alternative entertainment Reduces the number of people at a single gathering; provides 

alternative recreation in a more controlled setting

Stage 2: Preassembly preparation

9 Ask students to form “student patrols” Reduces the need for official interventions

10 “Sanitize” the gathering location Removes objects that can become a safety hazard

11 Monitor ads for gatherings Notifies authorities of large gatherings in advance

12 Limit parking Increases the effort needed to attend; removes targets that may be 

vandalized; clears exits in case of an emergency

13 Close or control traffic flow Reduces pedestrian injuries; prevents students from bringing in 

large, dangerous objects
34 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

Know the Fundamentals of Criminal Groups

INTERVENTION HOW IT WORKS

Stage 3: Assembling

14 Provide transportation to the event Facilitates orderly arrival; reduces the number of cars; prevents 

attendees from bringing large quantities of alcohol 

15 Establish a positive police presence Reduces anonymity and facilitates communication

16 Establish and control perimeters Prevents the gathering from spreading into the surrounding areas

Stage 4: Assembled gathering

17 Use alternative deployment methods Gives officers a tactical advantage over car patrols

18 Use visual deterrents to misconduct Reminds those attending of the consequences of rioting

19 Videotape the assembled gathering Reduces anonymity; assists in subsequent investigations

20 Site the media around the gathering Breaks-up the cohesion of large groups

21 Watch for flashpoints Immediate intervention can prevent a violent outbreak

22 Standardize the procedure to deal 

with disturbances

Helps stop violence as soon as it begins

Stage 5: Dispersal

23 Provide transport from the event Controls dispersal; reduces drunken driving

24 Facilitate orderly dispersal Breaks up the gathering before a disturbance begins

Source: Tamara Madensen and John E. Eck. 2006. Student Party Riots. Problem Specific Guides No 40. Washington, D.C.: 

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 35

LOOK FOR CONVERGENT SETTINGS

IN STEPS 8 AND 9 WE NOTED THAT MOST OFFENDER GROUPS ARE LOOSE KNIT AFFILIATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS, rather 

than tightly controlled hierarchical organizations. How do these groups form, how do they persist, and how do new loose 

knit groups reform when other groups are broken up? 

Convergent settings play an important role in these 

processes. Marcus Felson describes an offender 

convergent setting as a stable and predictable place 

where offenders, or potential offenders, can meet and 

form alliances. A place may be a convergent setting 

only at particular times. For example, a nightclub 

may offer a variety of performances throughout the 

week, but on Friday nights, the management caters 

to a particular crowd by providing music they find 

appealing. Potential offenders in this crowd know that 

if they show up on Friday nights they will find others 

with the same criminal interests. 

The parking lot of a street corner convenience 

store may provide another example of a convergent 

setting. The store serves as an anchor for offenders 

by providing food and shelter for those hanging out. 

It also provides a ready excuse to be at the location, 

should a police officer stop the offender. 

Convergent settings serve offenders in five ways:

1. They bring together offenders and potential 

offenders who would not meet otherwise. So 

they provide a spawning ground for offender 

groups. Many legitimate settings do this. High 

schools, for example, bring juveniles together 

who would not meet in other circumstances. 

The vast majority of these youth do not get into 

serious trouble, but a few students band together 

to commit crimes. Any youth gathering spot 

can serve as a convergent setting that can create 

groups that would not form in the absence of 

the convergent setting. Entertainment zones 

also serve such functions. A few mosques have 

served as convergent settings that allow Islamic 

extremists to meet and recruit potential new 

terrorists. Institutions for offenders—such as 

drug rehabilitation centers, half-way houses, and 

prisons—can become convergent settings.

2. They provide a venue for strangers to observe 

each other and build sufficient trust and 

knowledge that they can work together. If the 

setting only brings people together for very short 

intervals, then group formation is difficult. The 

ability to hang out and talk without looking 

suspicious is important.

3. They provide convenient ways for offenders who 

already know each other to meet. If an offender 

knows a bar to be a place where other offenders 

are likely to be present on a Saturday night, then 

he just needs to show up. He does not have to 

make specific plans with other offenders.

4. They help groups replace members. Without 

a replacement process, groups disappear. This 

is very common. With a convergent setting, it is 

easy for groups to recruit new members. When 

group members know that others at the setting 

are potential offenders this allows easy recruiting. 

Offenders who want to join a group know that if 

they routinely show up at a convergent setting, 

they have a good chance of becoming a member 

of a group. 

5. In private places they allow group members to 

meet without scrutiny. Such places supply venues 

for initiation rituals, planning of complex offenses, 

and social support. Whereas public convergent 

settings are usually created for legitimate reasons 

and exploited for illegitimate reasons, private 

offender convergent settings are usually created to 

serve illegitimate ends.
36 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

Know the Fundamentals of Criminal Groups

Figure 7. Convergent settings are sometimes crime 

hot spots

Convergent settings may also be crime hot spots 

(see Figure 7). A bar that is a convergent setting for 

offenders attracts offenders who might take advantage 

of targets in the area. The opposite is also true. An 

active drug dealing location may become a convergent 

setting because it attracts people who want to become 

part of the drug trade. These wannabe members 

can provide a temporary labor pool—for carrying 

messages, serving as look outs, steering customers, 

or holding guns, drugs, or money—and while doing 

this can be evaluated for recruitment as permanent 

members of the group. 

Analysts can detect convergent settings that are also 

crime hot spots through crime mapping. Convergent 

settings that are not crime hot spots will require you to 

find other methods of detection. Informants, offender 

surveillance and tracking, and other techniques will be 

more helpful than crime maps.

Convergent settings are not always physical places. For 

example, terrorists can use Internet websites as virtual

convergent settings. Such websites allow people from 

around the world to meet and exchange information. 

Child pornography can be distributed through virtual 

convergent settings that accelerate the formation of 

pornography rings.

What should you do about offender convergent 

settings? 

The most important thing is to look for them and 

exploit them for purposes of collecting data about 

offenders. Convergent settings can be a rich source of 

intelligence data describing active offenders: how they 

are organized, and what they may be doing.

Changing the setting so it does not facilitate offender 

groups is another important option. This is particularly 

true if the convergent setting is also a crime hot spot. 

Since many such settings are public places used by 

non-offenders, you should give preference to finding 

ways the place can continue to function without aiding 

offenders. This is possible if the owners of the place are 

not involved in crime. If the owner is aligned with the 

offender group, then regulatory or civil court action 

may be required to seize control of the place and keep 

it from being used by offenders.

There can be a conflict between using the offender 

convergent setting as a source of intelligence data 

and disrupting offender convergence. Allowing an 

offender convergent setting to operate in order to gain 

intelligence data also allows the offender group to 

continue committing crimes. This may be worthwhile 

if either a) many non-offenders legitimately use the 

setting, b) if closing the place simply displaces the 

convergent setting, or c) the offender group disrupted 

by the setting’s closure is highly likely to be replaced 

by some other offender group. 

On the other hand, altering a convergent setting to 

reduce crime may cut off vital intelligence and make 

it difficult to keep track of offender groups. If closing 

the setting reduces crime, and limits offender groups 

from reestablishing, then the loss of intelligence is 

probably a reasonable cost. This seems likely when the 

convergent setting is the locus of a crime hot spot. 

Consequently, before making a decision about 

how to address a convergent setting, police should 

consider who else, besides offenders, uses the place; 

the availability of alternative convergent settings that 

offenders can displace to; and the chances that another 

offender group will exploit the situation. 

EAD MORE:

arcus Felson . 2003 . “The Process of Co-Offending .” 

n Theory for Practice in Situational Crime Prevention, 

d ., Martha Smith and Derek B . Cornish . Vol . 16 of 

rime Prevention Studies. Monsey, New York: Criminal 

ustice Press . 

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Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 37

DISRUPT RECRUITMENT AND REPLACEMENT

POLICE WILL OFTEN TRY TO REMOVE KEY MEMBERS OF A CRIMINAL GROUP on the grounds that the broken up group 

will no longer be a problem. If its members are not replaced, or replacement takes a very long time, then disruption 

can work. 

Before looking at the different forms of replacement, 

let us examine a generic recruitment process used 

to varying extent by most offender groups that can 

replace their members: 

◾ The group must make contact with a potential 

new member. Convergent settings are useful at 

this stage and networks of offenders can refer 

potential recruits to group members. 

◾ Screening or conducting the equivalent of a 

background check must be undertaken. This may 

be limited—such as checking on the potential 

recruit’s reputation—or it might be extensive—for 

example, designed to weed out police operatives 

or informants. 

◾ Screening may be coupled with testing or testing 

may be done separately. Testing might involve 

carrying out simple tasks to see how the subject 

performs, initiation rites, or even training. 

Screening and testing will depend on the risks 

associated with recruiting the wrong person, and 

on the skill level needed to carry out the tasks. 

◾ Finally, the recruit might be employed as a 

peripheral member to carry out some minor tasks. 

Depending on the size and nature of the group, 

the subject may be promoted. 

These stages assume varying importance for different 

forms of replacement.

Forms of group replacement

There are four forms of replacement (as illustrated in 

Figure 8) that you need to be concerned with:

1. Full group replacement. This occurs if the 

targeted group is incapacitated and totally 

replaced by another group. Many offender 

groups have limited ability to replace members, 

or even desire to do so. A group of young men 

on a street corner may have formed because 

they grew up near each other and have known 

each other for a long time. The members trust 

each other. Arresting and incarcerating most of 

them may disband the group, but the remaining 

members may have little interest in recruiting new 

members. However, another group of similarly 

situated young men may then move into the 

criminal niche that the first group has vacated. 

While this may not occur immediately, it is likely 

to occur if the conditions that fostered the first 

group are still present. Full replacement may also 

come after groups fight it out for who will take the 

territory or businesses of the disrupted group. 

2. Fracturing a group. Removing members of a 

group may incapacitate the targeted group, but the 

remaining members may start up several smaller 

groups and continue the criminal behavior of the 

now defunct first group. The cottage industry 

theory of midlevel drug dealing suggests that 

this is common. According to this theory, 

many midlevel trafficking groups are loose knit 

marriages of convenience that form and reform. 

It could be that fracturing such a group facilitates 

recruitment of new crime participants because 

those offenders left on the street might seek 

out new partners. Fracturing can generate new 

groups if the conditions that facilitate group crime 

persist; the remaining members continue to take 

advantage of these conditions.

3. Replacement of peripheral members. If the 

group is made up of a core set of members 

surrounded by peripheral participants, then 

replacement of these peripheral members 

is possible when police remove peripheral 

members. The shell of disposable members, who 

undertake the riskiest activities, protects the 

core. This is common in retail drug trafficking—

core distributors hire locals to sell the drugs 

and take the risk. It is also used in fraud groups, 
38 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

Know the Fundamentals of Criminal Groups

where the core players use disposable agents 

(who might not know the core members’ names) 

to do the dirty work. In these circumstances, 

unlike continuous replacement, there is no 

expectation that members in the shell will ever 

advance to the core.

4. Continuous replacement. Some groups 

have recruitment practices that allow them 

to bring in new members and promote them. 

Enforcement may remove members from the 

core and periphery but the recruitment and 

promotion processes allow the group to continue 

its criminal activities. Continuous replacement 

requires the criminal group to have sufficient 

size that it can continuously suffer losses and 

maintain its basic structure. Any criminal group 

that is large and has existed for many years while 

under law enforcement pressure has probably 

mastered this strategy. Outlaw motorcycle gangs 

may be a good example of this: some have 

existed for decades with turnover at all levels 

of the organization. 

Figure 8. Forms of group replacement

Conditions for recruitment and replacement

The environmental opportunity structure within 

which the group operates creates two conditions 

necessary for recruitment and replacement: 

1. The group cannot persist if the environment does 

not facilitate the particular criminal behavior the 

group carries out. The environment must provide 

a set of conditions—the opportunity structure—

that permits the group to function. The group 

is adapted to this opportunity structure. Radical 

changes in the opportunity structure will limit all 

four forms of replacement discussed above. 

2. There must also be an opportunity structure for 

recruitment and replacement. One example is 

convergent settings that we discussed in Step 12. 

Convergent settings allow offenders to meet other 

potential partners and permit group members to 

routinely meet potential new members. 

Intelligence analysis needs to focus on the group’s 

environment to understand these two conditions. 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 39

Know the Fundamentals of Criminal Groups

Replacement of peripheral members

A police official we interviewed described the following example of the use of shell replacement . In the 2000s, police 

agencies in eastern Massachusetts took dozens of reports from victims of the “Big Carrot” scam . Victims were called 

at work by someone claiming to be “Jim, your UPS driver .” “Jim” divulged that his brother worked at Sears, Best Buy, 

or a similar “big box” store that was overstocked on big-screen TVs, or other high-end electronics, and the victims 

could get a great deal if they would pay cash . The victims met “Jim’s brother” outside the store, turned over the cash, 

and got a handwritten receipt and instructions to pick up their merchandise at the loading dock . By the time they 

discovered there was no merchandise, Jim’s brother had fled .

While many departments arrested dozens of men, they were unable to crack the core group who made the initial 

calls . They were never the ones to meet victims, collect the money, and hand over the “receipts .” Instead, they hired 

ex-cons to serve as the “runners,” who were the ones arrested . None of them knew the names of their bosses, 

and they were simply replaced with new stooges for the next round of scams . Although police did develop some 

intelligence on the ringleaders, as of 2010, police still occasionally received reports of these crimes, with no change 

in modus operandi .
40 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

INTERVIEW OFFENDERS

INTERVIEWING OFFENDERS CAN GIVE YOU USEFUL INFORMATION ABOUT WHY THEY COMMIT THEIR CRIMES, how they 

decide to commit them, and how they carry them out. You do not need to interview a “representative” or even a large 

sample to gain considerable insight into the group you are examining. You can sometimes conduct the interviews with 

offenders who are temporarily in custody, awaiting a court appearance. You might be able to get officers handling the 

case to ask the questions on your behalf, but you will have to brief them very carefully about the information you want 

and why. Even after release from jail or prison, you may find it useful to see if offenders are willing to talk about how 

they and others committed crimes. 

Cooperation depends critically on the content of 

the questions. Make it clear that you are not looking 

for information about specific crimes they have 

committed or information about specific co-offenders. 

Treat the offender as an expert whose insights you 

are seeking. If you make clear that you are interested 

in generalities about the crimes in question—how 

targets are selected, how crimes are committed, ways 

of recruiting members, etc.—you can get much useful 

information. Offenders are often willing to talk openly 

about their crimes if they see no risks for themselves 

in doing so. This has been shown in many research 

studies, with different kinds of offenders. If you have 

little experience with such interviews, seek out an 

investigator with a reputation for putting offenders at 

ease and gaining useful information. 

It is sometimes important to obtain information from 

a larger, more representative group. You might also 

feel it is important to interview active offenders who 

have not been caught. In such cases, your department 

may need to contract with a private research firm to 

conduct the interviews or with a university researcher. 

Such interviews are commonly undertaken by 

researchers studying a particular problem (see both 

Boxes for examples). 

Where there is no need to talk with active offenders, 

they can be interviewed in prison. Again, if you 

use outside researchers to conduct such interviews, 

you must brief them carefully about what you 

need to know. Your agency will have to work out 

confidentiality and nondisclosure agreements with 

the researcher so they do not have to report which 

offenders said what.

Interviewing procedures

Professor Scott Decker of Arizona State University, 

who has conducted many interviews with offenders, 

breaks up the task into the eight steps discussed below: 

1. Establish the goal of the interviews before you start.

What gap would the interviews fill and how will 

that help in your analytic efforts? Do you need to 

understand the offender’s motives, co-offending 

strategies, and target selection techniques? How 

will you use this information? It is important to 

devise a questionnaire to guide your interview. 

2. Decide who to interview. Interviewing just any 

member of the group might not be worthwhile. 

High-rate offenders would usually be more 

knowledgeable about the operations of the group, 

other members’ involvement, group objectives, 

and organizational structure. Seeking out the right 

person for the interview is therefore important.

3. Determine who should conduct the interview. This 

is mostly a matter of who has the skill and the 

access to the offenders. As mentioned above, if 

the offender is in police custody, a skilled officer 

might be able to interview the offender if you 

provide the questions that need answering. If you 

have the interviewing skills then you can do it. 

Interviewing active offenders who have not been 

caught poses greater difficulties. Locating them 

and interviewing them ‘on their own turf ’ will 

require advance intelligence about where these 

groups operate. In most cases, someone from the 

police could conduct the interviews, again, with 

your guidance, but it might be possible to enlist 

the help of skilled researchers in this task.
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 41

4. Convince offenders to participate. This is 

sometimes difficult, although research suggests 

that many convicted offenders are willing to talk 

about their own feats. You should consult your 

local legal counsel to find out what inducements 

can legally be offered to these offenders in return 

for their participation, which do not violate 

policies and professional ethics. 

5. Record the answers. Use of a tape recorder will 

allow the information to be transcribed and 

analyzed in detail. On the other hand, using a tape 

recorder may jeopardize cooperation. 

6. Analyze interview results. This can be helped by 

using hypertext analysis software packages, such 

as Folio Views or Ask Sam, which allow you to 

quickly sort through the interview results and 

identify patterns. 

7. Sort out the truth. This can be done by repeated 

questioning to look for consistency, interviewing 

different offenders about the same issue, or 

comparing what they say to what is already known 

through other sources. If you already have some 

knowledge about the group whose member you 

are interviewing, that knowledge will help sort 

truth from fiction. 

8. Use the interview results in problem solving.

Successful interviews will dictate response 

strategies that you can suggest to your police 

department. The Boston Operation Ceasefire, 

for example, used interviews with active gang 

members to learn about their preferences for guns 

and the gang’s dependence on drug dealing. The 

results from these interviews led to the use of 

directed patrol against gang drug sales whenever 

there were shootings.

Assemble the Key Information

Theft of supplies and medicines in hospitals: What nurses said...

ean Dabney interviewed 25 registered nurses in three hospitals to find out more about the theft of supplies and 

edicines . Almost all the nurses said that they took supplies from hospital stock, and claimed that this was accepted 

ehavior among nurses who generally believed it was ‘kind of compensation .’ Thefts of over-the-counter drugs, 

cluding painkillers, were very common and were never reported to the hospital authorities . Thefts of non-narcotic 

rescription medicine was also common; in these cases, nurses take advantage of the lag between the pharmacists 

alizing that the patient is no longer taking the medicines and when they quit sending them . Thefts of narcotic 

edicines by nurses, although rare, also occur, but are much more likely to be reported by other nurses . 

urce: Dean Dabney. 2000. Neutralization and deviance in the workplace: Theft of supplies and medicines by hospital 

urses. In Deviance and Deviants, ed. Richard Tewksbury and Patricia Gagne. Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing.

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42 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers

Assemble the Key Information

Incorporating offender interviews in problem solving

The Cincinnati Police Department and researchers at the University of Cincinnati worked together to use offender and 

victim interviews to reduce street robberies . Police were interested in whether groups of offenders were involved, 

if the robbers targeted Hispanic victims, and several other questions . Police and researchers developed a set of 

questions . Two detectives interviewed robbery arrestees and victims, and taped the interviews . At the university, 

the tapes were transcribed, the transcriptions coded so they could be analyzed, and then the coded date was 

analyzed . The results showed that the offenders were probably not operating in stable groups, but they had a distinct 

preference for Hispanic victims who robbers rightfully believed were unlikely to report the robberies . Police used 

these results to inform members of the Hispanic community in the area .

READ MORE:

Scott Decker . 2005 . Using Offender Interviews to Inform 

Police Problem Solving . Problem-Oriented Guides for Police . 

Problem-Solving Tools Series, No . 3 . Washington, D .C .: 

U .S . Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services .
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 43

TAP THE KNOWLEDGE OF OFFICERS

PATROL OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATORS ARE IMPORTANT SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE DATA and tapping their knowledge 

can be extremely helpful to you. This point is often addressed by developing better procedures for information sharing. 

Data sharing procedures can help, but they do not go far enough. This is because information sharing can only help 

when two conditions are met: someone has data of potential use for intelligence, and someone knows that the data is 

potentially valuable. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, has developed a classification based on these 

conditions, which we apply in the four cells of Table 7.

If the data is known to be of value to address an 

offender group, and an officer has the information, 

then the emphasis should be placed on data sharing 

(cell 1). However, when police have the data, but do 

not know its value, then intelligence analysts need 

to spend more time briefing patrol officers and 

investigators about what sorts of data is useful. This is 

sharing information about targets (cell 2). 

When no one in the police department has the data, 

then information or target sharing will not help. If 

intelligence analysts can identify specific gaps in their 

knowledge (they know the value of the data, but do 

not have it), then focused efforts to gain the data can 

be designed and launched (cell 3).

The most difficult circumstance is that no one knows 

that the data is of value (though it is), and no one in 

the police department has the data (cell 4). There is 

no satisfactory solution to this problem, but there are 

three practices that can help: 

1. If patrol officers or investigators have diverse 

experiences with a group of offenders, bringing 

them together to exchange ideas and experiences 

may be useful. Discussions among police who have 

very different experiences with the group may 

challenge some basic assumptions about the group 

and reveal potential knowledge gaps. The purpose 

of the discussion is to explore disagreements; 

consensus and agreement is not the goal. 

Table 7. Four problems with using the knowledge of police officers

FOUR PROBLEMS WITH USING THE KNOWLEDGE OF POLICE OFFICERS

Data’s value is known Data’s value is unknown

Data is known to 

police

Cell 1 

Someone within the police agency has 

the data, and they know it is useful for 

intelligence. 

Improvement in information sharing may 

help.

Cell 2

Someone within the police agency has the 

data, but the value of this data is unknown. 

Sharing target information may help.

Data is unknown 

to police

Cell 3

No one in the police agency has the data, but 

it is known that if the data were available, it 

would be valuable. 

Targeted data collection may be helpful.

Cell 4

No one in the police agency has the data, 

and even if that data was collected its value 

would not be known.

Discussions among police familiar with the 

problem, surveys of police personnel, or 

theory driven data collection may help.
44 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

Assemble the Key Information

2. Data may be dispersed among many individuals 

so that no individual understands that they have 

useful data. Surveys of officers and investigators 

can identify: (a) patterns of knowledge that no 

one was aware of; (b) hidden differences in police 

understanding; and (c) knowledge gaps that can 

be targeted for additional data collection. In 

the late 1990s, the Washington/Baltimore High 

Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (W/B HIDTA) 

conducted an annual survey of its many squads to 

assess commonalities and differences among the 

offender groups being investigated. The surveys 

suggested that for the most part, the groups being 

addressed by the investigative squads were small 

to moderate in size, not hierarchically organized, 

and not long lived. This was useful strategic 

intelligence for the W/B HIDTA.

3. Training officers, investigators, and intelligence 

analysts in environmental criminology theories 

may help them understand the problem being 

addressed. Discussing ways to address offender 

groups (based on research and experience) can 

also reduce the circumstances under which police 

do not know the data they need to collect.

Barriers to information sharing

Patrol officers and investigators may sometimes be 

unwilling to share information for reasons discussed 

below. Here we use the familiar framework of risks, 

effort, rewards, excuses, and provocations. 

Risks of Sharing. If officers feel there is greater 

risk for sharing information than not sharing, then 

little sharing will take place. Have clear policies and 

procedures for sharing and hold people accountable 

for sharing, when sharing is legally permitted. Hold 

supervisors accountable for assuring adequate sharing.

Effort of sharing. If information sharing is easy, 

more information will be shared. Reducing the effort 

necessary to pass information along can be facilitated 

by making it convenient. If two units routinely need to 

share information, this will happen more readily when 

they are located in close physical proximity. Reducing 

the paperwork burden can also reduce the effort, 

though this may interfere with holding supervisors 

accountable for sharing.

Rewards for not sharing. If officers or their units get 

more rewards for holding on to data than for sharing 

it, they will not share. Look for ways of crediting 

officers for sharing. If officers do not learn how the 

data they provided helped, then they are less likely 

to share in the future. Giving feedback on the utility 

of the data increases rewards for sharing. Further, if 

officers are only asked to give data, but seldom receive 

data, then they will have less incentive to share. Look 

for opportunities to provide them with useful data.

Excuses for not sharing. There are four common 

excuses officers use to avoid sharing intelligence data: 

it is not my job; there is no one to tell; others already 

know this; and, I did not know it was useful. Policies 

and procedures, training, and supervision can address 

the first excuse. Ensuring that intelligence analysts are 

known to officers can address the second. Holding 

discussions with officers and investigators about 

targets can address the last two excuses.

Provocations for not sharing. If officers and 

investigators have bad relationships with intelligence 

analysts, then they are more likely to withhold data 

than if they have good relationships. While policies, 

procedures, training, and supervision are necessary, 

they are not sufficient to assure information sharing. 

Good personal relationships are essential.
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 45

WORK WITH BUSINESSES, PRIVATE SECURITY, AND THE CITY

DISASTER PREPARATION ALREADY REQUIRES YOUR DEPARTMENT TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE MAYOR OR CITY 

manager, as well as with other city agencies such as fire, emergency medical, hospitals, and schools. Make use of 

this partnership when gathering intelligence about criminal groups that you may be investigating. In addition, forming 

partnerships with private security and businesses in your city can help your department in gathering intelligence about 

criminal groups. This is especially important for dealing with suspected terrorist groups. 

Businesses are an important source of information 

about the activities of criminal groups. For example, 

banks, check-cashing establishments, and moneytransfer stations, such as Western Union, can tell 

you about suspicious financial transactions or 

financial transactions of suspect groups; car rental 

agencies, motels, and real estate agents can give you 

information about newcomers and transients; and 

private security practitioners can inform you about 

organized fraud that might be funding terrorism. Your 

department should take charge of the partnership, but 

to obtain full cooperation it should give private sector 

colleagues public credit for their contributions. 

In the United States, private security employees 

outnumber the police by three to one. They 

are responsible for the security of most of your 

jurisdiction’s infrastructure and provide visible crime 

control in the places where people spend much of their 

daily lives: at work, on public transport, in educational 

facilities, in shopping malls, and even in gated 

communities. One of the best ways to approach the 

larger businesses in your community is through their 

corporate security officers, but there are many other 

security professionals in your community who could 

provide you with valuable help. These include local 

security consultants, the suppliers of guard services, 

and installers of security hardware and systems. 

You might think you already have good informal 

contacts with this group, facilitated by the many 

retired police officers employed within their ranks. 

However, the Department of Homeland Security 

recommends that, to serve the goal of preventing 

terrorism, police chiefs in larger jurisdictions 

should consider formalizing relationships with 

private security through coordination agreements 

or memorandums of understanding. Formalization 

shows employees from both sides that the partnership 

is an organizational priority. Specifically, it will help 

your department do the following:

◾ Safeguard the critical infrastructure in your 

community that is protected by private security 

and ensure rapid recovery in the event of an attack

◾ Obtain effective help from private security in 

emergencies 

◾ Improve the flow of information—in both 

directions. Partnering will allow you to 

communicate threat information to the private 

sector efficiently and, conversely, it will allow the 

private sector direct access to the right people when 

they need help or want to report information.

◾ Make use of private-sector knowledge on topics 

that your department might know little about, 

such as organized fraud or cybercrime

◾ Obtain access to private-sector resources and 

facilities that will help you meet training and 

operational needs 

Perhaps the most critical issue concerns the handling 

of sensitive information. Your department may be 

uncomfortable sharing information—especially about 

terrorist groups—with companies owned by foreign 

entities and it may not be legally permitted to share 

information that private security requests, such as 

criminal histories. For their part, private security 

may fear that proprietary business information could 

become public as a result of Freedom of Information 

Act requests. They might avoid speaking candidly 

at partnership meetings because competitors could 

learn about their problems, or because they might 

be charged with antitrust violations if they discuss 

inappropriate topics. Finally, they might not report 

instances of cybercrime because your department 

might then seize their records and computers. In a 

word, this all boils down to mutual trust which takes 

time and patient negotiation to develop. 
46 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

Assemble the Key Information

Getting started

◾ Clarify the purpose of the partnership and set goals for improved collaboration and coordination 

◾ Spell out what the partnership must do to accomplish its mission

◾ Identify the resources the partnership will need to meet its goals and find ways to secure these materials

◾ Find a physical and logistical home for the partnership and appoint a police officer to coordinate its activities

◾ Decide how the partnership members will communicate, both routinely and in emergencies

◾ Create an identity for the partnership through the use of a logo, brochure, or website, and use this identity 

to obtain funds and recruit members 

READ MORE:

John Dempsey . 2008 . Introduction to Private Security.

Thomson Higher Education .

Graeme Newman and Ronald Clarke . 2008 . Policing 

Terrorism: An Executive’s Guide . Washington, D .C .: 

U .S . Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services . 

The Law Enforcement-Private Security Consortium . 

2009 . Operation Partnership: Trends and Practices in 

Law Enforcement and Private Security Collaboration. 

Washington, D .C .: U .S . Department of Justice, Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services . www .cops .usdoj .

gov/Publications/e08094224-OpPartnership .pdf .
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 47

WORK THE COMMUNITY

YOU CANNOT OVERESTIMATE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE COMMUNITY: it is the source of most police knowledge about 

offender groups. Offender groups will attempt to control what community members know about them and what they 

pass on to police. So, if there is friction between community members and the police, offender groups will exploit this 

weakness.

By community, we mean people who live, work, study, 

or play in the area. There are four main ways that the 

community can assist police in addressing offender 

groups, corresponding to the four stages of SARA 

(Step 5). 

Identifying concerns and problems (scanning)

Community members are the first to encounter 

offender groups, if not as victims then as neighbors, 

acquaintances, customers, or tenants. Before police 

are aware of a new offender group, people in the 

community have often detected its presence. This may 

be one of the greatest values of community policing—

taking community concerns seriously and allowing 

the police to learn early about developing problems.

