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i 

97–498 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–64] 

AIRCRAFT CARRIER—PRESENCE AND 

SURGE LIMITATIONS AND EXPANDING 

POWER PROJECTION OPTIONS 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

MEETING JOINTLY WITH

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

NOVEMBER 3, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Vice Chair 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

DAVID SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

KATHERINE REMBER, Clerk 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York, Vice Chair 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

CRAIG COLLIER, Professional Staff Member 

VICKIE PLUNKETT, Professional Staff Member 

KATHERINE REMBER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ........................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, and Acquisition; VADM John C. Aquilino, USN, Deputy Chief of 

Naval Operations, Operations, Plans and Strategy (N3/N5); RADM Thomas 

J. Moore, USN, Program Executive Officer, Aircraft Carriers, Department 

of the Navy; and RADM Michael C. Manazir, USN, Director, Air Warfare 

(OPNAV) ............................................................................................................... 2 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Courtney, Hon. Joe ........................................................................................... 39 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 37 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., joint with VADM John C. Aquilino, RADM Thomas J. Moore, and RADM Michael C. Manazir ............................................. 41 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[Responses provided were classified.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 55 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 55 

(1) 

AIRCRAFT CARRIER—PRESENCE AND SURGE 

LIMITATIONS AND EXPANDING POWER 

PROJECTION OPTIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, MEETING JOINTLY WITH THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, Washington, DC, Tuesday, November 3, 2015. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2:35 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. FORBES. Today the subcommittee meets to discuss our aircraft carrier fleet and the challenges we face in meeting presence 

and surge requirements and sustaining our ability to project power 

overseas. We thank all of our panelists for their patience in these 

votes. I am sorry we are getting started just a little bit later. 

Because of that, all of us have agreed to basically waive our 

opening statements. We are going to put them in the record, and 

so we can get directly to Mr. Stackley’s opening comments, and 

then we can go to questions. 

[The prepared statements of Mr. Forbes and Mr. Courtney can 

be found in the Appendix beginning on page 37.] 

Mr. FORBES. We have a distinguished group of panelists today 

that includes the Honorable Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary 

of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisitions; Vice Admiral John C. Aquilino, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy; also, Rear Admiral Michael C. 

Manazir, Director for Air Warfare; and Rear Admiral Thomas J. 

Moore, Program Executive Officer for Aircraft Carriers. 

Gentlemen, thank you all for your service to our country. Thank 

you for being willing to be here to testify for us today, and thank 

you so much for your willingness to help us and guide us as a subcommittee in making sure we are doing the right thing for our national defense. 

With that, I would like to look to see if Mr. Courtney has any 

comments? Mr. Wittman? Mrs. Davis? 

If none, then we go directly to Mr. Stackley. Thank you, Mr. Secretary for being here, and we look forward to your opening remarks. 
2 

STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION; VADM JOHN C. AQUILINO, DEPUTY CHIEF OF 

NAVAL OPERATIONS, OPERATIONS, PLANS AND STRATEGY 

(N3/N5); RADM THOMAS J. MOORE, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY; 

AND RADM MICHAEL C. MANAZIR, DIRECTOR, AIR WARFARE 

(OPNAV) 

STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Forbes, Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Courtney, Representative Davis, distinguished members of the Seapower and 

Readiness Subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to appear 

today to address the capability provided by our Nation’s aircraft 

carriers. And with your permission, I would like to make a brief 

opening statement and submit a full formal statement for the 

record. 

Mr. FORBES. Without objection. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Before remarking on the topic of this hearing, I do want to express gratitude on behalf of the Department of 

the Navy with regards to you all’s heavy lifting in giving us a 

budget deal, and your work towards the National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] for 2016. A 2-year deal goes a long, long way 

in terms of providing stability for planning, and now we will work 

with the deltas between the President’s budget request and the top 

line that we receive, but I know it is a heavy lift on everybody’s 

part, and it is much, much appreciated. 

Today’s Navy is a balanced force of 272 ships, near half of which 

is routinely underway, and of that number, from the Eastern Med 

[Mediterranean] to the Sea of Japan to the South Atlantic and 

points beyond, about 100 ships and more than 75,000 sailors and 

marines are typically deployed. 

They are the providers of maritime security around the world. 

They are our first responders to crisis, in the aftermath of natural 

disaster to provide relief, in the face of regional turmoil to weigh 

against aggression, and when called into action to defeat our foe. 

They are our surest defense against the threat of ballistic missiles 

and they are the Nation’s surest deterrent against the use of strategic weapons. Their effectiveness in providing stability is a product of their presence, their response time, and their ability to 

project power. 

Accordingly, in determining the requirements for building, operating, maintaining, and modernizing our Navy, as necessary to conduct the full range of military operations assigned to the naval 

forces, we placed a priority on forward presence, current readiness, 

investment in those future capabilities critical to our technical superiority, and stability in our shipbuilding plan. 

Against the backdrop of today’s force, the Chief of Naval Operations’ [CNO] Force Structure Assessment outlines the requirement 

to build to a 308-ship Navy by the post-2020 timeframe to meet our 

requirements against the projected threat of that day. We are on 

that path. 
3 

Inarguably, as an instrument of American diplomacy, power projection, and global security, the centerpiece of both today’s and the 

future naval force is the aircraft carrier. In recent years, from combat operations over the skies of Afghanistan, to Iraq, to Libya, and 

Syria, to relief operations in response to natural disasters in Pakistan, in Japan, and the Philippines, to operations providing stability and assurance to our friends and allies around the globe, the 

Navy’s aircraft carrier force provides the combatant commanders 

[COCOMs] with a first, a flexible, and a sustained response that 

can be scaled to meet the Nation’s needs around the globe. 

George Will summed it well in a recent column: 

‘‘The Navy’s operations, on which the sun never sets, are the nation’s nerve endings, connecting it with the turbulent world. Although the next president may be elected without addressing the 

Navy’s proper size and configuration, for four years he or she will 

be acutely aware of where the carriers are.’’ 

Consistent with the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, 

the 308-ship Navy outlined by the CNO’s Force Structure Assessment, includes a requirement for 11 aircraft carriers. With the inactivation of the USS Enterprise [CVN 65] in 2013 and pending the 

delivery of Gerald R. Ford, CVN 78, in 2016, the Navy is operating 

at a deficit with a 10-carrier force. This will effectively be the case 

until the Ford is ready for her first deployment currently projected 

in 2021. 

In the interim, balancing presence and surge requirements with 

a 10-carrier force has become more challenging with increased combatant commander demand for carrier presence during the same 

period. The Navy has adjusted maintenance and operational schedules by extending carrier deployment lengths to mitigate operational impacts during this period. 

This increased frequency and duration of deployments, however, 

has resulted in increased maintenance and repair requirements 

back home such that not only have deployments been extended but 

so, too, the time required in a shipyard to make ready for the next 

deployment. These challenges have been further exacerbated in recent years by the budget uncertainty and impacts caused by sequestration. 

The net effect of operating with fewer than 11 aircraft carriers 

for an extended period of time, is a degradation to the Navy’s ability to provide the balanced presence and surge capacity. So to provide much needed stability across the spectrum of maintenance, 

training, and operations, the Navy is implementing what is referred to as the Optimum Fleet Response Plan, or O–FRP. 

In simplest terms, the O–FRP targets improved planning and 

discipline for the conduct of maintenance and training in support 

of carrier and amphibious groups deployments. Adherence to the 

plan helps balance the tension between the demand for presence 

and need for surge capacity, which will be greatly relieved with the 

entry of Ford in the deployment cycle. 

The Ford, the first new design aircraft carrier since the Nimitz 

more than 40 years ago, will bring a significant increase in carrier 

capability to the fleet: 33 percent increase in the rate at which we 

launch and recover aircraft; a propulsion plant three times the 

electrical generating capacity, and 25 percent more energy than 
4 

Nimitz; increased service life allowances for power, weight, and stability to enable future modernization; increased survivability; improved combat systems, firefighting systems, weapons handling, 

and the basic hull design. And importantly, a $4 billion reduction 

per ship in total ownership cost over the ship’s 50-year service life. 

Those members who have visited the Ford under construction 

fully appreciate the daunting numbers that measure her. Tens of 

thousands of tons of structure, thousands of miles of cable and fiber 

optics, hundreds of miles of pipe, thousands of compartments, hundreds of ship systems, tens of thousands of sensors integrated to 

drive a greater than thousand megawatt nuclear power plant 

across the globe to its life. It is a remarkable demonstration of 

what American industry is able to achieve, and it is a quantum increase in capability for our warfighter, capability required by our 

Navy in the century ahead. 

To be clear, the challenges associated with concurrent development, design, and construction of the advanced warfighting aviation and propulsion systems on [CVN] 78, has resulted in cost 

growth and some delay. Cost growth has been arrested, was arrested early in the ship’s construction, and today, with the ship’s 

design effectively complete and production near 95 percent complete, we are focused on completing the test program and delivering the ship next spring. 

Equally important, while we confront the impacts associated 

with concurrency on the [CVN] 78, we made essential changes to 

eliminate these causes for cost growth and further improve performance on CVN 79 and 80. 

In summary, the Navy is committed to providing the Nation with 

a force needed to perform assigned naval missions around the 

world, around the clock, every day of the year. From peacetime 

presence to crisis response to power projection, the carrier is the 

backbone of that force. We are working with the Joint Staff and 

combatant commanders to mitigate impacts to operations and 

maintenance in response to current demands during this 10-carrier 

period, while we also work to improve performance of new construction and maintenance to restore the 11-carrier force, and with 

it, our ability to fully meet our presence and surge commitments, 

and we look forward to your questions. 

Mr. FORBES. Secretary, thank you for your comments. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Stackley, Admiral 

Aquilino, Admiral Moore, and Admiral Manazir can be found in the 

Appendix on page 41.] 

Mr. FORBES. It is my understanding, Admirals, that none of you 

have opening statements that you wish to make at this particular 

point in time. 

