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CONTRACTS FOR AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE 

TRAINING 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING 

OVERSIGHT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 15, 2010 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

JON TESTER, Montana 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MARGARET DAUM, Staff Director 

ALAN KAHN, Counsel 

MOLLY WILKINSON, Minority Staff Director 

KELSEY STROUD, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 1 

Senator Brown .................................................................................................. 4 

Senator Kaufman ............................................................................................. 5 

Prepared statement: 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 41 

Senator Brown .................................................................................................. 43 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, APRIL 15, 2010 

Hon. Gordon S. Heddell, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense ......... 7 

Evelyn R. Klemstine, Assistant Inspector General For Audits, U.S. Department of State ........................................................................................................ 8 

Hon. David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State ...................... 10 

David S. Sedney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, and Central Asia, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

For Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense .............. 12 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Heddell, Hon. Gordon S.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 48 

Johnson, Hon. David T.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 67 

Klemstine, Evelyn R.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 63 

Sedney, David S.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 74 

APPENDIX 

Questions and responses submitted for the Record from: 

Mr. Heddell ....................................................................................................... 78 

Ms. Klemstine ................................................................................................... 83 

Mr. Johnson ...................................................................................................... 86 

Mr. Sedney ........................................................................................................ 94 

Contractor Past Performance Evaluation submitted by Chairman McCaskill ... 101 

Audit information submitted by Chairman McCaskill ......................................... 104 

(1) 

CONTRACTS FOR AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE 

TRAINING 

THURSDAY, APRIL 15, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT, OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Claire McCaskill, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators McCaskill, Kaufman, Brown, and Coburn. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL 

Senator MCCASKILL. This Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight will come to order today. 

First, I obviously want to greet the new Ranking Member of the 

Subcommittee. Senator Scott Brown from the State of Massachusetts has joined this Subcommittee as its Ranking Member. I do 

not know what this says about the Subcommittee or me, but I have 

now gone through three ranking members in less than a year. I 

hope you hold up better than the last two. 

Senator BROWN. I will stay as long as you have me, Madam 

Chairman. Thank you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. No. I had a great working relationship with 

both Senator Collins, who was temporarily filling the role as things 

were getting sorted out and elections that really had not quite been 

decided yet, and then Senator Bennett did a great job for a period 

of time. 

But we have had a chance to visit, and I think we will work together well, and I look forward to it, so welcome to the Subcommittee. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Why are we here? Well, typically I try to 

start with self-effacing humor about how dry contracts are and how 

typically no one cares about this subject matter longer than the 

brief moment of outrage when they read a brief quote in a paper 

somewhere about some trouble that has happened in contracting. 

Honestly this is a little different. 

We are now much more educated as a Nation about fighting 

counterinsurgency. We have learned hard lessons about fighting 

counterinsurgency. Lives have been lost. Families across this great 

Nation grieve as I speak for members of their families that have 

been killed fighting counterinsurgencies. 

2 

One thing we have learned is that it has become crystal clear 

that to successfully fight counterinsurgencies you have to be strategic and effective at making sure there is local rule of law. Why 

is that important? Well, that is important because counterinsurgency thrives on being able to substitute their rule of law for that 

of a legitimate government. 

The Taliban has done so well in Afghanistan because they were 

providing police protection to impoverished communities many 

times through fear, many times through retribution. But the 

Taliban, it was a sheriff. And when the Taliban was not the sheriff 

there was rampant corruption and even when the Taliban was the 

sheriff there was rampant corruption. 

We learned all of these lessons in Iraq as we tried to move into 

the country to get rid of a despot, a bad guy, that was destabilizing 

the region; and we learned the hard way that if we did not focus 

on establishing a rule of law, on not just going after the bad guys 

but leaving a military and a police presence that could stabilize the 

way of life that most people on this planet want. They want to be 

able to take their kids to school, feed their families, and not worry 

that they are going to be killed on the way to work. 

So that is why this hearing is so important. Training the police 

in Afghanistan is part of our military mission. It is as important 

as anything else that we are doing in that Nation right now. It is 

as important as training the military. It is as important as hunting 

down the terrorists and killing them. 

So what happened in that regard? And it is an unbelievably incompetent story of contracting. For 8 years we have been supposedly training the police in Afghanistan. Here is what we have 

done. We have flushed $6 billion. $6 billion. 

Now, am I exaggerating? Let me quote the general in charge of 

training the police in Afghanistan. This is what General Caldwell 

said, ‘‘It is inconceivable but in fact for 8 years we were not training the police.’’ He went on to say that essentially we were giving 

them uniforms. 

No one had control of these contracts. No one agency. This has 

been a game of pass off. The ultimate recipe for disaster is not having one single agency with a clear line of authority in charge able 

to make sure the mission is accomplished with efficiency, effectiveness, and that money is not walking away. None of that happened 

for 8 years. 

I will give you one anecdote. Early this year the Italians showed 

up. This has been an international, very unorganized but nonetheless an international effort. The Italians showed up. And the Afghan volunteers that had volunteered to be on these police departments were posting horrible scores on the shooting range. They 

were the gang that could not shoot straight. And there was this 

wringing of hands, what are we going to do about these Afghan police officers that we are training that cannot hit the side of a barn. 

The first part of this year the Italian paramilitary came in and 

began looking at the problem. Are you ready for what the problem 

was? Nobody had checked the sites of the AK–47s and the M–16s 

they were shooting. They were out of line. 

So we were paying somebody to teach these people how to shoot 

these weapons and nobody that we were paying had bothered to 

3 

check the sites as to whether or not they were in line. So these 

guys were using the sites that were not even in line with where 

they were shooting. 

That is one example but I think it is pretty illustrative. These 

contractors, for whatever reason, did not have anybody who was 

saying, have you checked the sites when the scores were coming 

back bad year after year after year. Their scores have dramatically 

improved. 

Do not get me wrong. There are major challenges here. These 

people are showing up to become police officers without being able 

to read or write. Most of them have only seen a role model of a police officer that is not the role model we are looking for. We are 

asking them to change many things about their culture and the 

way they operate. This is a hard job. And do not get me wrong. I 

get it. It is a hard job, all the more reason that we need a line of 

accountability. 

We have an audit that is going to be the subject of the hearing 

to a large extent today. I want to make sure, as we talk about this, 

that we know that there are in fact reasons why people should be 

angry today. This new joint Inspectors General (IG) report that just 

came out in February, and we are going to talk about it extensively 

during the hearing, talks about the problem of this division of responsibility between the Defense Department and the State Department and how badly this has gone in terms of accountability 

and authority. 

Now, if this frankly was the first time that we had heard this, 

then maybe we should not have a full-blown hearing. We have 

identified the problem. Now you can get to work. Here is the rest 

of the story: 

• 2005—Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported 

that Department of State had not developed a plan for when, 

how, or what costs the training or equipping of the ANP 

would be accomplished. 

• 2006—the Department of State (DOS) and Defense Inspectors General found management of the DynCorp contract to 

be problematic and required more effective coordination between the Department of State and CSTC–A, and I start 

talking in acronyms. That means I have been here too long. 

That is essentially the division of the military that is in 

charge of overseeing these contracts. 

• 2008—GAO found State and Defense still had not developed 

a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining 

the ANP force, and the Department of Defense (DOD) IG reported that CSTC–A, the military department in charge, had 

not developed training programs. 

How about contracting officers? In the Department of State, we 

found in this 2010 report that contracting officers were not providing adequate surveillance. Guess what? In 2005, they said that, 

and in 2006, they said that. SIGAR who frankly has not completed 

enough reports that are meaningful in terms of the oversight capacity of our government, they even found in 2009 there was a 

problem. 

4 

Curriculum. The current report says there is a problem with curriculum. Guess what? In 2006, they said the same thing. In 2006, 

the State Department and the DOD IG reported obstacles to establishing a fully professional Afghan National Police including literate recruits, a history of low pay, pervasive corruption, on and on 

and on. 

In other words this is the third or fourth time that people who 

check into our government has said hello, it is not working. You 

are not doing a good job. 

This does not compute. Essential to our mission, men and women 

dying for the cause, and we cannot get basic contract oversight of 

this function under control. 

So this is going to be a tough one and there are going to be some 

tough questions because there is no excuse for this to go any further. There is no excuse. 

I welcome all of your testimony. I apologize for the delay in the 

hearing. We got caught up in—I will not go into it because I do not 

want this to be a partisan exercise. Unfortunately we got caught 

up in some stuff that we could not have the hearing the last time. 

And, Ms. Klemstine, that is why you are here today. One up the 

food chain was going to be here the last time but was unable to 

come today. So thank you for being here today. I welcome all of 

you. At this point I would like to turn the hearing over for an opening statement to Senator Brown. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to thank 

you for your nice welcome and the conversations we have had to 

lead up to this hearing. And I thought what you said was well said 

and I am not going to duplicate a lot of it but I will say as somebody who has been serving in the military for 30 years, presently 

holds the rank of a lieutenant colonel, and is familiar with contracting, being the head attorney for defense services in Massachusetts, these are things that I take very seriously. 

And having recently come back from Afghanistan and seeing the 

nature of the challenge and the enormity of the challenge and the 

fact that I am just flabbergasted as a new member, but as an ordinary citizen prior to this as to the amount of money we are spending over there and seeing the clear lack of progress. 

What does that mean? To me it means obviously dollars that 

cannot be spent here in the United States for services and other 

things that we come to know and expect. 

It also more importantly comes down to lives. As the Chairman 

said about having our men and women going to a foreign country, 

fighting to protect the rights of a citizenry that sometimes appreciates us, sometimes does not, but with a police force that would 

be fully stood up and raring to go would take the pressure off of 

us to not only be a clearing force but now be a security force. 

One of the things that I noted, as big as the problem is, when 

we first got into that country, Madam Chairman, the enormity of 

the problem is so big, it almost quite frankly feels like when I first 

got here I looked at the problems, the offices, the logistics, the hiring, it is just so big. By the time we left I actually had a real understanding of the plan that General McChrystal was trying to imVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:41 Apr 06, 2011 Jkt 057325 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\57325.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
5 

plement when it comes to winning the minds and hearts of the Afghan citizens and also trying to implement a plan with the army 

and the police force to take the pressure off of our soldiers, our 

MPs in particular, for going in and securing an area. 

Then when I read the Newsweek article and then when I have 

done my own due diligence and the research and read the reports 

I am like I do not get it. We are not talking about a couple of hundred million dollars. We are talking about $6 billion. 

When I saw the police force, with all due respect, I mean I know 

we have young cadet corps that are more squared away. I know we 

are in a new chapter here. I know I am new here, Madam Chairman, but we have to have someone stop, take responsibility, have 

communication lines develop between the entities and the agencies 

and just solve the problem because I am not sure everyone here 

testifying and people listening know that we are in a financial 

mess, and it is not getting any better. 

And for us to ask the American taxpayers and the taxpayers in 

my State to continue to contribute to an effort where there are 

wasted dollars, they do not buy it. I am somebody who believes in 

the value of a dollar. I want to know when my money goes somewhere that it is going to be spent properly. It is going to be fully 

accountable and that we are going to get a good value for our dollar. 

Madam Chairman, based on your earlier statements, as I said, 

I am not going to repeat. I am very interested in getting to the bottom of who is responsible—identifying that and say, great, who is 

going to be responsible now? How are we going to solve this problem? How are we going to make sure that the tax dollars that we 

send overseas are going to be used effectively so we can bring our 

men and women home quicker? And we can stand up that force so 

they can protect themselves and allow their produce and their natural resources to be harvested so they can become self-sufficient 

and we get back to doing the people’s business here in the United 

States. 

