National

Transportation

Safety Board

Collision of Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority 

Train 322 and Track Maintenance Equipment near 

Woburn, Massachusetts

January 9, 2007

railroad 

ACCIDENT REPORT

NTSB/RAR-08/01

PB2008-916301

National

Transportation

Safety Board

Railroad Accident Report

Collision of Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Train 322 

and Track Maintenance Equipment Near 

Woburn, Massachusetts

January 9, 2007

490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

NTSB/RAR-08/01

PB2008-916301

Notation 7992A

Adopted March 18, 2008
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National Transportation Safety Board. 2008. Collision of Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority 

Train 322 and Track Maintenance Equipment near Woburn, Massachusetts, January 9, 2007. Railroad 

Accident Report NTSB/RAR-08/01. Washington, DC.

Abstract: On Tuesday, January 9, 2007, at 1:38 p.m., southbound Massachusetts Bay Transportation 

Authority passenger train 322 operated by Massachusetts Bay Commuter Railroad struck a track 

maintenance vehicle that was on the track near Woburn, Massachusetts. The track maintenance vehicle 

was thrown forward about 210 feet; the train did not derail. Of the six maintenance-of-way employees 

working on or near the track maintenance vehicle, two were killed, and two were seriously injured. 

Emergency responders treated and released 10 passengers at the accident scene.

As a result of its investigation of the accident, the National Transportation Safety Board identified the 

following safety issues: train dispatcher procedures for blocking track segments to protect maintenanceof-way work crews working on the track; maintenance-of-way work crews shunting signaled track 

to protect themselves while working on the track; and alcohol and drug use by maintenance-of-way 

employees in the railroad industry

As a result of its investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board makes 

recommendations to the Federal Railroad Administration and the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way 

Employes Division. 
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Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations......................................................................................iv

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................ v

Factual Information .........................................................................................................1

Accident Synopsis ...................................................................................................................1

Accident Narrative .................................................................................................................1

Preaccident Events..............................................................................................................1

Collision ...............................................................................................................................4

Injuries ......................................................................................................................................5

Damage .....................................................................................................................................5

Personnel Information............................................................................................................6

Foreman ...............................................................................................................................6

Assistant Foreman..............................................................................................................6

Machine Operator...............................................................................................................6

Second Machine Operator.................................................................................................7

Welder/Watchman ............................................................................................................7

Track Worker/Welder.......................................................................................................7

Train Dispatcher.................................................................................................................7

Signal System ...........................................................................................................................7

Maintenance-of-Way Procedures..........................................................................................7

Train Dispatching....................................................................................................................9

Management Oversight..........................................................................................................9

Toxicological Testing ...........................................................................................................10

Previous Board Action: Alcohol and Drug Testing..........................................................11

Postaccident Actions .............................................................................................................12

MBCR .................................................................................................................................12

Safety Compliance Agreement.......................................................................................13

Analysis ...........................................................................................................................15

Exclusions ...............................................................................................................................15

Train Dispatching..................................................................................................................15

Track Maintenance Activities ..............................................................................................16

Alcohol/Drug Use by Maintenance-of-Way Employees ................................................18

Conclusions ....................................................................................................................22

Findings .................................................................................................................................22

Probable Cause .....................................................................................................................23

Recommendations..........................................................................................................24

Appendix A ....................................................................................................................27

Investigation...........................................................................................................................27

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

Amtrak National Railroad Passenger Corporation

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

FRA Federal Railroad Administration

MBCR Massachusetts Bay Commuter Railroad

MBTA Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority 

NORAC Northeast Operating Rules Advisory Committee
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Executive Summary

On Tuesday, January 9, 2007, at 1:38 p.m., southbound Massachusetts Bay 

Transportation Authority passenger train 322 operated by Massachusetts Bay 

Commuter Railroad struck a track maintenance vehicle that was on the track 

near Woburn, Massachusetts. Passenger train 322 consisted of six passenger cars, 

including a lead control car, and a locomotive pushing from the rear. The track 

maintenance vehicle was thrown forward about 210 feet; the train did not derail. Of 

the six maintenance-of-way employees working on or near the track maintenance 

vehicle, two were killed, and two were seriously injured. Emergency responders 

treated and released 10 passengers at the accident scene.

As a result of the accident, 160 feet of rail, 80 crossties, and 100 tons of ballast 

had to be replaced. The cost, including labor, was $15,841. The accident damaged 

the lead control car and undercarriage of the train. Repairing the train cost an 

estimated $450,000. The track maintenance vehicle was destroyed; replacing it cost 

$95,000. Total estimated property damage was $560,841.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 

cause of the January 9, 2007, collision of train 322 with a track maintenance vehicle 

near Woburn, Massachusetts, was the failure of the train dispatcher to maintain 

blocking that provided signal protection for the track segment occupied by the 

maintenance-of-way work crew, and the failure of the work crew to apply a 

shunting device that would have provided redundant signal protection for their 

track segment. Contributing to the accident was Massachusetts Bay Commuter 

Railroad’s failure to ensure that maintenance-of-way work crews applied shunting 

devices as required.

As a result of its investigation of the accident, the National Transportation 

Safety Board identified the following safety issues:

• Train dispatcher procedures for blocking track segments to protect 

maintenance-of-way work crews working on the track

• Maintenance-of-way work crews shunting signaled track to protect 

themselves while working on the track

• Alcohol and drug use by maintenance-of-way employees in the railroad 

industry 

As a result of its investigation of this accident, the National Transportation 

Safety Board makes recommendations to the Federal Railroad Administration and 

the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division. 
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Factual Information

Accident Synopsis

On Tuesday, January 9, 2007, at 1:38 p.m.,1 southbound Massachusetts Bay 

Transportation Authority (MBTA) passenger train 322 operated by Massachusetts 

Bay Commuter Railroad (MBCR) struck a track maintenance vehicle that was 

on the track near Woburn, Massachusetts. Passenger train 322 consisted of six 

passenger cars, including a lead control car, and a locomotive pushing from the 

rear. The track maintenance vehicle was thrown forward about 210 feet; the train 

did not derail. Of the six maintenance-of-way employees (work crew) working on 

or near the track maintenance vehicle, two were killed, and two were seriously 

injured. Emergency responders treated and released 10 passengers at the accident 

scene. 

