COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Ke lsey, Haley and Petty Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

MITCHELL L. PHELPS, INC. MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 1785-06-4 WILLIAM G. PETTY JULY 3, 2007 BOARD OF COUNTY SU PERVISORS OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUN TY AND SUE CHOZICK, ACTING ZONING ADMINISTRATOR OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY J. Peyton Farmer, Judge Designate John V. Notarianni (Velasquez & Associates, Ltd., on brief), for appellant. Jeffrey R.B. Notz, Assistant County Attorney (Ross Horton, County Attorney, on brief), for appellees.
Appellant Mitchell L. Phelps, Inc., appeals from a contempt order. Phelps argues that the trial court erred by: 1) violating Rule 1:1 of the Rules of the Suprem e Court of Virginia by amending, modifying, and expandin g the July 27, 2005 final order wi thout jurisdiction; 2) changing the terms of the fina l order and re-writin g the County code by substituting the word “max imum” for “minimum” as it relates to tree placement; 3) orde ring the removal of stru ctures and property of persons who were not a party to the suit; and 4) grantin g the County blanket i ndemnity fo r claims that may arise from the enforcement of its order. For the reasons di scussed below, we disagree with Phelps and affirm the trial court’s decision.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - I. B ACKGROUND Mitchell L. Phelps, Inc. owns property located at 14843 Dumfries Road, Manassas, Virginia. The proper ty is used as an automobi le “graveyard” (junkyard). The County filed a bill of complaint for injunctive re lief alleging numerous violations of the Prince Will iam County Zoning ordinance. On July 27, 2005, the trial court entered an order finding Phelps responsible for several violations of the County ordina nce and ordering Phelps to comply with Pr ince William County Code § 32-601.50. The Co de requires a 20-foot setback for all st ructures and uses from all property lines. It further requires that the setback area be screened by a solid, uniformly-colored wood or masonry fence of sufficient height to screen the property from p ublic view; a double, staggered row of evergreens consisting of trees an d shrubs, at least six feet in heig ht at the time of planting with minimum 15-foot spacing; and that all fences and plantings be maintained in good condition. Prince William Count y Code § 32.601-50 . The trial court further ordere d Phelps to co mply with its order within ninety days.

On December 12, 2005, Tyler Cowherd, a Property Code Enforcement In spector for Prince William County, inspected the ju nkyard. Cowherd stated that the junkyard “looked almost identical to what I saw before” th e trial court’s July 2005 order. Cowherd concluded that there was “no evidence whatsoever that [Phelps] has complied in any way with” the July 2005 order. Following Cowherd’s inspection, the County filed a motion to show cause why Phelps should not be held in cont empt of the trial court’s Ju ly 2005 order. The tria l court held a hearing on the motion on March 15, 2006, and subsequently issued an order find ing Phelps in contempt of its July 2005 order. The contempt order allowed th e County to (1) enter the junkyard and remove all unpermitted structures ; (2) create a setback area and install a fence as describe d in Prince William County Code § 32-601.50; and (3) plant a double-staggered row of ev ergreens at least six feet in height at the time of planting with a maximum of fifteen feet of space between each plant. The- 3 - contempt order also required Phelps to hold the County harmless and indemnify them for any claims that might arise from the County carrying out the provisions of this order. This appeal followed.
II. A NALYSIS Phelps’ contentions involve the trial court’s remedy for its contempt of the earlier trial court’s order. It is axiomatic that a court may find a party in contempt for “disobedience or resistance . . . to any lawful process, judgment, decree or order of the court.” Code § 18.2-456(5); see also Higginbotham v. Commonwealth , 206 Va. 291, 294, 142 S.E.2d 746, 749 (1965) (“It has long been recognized an d established that a court is invested with power to pun ish for contempt, both by the inherent nature and constitution of the court and by [statute].”) (internal citations omitted). On appeal, “[a]n adjudication of contempt w ill be reversed ‘only if we find that the court abused its discretion.’” Es tate of Hackle r v. Hackler , 33 Va. App. 51, 64- 65, 602 S.E.2d 426, 433 (2004) (quoting Barnhill v. Brooks , 15 Va. App. 696, 704, 427 S.E. 2d 209, 215 (1993)). At oral argument, Phelps conceded that it was in contempt of the tr ial court’s original order. Initially, we hold that Phelps’ argument rega rding Rule 1:1 is without merit. Phelps argues that the trial court’s contempt orde r impermissibly “amend [ed], modif[ied] and expand[ed] the July 27, 2005 final order.” On the contrary, the parties were before the court on an entirely different matter: Phelps’ contempt of the July 2005 order. Moreover, the record reveals that the trial court denied Phelps’ motion to re-open the underlying case at the show-cause hearing, and went on to hear the separate issue of Ph elps’ contempt of its July 2005 order. Thus, there is no viola tion of Rule 1:1 in this case. Phelps also argues that the trial court should be reversed beca use it changed th e terms of the 2005 final order and re-wrote the County code by subs tituting the word “max imum” for “minimum” as it relates to tree pl acement. Once again, we disagree with Phelps.- 4 - Our Supreme Court has stated that “t he punishment which may be imposed [for contempt] is not limited to a fine and/or imprisonment. It is adapted to what is necessary to afford the injured party remedial relief for in jury or damage done by the violation of the [order] . . . .” Deeds v. Gilmer , 162 Va. 157, 262, 174 S.E. 37, 78-79 (1934). Here, the remedy fashioned by the trial court was, essentially, a llowing the County to enter into Phelps’ property and remedy the ill that Phelps’ disobedience to the July 2005 order had ca used: the continued violation of the County zoning ordinance. While the trial court did depart from the wording of the County code when it required th at the evergreens be planted a maximum of fifteen feet apart, as opposed to a minimum of fifteen feet apart, it was free to do so as a part of its inherent power to fashion an appropriate punishment for the cont empt of its orders. There is nothing in the record or in Phelps’ argument i ndicating that the trial court’s de parture from the language of the County code is an abuse of discretion.