So, Madam Chairman, I will turn it back to you. I thank you for 

your welcoming remarks and I look forward to participating. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

Senator Coburn, it is great to see you. Would you like to wait for 

questions? 

Senator COBURN. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

Let me introduce the witnesses. First, Gordon Heddell has served 

as Inspector General for the Department of Defense since July—I 

am sorry. I did not see you, Senator Kaufman. You are so far away. 

We need to get you closer. 

Thank you, Senator Kaufman, for being here. Would you like to 

make a statement before we begin? 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KAUFMAN 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I just want to say how much I support what both of you have 

said. This is so incredibly important. The No. 1 priority is our 

troops in harm’s way in Afghanistan and one of the really very top 

6 

problems we have regardless of the waste which, as Senator Brown 

pointed out, is unacceptable under any circumstances. This is key. 

Getting the police squared away is one of the really key things 

we need so, as Senator Brown said, we can come home and leave 

them to do their own security. There is nothing we are working on 

here—that is the reason I am here today—there is nothing we are 

working on that is more important than this right here. 

How can we hold? We got to shape, we got to clear, we have to 

hold so that we can build, and the police are an important part of 

that. Right now, with the police, we are getting it squared away. 

It is not just a waste of money. They have been a negative. You 

talk about the rule of law. The rule of law in most of these areas 

is because the police are so corrupt. The people they are supposed 

to go to, to get the rule of law, are the things they are trying to 

stay away from. 

So I cannot think of a more important hearing going on on the 

Hill today than this one right here. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Senator Kaufman. 

Gordon Heddell has served as the Inspector General for the Department of Defense since July 2009. He served as Acting Inspector 

from 2008 to 2009. Prior to joining the Department of Defense in 

the Inspector General’s office, Mr. Heddell served as the Inspector 

General at the Department of Labor. 

Evelyn Klemstine is the Assistant Inspector General for Audits 

for the State Department. Ms. Klemstine previously served as the 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits at NASA and as the Program Director for the International Programs Division at the Defense Department, Office of Inspector General. 

David Johnson has served as the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs at the 

State Department since October 2007. In addition to numerous 

other distinguished posts with the Federal Government, Mr. Johnson served as Afghan coordinator for the United States from May 

2002 to July 2003. 

David Samuel Sedney is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs. 

Previously Mr. Sedney served as Deputy Chief of Mission, Charge 

de Affairs and Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in 

Kabul, Afghanistan. 

It is the custom of the Subcommittee to swear in all witnesses 

that appear before us. So if you do not mind, I would ask you to 

stand. 

Do you swear that the testimony that you will give before this 

Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth, so help you, God? 

Let the record reflect that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

Thank you all very much. 

We will be using a timing system today. We would ask that your 

oral testimony be no more than 5 minutes. Your written testimony 

will be printed in the record in its entirety. 

Mr. Heddell, we would ask you to begin. 

7 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Heddell appears in the Appendix on page 48. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. GORDON S. HEDDELL,1 INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. HEDDELL. Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member Brown, 

and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for 

the opportunity to discuss the joint audit that was performed by 

the Inspectors General of the Departments of Defense and State. 

This audit examined the Administration and contract oversight 

of the State Department program to provide training to the Afghan 

National Police. This audit was conducted at the request of the 

Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense. 

As you know, the training and development of the Afghan National Police to provide security in countering the insurgency in Afghanistan is a key element of the U.S. strategy. As such, it is critical that the Afghan police be trained to support the counterinsurgency mission along with community policing skills. Effective contract oversight is crucial to achieving these goals. 

Prior inspection and assessment reports by this office, as you 

noted, the Chairman, have noted that adequate staffing of key contracting positions is absolutely essential for immediate and effective oversight. It has become very apparent that the insurgents in 

Afghanistan are increasingly targeting the Afghan police and that 

average annual death rates among these police officers have been 

steadily increasing. 

As a result, contract requirements regarding training need to be 

modified to address this growing insurgency. This requires close 

interaction between the contractor and what is now known as 

NATO Training Mission/Combined Security Transition Command 

Afghanistan. 

The current contract arrangement simply does not facilitate this 

close interaction because the Department of Defense is required 

first to coordinate all contract changes with the Department of 

State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, at times a very cumbersome process. 

Furthermore, in August 2009, the Chief of Mission in Afghanistan reported that the lack of a single unified chain of command 

sometimes created confusion and delays in enhancing the police 

training program. Accordingly, the Chief of Mission and the commander of the International Security Assistance Forces recommended the transfer of contractual authority to the Department 

of Defense for the training of the Afghan police. 

To bring about the recommended transfer of responsibility, the 

Department of State planned to allow its current police training 

task order to expire and the Department of Defense planned to add 

police training to an existing contract. 

However, a March 15 decision by the Government Accountability 

Office sustained a DynCorp protest of the planned action. In light 

of this decision, the State Department plans to make adjustments 

to improve the existing police training program, to include more direct involvement by the military in training the Afghan police and 

moving the contracting authority from Washington, DC to Kabul. 

Furthermore, inadequacies in the Administration and oversight 

of the contract compound the challenges that exist in providing the 

8 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Klemstine appears in the Appendix on page 63. 

required training to the Afghan police. These challenges include 

weaknesses in quality assurance, review of their invoices, support 

for the billing and making of payments, defense contract audit 

agency involvement or lack of involvement, maintenance of contract 

files and accountability of government property. My written statement provides additional information on these deficiencies. 

Our audit also questions the fact that the State Department still holds about $80 million in expired Department of Defense funds 

and that this needs to be resolved. The deficiencies identified in the 

Administration and oversight of the contract illustrate the larger 

challenges that are caused by the lack of sufficient contract personnel, geographic distance and the wartime environment all complicating this important matter. 

My office will closely follow the efforts of the Department of Defense to oversee the future contract to train the Afghan police and 

to appropriately use the funds provided by Congress for that purpose. 

I look forward to continuing our strong working relationship with 

this Subcommittee and with all oversight organizations engaged in 

the important work that is being carried out in Afghanistan and 

in Southwest Asia generally. 

And this concludes my statement. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Ms. Klemstine. 

TESTIMONY OF EVELYN R. KLEMSTINE,1 ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. KLEMSTINE. Thank you, Chairman McCaskill and Ranking 

Member Brown, for the opportunity to present our joint audit on 

the national police training program contract in Afghanistan with 

the Department of Defense Inspector General. 

Deputy Inspector General Geisel sends his regards but he is in 

Baghdad this week. 

We conducted this joint audit in response to a congressional request with an objective determining the ability of the Afghan National Police (ANP), training program to address Afghan security 

needs. We also reviewed contract management activities and the 

status of Afghan Security Forces (ASF), funds provided by DOD to 

the State Department. 

In 2006, when the security environment in Afghanistan was 

more stable, DOD decided to use the State Department’s existing 

Civilian Police program (CIVPOL), contract to implement the ANP 

training program. The contractor, DynCorp International, was 

awarded two task orders valued in excess of $1 billion. 

These two task orders directed DynCorp to provide personnel, life 

support, and communications for the training program. The State 

Department was responsible for procuring services, overseeing the 

contract, and managing and reporting on funds transferred from 

DOD. 

We found under the CIVPOL contract DOD did not have the authority to direct the contractor thereby restricting DOD’s ability to 

rapidly modify ANP training to respond to the rising insurgency 

and the changing security situation in Afghanistan. 

9 

While the State Department was focused on training the ANP to 

be an effective police force after security in Afghanistan had been 

stabilized, DOD was focused on the survival and tactical training 

of the ANP to counter the growing insurgency. 

In addition, while the foundation has been laid for an effective 

women’s police training program, there has been inadequate 

progress in training a sufficient number of Afghan women. The 

lack of trained women’s police corps members has limited the effectiveness of law enforcement in Afghanistan. 

We recommended correcting these deficiencies by clearly defining 

ANP training program requirements, increasing the training facility capacity for women police members and enhancing efforts to recruit women training instructors. 

In response to the draft report, management provided a detailed 

description of the requirements for the training program and 

agreed to provide additional resources for training policewomen. 

In overseeing CIVPOL contract, we found the State Department 

contracting officials did not assign sufficient numbers of contract 

oversight personnel to the ANP task orders and did not prepare a 

quality assurance surveillance plan to ensure that the contractor 

met the performance requirements of the statement of work. 

In addition, those contracting personnel who were assigned to 

monitor the task orders did not provide adequate oversight to ensure that all goods and services were received. 

Specifically the following internal control weaknesses were identified. One, government furnished property was not adequately accounted for. Two, contract files were incomplete and not always 

available. Three, deliverables were not always matched to receiving 

reports, and four, procedures for reviewing contractor invoices to 

determine whether costs were proper were not followed. 

As a result of these internal control weaknesses, State Department personnel could not ensure that funds allocated by DOD for 

the program were expended in accordance with DOD requirements. 

We recommended that the number of contract personnel responsible for contract oversight be increased, that a complete inventory 

of government property be performed, that the contract officers 

maintain complete and accessible contract files, and that goods and 

services be matched against invoices. 

In addition, we recommended that the Defense Contract Audit 

Agency (DCAA), perform an audit to determine whether all expenditures were allowable, allocable, and reasonable, and request reimbursement from DynCorp for any payments DCAA determines to 

be improper. 

In response to the draft report, management generally agreed to 

increase the number of oversight personnel going forward and 

strengthen internal controls and undertake an audit. 

In addition to identifying various internal control weaknesses, we 

also requested contract invoices and other supporting documents 

for $217 million in ASF funds already expended. 

Unfortunately, the State Department financial managers did not 

provide detailed transaction data until after the draft report was 

issued. As a result, we could not determine whether the Department had expended the funds in accordance with congressional intent. 

10 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 67. 

However, we did ascertain that $80 million in funds transferred 

from DOD remained unexpended well after the end of the availability period established by appropriations law. We recommended 

that the State Department determine the status of ASF funds and 

that any excess funds, to include the $80 million in expired funds, 

be returned. 

In March 2009, the President announced a comprehensive new 

strategy for Afghanistan which included an emphasis on training 

and increasing the size of Afghan security forces. 

The State Department and DOD are committed to providing a 

stable and secure environment for all Afghan citizens. This requires that we effectively train and mentor Afghan forces, monitor 

our contracts effectively, and ensure that taxpayers’ money is spent 

appropriately. 

Finally I would like to note that this audit was conducted in 6 

months. Given the scope of work which took place in the United 

States and six locations in Afghanistan, the short time for the successful completion is a tribute to the professionalism of the audit 

co-directors Mark Ives from DOD IG and Jim Pollard from the 

State Department OIG and their teams. 

Once again I thank you, Chairman McCaskill and Senator 

Brown, for the opportunity to appear today and I am ready to answer your questions. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much and thank you to the 

staffs. That is quite an accomplishment, 6 months for this audit. 

I know a little bit about that. That is amazing. Congratulations to 

your teams. 

Mr. Johnson. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. DAVID T. JOHNSON,1 ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND 

LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member Brown, and Senator Kaufman. We appreciate the opportunity 

to appear before the Senate Subcommittee today. 

The topic of today’s hearing, Contracts for Afghan National Police Training, is both urgent and it is important. As we all know, 

President Obama aims our military to begin transitioning out of 

Afghanistan in the summer of 2011. That is premised on the expectation that Afghan security forces can provide security for the Afghan people to support their self-governance. 