While police should pay close attention to the 

community, you should not take all views expressed by 

the public as equally valid. You should treat expressions 

of concern regarding offender groups as hypotheses 

that you need to test (Step 21). Table 8 illustrates this 

point. Community members may express no concern 

about some group behaviors—because they do not 

find these troublesome; they are intimidated; they gain 

from the behaviors; or they are unaware of them. Police 

enquiries may indicate that this lack of concern is 

valid (cell 1) or that there is a serious problem but the 

public is not expressing concern (cell 2). In contrast, 

the community may find some group behaviors very 

troublesome. Analysis may indicate that these concerns 

are misdirected (cell 3) or that they are fundamentally 

sound (cell 4). Distinguishing between cells 3 and 

4 is often difficult. Community members may have 

important insights that go beyond data available to the 

police, but they can also misperceive situations and 

demand actions that are inappropriate, costly, or violate 

civil liberties.

Table 8. Community concerns and community problems

NO EVIDENCE OF A PROBLEM EVIDENCE OF A PROBLEM

No expressed 

community concern

1. Issues that can be ignored. But you 

cannot rule out the possibility of a deeply

hidden problem.

2. Determine why the community is 

unconcerned with the problem and 

consider expanding work with the 

community to address the problem.

Expressed 

community concern

3. Seek data to determine if the concern 

is valid, or if evidence is negative, 

determine why some members of the 

public believe there is a problem. The 

public’s concerns may need redefining. 

This may not be an issue intelligence 

analysis can address.

4. Some community members may be in 

a good position to assist with gathering 

intelligence.
48 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

Assemble the Key Information

Knowledge about offender groups (analysis)

The most obvious way community members can help 

is by providing data on the offender group. You can 

expect four groups of people to have useful knowledge 

of the group: 

1. Co-offenders are community members who are 

members of the group or knowingly assist the 

group in its activities. 

2. Victims are people directly harmed by the group’s 

criminal behaviors. (Many of these victims, 

especially of group violence, may be co-offenders.) 

3. Place managers are the owners and managers of 

businesses, residences, and other facilities that the 

group uses. These managers may be unaware of 

the group’s activities, they may know what is going 

on but choose to ignore it, or they may knowingly 

work with the group. 

4. Others include neighbors, businesses, delivery 

workers, and government workers who frequent 

the area and encounter the group.

The value of the information will depend on how well 

these people know the group, their physical proximity 

to the group’s area of operation, and the degree to which 

the group’s behavior influences their lives. If the group 

is well integrated into the community, this might limit 

the information you can expect to get from the public

Possible ways to address group (response)

Just as community members vary in their knowledge 

of a group, so does their ability to assist in dealing 

with the group. Those most knowledgeable may not 

be those who can do the most about the group. Those 

who can provide the greatest assistance in addressing 

problems may not be those who know most about 

the group. Residents of an apartment building, for 

example, may know a lot about a gang that uses the 

building, but they may not be able to do much about 

it. On the other hand, the owner of the building, who 

may know the least about the group, has the power 

to change lease conditions and alter the building’s 

physical environment.

There are three ways members of the public can assist: 

1. They have resources and legal powers that can be 

used against the group. Place managers provide a 

good example, particularly if the group relies on 

specific locations for their activities.

2. They have expertise that can be applied to the 

solution. Such expertise can vary from the ability 

to help remove an abandoned building or clean up 

a vacant lot used by a gang, to having computer 

training sufficient to create a database and website 

for a community group.

3. They create community and political support for 

actions against the group. This can be particularly 

important if the offender group is networked 

with elected officials, or there is a need to put 

pressure on business or property owners who 

facilitate the group’s activities. At minimum, you 

do not want substantial community antagonism 

to the police efforts, so winning and maintaining 

public support can be important for solving crime 

problems. Selling a solution to a community 

after it has been decided on behind closed 

doors is often more difficult than including 

community members in problem solving from the 

beginning—even if this raises concerns about how 

much intelligence information can be shared with 

participating community members. 

Perceptions of effectiveness (assessment)

The final way community members can assist 

intelligence analysis is the evaluation of police 

actions. If public perceptions are important, then poll 

community members after police actions to determine 

if they perceive a reduction in the problem. This can 

be as simple as informal discussions with members 

of the public or as rigorous as randomly sampling the 

public and interviewing them about how they view the 

problem. For example, if the police take action against 

an offender group shaking down business owners for 

protection money, it would be useful to have covert 

conversations with business owners to determine if 

they are still receiving threats.

Even if such data is not used to evaluate effectiveness, 

sharing evaluation results with the community is 

useful. It may be that while there is strong quantitative 

evidence of a reduction in the group crime problem, 

members of the public can point to exceptions that 

you need to address. 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 49

CREATE INTELLIGENT MAPS

GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS (GIS) CAN ASSIST THE ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL GROUPS AND PROBLEMATIC 

gatherings. Geographic analysis allows you to think and communicate “visually” about the problem you are investigating. 

This can be very helpful in your process of research, analysis, and presentation of the intelligence you have gathered. It 

can help you provide your police department with timely and accurate intelligence, and also with advice on tactics and 

deployment strategies.

The questions you might seek to answer using GIS 

include the following: 

◾ Where are these groups concentrated 

geographically?

◾ How dispersed are they in your jurisdiction, state, 

nationally, or even internationally?

◾ Can the environmental characteristics of the 

place where these groups are found give you any 

additional clues about the group?

◾ Which kinds of urban areas or cities are these 

groups more likely to operate in?

◾ Are there any unique geographic features of 

the area that hold some special meaning for the 

groups who live there? 

◾ Have there been geographic shifts in the groups’ 

movements throughout years? If so, what dictates 

these geographic shifts?

◾ Can you identify any geographic patterns 

about the movements or distributions of these 

groups throughout your jurisdiction, the state, 

or the nation?

◾ What targets are most at risk? Where are these 

targets located?

Geographic analysis and problem-oriented policing

The analysis needed for problem-oriented policing 

under SARA (Step 4) can also be applied in geographic 

analysis (see Vann and Darson listed below). 

Scanning. Maps can quickly identify crime clusters 

and hot spots by location, time of day, type of crime, 

etc. For example, you can use GIS to identify types 

of crimes committed by the group you are studying. 

But be cautious. Some problems are not strongly 

geographical, and will not show up on maps. So do not 

rely exclusively on maps to detect problems. 

Analysis. Maps can be used to relate crime to other 

spatial variables, such as street layout, transportation 

arteries, land use categories, locations, and so on. 

It can also be used to profile crimes that have been 

committed by the group you are studying, which will 

give you valuable information on offenders and their 

characteristics. GIS can also be used to map at-risk 

targets and locations where these groups operate. In 

addition, GIS can be used to understand the reasons 

why the groups commit the crime and how location 

affects their decision.

Response. Maps can be used strategically (e.g., 

identifying crime patterns) and tactically (e.g., 

extrapolating serial crimes to predict anticipated 

targets). If you have identified at-risk targets 

and locations, for example, GIS can be used to 

map the response strategy you are proposing to 

your department, thus allowing for well-planned 

resource allocation. 

Assessment. Maps can be used as before and after 

overviews depicting the effects of the intervention 

proposed. Such examination will allow you to make 

an assessment of the success or the failure of the 

intervention implemented.

Cracking down on gangs with GIS

The Akron (Ohio) Police Department’s Gang Unit 

incorporated mapping in their efforts to address 

the gang problem in the city. The unit used graffiti 

markings throughout the city to identify the active 

gangs and to record gang boundaries and track gang 

activity. Gang Unit officers began by visiting the sites 

and taking pictures of the graffiti, which were marked 

with the graffiti’s location. The data was then entered 

into a GIS database to map the boundaries of more 

than 30 gangs in Akron. Apart from allowing officers 

to describe the areas where gang activity was present, 
50 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

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this also enabled them to identify overlapping space—

“hot zones” or “conflict zones”—where gang conflict 

was most common. These areas were identified through 

graffiti portraying insults between the rival gangs. The 

map of these territories is shown in Figure 9 on page 51.

Tracking gang activity in Orange County, California

Recognizing that gang activity crossed jurisdictional 

boundaries, the Orange County Chiefs and Sheriffs 

Association created a countywide Gang Strategy 

Steering Committee to address the shared problem 

of gang violence. The committee comprised 22 law 

enforcement agencies, as well as researchers, local 

government agencies, the community, and businesses. 

It created a Gang Incident Tracking System (GITS), 

which was used, in conjunction with GIS, for mapping 

and spatial analysis of gang activity in the county. 

GITS and GIS were used not only for monthly 

statistics and information management, but also for 

personnel deployment, strategic planning, and resource 

management. The data gathered through these systems 

was used to evaluate gang prevention strategies, 

and intervention and suppression activities for each 

individual department, as well as for the county. 

Geospatial analysis of terrorist activities

Researcher Brent Smith and colleagues used GIS to 

examine incidents of terrorism in the United States 

during the past 25 years. Specifically, the research 

focused on the planning processes and behaviors that 

the terrorists engaged in while preparing their attacks. 

A strong spatial relationship was found between 

terrorist incidents, terrorists’ preparatory behaviors, 

and where they resided. Fifty percent of incidents 

happened within 30 miles from where they resided, and 

this was most apparent among international, left-wing, 

and single-issue terrorists. The analysis also found, for 

example, that in the case of environmental terrorists, 

antecedent activities took place very close to the 

incident location, with a median distance of about 5.3 

miles. For international terrorists, this distance ranged 

between 271 and 810 miles, implying a quite different 

planning strategy. 

The Crime Mapping and Analysis Program (CMAP) 

provides training to law enforcement agencies in 

the use of GIS, as well as crime and intelligence 

mapping. The program is funded by the National 

Institute of Justice’s Office of Science and 

Technology. CMAP provides useful resources 

including a crime analysis unit developer kit, free 

software downloads, publications, and free crime 

mapping and analysis manuals. Their website is 

www.justnet.org/Pages/cmap.aspx.

READ MORE: 

Spencer Chainey and Jerry Ratcliffe . 2005 . GIS and 

Crime Mapping. New York: Wiley .

Brent L . Smith, Jackson Cothren, Paxton Roberts, 

and Kelly R . Damphousse . 2008 . Geospatial Analysis 

of Terrorist Activities: The Identification of Spatial 

and Temporal Patterns of Preparatory Behavior of 

International and Environmental Terrorists. Report 

published by the U .S . Department of Justice under 

Grant #2005-IJ-CX-0200 . www .ncjrs .gov/pdffiles1/

nij/grants/222909 .pdf .

Irvin Vann and David Garson . 2003 . Crime Mapping: 

New Tools for Law Enforcement. New York: Peter Lang 

Publishing .
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 51

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Figure 9. Major gang territories in South Akron

Source: Otto et al. n.d. Cracking Down on Gangs with GIS. Akron (Ohio) Police Department. 

(Available at faculty.uml.edu/apattavina/44.594/GISGangs.pdf.)
52 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

USE NETWORK ANALYSIS TO CONNECT THE PLAYERS

NETWORK ANALYSIS ALLOWS YOU TO EXAMINE LINKS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF A GROUP AND RELATIONSHIPS among 

groups and organizations. It has been applied to investigations of organized crime groups and street gangs, and in 

uncovering terrorist networks. 

It is often important to determine each individual’s 

role within the group. For example, when investigating 

an organized crime group, you can integrate 

information from other sources, such as crime 

incident data, telephone records, and surveillance 

reports to determine who the leader is; who is 

responsible for drug supply, distribution, sales, 

smuggling; who handles money laundering; and so on.

Types of network analysis

Researchers categorize network analysis into three 

generations according to the degree of complexity: 

1. The first generation is a manual approach. It 

creates a link chart showing criminal associations 

based on raw data on relationships. This might 

not be difficult to do when the group is small 

and the relationships among its members are not 

complex. 

2. Second generation network analysis uses software, 

such as Analyst’s Notebook, Netmap, XANALYS 

Link Explorer, and COPLINK. These programs 

can handle large groups and large amounts of 

relationship data. They permit a visual analysis of 

relationships among members of the groups and 

are helpful in determining whether the group is 

loosely or tightly organized. 

3. Third generation social network analysis provides 

a graphic representation of social networks (also 

known as a sociogram) and can reveal subgroups, 

discover patterns of interaction, identify central 

individuals, and uncover network organization 

and structure. Because it uses mathematical 

computations to identify these patterns, it allows 

less subjectivity on the part of the analyst and 

reduces the risk of omitting important details. 

This type of network analysis is becoming widely 

used by researchers and analysts. 

Elements of social network analysis 

Key elements to analyze when performing 

social network analysis include actors, network 

positions, network structure, network density, and 

connectedness.

Actors 

When studying particular actors or individuals, 

you should concentrate on gathering information 

on connections among individuals, places, vehicles, 

phone numbers, and other things. Personal 

characteristics of actors are far less important. The fact 

that Fred often calls Gene’s phone, and Gene was seen 

driving a car owned by Trisha is more important than 

the fact that Fred is 25 and Gene is 27, and that no one 

knows Trisha’s age.

Network position 

Three major concepts in network analysis—degree 

centrality, closeness centrality, and betweenness 

centrality—will help you identify the position of actors 

in the network:

1. Actors with many direct ties to others have high 

scores on degree centrality. They may play an 

active role in the network, making them more 

critical. 

2. Actors who are physically closer to more actors 

in the network will have high scores on closeness 

centrality. They are able to easily coordinate tasks 

and transfer resources within the network. 

3. Lastly, those actors who connect many other 

actors have high scores on betweenness 

centrality. Their removal may prevent contacts 

between other actors; effectively fracturing the 

network.
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 53

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The Royal Canadian Mounted Police use a Target Profile Sheet to gather 

information about actors involved in serious and organized crime.

Personal Data:

◾ Personal details 

◾ Information on the target’s affiliations (e .g ., geographic scope of criminal activity, memberships, or 

addictions)

Criminal History:

◾ Target’s criminal history

◾ Target’s criminal reputation (e .g ., position, influence, and importance in the criminal network)

Criminal Roles:

◾ The criminal capacity of the actor (e .g ., crime projects the actor facilitated)

◾ The current role or primary function of the actor within the network, and how easily replaced

Skills and Experience: 

◾ The expertise and skills that distinguish this actor from others in the group

Finances: 

◾ Known fixed assets and income of the actor and his/her deemed nominees

Vulnerabilities:

◾ What personal, behavior, status, or relationship aspects make the actor vulnerable or attractive to 

law enforcement

Social Ties:

◾ Connections (including family ties), specified by:

a . The type of the relationship

b . Frequency of interaction

c . Degree of criminal association

d . Degree of licit professional association

e . The nature of the social relation

The Investigative Research: 

◾ The investigation itself (previous and ongoing efforts)
54 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers

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Network structure 

When analyzing the relationships between two or 

more actors in the group, you are interested in not 

only the relationships among them, but also cliques 

or groups of close ties between these actors. That 

is, you are examining the structure of the entire 

network—for example, whether it is loosely or tightly 

organized. This could be important when devising a 

response strategy. For instance, more open or widely 

spread networks are more vulnerable to disruption by 

removing key members. 

Network density 

The density of a network allows you to determine 

how close knit or loose knit it is. Figure 10 gives a 

simple formula for density and applies it to three 

networks. The first network has less than a third 

of the maximum possible connections. The second 

network has all possible connections. Networks that 

are fully connected (density of 100 percent) are called 

cliques. The third network is called a cluster because it 

is at least 80 percent connected. Note that in the first 

network, three members (E, F, and G) form a clique. 

In a clique it may be difficult to distinguish between 

critical and peripheral members. 

Connectedness 

You may find it useful to determine the degree of 

connectedness among members, especially when it is 

vital for you to determine the flow of communication 

or authority. Connectedness is determined by the direct 

and indirect ties among the network members (count 

the connections between two members). In network 

1 of Figure 10, one link connects individuals A and B. 

Two links connect A to D and three to C or E. Four 

links are needed to get to the other three members. 

Network analysis and Operation Ceasefire 

David Kennedy and his colleagues made important 

use of network analysis during Boston’s Operation 

Ceasefire. Members of various criminal justice 

agencies identified violent gangs and provided 

information on the gang members. More importantly, 

they provided information on conflicts among 

different street gangs, which were translated into 

sociograms that laid out the gang conflict network 

(see Figure 11). Gangs not in conflict with other gangs 

are in the upper right, but are not part of the network. 

This seemingly simple information illustrated why 

particular geographic areas were experiencing high 

levels of violence. It also revealed which street gangs 

were most connected within the network and which 

therefore merited an intervention focus. Finally, it 

helped to anticipate consequences of interventions 

by highlighting rival gangs that might attempt to take 

advantage of law enforcement focus on a particular 

street gang. 

READ MORE: 

F .A .J . Ianni, and E . Reuss-Ianni . 1990 . “Network 

Analysis .” In Criminal Intelligence Analysis, ed . Paul 

Andrews and Marilyn Peterson, 67–84 . Loomis, 

California: Palmer Enterprises .

David Kennedy, Anthony Braga, and Anne Morrison 

Piehl . 1997 . “The (Un)Known Universe: Mapping Gangs 

and Gang Violence in Boston .” In Crime Mapping and 

Crime Prevention, ed . D . Weisburd and T . McEwen, 

219–262 . Monsey, New York: Criminal Justice Press . 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 55

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Figure 10. Density and other measures of networks

Source: Ianni and Reuss-Ianni 1990.

Figure 11. Gang conflict network

Source: Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl 1997.
56 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

UNDERTAKE CONVERSATIONAL ANALYSIS OF WIRE TAP DATA

CONVERSATIONAL ANALYSIS IS USED TO INVESTIGATE CRIMINAL NETWORKS AND PROSECUTE CRIMINAL CASES. 

It involves compiling and reviewing telephone conversations between two or more people in a criminal conspiracy. 

It reveals relationships between these people, the key players in crimes, and each member’s role in the network. 

Procedures 

Conversational analysis has three main stages: 

(1) collecting and transforming the data; (2) analyzing 

the data; and (3) reporting findings.

In more complex investigations you might find it 

helpful to analyze the conversations using an Ask Sam 

or Folio Views—hypertext software programs that 

allow for storing, sorting, retrieving, and analyzing 

textual data (see Mangai Natarajan’s study described 

below). In other cases, it can be helpful to produce 

a written transcript to aid in the detailed analysis of 

conversations: looking at what is said, and what is 

merely implied but left unsaid. There are two types of 

analysis for this situation. 

Micro analysis

This consists of two forms of analysis, phonological 

analysis and syntactic analysis.

Phonological Analysis examines the sounds used by 

those speaking and is necessary when recordings are 

not clear—for example, if you have to clarify whether 

someone said “I wouldn’t take a bribe, would you?” or 

“I would take a bribe, wouldn’t you?”

Syntactic Analysis examines sentence structure 

and helps to clarify grammatical relationships. For 

example, when a speaker says “I want you to do it,” the 

‘you’ maybe ambiguous, since it can refer to the other 

party involved in that part of the conversation, or it 

might include other people as well. When someone 

says “I want you to do it” he is most likely referring to 

the primary respondent in the conversation.

Discourse analysis

Discourse analysis is used to analyze the linguistic 

aspects of conversations. It comprises a variety of 

sub-analyses. 

Topic Analysis seeks to identify who introduces 

which topics and whether or not the topics are 

recycled or reintroduced later in the conversation. 

This information is useful when establishing the 

speaker’s intentions. Topic analysis is also used to 

establish conversational dominance. For example, 

when one person introduces 80 percent of the topics 

in a conversation, this is indicative of an asymmetrical 

relationship between the participants, and signifies the 

person is a leader, or an instigator who is trying to get 

others to do his will. 

Project Caviar

The Caviar network was a criminal enterprise engaged 

in international drug trafficking . Police in Canada, 

Europe, and South America ran a two-year investigation 

that led to the dismantling of hashish and cocaine 

distribution chains spanning these countries . The 

primary data submitted as evidence in the trials of 22 

members of the network was electronically monitored 

telephone conversations . These were used to identify 

primary participants and determine how deeply each 

person was involved in the trafficking operations .
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 57

Response Analysis involves examining the responses 

to topics introduced by others. Topic response options 

listed below summarize the most common strategies 

used by listeners when they have been introduced to a 

topic. They may:

1. Resolve the topic

2. Resolve part of topic

3. Request clarification or amplification of topic

4. Provide off-topic responses

5. Change or redirect the topic

6. Provide vague, ambiguous, or no response

7. Provide clarification that denies or changes the 

premise of the topic

8. Deny the topic’s premise 

For example, if the respondent in the conversation 

says ‘uh-huh,’ he is not carefully agreeing to whatever 

has been introduced. Or when a person does not 

respond, it generally indicates negativity. 

Topic-flow analysis organizes topics sequentially, 

noting the conversational movement among speakers, 

and marking the success or failure of the speakers in 

their efforts to achieve their goals. Topics of discussion 

are generally put into three categories: substantive 

topics (the goal of the conversation), corollary topics 

(ways of achieving or arriving at the substantive 

topics), and transitional topics (formulaic aspects of a 

conversation, such as greetings and in-between ‘small 

talk’ that often provides psychological breaks from the 

heavier conversation). 

Language function analysis identifies functions of the 

words used. For example, speakers promise, deny, 

report facts, complain, give opinions, advise, order, 

and thank, and they use different linguistic tools to 

achieve these functions—i.e., using language to get 

things done. 

Contrastive analysis compares phrases used in the 

conversation analyzed—for example, in an investigative 

report compiled by police officers. Officers commonly 

paraphrase the suspect’s words so that quite a different 

message is conveyed from what was actually said. 

Contrastive analysis will, therefore, allow you to 

compare and contrast these distinctly different sources 

of data pertaining to the same people. 

Uncovering a drug trafficking organization in 

New York 

Mangai Natarajan of John Jay College of Criminal 

Justice conducted an analysis in 2000 of wiretap 

records and other prosecution materials to uncover 

the structure of a large drug trafficking organization 

in New York City. She sought to determine the roles 

and status of the individuals within the organization 

and to chart the hierarchy among its members. She 

scanned 600 pages of transcripts of 151 telephone 

conversations, ranging in duration from 2 to 10 

minutes, into “Folio Views.” Her analysis consisted of 

five distinct stages:

1. Conversational count by individuals. This yielded 

a count of the number of conversations each 

individual was involved in, as well the number of 

other people with whom he or she had telephone 

contact.

2. Status analysis. This involved the use of a 

coding guide to determine the relative status of 

individuals. The guide was used to distinguish 

between people of higher and lower status, 

and included such indicators as requesting 

information, expressing satisfaction, providing 

information, giving orders, clarifying orders, and 

use of ‘sir.’ 

3. Task analysis. This involved identifying the major 

tasks performed by each individual by inspecting 

the content of the conversations. The individuals 

were identified as bosses, assistant managers, field 

workers reporting to the assistant managers, and 

field workers reporting to the chief operator.

4. Network analysis. This involved establishing links 

between individuals (Step 19).

5. The organizational chart. This involved developing 

an organizational chart by using the information 

obtained from stages 1-4. This is shown in Figure 

12 on page 58. 

Produce Intelligence
58 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

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Figure 12. Structure of the drug trafficking organization according to wiretap database

Source: Natarajan 2000.

READ MORE: 

Roger Shuy . 1990 . “The Analysis of Tape Recorded 

Conversations .” In Criminal Intelligence Analysis, ed . 

Paul Andrews and Marilyn Peterson, 117–147 . Loomis, 

California: Palmer Enterprises .

Mangai Natarajan . 2000 . “Understanding the Structure 

of a Drug Trafficking Organization: A Conversational 

Analysis .” In Illegal Drug Markets: From Research to 

Prevention Policy, ed . Mangai Natarajan and Mike Hough, 

273–298 . Monsey, New York: Criminal Justice Press . 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 59

COMPARE COMPETING HYPOTHESES

UNFORTUNATELY, YOUR BEST INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IS ALWAYS INCOMPLETE, often riddled with errors, sometimes 

contradictory, and typically ambiguous. This is mostly because you are trying to predict the behaviors of people who 

are trying to conceal their actions from the police. If your best efforts have a high chance of being wrong, how can you 

improve your intelligence information?

The answer is to consider alternatives and 

systematically compare these alternatives. Morgan 

Jones describes an eight-stage approach, developed 

by the CIA, called Analysis of Competing Hypotheses 

(ACH). We will follow his description here. 

Stage 1: Generate hypotheses. Typically, there is 

more than one way to interpret data. So it is better to 

package the information produced from the data as 

a set of competing hypotheses: a range of plausible 

alternative interpretations of the data. Sometimes a 

single analyst can imagine multiple interpretations. 

But it is often useful to have several people consider 

the data and come up with alternatives. 

Stage 2: Construct a matrix for comparing the 

hypotheses. Examples are given in Tables 9, 10, and 

11. While you can examine any number of hypotheses, 

it may be more practical to restrict consideration to 

the most plausible ones, or to the most contrasting 

ones (that is, minor variations of the same basic 

hypotheses are lumped together).

Table 9. Matrix 1

MATRIX 1: Testing each piece of evidence for consistency

Evidence

Hypotheses

A B C D

1. C C C C

2. I C I C

3. I ? I I

4. I C C C

5. I C I I

Based on Morgan 1998

Stage 3: List evidence along the left side. Evidence 

comes from the data already collected. Focus only on 

significant evidence, rather than many minor details 

that could be distracting and irrelevant. Also, if the 

absence of information is important, then this too, 

is evidence. This will be particularly significant if a 

hypothesis asserts that certain information should 

be available, but it cannot be found. Also ask, “What 

evidence not in the matrix would overturn the 

hypothesis, if it were available?” Looking for this 

evidence can help evaluate these hypotheses.

Stage 4: Test evidence for consistency with each 

hypothesis. Once you list all the evidence, work across 

(row by row) and determine if each piece of evidence 

is consistent with each hypothesis. If the evidence is 

consistent with a hypothesis, put a C in the cell for the 

hypothesis. If it is inconsistent, put an I in the cell. And 

enter ? in the cell if it is unclear whether the evidence 

is consistent or inconsistent with a hypothesis. If 

you wish, you can give degrees of consistency or 

inconsistency using numbers, symbols, or colors. 

Stage 5: Refine the matrix. You may find new 

hypotheses that had not been considered. These 

should be added. New evidence may be uncovered and 

this should be added. Block out any piece of evidence 

that is consistent with all hypotheses (as is the case 

with evidence one in Table 10: Matrix 2). Evidence 

that is consistent with all hypotheses cannot help you 

determine which hypotheses are the most likely to be 

true. Do not discard this evidence, as it may 

turn out to be useful later.

Stage 6: Evaluate each hypothesis. Now, 

work down and consider each hypothesis 

separately. Block out any hypothesis for 

which there is considerable inconsistent 

evidence. Before making a final decision, 

consider the quality of the evidence 

involved. In Table 11: Matrix 3, we have 

blocked out hypotheses A and C because 

three of the four relevant pieces of evidence 

are inconsistent with them.
60 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

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Stage 7: Rank the remaining hypotheses.

The hypothesis that is rated the highest has 

the least inconsistent evidence. Hypothesis 

B appears superior to hypothesis D in 

Matrix 3, because it has no inconsistent 

evidence, though one piece of evidence 

is ambiguous. Because the data on which 

the evidence is built can be subject to 

alternative interpretations, different 

analysts may have different interpretations. 

The advantage of the ACH process 

is that it forces everyone involved to 

look at all the hypotheses and evidence 

systematically. It can eliminate the 

hypotheses that are least likely and narrow 

the discussion to a few hypotheses. If, at 

this step, you determine that specific types 

of data could break the deadlock, then 

commission additional data collection. 

When new evidence is available, go back 

to step 5 and compare the remaining 

hypotheses with the old and new evidence. 

Stage 8: Perform a sanity check. Morgan 

advocates reviewing the findings to make 

sure no mistakes were made and that those 

involved are comfortable with the decision. 

Though you can conduct the ACH process 

with paper and pencil, the Palo Alto 

Research Center (PARC) has developed 

a simple and free downloadable software 

program. The PARC software has several additional 

features. It allows you to describe the type of evidence, 

rate the credibility of the evidence, and rate the 

relevance of the evidence. It also allows you to give a 

score to the evidence for each hypothesis and come 

up with a numerical score for each hypothesis. Finally, 

though the PARC software has somewhat different 

steps, the underlying logic is the same as the steps 

described here.

It is important to remember that ACH relies on the 

logic of refutation rather than support. In other words, 

ACH systematically eliminates the worst hypotheses

(those which are the least consistent with the evidence). 

In this way it narrows the field of plausible hypotheses. 

It does not prove a hypothesis is true. The hypotheses 

remaining are the least inconsistent; least bad. 

Though ACH cannot assure that intelligence 

information is always correct, by forcing a systematic 

rigorous approach to using data it reduces the chances 

of error.

READ MORE:

Morgan Jones . 1998 . The Thinker’s Tool Kit: 14 Powerful 

Techniques for Problem Solving. New York: Three Rivers 

Press .

Palo Alto Research Center . 2006 . ACH2.0.3Download 

Page—Analysis of Competing Hypotheses. www2 .parc .

com/istl/projects/ach/ach .html .

Michael Townsley, Monique Mann, and Kristian Garrett . 

2011 . The Missing Link of Crime Analysis: A Systematic 

Approach to Testing Competing Hypotheses . Policing 

5(2): 158–171 . 

