[Cite as State v. Geiger, 2016-Ohio-7571.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 15AP-1120 

 (C.P.C. No. 14CR-5148) 

v. : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

Travis L. Geiger, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on November 1, 2016 

 

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and 

Barbara A. Farnbacher, for appellee. Argued: Barbara A. 

Farnbacher.

On brief: Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and John W. 

Keeling, for appellant. Argued: John W. Keeling.

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

BROWN, J. 

{¶1} Travis L. Geiger, defendant-appellant, appeals from a judgment of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, in which the court found him guilty, pursuant to 

a plea of no contest, of possession of cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.11, a first-degree 

felony; and tampering with evidence, in violation of R.C. 2921.12, a third-degree felony. 

Specifically, in this appeal, appellant contests the trial court's denial of his motions to 

suppress evidence. 

{¶2} On the afternoon of December 6, 2013, Ryan Steele, a patrol officer with the 

Columbus Police Department, saw appellant in a parked car in an area known for drug 
No. 15AP-1120 2

sales. Officer Steele radioed other officers to wait for appellant's vehicle to leave and then 

watch for a traffic violation. Appellant drove away and parked on another street. Officer 

Steele positioned his cruiser behind appellant's vehicle and approached appellant's 

vehicle. Officer Steele initially was going to engage in a consensual encounter with 

appellant but then saw the vehicle was parked in a no parking zone. Officer Steele asked 

appellant if he knew he was parked in a no parking zone and asked for appellant's 

identification. Appellant, a man who weighs approximately 400 pounds, asked Officer 

Steele if he could get out of the vehicle to retrieve his identification from the center 

console. Appellant got out of the vehicle and leaned inside. Officer Steele observed 

appellant remove a bag with a white substance from the center console. Officer Steele 

initially testified that he was standing behind appellant when he observed the bag but, on 

cross-examination, testified that he was in front of the vehicle and observed the bag 

through the front windshield. Steele then positioned himself to the rear of the driver's 

door and saw appellant's hand was empty. Steele could see the top of the bag in 

appellant's coat pocket. Steele was not certain about what the bag contained, so he asked 

appellant if he could search him, and appellant raised his hands, which Steele considered 

a manifestation of consent. Steele then retrieved the bag of cocaine from appellant's coat 

pocket. 

{¶3} Appellant was indicted for possession of cocaine and tampering with 

evidence. On October 29, 2014, appellant filed three motions to suppress, seeking to 

(1) suppress evidence stemming from the search of his vehicle, (2) suppress evidence 

stemming from the search of his person, and (3) suppress any statements made during 

such searches. The trial court held a hearing on the motions to suppress, at which Steele, 

among others, testified. At a second hearing on the motions to suppress, the trial court 

decided to recall Steele at a later hearing to clarify his testimony. The trial court held a 

third hearing on the motions to suppress and, after receiving testimony from Steele, the 

court denied appellant's motions to suppress. Appellant subsequently entered a plea of no 

contest. 

{¶4} On November 12, 2015, the trial court entered a judgment finding appellant 

guilty of possession of cocaine and tampering with evidence. The court sentenced 

appellant to 4 years of imprisonment on the possession of cocaine count and 12 months of 
No. 15AP-1120 3 

imprisonment on the tampering with evidence count, with the sentences to run 

concurrently. The court also imposed a fine of $10,000, a 24-month suspension of 

appellant's driving privileges, and 5 years of post-release control. Appellant appeals the 

judgment of the trial court, asserting the following two assignments of error: 

[I.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED 

THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION[S] TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 

OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF AN INVESTIGATION AND 

DETENTION THAT EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE 

GROUNDS JUSTIFYING THE INITIAL DETENTION, 

WHICH WAS TO ISSUE A PARKING CITATION. 

[II.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THE 

DEFENDANT GUILTY OF TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE 

WHEN THE FACTS PRESENTED BY THE STATE 

INDICATED THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT GUILTY 

OF THIS OFFENSE. 