Since 2003, the State Department has provided a variety of 

training and assistance to the Afghan National Police. Since 2005, 

our training programs have supported the United States military 

in its responsibility to develop the overarching Afghan national security forces which includes both the army and civilian police. 

As you know, Madam Chairman, from your Subcommittee’s oversight record, building civilian capacity in a conflict zone like Afghanistan where civil institutions had been largely destroyed over 

20 years of conflict is incredibly challenging. 

The State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) undertake these assignments to adVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:41 Apr 06, 2011 Jkt 057325 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\57325.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
11 

vance our broader national security and foreign policy objectives. 

Our expertise in law enforcement and criminal justice programs is 

widely recognized. 

Building on the recommendations for improvement from the 

oversight community and from this Subcommittee, we hope soon 

also to be recognized for our agility and proficiency in contract 

management and oversight. 

Where our OIG colleagues have identified that we have fallen 

short is in how we have adapted our contract oversight to challenges of operating in theaters of war where military operations 

and complex security requirements limit our on-the-ground staffing 

and our staff’s ability to travel to the sites where training takes 

place. 

As stewards of increasingly more taxpayer dollars for critical national security and foreign policy objectives, we must effectively 

adapt to this battlefield environment so that we craft procedures 

and methods that allow our contract management and oversight activities to be fully carried out. 

The report discussed here today identifies a number of recommendations with which we fully agree and are working to address. For example, INL’s current oversight team has already been 

enhanced. Our team now consists of 33 staff, 12 program officers 

in Afghanistan and Washington, seven in-country contracting officers’ representatives (ICORs) now provide oversight in Afghanistan 

while the contracting officer’s representative and 13 of his staff address contract oversight and Administration in Washington. 

The increased ICOR staffing enables us to strengthen our asset 

management and inventory reviews processes. More ICORs are in 

various stages of the hiring process and will be in Afghanistan beginning in May. By September we will have 22. 

We will implement fully standardized contract management operating procedures and guidelines by June 30 of this year. Standing operating procedures and a Web-based contracting officers representative file fully accessible to staff worldwide around the clock 

will be in place by the end of May. Along with more frequent reviews, this will further strengthen our internal controls. 

We have engaged DCAA to audit our Afghanistan task order 

with two audits in process and they are preparing to audit the task 

orders that are the subject of the OIG report. To date, INL has rejected 17 percent of police training invoices for Afghanistan resulting in 16.3 million in the denied claims. 

Many of INL’s police training accomplishments are not easily 

represented in a chart. Capacity building is a long-term process 

even in stable post-conflict areas but Afghanistan which continues 

to face an active insurgency is a special case. 

For example, our police training programs are designed to empower Afghan civilians, many of whom lack basic literacy with the 

core skills needed to mobilize as police officers and respond to the 

direction of their local commanders. 

Embedded in a Washington Post story on February 27, was an 

Afghan police training success story. While the news sadly communicated the grim tale of yet another suicide bombing attack, the report indicated that after multiple bomb detonations police officers 

assembled at the scene rather than retreating and remained until 

12 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Sedney appears in the Appendix on page 74. 

they had covered their fallen colleagues, a scenario which would 

likely have been different only 2 years ago. 

This is one instance but it is descriptive not only of the challenging environment in which Afghan National Police operate but 

of the kinds of actions and operations their training has made them 

capable of undertaking. 

Madam Chairman, the Department takes very seriously the need 

to safeguard the public’s trust in managing programs and contracts 

that support our national security objectives around the world. It 

is after all through these programs that our partners worldwide develop the bedrock of civil society, a safe, secure place where people 

can live free from fear. 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss INL’s contract oversight. I will do my best to address your questions. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. Sedney. 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID S. SEDNEY,1 DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, AND 

CENTRAL ASIA, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. SEDNEY. Thank you very much, Chairman McCaskill, Senator Brown, and Senator Kaufman. Thank you for the opportunity 

to appear today with my interagency colleagues. 

As you know, the President’s strategic review of Afghanistan and 

Pakistan recommend that heightened efforts to increase the quantity and quality of Afghan national security forces as part of a 

strategy to enable the eventual transfer of responsibility for security to the Afghan government. This is not an exit strategy. It is 

a transfer strategy. 

Improving the capacity of the Afghan National Police is particularly important as police are the primary link to the Afghan government for many Afghans particularly in rural areas. 

Moreover, the Afghan police are on the front lines of the fight 

against the Taliban and its affiliates. The Afghan National Police 

are situated in areas where no coalition or Afghan national army 

forces are and are often the target of much greater attacks. Casualty rates are higher in the Afghan National Police than in the 

army. It is two to three times more dangerous to be a policeman 

today in Afghanistan than to be a soldier in the Afghan national 

army. 

The effort to train the Afghan National Police as you pointed out, 

Chairman McCaskill, has been under resourced, under prioritized, 

and under carried out. One of the priorities of this Administration 

when it came in was to refocus our efforts with the renewed leadership, with greater resources, but more importantly than the number of resources, more targeted and more effective resources aiming 

at building the quality of the entire Afghan national security forces 

in an integrated effort with the Afghan national army and in a 

combined civil/military campaign plan that will enable us to carry 

out the transition that I described. 

13 

As part of this revision, we, along with our NATO colleagues, 

have transitioned to the NATO training mission Afghanistan which 

General Caldwell, who you mentioned in your opening statement, 

is now the commander of, of course dual-hatted also as the commander of CSTC–A. The NATO International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) and our non-NATO partners have made progress towards growing the end strength and quality of ANP. 

In December 2009, the ANP achieved its end strength goal of 

96,800. In January 2010, the Joint Coordination Monitoring Board, 

the international board charged with ensuring the international 

and Afghan ministerial plans aligned with the goals of the Afghan 

government agreed with the Afghan government’s plan supported 

by ISAF and the U.S. Government increased the size of the ANP 

to 109,000 by October 31, 2010, and to 234,000 by October 31, 

2011. 

The increase in 2010 will consist of approximately 5,000 Afghan 

border police, 5,000 Afghan national civil order police which is the 

mobile gendarme force that is equipped to act as a light infantry 

role throughout the country, and 2,000 Afghan uniformed police as 

well as other specialized police and enablers. 

At the end of March 2009, the Afghan Ministry of Interior reported that the total ANP will be equal to 102,138, slightly above 

the February goal of 99,261. 

However, increases in the size of ANP forces must come with a 

commitment for improvement in the quality of the force. Initiatives 

to improve the quality of the force include improvements in the 

training infrastructure, increased pay equal to that of the Afghan 

national army, better equipment, expanded literacy training, and 

embedded partnering and mentoring. 

In addition, we are working hand in glove with the Department 

of State to build rule of law structures and processes to support 

that ANP. As part of our effort to improve the police training process, the ambassador and the commander of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, as my colleagues earlier mentioned, recommended in an August 2009 cable that management of the Defense-funded, Statemanaged police training contract should be shifted from the Department of State to the Department of Defense. The Department 

of State and the Department of Defense subsequently approved this 

recommendation. 

Due to the operational need to quickly award a new contract and 

the respective organizations subject matter expertise and experience utilizing the respected subject organizations expertise and experience in support of Afghanistan operations, the commander of 

CSTC–A selected the counter narcoterrorism and technology program office through the U.S. Army space and missile defense command of the Army strategic forces command to oversee the development of an appropriate acquisition strategy for the ANP program. 

The strategy called for procuring the required services through 

the issuance of a task order under existing multiple award indefinite delivery, indefinite quality contracts with CNTPO. The task 

orders for the training of ANP and ANP programs logistics requirements were to be competed among five holders of an existing 

MAIDIQ contract. 

14 

However, before orders could be issued, on March 15, the Government Accountability Office, as the Inspector General earlier 

mentioned, sustained the protest by DynCorp International. The 

GAO determined that the task orders for the ANP program were 

outside the scope of the MAIDIQ contracts. 

As a result, the ANP training effort will not be awarded under 

that contract. DynCorp will continue performance under the current State Department contract which has been extended to July 

of this year while the Department of Defense in conjunction with 

the Department of State weighs options to ensure the ANP program requirements are met in an expeditious manner in consideration of this development and in compliance with the GAO recommendations. 

It is important that any contractor DOD selects be responsible 

and perform within the strict rules, regulations, performance expectations, and acceptable ethical and business practices that we 

demand. 

Please be assured that we take seriously any allegation that a 

contractor fails to meet these expectations and requirements. The 

selection of DOD contractors responsible and capable to meet our 

requirements to assist in training and development of the Afghan 

National Police is no exception. 

I hope you find this information helpful. Thank you and I look 

forward to your questions. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much. 

Just to make sure I am respectful of my colleagues, if staff would 

run the clock for 7 minutes for each member. We will take as many 

turns as we need to get all the questions out. I have a tendency 

to go on and I want to make sure I do not go on too long without 

being respectful of Senator Kaufman and Senator Brown’s time. 

So let me start with you, Mr. Sedney. What really happened here 

is the commanders over there decided that when they were telling 

DynCorp they needed this, DynCorp was telling their folks, well, 

be careful just because the military is telling you to do it does not 

mean we are going to get paid for it because the State Department 

is making those calls. 

So somebody finally figured out that it would be a good idea to 

have the people in charge of military mission be in charge of the 

contracting over an essential leg of a three-legged stool as it relates 

to that mission in Afghanistan. 

Is that a fair characterization? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Yes, along with the Inspector General’s report, the 

lack of unity of command in the police training effort. Clearly it 

was inhibiting what we were trying to do and I would repeat what 

was said earlier. The shift in environment where the security situation was getting worse and the police were being called upon to do 

more and different things than envisioned originally when the decision was made to utilize the State Department contract made clear 

that we needed that flexibility and that ability to have that unity 

of command. 

There were multiple examples from the small to the large of 

where that lack of unity of command was inhibiting what we were 

able to do, and that is why our new commander and our new amVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:41 Apr 06, 2011 Jkt 057325 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\57325.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
15 

bassador out there made this decision to recommend what I mentioned before in that cable that they sent on August 11. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I certainly spent a lot of time when I was 

in Afghanistan with the ambassador and with General McChrystal 

and with General Caldwell. I completely agree that was the right 

thing to do but it is important to note that happened in August 

2009, and we have no contract and we are not even close to having 

a contract. 

So I need to know today what is the plan? How are we going to 

get contractors committed and over there with jurisdiction and the 

supervision of the Department of Defense and the military to train 

Afghan police officers? 

Mr. SEDNEY. We do not have a final answer for you on that, 

Chairman McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is unacceptable. 

Mr. SEDNEY. However, I can tell you what we have done in the 

months since the GAO decision and where we are working to go to. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let me make sure the record is clear here. 

The complaint was filed in December. This is a really important 

part of the mission. There is a chance anybody who knows anything about these contracts and anything about complaints, and believe me if anybody knows about this it is the Pentagon, about 

challenges to contracting, they know that GAO has an important 

role to play. 

At the moment that the complaint was filed, all hands on deck 

should have been looking at this at the Pentagon to say what is 

plan ‘‘B’’. If this objection is upheld by the GAO, what is plan ‘‘B’’? 

The President had already announced that this strategy was just 

until July 2011. The clock is ticking. So we know in December of 

last year that there could be a problem with transitioning this contract under the military control and you are telling me today, what, 

December, January, February, March, April, you are telling me 5 

months later you do not know what you are going to do. 

Mr. SEDNEY. No, Chairman McCaskill, I am not telling you that 

we do not know what we are going to do. I am saying we have not 

decided the final form of what we are going to do. But as I said, 

if I could lay out where we are, what we are moving towards. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. What I want to hear is a decision has 

been made and we are going to get on it. That is what I want to 

hear but I am open to listening to what you want to say. 

