S. HRG. 114–357 

IMPACTS OF THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 

OF ACTION (JCPOA) ON THE UNITED STATES 

INTERESTS AND THE MILITARY BALANCE IN 

THE MIDDLE EAST 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 29; AUGUST 4; AUGUST 5, 2015 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

IMPACTS OF THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION (JCPOA) ON THE UNITED STATES INTERESTS AND THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 

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S. HRG. 114–357 

IMPACTS OF THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 

OF ACTION (JCPOA) ON THE UNITED STATES 

INTERESTS AND THE MILITARY BALANCE IN 

THE MIDDLE EAST 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 29; AUGUST 4; AUGUST 5, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

JULY 29, 2015

Page 

IMPACTS OF THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION (JCPOA) ON THE

UNITED STATES INTERESTS AND THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE

EAST ...................................................................................................................... 1 

Carter, Hon. Ashton B., Secretary of Defense ....................................................... 6 

Dempsey, General Martin E., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ................. 10 

Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 58 

AUGUST 4, 2015

THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION (JCPOA) AND THE MILITARY

BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST ............................................................................ 89 

Hayden, General Michael V., USAF (Ret.), Principal, The Chertoff Group 

and Former Director, Central Intelligence Agency ........................................... 93 

Haass, Richard N., President, Council on Foreign Relations and Former Director of Policy Planning, U.S. Department of State ........................................ 94 

Edelman, Hon. Eric S., Distinguished Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy .......... 99 

Burns, Hon. R. Nicholas, Goodman Professor of Diplomacy and International 

Relations, Harvard Kennedy School ................................................................... 110 

AUGUST 5, 2015

JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION (JCPOA) AND THE MILITARY BALANCE

IN THE MIDDLE EAST ............................................................................................ 151 

Mead, Walter Russell, Distinguished Scholar in American Strategy, The Hudson Institute and Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs, Bard College ............... 154 

Singh, Michael, Lane-Swig Senior Fellow and Managing Director, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ................................................................. 163 

Takeyh, Ray, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, The Council on 

Foreign Relations ................................................................................................. 171 

Gordon, Philip, Senior Fellow, The Council on Foreign Relations ...................... 177 

Nephew, Richard, Fellow, The Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia 

University ............................................................................................................. 190 

(III) 

(1) 

IMPACTS OF THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE 

PLAN OF ACTION (JCPOA) ON THE UNITED 

STATES INTERESTS AND THE MILITARY 

BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 29, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:47 a.m., in Room 

SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain 

(chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, 

Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, 

Lee, Graham, Cruz, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, 

Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Since the time is here and our two witnesses 

that we requested to appear are here, I will go ahead and begin 

with my opening statement. As I have mentioned—— 

[Applause.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Hey. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator REED. That was for your opening statement, John. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator REED. There is such anticipation. 

[Pause.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. The committee meets today to 

begin a series of oversight hearings on the Joint Comprehensive 

Plan of Action [JCPOA], which the United States and other major 

powers have signed with Iran. 

We welcome our distinguished witnesses and thank them for 

joining us today. We appreciate Senators Kerry and Secretary 

Moniz and Secretary Lew being here. I would, for the record, I did 

not request the presence of Secretary Kerry or Moniz or Secretary 

Lew. I am glad they are here, at their desire to do so, since this 

focus of today’s hearing, as befits the role of this committee, is on 

the strategic and military implications of the Iran agreement. 

What we want to know, among other things, is how this agreement will affect regional security, proliferation, and the balance of 

power in the Middle East; what impact it may have on Iran’s maVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
2 

lign activities and hegemonic ambitions in the region; what it 

means for perceptions of American credibility and resolve among 

our allies and partners; and what the consequences are for U.S. defense policy, military planning, and force structure. 

When we consider these broader strategic consequences of the 

agreement, the second-order effects, what is already a bad deal 

only looks that much worse. To this committee, perhaps of most 

concern about the agreement itself pertains to the verification and 

monitoring mechanisms. 

As has been publicly reported, the inspections of Iran’s facilities 

will be conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency, or 

IAEA. There will be no Americans allowed on the ground, and the 

details of how these monitoring activities will occur in certain important instances are contained in a separate agreement between 

the IAEA and Iran, which the U.S. Government and the Congress 

have not seen. 

Furthermore, the mechanism to resolve the longstanding international concerns about the possible military dimensions of Iran’s 

nuclear program is contained in another side agreement between 

Iran and the IAEA, which the U.S. Government and the Congress 

have also not seen. To be sure, much is known about Iran’s past 

weaponization activities, but we can never know what we do not 

know, which is why the Director of the IAEA has said that effective 

verification depends on resolution of the PMD [previous military dimensions] issue. How that will occur we do not know. 

This presents a major problem. All of us will soon vote on the 

Iran agreement, and the merits of this agreement hinges on its 

verifiability. And yet we cannot even read key documents pertaining to these verification measures, and our own Government is 

not even a party to those agreements. I find that deeply troubling. 

What is more troubling are the broader military implications of 

this agreement. Iran is not just an arms control challenge. It is a 

geopolitical challenge. 

For years, many of us have urged the administration to adopt a 

broader strategy to counter Iran’s malign activities in the Middle 

East. Unfortunately, that has not happened. Instead, we have 

watched with alarm as Iran’s military and intelligence operatives 

have stepped up their destabilizing activities and increased their 

influence and control in places like Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, 

Bahrain, and Gaza. 

Iran has done all of this under the full pressure of a sanctions. 

Now Iran will soon receive a windfall of sanctions relief, estimated 

at roughly $60 billion or possibly as much as twice that. Yes, a 

good amount of that money will surely go to Iran’s domestic priorities. But it is only fair to assume that billions of dollars that will 

flow to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Quds Force, 

money that will likely be used to boost arms supplies to Iran’s terrorist proxies, to sow chaos and instability across the region, and 

to double-down on Bashar Assad right when he needs it most. 

This will present a host of new challenges for the Department of 

Defense. What is worse, not only could this agreement strengthen 

Iran’s malign activities in the region, it is also likely to enhance 

Iran’s acquisition of conventional military capabilities. 

3 

For nearly a decade, an international arms embargo has significantly hurt Iran’s ability to build up and modernize its aging military. Throughout the nuclear negotiations, the administration insisted that its diplomacy was limited exclusively to the nuclear file. 

Indeed, just a few weeks ago, General Dempsey told this committee 

that, ‘‘Under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on Iran 

relative to ballistic missile capabilities and arms trafficking.’’ 

And yet, thanks to last-minute concessions by the administration, that is exactly what this agreement would do. At Year 5, the 

international arms embargo will disappear, and Iran will be free to 

acquire advanced military capabilities, such as fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and anti-access weapons. 

At Year 8, international restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile 

programs will disappear, and Iran will be free to acquire through 

entirely licit means the necessary technology and materiel for ever 

more sophisticated ballistic missiles, including ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles]. 

And in all of this, Iran will not only have billions of dollars with 

which to go on a shopping spree in the international arms market, 

but it is also sure to find plenty of States that are eager to sell 

those weapons, especially Russia and China. In this way, the Iran 

agreement not only paves Iran’s path to a nuclear capability, it will 

further—it will further Iran’s emergence as a dominant military 

power in the Middle East. 

This has direct and dangerous implications for U.S. armed forces. 

The ultimate guarantee that Iran will not get a nuclear weapon is 

not a 109-page document. It is the capability of the U.S. military 

to do what is necessary if all else fails. And yet this agreement 

would enable Iran to construct the kind of advanced military arsenal that could make our military option far costlier to employ. 

Instead of enhancing our deterrence of Iran, this agreement 

seems to enhance Iran’s deterrence of us. In short, if this agreement fails, the U.S. service members are called upon to take action 

against Iran. Their lives could be at greater risk because of this 

agreement. 

And that is perhaps the most troubling aspect of all about this 

agreement, what it means for America’s credibility in the Middle 

East. Since 1979, Republican and Democratic administrations have 

sought to contain the Islamic Republic of Iran and prevent it from 

acquiring a nuclear weapons capabilities. 

Our allies and partners have entrusted much of their own security to the United States because they have believed that our commitment were credible. In this way, America’s role in the region 

has been to suppress security competition between states with long 

histories of mistrust and to prevent that competition from breaking 

into open war. 

I fear this agreement will further undermine our ability and willingness to play that vital stabilizing role. Our allies and partners 

in the Middle East have increasingly come to believe that America 

is withdrawing from the region and doing so at a time when Iran 

is aggressively seeking to advance its hegemonic ambitions. 

Now we have reached an agreement that will not only legitimize 

the Islamic Republic as a threshold nuclear state with an industrial enrichment capability, but will also unshackle its regime and 

4 

its long-held pursuit of conventional military power and may actually consolidate the Islamic Republic’s control in Iran for years to 

come. 

After turning three decades of U.S. foreign policy on its head, is 

it any wonder that this agreement may lead our allies and partners 

to question America’s commitment to their security? As that happens, these states are increasingly likely to take matters into their 

own hands, and indeed, we already see evidence of that. 

These fateful decisions may well manifest themselves in growing 

regional security competition, new arms races, nuclear proliferation, and possibly conflict, all of which would demand more, not 

less U.S. leadership and presence in the region. It would be ironic, 

but not historically unprecedented that a diplomatic agreement intended to decrease risk of conflict actually increased those risks instead. 

All of us hope that will not be the case now, but it is the job of 

the Defense Department to be ready when our highest hopes fail 

us, and I fear there is much work to do. 

I welcome the witnesses. 

Senator Reed? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And good morning, Secretary Kerry, Secretary Moniz, Secretary 

Lew, Secretary Carter, General Dempsey. 

Your appearance before the committee comes a little more than 

2 weeks after the world woke up to the news that after 20 months 

of negotiations, the P5+1 and Iran agreed on the terms of the Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action. The agreement, no matter your position on it, is historic and, if implemented scrupulously, could 

serve as a strategic inflection point in the world’s relations with 

Iran for international nonproliferation efforts and for the political 

and security dynamics in the Middle East. 

And I commend the President and his negotiating team, from 

Cabinet officials to our Nation’s scientists, for their persistence and 

hard work. 

In the weeks ahead, Congress has a solemn obligation to carefully review the details of this historic agreement and to independently, independently validate that the agreement will meet our 

common goal of stopping Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Today’s hearing is part of that obligation, and I look forward to your 

testimony. 

Secretary Kerry, you were the key architect of this agreement, 

and your willingness to take on what I am sure feels like a thankless endeavor is to be commended. I hope you will help us understand why it is your assessment that this agreement is a good deal 

and how you intend to direct our diplomats in the field to work 

with our partners in the region to address Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region. 

Secretary Moniz, you played an important role in negotiations, 

and you, too, have been a strong advocate for the Comprehensive 

Plan of Action throughout. During your testimony, I hope you will 

help us understand what gives you confidence in the technical safeguards built into this agreement, particularly with regard to, one, 

5 

the cutting off of Iran’s pathways to a nuclear weapon; two, the 

cradle-to-grave access and portability of the supply chain; three, 

the dedicated procurement channel to manage all purchases of nuclear supply groups’ trigger lists and dual- use items; and four, the 

IAEA additional protocol for enhanced inspections and its design 

for detecting elements of a covert weapons program; and finally, 

the limitation on Iran’s enrichment program. 

Secretary Carter, you are a unique Secretary of Defense, with a 

Ph.D. in physics, and having spent so much of your career on nuclear weapons, I look forward to your technical insights to these 

elements, as well as those of Secretary Moniz. 

Both Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, while neither of 

you were a party to the negotiations, you have both recently traveled to the Middle East to speak with your counterparts about the 

agreement’s potential implications for regional security. During 

your meetings, you undoubtedly heard the assessments of our partners and our allies on a range of issues, including how Iran may 

use sanctions relief to pursue its regional ambitions, expand its 

support to terrorist proxies, and invest more heavily in its military. 

These are serious concerns and ones which I share. Our partners 

in Israel see Iran as a significant and ongoing threat to their national security interests. While Prime Minister Netanyahu is unlikely to ever endorse this historic deal, it is incumbent upon the 

United States to deepen further our cooperation on military and intelligence matters with Israel and to better understand the concerns of the Israelis. 

It is also critical that our partners and allies in the Middle East 

know that the United States will not abandon the region in the 

wake of this nuclear agreement and that we will continue to stand 

alongside them as we confront common state and nonstate threats. 

The May 2015 joint statement following the U.S. and Gulf Cooperation Council, or GCC, meetings at Camp David provided a road 

map for how the administration intends to proceed. It also makes 

clear that the Department of Defense will be at the forefront of 

these efforts. 

Critics of the Vienna agreement point to perceived flaws related 

to Iran’s ballistic missile capability and its support of terrorist 

proxies across the region. The Camp David joint statement outlines 

our commitment to enhancing the ballistic missile defense capabilities of the GCC and improving their interoperability to increase 

collective defense in order to counter Iran’s support of terrorist 

proxies. 

The joint statement indicates that we will be increasing our 

training and exercise engagements with GCC special operations 

forces elements so as to better enable our partners to confront 

Iran’s asymmetric capabilities. These are important efforts that I 

look forward to hearing about today. 

I want to make one final point. These negotiations focused on denying Iran a pathway to a nuclear weapon. A nuclear Iran would 

be a more formidable force in the region. And as it has repeatedly 

demonstrated, not a force for peace and stability, but one that supports terror and seeks to impose its will throughout the Middle 

East. 

6 

Moreover, a nuclear Iran would likely prompt a nuclear arms 

race in the region that through action or design could lead to catastrophe. None of us would condone or ignore Iran’s support of terror 

or other destabilizing activities in the region, but the focus of these 

negotiations were properly focused on nuclear weapons. 

The history of arms control makes this point. As Fred Kaplan, 

a noted national security expert pointed out, the United States-Soviet strategic arms treaties signed throughout the Cold War didn’t 

require the Soviet Union to disavow Communism and its support 

of Third World insurgencies or institute Jeffersonian democracy. 

But the deals were still very useful. They capped and in later years 

reversed the nuclear arms race, and they provided a forum for diplomacy, a cooling off of the distrust and hatred at a time when 

no other issue could have done so. 

I look forward to the panel’s responses as we continue to understand this agreement and evaluate the capacity to cut off all pathways to a nuclear device and provide long- term warning of violations so that an appropriate response can take place. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank the witnesses for being here today. 

And Secretary Carter, could we begin with you? 

STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE 

Secretary CARTER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

And with your leave, I think that you preferred, and that is fine 

with us, if only I and General Dempsey make opening statements 

as the other witnesses—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. I hope that is agreeable to the other witnesses? 

Secretary CARTER. It is. It is, I believe. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Secretary CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Ranking Member Reed. Thank you, all the members 

of the committee, for giving me the opportunity to testify this 

morning on our defense strategy toward this critical region in the 

wake, as the—as Senator Reed noted of my travels to the region 

last week, the chairman’s also, and of course, very importantly, 2 

weeks after the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. 

I am pleased to be joined by my fellow Cabinet members, who 

can talk in detail about that agreement reached in Vienna. That 

deal is an important step, one brought about by the leadership of 

President Obama, the persistent diplomacy of Secretaries Kerry, 

Moniz, and others, crippling sanctions that Secretary Lew led and 

that Congress helped put in place. 

It is a good deal because it prevents Iran from getting a nuclear 

weapon in a comprehensive and verifiable way. Once implemented, 

it will, therefore, remove a critical element of risk and uncertainty, 

one element of risk and uncertainty. But a critical element of risk 

and uncertainty from the region. 

For those reasons and those my colleagues have provided in testimony before other congressional committees, I urge you to support it. I also urge you to support the broader elements of the deVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
7 

fense strategy in the Middle East I will describe, including and especially by supporting a stable and reformed defense budget to implement it. 

The successful negotiation of this deal is one part of our broader 

foreign and defense policy. As the most influential power in the 

world, we have responsibilities all over the globe. The Middle East 

remains important to America’s national interests, and as a result, 

the Department of Defense is committed to confronting the region’s 

two principal security challenges, Iran and ISIL [the Islamic State 

of Iraq and the Levant]. 

The department’s strategic approach to protecting our interests 

and confronting those challenges will remain unchanged. We will 

continue to maintain a strong military posture to deter aggression, 

to bolster the security of our friends and allies in the region, especially Israel, to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf, to check 

Iran’s malign influence, and to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. 

We are also continuing to advance our military capabilities that 

provide all options as the President has directed should Iran walk 

away from its commitments under this deal. Last week, I was in 

the Middle East, and I had the opportunity to visit with some of 

our men and women in uniform who are carrying out this strategy. 

I know how much all of you care for them, and like me, you are 

proud of their impressive work. 

And I will tell you this morning what I told them. We are continuing full speed ahead, standing with our friends, standing up to 

ISIL, and standing against Iran’s malign activity. 

On ISIL, as I testified earlier this month, we have the right 

strategy in place, built on nine synchronized lines of effort, to 

achieve ISIL’s lasting defeat. But we continue to strengthen execution. Today, in Iraq and other places, we are working with partners 

on the ground and in global coalition to enable capable and motivated ground forces to win back Iraq’s sovereignty and peace on its 

own territory. 

I saw several parts of that effort last week and spoke with some 

of our partners on the ground. We are headed in the right direction 

in this counter ISIL effort. We have made some progress, but we 

need to make more. 

On Iran, this new deal, when implemented, will place significant 

limitations on Iran that will effectively cut off its pathways to the 

fissile material for a nuclear bomb. But it is also important to note 

that it places no limitations—let me repeat that—no limitations on 

what the Department of Defense can and will do to pursue our defense strategy in the region. 

It places no limits on our forces, our partnerships and alliances, 

our intensive and ongoing security cooperation, or on our development and fielding of new military capabilities, capabilities we will 

continue to advance. 

If Iran were to commit aggression, our robust force posture ensures we can rapidly surge an overwhelming array of forces into 

the region, leveraging our most advanced capabilities, married with 

sophisticated munitions that put no target out of reach. 

Iran and its proxies will still present security challenges. Iran 

supports the Assad regime in Syria, backs Hezbollah in Lebanon 

whose fighting positions, by the way, I observed firsthand during 

8 

a visit to Israel’s northern border last week with the Israeli defense 

minister, and is contributing to disorder in Yemen. And Iran still 

directs hostility and violence to our closest ally in the region, 

Israel. 

In the face of that malign activity, we will continue to meet our 

commitments to our friends and allies in the region, especially 

Israel, and continue to build on and enhance our cooperation in 

meaningful ways. I made that clear last week in Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq. 

I also made clear that we will continue to maintain our robust 

regional force posture, ashore and afloat, which includes tens of 

thousands of American personnel on our most sophisticated ground, 

maritime, and air and ballistic missile defense assets. 

Our friends understand, despite our differences with some of 

them about the merits of this deal, that we have an enduring commitment to deterrence and to regional security. I am proud to say 

that our defense partnerships in the region have never been stronger. And as I made clear in Israel and as we agreed at Camp David 

with our Gulf partners, as Senator Reed indicated, we are committed to making them even stronger and more capable against a 

range of threats. 

The United States will maintain its ironclad commitment to 

Israel’s qualitative military edge, or QME. We will keep providing 

Israel with advanced capabilities. For example, next year Israel 

will be our first and only friend in the region flying the F–35 Joint 

Strike Fighter. 

We continue to work with Israel on ballistic missile defense systems—in fact, three of them—the Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and 

the Arrow system for missiles of progressively increasing range. 

And we are working multilaterally and bilaterally to improve the 

capability and capacity of our Gulf partners also. At the GCC summit at Camp David, hosted by the President in May, and last week 

with Saudi leaders, I stressed a number of functional areas that 

will be critical to enabling Gulf countries to play a stronger regional role, including maritime forces; ground forces, including especially special operations and counterterrorism forces; air and ballistic missile defense forces; and cyber protection. 

We also conduct over 50 military exercises a year with our regional partners. And we have offered sophisticated defense equipment, including the THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] ballistic missile defense system and long-range precision 

strike capabilities to some of our Gulf partners. 

In conclusion, this is a good deal because it removes a continued 

source of threat and uncertainty in a comprehensive and verifiable 

way by preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. It is a deal 

that takes no option away from a future President. This is an important achievement and a deal that deserves your support. 

Meanwhile, the United States, the Department of Defense, and 

the men and women of the finest fighting force the world has ever 

known, with your support, will continue to be committed to the defense of America’s interests, friends, and allies, to counter ISIL and 

Iran’s malign influence, and to uphold the President’s commitment 

that Iran will not obtain a nuclear weapon should it walk away 

from this deal. 

9 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Carter follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ASH CARTER

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee: thank you 

for the opportunity to testify this morning—after my trip to the Middle East last 

week—on our defense strategy in the region. And I am pleased to be joined by my 

fellow Cabinet members who can talk in detail about the Joint Comprehensive Plan 

of Action reached in Vienna earlier this month. 

That deal is an important step . . . one brought about by the leadership of President Obama, the persistent diplomacy of Secretaries Kerry and Moniz and others, 

and the crippling sanctions Secretary Lew led and that Congress helped to put in 

place. 

It is a good deal. It prevents Iran from getting a nuclear weapon in a comprehensive and verifiable way. Once implemented, it will therefore remove a critical element of risk and uncertainty from the region. For those reasons, and those my colleagues have provided in testimony before other Congressional committees, I urge 

you to support it. I also urge you to support the broader elements of the defense 

strategy in the Middle East I will describe, including and especially by supporting 

a stable and reformed defense budget. 

The successful negotiation of this deal is one part of our broader foreign and defense policy. As the most influential power in the world, we have responsibilities all 

around the globe. The Middle East remains important to America’s national interests. And, as a result, the Department of Defense is committed to confronting the 

region’s two principal security challenges: Iran and ISIL. 

The Department’s strategic approach to protecting our interests and confronting 

those challenges will remain unchanged. We will continue to maintain a strong military posture to deter aggression; to bolster the security of our friends and allies in 

the region, especially Israel; to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf; to check 

Iran’s malign influence; and to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. We’re also continuing to advance our military capabilities that provide all options, as the President has directed, should Iran walk away from its commitments under this deal. 

Last week, I was in the Middle East, and I had the opportunity to visit with some 

of our men and women in uniform who are carrying out this strategy. I know how 

much all of you care for our personnel, and like me, you are proud of their impressive work. And I will tell you this morning what I told them: we’re continuing full 

speed ahead—standing with our friends, standing up to ISIL, and standing against 

Iran’s malign activity. 

On ISIL, as I testified earlier this month, we have the right strategy in place— 

built on nine, synchronized lines of effort—to achieve ISIL’s lasting defeat. But we 

continue to strengthen execution. Today, in Iraq and other places, we are working— 

with partners on the ground and in a global coalition—to enable capable and motivated ground forces to win back Iraq’s sovereignty and peace in its own territory. 

I saw several parts of this effort last week and spoke with some of our partners on 

the ground. We’re headed in the right direction in this counter-ISIL effort: we’ve 

made some progress; but we need to make more. 

On Iran, this new deal—when implemented—will place significant limitations on 

Iran that will effectively cut off its pathways to the fissile material for a nuclear 

bomb. But it is also important to note that it places no limitations—let me repeat 

that, no limitations—on what the Department of Defense can and will do to pursue 

our defense strategy in the region. It places no limits on our forces, our partnerships 

and alliances, our intensive and ongoing security cooperation, or on our development 

and fielding of new military capabilities—capabilities we will continue to advance. 

If Iran were to commit aggression, our robust force posture ensures we can rapidly surge an overwhelming array of forces into the region, leveraging our most advanced capabilities, married with sophisticated munitions that put no target out of 

reach. 

Iran and its proxies will still present security challenges. Iran supports the Assad 

regime in Syria, backs Hizballah in Lebanon—whose fighting positions I observed 

firsthand during a visit to Israel’s northern border last week—and is contributing 

to disorder in Yemen. And Iran still directs hostility and violence to our closest ally 

in the region, Israel. 

In the face of that malign activity, we will continue to meet our commitments to 

our friends and allies in the region, especially Israel, and continue to build on and 

enhance our cooperation in meaningful ways. I made that clear last week in Israel, 

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq. I also made clear that we will continue to maintain 

10 

our robust regional force posture ashore and afloat, which includes tens of thousands of American personnel and our most sophisticated ground, maritime, air, and 

ballistic missile defense assets. 

Our friends understand, despite our differences with some of them about the merits of this deal, that we have an enduring commitment to deterrence and to regional 

security. I am proud to say that our defense partnerships in the region have never 

been stronger. And, as I made clear in Israel and as we agreed at Camp David with 

our Gulf partners, we’re committed to making them even stronger and more capable 

against a range of threats. 

The United States will maintain its ironclad commitment to Israel’s qualitative 

military edge. And we will keep providing Israel with advanced capabilities—for example, next year, Israel will be our first and only friend in the region flying the 

F–35 stealth fighter. 

And we are working multilaterally and bilaterally to improve the capacity and capabilities of our Gulf partners. At the GCC Summit at Camp David hosted by the 

President in May, and last with week with Saudi leaders, I stressed a number of 

functional areas that will be critical to enabling Gulf countries to play a stronger 

regional role: including maritime forces, ground forces including especially special 

operations and counterterrorism forces, air and ballistic missile defense forces, and 

cyber protection. We also conduct over 50 military exercises a year with our regional 

partners, including the International Mine Counter Measure Exercise, and the 

Eagle Resolve and Eager Lion exercises, which deepen coordination and interoperability. And, we’ve offered sophisticated defense equipment, including the THAAD 

[Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] ballistic missile defense system and longrange precision strike capabilities, to some of our Gulf partners. 

In conclusion, this is a good deal because it removes a continued source of threat 

and uncertainty in a comprehensive and verifiable way by preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. It is a deal that takes no option away from a future President. This is an important achievement and a deal that deserves your support. 

Meanwhile, the United States, the Department of Defense, and the men and 

women of the finest fighting force the world has ever known, with your support, will 

continue to be committed to the defense of America’s interests, friends, and allies, 

to counter ISIL and Iran’s malign influence, and to uphold the President’s commitment that Iran will not obtain a nuclear weapon should it walk away from this deal. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

General Dempsey? 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, 

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member 

Reed, and the members of this committee, for the opportunity to 

address your questions regarding the military implications of the 

negotiated deal with Iran. 

Given our discussion before this body just a few weeks ago, I will 

keep my comments brief. 

As I have stated previously, I was consulted on the military implications during the course of the negotiations and provided my 

best military advice appropriately. If followed, the deal addresses 

one critical and the most dangerous point of friction with the Iranian regime. But as I have stated repeatedly, there are at least five 

other malign activities which give us and our regional partners 

concern. 

These run the gamut from ballistic missile technology to weapons 

trafficking, to the use of surrogates and proxies, to naval mines 

and undersea activity, and last, but not least, to malicious activity 

in cyberspace. The negotiated deal does not alleviate our concerns 

in those five areas. The negotiated deal does not change the military options at our disposal. 

And in our ongoing efforts to counter the Iranian regime’s malign 

activities, we will continue to engage our partners in the region to 

11 

reassure them and to address these areas. Ultimately, time and 

Iranian behavior will determine if the nuclear agreement is effective and sustainable. In the interim, I will continue to provide my 

best military advice and present military options. 

With that, I stand subject to your questions. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I mention to my colleagues we have a vote 

on right now, and usually we bounce back and forth, but I think 

that this is important enough for us to recess for until the completion of the second vote. I understand there is two, that one is ending right now and the other is beginning. 

So I would ask the indulgence of our witnesses, and I apologize 

if they—if we could recess for approximately 10 minutes while we 

are able to complete these two votes. I think this hearing is important enough not to have us bounce back and forth because I think 

all members would like to hear the complete testimony. 

So, again, my apologies. We will stand down for 10—10 minutes. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. The committee will reconvene, and I want to 

thank the witnesses for their patience. I am sure they understand 

that from time to time, we are required to vote. 

So I want to thank the witnesses for being here. 

And General Dempsey, your statement has been completed. And 

is there any other statements that would like to be made? Then we 

will begin with questions, and we will have 5 minutes. 

Secretary Carter, the issue has arisen that there is side agreements that have been made between the IAEA and Iran that apparently the Congress has not been made privy to, and could I ask 

that since these IAEA agreements, side agreements have to do with 

the weapons programs of the Iranians and the inspection and 

verification of those programs, will we in Congress receive the information concerning those side agreements in order to make a 

judgment as to the degree of verification? 

Secretary CARTER. Chairman, I think it is important that the 

content of those agreements and the manner in which they provide 

for verification of the nuclear undertakings Iran is making in this 

agreement and the procedures of the IAEA be known to the Congress. I can’t speak for the actual specific documents themselves. 

I am sure Secretary Moniz or Secretary Kerry can. 

But it is an important part of the verification of the agreement, 

and obviously, verification is an important part of any—any agreement. Let me ask Secretary Moniz if he wants to add anything on 

the specifics of the IAEA? 

Secretary MONIZ. Well, thank you, Ash. 

I could certainly add that the—first of all, to be honest, sir, I 

would not call them side agreements in the sense that the agreement in the JCPOA is that Iran must cooperate for the IAEA to 

complete its process on PMD. Then the IAEA, as is standard, negotiates a safeguards confidential document with the country to define the protocols that will—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Those protocols—those protocols are very important, Mr. Secretary. Are we going to be aware of those protocols? Because we know that with any agreement with a country 

such as Iran, the devil is in the details. 

12 

Secretary MONIZ. All I can say is that—well, first of all, I personally have not seen those documents. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Which is astounding, to be honest with you. 

That is—— 

Secretary MONIZ. Well—— 

Chairman MCCAIN.—absolutely astounding that you have not 

seen the documents that are about the requirement for verification. 

Secretary MONIZ. All I can say is that the agreement requires 

their cooperation with the IAEA, and this is the standard practice 

of the IAEA, whose independence is very critical to all of us. 

Chairman MCCAIN. What is critical to all of us, Mr. Secretary, 

that we have verification of the—and inspections of Iranian activities because they have a clear record of cheating. 

Secretary MONIZ. We agree. 

Chairman MCCAIN. So, so we agree, all of us, I believe, that we 

should see those instruments of verification. Otherwise, how can 

we make a judgment as to these—this agreement can be enforced 

and verify with a country that has a long record of cheating? 

Secretary MONIZ. The IAEA will, of course, then take the information that Iran must provide by October 15th and complete their 

report. And at that time, I think we will understand the IAEA’s 

confidence in their—in their verification measures. 

Chairman MCCAIN. So we are—— 

Secretary MONIZ. Building up, I might say, a very long history 

of this. 

Secretary KERRY. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman MCCAIN. So we are then dependent on the confidence 

of the IAEA, not the actual viewing of the agreement and 

verification. I don’t think many of us would agree with that process. 

General Dempsey, you told the committee just a few weeks ago, 

‘‘Under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on Iran relative to ballistic missile capabilities and arms trafficking.’’ Now we 

are seeing after 5 years a relief of sanctions on conventional arms 

and, of course, 8 years ballistic missiles. 

How does that comport with the terms of this agreement with 

the statement that you made before the committee? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, it won’t surprise you, Chairman, to 

know that my recommendation was to keep pressure on Iran on the 

other malign activities for as long as possible, and that recommendation was made. And then it entered into the negotiating 

process. 

I will say I think that time works for us as well as Iran in this 

regard, and so with the agreement made, and having had the opportunity to give my advice, I support it. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Do you, Secretary Carter, believe that—that 

Iran will change its behavior as a result, if this agreement is finalized? And have you seen any indication of that? 

Secretary CARTER. I have not, Mr. Chairman. And speaking just 

from my own judgment, I don’t foresee that or have any reason to 

foresee that. That is why it is important that the agreement be 

verifiable. That is why it is important that Iran not have a nuclear 

weapon, and that is also why it is important that we keep doing 

everything that we need to do. 

13 

Defend our friends and allies, remain strong in the Gulf, freedom 

of navigation, ballistic missile defense, all the things we are doing. 

We need to keep doing those things, and the agreement doesn’t 

limit us in any way. 

Obviously, if Iran changes its behavior, that would be a welcome 

thing. But I see no reason to foresee that, Chairman, personally. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I see no reason to foresee it, and I see them 

now with about $50 billion or $60 billion with which to pursue 

those malign activities, and I have seen Secretary Lew’s testimony 

and others that don’t worry, they will be using it for domestic purposes. They are doing it now with the assets that they have. One 

can only imagine what they might be doing with 50 billion or 60 

billion additional dollars. 

Look, I just would like to say again I know that the witnesses 

have very busy schedules, and I am grateful that you sought to testify before the committee today in order to help us understand this 

issue. And I thank you. 

Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Carter, you indicated in your statement that the 

United States has not given up any of its military options with respect to the region and to the Iranians. And I would presume also 

it has not given up any of its military intelligence and national intelligence operations with respect to Iran. 

And those intelligence operations, I would presume, would be focused in great detail on potential violations of this treaty. Is that 

your sense, too? 

Secretary CARTER. Yes. Without going into detail here, certainly 

we have intelligence activities focused on the Iranian nuclear program. But we have on everything else they are doing, malign activity, Quds Force, ballistic missiles, arms transfers, the whole—the 

whole thing. It is a very important intelligence effort. 

Senator REED. And Secretary Moniz, I understand that General 

Clapper yesterday indicated that he is confident, I think is a reasonable explanation, of the intelligence community’s ability to detect any significant violation of the treaties with or without direct 

contact with IAEA. Is that a fair judgment in your mind? 

Secretary MONIZ. Yes. In fact, he and I, Clapper, CIA [Central 

Intelligence Agency] Deputy Director Cohen, National Geospatial 

Intelligence Agency head Cardillo all made statements. Clapper in 

particular said that we would have far greater insight into the Iranian program with the agreement. And I would add that far greater insight will persist essentially forever. 

Senator REED. General Dempsey, in your military assessment, 

what is more effective in delaying or stopping the Iranian nuclear 

program at this time or in the near future, a military strike or this 

P5+1 agreement? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, first, Senator, I would like to point out 

that the military options remain. 

Senator REED. Right. 

General DEMPSEY. Second, I think that a negotiated settlement 

provides a more durable and reduces near-term risk, which buys 

time to work with regional partners to address the other malign activities. But there are about five military implications. You have inVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
14 

vited me here today to talk about the military implications, if you 

would allow me? 

Senator REED. Please. 

General DEMPSEY. I mean, the first is it does reduce the risk of 

a near-term conflict with Iran over their nuclear program. Second, 

another military implication is we have to sustain those options. 

They have to be preserved into the future. 

Third, there is clearly the opportunity for Iran to use some of the 

revenue that they gain for malign purposes, and that bears watching and collaboration with our regional partners, including Israel. 

Fourth, this will require us to strengthen our relationships and 

our collaboration in that part of the world. Then derivative of that 

is, fifth, we will have to—we should maintain and will maintain 

our forward presence. 

Those are the military implications. 

Senator REED. The GCC in terms of the military expenditures, 

roughly double what the Iranians spend and has a capacity of even 

going much higher, given their revenues. Is that a fair assessment? 

General DEMPSEY. Yeah, double is probably the average. Certain 

countries far more than that. 

Senator REED. And one of the factors that we are going to have 

to work with our allies in the region is making sure that they are— 

those resources are focused and can deter or defeat any aggression 

or proxy aggression by the Iranians, and that is the whole point, 

I think, of the collaboration that you are undertaking? 

General DEMPSEY. We have got a series of initiatives, both with 

the Israelis and the GCC, to better position ourselves to address 

those other malign activities. 

Senator REED. And so, we have a situation develop where the resources are available. We are trying to reorganize in collaboration 

with the regional partners so they are much more effective to respond. So, essentially, we are not ignoring these hostile threats by 

the Iranians on the ground through proxy or anything else. Indeed, 

we are, in a sense, amping up our activities. 

Is that fair? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, what I would say, Senator, is you know 

my responsibility is to articulate risk and provide options to our 

elected leaders in how to mitigate them. And this does cause us to 

have to increase our military. We have to pay more attention to the 

malign activities. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe? 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Right now in the middle of one of the largest bills of the year, 

and I am the sponsor. Therefore, I haven’t been in on all this fun. 

So I read this morning to see what happened yesterday, Secretary 

Kerry. This is in the, I guess, the Washington Post. 

President Obama promised that his nuclear deal with Iran would 

not be based on trust, but rather unprecedented verification. Now 

it turns out Obama’s verification regime is based on trust after all. 

Trust in two secret side agreements negotiated exclusively between 

Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency that apparently 

no one, including the Obama administration, has seen. 

15 

And it goes on to say, ‘‘It turns out that only two parties, the 

IAEA and Iran, get to actually see it. However——’’ Well, and then 

further, in the U.S. News and World Report, it says, ‘‘By law, the 

administration is required to provide Congress with the contents of 

the nuclear deal and all related matters and annexes.’’ 

Secretary Kerry, do you agree with that analysis of the law, what 

your requirement is? 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, let me just say to clarify on the earlier 

part of the question, Congress will be fully briefed on this—on this 

agreement in a classified session. And indeed, one of our key negotiators, the day- to-day lead negotiator, Wendy Sherman, was 

briefed on it. And Ernie Moniz was likewise briefed on it. So we 

are aware of what the basics of it are. 

It is standard procedure. I mean, there are 189 countries that 

have an agreement with the IAEA that are signed up to the NPT 

[Non-Proliferation Treaty]. Not that many have agreements. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay, but my question is, are we entitled to all 

the related materials and indexes? 

Secretary KERRY. Correct. But, yes, those that are part of the 

agreement, per se. This is, by reference, and we—no country has 

access to the confidential agreements directly of the IAEA and a 

country. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, I can’t—I don’t mean to interrupt you, but 

my time is limited here. I can’t imagine that this wouldn’t be a 

part of what we all would be briefed on. 

Now yesterday, when Congressman Poe asked the question, he 

said the secret deal. Secretary Rice said that she has seen the deal 

with the IAEA, and she is going to share it with Congress. Now 

that is the question, if you have seen it since—— 

Secretary KERRY. No, but—— 

Senator INHOFE. Did you see it at the same time or prior to the 

time that Secretary Rice saw it? 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, National Security Adviser Rice has 

not seen it. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, she said she did yesterday. 

Secretary KERRY. No, she has been briefed on it. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, she did. 

Secretary KERRY. I gave her exact quote to Congressman Poe, 

and the exact quote is that she has seen—she has been briefed on 

it. She hasn’t actually seen the agreement. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. I will give you her quote and make sure 

it is in the record here. It says, ‘‘She said she did. She did see it. 

She did evaluate it. She said she did 6 days ago.’’ That is 7 days 

ago now. She said 6 days ago she had seen it and reviewed it and 

that Congress will get to see it in a classified session. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Congressman, you are quoting—Senator, 

you are quoting Congressman Poe. 

Senator INHOFE. Who is quoting her. This is in quotation marks. 

Secretary KERRY. And I corrected him with her direct quote, 

which we took from public record. Her quote says that she has 

been briefed. She has not seen it. 

Senator INHOFE. I have not seen that because I don’t think that 

she did correct that. That was specific on something that happened 

6 days before. As a matter of fact, that was in The Hill magazine. 

16 

Secretary KERRY. The White House press—the White House 

press briefing directly—— 

Senator INHOFE. The Hill magazine was—had something about 

that, and that was prior to the time. It was 7 days ago today, Secretary Kerry, that we had a confidential, classified briefing, right? 

I was there. You were there. Most of the people at this table were 

there. 

And I would say this. In a classified session, you can’t say what 

was said, but was that addressed at all? 

Secretary KERRY. It was. 

Senator INHOFE. Was that addressed at all? 

Secretary KERRY. It was addressed. It was. A question came up 

about it, and the answer was given that, of course, Congress will 

be briefed with respect to the contents. And of course, you need to 

be briefed. Everybody needs to be briefed. 

Senator INHOFE. My point is, Mr. Secretary, that that was a classified session where we were in a position to be briefed at that 

time, and we weren’t. 

Secretary KERRY. I don’t think we had the full material to brief. 

I didn’t have it, anyway. But we are prepared, and I think Wendy 

Sherman is going to be briefing very shortly on that, Senator. 

But what we did provide, what we can provide is the actual road 

map that the IAEA put out, and the IAEA has issued a full road 

map of what their expectations are. 

Senator INHOFE. I understand that. But I am talking about the 

deal, the secret documents. That is what I am referring to. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, it is not—it is a confidential agreement. 

It is being—it is being postured as this great sort of—— 

Senator INHOFE. I think—— 

Secretary KERRY. It is a confidential agreement, which is the 

standard procedure of the IAEA, and we have lived with the IAEA, 

Senator. We have relied on the IAEA for years and years. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. 

Secretary KERRY. And historically, the IAEA always creates what 

is called a comprehensive safeguards agreement, a CSA, which 

they negotiate with a country, and we don’t get that exact—it is 

not shared with the world. And there are reasons that it is confidential that have to do with what you can get out of that country, 

but we do get briefed on it. 

We are aware of it. Secretary Moniz has actually made some recommendations to the IAEA for them to actually tighten it up a bit. 

I think, Secretary Moniz, you might—you have certainly got confidence in it, in what you have heard—— 

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Secretary, my time has expired. But I 

would say to the chairman, it is incomprehensible that we didn’t 

have full access to that, and I think most of the people agree with 

that. 

But my time expired. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Nelson? 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Gentlemen all, thank you for your public service. 

Mr. Secretary Lew, I want to go down a different road. We have 

heard so many different commentaries about how much of a windfall the sanctions relief would be for Iran. We have heard $100 bilVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
17 

lion, $150 billion. The chairman is speaking of $50 billion or $60 

billion. 

You tell me if this is correct. That basically, sanctions relief of what has been withheld is about $100 billion, but in that $100 billion, there are contractual obligations of Iran to pay some $50 billion. And therefore, the net that would approximately come to Iran 

would be about $50 billion. 

Is that somewhere in the ballpark? That is correct? 

Secretary LEW. Senator, that is roughly correct. I am happy to 

walk down the numbers, to the best of my knowledge. 

Senator NELSON. You don’t need to. I am trying to get concepts 

here. 

Secretary LEW. Well, the one thing I would add is there is between $50 billion and $60 billion that is accessible. But that money 

is not sitting in U.S. banks. 

Senator NELSON. That is where I wanted to go. That money is 

sitting in foreign banks, is it not? 

Secretary LEW. It is sitting around the world in countries like 

China and India and many other countries. 

Senator NELSON. China, India, Japan, even Taiwan, and UAE 

[United Arab Emirates], those banks? 

Secretary LEW. Correct. 

Senator NELSON. Therefore, if we denied the lifting of economic 

sanctions, that money is in the hands of foreign banks. What, in 

your professional opinion, is the likelihood that that money would 

be released—— 

Secretary LEW. Well, just to be clear, Senator—— 

Senator NELSON.—to Iran? 

Secretary LEW. It is Iran’s money that is tied up because of sanctions. So they have sold oil. The money has gone into these foreign 

accounts, and it is sitting there. If this agreement, this deal were 

to be rejected, the question is what do those other banks do? 

I don’t think they will feel bound to hold that money the way 

they have held it in an escrow away from Iran, and I think without 

a nuclear agreement, some of that money will start going back to 

Iran if there is no agreement, if this agreement is rejected. 

Senator NELSON. So, to recapitulate then, if we were to reject it, 

the money is likely to flow because it is in the hands of foreign 

banks that would not be compelled to adhere to the United States 

wishes at that point. Is that correct? 

Secretary LEW. Right. We do, obviously, have sanctions that we 

could impose in other ways, but this money is not sitting in U.S. 

banks. We can’t lock it up directly. We need the cooperation of 

other governments, other central banks, other banks in order to 

keep this money from Iran. 

And just to add one more detail, I think the notion that somehow 

a $50 billion, $60 billion check gets written is wrong. They can’t 

spend all this money. This is the foreign Reserve that they need 

to settle their foreign transactions. 

They are already using—doing transactions in some of these 

countries that are permitted, using their foreign Reserves as exchange. They still will need to buy things overseas. So they can’t 

just spend all this money, or their ability to conduct international 

commerce goes away. 

18 

And as I have said before, they have hundreds of billions of dollars of competing domestic needs. So while I can’t say that not a 

penny will go to malign purposes. I have never said that. I think 

the magnitude of resources available is highly exaggerated by the 

notion of thinking that it is some $50 billion transfer. 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Secretary Moniz, can you explain to the 

committee the insight that you, we—the United States Government—will have as a result of this agreement on their uranium 

centrifuge program, number one, and, number two, on their plutonium program as a result of the agreement stating there has to be 

modifications and/or dismantlement of the plutonium reactor? 

Secretary MONIZ. Yes, Senator. On the uranium centrifuges, we 

will have—well, the IAEA will have daily access and the use of advanced technologies to make sure that all of the idle ones are 

locked up and used only as replacements for broken ones. And they 

will confirm that they are broken. 

In addition, for 20 years, we will have containment and surveillance of all manufacturing of key centrifuge parts. So it is, as General Clapper said, we have tremendously enhanced insight into 

their program. 

On the plutonium, we will take—they will be required to take 

out the core part of the reactor, fill it with concrete. And then with 

international collaboration, and we will be part of that, we will 

make sure that the replacement reactor is the one that reduces 

plutonium production by about a factor of 10. So it is way below 

the amount needed for a weapon. 

But second, they have also agreed that belt and suspenders, that 

the spent fuel for life, which is where the plutonium resides, will 

be sent out of the country. So we have very, very good containment 

there. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sessions? 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank all of you. 

I have been a member of and chair now the Strategic Subcommittee. I worked with Senator Donnelly and Senator Nelson 

over the years. It has been the unified view of the world’s developed nations that Iran not have a nuclear weapon. It is a grave 

threat to peace in the world. 

Secretary Kissinger, sitting where you are, said a few months 

ago that if Iran gets a nuclear weapon, he named Turkey, Saudi 

Arabia, Egypt would get nuclear weapons. Proliferation dangers 

are very real, and that is why the whole world and even the U.N. 

[United Nations] has been firm on this. 

So I am very worried about where we are, and I believe the initial error was the commencement of negotiations in 2009 after 

President Bush had pulled back from that because of the behavior 

of Iran. And experts in the region warned us that the Iranians are 

exceedingly patient, that talking can be a trap. 

And the deeper you get into this talk, the less able you are to 

take corrective action and to alter the situation as we see it. So 

now we are at the end. The Iranians see long term, and I am afraid 

that we have endangered the goal that we had it pretty well a 

unanimous nation, world behind. 

19 

Secretary Carter, do you believe that Iran represents the world’s 

foremost sponsor of terrorism? 

Secretary CARTER. Let us see, state sponsor, probably so. I— 

there are, unfortunately, it is such a kaleidoscope these days that 

there are lots of sources of terror. But I think for state sponsorship, 

that is probably accurate. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think that is consensus. Secretary Kerry testified yes to that question yesterday in the House. 

Secretary CARTER. Right. 

Senator SESSIONS. And I wish it weren’t so. 

Secretary CARTER. Me, too. 

Senator SESSIONS. And there is a goal and dream that somehow 

Iran could be brought in from the cold and we can work with them, 

but I believe that it was former adviser to President Reagan, Bud 

MacFarlane, who said revolutionaries don’t go back on the revolution. And you believe that the Supreme Leader Khamenei remains 

committed to the revolutionary goals of the Iranian revolution? 

Secretary CARTER. I only read what he says, which suggests that 

he does. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think he does. I don’t think he has any intention to abandon that. Hasn’t he—he was recently at an event 

and led a rally in which chants punctuated the rally, ‘‘Death to 

America. Death to Israel.’’ Do you believe that those reflect his 

views? 

Secretary CARTER. Again, I am not an expert, but certainly I can 

read the newspaper. Certainly seems so, and that is the reason to 

be so concerned about Iran, Iran’s malign activities, support for terrorism, and especially to make sure they don’t get a nuclear weapon, as which is key. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think that is the only conclusion we can 

reach. I think he means what he says. We can think it is strange 

and unserious and not serious, but it is serious. It represents the 

radical ideological agenda of this regime, which makes it a pariah 

regime, which makes this a danger to the entire world. 

And negotiating an agreement that allows them to obtain missiles is also dangerous, even if it is 5 years or 8 years out. Iranians 

are very patient. 

Now you were asked earlier about this, and you said, ‘‘The reason we want to stop Iran from having an ICBM program is that 

the ‘I’ in ICBM stands for ‘intercontinental,’ which means having 

the capability to fly from Iran to the United States, and we don’t 

want that.’’ 

I think that was a very clear policy decision of the United States. 

But doesn’t this agreement allow after at least 8 years—and they 

have been known to cheat—to purchase on the open market items 

that would help assist them in building an ICBM system capable 

of reaching the United States? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, I am, and I think we all need to be very 

concerned about their ballistic missile activities with or without 

this agreement. That is why ballistic missile defense is so important, including ballistic missile defense of the United States. 

I spoke earlier about ballistic missile defense of Israel, which we 

also worked very hard with Israel on. 

20 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I think the administration and you have 

supported missile defense for the United States. 

Secretary CARTER. And also—I think we have, too. 

Senator SESSIONS. And you say they shouldn’t have this capability, and we should stop it. And this agreement, does it not, allows them to purchase anything they need on the world market 

after the date in the agreement? 

Secretary KERRY. No, Senator. Could I answer that? It actually 

does not. 

The 8 years represent the best that we were obviously able to negotiate with 3 countries of the 7, who said there should be nothing. 

But we were comfortable accepting the idea of the 8, which, by the 

way, still leaves us those 8 years with Chapter 7 enforcement with 

respect to that. But we were comfortable because we have a number of other tools already available to us, Senator, which we can 

apply to be able to prosecute their efforts with respect to missiles. 

Specifically, we have the Missile Technology Control Regime. We 

have the executive order of the President of the United States, 

which allows him to sanction anybody who is providing any materials whatsoever for missile construction. We have the Proliferation 

Security Initiative with 100 countries, which allows us to block the 

transfer of materials for weapons construction. 

We have the Iran, North Korea, Syria Nonproliferation Act. We 

have an additional two executive orders. So we have huge tools 

available to us way into the future—— 

Senator SESSIONS. It seems to me that last agreement, this 

agreement would trump that. 

Secretary KERRY. No, there is no trumping of anything. These 

are all existing. We also have—— 

Senator SESSIONS. I don’t know what the language is in the 

agreement for if it is not—has no meaning, Senator Kerry. 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, these are additional agreements that 

we have outside of this agreement, which allow us to continue to 

protect us with respect to missile development. We also have additional U.N. [United Nations] sanctions that prohibit the flow of 

weapons to Hezbollah, prohibit the flow of weapons to Iraqi Shia, 

prohibit the flow of weapons to Houthi, prohibit the flow of weapons to—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, they are flowing now, are they not? 

Secretary KERRY. Indeed, because they haven’t been enforced, 

which is precisely what the administration has decided we need to 

do more effectively. And that is why in 3 days, I am meeting with 

the whole GCC in Doha to lay out the very specifics of the proposal 

for how we are going to push back against Iran. 

But I would leave you with one thought, Senator. You have adequately and appropriately pointed to the rhetoric of the leader and 

to the things they are doing. Simple question. If that is what they 

want to do, are you better off preventing them from having a nuclear weapon, or do you want to go right back to where we were 

when they had 19,000 centrifuges, 12,000 kilograms of material, 

enough for 10 to 12 bombs. 

They have already mastered the fuel cycle. So don’t be looking 

15 years down the road. Right now, they have this ability. And we 

21 

are stopping that. We are taking that away from them and providing a lifetime—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. The Senator’s time has expired. 

Secretary KERRY.—inspection. 

Chairman MCCAIN. How did that North Korean one deal work 

out for you? 

Senator McCaskill? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Senator, I can give you the complete differentiation. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator McCaskill is—your time is expired. 

Senator McCaskill? 

Secretary KERRY. It didn’t work out for me. I didn’t cut the deal. 

Senator MCCASKILL. General Dempsey, is there anything in this 

agreement that would constrain our ability to take any military action that our country thought was necessary against Iran? 

General DEMPSEY. No, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Lew, I am concerned about the alternative to the deal. And one of the things I don’t think has been 

covered enough in all of the testimony that has occurred, and I 

think all of us are following all of this very closely. I got the point 

that Senator Nelson was trying to make that the money is not in 

our control, and it appears, looking at it, if all the other countries 

walk away from us, if we reject this deal, that they are going to 

get the money one way or another. 

Either they are going to get the money because they are entitled 

to it if we do the deal, or they are going to get the money because 

we can’t control it. But I don’t know that that is completely accurate. 

And I think it is important because this is not about is this a 

good deal? This is also about what happens if we don’t do this deal? 

And I think it is important to talk about whether the power the 

United States would have if this deal was rejected to, in fact, force 

our will on these countries that hold this money. 

We have a lot of tools at our disposal, as the major economic 

power that we are. A lot of these are our NATO allies. Obviously, 

Japan. So I think it is fair that we shouldn’t just say if we walk 

away from this deal, they are going to get all the money, and they 

are going—I think it is fair to try to really drill down, and you try 

to give us a picture. 

Let us assume, I know none of you want to assume that this deal 

is rejected. But let us assume it is. At that moment, what power 

do we have as a country to keep this money from flowing to Iran 

and its nefarious activities? 

Secretary LEW. Senator, that is a very fair question. And obviously, nobody can give you an entirely precise answer because 

there is perfectly legal ways for them to use some of this money 

now. 

For example, if they buy Chinese goods, they can pay with their 

Reserves that are held in China. So they could make the decision 

that they are going to acquire the things they need to acquire 

through the countries where they have Reserves and chip away at 

those Reserves. 

The question of what our unilateral sanctions can do versus multilateral sanctions is a complicated one. We have powerful, powerVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
22 

ful unilateral tools. The United States is the world’s banking center. The dollar is the Reserve currency. Transactions that go 

through U.S. financial institutions are within our grasp. 

But that doesn’t give us the ability to reach out to all foreign 

banks and to all foreign transactions. And I think that it is at our 

own peril if we have a sanctions regime where we are enforcing 

unilateral sanctions that the rest of the world is rejecting, which 

is very different from what has been going on over these last few 

years. 

We have worked bilaterally with countries around the world to 

do things against their own economic interest because they agreed 

with us on the imperative of stopping Iran from getting a nuclear 

weapon. 

If they see us walk away from an agreement that they believe 

would stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, I think the degree 

of cooperation we get goes down considerably. It is not black and 

white. It is not we go from being able to do everything to doing 

nothing. But what has made the sanctions regime so effective these 

last few years is the fact that we have had the international cooperation. 

India and China have been buying less oil from Iran than would 

have been good for their economy. How do you enforce bilaterally 

with countries around the world doing things against their interest 

just by saying we insist? 

So there are things we can do. There are certainly ways that—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think it—— 

Secretary LEW. But it gets much harder. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And I appreciate that answer. But I really 

think it would be helpful for those of us who are really trying to 

analyze both scenarios if you all would try, to your best ability, put 

in writing what you envision, what would be our best effort at 

keeping Iran isolated if, in fact, this deal is rejected. 

Because I don’t think it is fair for us just to assume that we have 

no power if this deal is rejected because, clearly, we still are going 

to have a lot of power. 

I am almost out of time. This is an important question, I think, 

for Secretary Moniz. And I know this is a hard question to give an 

exact answer to. But do you believe that if we walk away from this 

deal, Iran has a nuclear weapon by Christmas? 

Secretary MONIZ. Well, I can’t really answer that question. What 

I can say is—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Do your best. I think it is important for us 

to know how close they are. 

Secretary MONIZ. They—well. They are a nuclear threshold state 

today. They could certainly generate the nuclear materials within 

months, which is before Christmas. And what is then the unknown 

is the degree to which they have completed, which we can’t discuss 

right now, other weaponization requirements. 

That is what, of course, the IAEA, in building up its dossier over 

many years, which it now needs to complete, have certainly identified, labeled Iran as having had a structured program of activities 

relevant to nuclear weapons in the past. So it is a threshold state, 

and that is the risk we face. The deal will walk them back from 

23 

that threshold and give us permanently more insight into their— 

into any weapons program they might choose to pursue. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Wicker? 

Senator WICKER. They are a nuclear threshold state, and they 

have denied all along that they had any intention of doing so up 

and to the present time. I think that is instructive. 

I think Senator McCaskill may be onto something here with regard to all of the options before us. My friend Senator Reed asked 

a question about are we better off with a negotiated settlement or 

a military strike, as if those are the only two alternatives. Of 

course, we know that those are not the only two alternatives. 

I wish our European friends, our Western allies had not been so 

eager to leave the sanctions regime, but they were. The United 

States could go it alone. And as the Secretary pointed out, we do 

have unilateral tools that would be effective. 

So, you know, continue trying to get a good deal, continued unilateral tools on the part of the United States, making people choose 

between banking with America and banking with Iran. Those tools 

are there. 

Let me say to you, General Dempsey, I appreciate your service, 

and I appreciate the many times you have come before this committee. We have disagreed and agreed from time to time. It would 

seem to me that your brief nine- sentence opening statement to 

this committee today amounts to damning this agreement with 

faint praise, I have to say. 

You mentioned that there are six areas in which Iran is a bad 

actor, and you say five—five of these malign activities give us real 

concern, and you list them. But then you end and give us these 

words of assurance. 

‘‘Ultimately, time and Iranian behavior will determine if the nuclear agreement is effective and sustainable.’’ That, sir, does not 

give me a confidence level, and I just have to tell you that, based 

upon your very brief and I think tepid endorsement of this agreement. 

With regard to the conventional arms embargo, as late as the 

spring, we weren’t hearing about this. General Dempsey, when did 

you become aware that there would be this huge relief from the 

conventional arms embargo, and isn’t it a fact that it caught you 

by surprise? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, first, Senator, I would ask you not to 

characterize my statement as tepid nor enthusiastic, but rather 

pragmatic. And I have said from the start that relieving the risk 

of a nuclear conflict with Iran diplomatically is superior to trying 

to do that militarily, but I will sustain the military options in case 

that becomes necessary. 

As to your question about timing, I was consulted or asked for 

my advice episodically when military implications became part of 

the conversation. And probably about a week or two before the 

agreement was finalized, I gave my final recommendation regarding sanctions. 

Senator WICKER. Well, late—that is very late in the agreement, 

and I would just say it seems to me that the advice that we have 

been getting on the other side of this agreement down through the 

24 

months and over time, this—this massive retreat from conventional 

arms embargos is something new and something very troubling. 

Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, in the minute I have left that 

the assessment of the facts and the assessment of the effect this 

agreement will have by neighbors in the region I think is so instructive, should be so instructive to this Congress. And I don’t 

blame my friends on the Democratic side of the aisle for having 

concerns also. 

It is striking that from right to left, every ideology within the 

country of Israel is opposed to this agreement. It is striking that 

the Arab neighbors, the Saudis and others, are alarmed at this 

deal. 

And I would submit to the record, Mr. Chairman, in the closing 

seconds an op-ed by Ari Shavit, senior correspondent for left of center Israeli newspaper Haaretz, in which he says, ‘‘The Iranian negotiating team succeeded in destroying completely the sanctions 

mechanism.’’ He points out that, ‘‘The United States, European 

Union, Britain, France, Russia, and China recognize again and 

again Iran’s right to develop advanced centrifuges, which could be 

5 to 10 times bigger than the capacity of the old ones.’’ 

‘‘This means,’’ Mr. Shavit concludes, ‘‘that the international community is not only enabling, but actually ensuring the establishment of a new Iranian nuclear program, which will be immeasurably more powerful and dangerous than its predecessor.’’ 

I submit this article for the record, Mr. Chairman—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:] 


15-66_haaretz.eps
25 

Senator WICKER.—with a great deal of concern. 

Thank you, sir. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all very much, both for your efforts on this negotiation and for being here today. 

Secretary Carter, you were in the Middle East last week. Can 

you tell us what you heard from our allies in the Middle East about 

how they felt about this agreement, specifically Saudi Arabia and 

Israel? Obviously, we have heard what Prime Minister Netanyahu 

has had to say. 

Secretary CARTER. Sure. Sure, Senator. 

Beginning with Israel, Prime Minister Netanyahu was very clear, 

as he has been clear publicly in his opposition to the deal. We discussed that, but then we discussed many other things as well. 

Hezbollah’s activity up on the border with Lebanon. In fact, I visited there. Our missile defense activities, our cybersecurity cooperation, our intelligence cooperation, lots of other regional issues. And 

so, we discussed many topics, but he was very clear. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And excuse me for interrupting, but would 

you agree with Senator Wicker’s characterization that the Israelis 

were united in their opposition to the agreement from left to right? 

Secretary CARTER. I only spoke about this to the prime minister, 

of course, who is the leader of their country. He was, as he has 

been publicly, very, very clear. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And what did you hear from some of our Arab 

allies in the Middle East? 

Secretary CARTER. I spoke to the king of Saudi Arabia, who repeated to me a statement he had issued a few days before supporting the agreement. He referenced that—again, I don’t think 

this is violating any confidence—that the verification and, as he 

put it, snapback provisions were particularly important to him. So 

he referenced those things. 

And then, again, we went on to talk about other things that are 

more related to the defense agenda, including the—his air force’s 

munitions, cyber concerns that Saudi Arabia has, and something 

that we started to discuss at the GCC, namely Saudi Arabia’s role 

in countering ISIL, which is a whole other subject there. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And did you hear from any of our other Arab 

allies in the Middle East that they support the agreement? 

Secretary CARTER. I spoke to the Jordanians about it. Again, this 

wasn’t a major topic with them. We had a lot of other things to talk 

about. 

But did not express any opposition. I don’t recall exactly what 

they said. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Okay. 

Secretary CARTER. It wasn’t really the subject of our meeting 

there. Those are the three places that I met with. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

General Dempsey, is there a military option, short of invasion, 

that would roll back Iran’s nuclear program more substantially 

over the next 10 years than the JCPOA does, in your opinion? 

26 

General DEMPSEY. Well, I would have to make assumptions 

about how often we would be compelled to conduct airstrikes or 

stand up munitions. But the military options that exist would disrupt the program by several years, but there is nothing to say we 

couldn’t repeat it if necessary. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And do you have—is there any intelligence information to suggest what Iran’s response would be, should we engage in an airstrike against them? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, I wouldn’t say it rises to the level of intelligence. But the analysis suggests that they would counter our 

presence in the region at every opportunity and use these other 

malign activities that they have available to them. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Secretary Moniz, there has been a lot of discussion about the 24- 

day delay, and you have testified in the Foreign Relations Committee that to the extent to which we would be able to detect nuclear activity—so uranium—in an extended period beyond the 24- 

day delay. 

What if the activity does not include nuclear material, to what 

extent are you—do you believe we could detect other activity other 

than uranium-related or nuclear-related activity? 

Secretary MONIZ. Well, Senator, first of all, permit me to reinforce the fact that having the 24-day period is itself new in the 

sense that there has never been any time limit in terms of access 

to undeclared sites. Again, to repeat, on nuclear materials, we have 

very, very sensitive capabilities, and historically, those have been 

proved. And we can add more in classified context. 

With regard to non-nuclear materials, it gets more difficult. However, when one has nuclear weapon specialized activities, such as 

explosively driven neutron initiators, we would not be without tools 

to detect activities in that kind of a time period. 

But clearly, as one gets farther and farther away into, let us say, 

just conventional explosives testing, which is something militaries 

do normally, then it is a question of intelligence putting together 

the context for suspicious activities. But nuclear material, in the 

end, you need to do nuclear materials to get to the weapon, and 

that is where we have extraordinary techniques. 

Mr. Chairman, if I may add one more comment? If you permit, 

just to go back to Senator Wicker’s comment on advanced centrifuges, I don’t know that particular article you quoted. But it appears to have forgotten to mention that their most advanced machines, which are 5 × their current machines, they are already operating at full cascade level, two different machines. 

And those are going to be dismantled before this—before this is 

implemented. 

Thank you. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I am informed that Senator Ernst is required 

to preside over the vital proceedings on the floor of the United 

States Senate, which is critical to her presence. So I would ask the 

indulgence of my colleagues to allow her to proceed. 

Senator ERNST. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, colleagues. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. 

27 

This will be one of the most significant votes that we take as 

members of Congress, moving forward. So I believe it is imperative 

that we get this right. 

Not long ago, the United States discovered that we had had a 

data breach at OPM [the Office of Personnel Management]. Simple. 

Data, personnel records had been tapped into. So that just is laying 

the groundwork of where I am going next. 

Secretary Carter and Secretary Moniz, I am very concerned regarding the Government’s ability to detect, deter, and defeat cyber 

attacks on our Government, particularly by China, Russia, and 

Iran. With respect to Iran in particular, according to Director of 

National Intelligence James Clapper, Iran has conducted cyber attacks on U.S. Government officials involved in nuclear nonproliferation, hacking which compromised the Marine Corps 

intranet, Sands Las Vegas Casino, and attacks against U.S. banks. 

In relation to the Iran deal, these attacks, along with recent successful attacks against OPM, leads me to have less than full confidence in our own cyber capabilities, let alone the cyber capabilities of the IAEA. It is vital IAEA has a lock-tight ability to protect 

its equipment and technology, vital to ensuring effective monitoring 

of Iranian facilities under this agreement against cyber attacks. 

Just simple ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no,’’ Secretary Carter. Are you concerned 

regarding Iran’s ability to impact the effectiveness of IAEA monitoring equipment through cyber? 

Secretary CARTER. I am sorry. I can’t give you a ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ answer to that. I am very concerned about Iranian cyber activity, and 

you named three countries. I could go on with the ones. 

This is a big problem. And sadly, I share the lack of confidence 

you have in the adequacy of our defenses. In the Defense Department, you would think with all that we have paid attention to protecting our own networks, that we would be secure. But we are not, 

and we know that. 

And it is not just Iran, but it is others as well. And that is why 

we are trying to make investments in that area and pull up our 

socks in the cyber area. 

Senator ERNST. So—— 

Secretary CARTER. But I can’t reassure you on the cyber front. 

Senator ERNST. I am very concerned about this. Secretary Moniz, 

yes or no, do you share a concern that this could be vulnerable? 

Secretary MONIZ. Oh, I absolutely share a concern. But the IAEA 

does have some robust technologies in terms of—— 

Senator ERNST. They are much more advanced than the United 

States? 

Secretary MONIZ. I didn’t say that, no. Look, cyber is tough. General Dempsey also mentioned cyber is something that keeps us up 

all the time, and we have to develop our capabilities. 

Senator ERNST. Fantastic. I have no confidence that we would 

not be able to know if there were tampering involvement going on 

as we try and monitor these activities or as IAEA tries to monitor 

these activities. 

Secretary MONIZ. The IAEA, Senator, is, of course, quite aware 

of this, and they do have measures. 

28 

Senator ERNST. And I hope that they improve those measures. I 

do believe that we are vulnerable, as we have seen with our own 

infrastructure. 

And General Dempsey, we have heard some other discussion 

today about the choices that the President has with this agreement. Now 2 weeks ago, many of our news outlets, USA Today, 

others had quoted President Obama as the choice is the Iran nuclear deal or war. This seems to be a military decision, and I understand that you advise the President on these issues. 

Is that what you have told the President is that we either take 

this deal or we go to war? 

General DEMPSEY. No. At no time did that come up in our conversation, nor did I make that comment. 

Senator ERNST. Who is advising the President then that we must 

go to war if this deal is not signed? 

General DEMPSEY. I can’t answer that. I can tell you that we 

have a range of options, and I always present them. 

Senator ERNST. And I thank you for that. Because I do think and 

I think it is imperative that everybody on this panel understand 

that there are other options available out there, and a multitude 

of options. We are taught in the military about DIME, diplomatic 

options, information operations, military operations, and economic 

types of sanctions and opportunities that we might have. 

So for the President to outright reject everything but war is outrageous to me. And I do hope that you are able to better advise him 

that he needs to be careful with his language because that seems 

to be the rhetoric we are hearing out there is that we either go to 

war or we accept this deal, and I reject that premise. 

General DEMPSEY. As long as we agree that the—that military 

strikes on a sovereign nation is an act of war. But there are things 

between here and there. 

Senator ERNST. Absolutely. I agree, General Dempsey. 

Thank you, gentlemen, very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Blumenthal? 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dempsey, you answered—well, first of all, let me thank 

everybody at this table for your service to our Nation and the hard 

work and dedicated service that produced this agreement. Whether 

we vote for it or not, and I have made no decision for myself, I 

think the Nation owes you its gratitude for the hard work that you 

have done. 

Is it fair to say, General Dempsey, that the breakout time for 

Iran to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon will 

return to what it is now, about 2 to 3 months, after the 10-year 

period? 

General DEMPSEY. I don’t know that it is fair to say that because 

I think that some of the additional protocols and things which are 

out of my area of expertise could inhibit them for a longer period 

of time. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Let us assume for the moment that, in 

fact, the breakout time is reduced at the end of that 10-year period 

to essentially what it is now. Will the United States be in a strongVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
29 

er or weaker position militarily if the military option is necessary 

for some future President? 

General DEMPSEY. The chairman earlier correctly pointed out 

that Iran could procure some weapon systems that could make our 

military option more difficult but will not make it more impossible. 

And I think the answer to your question, Senator, is depends how 

we use the time between now and then, and we have got to plan 

with our allies in the region to increase their capabilities over that 

period of time. 

So if we use the time wisely and we have the resources necessary 

to do it, we should not assume we would be in a weakened position. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Because the expectation has to be that the 

Iranians will use that time to build their conventional forces. At 

the very least, they will have more revenue from various sources 

as the sanctions are lifted, substantial revenue. Is that correct? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, but they are starting from an extraordinarily weakened position conventionally. But in the asymmetric 

arena, they are starting from a position of relative capability. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Where I am going with this question is 

what changes in military force structure do you think the United 

States has to take, both to make sure that our National security 

is assured and also that our allies’ is as well? What specific 

changes should the Armed Services Committee be supporting in 

the near and longer term? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, I mean, that is almost a separate hearing. But I would suggest to you that we really need to have the 

kind of budget certainty that the Secretary of Defense has articulated. And then, second, that we should not at this point in time 

consider reducing our force presence in the Middle East area of responsibility. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Lew, let me turn to the economic sanctions that could be available, which my colleague from 

Iowa has mentioned. Can those be put back in place? Can the 

United States alone, even without our allies, use its finance system 

and its banks to implement a severe sanctions system? 

Secretary LEW. Senator, we certainly have very significant tools 

that we have used unilaterally and we could use again unilaterally. 

But what we have seen over the last several years is the impact 

of multilateral sanctions that have truly had a crushing impact on 

Iran’s economy. 

It has brought them to the table. They have reached the agreement that we are here discussing. I think the notion that we can 

unilaterally equal or surpass that is something that is inconsistent 

with what we have learned. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. We may not be able to equal or surpass 

it, but we can certainly make a significant and also severely damaging effort if we choose to do so. Is that right? 

Secretary LEW. We can. And what I would say is, importantly, 

that the snapback provisions that are in this agreement, if Iran 

violates it, make it so that both the U.S. and the international 

sanctions would be back in place, which puts us in the strongest 

position. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. The challenge will be to mobilize our partners in that effort. 

30 

Secretary LEW. Well, actually, I don’t think it is a challenge. The 

way it was constructed, it is a very strong snapback provision. The 

international sanctions snap back in a way that we can work our 

will by exercising a veto if there is a disagreement with us. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Kerry, did you have a comment? 

I noticed that you seemed to be—— 

Secretary KERRY. Well, there is a surreality here. I mean, and 

with all due respect, the Senator from Iowa is not here. But the 

President of the United States is not mandating war. He is not— 

doesn’t want to go war. It is not his choice, and he is not advocating war. 

What he is saying is that if you analyze the alternatives here, 

and this is what I mean by surreality, when you say could the 

United States continue some sanctions? To what end? To negotiate? 

I mean, with whom? 

Do you think the ayatollah is going to come back and negotiate 

after he has already negotiated? 

Chairman MCCAIN. Secretary Kerry, the time has expired. Please 

shorten your remarks. 

Secretary KERRY. Could I just finish one thing, Senator? 

Chairman MCCAIN. Yes. 

Secretary KERRY. The reason that the President talks about the 

possibility of war is Iran has already made it clear that if this is 

rejected, they consider themselves free to go back and enrich and 

to go back to where they were with the 12,000 kilograms, 10 to 12 

bombs, et cetera. 

And the inevitable consequence of that will be a ‘‘What are you 

going to do about it?’’ next step. We will have lost the international 

support because the international community is ready to enforce 

this deal. If we reject this unilaterally, they walk away. 

So you have huge difficulty with the sanctions, and you lose your 

capacity to have the support for the military strike if there had to 

be one. It is not a choice the President wants to make, but it is 

the inevitable consequence of Iran moving to assert what they believe is their right in the furtherance of their program. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ayotte? 

Senator AYOTTE. I want to thank the chairman. I want to thank 

all the witnesses for being here. 

I also want to take this opportunity. It is probably going to be 

the last time that General Dempsey testifies before the committee. 

I want to thank you for your dedicated service and for the service 

of your family. 

And I know, General, that when you appeared before the committee on July 7th, I was actually the person who asked you about 

there had been floated some views in the press at that time that 

Iran was pushing for lifting of the resolution on ballistic missiles 

and the resolution of arms, which we now know are in the agreement at 5 years and 8 years. 

Just to be clear, when you came before the committee then, you 

said under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on Iran on 

those issues. So was it your military recommendation that we not 

agree to lifting of those sanctions? 

31 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. And I used the phrase ‘‘as long as possible,’’ and then that was the point at which the negotiation continued. But, yes, that was my military advice. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

I also wanted to ask you about an issue I know Senator Ernst 

had talked about in the Iranian cyber activity. And a number of 

years ago, we saw that there was an interruption of Iran’s nuclear 

program through some other cyber activity, I think was reported, 

called Stuxnet. And that was reported in the press, I believe. 