Phelps also argues that the junk and unpermitte d structures on its property belong to its tenants, and that the trial court lacked authority to order it to remove its tenants’ property. According to the County code, Phelps is responsib le for the zoning violation – not its tenants.
See Prince William County Code § 32.1000.1 (“An owner of property shall be responsible for, and subject to prosecution and conviction for, an y violation of this chapter found to exist on his property.”). 1 Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in ordering Phelps to comply with the zoning ordinance based on the plain language of the County code.

1 We also note that the record does not reflect any attempt by Ph elps to join its tenants as parties to the original suit, nor did Phelps ever attempt to appeal the trial court’s original July 2005 decision on the merits of this case. Thus, the issue of whether the trial court was without jurisdiction over the tenants and their property is not before this Court. See Rule 5A:6 (requiring a notice of appeal be filed within thirty days afte r entry of the final order).- 5 - Finally, Phelps argues that th e trial court erred by gran ting the County indemnity for claims that may arise from enforcement of the c ourt’s order. We disagree with Phelps and hold that the trial court acted within its discretion in this matter. Our decision in Epperly v. County of Montgomery , 46 Va. App. 546, 620 S.E.2d 125 (2005), controls the outcome of this case. In Epperly , the trial court found the appellant in contempt for failure to comply with its order re quiring him to bring his property, which was used as an automobile graveyard, into complian ce with the County zoning ordinance. Id. at 551-52, 620 S.E.2d at 128. As part of its contem pt order, the trial court in Epperly granted authority for the County to “enter upon the [property] fo r the purpose of removing any and all junk material . . . which, within the discretion of th e County, constitutes junk ma terials the storage of which is prohibited and unlawful unde r the Montgomery County Code.” Id. at 552, 620 S.E.2d at 128. The trial court also ordered that the C ounty would be “free and clear of liability for damage or destruction to prope rty . . . .” when carrying out the trial court’s order. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We affirmed the contempt order in Epperly , determining it to be “‘no more than what was necessary to compel [the appellant] to comply with the code and to protect the [County’s] rights . . . .’” Id. at 557, 620 S.E.2d at 131 (quoting Rainey v. City of Norfolk , 14 Va. App. 968, 975, 421 S.E.2d 210, 211-12 (1992)). Because the case before us is indistinguishable from Epperly , we are bound to follow the rationale in Epperly and conclude that th e trial court did not abuse its discretion by instructing Phelps to hold harmless and i ndemnify the County.
III. C ONCLUSION We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Affirmed.