I am going to defer my questions to the end because I have a 

number of them, but Mr. Secretary, if I could just ask you. You 

have got a very impressive team with you today. Could you just let 

all the two subcommittees know about the team you brought with 

you today, and then as soon as you have done that, I am going to 

ask Mr. Courtney for any questions that he might have. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Thank you. I refer to these as our 

aircraft carrier brain trust. To my far left is Rear Admiral Manazir. 

He is our requirements officer on the CNO staff responsible for 
5 

naval aviation, both carrier force as well as the aviation side of the 

carrier force. 

Rear Admiral Tom Moore is the program executive officer for carriers. He is responsible for construction and in-service complex refueling overhauls, lifecycle support for our aircraft carriers. 

And Vice Admiral Aquilino is our head of operations for the Department of the Navy, working directly for the CNO as well as 

working closely with the Joint Staff. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, all three admirals have had very impressive careers, done a lot for our country, as have you, and we 

just appreciate their presence here today. And with that, Mr. 

Courtney is recognized for any questions he may have. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and to the witnesses 

for all joining us here today. 

Again, Secretary Stackley, as usual, you gave a great sort of 

chronology and update regarding what is going on with the carrier 

fleet. I guess, you know, the question I think that is on a lot of people’s minds is, though, that these necessary adjustments that the 

Navy has had to make in terms of the maintenance, new maintenance program, and as well the somewhat of a delay for the Ford 

because of the shock trials. I mean, we actually now have parts of 

the world where carriers used to be that aren’t there anymore, at 

least for some periods of time. 

So maybe you could just sort of, for the record, again, just kind 

of talk about, you know, what those gaps, as the media calls it, or 

you know, the impact that this is having right now? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, I am going to turn to Admiral Aquilino 

to address that because he specifically has been working this issue 

on the Navy staff. 

Admiral AQUILINO. Good afternoon, sir. Thank you for the question. As you know better than anyone, the carrier force today is the 

centerpiece of the Navy’s deterrence factor, power projection, 

lethality, and across the globe provides the presence needed to 

deter conflict, which is our primary goal. 

We are at a position now in time where due to prior, what I 

would call, overutilization, we are not at a position where we can 

push forward the amount of carrier presence we would like in a 

sustainable affordable manner, as well as keep in the reserve tank 

some surge capacity to be able to respond to crisis when needed. 

That is due to a number of reasons. 

Admiral Moore will probably talk later about the fact that we are 

currently at 10. Eleven is the number that our force structure analysis tell us we need. 

Based on the fact that we are at 10, that puts us at an ability— 

or not at the ability we need to push what we would like forward. 

Additionally, we severely overused the carrier force throughout the 

years 2011, 2012, and 2013 when we maintained a 2.0 presence in 

the central—in the, excuse me, the Middle East, while at the same 

time providing presence to the Pacific where it is also needed, and 

that has put us in a place where we are a little bit behind the 

power curve. 

What we are trying to do now is to reset in stride. We have to 

do that because very little chance to achieve a peace dividend from 

a force that doesn’t go back into garrison. So our operate forward 
6 

priorities did not give us the, really the opportunity to come back 

and reset. So the Navy is present, as you know, each and every day 

forward at almost the same levels that we have been operating 

over the past 15 years. 

So the plan we have developed is figure out how to provide as 

much presence as we can sustain and afford, while at the same 

time resetting to get to the CNO’s stated goal of two-plus-three carriers hopefully by 2020. Those short periods where we can’t provide 

presence are kind of—it is kind of the bill we are paying now to 

get to that sustainable level we need. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And I think Secretary Stackley used the term 

balancing in terms of trying to, again, deal with what is a long 

overdue need, which is to get, like you said, a maintenance schedule that is in stride, but also balancing, obviously, the demands 

that are out there. And I guess the question is, you know, you are 

going to be showered with demands, and you know, it is going to 

take discipline to sort of maintain this for the next 3 years or so. 

I mean, do you all feel confident that, you know, we are going to 

be able to get through this patch, and again, accomplish the goals 

of having a fleet that is ready to again meet all the requirements 

that are out there? 

Admiral AQUILINO. So before the Secretary jumps in, we are confident that our model and our plan, sir, will get us to where we 

need to be. Absent the fact that the world gets a vote. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Right. 

Admiral AQUILINO. So with that, sir. 

Secretary STACKLEY. I was going to punctuate his comment that 

it’s a hypothetical in terms of what crises the Nation is going to 

deal with and there is going to be a continual rebalance of the risk. 

Today we are at 10. We are at 10 carriers, I think it is important 

to understand where are the carriers today. 

Four of the carriers are in deep maintenance today. We have a 

carrier in RCOH [refueling and complex overhaul], the other three 

carriers in depot that are going to be tied up in the depot for a period of time. A fifth carrier, the George Washington, is coming back 

to the States to enter her RCOH, so she is not available. She will 

not be available for surge, so you have five carriers then that are 

carrying on the operating cycle, and they are going to be rotating 

through their deployments. 

So the question that you ask regarding will we have the discipline to maintain our maintenance cycle and support—you know, 

maintenance, training, operational cycle to get the health of the 

force back up, we are operating a small number of carriers, low 

density, high demand, and if the temperature rises in a risk area 

around the world, then senior leadership is going to have to decide 

is it more important to do that maintenance, which is a long-term 

investment, or do we have to respond today to the immediate crisis? And that is going to come down to what the nature of the crisis 

is. 

Mr. COURTNEY. I guess that is my last question. So again, if the 

balloon goes up or there is some real imminent crisis that threatens our Nation, I mean, there is a way that you can sort of plug 

things up and move carriers out, even those that are tied up back 

home in repairs? 
7 

Admiral AQUILINO. From an operational standpoint, sir, I think 

if the balloon goes up, we will, as the most flexible agile force out 

there, figure out how to get it done. That will accept some risk on 

our part with regard to the levels of training of the forces that we 

would have to push and the timelines in which we would have to 

push them, but I am pretty confident we would be able to button 

some of them up, not all of them. 

I won’t speak for my buddy next to me, the maintainer. It is pretty hard to button up a carrier in RCOH, but there is others that 

are at certain levels where we would be able to accelerate their getting them to sea. 

Admiral MOORE. Sir, I think, you know, part of the answer to the 

question is could you do it? Yeah, you could do it once. Part of the 

challenge is, you know, we have these carriers, they are designed 

for 50 years, and right now we are operating them at a pace faster 

than they were designed. And I think not only the sustainment of 

the carrier but you can see the impacts on the industrial base 

today. So could we do it? Sure, we could do it once, but my analogy 

is kind of like I couldn’t run a 4-minute mile. I might be able to 

run at that pace for 100 yards, but then I would run out of gas. 

And these ships right now, and you can see the impacts with the 

Eisenhower and some of the other carriers. Right now, we are consuming the service life of these ships at a pace that is faster than 

they are designed, and eventually you are going to use up that 

service life, and then we will be in a situation where they won’t 

make it to 50 years, and then the domino effects from that will 

really cause us significant problems downstream. 

Mr. COURTNEY. I want to thank all of you for your testimony and 

your service. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Before we go to Congressman Wittman, can we clarify what we just said? We said ‘‘we could do it.’’ Tell us what ‘‘do 

it’’ means and what risk we have to do it, because when you are 

doing these deep maintenance on these carriers, I take it you don’t 

have sailors that are sitting there doing their training and they are 

sitting on the carrier at that particular point in time. 

So what would you have to do if, as Mr. Courtney asked, you 

needed to send one of these carriers out, where are you going to 

get the sailors and the training, and what risk is it to those sailors 

to go out there if they don’t have that training and they are not 

prepared at that particular point in time? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. I am glad you asked the question. 

As I walked through and described, we have got four carriers in 

some level of maintenance from RCOH up to—— 

Mr. FORBES. And Mr. Secretary, we know what RCOH means. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Okay. 

Mr. FORBES. Can you, just for the record, make sure we are clarifying that. Try to stay away from acronyms—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. As much as possible because we are 

using this record later. 

Secretary STACKLEY. The refueling complex overhaul for a carrier 

once in its midlife, it is about a 44-month depot period where you 

open her up and refuel her, as well as, do about a third of the total 
8 

modernization that the ship will get in its lifetime, so it is down 

hard. You are not going to pull a carrier out of an RCOH. 

And then you have other availabilities that are not as invasive, 

but they do bring a carrier down and you are not going to be able 

to pull a carrier right out. You are going to have to restore systems, 

and at the same time you are restoring systems, you have got to 

rebuild the crew because when a carrier goes into a depot period, 

there is a lot of turnover of the crew and they are not ready to go 

out and start operating. They have got to go through their re-certifications to ready for sea, and then a carrier comes with the air 

wing. You also have to integrate the air wing back on the carrier. 

So there is a very disciplined maintenance, training, operational 

cycle that we are trying to return to with the O–FRP. So the carriers that we have in deep maintenance today, could we pull one 

or two out and make it available? Maybe, but there is a timeline 

that you have to deal with, so you will not get the response that 

we have committed to in the two-plus-three regimen that the CNO 

has referred to, which is two carrier presence, plus three surge capable within a very limited window of time, which is factored into 

our operational plans for major combat operations. 

We would be delinquent to providing that, depending on which 

carriers you pull out and how long it takes to button the carrier 

back up, get its systems operational again, and then integrate crew 

and air wing, get it ready to deploy. 

Mr. FORBES. And I don’t want to be facetious, but it is not like 

we are just putting gas in a tank and we just have to pull the hose 

out and put it back in the pump and call everybody back, get on 

the ship. And we are talking about months of training, preparation, 

putting crews together, getting airplanes on, so during that month 

period of time, we still have huge gaps in our operational plans 

where we wouldn’t have the carrier surge, fair? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. Mr. Wittman is recognized for any questions 

he may have. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you 

so much for joining us today, and thanks for your service to our 

Nation. 

Admiral Manazir, I wanted to jump away from the ship itself to 

a critical element of the ship, that is, our air wings. And as we are 

going from 10 to 11, as we are bringing Ford on, the question is, 

do we have the complementary aircraft to make sure that they are 

available so as Ford becomes available, we make sure that we have 

all the full complement across the spectrum of our carriers to make 

sure the aircraft is there? 