In this agreement, according to paragraph 10.2 of Annex 3 of the 

deal, the United States is actually obligated under this agreement 

to help strengthen Iran’s ability to protect against sabotage of its 

nuclear program. It might be hard for Americans to believe that we 

would agree to help Iran protect against sabotage of its nuclear 

program in light of its prior intentions. 

And General Dempsey, I wanted to ask your opinion on that. Do 

you think it is a good idea for the United States to help Iran actually protect its nuclear program against sabotage? 

General DEMPSEY. I hadn’t thought about that, Senator, and I 

would like to have the opportunity to do so. I will say there is— 

back to the cyber question that was asked earlier. I think next 

week this committee and the Senate will consider some cyber legislation that we have been eager to see passed for some time so we 

can get ourselves better protected. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, when we know that Iran continues malign 

activity on the cyber front, the idea that we would agree to help 

them protect its nuclear program against sabotage. And I assume, 

as I read this language, that that would also obligate us to inform 

the Israelis—inform Iran if the Israelis were undertaking any kind 

of activities that might undermine its nuclear program, at least if 

we are going to adhere to the plain language of this agreement. 

So I wanted to also ask about this idea. We have heard a lot 

about sanctions, and sanctions, as I understand, Iran has written 

the United Nations on July 20th about the sanctions regime. And 

one of the issues that has concerned me about this agreement is 

that once the sanctions, the long list of mainly congressionally 

mandated sanctions that will be lifted under this agreement are 

undertaken, if Iran, for example, engages in terrorist activity, 

which it is known to do, separate from the nuclear program, Iran 

seems to have taken the position in its letter to the U.N. 

And I have actually read the agreement, and I have been concerned that the agreement provides the same that, in fact, Iran 

says it is understood that reintroduction or reimposition, including 

through extension of the sanctions and restrictive measures, will 

constitute significant nonperformance, which would relieve Iran 

from its commitments in part or in whole. 

So my question is, as I read this, I am deeply concerned that if 

we want to reimpose the toughest sanctions on issues related to 

their terrorist activities and support for terrorism, which is another 

tool in the toolbox, General, aside from our military options, that 

Iran can then walk away from this agreement. 

And if the answer is you disagree with this characterization, 

please tell me where in the plain language of this agreement am 

I wrong. 

32 

Secretary LEW. Senator, the language says we can’t reimpose the 

nuclear sanctions if Iran complies with the nuclear agreement. We 

have never given away any of our ability to use other sanctions regimes—terrorism or human rights or—— 

Senator AYOTTE. But, Secretary Lew, with all due respect, the 

nuclear sanctions are the toughest sanctions that we would impose 

in other context, too, including on crude oil, oil and gas, on—— 

Secretary LEW. Senator, we Reserve the right, if there is a financial institution that is engaging in financing terrorism, to put sanctions back on that institution. That is not a violation of the agreement. It is not a nuclear sanction. 

Senator AYOTTE. But Iran seems to take a different position. 

Secretary LEW. Well, what Iran does believe is that we can take 

the nuclear sanctions, put a different label on them, and put them 

right into place. And what we would have to do is make the case, 

as we have on many occasions, that institutions should be sanctioned for their behavior on terrorism and human rights and regional destabilization. 

We will continue to do that. We will do it vigilantly, and all of 

our sanctions that apply in that area still stand. 

Secretary KERRY. There is no restraint. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Donnelly? 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And General Dempsey, thank you also. Every time we say goodbye to you, you come back in another week on another panel. And 

I know it is not by choice, but we are thrilled to have you here 

again. 

Thank you very much for your service. 

Mr. Secretary, Secretary of Energy, if a year from now we have 

suspicions that something is going on at Parchin, does the IAEA 

have access to go inside that building and see it or not? 

Secretary MONIZ. Well, again, we certainly have, through the initial protocol and this agreement, access anywhere that there is suspicion of nuclear activity. The protocols, again, I would have to see 

with the IAEA, but it is certainly a different—forward looking is 

very different from resolving the possible military dimensions 

of—— 

Senator DONNELLY. We need to know forward looking on this, on 

whether it is Parchin or other military facilities, does the IAEA 

have access to go inside those facilities? 

Secretary MONIZ. They certainly must have the access granted 

to, again, resolve the issues that they need to resolve. They must 

have integrity in the process. 

Secretary KERRY. And if they do not, Senator, they would be in 

material breach of the agreement. 

Senator DONNELLY. Okay. So this is different moving forward 

than what has gone in the past? 

Secretary KERRY. It is not only—yes, it is different. And there is 

a different mechanism to bring it to a close for the 15 years. But 

even under the additional protocol, speaking to Senator McCain’s 

concern about North Korea, the lesson of North Korea produced the 

additional protocol, and now there is the additional protocol and 

the modified code, which have huge new requirements for access. 

33 

Senator DONNELLY. Secretary Lew and maybe Secretary Kerry 

on this. One of the proposals that has been put forward is to say 

no to this deal and then to tell the other countries who are involved 

in regards to sanctions that a viable alternative is to simply say 

to France, Germany, Britain, and others, ‘‘Choose us or choose 

them as you move forward economically,’’ that, you know, if you are 

going to continue to do business with Iran, then you can’t do business with us. 

Do you see that as viable moving forward? 

Secretary LEW. Senator, we do have powerful tools that make it 

very dangerous for foreign business to violate U.S. laws. And if 

they do business and violate our sanctions, we will enforce. 

Whether we can do that against the whole world effectively without doing damage to our own economy is something that we have 

to have serious considerations about. It is one thing when we are 

taking action in concert with the world. It is another thing if we 

are standing on our own. 

So the ability of a technical sanction to work is not the same as 

it being effective or necessarily adding up to what we would like 

to accomplish. 

Senator DONNELLY. Okay. Secretary Carter, have you—I know 

you are talking to the GCC countries. You have been in the region 

there. 

It seems to me that one of the challenges here is confidence, confidence that they will be safe, that Israel will be safe. That is what 

this comes from is making sure that your child can be safe and 

sleep safe that night. And that is what Mr. Netanyahu was trying 

to ensure, and that is what we are trying to ensure. 

So, as you look at it when you talk to our GCC friends and others, is there any putting together of a plan that says to Iran not 

one more inch? That as we move forward, you will see from year 

to year to year that in Yemen not one more inch, that against 

Hezbollah there will be massive retaliation if there is actions, that 

we will stand with the Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar to make sure 

that they have success, and we will be viable and strong against 

whatever, you know, efforts Iran has in Iraq. 

To lay out the plan, let people know, let Iran know in advance 

would help create, I think, a better sense of confidence that there 

is a reason—that there is a reason to stand with us. 

Secretary CARTER. I think that is extremely important, and that 

is what the GCC countries are looking for in my conversations with 

them, namely the continued commitment of the United States to 

help them protect themselves so they can sleep well at night, maintain our regional role, counter Iran’s malign influence and activities. At the same time, they recognize perfectly well what has been 

said up here, which is an Iran with nuclear weapons would be an 

enormous problem and are supportive of an agreement that heads 

that off. 

But at the same time, they want to make sure that we are there. 

That is what the GCC countries were told at Camp David by the 

President. My trip was in part to solidify all of the things we are 

doing—— 

Senator DONNELLY. I am just about out of time. So I just want 

to finish by saying I think it is important to publicly state a ‘‘not 

34 

one inch more’’ policy. And then, additionally, I am not at all comfortable with our people who are still in Iran. They have to come 

home. I wish they had come home as part of this agreement, and 

I know you do, too. 

But this cannot rest because we don’t leave anybody behind, and 

we don’t intend to leave them behind either. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Fischer? 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Moniz, I would like to follow up a little bit on what 

Senator Blumenthal was asking you about with regards to the 

breakout time. What are some of the main factors that you consider when you calculate that breakout time? 

Secretary MONIZ. Well, the key factors are the enrichment capacity and the stockpile of enriched uranium. But there are many 

other factors as well which come in, such as the rate at which additional capacity could be built in during a breakout time. So all of 

this comes in to our National laboratory evaluation. 

Senator FISCHER. That would include the number of centrifuges 

as well. Is that correct? 

Secretary MONIZ. Correct. 

Senator FISCHER. After 15 years of this agreement, what limits 

do you think will be in place on those things that you just mentioned? 

Secretary MONIZ. Well, after 15 years, they will probably expand 

their capacity after those restraints, and that is why such a key 

element is the—are the verification measures that we put in place 

for all time, basically. 

Senator FISCHER. So we are talking about tracking the nuclear 

material to make sure it is not diverted from a civilian program. 

Correct? 

Secretary MONIZ. And that is 25 years, right. 

Senator FISCHER. Correct. We are basically just checking Iran’s 

math. Correct? 

Secretary MONIZ. Checking the math? Well, no, we are checking 

our math, if you like. So the idea is to follow—— 

Senator FISCHER. We are checking our math. 

Secretary MONIZ. And for 20 years, we follow all the manufacturing. So it is the supply chain that we follow. Making a—and our 

intelligence people will tell you that to actually reproduce the entire supply chain covertly probably in multiple places would be 

very, very difficult to conceal. 

Senator FISCHER. And we are just looking at, of course, the declared facilities. Is that correct? 

Secretary MONIZ. No. We have—we have, of course, strong measures in the declared facilities. But key is the undeclared facilities, 

which, by definition, ultimately rests on the actions of our and our 

allies’ and friends’ intelligence capacity. 

Senator FISCHER. And do you believe—well, do you have confidence in that capacity that we will be able to locate any 

undeclared facilities and pressure Iran to allow us to make sure 

that we have verification in those as well? 

Secretary MONIZ. Well, again, I would go back to the statements 

of General Clapper and Cardillo and Cohen. Again, Clapper said 

35 

specifically that this will give us much greater insight into what 

they are doing. That then leads us, and other intelligence agencies 

that we work with, to point IAEA in the right place, and now we 

have a unique new tool of a finite time to get access to that place, 

or they are in material breach. 

Senator FISCHER. Are you concerned at all on what I view as the 

discrepancies between statements made by our administration and 

compare those to what is being—statements being made by the adviser to the supreme leader when it comes to access to allowing the 

IAEA to look at the military centers in Iran? 

Where I think I believe I have heard our administration say that 

we do have access to those. They are declared facilities. But yet the 

adviser to the supreme leader says the access of inspectors from 

the IAEA or from any other body to Iran’s military centers is forbidden. Who is correct on that? 

Secretary MONIZ. Well, I think we are correct. First of all, I just 

might point out that there were many statements made before Lausanne, before Vienna, that you could—— 

Senator FISCHER. This one was made July 21st. 

Secretary MONIZ. Yes, but I am saying there were many statements made before then, and you can check those statements 

against the agreement. They don’t square up all the time, shall we 

say? 

Senator FISCHER. How are you—— 

Secretary MONIZ. Now in terms of—— 

Senator FISCHER. How are you going to reconcile that? 

Secretary MONIZ. In terms of the new—those statements were 

very clear. First of all, the aim is not to go to military sites, and 

by the way, it is not us, it is IAEA, of course. The aim is to go to 

where there is there suspicious or suspicion of nuclear-relevant activities. 

If they are in a military site, doesn’t matter. There is still the 

IAEA access to those sites. 

Senator FISCHER. I only have a few seconds left, but I would hope 

that you would reconcile those statements for the public. You have 

stated that—— 

Secretary MONIZ. We cannot control their statements. 

Senator FISCHER. You have stated that the 24-day waiting period 

for international inspectors won’t allow the regime to conceal any 

illegal activity. But as I read the agreement and many other people 

have pointed out, the inspectors’ request to visit those sites could 

be delayed much longer than 24 days. 

I know that you are not concerned about the 24-day period. You 

believe that we would or the IAEA would be able to handle that. 

But if you look at different parts in Section Q of Annex 1 of the 

agreement, I think we have the potential that we are looking at an 

89-day delay. Do you think that would be possible, and how confident are you about us being able to inspect then? 

Secretary MONIZ. No, we certainly—we certainly cannot allow for 

that. I might say I did not say any illegal activity. I focused specifically or especially on activity with nuclear material as my real 

focus, number one. And number two is the IAEA, at any sign of 

lack of cooperation, they have to launch the process with their request for access. Then comes the 24 days. 

36 

As I have mentioned also, there is in the unclassified literature 

an example in Iran of a 6-month delay, an attempt to conceal 

which did not work. They were caught red-handed. 

Senator FISCHER. You said you wouldn’t allow the 89 day. You 

just couldn’t allow that. How many days after 24 days would you 

allow? 

Secretary MONIZ. No, none after 24 days. It is that the process 

to launch the formal request for access from IAEA has got to be 

prompt. That launches the 24-day clock, and that is the end. 

Senator FISCHER. You would not allow anything past that? 

Secretary MONIZ. I would not. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. 

Secretary MONIZ. Senator Gillibrand? 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for joining us. Thank you for your intense 

work on this. Obviously, we all care about the National security of 

the United States and our allies. 

Secretary Moniz, you and I had a very long conversation about 

nuclear details, and what I would like you to discuss with the committee specifically is the nuclear capabilities that Iran has today 

are considerable, and most experts have given it a 2- to 3-month 

timeframe to have enough enriched uranium for one bomb. 

I would like you to talk a little bit about their nuclear expertise 

and, if left unchecked, how quickly can they ramp up to greater 

production to more highly enriched uranium if—excluding this deal 

arrangement? 

And then, after you have described that, I would like you to describe what the ramp-up time would look like, post 8, 10, 15 years. 

Because what I understand from reading the agreement is that you 

have spent a lot of time identifying what can be changed and modified in the three existing facilities so that they don’t run a military 

risk. 

And so, I would like that more fully described, and obviously, 

and the last point I want you to address is my constituents are 

very concerned about clandestine operations. To the extent you can 

talk about this in this setting, I would like you to address how you 

detect a clandestine enrichment facility during the agreement. 

Secretary MONIZ. Quite a few questions, Senator. In terms of 

their current capacity, well, they have again demonstrated the capacity to enrich uranium. That is clear. But I do want to emphasize 

that they have also demonstrated they have enriched to 20 percent 

enrichment. 

Twenty percent is the cut-off that the IAEA uses for low-enriched 

and high-enriched uranium. But the point here is that the amount 

of work needed to get to 20 percent is nearly all the work you need 

to get to 90 percent, which would be weapons grade. 

So they have the capability, and as I have already mentioned, 

they already have full cascades running of the next generation five 

times more powerful. This agreement will have those dismantled at 

the time of implementation. So what is critical is we are rolling 

them back in every dimension of their program for at least a considerable period. 

Now in terms of the breakout time, again, the President was 

very clear and our P5+1 partners were very clear that a quanVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
37 

titative criterion for the negotiation was there had to be at least 

a 1-year breakout time in terms of fissile material for at least 10 

years. We have accomplished that with this agreement. Our lab scientists are fully behind this, as are those of other countries. 

Then that will roll off and after 15 years at some point, depending upon what they do, then we can revert, we may revert to the 

current kinds of breakout times for fissionable material. We still 

need to keep the lid on weaponization activities and make sure 

those are not taken. And that was a notable improvement from 

Lausanne to Vienna for that. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Right. So the agreements says they can’t 

ever make the steps towards weaponization? 

Secretary MONIZ. They can’t ever make those steps, and that is 

the point where we will be much better off at that time than today 

because we will still have enhanced verification procedures that 

can point our and other intelligence agencies to any violations. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. And after modifications at Arak, is there 

any way at that you can reverse those modifications and make it 

a heavy water plutonium facility again? 

Secretary MONIZ. The Arak reactor, in its redesign, would provide us in this language a breakout time of years. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Right. So to unwind, it would be significant? 

Secretary MONIZ. Because once it is online, they would need 

years of operation to get enough plutonium to be relevant, and the 

IAEA would detect their change of the operation within 1 or 2 

months. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. And with regard to Fordow, what is the assessment there? After modifications, if they wanted to breach the 

agreement and try to get up and running again, does that take a 

significant amount of time? 

Secretary MONIZ. Well, first of all, yes. Because, first of all, most 

of the centrifuge and infrastructure will not only be stripped out 

completely, but they will not even be stored at Fordow. They must 

be taken up to Natanz. 

Second, we will have a major international not only IAEA daily 

presence, but an international presence—the Russians working 

with them on stable isotopes, new science opportunities. If they 

kick everybody out, you know—— 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Right away? 

Secretary MONIZ. The alarm bells go off. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Carter, with my last few seconds, 

do our military options become marginally better or worse before 

or after the agreement? 

Secretary CARTER. If the agreement is implemented, they become 

marginally better for the reason that under the agreement, the facilities are—we learn more about them. Many of them are dismantled, and so in that sense, that purely technical military sense, becomes somewhat easier. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Cotton? 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. 

I want to discuss the two secret side deals between the IAEA and 

Iran. I had to travel to Vienna last weekend to discover the existence of these side deals. The administration has now confirmed 

38 

their existence. There is still some lack of clarity about their content. 

Secretary Kerry, have you read either of these two side deals between the IAEA and Iran? 

Secretary KERRY. No, I haven’t read it. 

Senator COTTON. Have you read any previous drafts? 

Secretary KERRY. No, I haven’t. 

Senator COTTON. On any form—paper, tablet, computer? 

Secretary KERRY. I have been briefed. I have been briefed 

through our team that met with the IAEA. 

Senator COTTON. Did anyone on your team read the text of these 

agreements? 

Secretary KERRY. I believe one person may have read it at the— 

at the facility but doesn’t have it. They don’t possess it. 

Senator COTTON. What is that person’s name? 

Secretary KERRY. It is possible. I don’t know for sure, but it is 

possible Wendy Sherman may have. But I don’t know that for sure. 

Senator COTTON. Secretary Moniz, have you read the text of 

these agreements? 

Secretary MONIZ. No, sir. I have not seen them. 

Senator COTTON. Have you read any prior version? 

Secretary MONIZ. No, sir. 

Senator COTTON. On any medium—computer, tablet, phone? 

Secretary MONIZ. No. No. 

Senator COTTON. Has anyone on your team at the Department 

of Energy? 

Secretary MONIZ. Not—I am not sure. I don’t know. I think not, 

but I am not sure about that. I can ask in terms of the technical 

team may have—maybe somebody saw something. 

Senator COTTON. Please do and get back to us. 

Secretary MONIZ. Okay. 

Senator COTTON. Secretary Kerry, besides potentially Under Secretary Sherman, has, to your knowledge, anyone else in the United 

States Government reviewed the text of these agreements? 

Secretary KERRY. Not that I am aware of. I don’t know. I don’t 

think so. 

Senator COTTON. If Under Secretary Sherman has read the text 

of these agreements, even if they are not in her possession, does 

that not undercut the claims of confidentiality between the IAEA 

and Iran? 

Secretary KERRY. I don’t know whether she read a summary or 

a draft, I have no idea. I said I think, and I am not sure. But I 

know she is briefing the Senate very shortly, Senator. So she will 

be briefing in a classified setting. 

Senator COTTON. I have received several classified briefings 

about the deal, and I look forward to another one. But what Congress would like is the text of these agreements, as required by 

U.S. law. 

Certain published reports starting—or most recently with the Associated Press yesterday say that the content of the side deal that 

discusses Parchin, the military base where detonators for nuclear 

devices may have been tested, will allow Iran to collect their own 

samples and submit those samples to the IAEA, much like an NFL 

39 

[National Football League] player taking his own urine sample and 

sending it to Roger Goodell for a drug test. 

Can you confirm or deny that that is the content of those side 

deals? 

Secretary KERRY. I can’t here in this session. But what I can confirm is that Secretary Moniz, in his discussions both with the IAEA 

and with the team, made recommendations to them and I believe 

is satisfied that this can—whatever the process is, that the process 

will be able to provide the answers we need. 

I don’t know, Secretary Moniz, if you want to add anything to 

that? 

Senator COTTON. Actually, no, I would like to stick with you, Secretary Kerry. Why can’t we confirm or deny the content of these 

agreements in public? Why is this classified? It is not a sensitive 

U.S. Government document. The ayatollahs know what they agreed 

to. 

Secretary KERRY. Because we respect the process of the IAEA, 

and we don’t have their authorization to reveal what is a confidential agreement between them and another country. 

Senator COTTON. So the ayatollahs will know what they agreed 

to, but not the American people? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, the—no, not exactly. Because we will 

share with you in the classified briefing what we understand the 

context to be. But they negotiated the agreement with the IAEA. 

The IAEA is an independent entity under the United Nations, 

Senator, as I know you know. And under I don’t know even at this 

point what the law says about the United States requiring something which another entity’s laws prohibit. So we have to see 

whether that is a conflict of law or not. 

Senator COTTON. Well, U.S. law requires any deal between any 

party, not just the United States, to be submitted to Congress before the 60-day clock begins to tick. To the extent the IAEA, which 

I respect for the very admirable work they do, which is often not 

supported by their member states, says it is unprecedented, I 

would say this deal is without precedent. And past precedence with 

cooperative countries like South Korea or—I am sorry, South Africa 

cannot be cited. 

I would like to move on to a second topic, specifically Iran’s support for terrorism. Could I have Chart 1, please? 

40 

General Dempsey, this chart describes a particularly powerful 

kind of roadside bomb known as an explosively formed penetrator. 

Are you familiar with what it shows? 

General DEMPSEY. I am, Senator. 

Senator COTTON. Could you explain exactly what the bottom diagram shows of how an explosively formed penetrator works? 

General DEMPSEY. A copper cone is melted at super high temperatures and projected and essentially burns its way through 

armor plate. 

Senator COTTON. The copper disk travels at about 6,000 feet per 

second. 

Could I have Chart 2, please? So we can see what happens to a 

Humvee when a ball of fire travels at 6,000 feet per second. 


15-66_Chart1.eps 15-66_Chart2.eps
41 

General Dempsey, is that familiar to you? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, Senator, it is. 

Senator COTTON. Do you know how many American troops were 

killed by such explosively formed penetrators? 

General DEMPSEY. That particular incident or in general? 

Senator COTTON. No, in general. 

General DEMPSEY. Several hundred. 

Senator COTTON. Was Iran a main supplier of these explosively 

formed penetrators? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. Yes. 

Senator COTTON. Was Qasem Soleimani and the Quds Force and 

the Revolutionary Guard Corps the main perpetrators in Iran? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. 

Senator COTTON. Secretary Kerry, those entities and Qasem 

Soleimani will ultimately receive sanctions relief from this deal, 

not necessarily from the United States Government, but from the 

United Nations and the European Union. What should we say to 

the Gold Star moms and dads of the over 500 American troops who 

were killed by an Iranian ball of fire traveling 6,000 feet per second? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, we should tell them, obviously, first of 

all, how extraordinarily grateful we are for the service of their 

loved ones. We should also make it very, very clear that under the 

United States initiative, Qasem Soleimani will never be relieved of 

any sanctions. 

We would also tell them and lay out to them what we intend to 

do, which has not been done yet sufficiently, to push back against 

Iran’s behavior, that we have a number of laws in place, requirements by which we will be able to prevent Iran from transferring 

these weapons. 

And we have already engaged, Senator, in very forward- leaning 

initiatives to do that. We specifically turned around a convoy recently in the last months that was bringing weapons to Yemen, and 

we have been crystal clear, and I will be even more clear when I 

meet with the Gulf states, about our united efforts to hold them accountable for these kinds of activities. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you, all. My time has expired. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Hirono? 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to ask this question of all of the witnesses. But I 

would like to start with Secretary Carter and Chairman Dempsey. 

In your assessment and without getting into specifics which cannot be discussed in this open setting, is there any military, military 

strategy or response that would achieve the same goals as the 

agreement before us without embroiling the United States and our 

allies in a potentially devastating long-term war in the region? 

And I would like a ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ answer, given the setting. Starting with Secretary Carter? 

Secretary CARTER. I am sorry to be difficult on that, but I just 

need to understand the question a little bit more. Do you mean if 

there is no deal, and Iran gets a nuclear weapon? 

Senator HIRONO. If there no deal. 

Secretary CARTER. Then we have a serious issue. 

42 

Senator HIRONO. Well, not even that—— 

Secretary CARTER. We don’t give up at that point, but we would 

have to defend ourselves, our friends, and our allies in the face of 

that reality. Is that responsive to your question? 

Senator HIRONO. Well, the reality is that without this agreement, 

Iran can produce a nuclear bomb in 2 to 3 months. So, without this 

agreement, is there any military—I will reiterate the question. Is 

there any military strategy or response that would achieve the 

same goals as this agreement? More yes? More no? 

Secretary CARTER. I am going to have to say that there is a military response—maybe this is responsive to your question, Senator. 

There is a military option, which I know you have been briefed on, 

which has the effect, as I have said earlier, of setting back the Iranian nuclear program. 

It doesn’t stop it forever, but it substantially sets it back. We 

have talked about that publicly for quite a while. We work on that. 

And so, if that is responsive to your question, that exists. 

Senator HIRONO. But Mr. Secretary, the other part of my question is, though, yes, we can have a military response that would 

set them back, but would that military response involve us in a— 

basically a long-term war in that region? Would that be a highly 

likely outcome in the military? 

Secretary CARTER. Iran would surely respond to such an attack. 

So in a hypothetical situation in which that occurred, which this 

deal is intended to make unnecessary, Iran could respond for sure. 

Senator HIRONO. Chairman Dempsey? 

General DEMPSEY. One of my jobs, Senator, is never let the Nation run out of options. So we would not run out of options, but 

they would become increasingly costly, to be sure. 

Senator HIRONO. And long term? 

General DEMPSEY. And long term. 

Senator HIRONO. Yes. Secretary Kerry, would you care to respond and the other members of the panel? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I think—I think General Dempsey answered the question earlier when he said that the deal is far more 

durable and provides a more durable option and longer term, a period of time where it would be much more durable than the military option. 

I mean, my—look, I think it is pretty clear that if Iran were to 

start enriching or move back to its program, we have no inspectors. 

We have no sanctions that are universal. The United States can 

have them, but we have already seen sanctions don’t get them to 

give up the program. 

So you are stuck with a situation of what will change the dynamic of their program. And the fact is then you are in, as Secretary Carter has said and as General Dempsey has just said, they 

will respond. And then we will respond, and then it is back and 

forth. 

The question is, where does that end, and how does it end? And 

does it accomplish the goal of getting rid of their program? We 

don’t believe so. 

We believe this agreement accomplishes the goal and provides us 

with the support on a continuing basis of the international community. 

43 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Let me go on to another question because I am running out of 

time. This is for Secretary Carter and, again, Chairman Dempsey. 

Are you contemplating any changes in our force posture, assuming 

this agreement goes into effect and stays in effect? 

Secretary CARTER. Yes. It is a ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ answer. Yes, but if 

I could say more—— 

Senator HIRONO. Well, this is not a ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ answer. 

Secretary CARTER. If I could say more, Senator, in all seriousness? 

Senator HIRONO. Briefly. 

Secretary CARTER. Yes. We are doing a great deal in the Gulf. 

That is what I was there talking to our Gulf partners about. That 

is what we talked about at the GCC summit a few months ago. 

We are doing a great deal with Israel. I mentioned missile defense, the F–35 qualitative military edge. So this is a dynamic region with or without a deal, and one that has Iran and other problems to boot. And so, we have to and are doing a lot to strengthen 

our posture and our alliances and partnerships in the region, and 

we will continue to do so. 

Senator HIRONO. General Dempsey, would you like to weigh in? 

General DEMPSEY. With Israel, we are working on ballistic missile defense, maritime security, counterterrorism, and counter tunneling, which is a new and emerging challenge for the state of 

Israel. 

And with the GCC, it is ballistic missile defense, special operating forces, maritime, counterterror, and cyber. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I would like to tell the committee that the 

witnesses have to leave at 12:45 p.m. So the order will be Senator 

Rounds, Senator King, Senator Tillis, Senator Sullivan, Lee, and 

Graham. And no one else. I am sorry. 

So, Senator Rounds? 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your service. 

Today, you have gone through 15 different interrogators. I get to 

be number 16. One of the things that happens when you are number 16 is a lot of the questions that you have got have been asked. 

But it also gives you an opportunity to try to analyze and see just 

exactly what it is all about and what the real issues are, and I 

would like to just begin with this. 

It seems to me that one of the concerns that we have is, is if we 

assume that we have a rogue nation who is a threshold state today 

with regard to nuclear weapons, the goal of this was to eliminate 

them from having nuclear weapons or, in the second position, to 

delay the implementation or their capabilities with regard to nuclear weapons. 

I would like to know from the panel, and it is very simple, are 

we stopping them from getting nuclear weapons, or are we delaying 

them for a period of 10 to 15 years from getting nuclear weapons? 

In your opinion, General? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, my opinion, sir, our Government’s policy 

has been they will not get a nuclear weapon, and nothing we are 

talking about here today should change that policy. 

44 

Senator ROUNDS. Mr. Moniz? 

Secretary MONIZ. I agree with General Dempsey, and in terms 

of our capabilities to make sure that they are not pursuing a nuclear weapon, this agreement will leave us better off with the 

agreement than without the agreement forever. 

Senator ROUNDS. Mr. Carter, Secretary Carter? 

Secretary CARTER. I concur with those two. 

Secretary LEW. Senator, I have worn many hats in this administration. In each one, I have said Iran will not be permitted to get 

a nuclear weapon. I believe that deeply. 

Senator ROUNDS. Secretary Kerry? 

Secretary KERRY. And I agree. The President’s policy is they 

won’t get it. There is no—if they were to try to not implement this 

agreement or the implementation is not full, the other options are 

still available to us. They will not get a weapon. 

Secretary MONIZ. So, if I may? 

Senator ROUNDS. Yes. 

Secretary MONIZ. Just one note just to say that, in addition, I 

think it is significant that the agreement codifies with the P5+1 

that Iran will never get a nuclear weapon. 

Senator ROUNDS. And yet here is my question then, gentlemen. 

It appears to me that in each time I have heard the discussion 

comes back down to for a period of 10 years, we have something 

in terms of the agreement that restricts them. But somewhere between 10 and 15 years we change, and that during that time period, they can begin because there is nothing in the agreement 

which stops them from moving back into and adding to their nuclear capabilities. 

If they are a threshold state today and if we have delayed them, 

that is one thing. But if, at the end of this time period, they may 

freely pursue nuclear options, then I think that is really the gist 

that we are trying to decide. 

But along that line, and General Dempsey, I appreciated your 

thoughts here earlier when you said that you were pragmatic with 

regards to your comments. It seems to me that we had an embargo, 

which was in place, which many of us were relying on when it 

came to both an arms embargo and also with regard to ICBMs. You 

indicated that just matter of fact on July 7th of this year, you have 

heard it earlier, your quote was, ‘‘Under no circumstances should 

we relieve pressure on Iran relative to ballistic missile capabilities 

and arms trafficking.’’ 

Secretary Carter said, ‘‘The reason that we want to stop Iran 

from having an ICBM program is that the ‘‘I’’ in ICBM stands for 

‘‘intercontinental,’’ which means having the capability to fly from 

Iran to the United States, and we don’t want that.’’ 

Secretary Kerry indicated that there were other ways in which 

we could handle the situation. If we had an embargo in place and 

we had concerns about this, what is the purpose for the embargo 

if we had other means in the first place? 

General, clearly, this—seems to me that you were pretty clear 

that this was not exactly the kind of advice that you were suggesting that they allow this to come out? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, as I have said, Senator, I would have 

been happy to see the embargos maintained in perpetuity. I think 

45 

the question would have to be asked, were they likely to be sustained in perpetuity, given that they were imposed to bring Iran 

to the table? Once Iran came to the table, it then became truly a 

negotiation. 

And sanctions are only one way to keep pressure on those other 

malign activities. We have other instruments and other military 

options to pursue. 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, if I could add to that? We—obviously, 

all of us would prefer have it there forever and ever. The problem 

is we are dealing with a U.N. resolution, the nuclear resolution, 

1929, which said that the Iranians, if they come to negotiate and 

suspend, then all the sanctions would be lifted. That was what was 

contemplated by the empowering resolution here. 

Now the arms embargo was slid in at the very last minute by 

then-U.N. Permanent Representative Susan Rice. She got it in, and 

it really sort of slid into the nuclear provision itself. 

But under the nuclear provision, at the end of a period of time, 

when the IAEA would draw its broad conclusion, this would have 

been lifted completely anyway, and we had no power to stop that. 

So, in effect, our getting the 8 years was a victory. Our getting the 

5 years was a victory. But we have these other tools that completely strengthen our ability to do it in perpetuity. 

Senator ROUNDS. Secretary Carter, would you say that the—that 

today Iran does not have the capability of getting ICBM and that 

10 years from now, based upon the provisions in place without the 

embargo, that they would still not be able to have an ICBM? 

Secretary CARTER. They don’t have an ICBM today. I wouldn’t 

rule out that in 10 years Iran could progress to an ICBM. We have 

seen in North Korea develop and test missiles of increasing range, 

and they can do that on their own, as the North Koreans have done 

without a lot of external help. 

Now that doesn’t mean they would, and that is not a crystal ball 

of the future. But judging from principally the experience with 

North Korea, you can’t rule that out, and that is why we need to 

protect ourselves, whichever, whatever happens with the nuclear 

agreement, protect ourselves with missile defenses, with the other 

statutory and other international agreement protections that we 

have, deterrence and everything else. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King? Your time has expired, Senator. 

Senator King? And I would ask the Senators to respect the time 

limit. 

Senator KING. You heard the chairman. We are going to try to 

go through some of these questions as quickly as possible. 

Secretary Lew, what would the allies’ reaction be in terms of the 

sanctions if the U.S. rejected this agreement? 

Secretary LEW. Senator, I think that they have made clear that 

they think the agreement should be put into force. I don’t want to 

speak for any of them, but they are already taking actions to show 

that they are beginning to deal with Iran in a different way. 

The vice chancellor of Germany was over there with a group of 

business people. There is a French delegation over there. I think 

that, you know, they are going to take a very dim view of our rejecting this agreement. 

46 

On the other hand, I do believe they respect our unilateral sanctions. They fear them, and that will put them in a very difficult 

bind. But I don’t think that we will have as much capacity to bring 

the world community together in that situation as we have had up 

until now. 

Senator KING. And I suspect the reaction would be different 

among—China and Russia may have a different reaction than Germany? 

Secretary LEW. Yes. And I think if you look at like the developing countries, countries like India, they are not in the P5+1. And 

I just pick them because they are a big economy that is dependent 

on oil imports. 

We have had a sustained diplomatic engagement with many 

countries to keep them in line with our oil sanctions. That will get 

harder and harder if they see the rest of the world going another 

way. They are going to look and ask how much capacity do we have 

to take enforcement actions? Can they find ways around them? 

And ultimately, they will start doing business more and more in 

other countries. 

Senator KING. Would it be fair to say that the sanctions regime 

would fray, if not unravel? 

Secretary LEW. I think that is fair. I have been trying to be 

measured. 

Senator KING. Erode? 

Secretary LEW. Yes, I have been trying to be measured because 

I don’t believe it is black and white. I think it would start to fray, 

yes. 

Senator KING. I appreciate that. Secretary Carter, you just visited the Middle East. Is the danger of proliferation greater or lesser 

as a result of this agreement? In other words, are the allies or 

some of our allies in that region who may think about their own 

weapon, are they less likely to acquire a weapon because of this 

agreement or more likely? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, I think logic would suggest that if the 

agreement is implemented, meaning that Iran doesn’t have a nuclear weapon, that it is less likely that other states in the region 

get a nuclear weapon. 

Senator KING. Mr. Moniz, I know we are going to have a lot of 

time to talk about this, but there has been all this discussion about 

the secret agreement. It is true, is it not, that this agreement between the IAEA and Iran applies to the past—the past actions of 

Iran with regard to nuclear weapons at Parchin and other places 

but does not apply to future inspections? 

We know what the future inspection regime is going to be in 

order to implement this agreement. Is that correct? 

Secretary MONIZ. That is correct. Again, what the JCPOA accomplished is forcing Iran to cooperate with IAEA to finish the examination of past behavior. 

Senator KING. So the so-called ‘‘secret agreement’’ is for a small 

part of this deal, but it is not the essence of it, which is the inspections and verification of Iran’s compliance from today forward? 

Secretary MONIZ. That is correct, yes. 

Senator KING. And finally, in 28 seconds, this famous 24 days. 

Is there any way that they could clean up a facility where they had 

47 

been processing fissile material sufficiently that it could not be discovered if the inspection took place after 24 days? 

Secretary MONIZ. Well, you know, I can never say 0.00 percent, 

but—but with very, very high confidence, I think we would find nuclear material utilization evidence. Certainly the risk of getting 

caught would be extremely high. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Tillis? 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I hope that—I want to get back to, and Chairman Dempsey, I 

will start with you. But I want to go back to what you said, I think, 

in one of your responses to the malign activities that I believe that 

Secretary Carter in response to a question says he has no reason 

to believe that they will change. 

That is the Iran terror network. That is their increasing threat 

in terms of cyberterrorism. It is their ballistic missile program. It 

is their weapons trafficking. We could get into human rights violations, all the other things they are guilty of. We could get into an 

ayatollah sending a tweet out that has the image of some have said 

it is the President, some says it is an American. It is someone 

wearing an American lapel pin. 

These people are evil people, and they are going to continue to 

expand in the areas where they think they can. They are people 

who have violated 27 international agreements or treaties. 

They have violated some of the terms of the Nonproliferation 

Treaty. Some of that language is similar, as I understand, in the 

agreement that we have here today. 

So they are a dangerous—they are dangerous. I understand why 

you would be concerned with the nuclear threat because it could 

limit other military options if it existed. 

So my question is if this deal goes through, what does our posture look like in the Middle East and with our partners over the 

next 2 years? What looks measurably different to make us feel like 

we are in a position to make it untenable to the Iranian leadership 

to move forward with a nuclear weapon? 

General DEMPSEY. Senator, first, I do want to highlight the fact 

that when we talk about Iran, it is really the regime, and I know 

you know that. 

Senator TILLIS. There is no doubt about it. It is not about the 

Iranian people. 

General DEMPSEY. It is not the Iranian people. It is Qasem 

Soleimani, the IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps], Quds 

Force, and their leadership. The Iranian people, there is some reason to hope that this would actually cause them to understand that 

there is a place for them in the international community. 

But how does our posture change? Our posture changes on the 

basis of these areas on which we have agreed to work with our 

partners, both Israel and the GCC nations. And we are very muscular. We have a muscular posture in the region right now. 

For the most part, it will stay the same, but it may shift its activities a bit. 

Senator TILLIS. Secretary Carter or Chairman Dempsey, I am 

trying to get my hands around the thought process that would 

make the Saudis less likely to acquire a nuclear weapon, probably 

48 

acquire a nuclear weapon most likely from Pakistan, a warhead, 

and a ballistic missile from China that is capable of delivering a 

Pakistani warhead. 

Why would any of the leadership in Saudi Arabia, and then as 

a result of that, you only need one to spark other nuclear proliferation. Why on earth, if we are talking about a nation that has violated a number of treaties and agreements, the possibility that that 

could occur and a nation having to be prepared to have their own 

deterrent, where is the logic in this agreement preventing them 

from going ahead and moving forward and having that capability 

themselves? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, the agreement doesn’t limit what anybody else does. 

Senator TILLIS. Yes, I agree with you. I am saying why wouldn’t 

they? 

Secretary CARTER. The logic—I can’t speak for any of those countries, but the logic is that if Iran is effectively prevented from having a nuclear weapon, which is the purpose of this, then that cause 

at least for a Saudi Arabia or an Egypt or a Turkey to get their 

own nuclear weapon is removed, and logic would suggest that. I 

can’t speak for the psychology, but that is what logic would suggest. 

With respect to Iranian behavior, I mean, this comes down to a 

question of managing that risk because we see exactly what 

Iran’s—they say what at least the leadership is thinking. And the 

point is that it is better if they don’t have a nuclear weapon than 

if they do. 

This is an effective way of making sure that they don’t have a 

nuclear weapon. It does not eliminate all risk, especially with Iran. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Heinrich? 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Secretary Carter, some have suggested that military strikes 

against Iran could be both quick and effective, without acknowledging the costs and consequences and risks that that might entail. 

Could you talk a little bit about what the primary risks, both to 

the U.S. and to our allies, would be if we had to take that course 

of action? 

And could you speak to what would set Iran’s nuclear program 

back further, a military strike or this accord in terms of timeline? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, speaking now just very generally and 

not specifically, the two things that make the successful implementation of the agreement preferable from that point of view to a 

strike is that the effects of a strike are temporary. And second, that 

Iran would, as I said earlier, respond to an American military 

strike upon Iran, and one needs to think through then what the 

subsequent steps are, including the possibility that Iran, at that 

point, would become irreconcilably committed to getting a nuclear 

weapon. 

Now I say that is predicated on the effective implementation of 

this agreement. And effectively implemented, the agreement stops 

Iran from getting a nuclear weapon not just for 10 years and not 

just for 15 years, but by dint of the provision Secretary Moniz was 

talking about, way beyond that. So we are comparing that situaVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
49 

tion, which is effective implementation, complete implementation of 

this agreement, to the military option. 

Now we also have to recognize that there may not be effective 

implementation of this agreement. We have to recognize there may 

not be any agreement and so forth, and that is why we are under 

instructions from the President to preserve and, indeed, we are improving—and I can’t go into that here—the military option. 

Because temporary as it is and so forth, it needs to be there because that is our fallback if it is the only path left. 

Senator HEINRICH. Since we are pursuing this accord, under this 

accord, do you think that that option gets more effective and 

stronger or less effective over the course of implementation of this 

deal? 

Secretary CARTER. As I indicated earlier, from a purely technical 

and military point of view, it gets marginally more effective, and 

the reason for that is that we have a more complete understanding 

of where everything is that could be associated with their nuclear 

program that we might strike and have more detail about the nature of those things. And so, it just follows that we—— 

Senator HEINRICH. That makes perfect sense. Secretary Moniz, I 

want to get you because I don’t have a lot of time left. But can you 

talk a little bit, from the point of view of a nuclear physicist, about 

why it is so difficult to—if you have a covert facility where enrichment occurs, why it is so hard to sort of clean up the signs of having uranium or, for that matter, plutonium at a facility like that? 

And would you answer the question, would an undeclared facility 

itself be a violation of the JCPOA? 

Secretary MONIZ. Well, on the second part, absolutely an 

undeclared facility would be—would be a violation, and I think, 

frankly, a stern response would be in order. 

With regard to the cover-up, there is not too much we can say 

here in public. But just to say that the dealing with nuclear materials, whether it is enrichment or looking at the characteristics of 

uranium in an explosive situation, for example, would tend to leave 

lots of very, very small particles, difficult to clean up. But beyond 

that, we could talk in a classified environment. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you both very much. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sullivan? 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

You know, one of the frustrations that you are seeing here with 

the Congress is we are reading it. We are digging into it. And yet 

when we have questions, looking at the language, we seem to get 

these spin answers that don’t seem to comport with the language. 

So, Secretary Lew, Secretary Kerry, I want to go back to the 

snapback provision. But is there a term called ‘‘the snapback provision’’ in the agreement? 

Secretary KERRY. I don’t think it is specifically referred to as 

such. 

Senator SULLIVAN. No, there isn’t. The word ‘‘snapback’’ is not in 

the agreement. 

Secretary LEW. No, but it is created by the—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. Let me let me make my point, Mr. Secretary. 

I got a lot of questions, and I don’t have a lot of time. 

50 

I think it would be helpful if you didn’t use that term much. It 

is not in the agreement. I think, in some ways, it is deceitful because it is an illusion. And I think that, in many ways, the provision in the agreement—and I will have my question—the snapback 

is actually more focused on the United States than it is Iran. 

And as you know, Mr. Secretary, those of us who were involved, 

I was, in the Bush administration with getting countries to actually 

economically isolate Iran, we used a lot of leverage. We did use leverage with countries, saying, hey, you either are going to be in 

their market or ours. And that was effective. 

But it goes to this idea if there is some kind of snapback, that 

was a slog. That wasn’t a snap. That took years to get countries 

to divest out of the Iranian economy. It will take years to do it 

again. 

But let me ask a hypothetical. It was actually a question I asked 

during the closed hearing. A number of Senators, Republicans and 

Democrats, were not satisfied with the answer, and it focuses a little bit on what Senator Ayotte said. 

So let us assume sanctions are lifted. We get the, whatever, $60 

billion—the Iranians are looking for $120 billion of additional investment. So that is on top of what we would have in terms of 

whether it is $59 billion or $60 billion. 

No violations of the agreement. The economy is humming along. 

There is an act of terrorism. By the way, the sanctions that are lifted are Annex 2, which is essentially all our bullets. This is a lot 

of American power, including the unilateral sanctions that you 

mentioned, Secretary Lew, on the financial system. 

An act of terrorism happens. It is big. They kill more American 

troops. They blow up a consulate. It is likely. I think it is likely 

that they are going to do that in the next 10 years. 

The Congress is upset. The new President is upset. We impose 

sanctions. We reimpose Annex 2 sanctions. This is our power. 

And Mr. Secretary, Secretary Lew, I am glad that you have 

talked about how this is power. We do have a lot of unilateral 

power with regard to sanctions. So then Iran cites paragraph 26 of 

the agreement, and I am going to read it. 

It says, ‘‘Iran will treat such a reintroduction or reimposition of 

sanctions as grounds to cease performing its commitments.’’ Deal 

is over. 

They are cranking. Their economy is cranking. We just sanction 

them for terrorism with these sanctions, and they can walk. They 

can legally walk from this agreement. 

So let me ask you this. If we ever, ever impose so- called snapback sanctions, isn’t the deal over? Where am I wrong on that 

question? 

Secretary LEW. Well, Senator, we would snap sanctions back 

once they violated the agreement. 

Senator SULLIVAN. No, no. I am talking about—no, no. I am not 

talking about a violation of the agreement. 

Secretary LEW. Let us talk about two different about two different worlds. One, they violate—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. Answer the question. You didn’t answer it in 

the closed setting. You are not answering it now. 

51 

Secretary LEW. You asked two questions. I was answering the 

first one. I was just taking them in order. 

The first set of questions you asked was about the snapback, 

does it work? Yes, it works because if they violate the agreement, 

our unilateral sanctions, we can do. As you know, I have the authority to put those back into place. The U.N. sanctions were structured so they will go back into place. 

Senator SULLIVAN. And they can walk. 

Secretary LEW. No. That is if they violate the nuclear agreement. 

So scenario one is they violate the nuclear agreement. 

Scenario two, they blow up some facility. They take an act of terrorism. They do something non-nuclear. We have the right to put 

these kinds of measures in place. They are not nuclear sanctions 

at that point. They are terrorism sanctions at that point. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Iran has stated that it will treat such reintroduction, reimposition of the sanctions in Annex 2—— 

Secretary LEW. But, Senator, it is not—— 

Senator SULLIVAN.—in Annex 2 as grounds to cease performing 

its commitments. How am I not reading that correctly? 

Secretary LEW. Sir, Annex 2 illustrates, lists the nuclear sanctions—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. The Senator’s time has expired. 

Senator SULLIVAN. I know what is in Annex 2. It is huge. 

Secretary LEW. Right. 

Senator SULLIVAN. The Senator’s time has expired. 

Secretary LEW. And I am happy to pursue this in greater detail. 

It is an important issue, but we have not given away our ability 

to put these kinds of measures in place for non-nuclear purposes, 

provided they comply with the nuclear agreement. 

If they don’t live with the nuclear agreement, they go back for 

violation of the nuclear agreement. 

Senator SULLIVAN. I think the Iranians have a different view. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Lee? 

Senator LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have got a number of questions regarding the military implications of this deal. There is one other issue I want to follow up on, 

though. 

Secretary Kerry, why isn’t this a treaty? And as a treaty, why 

isn’t it subject to advice and consent with two-thirds of the Senate 

concurring? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, there are many reasons why, Senator, 

not the least of which is that we don’t have diplomatic relations 

with Iran. This is a situation with a multilateral agreement with 

many countries, and you don’t normally negotiate a treaty in that 

kind of context. So it is a political agreement, and we believe that 

the leverages that are in it through the snapback of sanctions, 

through the oversight and the inspections are very powerful incentives for Iran’s compliance. 

Senator LEE. Okay. I would note that there is nothing in Article 

II, Section 2 that limits the definition of treaty along the lines of 

what you described. And in fact, nothing in your definition of the 

term ‘‘treaty’’ on the State Department’s own Web site limits it that 

way, and it defines ‘‘treaty’’ as ‘‘a formal written agreement beVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
52 

tween sovereign states or between states and international organizations.’’ 

It doesn’t limit it to the fact that it has to be between two. I don’t 

think that is an adequate answer, but we will move on. 

General Dempsey, presumably, one of the weapon systems that 

Iran is likely to acquire and that Russia has indicated a willingness to sell would be an advanced air defense system. Can you describe for us what kind of impact this might have on U.S. military 

operations? For example, a hostage rescue operation, reconnaissance operations, and so forth? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, there is no question, Senator, it would 

make application of the military option to reduce their nuclear capability more difficult and—but not impossible. But more difficult. 

Senator LEE. Thank you. 

Now Wendy Sherman, the chief negotiator for the United States 

during these talks, stated in February of last year, of 2014, to the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Iranian ballistic missiles 

were ‘‘indeed going to be part of something that would have to be 

addressed as part of the comprehensive agreement.’’ 

Now, Secretary Kerry, at that time, was Secretary Sherman referring to lifting the U.N. embargo on ballistic technology when she 

made this statement to the Foreign Relations Committee, or did 

the United States intend to include restrictions on ballistic missiles 

in this agreement? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, it does include. In fact, it is under Chapter 7 and enforceable therefore under the United Nations Article 

41. And there are restrictions within this agreement. 

And I would also comment on the earlier question that the defensive weapons are not covered by the embargo. So the S–300, for instance, from Russia is not covered anyway. 

Senator LEE. I do have to ask you another question, Secretary 

Kerry. Given the fact that one of the problems that we have got 

with Iran, one of the reasons why we are so concerned about Iran 

getting nuclear weapons has to do with the fact that this is a roguish state, a state that has made not only threats, but taken aggressive actions toward the United States and her allies. 

It has taken—made threats to wipe Israel off the map, for example. There are real reasons why we don’t want them getting nuclear arms. 

In light of the fact that that is the biggest reason why we are 

so concerned, why we are willing to enter into negotiations to possibly lift sanctions against Iran, giving Iran a big economic benefit, 

why, why on earth didn’t we insist as a condition precedent to getting any deal at all that Iran, for the love of God, cease and desist 

from its terrorist ambitions, cease and desist from making comments like that it wants to wipe Israel off the map, cease and desist from undertaking and funding acts of terrorism against the 

United States and her allies? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, as was mentioned earlier, look, it would 

be great and ideal if one could negotiate that. I am not sure how 

long it would take. And given the imperatives that we had with respect to Iran’s 19,000 centrifuges, 12,000 kilograms of weapons 

fissile material equal to 10 to 12 bombs already, their mastering 

of the fuel cycle, and their near imminent finishing of the Arak reVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
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actor, which would have produced weapons-grade plutonium at the 

rate of two weapons a year, we felt that we had to keep this targeted on the greatest threat of all that you have just defined, which 

is the potential of their having a nuclear weapon. 

And if, indeed, they are meaning to translate their slogans of 

‘‘death to America, death to Israel’’ into policy, then getting rid of 

the nuclear weapon is everybody’s first imperative here. So that is 

what we focused on because we knew that you could get tangled 

up. Our definition, you know, one man’s freedom fighter is another 

man’s terrorist. 

You can be fighting forever on the issue of Sunni, Shia, definitions of who is protecting whom, and you won’t get anywhere. You 

literally will not get there. That is why we separated those activities. 

Now that does not—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Manchin? 

Secretary KERRY. That does not reduce our commitment, as we 

have defined here again and again, to push back on every one of 

those activities. But it is easier to push back against an Iran that 

doesn’t have a nuclear weapon than one that does. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Manchin has one question, I believe? 

Senator MANCHIN. I just have one. Yes, one question very quick. 

I read—and I just want to go over this and just any reaction you 

may have. Fareed Zakaria wrote, and I read this in my local paper 

back home. 

‘‘Let us imagine the opponents of the nuclear agreement with 

Iran get their way. The United States Congress kills it. What is the 

most likely consequence? Within 1 year, Iran would have more 

than 25,000 centrifuges. Its breakout time would shrink to mere 

weeks, and the sanction against it would crumble. How is this in 

America’s national interest, Israel’s or Saudi Arabia’s or any of the 

people in that area?’’ 

And they say it is not a plausible scenario. In 2005, three European powers rejected a nuclear deal with Iran with 2 years of negotiation. So all I would ask is if this does collapse, does it put them 

on an accelerated—with their intentions being shown already, does 

it put them on an accelerated path? And I think maybe it might 

be—— 

Secretary KERRY. Well, we believe so. The President believes it. 

Our intel community believes it. Our intel community has made it 

very clear to us what—that there is no return to negotiations with 

this ayatollah and that they will then believe we have given them 

the reason that they have to develop a nuclear weapon. 

Senator MANCHIN. Well, let me just say—— 

Secretary KERRY. Because we won’t deal in good faith. 

Senator MANCHIN. John—I’m sorry, Secretary. Between November 2012 and 2013, even when we had the noose around their neck, 

they still produced 6,000 more centrifuges. So their determination 

is to do it no matter how much we have them strangled. Correct? 

And Secretary Moniz, have you all followed that as far as—— 

Secretary MONIZ. That is quite correct, yes. 

Senator MANCHIN. So they are determined. They are going to 

move forward? 

54 

Secretary MONIZ. Absolutely. They have declared they would go 

to hundreds of thousands of SWU [Separative Work Unit] versus 

the current 20,000—— 

Senator MANCHIN. And you believe in the heart of hearts and 

deep in your soul—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. The one question is now expired. 

Senator Graham? 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 

General Dempsey, do you believe the Iranians have been trying 

to build a bomb or a nuclear power program for peaceful purposes 

all of these years? 

General DEMPSEY. I believe they have a militarization aspiration. 

Senator GRAHAM. Who is the commander-in-chief of the Iranian 

armed forces, Secretary Carter? Who calls the shots? 

Secretary CARTER. The supreme leader. 

Senator GRAHAM. Who decides if Iran goes to war? The supreme 

leader, right? 

Secretary CARTER. I believe so, yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Who decides if they try to break out, the supreme leader? 

Secretary CARTER. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Does the supreme leader’s religious views compel him over time to destroy Israel and attack America? 

Secretary CARTER. I don’t know. I don’t know the man. I only—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, let me tell you, I do. 

Secretary CARTER.—read what he says. I read what he says. 

Senator GRAHAM. I know the man. I know what he wants. And 

if you don’t know that, this is not a good deal. 

Could we win a war with Iran? Who wins the war between us 

and Iran? Who wins? Do you have any doubt who wins? 

Secretary CARTER. No. The United States wins a war. 

Senator GRAHAM. We win. Is it your testimony here that Saudi 

Arabia is okay with this deal, and they have committed to you they 

are not going to feel compelled to get a bomb because of this deal? 

Secretary CARTER. No. My testimony is that I can’t speak for 

Saudi Arabia. I have spoken to Saudi Arabia. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, you have spoken for Saudi Arabia all 

over the American media, reassuring everybody on this committee 

they are okay. 

Secretary CARTER. I reported what they said. So—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, you think they were lying to you? 

Secretary CARTER. Of course not. Of course not. 

Senator GRAHAM. Or do you think they would want weapons? Do 

you think they were telling you what you wanted to hear to give 

them weapons? 

Secretary CARTER. I only could say what they said. This is a little 

bit like what is the ayatollah thinking? I only read what he says. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, okay. Fine. 

Secretary CARTER. And I just take it at face value. 

Senator GRAHAM. Who is your counterpart, Mr. Moniz? What is 

his name? 

Secretary MONIZ. Mr. Salehi. 

55 

Senator GRAHAM. Have you read what he said on July 22nd, according to Middle East Media Research Institute, about the side 

deal? He said, let us see, ‘‘We have reached an understanding with 

the IAEA. God willing, there will be very positive results. We do 

not accept the PMD [Previous Military Dimensions] arrangement. 

We don’t agree with that, and we reject the concept.’’ 

What kind of arrangement has he made to make him feel so positive? 

Secretary MONIZ. First of all, I had not read it. That is the first 

question—— 

Senator GRAHAM. I am going to give it to you. 

Secretary MONIZ. Second—— 

Senator GRAHAM. You don’t have to answer. Would it be surprising to you that he is telling the Iranian people don’t worry 

about this side deal. We are going to get a good outcome? 

Secretary MONIZ. I assume what he is suggesting is that—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, if you didn’t know about it—— 

Secretary MONIZ. Is that there were no nuclear materials in 

Parchin, and that remains to be seen. That is my assumption, but 

I don’t know. 

Senator GRAHAM. I assumed that he is saying that we have 

reached an arrangement that we are okay with. That is what I assume, but the difference does matter. 

Secretary MONIZ. I would read it differently just from hearing it. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Well, we don’t know what he means. 

And apparently, we don’t know what the ayatollah wants. I know 

what he means. He means he has reached an agreement where 

they don’t have to worry about an inspection, and I think the ayatollah will eventually acquire a nuclear weapon unless somebody 

stops him. 

Do our allies in Israel, across all party lines, believe this is a bad 

deal, Secretary Kerry? 

Secretary KERRY. No. Not everybody believes it is a bad deal. 

Senator GRAHAM. Name one political party in Israel. 

Secretary KERRY. Oh, political party? I am sorry. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, people who are actually governing the 

country. Name one political party in Israel that is for this deal. 

Secretary KERRY. I didn’t hear you say political party. 

Senator GRAHAM. I am sorry. I—— 

Secretary KERRY. Political parties are opposed. 

Senator GRAHAM. Every political party in Israel is opposed to 

this deal. So when you speak about Israel in this deal, it is not 

BiBi [Netanyahu], it is everybody. 

Thank you. 

Secretary KERRY. No, Senator, it is not. 

Chairman MCCAIN. The Senator’s time has—— 

Secretary KERRY. It is actually not everybody. Ami Ayalon, the 

former head of Shin Bet—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Not a political party. 

Secretary KERRY. No, but you said everybody in Israel. 

Chairman MCCAIN. The time has expired. I don’t think we—Senator Cruz? 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

56 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here. I would ask that your answers be brief because my time is limited. 

General Soleimani, the head of the al-Quds Forces, has more 

blood of American service members on his hands than any living 

terrorist. Under this agreement, the sanctions on General 

Soleimani are lifted. 

Now Secretary Kerry said to the families of those men and 

women who gave their lives, who were killed by General Soleimani 

we should apologize. 

Secretary KERRY. I never said we should apologize. 

Senator CRUZ. Secretary Carter, I understand that the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency has a classified list of roughly 500 American soldiers who were murdered by Iranian IEDs [improvised explosive devices]. I would ask, Secretary Carter, so that we can do 

what Secretary Kerry suggested, that the Defense Department release that list to every member of this committee, declassify that 

list and release it directly to the service members’ families who 

were murdered by General Soleimani. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, let me look into that, and I will get back 

to you, Senator. 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, I never said the word ‘‘apology.’’ I 

never mentioned apologize. I said we should thank them for their 

extraordinary service. I never said a word ‘‘apologize.’’ Please, don’t 

distort my words. 

Senator CRUZ. Secretary Kerry, it is duly noted that you do not 

apologize to the families of the service members who were murdered by the Iranian military. 

Secretary KERRY. That is not what I said, Senator. 

Senator CRUZ. Do you apologize or not? I don’t want to put words 

in your mouth. So which one is it? 

Secretary KERRY. I thank them. I thank them for their extraordinary service, and I would remind them that the United States of 

America will never take the sanctions off Qasem Soleimani. 

Senator CRUZ. Sir, I just want clarity. Do you apologize or not? 

Because you wanted to clarify that point. 

Secretary KERRY. I said we thank them for their service, but we 

will not take the sanctions off Qasem Soleimani. 

Senator CRUZ. All right. Secretary Moniz, I want to turn to a different question. The single greatest threat to the United States if 

Iran acquires a nuclear weapon is that of an electromagnetic pulse, 

a nuclear weapon detonated in the atmosphere over the Eastern 

Seaboard that could kill tens of millions of Americans. 

On July 23rd in testimony before Congress, you told the United 

States Senate you hadn’t read the congressionally mandated commission on EMPs [electromagnetic pulses] and that you didn’t 

know what an EMP was. 

Secretary MONIZ. That is incorrect. I said I did not know this 

2008 report recommendations. I said I was quite familiar with the 

issue, and we all know about EMPs from airburst nuclear weapons. 

Senator CRUZ. Secretary Moniz, let me read the testimony verbatim so that I don’t mischaracterize you. 

‘‘Senator Johnson—’’ Let me—sir, let me read what you said. 

Secretary MONIZ. Please. 

57 

Senator CRUZ. ‘‘Senator Johnson: Are you familiar with the 

EMPs commission’s 2008 report?’’ 

‘‘No, I am not, sir.’’ 

‘‘You are not? Do you know—do you know what an EMP is?’’ 

‘‘You will have to explain it to me, please.’’ 

Secretary MONIZ. What? 

Senator CRUZ. I find that stunning. This is testimony. You can 

read the record. 

Secretary MONIZ. That was about the report. If you read further 

in the testimony, you will see my explicit statement. Of course, I 

know about the issue. I happen to know something about nuclear 

weapons. I know about EMPs. I know about various actions—— 

Senator CRUZ. Do you agree that an EMP detonated by Iran in 

the atmosphere could kill tens of millions of Americans? 

Secretary MONIZ. An EMP detonated by anyone obviously is a 

very potent weapon. 

Senator CRUZ. It could kill tens of millions of Americans. Do you 

agree with that? 

Secretary MONIZ. That would depend, obviously, on the specifics 

of the case. 

Senator CRUZ. But do you agree that it could? 

Secretary MONIZ. It depends upon the specifics. These are highly 

variable. 

Senator CRUZ. Does that mean, yes, it could? 

Secretary MONIZ. I said it is highly variable in its impact. 

Senator CRUZ. Okay. You are refusing to answer the question. 

Secretary Carter, is it correct that Iran is the leading state sponsor of terrorism in the world? 

Secretary CARTER. I was asked before, and I believe that is true, 

yes. 

Senator CRUZ. Do you have any doubt whatsoever if in excess of 

$100 billion goes to Iran that some of that money will go to 

jihadists who will use it to murder Americans? 

Secretary CARTER. I can’t say that. I can say that their malign 

activities about which we are extremely concerned are quite well 

funded today. 

Senator CRUZ. Okay. But finally, because I just have a second 

left—— 

Secretary CARTER. And it is those malign activities and the rest 

of the conduct that makes it so important that they not also have 

a nuclear weapon. 

Senator CRUZ. Finally, because I just have a second left, Secretary Kerry, you told Senator Lee that this was not a treaty because we don’t have diplomatic relations with Iran. I would note 

that is directly contrary to the testimony you gave yesterday to the 

House. 

Secretary KERRY. No, it is—— 

Senator CRUZ. When you were asked—when you were asked why 

is this not considered a treaty? And I will read your answer verbatim. 

‘‘Well, Congressman, I spent quite a few years——’’ 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, I know what I—— 

Senator CRUZ. Sir, let me ask the question. 

58 

Secretary KERRY. You are not reading my whole answer because 

I also said what I just said. 

Senator CRUZ. Well, Congressman—Secretary Kerry? 

Chairman MCCAIN. The Senator’s time—I apologize. The Senator’s time has expired, and I promised the witnesses that I would 

get them out, as every member that wanted to was able to ask 

questions. 

I would appreciate—I want to tell the witnesses I appreciate 

their patience. I know it has been a very long morning for them. 

I also know that they appreciate the gravity of this issue and the 

importance of allowing every member of the committee to at least 

ask questions and be informed by your testimony. 

So, Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Mr. Chairman, could we keep the record open in 

case there are Senators that have written questions? 

Chairman MCCAIN. I am sure that Senator Manchin will have a 

written question for you. 

Senator NELSON. And I will as well. 

Chairman MCCAIN. So—as will Senator Nelson. 

Chairman MCCAIN. So I want to thank the witnesses, and this 

is a very important issue and the testimony has been very important I think not only to members of the committee, but the entire 

Senate. I thank the witnesses. 

We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

TRUST WITH GULF ALLIES

Senator WICKER. Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, let me start by making 

some observations about the Persian Gulf, and then ask some questions about our 

allies in the Gulf—specifically Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In 2009 the U.S. entered 

into a civilian nuclear energy cooperation agreement or 123 agreement with the 

United Arab Emirates (UAE). As part of the agreement, the UAE renounced the 

military use of nuclear technology and signed the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, which 

institutes a more stringent inspections regime on the UAE’s nuclear activities. 

The UAE 123 agreement is now known as the nonproliferation ‘‘gold standard’’ 

for nuclear cooperation agreements. I would observe that this gold standard addresses Israel’s primary concerns about nuclear cooperation with our partners in the 

Gulf. I would also observe that the U.S. has not reached a 123 agreement with 

Saudi Arabia because the Saudis will not agree to an agreement that achieves a 

similar gold standard. 

Finally, I’d observe that despite being a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Treaty (NPT), Iran swore never to obtain nuclear weapons or to use nuclear technology for military purposes. But Iran has consistently cheated and lied to the IAEA 

for 30 years, with seven of eight major nuclear sites started secretly in violation of 

the NPT. 

1. Secretary Carter, you recently returned from a visit to Saudi Arabia. How did 

you explain to our Saudi friends that the Administration trusts Iran more than we 

trust the Saudis? How would you explain to our friends in the UAE that the Administration trusts Iran more than we trust the Emirates? 

Secretary CARTER. To be clear, the nuclear accord with Iran is not about trust but 

about verification. As Secretary of Defense, I will continue to ensure that appropriate military options are available to the President. During my trip to Saudi Arabia in July, I conveyed this message at the highest levels of the Saudi government 

and reiterated that the Iran nuclear deal is in our common interest as it will further 

a more stable and secure region. Furthermore, I reminded the Saudis of the 

strength of our strategic partnership, as well as that U.S. assurances to protect 

59 

Saudi Arabia’s security do not change in light of a nuclear agreement with Iran. The 

United States continues to work with each country—as well as multilaterally with 

the Gulf Cooperation Council States—toward strengthening the regional security architecture in a manner that, combined with the strong U.S. military force posture 

in the region, deters Iran from coercing its neighbors. My message to the United 

Arab Emirates is and will remain in the same vein. Advanced partnerships with our 

Gulf partners, as well as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, clearly support 

U.S., Saudi, and Emirati strategic interests in Middle East stability. 

2. Senator WICKER. General Dempsey, based on your engagement with your Saudi 

counterparts, is it your professional military judgement that the Saudi military and 

intelligence services view Iran as a threat? The U.S. has Patriot missile batteries 

on alert in Bahrain. Is it correct to say that these missile batteries are intended 

to thwart a missile attack from Iran? 

General DEMPSEY. [Deleted.] 

IRAN AND THE MILITARY OPTION

Senator WICKER. The arms embargo and ballistic missile restrictions on Iran will 

be lifted not later than eight years from now, and possibly much sooner. 

3. What problems do you see the lifting of these restrictions creating for our regional allies and for our own forces operating in the Middle East? 

Secretary CARTER. The only arms and missile sanctions that will be relieved are 

those that were put in place by the United Nations Security Council, which expressly linked the sanctions to concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. The United 

States has a number of domestic and other multilateral authorities related to 

counterterrorism and counter proliferation that we will continue to use to counter 

Iran’s destabilizing activities. Those tools include sanctions under U.S. law that generally target weapons of mass destruction and missile proliferation around the 

world. The United States will continue efforts to counter missile proliferation to 

Iran through the use of U.S. domestic law sanctions, export controls, and the 34- 

country Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Finally, the U.S. military is 

postured in the region to act as a deterrent against any Iranian military aggression. 

Furthermore, the Department will continue to advocate for strong international 

responses, including U.S. action, if Iran should violate U.S. or other multilateral 

sanctions. Coalition efforts to stop Iranian shipments to Yemen demonstrate our resolve on this matter. 

General DEMPSEY. Our regional allies understand that the United States is committed to defense of the region. Our military remains engaged through forward basing, joint and combined exercises, and senior-leader engagements. In my discussions 

with our allies in the region, they express their confidence in our security cooperation and security assistance efforts to develop their respective armed forces into a 

deterrent force to counter Iran’s malign activities in the gulf. 

4. Senator WICKER. What steps can we take to deal with the challenges created 

by Iran expanding its activities in these arenas? 

Secretary CARTER. The Administration is fully aware of the threat posed by the 

Iranian ballistic missile program. That is why the Administration has taken the 

steps to ensure that the United States is protected today by the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system from potential Iranian Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles. The Administration is also taking steps to increase the effectiveness of the 

GMD system by 1) improving the reliability of the Ground-Based Interceptor kill vehicle; 2) deploying a Long-Range Discrimination Radar in Alaska; and 3) enhancing 

the discrimination capabilities of currently deployed ground-based sensors. The Department continuously monitors Iran’s efforts to develop ballistic missiles and are 

prepared to take steps, as necessary, to ensure that the United States remains protected from future Iranian threats. 

General DEMPSEY. The first step will be to prevent Iran from acquiring advanced, 

offensive weapons by working with our partners to be selective in what they choose 

to sell to Iran. With respect to curbing ballistic missile acquisition, we will continue 

to employ the Missile Technology Control Regime members’ voluntary export. I don’t 

assume that these efforts will be 100 percent successful, so the second step will be 

to deter and contain Iran’s conventional and ballistic missile capabilities. If Iran 

continues to abide by the JCPOA, they will one day be able to legally import and 

export weapons, but we will retain the right—through multiple UNSCRs—to interdict illegal shipments to their proxies. In addition to enabling our partners’ conventional forces, we will also help to build missile defenses in both the region and at 

home that will significantly diminish Iran’s ballistic missile threat. 

60 

ARMS EMBARGO AND MISSILE EMBARGO

Senator WICKER. The JCPOA makes no mention of the arms embargo or the missile embargo. Rather, these provisions were included in United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 2231. Regarding this, Foreign Minister Zarif said on July 21, 

‘‘The issue of missiles and the purchase and sale of arms is implicitly beyond the 

[scope of the] deal. It is only included in a resolution and its non-implementation 

will not be considered a violation of the deal,’’ 

5. General Dempsey, according to UN Security Council Resolution 2231, the arms 

embargo on Iran will be lifted if the IAEA submits a report that concludes that 

Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful. General Dempsey, is that of concern to you? 

General DEMPSEY. While it is unlikely that the IAEA will reach its Broader Conclusions before the 5 or 8 year thresholds, it may do so if Iran proved cooperative, 

open and honest about its program. The JCPOA buys us time while we continue 

to focus on Iranian malign activity. 

6. Senator WICKER. General Dempsey, can you clarify whether violations of the 

arms embargo would be considered violations of the JCPOA? Would we be able to 

snapback sanctions should Iran violate the arms and missile embargos? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, a violation of the arms embargo would be a violation of 

the JCPOA. According to the agreement, the U.S. may unilaterally respond to an 

Iranian violation by choosing not to meet its commitments in whole or in part. The 

U.S. may also invoke its option to call for a U.N. Security Council vote to maintain 

the suspension of sanctions. Under the agreement, the U.S. may act unilaterally to 

snap-back sanctions through its veto option as a standing member of the U.N. Security Council. 

7. Senator WICKER. General Dempsey, is Iran continuing to provide arms to Shiite 

militias in Iraq? To Houthi rebels in Yemen? To the Assad regime? To Hezbollah? 

If the answer is yes, isn’t Iran already violating key UNSC resolutions? 

General DEMPSEY. Iran has sent arms and humanitarian aid to the Houthis, supported the Assad regime through weapons, funds, and advisors, and remains Lebanese Hezbollah’s principal supporter. As a result, Iran is in violation of a number 

of UNSCRs including the resolution that established the arms embargo against 

Iran, UNSCR 1747. 

QUALITATIVE MILITARY EDGE

Senator WICKER. We are Israel’s strongest strategic ally. We work closely together 

in areas like missile and cyber defense and to uphold the IDF’s qualitative military 

edge (QME). Israel believes this deal with Iran will create significant additional defense challenges. 

8. General Dempsey, beyond the high-profile and valued cooperation on programs 

like Iron Dome, David Sling and the sale of the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter, how can 

we work more closely with Israel to tangibly bolster their security and deterrence 

in this more challenging regional strategic environment? 

General DEMPSEY. The United States is Israel’s strongest strategic ally. Preserving Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge remains a priority. Our military cooperation with the Israel Defense Force is extensive and we will continue to work closely 

with our Israeli partners to prioritize Israel’s security concerns and support them 

through the most advanced technology. 

BALLISTIC MISSILES

Senator WICKER. The threat from ballistic missiles, rockets and cruise missiles 

continues to expand with terrifying speed across the Mideast. These weapons are 

being regularly used in Egypt, Gaza, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and elsewhere throughout 

the region. And yet we have just concluded an agreement with the nation supplying 

most of these weapons to its Middle East proxies in which constraints on such delivery systems are noticeably absent. In fact, the nuclear deal with Iran actually lifts 

current missile restrictions on Tehran after eight years. The Iranian regime certainly can be expected to increase its missile programs with investment from 

unfrozen financial assets in order to project strategic dominance while waiting out 

the decade-long clock limiting its atomic arms program. 

9. General Dempsey, what is your current assessment of Iran’s ballistic missile 

program and the capabilities of the U.S. and our regional allies to defend against 

Iranian missile attacks? 