Table 10. Matrix 2

MATRIX 2: Eliminating evidence consistent with all 

hypotheses

Evidence

Hypotheses

A B C D

C C C C

C C I C

I ? I I

I C C C

I C I I

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Based on Morgan 1998

Table 11. Matrix 3

MATRIX 2: Eliminating evidence consistent with all 

hypotheses

Evidence

Hypotheses

A B C D

1. C C C C

2. C C I C

3. I ? I I

4. I C C C

5. I C I I

Based on Morgan 1998
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 61

FIND WAYS TO SHARE VITAL INFORMATION WITH OTHER JURISDICTIONS

RIGHT AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS MANUAL, WE MENTIONED THAT THE 9/11 COMMISSION CRITICIZED INTELLIGENCE 

agencies for failing to “connect the dots” and that this criticism focused attention on the need to find ways of sharing 

critical information. As former CIA director, R. James Woolsey, noted in testimony to Congress, “the flow of information 

sharing is likely to be more from localities to Washington, rather than the other way around.” The fact that local police 

came face-to-face with three of the 9/11 hijackers in traffic stops before the attack is often cited as an example of an 

opportunity that was lost because an integrated information sharing system was not in place. 

We are still struggling with the difficulties of putting 

such a system in place. The regional Joint Terrorism 

Task Forces established by the FBI throughout the 

country before 9/11, represent one attempt to find 

a solution to this problem. Fusion in many states 

represents another information-sharing initiative. 

Information from multiple jurisdictions is pooled 

and made available to participating police. A center’s 

mission can be limited to antiterrorism, but it often 

includes other significant crimes, such as insurance 

fraud, money laundering, and armed robbery. 

Therefore, these fusion centers can serve as a valuable 

resource for your department. 

Joint Terrorism Task Forces

There are now more than 100 JTTFs throughout 

the country, including the 56 FBI field offices . Their 

mission is to coordinate federal, state, and local law 

enforcement efforts to detect, prevent, and respond 

to terrorist attacks . Primarily investigative and analytic 

agencies, JTTF are staffed by FBI investigators, agents 

from federal agencies—such as the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Bureau 

of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—and 

detectives from local police and sheriff’s departments . 

Several successes have been credited to the JTTF, 

including the arrest and conviction of the terrorists who 

mounted the first attack on the World Trade Center in 

1993 and of the so-called shoe bomber, Richard Reid .

Impediments to information sharing

In Step 15 we discussed some of the impediments 

to sharing information among the personnel of a 

single police department. Here we list six important 

impediments to sharing information among different 

departments and jurisdictions: 

1. There are more than 17,000 state and local law 

enforcement agencies in the United States, very 

few of which have staff trained in a common 

intelligence curriculum and technology to 

collate, analyze, and exploit raw intelligence 

data. Even within the same force, there might 

be little interconnectivity among existing 

computer systems. 

2. Secrecy is the stock-in-trade of intelligence 

agencies; historically, protecting sources and 

preventing leaks has been of great importance. 

This is why the need-to-know doctrine drives 

policy on information sharing. Unfortunately, 

in practice this doctrine inhibits information 

sharing and, therefore, inhibits new insights that 

sometimes occur when new eyes examine old 

information. 

3. Particularly in the early stages of an inquiry, it is 

likely that investigators will guard their information 

jealously. There are two reasons for this:

a. Investigators may be wary of leaks that would 

jeopardize the investigation. They may know 

that officers in other forces might benefit 

from the information, but who might also 

treat it carelessly or misuse it. Consequently, 

they might not share information when they 

should have done. 
62 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

Produce Intelligence

b. Investigators (understandably) wish to reap 

the kudos that will result from successfully 

apprehending the criminals they have been 

investigating. Sharing the information with 

some other enforcement agency, particularly 

one higher in prestige, could result in that 

agency taking over the investigation, making 

the arrests, and gaining all the glory. 

4. Some crimes, such as terrorism, are rare and it is 

hard for people to remain vigilant when nothing 

seems to be happening, and hard to maintain 

the morale of those doing the watching. Added 

to this is that useless information is vastly more 

common than information that is useful. While 

we often hear stories of intelligence successes, 

resulting from tips received or surveillance 

undertaken, we do not hear about the work that 

leads nowhere. This lack of success can result in a 

“why bother” attitude and a reluctance to expend 

the effort needed in pursuing investigations. It 

also can mean that investigators are reluctant to 

lose face by sharing information that could prove 

to be useless.

5. The essence of prevention is stopping something 

from happening. It can be hard to demonstrate 

that such efforts have been successful when the 

agency that collects the relevant information is 

not the agency that takes the action to prevent 

the thing from happening. Once again, this fact 

works against the intelligence function and more 

specifically against the sharing of information. 

6. Finally, there is much misunderstanding of 

laws and regulations governing the sharing of 

intelligence. In discussions on this topic someone 

is sure to bring up 28 C.F.R. Part 23, which only 

applies to federally-funded multi-jurisdictional 

intelligence systems, and even then only has very 

general rules about data access and storage. Many 

police and analysts seem to think that it prohibits 

them from sharing data or requires them to do 

certain things it does not actually require. So try 

to clarify legal/regulatory impediments that do 

and do not apply in your particular case. 

What, then, should you do to promote information 

sharing? There are two principles that should guide 

your approach: 

1. Identify key individuals within in or near your 

jurisdiction, who could be a continuing source of 

useful information, and cultivate a relationship 

with them so that they get to know and trust you. 

2. When a dealing with a specific problem (for 

example, one of a criminal motorcycle gang or 

a pedophile ring) you should identify specific 

stakeholders with a direct interest in reducing the 

problem, who would be likely to help you with 

your investigation. 

READ MORE: 

Graeme Newman and Ronald Clarke . 2008 . Policing 

Terrorism: An Executive’s Guide. Washington, D .C .: 

U .S . Department of Justice, Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services .
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 63

DIAGRAM THE CRIME PROCESS

OFFENDING IS NOT AN INSTANTANEOUS EVENT THAT OCCURS WITHOUT A PAST OR A FUTURE. It is a process that 

offenders must complete for their crime to be successful. This step and the following one will show you how to diagram 

such processes so you can disrupt them. 

Follow a four-stage procedure for linking the process 

that offender groups follow in committing crimes to 

a set of interventions designed to thwart the group’s 

abilities. 

1. Describe the process offenders follow to commit 

crimes.

2. Add other actors and describe their actions that 

facilitate the crime.

3. Develop possible prevention interventions at each 

process stage, for each actor.

4. Select a comprehensive set of actions from these 

possible actions.

Describe the process

The simplest crime process diagram has three stages 

that describe what the offenders do before they 

can commit a crime, during the commission, and 

afterwards (top row in Figure 13). All preparatory 

actions, such as finding crime targets, planning, finding 

weapons and other tools, organizing confederates, and 

so forth, are in the before stage. In the during stage are 

all the actions the offenders must take while directly 

carrying out the crime, including overwhelming 

victims, gaining access to the site, providing security, 

and securing valuables. The last stage includes activities 

such as escaping, disposing of stolen items, threatening 

witnesses, and laundering money.

Any of the stages can be divided into multiple substages to show the process in greater detail (see second 

row of Figure 13, and for more detail see Step 11). 

Figure 13. Crime process diagrams
64 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

The before-during-after framework is useful, but it 

does not fit all crimes. Money laundering, for example, 

follows a different process. The model of money 

laundering in the bottom of the figure is very general. 

A model for a specific money laundering operation 

would describe sub-stages within each major stage. 

If the offender group has several ways to commit the 

crime, then you should create multiple models: one for 

each way.

Add other actors

Since all crimes involve actors other than offenders, a 

comprehensive process model should account for their 

actions, too. In Step 7 we introduced the various actors 

we should be concerned with: offenders, handlers, 

targets, guardians, and place managers. During the 

before stage, what are potential victims doing that 

the offenders can take advantage of? What is being 

done by the owners and managers of places where 

the crimes occur? At the during stage, what are all the 

actors doing? And afterwards, what are all the relevant 

actors doing? 

Table 12 shows how this additional data can be 

included. The relevant actors depend on the crime 

problem, as does the number of stages. Empty 

cells indicate where there is too little intelligence 

data to determine what a particular actor is doing. 

If understanding what is going on at this stage is 

important, then you need to focus data gathering on 

this cell. 

Table 12. Adding details to the model

Create Effective Actions

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY GRID

WHEN

ACTORS

Group A Group B Targets Place managers

Long Before What place 

managers are 

doing at this stage

Just Before What this group is 

doing at this stage

During What this group is 

doing at this stage

After What targets are 

doing at this stage

Comments:

In this example, there are two interacting offender groups, their crime targets, and people who 

own or manage locations critical for the crime. Other combinations of actors are possible, as are 

different stages of the process. In each cell, describe what the actor is doing at that stage, based 

on intelligence. For groups, describe what they do to carry off the crime successfully. For targets, 

describe what they do, or fail to do, to protect themselves. If a cell is empty there is a lack of data.

Develop possible interventions

Table 13 on page 65 describes possible prevention 

actions associated with the actors and stage. Ideally, 

every cell in the grid would have multiple possible 

actions. But some cells will be blank indicating that 

you cannot identify a good preventive action due to a 

lack of information.
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 65

Create Effective Actions

Table 13. Developing responses

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY GRID

WHEN

ACTORS

Group A Group B Targets Place managers

Long Before Preventive actions Preventive actions

Just Before Preventive actions

During Preventive actions

After Preventive actions

Comments:

In each cell create a list of actions involving that actor who could disrupt the crime process at 

that stage. Ideally, the entire grid would be filled, but this requires intelligence for each cell. Blank 

cells indicate where no prevention will be implemented because of lack of intelligence. Once a 

comprehensive list of actions has been developed, select the combination of actions most likely to 

be implemented and most likely to have an impact on the problem.

Select a set of interventions

Having created a list of possible prevention actions, 

organized by actor and stage, it is time to select the 

combination of actions that are most productive. The 

characteristics of a good set of interventions can be 

described by the acronym EAGLE. The parts are:

◾ Effective

◾ Acceptable to the community

◾ Go well together

◾ Legal

◾ Expected to be implemented

To create a comprehensive set of prevention actions; 

1) address each stage of the process, and 2) address at 

least two actors at each stage. This provides a layered 

attack on the offender group’s capabilities that has builtin redundancy. Should some actions fail, or should the 

offender group attempt to thwart the prevention, other 

parts of the plan can take up the slack.

READ MORE:

Derek Cornish . 1994 . “The Procedural Analysis of 

Offending and its Relevance for Situational Prevention .” 

Vol . 3 of Crime Prevention Studies . Monsey, New York: 

Criminal Justice Press . 
66 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

APPLY SITUATIONAL PREVENTION TO EACH STAGE OF THE CRIME

COMPLETELY REMOVING THE OFFENDER GROUP MAYBE DESIRABLE, BUT NOT BE POSSIBLE because of offender 

replacement (Step 13). If members of the group are arrested, new members may replace them. Or new groups 

can spring up to continue the offending. This is often the case with violent street groups and retail drug dealing 

organizations. It is also the case with large-scale international criminal organizations. Another circumstance under which 

removal strategies may be inadequate occurs when removal can provoke violence. Consequently, you need to use other 

approaches that are complementary with a removal strategy but help thwart replacement and violent competition.

Situational Crime Prevention can be very useful for 

influencing offender behavior, particularly when 

offender removal is difficult, replacement is likely, or 

removal creates additional violence. As we described 

in Step 6, offenders make choices based on the local 

context of crime opportunities; they exploit the 

environment, taking advantage of circumstances that 

encourage crime. Recall ESEER: if crime is easy, safe, 

excusable, enticing, and rewarding there will be more 

crime. Situational Crime Prevention changes the 

incentives. It alters the social and physical context of 

crime to make crime harder or riskier, or by removing 

rewards, excuses, and provocations. 

Because different crimes are encouraged by different 

features of the environment, you need to analyze 

local circumstances to determine exactly how to 

influence offenders. To aid the selection of appropriate 

interventions, a classification of 25 situational 

techniques has been developed, which is reproduced 

in Figure 14. We will briefly summarize the 25 

techniques below.

Increase the Effort. Target hardening involves 

securing targets. Access control makes it difficult for 

the offender to get to the target. Exit screening makes 

it difficult to escape with the target, or from the target 

site. Deflection (for example, through street closures) 

steers offenders away from targets. Controlling tools 

makes the crime harder by denying critical resources 

(e.g., explosive materials) to the offender group.

Figure 14. 25 Techniques of situational crime prevention

Increase 

EFFORT

Increase 

RISK

Reduce 

REWARDS

Reduce 

EXCUSES

Reduce 

PROVOCATIONS

Harden targets Extend 

guardianship

Conceal 

targets

Set rules Reduce frustration 

and stress

Control access Assist natural 

surveillance

Remove 

targets

Post 

instructions

Avoid disputes

Screen exits Reduce 

anonymity

Identify 

property

Alert 

conscience

Reduce arousal and 

temptation

Deflect 

offenders

Engage place 

management

Disrupt 

markets

Assist 

compliance

Neutralize peer 

pressure

Control tools/

weapons

Strengthen 

formal 

surveillance

Deny benefits Control drugs 

and alcohol

Discourage 

imitation

Source: R.V. Clarke. 2008. “Situational Crime Prevention.” In Environmental Criminology and 

Crime Analysis, ed. Wortley and Mazerolle. Cullompton, UK: Willan.
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 67

Increase the Risks. Extending guardianship involves 

having citizens do more to protect each other. 

Assisting natural surveillance is related to this; it 

makes it easier for citizens to watch an area. Reducing 

anonymity reduces the ability of offenders to hide by 

being unknown. Place management involves a wide 

variety of practices to engage owners of locations in 

prevention. Formal surveillance employs dedicated 

security personnel or electronic monitoring.

Reduce Rewards. Concealing targets attempts to hide 

them from offenders. Removing targets takes this a 

step further and takes the targets away completely. 

Property identification involves marking targets so 

they have less value at resale. Disrupting markets also 

makes it difficult to sell stolen merchandise or illegal 

substances and services. Finally, denying benefits 

entails taking the value out of the behavior (for 

example by using ink tags in clothing stores that spoil 

stolen items).

Remove Excuses. Rule setting removes ambiguity 

for misbehavior and allows early intervention. 

Posting instructions serves as a reminder about 

rules. Awakening conscience appeals to offenders’ 

sense of justice. Assisting compliance makes good 

behavior more likely. Finally, controls on drugs and 

alcohol make it harder to overcome inhibitions about 

committing crime. 

Reduce Provocations. Reducing frustration and 

stress makes it harder for offenders to justify their 

actions. Avoiding disputes keeps conflicts from arising 

or getting out of hand. Curtailing emotional arousal 

also reduces temptations to offend. Neutralizing peer 

pressure keeps offenders from encouraging each other 

to commit crimes. Discouraging imitation limits 

information to offenders so they are less likely to copy 

criminal behaviors of others.

Some techniques may work better together than 

separately. Thus, rule setting is typically accompanied 

by posted instructions that serve as veiled threats to 

an offender. And rules that require people to reveal 

their identities both removes anonymity and increases 

the offenders’ perceived risk. No technique works in 

all circumstances for all crimes. Thus, rule setting 

and instructions alone may be of little importance 

to a determined offender, but they may deter the 

more casual, opportunistic offenders. However, all 

the techniques have an important role in controlling 

particular crimes in some circumstances. 

As we have discussed, intelligence data can be used 

to determine the process that the offender group uses 

to exploit crime opportunities. At each stage of the 

process a situational analysis should be conducted 

to determine the best ways to keep the group from 

successfully executing that part of the process. This 

is illustrated in Figure 15. While it is obvious that 

curtailing early stages of the process can prevent the 

group from committing crimes, it is less obvious why 

Figure 15. Applying situational prevention to the entire crime process

 

Create Effective Actions
68 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

Create Effective Actions

dealing with the final stage is productive. The reason 

is that it is this stage when the group gets its reward. 

Whether it is the sales of stolen goods, an enhanced 

reputation for a killing, or publicity for a terrorist 

attack, most rewards come at the end. Situational 

interventions at this stage can substantially reduce the 

incentive for further crime.

A comprehensive strategy for preventing a group from 

producing crimes will contain a set of actions at each 

stage of the group’s crime process. While planning 

a strategy for preventing the group’s activities you 

should describe the situational techniques used at 

each stage of the process. To provide assurance that 

the overall strategy will be effective, it is useful to 

employ at least two different types of techniques (e.g., 

increasing risks and reducing rewards, or removing 

excuses and increasing effort) at each stage.

READ MORE:

Ronald Clarke . 2008 . “Situational Crime Prevention .” 

In Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis, ed . 

Richard Wortley and Lorraine Mazerolle . Cullompton, 

Devon: Willan Publishing .

Marcus Felson and Ronald Clarke . 1998 . Opportunity 

Makes the Thief. Police Research Series . Paper 98 . 

London: Home Office 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 69

WORK WITH GATHERINGS AND CROWDS

IN STEP 17, WE DISCUSSED THE IMPORTANT ROLE THAT COMMUNITY MEMBERS PLAY IN ADDRESSING CRIME. This is 

particularly true when dealing with large gatherings of individuals, though many of these gatherings are not serious 

problems for the police. Special events, large block parties, celebrations, and daily commuter crowds typically need the 

police only to provide traffic regulation, offer directions to citizens, and ensure security against minor crimes. However, 

demonstrations to protest government policy, to push social or economic agendas, to voice opposition to other political 

or cultural positions, or to take stands against corporate practices may require active police intelligence analysis before, 

during, and after the events. 

Covert gathering of data about the organizers of the 

gathering, their intentions, and their plans is tempting, 

but highly risky because it puts personal liberty in 

jeopardy. Once revealed, or even suspected, covert 

gathering of data can undermine the public support 

for the police.

When dealing with gatherings, intelligence analysis 

must be considered within an overall police strategy 

for facilitating individuals’ abilities to make their 

opinions known and carry out constitutionally 

protected actions, while at the same time preventing 

violence and other harmful behaviors. Spying on 

individuals to determine who holds what legitimate 

beliefs and belongs to what legitimate organization 

is not permissible in most western democracies. 

Identifying violent individuals, or individuals who 

facilitate violence, is a legitimate police activity. The 

boundary between these two actions is grey, and 

keeping police actions to the correct side of this 

boundary is often difficult.

One way to keep police away from this boundary is 

to get the participants in the gathering to keep order, 

ostracize troublemakers, and not obstruct focused 

police actions to remove troublemakers. This may be 

difficult, but is often easier than imagined because of 

some basic characteristics of gatherings and crowds, 

including:

◾ Individuals in crowds are rational. Individuals 

do not surrender their rationality when in crowds 

nor do they lose their capacity to make decisions. 

◾ Large gatherings are diverse. They contain 

people with many different perspectives and 

intentions. 

1. In most cases, only a tiny fraction is seeking to 

create trouble. This group will use the larger 

gathering for their purposes and may attempt 

to provoke the police into taking forceful 

actions against the larger gathering, and thus 

gain the support of the other members of the 

gathering.

2. Another slightly larger fraction may be willing 

to facilitate the troublemaking, or join in once 

it is started. But they are unlikely to act unless 

the first group provokes the police to overreact. 

3. A much larger proportion of the gathering 

will stand-by, either confused or puzzled, 

but if seriously provoked may provide tacit 

support for the first two groups. 

4. The greatest number of participants in the 

gathering will try to distance themselves from 

the troublemakers by leaving the scene once 

trouble starts.

◾ People in gatherings have limited information.

They often know little about what is going on 

around them. Even with a cell phone and text 

messages, a person in the middle of a gathering 

is unlikely to know what is going on at the edges, 

and those at the head of a march will know little 

about what is going on at the tail.
70 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

Create Effective Actions

◾ People in gatherings influence each other.

Probably the most important influences on 

members of a gathering are the people in their 

immediate vicinity. These are often people who 

accompany them to the gathering, or who they 

knew before the gathering. 

◾ Crowd members and police influence each 

other. You cannot understand what the crowd 

will do without considering what the police will 

do. And much bad behavior by individuals in 

crowds is in reaction to police actions, and vice 

versa. When things go very wrong, it is often 

because some police and some crowd members 

co-produced disorder.

To the maximum extent possible, police should 

facilitate legitimate goals of the gathering. This 

requires building trust with the leaders of the 

gathering so their help can be enlisted in policing the 

gathering. Explaining police actions before, during, 

and after the gathering is critical. So is having an 

agreed on plan for the event. Also, because few plans 

can be implemented without changes, there needs to 

be a way for police and members of the gathering to 

communicate.

Overt and bidirectional intelligence is important. 

The Swedish Police have developed a strategy 

involving “dialogue policing.” Trained officers, 

dressed in civilian clothes, but clearly identified 

as police officers, work directly with leaders of the 

gathering. They pass information about the leaders’ 

intents and concerns to the police commander, and 

the commander’s concerns and intent back to the 

leaders. They do not spy on individuals in the crowd 

or report specific illegal behavior—that is the job of 

others in the police. They seek to dispel rumors and 

provide a way for the police to negotiate with the 

gathering’s leaders, thereby reducing the anxiety of 

both the police and members of the gathering. If the 

police need to take forceful action against specific 

individuals or a small group, the dialogue officer can 

explain what is taking place and why.

Dialogue policing is an overall strategy of negotiation 

and discussion that begins at the earliest stages of 

planning the gathering (see Table 14). In this context 

the police can learn a great deal about the gathering 

without resorting to covert actions. 

Table 14. Dialogue policing before, during, and after a demonstration

BEFORE DURING AFTER

Ensure police statements to 

the media build trust with 

demonstrators

Check that agreements are kept 

and facilitate new agreements

Avoid potentially provocative 

statements in media by the police

Create agreements between 

demonstration organizers and 

police

Establish active communication 

links between police and 

demonstration organizers

Get feedback on police operations 

from demonstration organizers

Exchange information between 

police commanders and 

demonstration organizers

Prevent hazardous incidents or 

reduce their seriousness

Explain police actions during the 

demonstration to demonstrators

Create scenarios for the 

commander

Read mood in crowds and 

among police

Give feedback to police on 

behavior of demonstrators

Involve and inform third parties Inf

affected by the demonstration

orm third parties affected by 

the demonstration

Exchange information with 

third parties affected by the 

demonstration

Adapted from: Holgersson and Knutsson 2010
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 71

Create Effective Actions

The dialogue officers are not the only way that 

information is communicated to the gathering by the 

police, or that the police gather information about 

the crowd. Throughout the gathering, police assess 

the mood of the crowd and modify their actions 

accordingly. Many of their actions are intended to 

remove excuses for misbehavior, and to not provoke. 

At the same time police communicate a specific risk 

to the few individuals who may be intent on violence, 

and deny them the rewards of being supported by 

the vast majority of the crowd. By socially separating 

those intent on violence from the rest of the crowd, 

the police make it harder for them to use violence to 

gain their objectives.

READ MORE:

Stefan Holgersson and Johannes Knutsson . 2010 . 

“Dialogue Policing—A Means for Less Crowd Violence?” 

In Preventing Crowd Violence, ed . Johannes Knutsson 

and Tamara Madensen, 191–216 . Boulder, Colorado: 

Lynne Rienner Publishers .
72 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

PULL LEVERS

IDENTIFYING HIGHLY ACTIVE OFFENDERS AND THEN GIVING THEM A DIRECT CREDIBLE THREAT OF LEGAL SANCTIONS

can substantially reduce their offending. However, offenders working in a group are more difficult to influence because 

the group’s members can exert strong counter pressure. David Kennedy pioneered a three-pronged approach to 

reducing group violence, called “Pulling Levers,” that not only overcomes this group effect, but also turns it to an 

advantage. It has been successfully applied in a variety of cities and to problems of street level drug dealing.

Much of the violence in poor neighborhoods is the 

result of disputes between rival street gangs. The 

dispute may be over a drug transaction, or a real or 

imagined slight. Group members encourage each other 

to violence because they believe that this is expected 

of them by the other members of the group. In fact, it 

may be that few if any group members prefer violence, 

but all believe the others do. In Step 6 we described this 

as “pluralistic ignorance.” Group members also justify 

their behavior by taking an oppositional stance to 

legitimate authority, particularly the police, and believe 

wrongly that they are standing up for the community 

and have their community’s support. 

Pulling Levers exploits these mistaken beliefs in order 

to get group members to regulate each other’s conduct. 

It seeks to accomplish this goal in three ways, all 

requiring direct communication with offenders:

1. Providing a direct credible threat. The objective 

is to hold the entire group responsible for the 

violent actions of each member. Standard police 

practice after a killing is to arrest and prosecute 

only the offenders directly responsible. Other group 

members who provide a supporting role are left 

untouched. Also left untouched are group members 

not directly involved who have outstanding 

warrants, are in violation of parole conditions, or in 

other ways vulnerable to criminal justice sanctions. 

There is an incentive for those not touched by the 

investigation to provoke other group members to 

violence. If one group member takes the fall for 

a killing, then the other group members achieve 

higher status. Under Pulling Levers, legal pressure 

is placed on all group members if one of their 

members is involved in a killing. The risk is thereby 

spread to the entire group so there is less incentive 

for members to provoke each other to violence. 

To accomplish this, two sets of data are needed: 

a. All violent street groups in an area need to be 

identified and the relationships among these 

groups need to be established. Some groups 

will be allied with each other, some will be 

fighting with others, and some groups may 

have no contact with others. This information 

needs to be updated regularly. 

b. All members of each group should be 

identified: who they are, their descriptions, 

their criminal histories, where they can be 

found, and other similar information. This 

information, too, needs to be routinely 

updated. 

e network of group members and the network of 

oups are used when communicating with offenders. 

is addresses the problem of violence created by 

uralistic ignorance by giving all group members 

ace saving way of backing away from violent 

counters. 

Providing a way out of street life. Whereas 

the first purpose is to convey a direct deterrent 

threat, the second is to offer a way out of the gang 

through job training, substance abuse treatment, 

and other help. This not only affords a way out 

for individual members of the group, but it also 

threatens the integrity of the group itself because 

the real possibility of a positive exit undermines 

the shared belief that legitimate society is a source 

of the group’s troubles. So even if relatively few 

group members take advantage of the offer, 

the possibility of a way out reinforces the law 

enforcement threat of the first message.

Th

gr

Th

pl

a f

en

2.
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 73

Create Effective Actions

3. Demonstrating that the community is against 

violence. The third objective is to provide the 

community with a forum for expressing their 

strong dislike of violent behavior. Community 

members, particularly those closest to the group 

members—family members, former group 

members, and people working in the streets—

communicate a dual message: “You are part of 

the community and we want you safely back. But 

we strongly disapprove of your violence which 

is destroying our community and if you do not 

change we will support the actions of the police 

to make you stop.” Socially isolating the group 

removes the excuse that they are acting on the 

part of the community.

The call out session 

“Call out sessions” are widely used. Group members 

are summoned to a meeting, held in a safe venue in 

which all three messages are conveyed. While it is 

impossible to get all of them to attend, the objective is 

to get some members from each group who can then 

bring the word back to those who did not attend. In 

Cincinnati, most call outs were held in a courtroom 

so members in jail, as well as those on parole or 

probation could get the message. 

The police deliver the first message, often supported 

by federal and local prosecutors and other criminal 

justice agencies. Outreach workers who can guide 

group members into job training, rehabilitation, or 

educational services deliver the second message. 

Community members deliver the third message.

The first meeting seldom achieves a reduction in 

violence, but the police and other criminal justice 

agencies must swiftly carry out their threat when the 

next killing occurs. Then a second call out meeting 

is held and the results of the investigation are used 

to demonstrate that the consequences are real. The 

other two messages are reinforced and the successes 

of anyone who took advantage of the exit services 

are highlighted. This cycle sometimes needs to be 

repeated several times.

It is important to track the progress of these efforts. 

Much of the analytical support needed to develop 

network diagrams and track progress for the 

Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV) is 

provided by the University of Cincinnati’s School 

of Criminal Justice, which routinely monitors 

shootings and killings in the city and uses group 

related homicide trends as a method of monitoring 

effectiveness. 

READ MORE:

Anthony Braga, David M . Kennedy, Anne M . Piehl, 

and Elin J . Waring . 2001 . “Measuring the Impact of 

Operation Ceasefire .” In Reducing Gun Violence: The 

Boston Gun Project’s Operation Ceasefire. Washington, 

D .C .: National Institute of Justice . www .ncjrs .gov/

pdffiles1/nij/188741 .pdf .

University of Cincinnati Policing Institute . 2009 . 

Implementation of the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce 

Violence (CIRV): Year 2 Report. Cincinnati, Ohio: 

University of Cincinnati Policing Institute . www .

cincinnati-oh .gov/police/pages/-32719-/ .
74 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

BE ACCOUNTABLE

IT IS OFTEN DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE IF INTELLIGENCE WORK IS PRODUCTIVE, particularly when it serves a long-term 

initiative to address criminal groups. Its particular contribution as part of such an initiative is also hard to determine. Like 

all police functions, however, accountability is critical and all intelligence-driven operations should have clear goals and 

defined outcomes that can be measured. 

The single biggest difficulty is that long-term 

initiatives tend to lose sight of their goals and begin 

to focus on their activities. When addressing criminal 

gangs, for example, the emphasis tends to be on 

numbers of arrests and disrupting the gangs, rather 

than reducing the harms the gangs are producing. 

Intelligence analysts can play an important role in 

keeping the initiative focused on its goals by measuring 

outcomes and results. This step examines how to 

incorporate effectiveness measures into the planning 

of an intelligence-driven initiative. The principles we 

describe here are not unique to intelligence, but are, in 

fact, good practice for all policing.

Setting clear goals and developing measures of 

effectiveness begins early in the planning of any 

initiative designed to address group-related crime. 

