IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

July 19, 2019 Session

IN RE KHLOE B. ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Washington County

No. 18-AD-0043 John C. Rambo, Chancellor

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No. E2018-02265-COA-R3-PT

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Kristin B. (“Mother”) appeals the judgment of the Washington County Chancery 

Court (“Trial Court”) terminating her parental rights to the children, Khloe B. and 

Madison B. (“the Children”). Upon petition of Matthew B. (“Father”) and Amanda B. 

(“Stepmother”) (collectively, “Petitioners”), the Trial Court found that Mother had 

abandoned the Children by her actions exhibiting wanton disregard for the Children’s 

welfare and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best 

interest. The Trial Court, therefore, terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children. 

Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court 

Affirmed; Case Remanded

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W.

MCCLARTY and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JJ., joined.

Michelle Caggiano, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the appellant, Kristin B.1

Rachel Ratliff, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the appellees, Matthew B. and Amanda B.

 

1 We recognize that Mother’s name is listed as both “Kristen” and “Kristin” throughout the 

record. Based upon Mother’s signature on her affidavit of indigency, we believe her name to be 

“Kristin” and will refer to her as such for purposes of this Opinion. 

08/26/2019
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OPINION

Background

This action commenced on January 26, 2018 when Petitioners filed a petition with 

the Trial Court seeking to terminate the parental rights of Mother to the Children. In their 

petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights, Petitioners allege as grounds that Mother 

abandoned the Children by failing to visit or financially support the Children during the 

four months prior to the petition’s filing and that Mother had failed to manifest an ability 

and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for the Children. 

Petitioners further allege that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s 

best interest.

In January 2018, a notice to incarcerated parent was filed with the Trial Court 

reflecting a certificate of service to Mother at the Washington County Detention Center 

in Jonesborough, Tennessee. Upon Mother’s request, an attorney was appointed to 

represent her in this matter. Mother subsequently filed an answer in March 2018, 

denying both that statutory grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights and that 

termination was in the Children’s best interest.

A trial was conducted on September 4 and 18, 2018. At the beginning of trial 

during opening statements, Mother’s attorney stated: “We’ve prepared to proceed in 

regards to the Wanton Disregard because mother was incarcerated, she would stipulate to 

the fact that she was incarcerated in October of 2017.” Later during the trial, Mother’s 

attorney informed the Trial Court that Mother was not objecting to wanton disregard 

being tried as a ground for the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

During trial, Pamela Hensley, Khloe’s kindergarten teacher, testified that 

Stepmother was present during most field trips. According to Ms. Hensley, Stepmother 

was “very active volunteering in [her] classroom and coming on field trips.” Ms. 

Hensley testified Mother did not attend any of the field trips that parents were allowed to 

attend, and she never saw Mother at the school for anything. Ms. Hensley further 

testified that Mother had emailed her one time in late September 2015 but she could not 

respond due to a court order at the time. Ms. Hensley explained that the administration in 

the principal’s office had informed her that Mother had no legal right to receive 

information from the school regarding the child. According to Ms. Hensley, Mother 

never attended any parent-teacher conferences during Khloe’s kindergarten year. 

Amanda Baker, Khloe’s pre-kindergarten teacher, testified that she was familiar 

with Father and Stepmother but that she only saw Mother twice at school during the time 

Khloe was in her class. Ms. Baker clarified that Mother had come with Father through 

the “car rider drop off line” with Father on two mornings toward the beginning of the 

year. Ms. Baker testified that Mother had not attended any events that the parents were 
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allowed to attend, but Stepmother attended these events after she became involved with 

Father. Ms. Baker testified that she also taught Madison in pre-kindergarten from August 

2016 to May 2017. 

Father testified that he and Mother were married from March 2012 until December 

2014. According to Father, when Madison was born, she had to stay in the Neonatal 

Intensive Care Unit because she was born with drugs in her system and had to be placed 

on morphine to wean her off the drugs. Father explained that Madison remained in the 

hospital for three weeks before she was discharged into the care of Mother and Father. 

According to Father’s testimony, Mother and Father began having problems in 

their marriage after Madison was born. Father explained that he knew Mother had used 

drugs in the past but was unaware she was still using them. Father testified that Mother 

had gone to Woodridge several times, once or twice before Madison was born and a 

couple times after Madison was born. Father stated that Mother also attended a month

program at Willow Ridge and programs at Magnolia Ridge and Frontier Health. Father 

testified that prior to Madison’s birth, he observed Mother using narcotics and that he 

tried to get her help by sending her to Woodridge and Frontier Health. Father further 

testified that months after Madison was born, Mother would go stay at her uncle’s home 

for periods of time extending from a week through a month at a time before returning 

home.

Father testified concerning Mother’s criminal activity and presented court, 

probation, and jail records to the Trial Court. The court records reflect that in April 2013, 

Mother pled guilty to a charge of theft under $500 and was placed on supervised 

probation. Mother was subsequently arrested in August 2013 for aggravated assault 

against Father’s sister. On the basis of the aggravated assault charge, Mother was 

charged with a violation of her probation stemming from the theft charge. In October 

2013, Mother pled guilty to a violation of probation and was sentenced to time served. 

Court records reflect that Mother ultimately pled guilty to the aggravated assault charge 

in September 2014 and received a sentence of three years supervised probation.

In April 2014, Mother was arrested and charged with domestic assault, but the 

charge was subsequently dismissed. Father testified that a few days after the domestic 

assault charge, Mother had threatened to kill herself, picked up a knife, and put it to her 

wrist. Father testified that he contacted law enforcement, and Mother was arrested at that 

time. He testified that while he was not fearful that Mother was going to harm him, he 

thought she was going to hurt herself. That charge of domestic assault was dismissed. 

In June 2014, Mother was arrested and charged with driving under the influence, 

failure to exercise due care, and violation of implied consent. According to Father, 

Mother was arrested for the driving under the influence charge after she wrecked a Jeep. 
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Father told her “[he] was done.” Mother pled guilty to driving under the influence and 

the other charges were dismissed. 

