This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-1704

Pamela Powell, individually, 

and on behalf of her minor child, Grace Powell Hernandez,

Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services,

Respondent,

Carver County,

Respondent.

Filed March 9, 2015

Affirmed

Chutich, Judge

Carver County District Court

File No. 10-CV-14-407

Pamela Powell, Chanhassen, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Patricia A. Sonnenberg, Assistant Attorney General, St. 

Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Commissioner of Minnesota Department of Human 

Services)

Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Dawn M. O’Rourke, Assistant County Attorney,

Chaska, Minnesota (for respondent Carver County)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and 

Chutich, Judge. 
2

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

CHUTICH, Judge

Appellant Pamela Powell challenges the district court’s dismissal of her appeal for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because of her failure to timely serve respondents

Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services (the commissioner) and 

Carver County. Because we conclude that Powell failed to serve the commissioner and 

Carver County within the permitted timeframe of Minnesota Statutes section 256.045, 

subdivision 7 (2012), we affirm.

FACTS

In July 2013, Carver County sent Powell a written notice sanctioning her

Minnesota Family Investment Program benefits because she failed to comply with the

employment plan that Carver County had created for her. Powell had previously met 

with a Carver County job counselor to develop an employment plan but refused to 

comply with the plan, claiming that it needed to include the same educational component 

as her previous plan in Freeborn County. 

Powell appealed Carver County’s decision to the Minnesota Department of 

Human Services. A human-services judge held a two-day evidentiary hearing and issued 

a recommended order affirming Carver County’s decision. The human-services judge 

determined that it was within Carver County’s discretion to develop an employment plan 

distinct from Freeborn County and that Powell’s failure to comply with Carver County’s 

plan warranted sanctions. 
3

On March 12, 2014, the commissioner adopted the human-services judge’s 

recommended order. The commissioner’s final order was mailed to Powell, and a 

document was attached informing Powell that she could (1) request reconsideration, or 

(2) appeal to the district court. It further explained that if she appealed, she was required 

to serve a notice of appeal “upon the other parties and the Commissioner” within 30 days 

of the date of the decision. The document also referred her to the statutory requirements 

for filing an appeal. 

Powell appealed the commissioner’s order to the district court. On April 10, 2014, 

Powell hand-delivered a document titled “Notice of Late or Incomplete Household 

Report Form” to a Carver County agent. Powell had written on the top of the document, 

“THESE MATTERS ARE STAYED ON APPEAL!!” That same day, Powell also filed a 

22-page notice of appeal with the district court. 

On April 21, 2014, the district court sent Powell a discrepancy notice, stating that 

she needed to complete and file affidavits of service on the defendants. On May 15, 

2014, Powell completed affidavits of service to show that she had served notices of 

appeal on both defendants by mail on May 15. 

Carver County moved to dismiss Powell’s appeal for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction, arguing that she did not timely serve Carver County or the commissioner 

within 30 days as required by Minnesota Statutes section 256.045, subdivision 7. The 

district court granted Carver County’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Powell had 

failed to serve either Carver County or the commissioner with a notice of appeal by the 

statutory deadline of April 14, 2014. The district court calculated the April 14 statutory 
4

deadline by adding 33 days

1

to March 12—the date that the commissioner signed the 

final order. 

The district court acknowledged that Powell had properly filed a notice of appeal

with the district court but concluded that her obligations to serve the defendants with 

notices of appeal were separate requirements that she did not complete. The district court 

then dismissed Powell’s appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Powell appealed.

D E C I S I O N

Powell argues that the district court erred when it dismissed her appeal. Carver 

County and the commissioner contend, and we agree, that Powell’s failure to timely serve 

the respondents with a notice of appeal properly resulted in the dismissal of her appeal.

When an aggrieved party fails to appeal a state agency decision within the 

statutorily prescribed time limits, the appeal is properly dismissed for a lack of 

jurisdiction. Reynolds, 737 N.W.2d at 369. Subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of 

law that this court reviews de novo. Tischer v. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. of 

Cambridge, 693 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. 2005).