Intelligence has an important role to play in both 

setting goals and developing measures of success. 

That is, you need to determine how you and others 

will know whether or not the initiative obtained its 

objectives. 

Table 15. Planning and measuring

PLAN MEASURE WHAT THE 

MEASURE SHOWS

WHAT THE MEASURE 

DOES NOT SHOW

Goals: desired level of 

problem

Outcomes: degree 

of goal achievement

Whether the 

initiative is effective 

in curbing the 

problems created by 

the criminal group

Whether the benefit is worth the costs

Efficiency: To measure efficiency divide 

outcomes by expenditures or by activities

Objectives: anticipated 

impacts on the group 

or their environments

Results: degree to 

which objectives 

were achieved

Whether the 

initiative is altering 

the groups’ 

functioning

Problem reduction effectiveness 

Compare outcomes to results to see if 

results are productive

Actions: activities 

planned

Activities: actions 

carried out

What the initiative is 

doing

Whether the initiative is achieving 

anything 

Compare activities to results to determine 

achievements

Resources: personnel, 

equipment, 

information systems, 

and money needed

Expenditures: 

resources 

consumed

The costs of the 

initiative

Whether these costs are “buying” anything 

of value 

See efficiency measurement above

Table 15 lists four minimal requirements for planning 

an initiative to address a criminal group. Next to each 

is its accountability measure. The first thing to be 

decided is what the initiative is supposed to achieve. 

These are the goals of the initiative. Goals should be 

described relative to the harms the group produces. 

Goals can be stated in terms of absolute numbers 

or in percent reductions from current levels. For 

example, the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 75

(CIRV, as described in Step 26) set goals in terms of 

percent reductions in group-related homicides to be 

achieved over a 12-month period. 

An intelligence initiative addressing possible violence 

associated with a political demonstration could set 

the goal in terms of property damage, injuries, or 

other harms that should be minimized. The goal 

ought to be achievable and meaningful. While 

completely eliminating group-related homicides 

is certainly desirable, it may not be achievable. A 

very small reduction may be achievable, but is less 

meaningful. The expression, “do not let the perfect be 

the enemy of the good” applies here. An unattainable 

perfect goal may prevent the achievement of a very 

good goal.

The outcome of the initiative is the actual measured 

reduction in harm. Outcomes are measures 

showing how close you came to achieving the 

planned goals. It would be the actual number of 

homicides (or actual percent reduction) in the CIRV 

example. It would be the actual number of injuries 

or level of property damage in the example of the 

political demonstration. Outcomes do not describe 

the efficiency of the initiative. To determine the 

“bang for the buck” or “value for money,” you need 

to divide the outcome (e.g., crimes reduced) by the 

resources used (e.g., money expended). Ideally, each 

unit of the outcome (e.g., homicide prevented) is 

associated with a low cost.

Objectives describe the impact of the initiative 

on the group or the facilitating environment. The 

initiative seeks to change either the group itself—e.g., 

break up the group, impede its ability to recruit new 

members, and so forth—or it seeks to change the 

environment that facilitates the group’s crimes—e.g., 

deny the group access to specific locations, keep 

the group’s members from intimidating community 

members, and so forth. The theory of your initiative is 

that if these objectives can be obtained, then this will 

lead to achieving your goals. 

Results are measures of the degree to which these 

objectives have been obtained. Because group 

functioning might not be easily observed, results are 

often documented through interviews with arrested 

group members, discussions with community 

members, informant reports, and from similar 

sources. Regardless of how successful the initiative is 

in obtaining desirable results, the impact on the group 

only matters if the harm from the group’s activities 

can be reduced (outcomes). Results do not measure 

initiative effectiveness (that is what the outcomes 

measure), but they show possible progress in that 

direction.

The next stage down from objectives is actions. The 

planned actions are the steps necessary to produce 

the desired objectives. Examples of such actions are 

drug buys, surveillance of group members, interviews 

with victims, and meetings with community members. 

Counting the actions carried out, or measuring 

the time expended on actions produces measures 

of activities. Activity measures show what you did 

(but not what you accomplished). Knowing what the 

initiative does is important so activities can be linked 

to results, and then outcomes. But activities consume 

resources so it is not desirable to maximize activities 

unless they produce commensurate results and 

outcomes. Ideally, you would have very few activities 

and produce great results and major outcomes.

Having determined what actions are necessary to 

carry out the initiative, the final step is to determine 

the resources needed to carry out the actions. 

Resources are the raw inputs into the initiative.

Typically, the personnel constitute the bulk of 

resources, while specialized equipment and databases 

are also often needed. 

Expenditures measure resources used, such as 

personnel time spent on various tasks, informant 

payments, and fees for access to proprietary databases. 

It is often useful to monetize expenditures so you can 

create efficiency measures by dividing outcomes by 

money expended. A highly efficient initiative achieves 

large outcomes with little expenditure, while an 

inefficient initiative costs a great deal and gains little.

Never Compromise Ethics and Integrity
76 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

Never Compromise Ethics and Integrity

In short, expenditures buy activities, which produce 

results, which create outcomes. This is depicted in 

Figure 16. While the planning process starts with 

goals, moves to objectives, then to actions, and ends 

with resources, the measurement process tracks the 

actual implementation of the initiative, and works in 

the opposite direction: from expenditures, to activities, 

to results, and ends with outcomes. 

Tracking these four types of measures over time is 

critical for ensuring that the initiative is doing what it 

is supposed to do. If the outcomes are not improving 

then changes need to be made in the planned 

objectives and actions.

Figure 16. Measurement schema
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 77

DO NOT DELUDE YOURSELF

IT IS EASY TO DECEIVE YOURSELF, BUT THIS CAN BE DANGEROUS IN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS. When self-deceptions are 

due to thinking mistakes they are called cognitive traps; when due to how the intelligence function is organized, they are 

called groupthink.

Cognitive traps

Richard Heuer shows how intelligence failures result 

from three limitations of our thinking: 

1. When our minds have too much information 

to process they discard data they judge to be 

irrelevant. 

2. When facts are missing or the quality of data is in 

doubt, our minds often fill in gaps. 

3. When there is limited time available to assess the 

data, our minds jump to conclusions. 

These limitations result in our minds using short 

cuts, or heuristics, to speed up thinking. Heuristics 

are helpful in everyday situations when they fit the 

situation, and when the costs of being wrong are small. 

Cognitive traps arise when the heuristics do not fit 

the situation. 

Table 16 on page 78 and 79 lists common heuristics 

and related cognitive traps in the first three columns. 

The fourth column describes situations where the 

heuristics can be useful. The last column describes ways 

of avoiding traps when the heuristic does not apply. 

Groupthink 

Groupthink is the tendency of a team to reach a 

conclusion that reduces internal conflict, rather than 

addresses the problem. It is most prevalent when the 

team: (a) lacks diversity; (b) is isolated from groups 

that may have alternative points of view; and (c) has 

no clear rules for decision making that make it safe 

to voice conflicting opinions. Groupthink becomes 

worse when the team’s decision making is dominated 

by a single person or faction. In the extreme, a senior 

police executive or elected official dictates a party line 

that constrains the team’s analysis. 

Groupthink can be reduced; (a) by increasing 

the diversity of backgrounds and experience of 

participants; (b) by creating explicit rules for 

discussion that require airing opposing viewpoints; 

and (c) by promoting values of getting the story right 

and reducing the problem, rather than creating a 

consensus and focusing on enforcement. 

Judge the strength and weight of evidence. Strength 

refers to the role the evidence plays in confirming or 

falsifying a hypothesis. Weight refers to the degree that 

the evidence can be trusted. An informant may report 

that leaders from two rival gangs recently met to plan 

an attack on a third gang. This confirms analysis 

about the changing relationships among gangs. If the 

informant has a history of spreading false rumors or 

it is doubtful that the informant could have firsthand 

knowledge of the meeting, then the weight of the 

evidence is small, though the strength may be high.

Guard against inflating a problem

Christopher Bruce has reminded us that police and 

analysts tend to equate their own self-worth with the 

seriousness of the crimes and the danger posed by 

the criminal groups they are investigating. Consequently, 

officers, analysts, and, on occasion, entire police 

agencies exaggerate certain crime problems. This is 

largely unintentional, though it might play well in the 

media and might help garner more resources for the 

department. However, it can have more pernicious 

effects. Relatively harmless groups of kids may get

treated like gangs, immigrant communities harboring 

nothing more serious than a few illegal immigrants may 

be treated like havens of terrorism, and every gathering 

of motorcycle enthusiasts is policed as if the Hell’s 

Angels are mobilizing for war.
78 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

Table 16. Heuristics and cognitive traps in intelligence analysis

Never Compromise Ethics and Integrity

HEURISTIC EXPLANATION EXAMPLE WORKS IF... COUNTERMEASURES

Anchoring The initial guess 

strongly influences 

the final estimate.

An initial estimate that 

a biker gang has 100 

members influences 

later estimates. If this 

first guess is wrong, so 

will be later estimates.

The people making 

the first estimate 

have a good track 

record for accuracy.

Consider multiple first 

guesses that are very 

different.

Tunnel vision Focus on a 

narrow range of 

alternatives, often 

just one.

Only enforcement 

is considered for 

addressing an offender 

group. Other tactics 

might work better.

There is strong 

evidence supporting 

the narrow range of 

alternatives.

Use evidence-based 

approaches, when 

available. When not, 

seek out a range of 

alternatives, including 

unusual ones.

Select the first Choose the first 

alternative as being 

good enough.

The first explanation 

of the group’s behavior 

that fits the data is 

chosen. Alternative 

explanations that 

might also fit are not 

considered.

The cost of a 

mistake is small and 

speed of decision is 

critical.

Even when a good 

explanation is available, 

brainstorm plausible 

alternatives that might 

fit the facts.

Availability Decisions are 

based on what 

comes to mind 

most easily.

Following media 

reports of a notorious 

group, analysts label 

their group as similar.

Prominence of an 

idea is linked to its 

validity.

Use brainstorming or 

other techniques that 

expand ideas. (See 

“Select the first.”)

Framing The answer 

is strongly 

influenced by how 

the question is 

asked.

“How will we break up 

the group?” points to 

enforcement; “How will 

we reduce the harms 

this group creates?” 

suggests a wider range 

of tactics.

The way of asking 

the question has 

a track record of 

leading to success.

Make sure the decisionmaking group is diverse 

in background and 

experience. Invite in 

outsiders who might ask 

different questions 

Make hypotheses explicit. The more explicit your 

team is about its assumptions, the more likely it 

can test its assumptions and avoid costly mistakes. 

Searching for alternative hypotheses helps reveal 

hidden assumptions (Step 21). It is much easier to find 

hidden assumptions when the group places two or 

more explanations in fair competition and the team 

engages in systematic searches for data that can falsify 

one or more of the explanations.

Debrief. Whether the intelligence operation was 

successful or not, and particularly when it was not, 

analysts and others involved should systematically go 

over the experience to document lessons learned.

READ MORE:

Richard Heuer . 2007 . Psychology of Intelligence 

Analysis . Hauppauge, New York: Novinka Books . 

Kim Rossmo . 2009 . Criminal Investigative Failures . Boca 

Raton, Florida: CRC Books .
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 79

Never Compromise Ethics and Integrity

HEURISTIC EXPLANATION EXAMPLE WORKS IF... COUNTERMEASURES

Representativeness

Base a judgment 

on another group 

that shares some 

characteristics. 

Both groups dealing 

drugs leads to the 

conclusion that meth 

sellers operate like crack 

dealers.

The characteristic 

is important and 

genuinely diagnostic 

of the problem.

Keep in mind variation. 

Look for differences as 

well as similarities.

Identity Big events must 

have big causes.

A multiple shooting 

suggests a planned 

attack by several 

shooters, when in 

fact one shooter acted 

impulsively when 

threatened.

The only causes 

possible are big.

Consider that small, 

perhaps seemingly 

inconsequential things, 

initiated the causal 

chain.

Correlation Two events that 

occur close in time 

and space must be 

related.

Analysts conclude that 

two shootings in one 

neighborhood in one 

week are due to gang 

disputes.

The association has 

been established by 

research and it is 

strong.

Coincidence and 

randomness are always 

possible. Look for 

other evidence beside 

association.

Confirmation Look only for 

evidence that 

supports a 

hypothesis.

Having decided that 

all members of a 

group come from one 

neighborhood, only 

evidence supporting 

this conclusion is 

examined.

Evidence in support 

contradicts all 

the alternative 

hypotheses.

Look for contradictory 

evidence. Consider 

evidence supporting 

alternative hypotheses 

(Step 21).

Adapted from: Rossmo 2009
80 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers

BE PRINCIPLED IN YOUR WORK

THE PUBLIC ARE OFTEN SKEPTICAL OF CLAIMS FOR THE UTILITY OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND CONCERNED ABOUT

threats it may pose to personal liberty and democratic values. Others in the police and public feel that it is useful, 

essential, and poses little threat to democracies or liberty. Examples can be found to support both sets of views. In 

short, police intelligence is controversial and the controversy will not be resolved any time soon.

Despite this, there can be consensus around specific 

issues. Most people would agree that certain police 

intelligence operations are useful and promote 

democratic values. Excellent examples of this are the 

directed deterrence projects, based on “Pulling Levers” 

(Step 26), that have been used across the United States 

to combat street group-related homicides and street 

drug dealing. These projects focus police attention 

on high-violence individuals and groups, and highvolume drug markets. Police implement these projects 

in collaboration with community groups, and can 

field them without threatening civil liberties. Focusing 

reduces the number of individuals brought under 

police scrutiny and community collaboration provides 

some transparency. And, it reduces crime. 

Protecting individual liberties and constitutional 

principles is fundamental to policing. There is no 

debate over this. Because this is so important, it bears 

repeating, largely because there have been failures in 

the past to adhere to these standards. Such failures are 

not simply the fault of individuals; they are the failings 

of the agencies that employ the individuals. Agencies 

that rely heavily on law enforcement (and overlook 

alternatives), employ broad sweeping campaigns 

(instead of focusing on the most harmful people and 

places), and measure activities (rather than outcomes) 

facilitate such failures.

An important way to ensure that intelligence 

analysis lives up to high ethical standards is to focus 

on harmful target groups and measure success by 

outcomes. When success is measured by arrests, 

seizures, disrupted criminal organizations, and other 

means, then there is an incentive to produce arrests 

and seizures, and to announce that criminal groups 

have been fractured (whether they have been or not). 

Shifting the focus to outcomes makes it easier to take 

the more principled path, but it does not guarantee 

ethical behavior. When we call for a focus on goals and 

outcomes we are not claiming that “the ends justify the 

means.” But by stating that there are many means to 

select among, we are claiming that in most, if not all, 

circumstances there will be good means that can help 

achieve the ends desired; it is not a choice between 

effective bad means, and ineffective good means.

There are 10 principles that if followed will help 

assure ethical results. Except for the first, they are 

in no particular order. Indeed, they overlap and are 

mutually supporting.

1. Reinforce democratic values. Open discussion 

and debate is the foundation of democracy. Many 

of the principles that follow have their foundation 

in this principle. Conduct intelligence analysis 

in a manner that facilitates open discussion and 

debate. However, know that you cannot divulge all 

data. In fact, divulging some data will undermine 

democratic values. Still, to the extent possible, 

be open about information. Look for ways that 

allow for open discussion with the public that do 

not compromise individual liberties, sources of 

data, or methods for obtaining data. At the very 

minimum, do not use your position to undermine 

democratic institutions and processes.

2. Tell the truth. Better to say nothing than to give 

false reports. Though deceiving offenders can 

produce short-term gains, in the long term they 

learn about the deceptions. Importantly, the public 

is also likely to be deceived. In either case, gaining 

future cooperation from the public or from 

offenders becomes more difficult.

3. Tell as much as possible. You might not be 

able to tell all, but it is possible to tell much. 

You do not have to tell it all at one time; 

some information can be kept secret for a 

time. Definitely convey the uncertainty in the 

information shared with the public.
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 81

4. Focus on behaviors, not characteristics. As much 

of your intelligence is uncertain, protecting the 

anonymity of individuals is important. Focus on 

the behavior of groups, not the characteristics 

of their members. Do not generalize beyond 

the specific offenders in question. Do not hold 

individuals up for public ridicule. 

5. Demonstrate progress. Focus on the harms done 

by groups and measure your progress by the 

reduction in these harms, not by your activities. 

Focusing on progress toward achieving goals 

reduces the need to discuss sources, methods, 

and other things that should be kept confidential. 

When you describe actions and activities, link 

them directly to goals and outcomes. Admit 

setbacks and explain them.

6. Be truthful to yourself. Conduct self-assessments 

of your work. When successful, discover why it 

worked and how it can be repeated. Acknowledge 

that some successes were due to good fortune, 

and may not be repeatable. When unsuccessful, 

find out why you did not succeed and what you 

can do to avoid repeats. Identify unforeseen 

circumstances that impeded success and 

determine how these can be addressed in the 

future. 

7. Recognize limits. Acknowledge that when it 

comes to crime, all data is suspect, and this is 

even more the case when dealing with offender 

groups. Understand that as much as you think you 

know about a group, or your effect on the group, 

you probably do not know enough. Appreciate 

the limits of human cognition and develop ways 

to reduce their negative impact. Recognize that 

you are likely to be wrong and that humility is a 

requirement.

8. Focus. Police resources are scarce and the public is 

most concerned about broad use of police powers. 

For both reasons, target groups that produce 

the most harm. Use criminal justice sanctions 

precisely, and convey credible deterrent threats 

to group members. When seeking to address 

locations that facilitate group crimes, pick the 

exact places that aid the groups, rather than larger 

areas. Focusing not only expends fewer resources 

and poses less of a threat to civil liberties, but it is 

also the most effective approach.

9. Be wary of false consensus. The uncertainty 

inherent in understanding group criminal 

behavior means that it is highly unlikely that any 

group of police agents has a full understanding 

of what is going on. There will always be 

surprises. Consequently, it is important to create 

an environment that encourages new ideas, 

innovative ways of doing things, alternative view 

points, and dissenting opinions.

10. Test ideas. Hypothesis testing is seldom viewed 

as a moral imperative, but when the truth is 

uncertain and the stakes are high, it is critical that 

ideas be put to strong tests. A strong test seeks out 

information that could falsify the idea. Testing is 

quintessentially democratic, because it does not 

rely on the status of the person with the idea, or 

how many followers that idea has. The idea must 

survive assault by facts and logic. 

Never Compromise Ethics and Integrity
82 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

DON’T UNNECESSARILY BEAT YOURSELF UP

WE HAVE REPEATEDLY ARGUED IN THIS MANUAL THAT ARRESTING GROUP MEMBERS IS RARELY ENOUGH to solve a 

crime problem and, in line with the principles of problem-oriented policing, you should work to change the conditions 

that make the group’s crimes possible. However, we are not blind to the difficulties of doing this. Arresting offenders 

is seen as the prime duty of the police, and a clear legal and procedural framework exists to guide you. On the other 

hand, changing the facilitating conditions for crime is a much less familiar role for police and you can expect it to be 

resisted. Furthermore, compared with traditional policing, which has been around since the London Metropolitan Police 

was founded in 1829, experience in the use of problem-oriented policing is comparatively recent and you can expect its 

procedures to be less well-defined, if not outright murky.

Our manual has been written to help you, but you can 

expect to run into roadblocks of two kinds that can 

delay and discourage you. These are: (1) objections 

to the idea of reducing opportunities for offenders, 

and (2) difficulties of changing critical facilitating 

conditions. 

Objections 

The source of many objections you might encounter 

is the fundamental attribution error. Psychologists 

use this term to describe the human tendency to 

ignore the role of situation and environment in 

causing behavior. For psychologists, behavior results 

from the interaction between the organism and the 

environment. Translated for police, this means that 

crime results from the interaction of a motivated 

offender with a crime opportunity. Traditional 

policing focusses on “taking out” the offender from 

the equation, while problem-oriented policing seeks 

also to remove the opportunities for crime. The 

difficulty is that the public have little understanding 

that opportunities play a large part in causing 

crime. They think that crime is solely the result of 

immorality, selfishness, and greed. As a consequence, 

you will likely encounter many objections and even 

accusations as you seek to change the facilitating 

conditions for the problem you are addressing, such as 

these below:

1. You are not doing your job. That is to say, you 

are not arresting offenders and bringing them to 

justice. This argument may be made when you are 

trying to persuade some individuals—for example 

shopkeepers, apartment complex managers, owners 

of pubs and clubs—to change their premises or 

practices to make crime less likely to occur. 

2. You are blaming the victim and inconveniencing the law-abiding. Those who accuse you of 

not doing your job might also claim that you are 

blaming them for the crime problem, and inconveniencing them with burdensome requirements, 

when all they are trying to do is run a successful 

business that provides a service to the public. 

3. You are ignoring displacement. People tend 

to believe that offenders will always find a way 

to commit crime whatever the impediments 

thrown up against them. It is not only the public 

that believes this—many police do as well. But 

there is now ample evidence from research that 

displacement is a much less common result of 

reducing opportunities for crime than usually 

believed. You should be ready to counter the 

displacement argument by becoming familiar 

with Analyzing Crime Displacement and Diffusion, 

Problem-Solving Tool Guide No. 10. 

Facilitating conditions may be too difficult 

to change

You can usually deal with the objections listed above 

through patient explanation (another skill required 

of those engaged in problem-oriented policing). 

However, your efforts to change facilitating conditions 

might run into a more intractable roadblock—some 

of these conditions just cannot be changed. We are 

not referring here to obvious facts of geography, such 

as the proximity to the Mexico border that facilitates 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 83

theft of cars for export. Instead, we are referring to 

the limits of local police to persuade key stakeholders 

to make changes. We identify three sources of these 

limits below, together with illustrative examples: 

1. Action is needed at regional or national levels. 

For example, a facilitator of most varieties of car 

theft—whether joyriding, theft for resale, or theft 

for export overseas—is the lack of in-built vehicle 

security. Only in recent years has effective security, 

such as electronic ignition immobilizers and 

central door and window locking, been built-in at 

manufacture. But the vehicle fleet in the United 

States now averages more than 10 years in age 

and, assuming your jurisdiction is typical, most of 

the cars it encompasses provide easy pickings for 

thieves. In the long-run, this situation will change 

as manufacturers increasingly adopt more built-in 

security, perhaps in response to federal regulation 

or to meet public demand. Meanwhile, your hands 

are tied. 

2. Stakeholders may be unable or unwilling to act.

It might be thought that the best way to reduce 

theft for export to Mexico would be to tighten 

vehicle inspection at the border. Leaving aside that 

many stolen cars cross the border before they have 

been reported stolen, there are several reasons 

why this is difficult to achieve. First, border 

security is more heavily focused on incoming 

than outgoing traffic. Second, number plate 

recognition devices are prone to malfunction, 

so their warnings are often ignored. Third, 

increasing inspection times by just a minute or 

two will rapidly result in lengthy queues and 

unacceptable delays. Finally, organized thieves 

are well-practiced in deceiving hurried inspection 

procedures. Consequently, what seems to be 

an obvious and effective way to deal with the 

problem cannot be implemented. 

3. Changes are too expensive or too disruptive 

of business models. Research has clearly shown 

that two clerks on duty in convenience stores, 

particularly at slow times, substantially reduce 

the risks of robbery. Nevertheless, legislation 

mandating this measure was strenuously resisted 

in Florida and elsewhere, on grounds that it was 

too costly. In fact, all businesses, from corner 

stores to national banks, always compare the costs 

of crime prevention with the costs of crimes that 

might be prevented. When the risks of crime 

are low, the businesses often prefer to run these 

risks and call in the police when a crime occurs. 

They may also resist a crime prevention measure 

when it requires them to make difficult changes 

in their usual operations. For example, new 

home builders in Charlotte resisted police advice, 

based on solid research, that site burglaries could 

be reduced if appliances were installed in new 

homes immediately before the purchasers took 

up residence rather than weeks before. This was 

because builders found it was administratively 

easier to arrange for appliances for a particular 

housing development to be delivered together and 

installed all that same time instead of arranging 

for them to be installed just before each house 

was occupied. 

It may be problems such as these that undermine 

your problem-oriented policing project. But you 

should always remember there is never just one way 

to solve a problem. If you run into a roadblock, turn 

your attention to another key facilitating condition 

that you might be able to change. Who knows, you 

might therefore enjoy the considerable satisfaction of 

bringing about a lasting reduction in crime. 

READ MORE: 

Ronald V . Clarke and Herman Goldstein . 2002 . 

“Reducing Theft at Construction Sites .” In Analysis for 

Crime Prevention. Vol . 13 of Crime Prevention Studies . 

Monsey, New York: Criminal Justice Press . 

Never Compromise Ethics and Integrity

Part 2

Case Studies 

of Criminal 

Groups and 

Problem 

Gatherings

Part 2: Case Studies of Criminal Groups and Problem Gatherings
86 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

HOW TO READ THE CASE STUDIES

IN WRITING THIS MANUAL, WE DISCOVERED THAT WHEREAS CRIME ANALYSIS COVERS THE GENERALITY OF CRIME, 

intelligence analysis is mostly focused on offending by groups. We had not seen this point made before, but it soon arose 

in our discussions about intelligence analysis with police analysts—in fact, they mostly took the point for granted. 

At first, we treated this idea as a hypothesis, but we 

gradually became more confident that it does indeed 

represent the reality of intelligence analysis, at least 

in the policing field. Consequently, we thought it 

important to test the idea by undertaking a closer 

study of a variety of groups and gatherings in order to 

learn more about:

1. The kinds of information needed to understand 

them sufficiently well to identify possible points of 

intervention for problem-oriented policing 

2. The guidance provided by the literature about 

ways to analyze the information that might exist

3. The existing information on the range of measures 

that have been deployed by police and others 

to prevent the crimes committed, to apprehend 

the offenders, and generally to reduce the harms 

resulting from the actions of the groups and the 

activities associated with the gatherings 

For these purposes, we did not have to cover every 

kind of criminal organization and problem gathering; 

indeed, it would have been impossible to do so in the 

limits of time and pages available. Rather, we sought 

to include a variety of groups and gatherings, some 

familiar (e.g., street gangs, retail drug dealers, and 

street racing) and some less so (Internet pedophile 

rings, organized insurance fraudsters, and animal 

rights extremists). In making our selections, we 

chose not to include groups and gatherings for which 

published information was sparse. The first eleven 

case studies describe a wide variety of crime groups 

and the final five case studies describe a diverse 

selection of problem gatherings.

While our original objective in assembling this 

information was to test the ideas we present in the 

body of the manual, we thought it could be helpful 

to present summaries of the assembled information 

in the form of the case studies. If you happen to 

be dealing with any of the groups or gatherings 

included here, you might find the relevant case 

studies to be of direct value in your own intelligence 

work. More generally useful to you, however, 

might be the examples they provide of the kinds 

of intelligence that could be collected for other 

groups and gatherings, and the kinds of preventive 

interventions that might be considered. This would 

be the main benefit of looking through all the case 

studies once you have finished reading the body of 

the text.

The goal of these case studies is to provide a general 

way of approaching criminal groups, rather than 

provide an encyclopedia of what is known and 

unknown. This can change rather swiftly, and there 

is some debate over a number of issues. At the end 

of each case, we provide a few readings. These are 

the sources we found most useful. We choose not to 

provide detailed citations to all the things written on 

each group. If you find yourself directly addressing 

one of the types of groups in these case studies, you 

should do additional research to come up with useful 

approaches. Researching a Problem, one of the Guides 

from the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, could 

help you get started. 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 87

The case studies were mostly written by our colleague, 

Gohar Petrossian. They follow a reasonably standard 

format adjusted somewhat to the topic and to the 

available information. They begin with a general 

overview of the problem, followed by the discussion 

of the facilitating conditions or factors promoting 

the problem. Some case studies include sections 

explaining how these groups are organized. Examples 

of domestic or international response strategies are 

presented either in the body of the text or in separate 

boxes. Lastly, suggestions as to what you might 

contribute as an intelligence analyst and what your 

agency can do are provided at the end of each case 

study. Be aware that these examples are not intended 

to be exhaustive and, unfortunately, few have been 

rigorously evaluated. They are included merely to help 

you and your agency get started!

READ MORE: 

Ronald Clarke and Phyllis Schultze . 2004 . Researching 

a Problem . Problem-Oriented Guides for Police . 

Problem-Solving Tool Series No . 2 . Washington, D .C .: 

U .S . Department of Justice, Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services .
88 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

RETAIL DRUG DEALERS

MANY, PERHAPS MOST, POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES HAVE GROUPS OF DRUG DEALERS OPERATING ILLICITLY in their 

city. The variety of drugs sold makes it difficult to describe the role of intelligence in addressing local drug markets, and 

we will stick to some broad principles that must be adapted to your local conditions.

Forms of retail drug dealing

Drug markets are where the supply of drugs meets the 

demand for drugs. They are of two general types: 

◾ Closed markets. These operate through social 

networks. To buy drugs you must know a seller 

in the network who trusts you, or you need 

someone who knows a seller. The advantage to all 

participants is that closed markets offer security 

from the police, and from robbery by other 

offenders. For buyers, they can also provide some 

assurance of product quality because information 

circulates among the insiders who routinely 

interact with each other. 

◾ Open markets. Participants in these markets may 

not know each other. Street markets tend to be 

geographically fixed so that customers can find 

them. For sellers, the advantage is that they can 

get more customers, but there are major risks 

from police and from robbery. Open markets tend 

to be more violent than closed markets because 

they are less secure. Open markets can become 

convergent settings (Step 12) and thereby foster 

criminal activity in their surroundings.