I know that we look at our F–18s; we are transitioning too, to 

the F–35. Give me your perspective on where we are with the number of necessary aircraft to make sure we have full operational capability for all of our aircraft carriers, and then where are we with 

number of F–18s on the deck, and then where are we with the 

transition from F–18 to F–35? 

Mr. MANAZIR. Yes, sir, Congressman Wittman. Thanks very 

much for the question. You have rightly pointed out that a key relevance of our aircraft carrier is the air wing on top. As the committee knows, we retired USS Enterprise in 2012 after 51 years of 
9 

service. The air wing that was on top of Enterprise in the Cuban 

missile crisis was vastly different than the air wing that was on top 

when we retired her in 2012, and the relevance in the fights that— 

the conflicts that we have had is that force. 

The short answer to your question, yes, sir, we have enough airplanes to source 11 aircraft carriers when Ford comes online. Part 

of my job is to build that force and to afford that force. Right now 

we have a current readiness problem in our F–18Cs, and as I testified before, because of the extension of the F–35 program to the 

right, we have had to sustain our F–18Cs far longer than we had 

planned on. 

Because we are sustaining them past 6,000 hours of their service 

life, we are running into problems with corrosion internal to the 

airplane that we had not seen or planned, because we hadn’t 

planned to take them past 6,000 hours. So our near-term readiness 

problem is getting enough F–18Cs out to source our carrier strike 

groups that deploy. 

What we are seeing right now is we have enough to send out F– 

18Cs on deployment, and we are taking—well, we have less airplanes than we need in the earlier phases of our fleet response 

training plan, so we are taking readiness hits there. So the forces 

back here at home cannot train enough because they don’t have 

enough assets. So we are, in the vernacular, taking risk here at 

home to make sure that we have deployed assets. 

Our F–18Es and Fs, sir, are the majority of our force going to 

2035. We might even fly those airplanes close to 2040. They are 

relevant, very, very good airplanes, and when coupled with the F– 

35C coming off the carrier deck, form the most potent airplane 

combination of any force that is out there, and so keeping that F– 

18E, F, relevant all the way through past 2035 is key. 

The Navy plans to IOC, initial operational capability, the F–35C 

in August of 2018. We will have enough squadrons to outfit over 

half of our carrier force with F–35Cs, complementing the F–18Es 

and Fs. We will have a predominant F–18E and F force to 2035 

with a single F–35C squadron in every air wing by then. That complementary capability is going to give us the warfighting power 

that we need. 

Mr. WITTMAN. I know, as I visited the depots where the work is 

going on in F–18s, that there is a pipeline issue there, too, where 

we need to get more aircraft through there. Isn’t there overall, 

though, a strike fighter shortfall, and doesn’t that create a significant problem with that backup in the depots, as you said, trying 

to get those [F–18] C aircraft out and where the demand is, and 

if there is a backup there, to me, it does create a problem, and 

there is an issue about the number of strike air aircraft that we 

have. 

Mr. MANAZIR. Yes, sir. As we testified, we have a strike fighter 

inventory management challenge because if you look at the demands on the strike fighters into 2030, we have a shortfall. I can 

say that shortfall in the early part of the 2020s is about 138 airplanes; so we are taking measures to get the depot to be more efficient, near term, and then to acquire more airplanes to source that 

shortfall. 
10 

There are two reasons for the near- to mid-term shortfall. The 

first one is the extension of F–35 has caused us to have to extend 

the F–18Cs from 6,000 hours to 10,000 hours. That work was the 

level of work done to each airplane was unplanned in the depot. 

The second thing that we haven’t done is procured enough airplanes to offset the amount of flying we have been doing to what 

Vice Admiral Aquilino talked about the use of our carriers. CNO 

Greenert testified a year ago that we need two to three squadrons 

of Super Hornets to offset the attrition loss, the hours that we have 

flown those airplanes. That is 24 to 36 airplanes. 

When you infuse 34 to 46 new airplanes into this mix, plus to 

get the depot to be more efficient, sir, that gets a long way towards 

getting at that strike fighter inventory management challenge, the 

shortfall if you look at supply, demand, and usage. 

If we also acquire enough F–35Cs starting in the latter part of 

this decade in this Future Year Defense Plan, you will now be able 

to manage to the warfighting requirement that you talked about, 

getting out to those 11 carriers and having the combat capability 

that we need. But it is a challenge we are addressing, sir, with all 

of our might in the Naval Aviation Enterprise. 

Mr. WITTMAN. I understand with adding more Super Hornets 

and being able to make up that shortfall, regardless of how quickly 

we can get the depots to respond with efficiencies, but can we, and 

is the capability there to move the F–35C to the left to make that 

up? So the question is, is it a situation where we may need more 

Super Hornets because you can’t get enough F–35Cs to the fleet, 

or is it a reality that you can do both? 

Mr. MANAZIR. Sir, we are looking for both. My definition of the 

near-term problem or mid-term problem of F–18Es and Fs is, if we 

acquire F–18Es and Fs, 2016, 2017, and 2018, 36 airplanes, 2 to 

3 squadrons, and we IOC the F–35C on time in August of 2018, 

with Block 3F software, that we will get at the combat capability 

you are talking about. 

Sir, we can certainly accelerate F–35 platforms to the left and 

buy those, but they are not the capability that the Navy wants. We 

specifically want 3F software. CNO Greenert testified to that, and 

CNO Richardson has committed that that airplane with Block 3F 

software is the capability that we need on our carrier flight decks 

to support the integrated capability we bring to the rest of our air 

wing. So yes, sir, we could buy airframes, but they won’t be the capability that the Nation needs. 

Mr. WITTMAN. I think that is the key to understand is the current capability with E and F platforms, what you would have are 

the 35Cs to make sure we got that complementary capability there. 

Let me ask you this in closing. You talk about making the depots 

more efficient. To me, there is still a pipeline issue in the aircraft 

that we have to move through the depots to make sure we meet 

demand currently, not out into 2017, 2018, and 2019, but currently. 

Tell me where we are with making sure that efficiency is going to 

be there because that creates a short-term issue. 

Mr. MANAZIR. Yes, sir. This gets a little bit complex, but I will 

simplify it for you. When we brought the initial bunch of airplanes 

into the depot, we applied a lean manufacturing model to the 

depot, and that means that when you bring an airplane in, you 
11 

have a kit that you are going to replace parts in the airplane, and 

the mechanic, the artisan takes a new part, replaces an old part, 

moves the airplane along. When we opened up these F–18Cs, given 

that we extended them past 6,000 hours, we found that there was 

so much corrosion in there, that too much engineering work could 

be done. 

So in stride, we have changed that process to something called 

Critical Chain Process Management, which is looking at the actual 

constraint for each airplane, assessing where that constraint lies, 

and then attacking the constraint. We have been underway in that 

process now for a year. We have already increased the depot 

throughput by 40 percent. We expect it to get even greater than 

that to where we have delivered somewhere on the line of 30 airplanes from the depot a year ago. We are looking to deliver 104 airplanes a year from now. 

So yes, sir, we are getting our feet under us. We had to change 

the whole process to understand what kind of an engineering problem we have. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Can I—I just wanted a little bit of clarification. First, Admiral Manazir described what we are doing in terms 

of increasing throughput at the depots. Part of that has been bringing on additional engineers and artisans, so we have, in fact, increased the hiring to help that throughput; but we have also 

turned to Boeing as a facility with the expertise and the tooling required. 

So we are looking to pull the right levers to increase that depot 

throughput. Today, we cannot—we cannot accept the numbers that 

we are suffering through today, and so when Admiral Manazir 

talked about the projected shortfall in the 2020s, we have got to 

improve upon the depot part of the equation to do better than that. 

The other piece in terms of procurement, he described the F–35C. 

Just to clarify, the 2018 initial operating—operational capability 

for the F–35C for the Navy, that is with 3F software. F–35Cs 

bought in 2016 will deliver in 2018 in the 3F configuration. That 

is a software configuration. 

So the aircraft we are procuring will have the hardware necessary to support the software. The issue is we haven’t crossed that 

bridge yet. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Mrs. Davis is recognized for any questions she 

might have. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Thank you very much all of you for 

being here and your service. 

Getting back to the issue of the number of air wings for the 11th 

carrier as it comes online. Did I understand, are we still behind in 

terms of that last air wing? 

Admiral MANAZIR. No, ma’am. We have a model. We have 10 air 

wings, and we resourced—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. You have already—— 

Admiral MANAZIR [continuing]. At 10 air wings. Yes, ma’am. We 

do a—we do a tiered readiness approach to deploying our forces. 

That is that as we get closer to deployment, the resourcing gets 

higher and higher. The way that we have had to manage our F– 
12 

18C strike fighters is to take airplanes away from the earlier 

stages of the training, and that is what the effect has been to this 

depot throughput that Secretary Stackley talked about, the challenge that we have had and that I have relayed, but we can resource a number of air wings we need to deploy our carriers. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And the number—and the personnel that is required 

as well, is the recruitment going in such a way that we know that 

we are going to have the pilots when we need them? 

Admiral MANAZIR. Yes, ma’am. We have exceeded. The Chief of 

Naval Personnel will tell you that we are exceeding our accession 

goals and we are exceeding our retention goals for the force that 

we need across officers and enlisted, but we definitely have enough 

people to resource all the air wings and the carriers that we are 

pushing forward. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Is there anything about that that still concerns you? 

Admiral MANAZIR. I think retaining our talent is always a concern, making sure that the Navy rewards our sailors and our officers and chiefs for doing the job that they do. We can’t adequately 

reward them because of the load, and we try to find ways to motivate them to stay. Obviously, when a new sailor comes in, we have 

to train them, and then that person has to get expertise in order 

to work for us, so always retaining the right kind of talent, retaining that high level of talent of our young Americans is a concern, 

but keeping the numbers, no, ma’am, I am not concerned about 

that. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Because at one time we were using more bonuses. 

You are not doing that now? 

Admiral MANAZIR. I have to defer to the Chief of Naval Personnel on the bonus structure for retention, but I will tell you that 

the report to us is that we are meeting all our retention and accession statistics. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Great. I wanted to just move to the fleet response time, Optimized Fleet Response Plans, and how they affect 

carrier availability as well. We are first—more or less into this first 

cycle, but what is it again, what concerns you the most about that, 

how quickly could mitigation measures be put in place if the carrier strike group maintenance gets behind schedule. 