As a result of the accident, 160 feet of rail, 80 crossties, and 100 tons of ballast 

had to be replaced. The cost, including labor, was $15,841. The accident damaged 

the lead control car and undercarriage of the train. Repairing the train cost an 

estimated $450,000. The track maintenance vehicle was destroyed; replacing it cost 

$95,000. Total estimated damage was $560,841.

Accident Narrative 

Preaccident Events

On the day of the accident, the track crew went on duty at Wilmington, 

Massachusetts, at 7:30 a.m.2 The supervisor told the track crew foreman to replace 

crossties near the Woburn industrial switch on track 2. To accomplish this work, 

the track crew needed a track maintenance vehicle—a speed swing3—to lift the 

ties that were to be replaced. (See figure 1.) The foreman told the operator of the 

track maintenance vehicle to drive it to Rothstein’s switch, where it could be easily 

placed on track 2. The rest of the track crew gathered the necessary tools and 

supplies and met the operator at Rothstein’s switch about 9:30 a.m.

1 All times in this report are eastern standard time.

2 All times in this report are rounded to the nearest minute.

3 A speed swing is an on-track maintenance vehicle that uses a hook to lift railroad crossties.
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Figure 1. Pettibone Speed Swing 445E.4

The train dispatcher gave the foreman authority to occupy track 2 between 

Crawford and Winchester. (See figure 2.) At 9:45 a.m., the track segment between 

Crawford and Winchester had been designated “out of service” on a Form D track 

permit, which also said, “clear track by 3:00 p.m.” When the dispatcher authorized 

the track permit, the dispatching system recorded the track segment as “blocked,” 

meaning that the track signals controlling entry displayed a red aspect, which is a 

stop indication for approaching trains. The crewmembers put the track maintenance 

vehicle on their track segment and proceeded to the work location, where they 

began replacing crossties. A watchman was assigned to warn the track crew of 

trains that were approaching on the adjacent track (track 1). 

In the meantime, a track inspector had asked for and received permission 

from the foreman to operate a hy-rail inspection truck through the track crew’s 

work area5 on track 2. The dispatcher verified with the foreman that the inspector 

had the foreman’s permission. The inspector started about noon, when the track 

crew was at lunch and, thus, clear of the track. The track maintenance vehicle 

operator, who was eating lunch in the cab of the machine, said that he saw the hyrail inspection truck pass the work area.

4 The Speed Swing 445E was built by Pettibone. It had four large rubber tractor tires and was equipped 

with steel wheels that could be lowered onto the rail. The Speed Swing had a hydraulically powered front arm 

with several different attachments. On the day of the accident, it was equipped for handling crossties. The 

machine weighed 32,217 pounds.

5 Under the MBCR’s Special Instructions, 133-S2, an inspector can enter and/or travel on an out-ofservice track segment as authorization is received from the foreman who “controls” the track.
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Figure 2. Map of accident area. 
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At 12:46 p.m., the track inspector reached Winchester and asked the 

dispatcher for the authority to enter the track segment between Winchester and 

Somerville Junction. The dispatcher placed a block on the track segment and then 

authorized the track inspector to proceed. The inspector stopped at Somerville 

Junction; he asked for and received permission from the dispatcher to pass the red 

signal at Somerville Junction. After the inspector passed Somerville Junction, he 

told the dispatcher that he had departed the track segment between Winchester and 

Somerville Junction. At 1:25 p.m., the dispatcher formally acknowledged his report; 

she did not unblock the track segment that he had just released. About 5 minutes 

later, at 1:30 p.m., according to the dispatching system,6 the dispatcher unblocked 

the track segment between Crawford and Winchester, the segment occupied by 

the track crew. The track segment between Winchester and Somerville Junction 

that had been released by the track inspector remained blocked. At 1:32 p.m., the 

dispatcher cleared the signal at Crawford that allowed entry into the track segment 

from Crawford to Winchester by a southbound train.7 At 1:37 p.m., southbound 

train 322 entered the track segment from Crawford to Winchester. However, the 

track segment had been removed from service and the track maintenance crew 

had been given exclusive track occupancy, so their expectation was that no train 

would be permitted on the track while they were working on it. Trains would be 

allowed to pass on the adjacent track, and a watchman was provided to alert the 

maintenance crew of any passing trains so the crew would remain clear of the 

adjacent track. 

Collision

Event recorder data from train 322 indicates that the engineer initiated 

emergency braking at 62 mph and the train speed decreased to approximately 44 

mph at the time of the collision. In postaccident interviews, the engineer said that 

his last signal indication was clear and, as he exited the curve, he noted equipment 

on his track. He sounded the whistle and put his train into emergency, but was 

unable to stop before striking the vehicle.

The watchman told investigators that he looked north and saw the 

approaching train. He blew his handheld compressed air warning horn and started 

yelling at the other crewmembers. The track maintenance vehicle operator started 

blowing the whistle on his machinery when he heard the watchman’s horn (a 

normal practice when a train approaches on an adjacent track). He then looked in 

the rear view mirrors and realized the train was on his track. He opened the door 

of the track maintenance vehicle and jumped to the ground. He recalled seeing the 

crewmembers who were killed standing in front of the track maintenance vehicle 

before it was struck. About 1:39 p.m., the train engineer radioed the dispatcher 

6 The dispatching system records the time when the dispatcher sends a message to request a field 

device to change its status and then records the time when a message is received from the device indicating 

that the change has occurred. 

7 At 1:33 p.m., according to the dispatching system, the dispatcher unblocked the track segment from 

Winchester to Somerville Junction.
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that he had just hit some track equipment. (See figure 3.) Shortly thereafter, an 

audio recording recorded the train dispatcher saying that she had pulled down 

(that is, removed) the wrong block.

Injuries 

Of the six track employees working on or near the track maintenance vehicle, 

the track foreman and the track worker/welder were killed. The assistant foreman 

and the track maintenance vehicle operator were seriously injured. The remaining 

two track workers were not injured. Emergency responders treated and released 

10 passengers at the accident scene.

Damage

As a result of the accident, 160 feet of rail, 80 crossties, and 100 tons of ballast 

had to be replaced. The cost, including labor, was $15,841. The accident damaged 

the lead control car and the undercarriage of the train. Repairing the train cost an 

estimated $450,000. The track maintenance vehicle was destroyed; replacing it cost 

$95,000. The total estimated damage was $560,841.