 

{¶5} Appellant argues in his first assignment of error that the trial court erred 

when it denied his motions to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an investigation 

and detention that exceeded the scope of the grounds justifying the initial detention, 

which was to issue a parking citation. An appellate review of a ruling on a motion to 

suppress evidence presents mixed questions of law and fact. State v. Long, 127 Ohio 

App.3d 328, 332 (4th Dist.1998). During a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes 

the role of the trier of fact and is, therefore, in the best position to resolve questions of fact 

and evaluate witness credibility. State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366 (1992); State v. 

Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521, 548 (2d Dist.1996). As a result, an appellate court must 

accept a trial court's factual findings if they are supported by competent and credible 

evidence. State v. Guysinger, 86 Ohio App.3d 592, 594 (4th Dist.1993). The reviewing 

court must then review the trial court's application of the law de novo. State v. Russell, 

127 Ohio App.3d 414, 416 (9th Dist.1998). 

{¶6} The State of Ohio, plaintiff-appellee, argues that appellant never raised an 

argument challenging the scope or duration of the detention in either his motions to 

suppress or the suppression hearings. The state claims these issues cannot be raised now 

for the first time on appeal, and, thus, appellant waived them for purposes of appeal. The 

state contends that appellant only argued at the hearings that Officer Steele's testimony 
No. 15AP-1120 4 

was not credible and there was no probable cause, while his generic motions challenged 

only the search of his car and the "stop and frisk" without any specific arguments as 

applied to the facts of this case. 

{¶7} Crim.R. 12 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 

(C) Pretrial motions. Prior to trial, any party may raise by 

motion any defense, objection, evidentiary issue, or request 

that is capable of determination without the trial of the 

general issue. The following must be raised before trial: 

* * * 

(3) Motions to suppress evidence, including but not limited to 

statements and identification testimony, on the ground that it 

was illegally obtained. Such motions shall be filed in the trial 

court only. 

* * * 

(H) Effect of failure to raise defenses or objections. Failure by 

the defendant to raise defenses or objections or to make 

requests that must be made prior to trial, at the time set by 

the court pursuant to division (D) of this rule, or prior to any 

extension of time made by the court, shall constitute waiver of 

the defenses or objections, but the court for good cause shown 

may grant relief from the waiver. 

{¶8} When a defendant seeks to suppress evidence, he must apprise the 

prosecutor of the grounds on which he challenges the validity of the evidence. Xenia v. 

Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 218 (1988). The failure of a defendant to adequately specify 

the grounds for his motion to suppress evidence results in a waiver of that issue on 

appeal. Id. The defendant must "raise the grounds upon which the validity of the search or 

seizure is challenged in such a manner as to give the prosecutor notice of the basis for the 

challenge." Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. The Supreme Court of Ohio has further 

held that a motion to suppress must "state with particularity the legal and factual issues to 

be resolved," thereby placing the prosecutor and court "on notice of those issues to be 

heard and decided by the court and, by omission, those issues which are otherwise being 

waived." State v. Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d 54, 58 (1994). 
No. 15AP-1120 5

{¶9} Here, appellant's motions to suppress raised no specific issues and were 

only general motions containing boilerplate language. At the hearings on the motions to 

suppress, neither party raised the prolonged detention issue in its opening or closing 

arguments. The only issues appellant's counsel raised at the three hearings were that 

Officer Steele's testimony was not credible due to inconsistencies in his testimony and the 

lack of probable cause. At the second hearing, appellant's counsel summarized his 

position by stating: 

All of this goes to the credibility and these other things of the 

officer's testimony in terms of this Court making a 

determination on probable cause. I think the officer's 

testimony is not credible. I think there was no probable cause. 

And I think that's the state of the evidence. 

(July 16, 2015 Tr. at 11-12.) 