Open markets are a much more serious problem for 

communities than are closed markets: not only are 

they more violent, but they cater to larger numbers of 

people and they are more visible to the public. 

What are the facilitating conditions?

◾ Consumers. A relatively few high-volume 

consumers and many small-time users are needed.

◾ Supply. The dealer must be connected with 

people who can supply drugs. Suppliers are often 

organized in a “cottage industry” style where small 

groups form and disband as necessary. They may 

travel from small cities to larger metropolitan 

areas to secure drugs to supply their local dealers. 

Such suppliers are easily replaced.

◾ Financing. There are two ways drug dealing can 

be financed: 

1. The dealer uses his own money to purchase 

drugs. The supplier gets paid up front and the 

dealer pockets the proceeds from the sales. 

Small-scale operations can function this way. 

2. The supplier provides the drugs on credit, and 

the dealer pays him back from the proceeds. 

This requires either trust or an enforcement 

mechanism. This increases the risks of 

violence. 

Though these are the dominant financing 

arrangements, others are possible. For example, 

a dealer might provide enforcement services to a 

supplier in exchange for drugs, or pay for drugs with 

stolen goods or firearms. 

◾ Social networks of buyers and sellers. For closed 

markets the minimal requirement is a social 

network of individuals, some of whom want drugs 

and others who have drugs to sell. This may be the 

dominant form of drug sales as it has the fewest 

requirements.

◾ Neighborhoods. Open drug markets require 

locations that are easily accessible to customers 

and where their operations will not be disrupted 

by property owners. Low-income neighborhoods 

are ideal locations because much of the property 

is owned by absentee landlords who have 

little incentive to intervene because of the low 

economic return on their properties. Once 

established, drug sellers tend to congregate near 

each other, just like legitimate businesses, if the 

area suitable for drug dealing is big enough to 

accommodate them without conflict.
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 89

Criminal Groups

◾ Streets. Large open markets need ready access to 

customers. So these tend to be on or near major 

arterial routes or highways, within vulnerable 

neighborhoods. Street patterns that permit 

circular cruising give customers the ability to 

locate dealers quickly and leave.

◾ Places. These are open markets where people can 

legitimately hang out and where owners will not 

interfere. Corner convenience stores are useful 

because dealers and customers can blend in. 

Nearby rental apartments where landlords are not 

scrupulous about tenant management provide 

locations for stashing drugs, meeting suppliers, 

and resting places. Lax place management is 

critical in all circumstances.

What is being done?

There has been a shift in attention from policing drug 

networks to policing drug places. The rise of hot spots 

policing has led to intensive patrolling of small areas 

with high crime concentrations. If these concentrations 

are close to drug markets, the markets suffer from 

these patrols. Problem-oriented approaches have 

been found to be effective in suppressing open drug 

markets, and superior to hot spots policing alone. Most 

successful problem solving has engaged the owners of 

properties—landlords, retailers, bar owners, and so 

forth—in making their locations unsuitable for dealing. 

Typically, these place managers cooperate. But when 

they do not, public pressure and the threat of civil 

sanctions can be helpful. Many landlords are woefully 

ignorant about crime and drug dealing, so landlord 

training can be helpful. 

Street closures and other traffic manipulations can 

also be helpful in specific circumstances. When 

dealers and users take advantage of easy access to 

market sites, then altering traffic flow by changing 

street access can be helpful.

What can you do?

Differentiate between open and closed markets, but 

recognize that some markets may use aspects of each.

Keep a current list of open and closed markets in your 

area.

Rank markets by the three Vs:

◾ Violence—killings, shootings, and assaults

◾ Volume—number of dealers, sellers, and 

transactions

◾ Visibility—how noticeable to the public

Determine how dealers in the most problematic 

markets either finance their supplies or get protection 

for their operations.

Know who the dealers are and who they associate with.

For open markets you could identify places critical for 

market operation and their owners/managers; study 

street patterns that allow buyers to meet sellers; or 

identify facilitating conditions that can be altered at 

the place, street, and in the immediate area.

For closed markets you could gather intelligence on 

how these develop and interact; and identify those 

which are most problematic using the three Vs—

violence, volume, visibility.

What can your agency do?

Set priorities. Put high-violence markets (usually open 

markets) at the top of the list for closing down. 

Drive illicit drug use underground. Drug dealing 

cannot be eliminated, but it can be reduced. 

Displacing open markets to closed can reduce each of 

the three Vs: violence, volume, and visibility.

Engage place owners. Involve owners and managers 

of locations at risk of drug dealing. This will include 

apartment owners and managers, bar owners 

and employees, entertainment venue owners and 

employees, and others.
90 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers

Criminal Groups

Address street patterns and traffic flow. Alter street 

patterns that assist open drug dealing. Gain the active 

participation of local residents and businesses to 

minimize collateral damage to legitimate activities.

Communicate directly with the dealers. Creating a 

credible direct deterrent threat to dealers has been 

shown to reduce open drug dealing. This approach 

operates very much like “pulling levers” (Step 26).

READ MORE:

Alex Harocopos and Mike Hough . 2005 . Drug Dealing in 

Open-Air Markets . Problem-Oriented Guides for Police . 

Problem-Specific Guides Series, No . 31 . Washington, 

D .C .: U .S . Department of Justice, Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services . 

Rana Sampson . 2001 . Drug Dealing in Privately Owned 

Apartment Complexes. Problem-Oriented Guides 

for Police . Problem-Specific Guides Series, No . 4 . 

Washington, D .C .: U .S . Department of Justice, Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services . 

Ronald V . Clarke . 2005 . Closing Streets and Alleys 

to Reduce Crime: Should You Go Down This Road?

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police . Response Guides 

Series, No . 2 . Washington, D .C .: U .S . Department of 

Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services .
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 91

TERRORISTS

UNTIL 2001, YOUR CHIEF MIGHT RARELY HAVE THOUGHT ABOUT THE THREAT OF TERRORISM, but 9/11 changed that. 

However remote the threat of an attack may be, the consequences can be so horrific that police must now spend 

precious resources on prevention and preparation. 

Apart from being an act of unparalleled evil, 9/11 

was unusual because its perpetrators were foreign 

terrorists. This might have signaled an increase in 

foreign attacks, though until then the great majority 

of attacks had been perpetrated by domestic terrorists, 

such as eco-terrorists, anti-abortionists, hate groups, 

and militias. The most lethal attack by domestic 

terrorists was the 1995 car bombing of the federal 

building in Oklahoma by Timothy McVeigh. 

Domestic terrorists have not been able to conduct 

repeated attacks, with the relatively minor exceptions 

in the 1960s of the black power movement, and the 

bombings carried out by the Puerto Rican Liberation 

movements in the 1960s and 1970s. Could repeated 

terrorist attacks again happen here? These are some 

possible sources of risk: 

◾ A long history of violence among Latino and 

other gangs in large U.S. cities, some of whom are 

composed of former paramilitary extremists such 

as the Mara Salvatrucha deriving from El Salvador.

◾ Deportation of illegal immigrant gang members 

back to their home country, thus creating the 

opportunities to establish international networks.

◾ Existence of well-established immigrant 

communities that provide cultural cover for 

potential terrorists. 

What can your department do to avert an attack? 

The most important things to do are to strengthen 

community policing, particularly of immigrant 

communities, and develop links with fusion centers 

and the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force. 

What can you do, as an intelligence analyst, to support 

your chief? You should:

◾ Learn about terrorism so that you know what kind 

of intelligence to assemble. Start with Policing 

Terrorism, listed in “Read more.” (Since terrorism 

myths abound, Myths about terrorism on page 92 

includes those discussed in Policing Terrorism.) 

◾ While accepting that the risk of attack for most 

cities is very low, try to determine which factors 

could increase the risk for your city (see Brief 8 in 

Policing Terrorism). 

◾ Develop local intelligence by analyzing reports 

from police officers, particularly community 

officers in areas where potential terrorists might 

feel comfortable, and from businesses such as 

motels, banks, and car rental agencies (see Step 

16). The San Diego Police Department routinely 

monitors reports of the theft of propane canisters 

from suppliers and e-mails the information to its 

investigators and analysts. 

◾ Identify possible targets for attack in your 

jurisdiction. Begin by drawing up three lists: 

1. A short list of the most obvious targets to be 

protected as soon as possible. (For guidance, 

see Briefs 29 and 30 of Policing Terrorism.) 

2. A prioritized list of other targets that require 

extensive target hardening and a timetable for 

ensuring that this is done. 

3. A longer list of all possible targets that should 

be protected by some basic target hardening 

measures that your department should work 

to get put in place. 

READ MORE: 

Graeme Newman and Ronald Clarke . 2008 . Policing 

Terrorism: An Executive’s Guide . Washington D .C .: 

U .S . Department of Justice, Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services . 
92 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers

Criminal Groups

Myths about terrorism

1 . Anyone might be a terrorist. A white-haired grandmother from the Midwest, even if behaving suspiciously, is very unlikely 

to be a terrorist . More likely is that she is confused or ignorant of the rules, and that should be the assumption when police 

approach her . They should reserve their suspicions for those who most closely fit the terrorist profile . 

2 . Every immigrant is suspect. Those who fit the terrorist profile best (for the present at least) are young male immigrants of 

Arab appearance . Among this group, only a tiny minority are wannabe terrorists or even terrorist sympathizers . Assume in 

your dealings with immigrant groups that they are as opposed to terrorism as anyone else . 

3 . Terrorists are crazed fanatics. However much we disagree with their reasoning and condemn their cruelty, cold rationality 

guides much of their behavior . Like all organized criminals, they carefully plan their acts, they try to avoid being caught, and 

they are determined to succeed.

4. Terrorists are eager to die. As we know, some terrorists are willing to die for their cause, but many are careful with their 

lives. They have the same ambitions for success and happiness as everyone else, and they would prefer to escape and 

strike again rather than fail and die.

5. Terrorists are evil geniuses. Not every terrorist has the mind attributed to Osama bin Laden. Most are ordinary, fallible 

individuals. They might carefully plan their acts, but they cannot anticipate every eventuality and they will be forced to 

improvise and take chances. This will sometimes result in failure and perhaps in being killed.

6. Terrorists might strike anywhere. Only in theory they might; in practice they must conserve their resources and strike 

for the greatest effect. If we think like terrorists we can anticipate their choices and act accordingly to protect the most 

vulnerable targets.

7. Terrorists are unstoppable. Most groups of terrorists last only one or two years before falling apart. There are also many 

examples of terrorism being substantially reduced. For example, the Israelis have reduced suicide bombings by installing 

border fences.

8. We can win the war on terrorism. We can hinder the terrorists and make them less successful, but we can never eliminate 

terrorism from our world. That is about as unlikely as winning the war on crime.

9. If it can happen in London (Israel, Delhi...), it can happen here. Do not assume that a form of terrorism that occurs 

overseas can easily be reproduced here. Each form of terrorism depends crucially on the opportunities provided by the 

environment in which it is committed. This environment is rarely the same from country to country. For example, the routine 

suicide bombings that used to be committed in Israel were made possible by the close proximity of Palestine, the relative 

ease of entering Israel, and the steady supply of willing bombers. Such conditions do not exist here.

10. We must prepare for nuclear attack. Most experts agree that the logistics of building or stealing, and delivering a nuclear 

bomb make it unlikely terrorists would attack us in this way. Planting a “suitcase bomb” (a radiological dispersal device) in 

any of our large cities would be much easier. That this would lead to mass casualties is unlikely, though it might result in 

widespread panic.

11. Fighting terrorism is a job for the feds. The FBI and the CIA cannot defeat terrorism on their own. They must garner the 

support of the public, the private sector, and above all, police agencies. Local police have a key role in gathering intelligence 

about terrorists, in helping to protect vulnerable targets, and in responding to any attack.

12. Sharing intelligence is the key to defeating terrorism. However much we improve intelligence we could never rely on it 

alone. We also need systematically to reduce the opportunities for terrorism by protecting the most vulnerable targets.

Local police might be excused for failing to unearth a terror plot; but there is no excuse for failing to protect key targets or 

fumbling the response in the event of an attack.
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 93

WHITE SUPREMACISTS

MEMBERS OF WHITE SUPREMACIST GROUPS BELIEVE THAT WHITES SHOULD DOMINATE SOCIETY because they are 

superior to other races. They hold in contempt not only other races, ethnicities, and non-protestant religions, but also 

gays and lesbians. Sometimes they commit hate crimes against these groups. They share a common ideological focus to 

clean up “cultural pollution” in the United States.

Group members tend to be middle-aged males, 

average in terms of income, occupation, and level of 

education. Since 9/11, some white supremacist groups 

have actively sought to recruit current and former 

members of the U.S. Armed Services in order to 

exploit their access to restricted areas and intelligence, 

or to apply their specialized training in weapons, 

tactics, and organizational skills. 

More than 500 white supremacist groups are 

thought to exist in the United States, with an overall 

membership of 100,000 to 200,000. They publish 

more than 50 periodicals and have established about 

2,000 different hate sites on the Internet. They now 

increasingly rely on the Internet to express their views, 

recruit new members, and sell their products. Five 

main groups of white supremacists are as follows:

1. The Identity Church incorporates some of the 

most active and violent organizations, including 

“Aryan Nations,” “Covenant and Sword,” and 

“Arm of the Lord.” They seek to justify their racist 

and anti-Semitic beliefs in a scriptural reading 

that posits white Christians as God’s “chosen” 

people. They see Jews, defined as non-white, 

as the greatest enemy, whose ultimate plan is 

to “race mix” the white race out of existence by 

brainwashing white women into the arms of 

black men. On the other hand, they view Blacks 

as “pre-adamic,” a race incapable of creativity 

and intellectual labor and of constructing a 

“civilization” or “culture.” Followers of the Identity 

Church ideology believe in the inevitability of a 

global war between races, which they see as the 

only way to create a white homeland. 

2. Neo-Nazis such as the “National Socialist White 

People’s Party” and the “National Alliance,” use 

tracts of Germany’s Third Reich to inform their 

“Americanism” and “White-power” rhetoric.

3. Skinheads share neo-Nazi rhetoric and ideology 

in a somewhat less orderly and consistent manner. 

According to the Anti-Defamation League (www.

adl.org), their numbers may be increasing. They 

tend to be younger, more loosely organized, but 

also more violent than some other hate groups. 

4. The Ku Klux Klan, though once powerful and 

prominent, is currently in a state of fragmentation. 

In its contemporary form, it addresses problems 

like AIDS, crime, welfare, or immigration “solely 

through the prism of race and offers not solutions 

but a license to hate.” (June A. Marlin. 1992. Klan’s 

Invisible Empire is Alive and Active in Northeast. 

Available at http://alb.merlinone.net/mweb/

wmsql.wm.request?oneimage&imageid=5618828.) 

5. The Posse Comitatus (Latin for ‘power of the 

county’) shares the anti-Semitism of other hate 

groups, alongside the anti-statism of the militia 

groups. The only legitimate form of government 

for the Posse Comitatus exists at the local level, 

since the federal government is dominated by 

Jewish financial interests. 

Conditions that promote the emergence of white 

supremacist groups or facilitate their actions 

Such conditions include the following:

◾ Uncertain economic times, farm crises, and 

perceived threats to rural industries 

◾ Social changes, such as the rise of the women’s 

movement, the civil rights movement, and gay and 

lesbian movements 

◾ High rates of non-white immigration

◾ A volatile political atmosphere, such as that 

surrounding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

◾ The election, in 2008, of America’s first African 

American president
94 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers

Criminal Groups

◾ The existence of radical churches in rural states

◾ Lax gun controls in these states

◾ Internet providers that tolerate hate messages on 

web pages

It is immediately obvious that very little can be done to 

change these societal conditions, although the House 

of Representatives passed the Local Law Enforcement 

Hate Crimes Prevention Act 2007 to provide federal 

assistance to state and local jurisdictions to prosecute 

hate crimes. In fact, local and state police are perhaps 

in the best position to take action against such groups. 

What can you do?

Learn about hate groups and identify those active in 

your area. Gather intelligence about their ideologies 

and their backgrounds, and identify possible targets of 

these groups. 

Gather intelligence about the leaders of the hate 

groups. Where legal grounds for arrest exist, removing 

the leader will significantly impact the functional 

capability of the group.

Use analysis to identify possible target locations and 

select areas at risk. Inform your department about 

possible future attacks. 

Identify and monitor websites operated by hate groups 

active in your jurisdiction. 

Study the modus operandi in hate crimes. This may 

help prevent future attacks on similar targets. 

What can your agency do?

Form a task force trained to recognize and properly 

respond to hate crime if and when it occurs in your 

jurisdiction. 

Warn the leaders of organizations targeted by hate 

groups to watch out for possible signs of hate crimes 

and encourage them to contact your agency if 

alarmed.

Encourage the community to report hate crimes and 

employ its assistance in investigating and responding 

to hate crime incidents, and in apprehending the 

perpetrators. 

Seek help from state and federal law enforcement 

if the groups’ operational outreach is beyond your 

jurisdiction and more sophisticated investigative tools 

are necessary to support your current operations. 

Identify and disrupt any gatherings that use racial 

slogans, anti-Semitic themes, or any other white 

supremacist ideology to carry out their activities and 

recruit new members.

Identify and remove (if possible) the possible financial 

sources of these groups.

Four characteristics of enduring 

white supremacist groups

1 . Strong leaders with a clear ideological agenda as, 

for example, in the cases of the Aryan Nations and 

the National Alliance . 

2 . Consistent pursuit of activities to expand their goals 

and acquire the necessary finances . Most groups 

have perpetrated serious crimes on a regular basis, 

which has contributed to group stability.

3. Strategic advantage taken of political opportunities.

The broader political atmosphere feeds these 

groups with the opportunities to further their 

ideologies.

4. Internal cohesion. Organizational instability is seen 

as a major threat to the survival of these groups.

This can result from conflict among its leaders, loss/

removal of leadership or the inner core, and the loss 

of funds.

Source: Freilich, Chermak, and Caspi 2009.
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 95

Criminal Groups

Operation Lone Wolf

In 1998, the San Diego P .D . began to investigate a hate crime case where several prominent members of the 

community and religious locations were targeted . The two-year investigation resulted in the arrest and prosecution 

of Alex Curtis, a well-known white supremacist leader . Curtis had been involved for many years in promoting and 

fostering racial violence through his website, telephone hotlines, and newspaper (The Nationalist Observer) . He 

targeted businesses owned and operated by Jewish people, as well as elected officials or known public figures who 

either openly spoke against white supremacist activities, or who helped minorities . The investigation also led to the 

arrest of Curtis’ cell members . Following the arrests, San Diego experienced a dramatic decrease in hate crimes .

Source: San Diego P .D . 2001 . Herman Goldstein Award . Available at www .popcenter .org/library/awards/goldstein/2001/01-60 .pdf .

READ MORE:

Neil Chakraborti and Jon Garland . 2009 . Hate Crime: 

Impact, Causes and Responses. Thousand Oaks, California: 

Sage Publications, Ltd . 

Joshua D . Freilich, Steven M . Chermak, and David Caspi . 

2009 . Critical events in the life trajectories of domestic 

extremist white supremacist groups . Criminology and Public 

Policy 8(3): 497–530 .
96 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

ANIMAL RIGHTS EXTREMISTS

ANIMAL RIGHTS EXTREMISTS, AND MEMBERS OF GROUPS ENGAGED IN THIS KIND OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, are generally 

young to middle-aged, white, and well-educated. Thus, they draw from the same pool of individuals who are attracted 

to organizations that work peacefully for animal rights, such as Greenpeace, the Wilderness Society, and People for the 

Ethical Treatment of Animals. 

SHAC (Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty) is an 

extremist animal rights group. In 1999, it almost 

succeeded in shutting down Huntingdon Life Sciences, 

a British company that conducts product safety 

testing on animals. SHAC employed a combination 

of intimidation and violent protests and, since then, 

extremist groups have become increasingly violent 

and are said to have caused millions of dollars’ worth 

of damage. 

How are they organized?

The best-known animal rights extremist group is the 

Animal Liberation Front (ALF). It was established 

in Great Britain in the 1970s as an outgrowth of 

groups such as Greenpeace and the Sea Shepherd 

Conservation Society. It consists of an unknown 

number of individual cells made up of a few people 

who act autonomously. The activists remain largely 

anonymous to both the public and each other, which 

is done purposefully to maximize the security and 

fluidity of the movement. The ALF operates in more 

than a dozen countries, including France, New 

Zealand, Poland, Italy, and Slovakia. 

Apart from this group, other lesser-known groups 

have claimed responsibility for criminal actions in 

defense of animals. These include the Animal Rights 

Militia; the Justice Department,1

 a UK-based extremist 

group; Bakers for Animal Liberation; Guerilla 

Advertising Contingent; Kangaroo Wilderness 

Defense; the Lawn Liberation Front; and Pirates for 

Animal Liberation. The Animal Rights Militia, the 

Justice Department, and SHAC have been especially 

active and violent in both the United States and Great 

Britain in recent years. 

1 . The Justice Department is an extreme animal rights group based in the 

United Kingdom . See: Anti-Defamation League . 2010 . “Justice Department 

Claims Responsibility for Threats Against UCLA Animal Researcher .” 

December 3 .

What criminal activity are these groups 

engaged in?

Researchers have classified the criminal activities of 

these groups into four groups: 

◾ Type I commit minor crimes, involving little 

property damage, which may include such acts 

as civil disobedience, hanging banners, spray 

painting slogans, and smashing windows. 

◾ Type II commit significant acts of property 

damage, including setting fire to research 

laboratories and using firebombs or incendiary 

devices. 

◾ Type III engage in threatening behavior directed 

against people, including bomb hoaxes, e-mail 

threats, harassing phone calls, splashing people 

with red paint, pelting people with tofu pies, 

leaving dead animals on dinner plates, etc. 

◾ Type IV make physical attacks against persons, 

including beatings and bombings. 

Who and what is at risk?

The locations most at risk include federal research 

facilities, universities, factory farming operations, 

furriers, and fast-food restaurants. The groups use 

stolen footage from labs to create publicity materials 

and films. Research scientists, corporate officials, 

and their families are at heightened risk of being 

threatened or assaulted.

The groups use three forms of attack: (a) primary 

targeting, which can involve visits to the homes of 

those directly involved in using animals and delivering 

threats or violence; (b) secondary targeting that 

involves attacks on companies doing business with 

animal-related institutions, such as banks; and (c) 

tertiary targeting that involves harassing the customers 

or workers of these companies because they are doing 

business with animal-related institutions. 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 97

Criminal Groups

In the 1990s, Operation Bite Back and Operation Bite 

Back III, multistage campaigns led by the ALF, included 

the release of more than 10,000 mink from the Arritola 

Mink Farm in Mt. Angel, Oregon—the largest number 

of animals released to that time. These and other 

actions by the ALF led to legislation, including the 

federal Animal Enterprise Protection Act (1992), which 

criminalized causing more than $10,000 in damages at 

commercial and academic institutions that use animals.

Examples of action taken against extremists

The National Association for Biomedical Research 

(NABR) developed a coalition for research groups 

and pushed for the passage of the Animal Enterprise 

Terrorism Act in 2006. The Act is designed to protect 

enterprises and researchers who are engaged in 

animal-related research from the forceful, violent, and 

threatening acts of animal rights extremists. The Act 

protects not only primary, but also secondary parties, 

such as suppliers, from harassment, intimidation, 

threat, and violence. 

California has been a prime target for animal activist 

attacks in the United States and has passed laws to 

address the problem. In 2008, for example, former 

Assemblyman Gene Mullin led an effort to pass 

the Researcher Protection Act, which made it a 

misdemeanor to publish personal information about 

researchers or their families, “with the intent that 

another person imminently uses the information 

to commit a crime involving violence or a threat of 

violence against the academic researcher or his or 

her immediate family member.” The Act also outlaws 

entering the property of academic researchers to 

intimidate them and to cause them to stop their work. 

Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles is one 

of many institutions that have adopted a variety of 

security measures. In addition to carefully screening 

employees before they are hired, these measures include 

changing the location of the research facility from the 

ground floor to a higher floor, instituting strict access 

controls (researchers can only enter the facility by using 

electronic key cards), and controlling the elevators by 

using security guards with key-cards for access. 

The research community at large has undertaken 

public outreach to help people understand that animal 

research is necessary for medical progress and is 

heavily regulated by the government. 

What promotes animal rights extremism?

◾ The existence of medical, university, or 

pharmaceutical research facilities that conduct 

experiments on animals 

◾ Absence of laws protecting researchers and 

research institutions

◾ “Factory farming” operations

◾ Financial support given to these extremist groups 

by animal lovers

What can you do?

Collect intelligence on the most active groups and 

members within these groups through their websites 

and other sources. Determine if any of these groups 

are active in your jurisdiction or nearby.

Monitor their websites to identify any material used to 

threaten or frighten their intended victims. 

Identify the methods and technology used by these 

groups to attack their victims. 

Determine which type of criminal activity (refer to the 

four types discussed above) each group is likely to be 

engaged in (or has historically engaged in) and devise 

prevention strategies accordingly. 

What can your agency do if extremists pose a 

threat?

Raise awareness about these groups through 

community meetings and publicity. Inform the public 

about the methods and technology used by these 

groups to attack their targets. 

Encourage institutions or people most at risk to report 

any threat, harassment, or intimidation they may 

experience from animal rights extremist groups. 

Inform these potential targets of security measures 

and responses that they can develop to protect 

themselves from current or future attacks, 

intimidation, or harassment. 

Advocate legislative changes to control the criminal 

activities of these groups. 
98 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

Criminal Groups

Control or limit any demonstrations that may result in 

criminal activity by these groups. Coordinate response 

strategies with other criminal justice agencies or 

agencies in nearby jurisdictions. 

Support any efforts of the local research community 

to raise awareness about the importance of medical 

research.

Urge animal lovers not to give money to these 

extremist groups by informing them about the harms 

suffered by victims who are attacked. 

READ MORE:

Don Liddick . 2006 . Eco-Terrorism: Radical 

Environmental and Animal Liberation Movements . 

Westport, Connecticut: Praeger . 

Home Office . 2004 . Animal Welfare-Human Rights: 

Protecting People from Animal Rights Extremists.

London: Communications Directorate .
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 99

INTERNET PEDOPHILE RINGS

PEDOPHILIA IS CLASSIFIED AS A MENTAL DISORDER AND IS DEFINED BY AN INTENSE DESIRE TO ENGAGE IN SEXUAL ACTIVITY

with prepubescent children. However, many pedophiles claim that there is nothing abnormal about sexual activity between 

adults and children. These days, many pedophile rings operate and spread through the Internet. These include Candyman, 

Shangri-La, Girls 12–16, and Innocent Images, with a combined membership of many thousands. 

Pedophile rings engage in a variety of activities, 

including: 

◾ The production and distribution of child 

pornography, which is used not only for sexual 

stimulation and gratification, but also to assist 

in the seduction of a child, to lower the child’s 

inhibitions, and to show what the offender wants 

the child to do. This is known as “grooming.” 

Some pedophiles keep pictures of their sexual 

activity with children. These can be used to either 

pressure the child to remain silent about the 

activity, to exchange with other collectors, or to 

establish bona fides when making contact with 

other group members. 

◾ Distribution of information about past or 

present child victims, access routes to vulnerable 

children, possible victim locations—such as 

special schools and hostels—methods and tips on 

grooming, and information on other pedophiles 

engaged in organized sexual abuse of children. 

Many different ways exist of distributing these 

materials, including e-groups, newsgroups, chat 

rooms, bulletin board systems, e-mail, websites, 

and peer-to-peer networks. Predators also use 

Internet social networking sites, such as MySpace, 

Twitter, and Facebook, to locate minors, and they 

can also use the Internet to carry out “live” chats 

with potential victims and to have “virtual sex” 

with the children.

◾ Support groups to promote such goals as “sexual 

liberation for all persons.” The most prominent 

of the U.S. support groups is the North American 

Man/Boy Love Association (NAMBLA), but 

others include the Childhood Sensuality Circle, 

Pedophiliacs Anonymous, and Pedophile 

Information Exchange. They prepare materials 

and newsletters advocating legalization of sexual 

relations between adults and children. They serve 

to justify pedophilia in the members’ minds and 

reinforce the belief that society, not the pedophile, 

is misguided. 

◾ Financial profit. In many cases, the websites sell 

child pornography and can realize substantial 

profits for the operators. People involved in selling 

child pornography can be either pedophiles 

themselves, or people who are not sexually 

attracted to children but rather are motivated 

solely by financial gain. 

What facilitates Internet child pornography rings?

◾ Lack of legal regulation of the Internet

◾ Cross-jurisdictional differences in laws and 

regulations regarding child pornography on the 

Internet

◾ Lack of law enforcement knowledge about the 

Internet 

◾ The extensive possibilities the Internet provides to 

hide the users’ identities 

◾ The international operations of many of the 

pedophile rings

◾ The sophistication and availability of technology 

(e.g., mobile phones with cameras) that enhances 

the pedophiles’ activities on and off the Internet

◾ The volume of Internet daily activity that makes 

it impossible to track every site and every person 

visiting these sites

◾ The affordability and ease of creating and 

operating new websites (operators can easily shut 

down a website that the police are investigating 

and open a new one)
100 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

Criminal Groups

◾ Pedophile rings that are knowledgeable about 

security measures, which can be employed to 

avoid detection. (Internet sting operations may 

have succeeded only in catching inexperienced 

operators) 

◾ The historic reluctance of Internet Service 

Providers (ISPs) to monitor and censor content

◾ The reluctance of many victims (and their 

families) to report abuse

◾ A widespread perception that child abuse is 

committed by strangers, not by friends or relations 

◾ The reluctance of parents to monitor their 

children’s computer use 

◾ The existence of pedophile support groups that 

encourage/justify such activities 

Examples of actions taken against Internet child 

pornography rings

Police sting operations have identified and removed 

online pedophile rings. For example, Operation PIN, 

which established a “honeypot” website claiming to 

offer child pornography, involved the police from 

Australia, Canada, the U.K., and the United States. As 

the browsers clicked through screens warning of the 

explicit nature of the content, they came to a screen 

that announced that their attempt to obtain online 

child pornography had been traced and would be 

reported to local police. 