Figure 3. Damaged track maintenance vehicle.
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Personnel Information

The MBTA owned the railroad where the accident occurred. However, it 

contracted out the operations, equipment maintenance, and track maintenance. 

The MBCR became the contractor in 2003, and on the day of the accident, all of 

the railroad employees, including supervisors, train dispatchers, train crew, and 

maintenance-of-way employees, were MBCR employees.

The operating company for the railroad changed from the Boston and 

Maine Railroad to Gilford Transportation Industries (1983), to Amtrak (1986), and 

then to the MBCR (2003). The foreman and machine operator had been hired by 

the Boston and Maine Railroad and stayed in the Boston area working for each 

of the different railroads. The rest of the employees had started working for the 

railroad under Amtrak. The information available in the current MBCR personnel 

files is primarily from between 2003 and the date of the accident. The foreman and 

other track workers typically worked from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., Monday through 

Friday. The train dispatcher did not have a fixed schedule but worked when called 

to duty.

Foreman

The 54-year-old track foreman was killed in the accident. He had been 

hired by the Boston and Maine Railroad on September 12, 1977. He had started 

as a trackman and worked through the normal job progression, training, and 

examinations to become a qualified foreman. He had not worked during the 

weekend. He had worked a normal shift on Monday, and he had started his shift 

on the day of the accident at 7:00 a.m.

Assistant Foreman

The 51-year-old assistant track foreman was seriously injured. He had been 

hired by Amtrak on October 26, 1988. He had started as a trackman and worked 

through the normal job progression to become a qualified foreman. 

Machine Operator

The 55-year-old machine operator had been hired by the Boston and Maine 

Railroad on August 25, 1975. He had started as a trackman and worked through the 

normal job progression to become a qualified machine operator. He was injured 

when he jumped from the track maintenance vehicle.
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Second Machine Operator

The 54-year-old second machine operator had been hired by Amtrak on 

September 6, 1997. He had started as a trackman and worked through the normal 

job progression to become a qualified machine operator. He was working on the 

ground at the time of the accident and was not injured.

Welder/Watchman

The 37-year-old welder had been hired by Amtrak on December 5, 1994. 

He had started as a truck driver and later qualified for a welder position. He was 

working as a watchman on the day of the accident and was not injured.

Track Worker/Welder

The 30-year-old track worker/welder was killed in the accident. He had 

been hired by Amtrak on January 3, 1995. He had started as a trackman and later 

qualified as a welder. He was working on the track on the day of the accident. 

Train Dispatcher

The 31-year-old train dispatcher had been hired by Amtrak on January 17, 

2002. She had established a seniority date on February 18, 2002, working a customer 

service desk. She received on-the-job training under the supervision of a qualified 

train dispatcher. In May 2002, she qualified to work the Boston East dispatching 

desk. In May 2003, she had qualified to work the Boston West dispatching desk 

(the desk for the territory where the accident occurred). On the Sunday before the 

accident, she had worked from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. On Monday, she had been on 

call but had not worked. She said that she had just sat around her apartment and 

had gone to bed about 9:30 p.m. or 10:00 p.m. and that she had felt rested when she 

started working on Tuesday at 7:00 a.m.

Signal System

Train movements were authorized by signal indications of a traffic control 

system on the wayside of each track segment. The signals were controlled and 

monitored by the MBCR’s dispatching office in Somerville, Massachusetts.

Maintenance-of-Way Procedures

Train movements in the area where the accident occurred were authorized 

by a dispatcher at the MBCR’s operation center in Somerville, Massachusetts. At 
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the time of the accident, train movements were under the Northeast Operating Rules 

Advisory Committee Rulebook (8th Edition, effective January 1, 2003). The rulebook 

was supplemented by the following:

• MBCR Service Employee Timetable No. 5, effective April 24, 2006

• General Order No. 501, effective January 1, 2006

• General Order No. 502, effective April 24, 2006

•	 Train Dispatcher’s Manual, effective January 1, 2006.

According to the rulebook, a maintenance-of-way foreman must get a Form 

D Track Permit Line 4 authorization from the dispatcher before placing equipment 

on a track. The permit removes the track segment from service and puts it under 

the control of the foreman. This action creates an “exclusive track occupancy” for 

the track crew; therefore, no train is allowed on the crew’s track segment.

Rule 133-S1, Protection of Out-Of-Service Track (a supplemental instruction 

in the Service Employee Timetable No. 5), requires the employee-in-charge to 

place “... a shunting barricade at each end of the work area within the Line 4 

limits.” The shunting barricade used by the MBCR consists of a shunting device 

and a metal flag referred to as a barricade. The metal flag (barricade) does not 

physically restrict train movement, but it does provide a visual warning that the 

track segment is occupied. The shunting device provides an electrical connection 

between the rails and indicates to the signal system that the track is occupied, so 

that the signals at the entrance to the segment cannot be cleared. When a track is 

shunted, the signals display the most restrictive indication, as though a train is 

occupying the track. 

The dispatcher cannot clear signal indications for trains approaching a block 

that is occupied by another train. Therefore, if a train dispatcher makes a mistake, 

the train’s track occupancy still provides signal protection. Many vehicles used 

for railroad maintenance (such as the equipment used on the day of the accident) 

have been modified to operate on railroad tracks. However, unlike a train, track 

maintenance equipment operating on track seldom shunts the track. Consequently, 

if a dispatcher makes a mistake, nothing provides signal protection for a track 

maintenance crew unless a shunting device has been applied.

According to the track inspector, the shunts were not in place when he 

inspected the track before the accident. When one of the track crewmembers was 

asked whether shunts had been used, he could not remember. However, when he 

was asked to remember the last time he had seen a track shunted, he replied

It’s been a while, because we, really, basically – it’s only when we have the 

big, big jobs. When you have big jobs when you did that, not like regular 

maintenance jobs or just maintenance work, because we always had to flag 

them. 
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Interviews with track maintenance employees, including those not involved 

in the accident, confirmed that it was common practice to use shunts only for big 

jobs and that replacing ties, as the track crew in the accident had been doing, was 

considered to be a small job. During the investigation, MBCR’s track supervisors 

did not have specific records indicating whether shunting devices were used for 

all track maintenance jobs.

Train Dispatching

When an MBCR dispatcher blocks a track segment, a computer entry is 

required to identify for whom the segment is being blocked. At the time of the 

accident, the dispatcher could enter one of the following into the computer: the 

name of the foreman, the number of the track gang, the number of the equipment, 

or the number of the track permit. The accident dispatcher chose the track permit 

number and entered M302. 