Mr. SEDNEY. You are correct that once the contract protest was 

filed, we should have been and we were aware that we needed to 

start making alternate plans. Those alternate plans had to of 

course cover a wide range of possibilities of the contracting, and as 

I understand it, I am not a contract lawyer, but as I understand 

it, I was advised that there are some things that we had to be careful to do that in terms of preparation could not go beyond actions 

that could then lead to further protests so we have to be careful 

what we did legally. 

On March 9, 2010, we received a joint message from our military 

and civilians in the field, and this was a result of work that we had 

leading up to that, pointing out some of the areas that we need to 

work on, and what were some of the alternate ways forward. 

16 

Since the GAO decision, my department, myself, Assistant Secretary Johnson, his department, have met. The current DynCorp 

contract is an extension of a contract which had expired and that 

extension runs until July of this year. 

We determined we had several possible ways forward at the current time. We could, in conjunction with the GAO report which 

very strongly came out in recommending that we do a full, fair, and 

open competition of the contract, while we could have appealed 

that decision or contested that decision and asked for reexamination of that decision, we decided not to because even if we felt that 

our position was right and the GAO decision was wrong, further 

contesting of that decision would just lead to a longer period of 

time with uncertainty. 

So we are going to go ahead in full conformance with the GAO 

recommendation of a full and open competition. 

A full and open competition of that contract requires that we 

have the requirements put in place, that we follow all the steps of 

the contracting process, and the Department of Defense is moving 

forward in an expeditious manner, in a speedy manner, as fast as 

we can go, but this is not a process that in and of itself is ever fast 

as I am sure you know, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I do know. I will make a bold prediction. 

DynCorp will be extended again and DynCorp will be there doing 

this until a decision is made as to what extent our level is going 

to change in terms of our commitment in Afghanistan sometime 

next year. 

The lesson that probably needs to be learned here is that 

shortcutting the process through existing task orders and contracts 

is what generally speaking the Pentagon likes to do. 

The military has very little patience with the process of full and 

open competition. It is a process that has a number of required 

steps. But they are there for good reason. If there is anyplace that 

I think the American people have figured out that we have got to 

have some help on full and fair and open competition, it is the hiring of security forces and the training of security forces because I 

mean I do not know how many other companies in America are as 

well known as Blackwater, and it is not for good reasons. 

So circumventing that full and fair, in hindsight, I just want to 

say that the moment the decision was made to try to move it out 

of the State Department, it seems to me that full and fair open 

competition would have been the most efficient way to move forward rather than trying to shoehorn this into something else in 

order to take a shortcut. It turns out that the shortcut was not so 

short. 

My time is up for this round, and I will turn it over to Senator 

Brown. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I am going to actually, as a courtesy, extend my time to Senator Kaufman. He has 

a few questions, and then if I could reserve and come back that 

would be great. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you very much. I want to associate 

myself with the Chairman’s remarks. 

17 

Look, I have been to Afghanistan three times in the year and a 

half I have been a Senator. I have sat through 70 briefings in preparation before and after leaving on those trips. I had no idea we spent $6 billion. I have not had a single person 

in any one of those briefings refer to the Afghan National Police 

as anything except a big problem. Not a problem to get them well, 

a problem just the way they sit. They are purveyors of corruption 

from one end of Afghanistan to the other to, as the Chairman so 

well put it, the rule of law. 

If we are going to build, clear, hold, and build, we have to have 

the rule of law. No rule of law. The police are the ones who man 

the barricades and on the highway stop people. Just read the stories about what went on in Marjah and why the people were so 

upset with us because of the former government. 

The other thing I want to say, look, the four of you are doing a 

great job. I mean I really applaud you for what you are doing. This 

is incredibly difficult. So what I am saying is not referring to you. 

You happen to be, unfortunately, the messengers sent to sit here 

at the table. 

But I think what the Chairman says is compelling. If we do not 

do something, we are in dire shape over there. I mean that is not 

a deep, dark secret. The key to it is we cannot go into places and 

clear and hold, we cannot hold if we do not have the police to do 

it and we surely cannot build and we surely cannot transfer. 

So we have to come up with something in the next 6 or 8 months. 

As the Chairman said, this is not a decision, we are talking about 

June, starting to draw down troops. We are talking about making 

a decision this December on whether we are going to win or not. 

And I will tell you what. At the top of my list, not the No. 1 

thing, but the No. 2 thing is where do we stand with the Afghan 

National Police? The attrition rates were out a bit. They are getting out of control. 

So really what I would like you to do if you could, and I know 

I have sat here and listened to you mention the deteriorating condition, lack of unity of command, and some of the things that have 

been said but this is catastrophic. 

This was not something that you can just go around the edges. 

It is a deteriorating condition so we have no police. And we knew 

what the literacy of the police are. But they are saying the same 

things now after $6 billion. We have this incredible problem with 

the literacy of the police. 

So, what I would like, if each of you would kind of—and I know 

you are under constraint. What are the one or two things that you 

really believe you could spend $6 billion on, and end up with practically no where—what are the two or three things? 

I got the unity of command and I got deteriorated conditions. 

What are the one or two things that we can do, and what is the 

one thing you think could best help us reach the point the Chairman said, so that we can move ahead and actually have progress 

on the ground so we can reach this 134,000 trained troops? 

I will start with Mr. Heddell. 

Mr. HEDDELL. I will say, just for starters, just about everything 

that could go wrong here has gone wrong. And looking back to November 2006, it was relatively clear to my office, Senator Kaufman, 

18 

that the training that was being provided was already inadequate. 

The needs of the Afghan police training were already out of date, 

so to speak, and it was pretty apparent that there was not enough 

management on the ground in-country overseeing the contract. 

You are asking for a couple of things here. But I spent 28 years 

in Federal law enforcement so I cannot come up with two things 

because there is at least 10 things and they all need to be addressed. 

The fact is, aside from the need to increase the size of the total 

Afghan National Police force just to address the counterinsurgency 

and to protect civilian population, they need to start at the very beginning. 

Recruiting is a tremendous challenge over there, finding the 

right people for this kind of work, and then retaining them, paying 

them what they need to be paid to live and then training them on 

the force. Of course we talked about the dangers and the fact that 

the death rate for Afghan National Police officers, by our records, 

has gone up four or five times what it was. 

Senator KAUFMAN. The total now is 129, in my briefing. 

Mr. HEDDELL. The average death rate per month for Afghan National Police officer in the last 4 years, we think, has gone up from 

24 a month to about 125. 

Senator KAUFMAN. OK. 

Mr. HEDDELL. Those figures are approximate, but they are dramatic. The fact of the matter is we need to change the training curriculum to be able to address the counterinsurgency. We need to 

be able to teach survivability over there. They need to know that 

they can go out on the street, do their work and survive. 

They need tactical skills aside from the basic community policing 

skills that any police official would need to have. We need better 

trainers. The example that Madam Chairman gave with the 

Carabinieri Italians, I mean what a simple but yet an unbelievable 

situation that they had not sighted the weapons. 

Most of all, Senator Kaufman, they need leadership. They need 

police officers who can lead. If there is one single thing they probably need more than anything else, it is that. 

And the second thing, if I had to give you two items, would be 

find a way to dismiss so many corrupt police officials in-country. 

I met, last November, with Minister Wardak, the Minister of Defense, and he talked for almost an hour and most of it was about 

the corruption. 

Corruption undermines everything that we are trying to achieve 

in that country and particularly with respect to police officials. 

Senator KAUFMAN. My point is you know there is an old definition of insanity in doing the same thing over again and expecting 

different results. And what the Chairman said is what are we 

going to do in that 6 months, and the folks in there that have been 

doing this, I mean you say there are not enough contract oversight. 

Part of this has to be what were the contractors doing? What you 

laid out was a problem we knew in 2001. Everything you said you 

did not have to have a Ph.D. to figure out that those were the 10 

or 12 things that we had to do. 

We are now here 9 years later, and we are exactly at the same 

spot. You basically laid out the questions I have. And, Wardak and 

19 

Minister of the Interior Atmar, they say all the right things, but 

what they say is there is no training going on. 

I am saying briefing after briefing after briefing was this is just 

where the police are. What I am trying to do is get at the answer 

to the Chairman’s question. I guess, what the problem is, you pretty well laid it out. 

Does anybody have any ideas what to do in the next 6 months 

so that when we come up for review in 7 months, we have a realistic opinion of where the police are and how we can move forward? 

Mr. HEDDELL. If we have to wait for a contract, a new contract, 

we are not going to do very much. The Department of Defense is 

working with the Department of State, I know that, to make an interim fix. The fact of the matter is it needs to be fixed right now. 

And I can tell you you do not train a police officer in a year. It 

takes 2, 3, and 4 years to get there. 

Senator KAUFMAN. But here is the thing, and I agree with you 

about that and people talk about us going out in June and we cannot go out in June. We do not have enough time. 

We do not have to have all the answers but we have to make 

progress. We have to be able to say we are moving in the right direction. We got to be at some point like in December where we do 

not have a list of the 12 things you said that are wrong, which I 

totally agree with everyone of the them, that there is maybe six on 

the list. We are making progress on two of them. 

Mr. SEDNEY. I would hate to think we have to wait to get a contract on-board to start training police officials to survive. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Can someone else give a suggestion? What is 

it that we should do? I get back to the question the Chairman 

raised. What can we do so that we do not have to wait, so we come 

in December, we will have a good idea of whether we really can actually train police and get them out there on the job. Isn’t that the 

question? 

Ms. KLEMSTINE. If I could. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think Mr. Sedney wants to also but go 

ahead both of you briefly or all three of you go ahead and then we 

will go to Senator Brown. 

Ms. KLEMSTINE. Briefly I would say that I would put them into 

three areas. The first thing that we really need to do is we need 

to adequately define our requirements. Every contract starts on the 

requirements side. 

My past experience on the contract side has shown that the requirements are never well defined. We have to do that. Then we 

have to have adequate performance measures by which to reevaluate the contractors. Without any accountability, it does not make 

any difference. That was one of the things that the joint report 

pointed out that there was not performance measurements in this 

contract to hold the contractor accountable for what needs to be 

done. 

And then the third area we need to do is an adequate job of overseeing the contract. But in terms of overseeing the contract, things 

will have to be a little bit different than what we institutionally 

know as contract oversight just because we are in a war-type zone. 

20 

So we have to develop standard operating procedures and adequate ways to do these type of contract oversight in areas of contingency operations. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think I would agree on a couple of the points and 

make one further. The basic measures that would improve the recruitment and retention direct, more direct pay, direct pay for all, 

better and longer training programs focused on literacy. 

But with due respect to General Caldwell, we have trained many 

people in Afghanistan. Under his leadership, we trained 3,000. 

Under General Formica, we have trained almost 16,000. Under 

General Cohen, we have trained almost 30,000. Under General 

Durbin, we trained almost 66,000. 

So there has been a great number of people trained, and the end 

strength now is about 100,000. But we have not been able to retain 

them the way we need to. As the DOD inspector general mentioned, it takes a longer time than a 6- or 8-week training program 

to get the kind of police officer that you need. So retention is a key 

part of this. 

I would also join the Ms. Klemstine. A clear statement of work 

so that we can move out on new training whether it is under the 

contract that we manage or if we are able to move it over to DOD 

more rapidly, to do it that way. 

But those sorts of things would allow us to proceed as rapidly as 

possible. Thank you. 