General DEMPSEY. [Deleted.] 

61 

10. Senator WICKER. General Dempsey, do you foresee the possibility that if Iran’s 

ballistic missile capabilities continue to expand in size and sophistication there may 

be a similar phenomenon with other regional states? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, the other regional states feel threatened by Iran and will 

look to improve their ballistic missile defense capabilities as well as seek an offensive strike capability to counter potential Iranian aggression. 

11. Senator WICKER. General Dempsey, what are the consequences for U.S. and 

partner security of Iran’s unrestricted missile and rocket developments? Is there a 

probability that our Gulf partners will seek their own advanced surface-to-surface 

delivery systems in response? What is the risk for American forces in theater? 

General DEMPSEY. Iran’s missile and rocket development continues to pose a potential threat for U.S. forces and partner nations in the region. I believe our Gulf 

partners will seek their own advanced surface-to-surface delivery systems. Iran’s 

missile and rocket capability will place our own forces operating in the Middle East 

in more danger as Iran develops more capable weapon systems and continues its 

malign activities in the region. 

12. Senator WICKER. General Dempsey, what more—beyond current activities—do 

our Israeli partners need from us in countering the ballistic capabilities of Iran and 

its proxies that surround the Jewish state on virtually all sides? 

General DEMPSEY. We are commited to working with Israel to address the Iranian 

ballistic missile threat. We are co-developing missile defense technology with Israel 

on David’s Sling and the Arrow system and continue to prioritize Israel missile defense efforts. Since 2001, we have provided over three billion dollars for Ballistic 

Missile Defense to Israel, including funding for Iron Dome. More recently, the Secretary visited Israel in July and discussed this topic with both Prime Minister 

Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Ya’alon. Our continued work with Israel on the 

threat posed by Iran’s ballistic missile forces is steadfast. 

Senator WICKER. Current assessments of Iran’s capabilities indicate the range, accuracy and quantity of Iran’s ballistic arsenal today is improving dramatically in 

real time. Iran has been successfully using its space launcher program as a civilian 

cover for development of an ICBM. 

13. General Dempsey, can U.S. and allied missile defenses sufficiently cope with 

this rapidly-evolving situation? 

General DEMPSEY. We are matching the threat through the deployment and development of missile defense systems as part of European Phased Adaptive Approach 

capability as the US contribution to NATO ballistic missile defense. We currently 

have a radar system deployed to Turkey and an Aegis BMD ship in the Eastern 

Mediterranean. Soon we will activate the Aegis Ashore site in Romania and begin 

construction of one in Poland. 

IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL

Senator WICKER. Secretary Carter, you had the opportunity to visit Israel last 

week and General Dempsey, you did the same last month. As you both no doubt 

heard, the Israeli defense and security leadership have profound reservations about 

the Iran agreement—viewing it as so fundamentally flawed as to be in essence an 

international recognition of Iran as an emergent nuclear weapons state in the region. 

14. Secretary Carter, what can you tell us about Israel’s concerns about the proposed deal, based on your conversations with your Israeli counterparts? 

Secretary CARTER. Israel has made its concerns with the nuclear agreement with 

Iran well known. The concerns shared with me during my visit to Israel are consistent with those being publicly articulated. Friends can disagree, however, and ultimately I believe that the best way to protect Israel from a nuclear-armed Iran is 

the negotiated nuclear framework reached between the P5+1 and Iran. The United 

States is steadfast in its commitment to Israel’s security. During my visit to Israel 

last month, I discussed with Minister of Defense Ya’alon several opportunities for 

deepening cooperation with Israel, including on Iranian missile threats and asymmetric regional challenges. 

COUNTERING IRANIAN REGIONAL ACTIVITIES

Senator WICKER. I think we all can agree that Iran is unlikely to change its regional behavior in the wake of this agreement. If anything, flush with new reVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
62 

sources, Iran will increase its regional mischief. The administration has indicated 

the U.S. will continue to confront Iran in the region. 

15. Secretary Carter, what specific actions will the U.S. take if Iran, after sanctions relief, provides more funding to terrorist groups and expands its malign activities in the region? 

Secretary CARTER. First, Iran’s economy is faltering and I would expect that any 

financial gains Iran realizes from sanctions relief will be needed for the domestic 

economy—some Iranian leaders have said as much. Iran needs about half a trillion 

dollars to meet pressing investment needs and government obligations. That said, 

Iranian support to militants or terrorists does not require substantial resources. 

Therefore, it is important to focus on strategies that counter this behavior, especially by working with our partners in the Gulf. The United States has sufficient 

domestic authorities—including sanctions authority under U.S. law—to counter 

Iran’s support for terrorism and other destabilizing activities. The United States 

continues to enforce U.S. sanctions based on Iran’s support for terrorism and human 

rights abuses. The United States will also continue to work with key partners to 

counter Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region. 

Deterrence is always a complex enterprise, but our partnerships and preparations 

keep us well postured to counter Iranian destabilizing activity. The Department will 

remain vigilant, but as the President stated, Iran won’t use the majority of sanctions relief for its support to terrorism, and the United States’ unilateral sanctions 

targeting those activities will remain in place. The Department will continue to 

work with interagency partners to check Iranian destabilizing activities. 

16. Senator WICKER. Secretary Carter, what is your plan to confront Iranian actions in Lebanon, in Syria, in Yemen, in Iraq and in the Palestinian territories? 

Secretary CARTER. The United States will continue to counter Iranian malign influence in the region. The Department remains prepared and postured to bolster the 

security of regional partners, including Israel, to defend against aggression and to 

ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf. The United States remain cognizant of 

Iran’s continued support for the Assad regime in Syria, and that Iran has supported 

rebel groups in Yemen and throughout the region. U.S. forces will remain postured 

to challenge that activity when it runs counter to U.S. interests or destabilizes the 

region. 

The President has made clear his readiness to further strengthen U.S. support to 

Israel’s security, including through negotiating a new ten-year Foreign Military Financing (FMF) memorandum of understanding and increasing missile defense funding. The Department is also supplying Israel with a large resupply package of essential munitions to deter and defend against any threats. 

Furthermore, the U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit at Camp David 

was about strengthening historical partnerships in order to confront new challenges 

facing the Middle East. There was a recognition that all of the GCC States, as well 

as the United States, need to commit to broadening and deepening bilateral U.S.- 

GCC relationships to advance our shared regional security interests. 

Toward this shared goal of advancing the U.S.-GCC partnership, the United 

States and the GCC States seek to develop strengthened capabilities and coordination on issues such as maritime security, cyber security, ballistic missile defense and 

arms transfers, special operations forces, and exercises and training. 

17. Senator WICKER. Secretary Carter, based on your conversations in the region 

last week, do you believe that Iran is part of the problem or part of the solution 

in Syria and Iraq? 

Secretary CARTER. The Department of Defense has no plans to cooperate with 

Iran directly on Syria or Iraq. With that in mind, there is some space for Iran to 

begin playing a more constructive role in the region, specifically in Syria as it relates to a transition of power to end the Syrian civil war. 

Senator WICKER. Last week, Secretary Kerry told the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee that the U.S. will work to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1701, 

which prohibits the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah. 

18. Secretary Carter, how is the Pentagon planning to prevent the transfer of 

weapons to Hezbollah? 

Secretary CARTER. The Department will rely on bilateral cooperation with countries in the region to block Iranian access to their territory for activities related to 

the illicit shipping of arms or missiles. The Department is already preparing with 

our Gulf partners—as discussed between the President and Gulf leaders at Camp 

David in May—to ramp up regional interdiction activities to ensure continued reVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
63 

strictions on Iranian missile and arms activity. Executive Orders 12938 and 13382 

authorize U.S. sanctions on foreign persons involved in the proliferation of weapons 

of mass destruction or their means of delivery, including missiles capable of delivering such weapons, by a country of proliferation concern, such as Iran. The Iran, 

North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act of 2006 provides for U.S. sanctions on 

entities and individuals involved in the transfer or acquisition of ballistic and cruise 

missiles. The Lethal Military Equipment Sanctions provision in the Foreign Assistance Act, the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, and the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation 

Act of 1992, also provide for U.S. sanctions in certain cases involving the sale or 

transfer of conventional arms. In addition, Executive Order 13224 provides for the 

imposition of sanctions on persons that provide material support to Hizballah, an 

entity designated under that executive order. 

The Department will still rely on a series of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) that levy arms embargos relating to key countries of concern and 

help counter Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region. Iranian arms transfers to 

prohibited recipients would thus still be a violation of UNSCRs, including to the 

Houthis in Yemen, to non-state actors in Iraq (including Shia militants), to nonstate actors in Lebanon (including Hizballah), to Libya, and to North Korea. The 

Department will work with over 100 countries around the world that are participants in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to help limit Iranian missile-related imports or exports. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) also plays 

a critical role in preventing the spread of critical missile technology. The MTCR 

Guidelines maintain a strong presumption of denial of the transfer of Category I 

systems, which include ballistic missiles. The Department will continue to rely on 

countries’ adherence to the MTCR Guidelines to stop transports in support of Iran’s 

missile program. 

INSPECTIONS AND VERIFICATION

Senator WICKER. Throughout the negotiations, including in the weeks prior to the 

agreement, the administration promised ‘‘anywhere, anytime’’ inspections. The 

agreement now allows ‘‘managed access’’ and could take up to 24 days to resolve 

any disputes over access and allow actual inspections. 

19. Secretary Carter, the administration argues that having IAEA inspectors on 

the ground is going to give us additional insight into the Iranian nuclear program. 

Under the JCPOA, will these inspectors have the freedom to go to any other Iranian 

sites, including military sites, at-will? 

Secretary CARTER. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be able 

to get timely access to the places it needs to go, or Iran will be in violation of the 

agreement. If the IAEA has a question about an undeclared facility, it will be able 

to request timely access through the Additional Protocol. This access requires notice 

of at least 24 hours—but such access has proven very successful in deterring and 

detecting illicit activities around the world. Even if Iran were to attempt to clean 

out a location before granting access, radioactive evidence is not easily removed. 

IAEA testing almost certainly would detect the recent presence of nuclear material 

if it had been present. And, most importantly, we will have robust insight into every 

part of Iran’s nuclear program. Certain transparency measures will last for 15 

years, others for 20 to 25 years, and some will last forever—such as Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol. With this transparency, if Iran tried to reverse 

course and break out, we would see it and have time to respond. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

ENRICHMENT OR ADVANCED CENTRIFUGES

20. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Moniz, how many countries produce their own nuclear power but don’t enrich their own uranium? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

21. Senator AYOTTE. Why did we agree to allow Iran to build advanced centrifuges 

in the first 10 years of the deal? 

Secretary KERRY. Under the JCPOA, Iran is constrained to using only its first 

generation IR–1 centrifuges to enrich uranium for the first 10 years. Testing of 

Iran’s more advanced centrifuge designs will be significantly constrained. Iran will 

have the option after Year 10 to undertake a gradual development of its enrichment 

program, consistent with an enrichment research and development plan, but it will 

be limited to enriching only up to 3.67 percent and constrained to a 300 kg stockpile 

64 

of this low-enriched uranium for another five years. These limitations are important 

to ensuring that Iran’s breakout timeline does not drop dramatically after Year 10. 

Importantly, the transparency measures under the JCPOA will ensure unparalleled 

insight into Iran’s program. Certain transparency and monitoring measures will last 

for 15 years, others for 20–25 years, and some will last indefinitely—such as Iran’s 

adherence to the Additional Protocol. After 15 years, should we suspect Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, we would have the same options available to us then as we 

do today to prevent such an effort from coming to fruition. 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

22. Senator AYOTTE. What kind of centrifuge research and development can Iran 

undertake in the first 10 years under the JCPOA? 

Secretary KERRY. Under the JCPOA, Iran is constrained to using only its first 

generation IR–1 centrifuges to enrich uranium for the first 10 years. Research and 

development related to Iran’s more advanced centrifuge designs will be significantly 

constrained. Under the JCPOA, Iran may only continue to conduct centrifuge research and development in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium. 

Iran may build or test, with or without uranium, only those centrifuges specified 

in the JCPOA. For 15 years, Iran must conduct all testing of centrifuges with uranium only at Natanz, and must conduct all mechanical testing of centrifuges only 

at Natanz and the Tehran Research Centre. For 10 years, Iran’s enrichment R&D 

with uranium must only include IR–4, IR–5, IR–6, and IR–8 centrifuges. Mechanical 

testing on up to two single centrifuges for each type may be carried out only on the 

IR–2m, IR–4, IR–5, IR–6, IR–6s, IR–7 and IR–8. 

Consistent with the JCPOA, Iran may continue the testing of a single IR–4 centrifuge machine and IR–4 centrifuge cascade of up to 10 centrifuge machines for 10 

years. Iran may only test a single IR–5 centrifuge machine for 10 years. Iran may 

continue testing of the IR–6 on single centrifuge machines and its intermediate cascades, and may commence testing of up to 30 centrifuge machines from one and a 

half years before the end of Year 10. Iran may commence testing of the IR–8 on 

single centrifuge machines and its intermediate cascades, and may commence the 

testing of up to 30 centrifuge machines from one and a half years before the end 

of Year 10. Iran must proceed from single centrifuges to small cascades to intermediate cascades in a logical sequence. 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

EXCLUDING CONGRESS

23. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Kerry, does the administration believe the U.N. Security Council’s Resolution is legally binding on the United States if Congress rejects the deal? 

Secretary KERRY. Nothing in the resolution requires the United States to take any 

action that would be inconsistent with the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 

2015 (INARA). If Congress were to enact a resolution of disapproval over a veto by 

the President, the United States would not be under any legal obligation to cease 

the application of U.S. sanctions on Iran (as contemplated by the JCPOA) as a result of the UN Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 2231. In fact, the same is 

true if such a resolution is not enacted. 

However, if Congress were to override a veto on a resolution of disapproval and 

the United States walked away from this deal, the most likely scenario would be 

that Iran would refuse to meet its commitments under the JCPOA, the JCPOA 

would collapse, and the UN sanctions relief contemplated under UNSC Resolution 

2231 would never materialize. This is because the UN sanctions relief under UNSC 

Resolution 2231 does not occur until the IAEA verifies that Iran has taken the nuclear steps outlined in the JCPOA. Without sanctions relief from the United States, 

Iran would not disconnect centrifuges, or get rid of its uranium stockpile, or fill the 

core of the current Arak reactor with concrete. In such a scenario, the existing 

UNSC sanctions regime would remain in place, but we anticipate that it would be 

much harder to ensure that these measures are adequately enforced. If the United 

States walked away from the strong deal that has been negotiated, other states 

would be less willing to cooperate with us in enforcing these measures, such as by 

interdicting suspicious cargo at our request. This would put us in the worst possible 

position of having no deal on the nuclear side, and losing our leverage to ensure 

the effectiveness of multilateral and national sanctions. 

65 

24. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Kerry, if Congress rejects this deal, will the President attempt to implement portions of it anyway? 

Secretary KERRY. Any action by the President to implement the JCPOA will be 

taken consistent with U.S. law, including the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act 

of 2015 (INARA). 

If Congress rejected the deal by enacting a joint resolution of disapproval, the 

United States would not be in a position to fulfill its sanctions relief commitments 

under the JCPOA because of the restrictions under INARA. The expected result 

would be that Iran would refuse to meet its commitments, and the JCPOA would 

collapse. Without sanctions relief from the United States, Iran would very likely not 

take the significant nuclear steps required by the JCPOA to roll back and constrain 

its nuclear program, or provide unprecedented access to monitor it. In this scenario, 

the existing UNSC sanctions regime would remain in place because the IAEA would 

not be in a position to confirm that Iran has taken the nuclear steps outlined in 

the JCPOA. Compliance with these and other sanctions would begin to erode, however, as countries perceived that the U.S. had turned its back on a feasible negotiated solution. This would put us in the worst possible position of losing our constraints on Iran’s nuclear program while our leverage begins to ebb. 

25. Senator AYOTTE. Would you characterize the Iran deal as a ‘‘significant arms 

control agreement’’? 

Secretary CARTER. No, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is not an arms 

control agreement. It is a strong non-proliferation deal that cuts off all of Iran’s 

pathways to a nuclear bomb. It is not an ‘‘arms control agreement’’ in that it does 

not limit U.S. arms in any way and is not a legally binding international agreement. 

Secretary KERRY. The JCPOA is a strong non-proliferation deal that cuts off all 

of Iran’s pathways to a bomb. The JCPOA goes beyond standard IAEA safeguards 

requirements in providing for assured access to undeclared locations. It contains the 

most comprehensive inspection and verification regime ever negotiated to monitor 

a nuclear program. It is not an ‘‘arms control agreement’’ in that it does not limit 

U.S. arms in any way and is not a legally binding international agreement. 

CENTRIFUGES

Senator AYOTTE. The administration, including in Secretary Kerry’s testimony for 

the hearing, has repeatedly emphasized that the deal will require Iran to get rid 

of ‘‘two-thirds of its installed centrifuges.’’ 

26. Secretary Moniz, under the deal, how many Iranian centrifuges would be dismantled and destroyed—as opposed to disconnected and moved? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

27. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Moniz, if Iran were to violate the agreement and 

move to reinstall 1,000 IR–2 centrifuges for use in a breakout, how long would that 

take? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

INSPECTIONS AND VERIFICATION

Senator AYOTTE. The deal establishes a tedious and time-consuming process that 

we can expect Tehran to exploit for gaining access to undeclared sites. As I understand it, the IAEA cannot even begin this 24-day process until after it informs Iran 

of its concern about a site, requests ‘‘clarification,’’ and awaits Tehran’s explanation. 

(Appendix 1, page 23, para 75.) 

28. Secretary Moniz, this initial process will alert Iran to the IAEA’s suspicions, 

and will take an undetermined amount of time. The JCPOA was supposedly crafted 

under the assumption that Iran will try to cheat. Assuming Iran will delay an inspection as long as it can within the terms of the plan—how long could it take from 

when the IAEA notifies Iran of its concern with an undeclared site until inspectors 

can enter the site? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

29. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Moniz, for undeclared sites, it could take much 

longer than 24 days, couldn’t it? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

66 

Senator AYOTTE. A great deal of weaponization work does not include nuclear material and does not leave a radioactive footprint. 

30. Secretary Moniz, won’t Iran be able to conceal or move non-nuclear related 

weaponization work easily within the 24 day window? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

Senator AYOTTE. As Olli Heinonen, the former Deputy Director General for Safeguards of IAEA, has testified, ‘‘A 24-day adjudicated timeline reduces detection 

probabilities exactly where the system is weakest: detecting undeclared facilities 

and materials.’’ 

31. Secretary Moniz, while monitoring facilities with satellites during the 24 day 

period will detect large-scale efforts at deception, i.e. re-paving areas, ferreting out 

nuclear material or equipment, how will you prevent Iran from covering up other 

activities, like computer modeling for weaponization purposes? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

32. Senator AYOTTE. What happens if during the 24 day period we observe Iran 

cleansing a site? 

Secretary KERRY. If Iran were to deny an International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) request for access to a suspicious undeclared location, and Iran and the 

IAEA cannot resolve the issue within 14 days, the issue is brought to the Joint 

Commission, which then has seven days to consider the issue. If Iran still will not 

provide access but five members of the Joint Commission (such as the United 

States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the European Union) determine 

that access is necessary, Iran must then provide access within three days. 

Iran understands that any failure to cooperate with the IAEA will raise significant suspicions among the P5+1 and could lead to a snapback of sanctions. Following a request for access by the IAEA to a suspicious undeclared location, we 

would continue to closely monitor for indications that Iran was attempting to sanitize a site, and would respond appropriately should we observe such sanitization activities. 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

33. Senator AYOTTE. Would this constitute a significant violation of the agreement? 

Secretary KERRY. If we believe that there has been a violation related to any commitment in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), we can refer the issue 

to the Joint Commission. If, after a short period of time, our concerns are not resolved to our satisfaction, we could notify the United Nations (UN) Security Council 

that we believe Iran’s actions constitute ‘‘significant non-performance’’ of its JCPOA 

commitments. We have full discretion to determine what is and is not significant 

non-performance. 

The United States has the ability to re-impose both unilateral and multilateral 

nuclear-related sanctions in the event of non-performance by Iran. And, in the case 

of UN sanctions, under UN Security Council Resolution 2231 we could do so even 

over the objections of any member of the Security Council, including China or Russia. In addition, we have a range of other options for addressing minor non-compliance. These include snapping back certain domestic sanctions to respond to minor 

but persistent violations of the JCPOA. Our ability to calibrate our response will 

serve as a deterrent to Iranian violations of the deal. 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

34. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Moniz, will the IAEA inspectors be able to move 

around the country without Iranian approval? The former Deputy Director General 

for Safeguards of IAEA, Olli Heinonen, has said that nuclear bombs or warheads 

can be put together in a relatively small space, some 239 square yards in size. How 

can the inspectors find a place like that without freedom to move without prior approval? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

67 

35. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Moniz, what happens if after the 24 day period 

Iran has still not provided access to a site? Are there consequences spelled out in 

the agreement for specific violations? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

Senator AYOTTE. As part of the IAEA process of requesting site access, the agency 

must provide Iran ‘‘reasons for access in writing and will make available relevant 

information.’’ 

36. Secretary Moniz, couldn’t this reveal sources and methods and jeopardize future monitoring capability? Will we be limited in the number of times we are willing 

to come forward because we are concerned about exposing our sources? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

37. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Carter, isn’t it detrimental to U.S. national security interests to have more countries in the Middle East enriching uranium? 

Secretary CARTER. I do not anticipate a nuclear arms race because of the deal. 

However, the Department will remain vigilant on this issue and watch regional developments closely. I believe this agreement will verifiably prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and curtail, rather than exacerbate, the risk of an arms race. 

Additionally, the United States will remain committed to ensuring compliance with 

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by all parties to the treaty, not just Iran. The 

United States retains authorities and capabilities to prevent nuclear proliferation 

around the globe, and continue to use these effectively. 

38. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Carter, isn’t it reasonable to say that the more 

countries we have enriching uranium in the Middle East, the more likely it is that 

bad actors or terrorist groups could get their hands on nuclear materials that could 

be used against Americans? 

Secretary CARTER. [Deleted.] 

Senator AYOTTE. Referring to the nuclear negotiations with Iran, former Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal, recently told BBC ‘‘I’ve always said whatever 

comes out of these talks, we will want the same. So if Iran has the ability to enrich 

uranium to whatever level, it’s not just Saudi Arabia that’s going to ask for that. 

The whole world will be an open door to go that route without any inhibition . . .’’ 

39. Secretary Moniz, if this deal goes forward and Iran’s enrichment program is 

legitimized and recognized, isn’t it likely that countries like Saudi Arabia and the 

UAE will develop their own enrichment programs as well? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

DEAL IMPLEMENTATION INDEPENDENT OF IAEA REPORT ON PREVIOUS MILITARY

DIMENSIONS

Senator AYOTTE. On July 22, the Head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran 

said, ‘‘By December 15, at the end of the year, the issue (of the PMD) should be 

determined. The IAEA will submit its report to the board of governors. It will only 

submit it. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action will continue independently of 

the results of this report.’’ 

40. Secretary Kerry, will the implementation of this deal continue independently 

of the results of the IAEA report on Iran’s previous military dimensions? 

Secretary KERRY. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran have 

agreed on a time-limited ‘‘Roadmap’’ through which Iran will address the IAEA’s 

concerns regarding past and present issues, including the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program and those specific issues set out in the IAEA 

Director General’s November 2011 report. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 

Action (JCPOA), Iran must complete the activities required of it in this Roadmap 

by October 15, well in advance of any sanctions relief. The IAEA will report whether 

or not Iran has taken those steps. If Iran does not take those steps, we will not provide sanctions relief. 

68 

DURATION

41. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Kerry, does the new U.N. resolution expire in ten 

years? 

Secretary KERRY. Ten years after JCPOA Adoption Day all provisions of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231 will be terminated, unless UN sanctions on 

Iran have been snapped back as permitted by the resolution. The P5+1 have indicated their intention to extend the snapback provisions of UNSCR 2231 for an additional five years beyond the resolution’s ten-year duration. 

42. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Kerry, what does that mean for Iranian restrictions and obligations after the ten year mark? 

Secretary KERRY. This is a long-term deal that has many elements and different 

phases, and some key elements that last forever. UNSCR 2231’s snapback provision 

will provide a significant incentive for Iran to meet its commitments for the ten 

years of the resolution, plus an additional five years if the P5+1 are able to extend 

the snapback provision as they have stated they will do. However, the risk that 

UNSCR sanctions will snap back is not the only incentive for Iran to meet its commitments, as U.S. and EU sanctions may be re-imposed at any time if Iran fails 

to comply with the JCPOA. 

For 10 years, Iran will be subject to very strict limitations on its domestic enrichment capacity and research and development—ensuring a breakout time of at least 

a year. 

For at least 15 years, Iran will be subject to strict limitations on core elements 

of its nuclear program, including an enriched uranium stockpile limit of 300 kg of 

UF6; a limit on heavy water, consistent with Iran’s needs following conversion of 

the Arak reactor; no uranium enrichment or fissile material at the Fordow facility; 

all enrichment capped at no more than 3.67 percent, far short of what is usable in 

a nuclear weapon; no production of reactor fuel in Iran unless approved by the 

United States and our partners; and no reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel, 

which prevents the acquisition of plutonium for weapons. 

In addition, for 15 years, Iran is committed not to conduct work on uranium or 

plutonium metals, which are essential elements for a nuclear weapon; not to seek 

or acquire highly enriched uranium or plutonium, either indigenously or through 

foreign procurement; and not to work with other countries on enrichment technologies absent approval by the Joint Commission established under the JCPOA. Inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years, with some 

continuing for 25 years and others lasting forever. For example, the deal provides 

for Iran’s ratification of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, which would make those 

transparency obligations permanent. 

All spent fuel from the Arak reactor will be shipped out of Iran for the lifetime 

of the reactor. Iran has also committed indefinitely to not engage in specific activities that could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear weapon. It has 

also committed to rely only on light water for its future nuclear reactors. 

43. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Kerry, do the snapback sanction provisions extend 

beyond 10 years? 

Secretary KERRY. The P5+1 have indicated in writing their intention to extend the 

snapback provision of UNSCR 2231 for an additional five years beyond the ten-year 

duration of that resolution. With respect to U.S. sanctions, we can snap back our 

sanctions at any time if Iran violates its JCPOA commitments. 

SNAP BACK SANCTIONS

Senator AYOTTE. Foreign Minister Zarif reportedly told Iran’s parliament recently 

that ‘‘the surge of foreign businesses into the country [after sanctions are lifted] 

would make it difficult for the United Nations to restore sanctions.’’ 

He said the ‘‘swarming of business for reinvesting their money is the biggest barrier for such an action.’’ He also said the P5+1 countries ‘‘would hesitate to seek 

renewed sanctions if the move cut off new and lucrative business ties to the Iranian 

market.’’ 

44. Won’t the rush of cash and investment back into Iran after sanctions are lifted 

give the Iranians increased immunity to the possible re-imposition of sanctions and 

will create a broad and formidable international European, Russian, and Chinese 

government and business coalition opposed to the re-imposition of sanctions? 

Secretary KERRY. We have been very clear that should Iran violate its commitments under the JCPOA after we have suspended sanctions, we will be able to 

promptly snap back both U.S. and UN sanctions, and our EU colleagues have made 

69 

clear their intention to do so with respect to their sanctions as well. In the event 

that there is an Iranian violation, we expect to have strong international support 

for sanctions, as evidenced by the broad international coalition that we have built 

in recent years in response to the Iranian nuclear threat. Moreover, while the increased economic activity of our partners with Iran could raise the cost of snapping 

back sanctions, it is important to bear in mind that this increased economic activity 

also significantly raises the cost to Iran of non-compliance given the threat of snapback. 

Secretary Lew. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

45. Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Kerry, in a noteworthy comment, Zarif also reportedly reassured Iran’s parliament that sanctions can be restored only for a major 

breach of the deal and not for a small infraction. Doesn’t that comment suggest that 

Iran, consistent with their past behavior, does not plan to fully abide by the agreement? 

Secretary KERRY. While we would not want to speculate on Foreign Minister’s 

Zarif’s intent, the fact remains that under the JCPOA and under our own sanctions 

laws, we have a wide range of options to respond to any Iranian non-compliance, 

from significant non-performance to more minor instances of non-compliance. 

Specifically, the United States has the ability to re-impose unilateral and multilateral nuclear-related sanctions in the event of Iran’s non-performance. In the case 

of UN sanctions, under UN Security Council Resolution 2231 we could do so over 

the objections of any member of the Security Council, including China or Russia, 

if we deemed Iran’s actions to constitute ‘‘significant non-performance,’’ and we 

would judge for ourselves what non-performance was ‘‘significant.’’ This unilateral 

ability to snap back all of the UNSC sanctions gives us extraordinary leverage to 

get cooperation from other countries if we seek to take lesser steps instead. In addition, we have a range of other options for addressing relatively minor non-compliance. These include designating specific entities that are involved in activities inconsistent with the JCPOA, snapping back certain domestic sanctions to respond to 

minor but persistent violations of the JCPOA, or using our leverage in the Joint 

Commission on procurement requests. 

ARMS EMBARGO AND MISSILE RESTRICTIONS

Senator AYOTTE. The JCPOA makes no mention of the arms embargo or the missile embargo. Rather, these provisions were included in United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 2231. On July 26, 2015, Iran’s Defense Minister said, ‘‘Missilerelated issues have never been on agenda of the nuclear talks and the Islamic system will resolutely implement its programs in this field.’’ 

On July 22, 2015, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister said ‘‘Whenever we consider it 

necessary for our own security, [or] to help our allies in the region we will provide 

weapons. . . . We don’t feel shy. We will provide weapons to whomever and whenever 

we consider appropriate. And we will buy weapons from wherever we can.’’ 

According to UN Security Council Resolution 2231, the arms embargo on Iran will 

be lifted as soon as the IAEA submits a report that concludes that Iran’s nuclear 

program is peaceful. 

46. Could the IAEA make that determination before five or eight years? So does 

that mean that the arms embargo and missile restrictions could be lifted sooner 

than five and eight years, respectively? 

Secretary KERRY. Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), 

transfers of certain types of arms and related materiel to Iran remain prohibited 

for a period of five years and transfers of ballistic missile-related items, technology, 

and assistance to Iran remain prohibited for eight years, unless the IAEA reaches 

the Broader Conclusion that there are no undeclared nuclear material and activities 

in Iran and all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities. Based on the 

IAEA’s past practice in other countries and the extent of Iran’s nuclear program, 

we expect it will take a substantial number of years of applying the Additional Protocol and evaluating the full range of Iranian nuclear activities to reach that milestone. 

Separate from the UN Security Council restrictions, we will continue to implement a number of robust domestic and multilateral authorities related to counterterrorism and proliferation to address Iran’s arms and ballistic missile activities. 

For example, we will keep in place the U.S. sanctions that apply to Iran’s missile 

program, including the ‘‘secondary’’ sanctions that apply to foreign banks that engage in transactions with entities that have been designated for their role in Iran’s 

missile program, and will continue our efforts to counter the spread of missiles and 

70 

related technology to or from Iran through the use of U.S. sanctions, export controls, 

and cooperation with partner states, including through the 34-country Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 

Secretary CARTER. Annex B of United Nations Security Council Resolution 

(UNSCR) 2231 calls upon Iran to ‘‘not undertake any activity related to ballistic 

missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches 

using such ballistic missile technology.’’ The resolution also prohibits certain arms 

and missile-related transfers to or from Iran absent approval on a case-by-case basis 

by the UN Security Council. The United States would be able to block UN Security 

Council approval of any transfer of weapons or ballistic missile-related items covered by the restrictions that remain in force under UNSCR 2231, and it is difficult 

to imagine any circumstance in which we would consider allowing the Council to 

approve such a transfer. This arms embargo is to remain in place for five years and 

the missile-related restrictions are to remain in place for eight years, unless the 

IAEA reaches the Broader Conclusion that there are no undeclared nuclear material 

and activities in Iran and all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities. 

Based on the IAEA’s past practice in other countries and the extent of Iran’s nuclear 

program, we expect it will take a substantial number of years of applying the Additional Protocol and evaluating the full range of Iranian nuclear activities to reach 

that milestone. After that, there are still a number of domestic and multilateral authorities related to missile proliferation that the United States can continue to use 

to disrupt transfers of missile-related technologies to Iran. 

The Administration is fully aware of the threat posed by the Iranian ballistic missile program. That is why the Department has taken the steps to ensure that the 

United States is protected today by the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) 

system from potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Administration 

is also taking steps to increase the effectiveness of the GMD system by 1) improving 

the reliability of the Ground-Based Interceptor kill vehicle, 2) deploying a LongRange Discrimination Radar in Alaska, and 3) enhancing the discrimination capabilities of the currently deployed ground-based sensors. The Department continuously monitors Iran’s efforts to develop ballistic missiles and is prepared to ensure 

the United States remains protected from future Iranian threats. 

General DEMPSEY. Although it is highly unlikely, if the IAEA reaches a Broader 

Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities before the 

five or eight year embargos are set to end, then the restrictions could be lifted early. 

47. Senator AYOTTE. Can you clarify whether violations of the arms embargo 

would be considered violations of the JCPOA? Would we be able to snapback sanctions should Iran violate the arms and missile embargos? Would the administration 

do so? 

Secretary KERRY. The arms embargo and missile-related restrictions on Iran 

under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1929 were designed to pressure 

Iran specifically to address the international community’s concerns with its nuclear 

program. UNSCR 1929 anticipated that these restrictions would be lifted as Iran 

addressed these concerns. Not surprisingly, Iran and Russia pushed for an immediate lifting of the arms embargo and missile restrictions as soon as Iran took the 

key nuclear steps provided for in the JCPOA. Through hard bargaining, we were 

able to ensure that UNSCR 2231 endorsing the JCPOA extends arms- and missilerelated restrictions for a significant period of time after the JCPOA takes effect, 

even though these restrictions are not part of the JCPOA. Even after these restrictions on Iran are lifted, we can still rely on a broad set of multilateral and unilateral tools, including other UNSCRs and domestic sanctions, to continue to restrict 

Iranian conventional arms and missiles. We will also keep in place the U.S. sanctions that apply to Iran’s missile program, including the ‘‘secondary’’ sanctions that 

apply to foreign banks that engage in transactions with entities that have been designated for their role in the missile program. 

Secretary CARTER. Annex B to United Nations Security Council Resolution 

(UNSCR) 2231 provides for a five-year-long arms embargo and eight-year-long missile-related restrictions on Iran (which would end earlier if the IAEA reaches the 

Broader Conclusion that there are no undeclared nuclear material and activities in 

Iran and all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities). However, it is 

our understanding that Iranian attempts to circumvent these restrictions, which are 

not directed against the nuclear program, would not be considered a violation of the 

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). With that in mind, the administration would take any prohibited arms transfers or missile procurement attempts seriously, and act accordingly to respond to noncompliance by Iran and any nation supporting such efforts within the framework of existing UN sanctions, international 

counter proliferation regimes, and U.S. laws. We will continue to have a range of 

71 

unilateral and multilateral means available to halt Iranian arms transfers and restrict Iran’s missile program, just as we do today. Recent coalition efforts to stop 

Iranian military shipments to the Houthis in Yemen demonstrate our resolve and 

our capabilities on this matter. 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, a violation of the arms embargo would be a violation of 

the JCPOA. 

According to the agreement, the U.S. may unilaterally respond to an Iranian violation by choosing not to meet its commitments in whole or in part. The U.S. may 

also invoke its option to call for a U.N. Security Council vote to maintain the suspension of sanctions. Under the agreement, the U.S. may act unilaterally to snapback sanctions through its veto option as a standing member of the U.N. Security 

Council. 

48. Senator AYOTTE. Is Iran continuing to provide arms to Shiite militias in Iraq? 

To Houthi rebels in Yemen? To the Assad regime? To Hezbollah? 

Secretary KERRY. The U.S. sees Iran clearly for what it is: the world’s foremost 

state sponsor of terrorism; a supporter of terrorist groups such as Hizballah and 

Hamas; a backer of the Asad regime’s brutality in Syria; and a force for instability 

in Yemen. That is why we will maintain and continue to aggressively enforce our 

sanctions against Iran’s support for terrorism, destabilizing activities in the region, 

and human rights abuses. If Iran intensifies these actions, we—along with our partners—will combat them. 

U.S. support to our regional partners will continue to be key to countering Iranian 

aggression in the region. That is why we are working to expand our cooperation 

across the board with regional partners that share our concerns over Iran, as the 

President agreed with regional leaders at the Camp David summit in May. This effort will strengthen our regional partners across a range of areas, while making 

clear we will not accept Iranian efforts to spread instability and strengthen its terrorist proxies. 

Secretary CARTER. [Deleted.] 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, Iran has provided arms to all of these entities. 

49. Senator AYOTTE. If the answer is yes, isn’t Iran already violating key UNSC 

resolutions? 

Secretary KERRY. We are certainly concerned that Iran continues to violate the 

UN sanctions imposed against it, including through illicit procurement and arms 

transfers. Iran’s export of weapons, including to some of the most extreme and irresponsible actors in the region, remains a serious factor fostering instability. We continue to deter and respond to such violations, including through interdiction, sanctions, and law enforcement measures, as appropriate. 

We also have longstanding engagement with the United Nations on sanctions evasion issues related to Iran. We report violations and bring issues to the Sanctions 

Committee and the UN Panel of Experts when we have releasable information and 

doing so would further our nonproliferation objectives. Other countries are expected 

to do the same. We continue to work closely with likeminded partners on the UN 

Security Council to urge the Security Council’s Iran Sanctions Committee to follow 

up on reported sanctions violations. 

Secretary CARTER. Any Iranian arms transfers to Houthis in Yemen, non-state actors in Lebanon (including Hizballah), and/or Iraqi Shi’a militias would violate relevant UN Security Council resolutions that call upon all member States to comply 

fully and effectively with UN Security Council-mandated arms embargoes on providing weapons to these groups. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DEB FISCHER. 

BREAKOUT TIME AFTER YEAR 15

50. Senator FISCHER. Secretary Moniz, you stated that Iran would probably expand their capacity to enrich uranium after 15 years of this agreement. Please 

elaborate on the impact this increased capacity could have on Iran’s breakout time 

to produce a sufficient amount of highly enriched material for a nuclear weapon in 

year 16 and beyond, including any factors that will prevent said breakout time from 

being reduced significantly below the one-year period this agreement seeks to ensure until year 15? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

72 

CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

51. Senator FISCHER. Secretary Moniz, are there any plans for the United States 

to directly finance modifications to Arak or any other part of Iran’s nuclear program? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

52. Senator FISCHER. Secretary Moniz, the agreement includes numerous provisions related to civilian nuclear cooperation; has any U.S. assistance been offered? 

Please describe the assistance you believe you are authorized to provide. 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

POSSIBLE MILITARY DIMENSIONS (PMD)

53. Senator FISCHER. Secretary Kerry, will Congress be able to review in a timely 

manner the full extent of the IAEA’s final assessment, described in paragraph 8 of 

the ‘‘Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues’’ and scheduled to be submitted to the Board of Governors by December 15, 2015? 

Secretary KERRY. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the 

IAEA will provide to the IAEA Board of Governors by December 15, 2015, the 

IAEA’s final assessment on the resolution of all past and present outstanding issues 

regarding the Possible Military Dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. Consistent 

with past practice, we expect the report will be made public by the Board of Governors. We will continue to brief Congress in a timely manner on the PMD investigation. 

54. Senator FISCHER. Secretary Kerry, you have stated that Iran will not receive 

any type of sanctions relief until the outstanding issues, as set out in the annex of 

the 2011 Director General’s report (GOV/2011/65) and often described the possible 

military dimensions (PMDs) of Iran’s nuclear program, are clarified. Do all the 

members of the E3/EU+3 share this view? Please provide the specific legal basis 

contained in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) for denying Iran 

sanctions relief if these issues are not clarified. 

Secretary KERRY. We have always said that we consider Iran addressing Possible 

Military Dimensions (PMD) with the IAEA to be of critical importance, and the 

P5+1—including all of our E3 partners—has spoken with one voice on this throughout the negotiations. It is this unity that provided the leverage the IAEA needed 

to secure the Roadmap Agreement with Iran. 

Under the Roadmap, Iran agreed to a time-bounded process to address the IAEA’s 

concerns regarding past and present issues, including the Possible Military Dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program and those specific issues set out in the IAEA Director General’s November 2011 report. 

To be clear, this process cannot stretch out forever. Iran has committed in the 

JCPOA to take all the steps required of it under the Roadmap by October 15. Iran 

will obtain sanctions relief only if it takes those steps—in addition to the other 

major nuclear steps it must take. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SULLIVAN

SANCTIONS

55. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary Lew, under the Dispute Resolution Mechanism 

of the agreement, Sec. 37 language suggests that foreign investors would be allowed 

to fulfill the length of newly negotiated contracts with Iran, even in the aftermath 

of a violation or act of terrorism. The language itself states that ‘‘ . . . provisions [of 

the old UN Security Council resolutions] would not apply with retroactive effect to 

contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities 

prior to the date of application.’’ How does this grandfather clause impact the fidelity of a ‘‘snapback’’ sanctions regime when foreign investors have the legal authority, under this agreement, to complete their contracts? 

Secretary Lew. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

56. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretaries Kerry and Lew, the agreement outlines the parameters of an ‘‘implementation day’’ which includes the ‘‘comprehensive lifting of 

all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions reVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
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lated to Iran’s nuclear program, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy.’’ Although this occurs with IAEA verification that Iran 

has completed certain commitments over a couple of months, why are the bulk of 

these sanctions being lifted at the beginning, and not incrementally over several 

years? Typically in diplomacy, we exchange one thing for another and so on and so 

forth, until the final objective is achieved. Why did we give up all of the benefits 

upfront, by lifting the entire scope of Annex II sanctions before Iran achieved a series of benchmarks or swore to disavow acts of terrorism? 

Secretary KERRY. Iran must complete a series of key nuclear-related measures, as 

verified by the IAEA, before it receives any sanctions relief under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). These measures are substantial and extensive. 

They include the export of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile in excess of 300 kg of 

uranium hexafluoride enriched up to 3.67 percent, the removal and storage of twothirds of its centrifuges (an amount totaling well over 12,000 centrifuges), the removal and permanent disablement of the existing reactor core at Arak, and the implementation of a number of additional transparency measures. The cumulative effect of these steps would leave Iran with a breakout time to acquire enough fissile 

material for a nuclear weapon at one year or more, and would increase our visibility 

into any would-be breakout attempt. Iran must take all of these steps before receiving any JCPOA sanctions relief. 

Secretary Lew. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

57. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretaries Kerry and Lew, I posed a hypothetical in today’s hearing: All sanctions against Iran have been lifted. Its economy is humming. 

It’s abiding by the nuclear agreement. And then it commits a major act of terrorism, 

killing American civilians or soldiers. The Congress and the president then re-impose biting sanctions. However, Iran cites Paragraphs 26 and 37 within the agreement pertaining to sanctions relief, which state that if ‘‘sanctions are reinstated in 

whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.’’ They also refer to their own interpretation of that clause filed with the U.N. Security Council which states: ‘‘It is understood that reintroduction or re-imposition, including through extension of the sanctions and restrictive measures will constitute significant non-performance which 

would relieve Iran from its commitments in part or in whole.’’ In my mind, if we 

impose sanctions in any respect, the deal is over. If this is not the case, please 

elaborate. 

Secretary KERRY. It is essential to recall that this deal does not provide for all 

U.S. sanctions on Iran to be lifted. All of our non-nuclear sanctions authorities remain in place and are unaffected by the JCPOA. 

In any event, we would not violate the JCPOA if we imposed new sanctions on 

Iran for supporting terrorism, committing human rights abuses, acquiring ballistic 

missile technology, or any other non-nuclear reason. We have been clear about this 

fact with Iran and the other P5+1 countries. Additionally, the JCPOA does not provide Iran any relief from U.S. sanctions under these authorities. 

What we have committed to do is quite specific: not to re-impose those specific 

nuclear-related sanctions provisions specified in Annex II to the JCPOA and not to 

impose new nuclear-related sanctions, contingent on Iran abiding by its JCPOA 

commitments. That does not mean that we would be precluded from sanctioning 

specific Iranian actors or sectors if the circumstances warranted. All of our other 

sanctions authorities remain in place and are unaffected by the JCPOA. Additionally, we have made it clear to Iran that we would continue to use and enforce sanctions to address its other troubling activities, including its destabilizing activities in 

the region. That said, this does not give us free rein to simply re-impose tomorrow 

all of our nuclear-related sanctions under some other pretext. Iran would obviously 

see that as bad faith, as would our international partners. In the end, if we decide 

to impose new sanctions, it will be important that we have a credible rationale for 

doing so. This has always been the case and will be no different in the future. 

Secretary Lew. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

LANGUAGE AND TECHNICAL NUANCES OF JCPOA

58. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary Kerry, the Senate Armed Services Committee 

has heard testimony from several high ranking military officials, that Iran is or has 

been responsible for facilitating the maiming or deaths of hundreds—if not thousands—of American troops. Yet in 2007, then Iranian Ambassador to the U.N., 

Javad Zarif maintained that ‘‘Iran has no interest in providing weapons to any inVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
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surgents groups in Iraq’’ and that ‘‘the United States . . . is trying to find or fabricate 

evidence.’’ It has been reported that you have a constructive relationship with the 

now Iranian Foreign Minister. The State Department has additionally acknowledged 

that you have logged more one-on-one time with him than with any other foreign 

minister since becoming Secretary of State. Given the substance of this relationship, 

has he ever acknowledged or admitted that Iran is directly or indirectly responsible 

for the maiming and deaths of American servicemen? 

Secretary KERRY. We will continue to counter Iran’s destabilizing and threatening 

actions in the Middle East region aggressively. We have made very clear to the Iranian regime these activities are unacceptable. I have often raised regional conflicts 

with Foreign Minister Zarif as part of our ongoing discussions. The President and 

I are committed to working closely with Israel, the Gulf countries, and our other 

regional partners to counter Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region. 

59. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretaries Kerry and Lew, the JCPOA lays out how the 

P5+1 desires a ‘‘new relationship’’ with Iran. Typically, in a contract such sentiments are expressed by both parties, but nowhere in the 150 pages of this agreement, do you see Iran making a reciprocal pledge. Secretaries, don’t you think this 

is indicative of manner in which Iran currently views the United States and do you 

see this attitude undergoing a transformational change in 10 years or so when the 

UN Security Councils concludes its ‘‘consideration of the Iran nuclear issue’’? 

Secretary KERRY. We have been clear from the beginning of this process that 

these negotiations are only about the nuclear issue and that our end goal is preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and ensuring that Iran’s nuclear program is and will remain peaceful going forward. 

There are different trends inside of Iran. It is possible that if the JCPOA is properly implemented, and Iran’s economy improves as a consequence of sanctions relief, 

it would strengthen the hand of moderate forces inside of Iran. However, the key 

point is that the deal is not dependent on anticipating those changes. If they do not 

change at all, we are still better off having the deal. 

Secretary Lew. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

60. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretaries Kerry and Moniz, my colleague, Senator Ayotte 

raised a very good question regarding United States cooperation in ‘‘strengthening 

Iran’s ability to protect against, and respond to nuclear security threats—including 

sabotage.’’ Given the United States’ past history in facilitating disruptions and subversions of Iran’s nuclear program, does this agreement now prevent us from conducting similar operations in the future? 

Secretary KERRY. We believe that the JCPOA, if implemented, will be the most 

effective means to ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon and ensuring 

that Iran’s nuclear program is and will remain peaceful going forward. We expect 

Iran to meet its commitments under the JCPOA. To be absolutely clear, the JCPOA 

in no way commits us to defend Iran’s nuclear facilities. The language in the JCPOA 

is designed to help bring Iran’s nuclear security and safety practices in line with 

those used by other peaceful nuclear programs around the world. It is in the interest of all countries that nuclear material be safeguarded from nuclear accidents, 

theft and terrorist attacks, including cyber-attacks, so any training provided by the 

IAEA or others will be solely for that purpose. 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

ICBM/CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS BAN

61. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dempsey, earlier this month you told this committee that ‘‘under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on Iran relative to 

ballistic missile capabilities and arms trafficking.’’ General Dempsey, Secretary Carter, can you provide any rationale on why our negotiators have conceded on this incredibly important issue and whether or not this concession is in the United States’ 

national security interests? Would a military response by the United States be 

riskier in 8 years, when Iran has both conventional weapons and ICBM’s, than it 

would be now, should they commit a major act of terrorism? 

Secretary CARTER. It is the Department of Defense’s job to plan and prepare for 

contingencies in the event that Iran chooses to violate the nuclear agreement. The 

Department continuously evaluates and updates U.S. forces posture to ensure a 

qualitative military advantage in the Middle East and are able to address Iran’s 

malign behavior appropriately. There are no limits placed on the Department’s preparedness as a result of this agreement. All military options remain on the table. 

75 

Additionally, even once the UN Security Council’s arms embargo and missile restrictions on Iran are lifted, the United States can continue to restrict Iranian conventional arms and missile-related transfers. There is a comprehensive set of multilateral and unilateral tools, including sanctions that can be relied on to restrict 

these transfers. 

General DEMPSEY. I was not part of the negotiation process, however as I understand it, our team decided that because the embargo was based on Iran’s nuclear 

activity, maintaining the UN embargo was impossible. As the lifting the embargos 

is contingent on Iranian compliance with the deal, and because we will still maintain authorities to interdict shipments to Iranian proxies like Hezbollah, I am comfortable with the terms of the agreement. 

Although Iran may buy weapons from Russia and China, developing into a conventional power would take time. A globally integrated economy would best support 

a modern conventional force. Conversely, should Iran continue to agitate and support malign activity, the country’s pariah status and resultant poor economic performance will likely check traditional military power. Whichever direction Iran 

takes, U.S. military forces will continue to outmatch Iranian capabilities by advancing our own weapons and building partner capacity. 

MISCELLANEOUS

62. Senator SULLIVAN. General Dempsey, given your own review of the agreement 

and analysis of the potential strengths and weaknesses—especially as it pertains to 

upholding American national security interests—do you endorse this agreement? 

General DEMPSEY. The agreement is not the military’s to endorse. That said, this 

deal clearly makes it more difficult for Iran to move towards a nuclear weapon than 

without an agreement. The deal primarily rolls back Iran’s nuclear program and 

provides the international community with unprecedented access to Iran’s nuclear 

facilities and nuclear supply chain. 

In any case, we are confident in our military options and stand determined in our 

commitment to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MIKE LEE

DOD CONSULTATION ON NEGOTIATIONS

63. Senator LEE. How often and under what circumstances were you, other members of the Joint Chiefs, or the Commander of CENTCOM consulted by members 

of the negotiating team on the military dimensions of the Iran agreement? Where 

there ever points in these consultations where you or DOD personnel disagreed with 

the direction of the negotiations or specific aspects to which our negotiators were 

agreeing? 

Secretary CARTER. The negotiating team kept the Department updated on the direction of negotiations and frequently consulted with myself and General Dempsey 

in regards to the military dimensions of the Iran agreement. The Department of Defense believes this is a good deal, because it verifiably blocks all pathways for Iran 

to achieve a nuclear weapon. 

General DEMPSEY. Throughout the negotiations, I performed my role as the principal military advisor to the President. Because of the complexity of constraints 

placed on Iran to comply with the deal, I am comfortable with the terms of the 

agreement. 

IRAN’S FUNDING FOR PROXIES

64. Senator LEE. How has Iran historically dispersed funding and military assistance to its proxies in the Middle East, is there anything in this agreement that will 

prohibit this new economic windfall from being used to fund such operations, and 

what impact will a large increase of funding and assistance to these proxies have 

on American forces and the security of our allies in the region? What will be done 

to protect our forces in the region from these threats? 

Secretary CARTER. Iran faces a major economic challenge, and we would expect 

that any financial gains from sanctions relief will be needed for its domestic economy—and some Iranian leaders have said as much. Iran needs about half a trillion 

dollars to meet pressing investment needs and government obligations. Conversely, 

Iranian support to militants or terrorists does not require substantial resources. It 

is therefore more effective for the United States to focus on strategies that counter 

this behavior, especially by working with our partners in the Gulf. 

But regardless of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Department remains absolutely committed to supporting the safety and security of our regional 

76 

partners, especially Israel. The President has expressed his desire to strengthen our 

security partnership with Israel through efforts such as a new ten-year Foreign 

Military Financing agreement and increased missile defense funding. Additionally, 

the U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit at Camp David was about 

strengthening historical partnerships in order to confront new challenges facing the 

Middle East. There was a recognition that all of the GCC partners, as well as the 

United States, need to commit to broadening and deepening bilateral U.S.-GCC relationships and the multilateral U.S.-GCC relationship, to the advancement of our 

shared regional security interests. 

Finally, there are numerous domestic authorities—sanctions or otherwise—to 

counter Iran’s support for terrorism or other destabilizing activities. The Department will continue to work with interagency partners to check Iran’s destabilizing 

activities. The Department is an important part of a broader government effort to 

counter these malign behaviors. 

Secretary KERRY. The U.S. sees Iran clearly for what it is: the world’s foremost 

state sponsor of terrorism; a supporter of terrorist groups such as Hizballah and 

Hamas; a backer of the Asad regime’s brutality in Syria; and a force for instability 

in Yemen. That is why we will maintain and continue to aggressively enforce our 

sanctions against Iran’s support for terrorism, destabilizing activities in the region, 

and human rights abuses. If Iran intensifies these activities, we—along with our 

partners—will combat them. 

Iran has used the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC–QF) to 

implement its foreign policy objectives and provide cover for intelligence operations. 

The IRGC–QF is the regime’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting destabilizing activities abroad. 

However, of Iran’s approximately $100 billion in overseas foreign reserves, we estimate that, after sanctions relief, Iran will be able to freely access only slightly 

more than half—a little over $50 billion. That is because over $20 billion is dedicated to projects with China, where it cannot be freely spent, and tens of billions 

in additional funds are effectively non-performing loans to Iran’s energy and banking sectors that are unlikely to be repaid, at least not in the next few years. 

U.S. sanctions on the IRGC will not be relieved under this deal. The United 

States will also maintain sanctions on the IRGC–QF, its leadership, and its entire 

network of front companies. This includes secondary sanctions that would penalize 

foreign financial institutions that engage in transactions with any of these designated entities. We retain the ability to impose additional sanctions on individuals 

and entities providing support to the IRGC or those involved in supporting terrorism or human rights abuses, if circumstances warrant. 

Secretary Lew. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

LIFTING OF THE ARMS EMBARGOS

65. Senator LEE. When the conventional weapons and ballistic missile embargos 

are lifted, what specific weapons and technology do you believe Iran is most likely 

to acquire, and for what purpose? What countries do you anticipate will be supplying Iran with these weapons, and will the United States have any level of control 

over, or oversight on, what Iran is acquiring and how it will be used? 

Secretary CARTER. [Deleted.] 

Secretary KERRY. The existing UNSCRs impose obligations on all States to implement the arms and missile embargoes and provide authorities to facilitate enforcement. To work, they are dependent on the compliance of all UN Member States, not 

Iran’s compliance. Under UNSCR 2231 that endorsed the JCPOA, those sanctions 

will continue for another five and eight years after Adoption Day (or until the IAEA 

reaches the broader conclusion that all nuclear materials in Iran remain in peaceful 

activities, whichever is earlier). 

After that, we will retain a number of unilateral and multilateral tools to counter 

Iran’s arms transfers and other destabilizing activities in the region. We would refer 

you to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence with any further questions 

regarding Iranian procurement intentions and activities. Any discussion of specific 

procurements by Iran would need to be in a classified setting. 

66. Senator LEE. Secretary Carter, given that the embargo on ballistic missile 

technology could be lifted in 8 years, do you anticipate that this agreement will have 

any impact on our current regional and homeland missile defense plans? 

Secretary CARTER. In the near term, we do not anticipate that the nuclear agreement will have any impact on our missile defense plans. Iran’s large and growing 

ballistic missile force continues to present substantial risks to our deployed forces 

77 

and bases in the Middle East and Europe, to our NATO European Allies and partners, as well as to Israel and our Gulf Cooperation Council partners. The United 

States will maintain its missile defense posture across the Middle East, and will 

continue to encourage partners to build interoperable ballistic missile defense systems through acquisition of U.S. platforms and enhanced cooperation. We will continue with plans to deploy U.S. missile defenses in Europe. We are also enhancing 

and modernizing our Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, which provides protection of the U.S. homeland against Inter-continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) attacks from countries like North Korea and Iran. 

In the future, we will reevaluate our missile defense plans and make adjustments, 

if necessary, to meet the Iranian ballistic missile threat. This could include expanding our homeland missile defense system to defend against an emerging ICBM 

threat from Iran. 

REGIONAL RIVALRIES WITH IRAN

67. Senator LEE. General Dempsey, if Gulf countries and others in the region who 

view Iran as a geopolitical rival or existential threat do not believe that this agreement will prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, or believe that Iran is in 

violation of the agreement, how do you anticipate they will respond? What role 

would the United States play in any potential conflict stemming from a suspected 

Iranian nuclear program? 

General DEMPSEY. Although Saudi Arabia and others in the region have noted 

concerns publicly over this deal it is unlikely that they would pursue a nuclear program in the way Iran has over the last decade. We continue to work with our partners in the region regarding the development of peaceful nuclear power and to encourage a Middle East that is fully compliant with the Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Treaty. 

ONGOING IRANIAN POLICIES AND U.S. POSTURE

68. Senator LEE. Secretary Carter, in an address in Tehran last week, Ayatollah 

Khamenei stated: ‘‘Our policy towards the arrogant U.S. government will not change 

at all’’, amid chants of ‘‘Death to America’’ and ‘‘Death to Israel’’. Again, this is a 

country whose policy towards the United States has included direct or indirect responsibility for the deaths of hundreds of U.S. military personnel over the past 35 

years and countless acts of terror and belligerence towards our allies. How will the 

continuation of these Iranian policies towards the United States impact our military 

posture in the CENTCOM area of responsibility and intelligence posture around the 

world? 

Secretary CARTER. Existing partnerships and preparations keep the United States 

well-postured to counter Iranian destabilizing activity. The Administration remains 

cognizant of Iran’s continued support for the Assad regime in Syria, and the extent 

to which Iran has supported rebel groups in Yemen and throughout the region. The 

United States will remain postured to challenge that activity when it runs counter 

to U.S. interests or destabilizes the region. 

Additionally, the Defense Department will continue to work with interagency 

partners to check Iran’s destabilizing activities. The Department is an important 

part of a broader government effort to counter these malign behaviors, and continues to maintain plans, preparations, and posture to be able to execute a robust 

military option, if called upon to do so. 

CONSIDERATION OF JCPOA AS A TREATY

69. Senator LEE. Secretary Kerry, you have given several justifications at hearings on this agreement as to why it was not submitted as a treaty for advise and 

consent in the Senate. Why specifically was the decision made not to submit this 

as a treaty, and how does the Department of State define ‘‘treaty’’ and determine 

if an agreement will be a treaty or an executive agreement? 

Secretary KERRY. The JCPOA is neither a treaty nor an executive agreement. The 

JCPOA consists of political commitments between Iran and the United States, the 

United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China, and the European Union. The 

United States has a longstanding practice of addressing sensitive problems in negotiations that culminate in political commitments. 

The JCPOA does not need to be a binding agreement under international law to 

be rigorous and enforceable; verifiability and transparency are built into the deal 

itself, and leverage and accountability flow from our ability to re-impose sanctions, 

including UN Security Council sanctions, if Iran does not fulfil its commitments 

with respect to its nuclear program. 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CRUZ

IRANIAN THREAT WITH NUCLEAR WEAPON

70. Senator CRUZ. General Dempsey, in your personal opinion, how grave is the 

threat of an Iranian regime that possesses nuclear weapons? Is there any reason 

we shouldn’t believe them when they declare their intentions to destroy Israel and 

the United States? 

General DEMPSEY. [Deleted.] 

71. Senator CRUZ. General Dempsey, as the Acting Commander of Central Command in 2007 through early 2008, I presume that you met with the leadership of 

our allies in the Middle East? Can you provide your opinion on what their reaction 

to a nuclear Iran will be? Will our allies in the Middle East seek to increase their 

conventional military capability? Do you believe our allies in the Middle East will 

be forced to purchase or develop their own nuclear weapons, or do you foresee them 

having to do both? 

General DEMPSEY. I have had long-lasting relationships with leaders in the Middle East from my time at Central Command, as you noted, but also during my tenure as Chairman. I have discussed the JCPOA with leaders throughout the region. 

If you are asking what their reactions to the deal have been, it runs the gamut. 

Israel has very publically expressed opposition, other countries have privately expressed some concern, some have expressed support, and some have not expressed 

a strong opinion either way. If you are asking what their response would be to an 

Iranian regime with nuclear weapons that is a hypothetical that I cannot answer. 

I will say that the JCPOA was designed specifically to prevent Iran from developing 

nuclear weapons. If Iran cheats on the deal, and if our very strong verification regime fails, and if Iran develops nuclear weapons, it is likely that other Middle East 

allies that have the resources will look to bolster their own military capabilities as 

well. That is why one of our priorities in the Department of Defense is to reassure 

our partners in the Middle East through continued military-to-military engagement. 

72. Senator CRUZ. Secretary Carter, you recently travelled through the Middle 

East and talked to some of those same leaders. What did they tell you about their 

concerns, and what actions do you see them taking? Which country’s reaction to the 

agreement alarmed you the most? 

Secretary CARTER. During my late July trip to the Middle East, I discussed common strategic threats with partners in the region, and sought to advance our bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Although our Gulf country partners are rightfully skeptical of Iran’s intentions, they understand that the lack of trust in Iran 

is precisely why the President sought a nuclear agreement that relies on verification 

to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Further, our Gulf partners understand fully that the U.S. commitment to regional security is enduring. Our Gulf 

partners also understand that the U.S. commitment of a robust military presence 

in the region will continue to serve as the ultimate deterrent against any aggression 

they could face. 

73. Senator CRUZ. Secretary Carter, as I understand it, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency is designed to provide the Defense Department’s core expertise with respect to countering the threats from weapons of mass destruction. How much did 

the Defense Threat Reduction Agency participate and inform decision making during the negotiation process? If so, how much deference was given to their expertise 

during the negotiations led by Secretary Kerry? What is DTRA’s foremost concern 

with the JCPOA? 

Secretary CARTER. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency/US Strategic Command 

Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction was not involved in the negotiations on the JCPOA. The negotiating team kept the Department updated on the direction of negotiations and frequently consulted with myself and General Dempsey 

in regards to the military dimensions of the Iran agreement. The Department believes this is a good deal, because it verifiably blocks all pathways for Iran to 

achieve a nuclear weapon. 

74. Senator CRUZ. Secretary Kerry, the Iranian Supreme Leader’s top adviser for 

international affairs, Ali Akbar Velayati stated that ‘‘(the westerners) have made 

some comments about defensive and missile issues, but Iran will not allow them to 

visit our military centers and interfere in decisions about the type of Iran’s defensive weapons.’’ Iranian Ground Force Commander, Brigadier General Ahmad Reza 

79 

Pourdastan, echoed similar statements as well. What mechanisms will we have to 

detect, interdict, or delay nuclear capabilities if we suspect that Iran is using military facilities to violate the terms of the agreement, particularly if they deny inspectors access to the sites after exhausting any proposed alternative arrangements, a 

review by the Joint Commission, and potentially the dispute resolution process? 

Secretary KERRY. If any JCPOA participant has reason to believe that Iran is 

using military facilities or any other facility to violate the terms of the JCPOA, it 

would have the option to share that information with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the IAEA could request access as appropriate to clarify any 

questions. If Iran were to deny an IAEA request for access to a suspicious 

undeclared location, including military facilities, and Iran and the IAEA cannot resolve the issue within 14 days, the issue is brought to the Joint Commission, which 

then has seven days to consider the issue. If Iran still will not provide access but 

five members of the Joint Commission (such as the United States, United Kingdom, 

France, Germany, and the European Union) determine that access is necessary, 

Iran must then provide access within three days. 

Iran understands that any failure to cooperate with the IAEA will raise significant suspicions among the P5+1 and could lead to a snapback of sanctions. Following a request for access by the IAEA to a suspicious undeclared location, we 

would continue to closely monitor for indications that Iran was attempting to sanitize a site, and would respond appropriately should we observe such sanitization activities. 

The United States has the ability to re-impose both unilateral and multilateral 

nuclear-related sanctions in the event of non-performance by Iran. And, in the case 

of UN sanctions, under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, we could do so even 

over the objections of any member of the Security Council, including China or Russia. In addition, we have a range of other options for addressing minor non-compliance. These include snapping back certain domestic sanctions to respond to minor 

but persistent violations of the JCPOA. Our ability to calibrate our response will 

serve as a deterrent to Iranian violations of the deal. 

75. Senator CRUZ. Secretary Kerry, the JCPOA stipulates that its signatories will 

cooperate with Iran to provide technical assistance, facilitate commercial licenses for 

supply of nuclear fuel, collaborate on technology projects, and most worrisome ‘‘nuclear security.’’ This entails ‘‘training courses and workshops to strengthen Iran’s 

ability to prevent, protect and respond to nuclear security threats to nuclear facilities and systems as well as to enable effective and sustainable nuclear security and 

physical protection systems,’’ as well as to ‘‘strengthen Iran’s ability to protect 

against, and respond to nuclear security threats, including sabotage, as well as to 

enable effective and sustainable nuclear security and physical protection systems.’’ 

If military facilities are still viewed to be of concern, does the fact that other nations 

will be able to improve the physical defense capabilities at Iran’s nuclear sites concern you? Can any such action on behalf of the US to address these military sites 

be deemed grounds for Iran to pull out of the deal? 

Secretary KERRY. Nothing in Annex III of the JCPOA requires the United States 

to participate in any specific cooperation activity. The language in the JCPOA is designed to help bring Iran’s nuclear security and safety practices in line with those 

used by other peaceful nuclear programs around the world. It is in the interest of 

all countries that nuclear material be safeguarded from nuclear accidents, theft and 

terrorist attacks; any training provided by the IAEA or others would be for that purpose. While there could be some activities where it would be beneficial for the 

United States to participate, we would only participate in such an engagement after 

a careful review to ensure that it meets our overall policy objectives and in ways 

that are consistent with our laws and regulations, which significantly restrict the 

types of interactions that we could have. Any cooperation with Iran in these areas 

would be with respect to declared, peaceful nuclear facilities operating consistently 

with the requirements of the JCPOA. We would not expect this to include any military facilities. 

We believe that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), if implemented, 

will be the most effective means to ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon and ensuring that Iran’s nuclear program is and will remain peaceful going forward. 

76. Senator CRUZ. Secretary Carter, what possible rationale is there in providing 

assistance to the Iranians for hardening their nuclear facilities, when we must reserve the capability and the will to strike and destroy those facilities in the event 

the Iranians fail to comply? 

80 

Secretary CARTER. To clarify, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 

does not commit the United States—or any of our P5+1 partners—to undertake any 

particular nuclear cooperation activity with Iran, with the exception of Russia’s explicit commitment to stable isotope production at the Fordow facility. The JCPOA 

does contemplate the possibility of cooperative activities to assist in ensuring Iranian facilities are in compliance with global nuclear safety standards. This is work 

that the International Atomic Energy Agency and its member states, including the 

United States, carry out in dozens of countries around the world. I believe it would 

be irresponsible not to provide basic cooperation to improve Iran’s capacity to prevent the theft or diversion of these nuclear materials. None of the work would reduce our ability to take military action against Iran if that was necessary to prevent 

their pursuit of a nuclear weapon. 

With that in mind, the Department’s primary responsibility with regard to the nuclear deal is to ensure that the President has all military options available for any 

Iran contingency. Therefore, the Department will maintain the plans, preparations, 

and posture to be able to execute a robust military option, if called upon to do so. 

If Iran violates the agreement, options that are available today will be available to 

any U.S. President in the future. The United States will likely be in a far stronger 

position 10 or 15 years from now, when Iran is further away from a nuclear weapon, 

and with the inspections and transparency measures in place that allow us to monitor the Iranian program. 

77. Senator CRUZ. Secretary Carter, throughout these negotiations, proponents of 

this deal have stated that the alternative to the deal is war. That statement is nonsense. Walking away wouldn’t have led to war; it would have led to a better deal. 

This deal doesn’t prevent war; it leads to a conflict with Iran. As we continue to 

decrease the size of our military to historic levels, Iran is increasing their military 

spending by a third next year, funded by the $100 billion signing bonus Secretary 

Kerry is providing them. Just last month, the Navy announced that it would have 

to remove its aircraft carrier presence from the Arabian Gulf for a couple months 

because they simply don’t have the capacity. How capable and prepared are we to 

protect our allies? How much improvement in air and missile defense has been accomplished across the Gulf Cooperation Council and Israel? 

Secretary CARTER. The United States remains fully committed to maintaining the 

defense capacity necessary to protect national security interests in the region, including security assurances to regional partners. Extensive access to the region provides the capacity and capability to respond credibly and effectively to regional 

threats, as well as the capacity to assess regional threats rapidly and efficiently. 

Furthermore, U.S. defense support for Israel remains ironclad and has reached unprecedented levels under this Administration. The Administration recognizes that 

Israel faces missile threats from a number of actors in the region. That is why in 

addition to Foreign Military Financing assistance, the United States has provided 

more than $3 billion in missile defense assistance to Israel since 2001. The Department has worked with Israel to develop a multi-layered missile defense architecture 

that includes Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow. The U.S. Government also continues to work toward advancing the U.S.- Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) security 

partnership as discussed at the Camp David Summit in May. The Department is 

focused on advancing cooperation in numerous areas, including in missile defense 

and military preparedness. In broadening and deepening the U.S. security relationship with GCC States through increased collaboration, coordination, and capacitybuilding, we bolster our ability to mitigate potential regional security threats. 

78. Senator CRUZ. General Dempsey, do you believe that Iran could develop significantly more capable air defense systems between now and when the deal lapses 

that might change its calculus on agreement compliance? 

General DEMPSEY. [Deleted.] 

HEZBOLLAH/ARMS

79. Senator CRUZ. Secretary Kerry, this week you attempted to ease these concerns regarding arms transfers to Hezbollah, stating: ‘‘There is a U.N. resolution, 

1701, that prevents the transfer of any weapons to Hezbollah. That will continue, 

and what we need to do is make sure we’re enforcing it.’’ Yet, President Obama said 

in a recent press conference: ‘‘It’s not like the U.N. has the capacity to police what 

Iran is doing.’’ Are the American people and our allies relying on the assurances 

of a UNSC resolution, one which has not been enforced in terms of Hezbollah, or 

will the United States monitor and prevent illicit weapons transfers throughout the 

Middle East? 

81 

Secretary KERRY. We will continue to use the multilateral and unilateral tools 

that are available to us to counter the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah. 

The existing UNSCRs impose obligations on all States to implement the arms embargo on Iran and provide authorities to facilitate enforcement. Under UNSCR 2231 

that endorsed the JCPOA, those sanctions will continue for another five years after 

Adoption Day (or until the IAEA reaches the broader conclusion that all nuclear materials in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier). 

After that, we will continue to have a number of other unilateral and multilateral 

tools available to us to counter Iran’s arms transfers and other destabilizing activities in the region. Equally important, we also continue to work with our partners 

to counter Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region and disrupt Iran’s weapons 

transfers. 

80. Senator CRUZ. Secretary Kerry, Annex B of UNSC Resolution 2231 stipulates 

the five-year conventional weapons embargo extension and the eight-year ballistic 

missile embargo extension can be waived subject to ‘‘a case-by-case’’ determination 

of the Security Council. Under what circumstances will the UNSC approve arms 

sales to or from Iran? 

Secretary KERRY. The United States would be able to block UN Security Council 

approval of any transfer of weapons or ballistic missile-related items covered by the 

restrictions that remain in force under UNSCR 2231, and it is difficult to imagine 

any circumstance in which we would consider allowing the Council to approve such 

a transfer. 

81. Senator CRUZ. Secretary Kerry, will the US come to the aid of Israel in the 

event Iranian arms in Hezbollah hands are used or deployed on our ally? 

Secretary KERRY. The JCPOA does not alter our relationship with Israel or our 

unwavering commitment to Israel’s security and right to self-defense. We will continue to aggressively counter Iran’s destabilizing actions in the region. 

We are also helping Israel address new and complex security threats by continuing to ensure Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge. We remain committed to working together with Israel to provide new capabilities to detect and destroy terror tunnels, build highly effective rocket and missile defense systems to protect the Israeli 

people, and help Israel improve its cyber-defense capabilities. 

POSSIBLE MILITARY DIMENSIONS

82. Senator CRUZ. Former CIA and DNI Director Michael Hayden said this past 

month: ‘‘We, of course, do not have total knowledge of how much progress the Iranians had made . . . I was stunned about a month ago when Sec. Kerry declared that 

we had ‘‘absolute knowledge’’ of their weaponization effort and that we need not 

overly focus on the past. I know of no American intelligence officer who would claim 

that we have ‘‘absolute knowledge’’ of the Iranian weaponization program.’’ Last 

month, former Defense Department senior analyst J. Matthew McInnis said: ‘‘We 

have a long history of getting it wrong on these states’ weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) programs . . . No intelligence professional would ever (or should ever) say 

they have absolute confidence in their knowledge on any subject, let alone on an 

adversary’s nuclear program. But the president and the secretary appear to be expecting exactly that of our intelligence officers. Moreover, they are basing the legitimacy and success of a nuclear agreement on it. Expecting the US intelligence community to have ‘absolute knowledge’ of a subject is unprecedented, and frankly absurd.’’ At this moment, does the US intelligence community have full knowledge of 

Iran’s past activities in relation to the possible military dimension? If the US does 

not obtain such knowledge, how are our officials supposed to gauge Iran’s progress 

without a baseline to reference? 