A dispatcher unblocks a track segment by selecting it on the computer 

screen, viewing the onscreen information that identifies the recipient of the blocked 

track, and then unblocking the track segment.

Each track segment on a train dispatcher’s computer screen is colorcoded. A white segment is unoccupied. A green segment is unoccupied and 

has been cleared by the dispatcher for an approaching train movement. A red 

segment is occupied, by either a train or a shunt. A blue segment has been 

blocked by the train dispatcher. A magenta segment is both blocked (blue) and 

occupied (red). While the Track Permit was in effect, the dispatcher computer 

data log shows that the segment turned from blue to magenta only twice. The 

first time was at 10:41 a.m. for 18 minutes; the second time was at 1:14 p.m. for 

8 minutes. 

Management Oversight

The MBCR monitors the effectiveness of and compliance with its operating 

rules by field audits, using its Program of Operational Tests and Inspections 

(effective July 1, 2003, and revised July 1, 2005).

The Program defines “Tests” and “Observations” as follows:

A “Test” is a rules compliance check, which requires an active effort on the 

part of the supervisor or supervisors, and includes an action on the part of 

the employee being tested. Examples would include conducting a questionand-answer session with a train crew to determine rules familiarity or 

conducting restricted signal tests in conjunction with a train dispatcher 

and/or signal maintainer. An “Observation” is distinguished from a 
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“Test” in that an observation is the passive monitoring of an employee, 

either observed or unobserved, in the normal course of his/her duties, by 

a supervisor.

According to the MBCR’s records from July 1, 2003, to January 9, 2007, 

the maintenance-of-way employees and the dispatcher had been observed.8 The 

foreman had been observed while performing his duties by a supervisor on 67 

occasions in the 3 years preceding the accident. On 13 occasions, the foreman had 

been observed for use of drugs or alcohol; all of his observations were negative. 

His most recent observation had been on December 28, 2006. The MBCR was 

unable to provide specific records indicating that the foreman had been observed 

for compliance with rule 140-S2, which outlines the steps to be taken when a track 

is taken out of service. One of these steps requires the employee-in-charge (in 

this case, the foreman) to confirm that the track is shunted. The track foreman 

had passed the annual exams for the Roadway Worker Protection (consisting of 25 

questions) and the Northeast Operating Rules Advisory Committee(NORAC) Operating 

Rules (consisting of 50 questions). 

The train dispatcher had been observed while performing her duties by a 

supervisor on 53 occasions in the 3 years preceding the accident. Three rule noncompliances were noted on the same day in 2005: two radio uses and one procedural 

issue. During the other 50 observations, 5 of which were “applying and removing” 

blocking devices, she properly followed the rules and procedures. 

The train dispatcher had passed the required initial examinations: NORAC 

Operating Rules Blocking Device Examination For New Hire Dispatchers And Operators

(consisting of 20 questions) and Operating Rules Examination For New Train 

Dispatchers (consisting of 100 questions). She also had passed the annual rules 

examination (consisting of 50 questions). Her records show that she had correctly 

answered the questions regarding blocking procedures. 

Toxicological Testing 

Under Federal regulations, the engineer, conductor, assistant conductor, and 

train dispatcher are defined as “covered” employees9 and are required in 49 Code 

of Federal Regulations (CFR) 219.203 (a)(1) by the Federal Railroad Administration 

(FRA) to provide specimens for postaccident toxicological testing. These four 

covered employees provided specimens, and all test results were negative for 

alcohol and drugs.10

8 Although the records indicated that no tests were performed, the MBCR indicated that it believed that 

tests had been performed but that the information had been entered improperly as observations (instead of 

tests) in the database.

9 Title 49 CFR 219.5 states, “Covered employee means a person who has been assigned to perform 

service in the United States subject to the hours of service laws...”

10 These substances include cannabinoids, cocaine, opiates, phencyclidine, amphetamines, barbiturates, 

and benzodiazepines.
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Under Federal regulations, track workers are “non-covered” employees 

and are not subject to most of the alcohol and drug testing requirements. 

However, postaccident testing of the remains of non-covered employees who are 

fatally injured in train accidents and incidents is required in 49 CFR 219.203 (a)

(4). The surviving non-covered employees are not subject to postaccident testing 

under Federal authority. Consequently, the remains of the track foreman and the 

track worker/welder were tested, and the four surviving track workers were not 

tested. 

The track worker/welder’s test results were negative for alcohol and drugs. 

The foreman’s test results were negative for alcohol but positive for cannabinoids. 

The concentrations of tetrahydrocannabinol and tetrahydrocannabinol carboxylic 

acid in his blood were 16.9 nanograms per milliliter (ng/ml) and 40.0 ng/ml, 

respectively.

Previous Board Action: Alcohol and Drug Testing

Over the years, the Safety Board has made recommendations concerning 

alcohol and drug use by transportation workers in safety-sensitive positions. In 

1987, the Safety Board undertook a safety study11 to review the first full year of 

implementation of the FRA’s alcohol and drug testing rules. The rules established 

requirements for postaccident toxicological testing and testing for cause. Random 

alcohol and drug testing was not required at that time.12 The rules applied to only 

certain covered (hours-of-service) employees, such as dispatchers, signalmen, 

engineers, conductors, and others on trains. The rules did not apply to maintenanceof-way employees, maintenance-of-equipment employees, or others in safetysensitive positions.13

As a result of the safety study, the Safety Board issued 11 recommendations 

to the FRA. One of those recommendations is relevant to the alcohol and drug use 

issue that has arisen again in the Woburn investigation:

R-88-23

Amend 49 CFR Part 219 to require postaccident toxicological 

testing of all employees in safety-sensitive positions.

The FRA responded on September 21, 1990, to the Safety Board that it had 

reviewed this issue on several occasions and concluded that employees covered 

11 See National Transportation Safety Board, Alcohol/Drug Use and Its Impact on Railroad Safety, Safety 

Study NTSB/SS-88/04 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1988). 

12 In a subsequent rule, the FRA established a requirement for random alcohol and drug testing of 

covered service employees commencing on November 21, 1989.