Father testified that he filed for divorce from Mother in August 2014. He and 

Mother entered into an agreed permanent parenting plan on August 28, 2014, while 

Mother was incarcerated. The parenting plan allowed Mother and Father equal parenting 

time. Father testified that the maternal grandmother (“Grandmother”) assisted him in 

filling out the paperwork. He stated that Grandmother told him equal custody would be 

the “best case scenario.” According to Father, he thought that he could believe what 

Grandmother told him because “she worked for a lawyer.” The divorce between Mother 

and Father was finalized on December 17, 2014.

The agreed parenting plan allowed Mother and Father to have alternating weeks of 

parenting time with the Children. Father testified that although Mother and Father 

supposedly shared equal parenting time, Mother never had the Children for an entire 

week at a time. Mother would have the Children on the weekends at Grandmother’s 

home, and Father would have them during the week. For Mother’s parenting time on 

weekends, Grandmother would pick up the Children from Father’s home every weekend. 

According to Father, Mother usually was not with Grandmother when she picked up the 

Children. 

Father testified that he provided financially for the Children’s needs, including 

clothing, food, babysitting, and school expenses, and that Mother did not provide any 

money to him for the Children. Father worked third shift until about a year prior to the 

September 2018 trial when he began working on day shift. When Father worked at night 

during his parenting time, Grandmother would care for the Children at night, and Father

would pick up the Children from Grandmother’s home in the morning after work. 

According to Father, Mother sometimes was at Grandmother’s home when he picked up 

the Children, but she was not present most of the time. 

Stepmother and Father had begun dating in February 2015. After Father and 

Stepmother moved in together in early March 2015, Stepmother began watching the 

Children at night while Father worked. Stepmother assisted Father with taking the 

Children to school. Father testified that Mother never assisted in taking Khloe to school 

and never attended any school events for which he was present.

In September 2015, Father hired an attorney and filed a “Motion to Modify 

Permanent Parenting Plan and for Ex Parte Restraining Order.” Father and Mother 

subsequently attended mediation and agreed to a temporary parenting schedule, which

decreased Mother’s visitation from equal parenting time to weekend visitation. During 

this time, Mother received visitation with the Children at Grandmother’s home each 

weekend except the third weekend of the month. In April 2016, Mother’s contact with 

the Children was restricted to supervised visitation every other weekend with 
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Grandmother supervising Mother’s visitation. The Children also were to have no contact 

with Mother’s paramour, D.H. Father acknowledged that before Mother went to jail, she 

would visit with the Children sometimes but not every scheduled time.

The records presented to the Trial Court reflect that in June 2016, Mother’s 

probation officer, Bethany Huening, filed an affidavit with the court alleging that Mother 

had violated the rules of her probation. Specifically, the allegations in the affidavit were 

that Mother had (1) admitted to the use of buprenorphine without a prescription on two 

occasions, (2) failed to complete treatment at Willow Ridge, and (3) failed to attend

intensive outpatient classes at Watauga Behavioral Health. Mother was arrested on the 

violation of probation charge on July 5, 2016. Mother remained incarcerated through the 

filing of the petition until her release in March 2018. While incarcerated in February 

2017, Mother failed a drug screen for amphetamines. She also failed a drug screen in 

September 2017 for buprenorphine while incarcerated. 

Stepmother testified to her involvement with the Children during trial. Stepmother 

stated that she moved in with Father at the beginning of March 2015 and that they were 

married at the end of that month. According to Stepmother, she assisted Khloe in getting 

ready for school in the mornings, dropped Khloe off at school, and picked her up from 

school in the afternoons. She also took care of Madison during the day while Khloe was 

at school and Father was sleeping. 

According to Stepmother, she attended a parent-teacher conference in March 2015 

with Khloe’s teacher, a field trip to The Bright’s Zoo in May 2015, Honors Day, pre-K 

graduation for Khloe in May 2015, and a Valentine’s Day party in 2016. Stepmother and 

Father had participated in an egg hunt and picnic at Khloe’s school and a parent-teacher 

conference in March 2015. They also had attended registration day when Khloe began 

kindergarten in August 2015 and a Dr. Seuss field trip with the school. Father, 

Stepmother, and Grandmother were present for a Christmas program at school in 

December 2015 and for Khloe’s kindergarten graduation in May 2016. According to 

Stepmother, Mother was not present at any of these events.

Stepmother testified that on Halloween in 2015, Mother was supposed to have the 

Children, but Mother was not present during that visit. Stepmother explained that 

Grandmother took the Children trick-or-treating without Mother. Stepmother stated that 

she does not recall Mother ever taking the Children to school or picking them up. 

According to Stepmother, Mother would be present once or twice at pickups immediately 

after a visitation order was put in place but that she had not been present most of the time. 

Stepmother testified that she had only seen her “a handful of times” in the four years she 

had been involved with Father and the Children. Stepmother further testified that Mother 

had not paid financial support for the Children since she had been with Father.
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Stepmother explained that she had potty-trained Madison because she was still in 

diapers when Stepmother became involved in helping care for the Children. Madison 

also did not speak very well when Stepmother entered the picture. Stepmother testified 

that she worked with Madison to help her talk more and understand her better. 

Stepmother and Father also have two other children in the home, twin sons, who love the 

Children. Stepmother expressed that she and the Children have a strong bond and that 

they refer to her as “Mom.”

Mother testified during trial and requested that the Trial Court decline to terminate 

her parental rights to the Children. Mother stated that after the Children were born, she 

had gotten up with them every night, fed them, clothed them, and bathed them. Mother 

testified that she stayed home with the Children while Father worked. During that time, 

Mother testified that she often would accompany Father when he took Khloe to school or 

would stay home with Madison if she was still asleep. 

According to Mother, that began to change when she and Father separated. 

Mother began working at Burger King, did not have much money or a driver’s license, 

and she had moved out of the home. Mother testified that it was difficult to talk to Father 

after they separated, especially once Stepmother became involved. According to Mother, 

she was supposed to receive equal parenting time and had tried to see the Children, but 

she had difficulty communicating with Father.