Secretary KERRY. A 2007 Director of National Intelligence report assessed with 

high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were working under 

government direction to develop nuclear weapons. 

Our ability to implement this deal is not linked to Iran’s past work. This deal is 

about what Iran’s nuclear program will look like in the future, and about Iran taking steps to show that it is not undertaking current or future nuclear weapons work. 

We are confident that this deal can verifiably ensure that Iran’s nuclear program 

will remain peaceful going forward. 

Under the JCPOA, Iran must provide the IAEA with the information and access 

required under the Roadmap Agreement to investigate concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program in the past. 

Secretary CARTER. [Deleted.] 

General DEMPSEY. [Deleted.] 

82 

83. Senator CRUZ. Secretary Kerry, as I understand it, the ‘‘Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues’’ is a mere framework that calls for 

‘‘separate arrangements,’’ solely between the IAEA and Iran, to address undeclared 

sites, past activities, and Parchin. Congress is not able to review these arrangements, and therefore has no basis to judge the progress or lack thereof regarding 

Iran’s possible military dimension. Additionally, none of the P5 countries are allowed to view these separate arrangements. This constitutes extraordinary terms of 

confidentiality. Are any other similar separate arrangements between the IAEA and 

any state under its inspection subject to comparable levels of confidentiality? 

Secretary KERRY. In the JCPOA, Iran committed to take certain steps set forth 

in the Roadmap Agreement negotiated between the IAEA and Iran. The Roadmap 

refers to two ‘‘separate arrangements’’ between the IAEA and Iran. Within the IAEA 

system, such arrangements related to safeguards procedures and inspection activities are confidential and are not released to other member states. The United States 

does not have a right to demand these documents from the IAEA. However, the 

United States was briefed on these separate arrangements, and we have briefed and 

will continue to brief Congress on them as well. 

It is standard practice for the IAEA and member states to treat bilateral documents as ‘‘safeguards confidential.’’ This is a principle the United States has championed throughout the IAEA’s existence to protect both proprietary and proliferation-sensitive information. There are many cases where states would have liked access to safeguards information, including the denuclearization efforts in South Africa, investigations in South Korea, and efforts to safeguard enrichment plants in 

Brazil and elsewhere, but where that information remained confidential. 

84. Senator CRUZ. Secretary Kerry, why are the terms of these ‘‘separate arrangements’’ so stringent that not even the P5 countries are allowed to view it? 

Secretary KERRY. In the JCPOA, Iran committed to take certain steps set forth 

in the Roadmap Agreement negotiated between the IAEA and Iran. The Roadmap 

refers to two ‘‘separate arrangements’’ between the IAEA and Iran. Within the IAEA 

system, such arrangements related to safeguards procedures and inspection activities are confidential and are not released to other member states. 

It is standard practice for the IAEA and member states to treat bilateral documents as ‘‘safeguards confidential.’’ This is a principle the United States has championed throughout the IAEA’s existence to protect both proprietary and proliferation-sensitive information. The United States does not have a right to demand these 

documents from the IAEA. However, the United States was briefed on these separate arrangements, and we have briefed and will continue to brief Congress on them 

as well. 

85. Senator CRUZ. Secretary Kerry, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency is responsible for partnering, verifying, researching, responding, defending, and preparing against the full threat spectrum—chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear 

and high yield explosives. According to DTRA’s website, the agency partners with 

‘‘countries that have been our allies for centuries, and we partner with countries 

that have recently opened their doors to the United States . . . with any country that 

wants to reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction, or be prepared for a 

crisis involving WMD.’’ Did DTRA in any way participate in negotiating the JCPOA 

before a final agreement was struck?’’ Has DTRA been consulted on the terms of 

the JCPOA since it was released? Can you verify that DTRA will not be a partner 

in protecting or securing Iran’s nuclear facilities, pursuant to Annex III Section D, 

whether through technology development, academic workshops, or information sharing? 

Secretary KERRY. The negotiation of the JCPOA was a fully interagency effort of 

the U.S. government. Implementation of the deal will similarly draw on the full 

spectrum of expertise within the U.S. interagency, including, where appropriate, the 

Department of Defense. 

Nothing in Annex III of the JCPOA requires the United States to participate in 

any specific cooperation activity. While there could be some activities where it would 

be beneficial for the United States to participate, we would only participate in such 

an engagement after a careful review to ensure that it meets our overall policy objectives and in ways that are consistent with our laws and regulations, which significantly restrict the types of interactions that we could have. 

IAEA INSPECTIONS AND VERIFICATION

86. Senator CRUZ. Please explain the rationale for a potential delay of up to 24 

days for IAEA inspections. 

83 

Secretary KERRY. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) includes the 

most comprehensive and rigorous verification regime ever negotiated, including an 

unprecedented access provision that ensures both timely and effective IAEA access 

to any undeclared location in Iran necessary to verify Iran’s compliance, including 

at military locations. 

To be clear, the IAEA can request access to any suspicious location with 24 hours’ 

notice under the Additional Protocol, which Iran will implement under this deal. 

This deal does not change that baseline. It enhances it, by creating a new mechanism to ensure the IAEA gets the access it needs to undeclared locations and by 

setting a firm limit to resolve access issues—24 days. Without the special access 

provisions we negotiated in the JCPOA, Iran could stonewall the IAEA for years 

and not be in violation. The IAEA has been seeking access to the Parchin facility 

for well over three years. 

Either Iran must provide the necessary access to resolve the IAEA’s concerns 

within 24 days (at the maximum), or Iran would be in violation of its Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) commitments and sanctions could be snapped 

back. Our experts believe, and the history in Iran and elsewhere has shown, that 

a site contaminated with nuclear materials is very unlikely to be successfully sanitized within 24 days, or longer for that matter. 

Iran understands that any failure to cooperate with the IAEA will raise significant suspicions among the P5+1 and would likely lead to a snapback of sanctions. 

If Iran refused access after a decision of the Joint Commission, the United States 

could take appropriate action at that time. 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

87. Senator CRUZ. Is the IAEA relying on Iran to provide samples from the 

Parchin site? If so, who or what entity in Iran is designated to carry out this task? 

Secretary KERRY. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran 

must complete the activities required of it in the ‘‘Roadmap for Clarification of Past 

and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program with the IAEA.’’ 

This includes a separate arrangement on Parchin. This arrangement, like other arrangements related to safeguards agreements and inspections activities, is confidential within the IAEA system. We cannot address publicly the details of what the 

Roadmap activities entail. As we have said before—and as we briefed Congress fully 

in classified settings—the U.S. government’s nuclear experts are confident that the 

Agency’s plans for Parchin are technically sound. Finally, Iran will not get additional sanctions relief until the IAEA verifies that Iran has completed its nuclear 

steps, including those related to PMD. 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

88. Senator CRUZ. Secretary Moniz, the JCPOA limits the stockpile of enriched 

uranium, or its equivalent in chemical forms, at 300 kg of up to 3.67 percent. However, Annex I outlines three significant instances when enriched uranium is not 

counted toward this limit when: (1) fabricated fuel assemblies from Russia are used 

at Russian reactors inside Iran, (2) when enriched uranium from other countries is 

used in Iran’s reactors, and (3) when enriched uranium in fuel assemblies are manufactured in Iran. How will the IAEA account for this additional uranium, and will 

it be reported on? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

89. Senator CRUZ. The JCPOA stipulates that, in the event Iran seeks to purchase 

fuel for the TRR and enriched uranium targets, the signatories to the Agreement 

‘‘will supply a quantity of 19.75 percent enriched uranium oxide (U3O8) and deliver 

[it] to Iran.’’ Can you guarantee that the United States will not engage as a supplier 

of enriched uranium oxide to Iran when it seeks to purchase this material? 

Secretary KERRY. Under the JCPOA, Iran will seek to enter into a commercial 

contract for the external supply of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). In 

the case of lack of conclusion of such a contract with a fuel supplier, the E3/EU+3 

will supply a quantity (in increments no greater than approximately 5 kg) of enriched uranium oxide to Iran, exclusively for the purpose of TRR fuel and target fabrication. Nothing in the JCPOA would require such a transfer specifically from the 

United States. 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

84 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

IRAN SANCTIONS

90. Senator NELSON. Secretary Lew, If Congress does not permit sanctions to be 

lifted under the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), will other 

countries continue to cooperate with U.S. sanctions? Specifically, will countries that 

import Iranian oil—China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—continue to 

comply with sanctions imposed by Section 1245 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112–239)? 

Secretary Lew. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

91. Senator NELSON. Secretary Lew, could the Department of Treasury compel 

their continued cooperation with threat of economic sanction? Would such a threat 

be credible? 

Secretary Lew. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND

NEGATIVE IRANIAN ACTIVITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator GILLIBRAND. We’ve heard a lot of concerns about the fact that this deal 

did not address Iran’s bad behavior in the region. 

92. Secretary Kerry, what were the Administration’s reasons for not addressing 

these issues? 

Secretary KERRY. Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region are a top concern of 

the Administration. An Iran with a nuclear weapon would make this aggressive behavior even more concerning. That is why the Administration believes the first step 

is to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. This arrangement addresses 

that concern by ensuring that Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon as we continue 

our work to hold Tehran accountable for its destabilizing regional activities, including its support for terrorism. The President is committed to working closely with 

Israel, the Gulf countries, and our other regional partners to do just that. 

93. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Kerry, how will we ensure that the loosening 

of sanctions and the integration of Iran into the world economy does not backfire 

and generate more violence in the region? 

Secretary KERRY. We remain vigilant against threats to regional stability from 

Iran, and have not let up on our efforts to address Iran’s support for terrorism and 

destabilizing activities in the region, including through designations of Iranians involved in support for terrorism during the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) period. We 

have made clear to Iran that we will continue to utilize all our tools to disrupt such 

activities by Iran. First, we are undermining Iran’s capacity to execute attacks directly or through its partners and proxies by expanding our cooperation with and 

strengthening the capacity of regional partners. Second, we are working to restrict 

Iran’s ability to move money and material for illicit purposes through sanctions and 

interdiction actions when necessary. Third, we remain committed to Israel’s security 

and that of our other regional allies and we continue to build up our partners’ capacity to defend themselves against Iranian aggression. Fourth, we are working unilaterally and with allies to weaken Hizballah’s financial networks. Finally, we are 

working to disrupt Iran’s relationships with its partners by publicizing Iran’s meddling wherever we can and over the long-term by strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law in countries facing threats from Iranian proxy activities. 

94. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Carter, do you anticipate that Iran will use 

some of its freed-up cash to fund its proxies like the Houthis in Yemen, Bashar alAssad in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Gaza? 

Secretary CARTER. [Deleted.] 

95. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Carter, what is the U.S. counter-strategy? 

Secretary CARTER. The Defense Department’s primary responsibility with regard 

to the nuclear agreement is to ensure that the President has all military options 

available for any Iran contingency. The Department will maintain plans, preparations, and posture to be able to execute a robust military option, if called upon to 

85 

do so. The Department remains prepared and postured to bolster the security of regional partners, including Israel, to defend against aggression, ensure freedom of 

navigation in the Gulf, and to check Iranian malign influence. Finally, the Department is postured and prepared to respond to possible Iranian non-compliance with 

the agreement. 

VERIFICATION

Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Moniz, the Additional Protocol specifies that for 

access to undeclared and other sites, ‘‘advance notice shall be in writing and shall 

specify the reasons for access and the activities to be carried out during such access.’’ The JCPOA says the IAEA will ‘‘provide Iran the reasons for access in writing 

and will make available relevant information.’’ I have talked to IAEA inspection experts who both have told me that the amount of information required under the 

JCPOA for access to an undeclared site appears to be greater than under the Additional Protocol. 

96. Secretary Moniz, can you explain to me why the agreement requires the IAEA 

to ‘‘make available relevant information’’ when the Additional Protocol does not? 

Could this requirement to ‘‘make available relevant information’’ be difficult to implement and perhaps inhibit a request for access if, for example, the request is 

based on intelligence information? 

Secretary Moniz, the Administration has indicated that it would take no more 

than 24 days to gain access to an undeclared site where there is suspicion of activities contrary to the JCPOA. However, the JCPOA also that states that the 24 day 

clock begins with the ‘‘IAEA’s initial request for access’’ and the initial request for 

access cannot be made until after a request for clarification and Iran’s response, potentially creating a delay longer than 24 days. According to the agreement, once a 

site is identified by the agency, and before the ‘‘IAEA’s initial request for access,’’ 

the IAEA must ‘‘provide Iran the basis for such concerns and request clarification’’ 

and then allow Iran to attempt to explain. The IAEA can only request access if ‘‘If 

Iran’s explanations do not resolve the IAEA’s concerns. 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

97. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Moniz, does this initial period potentially extend the time for access significantly beyond 24 days from the time a suspicious site 

is identified by the IAEA and the concern is communicated to Iran? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

98. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Moniz, some have suggested that the 24 day 

clock begins with the initial request for clarification, notwithstanding the language 

of the agreement. If this is the Administration position, has Iran agreed to this? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

99. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Moniz, what kind of cheating could Iran do 

within 24 days? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

100. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Moniz, according to Dr. Olli Heinonen, former 

Deputy Director of the IAEA, Iran could theoretically sanitize a suspected site of 

materials—including nuclear materials—within 2 weeks and has done so in the 

past. Do you agree with this assessment? Why or why not? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

101. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Carter, some analysts believe that if Iran is 

allowed to continue to enrich nuclear materials, even for allegedly peaceful purposes, that other countries in the region will follow suit and begin their own nuclear 

programs. What is your assessment of this likelihood? Will this deal lead to a 

nuclearization of the Middle East? 

Secretary CARTER. [Deleted.] 

102. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Moniz, this agreement begins with a significant roll back of Iran’s capabilities and levels of inspection that include access to 

known facilities, limitations on the number of centrifuges they can have spinning, 

86 

the 24-day access window and oversight of the supply chain. But over time, these 

restrictions and additional access are eliminated and after 25 years, all that is left 

are Iran’s responsibilities under the Nonproliferation Treaty and the Additional Protocol. Can you walk us through what we gain in the interim and at the end of 25 

years, are we back where we started? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

103. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Moniz, what kind of inspections regime (frequency, access, and clear consequences) will be necessary to create an effective deterrent so Iran will not cheat? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

104. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Moniz, does the IAEA have those capabilities? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

105. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Moniz, Iran’s clandestine activities, rather 

than just the existing facilities, are of great concern considering its history. What 

do we know about Iran’s past efforts to cheat and set up a clandestine program? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

PAST MILITARY DIMENSIONS

106. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Moniz, what do we still need to learn through 

the PMD process with the IAEA? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

107. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Moniz, what, if anything, does this deal do 

in response to that? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

108. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Moniz, what guarantees are there that the 

deal’s PMD process will cover everything clandestine that’s potentially out there? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

109. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Carter, will the access for these first 10–15 

years help in the future should Iran later be found to have developed a covert program and broken its commitments under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 

and Additional Protocol? 

Secretary CARTER. Ten or fifteen years from now, the United States will likely be 

in a far stronger position with Iran further away from a nuclear weapon, and with 

the inspections and transparency measures in place that allow for stronger international monitoring of the Iranian program than would be in place without this 

deal. I will not comment on the specifics of military planning, but I am confident 

in the Department’s ability to serve as an insurance policy against possible Iranian 

non-compliance. 

110. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Moniz, Which countries have the best weapons inspectors? Will they be on the ground in Iran? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

111. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Moniz, The agreement calls for 130+ inspectors from IAEA to monitor Iran’s program. In your opinion, is this number sufficient? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

112. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Moniz, Does IAEA have sufficient technical 

expertise to adequately monitor Iran’s nuclear program, particularly any clandestine 

activities? 

87 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

113. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Moniz, what about IAEA’s funding and resources? Are they sufficient? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

114. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Moniz, what if anything can the U.S. do to 

strengthen the IAEA’s hand? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

115. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Moniz, Do you believe that, at the end of the 

10–15 years of more restricted activity, Iran will be a ‘‘nuclear threshold’’ state capable of being able to move rapidly to weaponization? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

116. Senator GILLIBRAND. Do you have any concerns about Russia reprocessing 

spent fuel from Arak or with converting centrifuges at Fordow to isotope production? 

Secretary Moniz. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

Secretary KERRY. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran 

must export all spent fuel from the redesigned Arak reactor, for the lifetime of the 

reactor, to a mutually determined location in a P5+1 country or third country, for 

further treatment or disposition, as provided for in relevant contracts between the 

parties. While there are no such contracts to date, we would welcome one of our 

P5+1 partners—including Russia—taking on this role. 

Regarding Fordow, the JCPOA provides for two centrifuge cascades to be modified 

for the production of stable isotopes, conducted in joint partnership between Russia 

and Iran on the basis of mutually agreed arrangements. We welcome Russia’s willingness to cooperate with Iran on activities to transition the Fordow facility from 

a uranium enrichment facility—which is its current use without a JCPOA—to a nuclear, physics, and technology center without nuclear material and where no uranium enrichment or uranium enrichment research and development is conducted. 

RAMIFICATIONS OF CONGRESS REJECTING DEAL

Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Kerry, the Administration has stated that the consequences would be ‘‘catastrophic’’ if Congress were to reject the agreement. 

117. Secretary Kerry, please walk us through exactly what you foresee happening 

in such a scenario. 

Secretary KERRY. If Congress rejects the deal, the United States would not be in 

a position to fulfill its sanctions relief commitments under the JCPOA because of 

the restrictions under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The expected result would be that Iran would refuse to meet its commitments, and the 

JCPOA would collapse. Without sanctions relief from the United States, Iran would 

very likely not take the significant nuclear steps the JCPOA requires to roll back 

and constrain its nuclear program, or to provide unprecedented access to monitor 

it. In this scenario, the existing UNSC sanctions regime would remain in place because the IAEA would not be in a position to confirm that Iran has taken the nuclear steps outlined in the JCPOA. Compliance with these and other sanctions 

would begin to erode, however, as countries perceived that the U.S. had turned its 

back on a feasible negotiated solution. This would put us in the worst possible position of losing our constraints on Iran’s nuclear program while our leverage begins 

to weaken. 

118. Senator GILLIBRAND. Secretary Kerry, please explain why it wouldn’t be possible for the P5+1 to return to negotiations to get a stronger deal. 

Secretary KERRY. Our international partners joined us in applying tough sanctions to Iran because we made the case that Iran’s nuclear program was an uncontained threat to global security. Sanctions were used to bring Iran to the negotiating 

table, which worked. Now, after two years of negotiating with Iran, the international community does not believe that ramping up sanctions will result in a better deal. Instead, should Congress reject the deal and impose new sanctions, the 

international community would blame us for walking away from a credible solution 

88 

and would move forward with their desire to re-engage with Iran. We would no 

longer be able to maintain the tough international sanctions regime that forced Iran 

to negotiate. 

The countries whose cooperation we need—including those in the European 

Union, China, Japan, India and South Korea, as well as the companies and banks 

that handle their oil purchases and hold foreign reserves—are among the largest 

economies in the world. These partners, should they believe our efforts to negotiate 

a nuclear deal were disingenuous, would likely decide to stop cooperating with our 

sanctions. 

If Congress voted to reject the deal, we would go from a situation in which Iran 

is isolated to one in which the United States is isolated. That would be damaging 

in general, but would represent a significant setback in our ability to mitigate the 

profound threat to international peace and security the Iranian nuclear program 

poses. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD BLUMENTHAL

SANCTIONS ON IRANIAN BANKS

119. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Lew, thank you for your efforts and those 

at treasury working to stop terror financing and the entire OFAC team. You have 

a real challenge here with this proposed agreement because it is a Sisyphean task 

to disambiguate Iranian banks involved in terror financing from those involved in 

financing Iran’s covert nuclear program. They are really two sides of the same coin, 

both state enterprises of the Government of Iran. With Iran being a state sponsor 

of terror, I am deeply troubled that the sanctions relief in this proposed agreement 

will allow banks engaged in terror financing back into SWIFT and global commerce. 

While I have been assured that Bank Saderat remains sanctioned because of its terror finance activities, Oner Bank, which is a bank directly owned or controlled by 

Bank Saderat is removed from sanctions. Likewise, Karafarin Bank is given sanction relief. As you know the Karafarin Bank is a private bank controlled by Iran’s 

Supreme Leader, Seyed Ali Khamenei, through holding companies. Please explain 

to the Committee how the private bank of the Ayatollah is not engaged in terror 

financing. 

Secretary Lew. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

120. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Lew, another example is Bank Tejerat. This 

bank financed Iran’s attempts to acquire yellowcake uranium. But it also supports 

the activities of subsidiaries and subordinates of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard 

Corps and we know the IRGC is coordinating terrorism across the Middle East as 

we speak. So will you pledge today that Bank Tejerat will remain on our SDN (Specialty Designated Nationals) list and that you will work with our EU allies keep this 

and the other banks I mentioned out of the SWIFT system? 

Secretary Lew. Did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

(89) 

THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION 

(JCPOA) AND THE MILITARY BALANCE IN 

THE MIDDLE EAST 

TUESDAY, AUGUST 4, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in Room 

SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain 

(chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, 

Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, 

Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, 

Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Before we commence the hearing, I would 

like to say, since a quorum is now present, I ask the committee to 

consider two civilian nominations and a list of 1,476 pending military nominations. 

First, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of Ms. 

Joyce Louise Connery to be a member of the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board, and Mr. Joseph Bruce Hamilton to be a member 

of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Board. Is there a motion to favorably report these two civilian nominations to the Senate? 

Senator REED. So moved. 

Senator INHOFE. Second. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Is there a second? 

Senator INHOFE. It’s me. 

Chairman MCCAIN. All in favor? 

[A chorus of ayes.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. All those opposed? 

[No response.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. The ayes have it. 

Second, I ask the committee to consider a list of 1,476 pending 

military nominations, including General Mark A. Milley to be Chief 

of Staff of the Army, Admiral John R.—John M. Richardson to be 

Chief of Naval Operations, and Lieutenant General Robert B. 

Neller to be General and Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

Of these nominations, 298 nominations are 1 day short of the 

committee’s requirement that nominations be in committee for 7 

days before we report them out. No objection has been raised, these 

90 

nominations. I recommend the committee waive the 7-day rule in 

order to permit the confirmation of the nominations of these officers before the Senate goes out for the August recess. 

Is there a motion to favorably report these 1,476 military nominations to the Senate? 

Senator REED. So moved. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Is there a second? 

Senator REED. Second. 

Chairman MCCAIN. All in favor, say aye. 

[A chorus of ayes.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. The motion carries. This—a significant turnover in the—on the leadership—top leadership of the United States 

military. 

The committee meets today for our second oversight hearing on 

the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which the United States 

and other major powers have signed with Iran. 

We welcome our distinguished witnesses and thank them for 

joining us today: General Michael Hayden, Principal at the 

Chertoff Group and former Director of the Central Intelligence 

Agency; Ambassador Nicholas Burns, Goodman Professor of Diplomacy and International Relations at the Harvard Kennedy School 

and former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Ambassador Eric Edelman, Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and former Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy; and Dr. Richard Haass, President of the Council 

on Foreign Relations and former Director of Policy Planning at the 

State Department. A very distinguished panel, and I thank all of 

them for coming to testify before us today. 

The committee’s oversight is primarily focused on the strategic 

and military implications of the agreement, which is the responsibilities of the Armed Services Committee. Among other things, we 

want to know how this agreement will affect regional security, proliferation, and the balance of power in the Middle East; what impact it may have on Iran’s malign activities and hegemonic—— 

Senator REED. Dominating-the-region stuff. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman MCCAIN.—ambitions in the region—hegemonic ambitions in the region; what it means for perceptions of American 

credibility and resolve among our allies and partners; and what the 

consequences are for U.S. defense policy, military planning, and 

force posture. 

From this broader strategic perspective, this bad deal only looks 

that much worse. The committee is eager to hear our witnesses’ assessments of the vital details of this agreement, especially the 

verification and monitoring mechanisms, which include two side 

agreements between the IAEA and Iran, neither of which the administration or the Congress have seen. At the same time, what is 

even more troubling are the military implications of this agreement. 

Iran is not just an arms-control challenge, it is a geopolitical 

challenge. For years, many of us have urged the administration to 

adopt a regional strategy to counter Iran’s malign activities in the 

Middle East. Unfortunately, if such a strategy exists, there is no 

evidence of it. Instead, we have watched with alarm as Iran’s miliVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
91 

tary and intelligence operatives have stepped up their destabilizing 

activities in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, Gaza, and elsewhere. Iran did all of this under the full pressure of sanctions. Now 

Iran will receive a windfall of sanctions relief estimated at roughly 

$60 billion, or possibly much more. It is only fair to assume that 

billions of additional dollars will soon flow to the Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Force, or Quds Force, money that will be used to 

boost arms supplies to Iran’s terrorist proxies, to sow chaos and instability across the region, and double down on Bashar Assad right 

when he needs it most. This will present a host of new challenges 

for the Department of Defense. 

This agreement will not only strengthen Iran’s malign activities 

in the region, it will also further Iran’s emergence as a dominant 

military power in the Middle East. Despite repeated assurances 

that negotiations were strictly limited to the nuclear program, the 

administration made major concessions related to conventional 

weapons and ballistic missiles, concessions that the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned, before the agreement, should 

occur under, quote, ‘‘no circumstances.’’ 

In 8 years, this agreement would lift restrictions on ballistic missiles whose only conceivable military purpose would be to deliver 

nuclear weapons against the United States and its allies. In 5 

years, this agreement would lift the international arms embargo 

against Iran, freeing up the regime to acquire advanced conventional military capabilities. With billions of dollars in sanctions relief, Iran is sure to find plenty of states that are eager to sell those 

weapons, especially Russia and China. 

These concessions have direct and dangerous implications for the 

U.S. military. The administration says that the military option will 

remain on the table if Iran violates the agreement. And that is 

true. Yet, the agreement itself would enable Iran to construct the 

very kind of advanced military arsenal, the anti-access and area 

denial capabilities, that could raise the cost of employing our military option. In short, if this agreement fails, United States 

servicemembers are called upon to take action against Iran, their 

lives would be at greater risk because of this agreement. 

And that is perhaps most troubling of all about this agreement, 

what it means for America’s credibility in the Middle East. For decades, the United States has sought to suppress security competition in the region between states with long histories of hostility toward one another and to prevent war. I fear this agreement could 

further undermine our ability and willingness to play that vital 

stabilizing role. 

Our allies and partners in the Middle East have increasingly 

come to believe that America is withdrawing from the region, and 

doing so at a time when Iran is aggressively seeking to advance its 

ambitions. Now we have reached an agreement that will only legitimize the Islamic Republic as a threshold nuclear state with an industrial enrichment capability, but will also unshackle this regime 

and its long-held pursuit of conventional military power, and may 

actually consolidate the current regime’s control in Iran for years 

to come. 

The President and his advisors are fond of saying that the only 

alternative to this deal is war. This kind of false choice is all too 

92 

familiar from this administration. And these cheap scare tactics 

have no place in a national security debate of this magnitude. And 

our military leaders know better. The Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs, General Dempsey, told this committee last week, quote, 

‘‘We have a range of options.’’ Likewise, the President’s nominee to 

be the next Chief of Naval Operation testified that, quote, ‘‘There 

are other options besides going to war.’’ 

In addition to your analysis of the agreement and its consequences, all of us are eager to hear from each of you today what 

realistic alternatives there is to this agreement and what role the 

Congress should now play. 

Senator Reed. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And we are, indeed, fortunate to have before us today witnesses 

that have served time in the military and our diplomatic service, 

intelligence entities of our government. They have a wide range of 

knowledge and experience in issues relating to the Middle East, 

nonproliferation, asymmetric warfare, and matters of war and 

peace in general. 

This is our second hearing relating to the Joint Comprehensive 

Plan of Action, or the JCPOA. And I want to thank Chairman 

McCain for his effort to make sure the committee is presented with 

a range of views and opinions on the JCPOA. 

In the weeks ahead, Congress has an obligation to review carefully the details of this agreement and to validate that the agreement will meet our common goal of stopping Iran from acquiring 

a nuclear weapon. This week’s hearings are part of that effort. 

Last week, the committee held a hearing with the Secretaries of 

Treasury, State, Defense, and Energy, and the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. That hearing was important, as it provided 

the committee with the administration’s views on the agreement, 

plans for regional engagement in the months and years ahead, and 

an opportunity to better understand the details of the agreement, 

from Iran’s enrichment capabilities under the JCPOA to how snapback provisions and sanctions would be imposed if the terms of the 

agreement were violated. 

I hope our witnesses today will provide their assessment of 

whether the deal is in—the best available option to present the Iranians from obtaining a nuclear weapon, both in the near and long 

term. I specifically hope they will address a number of areas: the 

terms of the agreement itself, particularly with respect to cutting 

off a path to a nuclear device, past military dimensions of the program, duration, and the breakout time necessary for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon; the alternatives, if any, to the JCPOA— 

and I think these alternatives are something that we must consider; three, the inspection regime under the deal, including lessons 

learned from past international inspections that have been incorporated into this deal; four, the role and capacity of the International Agency—the Atomic Energy Agency to implement this 

deal; and finally, the sanctions regime under the JCPOA, and 

availability of those tools to be used against Iran in situations of 

93 

terrorism, regional destabilization activities, and human rights 

abuses. 

While the implementation of this agreement will not be performed by the Department of Defense, the Department will have a 

critical role in implementing the regional engagement policies and 

programs laid out at Camp David with our Gulf Cooperation Council partners. Secretary Kerry is in the region this week and is 

working with our GCC partners for the next steps of this policy: 

to enhance the ballistic missile defense capability of the GCC and 

to improve their interoperability and collective defense against 

asymmetric threats. These are important efforts that I look forward 

to hearing about today. 

Israel rightly views Iran as a significant ongoing threat to their 

national security interest. And, while Prime Minister Netanyahu is 

unlikely to ever endorse this agreement, the United States should 

make every effort to deepen further our cooperation on military 

and intelligence matters with Israel. I would be interested in hearing the assessment of the witnesses on how the United States 

might successfully move forward with the Netanyahu government 

if this agreement is ultimately adopted. 

I want to make one final point. These negotiations focused on denying Iran a pathway to a nuclear weapon. A nuclear weapon 

would be a more critical factor in the region. In fact, Iran would 

be a more formidable force in the region if it had a nuclear weapon, 

and, as it is repeatedly demonstrated, not a force for peace and stability, but one that supports terror and seeks to impose its will 

throughout the Middle East. Moreover, a nuclear Iran would likely 

prompt a regional nuclear arms race that, through accident or design, could lead to catastrophe. None of us would condone or ignore 

Iran’s support of terror or other destabilizing activities in the region, but these negotiations were properly focused on nuclear weapon. 

I look forward to the panel’s responses as we continue to deepen 

our understanding of this agreement. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Welcome the witnesses. 

General Hayden, we’ll begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, USAF (RET.), 

PRINCIPAL, THE CHERTOFF GROUP AND FORMER DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

General HAYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, 

for the invitation and including me in such a distinguished panel. 

I actually will be very brief in my opening remarks, because I 

know we’ve got an awful lot of questions with which we have to 

deal. 

I do appreciate, however, in my conversation with the committee 

staff, that the committee seems to be organizing its inquiry along 

a pattern of what I will call—the staff doesn’t—what I will call 

three bubbles: 

One bubble is the nature of the agreement itself. And that’s the 

part that the President has asked us to focus on. He actually has 

said, ‘‘Judge this agreement on whether or not it prevents Iran 

from getting a nuclear weapon in the next 10 years.’’ I actually 

94 

think that’s a fairly narrow focus, and that is not the only consideration that we must bring to mind in considering this agreement. 

Now, we can argue within that bubble as to whether or not it’s actually sufficient for that more narrowly defined task with regard to 

possible military dimensions, the inspection regime, the realism of 

snap-back inspections, and so on. And I’m sure we will discuss 

that, going forward. But, frankly, of the three bubbles I’m going to 

describe, it’s probably, in my eye, the most favorable, despite its 

weaknesses. 

A second bubble has to do with time. Where are we in 10 years? 

And where we will be in 10 years, if the agreement is honored, we 

will be, within Iran, with an industrial strength nuclear complex 

and permanent nuclear weapons threshold status. That’s what we 

have negotiated. And so, I think that’s also a second very important consideration, not just what it does from zero to 10. 

And then, finally and perhaps most immediately, it’s what the 

agreement does now to all the other aspects of Iranian behavior 

that are so troubling to us: what they do with regard to support 

to terrorism, Hamas, Hezbollah, their activity in Iraq, in Lebanon, 

shoring up the Bashar al-Assad government in Syria, and, of 

course, their contribution to the civil war in Yemen. Iran is doing 

that now, and is doing that as an isolated, impoverished, considered, renegade nation-state in the region. What might Iran be 

doing in those regards if Iran is no longer isolated, no longer considered renegade, brought back into the family of nations, and considerably richer than it is today? 

Mr. Chairman, the night before you arrived at Aspen, a few 

weeks ago, General Clapper was out in the big tent answering 

some questions, and he was asked about the agreement. And his 

bottom line was, ‘‘A terrorist-supporting state without a nuclear 

weapon, a terrorist-supporting state with a nuclear weapon, I think 

the choice is clear.’’ Jim’s a good friend, and that is an incredibly 

important consideration. But, I don’t think we can isolate ourselves 

to that consideration. As soon as he said it, I kind of perked up and 

said, ‘‘Let me give’’—I didn’t say it out loud, but to myself—‘‘Let 

me give you a contrary calculus.’’ Okay? ‘‘A terrorist-supporting 

state, isolated, renegade, impoverished, and not able to have normal dialogue or intercourse with the community of nations, and a 

terrorist-supporting state rich, engaged, accepted, and legitimated.’’ 

Those are the kinds of problems I think the immediate and predictable—not only—beyond that, inevitable—byproducts, even if bubble 

one were acceptable, that we would have to deal with before we 

consider the entire agreement acceptable. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I know we’ll have lots of 

questions, going forward. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Dr. Haass. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD N. HAASS, PRESIDENT, COUNCIL ON 

FOREIGN RELATIONS AND FORMER DIRECTOR OF POLICY 

PLANNING, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Dr. HAASS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this opportunity. 

95 

Look, this agreement with Iran, like any agreement, is filled with 

compromise. And I would say the—what we can simply do is summarize it as a tradeoff. Inconsistent, I think, with what General 

Hayden said, the agreement places significant limits on what Iran 

is permitted to do in the nuclear sphere for 10 to 15 years. But, 

these limits, even if respected in full, come at a steep price. And 

there’s essentially two principal prices. One is that it certainly facilitates Iran’s efforts to carry out what I would call an imperial 

foreign policy in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, starting now. 

And secondly, the agreement does not in any way resolve the problems posed by Iran’s actual or potential nuclear capabilities. And 

indeed, many of these problems grow significantly worse as we 

come out to 10 or 15 years. 

My own view is that a better agreement could and should have 

been materialized, but I also understand this is unprovable, and 

this is why historians can make a living. So, I will simply address 

the agreement that we have before us. But, I do think it needs to 

be judged on its merits rather than on the hopes it might lead to 

some type of a political transformation of Iran. We simply cannot 

know what, if any, effect it will have on Iran. And I think this is 

one we can argue round or flat. It could just as easily encourage 

radicalism in Iran as it could encourage moderation. 

I also have three baskets, not bubbles: 

One is the question of compliance. Given Iran’s history, there’s 

ample reason for concern. My own prediction, and it’s just that, is, 

Iran may well be tempted to cut corners and engage in what you 

might describe as retail noncompliance, but probably not wholesale 

noncompliance, lest it risk the reintroduction of sanctions or even 

military attack. I also come to this conclusion because I think, from 

Iran’s point of view, this is a good agreement, and it would be undisciplined on their part if they were to engage in wholesale noncompliance. Still, we’ve to guard against it, and I think we ought 

to be explicit as to what the penalties would be if they were to do 

that. 

On the regional side, as I said, Iran is an imperial power, and 

sanctions relief will be an enabler for them to do all the things they 

have been doing, but on a larger scale, and it could well extend, 

among other things, to Syrian civil war. This comes against the 

backdrop, I would simply add, of a Middle East which is already 

the least successful part of the world. I’ve used the analogy that 

the Middle East is a latter-day 30-years war of political and religious strife within and across boundaries. I see nothing in this 

agreement that will make that situation better, and, quite possibly, 

it will make it worse. 

And I’m happy to discuss, if people want, what I think, therefore, 

we need to think about doing in places like Iraq, in Syria and other 

places in the region. I would simply say, more broadly, is that we 

need to discourage the Saudis and others from developing a nuclear 

option to hedge against what Iran might do down the road. I mean, 

as bad as the Middle East now, a Middle East with one or more 

additional nuclear threshold states or actual states would be a 

nightmare, particularly since several of these regimes are brittle. 

So, it’s not just simply the question of nuclear use that we have 

96 

to think about, it’s the loss of custodianship over nuclear weapons 

and materials. 

Establishing strategic trust—or reestablishing strategic trust 

with Israel, I would also put high on the list. And, for the Israelis 

and others, including Jordan and other countries, we have got to 

have real, strategic dialogues to make sure they can contend with 

the very real threats, either stemming from Iran, ISIS, or what 

have you. 

My third area of concern deals with the long-term nuclear. And, 

in some areas, I think that’s the most serious. It’s necessary, but 

not sufficient, that Iran not be able to assemble one or more nuclear weapons down the road. And one thing I would recommend 

immediately is consultations with European and regional governments to deal with the question of a follow-on agreement to this 

one. What—again, if I’m right in my analysis that this agreement 

buys us 10 or 15 years, then we need to begin immediately on what 

is the aftermath. Because 10 or 15 years is not all that much. And 

we, ourselves, need to do serious planning, not simply diplomatically, but about sanctions, covert action, and military force. 

Now, I’m aware that you all, unlike me, have the responsibility 

to vote on this agreement. And I—as I’ve said, I believe it is a 

flawed agreement. But, I also think the framing is important here. 

And the issue before the Congress is not whether the agreement 

is good or bad, but whether, from this point on, the United States 

would be better or worse off with or without it. And I simply think 

there are several drawbacks to passing a resolution of disapproval, 

presumably overriding a presidential veto. And the two most serious ones are obviously what Iran could do in the nuclear realm in 

the short run, and secondly, the questions and doubts this would 

raise, not simply in the region, but around the world, about American reliability and predictability. 

At the other end of the scale or spectrum is the option of voting 

for the agreement. But, that would do nothing to address the flaws 

and the drawbacks and shortcomings of the agreement that exists. 

So, let me just put on the table a third option that I think is 

worth exploring, which is the idea to associate or link or somehow 

accompany any vote on this agreement with either legislation or 

some type of a formal communication between the White House 

and the Congress about American policies that would deal with 

each one of these three baskets. What would be American policy in 

the case of noncompliance? What would be certain principles that 

would guide American policy towards regional challenges? And 

what would be the principles and policies that would guide U.S.— 

the United States over the 10- and 15-year period and beyond 

when it came to Iranian policies in the nuclear realm. And what 

this—what the statements or these—this accompanying legislation 

would lay out is what would be intolerable and what the United 

States is prepared to do in the event of certain types of Iranian behavior. And I think such a statement would both have elements of 

reassurance to our friends and allies to help manage their behavior, but also send clear warnings to Iran about what would be the 

consequences of certain actions on their part. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Haass follows:] 

97 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY RICHARD N. HAASS

Mr. Chairman: Thank you for this opportunity to speak about the ‘‘Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’’ (JCPOA) signed on July 14 by representatives of the five 

permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and Iran. I want to 

make it clear that what you are about to hear are my personal views and should 

not be interpreted as representing the Council on Foreign Relations, which takes 

no institutional positions. 

The agreement with Iran, like any agreement, is a compromise, filled with elements that are attractive from the vantage point of US national security as well as 

elements that are anything but. A simple way of summarizing the pact and its consequences is that at its core the accord represents a strategic tradeoff. On one hand, 

the agreement places significant limits on what Iran is permitted to do in the nuclear realm for the next ten to fifteen years. But these limits, even if respected in 

full, come at a steep price. The agreement almost certainly facilitates Iran’s efforts 

to promote its national security objectives throughout the region (many of which are 

inconsistent with our own) over that same period. And second, the agreement does 

not resolve the problems posed by Iran’s actual and potential nuclear capabilities. 

Many of these problems will become greater as we approach the ten year point 

(when restrictions on the quantity and quality of centrifuges come to an end) and 

its fifteen year point (when restrictions pertaining to the quality and quantity of enriched uranium also end). 

I was not a participant in the negotiations; nor was I privy to its secrets. My view 

is that a better agreement could and should have materialized. But this debate is 

better left to historians. I will as a result address the agreement that exists. I would 

say at the outset it should be judged on its merits rather than on hopes it might 

lead (to borrow a term used by George Kennan in another context) to a mellowing 

of Iran. This is of course possible, but the agreement also could have just the opposite effect. We cannot know whether Iran will be transformed, much less how or how 

much. So the only things that makes sense to do now is to assess the agreement 

as a transaction and to predict as carefully as possible what effects it will likely 

have on Iran’s capabilities as opposed to its intentions. 

I want to focus on three areas: on the nuclear dimension as detailed in the agreement; on the regional; and on nuclear issues over the longer term. 

There is understandable concern as to whether Iran will comply with the letter 

and spirit of the agreement. Compliance cannot be assumed given Iran’s history of 

misleading the IAEA, the lack of sufficient data provided as to Iran’s nuclear past, 

the time permitted Iran to delay access to inspectors after site-specific concerns are 

raised, and the difficulty likely to be experienced in reintroducing sanctions. My own 

prediction is that Iran may be tempted to cut corners and engage in retail but not 

wholesale non-compliance lest it risk the reintroduction of sanctions and/or military 

attack. I should add that I come to this prediction in part because I believe that 

Iran benefits significantly from the accord and will likely see it in its own interest 

to mostly comply. But this cannot be assumed and may be wrong, meaning the 

United States, with as many other governments as it can persuade to go along, 

should both make Iran aware of the penalties for non-compliance and position itself 

to implement them if need be. I am assuming that the response to sustained noncompliance would be renewed sanctions and that any military action on our part 

would be reserved to an Iranian attempt at breaking out and fielding one or more 

nuclear weapons. 

The regional dimension is more complex and more certain to be problem. Iran is 

an imperial power that seeks a major and possibly dominant role in the region. 

Sanctions relief will give it much greater means to pursue its goals, including helping minority and majority Shi’ite populations in neighboring countries, arming and 

funding proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas, propping up the government in Damascus, and adding to sectarianism in Iraq by its unconditional support of the government and Shia militias. The agreement could well extend the Syrian civil war, 

as Iran will have new resources with which to back the Assad government. I hope 

that Iran will see that Assad’s continuation in power only fuels a conflict that provides recruiting opportunities for the Islamic State, which Iranian officials rightly 

see as a threat to themselves and the region. Unfortunately, such a change in thinking and policy is a long shot at best. 

The United States needs to develop a policy for the region that can deal with a 

more capable, aggressive Iran. To be more precise, though, it is unrealistic to envision a single or comprehensive US policy for a part of the world that is and will 

continue to be afflicted by multiple challenges. As I have written elsewhere, the 

Middle East is in the early throes of what appears to be a modern day 30 Years 

War in which politics and religion will fuel conflict within and across boundaries 

98 

for decades, resulting in a Middle East that looks very different from the one the 

world has grown familiar with over the past century. 

I will put forward approaches for a few of these challenges. In Iraq, I would suggest the United States expand its intelligence, military, economic, and political ties 

with both the Kurds and Sunni tribes in the West. Over time, this has the potential 

to result in gradual progress in the struggle against the Islamic State. 

Prospects for progress in Syria are poorer. The effort to build a viable opposition 

to both the government and various groups including but not limited to the Islamic 

State promises to be slow, difficult, anything but assured of success. A diplomatic 

push designed to produce a viable successor government to the Assad regime is 

worth exploring and, if possible, implementing. European governments likely would 

be supportive; the first test will be to determine Russian receptivity. If this is forthcoming, then a joint approach to Iran would be called for. 

I want to make two points here. First, as important as it would be to see the 

Assad regime ousted, there must be high confidence in the viability of its successor. 

Not only would Russia and Iran insist on it, but the United States should as well. 

Only with a viable successor can there be confidence the situation would not be exploited by the Islamic State and result in the establishment of a caliphate 

headquartered in Damascus and a massacre of Alawites and Christians. Some sort 

of a multinational force may well be essential. 

Second, such a scenario assumes a diplomatic approach to Iran. This should cause 

no problems here or elsewhere. Differences with Iran in the nuclear and other 

realms should not preclude diplomatic explorations and cooperation where it can 

materialize because interests are aligned. Syria is one such possibility, as is Afghanistan. But such diplomatic overtures should not stop the United States acting, be 

it to interdict arms shipments from Iran to governments or non-state actors; nor 

should diplomatic outreach in any way constrain the United States from speaking 

out in reaction to internal political developments within Iran. New sanctions should 

also be considered when Iran takes steps outside the nuclear realms but still judged 

to be detrimental to other US interests. 

Close consultations will be required with Saudi Arabia over any number of policies, including Syria. But three subjects in particular should figure in US-Saudi 

talks. First, the United States needs to work to discourage Saudi Arabia and others 

developing a nuclear option to hedge against what Iran might do down the road. 

A Middle East with nuclear materials in the hands of warring, potentially unstable 

regimes would be a nightmare. This could involve assurances as to what will not 

be tolerated (say, enrichment above a specified level) when it comes to Iran as well 

as calibrated security guarantees to Saudi Arabia and others. Second, the Saudis 

should be encouraged to reconsider their current ambitious policy in Yemen, which 

seems destined to be a costly and unsuccessful distraction. The Saudi government 

would be wiser to concentrate on contending with internal threats to its security. 

And thirdly, Washington and Riyadh should maintain a close dialogue on energy 

issues as lower oil prices offer one way of limiting Iran’s capacity to pursue programs and policies detrimental to US and Saudi interests. 

The agreement with Iran does not alter the reality that Egypt is pursuing a political trajectory unlikely to result in sustained stability or that Jordan will need help 

in coping with a massive refugee burden. Reestablishing strategic trust with Israel 

is a must, as is making sure it as well as other friends in the region have what 

they need to deal with threats to their security. (It matters not whether the threats 

come from Iran, the Islamic State, or elsewhere.) The United States should also step 

up its criticism of Turkey for both attacking the Kurds and for allowing its territory 

to be used as a pipeline for recruits to reach Syria and join the Islamic State. 

The third area of concern linked to the nuclear pact with Iran stems from its medium and long-term capabilities in the nuclear realm. It is necessary but not sufficient that Iran not be permitted to assemble one or more nuclear bombs. It is also 

necessary that it not be allowed to develop the ability to field a large arsenal of 

weapons with little or no warning. This calls for consultations with European and 

regional governments to begin sooner rather than later on a follow-on agreement to 

the current JCPOA. The use of sanctions, covert action, and military force should 

also be addressed in this context. 

I am aware that members of Congress have the responsibility to vote on the Iran 

agreement. As I have said, it is a flawed agreement. But the issue before the Congress is not whether the agreement is good or bad but whether from this point on 

the United States is better or worse off with it. It needs to be recognized that passage of a resolution of disapproval (presumably overriding a presidential veto) entails several major drawbacks. First, it would allow Iran to resume nuclear activity 

in an unconstrained manner, increasing the odds the United States would be faced 

with a decision—possibly as soon as this year or next—as to whether to tolerate the 

99 

emergence of a threshold or actual nuclear weapons state or use military force 

against it. Second, by acting unilaterally at this point, the United States would 

make itself rather than Iran the issue. In this vein, imposing unilateral sanctions 

would hurt Iran but not enough to make it alter the basics of its nuclear program. 

Third, voting the agreement down and calling for a reopening of negotiations with 

the aim of producing a better agreement is not a real option as there would insufficient international support for so doing. Here, again, the United States would likely 

isolate itself, not Iran. And fourth, voting down the agreement would reinforce questions and doubts around the world as to American political divisions and dysfunction. Reliability and predictability are essential attributes for a great power that 

must at one and the same time both reassure and deter. 

The alternative to voting against the agreement is obviously to vote for it. The 

problem with a simple vote that defeats a resolution of disapproval and that expresses unconditional support of the JCPOA is that it does not address the serious 

problems the agreement either exacerbated or failed to resolve. 

So let me suggest a third path. What I would encourage members to explore is 

whether a vote for the pact (against a resolution of disapproval) could be associated 

or linked with policies designed to address and compensate for the weaknesses and 

likely adverse consequences of the agreement. I can imagine such assurances in the 

form of legislation voted on by the Congress and signed by the president or a communication from the president to the Congress, possibly followed up by a joint resolution. Whatever the form, it would have to deal with either what the United States 

would not tolerate or what the United States would do in the face of Iranian noncompliance with the recent agreement, Iran’s long-term nuclear growth, and Iranian 

regional activities. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for asking me to meet with you and your colleagues here today. I of course look forward to any questions or comments you may 

have. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Dr. Haass. 

Ambassador Edelman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC S. EDELMAN, DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS AND FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 

POLICY 

Ambassador EDELMAN. Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, thank 

you very much for inviting me to join this panel today. I’m delighted to be here with them and before you. 

I submitted to the committee staff yesterday a lengthy statement, and I would ask that it be included in the—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Without objection. 

Ambassador EDELMAN.—on the record. 

First, let me say that I agree with much of what General Hayden 

and Richard Haass have said, but not all. The most important 

point I want to make this morning is, I think that you all are to 

be commended for the deliberation that you are engaging in on this 

agreement. I believe that major arms-control agreements that bind 

the Nation in matters vital to the national interest ought to rest 

on a strong public consensus. And that’s the reason why the 

Founders vested the power to ratify treaties with the Senate. And, 

although this is not a treaty—I recognize it’s not a treaty—I think 

the general proposition still remains very sound, so I appreciate the 

due diligence with which you’re approaching this. 

As Richard’s colleague, Ray Takeyh, and I wrote in the Washington Post last month, I believe that the Joint Comprehensive 

Plan of Agreement is deeply flawed because it concedes an enrichment capability that’s too large to Iran, a sunset clause that’s too 

short, a verification regime that’s too leaky, and enforcement mechanisms that are too suspect. The Institute for Science and InterVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
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national Security, which is one of the premier nonpartisan authorities on nonproliferation in general, has assessed that, on the agreement, after year 10, and particularly after year 15, as limits on its 

nuclear program end, Iran could reemerge as a major nuclear 

threat. Even if the deal succeeds during the first 10 years, it’s unknowable whether the agreement will continue to accomplish its 

fundamental goal of preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons 

in the long term. 

As Leon Wieseltier wrote earlier this week in The Atlantic, 10 

years is a young person’s idea of a long time. And I’m—unfortunately, now reached the age where I’m allowed to say things like 

that. 

I need to say that I’ve come to this judgment with some difficulty, because I’ve spent 30 years in the Foreign Service as a colleague of Ambassador Burns, and I have a strong belief in deference to executive authority in the conduct of foreign relations. 

And a multilateral agreement negotiated over many years should 

not be rejected for light or transient causes, for the reasons that 

Dr. Haass just mentioned in his statement. The only legitimate 

grounds for doing so, I believe, are when you believe that the 

agreement is so manifestly deleterious to the national interest that 

it warrants rejection and renegotiation. And I believe this agreement meets that standard because it will put the imprimatur of the 

international community and the United States on an industrialscale enrichment program that will leave Iran, even if the negotiated limits are adhered to, as a threshold nuclear state when the 

various provisions expire, as General Hayden said just a minute 

ago. This, in effect, reverses 50 years of U.S. nonproliferation policy. 

As my SAIS colleague, Michael Mandelbaum, wrote last week, 

‘‘We are abandoning the policy of prohibiting the spread of enrichment technology even to friendly democratic governments. And, as 

a result, it will henceforth be extremely difficult to prevent other 

countries, at first in the Middle East, but ultimately elsewhere, 

particularly in East Asia, from equipping themselves with the capacity for enrichment. In my view, this prospect of Iranian nuclear 

latency will, in turn, put the Middle East on the path to a catastrophic arms race.’’ 

The sanctions regime, with its snap-back provisions, I’m afraid 

will not be easily reconstituted once we have the entry into force 

of this agreement. And I would say, tellingly, that Foreign Minister 

Zarif noted, a few days ago, that sanctions would only be reimposed 

on Iran in case of serious violations of its obligations, and not in 

the case of small-scale violations—to Dr. Haass’s point. So, the Iranians are already telling us that they’re not worried about being 

held to account for incremental violation of the agreement. And, 

given Iran’s history of serial violation of its earlier obligations 

under the NPT, I think there’s a heavy burden on advocates of the 

agreement to show that the verification provisions will be adequate. 

We were told during the course of the negotiation that we would 

have anytime/anywhere verification for nondeclared sites. We now 

know that we’re going to have a much more complicated set of provisions that will leave potentially 24 days for Iran to deny and— 

101 

engage in denial and deception about its nuclear activities if it, in 

fact, is violating the agreement. 

The President has said that there’s—you know, this is not really 

a long time, it doesn’t really matter, you can’t really hide this activity. But, again, the Institute for Science and International Security 

has said that, in fact, these cumbersome procedures for requesting 

access to undeclared sites would allow Iran to disguise many smallscale nuclear and nuclear-weapons-related activities, including 

high-explosive testing related to nuclear weapons, small centrifuge 

manufacturing, and small centrifuge plants using advanced centrifuges. 

The termination of the United States-led sanctions against Iran’s 

energy, financial, and industrial sectors would repatriate as much 

as $150 billion, if all the frozen funds that Iran has accumulated 

are released, to rebuild its straightened economy and to modernize 

its military. As, again, Foreign Minister Zarif recently told the 

Majlis, once the structure of sanctions collapses, it will be impossible to reconstruct it. 

The deal, itself, will legitimize years of illegitimate conduct and 

enhance Iran’s drive for hegemony—that’s easy for me to say—— 

[Laughter.] 

Ambassador EDELMAN.—and, through sanctions relief that will 

provide for the modernization of Iranian military capabilities 

across the board and increasing its support for proxies and for terror. 

One example of what might happen is an effort by Iran to shift 

the strategic balance back in Syria against the Assad regime once 

and for all. Tehran’s military assistance to Baghdad and its extension of control through Shiite militias can be expected to continue. 

It may feel empowered to take a—undertake a counteroffensive to 

the gains that have been made by the progovernment forces in 

Yemen in the last few days. And the larger strategic problem I 

think we face is that Iranian hegemony in Yemen could be matched 

by additional Iranian moves in Saudi Arabia’s eastern province as 

well as in Bahrain, and thus, put Riyadh in the equivalent of an 

East-West strategic vice. Even an Iranian policy in Yemen that was 

not able to achieve its maximal gains would deepen the security 

vacuum, which has been a boon to the growth of al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula. 

With our allies dismayed and increasingly concerned about the 

value of U.S. guarantees, they will become more inclined to pursue 

policies of self-help. For Israel, this means trying to manage an intrinsically unstable virtual nuclear balance with Iran. Both Iran 

and Israel will face a high potential penalty for not shooting first 

in a crisis. Both countries will necessarily adopt extremely high 

alert postures and be certain to pursue preemptive strategies that 

will lead to chronic—what we used to call, in the Cold War days, 

chronic crisis instability. 

For Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab allies, the result will be 

further efforts to seek new security partners, perhaps bringing 

China into the Gulf arena as a major security player—we’ve already seen some indications of that—and increased pursuit of conventional arms, as well as seeking their own latent nuclear capability to offset Iran’s relatively short breakout timeline. UnfortuVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
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nately, it seems that the interaction between three or more nuclear-armed powers in the region would be much more prone to 

miscalculation and escalation than in the bipolar competition that 

characterized the Cold War. As Henry Kissinger and George Shultz 

wrote in the Wall Street Journal recently, ‘‘Traditional theories of 

deterrence assumed a series of bilateral equations. Do we now envision an interlocking series of rivalries, with each nuclear program 

counterbalancing others in the region?’’ 

There will be other knock-on effects, as Chairman McCain indicated in his opening statement, in the region across the Middle 

East as a result of this agreement. United States conventional deterrence in the traditional forms—carrier strike groups, expeditionary strike capability, long-range strategic airpower, and, when 

needed, boots on the ground—will become increasingly difficult to 

maintain in the region as Iran’s own military power grows and improves. In fact, we’re already under stress due to budgetary and 

other constraints, as Admiral Richardson admitted last week in his 

confirmation hearing. 

Because it—Tehran knows it cannot compete head to head with 

U.S. conventional capabilities, it has long pursued an asymmetric 

anti-access area-denial strategy, including mobile missile launchers, the development of anti-ship cruise missiles, advanced air defenses, burying and hardening its nuclear facilities, increasingly effective torpedoes, smart mines, and possibly, in the future, antiship ballistic missiles akin to those that are being deployed by 

China in the Pacific to hold United States carriers at greater risk, 

albeit on a smaller scale. 

The problems—one of the major problems I find with the agreement is the fact that, in 5 and 8 years respectively, and possibly 

shorter, depending on the agreement of the powers, the U.N. 

embargos on conventional arms and ballistic missiles to Iran will 

come off. And Foreign Minister Zarif, again, recently underscored 

to the Majlis that Iran’s pursuit of its ballistic missile and other 

defense capabilities while violating existing U.N. Security Council 

Resolutions will not violate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Agreement. 

As a result, I don’t think, in the future, you and your colleagues, 

nor my former colleagues in the Department of Defense, will be 

able to maintain the assumption of unimpeded access and control 

in all domains of warfare in the Persian Gulf that we have had in 

the past. I think we’re going to have to expand our regional military presence to reassure Israel and the Gulf states and to deter 

Iran. And, as Iran’s A2AD capabilities mature, the United States 

must take concerted efforts to maintain or achieve superiority in a 

range of areas, including long-range strike, advanced bunker-buster munitions like the massive ordnance penetrator, sustainable unmanned ISR and strike platforms, advanced integrated and layered 

air and missile defenses for our in-theater forces and for our allies, 

and greater capability for undersea precision strike, and perhaps 

relying on close-in weapon system and directed energy to defend 

our fielded forces against cruise missile and swarming boat attacks. 

This is going to be extremely difficult, particularly in an environment where defense spending is constrained under the caps of the 

103 

Budget Control Act and sequestration, a subject about which I’ve 

had the privilege of testifying before this committee in the past. 

The administration’s constant refrain has been that no other 

agreement would have been possible, and this is the best deal 

achievable, and the only alternative is war. I reject all of those 

propositions. As the historian E.H. Carr once suggested, ‘‘In politics, the belief that certain facts are unalterable or certain trends 

are irresistible commonly reflects a lack of desire or a lack of interest to change or resist them.’’ I believe the U.S. still has options, 

short of war, that it could exercise to try and secure a more acceptable agreement. Iran is in violation of multiple legally binding U.N. 

Security Council Resolutions, some of them negotiated by my colleague to the left. Its regime relies heavily on energy export revenues and remains vulnerable both to sanctions and the persistently 

low price of oil, which is likely to remain low for the next several 

years. It is footing the bill and providing the manpower to keep its 

proxies on the front lines in Syria and Iraq. And those proxies are 

facing rising pressure at home to keep morale high and continue 

the fight in the wake of extremely high casualties. And I see that 

the Washington Institute has just released a study this morning 

about the IRGC casualties in Syria. 

In short, Iran needs an agreement more than the United States. 

And, while I recognize that rejecting the current deal will create 

a great deal of discomfort for the administration, and will be very 

messy and a very vexing task to renegotiate, I still believe that the 

United States has powerful tools, in the form of sanctions, to discourage others from making a headlong embrace of Iran, a fact 

which a number of our P5+1 partners have recently acknowledged, 

even though it’s been a bit of a discomforting acknowledgment for 

them. 

Finally, let me make one observation about something Dr. Haass 

said which I think was important, which is, if this agreement is rejected, the administration has argued that it’s possible—and others 

have suggested—it’s possible Iran might make a sprint to a bomb. 

Now, on the one hand, that contradicts some of the argumentation 

that the administration has made about the fatwah that’s been 

issued by the Supreme Leader against nuclear weapons, and also 

against a longstanding conclusion of the intelligence community— 

and I’d defer to General Hayden here—that the Iranians have tried 

to put in place the means to have a nuclear weapon, but have not 

made the decision to actually weaponize. But, we do need to recognize that that is a possibility and that Iran might do that. And so, 

I would encourage the Congress, whether you approve or disapprove of the agreement in the end, to add to it a—an authorization for the use of force to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear 

weapons capability under either eventuality—that is to say either 

the approval or disapproval of the agreement—in order send a very 

strong signal to Iran that the objective for which we were negotiating, preventing them from getting a nuclear weapon, will be realized. 

Thank you very much for your time and attention. I look forward 

to questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Eric Edelman follows:] 

104 

1George Anastaplo, The Constitution of 1787: A Commentary (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 

University Press, 1989), p. 112. 2 Eric Edelman and Ray Takeyh, ‘‘On Iran, Congress Should Just Say No,’’ Washington Post, 

July 17, 2015. 3 Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ‘‘Kicks the Can Down the Road’’: How to Prepare for the Day When the Can Finally Lands 

(Washington, DC: ISIS, July, 22, 2015). 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR ERIC EDELMAN

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee, thank you for 

giving me the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the full range of 

issues connected with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to resolve 

the Iranian nuclear issue, including regional security and United States defense policy in the Middle East. I have followed this issue for more than a decade as the 

United States Ambassador to Turkey and then as Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy. Since retiring from government service in 2009, I have continued to track 

the progress of Iran’s nuclear program and the negotiating effort to prevent Iran 

from developing a nuclear weapons capability. I have worked with several of my colleagues at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments on the broader 

threat that the program presents to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and regional security in the Middle East. I am also the co-chair with Ambassador Dennis 

Ross of a bipartisan Iran Task Force sponsored by the Gemunder Center for Defense 

and Strategy that has produced a series of detailed appraisals of the negotiations 

and now the JCPOA, but I want to stress that my comments today reflect only my 

personal views. 

First, let me say that I appreciate the care and deliberation that you and your 

colleagues are taking in examining this agreement. Major arms control agreements 

that bind the nation in matters vital to the national interest should rest on a broad 

public consensus and not purely on the preferences and actions of one individual. 

That is why the Founders required treaties to be ratified by a two-thirds majority 

of the Senate. As Constitutional scholar George Anastaplo observed many years ago, 

The arrangements in Section 2 with respect to treaties and appointments 

take it for granted that the Senate can be depended upon to be as well 

equipped as the President to know, or at least to be told, what is needed 

by the Country from time to time. The Senate shares the Executive power 

here, however convenient it may be to vest in a single man the negotiation 

of treaties . . . The President is not assumed to know things the Senate does 

not know or that the Senate cannot be told in appropriate circumstances. 

Although this agreement is not a treaty, I believe the general proposition remains 

sound. 1

As I wrote with my colleague and Iran Task Force member Ray Takeyh in The 

Washington Post last month, a careful examination of the JCPOA reveals that it is 

deeply flawed because ‘‘It concedes an enrichment capacity that is too large; sunset 

clauses that are too short; a verification regime that is too leaky; and enforcement 

mechanisms that are too suspect.’’ 2 The Institute for Science and International Security, one of the most respected non-partisan authorities on non-proliferation in 

general and Iran’s nuclear program in particular, was straightforward in its assessment: 

After year 10, and particularly after year 15, as limits on its nuclear program end, Iran could reemerge as a major nuclear threat. Even if the deal 

succeeds during the first ten years, it is unknowable whether the agreement will continue to accomplish its fundamental goal of preventing Iran 

from getting nuclear weapons in the long term. 3

Given these serious concerns, among many others, I believe the most judicious 

course is for Congress to disapprove the agreement, which would then allow for a 

more stringent deal to be renegotiated. As a career Foreign Service Officer for nearly 30 years, with a strong belief in the role of executive authority in foreign affairs, 

I have come to this recommendation extremely reluctantly. A multilateral agreement, negotiated over many years, should not be rejected for light or transient 

causes. The only legitimate grounds for doing so is when one believes that an agreement is so manifestly deleterious to the national security that it warrants rejection 

and renegotiation. In this case, I believe this agreement will put the imprimatur of 

the international community and the United States of America on an industrialscale enrichment program that will leave Iran—even if the negotiated limits on enVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00110 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
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4 ‘‘Transcript: President Obama’s Full NPR Interview on Iran Nuclear Deal,’’ NPR, April 7, 

2015; and ISIS, ‘‘The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ‘‘Kicks the Can Down the Road.’’ 5Michael Mandelbaum, ‘‘The Iran Deal: It’s The Deterrence, Stupid,’’ The American Interest, 

July 30, 2015. 6 JINSA Gemunder Center Iran Task Force, Scorecard for the Final Deal with Iran (Washington, DC: JINSA, July 29, 2015); Jonathan Ruhe, the associate director at the Gemunder Center has provided me with invaluable assistance in preparing this statement. The report is available at www.jinsa.org/publications/scorecard-final-deal-iran. 7 ‘‘Foreign Investments in Iran to Serve as Barrier for Sanctions Snapback—FM,’’ Voice of the 

Islamic Republic of Iran, Radio Farhang, July 21, 2015, available via BBC Monitoring Trans 

Caucasus Unit. I am indebted to my colleague Ray Takeyh for drawing my attention to these 

statements by Foreign Minister Zarif. 

richment are adhered to scrupulously—as a threshold nuclear state when the various provisions expire. President Obama conceded as much in an interview with 

NPR in April, when he observed, ‘‘In year 13, 14, 15, they have advanced centrifuges 

that enrich uranium fairly rapidly, and at that point the breakout times would have 

shrunk almost down to zero.’’ The Institute for Science and International Security 

analysis cited above confirms the President’s judgment, noting that after 15 years, 

‘‘Iran’s breakout timelines could shrink to just days.’’ 4

This agreement reverses almost 50 years of U.S. non-proliferation policy. As my 

colleague at Johns Hopkins SAIS, Michael Mandelbaum, has noted, the agreement 

abandons the ‘‘policy of prohibiting the spread of enrichment technology even to 

friendly democratic governments . . . as a result, it will henceforth be extremely difficult to prevent other countries, at first in the Middle East but ultimately elsewhere, particularly in East Asia, from equipping themselves with the capacity for 

enrichment.’’ 5

It is likely, in my view, that the prospect of Iranian nuclear latency will, in turn, 

put the Middle East on the path to a catastrophic arms race. Five to ten or twelve 

years down the road, such an arms race is likely to result in a more proliferated 

region, with multiple adversaries, each armed with small and vulnerable nuclear arsenals struggling to co-exist in an inherently unstable strategic environment. The 

flight times between the competitors will be mere minutes, and hence the decisionmaking space will be considerably constrained. This would present an unprecedented challenge for the region, the United States, and the world at large with 

every possibility that the ultimate weapons will be used by accident or miscalculation for the first time since 1945. 

JCPOA SHORTCOMINGS

Last week, the Task Force I co-chair issued a detailed assessment of the problems 

and questions posed by the JCPOA. This is a deal that would essentially legitimize 

Iran’s nuclear program, require the international community to provide it with assistance, and leave it as a threshold nuclear state, with no clear mechanisms that 

would remain after the provisions sunset to ensure that Iran will adhere to its NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations.mechanisms that would remain after the provisions sunset to ensure that Iran will adhere to its Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 

obligations.mechanisms that would remain after the provisions sunset to ensure 

that Iran will adhere to its Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations. 6

Indeed, though Iran’s breakout time would be rolled back over the next decade 

and beyond, all major restrictions on its nuclear and conventional military programs 

would be removed over 5–15 years, including the prohibition on new nuclear-related 

facilities. Furthermore, the sanctions regime that originally weakened Iran and 

brought it to the negotiating table to begin with would be rolled back quickly with 

Iran getting an early windfall when its frozen assets are released. The sanctions regime, despite the efforts to create a ‘‘snap-back’’ mechanism, could not be easily reconstituted. Tellingly, Foreign Minister Zarif has noted that sanctions could be ‘‘reimposed on Iran only in case of serious violation of its obligations and not in case 

of small-scale violations.’’ In other words, Iran doesn’t need to worry about being 

held to account for incremental violation of the agreement. 7

While Iran’s nuclear activities would be made more transparent by some of the 

requirements of the JCPOA, these measures would still be insufficient to detect or 

deter every possible attempt at a breakout or sneak out. The failure to secure the 

much bruited ‘‘anytime/anywhere’’ inspections standard is a case in point. As a recent Institute for Science and International Security study notes, under the cumbersome procedures for requesting access to undeclared sites: 

Iran could likely move and disguise many small scale nuclear and nuclearweapon-related activities. These include: 

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8 ISIS, Verification of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Washington DC: ISIS, July 28, 

2015), p. 7. 9 ‘‘Foreign Investments in Iran to Serve as Barrier for Sanctions Snapback—FM,’’ Voice of the 

Islamic Republic of Iran, Radio Farhang. 10 Aresu Eqbali and Asa Fitch, ‘‘Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei Says Nuclear Deal Won’t 

Change U.S. Ties,’’ Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2015. 

• High explosive testing related to nuclear weapons; • Small centrifuge manufacturing plant; • Small centrifuge plant that uses advanced centrifuges (in this case, we 

assume a facility of tens of, or at most a few hundred, centrifuges organized in specially designed facilities suitable for rapid removal and with 

a containment system). 8

I have focused here on the question of verification, as opposed to other deficiencies, because the history of arms control arrangements is replete with instances 

of cheating—Versailles, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties, and INF Treaties 

offer just a few examples—and because Iran’s record of serial violation of earlier 

NPT obligations creates a particular burden on defenders of this arrangement. 

Whether or not Iran complies fully—and there are diverse reasons to believe it 

would not—the net result would be a regime in a much stronger position than it 

is today. The termination of United States-led sanctions against Iran’s energy, financial, and industrial sectors would repatriate as much as $150 billion in frozen 

funds while allowing Iran to rebuild its straitened economy through rejuvenated oil 

exports and foreign investment. Moreover, the Iranian leadership is counting on a 

surge of business activity, unleashed by the ending of sanctions, to immunize them 

against future efforts to re-impose sanctions in the event that Iran violates the 

agreement. As Foreign Minister Zarif recently noted, ‘‘Once the structure of the 

sanctions collapses, it will be impossible to reconstruct it.’’ 9

Combined with lifting the U.N. arms embargo and sanctions against Iran’s ballistic missile program within eight years and possibly less, these increased revenues 

would enable the country to modernize and expand its military capabilities across 

the board and to boost its support for terrorist and other proxy forces across the 

Middle East. At the same time, the JCPOA’s sunset provisions would transform 

Iran from a near-pariah to being treated ‘‘in the same manner as that of any other 

non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.’’ The ‘‘deal’’ itself will legitimize years 

of illegitimate conduct and will enhance its drive for hegemony, and through sanctions relief, it will provide the means and mechanisms to accomplish this end. 

Therefore, rather than being isolated and restrained, Iran would be unleashed by 

the sunset of the agreement to continue its struggle for mastery in the Middle East. 

Iran’s Supreme Leader has said as much in the days and weeks since the JCPOA 

was signed in Vienna (amidst a number of large public rallies marked by the continuing mantra of ‘‘Death to America,’’ which seems to be a core ideological principle 

of the current regime). 10

REGIONAL IMPACT

With a latent nuclear deterrent, enhanced military capabilities, and bolstered revenues, Iran would attempt to push its influence further around the Middle East 

through proxies and subversion. Even under the weight of crippling sanctions, 

Tehran has backed Bashar al-Assad to the hilt in the Syrian Civil War, spending 

billions of dollars and inserting the forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 

(IRGC) and its proxies in Hezbollah ever more deeply in major combat operations 

to keep the regime on life support. An influx of cash from sanctions relief could encourage Iran to try to shift the strategic balance back in the regime’s favor once and 

for all. Subsequently Hezbollah, which has been forced to direct much of its energy 

to defending the Syrian regime, could re-prioritize the ‘‘resistance’’ struggle and increase the already significant threat to Israel on both the Lebanese and Syrian 

fronts. Undoubtedly it would enjoy even greater support from Iran after the agreement. This is no small consideration, since Hezbollah already possesses roughly 

100,000 rockets and missiles, including many long-range surface-to-surface and sophisticated anti-tank and anti-ship missiles. 

Tehran’s military assistance and political control in Baghdad (and possibly Erbil) 

would increase as well, allowing it to further consolidate its grip over Shia-majority 

swathes of the country while doing nothing to soften the sharp sectarian divisions 

that foster instability within and beyond Iraq. This would play a role in driving the 

radicalization of Iraqi Sunnis, in effect, recruiting new foot soldiers for ISIL. Similarly in Yemen, Iran’s support for the Shia-affiliated Houthi insurrection has already helped unravel that country’s tenuous efforts at constitutional reform, while 

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11 Eric Edelman, Andrew Krepinevich, and Evan Braden Montgomery, ‘‘The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran,’’ Foreign Affairs, January/February 2011. 12 Henry Kissinger and George P. Shultz, ‘‘The Iran Deal and Its Consequences,’’ Wall Street 

Journal, April 7, 2015. 13Travis J. Tritten and Chris Church, ‘‘Admiral: Carrier Gap in Persian Gulf hinders War 

effort,’’ Stars and Stripes, July 30, 2015. 

simultaneously hindering United States counterterrorism cooperation and creating 

a potential quagmire for Saudi Arabia and other United States regional allies. The 

larger strategic problem is that Iranian hegemony in Yemen could be matched by 

additional Iranian moves in Saudi’s Eastern Province as well as in Bahrain (both 

majority Shia), and thus put Riyadh in an east-west strategic vice. An increase in 

Iran’s influence there could create myriad challenges, including: the growth of a 

proxy force on Riyadh’s doorstep and greater instability astride a global energy 

chokepoint in Bab el-Mandeb. Even an Iranian policy that did not achieve its maximal aims would result in deepening the security vacuum within Yemen, which has 

proven to be a boon to the growth of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. 