Admiral AQUILINO. Thanks for the question, ma’am. I will talk 

a little bit about the operational aspects and defer to the maintenance questions. But the key portion of the Optimized Fleet Response Plan is that it synchronizes all the things needed to produce 

an aligned, fully trained, ready carrier strike group, and to include 

the air wing, trained to execute the high-end fight when it is needed, and it is predictable to the sailors and the people who resource 

it. 

It aligns maintenance, training, supply, ordnance, and nine aspects that we have identified required to get that strike group out 

on time, again, trained to the high end. So we are confident that 

this will work. We have already seen aspects that we have implemented shorter portions of it to some of the strike groups, and the 

Eisenhower will be first one from start to finish out the door, deploys in 2016, comes back in 2017. I think we are on a good path. 

Admiral MOORE. Yes, ma’am. As far as the maintenance goes, I 

think it is—you know, when we put the O–FRP together, we made 
13 

a conscious decision to put the maintenance piece first in recognition that getting maintenance done as scheduled and getting it 

done on time was a key part of the O–FRP, if not, the most important part. 

I think that we have seen here recently as a result of being down 

at 10 carriers and having to run carriers at a pace that they 

were—faster than they were designed for. For instance, the Dwight 

D. Eisenhower, which just finished a 24-month availability, which 

was only scheduled for 14 months. She had deployed four times 

since 2008 with only one maintenance availability in there, so 

much faster than we had designed, consuming the service life of 

that ship much faster, so it is really no surprise. I think that you 

saw some of the impacts there. 

We have got to get our arms around that. We certainly spent a 

lot of time looking at Eisenhower to figure out where we can do better going into maintenance periods. We appreciate the support of 

the Congress and some resources to add personnel at our naval 

shipyards. That is certainly going to help. But going forward, you 

know, getting back 11 carriers is one of the ways to get back into 

a maintenance cycle that will be sustainable and then will support 

the O–FRP. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Great. Thank you. Secretary Stackley, you just briefly mentioned the budget deal, and I just—is everybody breathing 

a little bit easier? Does that make a difference in terms of moving 

forward? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I think it makes a huge difference because 

for at least the next 2 years, the next two cycles, we will know 

what our top line is, and we will have some certainty going into 

the next year. Uncertainty is a killer when it comes to planning, 

when it comes to execution, and you make poor decisions when you 

don’t know what your budget top line will be and when you will 

receive it. 

So as I described it, we didn’t get the full amount of the President’s budget request. We are going to work with you all, obviously, 

to adjust, but having some certainty for the next 2 years goes a 

long, long way in terms of execution. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Conaway, the gentleman from Texas, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you. I am on the Seapower Subcommittee 

because I am landlocked. I don’t have a boat. I don’t have a dock. 

I don’t have a homeport. I don’t have nothing. Till 2006, we tried 

this two and three issue with 12 carriers, and now we are trying 

to squeeze a square peg in a round hole with 11 carriers, or 10 carriers. Can you talk to me—I don’t know, Mr. Stackley or who— 

about did the development of the two deployed three surge concept, 

did it predate Putin’s surge, and we talked about the balloon going 

up. I would rather keep the balloon going up with a deterrence factor, so how do we deter Putin in the Atlantic and the Med and 

deter China in the South China Sea, and keep something of the 

Persian Gulf. That looks like three versus two, so can you talk to 

me, what would be the history of the two plus three, and then how 

do we deter Putin and reassure our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 
14 

Organization] allies that we are there where we need them, and 

when we are needed. 

Admiral AQUILINO. Sir, thanks for the question. I will walk you 

through a little bit, I think, on how we view the deterrence portion, 

and don’t have the history back to that far on the two plus three. 

But for the deterrence portion of your question, the Cooperative 

Strategy for the 21st Century that was signed in March by the 

CNO, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, as well as the Commandant of the Coast Guard, takes a view of the maritime concerns that exist and how the Navy will contribute to that deterrent 

requirement. 

We are globally deployed, as you know, all the time, to all the 

AORs [areas of responsibility]. We have a forward-deployed naval 

force in the Western Pacific, compromised of the Ronald Reagan 

strike group, specifically. We currently are—George Washington is 

coming around. The South America just went through the Straits 

of Magellan, participating in UNITAS [annual multilateral exercise] with our South American partners. We have ballistic missile 

defense ships forward deployed to Rota, Spain, in support of the deterrence against the Russian piece. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I know I am over here talking about carriers. So 

how—is it time to relook at the two plus three since nobody—does 

anybody on the panel know what the history of two plus three is, 

or how we got there? Mr. Stackley. 

Secretary STACKLEY. It actually—I am going to say it was three 

plus three just shy of a decade ago. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

Secretary STACKLEY. About the 2007 timeframe. And this—the 

numbers are derived from operational planning and the force that 

would be required to win major combat operations in the 3–0 plan. 

Mr. CONAWAY. And so in that timeframe was—where was Putin 

and his aspirations? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Like I say, sir, this goes back to the 2006, 

2007 timeframe, and it has evolved over time. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Yeah, yeah. Is there a group in your team that 

looks—that from time to time steps back and relooks at the conventional wisdom to say, when that was done a decade ago, when we 

set on two plus three, and we’ve held that through two different 

administrations, and now we are trying to justify that with 11 carriers that we might have at something—or 10 we got now, 11 we 

will have in 2019, 2020, 2021, whenever the Ford comes online. Is 

there a group that red-teams that to say, you know, we really— 

given that Putin is out there, we need three plus three or three 

plus two, what is it—is there somebody that does that? 

Admiral AQUILINO. Yes, sir, the combatant commanders are responsible to identify the forces they need to meet the goals for deterrence and then ultimately to be able to respond to crisis—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. So General Breedlove would tell us that he 

doesn’t need—he would not prefer a carrier somewhere in the Atlantic or the Med? 

Admiral AQUILINO. So the combatant commanders via our global 

force management process have identified their requirements. 

Those get supported by the services, and then allocated per the 

Secretary of Defense. 
15 

Mr. CONAWAY. Yeah. I know you guys make hard choices. I got 

it. We limit your resources and try to make you squeeze all kinds 

of stuff out of it, but I guess I have got to ask for the record, would 

12 carriers make this overall two plus three and the maintenance 

and the deployments and the training and the aircraft and all the 

other kinds of things that you are talking about, wouldn’t it be 

easier with 12 than 11? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Straight math, yes, sir. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Straight math. The reality is, the larger the 

force—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Yeah, I know—— 

Secretary STACKLEY [continuing]. The more flexible you have got, 

and then the issue is how do you afford that. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Yeah, I know, I got you. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I got you. But I do think, at some point, justifying 

the two plus three in today’s world—because I would argue that 

the world is not as safe today as it was in 2006 and 2007. China 

wasn’t doing what it was doing, Russia is not doing what it is 

doing, and so—and maybe we need a review of that whole issue to 

see if we are, in effect, doing our country the right way by at least 

saying we need that third carrier on the—you know, out at any one 

point in time. 

So I appreciate you guys being here, great service to our country. 

I am awed by the distinguished careers each of you have had, so 

thank you for what you have done for our country and your families putting up with all that time being away from them. So thanks 

on our behalf as well. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Conaway, thank you. And I was going to defer 

my questions to the end, but I want to clarify a couple of questions 

Mr. Conaway had just asked you. 

Are we going to have a gap in our carrier presence in either the 

Pacific Command [PACOM] or the Central Command [CENTCOM] 

this year or next year? 

Admiral AQUILINO. Yes, sir. We currently are experiencing what 

the CENTCOM commander would call a gap in the CENTCOM 

AOR. 

Mr. FORBES. And what he would call a gap is actually a gap, isn’t 

it? 

Admiral AQUILINO. It is a—— 

Mr. FORBES. It is not like we are talking about terminology, syntax that’s different than we won’t have a carrier there. That is a 

gap, fair? 

Admiral AQUILINO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And coming back to what Mr. Conaway says, has 

the United States Navy ever made the determination that the presence of a carrier—of an aircraft carrier strike group has a significant role in deterring a conflict from going to phase zero to phase 

three? 

Admiral AQUILINO. Yes, sir. Again, deterrence is one of the key 

missions. 

Mr. FORBES. And it is a significant deterrence? 

Admiral AQUILINO. I believe so. 
16 

Mr. FORBES. Well, let me clarify. 

Secretary STACKLEY. I will go so far as to say that it is at the 

very core of our maritime strategy for national security. 

Mr. FORBES. And the reason that we can know that is because 

you have no single unit that is more expensive, requires more resources to deploy than a carrier strike group, isn’t that fair to say, 

in the national defense of this country, single unit? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I’m not putting dollars against that. I am 

talking in terms of resources and capability that the carrier provides on scene. 

Mr. FORBES. And the reason that I am saying that is because one 

of the things you guys come in to tell us always is the role we have 

to do in balancing what we have, the resources we have. So when 

you come in here and say that we need a carrier strike group, as 

Mr. Conaway said, we need two, and be able to surge three, the 

reason we need that is because it is so vital and so important that 

we place one of the most important and costly resource allocations 

we have, to try to deter that conflict from going to phase zero to 

phase three. Is that a fair statement? I see some nodding of heads, 

but for the record, Admiral Manazir? 

Admiral MANAZIR. Absolutely a fair statement, sir. There is no 

replacement for a carrier strike group in any phase of any kind of 

conflict. There are multiple examples of when a carrier strike group 

was put in place to deter. Cuba in 1961; 1996, through the Taiwan 

Strait, two carrier strikers were sailed through there. The deterrence factor to the United States is significant, the carrier strike 

group, and no, sir, because of the resources the Nation puts into 

the carrier strike group, which is not only the carrier but the five 

destroyers, cruisers that go with it and all the people that go into 

that, it is worth that deterrence factor. Yes, sir, no replacement. 

Mr. FORBES. And the last part of that question is, the United 

States Navy has also made the determination that the ability to 

surge three more carriers is incredibly important to us being able 

to win a conflict if that conflict were to actually go from phase zero 

to phase three. Is that a fair statement? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Absolutely. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. With that, I would like to recognize Mr. 