According to Mother, she visited with the Children between March 4, 2016 

through July 4, 2016, every other weekend at Grandmother’s home. Mother explained 

that she lived with Grandmother so she was present at the visits unless she had to work. 

Mother testified that she did not accompany Grandmother when she picked up and 

dropped off the Children due to the tension between the parents. According to Mother, 

she would see the Children while they were at Grandmother’s home. Mother testified 

that while she was incarcerated, she sent two letters to Khloe and spoke with the Children 

via telephone. Mother explained that the agreed order restricting her time with the 

Children to only supervised visitation on weekends was based mainly on the individual 

she was dating at the time, D.H. 

Mother testified that she had not been ordered to pay child support to Father and 

had financially supported the Children when they visited her by purchasing clothing, 

toys, and groceries. Mother testified that prior to her incarceration, she had a great 

relationship with the Children and saw them as much as she could. 

Mother testified that she never was notified of any school activities so that she 

could attend them. When asked by the Trial Court why she did not attend the events with 

Grandmother when Grandmother was in attendance, Mother stated that she was not 

aware of the events until the last minute and that she would not attend events because of 

the tension between Mother, Father, and Stepmother. Mother testified that the main 
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reason she did not attend Khloe’s kindergarten graduation was because of the tension

between Mother, Father, and Stepmother. 

Mother acknowledged that Madison was born drug addicted but stated that the 

doctors informed her that the Prozac she was taking “had a lot to do with it.” Mother 

stated that she took Lortabs for her back during her pregnancy. Mother acknowledged 

failing a drug screen in 2015 but stated that she stopped using after she failed that drug 

screen. 

Mother testified that she was incarcerated from July 5, 2016, through March 27, 

2018. Mother stated that she had been arrested for violating her probation after she had 

failed drug screens. Mother stated that she had taken Suboxone “every now and then” 

from January to April 2016. According to Mother, she was “trying to get off pain pills.” 

Mother acknowledged using Suboxone consistently and failing three drug screens in the 

months leading up to her July 2016 incarceration. Mother stated that she did not have a 

prescription for the Suboxone due to her inability to afford to go to a Suboxone clinic. 

Mother acknowledged failing drug screens while in prison, one in February 2017 for 

amphetamines and another in September 2017 for Suboxone. 

At the time of trial, Mother had been released from her incarceration and was no 

longer on probation. Mother testified about efforts she had made to remedy her 

addiction. Mother testified that she went to Woodridge twice in 2015 for her addiction 

problems and her depression. She said it helped for a little while. According to Mother, 

she also went to Willow Ridge for a month. 

Mother further testified that she entered a rehabilitation program the day she left 

jail for twenty-eight days and was released from that program in April 2018. Mother 

agreed to attend aftercare treatment and was referred to Watauga to attend meetings a few 

times a week. Mother testified that she recently had been attending Alcoholics 

Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous meetings and continued appearing for those 

meetings when she could obtain transportation. Mother stated that she had attended two 

appointments at Watauga Behavioral Health and that she was going to reschedule an 

appointment that she missed due to work. Her first appointment at Watauga was in May 

2018 and the second was in July 2018. 

Mother testified that she had not completed any program to remedy her drug 

addiction. Mother acknowledged walking out of treatment at Woodridge due to an 

altercation with other individuals at the facility. Mother had attended intensive outpatient 

treatment but did not complete the program. According to Mother, she no longer 

associated with individuals who drink alcohol or use drugs, and she no longer had an urge 

to use them. Mother further testified that she decided to cease the medication for her 

depression because she “didn’t like the way they made [her] feel.” According to Mother, 
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she had informed her doctor that she was stopping her medication, and he instructed her 

to slowly stop the medication.

Mother is employed currently at Cranberries, a restaurant in Johnson City, and has 

been employed there since June 2018. Mother currently resides at Grandmother’s home. 

Mother testified that she had not seen the Children since July 5, 2016, and had not spoken 

with the Children since November 2017. Mother acknowledged that her relationship 

with the Children was not very good at the time of trial. 

Cathlyn C. Cannon testified as an expert witness in the area of family and 

individual mental health counseling. Ms. Cannot met the Children on two occasions. 

According to Ms. Cannon, Khloe told her that she was “required to call [Stepmother] 

Mommy, but that she also has a mommy that she doesn’t see very often.” Ms. Cannon 

stated that the Children informed her that they wished to see Mother and that Khloe told 

her she missed Mother. Grandmother provided Ms. Cannon with letters Khloe had 

written to Mother, but she did not speak to the Children about the letters. Ms. Cannon 

opined that it would be detrimental to the Children if Mother’s rights were terminated. 

Ms. Cannon stated that this conclusion was based on the Children expressing interest in 

Mother and their awareness that they were involved with Mother when Grandmother was 

present. Ms. Cannon met with Mother, Grandmother, and the Children, but she did not 

meet with Father or Stepmother with the Children present.

Grandmother attended the exchanges for the Children instead of Mother “to keep 

them from arguing.” Grandmother testified that Mother gave her money, helped with 

groceries, and bought clothes and toys for the Children when they were in her home. 

Grandmother testified that Mother visited with the Children while they were in her home 

on weekends until Mother was incarcerated. From March 2016 until her incarceration in 

July 2016, Mother lived with Grandmother half of the time and stayed with her 

boyfriend, D.H., half of the time. Mother came to her home to visit with the Children 

during this time.

Grandmother stated that Mother’s visitation was restricted to supervised because 

Mother was dating D.H. and “because of his felony records.” Grandmother testified that 

she did not believe Mother was still dating D.H. However, Grandmother identified D.H. 

and Mother in a photograph from September 7, 2018, at a movie theater. Grandmother 

testified that Mother had been “really trying” and that she had seen a different side of 

Mother. However, Grandmother stated that she was “very disappointed” after seeing the 

photograph of Mother and D.H. because D.H. is “not good, he’s not good for anybody.” 