{¶10} At the third hearing, during which Officer Steele was recalled as a witness by 

the court for clarification, appellant's counsel stated after the close of testimony: 

I think the bottom line is there was no probable cause for the 

actions of this officer. The officer's credibility has been 

extremely compromised because of all these different 

statements in the same hearing and then different statements 

today. I mean, who do we believe? What do we believe? We'd 

ask the Court to grant our motion. 

(July 20, 2015 Tr. at 35.) 

{¶11} In the trial court's oral pronouncement, the court did not make any 

reference to the prolonged detention issue appellant raises under this assignment of error. 

The trial court's decision was based on its belief that Officer Steele's testimony at the third 

suppression hearing was credible, and because he was able to observe the contraband, he 

had the right to take the contraband from appellant and proceed from there. Appellant 

never moved the trial court to amend his written motions to suppress to include the 

prolonged detention issue and did not attempt to establish "good cause" for relief from the 

waiver. Crim.R. 12(H). 

{¶12} Furthermore, appellant cannot raise his prolonged detention argument for 

the first time in his appeal to this court. "It is well-settled law that issues not raised in the 
No. 15AP-1120 6

trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal because such issues are deemed 

waived." State v. Barrett, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-375, 2011-Ohio-4986, ¶ 13. This waiver rule 

applies to arguments not asserted either in a written motion to suppress or at a 

suppression hearing. State v. Johnson, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-637, 2014-Ohio-671, ¶ 14. 

Appellant never made that argument either in his written motions to suppress or at the 

suppression hearings. As noted above, the trial court also did not expressly consider that 

argument in ruling on appellant's motions to suppress. Accordingly, appellant waived 

this prolonged detention argument for purposes of this appeal by failing to raise it in the 

trial court in any manner. 

{¶13} For the foregoing reasons, we find that appellant waived the prolonged 

detention argument by failing to raise it in his motions to suppress or at the suppression 

hearings. In addition, we find appellant waived the argument by raising it for the first 

time on appeal. Therefore, appellant's first assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶14} Appellant argues in his second assignment of error that the trial court erred 

when it found he was guilty of tampering with evidence when the facts presented by the 

state at the plea hearing indicated that he was not guilty of the offense. R.C. 2921.12, 

provides, in pertinent part: 

(A) No person, knowing that an official proceeding or 

investigation is in progress, or is about to be or likely to be 

instituted, shall do any of the following: 

(1) Alter, destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, 

or thing, with purpose to impair its value or availability as 

evidence in such proceeding or investigation; 

(2) Make, present, or use any record, document, or thing, 

knowing it to be false and with purpose to mislead a public 

official who is or may be engaged in such proceeding or 

investigation, or with purpose to corrupt the outcome of any 

such proceeding or investigation. 

{¶15} Here, after appellant entered his no-contest plea, the trial court informed 

appellant that "the State will present the Court with facts and if those facts are sufficient, 

there will be a finding of guilty." (Sept. 24, 2015 Tr. at 8.) The court then asked the state 

to present the facts, and the following exchange took place: 
No. 15AP-1120 7

MS. SACKSTEDER: Your Honor, on December 6 of 2013, the 

Defendant, Travis Geiger, was sitting in a car that was parked 

in a no parking zone at North Ohio and Toronto in Columbus, 

Ohio, Franklin County, Ohio. Columbus police officers 

approached him, asked him for his driver's license. The 

Defendant asked to get out of his car so he could get the 

driver's license from the center console. 

The officer was watching him as he was retrieving his driver's 

license and saw him put what appeared to be a large baggie of 

cocaine into his coat pocket. The officers then asked the 

Defendant for consent to search his person. The Defendant 

agreed. The officers found in the coat pocket 51.77 grams of 

cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance. 

This cocaine was, in fact, analyzed by a chemist and found to 

be that much cocaine. 

This did all occur in Franklin County, Ohio. 

THE COURT: What's the Tampering all about, counsel? I 

need to -- 

MS. SACKSTEDER: Your Honor, it was the hiding the 

cocaine in his coat pocket when the officers had asked him for 

his driver's license. 