In the United States, ISPs are legally required to 

report known illegal activity on their sites, but they 

are not required to search actively for such sites. 

Police may apply for a court order to seize ISP 

accounts. Microsoft has announced the development 

of the Child Exploitation Tracking System that links 

information, such as credit card purchases, Internet 

chat room messages, and conviction histories. 

Some non-profit organizations seek to raise public 

awareness about Internet child pornography and will 

act as political lobby groups. These groups include 

Wired Safety and Safeguarding Our Children-United 

Mothers. 

The National Center for Missing and Exploited 

Children operates a CyberTipline that allows parents 

and children to report child pornography and other 

incidents of sexual exploitation of children. 

What can you do?

Cooperate with your department specialists in 

Internet crime. They know how to access encrypted 

sites and e-mails, which may be necessary for 

gathering intelligence about these groups. 

Monitor the activities of child pornography groups, 

newsgroups, websites, and chat rooms. Postings on 

these sites for other pedophiles can be used to gather 

intelligence about online and off-line activities. For 

example, some sites list member’s e-mail addresses to 

encourage private communication. This information 

can be used, instead, to gather intelligence and launch 

an investigation. 

What can your agency do?

Authorize officers to enter pedophile newsgroups, 

chat rooms, or P2P networks posing as pedophiles and 

request child pornography images from others in the 

group. They can also enter child or teen groups posing 

as children and engage pedophiles who may send 

pornography or suggest a meeting. 

In 1996, the San Jose (California) P.D. investigated a 

complaint against a man who had sexually molested 

and photographed a 10-year-old girl at a children’s party 

given by his adult daughter in her home. The images 

were later transmitted via the Internet to members of 

what turned out to be the Orchid Club. The investigation 

into that club extended to a number of countries, 

including the U.K. Examination of the offender’s computer 

uncovered links to the Wonderland Club, another covert 

pedophile group that used password protection and 

encryption to hide their activities. The case led to a 

worldwide investigation of members of both clubs, as 

well as to the discovery of a third club, the Roundtable.

Source: Associated Press. 1998. “Disgrace follows child porn bust.” 

November 7.
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 101

Criminal Groups

Establish a well-publicized e-mail “hot line,” which 

can be used to report any indications of distribution of 

child pornography. 

Set up a “honey trap site” that purports to contain 

child pornography, which can be used to capture the 

IP address or credit card details of visitors trying to 

download images. 

Involve the local community, which can help in raising 

awareness about the problem, as well as coming 

forward with information that may assist in arresting 

and prosecuting perpetrators.

Cooperate with local non-profit organizations in 

raising awareness about these groups through visits to 

local schools and youth centers. 

READ MORE:

Richard Wortley and Stephen Smallbone . 2006 . Child 

Pornography on the Internet. Problem-Oriented Guides 

for Police . Problem-Specific Guides Series, No . 41 . 

Washington, D .C .: U .S . Department of Justice, Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services .

Tony Krone . 2005 . International Police Operations 

against Online Child Pornography . Trends and Issues in 

Crime and Criminal Justice, No . 296 . Australian Institute 

of Criminology . 
102 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

GRAFFITI CREWS

HARDLY ANY AMERICAN CITY IS ENTIRELY FREE OF GRAFFITI, MOST OF WHICH IS GANG-RELATED, HATE-INSPIRED, 

or simply vandalism. Much less common is “art graffiti,” where the motive is to create a startling or even beautiful 

decoration on a publicly visible surface, such as the side of the building. Since this is done without the owner’s consent, 

the graffiti shows the artist’s daring and contempt for the law. 

Art graffiti is often committed by organized groups 

or “crews.” Most members are males aged 8–19, most 

are poor, and they come from a variety of ethnic 

backgrounds. 

Crews choose highly visible sites for their graffiti, such 

as subway routes, rooftops, freeway walls, billboards, 

and bridges. They prefer sites that involve some 

element of risk and that will be seen by other crews. 

They sometimes choose locations, “walls of fame,” 

near other writers’ tags to achieve a symbolic copresence with them. They might write compliments 

near well-executed pieces or cross out (“dis”) or paint 

over (“go over”) poor works. 

To increase their status, graffiti crews may “go 

citywide” or might “tag the heavens” by writing on 

tall buildings. They often work at night, which gives 

them time to cover a greater area. They prefer the cold 

winter months, because the nights are longer, fewer 

police and others are about, and overcoats allow spraycans to be easily concealed. 

Graffiti crews sometimes engage in shoplifting, 

handling stolen goods, marijuana use, and drinking in 

public. They rarely belong to street gangs, but may be 

recruited by gangs to develop a tag for gang clothing, 

to mark the gang’s territory, or to paint “Rest in Peace” 

murals for those who have died on the streets. In 

return, the taggers gain protection from the gang and 

are sometimes rewarded with drugs.

A tag is the writer’s name or alias, or the name of the 

crew to which he belongs. Each writer tries to develop 

a distinctive tag that allows him to “get up” or be 

recognized by other graffiti artists. 

Crews create more complex forms, called “throw-ups” 

and “pieces” or “murals.” Throw-ups are generally 

multicolored and use large “bubble” or sausage-shaped 

letters. They may include personal symbols or tiny 

self-portraits. Pieces or murals are large-scale, multicolored features that may include human figures, 

animals, and urban structures. 

How are crews organized?

Crews range in size from as few as three to as many 

as several dozen individuals. They are formed 

for companionship and for undertaking pieces in 

difficult to reach locations or that entail risky and 

time consuming work. While crews have no formal 

hierarchy, members will take responsibility for certain 

tasks, depending on their standing in the group. Some 

work mopping up, filling in the colors, and serving as 

lookouts, while others write the pieces. 

In addition to tagging or “piecing” together, crews 

may hold regular “art sessions” to work on collective 

designs, share the “piecebooks” in which they draw 

their designs, and hone their talents to create future 

large pieces.

Crews might make contact with other crews by going 

to “writers’ corners,” which are locations where they 

can meet established writers, exchange ideas, and, 

sometimes go out and hit together. Generally these 

writers’ corners move around as a response to police 

crackdowns and increased surveillance. 

Why become a graffiti artist?

◾ “Getting up” satisfies a need for recognition and 

respect. Belonging to a graffiti crew also provides 

a medium through which artists ‘communicate’ 

with each other

◾ A desire to “escape real life” through creating a 

new name and establishing a new identity—thus 

becoming a different person

◾ The illegal nature of the act provides excitement 

and re-affirms masculinity
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 103

Criminal Groups

In an article originally published in Security Journal,

George Kelling of “Broken Windows” fame, documented 

the successful program to rid the New York City subway 

of the notorious graffiti that blanketed the trains in the 

1970s and early 1980s. After years of failed initiatives, 

the subway management adopted a fresh approach: 

once a car had been cleaned of graffiti it would be taken 

out of service and cleaned again as soon as it attracted 

any fresh graffiti. This removed the incentive for graffiti 

writers to “get up” and eventually led to the elimination 

of the problem.

What facilitates art graffiti?

◾ The proliferation of graffiti websites that provide 

advice and information 

◾ Widespread availability of spray paint and other 

graffiti aids, including those found on the Internet

◾ Difficulties of apprehending and successfully 

prosecuting graffiti artists

◾ Widespread public ambivalence about the 

seriousness of the problem, often promoted by 

social commentators who may praise the activity

Examples of what has been done to address 

the problem

◾ Police and citizen surveillance teams have staked 

out popular graffiti-writing areas using two-way 

radios, home video cameras, and night vision 

goggles.

◾ Freeway signs and bridges have been secured with 

razor wire, and buildings protected with graffitiresistant coatings. 

◾ Graffiti hotlines have been established and 

undercover transit and police officers have been 

deployed in the guise of high-school students and 

journalists. 

◾ High school “bounty hunters” and others have been 

given monetary rewards for turning in writers.

◾ So-called “coercive” crime prevention has been 

used, involving curfews from late night until 

sunrise (on those under the age of 18), high levels 

of surveillance of public areas, and extensive rules 

of entry and behavior in such places as shopping 

centers and malls. 

◾ Writer’s parents have been arrested on charges of 

contributing to the delinquency of minors and have 

been billed for thousands of dollars in damages. 

◾ Access to spray paint and other graffiti-writing 

materials has been curtailed by making it a 

misdemeanor to sell them (the availability of these 

materials on the Internet could limit the value of 

this approach).

◾ Rapid cleanup has been used to deny crews the 

reward of having their work seen by others, thus 

removing the incentive for putting up graffiti (see 

the text boxes in this step).

◾ The community has been enlisted in campaigns to 

combat graffiti by education, community watches, 

beautification programs, and “paint-outs.” 

How can you help your agency?

A wide repertoire of measures can be deployed against 

graffiti crews and you can best assist your department 

by identifying those most appropriate for your 

jurisdiction. Specifically, you could: 

1. Map hot spots of art graffiti, distinguish them 

from other graffiti hot spots, and try to predict 

when these locations are most likely to be hit. 

2. Identify chronic offenders or crews by close study 

of writers’ corners and “walls of fame.” 

3. Try to identify older, more experienced writers, 

who often recruit novice writers. 

The NYPD’s Vandal Squad concentrated on removing 

the most prominent graffiti artists. For big busts they 

spent time researching and developing a profile of the 

writer’s identity. Since active writers were extremely 

secretive about their identities, the Squad often 

made very public arrests of older writers, therefore 

discouraging the younger ones.
104 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers

Criminal Groups

4. Monitor websites, such as graffiti.org, that 

promote graffiti writing. These websites provide 

a wealth of information not only on individual 

and crew activities, but also their associates and 

networks. See if they include specific information 

about your jurisdiction.

READ MORE:

Jeff Ferrell . 1993 . Crimes of Style: Urban Graffiti 

and the Politics of Criminality . Boston: Northeastern 

University Press . 

M . Sloan-Howitt, and George Kelling . 1992 . “Subway 

graffiti in New York City: ‘Getting Up’ vs . ‘Meanin It and 

Cleanin It .’” In Situational Crime Prevention: Successful 

Case Studies, ed . R .V . Clarke . Albany, New York: Harrow 

and Heston . (Reprinted from Security Journal .)
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 105

OUTLAW MOTORCYCLE GANGS

THE HELLS ANGELS ARE THE BEST KNOWN OF ALL OUTLAW MOTORCYCLE GANGS (OMG). These are criminal 

organizations that are mostly involved in the distribution of illegal drugs, though they also commit other crimes, including 

extortion, intimidation, kidnapping, money laundering, robbery, motorcycle theft, and homicide. 

The gangs are strictly hierarchical and vary in 

size from a single chapter to hundreds of chapters 

worldwide. The “Big Four” American-based OMGs 

are the Hells Angels, the Outlaws, the Bandidos, and 

the Pagans (see Table 16 on page 106). Local-level 

OMGs usually comprise fewer than 50 members. 

Most national-level OMGs maintain criminal 

networks of regional and local motorcycle clubs, 

commonly referred to as “support,” “puppet,” or 

“duck” clubs, whose members undertake crime in 

support of the larger OMGs, and who are a source of 

new members. 

The 1% gangs

In July 1947, a fight between two motorcycle gangs 

led to arrests and considerable publicity . One of the 

gangs was the “P .O .B .O .B .” (Pissed Off Bastards Of 

Berdoo), which one year later took the name “Hells 

Angels .” Commenting on the incident, the president 

of the American Motorcycle Association declared that 

motorcycle riders are law-abiding citizens with only 1 

percent causing trouble . This marked the birth of OMGs, 

some of whose members now wear a diamond-shaped 

patch with “1%” on their “cuts.”

Approximately 20,000 OMG members reside in 

the United States. They are white males who ride 

“American Iron,” i.e., Harleys and Harley facsimiles 

with engines of at least 750cc. The early requirement 

of having an American-made motorcycle still exists 

today. Riding any other motorcycle is grounds for 

expulsion from the group.

OMG members are identified by their “colors” or 

patches, which are sewn on denim jackets or black 

leather vests and referred to as “cuts.” The top rocker 

of the three-piece patch identifies the gang. The center 

shield is the gang’s logo, some of which are legally 

trade-marked or copyrighted. The bottom rocker 

identifies the area or territory which that chapter or 

gang claims to control. 

Patches and tattoos denote members’ status. For 

example, the Hells Angels’ Filthy Few patch indicates 

that the wearer has committed a murder for the 

organization. Its Dequiallo patch indicates that the 

wearer has committed an act of violence toward a 

person in authority or violently resisted arrest. The 

Big Four OMGs used to not attack police officers 

because they believed that the resulting heightened 

enforcement would cost far more than was gained. 

Since the mid-1980s, however, attacks on police have 

increased.

Most OMG chapters have clubhouses that are used for 

business and social gatherings. These have meeting 

rooms, bars, gym equipment, and garage areas. They 

have extensive security, including video-cameras, 

telephone scramblers, and 24-hour watches. 

What facilitates OMG activities?

◾ Failure by police to identify and remove more 

violent members of the gang

◾ Failure to disrupt the gang by identifying and 

removing its leadership

◾ Failure to identify and dismantle “support,” 

“puppet,” or “duck” clubs

◾ Lack of criminal intelligence information sharing 

among jurisdictions

◾ Absence of bylaws prohibiting fortified clubhouses

◾ High demand for illegal drugs
106 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers

Criminal Groups

Examples of what has been done regionally and 

nationally to deal with OMGs

A variety of national and international initiatives 

have been launched to deal with OMGs, such as the 

National Association of Chiefs of Police’s (NACP) 

National Strategy to Combat Outlaw Motorcycle 

Gangs, and Interpol’s Project Rockers that monitors 

OMGs throughout the world and shares information 

with member states about OMG memberships, modus 

operandi, and criminal activities. The project posts 

“red notices” that seek arrest of OMG members with 

outstanding warrants, and “green notices” that provide 

information on those who operate internationally. 

Project Focus—run by the Criminal Intelligence 

Service of Canada—provides Canadian authorities 

with current information on OMGs to help them 

devise effective biker enforcement policies. The project 

maintains information on active gangs, location 

of clubhouses, and photo albums of gang colors in 

North America. It also collates information on known 

members including plates, telephone numbers, tattoos, 

physical descriptions, nicknames, and addresses. 

Did you know?

◾ OMGs often confiscate property from expelled 

members and may brutally remove gang tattoos.

◾ Bikers who deal with the police or rival gangs, or 

are drug addicts, face expulsion or death.

◾ Hells Angels have a saying: “Three can keep a 

secret if two are dead.”

◾ Bikers hang rival colors or police items upside 

down to signal disrespect.

◾ Outlaw bikers are bringing more discrimination 

and harassment suits against police.

◾ The Internet is the preferred means of 

communication for some OMGs.

Table 16. “Big Four” American-based outlaw motorcycle gangs

HELLS ANGELS

•	 2,000-2,500 members in the United States and 26 other countries 

•	 Engages in drug trafficking and a variety of other crimes such as 

extortion, homicide, money laundering, and motorcycle theft

•	 Most concentrated population in California; operates internationally

BANDIDOS

•	 2,000-2,500 members in the United States and 13 other countries

•	 Mostly involved in drug trafficking 

•	 Active in the Pacific, Southeastern, Southwestern, and West Central 

U.S. regions

OUTLAWS

•	 1,700 members in the United States and 12 other countries

•	 Similar involvement in drug dealing and crimes as the Hells Angels 

•	 The dominant OMG in the Great Lakes region

PAGANS

•	 900 members in the United States, none outside the United States

•	 Cooperates with traditional organized crime groups

•	 Operates mostly in the Northeastern United States
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 107

Criminal Groups

What can you do?

Assist your agency’s on-going investigations of OMGs 

by constructing a social network analysis of gang 

members (see Step 19), using data from surveillance 

and informants and, if available, from wiretaps. This 

will assist you in describing the hierarchy of command 

and therefore where your agency should focus its 

efforts to arrest the leadership. 

What can your agency do?

Establish task forces. Many police agencies have 

established task forces that gather intelligence about 

local OMGs. For example, task force members might 

stake out OMG clubhouses and systematically record 

those entering. The task forces include a network 

of correctional, parole, and probation officers that 

give police added leverage for interviewing potential 

informants and witnesses. 

Use undercover operations and informants. 

Undercover agents have been used to infiltrate OMGs. 

This can be dangerous and the agent might have to 

make significant compromises because the initiation 

process usually involves activities that are illegal or 

conflict with ethical policies of police departments. An 

alternative is to make use of informants, but this can 

also result in serious threats to their safety. 

Use technology. Computer-assisted dispatch (CAD) 

hazards files can alert responding officers to OMG 

members’ homes, work places, and locations visited, so 

that the officers can write offense or incident reports. 

Be sure to share information. Placing gang members 

into the National Crime Information Center files will 

help notify investigators when police contact is made 

for traffic violations or when tracking gang members’ 

activities and movements. 

Seek the passage of bylaws prohibiting fortified 

buildings. Canadian municipalities have done this to 

prevent fortified buildings from being used as bunkers 

for OMGs. The bylaws regulate security features, such 

as metal doors, bullet-proof windows, surveillance 

towers, and security technology. 

READ MORE:

National Drug Intelligence Center . 2009 . National Gang 

Threat Assessment, 2009 . Tallahassee, FL: National 

Gang Intelligence Center . 
108 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

STREET GANGS

LOW-INCOME NEIGHBORHOODS, MARKED BY UNEMPLOYMENT AND VIOLENCE, ARE THE MAIN BREEDING GROUNDS FOR

street gangs. These gangs are no longer confined to large cities, but are now found in suburban and rural areas. Many 

are engaged in drug dealing, however they could also be involved in other criminal activities, including robbery, auto 

theft, drive-by-shootings, and homicide. Many gang members join to make money from crime, but they also see the 

gang as a brotherhood or a support system, which they join to seek protection and respect. 

According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, 

there are an estimated 900,000 street gang members 

across the country. States with the largest gang 

populations are California, Illinois, Texas, Florida, and 

Ohio. About 90 percent of gang members are African 

American or Hispanic (with a few Asian gangs) and 

about half are under the age of 18. 

Street gangs are classified into three main groups 

according to size and operational reach: 

1. National gangs comprise several thousand 

members that operate both nationally and 

internationally, especially in Mexico and Central 

America. Some of these include: Almighty Latin 

Kings, the Crips, the Bloods, 18th Street, Asian 

Boyz, and Vice Lord Nation. 

2. Regional gangs are composed of several hundred 

to several thousand members. These include 

Florencia 13, Fresno Bulldogs, Latin Disciples, 

Tango Blast, and United Blood Nation. 

3. Local gangs, also referred to as neighborhood 

gangs, vary greatly in size from a handful of 

individuals to a hundred or more members. 

How are they organized?

Most gangs are loosely knit coalitions of small, 

autonomous cliques. Leadership of these gangs is 

usually decentralized and nonhierarchical. It can 

change rapidly and may vary by the type of gang 

activity; e.g., drug sales leaders may differ from 

“gangbanging” leaders. 

The more organized gangs may have clearly defined 

leaders and leadership roles. These roles may include 

“making sure all laws and policies are being followed,” 

“giving orders,” “being the thinkers,” and “making the 

overall decisions for the group.” 

Many organized gangs hold regular meetings to collect 

dues and discuss any problems, as well as to enhance 

group cohesion, to communicate responsibilities, and 

disseminate information. 

Gang member affiliations can be identified through 

“colors” (clothing and emblems), tattoos, hand signs 

(used within the gang), and graffiti (gang symbols on 

clothing, school books, backpacks, and walls). 

In 1990, Los Angeles instituted “Operation Cul-de-Sac” 

in Newton, an inner-city neighborhood plagued by drug 

and gang activity. Barriers were installed to impede 

drive-by shootings and drive-up drug purchases. Foot 

and bicycle patrols were stepped up to suppress these 

crimes and to improve police-community relations. The 

barriers prevented cars from entering the street, or 

required those that entered to leave the same way. This 

increased the risks for shooters, because their targets 

would have their own guns ready when the car returned.

In the two years after the barriers were installed, only 

one homicide was recorded, whereas in the year before 

seven homicides were committed in the area. Homicides 

were not displaced elsewhere.

Source: Ronald V. Clarke. 2005. Closing Streets and Alleys 

to Reduce Crime: Should You Go Down This Road? ProblemOriented Guides for Police, Response Guide No.2. Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services. Accessible at www.cops.usdoj.gov.
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 109

Criminal Groups

Gang members can be classified as hardcore, associate, 

or wannabe members. These designations are 

based on their criminal performance, street-smarts, 

incarceration experience, or abuse endured for the 

group. Membership is sometimes defined by age, such 

as “youngsters,” “old gangsters,” “young homies,” and 

“old homies.” 

Examples of action taken against gangs

Two federal statutes are used to prosecute street 

gangs: the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

Organizations (RICO) Act, and the continuing 

criminal enterprise (CCE) statutes of the 

Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control 

Act of 1970. These “conspiracy” statutes allow 

prosecutors to present evidence of multiple criminal 

acts committed by various members of the gang. 

Some cities, including Los Angeles, San Antonio, and 

Chicago, have adopted gang injunctions as a way of 

addressing local gang problems. These restraining 

orders are issued against specific gang members by 

the city’s Attorney’s Office and approved by a judge. 

The orders prohibit the gang members from engaging 

in certain activities that may range from selling drugs 

or possessing a weapon, to congregating in a group, 

being out at night, and possessing a cell phone. 

The National Gang Center provides descriptions of 

successful anti-gang programs, and offers links to 

tools and databases that assist police to address the 

gang problems within their jurisdictions. The Center 

collates daily newspaper reports on national gang 

activity, and maintains a database of professionals 

working with gangs. 

The Boston Gun Project is the most successful 

program to date in addressing gang violence (See 

Step 26). 

What can you do?

Although your jurisdiction might have no homegrown 

gangs, gangs are mobile and you might have to deal 

with those that come from nearby cities. You can 

gather intelligence about their colors, signs, activities, 

and rivalries either directly, or from the police 

agencies who are dealing directly with these gangs. 

You should seek information to answer questions 

such as:

◾ How prevalent is the problem and how many 

gangs are in operation? Are they national, 

regional, or local gangs? 

◾ Which of them pose a threat and what criminal 

activities are they engaged in? 

◾ How many gang members can be identified? What 

is their demographic profile, i.e., racial/ethnic 

composition, age group, immigration status? 

◾ Who are the gang leaders (if any) and what 

information is available about them? What 

information should be gathered about them?

Identify hotspots where these gangs are more likely to 

operate and determine whether their operations also 

reach larger areas. Determine whether any geographic 

shifts in their operations occur, and decide how this 

can be dealt with.

Prioritize gangs by the level of violence of their 

members. Then focus on the most violent groups first.

With sufficient intelligence in hand, advise your 

department about response strategies that would work 

best. These may range from completely eliminating 

the gang problem to dealing with the problem more 

effectively. 

Learn about Internet databases, such as GangNet and 

Cal/Gang, that allow law enforcement agencies to 

identify individuals involved in gangs—their names, 

street names, addresses, known associates, gang hand 

signals, vehicles, and tattoos. Cal/Gang can be accessed 

by law enforcement officers in California, while GangNet 

is used in many states and in Canada. The Orange 

County (California) Gang Incident Trafficking System 

combines traditional crime mapping and gang crime 

reporting. Local analysts used the system to discover 

that adult gang members were far more likely to be 

involved in violence than juvenile gang members, a 

crucial fact that was used to redirect the agency’s gang 

intervention programs.
110 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers

Criminal Groups

What can your agency do?

Raise awareness about the gang problem through 

schools and community organizations and develop 

partnerships with the community to gain help in 

addressing the problem. These partnerships should 

include faith-based groups, social service agencies, 

and other law enforcement agencies. Most programs 

that have shown success engaged in collaboration with 

a wide range of actors and have used a combination of 

prevention, intervention, and suppression strategies. 

READ MORE:

Scott Decker . 2008 . Strategies to Address Gang Crime . 

Washington, D .C .: U .S . Department of Justice, Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services . 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 111

AUTO-ACCIDENT FRAUD RINGS

CRIMINAL RINGS ARE FREQUENTLY INVOLVED IN AUTO-ACCIDENT INSURANCE SCAMS, of which there are two main kinds: 

(1) staged accidents for which insurance claims are made; and (2) false injury and physical damage claims, so-called 

“build ups,” resulting from actual accidents. These cases sometimes include “jump-ins,” people who were not present at 

the accident but who file claims. 

The groups involved may use the funds from 

insurance frauds for other criminal activities, such 

as drug trafficking. Indeed, the rings include many 

former drug traffickers. 

The rings often hit insurers with many small claims 

to stay under the company’s anti-fraud radar. When 

insurers begin to investigate such claims, they may find 

they are dealing with large rings with a wide reach. 

According to the FBI, auto-accident frauds cost the 

insurance industry about $20 billion a year. Densely 

populated states, such as New York, New Jersey, 

California, Florida, and Massachusetts are among the 

hardest-hit. New York City is especially vulnerable. 

Who is involved and how are they organized?

Auto-accident fraud rings recruit “accident victims” in 

two main ways: 

◾ They use “runners” to recruit phony victims, 

often new immigrants, who are paid for 

participating in fake auto accidents. 

◾ They use “steerers” to recruit accident victims 

from news reports, by visiting hospital emergency 

rooms and by approaching people who visit the 

police to collect copies of accident reports. They 

show these people how to profit from the accident 

and take them, or refer them, to clinics associated 

with the rings or directly operated by them. 

These clinics pad the bills with expensive and 

unnecessary treatments and then collect payment 

from the insurance company. 

In response to legislation that classified insurance 

frauds as felonies, the rings have shifted tactics from 

actual to paper accidents. This is done by using 

information from legitimate or falsified police reports 

to steer patients to medical clinics. 

Instead of paying people to borrow their insurance 

and their cars, the rings may use false identities to 

purchase cars and insurance, and, therefore, to file 

false insurance claims. 

Two common scams

Scheme 1. Load a car with people, pull in front of 

another car and slam on the brakes. If the expected 

collision ensues, the innocent party is almost always 

liable. Young women and the elderly are frequently 

targeted, the former because they are more prone to 

admitting fault and the latter because they are prone to 

becoming flustered. These scams, called “swoop and 

squat,” sometimes target buses, where the passengers, 

who work with the ring, immediately report injuries 

and file insurance claims. Bus drivers sometimes work 

directly with the ring.

Scheme 2. Load two cars with people, crash the cars, 

call the police and say that everybody was hurt. The 

insurance companies are then billed for unnecessary 

medical procedures. Again, these schemes may also 

include buses.

Factors contributing to auto-accident 

insurance fraud

◾ Ordinary citizens who are willing to participate 

in the schemes, because they believe that: (1) they 

are entitled to compensation for money they have 

paid in policy premiums; (2) the frauds only hurt 

insurance companies who deserve to be “hit”
112 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

Criminal Groups

◾ Lack of insurance staff trained to detect fraudulent 

claims

◾ Lack of public awareness programs to educate 

potential victims

◾ Lack of state insurance fraud bureaus that can 

undertake cross-jurisdictional investigations

What has been done nationally to address the 

problem?

In 1976, Florida passed the False and Fraudulent 

Insurance Claims Act (FFICA), which made insurance 

fraud a specific offense. Florida also created the Division 

of Insurance Fraud to investigate frauds falling under the 

definitions of the FFICA. Since then, many other states 

have established similar insurance fraud bureaus. 

The National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB) was 

formed in 1992 by over 1,000 member insurance 

companies to help deal with insurance fraud. The 

NICB serves as a conduit between the insurance 

industry and federal, state, and local law enforcement 

agencies. It holds multiple databases, currently with 

more than 350 million records of suspicious claims, 

which insurance companies can access to check claims.

Most insurance companies subscribe to the American 

Insurance Services Group Index, which provides 

data pertaining to bodily injury and workers’ 

compensation. Many have established hotlines with 

interactive conversation that allows for the gathering 

of detailed information about possible insurance 

fraud claims. Many have also established Special 

Investigative Units (SIU) specifically to investigate 

possible fraudulent claims. 

Randolph (Massachusetts) P.D. partnered with other 

state and county law enforcement entities to form 

the Community Insurance Fraud Initiative (CIFI), a 

task force to address the city’s auto insurance fraud 

problem. The CIFI offered a $5,000 reward for 

information leading to the arrest and conviction of 

perpetrators of the fraud. Two hundred and sixtythree individuals were arrested, which, together with 

arrests made by other task forces operating in six 

nearby cities, resulted in a reduction of $100 million in 

fake auto accident claims in those cities in 2004. 

What can you do? 

Gather information on the time and location of autoaccidents, as well as the number of people involved 

in each accident to determine if possible rings are 

involved. Staged auto-accidents happen during busy 

times on busy streets, and generally involve many 

passengers. 

Determine if there is a high concentration of auto 

accidents in neighborhoods or areas with high 

concentrations of immigrant populations. Gather 

information about the people involved in the 

accidents, including their age, gender, and ethnicity, 

which may help determine whether staged accidents 

are taking place. 

Learn how to use the different databases provided by 

NICB designed to fight insurance fraud. The wealth 

of knowledge provided by this organization can prove 

valuable in your department’s investigative efforts. 