Khloe testified that she calls Stepmother “Mama,” but that she was unsure what to 

call Mother “because she hasn’t really been in our life a lot.” Khloe said she had not seen 

Mother in a long time. According to Khloe, Mother never took her shopping or 

purchased anything for her, but Grandmother did those things. When Khloe was asked if 
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anyone had told her to say anything she did not wish to say, she responded that 

Grandmother told that that if she was nervous at court, to “tell the Judge that you want 

[Grandmother].” Khloe denied that Father or Stepmother had ever told her to say 

anything she did not want to say or instructed her to tell the trial judge anything. Khloe 

testified that Stepmother had “been there for us when a mom wasn’t there for us.” 

According to Khloe, Grandmother used to yell at her when she was on her tablet if

Grandmother was wanting her to look at photographs of Mother and Father from when 

they were in a relationship. Khloe stated that Grandmother told her that Father was 

“never there for us.” Khloe testified that Grandmother also told her she should not call 

Stepmother “Mama” because “she’s not your mama.” According to Khloe, Grandmother

had instructed her to write letters and pictures for Mother when Mother was in jail but 

that Khloe “didn’t really do it.” Khloe testified that she did not wish to see Mother 

because she had not been around for them and “it’s uncomfortable.”

Following trial, the Trial Court took the matter under advisement. On December 

3, 2018, the Trial Court entered its judgment, terminating Mother’s parental rights on the 

sole ground of wanton disregard. In its judgment, the Trial Court found by clear and 

convincing evidence that Mother had abandoned the Children through her actions 

exhibiting wanton disregard for their welfare and that termination of her parental rights 

was in the Children’s best interest. Mother timely appealed the Trial Court’s judgment to 

this Court.

Discussion

Although not stated exactly as such, Mother raises two issues on appeal: (1) 

Whether the Trial Court erred by finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother 

had abandoned the Children through her actions constituting wanton disregard for the 

Children’s welfare and (2) Whether the Trial Court erred by finding by clear and 

convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest 

of the Children. 

With regard to the termination of parental rights, our Supreme Court has

instructed:

A parent’s right to the care and custody of her child is among the 

oldest of the judicially recognized fundamental liberty interests protected 

by the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions.2 Troxel v. 

 

2 U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 

property, without due process of law . . . .”). Similarly, article 1, section 8 of the Tennessee 

Constitution states “[t]hat no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, 

liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, 
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Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed.2d 49 (2000); 

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed.2d 551 

(1972); In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tenn. 2010); In re Adoption 

of Female Child, 896 S.W.2d 546, 547-48 (Tenn. 1995); Hawk v. Hawk, 

855 S.W.2d 573, 578-79 (Tenn. 1993). But parental rights, although 

fundamental and constitutionally protected, are not absolute. In re Angela 

E., 303 S.W.3d at 250. “‘[T]he [S]tate as parens patriae has a special duty 

to protect minors . . . .’ Tennessee law, thus, upholds the [S]tate’s authority 

as parens patriae when interference with parenting is necessary to prevent 

serious harm to a child.” Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580 (quoting In re 

Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)); see also Santosky 

v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed.2d 599 (1982); In 

re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 250. “When the State initiates a parental rights 

termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental 

liberty interest, but to end it.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759, 102 S. Ct. 1388. 

[“]Few consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of 

natural family ties.” Id. at 787, 102 S. Ct. 1388; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 

519 U.S. 102, 119, 117 S. Ct. 555, 136 L. Ed.2d 473 (1996). The parental 

rights at stake are [“]far more precious than any property right.” Santosky, 

455 U.S. at 758-59 102 S. Ct. 1388. Termination of parental rights has the 

legal effect of reducing the parent to the role of a complete stranger and of 

[“]severing forever all legal rights and obligations of the parent or guardian 

of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(l)(1); see also Santosky, 455 

U.S. at 759, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (recognizing that a decision terminating 

parental rights is [“]final and irrevocable”). In light of the interests and 

consequences at stake, parents are constitutionally entitled to 

[“]fundamentally fair procedures” in termination proceedings. Santosky, 

455 U.S. at 754, 102 S. Ct. 1388; see also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of 

Durham Cnty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 68 L. Ed.2d 640 

(1981) (discussing the due process right of parents to fundamentally fair 

procedures).

Among the constitutionally mandated [“]fundamentally fair 

procedures” is a heightened standard of proof – clear and convincing 

evidence. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769, 102 S. Ct. 1388. This standard 

minimizes the risk of unnecessary or erroneous governmental interference 

with fundamental parental rights. Id.; In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 

596 (Tenn. 2010). [“]Clear and convincing evidence enables the fact-finder 

to form a firm belief or conviction regarding the truth of the facts, and 

eliminates any serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of these 

factual findings.” In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596 (citations omitted). 

 

liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.”
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The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard ensures that the facts are 

established as highly probable, rather than as simply more probable than 

not. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); In re 

M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

Tennessee statutes governing parental termination proceedings 

incorporate this constitutionally mandated standard of proof. Tennessee 

Code Annotated section 36-1[-]113(c) provides:

Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based 

upon:

(1) A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that 

the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights 

have been established; and

(2) That termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the 

best interests of the child.

This statute requires the State to establish by clear and convincing proof 

that at least one of the enumerated statutory grounds3for termination exists 

and that termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Angela E., 303 

S.W.3d at 250; In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tenn. 2006); In re 

Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002). “The best interests analysis is 

separate from and subsequent to the determination that there is clear and 

convincing evidence of grounds for termination.” In re Angela E., 303 

S.W.3d at 254. Although several factors relevant to the best interests 

analysis are statutorily enumerated,4the list is illustrative, not exclusive. 

The parties are free to offer proof of other relevant factors. In re Audrey S., 

182 S.W.3d at 878. The trial court must then determine whether the 

combined weight of the facts “amount[s] to clear and convincing evidence 

that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re Kaliyah S., 455 

S.W.3d 533, 555 (Tenn. 2015). These requirements ensure that each parent 

receives the constitutionally required “individualized determination that a 

parent is either unfit or will cause substantial harm to his or her child before 

the fundamental right to the care and custody of the child can be taken 

away.” In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 188 (Tenn. 1999).