Minnesota Statutes section 256.045, subdivision 7, states that

any party who is aggrieved by an order of the commissioner 

of human services . . . may appeal the order to the district 

court of the county responsible for furnishing 

assistance . . . by serving a written copy of a notice of appeal 

upon the commissioner and any adverse party of record 

 

1 Because the commissioner’s signed order was issued by mail, Powell had three 

additional days to serve the respondents. Reynolds v. Minn. Dept. of Human Servs., 737 

N.W.2d 367, 370 (Minn. App. 2007) (concluding that Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 

6.05 extends the 30-day timeline in section 256.045, subdivision 7, by three days when 

the commissioner issues a decision by mail). 
5

within 30 days after the date the commissioner issued the 

order.

The commissioner’s order was an agency decision, and it was signed on March 12, 

2014. Powell, as the aggrieved party appealing, had 33 days to serve the commissioner 

and any adverse party with a notice of appeal. See Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 7; Minn. 

R. Civ. P. 6.05. Thirty-three days, added to the March 12 signing date, meant that Powell 

was required to serve the commissioner and Carver County with a notice of appeal by 

April 14, 2014.

Powell did not serve either Carver County or the commissioner with a notice of 

appeal by April 14. And failure to appeal an agency’s decision within the timeframe 

provided in the statute results in a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. See Reynolds, 737 

N.W.2d at 369. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Powell’s appeal for a 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Powell contends that the notice of appeal she filed on April 10 with the district 

court simultaneously satisfied her requirement to serve respondents. But as the district 

court notes, service and filing are separate requirements. See, e.g., Minn. R. Civ. P. 5 

(“Service and Filing of Pleadings and Other Papers”). Moreover, the plain language of 

section 256.045, subdivision 7, explicitly required Powell to serve a written copy of her 

notice of appeal on the commissioner and any other adverse party of record. Powell did 

not serve either the commissioner or Carver County within the permitted time period.

Powell further argues that she properly served Carver County with a notice of 

appeal on April 10 when she hand-delivered a document titled “Notice of Late or 
6

Incomplete Household Report Form” to an agent of Carver County. At the top of this 

document, Powell had written, “THESE MATTERS ARE STAYED ON APPEAL!!” 

The document Powell delivered to Carver County on April 10 was a socialservices notice informing Powell that her medical services were subject to termination. 

Powell claims that her handwritten notations at the top of the document were sufficient to 

transform it into a notice of appeal. We disagree. Section 256.045, subdivision 7, 

required Powell to serve an actual notice of appeal on the respondents: a document 

unrelated to her appeal with her handwritten notations was simply not sufficient to place 

Carver County on notice of her appeal. We recognize that Powell is proceeding without 

an attorney, and while some leeway is given to a person who represents herself, we may 

not excuse her failure to comply with this fundamental procedural requirement. See State 

v. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d 368, 372 (Minn. 1988).

Powell also claims that the district court judge was biased and the dismissal of her 

claim should be reversed because the judge was a former Carver County assistant 

attorney, the judge colluded with the respondents, the judge engaged in a fraud and 

cover-up throughout her appeal, and the judge was appointed by the governor.

These allegations of judicial bias are meritless. The law presumes that a district 

court judge can put aside previous legal employment and whatever loyalties it may have 

created. In re Jacobs, 791 N.W.2d 300, 302 (Minn. App. 2010), aff’d, 802 N.W.2d 748 

(Minn. 2011). And nothing in the record shows that the judge was biased here: the 

district court heard Powell’s arguments, allowed her to submit evidence, and properly 

dismissed her appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
7

Powell’s dissatisfaction with the district court judge appears to stem from the 

adverse ruling she received. But receiving an adverse ruling is not a proper basis for 

imputing bias to the district court judge. Ag Servs. of Am., Inc. v. Schroeder, 693 N.W.2d 

227, 236-37 (Minn. App. 2005). Moreover, judicial bias does not exist merely because a 

governor appoints a district court judge; the law directs the governor to do so. Minn. 

Stat. § 480B.01, subd. 1 (2014). 

Powell asserts several additional arguments as to why the district court erred in 

dismissing her appeal, but all of these arguments are without merit. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the district court properly dismissed her appeal for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction.

Affirmed.