Many of these problems potentially could be mitigated or addressed by the United 

States in cooperation with its allies. U.S. policy, however, has been self-defeating 

in this regard. Our closest regional partners, namely Israel and the Gulf Arab 

states, have been disconcerted by the Iran nuclear deal. The serial concessions that 

moved United States redlines in the nuclear negotiations from prevention of an Iranian nuclear capability to limiting the time for breakout to one year, as well as the 

failure to enforce the red line on Syrian CW use two years ago, have called into 

question the credibility of United States promises to defend our allies against a reinvigorated and resurgent Iran. Finally, and most importantly, the actual terms of the 

JCPOA confront our allies with the prospect of a nuclear-capable Iran that is better 

situated to realize its hegemonic aspirations in the Middle East. 

With our allies dismayed and increasingly concerned about the value of U.S. guarantees, they will become more inclined to pursue policies of self-help. For Israel, this 

means trying to manage an intrinsically unstable virtual nuclear balance with Iran. 

Given the geographic, demographic, and military asymmetries between Iran and 

Israel (and the high potential penalty for not shooting first in a crisis), both countries will assume extremely high alert postures and be certain to pursue preemptive strategies that will lead to chronic crisis instability. 

For Saudi Arabia and our other Sunni Arab allies, the result will be further efforts to seek new security partners, perhaps bringing China into the Gulf arena as 

a major security player, and increased pursuit of conventional arms as well as seeking a latent nuclear capability of their own to offset Iran’s relatively short breakout 

timeline. Unfortunately, it seems likely that the interaction among three or more 

nuclear-armed powers in the region would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. 11

In the Cold War the spread of nuclear weapons among United States allies was 

a collective good, since Britain, France, and the United States were members of the 

same formal security alliance, with a nuclear planning group to coordinate deterrence efforts and official policy declaring nuclear weapons integral to Western Europe’s collective defense. A similar process in the Middle East would be a zero-sum 

phenomenon, since an unstable Iran-Israel nuclear dyad would be replicated between both countries and Saudi Arabia, were Riyadh to pursue an arsenal, and so 

on with Turkey, Egypt, or others. As Henry Kissinger and George Shultz commented recently, ‘‘Traditional theories of deterrence assumed a series of bilateral 

equations. Do we now envision an interlocking series of rivalries, with each new nuclear program counterbalancing others in the region?’’ 12

MILITARY EFFECTS

These regional impacts would be daunting enough for U.S. defense planners who 

already face serious difficulties maintaining credible conventional deterrence in the 

region, given the prevailing trends and budgetary constraints. The aforementioned 

shortcomings of the JCPOA, however, will have knock-on military effects across the 

Middle East. 

United States conventional deterrence, in the forms of carrier strike groups, expeditionary strike capability, long-range strategic airpower, and (when needed) boots 

on the ground, will become increasingly difficult to maintain as Iran’s own military 

power grows and improves. In fact, they are already under stress due to budgetary 

and other constraints, as Admiral Richardson admitted last week during his confirmation hearing. 13

Because Tehran knows it cannot compete head-to-head with the United States in 

conventional capabilities, it has long pursued its own asymmetric anti-access/areaVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
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14David Lerman and Anthony Capaccio, ‘‘How Iran Arms Embargo Became Key Sticking 

Point in Vienna Talks,’’ Bloomberg, July 10, 2015. 15For a more detailed background on Iran’s pursuit of anti-access/area-denial capabilities in 

past years, see Andrew Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle? (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic 

and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), pp. 27–36; for Zarif’s comment see ‘‘Iran Can Deny Access 

to Nuclear, Military Sites Under Deal—FM,’’ Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Radio 

Farhang, July 21, 2015, available via BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit. I am grateful to 

Ray Takeyh for providing this reference. 16 An excellent preliminary examination of future requirements to counter Iran’s emerging A2/ 

AD complex is Mark Gunzinger with Chris Dougherty, Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

Budgetary Assessments, 2011), quotation on p. 19. 17 ‘‘Russia modernizing S–300 missile system for Iran: RIA, citing Putin aide,’’ Reuters, July 

30, 2015. 18See Mark Gunzinger with Chris Dougherty, Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat 

Iran’s Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats. 

denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the Gulf, including: mobile missile launchers, antiship cruise missiles, advanced air-defense systems, new deeply-buried and hardened 

nuclear facilities, increasingly effective torpedoes, smart mines, and possibly antiship ballistic missiles akin to those deployed by China in the Pacific Ocean to hold 

United States carriers at greater risk, albeit on a smaller scale. 

As the JCPOA sunsets, Iran will be able to access the materiel and technology 

to bolster these forces. Russia and China, not to mention Iran, pushed for the lifting 

of the arms embargo and ballistic missile restrictions not because they believed the 

windfall in unfrozen assets would ameliorate the condition of the long-suffering Iranian people, but because Iran wished to secure, and Russia and China hoped to sell, 

precisely these capabilities. 14 Foreign Minister Zarif recently underscored to the 

Majlis that Iran’s pursuit of ballistic missile and other enhancements of its defense 

capabilities, while violating existing UNSCRs, is not a violation of the JCPOA. 15

As a result, the United States will not be able to rely, as it has for the past 30 

years, on an assumption that it will have unimpeded access and control in all the 

domains of warfare in the Persian Gulf. In the wake of this deal, the United States 

will likely have to expand its regional military presence to reassure Israel and the 

Gulf States and to deter Iran. The Iranians, however, would now have an additional 

$150 billion dollars to beef up its A2/AD capabilities, the IRGC Quds Force, and the 

ability to project power regionally through subversion and proxies. The United 

States will need to upgrade both its own and allied capabilities to counter this growing threat from Iran and will likely have to ‘‘reassess the validity of its legacy planning assumptions, operational concepts, and forward military posture for the Persian Gulf.’’ In particular this means developing concepts that enable the United 

States to fight both within range of Iranian missile forces as well as from extended 

range. 16

The potential acquisition by Iran of an upgraded S–300 air defense systems from 

Russia—which appears already to be in the works—as well as upgrades for its outdated air fleet and potential expansion of its nuclear infrastructure, would pose a 

severe challenge to the air supremacy currently enjoyed by United States forces in 

and around the Persian Gulf. 17 Thus far, Tehran’s attempts to challenge the status 

quo in the Strait have been met with firm demonstrations from the United States 

Navy that underscore Iran’s inability to mount any realistic opposition—most notably sending additional United States carrier battle groups into the Gulf. As time 

goes on these steps may carry greater risk for U.S. forces than we assume today. 

As Iran’s A2/AD capabilities mature, the United States must make concerted efforts to maintain or achieve superiority in a range of areas, including: long-range 

U.S. strike and stealth capabilities; advanced bunker buster munitions like the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP); sustainable unmanned intelligence, surveillance 

and reconnaissance strike platforms; and advanced, integrated, and layered air and 

missile defense systems for its in-theater forces and for its allies. We will need to 

develop greater capability for undersea precision strike and the ability, perhaps relying on close-in weapon systems and directed energy weapons, to defend our fielded 

forces in the theatre against cruise missile and swarming fast boat attacks. All of 

this will be extremely difficult, especially in an environment where defense spending 

is constrained under caps imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the continuing threat of sequestration.environment where defense spending is constrained 

under caps imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the continuing threat 

of sequestration.environment where defense spending is constrained under caps imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the continuing threat of sequestration. 18

109 

19 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (London: Macmillan and Company, 1939), p. 89. 20 20 Josh Rogin, ‘‘Top French Official Contradicts Kerry on Iran Deal,’’ Bloomberg View, July 

30, 2015; French officials have denied that Monsieur Audibert made these comments, but other 

members of the congressional delegation who heard him say these things have corroborated the 

initial account. Furthermore, Audibert in his denial to Le Monde has reinforced the potential 

power of the U.S. sanctions. The original story is found at http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015–07–30/top-french-official-contradicts-kerry-on-iran-deal. For the denial and follow-up 

see http://freebeacon.com/national-security/lawmakers-confirm-french-diplomat-supports-congress-rejecting-iran-deal/; and http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20150731.OBS3527/infoobs-le-conseiller-diplomatique-de-hollande-au-centre-d-une-polemique-a-washington.html 

JCPOA ALTERNATIVES

The Administration’s constant refrain has been that no other agreement would 

have been possible; that this is the best deal that could have been achieved, and 

that the only alternative is war. I reject these propositions. As the historian E. H. 

Carr once suggested, ‘‘In politics, the belief that certain facts are unalterable or certain trends irresistible commonly reflects a lack of desire or lack of interest to 

change or resist them.’’ 19

A better deal—an acceptable deal that ensures basic U.S. national security interests—is possible and absolutely necessary. The many deficiencies of the agreement 

need to be addressed now, as they will not be susceptible to remediation after Iran 

has received the upfront benefits of sanctions relief. Our Iran Task Force has maintained throughout the negotiations that Iranian concessions will come only if 

Tehran believes it has more to lose than its counterparts. Fortunately, the United 

States still has options short of war that it could exercise to secure an acceptable 

agreement. Iran is in violation of multiple legally binding U.N. Security Council resolutions. Its regime relies heavily on energy export revenues and remains vulnerable both to sanctions and to oil prices that will likely remain low for the next year 

or more. It is footing the bill, and providing manpower, to keep its proxies on the 

frontlines in Syria and Iraq, even as those proxies face rising pressures at home to 

keep morale high and continue the fight. 

For all these and other reasons, Iran needs an agreement more than the United 

States. Rejecting the current deal will create discomfort for the Administration, and 

will require it or its successor to embark on a new round of diplomacy. This will 

undoubtedly be a messy, vexing task for whoever takes it on, but the United States 

retains powerful tools in the form of sanctions to discourage others from undertaking a headlong embrace of Iran—a fact which some of our P5+1 partners have 

recently acknowledged, much to their discomfort. 20

The Administration has suggested that, in the event the agreement is blocked by 

Congress, Iran might sprint to a bomb (although this contradicts both the Administration position that the Supreme Leader has issued a fatwa against pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the intelligence community’s consistent assessment that Iran is 

pursuing the means to build weapons, but has not made a decision to proceed with 

weaponization). The reality is that Iran could undertake such an effort, but only at 

great potential peril to itself. Congress might consider raising the potential costs by 

coupling its disapproval of the deal with authorization for the use of force to prevent 

Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. 

To succeed, a new round of negotiations must use increasing pressure, including 

additional authorities beyond the tools that Congress has already provided. This is 

crucial if we hope to redress the manifest inadequacies of the existing agreement. 

Otherwise, we will put ourselves on a path that leads to a catastrophic war in the 

Middle East. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for my time, and I look forward to the Committee’s 

questions. 

About the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an independent, 

nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and 

debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s analysis focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters 

of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

110 

Ambassador Burns. 

STATEMENT OF HON. R. NICHOLAS BURNS, GOODMAN PROFESSOR OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL 

Ambassador BURNS. Mr. Chairman, thank you—Senator Reed, 

members of the committee. It’s an honor to testify. I appreciate it. 

It’s an honor to testify with three great public servants and friends 

of mine, to my right. 

Mr. Chairman, I’ve submitted my written testimony. I’ll just cite 

a few quick points to summarize my views. 

I support this agreement that the Obama administration has negotiated. I think it will help to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons power. I think the agreement also has many advantages that are specific to us. It’s going to arrest Iran’s forward 

movement of the last 10 years since Ahmadinejad took over, in 

2005. And it’s going to freeze their program for the next decade or 

more. It will effectively prevent Iran from producing fissile material for a weapon through uranium enrichment or plutonium processing. Its current breakout time—and this, I think, is the most 

significant advantage we have—the administration says now it’s 2 

to 3 months; under this agreement, for 10 to 15 years, Iran’s breakout time would be extended to a year. So, we have line of sight. 

We have the opportunity to act, should Iran subvert the agreement. 

There will also be significantly strengthened inspections of the nuclear supply chain to the Iranian plants for the next 25 years, and 

the additional protocol. 

The sanctions are important. They’re not going to be lifted until 

Iran implements the agreement in every respect. That could be 3 

to 4 to 5 to 6 months. I don’t anticipate it any sooner. And the administration has to maintain sanctions on Iran for terrorism violations and human rights violations. 

A final advantage. This is an opportunity for us to deter Iran 

from becoming a nuclear weapon state through diplomacy and negotiations rather than by war. I certainly support the President’s 

right—obligation to use force, if necessary, but, if we can take this 

step first, our country is far stronger. 

My second point, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, while the benefits 

are substantial, there are risks. And my colleagues have pointed 

out the risks. I don’t want to minimize those risks. The most significant, for me, is that the superstructure of Iran’s enrichment and 

plutonium programs will remain intact. They’ll be frozen, they’ll be 

in mothballs, they can be taken out of mothballs. Ten to 15 years 

from now, Iran could reconstitute—I think, will—a civil nuclear 

program. It could possibly use that civil nuclear program as a base 

to construct a covert program. 

So, the first 10 to 15 years of this agreement are a decided advantage for the United States. It’s the follow-on 10 or 15 years that 

represent a major challenge for us. And, should Iran seek a nuclear 

weapon during that time, the United States would need to do something that’s going to be difficult: reconstitute a global sanctions regime and also have the will and the capacity to use force to prevent 

Iran from becoming a nuclear-weapons power. I don’t think it’s impossible, but it would depend on a strong and assertive and selfVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00116 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
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confident American President at the time, either President 

Obama’s successor or the person after that. 

A final risk, Mr. Chairman. The conventional arms sales and ballistic missiles, the compromise that they’ll end in 5 and 8 years, respectively, I remain opposed to this compromise. I don’t think it’s 

in our interest. I’m sorry that it was made. What it will mean is 

that we’ll have to reconstitute a coalition of sanctions countries 

against Iran 5 years from now on conventional weapons, 8 years 

from now on ballistic missiles. 

Third point. I see the nuclear deal much in the way that I think 

Dr. Haass does, as a combination of benefits and of risks. And I, 

thus, fully understand why this is a difficult vote for many members, and why you’re deliberating in the way that you are. I would 

suggest that all of us—and I certainly include myself in this—need 

to go beyond the conventional wisdoms as we think about Iran. For 

example, I don’t believe that congressional defeat of the President’s 

proposal would lead inevitably to war, as some in the administration are saying. But, neither do I believe that the nuclear deal 

leads inevitably to an Iranian nuclear weapon, as some of the critics are suggesting. I think a lot’s going to depend on the United 

States. Can we create strategic deterrence against the Iranians? 

Can we coerce and intimidate them from becoming a nuclear-weapons power, not in the next 10 years, because we’ll freeze them, but 

in the follow-on 10 to 15 years? In that respect, the no-deal solution 

that many critics believe is preferable—and that would be walking 

away, ending the talks, continuing to sanction Iran, and negotiating a better deal—it’s an option that deserves to be looked at. I 

mean, I think we have a responsibility to look at it. 

I’ve tried to think about this. Ultimately, I think it probable that 

such a course would leave us weaker rather than stronger. It’s not 

at all certain to me—and I spent the years 2005 to 2008 working 

with the P5 as a member of it, sanctioning Iran—not at all certain 

that our partners would follow us out the door if we walked out 

unilaterally. Global unity that we’ve created, both President Bush 

and President Obama, against Iran, the sanctions regime, I think 

it would—not automatically, probably not even quickly—but, over 

time, it would begin to fray, and it would weaken. And, most importantly, the restrictions that have frozen Iran’s nuclear program 

since January 2004, and that would freeze them for the next 10 to 

15 years, they’d be lifted, because I think the Iranian response, the 

likely response, would be to walk away from—itself, from the deal 

if we chose to do so. So, instead of Iran being a year away from 

a nuclear weapon, it would go back to being a nuclear threshold 

state in this no-deal scenario. 

So, on balance, I believe the benefits outweigh the risks. In fact, 

I think there are greater risks in rejecting this agreement, because 

it would free Iran from the considerable restrictions that they will 

have to live under for a very long time. 

Just two more points, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your patience. 

My fourth point. To implement the deal successfully, however, 

the administration, I think, has to do more to strengthen our strategic deterrence and to coerce the Iranians over the short and long 

term. So, specifically, I hope, maybe as early as tomorrow, when 

112 

the President makes his speech, that the President will threaten 

publicly and unambiguously that the United States would and 

should use force against Iran, should it break the agreement and 

race towards a nuclear weapon. The U.S. should certainly reaffirm 

what Secretary Kerry’s been trying to do this week with the Gulf 

Cooperation Council—reaffirm our support for the Gulf Cooperation 

countries—and, as the Pentagon is trying to do—strengthen their 

missile defense and strengthen their ability to defend themselves. 

The President also needs to close ranks with Israel. It’s a glaring 

problem for American policy in the Middle East when we are openly feuding with our strongest partner. That’s a two-way street. And 

so, both leaders need to do this. But, certainly, especially for this 

committee, as the United States negotiates its next 10-year military assistance agreement with Israel—the current one expires in 

2017—assuring Israel’s qualitative military edge should be a priority for the United States. So, in effect—and this gets to the point 

of your hearing today on the regional implications—as we going 

forward with a nuclear deal, we will simultaneously need to go forward to contain Iran in the Middle East. And we’ll have a greater 

success, as Senator Reed has suggested in his opening remarks, of 

containing Iran if it’s a non-nuclear state over the next 10 to 15 

years than it would have been as a nuclear-weapon state. 

Finally, I recommend that Congress support the agreement. I 

fear a vote of disapproval will weaken the United States and our 

credibility in the region. It would let Iran off the hook. It would 

leave Iran closer to a nuclear weapon. I think what Dr. Haass has 

suggested at the end of his remarks is instructive. Could the Congress also pass accompanying legislation that might seek to 

strengthen our ability to be the strongest power in the Middle East 

and to coerce Iran in the future? 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Burns follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR R. NICHOLAS BURNS

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed and members of the committee, thank you 

for this opportunity to testify on the international agreement to prevent Iran from 

becoming a nuclear weapons power. 

This is one of the most urgent and important challenges for our country, for our 

European allies as well as for Israel and our Arab partners in the Middle East. The 

United States must thwart Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions and its determination 

to become the dominant military power in the region. 

This will be a long-term struggle requiring the focus and determination of the 

next two American Presidents after President Obama to ensure Iran complies with 

the agreement. We should thus marshal our diplomatic, economic and military 

strength to block Iran now and to contain its power in the region in the years 

ahead. 

With this in mind, I support the Iran nuclear agreement and urge the Congress 

to vote in favor of it in September. 

This is, understandably, a difficult decision for many members of Congress. It is 

an agreement that includes clear benefits for our national security but risks, as 

well. It is also a painful agreement, involving trade-offs and compromises with a bitter adversary of our country—the government of Iran. 

I believe, however, that if it is implemented effectively, the agreement will restrict 

and weaken Iran’s nuclear program for more than a decade and help to deny it a 

nuclear weapons capacity over the long term. That crucial advantage has convinced 

me that the Obama Administration is right to seek Congressional approval for this 

agreement. 

I have followed the Iran nuclear issue closely for the last decade. From 2005 until 

2008, I had lead responsibility in the State Department on Iran policy. During the 

113 

second term of the George W. Bush Administration, we worked hard to blunt Iran’s 

nuclear efforts. We created in 2005 the group that has since led the global effort 

against Iran—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and 

Germany (the P–5 plus One). This group offered to negotiate with Iran in 2006 and 

again in 2007. We were rebuffed on both occasions by the Iranian regime. 

When Iran accelerated its nuclear research program, we turned to sanctions. I 

helped to negotiate for the U.S. the first three United Nations Security Council 

Chapter VII sanctions resolutions to punish Iran for its actions. Led by the Treasury 

Department, we initiated United States financial sanctions and encouraged the European Union to do the same. We built a global coalition against Iran. While Iran 

became increasingly isolated, however, it chose to accelerate its nuclear research efforts in defiance of international law. 

When President Obama came into office in 2009, Iran had made considerable 

progress in advancing its uranium and plutonium programs. It made further 

progress in his first years in office and was on its way to become, in effect, a nuclear 

threshold state. In response, President Obama expanded the sanctions and coordinated an aggressive international campaign to punish and isolate the Iranian regime. 

Congress made a vital contribution by strengthening American sanctions even further. This increasingly global and comprehensive sanctions campaign weakened the 

Iranian economy and ultimately convinced the Iranian government to agree to negotiate during the past eighteen months. 

The Obama and Bush Administrations and the Congress acted over ten years to 

expand American leverage against Iran and to coerce it to accept negotiations. Despite these efforts, Iran was far along the nuclear continuum when negotiations 

began in earnest in 2013. 

It made sense for the United States to commit to negotiations with Iran in 2013. 

We retained then, as we do now, the capacity and right to use military force to prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear weapon should that be necessary. It is important 

to note that there were alternative negotiating frameworks available to the Obama 

Administration in 2013 that might have served our interest in containing Iran’s nuclear program more effectively. But, the issue before the Congress now is the specific agreement that has been negotiated by the Obama team. That is thus the focus 

of my own testimony today. 

In my judgment, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiated by 

Secretaries Kerry and Moniz is a solid and sensible agreement. It has many concrete advantages for the United States. 

First, the agreement will arrest Iran’s rapid forward movement on its nuclear research programs over the past decade since the inauguration of former President 

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. It will essentially freeze that program. The restrictions the 

United States negotiated will effectively prevent Iran from producing fissile material 

for a nuclear weapon (either through uranium enrichment or the plutonium process) 

at its nuclear facilities for at least ten to fifteen years. 

The number of centrifuges at the Natanz plant will be reduced by two thirds. Use 

of advanced centrifuges will not be permitted for a decade. Iran’s store of enriched 

uranium will be restricted to levels below those needed for a nuclear device. In addition, there will be no enrichment at all at the Fordow plant for fifteen years. 

The Administration also succeeded in blocking Iran’s plutonium program. The 

core of the Arak Heavy Water Reactor will be dismantled. The reactor will be transformed to make it impossible to produce sufficient quantities of plutonium for a nuclear device. Spent fuel will be transported out of Iran. There will be no reprocessing 

of fuel for at least fifteen years. 

The most important advantage for the U.S is that Iran’s current breakout time 

to a nuclear weapon will be lengthened from two to three months now to roughly 

one year once the agreement is implemented. This is a substantial benefit for our 

security and those of our friends in the Middle East. It sets back the Iranian nuclear program by a significant margin and was a major concession by the Iranian 

government in this negotiation. 

Significantly strengthened inspections of Iran’s nuclear supply chain for the next 

twenty-five years is a second advantage of the nuclear agreement. Iran has also 

agreed to be subjected to permanent and enhanced IAEA verification and monitoring under the Additional Protocol. This will give the IAEA much greater insights 

into Iran’s nuclear program and will increase substantially the probability of the 

United States detecting any Iranian deviations from the agreement. 

Third, sanctions will not be lifted until Iran implements the agreement in every 

respect. This could take up to three to six months. The United States and other 

countries should demand full and unambiguous Iranian implementation to 

deconstruct and modify its nuclear program according to the letter of the agreement. 

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And, after sanctions are lifted, we must be ready and willing to re-impose them 

should Iran seek to cut corners, cheat or test the integrity of the agreement in any 

way. 

A final advantage, Mr. Chairman, is that this agreement gives us a chance to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon through diplomacy and negotiations, rather than 

through war. While the United States should be ready to use force against Iran if 

it approaches our red line of acquisition of a nuclear weapon, the more effective 

strategy at this point is to coerce them through negotiations. And, it will be more 

advantageous for the United States to contain a non-nuclear Iran in the Middle 

East for the next decade than to contend with a country on the threshold of a nuclear weapon. In this respect, I admire the commitment, energy and the achievements of Secretary Kerry, Secretary Moniz and their team. 

While the benefits of this agreement for the U.S. are substantial, there are also 

risks in moving ahead. The most significant, in my judgment, is that while Iran’s 

program will be frozen for a decade, the superstructure of its nuclear apparatus will 

remain intact, much of it in mothballs. Iran could choose to rebuild a civil nuclear 

program after the restrictions begin to end ten to fifteen years from now. This could 

give Tehran a base from which to attempt to build a covert nuclear weapons program at some point in the future. 

Here is where considerable challenges may arise for the U.S. and its allies. While 

we can be confident Iran’s program will be effectively stymied for the first ten to 

fifteen years of the agreement, many of those restrictions will loosen and disappear 

altogether in the decade after. We will need to put in place a series of mitigating 

measures to deter Iran from diverting any part of its revived civil nuclear program 

to military activities. 

President Obama and his team will need to reassure Congress about the effectiveness and credibility of these initiatives to keep Iran away from a nuclear weapon 

after the first decade of this agreement. This should include a direct, public and unambiguous American commitment to use military force to deter Iran should it ever 

get close to construction of a nuclear weapon. In addition, the United States should 

assemble a coalition of strong partners willing to re-impose sanctions should Iran 

deviate from the agreement. The United States and its partners should also bolster 

the capacity of the IAEA and our own governments to be fully capable of detecting 

Iranian cheating. In sum, we will have to construct a long-term strategic deterrent 

to convince the Iranian government that it is not in its interest to pursue a nuclear 

weapons program a decade from now. 

Containing Iran will be a difficult challenge for American diplomacy. I differ with 

those critics, however, who believe that the expiration of the agreement will make 

Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon all but certain a decade or two from now. 

Much will depend on the Iranian leadership at that time. Will they want to risk 

another generation of international isolation and sanctions if they drive toward a 

nuclear weapon? Will they risk the possibility of an American or Israeli use of military force in response? A decision by Iran to turn back to a nuclear weapons ambition is a possibility, but by no means a certainty. The actions and resolve of the 

United States will have a major impact on Iran’s calculations. It will be up to the 

President and Congress at that time to make clear to Iran that we will be ready 

to use any option available to us, including the use of military force, to prevent Iran 

from becoming a nuclear weapons power. 

The overall effectiveness of the agreement will thus require the Obama Administration and its successors to maintain a very tough inspections regime and to be 

ready to re-impose sanctions if Iran seeks an illicit nuclear weapons program in the 

future. 

Congress is right to focus on these concerns and to require concrete assurances 

from the Administration that they can be overcome. Specifically, the Administration 

will need to focus hard on the possibility that Iran will cheat, as it has done so often 

in the past and attempt to construct covert facilities. Should this occur, the U.S. 

would need to ensure that the ‘‘managed inspections’’ set out in the agreement 

would work effectively. If Iran were to violate the agreement, American sanctions 

should be re-imposed. Gaining broader international agreement for sanctions would 

be a more effective way to intimidate the Iranian authorities. This would be a priority, but also a challenging hurdle, for American diplomacy. 

A final risk is the agreement that the prohibitions on Iran’s conventional arms 

sales and purchases and ballistic missiles will end in five and eight years, respectively, after the agreement is in force. I remain opposed to this compromise. In my 

view, it could embolden Iran and strengthen its conventional capacity in ways detrimental to our own interest. The next United States Administration will need to construct a new coalition to attempt to restrict and sanction Iran in these two areas. 

115 

On balance, however, I believe the nuclear deal will deliver more advantages than 

disadvantages to the U.S. There are greater risks, in my judgment, in turning down 

the agreement and freeing Iran from the considerable set of restrictions it has now 

accepted for the next decade and beyond. 

Most importantly, I do not see a more effective, credible or realistic alternative 

that would give the United States a greater probability at this point of preventing 

an Iranian nuclear weapon. That is the key question members of Congress should 

ask before you vote. Is there a more effective way forward than the one negotiated 

by the Obama Administration? 

The most common criticism of the nuclear deal is that the United States should 

have walked away from the talks during the last year, sanctioned Iran further and 

attempted to negotiate a better and stronger agreement. Some experts have recommended that Congress vote to disapprove the President’s policies or to pass a bill 

that would alter the deal in such a way that a fundamental renegotiation of the 

agreement would be necessary. 

If I thought it was realistic to renegotiate the agreement to make it stronger, I 

would support that option. But, I don’t believe it would be possible to do so and, 

at the same time, to maintain the integrity of our coalition against Iran. 

While this ‘‘No Deal’’ scenario could play out in many, different ways, I think it 

is probable that it would leave the United States weaker, rather than stronger, in 

confronting Iran’s nuclear program. If the United States left the negotiations unilaterally, I don’t believe it is likely that Russia and China and even possibly the European allies and other key international economic powers would follow us out the 

door. These countries are all strong supporters of the nuclear deal before the Congress today. The global coalition and the sanctions regime we spent the last ten 

years building would likely fray and weaken over time. We would lose the strong 

leverage that brought Iran to the negotiating table. While American sanctions were 

very important in convincing Iran to negotiate, it was the global nature of the sanctions with buy-in from nearly every major economy in the world, that also made a 

critical difference in cutting off Iran from the international banking and financial 

system during the past few years. All of these benefits would be at risk after a U.S. 

walkout. 

Most importantly, the strong restrictions that have effectively frozen Iran’s nuclear program since January 2014 would all be lifted if the negotiations are ended. 

The negotiated agreement would cease to be in force. Iran would be free to resume 

its advanced uranium enrichment and plutonium programs. We would lose the 

IAEA’s insights into Iran’s program as the inspections regime would weaken. Iran 

would not be one year away from a bomb under the Obama agreement but on the 

threshold of a nuclear weapons capability. 

While I don’t agree that this ‘No Deal’’ scenario would lead inevitably to war, it 

would leave the U.S. worse off. On balance, this alternative is not preferable to the 

concrete restrictions on Iran’s program ensured by the nuclear deal. 

If it seeks to disapprove the President’s policy, Congress should offer a realistic 

and effective alternative. But, I am unaware of any credible alternative that would 

serve our interests more effectively at this point than the agreement proposed by 

the Obama Administration and the other major countries of the world. 

Rather than vote to disapprove the President’s policy, I hope members of both parties will work with the Administration to strengthen the ability of the United States 

to implement the agreement successfully and to contain simultaneously Iranian 

power in the Middle East. 

We should create, in effect, a two-track American policy towards Iran in the future. On the one hand, we should work to ensure Iran implements the nuclear deal. 

On the other hand, we will need to construct a renewed effort with Israel, Turkey 

and our friends in the Arab world to contain Iran’s growing power in the region. 

Now that we are talking to Iran again after thirty-five years of minimal contact, 

there may be issues on which contact with Tehran will be in our interest. Protecting 

the Afghan government from Taliban assaults is one such possibility. Convincing 

Iran to withdraw its support for President Assad in Syria is another. 

But, I do not believe we will experience anything approaching a normal relationship with the Iranian government as some in our own country have suggested. This 

is not the time to restore full diplomatic relations with its government. There is too 

much that still separates us to justify such a decision. In fact, our larger interests 

in the Middle East require the creation of a coalition of countries to oppose Iran 

as it makes an assertive push for power into the heart of the Sunni world in Iraq, 

Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. The United States will have greater success, however, 

in confronting a non-nuclear Iran over the next decade rather than an Iran with 

nuclear weapons. This is another advantage of the nuclear deal. 

116 

With this in mind, there is more the Obama Administration can do to ensure effective implementation of the nuclear deal and to push back against a more assertive Iranian policy in the region. Here are some concrete suggestions toward that 

end. 

• A first-order diplomatic priority should be for the United States to do everything in its power to maintain the ability to re-impose sanctions on Iran, if necessary. Russia and, especially, China will likely be weak and undependable 

partners in this regard. The United States should thus focus on securing commitments from the European allies that they will work with us to re-impose 

sanctions in the future, if necessary. The Administration should also convince 

Japan, South Korea, India and other major economies to be ready to curtail 

commercial links to Iran should it violate the nuclear agreement; • The United States should set a very high bar for Iran on implementation of the 

agreement. Specifically, the United States should call attention to even the 

most minor Iranian transgressions from the start of the implementation process. If we don’t set an exacting standard, Iran may well diminish the integrity 

of the inspections regime by cutting corners and testing its limits. Establishing 

a tough-minded policy now is the right way to convince Iran there will be immediate penalties should it not implement the deal fully and completely; • The United States should reaffirm publicly that we have vital national interests 

in the Persian Gulf and that we will use military force, if necessary, to defend 

them. That was the essence of the Carter Doctrine of the late 1970s and has 

been the policy of Republican and Democratic Administrations since. President 

Obama should continue the campaign he has already begun to assemble a 

strong coalition of Gulf States to contain Iranian power in the region. This will 

require accelerated military assistance to our Arab partners and a strong, visible and continuous American military presence in the region; • The United States should also try to close ranks with Israel and to strengthen 

even further our long-standing military partnership. The United States-Israel 

ten-year military assistance agreement that I led in negotiating in 2007 expires 

in two years. The Obama Administration could reaffirm our ongoing commitment to Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME) over any potential aggressor 

in the Middle East region. The Administration should accelerate military technology transfers to Israel to head off any potential challenge to Israel from Iran 

or, as is more likely, from its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas. 

The United States and Israel should also make a renewed effort to diminish their 

public divisions. President Obama should take steps to work more effectively with 

Prime Minister Netanyahu. But, repairing such a wide public dispute requires both 

leaders to make it work. Prime Minister Netanyahu would be well advised to diminish his excessive public criticism of the United States government. I found in my 

diplomatic career that allies work best when they work out their differences privately rather than publicly. 

• President Obama should reaffirm publicly and in the most unmistakable terms, 

his readiness to deploy military force to strike Iran should it violate the agreement and seek to race toward a nuclear weapon. This would help to create a 

more durable American strategic deterrence to convince Iran that abiding by 

the nuclear agreement is in its best interest. 

• Finally, the United States should also press Iran to meet the grievances of 

American families who lost their loved ones in Iranian-inspired attacks on 

American citizens in past decades. This includes, of course, the bombings of the 

United States Embassy in Beirut and the United States Marine Barracks in 

1983. It also includes the assassination of Dr. Malcolm Kerr, President of the 

American University of Beirut, in January 1984. His family has brought suit 

against Iran in United States Federal Court as they believe Iran authorized his 

murder through its proxies in Lebanon. There are many other such civilian 

cases against Iran. Implementation of the nuclear deal should not be made conditional on resolution of these cases, in my judgment. But, we should not agree 

to resume full diplomatic relations until Iran has agreed to settle them. By raising them now, we would send Iran an unmistakable signal that we expect these 

cases to be adjudicated fairly and with justice for the American families in the 

future. 

• At the same time, the Administration must continue to press as an urgent priority for the release of those Americans imprisoned or missing in Iran. 

These steps would help to strengthen our ability to implement the Iran nuclear 

agreement and to put Iran on notice that it has a long way to go before it can resume a normal relationship with the United States. 

117 

Successful implementation of the nuclear deal will require strong, self confident 

and determined American leadership. We are the indispensable center of the P–5 

plus One group that negotiated the agreement. We have to insist on full Iranian 

implementation of the agreement. We must assemble an Arab coalition to contain 

Iran in the region. And we have to remain Israel’s strong and faithful partner in 

a violent, turbulent, revolutionary era in Middle East history. 

Mr. Chairman, I urge members of Congress to support this agreement. A vote of 

disapproval in the absence of a credible alternative, would, after ten years of effort, 

be self-defeating for our country. 

If Congress votes to disapprove and manages to override the President’s veto, it 

would very likely dismantle the agreement, lead to the gradual disintegration of the 

global sanctions regime and remove all current restrictions on Iran’s nuclear efforts. 

Such a result would leave Iran closer to a nuclear weapon. That is not a sensible 

course for our country. 

I also fear a vote of disapproval would weaken the effectiveness and credibility 

of the United States in the Middle East and around the world. 

There is another path open to Congress. Work with the President to strengthen 

America’s position in the Middle East. Move forward with the nuclear deal. Push 

back against Iranian power in the region. A Congress that sought greater unity with 

President Obama would help to strengthen our country for the struggles that are 

inevitably ahead with Iran in the years to come. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, thank you. 

I want to thank the witnesses for very important testimony. And 

I note that all—a large number of my colleagues paid close attention. 

Is there any agreement among—disagreement among the witnesses that Iran is the largest state sponsor of terror in the world? 

Is there anyone who disagrees with that? 

[No audible response.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Is there any disagreement that the Iranian 

are now spending billions of dollars on those adventures, whether 

it be in Iraq or Syria or Yemen, or even now, we—I understand 

they are providing weapons to the Taliban—is there anyone who 

disagrees with their activities throughout the region? 

[No audible response.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Is there any doubt that they’re spending 

quite a bit of money on these efforts to destabilize and exert their 

influence in these nations? 

[No audible response.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, if that’s true, then obviously 

verification is a key issue. And we understand now that, quote, 

‘‘side agreements’’ have been made between the IAEA and Iran on 

the vital issue of verification. Is there anyone that thinks—that 

doesn’t think that Congress should be informed as to this vital part 

of the enforcement of any agreement? 

[No audible response.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, then I guess my question is that—oh, 

and, in case we missed it, I’d like to have the witnesses’ comment 

on the top advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who appeared 

on al-Jazeera on July 31st and was asked about United Nations 

(U.N.) inspection of Iran’s military sites. Here’s how he replied, according to the translation, quote, ‘‘Regardless of how the P5+1 

countries interpret the nuclear agreement, their entry into our 

military sites is absolutely forbidden. The entry of any foreigner, 

including International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors or 

any other inspector, to the sensitive military sites of the Islamic 

Republican—Republic is forbidden, no matter what.’’ 

118 

What do—first of all, if all those facts are true that you agreed 

to, and verification is a key item, here we are faced with these 

statements—and it’s not the first one that’s made a statement 

about entry into military sites—but also, shouldn’t the Congress 

know, shouldn’t the American people—more importantly, shouldn’t 

the American people know that there is verification the—on a— 

about inspections, and they should not be some secret side agreement that no one knows about? Isn’t this a critical item in ensuring 

that the nation that has been the constant violator, the constant 

cheater of international law concerning nuclear weapons—isn’t— 

doesn’t this give reason to some very deep concern on the part of 

those of us who are responsible and the American people? 

I’ll begin with—well, I’ll begin with you, Ambassador Burns, and 

we’ll work the other way. 

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I do agree with you. You know, the protocol here with the IAEA 

is that, when it has an agreement with any member state, they’re 

confidential. But, it—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. Yes. But, you know that this is not with any 

other state, Ambassador. I’ve heard that line. This is a country 

that has consistently cheated. It’s not Brazil. So, to just dismiss it 

in that way, I think, is, frankly, pure sophistry. 

Go right ahead. 

[Laughter.] 

Ambassador BURNS. I was actually just going to make—say exactly what you said. 

[Laughter.] 

Ambassador BURNS. However, I think, in this case—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. I have factitized. 

[Laughter.] 

Ambassador BURNS. It’s okay. I’m in violent agreement with you 

on this question. 

[Laughter.] 

Ambassador BURNS. I think, in the—they lied about the existence of Natanz. They lied about the existence of Fordow. We have 

to assume they’re going to cheat, on the margins or grossly, in the 

future. They’re in the dock of international public opinion. A way 

should be found for the IAEA Secretary General to brief in full the 

United States Government about what’s in the agreement. And I 

think the administration should find a way, perhaps in classified 

session, to brief the Congress. I agree with that. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Ambassador Edelman. 

Ambassador EDELMAN. Mr. Chairman, there are two issues here, 

I think. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I apologize for interrupting a—what I wanted to hear, Ambassador. 

[Laughter.] 

Ambassador EDELMAN. There are two issues, I think, with the 

verification provisions. One, I talked about in my statement, which 

is the 24 days between a challenge to see a suspect, undeclared 

site, and the potential of actually getting access to it. 

The side agreements with the IAEA have to do with the issue of 

past military dimensions to Iran’s activity and Iran being held to 

119 

account for all that and cooperating with the IAEA to resolve those 

issues. 

The problem here is that, until that is accomplished, I don’t understand, for the life of me, how you can even begin to assess the 

verification provisions, because we won’t know exactly the full scale 

of what their activity encompassed. So, that part is extremely important. And I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, there is no reason 

why the IAEA should not be able to explain to members of the Senate how they are going to go about working through with Iran the 

account—accounting for what Iran did in the past. That seems to 

me to be just a basic that one couldn’t even begin to go forward 

without having. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Haass. 

Dr. HAASS. Senator, we have a structural problem here, which 

is—because the IAEA is essentially a gentlemen’s regime. It’s a cooperative arrangement, where countries essentially declare what is 

meant to be inspected, and the IAEA is meant not to discover so 

much as confirm. The IAEA essentially doesn’t have hunting licenses, it has very restricted licenses to go look at certain places, 

under certain conditions, at certain times. That is clearly not adequate, given Iran’s histories. We’ve got a problem there. 

I would think the United States would want to have very candid 

conversations with the IAEA. We would want to establish a regime 

for intelligence-sharing that might be unique to the Iran situation. 

And, coming back to something I had in my statement, this is exactly the sort of area where I think Congress and the administration ought to spell out, in terms of what are the—what are our expectations about what Iran and the—would allow the IAEA to do? 

And what would be the consequences if Iran were not prepared to 

do that? And, very early on, I think we should test this. We’ve had 

all these statements by the Iranians about certain things are off 

limits, including military bases. Let’s test that. Let’s very quickly 

see what they’re prepared to—if this thing unravels—if this agreement unravels after a month or 2 months, so be it. But, I think it’s 

important that, if it were to unravel, that it is because the Iranians 

are unprepared to meet their obligations. So, very quickly on, we 

ought to test them, and we ought to hold them to a very high 

standard. 

Chairman MCCAIN. General Hayden. 

General HAYDEN. I agree with everything that’s been said so far. 

And, Senator, I would add that, in my view, that Iranian statement 

is an accurate reflection of what it is that the Iranians believe they 

have and have not agreed to. We claim that we will have access 

to the sites. And there are a lot of meanings tucked under the word 

‘‘access.’’ I would press our administration to define precisely 

whether or not ‘‘access’’ includes physical presence in the site, to 

enter and go about the facility, not whether you allow technical 

equipment, Geiger counters, or cameras to be entered into the facility by the Iranians. 

And then I guess I’d offer one additional caution. We should not 

allow our executive branch to tell you that access will be sufficient 

based upon the definitions provided by the IAEA, because, as Richard just pointed out, that’s not the kind of organization that they 

are. I think, absent your forcing that issue, access will not include 

120 

physical entry into any facility the Iranians do not want to permit 

physical entry. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Burns, one of the arguments against the arrangement is that there’s a better arrangement out there. Do you think 

that there is an arrangement out there, short of a military confrontation, that would be supported by the international community if we stepped back and essentially either try to increase sanctions or just step back and wait for the Iranians to come back to 

the table? 

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, I think this is the best alternative 

available to us right now. We could go back 10 years, 5 years, and 

perhaps design a different framework to these negotiations. Many 

of us would. But, this is the agreement that’s been negotiated. And, 

as I said in my oral remarks, I fear that if the United States is 

the one that walks away, the Iranians will have agreed to this, 

they’ll have accepted—they’ll have made major concessions, their 

program frozen for 10 to 15 years. It would give them the upper 

hand. 

It would be complicating in two respects. Beyond our agreement 

with the Europeans—the European oil and gas embargo, the European financial sanctions—we’ve been able to get the Indians, the 

Japanese, the South Koreans, the Indonesians onboard. I think it’s 

that global coalition that would fray and weaken first. 

And second, I think we’d also have problems with the Europeans. 

The Germans, the French, and the British all support this agreement. Their Parliaments are very likely—I think almost certainly— 

to support these agreements, given the nature of their systems. 

And so, we—they would be in a tough spot. I think their inclination 

would be to try to help us figure out a way forward. But, 

extraterritorial sanctions, which some Members of Congress have 

said would be our key instrument, would be very controversial in 

allied countries in Europe, unfortunately. And I think it would be 

difficult to carry that. 

The EU also has to reauthorize sanctions, and they vote by consensus. And so, of the 28 EU members, I can think of three to four 

who would be sorely tempted to withhold consensus, meaning the 

sanctions would end. So, keeping this coalition together is critical. 

What we’ve had, over 10 years now in the Bush and Obama administrations, is leverage over the Iranians—through the global coalition, through the financial and—sanctions, and through the Security Council Resolutions. That’s what we would give up. And so, 

I don’t see walking away, waiting for a better deal, as a credible 

alternative. 

Senator REED. And if we did walk away, would there be an internal dynamic in Iran, because of their institutional and political 

structures, to sort of show us that they’re going to go forward now, 

because they’ve given their best? They’re going to start accelerating 

their development of fissile material, they’re going to essentially 

get back on the path they were, which would bring forward very 

quickly options that we might have to contemplate—either intelligence options or military options? 

121 

Ambassador BURNS. I suspect that the—if we walked out and abrogated, effectively, the agreement by failing to implement it, the 

Iranians would feel compelled not to abide by the agreement. And, 

I think, for domestic reasons, but also for reasons of trying to position themselves perhaps for the next round of this drama, they 

would lift the restrictions that they’ve agreed to. They’d go back to 

being a threshold nuclear state. 

And, you know, we’ve had the upper hand over the last 10 years 

because most of the rest of the world feared the Iranians were 

heading towards a nuclear weapon. If we walk out first, I think 

that reduces our credibility to keep it together. 

Senator REED. And just very quickly, Secretary Kerry was with 

the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) yesterday. It appears that 

they’ve endorsed it, maybe with not enthusiasm, but—is that your 

impression? 

Ambassador BURNS. You know, I—it is. I mean, the statement by 

the Qatari Foreign Minister said that they would support this 

agreement, and they would it implemented. They also want their 

defenses strengthened. And there is also announcement by several 

dozen Israeli officials—former officials—Shin Bet Mossad military 

yesterday—I don’t think they embraced the deal, but they said that 

the—Israel should go along with it and work on strengthening 

Israeli-United States relations. 

Senator REED. Dr. Haass, I thought your statement was—no surprise—very insightful. And one of the lines is critical, ‘‘But, the 

issue before the Congress is not whether the agreement is good or 

bad, but whether, from the point of it on—this point on, the United 

States is better or worse off with it.’’ I know you’ve proposed a 

third track, but I think, essentially, we’re on one track of a motion 

to disapprove, and then whether it’s veto, and the veto sustained. 

So, basically, the track is, either this agreement’s going to be eventually sustained or it’s rejected. And my presumption from your 

comments is that, with all the shortcomings, that you would feel 

that, on that track, sustaining the agreement makes more sense. 

Dr. HAASS. It’s always odd to push back against someone who 

gave you a compliment. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator REED. I respect you. That’s why I asked the question. 

Dr. HAASS. Thank you, sir. And it’s mutual. 

I would, at this point, urge you and your colleagues to think, 

though, about some version of what I would call the third track. 

I mean, for example, Ambassador Edelman talked about the authorization for the use of military force. General Hayden talked 

about the conditions of access. Ambassador Burns talked about certain things we do with our allies. I could imagine a comprehensive 

statement—and I’m not a legal or political expert on what form it 

would take—presidential communication, legislation, resolution, 

what have you—but, something that would address the shortcomings, and, in some ways, fill out. This is a narrow agreement. 

It’s not just a flawed agreement, in some ways, but it’s a narrow 

agreement. And even if it were flawless, there would be lots of 

issues. And I would think it’s very much in our interest to do that, 

because one of our jobs here is to reassure friends in the region, 

so they don’t follow suit, and it’s to signal Iran so—in particular, 

122 

on the longer-term nuclear question. I—that, to me, is the biggest 

single set of concerns. And I would, very early on, sit down with 

the—ourselves and then the Europeans to think about what a follow-on framework would look like. 

Let me just make one other point. I think it’s—Senator McCain 

and I were talking about this a little bit beforehand—I find it frustrating and, in some ways, sad and problematic, we are where we 

are today, having this hearing. And I wish, earlier on, the administration and the Congress had worked more in tandem. And I think 

that would have strengthened our hand, vis-a-vis the Europeans, 

the Chinese, the Russians, and also the Iranians, so we could have 

come up with a sense of minimal collective requirements or standards. So, now we’re in a after-the-fact situation trying to do that. 

It is imperfect. But, I still think it’s—some version of that still 

makes the most sense at this point. 

General HAYDEN. May I add just one comment to what Dr. Haass 

just said, Senator? 

There are global implications to the nonproliferation regime, as 

well as regional implications. And I am—and so, Dr. Haass suggests a second regime after the 10-year period. Because there is 

such a danger to the global nonproliferation regime that this agreement actually explicitly says, (a) Iran gets all the benefits of an 

NPT party, but no other NPT party should believe that anything 

in this agreement sets a precedent for them. And so, what you’ve 

got if you don’t go to a second agreement is a regime with the Iranians that then threatens to undercut global nonproliferation. 

Senator REED. My time expired. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’m going to make this real quick since we have a full panel up 

here and everyone has to have access to their time. 

You know, prior to the time the first reports came out, I have to 

tell you—and I’ll address this to General Hayden and to Ambassador Edelman, because I know you guys better than the other 

two—prior to that time, I just thought the mere concept of negotiating with terrorists seems not a good idea. But, then there are two 

things that came out that I’ve realized that, when I go back to 

Oklahoma and talk to real people, that are problems with this. One 

is the lack of verification, the other is the billions of dollars going 

to terrorists. And I—I’ve—the last person I would expect to say 

what she said were the words that came from Susan Rice. She’s the 

one that said things that were not true about Benghazi, on the 

Sunni programs. And when she came out and said—I think this is 

with Wolf Blitzer, and this is a quote—she said, ‘‘We should expect 

that some portion of that money would go to the Iranian military 

and could potentially be used for the kinds of bad behavior that we 

have seen in the region up until now.’’ 

Now, I really believe, building on that, that this could fund the 

terrorism efforts through Hamas in Palestine, Bashar al-Assad in 

Syria, Yemen, and the rest of the places. The Pentagon currently 

estimates that Iran provides approximately $200 million a year to 

Hezbollah, alone. Now, on that thing, I asked the two of them, 

123 

‘‘What am I overlooking?’’ I mean, isn’t that pretty obvious, just on 

its face, that this would expand the use of money going to terrorists? 

General Hayden? 

General HAYDEN. Very quickly, Senator. Of course it will. Now, 

the intelligence community put out an estimate that was, I think, 

intentionally leaked, that most of the money would not go. But, you 

know, ‘‘most’’ is like 51 cents on the dollar, so that leaves an awful 

lot of headroom for that estimate—— 

Senator INHOFE. Sure. 

General HAYDEN.—beyond that. Right? Let’s just imagine a 

world in which none of it goes. You realize that you’ve created a 

situation for the Iranian regime, where they can do guns and butter, that there is no pressure, internally on the regime, for continuing their current behavior, which is not the case today before 

the sanctions are lifted. But, I agree, it’s even worse than guns and 

butter. It’s more guns and butter. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay, I thought— 

Ambassador? 

Ambassador EDELMAN. I agree, Senator Inhofe, with what General Hayden just said, and I would add one—you know, one other 

factor here, which is the fact that the Iranians, at the last minute 

in the negotiations, suggested that the price for getting the deal 

was to lift the conventional arms embargo and the embargo on ballistic missiles in the U.N. Security Council, which my colleague 

earlier talked about, and that it was supported vigorously by Russia, I don’t think, as I might have said in my earlier career as a 

Sovietologist, was ‘‘by accident, comrade.’’ This happened because 

the Iranians intend to use with this windfall—to use it to purchase 

advanced conventional systems with anti-access area denial elements to it, and the people who are going to sell it to them are 

going to be Russia and China. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. Very good answers. 

The second thing that I looked at was, you know, if you’re talking about 5 days, 10 days, 24 days, or whatever length of time, if 

you have to give a site warning that an inspection is going to take 

place, which that immediately sent up a red flag to me, then we 

had the statements by the Deputy Director Heinonen, who said 

that a 24-day adjudicated timeline reduces detection possibilities. 

He goes on to talk about what all can be done. 

Now, during the last hearing, Senator Fischer pursued it a little 

bit with Secretary Moniz and talked about the timeline. And I got 

a little confused there, because, first of all, you start off with the 

24 days. We know how that’s broken out. However, if Iran believes 

that any or all of the—you know, are not meeting their equipment—their commitments, it could refer the issue to the Joint 

Commission for 15 days, then the Ministers of Foreign Affairs for 

another 15 days. Now, that’s a total of 54 days. Now, I don’t know 

how much further it could go out. Is—do you agree that that could 

happen, in terms of something that would have to be verified? 

Ambassador EDELMAN. I’m aware of the provisions that you’ve 

talked about with regard to referring issues to the Joint Commission. You know, like any agreement, you know, we’re going to find 

out, once it’s actually in place, how it actually will work. But, I 

124 

think it is possible that you could get a longer-than-24-day period 

from the—— 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah. 

Ambassador EDELMAN.—request to an inspection. 

Senator INHOFE. Yeah, okay. 

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think that’s—— 

Senator INHOFE. Okay, that adds up to—— 

Ambassador EDELMAN.—perfectly plausible. 

Senator INHOFE.—some 56 days. 

General Hayden, do you think that they would be able to cover 

up a lot of stuff in 24 days, leave alone 56 days? 

General HAYDEN. Well, more time is better. And again, I think 

we all agree—— 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. 

General HAYDEN.—that there’s not going to be a sprint out to a 

new Natanz somewhere. It will be—there will be cheating, but it 

will be incremental. And that’ll be the kind that will be very, very 

difficult. 

And, Senator, one additional thing. In addition to your adding 

onto the back end, there’s some fuzziness at the front end before 

the 24-day clock starts, because there’s a dialogue between the 

IAEA and the Iranians about what it is—to identify what really the 

issues are, about which facilities. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Nelson. 

Senator NELSON. I want to thank all of you for very reasoned 

statements. And this is—I consider it one of the most important decisions that I will make. And I’m sure all of us in the Senate feel 

that same responsibility. 

General Hayden, in your opening comments, and later amplified, 

you think it will be more guns and butter if the agreement goes 

through, and you characterized it earlier, versus if the deal is rejected, it would be a more impoverished Iran. 

And so, I want to take that and ask Ambassador Burns—given 

the fact that, when you subtract out all of what Iran owes under 

contracts, it’s my understanding it’s a net of about $56 billion that 

would flow to Iran, most of which are in the banks of five countries: 

China, India, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. So, if the deal is 

rejected, my question is, What’s the incentive for those banks in 

those foreign countries that hold those dollars for Iran’s oil if those 

countries want additional Iranian oil—is there any incentive for 

them to keep them and, therefore, keep Iran impoverished? 

Ambassador BURNS. I think one of the problems is—and I’ve 

been in a couple of hearings now, and Senators and congresspeople 

are focusing on this issue, is—there’s really no Plan B. The expectation by all the adherents to this agreement is that it’s going to 

go forward. But, if it does fall apart, for whatever reason—or if the 

United States Congress decides to disapprove, and the President 

can’t sustain a veto—I think there’s going to be a dynamic that develops that’s not going to be in our favor. 

I’ve paid attention, of course, to Secretary Lew’s testimony about 

the amount of money he thinks would be available to the Iranians. 

I’m not competent to answer the question specifically. I would 

think some of that money will go to long-term contracts, some will 

125 

have to go to the Iranian economy, because it’s been so impoverished. They’ll have to spend on social welfare, infrastructure 

projects. No question, some of it will go to the IRGC, given the relationship of Qassem Soleimani, the head of the IRGC Quds Force, 

to the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. That’s to our disadvantage. 

And that’s what we’re going to have to compensate for. 

But, I look at this from a very practical viewpoint. I think if we 

get into this realm where the deal falls apart, the Iranians have 

more of the advantage than we do. And I think we will lose the 

grip on the international sanctions regime. And some of those 

banks around the world that have been—that had funded the Iranians, some of the long-term contracts will come back. It will be 

difficult, in that scenario, to impose extraterritorial sanctions, even 

in Europe, because the consensus would have broken down. So, I 

really don’t see the logic of that no-deal scenario. And that’s why 

I prefer and support the President’s initiative. 

Senator NELSON. I’ve been reading some of these annexes. And 

the one on access, which is Annex Q, it goes through this process 

on undeclared sites, that so many days, and so many days, and a 

vote of this Council, five of the eight members, another 7 days and 

3 days, which is the maximum of 24 days. If Iran still balks at giving us access, giving the IAEA access, to an undeclared site after 

that process, and, with the overlay of our intelligence, isn’t it pretty 

well that we’re going to be able to understand that that is covert 

activity, and we could operate accordingly? 

Anyone. 

General HAYDEN. I guess I’ll take that, Senator, because I’ve— 

in my previous life, I would be the one going into the Oval with 

the case. 

There’s actually a phenomenon in intelligence that describes that 

dilemma. It’s called the Phenomenon of the Unpleasant Fact. And 

you’re going in to your senior leadership with something that cuts 

across their policy goals, their policy preferences, and maybe even 

their politics. And there, the burden of proof is incredibly high. So, 

I actually think it’s going to take a long time to convince any President who would believe in the deal to go ahead and put the deal 

at risk by responding to what still is ambiguous behavior. And 

then, even after you’ve convinced our government, it’s going to be 

even more difficult to convince other governments that further action has to be taken if your evidence remains ambiguous. There 

will always be arguments for alternative explanations. 

Senator NELSON. You can’t—I don’t think you can hide traces of 

enriched uranium. And that’s why I think the IAEA plus our intelligence apparatus is going to be able to find it. 

General HAYDEN. No, I—number one, there would—there can be 

cheating that actually could approach being substantial without enrichment activity. But, I assumed in your scenario, Senator Nelson, 

that the IAEA would not get physical access in order to go ahead 

and do the swipes for the detection of isotopes. And that’s what I 

meant by ‘‘and it will remain ambiguous.’’ 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you all for your wise insight and help 

us make some tough decisions here. 

126 

I asked Secretary Carter, last week, and Secretary Kerry testified before the House last week that Iran is the number-one world 

sponsor of terrorism. So, we’re negotiating with a very problematic 

country whose religion transcends, sometimes, normal political discourse, I think, creates an ideological extremism that’s dangerous 

there. 

Dr. Haass, you mentioned the historical perspective. I remember 

Mr. O’Hanlon, from Brookings, testifying. I followed up on something he said about the fact that this may be 30, 40-plus years of 

dealing with this spasm of Islamic extremism that we’re seeing. 

And he just said, ‘‘Yes.’’ That was his answer. 

So, what we do with Iran, would you agree, should be consistent 

with an overall historic strategy, over decades perhaps, to help subside this extremism that we’re seeing? 

Dr. HAASS. In principle, yes. But, in practice, it’s going to be extraordinarily hard, simply because, even though Iran would say, 

from their point of view, the principal threat to stability in the region is the Islamic State, much of what Iran is doing is actually 

encouraging people to go join that organization by, for example, 

using Shiite militias inside of Iraq or supporting the Assad government. So, Iran’s own policy, I would argue, is against their own 

professed self-interest. And that’s why this is going to be so difficult. 

It’s one of the reasons, Senator, I’ll be honest with you, I am so 

pessimistic about the trajectory of this part of this world. We 

haven’t even discussed Turkey, we haven’t discussed Egypt, we 

haven’t discussed Yemen. We could—Saudi Arabia’s own internal 

dynamics. I think there’s more fault lines in this part of the world 

than we have fingers on our hands. And Iran is a significant, but 

not the sole, contributor to the pathologies of this part of the world. 

Senator SESSIONS. Ambassador Edelman, it seems to me that 

we’ve gotten into this negotiation improvidently. Bush administration said we can’t negotiate with this terrorist state. And President 

Obama decided to commence those negotiations. A wise Middle 

Eastern leader told us that you’ve got to know how to get out of 

a talking trap; otherwise, you can’t—you know, you lose all kind of 

ability to act. 

So, I guess what I’m asking, first and foremost—it seems to me 

that the—that an agreement of any kind with Iran should be 

founded on a—as part of an overall strategy to deal with the problems in the Middle East. And it seems to me this has been an ad 

hoc agreement, this situation that started talking that we couldn’t 

get out of it, and now we’ve ended up with an agreement that, I 

agree with you, does not serve the national interest. Is that incorrect, or you have any thoughts on that? 

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Sessions, thank you. 

First, I think, in fairness, although we were not directly involved 

in the negotiations with Iran during the Bush administration, my 

colleague to the left was constantly working with the then-EU3. 

And I believe, at the very end of the Bush administration, the 

other Ambassador, Burns, actually participated in one round of negotiations. So—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Were those official negotiations? 

127 

Ambassador EDELMAN. They were official negotiations, but—and 

his participation was brief and fleeting, I would say, but it was a 

part of the process. 

You’re right that—and, first, one of the occupational hazards of 

negotiating is, negotiators get the bit in their teeth, understandably; they work on something, and then they want to get a conclusion, they want to get a deal. And there is always the danger that 

the objective—in this case, preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon—gets lost, particularly in the final effort to conclude 

a deal, which is difficult and arduous. And, in this case, I think the 

negotiators got a lot of things. If you read the entire document, 

there are a lot of things I would have been—you know, I would 

have predicted they wouldn’t have gotten. It’s, you know, surprising in some of the limits, et cetera. But, the overall result, I 

agree with you, is not satisfactory. 

The—I think that, you know, my colleague, Ambassador Burns, 

said there seems to be no Plan B. I don’t quite understand that. 

I mean, the administration said, throughout the negotiation, it was 

prepared to walk away from a bad deal. It said repeatedly that a 

bad deal was worse than no deal. So, presumably, if they were prepared to walk away, there had to be some Plan B somewhere, because someone had to be thinking about what they were going to 

do if they didn’t actually get the deal. So, the idea that there’s no 

other deal out there that’s available, I don’t think is credible. 

I would add another thought experiment to this. Let’s say, for 

the sake of argument, that the Majlis actually act before you all 

do. And let’s say, for the sake of argument, the Majlis were to reject the deal. I don’t believe that the administration’s first response 

would be, ‘‘Oh, my God, there’s no deal. Now we have to go to war.’’ 

I think they would say, ‘‘We’ve got to figure out a way to get the 

Iranians back to the table and start negotiating again and get a— 

you know, get something we can do.’’ I don’t understand why that 

principle wouldn’t apply to this body, as well. 

Senator SESSIONS. Do you think—just to—do you—all right. My 

time is up. I’m sorry. He didn’t answer the question. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all of you. This is extremely enlightening, and it’s 

extremely important, and I think the decision that we make is one 

of the toughest decisions any of us have ever made since I’ve been 

here. And I’m sure the rest of our committee here agrees. But, it’s 

one that’s going to have world implications, not just to the United 

States, and not just Iran. 

With that being said, I look back in history. I grew up at a period 

of time when Iran was a friendly nation or a favored nation, with 

the Shah. And I remember, 1979, we had 52 hostages that were 

held for 444 days. The regime changed. I don’t know if any of— 

look—of you all look back in history, thinking this regime would 

withstand 36 years. Did anybody predict they would be able to 

hang on for that long? And if that’s the situation or evaluation, do 

we believe that they are on the brink of breaking, to where the people will revolt and change because of the hardship after 36 years? 

I would have thought—this hardship’s been going on for quite some 

time. They didn’t progress like they did prior to this regime change 

128 

in ’79. And if that would be the case, then what’s the chance of this 

regime changing if we do the deal or don’t do the deal? Which puts 

more pressure on them? Because I would think the only way we’re 

going to change that country, or even that part of the world, is if 

some of these regimes and some of these people who want a—more 

of a peaceful life are going to be able to take hold again. So, that’s 

one question. 

And also, the other question I would have is, Is there any possible way of stopping the flow of money if we walk away from the 

deal? I think we’ve touched on it. I think Senator Nelson asked the 

question. I know we all have been thinking about that. But, we act 

like we’re in control. And if we walk away, the money—we just put 

a grip on it, and nothing moves. 

The third thing I would ask you all is, If you were going to meet 

with the P5+1—if you were sitting down with all the representatives, whether they be ambassadors or spokespeople for these countries, what question would you ask? 

So, we’ll start with the third, if you—first—regime change. Can 

it be done if—with or without the deal? And then down to the 

three. 

So, we can start either way you want to start. Do you want to 

start? 

General HAYDEN. Regime change has not been the American objective, looking backward as far as my experience allows me to see. 

That said, the Iranian leadership has never wavered from the conviction that this was always all about regime change. So, that’s 

made our dialogue with them even more complex. 

I would say that one course of action gives a better chance of coercing regime change. That’s no deal. And then, there are hopes 

that, if you do have this deal, you might entice regime change because of integrating the state, the people, into the larger community. I actually think both chances are very low. I don’t think it’s 

going to happen. 

Senator MANCHIN. Money? 

General HAYDEN. One more on regime change. That is most—actually, looking at it, it is most tightly tied to demographics, and it’s 

a nation’s youth bulge that creates disturbances that lead to regime 

change. It’s very—it’s actually a very predictive indicator. Egypt 

just went through a youth bulge. Our youth bulge was—— 

Senator MANCHIN. I’m sorry, General, we’re going to have be 

very quickly, because I—I’m running out of time. 

General HAYDEN. Our youth bulge was ’68 to ’70. The Iranians 

are now on the back end of their youth bulge. 

Senator MANCHIN. Okay. 

Money, Dr. Haass? Or which way—do whatever, real quick. 

Dr. HAASS. Regime change, I don’t think it’s in the cards, unfortunately. 

Senator MANCHIN. Either way. 

Dr. HAASS. Either way. 

Senator MANCHIN. With or without. 

Dr. HAASS. It’s the impact—first of all, it’s likely to be slight, either way. Second of all, you can’t count on it. 

Senator MANCHIN. Gotcha. 

Dr. HAASS. Regime change may happen—— 

129 

Senator MANCHIN. Gotcha. 

Dr. HAASS.—for reasons that we can’t predict. If it does, it could 

be for the better, it could be for the worse. Took the Soviet Union 

over 70 years, happened rather quickly at the end. But, it simply— 

to me, it—it’s more wishful thinking right now than it’s—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Okay. 

Dr. HAASS.—than a strategy. 

P5+1. I would sit down, very quickly, and have the conversation 

both about how to deal with noncompliance, and, second of all, how 

to deal with the long-term nuclear challenge. Because this agreement stores it up, if you will, for years 10 and years 15. 

Very quickly, I’m worried that too many think—people think this 

agreement solves the problem. It parks the problem. And that’s the 

conversation I would begin with the P5+1. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you. 

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Manchin, excellent questions. In 

the interest of time, I won’t add anything on the regime change—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Okay. 

Ambassador EDELMAN.—question, except to say I think, on the 

margin, this agreement strengthens the regime rather than weakens it. 

On the flow of money, I think actually there are ways to staunch 

it. I think a strong vote in the Congress against this deal would 

help staunch it. And the reason I say that is the comments that 

my former colleague, Jacques Audibert, the French National Security Advisor to President Hollande, made in denying the conversations he allegedly had with some members of the House. He did say 

that he told them that it would be a powerful disincentive, given 

the kind of penalties BNP Paribas paid for violating U.S. sanctions. 

Senator MANCHIN. Could I have Mr. Burns just answer the two— 

Ambassador EDELMAN. Yeah. 

Senator MANCHIN.—because we just ran out of time. 

Real quick. 

Ambassador BURNS. Very quickly. We should hope for regime 

change, but we can’t bank on it. And I would say this is a tough 

regime which will likely survive, unfortunately. 

On the money, long line of European and Asian officials and 

businesspeople in Tehran ministries over the last weekend. So, I 

think it would be very difficult for us to kind of reimpose and rejigger that whole sanctions regime if we walked away. 

And finally, on the last question, I was in the P5+1 for 3 years. 

They need to stick with us on sanctions reimposition. I think the 

Europeans would. I don’t think the Russians and Chinese would. 

Senator MANCHIN. And your question to P5 would be what, right 

today? 

Ambassador BURNS. Excuse me? 

Senator MANCHIN. Your—— 

Ambassador BURNS. My question would be, we—I think it’s inevitable the Iranians will test the restrictions and try to cheat. And 

we’re going to need P5 unity. And that’s one of the downsides. It’s 

going to be difficult to have—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Commitment to do that. Thank you. 

I’m sorry, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator INHOFE [presiding]: Senator Ayotte. 

130 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Chairman. 

I want to thank all of you for being here. This has been very 

helpful. 

One of the issues that General Hayden raised, and some of you 

have raised on the inspection regime on undeclared sites—I think, 

if you look at the language in Annex 1, Section Q, that lays out the 

procedure for undeclared sites, it—I don’t see anywhere in that 

Annex—in fact, what I see in it, in paragraphs 75 and 76, is that, 

first, the IAEA has to raise the concerns of undeclared sites to the 

Iranians, then, at that point, they actually have to put in writing 

their concerns. The Iranians have an opportunity to respond, and 

they actually get to suggest alternatives to what the IAEA would 

like, in terms of access to undeclared sites. 

So, in that language, to General Hayden’s point, do you remain 

concerned, if the IAEA is not given physical access to undeclared 

sites, that that could undermine their ability, even if you use the 

most advanced testing to know, in fact, whether an undeclared site 

is being used for their nuclear program? I mean, is this a real 

issue? 

As I look at this—by the way, I think this is a lawyer’s dream. 

I mean, as we look at the back-and-forth on this, I mean, I can only 

imagine, my prior life as a litigator, I could have a ball with this. 

I’d just like your comment on physical access. Nothing in this can 

I see guarantees us any—or the IAEA, obviously—any physical access to their undeclared sites. 

Dr. HAASS. I’d say two things. It—you’re right, it doesn’t guarantee it. The question of access is not explicitly defined. But, second of all, we shouldn’t kid ourselves. For certain activities, even 

physical access is not a panacea. By definition, undeclared sites are 

just that. You can’t know something is going on if you don’t know 

what’s going on. So, for example, if there’s certain weaponization 

activity going on at an undeclared site, by definition we’re not 

going to have access to it, because we won’t know it’s going on. And 

certain types of activities don’t leave traces. So, even physical access is valuable, as it would be in some cases, is not a solution. Inspection is meant to be a cooperative enterprise. And I think we 

have to accept the limits that we’ve got a noncooperative party on 

the other end of this agreement. 

Senator AYOTTE. Ambassador? 

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you very much, Senator. 

If we get into this realm of the managed inspections, the 24 days, 

we’re into, likely, a significant violation. If the Iranians ultimately, 

in those 24 days, don’t provide access, that’s a violation of the 

agreement. And I think we would have the—if we’re serious and 

we would prosecute this, we would have the upper hand in getting 

a lot of international support—not from everybody, but from key 

countries. 

Senator AYOTTE. So, one other—I have a number of questions, 

but—Dr. Haass, you mentioned that we need to reassure our 

friends in the region so they don’t follow suit. One of the issues 

that many of us have heard an earful about is from our allies in 

the region and their potential desire to have threshold programs or 

programs, themselves, to hedge against the Iranian program, and 

that this is a real concern for us as a result of their ability to keep 

131 

their infrastructure in this agreement. Could you all comment as 

to what the impact could be on our allies in the region, in terms 

of their own nuclear programs or desire for this capability? 

Dr. HAASS. What it’s going to take is the combination of things. 

One is going to be that they’re going to have confidence in how we 

pursue this, noncompliance as well as follow-on—there’s clear ceilings, shall we say, on Iranian capabilities. We’re going to have to 

look at defensive systems of all sorts for these countries. 

I actually think the most interesting area may well be security 

guarantees. If we don’t want them to each go down that path themselves, the question then is, What are we prepared to do for them 

and with them in this area? Because, despite our best efforts, Iran 

may still achieve, you know, at a minimum, threshold status. So, 

I think if we don’t want—and we don’t want—the United Arab 

Emirates (UAE), the Saudis, and others going down that path, then 

I think it’s actually a big debate for the United States, which is, 

To what extent are we prepared to put, however conditional, various types of nuclear umbrellas out there in the region? 

Senator AYOTTE. Do others want to comment on that? 

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Ayotte, I would just add one 

thing, which is, if you take a country like the UAE, which has 

signed a 123 Agreement with the gold standard of no enrichment, 

they have been very vocal about, you know, what this means for 

them now that this very large industrial-scale program is being 

okayed by the international community. You see that in Saudi Arabia, as well. So, I think the concern you’ve expressed is extremely 

well placed and goes to General Hayden’s comment about the 

threat that this agreement, I think, represents to the broader nonproliferation regime over time. 

General HAYDEN. And, Senator, one solution is to compensate 

with conventional weapons to our allies in the region, which has 

its own second- and third-order effects with regard to the balance 

between the Arabs and the Israelis. And we may end up, as a byproduct of this agreement, with a far more militarized Persian Gulf 

than we’ve had in the past. 

Ambassador BURNS. One option for President Obama and his 

successor is to reaffirm the doctrine that the Persian Gulf is vital 

for the national security interests of our country. I think all administrations, Republican and Democrat, have essentially said that 

since Jimmy Carter’s administration, but we haven’t heard it in 

those terms, clear terms from the Obama administration. That 

would help to reassure the Gulf allies. 

Senator AYOTTE. I thank all of you for being here. Appreciate 

your insight. 

Chairman MCCAIN [presiding]: Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

And thank you all very much for being here this morning. 

You have all suggested, and I have heard this in virtually every 

other hearing on this Iran deal, that the likelihood of Iran breaching this agreement is more that they would breach it incrementally 

rather than that they would walk away or have a very flagrant 

breach. And so, one of the things that we ought to be thinking 

about if it goes forward is what other measures we could take with 

the other signatories to the agreement that would show Iran that 

132 

we are strong and we’re not going to tolerate those incremental 

breaches. 