Furthermore, other statutes impose certain requirements upon trial 

courts hearing termination petitions. A trial court must “ensure that the 

 

3

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1)-(13).

4

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i).
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hearing on the petition takes place within six (6) months of the date that the 

petition is filed, unless the court determines an extension is in the best 

interests of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1113[sic](k). A trial court 

must “enter an order that makes specific findings of fact and conclusions of 

law within thirty (30) days of the conclusion of the hearing.” Id. This 

portion of the statute requires a trial court to make “findings of fact and 

conclusions of law as to whether clear and convincing evidence establishes 

the existence of each of the grounds asserted for terminating [parental] 

rights.” In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 255. “Should the trial court 

conclude that clear and convincing evidence of ground(s) for termination 

does exist, then the trial court must also make a written finding whether 

clear and convincing evidence establishes that termination of [parental] 

rights is in the [child’s] best interests.” Id. If the trial court’s best interests 

analysis “is based on additional factual findings besides the ones made in 

conjunction with the grounds for termination, the trial court must also 

include these findings in the written order.” Id. Appellate courts “may not 

conduct de novo review of the termination decision in the absence of such 

findings.” Id. (citing Adoption Place, Inc. v. Doe, 273 S.W.3d 142, 151 & 

n.15 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)). 

B. Standards of Appellate Review

An appellate court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact in 

termination proceedings using the standard of review in Tenn. R. App. P. 

13(d). In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596; In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 

246. Under Rule 13(d), appellate courts review factual findings de novo on 

the record and accord these findings a presumption of correctness unless 

the evidence preponderates otherwise. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 

596; In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d 387, 393 (Tenn. 2009); In re Adoption of 

A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 809 (Tenn. 2007). In light of the heightened 

burden of proof in termination proceedings, however, the reviewing court 

must make its own determination as to whether the facts, either as found by 

the trial court or as supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount 

to clear and convincing evidence of the elements necessary to terminate 

parental rights. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596-97. The trial court’s 

ruling that the evidence sufficiently supports termination of parental rights 

is a conclusion of law, which appellate courts review de novo with no 

presumption of correctness. In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d at 393 (quoting In re 

Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d at 810). Additionally, all other questions 

of law in parental termination appeals, as in other appeals, are reviewed de 

novo with no presumption of correctness. In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 

246.
- 13 -

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 521-24 (Tenn. 2016) (footnotes in original but 

renumbered). 

Clear and convincing evidence supporting any single ground will justify a 

termination order. E.g., In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002). Our Supreme 

Court, however, has instructed “that in an appeal from an order terminating parental 

rights the Court of Appeals must review the trial court’s findings as to each ground for 

termination and as to whether termination is in the child’s best interests, regardless of 

whether the parent challenges these findings on appeal.” In re Carrington H., 483 

S.W.3d at 525-26 (footnote omitted). As such, we review each of the grounds for 

termination.

Only one ground for termination is implicated in this appeal. As pertinent, 

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(1) provides:

(g) Initiation of termination of parental or guardianship rights may be based 

upon any of the grounds listed in this subsection (g). The following 

grounds are cumulative and non-exclusive, so that listing conditions, acts or 

omissions in one ground does not prevent them from coming within another 

ground:

(1) Abandonment by the parent or guardian, as defined in § 36-1-102, has 

occurred;

We first address whether the Trial Court erred by finding the ground of 

abandonment by wanton disregard against Mother. Initially, we note that Petitioners had 

not included the statutory ground of abandonment through wanton disregard in their 

termination petition. However, Mother’s attorney acknowledged at the beginning of trial 

that although it was unclear whether that particular ground was pled in the petition,

Mother was prepared to defend against that ground during trial. Mother’s attorney 

further informed the Trial Court in the middle of trial that Mother was not objecting to 

the consideration of this statutory ground. In this case, it is clear from the record, Mother 

had prior notice that Petitioners were seeking to terminate her parental rights based on 

this statutory ground and agreed, through her attorney, to that ground being tried. We,

therefore, determine that the statutory ground of abandonment through wanton disregard 

was tried with the express consent of Mother. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.02 (“When issues 

not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they 

shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.”). Therefore, 

we will proceed to address Mother’s arguments on appeal.

Regarding wanton disregard, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102 provides:
- 14 -

(1)(A) For purposes of terminating the parental or guardian rights of a 

parent or parents or a guardian or guardians of a child to that child in order 

to make that child available for adoption, “abandonment” means that:

* * *

(iv) A parent or guardian is incarcerated at the time of the institution of an 

action or proceeding to declare a child to be an abandoned child, or the 

parent or guardian has been incarcerated during all or part of the four (4) 

months immediately preceding the institution of such action or proceeding, 

and . . . the parent or guardian has engaged in conduct prior to incarceration 

that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child.

Mother had been incarcerated since July 5, 2016. It is uncontested that Mother

was incarcerated during the entire four months preceding the termination petition. We 

then must examine whether Mother’s actions prior to her incarceration exhibited wanton 

disregard for the Children’s welfare. 

Mother contends on appeal that the Trial Court erred by considering Mother’s 

actions prior to the finalization of Mother’s and Father’s divorce, asserting that those 

facts could have been considered during the divorce proceedings and cannot be relitigated 

in the subsequent termination action. During oral arguments, Mother’s counsel 

specifically stated that res judicata and collateral estoppel would apply in the termination 

proceedings. 

Mother cites to In re Johnathan M., No. M2018-00509-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 

126995 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2019), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 2, 2019), to support 

her argument that the Trial Court should have considered only Mother’s actions that 

occurred following the divorce action. The Court in In re Johnathan M. does not appear 

to have considered the issue Mother is raising regarding the Trial Court’s consideration 

of events occurring prior to the parties’ divorce. The parties in In re Johnathan M.

divorced in November 2011. Id. at *1. The majority of the listed criminal activity by the 

parent occurred beginning in June 2012, which occurred after the parties’ divorce. See id.

at *1-2. The court looked at a shoplifting charge that occurred in 2011, but the appellate 

court noted that the date of the incident was not in the record on appeal. See id. at *1. 