I believe the Tampering does -- the statute does read that he 

did -- knowing that an official proceeding or investigation was 

in progress or was about to be or likely to be instituted did 

alter, destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, or 

thing with purpose to impair its value or availability as 

evidence. 

THE COURT: Mr. Gordon, anything you wish to add, sir? 

MR. GORDON: No, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: With respect to the Possession of Cocaine, the 

Court will enter a finding of guilty based upon the facts 

submitted to the Court. 

I'm having some issues with the Tampering. 
No. 15AP-1120 8

MS. SACKSTEDER: Your Honor, I would submit that it is 

directly in line with the statute. Mr. Geiger was approached, 

asked to get out of his car to retrieve his driver's license -- 

THE COURT: He wasn't asked to get out of his car, was he? 

MS. SACKSTEDER: He was not. He requested to get out of 

his car so he could reach into the center console for his 

driver's license. It will be the State's belief that that was in 

order to give him a better position to hide the cocaine, conceal 

it in his coat pocket that he knew was in the center console. 

THE COURT: Did he ever get his license? 

MS. SACKSTEDER: I don't recall that, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: I don't either. I know we've had hearings in 

this matter and - - 

MS. SACKSTEDER: It does indicate Officer Steele asked Mr. 

Geiger for his driver's license. He said he didn't have it -- oh, 

he said he had it, but. It -- he wasn't able to locate it in his 

pants pocket. Mr. Geiger exited the vehicle to better locate his 

driver's license. 

He then reached back in the vehicle and opened the center 

console. The officer positioned himself so he could see. 

Officer Steele believed Mr. Geiger was attempting to conceal 

what appeared to be contraband, which appeared to be 

cocaine or crack cocaine. 

It does not indicate if he did ever give them his driver's 

license. However, he was, if the Court recalls, cited for the 

failure to signal by the officer -- other officer, Officer Gitlitz, 

who was following him in a different cruiser. 

THE COURT: I was consulting my previous notes in this case 

which is what the time was. 

The Court will enter a finding of guilty on the Tampering, 

Count 2, also. 

(Sept. 24, 2015 Tr. at 9-12.) 
No. 15AP-1120 9

{¶16} Appellant argues there was no "official" investigation into a drug offense 

that was existing or likely to happen at the time appellant hid the cocaine in his coat 

pocket. Appellant maintains that when he was reaching for his identification (and 

cocaine) in his console, the only investigation involved a parking violation, and his 

attempt to hide the cocaine did not impair any evidence that related to the parking 

violation investigation. 

{¶17} Although the trial court showed pause in finding the facts supported a 

finding of guilty as to the tampering with evidence charge, when a defendant pleads no 

contest, he admits to "the truth of the facts alleged in the indictment." Crim.R. 11(B)(2). 

"[W]here the indictment * * * contains sufficient allegations to state a felony offense and 

the defendant pleads no contest, the court must find the defendant guilty." State v. Bird, 

81 Ohio St.3d 582, 584 (1998). The indictment for appellant's tampering charge in the 

present case provided he "did, knowing that an official proceeding or investigation was in 

progress, or was about to be or likely to be instituted, alter, destroy, conceal, or remove 

any record, document, or thing with purpose to impair its value or availability as evidence 

in such proceeding or investigation." These allegations sufficiently stated the tampering 

offense. 

{¶18} An exception to the rule in Bird exists where "the prosecutor presents a 

statement of facts and those facts positively contradict the felony charged in the 

indictment by negating an element essential to the commission of the offense alleged." 

State v. Cooper, 168 Ohio App.3d 378, 2006-Ohio-4004, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.). In such a case, 

"the court may not make a finding of guilt on the basis of the charges alleged in the 

indictment." Id. 