Mr. SEDNEY. I would offer that there are a lot of things that are 

happening now and have been happening over the past year that 

are moving us very much in the right direction. 

We do not have to start from today to do things right and do 

things better. We already have started and already have done 

things better. There are continuing changes and improvements underway. 

Senator McCaskill, you mentioned recruitment. Recruitment for 

the Afghan National Police has been sharply improving over the 

last several months due to a series of improvements including a recruiting training command, a more focused effort on recruitment 

and improved pay for the Afghan National Police. 

The recruitment is also up because we recognize the issue of 

leadership that everyone has mentioned. General McChrystal in 

his campaign strategy has focused on a key measure to improve 

performance and leadership in both the Afghan Nation army and 

Afghan National Police and that is through intensive partnering 

with the Afghan National Police by U.S. forces and coalition forces, 

throughout all of Afghanistan. 

Implementing that partnering is ongoing now. There are already 

police units that are being partnered. Units such as the Afghan national civil order police which had never been partnered before is 

going to be partnered now by elements of a special forces under 

ISAF. 

That partnering will help provide a bridge for the leadership. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Is that the same thing as ANCOP? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is the new name for ANCOP? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Afghan National Civil Order Police. The acronym is 

ANCOP. I try to avoid acronyms. 

21 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. I have never heard it called anything 

other than ANCOP which, for the record, ANCOP is the special police force that roams the country. They are not assigned to a province. They are not assigned to a jurisdiction. They are the elite police force. They were designed to be the elite police force. 

Mr. SEDNEY. Their performance has been very high. They have 

also suffered from the highest attrition, attrition meaning people 

who either leave before their contracts, attrition meaning people 

who leave before their contracts are up and the lowest retention 

meaning the fewest number of people who sign on for a repeat contracts. 

That is due for a number of reasons. One of them is high operational tempo. Another is lack of leadership which is mentoring 

and partnership. Another is because many of them are recruited by 

higher paying private security firms to provide private security 

services in Afghanistan which is a separate program. 

But let me go back to what is going right, Senator Kaufman. On 

Sunday and Monday of this week, I was in Afghanistan with General Petraeus and Ambassador Holbrook for their review of the concept drill, in other words an intensive look with the Afghans and 

our civilian and military leadership on our combined civil and military efforts in Afghanistan. 

The Minister of the Interior, Mr. Atmar, and Minister Mongol, 

the Deputy Minister of the Interior, both participated in that. The 

Afghan police and the performance of the Afghan police was a 

major subject of discussion during that. 

Minister Atmar pointed out that not only had we trained many 

police, as Assistant Secretary Johnson pointed out, there are many 

police who are performing well. He also admitted there are many 

police that are not performing well. 

Whether it is a Newsweek article or another forum where you 

focus on the problems, Minister Atmar asked us, and I am going 

to comply with his request, to highlight that there are also thousands, and in his words, tens of thousands of Afghan National Police who are doing a good job, who are not corrupt, who are being 

killed at the rate of 125 or 129 a month, and they are staying on 

the job. They are not fleeing the job. Some do but many more do 

not. 

They are committed to their country, and they often do not have 

the right resources, they do not have the right training, whether 

it is ineffective sights, ineffective equipment, whether they are 

using unarmored vehicles instead of armored vehicles in areas 

where IEDs are the biggest killers of people. 

So these are people on the Afghan side who are working hard to 

defeat an enemy that has been growing in strength. 

The message I took away, and I have spent several years living 

and working in Afghanistan as well as visited there about 10 times 

over the last year, is that General McChrystal’s strategy of 

blunting the rise and the improvement that the Taliban had is succeeding. 

The next step of course is to reverse that. Every step of the way 

the Afghan National Police is central to that. So we are building 

a better police force. We are training a better police force. 

22 

The partnership is helping us to put in place a police force that 

is going to perform better. We have a better story today than when 

you Senator and you Senator were there in the last several months 

and it will be better next month. 

Will it be dramatically improved everyday, no. But it will be significantly improved on a month to month basis. I feel very highly 

confident of that. 

In terms of the contract, the work that Assistant Secretary Johnson and I have done over the last several weeks, we want to make 

sure that we do not make any of those mistakes that you referred 

to, Senator McCaskill, in terms of the contracting process because 

more mistakes will lead to an even longer gap before we have a 

permanent contract. 

We do also need to find a way to bridge to a permanent contract. 

I agree with your prediction that the most likely, we both agree 

that the most likely outcome will be an extension. I hope I did not 

say anything a lawyer will find problematic with that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Just say I made you answer the question. 

Mr. SEDNEY. Thank you, Senator. 

But we have also communicated to the State Department new requirements. I agree with Inspector General Klemstine that we need 

to be clear about requirements. These new requirements that will 

address the problems that were laid out by Mr. Heddell on the 

areas that we need different kinds of performance in the police contract and we are working now to see how we can have that contract, how we can accomplish those goals through a possible extension of existing contract. 

There might be some other options but we will continue to work 

through that. We expect to have a resolution within the next 2 

weeks. I hope even sooner in terms of that extension or our other 

possibility. 

But as we are doing that, we are continuing to train. We are adding trainers for the police in other ways. The police contract is not 

the only way we are training. We have brought an additional coalition of military trainers. Other countries have put in more trainers. 

There are more both third country military trainers and third 

country police trainers that are already in Afghanistan than there 

were before as part of an effort through NATO and through our 

partner nations to increase training. 

For example, the Germans in the north who had been focusing 

their efforts on deployed military are now transitioning to trainers 

and a greater focus on training in the north and that is happening 

in many other areas as well. 

So while we focus, and I agree with you, Senator McCaskill, in 

your criticisms of the process. We have made mistakes. We are 

going to fix them. But there are many things that are going right, 

Senator Kaufman. I would be happy to go on at greater length. 

I apologize for taking up your time. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I am just self-conscious about getting to 

Senator Brown. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you. Madam Chairman, and through you 

to the witnesses. 

I had a whole host of questions but in just listening I wanted to 

shift gears and then I will come back to my original line of quesVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:41 Apr 06, 2011 Jkt 057325 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\57325.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
23 

tions. One of the things that I am just getting through the conversation is that the contract transition and the 5-month delay in 

awarding the contract quite frankly is putting our troops at risk. 

I am flabbergasted sometimes at the slow pace of government at 

a time when we need quick reaction and quick action on moving 

forward. So whatever tools and resources you need to get the job 

done, I would encourage somebody in your respective departments 

to start to get moving because my sense being in the military and 

also recently visiting is that we have a serious problem. We have 

to stop pointing the finger and going back and forth and just get 

the job done. 

With regard to who do we hold ultimately accountable, I am a 

little confused still. I know we have a contract. I have been reading. I understand it. I get it but my concern is now we are extending a contract that has not worked. People who have received $6 

billion. 

There has been very little training and now we are looking to extend it because we do not have the ability to enter into another 

contract because we used something that we felt would get it done 

quicker when in fact it delayed us so we are more time behind the 

eight ball. 

But I am hopeful that when you do the new contract there is 

going to be a way to hold the trainers responsible for delivering 

what they said they were going to deliver because as somebody who 

is just so fed up with overspending and over budgeting, at what 

point do we hold contractors, people that we hire to do a job, responsible for doing that job and getting our money’s worth? 

That is something I would like to ultimately leave for just someone to ultimately speak about. 

I will start with you, Mr. Sedney. You did say in the beginning 

you will need greater resources and you have not received the 

trainers. You need more trainers. 

I know in speaking to the appropriate authorities in Afghanistan, 

the United States is the only country that has provided the requested amount of trainers. The other countries have not supplied 

the appropriate trainers. 

Who in the food chain is responsible for trying to get the other 

countries to provide the appropriate amount of trainers? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Senator, first of all, let me say in response to the 

first part of what you said. I agree with you entirely and I can tell 

you I share your impatience and I can pledge you my greatest efforts to make both the quickest and the most effective response because sometimes speed works against effectiveness. 

On the issue of trainers that you raised, the U.S. forces, the U.S. 

military has provided the requested trainers under the NATO request because this is a NATO mission. We have a number of countries that have responded well to the combined joint statement of 

requirements—— 

Senator BROWN. But they have not fulfilled their obligation. 

Mr. SEDNEY. There are a number of countries we continue to 

work with and the overall number of unfilled spaces under the 

NATO combined joint statement of requirements is in the several 

hundreds, well over 400 when I checked this morning. 

24 

That certainly will be a major area of discussion with our colleagues both at NATO and also in the upcoming NATO ministerial 

in Estonia. 

At the same time as we are looking for other countries to step 

forward within the NATO context, we have also had a number of 

discussions and am not going to name the countries for reasons of 

the diplomatic confidentiality but a number of countries which 

have not yet been involved in Afghanistan have shown interest in 

contributing trainers. 

We are working aggressively with them because they see the 

challenge that instability and extremism in Afghanistan poses to 

their own national security. So we are not being limited by the 

past. We are actually looking into new and different areas, and 

again I would be able to do that in a more confidential setting because I do not want to put countries on the spot while we are in 

the middle of diplomatic negotiations. 

But I believe there are a number of areas of hope there. At the 

same time I want to stress what I said in response to Senator 

Kaufman, we are training police. The coalition and we, the United 

States, are training police and moving forward. This is an area 

where we are going to succeed. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you very much and I appreciate that. 

And I know who is helping and who is not and I would encourage 

the Administration to strongly encourage them to do what they 

said they would do. 

We all know about the $6 billion that has been spent and fewer 

than 12 percent of the country’s police are capable of operating on 

their own. 

We know about the lack of respect that the police get in Afghanistan based on their corruption and lack of training, etc. So considering all those problems, I guess I would defer this question to the 

IGs. Considering all these problems which have been apparent for 

a while who ultimately is responsible in saying how do we not fall 

into this rut again. 

Mr. HEDDELL. I will be glad to try, Senator Brown. 

Two areas, one is simply the training of police officers and doing 

it in the right way with the right trainers, with the right curriculum. The second part of that is managing and oversighting a 

contract worth billions of dollars. 

In both categories, if we are going to do it and we are going to 

do it obviously, we have to do it right. Under each of those categories, there are things that we need to do. 

I mean, under the management oversight of the contract, for instance, we need to have oversight and management in-country 

looking at the contracting officer representatives on the ground incountry. 

With regard to the contract itself, we have to have performance 

measures. We have to specifically say what we expect that contractor to do. Then we have to measure that contractor’s performance. 

With regard to property, DynCorp spent millions and millions of 

dollars on property and we did not do inventories. We did not know 

what we had or what we did not have many times. 

25 

Senator BROWN. Right. Well, there is no property management. 

There is no accountability. There are no hand receipts. There is 

nothing. 

Mr. HEDDELL. That is correct. 

Senator BROWN. How does that happen? 

Mr. HEDDELL. Because there were no managers on the ground. 

Senator BROWN. What are they getting paid for? Why is that? 

When they are getting paid to do a job, there has got to be a chain 

of command. There has got to be a natural flow chart. Here is the 

boss. Here is the subordinate. Where is the break down? I am missing it. 

Mr. HEDDELL. I can tell you what happened. 

Senator BROWN. Where is the breakdown? 

Mr. JOHNSON. As I mentioned in the statement that I made, the 

oral statement, in adapting the procedures that we had to working 

in a wartime environment, we developed what we thought were effective compromises, sometimes in consultation with our OIG colleagues, so that for example the contracting officers’ representatives’ files were retained in Washington. 

It was, therefore, a 24-hour delay, due to the shape of the globe, 

before someone on the ground in Kabul would have access to that 

material. 