A successful prosecution

In November 2000, the Federal District Court in Brooklyn 

broke up a 53-member auto insurance fraud ring that 

cheated insurance companies out of more than $1 million 

by staging 27 crashes in New York City. Two employees

of Medical Arts Rehabilitation clinic led the ring. They paid 

people $500 to stage an accident. These people recruited 

new drivers and passengers to crash their own cars,

who were treated at the clinic for injuries that were never 

sustained. The clinic then billed insurance companies for 

up to $20,000 for medical services, while the passengers 

filed bodily injury claims for between $3,000 and 

$22,000. Many of the recruits were “unsophisticated and 

often recent arrivals to the United States.” 

Source: Alan Feuer. 2000. Car Crashes Were Staged For Fraud, U.S.

Charges. New York Times, November 17.

What can your agency do?

Coordinate fraud probes with the insurance 

companies as well as other law enforcement 

agencies—such as the Attorney General’s office, 

district attorneys, or U.S. attorneys—as the problem 

may require a multi-jurisdictional approach. 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 113

Criminal Groups

Deploy undercover officers posing as accident 

victims to probe unscrupulous medical clinics that 

pad claims. Determine if these clinics work with an 

auto-insurance fraud ring and try to infiltrate their 

operations.

Execute wiretaps to gather information from medical 

clinics, lawyers, and employees of the insurance 

company suspected of involvement in the ring. 

Work closely with community organizations and 

immigrant groups to educate them about the dangers 

and risks involved in taking part in staged auto 

accidents. 

READ MORE:

Tony Baldock . 1997 . Insurance Fraud . Trends and 

Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No . 66 . Australian 

Institute of Criminology .
114 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

ORGANIZED SHOPLIFTERS

ORGANIZED SHOPLIFTERS STEAL LARGE AMOUNTS OF MERCHANDISE FOR RESALE. They may operate across state lines, 

and may target the same chain in different places. Their arrival in your town might be signaled by a spike in reports of 

goods being shoplifted in large quantities.

The groups are frequently composed of immigrants 

(legal or not) from the Middle East, South America, or 

Asia. This may be because they can sell the goods they 

steal to fellow immigrants who run small businesses. 

The groups sometimes also take part in drug 

trafficking, car theft, and burglary. 

The FBI reports that organized retail theft costs 

businesses $12–$35 billion annually in stolen goods, 

lost sales, and replacement costs. It is believed that 

the profits from organized shoplifting are sometimes 

used to fund foreign terrorists; according to the CRISP 

report (in the Read more section), “money laundering 

has been proven in many, if not all, organized retail 

crime rings operated by Middle Easterners.” 

How are they organized?

Each group consists of several members with distinct 

roles: “boosters” steal the goods; “handlers” sell the 

goods to fences; and others take care of transport and 

logistics.

Boosters act alone or in groups. They steal large 

quantities at one time, usually of the same items. 

They carry tools to remove security tags, they use 

foil-lined bags to defeat electronic tags, and they may 

use cell phones to communicate with other group 

members while shoplifting. They may change bar 

codes so merchandise registers at a much lower price 

on checkout (“ticket switching”). They may use stolen 

credit cards and use the receipts to return stolen goods 

to the store for cash. In some cases, they may simply 

wheel carts full of merchandise out the doors to a 

waiting getaway van. 

The stolen property may be held in rented storage 

units before being taken to the group’s home base. The 

property is often sold to street-level fences, who might 

own a bodega, pawnshop, or gas station. Some fences 

operate from home, selling items door-to-door, in flea 

markets and local taverns, or even on the Internet. 

They might sell-on the goods to mid-level fences, who 

clean and repackage them to look like new and then 

sell them to wholesale diverters, who might mix them 

with legitimate goods for sale to retailers.

What facilitates the work of organized shoplifters?

◾ Their unexpected arrival in towns and cities and 

equally quick departure

◾ Their links with immigrant communities, which 

facilitate disposal of goods

◾ Complacent retailers who have not been 

victimized by organized shoplifters

◾ Low priority accorded by police, prosecutors, and 

judges to shoplifting and fencing operations

◾ Poor security in many stores that puts them at risk 

(see below)

Which stores are at risk?

1. Those that sell goods that are CRAVED 

(concealable, removable, available, valuable, 

enjoyable, and disposable). Designer clothing, 

over-the-counter medicine, electronics, DVDs, 

health and beauty supplies, razor blades and infant 

formulas are considered to be among the “hot 

products” targeted by organized shoplifters in 

supermarkets. 

2. Large stores that make it easier for organized 

groups to hide among ordinary shoppers

3. Stores located close to highways that provide easy 

escape routes 

4. Stores with many part-time associates who have 

less commitment, lack theft awareness, and have 

limited training 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 115

Criminal Groups

5. Stores with the security weaknesses that aid 

ordinary shoplifters (see Shoplifting, 2nd Edition,

Problem-Oriented Policing Guide No 11). Such 

weaknesses include: 

a. Lax return policies that allow thieves to return 

stolen items to the store for credit or cash 

b. Unmonitored exits, blind corners/spots, high 

displays that conceal thieves from view, and 

open displays of high-risk items 

c. No security staff, poor stocktaking, and 

lacking security equipment such as electronic 

article surveillance and video-cameras 

6. Stores that do not report shoplifting to the police

What is being done regionally and nationally?

Walmart, Target®, Lowe’s®, Limited Brands, and other 

large retailers seek to identify organized shoplifting 

rings by investing in software that tracks regional 

patterns of theft.

Many states have passed laws that address organized 

retail crime and, in 2009, Congress passed the 

Combating Organized Retail Crime Act and the 

E-fencing Enforcement Act. 

The Law Enforcement Retail Partnership database 

(LERPnet) was created for merchants to share 

information on organized shoplifting with local, 

state, and federal law enforcement, as well as with 

other retailers. 

What can you do?

Regularly scan for stores with high shoplifting rates 

(see Table 17 on page 116) and try to determine the 

reasons. Notify your supervisors about the need to 

alert the stores to their problematic status and the 

need to take preventive actions. Keep in mind that 

reported shoplifting may be significantly lower than 

actual shoplifting due to differences in store security 

policies and staffing.

Alert other analysts and police officers to signs of 

organized shoplifting. 

What can your agency do?

Work with local merchants to encourage reporting of 

shoplifting and early sharing of information about the 

arrival of an organized crime shoplifting group. Alert 

nearby jurisdictions to the possible arrival of these 

groups in their locations.

Educate retailers about theft prevention and the 

importance of reporting shoplifting incidents. 

Measures focused on organized shoplifting include: 

displays that prevent the removal of multiple packages 

at one time; cabinets that beep if open too long; 

and stamping the store’s name on over-the-counter 

medicines or infant formula cans to reduce their resale value.

Reduce the opportunities to dispose of stolen goods 

by regularly monitoring pawnshops, flea markets, 

and used-goods stores. Visit local bodegas, taverns, 

and other small businesses, especially those owned by 

recent immigrants, to ask about suspicious attempts to 

sell them goods. 

READ MORE:

Ronald Clarke and Gohar Petrossian . 2012 . Shoplifting 

2nd Edition . Problem-Oriented Guides for Police . 

Problem-Specific Guides Series, No . 11 . Washington, 

D .C .: U .S . Department of Justice, Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services .

Walter Palmer and Chris Richardson . 2009 . Organized 

Retail Crime: Assessing the Risk and Developing 

Effective Strategies. ASIS International Foundation 

CRISP Report . 
116 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers

Criminal Groups

Table 17. Reported shoplifting by store in Danvers, Massachusetts

Scan regularly for stores with high rates of shoplifting. Crime analyst 

Christopher Bruce did this for the Danvers (Massachusetts) Police and 

produced this table. The store with the most shoplifting incidents was one 

of the largest in the town. But when size was taken into account by calculating 

the number of thefts per 1,000 square feet (see the final column of the table), 

the riskiest store turned out to be the one that had been ranked 3rd on the list 

before correcting for size; it was a tiny boutique store with staggeringly high 

shoplifting.

Visit the riskiest stores and try to understand why their rates of shoplifting are 

so high and what they might do to reduce the risks.

REPORTED SHOPLIFTING BY STORE 

IN DANVERS, MASSACHUSETTS, 

NOVEMBER 2008 TO OCTOBER 2010

Store Thefts Percent of 

All Thefts

Cumulative 

% Thefts

Cumulative 

% Stores

Thefts Per 

1,000 Sq. Ft.

1 210 33% 33% 2% 2.06

2 152 24% 56% 3% 1.83

3 36 6% 62% 5% 144.00

4 29 5% 67% 6% 0.36

5 24 4% 70% 8% 0.32

6 23 4% 74% 10% 0.28

7 21 3% 77% 11% 0.26

8 15 2% 80% 13% 0.18

9 9 1% 81% 14% 0.11

10 9 1% 82% 16% 0.11

11 9 1% 84% 17% 0.14

12 6 1% 85% 19% 20.00

13 6 1% 86% 21% 0.10

14 5 1% 86% 22% 0.17

15 5 1% 87% 24% 0.07

16 5 1% 88% 25% 0.13

17 5 1% 89% 27% 3.13

46 Stores with 72 11% 100% 100%

<5 Thefts
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 117

ORGANIZED CAR THIEVES

TEMPORARY THEFT OF CARS, OFTEN COMMITTED BY JUVENILE JOYRIDERS OR, TO A LESSER EXTENT, FOR USE OF THE

car in committing another crime, accounts for the bulk of car thefts. Permanent thefts, where the car is never recovered, 

are often committed by organized criminals, who are employing increasingly sophisticated tactics to outsmart today’s 

anti-theft devices. These thefts account for the bulk of the costs of car theft. In 2011, 47.7 percent of the value of the 

vehicles stolen was never recovered according to UCR reports, causing losses of about $1.8 billion nationwide.

Several forms of permanent theft exist, including: 

◾ “Rebirthing,” which is giving the car a new 

identity for resale 

◾ “Chopping” the car and selling its parts 

◾ Exporting the car, which is accomplished by 

shipping it overseas from one of the nation’s many 

sea ports or driving it over the border to Mexico 

You should try to determine if a car theft ring is 

operating in your area, and whether the cars are stolen 

for export. Theft for export is particularly likely if you 

are close to the Mexico border or near a major port. 

This step describes two techniques that will assist 

you in this task. It does not describe the facilitating 

conditions for organized car theft, or the modus 

operandi involved, since these are used for illustrative 

purposes in Step 10, “Modify the conditions that 

facilitate organized crimes,” and Step 11, “Study the 

modus operandi step-by-step.” 

Compare your auto theft rates with those of 

other jurisdictions

Officers in Chula Vista (California) P.D. suspected 

that being close to the Mexican border exacerbated 

the city’s auto theft problem. The department’s crime 

analysts tested this idea by calculating the theft 

rates for Chula Vista and neighboring cities. They 

found that Chula Vista’s auto theft rates, and those 

of other cities closest to the border, were two to six 

times higher than ones further north in San Diego 

County (see Figure 17). Many vehicles were stolen 

from parking lots and driven across the border before 

owners had even discovered the thefts. The analysts 

also found that pick-up trucks—highly prized in 

Mexico—were at greatest risk, and that the recovery 

rates of these trucks stolen in Chula Vista were lower 

than in cities further from the border. 

Organized car theft on 

the U.S./Mexico border

Resendiz has described a division of labor among those 

involved in the export of stolen vehicles from the United 

States to Mexico: 

Chauffeurs provided vehicles to cruise around mall 

parking lots and residential areas to “shop” for possible 

target vehicles.

Specialists used different tools to steal different model 

vehicles. They used flat head screwdrivers and vise 

grips to open Chevrolets, master keys for Chryslers, 

dent-pullers, screwdrivers, and vise grips for Fords. They 

usually took between fifteen seconds to one and a half 

minutes to break into any car.

Mounters were responsible for driving the vehicle to the 

buyers in Mexico. Once the vehicle was crossed, it was 

dropped off at a designated hideout, and from there, to 

customers and buyers.

Source: Rosalva Resendiz. 1998. International Auto Theft: An 

Exploratory Research of Organization and Organized Crime on the 

U.S./Mexico Border. Criminal Organizations 12:25–30.
118 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers

Criminal Groups

Figure 17. Vehicle theft rates per 1,000 residents in San Diego County, 2001

For all cities, 2000 Census 

data for population used 

except San Marcos, Poway, 

Encinitas, Imperial Beach, 

and Santee. For these 

cities population figures 

were provided by the city.

Source: Plouffe and Sampson 2004.

Calculate location quotients to identify a possible 

theft for export problem

The fact that many vehicles are stolen in your 

area may not mean that organized car thieves are 

operating; it could simply reflect a generally high rate 

of crime in your area. To test this you can calculate a 

Crime Location Quotient (CLQ). A CLQ compares 

the total number of a particular crime across a set of 

geographical units (for example, neighborhoods, 

cities, or counties), taking into account the 

distribution of other crimes in those units (see Figure 

18 for an example of the calculations). It is the ratio 

of target crimes to all crimes in a jurisdiction (e.g., 

county) divided by the ratio of the target crimes to all 

crimes in a larger area (e.g., state).
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 119

Criminal Groups

Figure 18. CLQ calculation to estimate the prevalence of theft for export in U.S. counties

Researchers have recently used the CLQ calculation to estimate the prevalence of theft for 

export in U.S. counties. 

They used the following formula: 

CLQ= (a/b)/(X/Y)

a= total number of motor vehicle thefts within the county

b= total number of all index crimes within the county

X= total number of motor vehicle thefts within the state where the county is located

Y= total number of all index crimes within that state

A CLQ value of 1.00 indicates an area has a typical representation of that crime compared to all other crimes. CLQ s over 

1.00 indicate overrepresentation of a particular crime, while CLQ values under 1.00 signify underrepresentation.

The map shows that theft for export is prevalent near heavily-trafficked borders and ports in the United States.
120 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers

Criminal Groups

What has been done to prevent theft for export?

Anything that makes it harder to steal a car will slow 

down the work of organized car theft rings, especially 

of the less sophisticated operators. Over the years, 

a wide variety of measures have been introduced to 

increase the risks or difficulty of car theft, including 

improvements to vehicle security, parking facilities, 

and vehicle documentation procedures. (In recent 

years, very promising reductions in theft have 

been reported for vehicles fitted with electronic 

immobilizers at manufacture—which is now a 

requirement for all new vehicles in the European 

Union, Canada, and Australia, but not yet in the 

United States.) In addition, some other measures 

specifically intended to reduce theft for export have 

been introduced, such as:

◾ The United States has developed a model bilateral 

agreement for the repatriation of stolen vehicles 

and has signed agreements with numerous 

countries in Latin America. U.S. agents have 

provided training to customs officials in these 

countries in ways to identify stolen cars. 

◾ The National Insurance Crime Bureau has assisted 

these efforts by stationing officials in Mexico 

and other South American countries to assist the 

process of repatriation. 

◾ U.S. Customs is field testing portable, hand-held 

computer scanners that will give inspectors in the 

field instant access to VIN information, as well as 

identify vehicles previously presented for export. 

◾ X-ray machines that can detect vehicles concealed 

in containers are increasingly being deployed at 

major U.S. sea ports.

◾ Many local programs encourage citizens to 

participate in vehicle theft prevention. For 

example, a program implemented by the McAllen 

(Texas) P.D., “Citizens Against Auto Theft,” 

involved placing colored decals on windows 

of automobiles. This alerted law enforcement 

officials that the car is not to be driven during 

certain hours of the day or driven into Mexico. 

What can your agency do?

Should your analyses suggest that a theft for export 

ring is operating in your jurisdiction, your agency 

could implement a program such as that developed by 

McAllen P.D. Publicizing the problem can be another 

option. By analyzing your vehicle theft records you 

can determine which makes and models are at most 

risk, and the public information campaigns can be 

geared toward encouraging owners of these vehicles to 

better secure their cars. 

READ MORE:

Nancy Plouffe and Rana Sampson . 2004 . “Auto Theft 

and Theft from Autos in Parking Lots in Chula Vista, 

CA .” In Understanding and Preventing Car Theft, ed ., 

Michael G . Maxfield and Ronald V . Clarke . Vol . 17 of 

Crime Prevention Studies . Monsey, New York: Criminal 

Justice Press . 

Gohar Petrossian and Ronald V . Clarke . 2012 . Export of 

Stolen Vehicles Across Land Borders. Problem-Oriented 

Guides for Police . Problem-Specific Guides Series, 

No . 63 . Washington, D .C .: U .S . Department of Justice, 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services .
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 121

CLANDESTINE METHAMPHETAMINE LABS

METHAMPHETAMINE IS SUPPLIED BY TWO MAIN TYPES OF NETWORKS: (1) large, highly organized groups involved in 

trafficking illicit drugs, and (2) smaller, less organized groups of individuals typically involved in methamphetamine use. 

The laboratories that produce methamphetamine have 

changed over time. There are now three main types of 

clandestine operations in the United States, which vary 

in organization, size, and production capacity: (1) super 

labs, (2) mom-and-pop labs, and (3) shake-and-bake or 

one pot labs. Shake-and-bake labs are the newest and 

most common type of production method. The shakeand-bake method can produce methamphetamine in 

about 30 minutes in a plastic bottle. 

Clandestine laboratories today are primarily ephedrine 

and pseudoephedrine based. Most local laboratories 

in the United States are run by small networks of 

methamphetamine users and low-level dealers. 

Group members may coordinate efforts to acquire 

necessary supplies and chemicals. Restricted precursor 

chemicals may be obtained by “smurfing,” whereby 

numerous individuals visit multiple retail outlets to 

make pseudoephedrine purchases. Group members 

also recruit others to purchase pseudoephedrine. 

Smurfing activities are increasing and evolving to 

include the illicit acquisition of bulk quantities of 

pseudoephedrine. 

Clandestine laboratories are hazardous, toxic, and 

volatile. They are located in a variety of settings 

including homes, motel rooms, or vehicles. Smaller 

laboratories are portable and more difficult to 

detect. While laboratories were traditionally located 

in specific regions and in rural communities, they 

are now being found in cities across the United 

States. According to the DEA, 118,940 clandestine 

laboratories have been seized in the United States 

since 2004. Given that law enforcement detects a small 

percentage of labs, the true number is unknown. 

Who is involved and how are they organized?

The groups involved in producing methamphetamine 

in clandestine laboratories continue to change as the 

problem evolves. Groups adapt to control efforts and 

may alter the way they communicate, acquire chemicals 

and supplies, and produce methamphetamine. 

Groups may be small (2–4 people) and loosely 

organized, or larger with more organization. They may 

be headed by independent operators or in conjunction 

with criminal gangs. Members may be recruited for 

specific roles related to manufacturing, including: 

◾ Gathering supplies 

◾ Purchasing precursor chemicals 

◾ Recruiting others to purchase precursors

◾ Assisting with production 

◾ Distributing methamphetamine

Cash or drugs may be exchanged for assistance. While 

local production is dominated by small and transient 

groups, larger, more organized groups have recently 

become involved in production in California. 

A successful prosecution

A federal prosecution in U.S. District court resulted 

in the conviction of 13 persons for conspiracy to 

manufacture methamphetamine. The defendants were 

charged with collecting chemicals needed to produce 

methamphetamine from multiple states for production 

purposes. The group was involved with producing 

methamphetamine in multiple locations including the 

home of a 60-year-old defendant. Sentences ranged 

from 3 years to 20 years.

Source: Todd South. 2012. 13-Person Meth Case Ends with 

Sentencing. Chattanooga Times Free Press, June 23.
122 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

Criminal Groups

Meth supply: at every step, 

offenders adapt, markets shift, 

and supply continues

The U.S. methamphetamine supply serves as an example 

of the challenges of responding to complex and evolving

crime problems. Despite decades of attempts to control 

the supply of methamphetamine, clandestine production

and trafficking continues and methamphetamine is 

widely available. Local manufacturers have continually 

adapted to control efforts by discovering alternative 

methods of production. Reductions in local supply 

are regularly offset by increases in production and 

trafficking from Mexico. There is need to develop a better 

understanding of the processes that underlie offender

adaptation and offending evolution at local, national, and 

international levels.

Factors contributing to clandestine manufacturing

◾ Continuing demand for methamphetamine 

◾ Profitability 

◾ Increased use of smurfing to acquire bulk 

quantities of pseudoephedrine

◾ Retail outlets that sell pseudoephedrine products 

without questioning suspicious purchases

◾ Continuous adaptations in manufacturing 

production processes 

What has been done nationally to address the 

problem?

In 2005, the U.S. Government passed the U.S.A. 

Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act. This 

legislation restricted retail access to pseudoephedrine, 

placed limitations on the purchase quantities, 

enhanced penalties for offenders, and increased 

regulations for distributors. Individual states have 

enacted various laws aimed at restricting access to 

precursors, criminalizing manufacturing-related 

activities, and increasing punishments. In 2006, 

Oregon became the first state in the United States to 

require a prescription for pseudoephedrine. 

What can you do? 

Conduct an in-depth analysis of the 

methamphetamine problem. Assess each dimension 

of the broader problem (i.e., use, trafficking, and 

manufacturing). 

Data on drug treatment admissions are available 

from Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 

Administration on the Treatment Episode Data Set 

(TEDS) website. Data on arrests, convictions, and 

sentences of criminal offenders can be obtained from 

criminal justice agencies. 

Determine whether methamphetamine is being 

manufactured locally, imported, or both. Identify how 

much of the methamphetamine on the streets is being 

produced locally versus being trafficked in from out of 

state or out of the country.

If local production is occurring, gather information on 

the following: 

◾ Type(s) of production processes being utilized

◾ Type(s) of laboratories producing 

methamphetamine 

◾ The main ingredients being used 

◾ Where offenders are obtaining ingredients and 

supplies

◾ How are offenders are obtaining precursor 

chemicals both legally and illicitly

Create a record of clandestine lab seizures and 

analyze this data to identify trends in production at 

the local level. 

Review logs of local pseudoephedrine sales for 

suspicious patterns of purchases and to determine 

if certain retail outlets are selling disproportionately 

high rates of pseudoephedrine. 

Look for information everywhere. You may need to 

talk to law enforcement officers, review police reports, 

and discuss the issue with community members who 

may have special knowledge about the problem. This 

could include pharmacists, persons who work in 

farming communities where anhydrous ammonia is 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 123

Criminal Groups

available, and personnel employed at stores where 

other chemicals and supplies needed to manufacture 

methamphetamine are sold. Understanding which 

communities have high rates of methamphetamine 

consumption and how many individuals with previous 

involvement in manufacturing or related activities 

reside in the area will be helpful. 

What can your agency do?

Gather intelligence on clandestine manufacturing 

from confidential informants and by sharing 

information with other law enforcement agencies in 

the area. Intelligence sharing is essential for obtaining 

information on suspicious patterns of activity that may 

cross jurisdictional boundaries. 

Coordinate investigations with other law enforcement 

agencies. 

Conduct undercover surveillance operations in retail 

outlets that sell pseudoephedrine in communities 

known to have high rates of methamphetamine 

use or that sell disproportionately high rates of 

pseudoephedrine products. 

READ MORE:

Rashi Shukla, Jordan Crump, and Emelia Chrisco . 2012 . 

An Evolving Problem: Methamphetamine Production and 

Trafficking in the United States . International Journal of 

Drug Policy 23:426–435 . 

Michael Scott and Kelly Dedel . 2006 . Clandestine 

Methamphetamine Labs, 2nd Edition . Problem-Oriented 

Guides for Police . Problem-Specific Guides Series, 

No 16 . Washington, D .C .: U .S . Department of Justice, 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services .
124 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers

CRUISING

ON WEEKEND EVENINGS, CITY CENTER PUBS IN BRITAIN ARE CROWDED BY YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN who are there to 

see and to be seen. In Mediterranean countries, especially on warm evenings, the same demographic groups fill the 

cafes and stroll on the piazza. In North America, late on fine evenings in spring and summer, young people, sometimes in 

the hundreds or even thousands, “cruise” the local strip in their automobiles, driving slowly, bumper-to-bumper. 

Cruising is a means for young men to show off their 

cars, to compare them with other people’s cars, to 

find racing competitors, to socialize, and to impress 

young women. In many communities across the 

country cruising is considered a pastime and a rite 

of passage, encouraged and glorified by movies 

like American Graffiti and The Hollywood Knights. 

According to a 2002 survey conducted by Teenage 

Research Unlimited, 60 percent of teenagers spent 

at least four hours a week cruising in a car. Another 

survey of young cruisers between the ages of 19 to 21 

revealed that 80 percent of the time their parents knew 

and approved of their cruising in the downtown area. 

It seems that parents preferred the downtown area 

because of the supervision of patrol officers. 

On the other hand, cruising can bring many problems 

in its wake. It snarls traffic, it can prevent access by 

emergency vehicles, and it can bring commerce to a 

halt. It may also bring problems of litter, urinating in 

public, underage drinking, vandalism, and worse. It 

is these consequences of cruising that the police need 

to address, not the otherwise harmless behavior of 

ordinary young men and women looking for social 

interaction.

Cruising is generally confined to downtown areas, 

though in coastal communities it is common along 

beaches. Cruisers drive a wide range of cars that 

include classic cars (whose drivers tend to be older 

and cruise to show off their expensively restored 

vehicles); pickup trucks (on huge wheels and jacked 

up suspensions); mini-trucks, muscle cars, low riders 

(whose chassis ride just inches off the ground); 

imported customized European cars; and HarleyDavidson motorcycles. 

Factors contributing to cruising

◾ Automobile ownership and accessibility to 

teenagers

◾ The need to be socially accepted

◾ The desire to show off vehicles

◾ Many cruisers are too young to go to bars or other 

places where they can socialize with friends and 

the opposite sex

◾ An unsupervised environment where youth can 

express themselves

What has been done nationally to address the 

problem?

The Salt Lake City Council in Utah passed an anticruising ordinance prohibiting cars from driving 

repeatedly (defined as driving three or more times 

in the same direction) past a “mobile traffic-control 

point” between 11:00 PM and 4:00 AM in an area 

identified by police as being congested. 

Police in Lakewood, Colorado, employed a strategy 

of “modified diversion” by closing off known 

cruising locations during 8:00 PM and 2:00 AM, 

the time period when cruising was most likely to 

occur, while minimizing its impact on legitimate 

traffic and businesses in these areas. The closing 

was announced through a news media campaign, 

which began a week in advance of the operation. 

This effort resulted in complete elimination of the 

cruising problem in Lakewood. 

When the enforcement strategies and the use of 

barriers failed to solve the cruising problem in 

Arlington, Texas, the police formed a “cruising 

committee” by forging partnerships with 

representatives of the city council, local business 

owners, and the parks, recreation, and transport 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 125

departments, which leased a downtown parking 

lot on Friday and Saturday nights and opened it to 

the cruisers. It was staffed by police, equipped with 

portable restrooms and cleaned up the next morning. 

The approach proved highly effective, as it not only 

solved the cruising problem, but also helped reduce 

other related problems. Up to 1,000 cars continued to 

cruise there during an evening, but local people had 

no longer to endure litter, vandalism, noise, and other 

public order problems. 

What can you do?

If cruising is a problem in your jurisdiction, you 

can gather information about the characteristics of 

the cruisers and determine if they are engaged in 

problematic behaviors that stem from cruising. 

Map the locations as well as the days of the week 

and time of the day when cruising is most likely to 

occur. Gather as much information as possible about 

these temporal and geographic patterns. Think about 

possible interventions you could advise based on 

successful actions in other jurisdictions. Help your 

department find an alternative location for cruising 

that would lead to fewer problems but which would 

still be used by the young people. 

What can your agency do?

Find out more about cruising by surveying local 

residents and businesses. Engage them in efforts to 

address the problem.

Once the cruising areas and times are identified, your 

department may increase enforcement in these areas 

during these designated times. Leaving aside arrests or 

citations for cruising, the presence of the police may 

reduce other related problems in the area. 

Find an alternative cruising area that appeals to the 

cruisers and does not conflict with the area businesses 

or the residents. This area can be controlled by the 

officers to ensure security. 

READ MORE:

Boise Police Department Planning Unit . 1990 . 

Downtown ‘Cruising’ In Major U.S. Cities and One 

City’s Response to the Problem . Boise, Idaho: Police 

Department . 

Ron W . Glensor and Kenneth J . Peak . 2005 . Cruising. 

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police . Problem-Specific 

Guides Series, No . 29 . Washington, D .C .: U .S . 

Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services .

Problem Gatherings

Santa Ana Cruising Abatement Project

The Santa Ana Police Department in California was faced with a serious cruising problem . On Sunday evenings, approximately 

1,000 cruisers drove along a major thoroughfare to gather and socialize . The cruising night resembled a large street party, 

where loud music and alcohol consumption were common, creating problems for nearby residents . Merchants complained 

that traffic gridlock kept regular customers from their businesses, and many businesses closed early to avoid subjecting their 

customers to intimidation from the cruisers . The police department responded to the problem by focusing on two weaknesses 

of the cruisers: (a) they lacked knowledge of anti-cruising laws, and (b) many of the cruisers drove vehicles belonging to their 

parents or others. The police set up a control point, where information about each vehicle was quickly made available through 

specially-designed computer software. At the same time, officers distributed an anti-cruising warning to each vehicle moving 

through the check point. The contact with the drivers was intended to reduce anonymity. Follow-up letters were then mailed to 

the registered owners of the vehicles advising them that the car had been identified as cruising, an illegal activity in Santa Ana.