Larsen for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LARSEN. If you all ever get around to building a 12th carrier, 

we will take it in Everett [Washington]. So I think it is Admiral 

Moore. Can you—we covered the two RCOH carriers. We didn’t 

cover the three depot maintenance carriers. Could you give us a 

flavor of what that schedule looks like? 

Admiral MOORE. Well, right now, you have got Abraham Lincoln 

in RCOH at Newport News Shipbuilding. You have got USS Nimitz 

in a 14-month availability in Bremerton. USS Carl Vinson down in 

San Diego for a 6-month availability down in San Diego. You have 

got USS George H.W. Bush at Norfolk Naval Shipyard right now 

with an 8-month availability at Norfolk, and then as the secretary 

alluded, you have right now USS George Washington returning 

from Japan to commence a refueling overhaul in August 2017. She 

will go back to Norfolk in December 2015, essentially she doesn’t 

have enough gas in her tank to really—is a deployable asset. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 
17 

Admiral MOORE. So you really have got those—in addition to 

Lincoln, you have got those three other carriers plus George Washington right now that is not available to us. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. And which of those are—which of those maintenance schedules are being pushed by a utilization that wasn’t anticipated versus ones that are on schedule? 

Admiral MOORE. Well, I think the ones—the Eisenhower is the 

one that we just finished, was the one that was significantly impacted by the pace that we ran the ship. Right now, it looks like 

Carl Vinson is doing fine, and as is George H.W. Bush. The one up 

in Bremerton, the Nimitz, is probably going to be the most challenging one to us for a couple of reasons. One, she is 40 years old. 

She is the oldest carrier ship of the class, so—and then, secondly, 

she has had a significant period of time where we’ve really run her 

at a higher op temp than some of the other carriers. So of the 

availabilities we have right now going on, I will tell you that the 

Nimitz, one that is in Bremerton, is the most challenging in terms 

of size and the work package it is on. 

Mr. LARSEN. Has that added months to the maintenance schedule over than what was anticipated? 

Admiral MOORE. Yes, sir. We actually, because of Nimitz, we 

were originally going to dock her this time. We decided to not dock 

her but put her in what is called an extended maintenance availability for 14 months, and then because of the run time of the ship 

we are going to deploy her, but we are going to bring her right back 

and put her back into a docking availability, so she is going to 

have, in the span of about 3 years, a significant amount of maintenance done on her to try and catch her back up, if you will. 

Mr. LARSEN. And then she is due for decommissioning—— 

Admiral MOORE. 2025 is when she inactivates. 

Mr. LARSEN. 2025. 

Admiral MOORE. Yes, sir. That is when she will hit 50 years. 

Mr. LARSEN. Any of this driving by the—I think the Readiness 

Subcommittee had a hearing where Admiral Harley testified that 

the Ford was going to be delayed 2 years, even though it is being 

delivered in 2016 and goes to work in 2018, there is a little delay 

there. 

Admiral MOORE. Well, there is no doubt that being at 10 carriers, which is exacerbated by the fact that the Ford won’t be now 

deployable till 2021, we will—you know, the law says you have to 

be 11 carriers, but it is only measured by when we commission 

Ford, and we will commission Ford next summer, but the reality 

is she is not a deployable asset now because of the way we are 

going to go test her until 2021, so we will be in a period of 10 carriers here until about 2021. 

Back to my initial comments, you know, when we inactivated Enterprise in 2012, that took us down to 10, and then that—in the 

last 3 years, in order to meet the demand signals of COCOMs and 

meet the present surge requirements, we have run carriers harder 

than we had typically done it and harder than they were designed. 

We have had—since 2012, had 7 aircraft carriers that have gone 

more than 300 days of deployed time between maintenance availabilities. Not all of it consecutive sometimes, but a lot of time, and 

that is an awful lot of run time, and that is a challenge that we 
18 

are going to have to continue to face here until we get Ford on the 

line. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. Admiral Manazir, could you comment—I 

think I know the answer to this, but I think you probably would 

know it with regard to the 18Gs [EA–18G Growlers]. Do we anticipate those being—do we anticipate the Navy’s 18Gs being the only 

air base electronic attack? Are we going to have the national mission and the expeditionary as well being carrier based, or is that 

what the Navy is anticipating, serving other services? 

Admiral MANAZIR. Yes, sir. So a couple of things in your question. The 18G Growler is the only Department of Defense airborne 

electronic attack platform that will be in service once the last of 

the Prowlers decommissions. The United States Navy has bought 

153 Growlers. Thank you very much for the partnership there. We 

are completing a study to see if that is enough—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

Admiral MANAZIR [continuing]. Growlers for all of the missions 

that the joint force would carry out. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. Good. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentlelady from Missouri, Mrs. Hartzler, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and appreciate hearing about the importance of the Growlers made in Missouri, and 

we certainly are trying to be supportive of making sure that you 

all have the assets that you need in that regard, so continue to 

work with us on that. 

I wanted to clarify about the USS Gerald Ford because at the 

subcommittee hearing that we had earlier, it said it was scheduled 

to be commissioned in the early half of 2016, but then due to the 

shock trials, it would be delayed an additional 2 years, so that 

would be 2018, but then you are saying now it will be 2021 before 

it is commissioned? 

Admiral MOORE. Yes, ma’am. If I could, just to clarify, we will 

deliver the ship and commission it next summer in 2016, and because it is the first ship of the class, it will have a series of initial 

operational tests and evaluation that we would have already done 

and that would have stretched out for several years to go prove 

that the ship does what we contracted the ship holder to do. 

So she was originally scheduled to deploy—her first deployment 

would have been in 2019, and now, because of the shock trial, we 

will now deploy her for the first time in 2021, so that is the delay 

I was referring to. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. And I know that they said in August 2015 is 

when they wanted to have that shock trial, and I know it has only 

been a few months, but have we had any development on that? 

Have they arrived at that point yet to do any of those? 

Admiral MOORE. We will shock her in summer 2019, August of 

2019, and we are making preparations to go do that now. We will 

bring her out of the yard. We will shake her down, and in our parlance, to make sure you kick the tires and make sure that you are 

getting what the taxpayer said that we were buying, and then we 

will go out and test her through a series of things for this brand 

new ship. And then we will go ahead and set her up and do a shock 

trial in the summer of 2019. 
19 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Well, it is concerning that it will be another 6 years basically, if I figure right, before we get to 11 full carriers again, and so hopefully we won’t need them, and the world 

stage will allow us to have that, only 10. 

But I wanted to talk more, and several people have already mentioned, but the maintenance situation. Of course, we had almost a 

2-year maintenance on the Eisenhower after you have already 

talked about the extended service that it had that resulted in that, 

but has there been any lessons learned by these extended deployments to maintenance needs, that perhaps you can bring to the 

Gerald Ford in redesigning or to help decrease the amount of maintenance that is needed on the newer model? 

Admiral MOORE. Yes, ma’am. Actually we spent an awful lot of 

time in the design of the ship trying to figure out how you could 

spend less time in maintenance and set the ship up so it would require less maintenance, so a couple of things. One, the Ford is designed to only have to dock the ship—dry-dock the ship every 12 

years. We dry-dock the Nimitz carrier today every 8 years, so over 

the life of the ship, that is two fewer dockings, that means more 

time available to the combatant commander. 

We looked at a lot—we used a lot of specialized materials on the 

ship that don’t corrode as much, so a large portion of the maintenance we do on the carriers today involves opening up tanks, going 

in and blasting, coating, and painting those, that takes—spend an 

awful lot of time. 

The other thing that we did that I could point out to you is a 

large portion of the Ford class, the interior of the ship is air-conditioned, and while that may seem like a great thing and you say, 

hey, it is nice you are doing that for the crew. Actually the reason 

we have done that is because one of the largest sources of corrosion 

and maintenance that we do on the ship is the ingestion of salt air 

from the environment that we work in, and so we spent an awful 

lot of time redesigning the Ford to air-condition large portions of 

the ship. 

For instance, this is the first aircraft carrier that we have ever 

had that we will actually air condition the propulsion spaces, and 

the combination of that and then a redesign of the ship, which has 

resulted in the half number of valves on board, we took the steam 

systems which generate hot water on a Nimitz-class carrier, they 

are electric now, so we don’t have steam piping running throughout 

the ship. 

So we tried to go back and take all the lessons learned off the 

Nimitz class, a very manpower-intensive ship, great class of ship, 

and rolled those into the Ford. So I think when you see the Ford 

get out there, we projected we will spend significantly less time in 

depot, which means the ship is available to the combatant commander and we will spend 20 percent less on maintenance dollars. 

The last thing is the class—this class of ship is designed to only 

go into a depot availability every 43 months as to compared to a 

Nimitz-class carrier which is right now at 36, so you are—we won’t 

put it into maintenance as much. When we put it in for maintenance, we will do less maintenance. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. That is good to hear. Thank you very much. I 

appreciate it. I yield back. 
20 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In looking at how the 

carrier fleet may be updated, there is a greater focus on the use 

of automated systems to alleviate costs. What plans does the Navy 

have in terms of extending ship life and freeing up resources for 

other uses? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Let me start with the ship life itself. It is 

a 50-year service life on the aircraft carrier. And today, the ship 

is not designed for a service life beyond 50 years. What we are trying to do is drive down the cost of getting it to 50 years. So the 

automation that you described, that is a critical component of that 

strategy because a big part of your cost in service life is the cost 

of people. 

And so to drive down the size of the crew on an aircraft carrier, 

we have converted to first reducing the maintenance load that the 

crew has to perform, but also relying on automation. Where a sailor in the past might have taken a particular action, now we are 

using automation to relieve that burden from the crew. 

So in total in terms of the ship’s force itself, 600 sailors come off 

of the comparable number that puts a Nimitz-class carrier to sea, 

largely thanks to the automation that we have embedded into the 

systems. So that is a lifecycle cost savings. And then as Admiral 

Moore described, the efforts to improve reliability and reduce maintenance loads makes the carrier more available to get underway in 

its 50-year service life. 