Because only the year of the incident is known, it is unclear whether the 2011 arrest for 

shoplifting occurred during the marriage or after the divorce in November 2011. The 

appellate court’s only conclusions pertaining to the shoplifting charge is that the record 

did not support the trial court’s finding that Mother had involved the child during the 

shoplifting incident or that the incident caused the child’s issues in school. In re 

Johnathan M. does not support Mother’s contention that the Trial Court erred by 

considering facts that had occurred prior to the finality of the parties’ divorce.
- 15 -

Our Supreme Court in In re Taylor B.W., 397 S.W.3d 105 (Tenn. 2013), addressed 

a similar situation, determining that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply to a 

subsequent termination of parental rights action following a previous custody and 

grandparent visitation action. In In re Taylor B.W., the parents of the children entered 

into a marital dissolution agreement and parenting plan during their divorce proceeding. 

Id. at 106. Following the divorce, the mother incurred criminal charges which resulted in 

her incarceration. Id. The parents then entered into an agreed parenting plan that 

reflected the mother’s incarceration, granted the maternal grandmother grandparent 

visitation with the children, and allowed for recommencement of the original parenting 

plan upon the mother’s release from jail. Id. While the mother was incarcerated, the 

father married the stepmother and ultimately filed for termination of the mother’s 

parental rights to the children. Id. The trial court found that res judicata did not apply to 

the termination action. Id. at 111. The mother appealed to the Tennessee Court of 

Appeals and ultimately to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Id. at 110-11. 

On appeal, the parties in In re Taylor B.W. agreed that a ground existed for 

termination of the mother’s rights and the only issue was whether termination of the 

mother’s rights was in the children’s best interest. Id. at 111. The mother argued that the 

parties’ agreed order amending the parenting plan estopped the father and stepmother 

from asserting that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best 

interest. Id. The Court explained as follows regarding res judicata and collateral 

estoppel: 

The doctrine of res judicata prevents a suit between the same parties 

or their privies on the same cause of action with respect to issues that could 

have been litigated in a prior suit. Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 

376 (Tenn. 2009). The cause of action in this suit involves the termination 

of Mother’s parental rights. The prior litigation between Mother and Father 

involved their divorce, a parenting plan for the children, and grandparent 

visitation. The causes of action in the two cases are different, and therefore 

res judicata does not prevent consideration of the parental termination 

action.

As we stated in Clark v. Sputniks, LLC, collateral estoppel is an 

extension of the principle of res judicata and only applies in a suit in which 

the issue involved has already been litigated in a prior suit by the same 

parties. 368 S.W.3d 431, 437 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. 

Leinart, 698 S.W.2d 335, 336 (Tenn. 1985)). The factors for determination 

of the best interest of a child depend on the type of action before the court. 

See In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 878 n.52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). The 

best-interest determination in a parental termination action is governed by 

the nine non-exclusive factors in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-

113(i). A modification of a parenting plan and grant of grandparent 
- 16 -

visitation, however, are governed by the sets of factors in Tennessee Code 

Annotated sections 36-6-106(a) (2010) (child custody) and 36-6-307 (2010) 

(grandparent visitation).

The determination of the best interests of [the children] in the 

present parental termination proceeding requires consideration of a 

different set of factors than those that were considered in the prior custody 

and grandparent visitation proceeding. Each determination therefore 

requires the issue of “best interest” to be decided using a different set of 

factors. The doctrine of collateral estoppel is therefore inapplicable 

because the issues are not identical. Mullins v. State, 294 S.W.3d 529, 536 

(Tenn. 2009) (citing Patton v. Estate of Upchurch, 242 S.W.3d 781, 787 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)).

Id. at 111-12. 

The issue raised by Mother in the present case is somewhat different from In re

Taylor B.W., in that Mother seeks to prevent the Trial Court from considering Mother’s 

criminal actions during the marriage as relevant to the ground of abandonment through 

wanton disregard, instead of the best interest analysis. Specifically, Mother argues that 

the Trial Court erred by considering three of Mother’s arrests and convictions (i.e. theft, 

aggravated assault, and DUI) in its analysis regarding abandonment by wanton disregard 

because Mother’s actions regarding those criminal convictions occurred prior to entry of 

the parties’ divorce decree. We disagree with Mother’s contention. 

In her brief, Mother essentially argues that Father acquiesced in Mother’s bad 

behavior and, therefore, cannot use that behavior against her in the termination 

proceeding. We emphasize that this termination of parental rights proceeding is an action 

concerning the Children, not Father, even though Father is a petitioner in the action. 

Applying the same logic utilized in In re Taylor B.W., the prior litigation between 

Mother and Father during the divorce action, wherein an agreed parenting plan was 

entered and approved by the Trial Court, is a different cause of action than the subsequent 

parental termination proceeding and does not contain the same issues as were previously 

adjudicated. Thus, neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel would apply to the 

termination action. As such, the Trial Court did not err by considering Mother’s actions 

that had transpired prior to and during the divorce proceedings.

Mother further avers that the Trial Court erred by considering two failed drug 

screens during her incarceration to establish that Mother abandoned the Children through 

wanton disregard. We agree with Mother that her conduct that occurred during 

incarceration cannot be relied upon as to the statutory ground of abandonment through 

wanton disregard because it was not “conduct prior to incarceration . . .” as required by 
- 17 -

the statute. See In re Johnathan, 2019 WL 126995, at *5 (determining conduct during 

incarceration cannot be the basis for termination of parental rights on the ground of

abandonment through wanton disregard). However, upon a review of the Trial Court’s 

judgment, the Trial Court did not rely on Mother’s actions of failing drug screens during 

her incarceration when determining that clear and convincing evidence existed to support 

the ground of abandonment through wanton disregard. The Trial Court specifically 

focused on Mother’s actions of engaging in theft, committing aggravated assault, driving 

and wrecking a Jeep while under the influence, and her involvement with D.H. We find 

no error with the Trial Court’s consideration of these acts by Mother that occurred prior 

to her incarceration.