So, I wonder if you could speak—and maybe I’ll start with you, 

Dr. Haass—about what other steps that we should be thinking 

about as we’re looking at the potential for incremental breaches. 

Dr. HAASS. Well, again, I think your premise is exactly right, and 

I think the Iranians—getting back to something General Hayden 

said—hope that the inevitable ambiguity gives them protection and 

that these issues get talked to death and, at the end, there’s no 

clarity. But, I—what I would think is—the only response I can 

think of is that we have—how would I put it?—lesser responses to 

lesser breaches. If we only have all-or-nothing responses, then 

I—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. Right. 

Dr. HAASS.—I think we tie ourselves in knots. So, we ought to 

have gradations of responses, if you will, in some ways geared to 

the breaches. I think we have a much better chance of getting 

something like that through the P5+1, the—something that seems, 

if you will, proportionate. 

Also, could I say one other thing? We have to think about if there 

is something of a breach, what is our goal? And our goal is not simply to penalize at that point, it’s also to get the Iranians back into 

compliance. And I think that’s got to be an important part of our 

policy, as well. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And so, what are—Ambassador Edelman—— 

Ambassador EDELMAN. Yeah. 

Senator SHAHEEN.—what are other actions that we might take? 

Ambassador EDELMAN. You know, Senator Shaheen, you’ve 

raised an important question, and it’s one that I find particularly 

troubling, because my own experience in government is—and I’m 

saying it in light of the comments by Minister Zarif, that, ‘‘Basically, oh, we’re only going to get penalized for big violations, not 

for little violations.’’ Of course, you pile little violations up on top 

of each other incrementally over time, and it can actually amount 

to, you know, serious capability being developed. 

The problem is, as General Hayden said earlier in the hearing, 

you’re always going to be dealing with ambiguous information. 

There will be an argument inside the intelligence community first 

about whether this information actually is a violation—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. And—— 

Ambassador EDELMAN.—and how important the violation is. 

Then we’ll have an—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. I’m sorry to interrupt you, but—— 

Ambassador EDELMAN.—then we’ll have an interagency debate 

about it. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I appreciate that. But, what I’m suggesting is 

that—what I think everyone was saying is that, if an agreement 

goes forward, we ought to be prepared that we’re going to respond 

to those incremental breaches. And so, what—what’s the menu of 

options that we’ve got, to do that? 

Ambassador Burns? 

Ambassador BURNS. I think the administration is prepared and 

should set a very high bar for the Iranians; meaning, if you anticipate that they’re going to begin to cheat, you have to be very 

133 

tough-minded and call them on those early rounds, or else they’re 

going to be emboldened, the way that Foreign Minister Zarif predicted in his public statement. And, at least from my own understanding of the administration’s position, they’re determined to be 

very tough-minded at the beginning. And I think that’s what we 

have to be. We’ll have to have the Europeans with us. In a strange 

sort of way, President Putin has stayed with President Obama on 

this particular issue, despite our sanctions on Russia over Ukraine. 

The Russians don’t want Iran to become a nuclear-weapons power. 

I’m not predicting they’re going to be a great partner, but you have 

to work on the Russians, as well. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Let me also ask—I think it was you again, Dr. 

Haass, and Ambassador Edelman, as well, who suggested that 

there were other steps that Congress could take, should an agreement go forward, that would help strengthen the U.S. position with 

respect to any agreement. And, Ambassador Edelman, you suggested an AUMF, which, you know, I think many of us might be 

open to, except that we haven’t been able to get an AUMF done on 

the actions that were taken against ISIS. But, what other kinds of 

measures are you suggesting that Congress might take that would 

help to strengthen our position? 

Dr. Haass? 

Dr. HAASS. It’s a longer conversation than your time limit would 

have, but certainly we would spell out of some of the parameters 

of the follow-on nuclear deal beyond the 10 and 15 years. I actually 

think that would be critical, dealing with, for example, questions 

of levels of arrangement. Just because the agreement ends at certain points, and may not preclude Iran from doing certain things, 

doesn’t mean we couldn’t put into place something that would be 

a follow-on that would preclude those things, or say, ‘‘If you are 

tempted to do it, here would be the results or the consequences.’’ 

So, I would think that is high on the list. We would also talk about 

some of the help we would provide for other countries in the region 

against certain kinds of threats from Iran. 

But, essentially, Senator, I would go through each of the three 

baskets—the noncompliance basket, the regional basket, and the 

follow-on nuclear basket—and say, each one of those, what do we 

see as the problems or the shortcomings or the issues likely to 

arise? What can we do now, looking at them—some would be immediate, some would be towards the future—to reinforce this 

agreement? And that—that’s the conversation I think Congress 

should be having with the executive branch, sooner rather than 

later. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Thank you all very much. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Fischer. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I would like to follow up on an answer that General 

Hayden gave to Senator Reed on his questions dealing with precedent and nonproliferation. As you all probably know, in paragraph 

11 of the preamble, it states that, ‘‘This agreement should not be 

considered as setting precedents for any other state.’’ And, Ambassador Edelman, in your beginning comments, in your opening comments, you said that this agreement reverses 50 years of nonVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00139 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
134 

proliferation policy, even to friendly governments. So, a couple of 

questions, here. 

First question. Does including a caveat like this in the preamble, 

does that really accomplish anything? And my second question 

would be, To what extent will this agreement impact future nuclear 

cooperation agreements? 

You know, if we’re prepared to embrace the idea of a serial violator building an enrichment program, and leave open the possibility 

that they begin reprocessing activities in 15 years, I don’t see how 

we can object to extending similar terms to other countries that actually have good nonproliferation records. 

So, I would like you to begin, in any order you’d like to. Ambassador Edelman, would you like to start? 

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Fischer, yeah, you’ve put your 

finger on something that I found troubling in the agreement, as 

well. And I think what you’re seeing there is that the administration has gotten that inserted into the agreement so that it can say, 

in principle, we have denied Iran the right to enrich; we’ve just recognized it, in practice, because we’re allowing them to have an industrial-scale enrichment capability. So, that’s why I think you see 

it there. And I think, notwithstanding the fact that people say it’s 

not a precedent, other people will say that it’s a precedent, just as, 

for instance, we asserted that the recognition of Kosovo’s independence unilaterally was not a precedent; Russia used that precedent 

against us in 2008, in Georgia. 

Dr. HAASS. Two things. Whenever you say something is not a 

precedent, it’s the equivalent of saying, ‘‘With all due respect.’’ 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. HAASS. And you inevitably run into it. 

That said, Iran is sui generis. And a lot of the countries we’re 

going to have to deal with nuclear programs are not Iran, thank 

God. Iran is an outlier. Whether it’s the UAE or potentially Saudi 

Arabia. I mean, they are qualitatively different sorts of challenges. 

So, I think we ought to, to the best we can, deal with this as a 

one-off. Yes, it’s going to be pushed in our face sometimes with people that are saying, ‘‘Well, you agreed to this,’’ and we’re going to 

have to argue, ‘‘But, that was a special case.’’ 

So, I think it is in our interest, to the extent this is a problematic 

agreement, to make it as sui generis as we can, understanding that 

others are going to cite it. But, it’s not the same as most-favorednation status. It’s not that problematic, because we’re not dealing 

with a world of rogues. Iran is, to some extent, an outlier, as is 

North Korea and several others. And the more likely conversation 

is going to be one, two, or three agreements with friends. And I 

think that is a qualitatively different sort of conversation. 

Senator FISCHER. So, you think, if a country that we are somewhat friendly with, if they want to say, ‘‘Okay, for 15 years, we 

won’t be running centrifuges, we’re not going to reprocess any reactor fuel, you know, we’re going to abide by that for 15 years, but, 

you know, hey, 15 years later, all those bets are off,’’ what’s the option then? 

Ambassador EDELMAN. Well, but we’ve had the—— 

Senator FISCHER. We’re going to say, ‘‘But, you’re a good actor, 

you’re not going to do this.’’ 

135 

Ambassador EDELMAN. But, that’s exactly what’s worked. Look 

at Japan, look at South Korea, and others. We’ve had a whole experience of close American relationships which have been, I would 

argue, the best nonproliferation tool available to the United States. 

So, to the extent we have good relations and there’s confidence in 

American reliability, then I don’t think we have to worry about proliferation across the board. 

So, at the end of the day, proliferation is part of a larger thing, 

called American foreign and national security policy. We’ve got to 

get the larger thing right. Then we’ll be in a better position to address proliferation pressures, just as we have in Asia. People predicted many countries in the Asia-Pacific would go down certain 

paths. They have not, I would argue, because we had military presence, we had credible security arrangements and commitments to 

them, and, with them, we dealt with their adversaries. So, I don’t 

think, if you will, it is hopeless in this area. 

Senator FISCHER. I’m running out of time. 

So, if Iran decides it wants to build a reprocessing spent-reactor 

fuel and produce highly enriched uranium or build a massive uranium enrichment program after year 15 of this agreement, what 

are our options? 

Ambassador BURNS. Our options will be to reimpose—well, first 

of all, they have—they will have the right to reconstitute a civil nuclear program. The danger will be, Will they use it as a cover for 

a covert military program? And we’ll have—this is where it gets 

challenging for us in years 10 to 15 to 20 to 25—we’ll have to, I 

think, reassert our ability to use military force, should they get 

close to a weapon, and reimpose a sanctions regime, should that be 

necessary. 

So, in essence, we’ll be back, if you will, to what we’ve been doing 

for the last 10 years, in trying to contain them. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here, and thank you for your very 

thoughtful and insightful testimony today. 

Dr. Haass, I think that one of the very important points you 

make is that we can agree or disagree that a better agreement 

could and should have materialized. Many of us, I think, have expressed the view that a better agreement was not only possible, but 

perhaps should have been reached. But, the reality today is that 

we have this agreement. And the question before us is not the one 

for historians, as you’ve said, it’s what the consequences are, the 

practical and real-world effects. And I know that you said that you 

did not have time, in response to my colleague Senator Shaheen’s 

question about what the follow-on could be, but perhaps you could 

expand on what you think, specifically, the Congress could insist 

on the administration doing, even if there are the votes to sustain 

the President’s veto. 

Dr. HAASS. Senator, I’d want to think about it in greater detail 

and have that conversation with some other experts, including the 

three gentlemen at this table for whom I have great respect. But, 

I would think that we would want to have certain limits on Iranian 

enrichment levels, possibly on the amount of enriched material. I 

136 

would probably want to have limits on delivery systems. I would 

want to talk about what exactly is the—is meant by the implementation of the additional protocol, what is our understanding of that. 

So, I would want to, essentially, keep ceilings and tabs on the Iranian nuclear program beyond 10 and 15 years. 

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an open-ended document. 

I believe our approach to Iran in the nuclear realm ought to be 

similarly open-ended. And we ought to decide in our own minds 

what—to what degree—what’s an acceptable threshold and what 

isn’t. Because, I think, to simply say that Iran is allowed to be a 

threshold nuclear power, but not a nuclear-weapon state, that 

leaves me uneasy, because that could—because it would mean zero 

breakout time, and that would put tremendous pressures on others 

to follow suit. So, where I think we ought to be detailing is, What 

sort of—what is our definition of an acceptable threshold? And I 

would want to get into—in many ways, many of the things addressed by this agreement for 10 and 15 years, I want to—I would 

want to see how they could be extended, either in their current 

form or in a modified form. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And I hope that conversation will continue 

even before the Congress has to vote on this issue. 

General Hayden, if the United States Congress rejects this agreement, does it lead to a better agreement? And, if so, how? 

General HAYDEN. It could lead to a better agreement, but it 

would require a powerful amount of American enthusiasm for Plan 

B. You don’t improve on Plan A without really strong American 

leadership. And that may actually be an important factor as to how 

much willingness the current administration would have into pursuing Plan B. 

I think it was Ambassador Edelman who suggested, earlier, you 

know, that there always seemed to—there had to have been a Plan 

B; otherwise, you can’t make the statement that, you know, a bad 

agreement is worse than no agreement. But, there doesn’t seem to 

have been any construct put forward the—what Plan B might look 

like. And so, again, very powerful American leadership, probably 

from both political branches. 

With regard to the Iranians, I don’t think they sprint to a weapon. I think we get more of the same. Actually, they’re—actually, I 

think it’s more likely that they abide by the agreement for a time 

period, rather than sprinting to a weapon, in order to try to create 

a wedge between ourselves and our, particularly, European allies. 

And I think the way it settles over time is the incremental growth 

of the Iranian nuclear system, not a sprint to weapons. 

To be very candid, Senator, we were never convinced they were 

going to build a weapon. I mean, if this were a weapon, it was our 

belief that Iranian foreign policy is best served by parking right 

here, because, unlike the North Koreans, cooking one of these 

things off in the desert pushes a whole bunch of things into the 

red, not into the green. And, unfortunately, I think what the agreement, in its current form, has created is this, if they just have a 

bit of strategic patience. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

137 

My time has expired. But, this issue obviously is immensely complicated. I have a lot more questions, and hope that I can explore 

them with members of this panel in another setting. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Cotton. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you all for being here today. 

General Hayden, you’ve spent a career in the American intelligence community, from the lowest levels to the very highest levels. I’ve heard it reported that you once said, ‘‘Intelligence is not 

a fact; otherwise, it wouldn’t be called intelligence.’’ I have the 

highest regard for the professionals in our intelligence community, 

but I want to review briefly the history of assessments of foreign 

countries’ pursuit or acquisition of nuclear weapons. 

The Soviet Union, China, India, Pakistan, Iraq—twice—North 

Korea, Iran, and Syria. Do you think the U.S. intelligence community has provided timely and accurate assessments, down to a 

month-by-month timeline, of these countries’ pursuit or obtaining 

of nuclear weapons? 

General HAYDEN. No, of course not, Senator. And hence, my earlier comments and other testimonies that, absent an invasive inspection regime, American intelligence alone can’t give you sufficient confidence in the agreement. 

Senator COTTON. And the reason it’s so hard is that these countries are very good at concealing their intentions and capabilities, 

and it can often be hard to develop assets that reveal those to us? 

General HAYDEN. Iran, much to my disappointment, particularly 

to the President I served, was a very hard human intelligence target. And, in many ways, that’s what you need in order to detect 

this, because the physical evidence of at least the early stages of 

breakout is very hard to come by. 

Senator COTTON. What, then, is your level of confidence of the 

United States intelligence community’s ability to have deep insight 

into Iran’s intentions and capabilities down to the nearly monthby-month assessment necessary? 

General HAYDEN. Yeah, I wouldn’t go, Senator, month by month. 

Back to my phenomenon of the unpleasant fact, how much evidence 

do you have to have in your folder to go in to tell the President 

his favorite plan is now off the rails? So, month by month would 

be very hard. 

But, again, back to my point, within the 10-year period, the best 

part of this agreement is Richard’s basket or my bubble of the 

agreement itself, because it does create some fairly robust ability. 

Not that they won’t cheat. They will cheat. That’s unarguable. But, 

I think the cheating will be roughly at the margins, and not that 

breakout or sprint. 

Senator COTTON. Do you expect that to happen in declared facilities, like Natanz or Fordow—— 

General HAYDEN. No. 

Senator COTTON.—or in undeclared sites? 

General HAYDEN. No, of course not. It would be in undeclared 

sites. It’s always in undeclared sites. 

Senator COTTON. In a country two and a half times the size of 

Texas. 

138 

General HAYDEN. Senator, Fordow was pretty far along. We 

count it as an intelligence success, but Fordow was pretty far along 

before we discovered it. We learned about Natanz from an Iranian 

opposition group. 

Senator COTTON. I want to move now to the alternatives to this 

deal, or, more specifically, what would happen if Congress were to 

disapprove this deal and override the President’s veto. I know 

there’s a lot of proponents of the deal who say, ‘‘It’s this deal or 

war.’’ 

Ambassador Edelman, recently a French diplomat, speaking to 

several Members of Congress, said that was not the case. Could 

you elaborate on that perspective and share your opinion of his perspective? 

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Cotton, I think you’re talking 

about my colleague, Jacques Audibert, the French President’s National Security Advisor. There is some dispute about what he actually said, since he’s denied part of it, but I think what’s not disputable is that he made it clear that a vote against the deal would 

have a very chilling effect on people going back into Iran, because 

of the potential penalties and lack of access to the United States 

financial system. And that, I think, is an important fact to bear in 

mind when we think about potentially walking away from the deal 

and renegotiating it. We have lots of tools at our disposal. 

Senator COTTON. What do we think would happen if the Iranian 

Parliament voted to reject this deal? Surely, it is a rubber stamp 

for the Supreme Leader, but, nonetheless, they still have scheduled 

a vote a few weeks after our vote in this Congress. 

Dr. HAASS. As you say, it’s unlikely, sir. If it were to happen, I 

think current arrangements would remain in place, in terms of 

sanctions, because it would be seen as their doing. So, I think there 

would be no major move afoot. The real question, What would Iran 

do in the nuclear sense? Again, I would think more drift than 

sprint, because that would be the sort of thing that they would 

think would be—would not stimulate or trigger the sort of reaction 

they supposedly would want to avoid. 

Senator COTTON. Ambassador Edelman, one final question, because my time is running short. Given the fact that a nuclearized 

Middle East, if this deal one day leads to that, would likely have 

countries with limited nuclear stockpiles, limited delivery vehicles, 

very-near-distances limited communications, less stable governments than we saw during the Cold War in the Soviet Union and 

the United States, what do you assess the risk of genuine outright 

nuclear war in the Middle East to be? 

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think, potentially, Senator, it’s very 

high. Back in the Cold War, nuclear strategists identified something called the ‘‘N country problem,’’ which was—it was possible 

to understand how a nuclear balance of power would work between 

two parties, but, once you got multiple parties into it, it seemed to 

be an insoluble paradox. And, in the Middle East, it would be 

heightened by the fact that you have very, very short flight times, 

you’d have relatively small arsenals, at least at the beginning, and 

you’ve have enormous incentives on the part of all parties to preempt. And I think there’s a very real chance you would end up with 

nuclear use in anger for the first time since 1945. 

139 

Senator COTTON. Thank you all. My time’s expired. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator King. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I want to thank you and the staff for putting together these hearings and giving us an opportunity to listen to some very provocative and thoughtful commentaries. I’m finding this a very difficult 

issue. It seems to me it’s all about weighing risks—weighing the 

risks of going into this arrangement, weighing the risks of not 

going in. And, of course, weighing those risks means alternatives. 

And you gentlemen have done a pretty good job today of picking 

out many of the defects in this agreement, which I agree are there, 

but the real question then becomes—is, What is the alternative? 

Ambassador Burns has testified that—and it seem to me logical—that if the agreement is rejected, two things happen. One is, 

Iran reverts to a situation where they have essentially an unfettered nuclear program, and, secondly, the sanctions will inevitably—and here’s where the choice of verb is difficult—erode, 

fray—unravel may be too strong a word. But, I don’t see it—how 

it’s possible to argue that the sanctions will be stronger if this deal 

is rejected unilaterally by the United States after it’s been adopted 

by the U.N. Security Council. 

General Hayden, you made the point that the agreement itself 

may not be that bad for 10 to 15 years. As I see it, what we’re essentially buying is 15 years of a nuclear-free Iran, and, if Iran 

starts to misbehave in a nuclear sense at the end of 15 years, we 

have the same options we have today. In fact, we may even be in 

a stronger position, because then we will be working with the rest 

of the world to impose those sanctions rather than working at 

cross-purposes with the rest of the world. Would you—help me out 

here. 

General HAYDEN. Sure. If the Iranians—and back to the baskets 

again, the—— 

Senator KING. Right. 

General HAYDEN.—one out there in the future—if the Iranians 

begin to misbehave after the limitations in the current agreement 

expire, they’re misbehaving from an incredibly higher baseline, in 

terms of what—— 

Senator KING. In what sense? 

General HAYDEN. In what is legitimately allowed the Iranian 

state, in terms of their nuclear industry. All right? And frankly, 

they will have time to do things on the margins to improve their 

capacities. So, I think it’s very important, as Dr. Haass says, a second regime out here that keeps meaningful limits—— 

Senator KING. Well, right now, they’re—the—all the intelligence 

is that they’re 2 to 3 months from a breakout. Would they be closer 

than that—— 

General HAYDEN. Oh, yes. 

Senator KING.—the 10 or 15 years? 

General HAYDEN. I mean, even in the administration’s calculations, when you get out there, somewhere between 13 and 17, the 

breakout period for sufficient fissile material, which is what we’re 

measuring here—— 

Senator KING. Right. 

140 

General HAYDEN.—gets below the current 2 to 3 months. So, 

that—so, you run that danger, even if you continue to have the 

tools you have on the table. And frankly, since Nick was involved 

in building the tools currently on the table, that doesn’t happen 

quickly. That’s going to take time. 

The other aspect that makes me uncomfortable are the more immediate effects of empowering a state that should still be a renegade state, of empowering a state by welcoming it back into the 

family of nations, and really giving it the wherewithal to do all the 

other things they want to do. 

Giving additional way of thinking about this, Senator—— 

Senator KING. I’m very limited on time. 

General HAYDEN. I’m sorry. I’m sorry. I’ll—— 

Senator KING. Let me follow up on that. 

Ambassador Burns, what would be the effect of—within Iran, of 

a unilateral American rejection, in terms of the relationship between the hardliners and Rawani and Zarif? 

Ambassador BURNS. Well, there is tension between them, there’s 

no question about it. This not a monolithic regime. And I would— 

in that hypothetical instance, I would think that there would be 

tremendous pressure in the Iranian system not to race towards a 

bomb—I think we all agree on that—but to reconstitute a nuclear 

threshold state so they’d be able to enrich uranium further, develop 

weapons-grade uranium, and continue to work on their plutonium 

processing. That would, I think, be—the rationale for that would be 

to reposition themselves for the next round of this. 

I think that would be a real problem for us, because if we’re the 

one that walks out first in this hypothetical example, we’re going 

to lose our leadership both—we’re the political organizer of the 

global coalition to isolate them, and we’ve been the organizer of all 

the sanctions resolutions, in the U.N. and elsewhere. And so, we 

lose our ability, I think, to keep that coalition together. And that’s 

why I, for practical reasons, believe that—I think the plan can 

work—the administration’s plan. It gets very difficult, as my colleagues and I are suggesting, after years 10 to 15, and you have 

to reconstitute the system and the will to contain the Iranians. 

Senator KING. Two quick points. One is, I want to associate myself with Senators Shaheen and Blumenthal, and Mr. Haass—Dr. 

Haass, and—all of you. You must help us think through agreement-plus. What is the—what is—what can Congress do to 

strengthen the implementation of this agreement and be sure that 

it is abided by? And I know that there are people here thinking 

about that. And, to the extent you can provide input, I think that’s 

important. 

The only other point I would make is, we’ve been talking mostly 

about the IAEA, as if that’s it for verification. But, the fact is that 

we’ll have five and probably six intelligence agencies watching intently—and I mean that literally—and working with the IAEA. So, 

I think it’s important to realize that this isn’t just the IAEA, that 

there is a combined intelligence capability that is quite vigorous. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ernst. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

141 

Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today. This has 

been an enlightening discussion, I think, very good for all of us to 

participate in and hear your areas of expertise. 

It has been brought up a couple of times already today, and I 

want to make it very clear—a couple of you have affirmed this— 

but, I would like to ask each of you, yes or no—a simple yes-orno question, and then we can come back and talk a little bit more 

about it. But, the President made very clear, several weeks ago— 

very, very clear—that it was either this nuclear agreement or war. 

There was no in between. It was either the agreement, sign it, have 

it done, or we are going to war. General Dempsey pushed back on 

this. Admiral Richardson pushed back on this. They agreed that 

there are other options available. So, just simple yes or no. If we 

don’t sign this agreement, are we going to war? 

General Hayden. 

General HAYDEN. There’s no necessity to go to war if we don’t 

sign this agreement. There are actions in between those two extremes. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you. 

Dr. Haass. 

Dr. HAASS. I would echo that, but I can’t rule out that Iran would 

not take steps that would force the United States to contemplate 

the use of military force. We would have to decide what, at some 

point, we deem to be intolerable. 

Senator ERNST. But, do you think there are other options before 

we get to war? 

Dr. HAASS. Absolutely, from sanctions to covert action of various 

types, and so forth. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you. 

Ambassador? 

Ambassador EDELMAN. Yes, Senator Ernst, I agree with you, I 

don’t think those are the only alternatives. 

Senator ERNST. And Ambassador Burns. 

Ambassador BURNS. I don’t believe that war would be inevitable. 

Possible. But, I do think congressional disapproval would weaken 

the U.S. and our ability to hold the sanctions regime together, 

which has been the key factor. 

Senator ERNST. And I think there has been some very good discussion today. I think it’s very, again, enlightening that we have 

gone from, a number of weeks ago, many people, whenever I would 

bring up this topic about having other options available, ‘‘Why are 

we just talking about war?’’ Now we’re having very good discussion 

about other things that we need to do, as the United States, to protect not only our population but our friends in that region and 

around the world. 

A number of weeks ago, this was not happening. People were either saying, ‘‘We’re going to sign this agreement or we’re going to 

war.’’ There are a lot of things that we can do. And, unfortunately, 

I think these discussions should have occurred much more significantly during the negotiations process. Now we’re at a point, we either take the deal, or not, and try and unilaterally come up with 

things that we can do as a country to push back on Iran. Do you 

agree with that? 

142 

Dr. HAASS. Violently, I agree with that. And I think we would 

have had far more negotiating leverage, had Congress been involved sooner. I remember—and Senator McCain and Senator Reed 

and others will remember, because we all go way back—when you 

used to have Senators and Congressmen as part of delegations. I 

would—I think the idea of joint negotiating approaches so Congress, if you will, is in on the takeoff as well as the landing—because, right now, you’re right, we have—we have, I always say, 

poor choices and very few of them. It would have been much better 

to have expanded the range of choices and to improve the quality 

of the choices. And I think there ought to be some lessons derived 

for future administrations and future Congresses about how to conduct negotiations. Because we’re leaving ourselves in a very difficult place if we only get to this point after the deal, if you will, 

is signed, sealed, and delivered. 

Senator ERNST. We are between a rock and a hard place right 

now. Most certainly. 

Iran’s chief terrorist is, of course, I think, General Soleimani. 

And we have talked a little bit about this gentleman today. And 

great article just out by Lieutenant General, Retired, Michael 

Barbero, ‘‘Empowering the Iranian Who Murdered Americans.’’ I 

think 20 percent of the deaths in Iraq have been attributed to the 

EFPs that the General had put in place—Soleimani. I think it’s 

good that we remember that this gentleman now is in good standing, once this agreement goes into place. And this is a man who 

I don’t think is going to curb his terrorist activity or backing of 

Hezbollah and Hamas and many of these other organizations. How 

will this deal empower this general? 

General Hayden, can you speak to that, please? 

General HAYDEN. Sure. Senator, in terms of direct impact, he 

wasn’t going to travel to the United States anyway, or show up at 

the U.N., so—but, we talked earlier about unleashing resources 

that can now be put at his disposal to continue doing what he’s 

been doing. And frankly, it couldn’t possibly come at a worse time. 

I mean, the man routinely is on the ground in Iraq directing Shiite 

militia. And now we’re giving him additional resources. 

Senator ERNST. Yes. Thank you. And I think it’s wise to remember that all of us that serve in the Senate probably have constituents and families in our States that have members that were killed 

overseas as a direct result from those EFPs. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Hirono. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Most of you have indicated that we have other options, should we 

walk away from this agreement. But, I am wondering, you know, 

what the scenario would be; because, if we walk away from an 

agreement, unless we enter into another agreement, the reality of 

which becomes questionable, given that we probably won’t be able 

to rely on our P5+1 partners to go along with us in trying to renegotiate another agreement, doesn’t that create the scenario, as I 

think Dr. Burns acknowledged, that it—this scenario increases the 

potential that we would have to resort to military action to stop 

Iran from proceeding apace with building a nuclear bomb? That is 

143 

not a question, but an observation, based on the testimony that I’ve 

heard today. 

General Hayden, as a former Director of the CIA, does this 

agreement improve the intelligent community’s ability to gain intelligence on Iran’s nuclear activities? 

General HAYDEN. It does, in the zero-to-10-year period, with the 

invasive inspection regime. I mean, assuming at least moderate 

Iranian compliance with that, you do have more detailed knowledge than we would otherwise have. 

Senator HIRONO. So, during this period, as we get more detailed 

information—intelligence—which I assume your assessment of the 

enhanceability for us to gain intelligence based on this agreement—as a result of this agreement, that we could, at the end of 

15 years, or even before then, determine what else we could consider doing to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power. 

General HAYDEN. Again, as Dr. Haass pointed out, in order to 

continue that invasive inspection regime, that window into what it 

is they’re doing, I don’t think there is any deus ex machina that’s 

going to happen in the next 10 or 15 years that’s going to allow 

us to do this remotely. And so, as part of the negotiation of a follow-on agreement, we would still need to have that kind of invasive 

inspection regime. 

Senator HIRONO. But, during the period that we have this enhanced inspection—well, this enhanced capability to gather intelligence, I would think that we would therefore be able to determine 

what else we can do at the end of 15 years. 

If someone else wants to weigh in on this, I see—yes. 

Ambassador BURNS. I’d be happy to. 

I think—— 

Senator HIRONO. Dr. Burns. 

Ambassador BURNS. I listed, in my oral statement, some measures that the administration can take now, things they haven’t 

done and said, to try and create a stronger containment coalition 

of the Iranians, because the Iranians are striking into the heart of 

the Sunni world. And then, on your question, Senator, we already 

have to think ahead to the time when this—these restrictions 

lapse, 10 to 15 years after the agreement takes effect. We’ll have 

to reconstitute much of what the Bush and the Obama administrations built up over the last 10 years. Now, I support the agreement, 

because I think the value of freezing them for the next 10 or 15 

years is considerable. But, I also see that, if the Iranian regime 

stays in place—and I think it’s probable that it will, although we 

can’t predict—and if they do try to reconstitute their program, 

we’re going to have to have an American President who will be 

very, very assiduous in rebuilding the coalition. So, you have to 

start that now and keep our closest allies with us. 

Senator HIRONO. One of the very interesting aspects to this hearing and all of your testimony, which I appreciate very much, is asking Congress to think about what we could be doing now during— 

you know, to address the eventuality, possibility of, at the end of 

15 years, as General Hayden has said, that Iran would have sufficient fissile material to break out with a nuclear weapon in a very 

short time. So, thank you all for really pushing us toward that kind 

of consideration now, rather than waiting til the end of 15 years. 

144 

Regarding the potential for Iran changing its behavior, I realize 

that we should be looking at the agreement itself. However, I’d like 

to ask Dr. Burns, What is the likelihood that this agreement and 

Iran’s compliance with it could lead to a moderating of Iran’s behavior to the outside world, as well as its—to its own people? And 

what else besides this agreement would increase the likelihood of 

a moderate Iran? 

We’ll start with you, Dr. Burns. 

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you very much—— 

Senator HIRONO. We may have to end with you. I’m running out 

of time. 

Ambassador BURNS.—Senator, because I live in an academic institution, I have to tell you, I’m not Dr. Burns, I don’t have a 

Ph.D.—— 

Senator HIRONO. Oh, excuse me. 

Ambassador BURNS.—just to be fully transparent. There are 

other Ph.D.’s here. 

Senator HIRONO. Dr. Haass. 

Ambassador BURNS. I would say that we—it would be a very ineffective argument for the administration to make that we should 

go forward with a nuclear deal because it’ll change Iran. I don’t 

think Iran’s going to change as long as the Supreme Leader and 

the Revolutionary Guard hold so much of the power. So, that can’t 

be a reason. I don’t hear the administration saying that now. And 

I think that’s fortunate. 

The reason to go ahead is because we’re in a long-term struggle 

with them, and we can now gain the advantage, over the next 10 

to 15 years, to freeze their nuclear program. But, as we’ve all been 

saying, we have to think strategically long-term, both in terms of 

mitigating measures against their nuclear program and containment measures against their military effectiveness—Syria, Lebanon, Hamas, Hezbollah, Yemen. They’re a real problem, and we 

have to push back against them. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Tillis. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Edelman, I’ll—I’d like to start with you, but I’d—I 

would invite in any of the panelists to chime in if they have comments. 

What is the likelihood that Iran will live up to the terms of the 

agreement? In other words, maybe another way of saying—a negative way of saying it—what’s the likelihood that they’re going to 

cheat? Do you believe they’re going to cheat? And in what way will 

they cheat? 

Ambassador EDELMAN. If they don’t cheat, it will be the first 

time that they haven’t cheated on their NPT and nuclear obligations to the—— 

Senator TILLIS. I think there are some 27 international agreements or treaties where they’ve documented having cheated in the 

past. So, we know they’re going to cheat. Is there any doubt among 

the panelists that they’re going to cheat at some level, push the 

edges? 

[No response.] 

145 

Senator TILLIS. So, Ambassador Burns, you mentioned about how 

the—voting down this agreement could substantially weaken our 

sanctions regime. But, let’s assume that you’re in a position where 

you have to deal with that. We’ve voted down the agreement, our 

partners, who are—I know, Foreign Ministers and CEOs, business 

leaders who travel into Iran in large numbers trying to figure out 

how they can invest and how they can become a part of the economic turnaround of that nation, but—so, you’ve got that hand 

dealt you. You’ve got—have a lot of these partners that have gone 

to Iran. We’ve identified a need to apply economic sanctions again. 

What do you do to make the best of that situation? 

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you, Senator. And very quickly if I 

could just say on your last question, I think it’s probable that their 

self-interest will be that they will appear to be living up to the 

agreement. I think they’ll try to keep it. But, no question in my 

mind, they’ll cut and cheat on the margins. That’s why we have to 

watch them. 

On your hypothetical question, if we were given the scenario of 

a congressional disapproval, override the President’s veto, and—I 

think we would want to begin with Britain and France and Germany to try to reconstitute a way forward to pick up the pieces. 

And that would be to keep the sanctions regime together and try 

to convince the Iranians that they’re better off living with an agreement that would take another set of negotiations. So, you’d probably be back into the negotiating game. 

I’ve testified that I think you’re right to look at the option, because if that option could work, that would be a logical way forward. I don’t think it can work, and I think, actually, there are 

more deficiencies there than there are possibilities for us. 

Senator TILLIS. Do you think that that is driven largely by these 

other countries believing this is a good deal on the pure merits of 

keeping Iran from having a nuclear weapon? Or is a lot of their 

motivation the economic benefit that they have by removing the 

sanctions and setting up shop in Iran? 

Ambassador BURNS. I think there are varying motivations. I really trust that the British and the French and the Germans want to 

see Iran denied a nuclear weapon. They started these negotiations 

3 years before we did, in 2002. They’ve been at it a long time. 

The Russians, I think, are an interesting case, because the Russians lie closer to Iran than anyone else, geographically. I don’t 

think the Russians want to see them become a nuclear weapons 

power, but the Russians want to cut us down to size, unfortunately, 

and that operates to be—it’s a conflict in our relationship. 

Chinese, I think, are motivated by commercial imperatives. 

Senator TILLIS. Well, that’s, maybe, the question I would ask of 

any of the panelists to opine. The—we talk about the—and I think, 

Ambassador Edelman, it was in your comments that you submitted 

for the record, that, you know, this—whether it’s 140 billion or the 

discount of $56 billion, what we haven’t really talked about is projecting the net positive economic impact through foreign investment that’s going to occur. China’s going to invest in Iranian infrastructure for the purposes of having oil or lower-cost energy coming 

to them. All of these various industries are going to come there, 

and I begin to believe that, over a 10-year period, that the $56 bilVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00151 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
146 

lion that we’re talking about, you can argue, for one reason or another, may or may not flow back into—or 140 billion, whatever the 

number is—but there could be tens of billions, hundreds of billions—dollars—more in economic benefit over this timeframe that 

would be absolutely available to fund terrorist operations, proxy 

wars, all the other malign activities that they’re involved in. Do 

you agree with that? 

Dr. Haass? 

Dr. HAASS. The answer is, there could be a lot of money to do 

it. That said, a lot of terrorism is actually fairly cheap. I mean, 

Iran’s doing pretty well under the current circumstances. I think 

it also points to the importance of keeping—you know, of energy 

policy, because the last thing we want is Iran also to get a windfall 

out of oil prices, which is something we haven’t really talked today. 

I’d say one other thing on the economics. What we don’t know— 

and I think it’s the optimist side—I put it out; I’m not sure I believe in it, but I mention it—is that this will set in motion certain 

dynamics within Iranian society. And I think, you know, the optimistic side would say it’ll strengthen certain middle class elements. 

So, while the regime will get some credit for improving the society, 

it might also set in motion some longer-term dynamics of demands 

for change. And none of us is smart enough to know how these 

things play out. 

Senator TILLIS. Thanks, Mr. Chair. 

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Tillis, if I could just add to what 

my colleague has said in response to you. I—one of the problems 

I have with waiting 10 or 15 years and then addressing this is precisely what you’re saying. The two tools we’ve had, the threat of 

military force and the impact of the sanctions, are both going to be 

much less powerful tools 15 years from now—or 10 years from now, 

even—than they are today. And that’s one reason why I think, as 

messy and problematic as it will be to reject the deal today, I would 

rather do it now and try and put the pieces back together now than 

wait 10 or 15 years. 

General HAYDEN. I’d just add one additional thought to Eric—to 

Ambassador Edelman’s point. 

It—in my view, it will be more difficult to get a multilateral 

sanctions snap-back than it will be to continue sanctions under a 

proposed Plan B. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sullivan. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

You know, one of the things that strikes me as I’ve read through 

this agreement now is, there’s a lot of asymmetry, in terms of commitments and obligations. Let me just give you one example, Ambassador Burns. There’s a—up front, a phrase that says, ‘‘The P5+1 

expresses its desire to build a new relationship with Iran.’’ And 

normally, as you would imagine in international diplomacy, you 

would normally get a reciprocal kind of statement in a lot of agreements, wouldn’t you? 

Ambassador BURNS. It would be advisable. I don’t think we’re 

going to have a new relationship. I think it will be a continuation 

of the same in trying to contain them. 

147 

Senator SULLIVAN. But, there’s no kind of reciprocal statement 

from Iran. So, we’re saying we want a new relationship. In the 

agreement, we say it. But, the agreement doesn’t say the Iranians 

want a new relationship with the West. Why do you think that’s 

the case? 

Ambassador BURNS. As you know, Senator, I was not part of 

these negotiations, so I can’t account for it. But, what we’re seeing 

is these conflicting statements, even 10 days ago—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. Yeah. 

Ambassador BURNS.—saying, from the Iranian side, ‘‘No access 

to military sites.’’ If they don’t give access to military sites, they’re 

in violation of the agreement in the opening stages. So, this agreement will test them. 

Senator SULLIVAN. But, I mean, the—it’s pretty obvious to me 

they—we say we want a new relationship. In the text, they’re silent. As a matter of fact, they’re not silent. After the agreement’s 

signed, they’re doing the ‘‘Death to the—Death to America’’ chanting, and it’s clear they clearly don’t want—or didn’t want to commit 

to a new relationship, even though it seems like a lot of what we 

have in here is focused on that. 

General Hayden, I wanted to kind of go into another area, in 

terms of asymmetry in the agreement. You know, the administration said they didn’t want to include terrorism, human rights, 

weapons programs, even the hostage situation, because they were 

focused on the nuclear agreement, only, as part of this. And yet, 

if you look at the details of this agreement, there are all kinds of 

affirmative actions that we’re supposed to take, you know, including helping them with finance, helping them with their energy sector, helping them import commercial aircraft, literally helping them 

import pistachios, Iranian rugs. One of the—so, there’s a lot of affirmative duties we have that have nothing to do with the nuclear 

side of this. 

One of these—it’s a little unclear who the obligation is to, but it 

also says that we’re, quote, supposed to ‘‘strengthen Iran’s ability 

to protect against sabotage in the nuclear facility—its nuclear facilities.’’ Do you think that is remotely a good idea? And is that a 

commitment the United States should—or anyone—should take 

up? And if we’re preventing sabotage, do we have to prevent our 

allies—say, the Israelis—to prevent sabotage? Hasn’t sabotage 

helped us, to be blunt? 

General HAYDEN. Well, it’s hard for me to talk about this in detail, but the plain-English reading of the sentence you just read 

would put a requirement, a legal responsibility, on us to protect the 

current—the negotiated Iranian nuclear program from any destructive activity, even if it were mounted by a friend of the United 

States. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Is that in the United States national interest 

to do that? 

General HAYDEN. I—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. In your experience? 

General HAYDEN. It is overly complicated. I—it’s hard for me to 

comment, in open session, on what the fine print means. I’m surprised to see that in there. I’m surprised that, although we insisted 

that ballistic missiles be talked about, they were thrown off the 

148 

table at Iranian insistence, until the 11th hour, and then they were 

brought up by the Iranians in order to get out from under—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. Ambassador—sorry, General—Ambassador 

Edelman, do you think that’s a good idea? 

Ambassador EDELMAN. I cannot—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. Do you think that’s in—— 

Ambassador EDELMAN. I cannot imagine, Senator Sullivan, how 

that could possibly be in the best interest of the United States, and 

it’s one of the reasons why I’m opposed to this agreement. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Is it in the best interest of some of our allies 

in the Middle East? 

Ambassador EDELMAN. Absolutely not. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Let me just turn to one other area that has 

been a real big concern of mine. You know, a lot of us—Ambassador Burns, Edelman, we worked together on the whole effort to 

economically isolate Iran, and there’s a lot that’s been talked about 

this snap-back provision. And, as you know, it took years to get our 

European allies, who were not motivated to really help out, initially, to divest out of Iran. And, as you mentioned, they’re already 

very quickly going and reinvesting in Iran. 

One of the things I’m most concerned about the snap-back provision—it’s being sold as this really important thing—powerful, 

prompt—but, it seems to me more of an illusion, because there’s a 

provision throughout the agreement—paragraph 37, paragraph 26, 

and other areas—where the Iranians essentially say, ‘‘If any sanctions are reinstated, in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as 

grounds to cease performing its commitments under the agreement.’’ So, it seems to me the snap-back provision is more aimed 

at us, it’s more a boomerang provision, than it is at them, because 

if we ever reimpose sanctions, they can legally—legally—walk 

away from the deal. 

Secretary Kerry and Secretary Lew have been asked this question a number of times. They don’t seem to be able to have a good 

answer for it. Are you concerned about this kind of illusory snapback provision? 

Ambassador BURNS. I think the snap-back provisions are going 

to be a challenge for us. We had the great—I had the great pleasure to work with you in a previous capacity on this, Senator, and 

we’re going to have to, I think, have some agreements up front 

with the Europeans that they’re going to be with us—those three 

Europeans—France, Germany, and Britain—when there are serious violations. If the Iranians take the position that the imposition 

of sanctions for Iranian violations ends the agreement, ‘‘Well, the 

agreement’s off’’—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. It’s in there. 

Ambassador BURNS.—then the agreement’s off, and then the 

United States, whatever administration is in power, will have the 

right to do what we have to do to keep them away from a nuclear 

weapon. So, I actually don’t think that puts pressure on us. I think 

it’s a—if the Iranians take that position, that gives us an opening, 

if the agreement’s not working, to abrogate the agreement, theoretically. 

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Sullivan, I mean, I, too, am a little worried about the snap-back provisions, for a couple of reasons. 

149 

One is, it seems to me there’s a contradiction at the heart of the 

argument that the administration has made on behalf of snap-back. 

On the one hand, they argue that the sanctions regime—correctly, 

by itself—has not stopped Iran’s nuclear program; but, if Iran violates the nuclear agreement, the penalty we’re going to impose on 

them is snapping back the sanctions. So, right from the get-go, 

there’s a problem. 

I will give the negotiators enormous credit. The provisions for 

snap-back are a—very, very cleverly, you know, constructed, but I 

think there’s a political problem, which is that the way that we 

guarantee snap-back is that the United States would have to veto 

the resolution in the Security Council that would allow the sanctions relief to continue. The United States, I think, always finds it 

difficult to wield the veto in the Security Council. We’ve done it 

from time to time to protect Israel and a few other things, but we 

don’t use the veto lightly. And I think this is going to be much 

harder to actually implement the snap-back than people have argued it will be. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Rounds. 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Burns, General Dempsey said, a few weeks ago, to 

Senator Ayotte’s question about Iran and ballistic missile capabilities, that, quote, ‘‘Under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on Iran, relative to ballistic missile capabilities and arms trafficking,’’ unquote. What do you think was the reasoning to allow 

the world’s leading sponsor of terrorism—and, by the way, that’s a 

title that was bestowed upon them by no less than our own State 

Department—to receive the gift of a sunset on U.N. sanctions in 

these two areas in 5 and 8 years, respectively? 

Ambassador EDELMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

I said, earlier, that I oppose this compromise that ends the conventional weapons and ballistic missile sanctions imposed in 2007 

and 2010 by the United Nations. What I heard from the administration, though, is somewhat reassuring. They say that, when these 

sanctions—when these U.N. sanctions, global sanctions, expire, 

that they will—or the next administration—will have to reimpose, 

certainly American sanctions, but also try to put together a coalition of countries to sanction the Iranians. It’s not in our interest 

to see the Iranians be able to import Russian or Chinese military 

technology, and it’s certainly not in our interest to see them develop ballistic missiles. 

Senator ROUNDS. It’s interesting that, in an Armed Services 

hearing on this deal last week, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter 

confirmed to me that, under this deal, he could not rule out Iran 

acquiring an intercontinental ballistic missile in 10 years. This 

means that Iran could have the capability of producing a weapon 

that could reach the United States soil in a decade. A week before 

that, General Paul Selva, now the Vice Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, told me that—during his confirmation hearing— 

that Iran remains the leading state sponsor of terrorism, and sanctions relief agreed to in the nuclear deal could be used by Iran to 

continue to—or continue to sponsor terrorism. 

150 

Gentlemen, do you believe that, with this agreement, the U.S. 

and our allies are safer today than we were a year ago, and will 

we be safer when this agreement ends in 10 years? 

Ambassador BURNS. I believe that we’ll be—we are going to be 

safer over the next 10 years. That’s the reason I’m supporting the 

President on this. If we freeze their program, then we have 10 to 

15 years of insight into what they’re doing, and severe restrictions 

on their program. 

Second question is tougher. And again, I think, as many of us 

have said, and I’ve certainly said, we’re going to have to be really 

good and forceful at putting back in place, if the same Iranian regime is in power, some of these restrictive measures, on our own 

and with a coalition, to ensure our safety in that 10-to-25-year period. 

Senator ROUNDS. Gentlemen? 

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Rounds, as Senator King said 

earlier, I think, a lot of this discussion that some of the panelists 

were discussing among ourselves before the hearing is a question 

of balancing risks. And my own view is that this deal, I would say, 

marginally improves our situation on the nuclear question over the 

next 10 years, but at the peril of various other threats to safety 

and security of the United States in the short term, outside the nuclear realm, and again in the nuclear realm at the expiration date 

of the deal. 

Dr. HAASS. Consensus on that. Which, again, is why I—I didn’t 

begin here, but I came out with the position that we need to think 

about how we buttress this agreement to deal with the downsides, 

in that the immediate regional problems, it will exacerbate; and 

the longer-term nuclear problems, I fear it will increase. So, I think 

anyone who’s inclined to vote against the resolution of disapproval 

for the agreement should think very hard about how that vote is 

accompanied by steps—statements and steps that I believe will offset the—you know, the truly problematic parts of this arrangement. 

General HAYDEN. Yeah, I think that my colleague has said it 

very well. In essence, there is some buying down of the nuclear 

risk, which was, frankly, somewhat theoretical and always long 

term. And the coin we’ve used to buy that down is embracing some 

concrete immediate risks and the danger of what happens after the 

10-year period. 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I thank the witnesses. There’s a lot more of 

this to be discussed, and—but, I think you’ve given the committee 

a very excellent depiction of the challenges. And I appreciate very 

much that you’ve taken the time to be with us. 

Hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(151) 

JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION 

(JCPOA) AND THE MILITARY BALANCE IN 

THE MIDDLE EAST 

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 5, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room SD– 

G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, 

Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Reed, 

McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, 

Hirono, and King. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, good morning, everyone. The committee 

meets today for our third oversight hearing on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which the United States and other 

major powers have signed with Iran. 

We welcome our distinguished witnesses, and thank them for 

joining us today: Professor Walter Russell Mead, Distinguished 

Scholar in American Strategy at The Hudson Institute and Professor of Foreign Affairs at Bard College; Michael Singh, the Senior 

Fellow and Managing Director of The Washington Institute for 

Near East Policy; Dr. Ray Takeyh, the Senior Fellow for Middle 

Eastern Studies at The Council on Foreign Relations; Dr. Philip 

Gordon, Senior Fellow at The Council on Foreign Relations; and 

Richard Nephew, Fellow at The Center for Global Energy Policy at 

Columbia University. 

This committee’s oversight is focused on the strategic and military implications of the nuclear deal with Iran. Among other 

things, we want to know how this agreement will affect regional security, proliferation, and the balance of power in the Middle East, 

what impact it may have on Iran’s malign activities and ambitions 

to dominate the region, what it means for perceptions of American 

credibility among our allies and partners, and what the consequences are for U.S. defense policy, military planning, and force 

posture. 

From this broader strategic perspective and following the testimony given in our two previous hearings on this topic, this bad 

deal, to me, only looks much worse. The committee is eager to hear 

152 

from our witnesses on whether this deal is the best we can do and 

what realistic alternatives exist. Given that even the administration acknowledges Iranian aggression, support for terrorism and 

rogue regimes, and destabilizing behavior are likely to continue, 

what should United States strategy toward Iran look like? 

The administration suggests that any criticism of this deal is 

tantamount to a call to war. Such scare tactics are to be expected 

from this administration, but they have no place in a debate of this 

magnitude. Our military leaders have also rejected the administration’s false choice. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General 

Dempsey, told this committee, just last week, quote, ‘‘We have a 

range of options.’’ Likewise, the President’s nominee to be the next 

Chief of Naval Operations testified that, quote, ‘‘There are other 

options besides going to war.’’ We ask our witnesses to provide 

their candid assessments of what realistic alternatives to this deal 

might be. 

The strategic and military implications of this agreement are 

perhaps even more troubling than the terms, themselves. Iran is 

more than an arms control challenge. It’s a geopolitical challenge 

that demands a comprehensive strategy. For years, many of us 

have argued—have urged the administration to adopt a regional 

strategy to counter Iran’s malign activities in the Middle East. Unfortunately, if such a strategy exists, there is no evidence of it. 

President Obama likes to say that this deal is built on 

verification rather than trust. But, consider what we’ve already 

verified about Iran’s activities and intentions, and contrast that to 

our own strategic drift. We know that, over the past decade, Iran’s 

military and intelligence operatives have stepped up their destabilizing activities in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, Gaza, 

and elsewhere. Iran did this despite the full pressure of sanctions. 

Imagine what it could do with even a small portion of the windfall 

of sanctions relief, estimated at roughly $60 billion, or probably 

much more. 

It’s reasonable to assume that billions of additional dollars will 

soon flow to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, or Quds Force, 

money that will likely be used to boost arms supplies to Iran’s terrorist proxies and double down on Bashar Assad, right when he 

needs it most. We know that Iran intends to become the dominant 

military power in the Middle East. Yet, despite repeated assurances that negotiations were strictly limited to the nuclear program, the administration made major concessions related to conventional weapons and ballistic missiles, concessions that the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned, before the agreement, should occur, quote, ‘‘under no circumstances. 

In 5 years, this agreement would lift the international arms embargo against Iran, freeing up the regime to acquire advanced conventional military capabilities from eager sellers, such as Russia 

and China. In 8 years, it would lift restrictions on ballistic missiles, 

whose only conceivable military purpose would be to deliver nuclear weapons against America and its allies. We know that these 

concessions have dangerous implications for the men and women 

serving in our military. This agreement would enable Iran to construct the kind of advanced military arsenal the anti-access and 

area denial capabilities that could raise the risk of employing our 

153 

military options, should Iran violate its obligations. In short, if this 

agreement fails, the lives of U.S. servicemembers could be at greater risk. 

We know that our allies and partners in the Middle East have 

increasingly come to believe that America is withdrawing from the 

region, and is doing so at a time when Iran is aggressively seeking 

to advance its ambitions. Now we have reached an agreement that 

will not only legitimize the Islamic Republic as a threshold nuclear 

state with an industrial enrichment capability, but will also 

unshackle this regime and its long-held pursuit of conventional 

military power, and may actually consolidate the current regime’s 

control in Iran for years to come. That is perhaps most troubling 

of all about this agreement, what it means for America’s credibility 

in the Middle East. 

For decades, the United States has sought to suppress security 

competition in the region between states with long histories of hostility toward one another and to prevent war. I fear this agreement 

could further undermine our ability and willingness to play that 

vital stabilizing role. For the sake of our own security, as well as 

that of our allies, I believe we cannot afford to let that happen. 

Once again, I want to thank the witnesses for appearing before 

us today. I look forward to their testimony. 

Senator Reed. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, to the witnesses. 

Over the past 2 weeks, the Chairman has assembled a series of 

hearings on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the 

JCPOA. Last week, the President’s representatives, four Cabinet 

Secretaries and the country’s most senior military officer, made the 

case for the agreement, both on the terms of the deal, itself, and 

the way forward with our friends and allies in the Middle East. 

Yesterday, the committee heard from a number of former senior 

government officials with experience in diplomatic, intelligence, 

and military communities. Today, the committee will hear from additional witnesses who bring with them a vast and extraordinary 

array of experience on the region, on nonproliferation issues, and 

sanctions implementation policy. 

Thank you, again, gentlemen. 

I want to thank the Chairman for assembling this series of hearings with the committee. They have provided a superb venue for 

attempting to understand the dynamics that shaped the P5+1 [5 

permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, plus Germany] 

negotiations and for assessing the impacts of the agreement on 

Iran’s calculations with respect to its nuclear program and their regional ambitions. 

I want to pose the same question to this panel that I asked yesterday. First and foremost, I hope you will provide an assessment 

of whether the deal is the best available option to prevent the Iranians from obtaining a nuclear weapon. I also specifically hope 

each of you will address, first, the terms of the agreement itself, 

particularly with respect to cutting off a path to a nuclear device, 

the sufficiency of the duration of the elements of the agreement, 

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and the breakout time necessary for Iran to acquire a nuclear 

weapon. Second, the alternative, if any, to the JCPOA. Third, the 

inspections regime under the deal, including any lessons learned 

from past international inspection regimes that have been incorporated into this proposal. Fourth, the role and capacity of the 

International Atomic Energy Agency to implement this agreement. 

Finally, the sanctions regime under the JCPOA, the availability of 

similar tools the United States will have at its disposal for targeting Iran as a result of support for terrorism, regional stabilization, and human rights abuses. 

Aside from the JCPOA, I’d also appreciate the witnesses providing their assessment of two other critical issues. First, while the 

P5+1 negotiated agreement, none of them share a border with Iran. 

Our partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council, the GCC, all share 

land or maritime borders with Iran. This makes Iran’s activities in 

the region a far more tangible problem for them. A Camp David 

summit earlier this year continued our engagement with the GCC 

partners on this issue. Secretary Kerry was not only in the region 

this week, but appears to have elicited their support for the agreement going forward. But, we have to continue to support their efforts, in terms of their defenses, their ability to respond to asymmetric threats from Iran. I hope our witnesses can provide some 

detail and context in this issue, too. 

Second, Israel rightly views Iran as a significant and ongoing 

threat to their national security interests. I’d be appreciate in hearing the witnesses’ assessment of how the United States might move 

forward with Israel under this agreement, if it is eventually supported, to protect our shared national security interests. In fact, 

that’ll be a key factor, going forward. 

Once again, I look forward to the panel’s responses. 

I also must apologize, because I have to rush up, in a few minutes, to the Banking Committee, who is also having a hearing. So, 

my departure is because of the coincidence of hearings, not anything else. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Thank the witnesses again, and we’ll begin with you, Professor 

Mead. 

STATEMENT OF WALTER RUSSELL MEAD, DISTINGUISHED 

SCHOLAR IN AMERICAN STRATEGY, THE HUDSON INSTITUTE AND CHACE PROFESSOR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BARD 

COLLEGE 

Mr. MEAD. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, distinguished members of the—— 

Chairman McCain: Could I just say, all of the testimony that is 

submitted will be part of the record. The written testimony. 

Thank you—— 

Mr. MEAD. Great. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Professor. 

Mr. MEAD. Thank you. 

I’m honored to have the opportunity to speak this morning. I cannot speak with any particular acuity about issues of verification or 

nuclear engineering. That’s not my approach to this. I’m interested 

155 

in this agreement as part of the broader framework of American 

Middle East policy. So, I will speak briefly about our interests in 

the Middle East, the issues that we have with Iran based on those 

issues, and then the implications of that for this agreement. 

United States has long had strong interests in the Middle East. 

I want to talk primarily about our interests in oil. There are some 

who believe that the fracking revolution, unconventional shale and 

oil here in the United States which lessens our energy dependency 

on the Middle East, will therefore lessen American interests in the 

Middle East. I’d like to suggest that’s probably not correct, because 

the flow—orderly flow—secure flow of oil from the Middle East to 

the major economic and industrial zones of the world is vital to 

their prosperity. If that oil supply were to be interrupted to Japan, 

China, and Europe, the American economy would rapidly suffer 

devastating consequences. This also—the fact that the United 

States is able to provide the security of the international oil flow 

is, to use the Chairman’s phrase this morning, you know, an important aspect of our suppression of security competition, not simply 

in the Middle East, but by ensuring that countries like China, 

Japan, and others don’t feel the need to maintain massive naval 

and intercontinental forces to secure the oil supply. So, this—our 

position in the Middle East is critical to America’s global strategy 

of trying to preserve peace and promote prosperity. America’s own 

lessening dependence on that oil does not change that dependency. 

Given that, how do we think about our interests in the Middle 

East and our security there? We have, since, really, the Franklin 

Roosevelt administration, taken the view, as a country, that we do 

not want any single power to have the ability to interrupt or to endanger that flow of oil, whether it was an external power, like the 

Soviet Union seeking to dominate the region from outside, or an internal leader, like Saddam Hussein when he invaded Kuwait, attempting to impose something like that kind of control. We have 

always sought to make sure that no single power can hold the 

world and us to that kind of blackmail. 

Today, it is—it’s the reality that, essentially, the only power that 

is capable of posing a danger of that kind would be Iran, Islamic 

Republic of Iran, as the strongest regional power, and one which, 

over a number of years, has been demonstrating a determination, 

at great cost and risk, to expand its regional footprint. So, when 

we think about this nuclear agreement with Iran, or, indeed, any 

agreement that the United States and Iran would make, we need 

to think about, How does this agreement play into that situation? 

One should also note that an additional threat that we face in 

the Middle East today, the rise of radical groups intent on an ideology of jihad, whether regionally or globally, that this, to some degree, is being exacerbated by the rise of Iran. The radical groups, 

like ISIS [the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and al-Qaeda, are 

deriving a great deal of legitimacy, funding, and recruiting strength 

from the sense, in the Sunni world in particular, that there’s a religious conflict going on between the Sunni version of Islam, the Shiite version of Islam, and Iran as the captain of Team Shiite, so to 

speak, has been winning. This is creating a sense of fear, even desperation, that makes fanatical forms of ideology and very radical 

organizations attractive, not only to young men who are looking for 

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something to do with their lives, but even to wealthy people in the 

Gulf and others who may be increasingly persuaded to fund them. 

I won’t test the patience of the committee by delving too deeply 

into these issues, but it is, I think, worth noting that, whatever 

else it may do, the JCPOA has the effect of strengthening Iran’s 

position in the region at a point when other powers in the region. 

Indeed, many American officials believe that the greatest danger to 

the region is an imbalance of power that favors Iran. Simply by removing sanctions, by ending Iran’s diplomatic isolation, increasing 

its resources, not merely with the sort of tranche of money that 

comes from unfreezing of frozen assets, but by accelerating Iran’s 

economic growth over a period of time so that it has more resources 

for various activities, simply geopolitically, leave aside the question 

of whether or not it’s a good or bad deal on the nuclear issue—simply geopolitically and regionally, this deal represents a very important success for Iran. It increases Iran’s capacities at a time when 

concern over those capacities is very high. 

That means that we need to be thinking, as a country, What is 

our policy? What do we do about this? Certainly some of Secretary 

Kerry’s recent diplomacy in the Gulf and elsewhere has been about 

trying to reassure countries who feel threatened by both the rise 

of Iran and the boost that it’s likely to receive from this agreement. 

It’s commendable that he’s seeking to reassure these countries, but 

what we should all understand is that their need to be reassured 

is not out of some sort of case of nerves; they are actually accurately reading the regional impact of this agreement. 

So, we actually now come down, I think, as a country—we have 

to think, What are our—what policy will we adopt? Is this—regionally speaking—is this nuclear agreement the first step in a rapprochement with Iran so that, now having resolved the nuclear 

issue, we try to reach ever-closer cooperation with Iran on a wider 

range of issues? If that’s the case, again, I would suggest that the 

regional unrest will grow, and the alarm of other countries who 

would fear that the United States and Iran, over their heads, are 

remaking the region in a way that they don’t like—we can expect 

greater instability in response to that. Or, having taken the nuclear issue off the table, as proponents of the deal suggest we’re 

doing, does this then free us up for a much more vigorous policy 

of containing Iran in the region—in particular, in Syria, which, for 

a number of reasons, is the most important focus, I think, of regional politics today in that part of the world? Are we going—you 

know, are we, for example, going to say, ‘‘Well, we can’t really take 

a strong line against Assad, Iran’s client, in Syria, because otherwise Iran might walk away from the nuclear agreement.’’ If that’s 

our thinking, then, in a sense, we have contained and constrained 

ourselves. Or do we say, ‘‘All right, now that we have this agreement, we need to work much harder on containing Iran’s ambitions 

and ensuring the balance of power in the Gulf’’? 

So, I would just suggest to you, as Senators who are working to 

make up your minds and inform your colleagues about whether or 

not this agreement with Iran should receive Congressional support 

and ratification, that you should not simply look at the nuclear dimensions of the deal, though obviously they are vitally important, 

but you must also consider this agreement, like any agreement beVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00162 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
157 

1http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120847. 

tween nations, as a step in a regional and geopolitical policy, and 

think through, Is this agreement leaving the United States in a 

stronger or a weaker position? Also, What assurances are you getting from the administration about the regional policies that it intends to follow this agreement with? Are we moving toward containment, or are we moving to engagement, are we moving in some 

other direction? I, myself, sense a lack of clarity about this sometimes in Washington. I hope, Senators, that you will be able to get 

us a clear answer as to where we’re going. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Walter Russell Mead follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WALTER RUSSELL MEAD

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and members of the committee: 

It’s a great honor to be invited to testify before this august committee and its distinguished members. That is especially true at a moment like this, when the Committee is called on to advise the Senate on a matter of great national importance. 

I am not presumptuous enough to tell the members of this committee how to vote 

on the JCPOA; to make that decision you must look at many factors. My testimony 

does not concern the technical specifications of the agreement, the strength of the 

inspections regime, or the verifiability of key provisions. My job is to offer the Committee some thoughts about the impact of the agreement on regional politics and 

to present some concerns that can inform your thinking as you proceed. 

Mr. Chairman, no agreement stands alone. Ultimately, the JCPOA will be not be 

judged as a standalone agreement; it will be judged as part of a policy aimed at 

securing American interests in a vital region at the lowest feasible risk and cost. 

It would be a mistake to think of this agreement simply in the context of nuclear 

weapons. It also needs to be examined in the light of important non-nuclear policy 

issues in a region of vital importance to the United States. At a time when the Middle East is in its most volatile, unsettled state in a century, and when a sectarian 

conflict between Shiite and Sunni Muslims is spreading, this agreement affects the 

balance of power, relations with our existing allies and perceptions of America’s role 

in the sectarian conflict. To reach an appropriate decision about this agreement, Mr. 

Chairman, the United States Senate needs to consider the agreement’s likely impact 

on important American interests and relationships across the Middle East, and to 

a lesser extent, elsewhere. 

To assist your analysis I will cover three topics this morning, reviewing the key 

interests of the United States in the region, the current situation in the region, and 

the likely impact of the JCPOA on those interests. I will conclude by offering some 

suggestions to the Committee about the questions you should be asking as you continue to review this matter with your colleagues, with scholars and practitioners in 

the field and with officials in the executive branch. 

When asked to identify America’s principal interests in the Middle East, most 

people will agree with President Obama’s summary: oil and the security of Israel 1. 

Israel is a valuable American ally and partner, an outpost of democracy, and, as 

the national state of the Jewish people, both a refuge from persecution and a shining example of what a free people can accomplish. With roots that date back to the 

19th century and even earlier, the bipartisan American commitment to the establishment of a secure homeland for the Jewish people is one of the oldest and most 

durable elements of our foreign policy. Every president since Woodrow Wilson endorsed this position, and ever since the Lodge-Fish joint resolution of 1922 endorsed 

the Balfour Declaration, bipartisan majorities in both Houses of the United States 

Congress have been steadfast in their support. 

Oil has played a role in American policy for almost as long. Access to Middle Eastern oil was an important military concern during and after World War Two, and 

the success of the Marshall Plan depended in part on increased Middle Eastern production in the early years of the Cold War. In recent decades, growing American 

demand for oil made the United States itself at least partially dependent on imported oil from the Middle East. The revolution in shale oil and gas has changed 

that picture, and many experts now believe that North America as a whole will be 

an energy exporting region for the foreseeable future. 

158 

Some have argued that energy independence will relegate Middle Eastern oil to 

a second tier of American interests and that an energy independent America will 

be less concerned about the security and stability of the Middle East. Perhaps unfortunately, this is not the case. If the Middle East is no longer necessary for America’s 

own energy needs, oil from this region remains vital to our friends, allies and economic partners around the world. If war in the Middle East, or the actions of a powerful regional hegemon seeking to blackmail the world should cut the flow of oil 

from the Middle East to Europe, India, China and/or Japan, the economic consequences to the United States would be enormous. American manufacturing companies operate globally and their overseas operations and supply chains would be 

serious affected by a disruption in energy supplies. The profits of American corporations depend on a healthy global economy; these companies would see their sales 

and profits drop as the consequences of the oil supply disruption rippled across the 

world. Stock markets globally would be severely affected, including in the United 

States. Worst of all, the world’s interdependent financial system would suffer severe 

shocks, and the health and solvency of American banks would come under severe 

pressure. 

The United States may not be dependent on the Middle East for our domestic energy supply, but the American economy remains profoundly and permanently entangled in the global economy. Prosperity will not endure here if the global economy 

suffers massive disruption, and interruptions or severe constrictions in the flow of 

oil and gas from the Middle East will remain capable of causing this kind of unacceptable disruption for the foreseeable future. 

Some might argue that, given the importance of Middle Eastern oil to the rest 

of the world, the United States could reduce our involvement in the Middle East 

with the assurance that other countries would step in to fill the vacuum. Why, some 

ask, should the United States assume the costs and risks of ensuring the flow of 

oil to other rich and powerful states around the world? 

The answers to this question go to the heart of American grand strategy for the 

last 100 years. As the bloodshed and destruction of warfare has increased, Americans have sought above all else to prevent wars between great powers from breaking out. While all war is destructive and horrifying, wars in which great powers, 

with their enormous technological and economic capabilities, turn their full strength 

against one another, have the potential to destroy civilization or human life itself. 

To make such wars less likely, the United States has worked to create an interdependent global system in which all countries depend so heavily on global flows 

of trade and investment that no country can contemplate cutting itself off from this 

system through starting wars. At the same time, the United States has worked to 

ensure the safe and secure passage of commerce across the world’s oceans, taking 

questions like energy out of the realm of geopolitical competition. 

In the Middle East, these policies have meant that since World War Two the 

United States has acted to prevent any power or combination of powers either inside 

or outside the region from gaining the ability to blackmail the world by threatening 

to interrupt the flow of oil to the great markets of Asia and Europe. Whether the 

danger came from external powers like the Soviet Union (which occupied part of 

Iran and threatened Turkey in the early years of the Cold War) or from ambitious 

leaders within the region (like Saddam Hussein when he invaded Kuwait), the 

United States has acted to ensure the security and political independence of the oil 

producing states of the region. 

These policies have helped create the longest era of great power peace in modern 

times. They have also reduced the cost of America’s military commitments. Because 

other countries do not feel the need to maintain large forces with an intercontinental capacity to protect their global trade, the United States has been able to 

maintain a global presence at a far lower cost than would be feasible if the world’s 

major economic powers were engaged in competitive military build ups. A strong 

American presence in the Middle East and on the high seas has the effect of suppressing security competition worldwide, enabling America’s most important interests to be secured with much less cost than would otherwise be possible. 

Should the United States withdraw from this role, the world would likely see increased competition among other powers. China, for example, would see a greater 

need to protect its oil security, accelerating the build up of its armed forces. Japan 

and India would both likely see this build up as a threat to their own energy and 

maritime security and would accelerate build ups of their own. Trust among these 

powers, already weak, would erode, and the dynamics of a zero-sum competition for 

security and access to resources would drive them towards greater hostility and 

more dangerous policies. Under those circumstances, American prosperity and security would be much harder to defend than they are now, and the risks of great 

power conflict would intensify. America’s Middle East policy is not just about the 

159 

Middle East; it is about America’s global interest in a peaceful and prosperous 

world. 

The starting point for any American strategy in the Middle East today must be 

the basic approach that has served us well since the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt. America’s vital interests require us to look to the safety and the security of 

the Middle Eastern oil producing states, ensuring that no power, either external or 

regional, gains the power to interfere with the smooth and stable supply of oil and 

gas to the great economic and industrial centers of the world. 

As we look at the region today, these vital American interests are not as well secured as one would wish. Today’s Middle East is threatened by conflicts that could 

lead to immense humanitarian disasters against which the horror of the Libyan and 

Syrian civil conflicts would appear small scale. Whether considered from the humanitarian standpoint or from the perspective of vital American interests, the dangers facing us in the Middle East today are immense, and it is against this background that the value of the JCPOA or indeed of any major policy step involving 

the region needs to be understood. 

One danger is presented by the rise of Iran and the consequences of its efforts 

to increase its power in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and beyond. Iran is the one country 

at the moment that appears to believe that it has both the capacity and the will 

to establish a hegemonic position in the region. Iran could challenge vital American 

interests in two ways. It could come close to success in this regional strategy, presenting the United States with the choice of accepting Iranian hegemony or engaging in conflict. Alternatively, an Iranian bid for control, while ultimately falling 

short, could create such chaos and upheaval in the region that normal governance 

would break down and some oil exporting countries could be paralyzed by international or civil conflict. 

Another danger comes from the surge in fanaticism among some Sunni groups, 

in part because of the fear inspired by what many see as an Iranian-backed surge 

of Shiite power across the region. Under the wrong circumstances fanatical movements like ISIS could either conquer or make ungovernable wide stretches of the 

Middle East, including important oil producing provinces and countries. The successful establishment of a ‘caliphate’ or some other form of radical and revolutionary 

governance across strategically important areas could present the United States 

with the choice between military intervention or accepting the establishment of a 

hegemonic regional power. Short of that, insurrections or guerilla conflicts involving 

fanatical groups could destabilize key countries. Additionally, groups based in territory controlled by these forces and accessing financial and other resources under 

their control could plan and carry out major attacks against western targets as alQaeda did from Taliban controlled territory in 2001. 

Beyond the danger of Sunni radicalism, there is the danger that the sectarian 

conflict between Sunni radicals and Shiite radicals aligned with Iran now taking 

shape would so seriously destabilize the region and important countries in it that 

the oil supply could not be secured. In this scenario, even if neither side in the sectarian war achieved anything like dominance, the social upheavals, economic distress and surge in violence and hate fueled by an escalating religious conflict could 

lead to conditions in which the oil industry could no longer function in a stable and 

orderly way. 

THE JCPOA AND THE REGIONAL CRISIS

In evaluating the JCPOA, the Senate needs to apply two tests. The first, which 

is where most of the attention so far has been concentrated, is the question of 

whether the agreement offers a path to resolve the question of Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons. The second test is of equal importance when it comes to determining 

the prudence and desirability of Congressional support for the existing agreement. 

That second question is whether the JCPOA will advance or hinder America’s vital 

interests in the region other than our interest in preventing the emergence of a nuclear Iran. Does the JCPOA make it more or less likely that any of the three dangers referenced above—of an Iranian drive for hegemony, of a similar movement by 

fanatical Sunni-based groups, or of an intensifying and escalating sectarian war 

that destabilizes the region—will come to pass? 

For the JCPOA to serve the American interest in the Middle East it needs to pass 

both tests; the agreement must block Iran’s path to nuclear weapons, and it must 

help (or at the very least, not hinder) America’s broader regional agenda. My purpose in appearing before the Committee today, Mr. Chairman, is to offer some suggestions about how the Members of this Committee and their colleagues in the Senate can determine whether the JCPOA advances, hinders or leaves unchanged 

America’s pursuit of its vital interests in a combustible region at a critical time. 

160 

This is a complex problem; the question of the effects of the JCPOA on Iran’s nuclear program is more technical than political, depending more on the nature of the 

limits and the verification protocols, though questions remain about whether the 

United States and the other signatories will have the political will to enforce it. The 

effect of the JCPOA on the regional situation depends much more on perception and 

policy. How will Iran, our allies and other forces in the region view the agreement? 