Going beyond 50 years, that would entail another refueling cycle 

for the aircraft carrier. And our experience to date is at that stage 

of the hull’s life, you are better proceeding with replacing the hull 

with a new ship than to try to refuel a 50-year-old hull to get another 25 years out of it. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. As our carriers operate within the carrier strike group, how do we stand as far as supporting vessels and 

resources that the Navy needs to ensure that every carrier group 

is properly supported? 

Admiral AQUILINO. Sir, the Military Sealift Command [MSC] is 

the supporting assets to meet our carrier strike group logistics requirements. They are currently structured to meet the force structure size of 11 carriers. And they are sized rightly to do that. They 

forward position in some cases, they deploy with them in other 

cases. But currently, we are matching the need with the requirement. 

Secretary STACKLEY. I would simply add, I described in my opening remarks the Force Structure Assessment that was completed 

by the CNO in 2012 and updated each year since. That outlines a 

very balanced force. So while the carrier, the 11-carrier force is the 

centerpiece, it also includes all the escort ships that are part of the 

carrier strike group, and support ships associated with replenishing supplies on the carrier and to support not just the carrier, 

but also the ships that would accompany her on deployment. 

And so then if you look at our shipbuilding plan going forward, 

you will see each type of ship that is outlined in that Force Structure Assessment, its procurement plan to either build new or to ex-
21 

tend its service life to ensure that we have the full complement described. 

Admiral MANAZIR. Sir, and if I can add, the Force Structure Assessment that Secretary Stackley is describing, to go back to a 

question that was asked by I believe the gentleman from Texas, 

this Force Structure Assessment is sized for United States Navy 

force to conduct a complex, multi-phase campaign against a highend adversary in one region, and be able to deter or impose costs 

on an adversary in another region. This force is designed to do that 

all the way to 2030, is our assessment. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. In your opinion, does it make more 

sense to—well, let me ask the question this way. With respect to 

the sustainment phase of ship construction, how would the requested funding be allocated to sustain the carrier force as it is? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I think what you are describing there, sir, 

is our funding in the President’s budget request, we have new construction funding, which is ships, conversion, and Navy, which is 

SCN, but inside of our operations and maintenance account is the 

maintenance funding required to support the carriers and their 

service life. 

So we talked earlier about the Optimum Fleet Response Plan. 

That lays out the cycle by carrier strike group for ships entering 

the maintenance window between deployments. And then the budget request that comes over annually provides the funding for the 

stack of ships that would be in depot maintenance as well as routine maintenance to execute the requirements consistent with the 

O–FRP. And it is done by ship type in terms of both maintenance 

and modernization for the specific windows. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. And I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman yields back. The gentlelady from 

New York, Ms. Stefanik, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the 

panelists for your testimony today and for your service and for your 

families’ service to our Nation. 

I am proud to represent Fort Drum, home of the 10th Mountain 

Division. And as you know, currently brigades are forward deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq, and have been since September 11, 

2001. And recently, I was fortunate to embark on the USS Truman 

while she was underway. And I also accompanied Chairman 

Wittman on a visit to the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, at 

NAS [Naval Air Station] Fallon in order to view the entire workup 

and training cycle prior to deployment. And these visits, both of 

them, made it very clear the significant role the Navy has in providing close air support to troops on the ground. 

And recently, there has been discussion about how our air wings 

may require some adjustments in order for the carrier strike group 

to be successful in the high-end fight against competitors like 

China. But as our Navy considers how to meet these challenges 

from the high-end threats, I also hope that the capabilities are 

maintained so that the carrier air wing can continue the support 

of troops on the ground like the 10th Mountain Division soldiers 

that I represent. 

So can you please explain to me how you plan to maintain or improve the carrier air wing’s current close air support capabilities 
22 

while simultaneously preparing for a high-end fight against a peer 

competitor? 

Admiral MANAZIR. So ma’am, that is my job as the Director of 

Air Warfare. I will tell you that the F–18Es and Fs that are over 

the top of our troops in northern Iraq and Syria and in Afghanistan 

supporting those troops for a decade are the same fighters that we 

will have through 2035. And coupled with the Joint Strike Fighter 

F–35C, which has significant close air support capabilities, you will 

still have the close air support capabilities that we have enjoyed for 

the last 15 years in these fights in different AORs. 

Those same aircraft, F–18Es and Fs and F–35Cs, are capable of 

operating in the high end, particularly when coupled with the E– 

18G Growler. So the air wing that you see on the flight decks now, 

augmented by the F–35C in August of 2018, will continue to be 

able to operate across all the phases of warfare, whether it is close 

air support or whether it is a high-end fight against an anti-access/ 

area-denial type of adversary. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Great. Thank you, Admiral. Any other comments? 

Admiral AQUILINO. No, ma’am, other than we are completely integrated with the Army team on the ground. We have made numerous operational changes. At my last deployment I had three Army 

LNOs [liaison officers] who rode the ship with us in direct communications with the troops on the ground in order for the pilots who 

were about to take off had the latest and greatest update on the 

situation on the ground so they could best support them. It is the 

most important thing we do, and we take it very seriously. 

Admiral Manazir is putting together a great list of equipment so 

that we are synchronized, aligned, and interoperable with our 

Army and Marine Corps team that is on the ground. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Great. I know I speak for the 10th Mountain soldiers I represent that we are appreciative of that support. And I 

yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentlelady yields back. The gentleman from 

Oklahoma is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like 

to thank all of the great service members that are testifying today. 

I am a Navy pilot by trade. I recently traded in my wings of gold 

for wings of silver. But I still, at heart, am a Navy pilot. 

I joined my fleet at a perfect time. I joined VAW–113, the world 

famous Black Eagles. And when I joined the squadron, we were in 

the middle of what was called at the time an interdeployment 

training cycle, IDTC. So I had the opportunity as a brand new guy 

coming out of the FRS [Fleet Replacement Squadron], had an opportunity to see the whole IDTC worked through. I got to participate in the Strike Fighter Advanced Readiness Program. I got to 

participate in JTFX [Joint Training Fleet Exercise], Air Wing 

Fallon, COMPTUEX [Composite Training Unit Exercise]. I eventually, after I finished my sea tour, I went and worked at the Naval 

Strike and Air Warfare Center. 

But what was interesting is, it was an 18-month cycle followed 

by a 6-month deployment. And then we had the wars in Afghanistan start and the war in Iraq start. And what was the IDTC 

ended up being instead of a 6-month deployment, a 10-month deployment. And at that point, it seemed like the interdeployment 
23 

training cycle pretty much went off the rails and they started new 

programs, Fleet Response Plan, and now the Optimized Fleet Response Plan. And even with these plans, to get more out of less, 

still gaps are emerging that are in my estimation dangerous. 

And one of the questions I have is, have you guys done a detailed 

analysis as to what the impacts would be for the training cycle if 

instead of 11 carriers we had 12? And I know other members have 

asked this question. But what would be specifically the impacts? I 

know that 12 is better than 11; we heard that. But what would it 

do, for example, for the IDTC, which of course has a different name 

these days? What would it do for the men and women who serve? 

Would they get to maybe not deploy as frequently? Would the deployments be 6 months instead of 10 months? Would there be fewer 

gaps, for example, in the Persian Gulf or in the Mediterranean? 

Would there be more time for us to stay at home training and 

maintaining not only the ships, but also the aircraft? 

So all of these kind of things that go into determining what is 

the right force structure and do we need 11 or 12. Can we get specific analysis as to what are the impacts? What is the difference in 

the fleet if we have 12 instead of 11? 

Admiral AQUILINO. Sir, I will hold off on the analysis piece, but 

I will get to your discussion on the training cycle. So the Optimized 

Fleet Response Plan is targeted to do what you highlighted as 

somewhat of a frustration. In that plan, the key segments of the 

design, the ship must get in on time for maintenance, it must get 

out on time. That preserves 120-plus days of basic training for the 

ships and the pilots to do the SFARPs [Strike Fighter Advanced 

Readiness Programs] and things you described. It also carves out 

an integrated class advance timeline of 120-some-odd days to do 

the COMPTUEXs and the JTFXs. And it preserves that ability to 

do the high-end training that previously I think we have seen was 

the shock absorber for when you either had to deploy early or when 

the ship came out of maintenance late. 

We are fencing that, understanding that the only way to train to 

the high end is to preserve that time and then have discipline in 

the process. That is a critical part of O–FRP. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So if that time is preserved, how are you 

stretching? Are you getting like when you deploy, the deployments 

are longer? Is that the goal? 

Admiral AQUILINO. We have done longer deployments in the 

past. But the tenet of O–FRP that the CNO needed to get to, based 

on a couple of questions before, was a commitment to a 7-month 

deployment. That is for the crews and families so that, number 

one, it is predictable; number two, it doesn’t impact on future retention problems later. Because as you know, you know, 1 day is 

okay, 6 months pretty challenging, 10 months is really hard. And 

I think the CNO wants to get away—we need to put that predictability back in. So the commitment to 7 months as a part of our 

force generation model is critical. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. When you say commitment to 7 months, meaning not to go past 7 months or do at least 7 months? 

Admiral AQUILINO. Seven months is the targeted goal for a carrier strike group deployment. That is what we are bringing into the 

global force management process. That is the number that we use 
24 

to generate the presence needed—or presence provided under a 

supply-based model that we are using today. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. I am down to my last second here. Can 

we get maybe for the record what that analysis would look like for 

those items I mentioned regarding a 12-carrier fleet vice an 11-carrier fleet? 

Admiral MANAZIR. Sir, at risk of not answering your question but 

telling you, we referred to a Force Structure Assessment that was 

delivered by the Navy to the Congress in February of this year. 

That Force Structure Assessment looked from now until 2030 using 

the Optimized Fleet Response Plan and looking at the projected 

threat capabilities. And that assessment came down and said 11 is 

the minimum number we need with an acceptable level of risk 

to—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Does that mean gaps when you say acceptable? 

Admiral MANAZIR. Sir, the gap part is different. That is the global employment of force. That is the global force management model 

gap. But 11 is the minimum force we need from a capability perspective. As Vice Admiral Aquilino testified to, a different process 

is used as to where to put that force. But the Force Structure Assessment was submitted by the Chief of Naval Operations to say 

that 11 is the number if you look across our force. 