Additionally, Mother further avers that the Trial Court erred by failing to find that 

“redeeming factors” were present when it determined that her actions exhibited wanton 

disregard for the Children’s welfare. Mother argues that she had cared for the Children 

during the marriage, “spent some time at” Woodridge for treatment, attended 

appointments with Watauga Behavior Health, attended NA/AA meetings since her 

release from jail, maintained employment, and continued to reside with Grandmother. 

Mother claims that with her “redeeming factors,” Petitioners had failed to prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that Mother had abandoned the Children through her actions 

constituting wanton disregard of the Children. We note that the NA/AA meetings Mother 

testified that she attended occurred after Mother’s incarceration. Even considering these 

“redeeming factors,” the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding 

that Mother’s actions prior to her incarceration exhibited wanton disregard for the 

Children’s welfare by clear and convincing evidence. 

Mother acknowledged using drugs without a prescription in the months prior to 

her July 2016 incarceration. Although Mother was restricted to supervised visitation in 

part due to her relationship with D.H., Mother stayed with D.H. and agreed to the 

supervised visitation. Mother was arrested and convicted of theft under $500; driving 

under the influence, which had resulted in an automobile accident; aggravated assault; 

and two violations of probation. All of those actions by Mother occurred prior to her 

incarceration in July 2016. We find, as did the Trial Court, that Mother’s actions prior to 

her July 2016 incarceration exhibited wanton disregard for the Children’s welfare. We,

therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s finding that the ground of abandonment by wanton 

disregard was established by clear and convincing evidence.

Having determined that a ground exists for the termination of Mother’s parental 

rights, we next address the best interest analysis. Mother contends that the Trial Court 

erred by finding that termination of her parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. 

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) provides a set of non-exclusive factors courts 

are to consider in determining whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best 

interest:
- 18 -

(i) In determining whether termination of parental or guardianship 

rights is in the best interest of the child pursuant to this part, the 

court shall consider, but is not limited to, the following

(1) Whether the parent or guardian has made such an adjustment of 

circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in the 

child’s best interest to be in the home of the parent or guardian;

(2) Whether the parent or guardian has failed to effect a lasting 

adjustment after reasonable efforts by available social services 

agencies for such duration of time that lasting adjustment does not 

reasonably appear possible;

(3) Whether the parent or guardian has maintained regular visitation or 

other contact with the child;

(4) Whether a meaningful relationship has otherwise been established 

between the parent or guardian and the child;

(5) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely 

to have on the child’s emotional, psychological and medical 

condition;

(6) Whether the parent or guardian, or other person residing with the 

parent or guardian, has shown brutality, physical, sexual, emotional 

or psychological abuse, or neglect toward the child, or another child 

or adult in the family or household;

(7) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s or guardian’s 

home is healthy and safe, whether there is criminal activity in the 

home, or whether there is such use of alcohol, controlled substances 

or controlled substance analogues as may render the parent or 

guardian consistently unable to care for the child in a safe and stable 

manner;

(8) Whether the parent’s or guardian’s mental and/or emotional status 

would be detrimental to the child or prevent the parent or guardian 

from effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision for 

the child; or

(9) Whether the parent or guardian has paid child support consistent 

with the child support guidelines promulgated by the department 

pursuant to § 36-5-101.
- 19 -

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i) (2017).

With regard to making a determination concerning a child’s best interest, our 

Supreme Court has instructed:

When conducting the best interests analysis, courts must consider 

nine statutory factors listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-

113(i). These statutory factors are illustrative, not exclusive, and any party 

to the termination proceeding is free to offer proof of any other factor 

relevant to the best interests analysis. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 

523 (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 878 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)). 

Facts considered in the best interests analysis must be proven by “a 

preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.” In 

re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 555 (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 

861). “After making the underlying factual findings, the trial court should 

then consider the combined weight of those facts to determine whether they 

amount to clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s 

best interest[s].” Id. When considering these statutory factors, courts must 

remember that “[t]he child’s best interests [are] viewed from the child’s, 

rather than the parent’s, perspective.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878. 

Indeed, “[a] focus on the perspective of the child is the common theme” 

evident in all of the statutory factors. Id. “[W]hen the best interests of the 

child and those of the adults are in conflict, such conflict shall always be 

resolved to favor the rights and the best interests of the child. . . .” Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 36-1-101(d) (2017).

Ascertaining a child’s best interests involves more than a “rote 

examination” of the statutory factors. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878. 

And the best interests analysis consists of more than tallying the number of 

statutory factors weighing in favor of or against termination. White v. 

Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 193-94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Rather, the facts 

and circumstances of each unique case dictate how weighty and relevant 

each statutory factor is in the context of the case. See In re Audrey S., 182 

S.W.3d at 878. Simply put, the best interests analysis is and must remain a 

factually intensive undertaking, so as to ensure that every parent receives 

individualized consideration before fundamental parental rights are 

terminated. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523. “[D]epending upon 

the circumstances of a particular child and a particular parent, the 

consideration of one factor may very well dictate the outcome of the 

analysis.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878 (citing White v. Moody, 171 

S.W.3d at 194). But this does not mean that a court is relieved of the 

obligation of considering all the factors and all the proof. Even if the 
- 20 -

circumstances of a particular case ultimately result in the court ascribing 

more weight—even outcome determinative weight—to a particular 

statutory factor, the court must consider all of the statutory factors, as well 

as any other relevant proof any party offers.

In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 681-82 (Tenn. 2017).

Mother contends that the Trial Court erred by finding that termination of her 

parental rights was in the best interest of the Children. Specifically, Mother contends that 

the trial court erred in its weighing of the totality of the best interest factors for 

consideration and had made contradictory findings of fact regarding the best interest 

analysis. We disagree.