They always had access to the material 24 hours later but it is 

not the same as being able to have the materials in the front of 

you. 

We did this because we were working in an environment where 

we were seeking to manage our risks, having no more people on 

the ground than we thought we had to. I think in retrospect, having more, taking some risks in the hiring process and having places 

doubled-billeted or triple-billeted going through the clearance process would have made more sense. 

I am anxious to come before you at some point, and the Chairman call me down for having so many people on the ground that 

I have lost the concept of materiality in auditing. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I will not do that. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I am aiming for it. But that is where we are trying 

to head. 

We did do some things in order to compensate for that by making 

all of the payments for the contract provisional in nature so that 

we can claw them back if they need to be and we have when we 

found issues that need to be addressed. 

As the Inspectors General pointed out, any delay in doing that, 

though, represents potential for lost documents, for lost memory, 

and reconciling that process over time is not nearly as efficient and 

effective as doing it at the time payment is made even though it 

does protect the government. 

So we are moving as rapidly as we possibly can in the direction 

of having more and more people on the ground. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you. I have run out of time, Madam 

Chairman. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let me first ask about the 2006 audit. Let 

me ask who did this before we started contracting this? Special 

forces? 

26 

Mr. JOHNSON. When the effort was first made to train police to 

do security sector reform, as it is called in diplo-speak, in Afghanistan in the early part of 2002 there was a division of labor among 

members of the G–18. 

The United State took responsibility for the Afghan national 

army for reasons which I think were intuitive to everybody in the 

room. 

The Germans who had a latent program that existed before the 

Russian invasion and before the Marxist coup that took place before that wanted to take the police responsibility on. They did but 

their approach was a very long-term approach. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And so we step in, the State Department did, and 

began a very modest training program in order to try to get people 

on the ground as quickly as possible. 

But as you may or may not recall, the diplomatic theory at the 

time was to have a relatively light foot print. We do not have ISAF 

outside of Kabul. We were still operating only Operation Enduring 

Freedom efforts outside of that. 

This has grown over time as we have seen and this is one of the 

issues that I think we need to take into account here. It is not so 

much that people did not do what we wanted them to do. It is that 

both our objectives and the situation on the ground has evolved 

and sometimes in unexpected and marked ways during this period 

of time. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let us just assume. We had this requirement to train local police during a counterinsurgency in Iraq. We 

now have the mission to train police during a counterinsurgency in 

Afghanistan. 

I do not think it is beyond anyone’s imagination that if we are 

fighting a counterinsurgency that that is going to be something 

that is going to have to be a core competency of our military as far 

as the eye can see. 

Would anybody disagree with that? That training local police in 

a counterinsurgency is something that should be a core competency 

of our military for as far as the eye can see. 

Mr. Sedney, would you disagree with that? 

Mr. SEDNEY. I personally would not disagree with that. In terms 

of just how we are going to allocate the division of responsibility 

in the government for future counterinsurgencies in terms of training police I believe that is still a matter that we have not fully 

come to closure on but I take your point and I would say I personally agree. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I will tell you this. That is what I would like 

to see come out of this hearing. In the volumes of information that 

I have consumed on this, there is no question that the trading back 

and forth, the fact that after 2006, you had an audit report that 

said you needed in-country CORs, and there were years that you 

maybe had one on a task force and they were not really doing any 

on-site checking because of the security risks. 

I mean it is unacceptable that—you know, I think I have a couple of documents that by the beginning of 2008, nearly 675 million 

was obligated without any evidence of an ICOR functioning in Afghanistan. That comes directly out of the report. 

27 

Prior to June 2009, there was only one in-country contracting officer’s representatives on the main ANP task order. That is not 

going to work. 

Anybody who is doing contract oversight will tell you that the 

kind of presence in-country in this kind of environment is woefully 

inadequate. 

So if we are going to be operating in the counterinsurgency as 

we do this local police training, it seems to me that it is imperative 

that somebody step up and say this has got to be a military COR 

competency and stop this, well, the State Department was not 

doing it. Well, we got to get it back under the military because the 

State Department contractors are not paying attention to us. State 

cannot really get out in the contingency because of the security 

risks. 

I mean if you look at this back and forth over the last 4 or 5 

years, you can say all you want to how many have been trained. 

But I think if we are honest about how many are currently operating at an effectiveness level in the country of Afghanistan, Americans have not gotten a good deal on their investment. 

So I am trying to get someone to come to the table and say it 

is time that people at the very top of the State Department and the 

very top of the State Department and General Petraeus acknowledged that this needs to come to defense and it needs to stay there. 

Is it not true that there is a plan already in place to not only— 

we are trying to transition it to defense but we cannot get it done 

because it was not done right and there is already planning going 

on on how to transition it back. Is that not true? 

Mr. SEDNEY. There certainly is discussion about what will follow 

after a transition to Afghan security lead so I am aware that there 

are discussions. I am not aware of a plan along the lines that you 

discussed but I have to confess I will not be able to speak for every 

plan in the Department of Defense. But I personally am not aware 

of such a plan, Madam Chairman. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think there is a chance that we will be 

doing police training in counterinsurgency operations in other 

places besides Afghanistan. That is something clearly if you understand the security threats around the world whether it is Somalia, 

whether it is Yemen, this is something that is going to be ongoing. 

It is my understanding that prior to the State Department taking 

this on that this had been a special forces function, the training, 

before it went to private contractors. 

Mr. JOHNSON. That is not my understanding. The special forces 

were operating as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. They had 

many liaison relationships throughout the country as part of that. 

But the police training which began after hostilities were concluded formally, if you will, was the responsibility first of our partners and then we began taking on more and more of that. 

If I might say while I have the floor, I think we are going to find 

that we need more than one solution to this problem because there 

are going to be places in the world where a defense-led effort will 

be both more appropriate and more effective and acceptable, and 

there are going to be places in the world where if only for reasons 

of acceptability from our partners, having a civilian-led effort is 

going to be also needed to be in this mix. 

28 

Senator MCCASKILL. My reference to special forces was worldwide. It had been special forces prior to the State Department. You 

are referring to Afghanistan. There was a time that the State Department was not involved in this and it was purely military that 

did training of local police under these circumstances. 

Mr. JOHNSON. My earliest recollection of this comes in our initial 

effort to assist the training of the police force in Haiti in the early 

1990s and that was a State-Department led effort. I understand 

that before that when there were needs there may have been special forces training programs which bled over to civilian police but 

it has not been the civilian lead at least over the course of the last 

couple of dozen years. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Did you want to add something, Mr. 

Sedney? 

Mr. SEDNEY. No. 

Senator MCCASKILL. No. OK. Senator Kaufman. 

Senator KAUFMAN. You are doing great. Keep going. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Why do you not take another round, Senator Brown, and then I will probably come back for one more. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I appreciate it. 

This has been very interesting. I wanted to just touch on the 

civilian training verses military style paramilitary training. Although the primary reason for change certainly is sensible, the Afghan police are suffering inordinate casualties in the field compared to their counterparts in the army based on this new emphasis on military style training, I think precipitated by the several 

debates between the State Department and DOD. 

The State Department and DOD inspectors’ report that we have 

been obviously cited the delay in changing the curriculum to emphasize the paramilitary skills as the problem in the current DODState Department management. 

Did this delay stem from the resistance by the State Department 

to buy into this change or resistence from DynCorp or basic bureaucratic problems or for some other reason? 

Mr. JOHNSON. There is no resistance to this on our part. We will 

respond to the defined requirements. If it requires additional or different trainers, that is what we will seek. If it requires skills that 

are outside the scope of civilian trainers, we will inform our military colleagues that we are not in a position to provide that service. 

Senator BROWN. Do you wish to comment on that, sir? 

Mr. HEDDELL. Yes. There is actually something I think to be 

learned from your question, Senator Brown, in the sense that the 

original contract required that there would be this joint relationship between the Department of State and the Department of Defense. 

And that in order for the Department of Defense to make a 

change, for instance, in the training curriculum, it was required 

that DOD provide at least 120 days notice before that change could 

be effective. 

What we found when we interviewed staff from the State Department, they indicated on average it took 6 months to actually execute a change. 

29 

It brings us to the heart of the issue which is that the Department of Defense needs in this particular case to be able to talk directly to the contractor. That was really the heart of the problem. 

The bureaucracy was holding us back and the lack of contracting 

management on the ground to effect these changes and bring about 

a new curriculum and to do the things that DOD needed to have 

done, the structure was not in place to do it. 

So what we learned from that is that we should not have this 

intermediary where DOD has to go through another entity to make 

changes. 

And we do not want to build a contract where it takes 120 days 

to make a rapid change when the insurgency is making rapid 

changes every day that we have to adjust to. 

Senator BROWN. I think that is accurate. I just want to shift 

gears just a minute. When we talk about the training, and I asked 

these questions in Afghanistan, it has gone from 8 weeks to 6 

weeks. 

Do we really think that is adequate enough to instill professionalism and ethics in that police force, into the trainees, and is 

that enough time to actually filter out those trainees to determine 

if they in fact have the ability to be professional and ethical? 

I think that is probably an IG question. 

Mr. HEDDELL. I would be glad to give you my opinion on that, 

Senator Brown. From the standpoint of basic training, no, 6 weeks, 

in my own opinion, is not enough. 

Senator BROWN. Especially since you do not have all the trainers 

you need as we referenced. 

Mr. HEDDELL. The fact of the matter is that 6 weeks or even 8 

weeks or even 16 weeks is not enough for anyone if you do not 

have some follow-up because, as I said earlier, it takes years, not 

weeks, not months but years to develop a police officer just to be 

at the acceptable level. 

So I presume that the reason that it went from 8 weeks to 6 

weeks is to get more police officers through the training. 

But once they get through the training, they need mentoring. 

They need advanced training. They need follow up. There is so 

much more to it than simply putting through a 6- or 8-week course. 

So I do not necessarily think that whether it is 6 or 8 weeks is 

right or wrong. I think what is important is that there has to be 

a long term plan here for development. 

Senator BROWN. So are we asking for contractors to put too much 

of an influence on the quantity of trainees versus actual quality or 

ethical responsibilities and professionalism? Do you think we 

should maybe go to a different standard of some kind? 

Mr. HEDDELL. Well, I cannot answer the question. It is probably 

more for the Department of Defense or Department of State. But 

it would appear to me that the way we were doing it was just not 

going to work. 

Senator BROWN. So saying that and referring it over, what is the 

solution? How do we change from quantity to quality to get the 

value for our dollars? 

Mr. SEDNEY. We are currently working on addressing both and 

we are very aware of the challenges that you laid out, Senator 

Brown. 

30 

To address the specific question of the 6 weeks versus 8 weeks 

training, yes, we have transitioned to 6 weeks training in order to 

be able to make maximum use of the police training facilities and 

produce more police. 

But those 6 weeks of training are better than the 8 weeks before. 

There is not less contact hours. There are more contact hours in 

those 6 weeks. It has gone from, we have shortened a rather long 

lunch period to a shorter lunch period. The training is longer days. 

One day off has now become a day of training. 

So the actual contact hours over 6 weeks is greater than the 8 

weeks. 

Senator BROWN. Right. I am aware of that. 

Mr. SEDNEY. So it is not a lesser training. 

However, I agree with Mr. Heddell. This is not a weeks or 

months long process. It is a year’s long process. The key here is not 

just continued training but also modeling, and that is where the intensive partnering that General McChrystal has put in in both the 

army and the police is so important because in order to instill those 

ethics that you talked about, the Afghan trainees, the Afghan policemen have to see them in operation. They have to see that they 

work. 