The letter was intended to warn cruisers who drove their own vehicles, and to inform parents whose cars were being used by 

their children. The letter warned that anyone who returned to the area to cruise would be subject to arrest. The check points, as 

well as roadblocks leading to these points were eliminated after several weeks. The project proved to be successful in reducing 

cruising and related problems in the area.
126 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers

ILLEGAL STREET RACING

SOME STREET RACERS ARE WELL-OFF STUDENTS, MOTOR SPORT ENTHUSIASTS, AND EVEN MIDDLE-AGED BUSINESSMEN, 

but the three main groups are: 

1. Young working-class males aged 16–25, some of 

whom attend trade schools or technical colleges, 

but many may have struggled in school and 

engaged in other delinquency. Most members of 

this group quite soon grow out of street racing.

2. Older white males (aged 25–40) who race older 

American-made “muscle” cars, such as Corvettes, 

Camaros, and Mustangs. 

3. A wide age range of Asian and Hispanic males who 

generally drive later-model Japanese cars, such as 

Hondas, Acuras, Mitsubishis, and Nissans. This 

group currently dominates the street racing scene. 

Races test a driver’s skill and the capabilities of the 

vehicles involved. They often take place at night in 

largely deserted streets or industrial areas. Street racing 

is not illegal in some jurisdictions, but it tends to be 

associated with illegal activities, including auto theft, 

impaired driving, illegal vehicle modification, illicit 

gambling, gang related activity, trespassing, vandalism, 

and littering. Fatal crashes linked to street racing have 

been found to involve both alcohol and excessive speed 

and often occur on urban surface streets. 

How are they organized?

Street races are often publicized by word of mouth 

and may be attended by dozens of racers and 

hundreds of spectators. During the race, lookouts 

keep watch for police using cell phones, police 

scanners, and walkie-talkies. Some groups may use 

police tape and false signs to block traffic for the 

duration of the race, or use rolling road-blocks to 

stage a race on a large highway. 

In some cases, illegal racers may operate websites 

to post announcements about race locations and 

about expected police activity. Some websites provide 

information about the previous night’s races, including 

ratings of police presence and crowd size. They may 

carry a link to the local police agency so the curious 

can see if a warrant has been issued for their arrest. 

Forms of street racing 

◾ Drag racing involves a contest between two 

vehicles that compete to cross a set finish line. In 

some jurisdictions drag racing is classified as a 

Class B misdemeanor. According to the National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration, about 

135 people die each year in street drag racing 

accidents.

◾ Hat Racing, also called “cannonball run” or 

“kamikaze,” involves point-to-point races where 

drivers put money into a hat for the winner. These 

races are often long distance, sometimes from city 

to city.

◾ Touge or Centipede races, popularized in Japan, 

occur on mountain passes or around normal 

traffic, one car at a time, or chase-style with a 

convoy of vehicles.

◾ Burnouts involve spinning rear tires at high 

revolutions to produce smoke trails.

◾ Donuts involve accelerating a vehicle with full 

steering-wheel lock.

◾ Rolling Road Blockages or Blockades comprise 

vehicles traveling slowly in convoy on major 

highways to prevent other vehicles from passing, 

so that vehicles ahead can engage in racing.

◾ Drifting involves accelerating around a corner to 

cause the rear of the vehicle to slide out and the 

tires to slip on the roadway.
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 127

Problem Gatherings

Factors contributing to illegal street racing

◾ Availability of vehicles to young drivers

◾ Lack of legitimate venues for racing and the 

existence of suitable abandoned or unsupervised 

locations 

◾ The need for thrills and excitement, as well as the 

expression of masculinity

◾ Street racers’ need for social status

◾ Existence of street racing movies and video clips 

on the Internet that can be imitated

◾ Lack of ordinances prohibiting street racing 

◾ The support of spectators

Examples of what has been done to address the 

problem

Kent (Washington) Police Department partnered 

with other law enforcement agencies, private property 

owners, local businesses, and the insurance industry 

to develop an enforcement plan known as CRASH 

(Curb Racing and Achieve Safer Highways). Police 

conducted surveillance of racing locations to identify 

races in progress and, once identified, uniformed 

officers closed off exits from the locations to prevent 

participants from dispersing. Drivers operating 

vehicles in violation of the traffic code were cited or 

arrested. Vehicles operated by drivers whose licenses 

had been suspended or revoked were impounded.

Some jurisdictions have installed speed bumps, 

concrete barricades, and freeway billboards to control 

or inform racers. To discourage spectators, parking 

can be prohibited on public properties and roadways 

during prime racing hours in the race area.

Australia and New Zealand have addressed street 

racing through legislation directed at such activities 

as dangerous or careless driving, causing unnecessary 

noise and smoke as a result of “burnouts,” and causing 

deliberate loss of traction doing “donuts.” Drivers 

who take part in these behaviors can have their 

operator’s license suspended and face the immediate 

impounding of their vehicles for periods of 48 hours 

to three months. Subsequent offenses may result in 

forfeiture of vehicles. 

Annual street races are permitted in cities in Canada 

(Toronto and Montreal) and Australia (Sydney, 

Adelaide, and Melbourne). This allows racers to 

experience the fun, camaraderie, and excitement they 

seek within a safer racing environment. Police can 

either work with existing national programs (Beat the 

Heat, Racers Against Street Racing, the National Hot 

Rod Association) that encourage safe, on-track racing, 

or implement their own local program. 

San Diego has acted to curb its 

street racing problem

◾ By passing a “spectator ordinance” making it an 

offense to attend an illegal street-racing event, and 

a “forfeiture ordinance” permitting the police to 

seize vehicles used in races.

◾ By establishing “DragNet,” a special unit to deal with 

the races. Officers infiltrate the illegal street-racing 

group to videotape races and use driver and license 

plate information to arrest the offenders.

◾ By designating the Qualcomm Stadium as a location 

for races, held on Friday nights.

What can you do?

Determine whether you have an illegal street 

racing problem in your jurisdiction. If so, study the 

characteristics of the racers, the kinds of activities they 

are involved in, and who their supporters are. 

Inform yourself about street racing through websites, 

such as Streetracing.com, RaceLegal.com and NHRA.

com. These websites provide racing and club news, 

articles, calendars, chat rooms, auctions, and message 

boards for many cities and states. The NHRA website 

focuses on encouraging legal racing, and attempts to 

educate users about related laws and statistics, such 

as number of illegal racers who were recently killed, 

injured, cited, arrested, or who had vehicles seized or 

licenses revoked. 
128 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers

Problem Gatherings

Through the chat rooms provided by these websites, 

you might be able to warn your department about 

upcoming races in your jurisdiction. Using network 

analysis you might be able to build up a picture of 

the major players involved in the groups. You can 

also infiltrate and monitor social networking sites to 

remain informed about upcoming street racing events.

What can your agency do?

Inform parents about the dangers of street racing so 

they can discourage their teenagers from participating. 

Ask parents to inform police about possible future 

street races that they hear about from their teenagers. 

Place roadblocks leading to locations where street 

racing is most likely to occur. These locations should 

be supervised during prime hours for street racing. 

Study solutions adopted elsewhere—in particular 

whether legal venues for street racing can be created, 

which can be more easily monitored and controlled. 

READ MORE:

Ron Glensor and Kenneth Peak . 2004 . Street Racing. 

Problem-Oriented Guides for Police . ProblemSpecific Guides Series, No . 28 .Washington, D .C .: 

U .S . Department of Justice, Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services .
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 129

SPRING BREAKS

THE ROOTS OF THE “SPRING BREAK” TRADITION CAN BE TRACED BACK TO THE FIRST COLLEGE SWIM FORUM, held in 

Fort Lauderdale in 1938. Since then, “spring break” has become a rite of passage among young college students across 

North America. It gained prominence through such films as Where the Boys Are (1960) and Spring Break (1983) and 

has been further popularized through MTV’s “Spring Break” and the video series “Girls Gone Wild.” Also, an industry of 

promoters of spring break trips advertise on college campuses.

Approximately half a million students each year 

vacation at popular spring break destinations. These 

include South Padre Island, Texas; Palm Springs, 

California; Fort Lauderdale, Daytona Beach, 

Pensecola, and Panama City Beach, Florida; and 

Lake Havasu, Arizona. Recent years have also seen 

increased numbers of students taking spring breaks in 

foreign destinations that include Cancun, Matzalan, 

and Acapulco, Mexico; as well as the Bahamas and 

Jamaica. Younger students may go to Mexico because 

of the lower legal drinking age of 18.

Students on spring break often engage in heavy 

alcohol consumption/binge drinking and some 

recreational drug use. One study at Panama City 

Beach found that an average male student had 18 

drinks during the previous day, while an average 

female consumed 10 drinks. Binge drinking is higher 

among fraternity or sorority members, and among 

those who lead a party-centered lifestyle. 

Students vacationing in groups are more likely 

to engage in pronounced substance abuse and in 

promiscuous sexual activity, which places them at a 

high risk of contracting sexually transmitted diseases. 

They might also engage in brawling, trespassing 

on waterfront properties, tearing down fences, and 

public urination. 

Contributing factors

◾ A wish to get away from college and “winter blues”

◾ Opportunities afforded for easy socializing and 

new romantic involvements

◾ The anonymity afforded by spring breaks (at least 

in the minds of the students)

◾ The feeling of being a different person on holiday 

and, therefore, open to experiment with casual 

sex, drugs, and excessive drinking

◾ Commercial trip organizers encourage and 

facilitate visiting spring break destinations

◾ Commercial enterprises at resort destinations 

cater to spring break revelers

Examples of measures to curtail irresponsible 

behavior during spring breaks

Beachfront resorts in Destin, Florida, cooperated with 

local police by imposing a late night curfew on their 

private beaches during spring break. Several hotels 

floodlit their beaches to prevent trespassing, drinking, 

and other related behavior. In addition, police patrolled 

several miles of beach, concentrating where large 

crowds of teenagers might gather, stopping and making 

underage drinkers pour their beer onto the sand. 

Police cameras were installed to monitor beaches 

and popular restaurants and bars in Sunset Beach, 

California. The police also increased uniformed and 

plainclothes patrols, set up DUI checkpoints, and 

enforced parking and traffic violations. 

Residents of Pacific Beach, California, prevented 

a planned “pub crawl” by using a law prohibiting 

alcohol sales to intoxicated patrons. The organizers of 

the event pulled out after they received notice from 

the district’s council member and the Department of 

Alcoholic Beverage Control, threatening to close down 

participating bars for 15 days should anyone be served 

alcohol who was already intoxicated. 

Louisiana State University (LSU) held a “Smart & 

Safe Spring Break Festival” for students before spring 

break to provide them with abstinence information 

and information on health and safety issues. The 

university’s police department deployed its motorcycle 

unit and K-9 bomb-sniffing dogs, performed 

intoxication demonstrations, and offered sign-ups for 

LSU’s emergency text messaging and other services. 
130 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

Problem Gatherings

Operation Blitz’ Em and Operation Spring Break in the 

Gold Coast, Australia, targeted speeding and drunk 

drivers during spring break. Random breath testing, 

unmarked cars, and speed cameras were deployed at 

hot spots and during high-risk times. Extra officers 

from the state traffic taskforce assisted local police.

Inducements offered by bars to 

students at spring break

“all-you-can-drink” (generally a purchase of a meal is 

followed by unlimited beer and other alcoholic beverages)

“twofers” (offering two or more drinks for the price of one)

“coin nights” (involves flipping a coin, where the winner 

gets a free drink)

“ladies nights” (female customers are offered special 

discounts)

“bladder bursts” (promise of an enjoyable night—

generally involving alcohol—where you don’t want to 

miss anything by going to the bathroom)

“bar crawls” or “bar hopping” (going from one bar to 

another)

What can you do?

Gather intelligence about the locations most likely to be 

visited by the students. Determine if these are mainly 

outdoors or indoors, and think of specific measures to 

address the issue based on the location type. 

Identify bars with lenient underage drinking 

practices that might attract underage students during 

spring break. 

Survey bars, restaurants, and motels that offer 

inducements to students at spring break and inform 

the owners and managers about possible dangers 

associated with these practices. 

While students might bring their own drugs with them, 

there might be local supply sources that you need to 

identify and alert your police department about. 

What can your agency do?

Control alcohol distribution by enforcing local 

ordinances against restaurant and bar owners, as well 

as alcohol vendors. Limit the number of liquor outlets 

during the spring break period. Working with vendors 

and bar owners to identify fake IDs can also help 

control underage drinking. 

Establish police presence/visibility at and around 

locations identified as hot spots and monitor student 

behavior to ensure compliance with the law. The 

presence of uniformed police officers can help bring 

the situation under control by monitoring drinking, 

public nudity, drug use, and other related behaviors.

Partner with the local media to encourage and 

influence responsible student behavior while on spring 

break. Encourage the media to practice more socially 

responsible marketing efforts to promote healthier 

and safer spring break activities. 

Local initiatives can involve offering financial rewards 

to individual “bounties” who report bars that serve 

intoxicated patrons, as well as underage students. 

Provide free false-identification training for restaurant 

and bar employees to help reduce illegal sales to 

underage students. 

Laws promoting responsible bar policies in certain 

states require servers, managers, and owners of 

restaurants and bars to attend a state-approved course 

every five years that includes information about 

alcohol’s effect on the body, drunk-driving laws, 

effective server intervention techniques, and related 

topics. Similar programs can be implemented by your 

police department.

Warn potential offenders by posting signs specifying 

the ordinances (such as “nudity is prohibited in a 

public area”) and that failure to follow these may lead 

to arrest. 

Roads near the locations where spring breakers gather 

can be monitored by the police to discourage students 

from driving under the influence. Meanwhile, 

free shuttle services can be offered by the hotels to 

encourage safe travel. Consider closing certain streets.

Encourage universities to enforce disciplinary 

measures against students found to have engaged in 

binge drinking or drug use. 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 131

POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS

SINCE THE DEMONSTRATIONS AT THE 1999 MEETINGS OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN SEATTLE, American 

police have increasingly been confronted with the problem of dealing with political protesters. There are four main kinds 

of political demonstrations:

1. Marches—proceeding from one location to 

another, such as the May 1, 2006, marches 

across the United States protesting the proposed 

immigration laws.

2. Rallies—gathering at a location to hear speakers 

or musicians, such as the November 3, 2007, 

student rally in Washington, D.C., to address 

issues on climate change and global warming.

3. Picketing—targeting a specific facility or building, 

such as the September 15, 2002, pickets at the 

Ukrainian Embassy in Washington, D.C., by the 

members of the Forum of Ukrainian Students 

of America, to honor Ukrainian journalists, and 

civil and political activists who had died after 

Ukrainian independence. 

4. Sit-ins/sit-downs—nonviolent occupation of a 

building or public place and refusal to leave until 

demands have been met or an agreement reached. 

Sit-ins were widespread in the 1960s by African 

American college students across the United States 

campaigning to end racial segregation. A recent 

example is Occupy Wall Street in 2011. 

Political demonstrations are generally peaceful, 

but violence and vandalism may occur, sometimes 

deliberately provoked by organizations such as the 

“Black Bloc”, which exploit demonstrations to further 

their own political ends. Violent demonstrations are a 

particular problem for local police, as the inability to 

handle them properly may have serious implications for 

police-community relations. 

The Black Bloc

◾ The Black Block is an international anarchist organization (also known as the Revolutionary AntiCapitalist Bloc) started in Germany in 1987, which soon spread to the United States and Canada . Its 

unofficial center in America is Eugene, Oregon . 

◾ It is best known for its violent demonstrations in Seattle in 1999 against the World Trade Organization . 

Other demonstrations include the 2001 demonstration at the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City, 

Canada; and the demonstrations in July 2001 in Genoa, Italy, at the General Assembly Summit . In 

recent years the Black Bloc has targeted such large American corporations as Banana Republic, Gap, 

Levi’s, McDonald’s, Old Navy, and Starbucks . 

◾ Black Bloc protesters arrive at demonstrations dressed in three layers . The outermost layer is regular 

clothes worn at the beginning of the demonstration before the Black Bloc tactics are activated . The 

middle layer is all black clothing (and a black mask worn when the members are given the signal to 

engage in confrontation) . The last layer involves regular clothes to escape from police . 

◾ The Black Bloc often deploys in tight formations (in black) when confronting the police, or intimidating 

other groups .
132 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers

Problem Gatherings

In most cases, your department will be called 

on to deal with smaller demonstrations that 

involve picketing or sit-ins. Sit-ins are common in 

administrative or congressional offices. For example, 

constituents may stage a sit-in in the office of their 

representative to protest his or her voting record. 

Sit-ins are especially common outside abortion and 

Planned Parenthood clinics. 

Picketing is more common among employees who 

are dissatisfied with wages, long hours, working 

conditions, and related issues. Picketing will 

also sometimes be undertaken to block access to 

government buildings and corporations. Pickets are 

generally non-violent, but the police department’s 

inability to handle the protests properly may lead to 

violent confrontations. 

Public-Order Policing

Aversion to disruption is used when police want to prevent demonstrations from interfering with the normal 

functioning of the city, for example, by denying the right to march on city streets and confining marches to 

sidewalks or to restricted areas and times of the day.

Controlling access involves the use of concrete or metal barriers to separate the protesters from the public 

and to control access through limited entry points.

Divide and conquer allows the police to have access to almost all parts of the demonstration by subdividing 

the crowds into smaller groups by the use of interlocking metal “french barriers.” This makes it difficult for 

demonstrators to circulate freely, while allowing effective control of the crowds.

Shock and awe involves deploying a very large number of police officers to deter outbreaks of violence or 

other unlawful behavior. Police might employ less-than-lethal weapons to deal with protestors and commonly 

arrest leaders who promote violence or are themselves engaged in violence.

Zero tolerance involves the rigorous enforcement of legal statutes during demonstrations. Failure to comply 

with the provisions of a permit may be met by police in full riot gear shutting down sound systems and mass 

arrests of protesters at the expiration time of a permit to demonstrate.

Non-confrontational crowd management involves supporting the legitimate aims of demonstrators while 

avoiding confrontation that may alienate the crowd as a whole. Unruly or violent crowd members are carefully 

identified and removed by the police.

Dialogue policing is an extension of non-confrontational crowd management (Step 25). It aids 

communication between demonstrators and police commanders through specially-trained police officers in 

the crowd. This encourages self-policing among demonstrators, facilitates legitimate expression of freedom of 

speech and assembly, and prevents miscommunication between the police and demonstrators.

Source: Madensen and Knutsson 2010.

What can you do?

Stay informed about current political issues that may 

possibly become reasons for political demonstrations. 

Gather information on groups in your jurisdiction 

who are most likely to act on these issues. Study the 

backgrounds of these groups and determine their 

overall demonstration “style.” 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 133

Problem Gatherings

Political protesters use the Internet to voice their 

concerns, recruit new members, and to announce 

the locations and times where protests are to be held. 

Therefore, you can monitor the websites operated 

by these groups to gain understanding about their 

networks and activities. Some of these websites 

include: 

◾ Infoshop www.infoshop.org

◾ Spunk Press www.spunk.org

◾ Anarchy Archives www.anarchyarchives.org

◾ Liberty for the People http://flag.blackened.net/

liberty/liberty.html

◾ Noam Chomsky Archive www.zmag.org/

chomsky/index.cfm

◾ Independent Media Center www.indymedia.org

Identify possible locations/targets, such as government 

buildings, corporate headquarters, financial 

institutions, and other symbolic buildings. Decide what 

strategies can be implemented and how these should 

differ from site to site and from group to group.

Gather information about strategies used by other 

police departments to handle similar situations. 

Determine if these strategies suit your police 

department’s operational goals and whether any of the 

strategies would undermine community relations. 

What can your agency do?

Police departments throughout the country have 

used a variety of approaches to control political 

demonstrators and other crowds (see PublicOrder Policing on page 132). Which of these your 

department adopts in any particular situation may 

depend partly on its philosophy, but also on the 

groups they are dealing with. 

Aggressive police intervention strategies may lead 

to violence in otherwise peaceful demonstrations, 

therefore, cooperative intervention is vital in 

controlling demonstrators. Keep in mind also, that 

advance changes to the setting can reduce damage. 

These include: blocking off streets and particular 

buildings; removing items such as building rubble that 

can be used as weapons; and temporary removal of 

street furniture such as trash cans that can be burned. 

Lastly, your department can use electronic surveillance 

technologies to provide real-time information on 

demonstrations and quickly send in more police 

should the crowd turn violent. 

READ MORE: 

Tamara Madensen and Johannes Knutsson, eds . 2010 . 

Preventing Crowd Violence. Vol . 26 of Crime Prevention 

Studies . Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc .
134 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers

STUDENT PARTY RIOTS

PARTIES ARE ALMOST SYNONYMOUS WITH STUDENT LIFE, BUT IF UNREGULATED, THEY CAN RESULT IN BEHAVIORS

requiring police intervention. These behaviors include underage drinking, binge drinking, drunk driving, sexual 

misconduct, fighting, sexual assaults, drugs, violence, noise, litter, and vandalism. 

Studies of blood alcohol concentration levels 

have found that students at fraternity parties get 

significantly more intoxicated than those at other 

parties. In one large study of 140 colleges, 44 percent 

of the students surveyed reported binge drinking and 

19 percent were frequent binge drinkers—those who 

binged three or more times in two weeks. 

Common features of student parties 

◾ The students present are mostly young adults—

some may be under 21

◾ Alcohol is generally consumed in large amounts 

and drugs may also be used

◾ The parties begin late at night and may continue 

into the early morning

◾ Males are most often responsible for fighting or 

destructive behavior

◾ The parties may result in noise complaints from 

local residents

◾ Drunk driving is common

◾ Students may engage in unplanned or unprotected 

sexual activity

◾ Other young adults not associated with the college 

may also gather at the parties 

◾ Students may get into trouble with campus or 

local police

The “life cycle” of student parties

Madensen and Eck report that the larger parties have 

a “life cycle” of five stages, around which police should 

organize their responses (see Table 18 on page 135).

Examples of what has been done to address 

the problem

Michigan State University used campaigns designed 

to challenge the attitudes and expectations of students 

regarding “celebration drinking.” The campaigns made 

use of student and local newspapers and incorporated 

the distribution of flyers in campuses, student 

residences, and at Greek Life fairs. 

The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation funded “A 

Matter of Degree” (AMOD) to reduce high-risk 

drinking among college students, which resulted in 

significant changes in drinking behaviors and decreases 

in related drunk driving, wild party complaints, and 

charges of maintaining a disorderly house. 

Some police departments offer the “Adopt-the-Cop” 

program. This makes a police officer available at 

student gatherings to serve as a mentor and advisor to 

ensure compliance with city and college requirements 

for student parties. 

In Minnesota, the Winona City Council passed an 

ordinance to control and track keg distribution. 

Anyone purchasing two or more half-barrels of beer 

in a residentially zoned area was required to obtain 

council approval, and liquor retailers were required to 

keep detailed records of barrels sold. 

Rutgers University enforces good behavior at Greek 

parties through its Board of Control, which comprises 

fraternity and sorority students who check on parties 

in progress to ensure there is no vandalism, sexual 

misconduct, fighting, or other misbehavior. Local 

police train these students in how to handle violent 

situations, write up violations of school policy, and 

call the police in case of violence. Parties are limited 

to Friday and Saturday nights and require registration 

with the Fraternity Affairs Office and the local police 

department. The Board of Control checks out the party 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 135

Problem Gatherings

three times a night, between the hours of 10:00 PM 

and 2:00 AM, where a checklist is completed about 

control measures such as checking IDs, using stamps or 

bracelets to identify guests, and keeping the noise down.

What can you do?

Study local college policies on controlling 

student parties and make contact with university 

administration should you need to find out more 

about these policies and how they are enforced. 

Work closely with campus police or security to gather 

information on upcoming parties by monitoring student 

newspapers and student postings at college campuses. 

Work with local student organizations to gather 

information about times of the day and days of the 

week parties are most likely to be held, how long 

they last, types of drinks consumed, how alcohol is 

obtained, whether drinking games are played, and any 

associated problematic behaviors. 

Make contact with local college fraternities and 

sororities to find out more about the policies currently 

used to monitor and control Greek parties. 

Table 18. Five stages of large parties

STAGE SUGGESTED RESPONSES

1. Initial Planning. Deciding to host a party, when 

and where; deciding whom to invite and how to invite 

them. Students are invited through flyers posted 

months in advance, word of mouth, or simple cues 

indicating that there will be a student party/gathering 

somewhere soon. 

Create a multi-agency task force with other community 

stakeholders, most importantly with the college 

concerned. 

Require a permit for a party of more than a few friends. 

Assign police officers as advisors to hosts of gatherings.

2. Preassembly preparation. Obtaining alcohol and 

food by hosts or guests before the party.

Ask students to participate in “student patrols” 

by establishing “peer security” groups within the 

gathering.

Monitor advertisements for gatherings.

3. Assembling process. Heading for the party. Students 

may drive, take a taxi or bus, or simply walk to the 

location. 

Facilitate orderly gathering by providing transportation 

to the event. 

Establish a positive police presence, intended to 

reduce anonymity for police and students and enhance 

communication. 

Establish gathering perimeters in order to gain control 

of disturbances.

4. Assembled gathering. Having congregated, students 

talk, drink, and possibly engage in other behaviors 

associated with student parties.

Use alternative deployment methods, such as horses 

and bike patrols.

Videotape the party to reduce anonymity.

Develop a standard operating procedure in case of a 

disturbance.

5. Dispersal process. The party is over and students 

return to their dorms or apartments. Drunk driving 

may be a problem if students have reached the party in 

their own vehicles.

Provide transportation from the event to dorms or 

other centralized locations. 

Ask people to leave when the party is over. 

Source: Madensen and Eck 2006.
136 Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 

Problem Gatherings

What can your agency do?

Discuss the alcohol policies effective on campus with 

local college administrators and suggest possible 

improvements should you find the college has 

problems effectively controlling student parties. 

Organize regular meetings/presentations on college 

campuses to discuss the dangers associated with 

irresponsible behavior at student parties. 

Encourage colleges to give warnings and impose 

disciplinary actions against students who are engaged 

in disorderly conduct, violence, or other behaviors 

associated with student parties.

Form a partnership with student organizations and 

campus police/security to promote a safe party 

environment and responsible behavior at student 

parties. At the beginning of each academic year, 

discuss alcohol laws, off campus behavior, and other 

safety issues related to student parties with fraternity 

and sorority presidents. 

Make clear to local bars, restaurants, and liquor outlets 

that sales to underage students will not be tolerated. 

Promote responsible beverage services, strengthen 

enforcement of drunk driving laws, and, where 

necessary, seek changes in local zoning ordinances to 

reduce the density of alcohol sales outlets.

Work with local rental property owners to require 

them to provide safe and secure apartments to 

students living off campus. Encourage them to call 

police in the event of problematic parties being held in 

their apartments. 

READ MORE: 

Tamara Madensen and John Eck . 2006 . Student 

Party Riots . Problem-Oriented Guides for Police . 

Problem-Specific Guide Series, No . 39 . Washington, 

D .C .: U .S . Department of Justice, Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services . 
Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers 137

About the Authors

About the Authors

John E. Eck

John Eck is a criminal justice professor at the University of Cincinnati, where he teaches police effectiveness, 

research methods, and crime prevention. His research has focused on the development of problem-oriented 

policing, police effectiveness, crime patterns, and crime prevention. Dr. Eck was a member of the National 

Academy of Science’s Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices. With Ronald Clarke, he 

authored Crime Analysis for Problem-Solvers: In 60 Small Steps. He is also the author of many publications on 

problem-oriented policing, crime mapping, and crime prevention, some written for the Center for ProblemOriented Policing. Dr. Eck received his bachelor’s and master’s degrees from the University of Michigan, and his 

doctorate from the University of Maryland’s Department of Criminology. 

Ronald V. Clarke

Ronald Clarke is university professor at Rutgers University and associate director of the Center for ProblemOriented Policing. He was previously head of the British government’s criminological research department, 

where he had a significant role in the development of situational crime prevention and the British Crime Survey. 

Dr. Clarke is the founding editor of Crime Prevention Studies, and his publications include Designing out Crime

(HMSO 1980), The Reasoning Criminal (Springer-Verlag 1986), Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case 

Studies (Harrow and Heston 1997), Superhighway Robbery: Preventing E-commerce Crime (Willan Publishing 

2003), Outsmarting the Terrorists (Praeger 2006), and with John Eck, Become a Problem Solving Crime Analyst

(U.S. Department of Justice 2005). He was formerly chair of the selection committee for the annual Herman 

Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing.

Gohar Petrossian

Gohar Petrossian is an assistant professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. She is the author of Export 

of Stolen Vehicles across Land Borders (Problem-Specific Guide No. 63, with Ronald V. Clarke), co-author of 

Shoplifting (2nd Edition) (Problem-Specific Guide No. 11, with Ronald V. Clarke), and scholarly articles published 

in Journal of Experimental Criminology and Security Journal. She holds a doctorate in criminal justice from the 

School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University-Newark, and a master’s in criminal law and procedure from John 

Jay College of Criminal Justice. 


KNOWING HOW INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS CAN HELP SOLVE PROBLEMS

and how problem solving can improve the effectiveness of intelligence 

analysis will aid any police practitioner interested in reducing crime 

or disorder . Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers fuses aspects of 

intelligence analysis with Problem-Oriented Policing . It is focused on 

the analysis of intelligence and has been written for three groups in 

local policing agencies: (1) intelligence officers and analysts, (2) crime 

analysts who may be called upon to use intelligence information and, 

(3) police managers who supervise crime and intelligence analysts .

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

145 N Street NE

Washington, DC 20530

To obtain details on COPS Office programs, 

call the COPS Office Response Center at 800-421-6770.

Visit COPS Online at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

ISBN: 978-1-935676-55-3

September 2013

e031313555