13 Safety-sensitive functions are defined in 49 CFR Part 209.303. 
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by the Hours of Service Act occupy the most safety-sensitive positions on the 

railroads and are the proper focus of Federal requirements. The FRA stated,

Categorical expansion of those tested following accidents would either 

result in an excessive testing burden in relation to the benefits derived 

(e.g., testing of an entire track gang at the scene of a derailment) or in an 

overboard delegation of decisional authority to the railroad supervisor in 

the field. 

In subsequent correspondence on March 3, 1994, the FRA again stated that 

it found no basis to expand postaccident toxicological testing to other railroad 

crafts. On May 3, 1994, the Safety Board replied,

Based on FRA’s response, the Safety Board classifies Safety Recommendation 

R-88-23 “Closed—Reconsidered.” However, the Safety Board will continue 

to monitor this issue closely.

Postaccident Actions

MBCR

Following the accident, the MBCR implemented various new instructions 

and procedures affecting the performance of the maintenance-of-way employees 

and train dispatchers. Programs were also started to enhance the communication 

between the railroad and the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes 

Division.

The MBCR issued the following items that specifically address improving 

safety for the employees occupying the track while performing work:

• Train Dispatcher Notice Number 07-01 requires the train dispatcher 

to overlay an additional block in the dispatching system if additional 

equipment is authorized to enter out-of-service track. Further, it requires 

that the foreman’s name be entered in the dialogue box that is used to 

identify for whom the blocking is applied. 

• Supplemental Bulletin Order No. 5-56A has new, more specific 

instructions for maintenance-of-way employees who are shunting a track 

after receiving authority to occupy a track segment. The instructions 

require the shunting to be verified by the train dispatcher or a qualified 

signal employee to ensure that the signals protecting the work area can 

display only restrictive indications. 

• Supplemental Bulletin Order No. 5-57A provides procedures to be used 

so that the signals leading to work areas display the most restrictive 
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indication when maintenance-of-way employees are in the work area 

for more than 30 minutes.

• Special Instruction 905-S1 requires verbal verification between the 

train dispatcher and the foreman. The train dispatcher must verify that 

blocking devices have been applied, and the foreman must specify the 

type of protection that will be utilized in the work area.

• The Roadway Worker Protection training program was enhanced by 

adding specific instructions to the program and by adding training that 

addresses protection while working on the track.

• Managers were told to focus their tests and observations on safetycritical rules, procedures, and special instructions that include but are not 

limited to the following: supplemental protection, Form D compliance, 

On Track Safety compliance, Rule G compliance, lock out/tag out 

compliance, movement permit compliance, job briefings, removing 

tracks from service, and radio procedures.

• The MBCR re-launched Operation Red Block14 on April 2, 2007, to coincide 

with alcohol and drug awareness month. A steering committee has been 

formed; it consists of the director of safety, chief transportation officer, 

and 18 union representatives. Thirty-two peer captains are presently in 

place system-wide. One employee was selected and has been licensed to 

handle evaluations. Red Block representatives have visited many of the 

on-duty locations to introduce the program to the employees.

Safety Compliance Agreement

On January 26 and February 5, 2007, MBCR’s General Manager and staff 

met with regional FRA employees to discuss development of a Safety Compliance 

Agreement with the agency. On May 29, 2007, the FRA, the MBTA, and the MBCR 

adopted the final version of the Safety Compliance Agreement (the Agreement).

The Agreement includes background information about the circumstances 

that led to the need for such an agreement. Between December 2003 and January 

2007, the MBCR had four fatalities, one critical injury, and one potentially serious 

incident involving MBCR maintenance-of-way employees. According to the 

Agreement, these accidents involved violations of railroad operating rules and/or 

Federal Roadway Worker Protection regulations (49 CFR Part 214), although the 

carrier makes no admission of violation. The Agreement also states that as a result 

of these incidents, seven maintenance-of-way employees were tested for drugs 

and/or alcohol. The four fatally injured employees were tested under Federal 

14 Operation Red Block is a labor-developed, company-adopted alcohol and drug prevention and 

interception program that emphasizes awareness of, education about, and prevention of alcohol and drug use 

through union-led prevention committees. Operation Red Block started in 1983.
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authority, and the three surviving employees were tested at the request of the 

company. The background information in the Agreement states, “Of that number 

[seven], four employees tested positive, and one employee submitted a specimen 

that may have masked a positive (negative dilute).”

The Agreement details future MBCR actions in the following three major 

areas: (1) compliance with roadway worker protection, (2) compliance with the 

FRA’s regulations on railroad operating rules, and (3) actions to be undertaken 

regarding control of alcohol and drug use.

Regarding compliance with the Roadway Worker Protection Program, the 

Agreement asks for the following actions: 

Train the train dispatchers on the Roadway Worker Protection Program; 

establish procedures to monitor the effectiveness of and compliance with 

the on-track safety program; establish procedures to record all authorities 

issued for exclusive track occupancy; require verbal communication 

between the train dispatcher and the track foremen when working limits 

are established—specifically include the application/removal of blocking 

devices and application/removal of the protection applied in the field 

(that is, barricade shunting); provide to the FRA records of the employees 

qualified on the Roadway Worker Protection Program; conduct training 

for roadway workers, train dispatchers, and supervisors of both working 

groups on the application of shunting barricades, other field protection 

methods, Form D requirements, and the application and removal of 

blocking devices; provide to the FRA a description of the procedures and 

of the “good-faith challenge”[15] by an employee concerning an on-track 

safety provision; and train the employees on the procedures of a good-faith 

challenge.

Regarding compliance with the FRA’s regulations, the Agreement specified 

the following actions: provide to the FRA the current Operational Testing Program, 

re-instruct supervisors on the Operational Testing Program, perform a monthly 

analysis of the efficacy of the Operational Testing Program, perform an internal audit 

of the Operational Testing Program, and designate by name or title an employee 

directly responsible for the implementation of the Operational Testing Program.

Regarding alcohol and drug concerns, the Agreement identified the following 

actions: provide supplemental training for the supervisors on signs and symptoms 

of alcohol and drug influence, make a good faith effort to work with the applicable 

parties to institute a company random testing program of maintenance-of-way 

employees, invigorate the Red Block program, and implement a plan to increase 

observations for alcohol and drug use by maintenance-of-way employees.