{¶19} Here, the state's statement of facts did not positively contradict a tampering 

with evidence charge by negating the element of knowledge that an official investigation 

was in progress or was likely to be instituted. Although appellant might have had a cogent 

argument that the evidence did not support all of the elements to the offense of tampering 

with evidence had he decided to proceed to trial and develop certain facts, nothing the 

state presented in its statement of facts at the plea hearing "positively contradict[ed]" the 

facts or "negat[ed] an element" stated in the indictment. It is unclear why appellant 

attempted to conceal the cocaine in his coat pocket. Appellant may have needed to move 
No. 15AP-1120 10 

the cocaine out of necessity because the cocaine was blocking access to his identification, 

or he may have moved the cocaine because he feared Officer Steele would see it while he 

retrieved his identification. Under these scenarios, appellant would have concealed it in 

his coat pocket knowing that an official investigation was likely to be instituted if Officer 

Steele saw him move the cocaine, which turned out to be the case. Appellant may have 

also concealed the cocaine in his coat pocket believing Officer Steele had already seen it 

when he opened the console. Under this scenario, it is clear that appellant concealed the 

cocaine knowing that an investigation was likely to be instituted. It was appellant's own 

action in attempting to move the cocaine while in close proximity to an observing officer 

that initiated an official investigation into the contents of the bag, and appellant knew it 

was likely under the circumstances. The facts recited by the state would not negate or 

positively contradict any element of the offense of tampering with evidence. For the 

foregoing reasons, we find the trial court did not err when it accepted appellant's nocontest plea to the tampering with evidence charge. Therefore, appellant's second 

assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶20} Accordingly, appellant's two assignments of error are overruled, and the 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

LUPER SCHUSTER, J., concurs. 

HORTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 

HORTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

{¶21} The majority finds that appellant waived his first assignment of error, i.e., 

the trial court erred when it overruled defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained 

as a result of an investigation and detention that exceeded the scope of the grounds 

justifying the initial detention, which was to issue a parking citation, by failing to raise it 

in his motion to suppress or at the hearing. (Majority Decision at ¶ 13.) I believe that such 

rationale raised by the majority creates an improper expansion of the notice requirements 

for defendants. 

{¶22} The majority uses Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216 (1988), to support its 

position that when a defendant wishes to suppress evidence, he must provide the 
No. 15AP-1120 11

prosecutor notice of the basis for the challenge. (Majority Decision at ¶ 8.) In Xenia, the 

Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the court of appeals which reversed the trial court's 

denial of defendant's motion to suppress. In doing so, the court emphasized that once the 

defendant demonstrates a warrantless search or seizure and adequately clarifies the 

ground for the challenge is lack of probable cause, then the prosecutor bears the burden 

on going forward with evidence whether probable cause existed. Id. at paragraph two of 

the syllabus. The Xenia standard, which merely requires the defendant to "adequately" 

put the prosecution on notice of the basis for the challenge, is not erroneous. Id. at 220. In 

that case, the court faulted the defendant's initial motion for merely asserting that a 

breathalyzer test was "illegally obtained," with no further explanation of the grounds for 

the challenge: "The motion does not clarify whether the illegality is due to violation of the 

Fourth Amendment, another constitutional provision, or some unnamed statute or rule of 

common law." Id. The defendant even neglected to file a memorandum of law to support 

the motion. Id. These deficiencies were remedied at the evidentiary hearing, where the 

defendant's attorney stated that the officers had lacked the probable cause required to 

stop his client. Id. at 221. Thus, although the Xenia court found that defendant's motion 

to suppress lacked clarity, it still found that the state had enough notice given the 

information elicited at the motion to suppress hearing. 

{¶23} I believe this is similar to the instant case, in that appellant satisfied Xenia's 

notice requirement. Here, his motion to suppress may have been light on particulars, but 

it was adequate under the Xenia standard to put the prosecution on notice of the grounds 

for the challenge. Unlike the deficient motion filed by the Xenia defendant, appellant cited 

the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as Article I, Section 14, Ohio 

Constitution, both of which prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. Furthermore, 

appellant's motion mentioned Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a seminal Supreme Court 

case examining the constitutionally valid scope of a warrantless seizure. See Terry at 17-

18 (citing cases and noting that it had "held in the past that a search which is reasonable 

at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity"). 