How does the agreement weaken or strengthen Iran on the ground? What policies 

will the United States and Iran pursue in the region and toward each other should 

the agreement come into full force? 

One thing seems clear: if the JCPOA fails to contain Iran’s nuclear program, and 

Iran gets a nuclear weapon, the agreement will be a disaster in regional politics as 

well. Iran’s drive toward regional hegemony will receive a powerful boost, the 

strength of fanatical movements in the Sunni world will be boosted by a sense of 

apocalyptic fear and rage, and the sectarian conflict will intensify in ways that are 

both unpredictable and, probably, very dangerous for American interests. 

But what if the JCPOA is successful on the nuclear front, even temporarily, and 

is seen to have stopped or slowed Iran’s drive for the bomb? Or, perhaps more probably, suppose there is a period of time in which the success or failure of the JCPOA 

on the nuclear issue is unclear? During this uncertain interval, one that could last 

for some time, how will the JCPOA affect the regional balance of forces? 

Here, the news is bad. Whatever the JCPOA does in terms of the nuclear program, when it comes to the conventional balance in the region the JCPOA appears 

to strengthen Iran. The end of sanctions does not just result in a ‘‘windfall’’ gain 

to Iran as frozen assets are released; it also adds substantial and growing amounts 

to Iran’s national income as normal trade relations resume, as Iranian oil production expands, and as access to markets for new technology and spare parts increases 

the productivity of Iranian society. In the short term this means that Iran will have 

more money with which to support regional allies like the Assad regime in Damascus; in the medium term as conventional weapons restrictions are lifted Iran will 

have the opportunity to strengthen both defensive and offensive arms capabilities; 

in the medium to long term Iran’s greater economic clout will substantially increase 

its political weight both in the region and in world affairs, giving it new allies and 

making a return to sanctions and isolation increasingly unlikely. 

These worries loom larger because Iran, under sanctions and suffering serious 

economic privation, has nevertheless been able to operate effectively in regional politics, scoring gains against Sunni adversaries that have seriously alarmed some of 

its neighbors. If an isolated and economically challenged Iran could achieve such results, one must ask what it can achieve under the more favorable conditions that 

will follow the implementation of the JCPOA. 

It is worth noting in this context that many of Iran’s neighbors do not share the 

Obama Administration’s view that the greatest danger from Iran flows from its nuclear program. Rather, the fear is that Iran’s large population, sectarian fervor and 

powerful security institutions make it potentially the most powerful state in the region and a threat to the security of its neighbors. For many Saudis in particular, 

whose close ties to Pakistan’s security establishment give them confidence that an 

Iranian nuclear weapon could be offset by the existence of the Pakistani arsenal, 

the nuclear program in Iran is much less threatening than Iran’s apparent ability 

and willingness to support militias, rebels and Iran-aligned governments across the 

region. 

Although Gulf governments have issued pro forma statements in support of the 

JCPOA, their fear and distrust of Iran, and their lack of comfort with American regional policy have led to dramatic shifts in their policy as they seek to offset the 

perceived negative consequences of the JCPOA on the regional balance. The most 

spectacular (and alarming) changes have been seen in the foreign policy of Saudi 

Arabia. The Kingdom has departed from a long history of quiet and cautious policy 

and initiated a series of high risk, high profile steps that testify to a deep sense 

of distress and unease with American policy and its consequences for the regional 

balance. 

The inevitable increase in Iranian conventional resources and capabilities that follows the JCPOA can damage American interests in three ways. First, if Iran devotes 

even some of its gains from the agreements to its regional allies and hegemonic 

goals, it could create a major crisis in the region that would require massive American intervention to avoid the danger of having one country dominate the oil wealth 

of the entire Gulf. Some countries would be endangered directly by subversion or 

conflict; others, increasingly surrounded by Iranian clients and allies, would feel the 

need to align their foreign policy and their oil production and pricing strategies with 

Iran. The United States could be faced with a triumphalist Iranian regime that 

would be able to manipulate world oil prices and supplies. It would be extremely 

161 

difficult for future presidents to create effective coalitions to limit or balance Iran 

under these circumstances. 

Second, fear of Iran can drive American allies and other actors in the region to 

actions that destabilize the region or run counter to American interests. Concerns 

about potential proliferation among other regional countries who want to balance 

the Iranian nuclear program are one example of the potential ‘blowback’ from the 

JCPOA. But there are others. Saudi Arabia and other oil producing Gulf states 

could for example ‘circle the wagons’ among Sunni states, tightening their links with 

military and intelligence services in countries like Egypt and Pakistan in ways that 

undercut important American goals. Many Gulf countries will see the expansion of 

Pakistan’s nuclear capacity and growth in the quality and quantity of its arsenal 

of delivery systems as an important deterrent and counter to Iran. This could only 

intensify the arms race in South Asia and increase the chances of conflict between 

India and Pakistan. It will also likely lead to more resources and power going to 

figures in the military and nuclear establishment who share radical ideologies uncomfortably close to those of al-Qaeda and other dangerous groups. Bringing Pakistan more fully into Middle East politics would be a natural and obvious move for 

oil rich Sunni states alarmed by a rising Iran. 

More broadly, fear of a rising Iran increases the incentives for rich individuals 

and states to deepen their links with fanatical organizations and fighters. Fanatical 

anti-Shiite fighters may, from an American standpoint, be terrorists who are as 

anti-western as they are anti-Iran. If Iran’s regional power is seen as rising, however, many in the Sunni world will be tempted to support these organizations as 

indispensible allies in the fight against Iran. 

Finally, the perception, plausible to some however incorrect, that Iran now has 

tacit American support in its quest for regional hegemony will act as a powerful recruiting incentive for radical pro-Sunni jihadi groups throughout the Sunni world. 

Sectarian conflicts feed on apocalyptic fears; the perception that Shiite ‘heretics’ are 

threatening the Islamic heartland and holy cities in the Arabian Peninsula will 

make it significantly easier for radicals to recruit new fighters—and to raise the 

money to employ, train and arm them. 

EVALUATING JCPOA

Elected officials charged with determining whether JCPOA strengthens or weakens the American position will need to balance a number of factors in determining 

whether or not the agreement merits Congressional support. This must necessarily 

be a judgment call; officials will have to weigh probabilities and balance the 

strengths and weaknesses of the agreement. For example, if the agreement is found 

to have a very strong ability to stop the progress of Iran’s nuclear program, those 

gains might be worth some regional difficulties. On the other hand, it is quite possible that the regional consequences of the agreement would be so severe that even 

a relatively effective nuclear agreement could be a net negative for American interests in the region. 

Judgments about the regional impact of the JCPOA must take one other factor 

into account: Administration policy in the region could substantially limit or seriously exacerbate the impact of the agreement on the regional situation. To reach 

useful conclusions on the likely consequences of this agreement, Mr. Chairman, you 

and your colleagues will need to consult with the Administration to determine as 

far as possible what the future course of American policy toward the Middle East 

and Iran will be. 

There are two possible courses the United States can take. One would be to see 

the JCPOA as the first step in a policy of accommodating Iran looking to de ́tente 

or an even closer relationship. Alternatively, the JCPOA could be seen as an effort 

to facilitate a tougher policy of regional containment by taking the dangers of nuclear proliferation off the table. Much depends on which course the Administration 

chooses. 

A policy of accommodation will maximize ‘blowback’ from the JCPOA, throwing 

the region and America’s key alliances into deep disarray. The more credible the 

perception is that the United States is prepared to accept and perhaps facilitate a 

large regional role for Iran, the more the United States will be seen as having taken 

the anti-Sunni side in a widening sectarian war. Gulf states who have long considered the United States a reliable protector will see American policy as a threat to 

their security and will explore new policy options with potentially very dangerous 

consequences for stability and American interests. The gap between radical and fanatical fighting groups and militias on the one hand and governing elites in the 

Sunni world will compress; alignments that are unthinkable today could become 

quite likely if key Sunni states come to believe that the United States has chosen 

162 

Iran and the Shiite in the sectarian war. Such a course of action is also more likely 

to empower hardliners in Iran, as they will be able to make a plausible case that 

Iran has a historic opportunity to vault into the ranks of leading global powers by 

consolidating its power in the critical Gulf area. 

American allies in the Middle East are well aware of this dynamic. This is why 

they have been seeking more arms and stronger political commitments from the 

United States as they brace for the impact of a stronger and richer Iran in the wake 

of this agreement. Fueling a conventional arms race in the region and making additional commitments to protect threatened states are among the consequences of this 

agreement; the Congress should take care to inform itself about the nature of these 

new commitments and engagements that the JCPOA has made necessary. 

A robust policy of regional containment combined with other pressures on Iran 

could significantly reduce the negative consequences of the agreement on American 

interests. This would almost certainly involve a much more active American role in 

Syria, where the struggle between a variety of Sunni groups and the Iran-aligned 

Assad regime has transfixed the region and led to the worst and most dangerous 

outbreak of Middle Eastern violence since the Iran-Iraq War. For many countries 

in the region, including close historical allies of the United States, a strong American military commitment to the overthrow of the Assad government would serve 

as an acid test for American seriousness against Iran. Certainly any line of American policy that fails to lead to the emergence of a Syrian government in Damascus 

that satisfies Sunni opinion will be seen throughout the region as ratifying Iran’s 

regional dominance. 

A similar logic applies to Iraq. If American aid to anti-ISIS forces in Iraq goes 

primarily to Shiite militias and regime forces seen as aligned with Iran, many 

Sunnis in Iraq and beyond will conclude that the United States is pro-Iran and antiSunni. The JCPOA increases the pressure on the United States to deepen its involvement in Iraq even as it makes the politics of that involvement more complex. 

Many of those supporting the JCPOA argue that the alternative to the agreement 

is an American war with Iran. Ironically, in order to balance the regional consequences of the agreement, the United States may well need to assume an increased risk of war in Syria and other frontline states. 

One of the reasons that the period leading up to the JCPOA has been so volatile 

in the Middle East is that many regional observers have concluded that American 

policy in the region is based on an American acceptance of Iranian hegemony on 

the ground. For the conspiracy minded, and their number is legion, this goes back 

to the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003 and then to turn the 

country over to its Shiite majority. From an American point of view, whatever one 

thought of the war itself, the establishment of majority rule represented the triumph of our beliefs in democracy; many in the Middle East viewed it as a deliberate 

choice by the United States to promote Iran and to check Sunni power. Suspicion 

intensified when the United States then, despite talk about ‘red lines’ and statements that Assad ‘must go’ remained inactive in Syria as casualties and the refugee 

toll mounted. Where the majority is Shiite, many said, the United States supports 

majority rule. Where the majority is Sunni, the United States does nothing. 

That perception has become destabilizing in a region where escalating sectarian 

conflict between Sunni and Shiite increasingly dominates the agenda; endorsing the 

JCPOA without also making major changes in American regional policy would confirm that perception and further drive the region in the direction of radical polarization, religious war, and transnational conflict. 

CONCLUSION

As the Congress deliberates over whether or not to endorse the JCPOA, it must 

pay close attention to the entire mix of American policies in the region of which the 

JCPOA will be one part. The JCPOA on its own strengthens Iran’s hand in the region by reducing its isolation and adding significantly to its economic resources. Unless this effect is offset by a much more robust policy of containing Iran, centered 

on a focused drive for regime change in Damascus, the JCPOA will make the Middle 

East as a whole less secure, and increase the prospect that the United States will 

be forced to choose between war and strategic setbacks that gravely undermine 

America’s global strategy and our peace and prosperity at home. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I certainly hope so. 

Mr. SINGH. Thank you, Dr. Professor Mead. 

Mr. SINGH. 

163 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SINGH, LANE–SWIG SENIOR FELLOW 

AND MANAGING DIRECTOR, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE 

FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. SINGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, 

members of the committee. 

The nuclear agreement with Iran contains strong points and 

weak points. My judgment, however, is that it leaves Iran with a 

significant nuclear weapons capability. Indeed, it allows Iran, I 

think, to improve that capability over the life of the deal while obtaining broad upfront sanctions relief. 

I believe this has been Iran’s twofold objective throughout the 

talks. It has escaped, rather than had to confront, a strategic choice 

between retaining its nuclear weapons option, on the one hand, and 

diplomatic and economic rehabilitation, on the other. I detail the 

nuclear aspects of the agreement in my written testimony, and I’m 

not going to dwell on those now. 

This is relevant to the topic at hand because Iran’s nuclear ambitions are not separate from, but are part and parcel of, its regional 

strategy, which emphasizes, as Professor Mead was talking about, 

projecting Iranian power while creating an inhospitable environment for the United States and our allies. Iran doesn’t accomplish 

this through conventional military power, in which its lacking, but 

through asymmetric capabilities, such as proxies, arms trafficking, 

sea-denial tactics, cyber activities, and missiles. There’s nothing in 

the accord that requires or even incentivizes Iran to alter these 

policies. Indeed, I’d say the deal seems more likely to facilitate 

Iran’s regional strategy. Iran will have additional resources, should 

it wish to help financially squeeze proxies, like Hezbollah—and I 

think we saw, in the Wall Street Journal this morning, a story that 

the Houthis in Yemen are also feeling a financial squeeze—to ensure that its militias in Iraq can outmatch the official security services there, as they do in Lebanon, and to buy political influence in 

places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. 

With the removal of the ban on the export of arms by Iran, and 

the lifting of the sanctions on the import of arms to Iran in no more 

than 5 years, Iran will face fewer impediments to arming its proxies. We do have other authorities, both U.N. [United Nations] and 

U.S. authorities, to address such activity in some circumstances, 

but those have been little used, and I’d say they are weakened 

rather than strengthened by this accord. Secretary Kerry, in a recent interview, he acknowledged that we’re not doing much interdiction, but he said we would double down in the wake of the deal. 

I’m afraid that, for folks in the region, that doesn’t really carry 

credibility. 

Such actions by Iran are likely going to spur a reaction by 

United States allies in the region who consider Iran their chief 

rival. They may act more aggressively and autonomously to counter 

Iranian policies—proxies, rather. This is a dynamic we’re obviously 

already seeing in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere. They may 

choose to pursue nuclear capabilities of their own to supplement 

that. 

As Professor Mead said, increased Iranian intervention, I think, 

would also feed already rampant sectarian polarization in the region, because that interventionism by Iran fuels support and reVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00169 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
164 

cruitment for the likes of ISIS, and it worries the Sunnis in the region. 

Beyond the Middle East, if we extend this further, Iran is likely 

to bolster its ties, I think, with Russia and China, who share with 

Iran an interest in challenging the United States-led international 

order. That cooperation is likely to be not just diplomatic and economic in nature, but also military. Moscow and Beijing are Iran’s 

largest suppliers of arms. Russia is likely not just to provide Iran 

with nonsanctioned systems, such as the S–300 or even a more advanced air-defense system, but also to come immediately to the Security Council to request exemptions for other types of arms exports to Iran. It’ll be up, frankly, to the United States to stand 

against those requests. Will we do so in every circumstance remains to be seen. 

Russia and China will also be able to assist Iran’s ballistic missile program when sanctions are lifted in 8 years. This is particularly important, I think, for Iran’s pursuit of ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], because that would benefit enormously 

from foreign assistance, given the limited pool of knowledge on this 

particular topic. 

A particular challenge, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, to 

United States interests in the region is Iran’s pursuit of a rudimentary, for now, anti-access area denial strategy in the Gulf. The 

region is well suited to such a strategy, because of its narrow confines, its highly concentrated population centers, and its target-rich 

environment, when it comes to, say, vulnerable energy infrastructure. It’s undoubtedly an area—A2/AD [anti-access area denial]— 

where Chinese assistance would be invaluable, since we see Beijing 

pursuing its own A2/AD capabilities in the western Pacific on a 

much larger scale. One defense analyst from CSBA has suggested 

that Iran could enhance its A2/AD strategy with select high-end 

technology, such as missiles—enhanced missiles, and expanded 

low-end investment in sea mines, fast attack craft, and the wellarmed proxies that it currently fields. 

Some of these regional effects that I’m talking about would, of 

course, result from any nuclear deal not preceded by an Iranian 

strategic shift. That’s why it’s so important to ensure that the benefits of such a deal outweigh these costs. As it is, I think we’re 

going to need to invest significant resources to offset the downsides 

of the accord. These will include increased resources for the intel 

community and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] to 

monitor Iran, to monitor Iranian compliance. We’ll need to repair 

relations with our regional allies, like Israel and the Gulf states, 

and increase assistance to those allies. I think we’re going to need 

to review our military posture to ensure we’re positioned to counter 

Iranian A2/AD efforts, which I believe has to be done in the context 

of an overall increase in defense resources if it’s going to be seen 

as credible by our adversaries. I think we’ll need more proactive 

policies to counter Iranian activities in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere. 

I do worry, as Professor Mead said, that we’ll be self-deterred 

from responding to violations of this accord. You—we see this dynamic with the INF Treaty [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 

Treaty] and Russia. We’ve seen this dynamic with Syria and the 

Chemical Weapons Accord. There was a very good article about 

165 

Syria on—in the Wall Street Journal, a couple of weeks ago, that 

delved into this very topic. I think that we’re going to need to be 

careful, in the wake of the deal, to avoid incrementally shifting our 

own policies in a misguided effort either to bolster Rouhani and 

pragmatists in Iran against a hardline backlash there, or to demonstrate the transformative effects of the deal. We should 

disincentivize Iran’s destabilizing behavior, incentivize more constructive policies. But, the strategic shift should be Iran’s, not ours. 

It seems to me the bottom line is that we’ve negotiated a weak 

agreement and painted ourselves into a diplomatic corner. I agree 

with you, though, Mr. Chairman, that the alternative to the deal 

is not war, but, rather, a mess with our allies, some very important 

allies. 

In the longer run, though, I’d argue that the real question is not 

whether we’re going to need an alternative policy, or whether we 

need an alternative policy, but when. Even in the best-case scenario, the limits the deal imposes on Iran are narrow limits, and 

even those will start phasing out in 5 to 15 years. If the deal works 

as intended, the agreement will buy time for us, but it also buys 

time for Iran. Iran’s going to use that to advantage. 

Thanks very much. 

[The prepared statement of Michael Singh follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SINGH

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee, thank 

you for this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the nuclear agreement 

with Iran and its implications for the United States and the Middle East. 

AMERICA’S OBJECTIVES AND IRAN’S

When we analyze foreign policy, the first question should be what interest or objective is served by a particular policy. A good policy should clearly advance U.S. 

interests and should complement rather than clash with our larger strategy, unless 

the policy in question heralds an entirely new strategy that can be clearly articulated and implemented. A prudent, conservative foreign policy should clearly deliver 

benefits that outweigh its costs or, by incurring certain costs, forestall an even 

greater projected cost. 

The objective in this case is not—and has never been—simply to conclude a nuclear agreement with Iran. A deal is a means toward an end, not an end in itself. 

The intended end in this case is to prevent Iran from possessing a nuclear weapon, 

in order to safeguard our interests in the Middle East and beyond, which would be 

clearly threatened by such a development. While this objective has long enjoyed consensus bipartisan support, the question that has divided policymakers—acutely in 

recent years—is how to accomplish it when faced with an Iranian leadership apparently willing to entertain great cost and risk to expand Iran’s nuclear weapons capability. 

At the outset of the recently concluded diplomacy—the P5+1 process devised in 

2005—the United States strategy was to persuade Iranian leaders to embark on a 

broad ‘‘strategic shift,’’ recognizing that the costs of their regional strategy outweighed the benefits. The logic of this approach was that Iran’s nuclear weapons 

ambitions were not separate from but an integral part of a larger security strategy, 

and only a strategic shift would sustainably end those ambitions. 

Absent such a strategic shift, the sensible stance was to insist on the suspension 

of Iran’s nuclear efforts and dismantlement of its nuclear infrastructure. Even if 

Iran retained the desire for nuclear weapons, it would be denied the means to develop them, and a ban on nuclear fuel cycle and related activities would be less challenging to police than limitations on the same activities would be. Such an approach 

would also offer an appealing symmetry—the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear fuel 

cycle infrastructure and related activities in exchange for the dismantling of sanctions. 

Absent such dismantling, the most sensible approach would have been to deny 

Iran at least those elements of its nuclear program most essential to retaining the 

166 

1 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, part C, para 16 

2 IAEA GOV/2011/65 

option to build a nuclear weapon in the future—to deny it a nuclear weapons capability, practically speaking. Yet retaining that option appears to have been a key 

Iranian objective in these negotiations. 

Iran’s negotiating positions over the past decade-plus of nuclear talks suggest a 

twofold objective: securing the removal of sanctions while retaining a nuclear weapons capability. While Iran has throughout the negotiations proven willing to brook 

temporary limitations on certain nuclear activities, it has steadfastly refused to consider steps—for example, forgoing advanced enrichment R&D, providing access to 

suspected weaponization sites and scientists, or accepting limitations on missile activities or permanent constraints of any kind—that would foreclose the future development of a nuclear weapon. 

Indeed, Iran’s behavior makes little sense absent a desire for nuclear weapons. 

It can obtain reactor fuel from abroad, as do most countries that utilize nuclear energy. Furthermore, an indigenous fuel cycle is marginal to Iran’s energy security, 

given its rich endowment of fossil fuels. Rather, it is Iran’s secret pursuit of that 

fuel cycle and other nuclear weapons-applicable technology that has proven a greater threat to its energy security in the form of sanctions on its hydrocarbon, financial, and other sectors. 

ASSESSING THE NUCLEAR ACCORD

It is instructive to assess the extent to which the agreement advances the United 

States and Iranian objectives described above. Nuclear weapons development requires three lines of action—fuel fabrication, weaponization, and development of a 

delivery vehicle. It also presumably requires secrecy, since being caught at the task 

would entail risk of a military response. 

When it comes to fuel fabrication, the nuclear agreement leaves Iran in possession 

of a full nuclear supply chain from uranium mining to enrichment, and also leaves 

in place the heavy water reactor at Arak. These are subject to various temporary 

restrictions—Iran agrees to cap the number and type of centrifuges installed, the 

level to which it enriches, and the amount of low-enriched uranium it stockpiles, 

and converts its heavy water reactor at Arak to avoid producing weapons-grade plutonium. It also agrees not to build new enrichment, heavy water, and reprocessing 

facilities. 

Two points stand out as most concerning, however: Iran is permitted to continue 

research and development on advanced centrifuges and to begin deploying such centrifuges after just eight and a half years. Because such centrifuges are designed to 

enrich uranium much more efficiently than Iran’s existing ‘‘IR–1’’ centrifuges, they 

are far better suited to a covert weapons-development effort—far fewer of them, operating for less time, would be required to produce weapons-grade fuel. Second, the 

restrictions described above phase out ten to fifteen years from now, meaning that 

at that time Iran would face few technical impediments to reducing its breakout 

time substantially. 

When it comes to weaponization, the agreement commits Iran not to ‘‘engage in 

activities, including at the R&D level, which could contribute to the development of 

a nuclear explosive device.’’ 1 But the question is how Iran’s adherence to this commitment can be verified, especially since such activities tend to be secretive by their 

very nature. Indeed, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reporting suggests 

that Iran has already engaged in various ‘‘activities related to the development of 

a nuclear explosive device,’’ 2 part of what the IAEA terms the ‘‘possible military dimensions’’ (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program. 

Many analysts have urged that Iran be required as part of any agreement to disclose the extent of its past (and possibly ongoing) weaponization and other clandestine nuclear efforts so that inspectors understand what progress Iran made, and 

provide the IAEA with the necessary access to ensure that such efforts are not resumed. The agreement does not appear to meet these criteria. It does not specify 

that inspectors must be given access to weapons-related sites and personnel, or that 

full disclosure of past weaponization and other clandestine nuclear work is required 

for the agreement’s implementation to proceed. Without such provisions, I do not 

believe we can have confidence that Iran’s work on nuclear weapons will not be resumed (perhaps by elements of Iran’s security apparatus, and perhaps even without 

the knowledge of the civilian officials with whom inspectors interact) or even that 

it has ceased. 

In the area of delivery vehicles, the agreement contains no limitations whatsoever 

as far as I can tell. Iran is not required to limit its ballistic missile development 

167 

3 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929, op9 

4 U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, Annex B, para 3 

5 5 ‘‘Iran: Russia Says New Rocket Raises Nuclear ’Suspicions,’’’ Associated Press, 

February 7, 2008. 6 2007 Iran Nuclear NIE 

and testing, nor does the list of ‘‘activities which could contribute to the design and 

development of a nuclear explosive device’’ from which Iran agrees to refrain in 

Annex I of the agreement include any mention of missile reentry vehicles, despite 

their inclusion in the IAEA’s accounting of PMD. Indeed, the binding ban on Iran 

‘‘undertak[ing] any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear 

weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology’’ 3 contained in U.N. 

Security Council Resolution 1929, is replaced with nonbinding, hortatory language 4

in U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231. 

The effect of this shift is that as of ‘‘Implementation Day’’ of the nuclear accord, 

Iran will not be barred from conducting ballistic missile launches or pursuing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, which are an essential part of any modern nuclear 

weapons program. This concern has even been voiced in the past by Russian officials. In 2008, following a failed Iranian missile test, then-Deputy Foreign Minister 

Aleksandr Losyukov said the test added ‘‘to general suspicions of Iran regarding its 

potential desire to build nuclear weapons.’’ 5 When sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile program are lifted in eight years, it will also be able to receive foreign assistance, which has been described in the past by United States officials as essential 

to its ability to produce intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). While some 

United States secondary sanctions on missile cooperation with Iran will remain in 

place, these are insufficiently robust to deter Iran’s likely partners. 

Taken together, these weaknesses suggest that the agreement will permit Iran to 

retain the option to build a nuclear weapon in the future. Indeed, the agreement 

could be seen as a means by which Iran buys time to perfect, in some cases with 

international assistance, the technologies—advanced centrifuges, weaponization, 

and long-range ballistic missiles—required to build a nuclear weapon in the future. 

In my view, this is not by accident—Iran’s ‘‘red lines’’ seem to have been designed 

to shape this outcome, implying again that Iran’s purpose in the talks has been to 

obtain sanctions relief while retaining or even improving its nuclear weapons capability. 

The strength of the agreement must instead rest, then, on our ability to detect 

and deter any such weapons-development effort, whether covert or overt. Unfortunately, the inspection mechanism in the accord does not appear up to this task. 

While robust monitoring will be in place at declared sites, the United States intelligence community assessed in 2007 that Iran ‘‘probably would use covert facilities— 

rather than its declared nuclear sites—for the production of highly-enriched uranium for a weapon.’’ 6 The agreement does not, however, permit inspectors anything 

approaching unfettered access to suspect sites. 

Rather, after an indefinite back-and-forth with Iran regarding suspicious activity, 

the IAEA could formally request access to a site, which would initiate a deliberative 

process lasting as many as twenty-four days. If, however, Iran continued to deny 

inspectors access at the end of this period, the matter might not be resolved for another thirty to sixty-five days—bringing the delay to fifty-four to eighty-nine days— 

or even longer if any of these periods were extended by consensus of a ‘‘Joint Commission’’ consisting of Iran, the EU, and the P5+1. This is far too long a delay to 

permit inspectors to do their jobs effectively. 

Combined with Iran potentially not being required to disclose and provide access 

to PMD-related sites, personnel, and documentation, and a missile program that is 

not subject to inspection at all to my knowledge, the result is an inspection regime 

that falls short of what is necessary to detect covert nuclear activity. This inadequacy is compounded by the fact that Iran’s breakout time even at declared sites 

could potentially diminish to near zero once the restrictions on its enrichment- and 

reprocessing-related activities phase out in ten to fifteen years, rendering it practically improbable to halt a breakout attempt even with monitoring in place. 

The inspection regime is further undermined by the agreement’s enforcement 

mechanism. The only remedy for noncompliance—whether the refusal of access to 

inspectors by Iran or any other violation—is the termination of the accord and the 

reimposition of previous U.N. resolutions, in which case Iran has asserted that it 

would consider its obligations under the agreement null and void. The implication 

is that small violations of Iran’s obligations are likely to go unpunished, and access 

requests are likely to face a high bar, for fear of unraveling the accord entirely— 

the IAEA may hesitate to make a formal access request for fear of being party to 

the agreement’s collapse, and the other parties to the accord may hesitate to support 

168 

7Secretary of State John Kerry at the Council on Foreign Relations, July 24, 2015 

the IAEA if they do. Violations of Iran’s other obligations may be explained away 

as inadvertent, the work of rogue elements within Iran, or otherwise not worth risking the entire accord over. 

As is often the case with such agreements, the leverage will be with the less riskaverse party. The United States has not, for example, imposed any cost on Russia 

for its reported violation of the INF Treaty, nor on Syria for apparently violating 

its commitment to destroy its chemical weapons. Indeed, in both cases U.S. officials 

have appeared loath even to acknowledge the violations. Iran has already indicated 

its intention to test the inspection regime by asserting that access to military sites 

will be refused as a rule. The absence of ‘‘snap’’ inspections will remove a psychological barrier to cheating and further encourage such risk-taking. Even in the event 

sanctions snap back, their initial effect is likely to be only psychological or symbolic—their economic impact will take far more time to be felt, much less to affect 

Iran’s decisions. 

Military force remains an option in extremis to enforce the agreement. However, 

the military option may prove more difficult to exercise in the future given the 

international legitimacy the accord grants to Iran’s nuclear activities, the international involvement in those activities that it permits, any steps by Iran to further 

harden its nuclear sites against attack, and the likely return of international investment and commerce to Iran. 

In sum, the nuclear agreement is best thought of as a form of containment: Iran 

will retain its nuclear weapons capability, and the United States and our allies will 

attempt to prevent it from being used. But it is a containment policy in which we 

agree in advance to gradually lower our defenses by phasing out the limitations on 

Iran’s nuclear activities by a date certain, and limit our own toolkit by lifting sanctions nearly comprehensively up front. In past proposals, the United States had 

made the easing of restrictions dependent on Iran’s own behavior. Under this accord, all Iran need do is bide its time and the restrictions will be lifted regardless 

of its policies. The incentive for Iran is therefore simply to wait: to avoid significant 

overt nonperformance under the accord, but not to alter in any fundamental way 

its nuclear ambitions or regional strategy. 

BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE NUCLEAR AGREEMENT

The challenge to United States interests posed by Iran goes well beyond its nuclear and missile program. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin 

Dempsey recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the threats posed 

by Iran also included its support for proxies, arms trafficking, sea-based mines, and 

cyber activities. These and other Iranian activities threaten our interest in nonproliferation, counterterrorism, freedom of navigation, and cybersecurity, and directly challenge a United States regional strategy focused on ensuring regional stability and bolstering the security of our allies. 

President Obama has asserted that the agreement does not presume any improvement in Iranian behavior on these fronts, though he has expressed hope that Iran’s 

behavior will in fact change as a result of the deal. However, in the short term at 

least, Iran’s behavior in the region is more likely to worsen than improve. 

Anti-Americanism is central to the ideology of the Iranian regime, and Iranian 

leaders—having just reached a diplomatic compromise with the United States—may 

feel the need to reaffirm its anti-American bona fides. The agreement is also widely 

perceived as a victory for Iranian pragmatists led by President Hassan Rouhani and 

was, according to Secretary of State John Kerry, 7 opposed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and other hardliners. Iran’s Supreme Leader, widely 

regarded as seeking to balance the regime’s contentious factions, may feel the need 

in the agreement’s wake to give freer rein to those hardliners to prevent one faction 

from becoming too powerful. 

Finally, Iranian regional behavior is not driven solely by United States policy or 

this nuclear accord, but by events in the region themselves. Iran’s security strategy, 

in part compensating for a lack of conventional military power, has focused on building asymmetric power through proxies and surrogates who are able to project Iranian power and keep potential foes such as Israel and Sunni Arab states occupied 

far from Iran’s borders. 

There is nothing in the agreement that requires Iran to change this strategy, or 

that would forestall a spike in malign Iranian behavior. Quite the opposite—the 

agreement will provide Iran with an influx of financial resources, some portion of 

which seem likely to go to foreign priorities such as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, or Yemen. 

An infusion of Iranian funds could have salutary effects on the Assad regime, which 

169 

8For more examples, see ‘‘The Regional Impact of Additional Iranian Money,’’ PolicyWatch 

2456, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 28, 2015, http://www. 

washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-regional-impact-of-additional-iranian-money. 9 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1747, op5 

has reportedly depended on Iranian assistance, for example receiving a fresh $1 billion line of credit from Tehran just last month; on Hezbollah, which has reportedly 

seen assistance from Iran decline as the latter was squeezed by sanctions; on Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which has reportedly been suffering from financial duress; and on Hamas, which seeks to rebuild military capacity degraded in its last 

round of fighting with Israel. It could also be used to step up recruiting for Iranianbacked militias in Syria and Iraq, to ensure that Iraqi Shiite militias backed by Iran 

are better resourced than official Iraqi security services, and to buy increased political influence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. 8

The agreement will also lift the ban on ballistic missile tests and the designations 

of certain entities involved in Iran’s regional troublemaking, such as (in eight years) 

the IRGC–Qods Force. It will also remove, in no more than five years, sanctions barring the transfer of arms to Iran—paving the way for the possible modernization 

of Iran’s relatively antiquated conventional forces—and will lift by my reading the 

ban on Iran exporting arms itself.than five years, sanctions barring the transfer of 

arms to Iran—paving the way for the possible modernization of Iran’s relatively antiquated conventional forces—and will lift by my reading the ban on Iran exporting 

arms itself.than five years, sanctions barring the transfer of arms to Iran—paving 

the way for the possible modernization of Iran’s relatively antiquated conventional 

forces—and will lift by my reading the ban on Iran exporting arms itself. 9 While 

in some circumstances other authorities exist to prohibit arms transfers to Iranian 

proxies, these measures have been poorly enforced and seem likely to be weakened 

further, not strengthened, by this agreement. As a result, and seeing as regional 

conflicts in which Iran is embroiled show little sign of abating, there is more reason 

to believe that Iran’s regional activities will increase rather than deminish, including the proliferation of sophisticated arms. 

While some regard Iran as a potential partner against the likes of ISIS, in fact 

any uptick in Iranian regional troublemaking stands to benefit ISIS and its ilk, 

which feed off the sectarian polarization Iran’s activities foster. In addition, because 

many United States allies in the region see Iran and its proxies as a major threat 

to their security, they are likely to respond to any increase in Iranian adventurism. 

To an extent, we are already witnessing these dynamics playing out around the region. To make matters worse, United States allies may also seek in the wake of the 

accord to match Iran’s nuclear capabilities to ensure they could respond rapidly to 

any Iranian nuclear breakout; while there is no guarantee they will do so, the incentive is clear. Our reassurances to them will be met with skepticism in light of our 

relative inaction thus far to counter Iranian regional aggression, and in light of our 

failure to follow through on similar assurances given to Ukraine in 1994 as part of 

our pursuit of a different arms control treaty. 

This incentive will remain even if, as some hope, the Iranian regime becomes 

friendlier or more constructive in the coming years. Even a different regime in 

Tehran may not wish to concede a nuclear capability that has been granted international legitimacy. Given the long history of rivalry between Iran and its major 

neighbors, the presence of a large, advanced nuclear program in Iran will likely 

prompt a balancing reaction in the region regardless of Tehran’s attitude toward the 

United States. 

The agreement also seems likely to foster closer diplomatic, economic, and military ties between Iran and a host of states outside the region, including India, Pakistan, Russia, and especially China. Sino-Iranian trade has been growing despite 

sanctions, and even China’s energy imports from Iran have reached record highs in 

2014–2015 despite NDAA sanctions calling for states to reduce their oil trade with 

Iran. In addition, China-Iran military ties have increased, with Chinese fighter jets 

landing in Iran to refuel and Chinese warships paying a call to the Iranian port 

of Bandar Abbas in recent years. Chinese and Iranian defense officials have called 

for expansion of these ties, and the lifting or phasing out of sanctions will smooth 

the way for this to occur. 

All of this is on its face would appear to constitute a significant strategic reversal 

by the United States—accommodating Iranian nuclear expansion after years of opposing it, lifting sanctions on Iran after years of expanding them, and facilitating 

Iran’s financial and diplomatic reintegration into the international community after 

years of seeking to isolate it. These actions stand in opposition to longstanding 

United States strategy in the Middle East, which aimed to foster regional stability 

and prosperity by bolstering the security of allies, effectively countering those who 

170 

challenged our mutual interests, and preventing inroads by hegemons from inside 

or outside the region. This conflict between our actions and our stated strategy inevitably leads allies to conclude either that our commitment to that strategy and 

to the region itself is diminished, or that we are embarking on a broader strategic 

realignment. 

LOOKING AHEAD

One of the chief defenses offered for the nuclear agreement is that, whatever its 

shortcomings, it is preferable to the alternatives. It is one thing to say, however, 

that a negotiated agreement of some sort was preferable to alternatives such as 

military conflict or acquiescence, and another entirely to claim that this is the best 

accord that could have been negotiated. I have little doubt that different tactics 

could have produced a stronger agreement. Indeed, it is the very denigration of our 

alternatives and failure to credibly project consequences—whether sanctions or military force—for Iran of failing to accept strict limitations on its nuclear activities 

that in my view most contributed to the weakness of this accord. The notion that 

Iran would have marched inexorably toward a nuclear weapon were it not for this 

deal ignores the considerable deterrent effect that further sanctions and the credible 

threat of military force would likely have had on Iranian decisionmaking. 

Such assertions on both sides, however, are now largely a matter for historical 

debate. The more immediately relevant question is whether to implement the accord. If the deal cannot muster sufficient domestic support, it should like any rejected agreement be renegotiated. There is no particular reason it cannot be, though 

the other parties are likely to resist. Ordinarily they would nevertheless require 

U.S. participation for the termination of international sanctions, but the recent passage of a U.N. Security Council resolution endorsing the accord and setting a schedule for lifting sanctions gives rise to the possibility—the text of the deal is not clear 

on this point—that the deal’s implementation could proceed even without the United 

States fulfilling our obligations. 

It is also possible that Iran would refuse to implement its obligations were the 

deal rejected by the United States, and that it would find sympathy from partners 

such as Russia and China. Because, however, our allies would remain committed 

to preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, Iranian noncompliance would 

not be met with resignation but would likely lead to a resumption of previous efforts 

to resolve the crisis through diplomacy and pressure. None of these scenarios is by 

any means an easy one; our policy to date will not be without consequences. 

If the nuclear accord is implemented, U.S. policymakers will need to contend with 

the new reality it creates. We must avoid the temptation to overlook harmful Iranian policies or offer unilateral concessions in a misguided effort to bolster one regime faction against another, but instead establish clear disincentives for destabilizing behavior and incentives for constructive behavior by Tehran. It will be important to ensure that the United States intelligence community and IAEA have 

sufficient resources to monitor Iranian nuclear efforts, to strengthen the United 

States position in the Middle East by reinvigorating our regional alliances, to restore the credibility of United States military deterrence in the context of an overall 

strengthening of United States defense resources, to more firmly counter Iranian regional actions while pressing Iran to play a more constructive regional role, and to 

respond quickly to violations of Iran’s nuclear obligations as well as activities not 

covered by the agreement such as provocative missile tests. Frankly these are objectives we should have been pursuing now for years—not merely considering as a consequence of a nuclear accord—but have neglected. 

Most difficult of all, the next president is almost certain to find the nuclear constraints imposed on Iran by this accord to be unsatisfactory, if for no other reason 

than those limitations will begin to expire by the end of the next president’s tenure 

if he or she is reelected. In this sense, the question is not whether, but when, we 

will need to devise an alternative policy toward Iran’s nuclear and regional activities. The next president will need to rebuild international support for a strengthened Iran policy with fewer tools at his or her disposal, and may well be doing so 

in a less favorable international context given recent shifts in the international security environment and the likely strengthened diplomatic, economic, and strategic 

ties Iran may enjoy with other states in the future. 

As I noted at the outset, sensible foreign policy must clearly advance American 

interests at a cost that is outweighed by the policy’s projected benefits. It is not 

clear that the nuclear agreement with Iran meets these criteria. It does not clearly 

achieve the objective it sets out to—the prevention of a nuclear-armed Iran—nor 

does it complement our broader strategy in the Middle East or our global nonproliferation strategy. Instead, it entails significant costs that are justified primarily 

171 

by conjuring the specter of an even more costly war no analyst believed was imminent. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Takeyh. 

STATEMENT OF RAY TAKEYH, SENIOR FELLOW FOR MIDDLE 

EASTERN STUDIES, THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Dr. TAKEYH. Thanks, Chairman, for inviting me, as well as Senator Reed, in his absence. 

I think it’s fair to say, and I think it’s indisputable to start with, 

the suggestion that this agreement has been negotiated with a 

rather peculiar regime, perhaps one of the most peculiar in annals 

of history. Most non-Western revolutionary states eventually abandon their ideological mission for sake of integration into the global 

economy and the international system. This has not been the case 

with Iran. Its leaders remain committed to an ideology rooted in 

anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism. This resilience of Iran’s 

Islamist enmities is, indeed, striking. Iran’s leadership continues to 

cling to radical policies that are just not detrimental to its national 

interests, but have been rejected by a large segment of its population. 

The question then becomes, What is the impact of this nuclear 

agreement on Iran and its regional surge? I think you have to 

think about Iranian foreign policy as before and after 2011, because 

they’re very strikingly different. Since the Arab Awakenings of 

2011, the post-colonials Arab state system has essentially collapsed. That system was predicated on a dominant state of Egypt 

and Iraq. Egypt is too preoccupied with its internal squabbles to 

become a real player seeking regional leadership. Iraq is a fragmented state led by a Shiite government that’s also from the Arab 

Councils. 

Iran has embarked on a dramatic new mission that is seeking to 

project this power in corners of the Middle East it never thought 

possible. This is not traditional Iranian foreign policy of supporting 

terrorism and rejectionist groups against Israel. This is essentially 

a new form of imperialism that is becking Iran. Imperialism may 

be attractive, but it is also financially burdensome. Without this 

arms control agreement and the financial rewards it will bring, in 

terms of sanctions relief, release of entrapped funds, and new investments, Iran would find it difficult to subsidize its imperial 

surge. 

It is often suggested—it may have been suggested here—that the 

United States can still redress Iran’s malign activities, irrespective 

of the agreement. However, in the wake of the nuclear agreement, 

the United States will have a diminished coercive power to achieve 

this task. The fact of the matter is, for the past 30 years we have 

responded to Iranian terrorism and Iranian regional aggression by 

applying economic sanctions. As a result of this agreement, the 

United States is committed to relieving those sanctions over a period of time. Today, Iran is segregated from the global financial 

markets, and sanctions inhibit the Central Bank. As they essentially diminish over time, the room for United States President’s— 

future United States President’s coercive options will correspondingly be parsed. Subsequent administrations may have no choice 

172 

but to use force or accommodate Iran’s transgressions, whatever 

those transgressions may be. 

Some have argued—the administration witnesses have argued 

that the United States is still committed to pushing back on Iran 

in the region, irrespective of this arms control agreement. They 

should be asked how, specifically, they are planning to do that. 

How are we planning to dislodge Iran from deep penetration of 

Iraq? Nobody has thought more about this than the chairman. This 

may actually require employment of American forces. The low estimates I’ve seen is 10 to 15,000 troops. Are they prepared for that? 

How are we prepared to dislodge Iran from Syria and support of 

the Assad dynasty, one of its most consequential clients? How are 

we going to—Hezbollah and the Shiite militias who are acting as 

Iran’s lethal proxies? 

In the Gulf, the suggestion has been made that we’re going to 

sell more arms, which I don’t think will do the trick. As a matter 

of fact, I would suggest it’s counterproductive. These countries have 

deep-seated structural economic problems. Additional money spent 

on that is unlikely to ameliorate those problem. Iran doesn’t seek 

to invade the Gulf country, it seeks to subvert them. Therefore, by 

selling more arms and using those resources away from vital economic tasks, we exacerbate the problems of the Gulf without necessarily creating a barrier to a projection of Iranian power. 

Finally, let me address briefly the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 

Action, and hopefully suggest some ideas for its revision that may 

broaden its appeal and make it stronger. My colleague, Eric 

Edelman, who was here yesterday in the wise man hearing, kind 

of suggested some ways ahead. I’d like to reiterate some of those 

that perhaps will be found useful. There are others. You can have 

your own suggestion. 

I have not seen, and I continue not to see, any credible defense 

of the ‘‘sunset clause’’. I haven’t seen it because it doesn’t exist. 

One thing I would say is the—what the United States should do 

is essentially try to suggest that, after expiration of the sunset 

clause, all members of the P5+1, plus Iran, should vote on whether 

the restrictions should be continued for additional 10 years; and 

every 10 years, we should vote on that—the members of the treaty 

should vote on that. This way, essentially we can determine Iran’s 

nuclear program going ahead by a majority vote among the signatories of the agreement, as opposed to some arbitrary timeclock. 

A majority vote every 10 years, I think, would be—the precedent 

for that is the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty]. NPT expired after 

25 years, and then all member states voted to extend its restrictions. 

A second suggestion I would make, we really ought to go back 

and revisit the notion of if Iran should develop IR8s, the advanced 

centrifuges. Vice President Salehi has suggested that it operates 17 

times faster than IR1 centrifuges that Iran currently have, more 

than its current stockpile, allowing the Islamic Republic to dramatically increase its enrichment capacity and provide—capability. 

At the very least, these machines should not be allowed to develop. 

This particular agreement suffers from the same structural 

agreement that, to be frank, every arms control agreement in the 

past has. It is not equipped to deal with marginal incremental vioVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00178 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
173 

lations. To be fair, no arms control agreement is. INF was bought 

up here, as well. This is particularly the case because, as has been 

mentioned in this hearing, Iranian violations are likely to be incremental. Foreign Minister Zarif, in his presentation of the nuclear 

agreement to the Parliament, said, and I quote—’’Sanctions can be 

reimposed on Iran only in case of serious violation of its obligation 

and not in case of small-scale violations.’’ How do you deal with 

that, incremental violations that Foreign Minister Zarif is promising? The entire defense leadership of Iran—General Ja’afari, the 

head of the Revolutionary Guards, Defense Minister Dehghan, and 

the head of the ground forces, General Pourdastan—have suggested, since the enactment of the treaty, that they will not provide 

access to military installations. That’s something that we have to 

deal with. Again, incremental violations are difficult to prosecute. 

That’s the history of arms control agreement. This agreement falls 

within it. 

Finally, let me say, I have heard—Secretary Kerry, in particular, 

but others have suggested that the Revolutionary Guards are 

against this agreement. Frankly, I don’t see that. I know where to 

look for this sort of a thing. I have surveyed all their public speaking. I have surveyed all the publication and media outlets that are 

related to them. They have suggested that they will not allow access to facilities, but I have not seen the opposition. The most succinct presentation of the Revolutionary Guard position was in—2 

days ago, in one of their newspapers, Javan—translated ‘‘Young’’— 

and assessed some like this—pardon the translation—ultimately— 

quote, ‘‘Ultimately, the positive achievements of the nuclear agreement is that it increases the power of the Islamic Republic in the 

region. It has made Iran’s regional allies happy. It has made its adversaries unhappy.’’ I think that’s a fairly succinct presentation of 

the Revolutionary Guards. I see the notion that they’re opposing it 

as farfetched. 

I will say, some of the measures that I suggested for reconsidering the agreement can actually help strengthen it and actually 

provide a greater bipartisan foundation for the agreement that can 

potentially forestall an Iranian bomb, stem proliferation cascade in 

the Middle East, and hopefully anchor this agreement on the greater bipartisan foundation, therefore ensuring its durability. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Takeyh follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY RAY TAKEYH

THE PERMANENT REVOLUTION

More than three decades after its founding, the Islamic Republic remains an 

outlier in international relations. Most non-Western, revolutionary states eventually 

eschew a rigidly ideological foreign policy and accept the fundamental legitimacy of 

the international system. But Iran’s leaders have remained committed to an ideology rooted in anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism. The resilience of Iran’s Islamist 

enmities is striking. Iran’s leadership continues to cling to radical policies even 

when such practices are detrimental to the country’s other stated national interests 

and even when a sizable portion of the population rejects them. 

The question then becomes why Iran’s ruling elite continues to maintain this ideological template? After all, other revolutionary regimes, after initially using foreign 

policy for ideological purposes, later moved away from that approach. Why has 

China become more pragmatic but not Iran? The answer is that the Islamic Republic is different from its revolutionary counterparts in that the ideology of its state 

174 

is its religion. It may be a politicized and radicalized variation of Shia Islam, but 

religion is the official dogma. Revolutionary regimes usually change when their ardent supporters grow disillusioned and abandon their faith. It is, after all, much 

easier to be an ex-Marxist than an ex-Shia. In one instance, renouncing one’s faith 

is political defection; in the other, apostasy. Although the Islamic Republic has become widely unpopular, for a small but fervent segment of the population it is still 

an important experiment in realizing God’s will on earth. 

Iran’s revolution continues to challenge the concept of nation-state and the prevailing norms of the international system. The essence of Islamic Republic’s message is that the vitality of its vision at home is contingent on its relentless export. 

Moreover, because God’s vision was not confined to a single nation, Iran’s foreign 

policy would be an extension of its domestic revolutionary turmoil. For the clerical 

state, the global order is divided between two competing entities, nations whose priorities are defined by Western conventions; and Iran, whose ostensible purpose is 

to redeem a divine mandate. Of course, no country can persist on ideology alone. 

Iran has to operate its economy, deal with regional exigencies and meet the demands of its growing population. But its international relations would be characterized by revolutionary impulses continually struggling against the pull of pragmatism. 

The Islamic Republic’s internationalism has to have an antagonist, a foil against 

which to define itself. A caricatured concept of the West has become the central pillar of the mullahs’ Islamist imagination. The Western powers are rapacious imperialists determined to exploit the region’s wealth for their own aggrandizement. 

Islamist themes soon followed, portraying the West as seeking to subjugate Muslims 

and impose its cultural template in the name of modernity. Disunity among Muslims, the autocracies populating the region, the failure of the Arab clerical class to 

assume the mantle of opposition and the young people’s attraction to alien ideologies 

are seen as byproducts of a Western plot to sustain its dominance over Islam’s 

realm. 

In many ways, China’s experience encapsulates the paradigm of the life cycle of 

a non-Western revolutionary state. Initially, the new regime rejects the existing 

state system and norms of international behavior. Foreign-policy decision making is 

dominated by ideological considerations, even if there are concessions made to pragmatic concerns. But, over time, a clear trajectory emerges. As new leaders come to 

power, the ideology is modified and later abandoned in favor of ‘‘normal’’ relations 

with other countries, usually to promote economic development and modernization. 

Thus, Western policymakers continue to be puzzled over why Iran has not yet become a post-revolutionary country. What makes this case more peculiar is that by 

the late 1990s, Iran did appear to be following in the footsteps of states such as 

China and Vietnam. Yet this evolution was stymied by the resilience of the Islamic 

Republic’s ideological mission. The institutional juggernaut of the revolution has 

contributed to this success, as has the elite molded in Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s austere image. But Iran’s foreign policy also has played a crucial role in sustaining this domestic ideological identity. A narrow segment of the conservative 

elite, commanding key institutions of the state, has fashioned a foreign policy designed to maintain the ideological character of the regime. That remains a key ingredient in determining how the Islamic Republic thinks of itself and its role in a 

changing Middle East. 

IRAN AND THE NEW MIDDLE EAST IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE NUCLEAR AGREEMENT

For much of the past three decades, the Islamic Republic’s inflammatory rhetoric 

and aggressive posture concealed the reality of its strategic loneliness. Iran is, after 

all, a Persian nation surrounded by Arab states who were suspicious of its revolution and its proclaimed objectives. The Gulf sheikdoms arrayed themselves behind 

the American shield, Iraq sustained its animosity toward Iran long after the end 

of its war, and the incumbent Sunni republics maintained a steady belligerence. 

Iran nurtured its lethal Hezbollah prote ́ge ́ and aided Palestinian rejectionist groups, 

but appeared hemmed in by the wall of Arab hostility. All this changed when Iraq 

was reclaimed by the Shias and the Arab Spring shook the foundations of the Sunni 

order. Today, the guardians of the Islamic Republic see a unique opportunity to 

project their power in a region beset by unpredictable transitions. 

The key actors defining Iran’s regional policy are not its urbane diplomats mingling with their Western counterparts in Europe, but the Revolutionary Guards, 

particularly the famed Quds Brigade. For the commander of the Quds Brigade, General Qassim Soleimani, the struggle to evict America from the region began in Iraq. 

‘‘After the fall of Saddam, there was talk by various individuals that they should 

manage Iraq, but with Iraq’s religious leaders and Iran’s influence, America could 

175 

not reach that goal,’’ proclaimed Soleimani. The struggle moved on and today ‘‘Syria 

is the frontline of resistance.’’ For the hardliners, the Sunni states attempting to 

dislodge Assad is really a means of weakening Iran. The survival and success of the 

Assad dynasty is now a central element of Iran’s foreign policy. 

The question then becomes what impact the nuclear deal will have on Iran and 

its regional surge. How will the Islamic Republic spend the billions of dollars it 

would receive as a result of the accord? Proponents of agreement insist that Iran 

will funnel much of this newfound wealth into its depleted economy. By their telling, even during dire economic times, Iran prioritized funding for its malign activities and thus does not need to steer new money in their direction. Such a curious 

justification overlooks how Iran’s regional policies, and its internal dynamics, are 

undergoing momentous changes. 

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stands as one of the most successful Persian imperialists in the history of modern Iran. In the 1970s, at the height of his power, the 

shah did not enjoy a commanding influence in Iraq. Lebanon’s factional politics continued to elude him, the Assad dynasty was no mere subsidiary of Iran, and the 

Persian Gulf emirates resisted his pretensions. Today, Khamenei has essential control of much of the Iraqi state, he is the most important external actor in Syria, 

and Hezbollah provides him with not just a means of manipulating Lebanon’s politics, but also shock troops who can be deployed on various war fronts. In the Gulf, 

the United States’ crumbling alliances offer Iran many tempting opportunities. 

Proponents of the view that Iran will not become a more aggressive regional 

power in the aftermath of a deal ignore how the Middle East has evolved since the 

Arab awakenings of 2011. The post-colonial Arab state system that featured the 

dominant nations of Egypt and Iraq is no more. Egypt is too preoccupied with internal squabbles to offer regional leadership while Iraq is a fragmented nation ruled 

by a Shia government ostracized from Sunni Arab councils. Iran has embarked on 

a dramatic new mission and is seeking to project its power into corners of the Middle East in ways that were never possible before. This is not traditional Iranian foreign policy with its sponsorship of terrorism and support for rejectionist groups targeting Israel; imperialism beckons the mullahs, but it is also economically burdensome. Without an arms control agreement and the financial rewards it will bring— 

such as sanctions relief, the release of funds entrapped abroad, and new investments—Iran would find it difficult to subsidize this imperial surge. 

Still, the claim that Iran will invest a portion of the economic spoils of a deal on 

domestic needs is not entirely wrong. President Hassan Rouhani belongs to the wing 

of Iranian politics that has long been attracted to the so-called China model, whereby a regime purchases domestic consent by providing a measure of economic opportunity to its stifled citizenry. Two years into Rouhani’s tenure, his government 

stands as one of the most repressive in the post-revolutionary period. Many civil society activists languish in prison, media censorship has continued unabated, and the 

intelligence services remain abusive and unaccountable. The state cannot sustain 

such an oppressive order without ameliorating some of its constituents’ misfortunes. 

It may come to pass that Iran, with its small, badly mismanaged economy, will not 

be able to emulate China’s authoritarian model, especially since the Green Movement that enlivened Iran six years ago continues to cast a long shadow. But to have 

any hope of success in his aims, Rouhani needs an arms control agreement as much 

as Khamenei’s Islamist imperialism. 

The much-discussed terms of the impending agreement with Iran thus offer the 

theocracy all that it wants. The accord would concede a vast enrichment capacity, 

as well as accepting both a heavy water plant and a well-fortified underground enrichment facility that the United States once vowed to shutter. It would permit an 

elaborate research and development program while relying on an inspection regime 

that falls short of indispensable ‘‘anytime, anywhere’’ access. In the meantime, the 

sanctions architecture will be diminished, and the notion of ever ‘‘snapping back’’ 

sanctions into place once they are lifted is delusional. Because the agreement itself 

would be term-limited, there would be no practical limits on Iran’s nuclear ambitions upon its expiration. 

CONTAINING IRAN AND MAINTAINING THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION: 

The defenders of the nuclear agreement with Iran insist that the United States 

can still hold Iran accountable for its pernicious policies, regardless of an accord. 

Such assurances miss the point that maintenance of an arms control agreement is 

not always consistent with a coercive policy. 

Signing a nuclear agreement with a nation acknowledges that that state is a responsible actor. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action suggests that the Islamic 

Republic will be left with a substantial nuclear infrastructure that is likely to grow, 

176 

over time, in size and sophistication. By concluding an accord with Iran, the Obama 

administration is effectively vouching that the clerical regime is a suitable custodian 

of nuclear technologies and that it can be trusted with a program that may eventually reach an industrial scale. A nuclear agreement would not only legitimize Iran’s 

program but also signal to the region that the United States sees Iran as a power 

whose claims have to be taken into account. 

In the American imagination, arms control and de ́tente are joined. Many in Washington are likely to call for improved relations with Iran given the deal. If the two 

powers can settle the nuclear issue, this thinking holds, then surely they can cooperate on topics of common concern such as the rise of Islamic State and ending Syria’s 

civil war. A superpower that has grown tired of the burdens of the Arab world can 

reasonably turn to a seemingly responsible stakeholder to stabilize the region. Now, 

consider that in the 1970s the United States, feeling overstretched, turned to another arms control partner, the Soviet Union, for help extracting itself from Southeast Asia. The history of such actions isn’t the only concern here: The notion of constraining Iran has no place in a policy that looks for areas of cooperation between 

the two states. 

Even if the United States were determined to hold the line and push back against 

Iran’s actions in the region, in the wake of a nuclear deal it may not have the necessary coercive power. For much of the past three decades, Washington has responded to Iranian terrorism and regional aggression by applying economic sanctions. But a nuclear agreement would commit the United States to lessening the financial pressure on Iran. Today, Iran is segregated from the global financial markets and sanctions inhibit its central bank. But with such sanctions revoked under 

an accord, future U.S. presidents’ coercive options will be sparse. Subsequent administrations may have no choice but to use force or accommodate Iran, whatever its 

actions. 

Unlike the United States, revolutionary regimes that enter nuclear agreements 

tend to see them as pathways to asserting power. During the heydays of arms control in the 1970s, the Soviet Union embarked on one of the most aggressive stages 

of its foreign policy. Moscow and its proxies took up the cause of militant actors 

throughout the Third World. As part of the Helsinki Accords, the Kremlin obtained 

from Washington a formal recognition of its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. 

The decade ended with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—the first time the Soviet 

Union had invaded a country outside Eastern Europe. In retrospect, these were a 

series of foolish and costly decisions. The Soviet experience, however, belies the notion that arms control accords moderate ideological regimes. 

The Islamic Republic looks upon the United States as a crestfallen imperial state 

seeking to dispense with its Arab inheritance. A staple of Supreme Leader Ayatollah 

Ali Khamenei’s rhetoric is that the United States is a declining power, beset by 

problems at home. In his telling, it is the United States that needed an arms control 

agreement as a means of paving its exit from the Middle East. With Iran’s actions 

and posture suggesting it is about to embark on its own expansive imperial mission, 

there might be little in way of coercive leverage that Washington can bring to bear. 

A hegemonic Iran may yet be the most consequential legacy of a nuclear accord. 

THE ROAD AHEAD

The United States cannot have a viable strategy of pushing back on Iran without 

re-considering key aspects of the JCPOA. As the JCPOA stands today, it is one of 

the most technologically permissive arms control accords in history. It is an agreement that is likely to spark a cascade of proliferation as Iran’s rivals and enemies 

seek to match its capabilities. However, a number of revisions to the agreement can 

help in strengthening it and ensuring that it is a less-deficient accord. 

My colleague Eric Edelman and I recently proposed that the United States should 

return to the negotiating table and revisit some of the most problematic aspects of 

this agreement: 

1. One of the most problematic aspects of the JCPOA is its sunset clause whereby 

the most essential restraints on Iran’s program begin to fade in a decade. The 

United States should insist that upon the expiration of the sunset clause, the 

P5 + 1 countries and Iran should vote on whether to extend the agreement for 

an additional 10 years. A majority vote every 10 years should determine the 

longevity of the treaty and not some arbitrary time-clock. The precedent for 

such a move is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) itself. After the 

NPT expired after 25 years, it was not simply cast aside but all member states 

voted to extend it in perpetuity. 

2. Limit Iran’s centrifuges to IR–1s: The other disturbing aspect of the JCPOA 

is its research and development stipulations. Under the current agreement, 

177 

Iran will have a right to begin installing advanced IR–8 centrifuges starting 

year 8. These machines operate approximately 17 times faster than Iran’s current stock of centrifuges, allowing the Islamic Republic to dramatically increase 

its enrichment capacity. Moreover, given how few such machines will be needed to enrich uranium, Iran can easily develop small, surreptitious installations 

that may escape detection. By limiting Iran to its more primitive models, we 

can best guard against a sneak out option. 

3. A more intrusive inspection regime: There has been much debate about ‘‘anytime anywhere’’ inspections versus the current plan that calls for an elaborate 

procedures and a 24-day waiting period. The inspection modality should resemble to the extent possible the South African model. When South Africa finally 

renounced its nuclear weapons, it provided the IAEA a full accounting of its 

previous nuclear history and access to its military installations. South Africa 

declared that it was prepared to offer the IAEA anytime, anywhere access. In 

practice, this meant that the inspectors could visit sites in South Africa in as 

little as a day. South Africa was determined to disarm and thus had no qualms 

about such extraordinary procedures. If Iran is similarly committed to proving 

its goodwill, it should concede to such a verification system. 

4. The JCPOA has sensibly stipulated that all of Iran’s spent fuel from its plutonium production will be send out permanently. A similar procedure should be 

in place for Iran’s enriched uranium. In essence, the enrichment aspect of the 

agreement should mirror its plutonium dimension. 

5. The agreement must also address Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal. The delivery 

systems are an indispensable aspect of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. It is 

inconceivable that the pathways to Iran’s nuclear weapons aspirations can be 

obstructed without addressing this important pillar of that program. 

These and other measures can best forestall and Iranian bomb and stem the proliferation cascade in the Middle East. These steps are fairly modest and reasonable. 

It is unlikely that America’s negotiating partners would disagree that these measures strengthen the agreement and perhaps anchor it on a bipartisan footing. I believe that the European states would support the United States should it want to 

revise aspects of this agreement. Nor do I think that a Russian Federation that 

views Iran’s oil sector as competitive to its own petroleum industry will strenuously 

object. If these powers agree, China will not obstruct a consensus rooted on simple 

but important set of demands. 

The one way that Congress can ensure that the executive branch returns to the 

negotiating table is to disapprove the JCPOA as it currently stands. There are 

ample precedents in the history of arms control whereby congressional objections 

has led U.S. diplomats to return to the table. During the Cold War, Senator Henry 

Jackson refused to approve SALT I unless the Nixon Administration agreed to his 

amendment that all future arms control accords between the United States and the 

Soviet Union must aim for strategic parity. His amendment expressed a sense of 

Congress that requested ‘‘the President to seek future treaty that, inter alia, would 

not limit the United States to levels of inter-continental strategic forces inferior to 

the limits provided for the Soviet Union.’’ The Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 

was also initially blocked by the Senate because of concerns over Soviet compliance. 

To ease congressional anxieties, the Nixon/Ford administrations had to engage in 

two additional years of negotiations. During the presidency of Bill Clinton, the Senate agreed to the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Test Ban Treaty only after 

inclusion of 28 conditions. 

These and many other such examples testify to the important role that Congress 

has played in ensuring that the United States negotiates the best possible agreement. Given the enormous flaws of the JCPOA and the enormity of its importance, 

the Congress should aim to do no less. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Dr. GORDON. 

STATEMENT OF PHILIP GORDON, SENIOR FELLOW, THE 

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Dr. GORDON. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman, Senators. I really appreciate the opportunity to speak before the committee this 

morning. 

178 

Like other speakers, I think this is a hugely consequential issue, 

and it really deserves all of the attention you and other committees 

are giving it. 

As I think many of you know, I was part of the administration 

from 2013 to 2015. I was the White House Coordinator for the Middle East, so I was very much involved in the efforts to get this 

agreement. But, obviously, here this morning I’m speaking as a private citizen and expressing only my personal views. 

My bottom line on this agreement is that I think it’s in the National security interests of the United States, and I hope Congress 

will support it. I say that, not because I think it is a perfect deal. 

It’s not a perfect deal. Like every one of you, I could spell out a 

number of ways in which it could be better and stronger. In fact, 

Ray just did so, and I would be happy to have all of the elements 

that he presented. 

The reason I think it’s a good deal and I hope you’ll support it 

is that I just think it’s far better than any realistic alternative. 

Without this deal, I am afraid we would very quickly be put in a 

position of facing a choice between an Iran that is steadily advancing its nuclear capabilities, as it has over the last decade, or using 

military force to temporarily stop it. 

As for the option that some always want to hope for, that we just 

keep on the pressure until Iran comes back to the table for a better 

deal or a perfect deal, I’m afraid that’s an illusion. Think about, for 

the past decade, we have had significant sanctions on Iran, and, 

during that period of time, we’ve seen Iran steadily advance its 

program to where it is today, from zero to 19,000 centrifuges, accumulating a very significant stockpile of low-enriched uranium, 

enough to make a number of nuclear weapons, an almost completed 

heavy water reactor at Arak. All without significant monitoring 

and verification. So, that’s why I’m afraid—and continuing research 

and development on advanced centrifuges—and that’s why I’m 

afraid that, if we reject this deal, we will end up not with a better 

one, but with an Iran that continues down the path that it has 

been on. 

It’s worth thinking about other cases, as well, when you think 

about this issue. Can we just continue to squeeze them until they 

give us everything we want? We squeezed North Korea pretty hard. 

North Korea is far poorer and more isolated than Iran. The result 

was not them coming and giving us everything we wanted, but a 

nuclear weapon state. We squeezed Iraq pretty hard, to the point 

of genuinely crippling sanctions, and demanded absolute access, 

and, instead of coming to the table and giving us everything we 

want, we actually had to implement that credible threat of force. 

Every case is different, but my point in mentioning those cases 

is simply to underscore that there’s no guarantee that, even if we 

could maintain these powerful sanctions and had a credible threat 

of force, that Iran would come back to the table and give us everything we want. I think there’s plenty of reason, actually, to believe 

that it would not. 

So, the issue is not whether we can use leverage to get Iran to 

agree with our list of desirables, but whether this deal that we 

were able to negotiate effectively cuts off its path to a nuclear 

weapon, which is what the sanctions were put in place to do. I 

179 

think it does, thanks to the joint efforts of Congress and the administration to put the sanctions regime in place. 

Now, others have made the positive case for how, in the administration and now others, have made the—the other witnesses before 

this committee and others—have explained how it blocks off those 

paths. I won’t take my time to do that, because I know even that 

case has left a number of Senators with concerns, and I’d rather 

just take my time and address a couple of those concerns. My written testimony goes into more, but just let me just mention three 

that I know are high on many lists. 

One, which was central to this hearing this morning, is the issue 

of Iran using freed-up financial assets to pursue nefarious ends in 

the region. We are all rightly concerned that Iran will use some of 

the assets it gains from sanctions relief to support its regional foreign policy agenda, which, in many ways, threatens our partners 

and our interests. I don’t think that’s invalid. Therefore, in an ideal 

world, we would keep all of these sanctions in place and freeze all 

of Iran’s assets, and get a good nuclear deal at the same time. But, 

frankly, that was never a realistic option. The deal on the table— 

any nuclear deal, even one that left Iran with 500 centrifuges or 

zero centrifuges instead of 5,000, always implied that there would 

be sanctions relief in exchange for the nuclear agreement. So, in 

that sense, to insist that sanctions be—relief be excluded from a 

nuclear deal with Iran is probably to exclude a nuclear deal, itself. 

If you don’t have a nuclear deal, that means no nuclear constraints, 

no enhanced monitor and verification, an Iran that continues to do 

all of these nefarious things that it—as it has been doing while 

under sanctions, and, I think, genuinely increasing difficulties in 

getting our partners to maintain sanctions once it’s clear—once it 

became clear that our aim went beyond the nuclear issue and essentially involved transforming Iran’s foreign policy, which is a 

highly desirable goal, but one unlikely to receive the support of the 

international community to pursue these sanctions. I am confident 

that, through continued and increased military and intelligence 

support for our partners in the region, who, by the way, collectively 

spend far more on defense than Iran does, we can continue to contain Iran just as we did before these international sanctions were 

put in place. I’d be happy to elaborate on the—that in the discussion. 

A second major concern, I know, of a number of Senators, is that 

the deal allows Iran’s nuclear program to expand once the so-called 

‘‘sunset provisions’’ expire. Again, I would say the same thing. In 

an ideal world, we would have negotiated an agreement that lasted 

indefinitely or at least for many decades. Obviously, the administration sought to get as long an agreement as possible. But here, 

too, I don’t think it was realistic to imagine that Iran was ever 

going to agree to a deal that it—kept the same tight constraints on 

its civil nuclear energy program forever. Asking for that deal would 

mean no deal, and tomorrow Iran could proceed with its program. 

So, while this part of the agreement also isn’t perfect, it nonetheless involves some very serious constraints for a very significant 

amount of time: until 2025 for the number of centrifuges, until 

2030 for the limited nuclear stockpile, until 2035 for centrifuge production, until 2040 for access to uranium mines and mills in Iran, 

180 

and indefinitely for adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 

commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons, and the application of 

the IAEA’s additional protocol, which requires access by inspectors 

to any suspected sites. 

Finally, the premise of the deal, we should keep in mind, is that 

Iran used this quite long period of time to demonstrate that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. If it fails to do that, all of the 

same options available to us now will be available to us then, including sanctions and military force—I think more likely, in that 

case, with the support of the international community. I think 

there are ways we can reinforce this insistence that Iran use this 

period to demonstrate its peaceful intentions. Again, be glad to 

elaborate those—on those in the discussion. 

The third concern I’ll mention here very briefly is that inspections are not sufficiently rigorous. I respectfully disagree with that 

assessment. There’s been a lot of focus on this—the standard of socalled anytime/anywhere inspections, which I think is an unrealistic standard only likely to apply after a military defeat or occupation. I think there’s been a failure to appreciate just how extensive 

the verification mechanisms in this agreement are, including not 

just the increased monitoring and daily access to the declared enrichment facilities, but the monitoring of the entire nuclear fuel 

cycle. In other words, to cheat successfully, Iran would have to 

somehow mine and mill uranium, convert it to gas at an industrial 

facility, enrich that gas to a weapons-grade enriched uranium at a 

different facility, and successfully develop a covert weaponization 

program, all at the time—at the same time, while escaping different monitoring programs. Anything is possible, but I think that’s 

a rather implausible scenario. The most important thing to say 

about it, of course, is, whatever you think about this inspections regime, it’s better than the one we would have if we didn’t have this 

agreement, which is much more minimal and would allow Iran to 

do all of these things tomorrow. 

Again, my written testimony goes into some of the other concerns 

I know you have, so I will just sum up, again, by repeating, Mr. 

Chairman and others, I don’t want to suggest for a minute that 

these—that the concerns that I listed, or others, are not legitimate. 

They absolutely are. Again, that’s why I appreciate these kinds of 

hearings. But, I do believe that, when you weigh the advantages 

and the disadvantage of the deal, the advantages outweigh them, 

and that’s why I hope Members of Congress will support it. 

As I’ve said, we can all describe ways to make this deal, quote/ 

unquote, ‘‘better,’’ but holding out for a perfect deal could mean no 

deal at all, and I really do believe that rejection of the agreement 

at this point, which, of course, was supported by every member of 

the U.N. Security Council and just about every country in the 

world, would result, not in a better deal, but in the continued expansion of the Iranian nuclear program while making it more difficult to keep international sanctions in place. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gordon follows:] 

181 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY PHILIP GORDON

Thank You, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and all the other distinguished members of this Committee for inviting me to testify here this morning. The 

Iran nuclear deal is a hugely consequential issue for our country and the world, and 

it deserves the serious debate it is getting before this and other Committees and 

in the Congress and the country as a whole. As you know, from March 2013 until 

April 2015 I was the White House Coordinator for the Middle East and therefore 

intimately involved in the effort to reach this agreement, right up until the Lausanne Framework was announced on April 2. Here this morning, of course, I am 

speaking as a private citizen and expressing only my personal views. 

My bottom line is that this agreement is in the national security interest of the 

United States, and I believe Congress should approve it. I say that not because it 

is a perfect deal—it is not, and I, like all of you, could easily come up with a list 

of changes we would make if it were only up to us. Instead I support it because 

I believe that it is far better than any realistic alternative. Without this deal we 

would very quickly face the unpalatable choice between acquiescing to an Iranian 

nuclear weapons capability or using military force to temporarily stop it. As for the 

option of simply maintaining pressure and threatening force until the Iranians accept a so-called ‘‘better deal,’’ I believe that is an illusion. For the past decade and 

more, we have increased sanctions pressure on Iran with the goal of getting it to 

abandon its program entirely—and the result has been a steady expansion of that 

program to where it is today—19,000 centrifuges; a stockpile of more than ten tons 

of low-enriched uranium (LEU); an almost completed heavy-water reactor at Arak; 

and increasingly advanced research and development (R&D) of centrifuges. I believe 

that rejecting this deal would result not in Iran agreeing to all our demands or even 

a ‘‘better deal’’ but the continued expansion of that program. 