In the past we would train people and put them out into a corrupt society. No matter how well you train them, whether it was 

8 weeks, 6 weeks, 16 weeks or 60 weeks, if you just stuck them 

out with no mentoring and training they were going to become 

more corrupt. 

We have realized that. Now we are working to change that. We 

also have developed and are going to be putting more emphasis on 

continued and repeat training, as Mr. Heddell mentioned, because 

again you have to keep bringing people back on. 

Senator BROWN. I am sorry. I do not mean to interrupt. I understand that. We got fully briefed as to what it is. 

I guess at least in my second question, so how much is it going 

to cost? I mean what is the number that the American people are 

ultimately going to be responsible for next year and the year after 

and the year after? What type of dollars are we talking about to 

once again to come up with? 

Mr. SEDNEY. I do not know the exact figure for what we have requested in the supplemental. I will be happy to get that up. 

Senator BROWN. Do you have a general idea if you do not have 

an exact number? Do you have a general number, an approximate 

number? 

Mr. SEDNEY. I understand and my staff is always willing to come 

up, is going to give me an exact number. I was going to say about 

$6 billion. 

Senator BROWN. For a year? 

Mr. SEDNEY. Yes, $6 billion for this year. 

Senator BROWN. Just to stand up a police force, it is going to be 

$6 billion a year? 

Mr. SEDNEY. The Afghan police and national army is together about $11.6 billion in fiscal year 2011 request. That is the Afghan 

National Police and army together. 

Senator BROWN. So $11.6 billion is to basically uplift the police 

and army in Afghanistan. 

31 

1The contractor past performance evaluation submitted by Chairman McCaskill appears in 

the Appendix on page 101. 2The information about the audit submitted by Chairman McCaskill appears in the Appendix 

on page 104. 

Mr. SEDNEY. And continue to train them, pay them. 

Senator BROWN. Equip them. The whole nine yards. 

Mr. SEDNEY. Right. 

Senator BROWN. I will save my remaining questions for follow 

up. Thank you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I have several questions I want to get to so 

I will try to limit my editorial comments because I know I am the 

biggest offender. If you all will try to help me by keeping your answers brief. 

I want to make sure I get a couple of documents in the record. 

The first has to do with the State Department’s ability to oversee 

contractors. Without objection, if there is an objection just let me 

know, I want to enter into the record the contractor past performance evaluation document that deals with the evaluation of 

Blackwater in Iraq.1

This is a dollar value on a contract of $1.2 billion. This occurred 

after the killing of 17 Iraqi citizens in Nisor Square. That is why 

it is important to remember the time frame here, that this was 

around the problems of that. 

When you read this document, the question is asked, would you 

recommend the contractor be used again, the answer is yes. It 

states that, this is the quote that is used in reports, ‘‘incidents 

cause the program officer to lose confidence in Blackwater’s credibility and management but concludes that new personnel have improved confidence in the contractor that, it is expected that next 

past performance evaluation will be substantially improved.’’ 

I would like to place that in the record. 

Senator BROWN. No objection, Madam Chairman. 

Senator MCCASKILL. The second thing I would like to place in 

the record is the DCAA DynCorp audit. This audit is an audit that 

came out in November of last year. As of last November, these are 

some of the findings of the audit of DynCorp. Keep in mind this 

is the contractor we are stuck with now. We are going to have this 

contractor for the indefinite future since we are going to a full and 

fair open competition which means it will likely be at least a year 

from now before there would be a new contract. 

These are some of the findings. Inadequate controls to ensure 

contract briefs contain adequate information for the billing department to prepare current, accurate, and complete those vouchers. 

Inadequate control to verify pay rates were authorized and accurate. Failure to prepare adequate budgets which may result in significant over or understatement of proposed costs. Failure to notify 

the government upon awards of subcontracts. 

This is problematic from an auditing standpoint because this is 

all the documentation that is necessary, all the oversight that is 

necessary to make sure that they are not walking away with our 

money and not performing the work. 

So I want to make sure that we enter that audit into the record.2

Tell me where the $80 billion is now, Mr. Johnson, that was 

found in the audit. Has it been returned? 

32 

Mr. JOHNSON. It has not been returned. The monies have been 

obligated against a task order and the reconciliation is ongoing on 

that task order. As soon as that is completed and we determine 

how much should be returned, we will do so immediately. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Could you respond to that, Mr. Heddell or 

Ms. Klemstine? Is it true they were obligated? I thought you found 

in your audit they were unobligated. 

Mr. HEDDELL. What we found, Madam Chairman, is that the Department of State improperly kept $80 million that had been transferred from the Department of Defense even though the funds had 

expired. 

The money we are talking about was used specifically, was supposed to be used for Afghan National Police training. It came in 

three separate appropriations and each appropriation had an estimated availability period. And, as of December 2009, the Department of State was still holding $80 million, and the availability period for that $80 million on the first one expired, $56.8 million expired in September 2007, and $23.2 million expired in September 

2008. 

As of January of this year, that was our understanding. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Do you disagree with that finding, Mr. 

Johnson? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I do not disagree that it would have expired had 

it not been obligated but it has been obligated and has to be reconciled against these billings so that we return the proper amount. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I assume you are saying it was obligated 

during the audit period or it was obligated after the audit period? 

Mr. JOHNSON. It was obligated prior to the audit period. What 

the Inspector General is referring to is that had it not been against 

a task order which was during the period of time the money was 

available to be spent, had it been fully reconciled, any monies left 

over should and would have been returned to the Treasury Department or to DOD depending on the date at which it became available. 

We are doing our best efforts to complete that process so that we 

return exactly the right amount. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Mr. Heddell. 

Mr. HEDDELL. Madam Chairman, it was obligated but the money 

had expired and it was not expended. The money, as far as we 

know, has never been returned to the Treasury Department. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So what you are saying is the obligation 

makes no difference if the time period expires and it is not expended. 

Mr. HEDDELL. That is my understanding. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think that is something that I would like 

to writing an answer with somebody’s signature that you all disagree with that because $80 million is a lot of money. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I would be pleased to provide you with that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. DCAA told the Subcommittee that the State 

Department did not engage them to perform real-time reviews. 

Why have you not used DCAA for this type of review? And second, 

in the audit it was reported that the State Department had canceled an audit. The contracting officer had canceled an audit. I 

would like an explanation on both of these, why DCAA is not being 

33 

used for real-time reviews and second why you would ever cancel 

an audit. 

Mr. JOHNSON. We are using DCAA and we are very pleased with 

their assistance to us. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Great. 

Mr. JOHNSON. We had a point of confusion between us and them 

about the request that we hade made of them. We were ongoing 

and worked on a request for a transfer of funds to pay for this 

audit on two other task orders and those were ongoing. 

And for reasons having to do with the way that payment was 

processed, one of those requests under one of those task orders was 

accidentally canceled. We were unaware of that. When we became 

aware of it, we began re-engaging with DCAA on that specific task 

order. Those discussions are ongoing. We intend for them to come 

and work for us and we intend to pay them for it. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Since we are going to have a State Department-run contract on police training in Afghanistan for the 

foreseeable future, are your in-country CORs getting out in the 

field as we speak? Mr. Johnson, are they conducting regular site 

visits to the training sites at this point in time? 

Mr. JOHNSON. They are getting out and they are conducting regular site visits. I do not think they are there yet because the numbers are not up to what we want them to be conducting as regular 

and frequent site visits as I think we want and I think as our oversight colleagues would like but we fully intend to remedy that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I would certainly like, I mean we will follow 

up with some of these questions. We want to be notified how many 

you have on the ground every quarter and we want to know how 

many site visits are going on, how many of them are regularly 

scheduled and how many of them are unannounced. 

The unannounced site visits are crucial in a contract like this. 

That is when you find people doing things I mean I hate to bring 

back bad memories of another hearing. But when you have craziness going on with the security force at an embassy which also 

happened in Afghanistan, those unscheduled site visits are incredibly important. 

Mr. JOHNSON. In my checkered past I was a bank examiner. 

Senator MCCASKILL. You know about showing up unannounced. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Right. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let me turn it over to Senator Brown for a 

few follow up questions. 

Senator BROWN. I just want to go on that line of questioning, 

Madam Chairman, and then I will go back. 

On the $80 million issue we were talking about, is there an enforcement arm of any kind that says, hey, listen your time has expired. You have the money. You have not used it. It is time to come 

back to the Treasury Department. 

Is there any mechanism that you have because I have to be honest with you, it seems like it is political doublespeak in terms of 

you know the money has not been used. It was back in 2007 and 

2008. We are in 2010. And then you say, well, it was not allocated 

before the audit. Well, if not, then when was it allocated because 

it is 2010, and the time expired. Was there an amendment of some 

sort that went into effect? Is there an agreement with the approVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:41 Apr 06, 2011 Jkt 057325 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\57325.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
34 

priate authorities to extend it out to another period of time to give 

you the authority to continue to retain that? 

Mr. JOHNSON. If I poorly communicated, I am sorry. My understanding is the monies were obligated against an ongoing activity. 

As soon as all the reconciliation of the billings which took place 

during that time period, not billings which will take place later—— 

Senator BROWN. It has been what? Three years now. When does 

the reconciliation take place? 

Mr. JOHNSON. It is ongoing. We are running at about a 2-year 

delay from conclusion of the task order. 

Senator BROWN. That is 2009, if we were in 2007. So it is longer 

than that obviously. We are in 3 years now, right? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I am not certain but I will work that time line for 

you, yes, sir. 

Senator BROWN. I guess what I am trying to say is you know I 

am a firm believer in contracts and dates. As it is the rule of law, 

we have a date. We perform. We fulfill. If we do not, it goes back. 

There seems to be a slippery slope here that we are going down 

in that you know we allocate money, taxpayer money, hard-earned 

taxpayer money for certain purposes. It does not get used. It should 

go back to be re-allocated, to be reused. 

We could use it right now for unemployment insurance to find 

another way to pay for that. I am hopeful, Madam Chairman, that 

we can get a reasonable answer, like why was not the reconciliation done right away, when are we going to have it done, and 

when if at all and how much money is actually going to be actually 

returned? 

I would also like to have that in writing for us to review. 

Do you have the ability, sir, to delegate the site visit responsibilities to the military or any other entity to assist you until you get 

up to speed, because I hear you? I understand. I was there. I get 

it now. I see how big it is. 

But if you are not up to speed and you cannot account, we are 

giving billions of dollars to people, is there anything that I can do, 

make a recommendation to the President or to the Majority Leader, 

anybody who is dealing with this issue to give you the tools and 

resources you need to either delegate or get this job done quicker 

and more efficiently? 

Mr. JOHNSON. In terms of some issues, for example, inventories, 

we have worked with the military to assist us in those. I think 

though that there is no substitute to have contracting office representatives who know the contract, who are trained to do this type 

of work there on the ground and getting out to do those things. 

That is the aim that we have. 

One of my kind colleagues pointed out to me that the monies 

that were appropriated for fiscal year 2007, could have been expended on things through September 2009. So we have a little 

while where we need to make sure we paid all our bills before we 

give the money back. 

Senator BROWN. OK. I would appreciate that in writing. 

Madam Chairman, I forgot and I am wondering if you will accept 

my modified opening statements for the record, if possible. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Your opening statement will be made part 

of the record. 

35 

Do you have anything else? 

Senator BROWN. I do but I will allow you to get back to your line. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That is OK. Why do you not finish up because I only have one or two more questions? See if there is anything else you want to cover. 