Although the majority describes appellant's motion as mere "boilerplate," it would have 

sufficed under Xenia to put the prosecution on notice of the grounds for suppression. 

(Majority Decision at ¶ 9.) Furthermore, the trial court judge felt it was adequate to put 
No. 15AP-1120 12

the state on notice as it conducted a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence 

over the state's memorandum contra. 

{¶24} The state noted in the first paragraph of its memorandum contra: "[a]s 

defendant fails to sufficiently provide both a legal and factual basis upon which to 

properly decide the issues, said motion should be overruled. * * * Notwithstanding, an 

evidentiary hearing relative to claims of improper search and/or seizure will establish that 

the evidence sought to be introduced by the state was obtained by Constitutionally valid 

means and that no applicable Exclusionary Rule bars its admission into evidence." 

(May 27, 2015 Memo Contra Mot. to Suppress at 1.) 

{¶25} The trial court conducted three hearings on the warrantless search. 

Consequently, the state has the burden to prove a valid search and/or seizure, which 

undoubtedly includes a demonstration that the seizure was not an unduly long detention 

based on the circumstances. I believe the state had sufficient notice on all issues regarding 

the valid search and seizure (alleged prolonged detention) and the state met its burden 

given the facts found by the trial court. As the majority noted in the decision, appellate 

review involves mixed questions of law and fact and "an appellate court must accept a trial 

court's factual findings if they are supported by competent and credible evidence." 

(Majority Decision at ¶ 5.) 

{¶26} The trial court made the following statement in conveying its version of the facts: 

THE COURT: All right. You know, I had Officer Steele come 

back because I wanted some clarification as to his testimony 

in this matter. And I think in reviewing everything that has 

been testified to we come down to -- the 

salient point here is what occurred once he approached that 

vehicle. 

* * * 

So the Court in reviewing this motion has to look at what 

occurred once the officer approached that vehicle and what 

transpired after that. 

Listening to the testimony today, the Court is convinced 

that the officer had the ability to walk up to the front 

of the vehicle and observe Mr. Geiger attempt to 

retrieve his driver's license and get out the vehicle.
No. 15AP-1120 13 

Also, just looking at the exhibits, I think the comments with 

respect to how open the doors were, especially when you look 

at the vehicle from -- in Exhibit A, and looking at it, the door's 

not open all the way. The door's open maybe halfway. And if 

the door was fully open and Mr. Geiger was reaching inside 

and the officer said he walked around to his right side of Mr. 

Geiger as he was doing whatever he was doing with respect to 

from the console to his pocket, the officer testified he 

observed a bag in his pocket that he believed to be 

contraband. If he observed that, and as he testified he did, and 

it was contraband, he had the right to take the contraband 

from the Defendant and proceed from there. 

I think based upon the testimony that the Court has received 

in this matter that the motion to suppress should be denied, 

and the Court will deny it at this time. 

(Emphasis added.) (July 20, 2015 Tr. at 35-37.) 

{¶27} The trial court does not mention the questioning of appellant–apparently 

because it did not find a problem with it. Again, the trial court held three hearings due to 

the conflicting nature of Officer Steele's testimony, which included the conversation he 

had with appellant when he initially approached appellant. The trial court simply does not 

conclude that Officer Steele's initial conversation with appellant presented any problems. 

{¶28} The trial court made no mention that the officer's conduct converted the 

limited detention into a prolonged drug investigation due to an improper request to 

search his vehicle as appellant suggests. Therefore, I do not believe the waiver doctrine as 

applied by the majority is necessary when the court clearly rejects appellant's version of 

the facts. However, I concur with the majority in judgment only with respect to appellant's 

first assignment of error. 

{¶29} I respectfully dissent as to the majority's decision regarding the second 

assignment of error. 

____________________