15 Title 49 CFR Part 214.311, Responsibility of employers, (b): Each employer shall guarantee each 

employee the absolute right to challenge in good faith whether the on-track safety procedures to be applied 

at the job location comply with the rules of the operating railroad, and to remain clear of the track until the 

challenge is resolved.
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Analysis

Exclusions

Safety Board investigators reviewed the signal system data logs. Signal 

system data indicated that the signals were functioning properly at the time of the 

accident. Investigators interviewed the train crew. The crew stated that the signals 

appeared normal and the response of the equipment was typical on the day of the 

accident. The Safety Board concludes that the signal system performance and the 

train engineer’s performance were not factors in this accident. 

Train Dispatching

After the track inspector reported that he was clear of the track segment 

between Winchester and Somerville Junction on track 2, the train dispatcher 

erroneously removed the blocking from the segment where the track crew was 

working (between Crawford and Winchester), not the segment just recently 

vacated by the track inspector (between Winchester and Somerville Junction). 

Moments later, when the train dispatcher needed to move southbound train 322, 

track 2 was not blocked at Crawford. She then set the signals to allow train 322 to 

enter the track segment between Crawford and Winchester. Train 322 entered the 

track segment on a clear signal indication and was unable to stop before striking 

the track crew. The train engineer initiated emergency braking, and train speed 

decreased from 62 mph to approximately 44 mph at the time of the collision. After 

the engineer reported the collision, the dispatcher was recorded saying that she 

had pulled down (that is, removed) the wrong block. 

Normally, the train dispatcher would have unblocked the track segment 

between Winchester and Somerville Junction after the track inspector reported 

that he had cleared that segment; however, the dispatching system recorded that 

she actually unblocked the segment where the track crew was working. Therefore, 

the Safety Board concludes that the train dispatcher forgot about the maintenanceof-way work crew and removed the blocking from the wrong track segment, 

allowing train 322 to enter the work area on a clear signal indication. 

Since the accident, the MBCR has changed the required entries for the 

dispatching computer system. The train dispatcher must now enter the name of 

each individual for whom the track segment has been blocked. In this accident, 

the train dispatcher used the track permit number to identify the track crew. 

Therefore, when the dispatcher unblocked the track segment, the dialogue box on 

the computer screen displayed a number rather than the name of the individual 
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who had received the authority for the track segment. Had the dispatcher used the 

foreman’s name to block the track, she would have seen that the name of the track 

inspector did not match the name of the foreman, and that should have alerted her 

before she unblocked the wrong track segment. 

Further, the MBCR has added the requirement that a second movement 

into a territory (in this case, the track inspector’s) must also be entered into the 

computer dispatching system. At the time of the accident, only one entry was 

required. If the new requirement had been in effect on the day of the accident, the 

names of both the foreman and the track inspector would have been entered into 

the computer dispatching system for the track between Crawford and Winchester. 

To remove the blocking, the dispatcher would have had to remove both names 

from the system. 

The primary method used by railroads to protect roadway workers with 

exclusive track occupancy is by train dispatcher blocking and unblocking of track 

segments. The layers of redundant steps required for the dispatcher to block 

and unblock track segments vary from railroad to railroad depending on their 

procedures and the design of their dispatching system. Although the MBCR has 

modified its dispatching methods since this accident, the potential exists on other 

railroads for a dispatcher to incorrectly apply or remove the protection. Therefore, 

the Safety Board recommends that the FRA advise railroads of the need to examine 

their train dispatching systems and procedures to ensure that appropriate safety 

redundancies are in place for establishing protection and preventing undesired 

removal of protection for roadway workers receiving track occupancy authority. 

Track Maintenance Activities

On the day of the accident, the track segment had been removed from service 

and the track maintenance crew had been given exclusive track occupancy; so their 

expectation was that no train would be permitted on the track while they were 

working on it. However, trains would be allowed to pass on the adjacent track, and 

a watchman was provided to alert the maintenance crew of passing trains.

The watchman told investigators that he blew his handheld warning horn 

after seeing the approaching train and that he also yelled at the other crewmembers. 

The track maintenance vehicle operator started blowing the whistle on his 

machinery when he heard the watchman’s horn in order to repeat the warning of a 

train on an adjacent track. However, the vehicle operator said that when he looked 

into his rear view mirrors, he realized that the train was actually approaching on 

the same track and he jumped from his vehicle just before the impact. The vehicle 

operator also stated that as he jumped he saw the crewmembers who were killed 

standing in front of the track maintenance vehicle just before it was struck by the 

train. 
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The train engineer had a clear signal indication and did not have any 

knowledge that a track maintenance crew would be occupying the same track. 

After exiting a curve at approximately 62 mph, little time (about 15 seconds) was 

available before the train reached the work area. The engineer realized that the work 

crew was on his track and initiated emergency braking. Train speed decreased to 

approximately 44 mph at the time of the collision.

A shunting device electrically prevents the signals from displaying clear 

indications to approaching trains. When the track inspector drove through the 

track segment occupied by the track maintenance crew, he did not encounter a 

shunting device. The train dispatcher also could not recall the track being colorcoded magenta on the dispatching computer screen. Had the work crew shunted 

the segment of track, the dispatcher’s screen would have displayed magenta for 

the entire time the work crew was at that location. On the day of the accident, the 

dispatcher computer data log showed the track being shunted only twice: one 

time for 18 minutes, and later for 8 minutes. The relatively brief recorded shunts 

were likely a result of the incidental actions by the work crew (such as moving 

tools or equipment or opening a switch), not of an intentional shunting. The Safety 

Board concludes that the maintenance-of-way work crew did not apply a shunting 

device; therefore, additional signal protection did not exist for the track segment 

they occupied, and the dispatcher’s screen did not indicate the track segment was 

occupied. 

MBCR rules required the track foreman to have a shunting device at each 

end of the work area every time a track was taken out-of-service for maintenance. 

However, interviews with track maintenance employees, including those not 

involved in the accident, confirmed that it was common practice to use shunting 

devices only for big jobs and that replacing ties, as the track crew in the accident 

had been doing, was considered to be a small job. The track crew had reserved the 

track segment from 9:45 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. and was clearly engaged in a significant 

amount of work on the day of the accident. The Safety Board concludes that MBCR 

maintenance-of-way work crews routinely reduced safety by not using shunting 

devices when performing jobs that required the track to be out of service. 