So that, sir, was the analysis that was submitted to Congress in 

February of this year. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So there is no analysis as to what would the 

impact be if you had 11? I am just asking. I mean nobody looked 

into that? 

Admiral MANAZIR. From what perspective, sir? If you are talking 

about where we would put the forces—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. From a gap analysis. Would it reduce gaps? 

Would it allow service members to spend more time at home to do 

training and to do maintenance and ultimately—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. Let me take that, sir. No, we have not done 

an analysis for a 12-carrier force since the JFK [John F. Kennedy] 

retired in 2006 timeframe. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. 

Secretary STACKLEY. To conduct that analysis, in other words to 

take the Force Structure Assessment that we have done and say 

what if we were a 12-carrier Navy, that would be not just adding 

a carrier, obviously, that would be adding all the elements associated with the carrier strike group, as well as the sailors that would 

be added to the deployment cycle, which is not a one for one. So 

that would be a very comprehensive assessment. 

Today, what we do is, as Admiral Aquilino described, is we are 

a supply-side equation today, where we know the force that we 

have got, we take a look at the peacetime presence demands, and 

we take a look at major combat operations and we see can we supply the amount of force necessary to satisfy both? Clearly, there is 

higher demand from the combatant commanders today than we can 

provide in an 11-carrier force. 

So there is a prioritization that takes place inside the Joint Staff 

in terms of the GFMAP [Global Force Management Allocation 

Plan]. For major combat operations, the 11-carrier force to provide 
25 

the two plus three surge carrier strike groups, we believe is what 

is necessary to meet our requirements. Would a 12th carrier strike 

group relieve some of the burden to the total force in terms of operational cycles? Yes, it would. Do we know what that would entail 

in terms of the total force structure, including sailors, and how that 

would ripple through the Optimized Fleet Response Plan? We have 

not done that analysis. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman’s time has expired. Let me say to 

you gentlemen, thank you for being here. Just a couple of wrap-up 

questions that I deferred from the beginning. The role of our two 

subcommittees that we have chosen to take today is not to point 

blame at Republicans or Democrats, the administration or Congress, not to point blame at the cuts of $780 billion versus sequestration, but it is to assess risk and to see how we—and threats, and 

see how we can fill those gaps. 

As I listened, Admiral Moore, to some of your speeches, which I 

appreciate and look at, you had a phrase that I have copied. And 

sometimes I give you credit for it and sometimes I don’t. But it is 

that we are an 11-carrier Navy in a 15-carrier world. And you 

probably said it more articulately even than that. But it sums up 

the fact that based on what Mr. Conaway was talking about, all 

those risks, we probably need 15 aircraft carriers as opposed to 11. 

Admiral Manazir, in all of your analysis you have told me privately, and not with any analytical backing behind it, but if we 

could ask you guys to go in another room and we brought our combatant commanders here, the guys who look every day into the risk 

that Congressman Conaway talked about, that growing risk of Russia, China, everything else in the world, they may say we need 21 

aircraft carriers, but certainly more than what we have. Regardless 

of what Admiral Moore would say that we might need in the world, 

or Admiral Manazir, what we may have from our combatant commanders, the reality is that the United States Congress and the 

United States Navy have basically agreed we need 11 aircraft carriers. And we have less than that today. 

The United States Navy has also, I think based on your testimony, concluded that the mere presence of one of those carrier 

strike groups has a significant role in stopping a conflict from going 

to phase zero to phase three. Therefore, not having that carrier creates a huge vulnerability that we cannot stop that escalation from 

taking place. 

So I ask any of you, if you can tell us the size gap that we will 

have over the next 12 months in either the Pacific Command or 

Central Command, where we will not have a carrier strike group 

present? 

Admiral AQUILINO. Yes, sir. There are in the next year some periods similar to what we are seeing in the CENTCOM AOR now. 

Again, the reason is, number one, not because we don’t want to. 

Mr. FORBES. No, no, this is not fault. 

Admiral AQUILINO. Copy. 

Mr. FORBES. And we have already established we have the gap. 

How large is the gap? We have heard that in non-classified statements. Can you tell me how many days that gap will be present 

in the next 12 months? 
26 

Admiral AQUILINO. I would prefer to tell you that offline, if that 

is okay, for classification purposes. 

[The answer was submitted in a classified forum.] 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. That would be fine. Okay. How about 

CENTCOM? Can you tell us what is going on there right now that 

is not a classified? 

Admiral AQUILINO. Currently, as has been reported, there is a 

gap in the CENTCOM AOR. 

Mr. FORBES. And when we mean gap, just so we know when we 

look the term up, we mean no carrier strike group. 

Admiral AQUILINO. Yes, sir. That is the gap. 

Mr. FORBES. And the other thing that we can agree upon that 

I think the United States Navy has concluded and made a judgment of, and the CNO has said, is that if we do not have that capability of having three carrier strike groups for the surge, which 

means we can bring them to the fight if we are not successful in 

keeping it from going from zero to phase three, that that has a 

huge impact on whether or not we can win or lose that conflict. Is 

that fair to say? 

Admiral AQUILINO. Yes, sir. Those follow-on assets that would be 

needed for many of the crises that are potential, they are critical 

to being able to win the fight, absolutely. 

Mr. FORBES. And if they are critical to winning the fight and we 

need three of those strikes to supplement the two that we don’t always have right now, give me an idea of the timeframe that I 

would be looking at over the next 12 months—and let me use my 

friend Mr. Courtney’s phrase if the balloon goes up—and maybe I 

would rephrase it if we had a conflict that went from zero to three. 

How long would it take to mobilize those three carrier groups and 

to send them on their way to that fight? 

Admiral AQUILINO. If you don’t mind, sir, I would prefer to give 

you those numbers offline as well. 

[The answer was submitted in a classified forum.] 

Mr. FORBES. Be fair to say, though, it would be a significant 

amount of time? 

Admiral AQUILINO. Yes, sir. And definition of significant—— 

Mr. FORBES. I understand. 

Admiral AQUILINO [continuing]. We can talk. 

Mr. FORBES. Now, the last thing I would like to put on that equation too is we know we do not have—we will have times where we 

will not have a carrier strike group in the Pacific Command or the 

Central Command, that that has a huge impact on whether we can 

deter a fight from going from phase zero to phase three. That in 

addition to that, we would have what we would conclude to be a 

significant time period, regardless of what significant means, in 

when we could mobilize the three carrier strike groups we would 

need to surge, therefore having an enormous detrimental impact on 

whether we could win or lose that conflict. 

When we talk about even if we win or lose, that time delay, can 

you tell me whether or not that could also equate to putting at significant risk the lives of men and women who would be in that 

fight? 

Admiral AQUILINO. Absolutely, sir. So a part of the planning that 

goes on, absolutely, is identified by the amount of time your forces 
27 

can respond. The delay to the response of those forces absolutely 

increases the risk, the timelines you are on, and ultimately gets to 

a personal risk. 

Mr. FORBES. And Admiral, you have looked at our military objectives. Can we accomplish all of our military objectives with our current aircraft carrier presence and surge posture? 

Admiral AQUILINO. Sir, the 11-carrier force that is identified as 

needed absolutely—— 

Mr. FORBES. No, no, I understand that. I am talking about today, 

with what we have today, and the world we are living in today and 

the environment you have. Can you accomplish it with what you 

have? 

Admiral AQUILINO. I would say we are accomplishing it, the requirements, at increased stress to the force and the ability to get 

to a sustainable posture that allows us to carry a Navy into the future to meet those same requirements over the long term. 

Mr. FORBES. And when I—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir I would just add to that, and I think it 

is in black and white in terms of the Force Structure Assessment 

that the CNO outlined. We require 11 aircraft carriers to meet our 

full range of military operational requirements. Today we are at 

10, and we are at 10 that are highly stressed because they have 

been driven hard. And so we have more carriers in depot maintenance today than we would normally have under a stable, a more 

stable operational cycle with an 11-carrier force. 

So we have the compounding impact of we are down a carrier 

and then driving the remaining carriers harder. We have more carriers in depot maintenance. So we have a shortfall in terms of our 

ability to generate the carriers with their air wings in response to 

crisis today. And until we get the Ford ready for deployment and 

we are back up to 11 carriers and the Optimized Fleet Response 

Plan catches hold in terms of restoring our operational and maintenance cycle to where it needs to be, until we get back into that 

state, we are going to be operating at a deficit. 

Mr. FORBES. And Mr. Secretary, we are here to help you. We are 

just trying to define what that risk is so we can make sure we 

shore it up. I do have one last question for you. The Navy has proposed a two-phased acquisition strategy for the construction of the 

USS John F. Kennedy, CVN 79. Now I understand that first phase 

would construct the hull and superstructure of the ship and the 

second phase would insert the combat systems. Has the Navy ever 

performed a two-phase aircraft carrier strategy? And is such a 

strategy contemplated for CVN 80? And can you tell us the reason 

why we are adopting that phase? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. The first question regarding 

whether the Navy has done this before on a carrier, I would have 

to go back and research whether we have done it with a carrier, 

but we have done that with surface combatants in the past where 

the shipbuilder would build the ship and then at a Naval Shipyard 

we would install the combat system. 

Today, in fact, on the DDG–1000 [Zumwalt-class destroyers] program we are doing exactly that as well. I would have to do research 

in terms of whether we have done it on a carrier. The motivation 

for doing this, the CVN 79 is the numerical relief for the Nimitz, 
28 

which retires in 2025. At one point in planning, the Navy was looking at the construction schedule for the CVN 79 to support a heelto-toe replacement of the Nimitz. That is not an optimal construction schedule for the shipbuilder. So there is this tension between 

we wanted to build the ship earlier to reduce cost of construction, 

but she is not required until Nimitz gets ready to retire. So do we 

ramp up a crew, have a ship operational for a period of time in advance of when she is needed? So those were the trades that we 

were looking at from a schedule perspective. Separately, we were 

looking at how can we reduce the cost of the CVN 78 class through 

its construction. And a couple things jump out. 