Senator BROWN. Just some general questions. As you know, the 

Afghan culture is largely tribal and locally based. I wrestled with 

this when I was there when I was getting back. 

Does it make sense to have a national police force that basically 

the tribal leaders do not recognize, they do not know. Some of the 

individual citizens do not even recognize the uniforms. Does it 

make sense to have a one-size-fits-all strategy in Afghanistan? 

Mr. SEDNEY. The kind of security force that we should have in 

Afghanistan is one that has been discussed and the question that 

you raise is an excellent one, Senator Brown, and there are people 

who have felt very strongly for all sides of a question that has 

many answers. 

There are certainly areas of Afghanistan where a national police 

force, a uniformed police force, large cities. Kabul has well in excess of 4 million people there now. For example other major cities. 

In some of the rural areas, Afghan justice is very much in the 

hands of traditional justice systems. 

One of the problems however is that over the years, especially as 

the result of the occupation by the Soviets during the civil war a 

lot of those traditional structures have either been destroyed or 

been seized by small, powerful, maligned actors who pervert the 

local systems so that they do not work effectively. 

So there are a number of activities that are going on looking at 

restoring those local activities in a way that is acceptable to the 

broad expanse of people while at the same time building national 

police in areas where they are most able to be effective. 

The latest polling I saw on that was of rural people in eastern 

Afghanistan where 38 percent of the people said they preferred 

local gurkhas to national police. Fifty percent of the people said 

they preferred national police to local gurkhas. 

So you have a fairly significant split but the people thought very 

strongly on both ways. 

It is a country in transition, and we are working on all those 

areas. But I would say that in terms of the kind of order that is 

required in the midst of an insurgency, the police have played, continue to play a very important role. 

In many ways, the acceptability of the police depends upon their 

performance. You and Senator Kaufman just mentioned the areas 

where there have been problems of the performance of the police. 

Minister Atmar has developed a program called the personal 

asset inventory that is designed to combat corruption. He believes 

that the increased prosecution of corrupt police through efforts by 

the major crimes task force we put in place are already having significant improvements in that area. 

We support Minister Atmar in those efforts and look forward to 

continued qualitative improvements in the police force. 

Senator BROWN. I have a whole host of questions but in the interest of time I will narrow it down to the top three at this point. 

They are not too difficult. Is that OK? 

36 

Senator MCCASKILL. Absolutely. We will take as many questions 

as you have for the record and we will keep that open for a week 

so that any additional questions we did not get to today because 

I have the same problem. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. If we stayed here with all my questions, it 

would not be good. 

Senator BROWN. Would you like to go? 

Senator MCCASKILL. No. Go ahead. You finish up. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you. 

I found it fascinating and so did our team. 500 meters from our 

forward operating base there are poppy fields all over the place. I 

know the reasons why. I get it. 

But is there, and I guess it would be directed to either one of 

you. Is there a plan? Are we going to eradicate? Are we going to 

allow it? Are we going to transition? Are we going to give them 

time lines? Listen, we know you are doing it, we know why you are 

doing it. But listen you only have another year to do it and then 

we are going to transition you into a different crop. And if you do 

not, then we are going to just eradicate it, because I have to be 

honest with you, seeing all those poppies—flying in those choppers 

for 3 days everywhere we went—in full bloom, I just thought about 

how that transitions into lives in our country and young people and 

others using drugs. 

Any thoughts? 

Mr. JOHNSON. You are correct in that we have had a rather expensive and not very effective eradication program in the past 

where we attempted to provide the ability of the central government to have the eradication capability. 

Seeing the expense involved and the relative inefficiency, practically in the areas where you were where poppy growing is indeed 

an agribusiness, Ambassador Holbrook has determined that we 

should focus instead on seeking an alternative livelihood-based approach where we find more and more opportunities for these individuals to grow a legitimate crop. 

I think that program is just barely getting underway. It could 

have significant impact over the course of the next year or two. 

Outside of the area where you were the area of Afghanistan is 

largely poppy free. In Helmand and in Kandahar, it is a basic business though. 

The other issue is we are focusing much more clearly on an interdiction effort. The Drug Enforcement Administration’s deployment 

in Afghanistan is the largest on the planet. It is working very hard 

in concert with the capabilities that we are helping to develop, my 

colleagues and I, of the Afghans to have their own counter narcotics police. 

Those have been quite effective over the course of the last several 

months. The seizures are up. But this very much remains a work 

in progress. 

Senator BROWN. Well, it is interesting. The seizures are up but 

then the growing is up too in certain regions. 

Getting back to policy a little bit I have two more short questions. How many companies are currently capable of providing poVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:41 Apr 06, 2011 Jkt 057325 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\57325.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
37 

lice services such as the ones in the contract? Who are they and 

do they have a fair opportunity to compete for the business? 

And then how would re-bidding for the contract of Afghan police 

forces impact America’s ability to win and perform our mission the 

next couple of months, and years, I should say? 

Mr. JOHNSON. The current indefinite quantity, indefinite delivery 

contract that we work under for the civilian police program in the 

State Department has three participants. 

DynCorp is one, Pacific Architects and Engineers is the second 

one, now a division of Lockheed Martin, and the third is Civilian 

Police International, that I think is a division of L–3. 

We have, just this week, put on the street a request for proposals 

that we hope will provide us a much broader number of companies 

who are willing and able to provide this service. We anticipate the 

program will close in terms of the bids being due I believe in June 

and we will have a period of time in the summer to evaluate. 

It is my goal, and I have been working on this for some time, to 

broaden that contractor base because I think there are more companies and more opportunities out there than we have had in the 

past. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I will defer to 

you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Senator Brown. 

Mr. Heddell and Ms. Klemstine, do you think that the State Department has added enough in-country contracting representatives 

with the acronym of ICOR, do you think they have added enough 

to provide adequate oversight to this contract? 

Mr. HEDDELL. Madam Chairman, what I know from January of 

this year I would say no. Unless something has occurred in the last 

30 days, I am not aware of it. But I would say no. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Ms. Klemstine. 

Ms. KLEMSTINE. I would reiterate that answer being no. However, I do think that there are plans in place to increase the number. I think if they get up to that number they will probably be in 

pretty good shape at that point. 

Senator MCCASKILL. What is that number? 

Ms. KLEMSTINE. I believe it is 33. 

Senator MCCASKILL. In-country? 

Ms. KLEMSTINE. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Is that correct, Mr. Johnson? 

Mr. JOHNSON. There are not 33 presently in-country. There are 

seven currently in-country. Our aim by September is to get to 22. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Is 22 enough, Ms. Klemstine? 

Ms. KLEMSTINE. I would have to go back and re-evaluate that. 

I do not know that off the top of my head. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think if you are working toward 22, as 

soon as we could possibly get the input of your agency that did the 

audit whether or not you think that is an adequate number. I 

would hate for us to have a goal of 22 and get there and still know 

we do not have enough to adequately keep track of what is happening with this contract. 

It is my understanding the people you are hiring to do this are 

in fact contractors? 

38 

Mr. JOHNSON. Madam Chairman, the individuals who have traditionally done this are what are known as personal services contractors. 

I know I could read you from the FAR what that means and how 

it is virtually the same as an employee but I also know that it 

would not answer the mail for you. 

We are in the process of using an opportunity we have under the 

law of so called 3,161 employees. We plan to convert as many of 

these individuals as possible to that employment status so that 

they will be direct employees of U.S. Government. 

I have the opportunity in Afghanistan but I do not have it globally. I will be looking for other ways to provide direct employees 

who are performing this service because I recognize the demand 

that you made that we have them not just be the functional equivalent of direct employees but actually be so. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Mr. Sedney, if you all take it back, does 

that mean you have the CORs ready and available to oversee this 

contract? 

I have spent an awful lot of time talking to people in uniform 

about contracting representatives over the last 3 years. Would it be 

your plan to try to utilize the individual personal service contracts 

that the State Department is going to execute over the next 6 

month to oversee this contract? 

How do you envision the contract oversight working if you all in 

fact enter into a contract as opposed to the State Department? 

Mr. SEDNEY. In terms of the complete and open competition that 

we are looking for, the numbers of contracting representatives will 

be part of that process. We are in the process of determining what 

that will be now. 

In terms of what the contracting officer representatives that Mr. 

Johnson was talking about having in place, our people out in the 

field have helped to contribute to the request for additional contracting office representatives. 

In terms of one of the requests that we are making of the Department of State if we were to extend the current contractor with 

DynCorp beyond that time, additional contracting office representatives are one of the areas that we have agreed is important and 

would like to see move forward. 

I do not have the figures on the exact numbers that we think 

would be necessary and we can get back to you on that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think it is really essential. I will be 

shocked. It will be like winning the lottery if we end up with anybody other than DynCorp through the time period in which the 

President has indicated that we are going to have this increased 

presence. 

In that case, if there is by a chance to transition, it will be terribly counterproductive if you have CORs in-country that are there 

and have made the commitment to be there for all of a sudden then 

get pulled back because now we have switched again. 

It would be unconscionable to switch contractors and not have a 

CORs force ready to go to oversee that contract because we could 

go a year without anybody in-country essentially like we have had 

on this contract. 

39 

For parts of the time there has been really almost nobody home. 

So we have to make sure that happens and I am going to depend 

on the two of you to communicate and figure out how to work that 

out. And if you need help above you, you need to speak up if there 

is going to be an issue because I do not want the contracting representative COR to go down anytime while we are making this 

kind of financial commitment for police training in Afghanistan. 

The last thing I wanted to cover on this subject matter is that the GDP of Afghanistan is about $13 billion a year. Sustaining 

what we are building, it is $11 billion in the supplemental for the 

army and the police, sustaining it, not building it but sustaining 

is $6 billion a year. 

I think it is pretty obvious that Afghanistan is not going to be 

able to afford to sustain what we are building for them. They cannot take over half of their GDP just to do local police and military. 

So that means the American people have probably made some 

kind of multi-billion-dollar commitment for many years forward. 

Certainly not at the level that we are this year and next year but 

certainly billions of dollars which means we are going to need contractors over there for many years. 

I just want to make sure that we get a sense of urgency about 

getting it right as quickly as possible because this has gone on way 

too long, way too long. 

I want to ask a favor before we close the hearing. We will have 

questions for the record for all of you. I want to as always thank 

the auditors, the Inspector General’s offices, for your great work. 

It is brave. Your people went in-country and the services of the auditing community are not valued enough in our government and I 

hope you all know the deep respect for that work. 

I also want to thank both of you. This was not an easy hearing. 

But this is hard stuff. It is a hard thing we are trying to do and 

the contracting in this area has certainly not been anything that 

any of us should be proud of. 

We are going to have a hearing, Mr. Johnson, in a few months 

on the contracting for counter narcotics in South America. 

We gave plenty of notice for documents. We have had difficulty 

getting documents out of the State Department. We were able to 

do this hearing without a lot of the documents we requested from 

the State Department. 

But it will be impossible for us to have the oversight hearing 

that we need to have on these contracts in South America without 

the cooperation of the State Department giving us the documents. 

So I would like to implore on the record today that you spend 

some time—I think this is under your silo at the State Department—if you would work to help us get the documents we need for 

that important hearing. 

I do not think we have ever had an oversight hearing on the expensive contracts that we issue on counter narcotics in South 

America and I would like it to be a full and complete hearing and 

it will not be without your cooperation. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. We have gathered 

the documents. They are going through the clearance process now. 

I will endeavor to push that as quickly as we can. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That would be terrific. 

40 

I want to thank everyone for being here. I especially want to 

thank Senator Brown for his participation. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:39 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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