The MBCR had many opportunities to be aware that the requirement to 

use shunting devices was commonly disregarded. For example, track supervisors 

visiting work sites could have seen that a shunting device (and attached metal flag) 

was not used as required. Transportation supervisors on passing trains could have 

observed that shunting devices were not in place. Dispatching supervisors could 

have noted the absence of a magenta indication on the dispatching screens. Finally, 

MBCR’s program of tests and observations should have provided a safety net to 

ensure that compliance with Rule 140-S2 was frequently examined. The Safety 

Board concludes that the MBCR’s management failed to ensure that maintenanceof-way work crews were using shunting devices as required. 

Since the accident, supervisors at the MBCR have focused their tests 

and observations on safety-critical rules procedures, including On Track Safety 
Analysis 

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compliance. According to MBCR data from July 1, 2007, to November 1, 2007, 

supervisors observed track employees removing track from service 35 times. In all 

instances, the employees properly applied a shunt. 

The Safety Compliance Agreement, which followed the accident, addresses 

the need for better communication regarding the train dispatcher’s blocking 

procedures and an employee’s shunting in the field. Further, the Agreement 

specifies the training of employees and the observational testing of employees by 

supervisors. As a postaccident action, the MBCR is emphasizing its requirement 

that the track be shunted with verification by either a train dispatcher or a qualified 

signal employee to ensure that the signals cannot be cleared for trains approaching 

the work area.

The Safety Board is aware that shunting by track maintenance work crews 

on main track is not a common practice in the railroad industry. This may be due, 

in large part, to the absence of a Federal requirement for shunting to provide 

maintenance-of-way work crew protection. Unless a shunting device is used by the 

work crew, the train dispatcher provides the only signal protection in controlled 

territory. As this accident demonstrates, the dispatching system is not immune to 

human error, and electrically shunting the rails is therefore an important safety 

redundancy. The Safety Board concludes that maintenance-of-way work crews 

on all railroads who depend on the train dispatcher for signal protection need 

redundant protection to restrict train movements into work areas. Therefore, 

the Safety Board recommends that the FRA require redundant signal protection, 

such as shunting, for maintenance-of-way work crews who depend on the train 

dispatcher to provide signal protection. 

Alcohol/Drug Use by Maintenance-of-Way Employees

The fatally injured track foreman tested positive16 for marijuana. An analysis 

of the levels of tetrahydrocannibinol and tetrahydrocannabinol carboxylic acid 

in the foreman’s blood suggest that he had likely used marijuana within 3 hours 

of his death and possibly much more recently.17 The most likely opportunity for 

his marijuana use was when the work crew broke for lunch, from about noon to 

1:00 p.m. 

Marijuana can have a number of psychomotor effects on human performance, 

including ataxia, confusion, dizziness, somnolence, speech difficulties, weakness, 

16 The FRA toxicology report indicates tetrahydrocannibinol, the psychoactive substance in marijuana, at 

a level of 16.9 ng/ml and tetrahydrocannabinol carboxylic acid, an inactive metabolite of marijuana, at a level 

of 40 ng/ml in the foreman’s blood. 

17 Based on data in: M.A. Huestis, J.E. Henningfield, and E.J. Cone, “Blood cannabinoids. II. Models 

for the Prediction of Time of Marijuana Exposure from Plasma Concentrations of Δ9-Tetrahydrocannabinol 

(THC) and 11-nor-9-carboxy-Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THCCOOH),” Journal of Analytical Toxicology, 1992 

Sep–Oct;16(5):283–90.
Analysis 

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and vision difficulties. Studies clearly demonstrate impairment of driving-related 

skills up to 3 hours after the use of marijuana.18 The Safety Board concludes that 

the foreman’s performance would likely have been measurably impaired at the 

time of the accident by his recent use of marijuana.

The positive drug test result for the track foreman is not an isolated incident 

among MBCR maintenance-of-way employees. The Safety Compliance Agreement 

discusses four MBCR accidents within a 3-year period (December 2003 – January 

2007) involving maintenance-of-way employees. Following these accidents, seven 

maintenance-of-way employees were tested for alcohol and/or drugs. Four of the 

employees were fatally injured and therefore were tested under Federal authority. 

Two of the four fatalities tested positive and are included in the FRA postaccident 

test data described later in this section. The three surviving employees were tested 

at company request; consequently, they are not included in the FRA postaccident 

test data. Two of the survivors tested positive, and the third survivor submitted a 

diluted specimen that may have masked a positive.

The fact that a majority of the employees had positive test results is 

symptomatic of a substance abuse problem among MBCR’s maintenance-of-way 

employees. The FRA addressed this problem in the Safety Compliance Agreement 

by prescribing multiple actions, including having the MBCR make a good faith 

effort to work with the applicable parties to institute a company random alcohol 

and drug testing program of maintenance-of-way employees.

The MBCR’s percentage of positive test results involving maintenance-ofway employees in postaccident alcohol and drug testing is a cause for concern. 

The Safety Board also reviewed industry-wide postaccident test data for accidents 

involving maintenance-of-way employee fatalities. Postaccident test data provided 

to the Board by the FRA show that over the 10-year period ending January 9, 

2007, (the date of this accident) the postaccident testing of 26 maintenance-ofway fatalities resulted in 5 positive test results, a 19.23 percent positive rate. The 

positive rate for maintenance-of-way employees is in marked contrast to the 

postaccident test results of covered employees. During the same 10-year period, 

FRA postaccident test data for accidents involving 122 fatally injured covered 

employees show 8 positive test results, a 6.56 percent positive rate. Covered 

employees are subject to random testing for alcohol and drugs at any time and at 

any place while they are on duty. The Safety Board concludes that postaccident test 

data for fatally injured railroad employees indicate greater alcohol and drug use 

among maintenance-of-way employees than among railroad employees subject to 

random and postaccident testing requirements. 

Congress has recognized the deterrent effect of random testing in the United 

States Armed Forces. In passing the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing 

Act of 1991, Public Law No. 102-143, Congress specifically noted that

18 R.C. Baselt, Drug Effects on Psychomotor Performance (Foster City, CA: Biomedical Publications, 

2001).
Analysis 

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The testing of uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces has shown that 

the most effective deterrent to abuse of alcohol and use of illegal drugs is 

increased testing, especially random testing.

The FRA has also recognized the deterrent effect of random testing in the 

railroad industry. The FRA has stated19 the following:

The deterrent effect of random drug testing, which was implemented 

in 1988-1989, most certainly influenced the dramatic reduction in postaccident positives from 41 in 1988 to only 17 in 1990.