One is there is work that is better tailored, better suited for 

being accomplished outside of the new construction yard where 

third parties could bid on it competitively. Two, we have this long 

history of a very long construction cycle for the carrier. Systems 

that you identify early on in the procurement process, particularly 

electronic systems, command, control and communication systems 

that are subject to obsolescence, by the time the ship is built and 

it is outfitted and delivered, those systems are already obsolete 

compared to the rest of the Navy. So we looked for an opportunity 

to install those systems as late as possible. 

And then the third piece is a very specific system which is the 

radar for the CVN 79 and follow. We are in fact developing a new 

radar for our carriers and big deck amphibs [amphibious assault 

ships], the Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar. That would not be 

available to install in line in construction on the CVN 79, but it 

is available to install in the second phase. 

So we looked at let’s optimize the construction schedule, which 

means building it earlier, but then let’s assign the manning more 

in line with the replacement of the Nimitz. So that created this bifurcation in terms of the schedule. And then in this phase two window we will install the C4I [command, control, communications, 

computers, and intelligence] equipment, the electronics equipment, 

we will install the new radar, and then we will complete some of 

this work that would be competed, frankly, with third parties and 

be able to be done pierside. 

It seems to be the right balance. It is unique to CVN 79 because 

of the schedule window that we have to do this. We will not have 

this opportunity on CVN 80 because her schedule, her construction 

schedule is going to be pressed up against she will be the numerical relief for the CVN—— 

Mr. FORBES. So we don’t have plans to use it on CVN 80? 

Secretary STACKLEY. No, sir. No, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. As you 

know, each day we come into this rather impressive committee 

room, I look at all the things I worry about in the world and the 

things I am grateful for. One of the things I am grateful for is that 

we have talented people with the kind of commitment that you 

have to making sure you are defending and protecting this country. 

So we thank you for that. 

Also, I have told you at the beginning that we wanted to give you 

any time that you needed to elaborate on something perhaps that 

we didn’t discuss you felt was important for the record or to clarify 
29 

something that you would like to clarify. So at that time I would 

love to do that. And Mr. Secretary, we will let you start. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, I gave an opening statement. I have 

had plenty of time to discuss the issues and questions and answers. 

And I would defer to my colleagues here. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Admiral AQUILINO. Sir, I am trying not to get quoted by you, as 

Admiral Moore did, just so you know. 

Mr. FORBES. Look, I am praising him. We would love to have another quote like that. 

Admiral AQUILINO. What I will leave you with, sir, just so you 

are aware, you know better than anyone your Navy is forward deployed each and every day doing the things that are needed. So I 

thought, based on the carrier hearing, I would tell you where your 

current—we talked about where the five parked ones are. Let me 

tell you where the five working ones are. 

So Theodore Roosevelt, just coming back from a greater than 8- 

month deployment that was in the north Arabian Gulf in support 

of the fight against Syria and ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the 

Levant]. On the way home, they went and participated with Operation Malabar with the Indian Navy. They also participated with 

the Japanese Navy as a part of that as well. 

Ronald Reagan now deployed as the forward-deployed naval force 

carrier coming out of Korea, doing operations in the Western Pacific. They will participate in an operation called ANNUALEX [Annual Exercise] with the Japanese. Pretty critical to our allies and 

partners to stay plugged in, interoperable. 

George Washington we talked about. While she is coming around 

to go into overhaul, she is executing Operation UNITAS on both 

the west side and the east side of South America, working with our 

partners down there across the globe. 

John C. Stennis on the West Coast and Harry S. Truman on the 

East Coast, both are almost complete with their workups. They will 

be deploying shortly as the follow-on replacements. 

And sir, I know I don’t have to tell you that, but I figured you 

would want to hear that. Still working hard each and every day. 

Thank you for your time. And I appreciate it. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral. And Admiral Moore, we would 

love to have another great statement. 

Admiral MOORE. I will try to avoid that today, sir, if I could. Mr. 

Chairman, I appreciate the time today. I have had one of the great 

honors of my career to have the opportunity to design and build 

and maintain our Nation’s aircraft carriers. We didn’t spend a 

whole lot of time talking about the Ford class today. Despite some 

of the challenges we have had with Ford, we are going to deliver 

her next year. We are on a sustainable path going forward. That 

is going to be a great ship, built by some fantastic shipbuilders 

down at Newport News, which are national assets. 

I did spend a lot of time talking about the Nimitz class and our 

need to maintain that ship for 50 years, and spent an awful lot of 

time talking about the industrial base. What I failed to mention is 

one of the things that we also should be worried about; I think the 

industrial base, no matter how hard we can run these ships, will 

be able to maintain the ship. 
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One thing I failed to mention I should have, the other thing is 

we are also running the sailors and the men and women on those 

ships extremely hard. And I have no doubt that the industrial base 

can put those ships back together. But I do worry about the pace 

that we are maintaining for our sailors. And so I would just like 

to add that for the record and point out again why it is so important for us to get back to 11 carriers. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral. Admiral Manazir, we are going 

to let you do cleanup. 

Admiral MANAZIR. Mr. Chairman, usually I am not shy as a 

fighter pilot, but I will try also not to make declarative statements 

beyond what you have already discussed with us today. And I 

thank you for the opportunity. I would like to clarify one point and 

then give some closing comments. 

Chairman Wittman, when you and I discussed the Super Hornets 

and F–35Cs, what I needed to clarify is why we buy both of those, 

the impact of the F–18E/F is most impactful at 2016, 2017, 2018. 

The airplanes we are procuring now and that combat capability of 

course go together. And as Secretary Stackley said, the F–35Cs 

that we are procuring in 2016 to deliver 2018 is the capability impact. So I hope that is a little more clear. 

Sir, thank you very much. And Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Courtney, thank you, members of the committee today, for the 

opportunity to join you and for the personal investment so many 

of you have made in ensuring Navy’s ability to defend the Nation, 

to protect American interests at sea, and specifically for your ongoing support of our Nation’s aircraft carriers. 

As your Director of Air Warfare, this is what I worry about, lose 

sleep at night about. But your bipartisan support, your visits to our 

carriers both underway and while they are being built and maintained, the assistance you and your fellow members provide truly 

make a difference. 

Adaptations and improvements to our carrier strike group capabilities continue. And they include most recently USS Eisenhower 

recently completing a highly successful series of developmental 

tests for the F–35C, called Developmental Test Period Two. That 

is our fifth-generation strike fighter that will ensure the Navy’s aircraft carriers deliver air dominance in that high-end warfight. The 

E–2D Advanced Hawkeye was deployed on the Theodore Roosevelt 

for the first time to bring superior long-range battle management 

command and control, with sensors that support offense and defense for the entire carrier strike group. 

The continued delivery of the carrier-based E–18G Growler as 

the only tactical aircraft in the joint force that ensures electromagnetic spectrum dominance of the battlespace. And the continued development of advanced weapons for carriers and their embarked air 

wings in anticipation of future adversaries, such as the long-range 

anti-ship missile. And even high-energy lasers, which will help ensure carrier strike groups can establish sea control in any environment. 

The maintenance and modernization of our current aircraft carriers and the ongoing procurement of the new Ford-class ships will 

ensure our Navy’s aircraft carriers and carrier strike groups continue to outpace the threat and bring unparalleled warfighting ca-
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pability for the combatant commanders. My colleagues at this table 

and over in the Pentagon understand and are committed to the 

work that remains to ensure providing these capabilities does not 

cost the taxpayer a dollar more than they should. 

The Nation’s investment in aircraft carriers is significant. Their 

global reach, their ability to amass firepower over sustained periods, their commanding presence and proof of our national resolve 

have routinely demonstrated a high return on these investments. 

The aircraft carrier, as the centerpiece of a carrier strike group, 

provides us with an unequaled hard, soft, and smart power advantage in a single, responsive, flexible, and mobile package, unfettered by geopolitical constraints. No other military capability delivers more. 

Sir, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify today. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you all. We appreciate the great work your 

staffs do in helping as well. And with that, if there are no other 

questions, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

NOVEMBER 3, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

NOVEMBER 3, 2015 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

NOVEMBER 3, 2015 

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QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. As to the two phase acquisition strategy, what would the funding 

profile include, by fiscal year, to realize CVN–79 in a single phase? 

Admiral MOORE. Delivering CVN 79 using a two-phased acquisition strategy is essential to remaining under the Congressional cost cap, delivering the ship with CVN 

78-like capability, and affordably maintaining an 11-carrier force structure. If the 

decision were made today to transition to a single phase acquisition strategy, it 

would cost ∼$532M more to deliver CVN 79 in a single phase as opposed to the current two-phased approach. The two funding profiles are shown below for comparison: 

In this scenario, a single phase delivery would prevent the integration of a lower 

cost Enterprise Radar Suite (ERS), requiring reversion to Dual Band Radar (DBR). 

The additional funding required in FY2017 and FY2018 reflects the cost to procure 

DBR hardware and software; accomplish the planning effort with HII–NNS to reintegrate installation of the Phase II equipment into the current construction contract; and the construction impact and time-related services caused by an 18-month 

extension of the construction contract with HII–NNS required to support installation of DBR. This process would deliver the ship only about six months earlier than 

planned due to procurement timelines associated with purchasing a DBR ship set 

for CVN 79. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER 

Mr. HUNTER. I’m familiar with the report you provided to the Defense Committees 

on the Automated Test and Retest (ATRT) program. In your report you said there 

are significant benefits to the fleet including reducing testing cost, improving product quality, reducing the time to field new capabilities, and reducing life cycle costs. 

This technology can rapidly re-test in response to cyber vulnerabilities. We know 

this to be an issue of concern—and I’ve raised this issue with both Secretary of Defense Carter and Under Secretary Kendall. Can you assure me you are aggressively 

pursuing this technology to its full potential including implementation across our 

entire carrier fleet? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Navy is pursuing Automated Test and Retest (ATRT) 

technology for the aircraft carrier (CVN) Fleet. The ATRT technology is being used 

in testing the CVN Machinery Control System. The technology is also being used 

in CVN Ship Control System Shore Based Facility testing. The Navy intends to extend the process and technologies across additional control systems for the entire 

CVN Fleet. 

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