The Trial Court addressed each statutory factor contained in Tennessee Code 

Annotated § 36-1-113(i) separately and concluded that in totality the factors weighed in 

favor of terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children. As to factor (1), the Trial 

Court found that Mother had failed two drug screens while she was incarcerated. Mother 

failed one drug screen in February 2017 for amphetamines and another drug screen in 

September 2017 for buprenorphine. Although those drug screens could not be used to 

support the statutory ground of abandonment through wanton disregard by Mother 

because it occurred during her incarceration, the Trial Court properly considered the drug 

screens for purposes of the best interest analysis. 

The Trial Court found that Mother’s actions had improved since her release from 

jail but that “warning signs” had arisen. Specifically, the Trial Court found that Mother 

had rekindled her relationship with the boyfriend, D.H., that had caused her visitation 

with the Children to be restricted to supervised, that she had made only “half-hearted 

efforts” to attend counseling, and that she had ceased her medication for depression. As 

the Trial Court concluded, those actions by Mother demonstrated that Mother was not 

“truly interested in reforming her conduct.” As such, the Trial Court found that this 

factor weighed in favor of the termination of Mother’s parental rights. 

The Trial Court determined that factor (2) was not relevant to the present case. 

Regarding factor (3), the Trial Court recognized that Mother maintained a relationship 

with the Children prior to her incarceration in July 2016. Although Mother failed to 

utilize all the parenting time she was allowed under the custody agreement, Mother did 

visit the Children regularly on weekends. The Trial Court found that this factor weighed

against the termination of Mother’s rights.

The Trial Court placed significant emphasis on factor (4) regarding Mother’s 

relationship with the Children, determining this factor to be “without question, the most 

significant best interest factor in this case.” As the Trial Court found, Mother’s 

relationship with the Children has become tenuous since they had not visited with Mother 
- 21 -

since her incarceration in July 2016. The Children now consider Stepmother as their 

mother. Khloe knows that Mother is her biological mother but her relationship with 

Mother is not close. The Trial Court recognized that the relationship between Khloe and 

Mother was “certainly not approaching a parent-child relationship.” Khloe testified 

during trial she calls Stepmother “Mama” and that Mother had not been in the Children’s 

lives very much. According to the Trial Court, the lack of a meaningful relationship 

between Mother and the Children predated Mother’s incarceration and began after her 

separation from Father. The Trial Court found that after her separation from Father, 

Mother had been “an occasional presence” in the Children’s lives as Grandmother 

exercised parenting time with the Children. The Trial Court specifically found that 

Mother had “outsourced” her parenting duties to Grandmother. 

Additionally, Mother was unavailable to parent the Children while she was 

incarcerated from July 2016 through March 2018 and during her post-incarceration 

rehabilitation program in April 2018. The Trial Court found that the lack of a meaningful 

relationship between the Children and Mother was Mother’s fault. The Trial Court also 

noted that Mother’s action of rekindling her relationship with her “‘bad news’ boyfriend” 

since her incarceration indicated Mother was not reformed since he had been the reason 

her contact with the Children was restricted to supervised visitation. According to the 

Trial Court, this demonstrated that Mother remained “uncommitted to developing a true 

mother-children relationship.” The Trial Court therefore determined that this factor 

weighed in favor of the termination of Mother’s parental rights. 

Concerning factor (5), the Trial Court found that no persuasive evidence was 

presented to demonstrate that the Children would suffer emotional, psychological, or 

medical harm if the Children were placed in Mother’s custody. However, the Trial Court

noted that the “true problem” was Mother’s unwillingness to actually become a primary 

caretaker to the Children. Nonetheless, the Trial Court found that this factor weighed 

against the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

As to factor (6), the Trial Court found that Mother had not shown any brutality, 

physical, sexual, emotional or psychological abuse, or neglect toward either of the 

Children. As such, this factor favored a continuation of Mother’s parental relationship 

with the Children.

Pursuant to factor (7), the Trial Court found that no evidence was presented of 

criminal activity or substance abuse in Grandmother’s home where Mother lived. In fact, 

the Trial Court specifically found that Grandmother’s home was safe and appropriate. 

The Trial Court, however, noted that Mother’s drug use had affected her ability to parent 

the Children. Mother was incarcerated due to a violation of probation resulting from her

drug use, but Petitioners presented no evidence to prove that Mother had parented the 

Children while high on drugs or alcohol. Consequently, the Trial Court found that this 

factor weighed against the termination of Mother’s parental rights. 
- 22 -

Regarding factor (8), the Trial Court found that Mother unilaterally had chosen to 

discontinue her depression medication and had provided no medical evidence or expert 

testimony to support her decision. The Trial Court described Mother’s testimony in court 

to be “monotone” and her demeanor to be “somber” but concluded that those 

observations alone were insufficient to determine that Mother was emotionally unstable. 

However, the Trial Court found that in combination, Mother’s “demeanor in the 

Courtroom, her past practice of letting her mother care for the Children, her discontinuing 

of depression medicine, her disinterest in counseling, and her rekindling of a bad 

romantic relationship” had demonstrated that Mother is unable or unwilling to provide 

stable care for the Children. The Trial Court recognized that this situation Mother 

created had resulted from Mother’s “detached emotional connection to [the] Children.” 

Therefore, the Trial Court found that this factor weighed in favor of the termination of 

Mother’s parental rights to the Children.

The Trial Court found that factor (9) did not weigh in favor of or against the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights because the parents had agreed that Mother would 

not pay Father child support. After weighing all the factors contained in Tennessee Code 

Annotated § 36-1-113(i), the Trial Court found that the termination of Mother’s parental 

rights to the Children was in the best interest of the Children. 

Upon a review of the record on appeal, we determine that the evidence presented 

does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings relevant to whether termination 

of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Children and that the combined 

weight of those facts satisfies the clear and convincing standard. Therefore, we affirm 

the Trial Court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights in its entirety.

Conclusion

The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed, and this cause is remanded to the 

Trial Court for collection of the costs assessed below. The costs on appeal are assessed 

against the appellant, Kristen B., and her surety, if any.

_________________________________

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF JUDGE