The Safety Board undertook a safety study to review the first full year of 

implementation of the FRA’s alcohol and drug testing rules, which were in effect 

before the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991. These rules 

did not apply to maintenance-of-way employees, maintenance-of-equipment 

employees, or others in safety-sensitive positions. The study found that limiting 

the applicability of alcohol and drug testing to only hours-of-service employees 

restricts the potential effectiveness of the FRA rule to control alcohol and drug 

use.

As result of the 1988 safety study, the Safety Board made 11 safety 

recommendations to the FRA. One of those recommendations, which is relevant 

to the Woburn investigation, asked the FRA to require toxicological testing of all 

employees in safety-sensitive positions. The FRA subsequently informed the Safety 

Board (3 years after the 1991 Act) that after reviewing the issue on several occasions, 

it had decided that employees covered by the Hours of Service Act occupy the 

most sensitive positions and that expansion of those tested would cause either 

an excessive burden or an overdelegation of decisional authority to the railroad 

supervisor in the field. Based on the FRA’s response, the Board classified Safety 

Recommendation R-88-23 “Closed-Reconsidered.” However, the Board stated that 

it would continue to monitor this issue closely.

As this accident and a review of 10 years of data show, a regulation to 

cover all safety-sensitive employees is overdue. The FRA data from postaccident 

alcohol and drug testing indicate that maintenance-of-way employees are about 

three times more likely to have positive test results than are covered employees 

(19.23 percent vs. 6.56 percent). This difference is attributable to the deterrent 

value of the FRA’s random testing program to which covered employees are 

subject but maintenance-of-way employees are not. The Safety Board concludes 

that the FRA’s random alcohol and drug testing program has been a deterrent to 

alcohol and drug use by covered employees, as evidenced by their significantly 

lower positive rate in postaccident tests than maintenance-of-way employees who 

are not subject to random testing. The Safety Board recommends that the FRA 

revise the definition of “covered employee” under 49 CFR Part 219 for purposes 

of Congressionally mandated alcohol and controlled substances testing programs 

19 66 Federal Register 64004. 
Analysis 

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to encompass all employees and agents performing safety-sensitive functions, as 

described in 49 CFR 209.301 and 209.303. Further, the Brotherhood of Maintenance 

of Way Employes Division can promptly take action to help its members address 

issues they may have with alcohol and drug abuse. Therefore, the Safety Board 

recommends that the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division 

promote the prevention of alcohol and drug abuse by assisting its members in 

addressing awareness, education, and treatment options. 
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Conclusions

Findings 

1. The signal system performance and the train engineer’s performance were not 

factors in this accident.

2. The train dispatcher forgot about the maintenance-of-way work crew and 

removed the blocking from the wrong track segment, allowing train 322 to 

enter the work area on a clear signal indication.

3. The maintenance-of-way work crew did not apply a shunting device; therefore, 

additional signal protection did not exist for the track segment they occupied, 

and the dispatcher’s screen did not indicate the track segment was occupied. 

4. Massachusetts Bay Commuter Railroad maintenance-of-way work crews 

routinely reduced safety by not using shunting devices when performing jobs 

that required the track to be out of service.

5. Massachusetts Bay Commuter Railroad’s management failed to ensure that 

maintenance-of-way work crews were using shunting devices as required.

6. Maintenance-of-way work crews on all railroads who depend on the train 

dispatcher for signal protection need redundant protection to restrict train 

movements into work areas.

7. The foreman’s performance would likely have been measurably impaired at 

the time of the accident by his recent use of marijuana. 

8. Postaccident test data for fatally injured railroad employees indicate greater 

alcohol and drug use among maintenance-of-way employees than among 

railroad employees subject to random and postaccident testing requirements.

9. The Federal Railroad Administration’s random alcohol and drug testing 

program has been a deterrent to alcohol and drug use by covered employees, 

as evidenced by their significantly lower positive rate in postaccident tests than 

maintenance-of-way employees who are not subject to random testing.
Conclusions 

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Probable Cause 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable 

cause of the January 9, 2007, collision of train 322 with a track maintenance vehicle 

near Woburn, Massachusetts, was the failure of the train dispatcher to maintain 

blocking that provided signal protection for the track segment occupied by the 

maintenance-of-way work crew, and the failure of the work crew to apply a 

shunting device that would have provided redundant signal protection for their 

track segment. Contributing to the accident was Massachusetts Bay Commuter 

Railroad’s failure to ensure that maintenance-of-way work crews applied shunting 

devices as required.
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Recommendations

As a result of its investigation of the January 9, 2007, collision between 

southbound Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority passenger train 322 

operated by the Massachusetts Bay Commuter Railroad and a track maintenance 

vehicle near Woburn, Massachusetts, the National Transportation Safety Board 

makes the following safety recommendations:

To the Federal Railroad Administration: 

Advise railroads of the need to examine their train dispatching 

systems and procedures to ensure that appropriate safety 

redundancies are in place for establishing protection and 

preventing undesired removal of protection for roadway workers 

receiving track occupancy authority. (R-08-05)

Require redundant signal protection, such as shunting, for 

maintenance-of-way work crews who depend on the train 

dispatcher to provide signal protection. (R-08-06)

Revise the definition of “covered employee” under 49 Code of 

Federal Regulations Part 219 for purposes of Congressionally 

mandated alcohol and controlled substances testing programs to 

encompass all employees and agents performing safety-sensitive 

functions, as described in 49 Code of Federal Regulations 209.301 

and 209.303. (R-08-07)

To the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division: 

Promote the prevention of alcohol and drug abuse by assisting 

your members in addressing awareness, education, and treatment 

options. (R-08-08)
Recommendations

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BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Mark V. Rosenker Deborah A. P. Hersman

Chairman Member

Robert L. Sumwalt Kathryn O’Leary Higgins

Vice Chairman Member

 Steven R. Chealander

Member

Adopted: March 18, 2008

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Appendix A 

Investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board was notified of the Massachusetts 

Bay Transportation Authority passenger train 322 collision with the maintenance 

equipment near Woburn, Massachusetts, about 4:20 p.m., on January 9, 2007. The 

investigator-in-charge was launched from the Safety Board’s Los Angeles Regional 

Office. No Board Member was on scene. 

Parties to the investigation included the Federal Railroad Administration, 

the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, the Massachusetts Bay Commuter 

Railroad, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, the United 

Transportation Union, and the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes 

Division.