Keep in mind that in North Korea—a country many times poorer and more isolated than Iran—we hoped maximizing economic pressure would bring the regime 

to its knees and oblige it to give up its weapons program, and instead North Korea 

became a nuclear-weapons state. In Iraq, we imposed starvation-inducing sanctions 

to deprive the Iraqis of the wherewithal to continue with their WMD [weapons of 

mass distruction] programs. We insisted Saddam Hussein allow completely unfettered access to his weapons sites or face war, he refused, and we ended up going 

to war. The point is there is no guarantee that even powerful sanctions and the 

threat of force will lead Iran to eliminate all aspects of its nuclear program, and 

plenty of reason to think that it will not. The issue is not whether we can use leverage to get Iran to agree to everything we might want, but whether this deal ensures 

that Iran’s nuclear program is and will remain exclusively peaceful. I believe it does, 

thanks to the efforts of Congress and the administration to leverage sanctions in 

pursuit of that goal. 

Others have testified before this Committee and others about the many ways this 

deal blocks Iran’s path to a nuclear weapons capability. These include reducing 

Iran’s number of installed centrifuges by two-thirds; reducing its stockpile of LEU 

to just 300 kg for 15 years; reconfiguring the heavy-water reactor at Arak; constraining centrifuge R&D; and providing for rigorous monitoring backed by the possibility of sanctions ‘‘snapback.’’ These and other steps—which are required prior to 

any sanctions relief for Iran—will mean that Iran’s breakout timeline (the time required to enrich enough uranium for one nuclear weapon) will be extended from the 

two months it is today to at least a year—more than enough time to detect violations and respond as necessary, including with renewed sanctions and/or the use of 

military force. Still, I know many Senators still have concerns—legitimate concerns, 

I might add—so I would like to address them head on. 

One major concern is that the deal frees up financial assets that will be put to 

nefarious ends. We are all rightly concerned that Iran will use some of the assets 

it gains from sanctions relief to support its regional foreign policy agenda, which in 

many ways threatens our partners and our interests. Thus in an ideal world we 

could keep all the current sanctions on Iran and get a good nuclear deal at the same 

time. But that was never a realistic option, and the concerns about lifting sanctions 

would be the same whether the deal allowed Iran to keep 5,000 centrifuges, or zero. 

To insist that sanctions relief be excluded from a nuclear deal, in other words, 

would be to exclude a nuclear deal itself. This would mean no nuclear constraints, 

no enhanced monitoring or verification, no end to Iranian meddling even while sanctions are still in place, and increasing difficulties in getting international partners 

to maintain sanctions once it was clear our aims went beyond the nuclear issue. 

I am confident that through continued and increased military and intelligence 

support to our partners in the region—who collectively spend many times more on 

defense than Iran does—we can continue to contain Iran, just as we did before the 

182 

international sanctions were put in place. I am also confident that rejecting any nuclear deal that unfreezes Iran’s assets and provides for sanctions relief would leave 

the nuclear issue unresolved and force us to watch Iran’s program grow or stop it 

with military force—all without support from our partners. The challenge of dealing 

with Iran in the region would of course be far greater if Iran were allowed to become 

a nuclear-weapons state. 

A second concern is that the deal allows Iran’s nuclear program to expand once 

the ‘‘sunset’’ provisions expire. Again in an ideal world, all the constraints on Iran’s 

nuclear program would be indefinite, or at least last for many decades. But here, 

too, it was never realistic to expect Iran would agree to indefinite restrictions on 

its civil energy program. While not perfect, many of the most important restrictions 

last for a very long time—until 2025 for number of centrifuges; until 2030 for the 

limited nuclear stockpile; until 2035 for centrifuge production; until 2040 for access 

to Iran’s uranium mines and mills; and indefinitely for adherence to the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty, the commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons, and the 

application of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, which requires access by inspectors 

to any suspected sites. Finally, the premise of the deal is that Iran must use this 

period of time to demonstrate that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. If it 

fails to do that, all of the same options available to us now will be available to us 

then, including sanctions and military force. To reinforce this point, the President 

and Congress should make clear now that violations of the agreement during this 

period will be considered inconsistent with Iran’s pledge never to seek nuclear weapons, and the United States will act accordingly. Even after certain restrictions expire, other Iranian actions—such as the development of highly-enriched uranium— 

could also be considered indications of intent inconsistent with the agreement. In 

any case, whatever concerns we might have about sunset provisions would have to 

be even greater about the absence of a deal—since without a deal Iran can begin 

doing all of these things right away. 

A third concern is that inspections are not sufficiently rigorous. I disagree with 

this assessment. There has been much focus on the unrealistic standard of ‘‘anywhere, anytime’’ inspections, which no sovereign country would ever accept, except 

after a military defeat or under occupation. I think there has also been a failure 

to appreciate just how extensive the verification mechanisms in this agreement are, 

including not just continued monitoring and daily access to declared enrichment facilities but the monitoring of the entire nuclear fuel cycle. To cheat successfully, 

Iran would have to somehow mine and mill uranium, convert it to gas at an industrial facility, enrich it to weapons grade at a different facility, and successfully develop a covert weaponization program—all without being detected by separate monitoring regimes. Anything is possible, but that is a rather implausible scenario. 

I also believe there has been significant misunderstanding of the notion that Iran 

has ‘‘24 days’’ to allow for inspections. The IAEA’s Additional Protocol—which Iran 

agreed in this deal to implement forever—requires Iran to provide access whenever 

and wherever the IAEA needs it. The problem is that there has never been a mechanism for resolving disputes over access, meaning that even AP signatories could 

drag out a dispute over access forever. That is what this agreement adds, and which 

never existed before. So while in certain circumstances Iran may be able to find 

ways to keep inspectors out of a suspected site for up to 24 days, that process itself 

would set off clear alarm bells, and Iran can certainly not hide an entire nuclear 

fuel chain under the alleged protection of this provision. 

Finally and perhaps most importantly: Whatever you think of the inspections regime—and as you can tell I think it’s pretty good—it is far better than the inspections regime we would have in the absence of this agreement. 

A fourth concern is that ‘‘snapback’’ of sanctions is not strong enough. Actually, 

I believe our power to snap back international sanctions is one of the most impressive aspects of this agreement. During the negotiations, Iran (as well as Russia and 

China) vigorously opposed leaving this power in United States hands, for the Russians as a matter of principle and for the Iranians because it could lead companies 

to think twice before investing in Iran. But that is effectively what they have done. 

While disputes must pass through a somewhat convoluted resolution process involving a Joint Commission and an Advisory Board, the bottom line is that if the United 

States says Iran has not complied with the agreement, not just United States but 

also United Nations sanctions can be re-imposed. That power should provide a 

strong disincentive against any Iranian temptation to cheat. It will also give companies reason to pause before investing in Iran absent evidence that Iran intends to 

abide fully by the agreement. 

Finally, there is the concern that the agreement will spur nuclear proliferation 

throughout the Middle East. All Americans are rightly concerned about the potential for nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, which is one reason why this deal 

183 

is so important. It is legitimate to worry that if Iran is eventually allowed to develop 

a large-scale uranium enrichment program, other states in the region will demand 

one as well. 

But I believe this concern is overstated. Iran, after all, already has a fairly largescale enrichment program—built up starting in the early 2000s and including domestic uranium mining and milling, gas conversion, and centrifuge production and 

R&D—and no one has yet sought to duplicate it. Nuclear enrichment is a costly, 

technologically challenging, and for most countries unnecessary process that raises 

international alarm bells about a country’s intentions. In any case, for at least a 

decade this deal pushes Iran significantly further away from a nuclear capability 

rather than bringing it closer—it would make little sense for countries in the region 

to forego their own nuclear capability while Iran is two months away from nuclear 

breakout but decide to pursue one when that timeline is extended to over a year. 

There are, moreover, steps we can take to mitigate the risk of other countries 

seeking their own nuclear programs. The first, to state the obvious, is to ensure that 

Iran does not develop the capacity to build a nuclear weapon—which this agreement 

does—and to reiterate the President’s pledge to do whatever is necessary to prevent 

that. The second—which the administration is already doing—is to bolster our defense cooperation with regional partners to ensure they do not feel vulnerable vis 

& vis Iran, and to make clear in word and in deed that the United States will not 

allow Iran to use even a potential nuclear weapons capability to threaten them. 

While none of these measures can guarantee that others in the region will not 

show an eventual interest in their own nuclear programs if this deal goes ahead, 

consider the scenario in the absence of a deal: Iran advances its program, installs 

more centrifuges, builds a large LEU stockpile, and finishes its heavy water reactor 

at Arak. That scenario seems far more likely to lead others in the region to imitate 

Iran than the implementation of this deal. 

Once again, Mr. Chairman, I do not want to suggest for one minute that these 

are not legitimate concerns, or that the deal is somehow perfect. I do, however, firmly believe that the advantages of this deal strongly outweigh the disadvantages, and 

urge Members of Congress to support it. As I have said, we can all describe ways 

we could make the deal ‘‘better,’’ but holding out for a perfect deal could mean no 

deal at all. I believe that rejection of this agreement—supported by the entire U.N. 

Security Council and just about every country in the world, including all the key 

players on sanctions—would result not in a better deal but rather in the continued 

expansion of the Iranian nuclear program while making it difficult to keep international sanctions in place. It would not necessarily result in war, but it could well 

mean having to decide soon between allowing the continued expansion of that program and using military force to stop it. This agreement would set back the Iranian 

program significantly while providing for unprecedented monitoring of that program, which seems a better option than either of those two paths. 

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Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Mr. NEPHEW. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD NEPHEW, FELLOW, THE CENTER ON 

GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 

Mr. NEPHEW. Thank you, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member 

Reed, and other distinguished members of this committee, for the 

privilege of speaking to you today. 

I will focus my remarks on three reasons to conclude that this 

is a good deal, from a regional perspective. 

First, it will create a 10- to 15-year band of time in which fears 

of an Iranian nuclear weapon will be much reduced. Since 2005, 

Iranian breakout time has dwindled to 2 to 3 months. Prior to the 

Joint [Comprehensive] Plan of Action, there were fears that Iran 

could stage an undetected breakout. With this deal, such an effort 

is not possible from declared facilities, and far more difficult to pull 

off from covert facilities. This is a welcome development for regional stability. 

Second, I believe this deal will reduce the chances of a nuclear 

arms race in the Middle East. The argument that a deal creates 

the strategic pretext for Arab nuclear weapons programs is logically flawed. Iran has been building its enrichment program for 

decades, and, in the last 10 years, notwithstanding U.N. Security 

Council obligations to stop. If there was ever a time to pursue enrichment, it was then. But, we simply have not seen any evidence 

that countries in the region are seriously pursuing enrichment programs, let alone nuclear weapons. The most advanced nuclear state 

in the Arab world, the UAE, has specifically pledged not to pursue 

enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. In exchange, the UAE 

[United Arab Emirates] is constructing advanced power reactors 

that will provide it with the civil nuclear energy it wants without 

the proliferation risks we all fear. There has been no indication 

that the UAE will backtrack on the decision it’s made, or that any 

other country in the Middle East is prepared to undertake the massive effort required to construct an enrichment program. Similarly, 

though many offhandedly suggest that the Saudis could buy a warhead from Pakistan, even the request would present real problems 

for the Pakistanis, who are still emerging from the pariah status 

that AQ Khan [Abdul Qadeer Khan] created. Pakistan’s rebuff of 

Saudi Arabia’s request for ground troops in Yemen suggest Pakistan will not accede to every Saudi request. 

Third, this agreement may be the start of a process of integrating Iran better into the international community and moderating its bad behavior. This may not happen. At a minimum, Iran’s 

leaders will have to wrestle with the benefits and risks of economic 

openness as a result of this deal, as well as the threat of returning 

sanctions if they break its terms. 

Now, of course, the deal does not solve everything and, as other 

witnesses have testified, may make some problems worse in the region. Since 1979, Iran has supported terrorism in causes we oppose, even when impoverished by war or sanctions. The nuclear 

deal does not address this problem, but neither did strategic economic pressure. It is unlikely that holding back relief, at the risk 

of a nuclear deal, would have. 

191 

To better manage the regional implications of the deal, I believe 

that four steps ought to be taken: 

First, we should and must continue to reaffirm our support for 

our partners in the region. This should include arms sales, but only 

as part of a broader package of cooperation across the security and 

economic spheres. The United States should also stand ready to 

use force against Iran, should it cheat on the deal. This is a meaningful concept for the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council], which acknowledged the crucial nature of U.S. security assurances in its 

statement on Monday in support of the deal. 

Second, we must have an active intelligence-sharing relationship, 

particularly with respect to Iran and its compliance with the nuclear deal. Partners will trust the situation remains in control if 

they know what we know. 

Third, we must have an active nuclear cooperation policy with 

countries throughout the Arab world. Through these, we should 

demonstrate that effective civil nuclear programs can be built without enrichment and reprocessing, in practice, even if prohibitions 

are not part of cooperation agreements. 

Fourth, we must enforce the terms of the deal vigorously, as well 

as use our sanctions authorities to target Iranian activities 

throughout the region. This deal is not U.S. unilateral sanctions 

disarmament. Snap-back is always possible and scalable. Beyond 

the nuclear issue, the United States retains a number of sanctions 

authorities that will continue to exact consequences for Iranian violations of human rights and damage Iran’s ability to engage in terrorism financing. The United States will still be able to pressure 

banks and companies into not doing business with the IRGC [Iran’s 

Revoluntionary Guards Corps], the Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani, 

and Iran’s military and missile forces. This is both due to direct 

risk of U.S. secondary sanctions, which remain in place, and an improvement in international banking practices since 9/11. The 

United States will also retain its ability to impose sanctions on 

those trading with Iran in conventional arms, as well as with respect to ballistic missiles, even after U.N. restrictions lapse. 

That said, we ought to seek ways to enhance these authorities. 

Certainly, Iran could judge that United States sanctions in these 

areas are unacceptable, and walk away. Partners could, likewise, 

view the United States as being in the wrong if our sanctions enforcement appears capricious. But, international reaction to U.S. 

actions will always depend on the context. If the rationale for doing 

so is credible, then we can convince others to support us. For Iran, 

it will have to face the prospect of all of our sanctions coming back 

into play. This will present real difficulties to decisionmakers in 

Tehran. 

To conclude, though it is not a perfect deal, I believe that the nuclear deal reached by the United States, the P5+1 partners, and 

Iran meets our needs, preserves our future options, and improves 

the security and stability of the Middle East. I urge Congress to 

make the right choice and to support it. 

[The prepared statement of Richard Nephew follows:] 

192 

1World Bank data, downloaded on July 20, 2015, and available at: http:// 

data.worldbank.org/country/iran-islamic-republic? 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY RICHARD NEPHEW

Thank you, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and other distinguished 

members of this Committee for inviting me to speak here today. It is a privilege 

and an honor to speak to you on a subject to which I have devoted nearly twelve 

years of my professional life as a civil servant at the Department of Energy, Department of State, and National Security Council: how to address the problems created 

by Iran’s nuclear program. In my current position at the Center on Global Energy 

Policy at Columbia, I have continued my study of the use of economic statecraft to 

deal with such national security challenges, with Iran as the centerpiece. 

I would like to begin by extending my personal gratitude to the members of the 

United States negotiating team, all of whom set aside personal commitments large 

and small in the pursuit of the agreement reached in Vienna on July 14. Regardless 

of how one evaluates this deal, one cannot contest that the people who worked so 

hard and diligently to conclude it did so with anything other than the intention of 

addressing a profound threat to U.S. national security. These men and women, 

many of whom I can call friends, are dedicated to stopping Iran from acquiring a 

nuclear weapon. Some of them have pursued this goal for decades. We are all most 

fortunate that this country produces diplomats, civil servants, and experts like 

these. 

I would like to offer here my evaluation of the Iran nuclear deal first as a general 

matter and then focus specifically on the regional implications of the deal. In doing 

so, I will describe what the deal itself has achieved, the consequences of this 

achievement, and the alternatives that would be facing us absent the deal. I come 

to the conclusion that, compared to the most realistic alternatives, this deal is a 

very good one. 

The agreement reached two weeks ago will prevent Iran from having a credible 

opportunity to produce weapons-grade nuclear material for use in a bomb for at 

least 10 years and likely beyond that. It does this through a combination of restrictions and monitoring that will ensure Iran faces a long path to weapons-acquisition, 

which can be detected almost as soon as it begins. In this respect, President Obama 

and his successors will have the time they need to evaluate Iranian compliance with 

the agreement, and to take any necessary decisions to address Iranian deficiencies. 

This includes the use of military force. President Obama has not taken this off 

of the table through this deal, nor would any President. Instead, President Obama 

has ensured that if such a decision is ever needed, it can be undertaken with greater time and clarity as to Iranian intentions. 

SETTING THE CONTEXT

To some degree, Iran has been at the precipice of a nuclear weapons capability 

since it first began operating centrifuges at the underground Natanz plant in 2007. 

Both Presidents Bush and Obama have had to consider regularly whether the Iranian nuclear program was getting out of hand, growing too large to be addressed 

through diplomacy. 

In my opinion, we were reaching just such a dangerous crossroads in 2013. Iran’s 

nuclear program had grown to involve over 20,000 installed centrifuges, nearly 

7,000 kilograms of up-to-5 percent enriched uranium gas (enough for multiple weapons), nearly 200 kilograms of up-to-20 percent enriched uranium gas (nearly enough 

for one weapon), and a reactor at Arak that was nearly finished. Moreover, Iranian 

cooperation with inspectors at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was 

stagnant, with access granted to confirm only that declared nuclear material was 

where it ought to be. While important, outstanding questions about Iran’s past nuclear program remained unaddressed and with little prospect of answers or access 

forthcoming. 

At the same time, sanctions were beginning to run out of steam. International oil 

prices were over $100 a barrel and prospects for taking away further Iranian oil revenues were slim. Despite aggressive diplomatic efforts, including at the Presidential 

level, we were getting fewer returns on our demands for oil reductions. Iran was 

the worse for our sanctions, suffering a GDP contraction of 6.6 percent between 

2012–2013 according to the World Bank. 1 Unemployment was high, as was inflation. But, still, Iran was continuing to expand its nuclear program and engage in 

all manner of destabilizing activities in the region. 

This was leading to calls both within the United States and from our partners 

to consider military action. The problem was that no one could articulate a theory 

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of such action that would be decisive in stopping Iran from ever getting a nuclear 

weapon without involving regime change. 

Faced with this situation, the United States decided to test the proposition that 

newly-elected President Rouhani was committed to fulfilling his campaign promise 

to seek removal of sanctions and a new relationship with the international community. Talks began in secret to see if a first step arrangement could be concluded that 

would, if not step back from the brink of military confrontation or an Iranian nuclear weapon, at least hold us at the lip. Such an arrangement would require—and 

did elicit in the end—major nuclear concessions from the Iranians. They would be 

forced to halt their progress, something they had sworn never to do, and even roll 

the program back in key respects. Sanctions relief would need to be part of it, in 

order to to create incentives to keep Iran negotiating for a final deal. It had to promise Iran a return on its investment but not make a final deal meaningless. 

The result was the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), a much-derided document at the 

time of its announcement but one that I think even critics would grudgingly agree 

has served these purposes well. 

Iran made clear during the negotiations on the JPOA that they would not be able 

to accept it as a permanent arrangement; the sanctions still in place were too severe 

and political pressure would prove toxic for Rouhani if talks went on too long. So, 

they wanted to complete the deal faster. Unfortunately, a similar desire to speed 

up the negotiations also emerged from the United States and some of our partners, 

despite the fact that Iran gave up much in its nuclear program for a modest amount 

of relief. This was the first time, but not the last, that opponents of the deal in the 

United States and Iran share a common view. Unfortunately, a similar desire to 

speed up the negotiations on a comprehensive deal emerged from the United States 

and some of our partners, despite the fact that—for a modest amount of relief—Iran 

gave up much. It was the first time, but not the last, that opponents of a deal in 

both the United States and Iran were in full agreement. 

As a direct consequence, deadlines were established that Iran sought to use as 

leverage against the United States. Iran came to believe that the deadlines put in 

place were more important for United States negotiators than for themselves, leading to inevitable delays in Iranian decision-making and extended talks. 

Still, the United States did not rush into a deal. Had it done so, talks would not 

have been extended first in July 2014, then in November, and then multiple times 

at the end of June and into July 2015. Instead, the U.S. negotiators demonstrated 

time and again that, as Secretary Kerry said, ‘‘we will not rush and we will not be 

rushed.’’ 

In the end, the Administration successfully demonstrated to Iran that, if it wished 

to conclude a nuclear deal, then it would have to make a number of concessions on 

issues that no less an authority than the Supreme Leader had established as red 

lines. Admittedly, this did not surprise me. Iranian negotiating style often involves 

brinksmanship and some degree of exaggeration. It is only through testing and 

prodding such red lines that the real limits of Iran’s negotiating room could be established. For this reason, key red lines—like the requirement that immediate sanctions relief be furnished before any nuclear changes could be implemented or that 

R&D continue without restriction or even that Iran would require 190,000 centrifuges in the near term—were broken by Iran in the final deal. 

EVALUATING THE NUCLEAR ASPECTS OF THE DEAL

The result of these negotiations is a deal that, in my view, satisfies U.S. national 

security objectives. I define these as being: 

1. Lengthening the time that Iran would need to produce enough nuclear material for one nuclear weapon; and, 

2. Ensuring that, during this time, any such attempt could be quickly detected, 

such that the entire length of the breakout time is available for response. 

With respect to the first objective, the deal manifestly delivers. 

The deal negotiated by the P5+1 will create a one year or longer breakout 

timeline for Iran’s declared nuclear program for the first ten years of the implementation phase of the deal. That’s just for uranium; for plutonium, the breakout 

timeline is far longer, potentially measurable in decades. Why? 

With respect to uranium, the deal restricts Iran’s installed centrifuges to just over 

6,000 IR–1 type machines for 10 years. Iran will be able to do some small scale enrichment using advanced machines at the end of this time period, but in numbers 

far too modest to contribute to breakout. This limitation will also hold back the 

progress of Iran’s enrichment program. One does not go immediately from small 

scale enrichment on small numbers of centrifuges to installing and operating thousands of machines. Iran will have to spend time perfecting these machines and it 

194 

is unreasonable to expect that they will achieve perfection in a few months of work. 

Iran has spent nearly twenty years working on the IR–1 centrifuge, 1970s technology that it bought outright, and only managed to operate this centrifuge at 

roughly half of its design capacity. 

Iran will also be limited to solely 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent U–235 in any form 

for 15 years. This restriction alone would hold Iran back from quick breakout because 60–70 percent of the work required for a bomb is in the initial period of enrichment from natural levels to ∼4 percent. 

But, combined with the centrifuge limits, Iran will be a year away for at least 

10 years—until 2025—and anywhere from 6–12 months away for another 5 years 

beyond that. It is also important to note that, during this time, inspectors will have 

continuous, online enrichment monitoring of Iran’s centrifuges. So, if a move to 

breakout were to take place, it could be detected almost immediately through a system of sophisticated, secure sensors. 

After that, it is true that breakout probably will narrow. But, only with respect 

to the declared uranium path. For plutonium, the breakout timeline is multiple 

years long and will not shrink for a considerable length of time. The Arak reactor’s 

modification will render it incapable of producing such plutonium, essentially permanently because of difficulty of modifying the reactor core of a once-operated reactor. Iran’s agreement to not engage in reprocessing R&D, to construct a reprocessing 

facility, or to construct a reactor capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium in 

useful quantities will last until 2030. But the impact of this decision will go farther: 

having been stymied in this work for so long, it is unreasonable to expect a rapid 

improvement in Iran’s capabilities or physical capacity. Judging by how long Iran 

has been building the Arak reactor (i.e., since 2007), it is reasonable to argue that 

it would be 2035 at least before Iran could have another such reactor, let alone 

spent fuel reprocessing capabilities. 

Breakout is not the sole measure of a deal. But, compared to the status quo— 

2–3 months to breakout for uranium, with 1–2 weapons worth of plutonium being 

produced per year at Arak—we are far better off with the deal than without it. 

The deal also offers much by way of timely detection. Daily access to Iran’s most 

sensitive nuclear sites remains possible. But, continuous monitoring—including 

through use of sophisticated new safeguards technology—may make this unnecessary. The right to utilize advanced monitoring technology is perhaps one of the most 

important if unsung elements of the deal, reducing cost and labor burdens while 

also dealing with problems of immediate access that would have constantly raised 

questions as to whether Iran was cheating at any particular moment. 

Beyond the declared facilities, there is an impressive array of monitoring provisions with respect to all of the key aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. From uranium 

production through centrifuge manufacturing, the IAEA will have the right to monitor what Iran is doing to ensure that it cannot be diverted to a covert path. Similarly, Iran will be forced to utilize a procurement channel that enables the United 

States to have a vote on what Iran can procure and end use verification by exporters 

and, in some cases, the IAEA. Some of these provisions lapse at the ten year mark 

but others—including the important provisions on centrifuge manufacturing and 

uranium production—continue for 20 and 25 years respectively. This means that the 

world will have visibility into Iran’s nuclear program beyond the international norm, 

even enhanced by the Additional protocol, until 2040. Of course, the access Iran is 

required to provide under its Comprehensive Safeguards Arrangement and Additional Protocol will continue so long as Iran is adhering to those treaties; a decision 

to withdraw from either would, naturally, trigger an international response. 

Some may argue that the time available to the President is far less than promised, seeing as there is now a dispute resolution process that participants are 

obliged to observe if there are difficulties with JCPOA implementation. This process 

could take perhaps as long as 80 days. But, within a 1 year breakout time, that 

is still enough time to seek new diplomatic action, based on the reapplication of 

pressure via the snap-back mechanisms that would be triggered at the end of that 

process as well as additional sanctions. 

Moreover, we must bear in mind that any contingency that requires less time 

than 80 days is also probably not one that sanctions would have addressed in any 

event. Exposure of an ongoing, near-breakout and covert Iranian nuclear weapons 

program would prompt consideration of military options more than sanctions, and 

I personally believe that use of force would be the best course of action in this instance. At the same time, more modest actions prompting snap-back also would be 

less likely to shrink the breakout time by any discernible degree. Discovery that 

Iran has 100 more kilograms of 3.67 percent enriched uranium would be a problem. 

But, it would not shorten breakout below the snap-back threshold. 

195 

In my view, therefore, any discussion of snap-back and the dispute process needs 

to be based on a thorough evaluation of likely scenarios and responses. Doing so results in different expectations for the risk created by any particular Iranian violation. 

AFTER THE SUNSET

Even some skeptics may agree that, within a 10–15 year band of time, the deal 

may work as designed. However, this is distinct from the concerns that exist about 

what would happen after the deal’s main restrictions end in 2030. Some, most notably Prime Minister Netanyahu, have alleged that it is in this fashion that the deal 

paves the way to an Iranian nuclear weapon. 

I disagree. First, the argument against sunset presupposes that there is either no 

point in time in which Iran could be trusted with a nuclear program—or, anyway, 

the Islamic Republic of Iran—or that negotiations could possibly have delivered a 

sunset far longer than what is in the deal. Having experienced these talks personally, I can vouch for the fact that there was no scenario in which Iran would accept 

voluntarily the absence of a serious nuclear program for decades. If the Iranian negotiators had delivered such a deal, people—including important people in the security services—would be right to ask why Iran endured sanctions for as long as it 

did. Moreover, Iran has become an advocate for the entire non-nuclear world in its 

defense of a nuclear program including enrichment. Expecting Iran to back away 

from that role, even in return for sanctions relief, went beyond what negotiations 

could achieve. 

Some would argue in response that this does not mean that sunset of 10 years 

is acceptable. Certainly, I too would have preferred a multi-decade long set of restrictions. But, it is legitimate to question why that would be necessary as well as 

to ask how many years would be enough to build confidence. Given that, taken in 

combination, the restrictions and access provisions extend in some respects for 15– 

25 years, it is reasonable to argue that sunset will be a prolonged affair. 

During this time period, of course, the United States is also free to abrogate the 

agreement and to declare that Iran’s nuclear program, at the time, remains a concern. Successful execution of this step will require effective diplomacy and the right 

context at the time. But, it is achievable if a future President decides that no other 

options would work. Of course, a future President could also decide that Iran’s nuclear program must be met with force. 

BUT WHAT ABOUT SANCTIONS?

A major complaint about the nuclear deal is that it provides Iran with far too 

much sanctions relief and that the practical effect of increasing trade with Iran will 

render snap-back ineffective. 

First, on the issue of scale, it is a blunt reality that Iran was not going to accept 

major restrictions on its nuclear program and invasive monitoring on the cheap. No 

one in the United States government would disagree that Iran should take these 

steps without compensation, seeing as it is Iran that stands in violation of its international obligations. But, in the real world, this is not a sustainable argument. Just 

as Iran could not scrap its nuclear program to make a deal work, Iran could also 

not accept nuclear steps being taken without reciprocation. De-escalation of the nuclear program required de-escalation of sanctions. 

Faced with this reality, the Administration did the right thing in leveraging sanctions relief for maximum, early nuclear steps. Instead of debating whether one sanction was worth 10 centrifuges, the Administration cut Iran a deal: in exchange for 

big nuclear steps, big sanctions relief could be given. Iran is now under every incentive to take the steps required of it as soon as possible (and, arguably, would be 

even now removing centrifuges if the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act had not 

been passed, mandating the present 60 day review period). The United States insisted, and Iran agreed, that no such sanctions relief could be enacted until the 

IAEA verifies that Iran has done its part. As a result, we will be able to see—and 

have the IAEA report—that Iran has done everything required of it before any relief 

flows. 

But, the sanctions relief provided by the United States does not equate with unilateral sanctions disarmament. The United States retains a number of sanctions authorities that will continue to damage Iran’s ability to engage in terrorism financing, 

as well as to exact consequences for violations of Iranian human rights and other 

destabilizing activities. This includes the all-too-important tool of secondary sanctions through the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment 

Act or CISADA. With this tool, the United States will still be able to pressure banks 

and companies against doing business with the IRGC, Qods Force, Qassem 

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Solemani, and Iran’s military and missile forces. The EU and U.N. decisions to remove some of these entities from their own sanctions list is therefore important to 

Iran mainly as a symbolic step; practically, these entities and individuals will find 

their international business activities stymied due to the centrality of the United 

States in global finance until they correct their own behavior in the eyes of the 

United States. 

Moreover, the United States will retain its ability to impose sanctions on entities 

and individuals trading with Iran in conventional arms and ballistic missiles, even 

after U.N. restrictions in this regard lapse in 5 and 8 years respectively. The U.N.’s 

provisions were important in terms of setting international approval and backstopping for U.S. unilateral efforts. But, they were conditioned, even as early as 2006 

and 2007, on Iran’s failure to fulfill its nuclear obligations. Even the earliest UNSC 

resolutions laid out a package in which these sanctions would be terminated when 

Iran satisfied the P5+1 and IAEA on the nuclear issue. Further, it is the consequence of U.S. sanctions on these targets that can best deter bad behavior. Similarly, international export controls governing transfers of these types will remain 

fully in force. 

Second, on the issue of snap-back, Iran’s growing international economic integration will cut both ways. Certainly, it is possible that the politics around future Iran 

sanctions will be prejudicial to rapid snap-back. However, the structure of the dispute process gives even just one country the right to insist that the UNSC consider 

whatever matter is in question with respect to compliance with the deal. The deal 

structures the snapback of UNSC sanctions such that the P5 veto power only works 

to end sanctions relief. In other words, though the process may need to be navigated, in the end, even acting alone, the United States can bring existing UNSC 

sanctions back into operation. 

As noted, this could come with political costs. Many skeptics point to these costs 

as likely meaning that no such snapback would ever be triggered. But, many of 

these same skeptics also argue that it is theoretically possible to end the deal now 

and keep international partners moving forward with the imposition of sanctions. 

This is out of joint with reality and practical experience. Simply put, international 

reaction to U.S. actions now or in the future will always depend on the context and 

narrative. If the rationale for doing so is credible and the context demands action, 

then chances for success will always be higher. 

Additionally, Iran too would have much to lose if snapback were to be triggered. 

Iran’s leaders would therefore have to carefully evaluate the costs and benefits of 

any course of action that threatens the integrity of the nuclear deal. These costs will 

grow as Iran’s economy recovers and grows. Explaining to Iran’s people why a civil 

nuclear program has gone out of alignment with any practical needs, prompting reversion of sanctions, would prove a difficult conversation for Tehran, maybe as difficult as the one the United States would need to have with partners about the imperative of reapplying sanctions. 

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

I would like to concentrate on two different sets of regional implications. The first 

is the risk that Iran will plow its hard-won sanctions relief into terrorism and regional troublemaking. The second is that Iran’s enrichment program will spawn a 

cascade of new nuclear programs through the Middle East. I will conclude with 

some thoughts on how to address these implications. 

Terrorism 

It is certainly true that Iran will continue to support terrorism and activities that 

we oppose throughout the region. No level of sanctions could stop them from doing 

so. This is a government that has, after all, funded and armed radical elements 

since the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, through the Iran-Iraq War, and after the 

intensification of crippling sanctions in 2010. Tehran continued to invest in the 

Assad regime, despite the immediate loss of over a quarter of its 2012 oil revenues 

from sanctions imposed in December 2011, and $60 billion in potential revenues 

from that point forward. Likewise, Iran has assisted Shiite militants in Iraq, the 

Taliban in Afghanistan, and is now supporting the Houthis in Yemen, despite major 

economic crisis at home. Clearly, money is no consideration for the Iranians when 

it comes to support for terrorism. 

But, money is important when it comes to Iran’s domestic front. Iran’s population 

as well as its leaders know how much money is at stake, and how it can be used. 

It is implausible that, after the Supreme Leader allowed Rouhani to be elected 

president in 2013 on a platform pledging economic recovery—in part, through promises of sanctions relief—either man would support initiatives that leave the Iranian 

population in the cold in order to protect foreign groups and leaders like Assad. To 

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2Stockholm International Peach Research Institute, ‘‘SIPRI Military Expenditures Database,’’ 

http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex—database. 

do so would be to risk the very instability and threat to the regime that the Iranian 

government have sought to prevent by seeking sanctions relief through this deal. 

Since the international community intensified sanctions against Iran in 2010, 

Iran has only grown more desperate. For example, the country’s oil sector now needs 

anywhere from $50 to $100 billion in investment to improve production, a point that 

Iranian officials, including Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh, have emphasized 

repeatedly over the past two years. External investment was cut off by sanctions, 

and Iran has not had the spare capital to maintain, much less improve, its facilities. 

Nor has it enjoyed access to new technologies that could enhance oil field productivity. 

Oil is, of course, only one part of Iran’s economy, which includes struggling industries like automobile and domestic manufacturing. To avoid an over-dependence on 

global oil markets, Iran has also made it state policy to build a diversified export 

economy. Given the prevailing low global oil prices, Iran is likely to continue trying 

to strengthen other sectors to maximize its growth potential and limit its vulnerability to an uncertain market. 

Lest observers assume that Iran would have turned its entire economy into a terrorism-financing machine if only it had the money, consider the fact that the most 

intensive sanctions on the country are only 3 years old. Before January 2012, oil 

sales were bringing in nearly $88 billion a year, money that Tehran largely spent 

as any government would: on domestic priorities—not solely to back anti Western 

interests. If the LA Times is to believed, this is a conclusion that CIA has itself 

reached. 

As with the effort to wean its economy off oil, Iran has also sought to reduce costly subsidies on everything from food, to housing, to energy, in order to improve the 

economy’s efficiency, reduce waste, and spur competitiveness. But sanctions targeting Iranian oil revenues hampered that effort, as the country lacked the hard 

currency—and political will—to forge ahead with subsidy reform, at least until 

Rouhani’s election. It is now struggling to complete this project, one that sanctions 

relief would undoubtedly boost by providing Iran with fresh revenue and reducing 

its citizens’ dependence on government handouts. This is particularly important for 

Rouhani, who will be looking to shore up domestic support in the run-up to parliamentary elections in February 2016 and to win reelection in 2017. 

But beyond this, any rosy expectations for Iran’s economy must be tempered by 

the reality that oil, still its primary economic driver, is worth less today than in 

years past and is predicted to stay that way for the foreseeable future. Iran simply 

won’t have as much money coming in on an annual basis, due to global economic 

conditions, until the rest of its economy picks up speed. Even if Tehran had wanted 

to spend $100 billion on nefarious side projects a few years ago (and let’s be clear: 

given $100 billion was more than the entire annual oil export revenue for Iran at 

the time, even when prices were high, this would hardly be credible), it makes even 

less sense today. Consequently, it is much more likely that only a portion of the liberated $100 billion and any future revenues will go to support Tehran’s regional adventurism. No 

one knows how much, but experts have made some educated guesses, suggesting 

that the regime has spent anywhere from $3.5 to $20 billion a year in Syria, figures 

that pale in comparison to annual military spending by the United States and the 

Gulf Cooperation Council. 2 This is not to say that Iran cannot do a lot of damage 

with a few billion more dollars. 

But, Iran will have to deal with residual United States and international sanctions inhibiting it. As mentioned earlier, this includes sanctions that preserve the 

secondary application of U.S. sanctions on foreign businesses and banks. But, beyond this, since 9/11, the international banking system has adopted new standards 

and helped create intergovernmental groups like the Financial Action Task Force 

[FATF] to crack down on money laundering and terrorism financing. Banks monitor 

their business far more aggressively now than ever before to detect and prevent 

such activities, in part by using the best practices and guidelines developed by 

FATF. Banks are also under greater scrutiny by their national regulators—and, in 

fact, by the U.S. Treasury Department—to keep their systems from being used by 

terrorists and their financiers for illicit acts. 

Moreover, if need be, Washington and its partners can always augment sanctions 

to deal with specific Iranian threats, such as Iran’s conventional arms market. 

These could be modeled on an existing authority, like sanctions covering the manufacture, shipping, and financing of weapons of mass destruction. Far be it from 

abandoning sanctions as a tool after the nuclear deal, the United States could use 

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3Gordon, Michael, August 3, 2015, ‘‘John Kerry Wins Gulf States’ Cautious Support for Iran 

Deal,’’ New York Times, Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/world/middleeast/ 

sanctions as an effective deterrent in this regional context. Care, however, will have 

to be taken to avoid giving Iran a pretext to argue that the United States is undermining the very sanctions relief that made a nuclear deal possible in the first place. 

In this context, several observers have suggested that it might be necessary to undertake strategic economic pressure against Iran as we have done to deal with the 

nuclear program. I think that this is probably unnecessary and potentially a mistake. First, we already have applied strategic economic pressure on Iran and did not 

meaningfully change its regional approach. Though the sanctions we applied on Iran 

from 2010–2013 were nuclear in focus, Iran felt no distinction. Nor did it respond 

by making accommodations on the terrorism front, as it did on the nuclear program. 

I believe this is because both the causes to which Iran is dedicated in the region 

are too dear to it to abridge and the financial requirements for the support of terrorism are relatively meager. To get the kind of economic pressure that would be 

required to get Iran to discontinue its financial support for terrorism—rather than 

reduce it, as probably did take place—we would have to establish the same kind of 

sanctions regime against Iraq in the 1990s, reducing Iran to a starvation diet. 

It is highly doubtful that our most important sanctions partners would support 

us in such an endeavor and the risk of sanctions leakage would be significant. But, 

even if they did, for how long would we prepared to keep such a regime in place? 

For, if we relaxed the pressure at some point, it is doubtful that Iran would abandon 

future support for terrorism. Ultimately, in my view, such a path leads us to requiring regime change, with all the complications that this would bring. 

Instead, I believe that the use of targeted financial sanctions pressure to cut off 

nodes is a better, more effective approach to dealing with support for terrorism, as 

part of a larger approach I will describe below. 

Regional Proliferation 

The second main concern posited is that Iran will fan the flames of regional nuclear proliferation, leading to nuclear weapons programs throughout the Arab world 

as a counter to Iran’s now entrenched nuclear program. 

I strongly disagree that this is the likely result of this deal. Moreover, I believe 

we have adequate tools to prevent such an outcome. 

First, this argument presupposes that countries have been waiting for a negotiated outcome to enshrine Iran’s enrichment program into international law to 

launch their own nuclear programs. But, this argument implicitly suggests that 

while a deal to constrain Iran’s nuclear program might motivate others to launch 

a breakout, Iran’s relatively unconstrained last ten years did not. If there is a logic 

to Arab nuclear weapons efforts, then it is that they cannot count on anyone else 

to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear arms and must counterbalance Iran themselves. 

If this were truly their view, then why only start now? We should be seeing signs 

of nuclear weapons breakout around the region. 

Instead, we see either nuclear programs being undertaken with an explicit, if 

bounded, unilateral renunciation of uranium enrichment (as in the UAE) or with far 

less direction and interest than would be expected (as in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, 

principally). There have been periodic statements of interest in nuclear energy by 

other countries in the region and even some efforts to establish the legal and scientific infrastructure that could facilitate a larger program. But, the most advanced 

Arab nuclear program is in the UAE and, as noted, it is being built on the back 

of a non-enrichment pledge that no one in the UAE has suggested they will renounce. If a nuclear arms race has been launched, it may be the most modest one 

in history. 

Of course, an argument can be made that, prior to the nuclear deal, Iran was 

under perpetual threat of military conflict with the United States. Now, with a deal, 

it is not. Such a mindset ignores the fact that President Obama has explicitly retained the military option for dealing with Iran’s nuclear program and that several 

candidates to succeed him have done the same (if not indicated that military strikes 

would be a preferred approach to diplomacy). But, it is arguable that conditions 

have changed and, therefore, so must the security calculus of Arab countries. 

The flaw in this argument, though, is that several states in the region have already stated their support for the deal, including those most often identified as the 

likeliest to match Iran with their own nuclear programs: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, 

Egypt and Turkey. The Gulf Cooperation Council issued its own statement of support on August 3, with the Foreign Minister of Qatar saying all of their behalf: ‘‘We 

are confident that what they undertook makes this region safer and more stable.’’ 3

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gulf-states-cautiously-support-iran-nuclear-deal.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage & 

module=second-column-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news 4 Usher, Barbara Plett, March 16, 2015, ‘‘Iran Deal Could Start Nuclear Fuel Race: Saudi Arabia,’’ BBC, Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31901961 5 Esfandiary, Dina and Ariane Tabatabai, April 22, 2015, ‘‘Why Nuclear Dominoes Won’t Fall 

in the Middle East,’’ Available at: http://thebulletin.org/why-nuclear-dominoes-wont-fall-middle-east8236 

The GCC’s statement also underscored the degree to which United States security 

assurances bring comfort to its membership. True, any of these countries could be 

concealing their security fears in order not to offend either the United States or 

Iran. But, taken in combination with the fact that none of them also has announced 

a decision to establish an enrichment program with which to compete against Iran— 

which would be entirely legitimate under the NPT’s current rules—it is pure conjecture to argue that the arms race has been launched. 

The statement that is used most often to contradict this positive assessment is 

that of former Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Turki al Faisel, who has often indicated that Saudi Arabia will insist on matching directly any physical capabilities 

that Iran has. 4 Presumably, this means that the Saudis will now seek to build their 

own enrichment plant to match Iran’s and to invest in the capabilities required to 

bring it to the nuclear weapons threshold. But, we have not seen that thus far. 

What we have seen is a willingness to spend some money to develop science centers 

that, one day, could train the experts required to start a nuclear weapons project. 

We have seen willingness to explore the construction of reactors, but the physical 

infrastructure has yet to be built or pursued seriously. 5 To acquire even an enrichment program—much less a nuclear weapons program—would require a massive expansion of Saudi expenditure and investment. Certainly, the Saudis have the money 

to finance the attempt but every day that they do not is another day deep into the 

future that they would be able to turn finance into nuclear material. It takes time 

to develop such capabilities. The Manhattan Project was a war-time endeavor financed by the world’s strongest economy and aided by some of the finest scientific 

minds in the world. Nuclear weapons programs in China, India, Pakistan, and 

North Korea have taken far longer. Iran’s enrichment program started in the late 

1980s, but on the backs of scientists who took their training at United States universities in the late 1960s and 1970s. Iran’s first reactor, supplied by the United 

States, was delivered in 1967. These things take time. 

Of course, there has long been a theory that Saudi Arabia could purchase nuclear 

weapons from Pakistan, drawing on the long history of support the Saudis have 

given the Pakistanis (which some say even involved financing the Pakistani nuclear 

weapons program). But, the Pakistanis have their own problems, none of which 

would be assisted by transferring nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons technology 

or even enrichment technology to a non-nuclear weapon state. Pakistan has sought 

to emerge from the pariah status it attained when A.Q. Khan sold uranium enrichment elsewhere in the Middle East (notably, to Iran and Libya but not to Saudi 

Arabia), one reason why—when the Bush Administration sought to overturn decades of nonproliferation practice by creating an India-specific set of carveouts to the 

nonproliferation regime—Pakistan was left in the cold. Moreover, Pakistan has already demonstrated independence from Saudi Arabia in turning down the Saudi request for ground troops in Yemen this spring. 

Egypt faces similar technical problems, while the UAE and Turkey have made 

clear that they have different priorities than matching Iran’s enrichment program 

(the latter aided by the maintenance of the NATO nuclear umbrella). 

But, let us briefly consider an alternative scenario in which the Iranian nuclear 

program is not constrained by a nuclear deal. If those arguing that nuclear proliferation will begin immediately, then killing this deal would logically become the 

starting pistol for an arms race as well. Iran’s nuclear program would almost certainly be rejuvenated, with thousands of new centrifuges and a completed Arak reactor only the most visible manifestations of a dedicated Iranian capabilities drive. 

Some have argued that a better deal would emerge from this, though this argues 

that Iran could be forced to agree to lower centrifuge numbers, longer terms, and 

more intrusive inspections after the United States becomes the diplomatic pariah 

for ending a deal most states in the world support. Assuming that is not the case, 

then the only response would be accommodation of even greater Iranian nuclear capabilities through a new deal—with a United States bluff having been called—or 

military action. Unless regime change were envisioned, military action is more likely to create an incentive for Iran to develop a nuclear deterrent in the future. As 

a consequence, more likely to spur the arms race that so many fear now. 

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U.S. POLICY RESPONSE

The above analysis lays out a reasoned examination of why the region will not 

spiral out of control simply because of the nuclear deal we are here to discuss. But, 

this is not to say that the United States should rest on its laurels. I recommend 

four specific steps to manage the consequences of the deal and to ensure that the 

doomsday scenarios I doubt will occur are clearly avoided. 

First, the United States must continue to reaffirm its support for our partners in 

the region. This should involve arms sales, but must go beyond that. We should 

maintain a robust military presence in the region and ability to quickly bring military assets to bear throughout it. We should also explore ways of working with Arab 

countries to make their military response force a capable, coherent and useful instrument to challenge and contain Iranian regional bad behavior. Most important, 

we need to demonstrate that, though we have global interests, we have regional priorities, foremost of these the security of our regional partners. Coordination of activities in the region to combat terrorism is an important part of the endeavor, as 

are continued strategic dialogues about how to handle the various problems that 

exist in the region. Importantly, dialogue must be a true two-way street in which 

the United States is free to share its perspectives and analysis, as are U.S. partners. 

This may include uncomfortable conversations about domestic situations in partner 

countries that could offer openings to Iranian troublemaking. Friends might not like 

hearing such things and resent the implied condescension, but it is the responsibility of friends to pass along tough messages as well as physical support. 

Second, we need to maintain robust intelligence-sharing with countries in the region about Iran’s activities and, importantly, compliance with the nuclear deal. 

Some things will need to be protected given sources and methods concerns, but the 

general modus operandi ought to be transparency when it comes to the nuclear deal. 

Only through confidence that intelligence cooperation is full and forthright will partners believe that they know all that we know about Iranian strategic intentions and 

capabilities. That can only come with enhanced coordination and sharing. 

Third, the United States must strive to be an active, positive nuclear cooperation 

partner with countries in the region. Trying to put the genie back into the bottle 

by denying nuclear cooperation with countries like Saudi Arabia unless they foreswear any future possibility of uranium enrichment on their territories was always 

a complicated—and probably impossible—proposition. Now, it is undeniably more 

difficult. But, nuclear cooperation can put us in a stronger position to discourage 

the exercise of the enrichment option, which is not precluded by the NPT. We have 

never been able to convince any country to relinquish forever its capacity to produce 

enriched uranium at home. Even the ‘‘gold standard’’ nuclear cooperation agreement 

with the UAE contains the possibility of the UAE backing out of its no-enrichment 

pledge if it so chooses as well as an expiration date, Instead of pressing for a selfdenying legal commitment, we must concentrate on removing the incentives to pursue enrichment or reprocessing by providing cradle-to-grave nuclear supply and by 

demonstrating our reliability as nuclear trading partners. 

Fourth, we must continue to enforce our existing sanctions to deal with Iranian 

terrorism, destabilizing regional activities and violations of human rights. As noted 

above, Iran has reserved the right to react negatively to such decisions by withdrawing from the nuclear deal. This is not the unprecedented, unacceptable sign of 

a weak agreement that critics are making it out to be, but rather a standard principle of national sovereignty. Even the NPT has a withdrawal provision. But, Iran 

will face consequences should it decide to do so. Iran is less likely to withdraw from 

this nuclear deal in response to credible enforcement of non-nuclear-related sanctions than it is in response to broad sectoral-based sanctions for non-nuclear reasons. To this end, even new authorities could potentially be adopted so long as they 

do not overlap the terms of the sanctions relief provided in the JCPOA or give Iran 

a credible argument that it is being deprived of the relief its nuclear restrictions 

have purchased. One such concept could be the promulgation of sanctions authorities, including an Executive Order, that permits sanctions against those who traffic 

in conventional arms to or from Iran. This would remove the need to demonstrate 

that such arms are going to a particular end use, making the legal hurdles less. 

Iran may choose to ignore these sanctions or protest them, but we can enforce them 

nonetheless and continue to make such trade anathema. Of course, we can continue 

to enforce the U.N.’s and our specific sanctions covering transfers to terrorist 

groups, Assad’s forces in Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen. 

CONCLUSION

I believe that the nuclear agreement reached by the United States, its P5+1 partners, and Iran is a good deal. It is not a perfect deal. There are things that, in a 

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perfect world, would be changed, starting with the fact that—ideally—Iran would 

not be permitted to engage in enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water activities in 

perpetuity. Such an Iran would also be forced to change into a better actor in the 

region and beyond. 

But, we do not have the luxury of that world. Instead, we face two options. We 

can either accept the deal that has been negotiated. Or, we can turn our backs on 

it. To do so is to go in an ill-defined alternative scenario. Some argue that in this 

scenario, sanctions can be intensified in order to achieve a better deal. Still others 

argue that military action could be undertaken. But, each of these courses of action 

would require taking significant risks that either they would not be successful and, 

in the attempt, that we would lose the support of the international community. An 

Iran strategy based on ‘‘going it alone’’ is not a recipe for success. 

Moreover, while pursuing such an alternative, Iran would either wait expectantly 

for the sucker punch to be delivered that would complete the job of undoing global 

support for United States efforts, or march forward on its nuclear program, beginning the operations of thousands of new centrifuges and constructing the Arak reactor in its original, bomb-factory design. 

For, at this point, there is no magical middle ground to be occupied. If the United 

States rejects the deal now, it will not be possible to negotiate a new one and certainly not before Iran undertakes a potentially dramatic expansion of its nuclear 

program. This is because of both the politics that will be associated with doing so 

in Iran—whose leaders would convincingly argue ‘‘if the United States is not going 

to fulfill this deal, what is to say they would fulfill a future one?’’—and because the 

JPOA would collapse at the same time as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. 

Some argue that Iran could continue to observe its JPOA commitments and so could 

the United States. But, United States law now makes that impossible. Under the 

terms of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA), if a joint resolution of 

disapproval is passed by Congress, the JPOA can no longer be observed by the 

United States as a legal matter. The law states that the President is no longer permitted to provide relief from sanctions established by Congressional action. So, 

waivers could not be extended under the statutory authorities in place. 

As such, the Executive Branch would have to restart efforts to reduce Iranian oil 

exports—paused under the JPOA—and impose sanctions for the movement of Central Bank of Iran funds. It is inconceivable that, even if Iran wished to keep the 

JPOA afloat, Iran would accept United States efforts to reduce Iran’s oil exports by 

holding steady on the nuclear program. So, even if new laws are not adopted by 

Congress or the Executive Branch, U.S. sanctions under the JPOA would again be 

active and in need of enforcement. 

Would international partners join us in this effort? It is highly doubtful and certainly not with the vigor needed to be effective. As such, the United States would 

be brought into confrontation with key trading partners. 

So, Congress must make the choice that it asserted was essential in the passage 

of INARA and decide if the alternative to the JCPOA is worth it. Leadership and 

vision from Congress, as the President has shown in pursuing this deal, is now 

needed. I urge Congress to make the right choice, and to support this deal. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Professor Mead, as a result of this—maybe I’d ask all the witnesses, beginning with you, Professor Mead—do you anticipate 

Iran’s support for the spread of terrorism and influence throughout 

other Middle East to increase or decrease as a result of this agreement? We know that they are in Yemen and Iraq and Syria and 

Lebanon, and now we have reports of them providing—the Iranians 

providing weapons to the Taliban. Do you believe that their efforts 

as—and status as the world’s number-one supporter of terrorism 

would increase or decrease? 

Mr. MEAD. Mr. Chairman, I believe the Iranians will use the opportunities offered by this agreement to expand their efforts to become stronger, to push their enemies back, and to redesign the 

Middle East in their own image. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Mr. Singh? 

Mr. SINGH. I think that, at the very least, there’s no indication 

that they’ll decrease it, and I think there’s good reasons to think 

that they could increase it as a result of the agreement, for a couVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00207 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
202 

ple of different reasons. One is that you may see them want to reaffirm their anti-American bona fides in the wake of having made a 

diplomatic deal with the United States, since anti-Americanism is 

so core to the regime’s identity. Second, I think that, because the 

Supreme Leader of Iran has generally tried to balance the different 

factions of the regime, to the extent this is seen as a victory for 

President Rouhani and the pragmatists, he may have a desire to 

sort of throw a bone to the hardliners in the IRGC [Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps] and so forth by giving them freer rein in 

other realms. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Takeyh. 

Dr. TAKEYH. As I mentioned, Chairman, the international relations of Islamic Republic, in my view, should be thought about in 

two segments—’79 to 2011, 2011 to today. In aftermath of 2011, we 

see a much more aggressive expansionist Iran, simply because 

there are more opportunities with the collapse of the regional state 

system as a result of Arab Awakenings. So, as they respond to 

those opportunities with additional funds, I expect a surge of Iranian imperialism and terrorism. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Gordon? 

Dr. GORDON. As I said in my testimony, Iran is, indeed, a leading 

state sponsor of terrorism, and it is right to worry that they would 

use some of the assets—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. My question was, Do you think it will increase or decrease? 

Dr. GORDON. I’m not sure that it will have a direct effect on what 

is—— 

Chairman MCCAIN. So, you’re not sure. 

Dr. GORDON.—Iran is already doing. 

Chairman MCCAIN. So, you’re not sure. I’ve got to—— 

Mr. NEPHEW. 

Mr. NEPHEW. Senator, I think that the Iranians are going to continue the policies they’ve had for the last 35 years. But, they 

weren’t going to change them without a nuclear deal, as well. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I see. So, it’s okay to have a nuclear deal and 

no restraint on their terrorist activities. Is that your answer, Mr. 

Nephew? 

Mr. NEPHEW. No, Senator. In fact, I said, a number of different 

ways, that we should have restraint on their terrorism support. We 

have a lot of policies that we can use to do that. 

Chairman MCCAIN. The question is, now that they have $50–60 

billion, or whatever additional they have, that they will—in the 

view of at least this Senator and others, they will increase their 

terrorist activities—more refugees, more killing, more expansionist 

into other countries in the region. 

Professor Mead, what do you make of the statements by the Gulf 

countries and the Saudis? A sort of a conditional endorsement of 

this agreement? 

Mr. MEAD. Well, Senator, I think they’re making the best agreement—best step they can, from their own point of view. They see 

a fait accompli, and they think they might as well see if they can— 

what they can get from the United States by, at least in public, appearing to go along, though I must say, very cautiously, I suspect 

203 

that if some of you were to go over to the region and speak with 

them privately, you might hear a more alarmed response. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I’ve already heard that, yes. 

Mr. Singh, we have various quotes from individuals in the Iranian regime that are saying, for example, that there will be no inspections of any military facility. What are we to make of those 

comments by more than one senior members of this regime? 

Mr. SINGH. Well, Senator, the agreement obviously gives Iran the 

ability to say no if the IAEA requests access to sites. So, I think 

that what you see now are the Iranians, not just for domestic consumption, but also for our consumption and the IAEA’s consumption, trying to condition us to understand what they will and won’t 

accept, to sort of already start testing this clause of the agreement 

about our access to undeclared or suspect sites. What you’ve heard, 

for example, from Ali Akbar Velayati, who is the Foreign Policy Advisor to the Supreme Leader, is, ‘‘Anytime we get a request for access to military sites, the answer is no.’’ That should be unacceptable to us, and it will set up a confrontation to demand access and 

get access to those sites. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Takeyh? 

Dr. TAKEYH. I think, as Mike suggested, there will be a real issue 

of contention. 

I just want to say one thing about inspection regime in this particular agreement, which is prolonged, and the notion that the only 

way you can get a different agreement is through armistice after 

the war. One of the things I did in the 1980s, when I was in college, I studied arms control, which in 1989 didn’t seem like a very 

good decision, but, actually, in retrospect, it is. South Africa actually agreed, during the time of when it was cleansing itself of nuclear weapons, to allow inspectors anytime/anywhere access, which 

they identified as one day. That was the arrangement that was essentially informally worked out with the IAEA. That process took 

a number of years for IAEA to validate that South Africa is no 

longer husbanding nuclear weapons. But, we have had inspections 

that are much more time-sensitive in the past for a country that 

was ruled by Nelson Mandela. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, of course, it’s also—the repeated refrain is ‘‘the best deal we could get.’’ That certainly is in the eye 

of the beholder. In the view of Dr. Kissinger and former Secretary 

[of State] Shultz, in the Wall Street Journal, this negotiation, more 

from doing away with Iran’s efforts to attain nuclear weapons, to 

delaying the Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. 

Senator REED. 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Singh, you made a very interesting point, which is that, in 

the aftermath of the agreement, if it’s withheld, the leadership in 

Iran could try to placate their most, you know, aggressive forces by 

giving them a freer hand. There’s a flip side to that, that if the 

agreement is rejected by the United States, wouldn’t it be a temptation to sort of vent their displeasure by increasing their terrorism 

activities in the region, and—otherwise, it would appear that 

they’re just simply accepting the fact that the sanctions are in 

place and that, you know, they’re just unwittingly going along with 

the U.S.? 

204 

Mr. SINGH. Well, Senator, I think that—as I mentioned before in 

response to Senator McCain, I don’t think that their regional strategy is going to change fundamentally as a result of the deal. I don’t 

think it would change if there were no deal. I think that their regional strategy is what it is, essentially. 

Senator REED. Right. 

Mr. SINGH. What the deal does is, it perhaps facilitates that regional strategy. If there is no deal, I have no doubt that you’ll have 

people in Tehran sort of crowing about the unreliability of the 

United States, and so forth. Again, what is the practical impact, in 

terms of what they do? I doubt that it causes a fundamental 

change. We’re already seeing, as Dr. Takeyh mentioned, an expansion in what they’re doing. 

Senator REED. But, it—that expansion—I think the point that 

you make would—could be facilitated by additional resources, but 

their strategy, their terrorism, et cetera, that trajectory is set, regardless of the outcome of the nuclear negotiation. 

Mr. SINGH. I think it is. There’s a flip side to that, though, which 

is, their nuclear weapons ambitions are part of that strategy. That 

strategy I mentioned about anti-access and area denial, about projecting power and restricting our ability to operate in the region, 

is undoubtedly enhanced by having either a threshold nuclear 

weapons capability or an actual nuclear weapon. So, that’s why we 

had, sort of at the outset of these negotiations, when I was involved 

from the NSC [National Security Council], thought that, for a nuclear agreement to be sustainable, you had to have a strategic shift 

by Iran. Since we haven’t seen that strategic shift, I think, fundamentally, the nuclear weapons ambitions remain in place. 

Senator REED. Those nuclear ambitions are at least suspended— 

there are various terms: parked, delayed, made more complicated— 

by the agreement, at least. 

Mr. SINGH. Well, I—— 

Senator REED. They’re made more complicated. 

Mr. SINGH. I think that—as I mentioned, I think that Iran’s objective has been twofold. I think they’ve wanted to have—to sort of 

cement that nuclear weapons option while getting the sanctions relief. I think the accomplishment, from the Iranian point of view 

here—and President Rouhani of Iran has sort of suggested this, he 

hasn’t said it explicitly—is that now Iran’s nuclear weapons program—he would say Iran’s nuclear program—is legitimized, essentially. Iran’s enrichment activities and other activities are accepted 

rather than considered illegal or illicit by the Security Council. So, 

it locks that option into place so that, if Iran wanted to exercise 

it in the future, whether because the sunsets expire, whether 

through covert means, which I actually think is much more likely, 

they have that option in place. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Dr. Gordon, the same—similar set of questions, in terms of—the 

agreement’s rejected, I think there’s—seems to be a consensus that 

the terrorism trajectory continues, maybe with more energy, or 

less. But, in terms of suspending, at least, their—or shackling a 

bit—their nuclear potential, that disrupts their overall strategy of 

combining this near-nuclear state with terrorism. 

205 

Dr. GORDON. Right. As I said in response to Senator McCain, I’m 

not sure there’s a direct link between this deal and their terrorism 

activities, which they will probably pursue. It is true—so, I agree 

with Mike on that score—they will have a little bit more resources 

to put to that, but those resources, you know, have other obligations on them, as well. 

I would note that most of their terrorism-supporting activities 

are not particularly cost-sensitive. I mean, Iran is devoting to terrorism what it chooses to devote to terrorism. More money in the 

coffers is not likely to make a significant difference there. So, my 

concern is—in the rejection scenario that you talk about, is that it 

doesn’t have a major impact on the continued support of terrorism, 

which is obviously a huge problem we need to confront, but, at the 

same time, we lose the nuclear deal. 

Senator REED. It essentially accelerates this strategy of enhanced 

terrorism with enhanced nuclear capabilities, so it’s not 10 years 

out, it’s several years out—— 

Dr. GORDON. Which—— 

Senator REED.—or we’re forced to make a choice very quickly 

about more severe steps. 

Dr. GORDON. Exactly. That would be the worst of all world, if 

they were able to move forward on the nuclear front while still pursuing the terrorism agenda. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SINGH. Senator, can I just clarify one point here? 

Senator REED. Sure. Sure. Absolutely. 

Mr. SINGH. There’s a point of disagreement, because I think that 

we shouldn’t minimize the impact of additional resources. If you 

look at the state of groups like Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic 

Jihad, Hamas, the Houthis, and so forth, in Yemen, there is plenty 

of reporting that’s out in the open source to suggest that these 

groups are financially squeezed, that support for Hezbollah has 

gone down, Islamic Jihad has had to close offices, Hamas was decimated, obviously, by the last round of fighting with Israel. So, additional resources, I think, can actually make a big difference. 

Then the other thing to bear in mind is, with the arms export 

ban to Iran lifted, with those arms sanctions being lifted in 5 years, 

with the ballistic missile sanctions being lifted, there could be a 

qualitative increase in what Israel—I’m sorry—what Iran is able to 

provide to groups like Hezbollah, which are facing Israel and other 

allies. So, replacing rockets with guided missiles, for example. 

Those are important things. 

Senator REED. Let me, on the other side, though, just to put it 

on the table and be evenhanded, is that this opening to the West— 

the trade, the commerce, the more interaction—will have a very 

difficult—it will have an effect, difficult to measure, but it might 

even be a counter effect, in that they have, now, a little bit more 

to lose, in terms of some more provocative activity, if they’re beginning to see a major increase in interaction with the international 

community. I—my time’s expired, but I just—— 

Mr. SINGH. I mean—you know, I can’t rule that out, but I would 

say we haven’t seen that, you know, with China, for example, 

which is opened economically to the world. 

Senator REED. Right. 

206 

Mr. SINGH. It’s not really diminished the danger, in a sense. 

Also, you know, we haven’t had a great success in the past in getting, say, European support for terrorism sanctions on Iran. 

Senator REED. But, that might change, too, given the fact that 

we have now got their agreement with the nuclear side. Now we 

can shift forces. I don’t want to abuse my time, but thank you, Mr. 

Singh. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for another excellent panel. It’s—provides some real insight to Congress 

on the issues that we face. 

I appreciate your testimony. 

Dr. Takeyh, you said it was curious how Iran is acting, because 

their actions, by any objective standard, seem to be contrary to 

their people’s interest in—to the interest of the—of Iran as a nation, which I would agree. That is evidence to me that maybe Bud 

McFarlane was correct to say, ‘‘This is another revolutionary regime, and real revolutionaries don’t change.’’ You look at Castro, 

you look at North Korea, you look at these situations. They’ve 

asked their devotees to commit everything to this division, and 

they won’t—they are loathe to give it up. Does that—do we not underestimate the religious, ideological drive behind this regime? 

Dr. TAKEYH. I agree with that, Senator. I think that Iran’s revolution has to be considered differently than China, Cuba, or, for 

that matter, the Soviet Union, because it is possible for some of 

those revolutionaries to kind of move on. To become an ex-Marxist 

is a sign of intellectual maturity. But, in this particular case, the 

religion—to be fair, a travesty and radicalized version—is the ideology of the state. There are people in the Islamic Republic hierarchy that believe the mission of the state is to realize God’s will 

on earth, and they get to determine what God’s will is. I mean, to 

ask them to abandon Marxism is maturity, to become an ex-Shi’ite 

is apostasy. This is serious stuff. I think this is one of the reason 

why Iran’s revolution has not had the trajectory of previous revolutions, whereby over time they tend to mellow out and perhaps 

even, for sake of global integration, become less radical. I don’t see 

that in here. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think that’s correct. I think we underestimate the power of religion in this circumstance. 

Professor Mead, if we were to end—undertake this agreement, it 

seems to me it ought to be undertaken as part of an overall strategy for the Middle East in the spasm of violence that we’ve seen, 

and that may continue for several decades, I would think. You 

think of the George Kennan ideas that framed our response to communism, and this expansionist tendencies. Don’t you think that 

what we need as a Nation is people, like the last two panels we’ve 

had, seriously analyzing the future of the Middle East, the nature 

of the extremist ideology that’s there, and developing a long-term, 

sophisticated policy to rebut it and to try to diminish it over time? 

Mr. MEAD. Senator, I think you’ve put your finger on something 

very important. As I’ve listened to some of the other testimony 

that’s come before this committee in recent hearings, I’m struck 

that what we’re not really hearing is, even from supporters of the 

207 

agreement, the idea, ‘‘Well, this is part of a well-orchestrated general strategy for the Middle East. This is what we’re trying to accomplish. This is why this agreement is a step forward.’’ We’re simply seeing the agreement defended as, ‘‘Okay, there is a nuclear 

problem, and this, we hope, will be a solution to the nuclear problem, or at least it’s less of a nonsolution than no agreement would 

be.’’ But, what we—you know, what we’re also hearing in the background is a kind of a universal confession of failure of strategy. 

What is our strategy for ISIS? Are we fighting Assad first, then 

ISIS? ISIS first, then Assad? Neither? Both? Something entirely 

different? I think I’ve rarely, in my lifetime—although I certainly 

have heard moments of strategic incoherence, I’ve rarely seen 

American policy on such a wide scale on so many issues in such 

a vital region seem to be so incoherent. I’m still waiting to see 

what our strategy in Libya is. So—or why we intervened in Libya, 

which was of really rather insignificant strategic importance, and 

have done nothing in Syria, which is enormously more important. 

Why not both? Why not neither? 

So, we do, I think, need, as a country, to have the kind of discussion about the Middle East that we had about Soviet expansionism 

in the 1940s, and to try to work our way toward some kind of general bipartisan agreement or confidence in an analytical approach 

to, really, a very vital part of the world. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I think you’ve said it well. I do believe 

it’s possible that we get a bipartisan approach. If we agreed to that 

kind of strategy, then we could be more willing to understand tactical decisions that are made along the way. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your leadership and for having 

these important hearings. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator KING. Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a fascinating 

hearing. 

Dr. Mead, before we begin, I’ve got to say, when I see Hudson 

Institute, a bell rings. Herman Kahn. Wasn’t he with the Hudson 

Institute? 

Mr. MEAD. Yes, sir, he was. 

Senator KING. A great theoretician of the early Cold War. 

Mr. MEAD. Exactly. 

Senator KING. I remember that term. 

A thought experiment. What if Iran had never had a nuclear program, no interest in nuclear weapons, no enrichment, zero. I would 

suggest we would still be having this discussion about how to contain Iran. But, the whole emphasis of the last 5 years or more— 

10 years—has been, ‘‘Let’s get rid of Iran’s nuclear capacity, and 

then we deal with the other issues.’’ I would agree with the Chairman that we don’t have an overall strategy. We should. But, the 

first element in the strategy was to not have a nuclear-armed Iran. 

That’s why we’re discussing what we’re discussing here. 

What’s bothered me about the discussion today and as this has 

evolved is that the rationale for the sanctions seems to have migrated. The sanctions were imposed—and, Mr. Gordon, you were— 

you participated in putting the P5+1 together—it was all about the 

nuclear weapons. Now people are saying, ‘‘Oh, we can’t release the 

208 

sanctions because it will be used for other things.’’ If there had 

been no nuclear weapons program, there wouldn’t have been sanctions, or they wouldn’t have been to the extent that they are today. 

Dr. Mead, think with me on this. Do you see what I’m saying? 

Mr. MEAD. Yes, sir, Senator. I guess what I would say is that I 

would agree that, from the beginning, we should have been thinking holistically about Iran and the region, and that the—that 

thinking about its nuclear capacity, thinking about its regional ambitions, and so on, ought to have been a single policy. 

Senator KING. But, when Ronald Reagan was talking about arms 

control, he wasn’t demanding that Russia—or the Soviet Union 

change its immigration policy or forswear expansionism or adventurism. He said, ‘‘Let’s control nuclear weapons.’’ You deal with 

these issues one at a time, it seems to me. 

Mr. MEAD. Well, it—actually, in President Reagan’s case, I think 

he was doing it—he was—he did have a kind of a full-bore strategy, a controversial strategy rolling back in Nicaragua and so on, 

so that actually, by the time he was engaged in serious nuclear 

talks with the Soviet Union, he had already laid down a number 

of markers and put them in a kind of a constrained position. 

Senator KING. But, that wasn’t part of the nuclear—— 

Mr. MEAD. What I’m—right, but that was a precondition. In his 

mind, the idea was, you demonstrate—— 

Senator KING. Right, right. 

Mr. MEAD.—to the Soviets that the other expansion can’t work, 

simultaneously outbuilding them in strategic weapons. 

Senator KING. I agree, I think that the strategy is twofold: (a) get 

rid of nuclear weapons in Iran, and (b) then develop the containment strategy, as Senator Sessions suggested, George Kennan or 

some other similar strategy. 

Mr. Gordon, one of the—we met, yesterday, with the Ambassadors of each of the P5+1. The question was asked, ‘‘What is the 

likelihood of reconstituting the international sanctions, should the 

Congress reject this agreement?’’ The term used by one of the Ambassadors was ‘‘farfetched.’’ You helped put that coalition together. 

How would you characterize the likelihood that these sanctions can 

be strengthened rather than erode, subject to an American rejection? 

Dr. GORDON. Senator, I think ‘‘farfetched’’ is probably a good description. As I described, this is now an agreement that has been 

reached and supported by every member of the P5+1, by the Security Council, and just about every country in the world. To come 

back and say that, you know, ‘‘We’ve just decided, after all, not to 

go along with it, but, by the way, we want you to keep on the sanctions,’’ which were so tough to get them to agree to in the first 

place, is just very difficult to imagine. 

I would add, even if somehow, you know, through the threat of 

secondary sanctions—you know, I don’t believe that it would collapse, the next day. We would have our secondary sanctions, and 

we would keep most countries onboard, at least to a limited degree. 

But, even under those circumstances, Iran could continue to advance its program. 

Senator KING. Dr. Singh, you mentioned, we haven’t been able 

to get much European support for terrorism sanctions. Isn’t that 

209 

part of the problem, here? We’re trying to separate these issues, 

deal with the nuclear and then deal with the terrorism. But, if we 

reject this agreement and try to get buy-in from the Europeans on 

a broader sanctions regime that would include terrorism, didn’t 

you, yourself, concede that that might be somewhat difficult? 

Mr. SINGH. I think, Senator, I would actually describe the history 

of this issue differently than you described it. I was Director for 

Iran at the National Security Council in 2005 and 2006, and then 

Senior Director for the Middle East after that. Actually, then we 

had quite a broad strategy of countering Iran in the region as well 

as taking on the nuclear program. We saw those things as connected to one another because of the view that the nuclear weapons 

program was a part of Iran’s regional strategy. In the—one of the 

reasons we went to the P5+1 and the U.N. on the nuclear issue 

was, that was the issue where it was easier to get, for example, the 

Russians and Chinese onboard. Iran doesn’t direct its terrorism 

against Russia and China; it directs it against the United States 

and our allies. 

So, I would say that we have actually moved away—further away 

from that kind of broader approach. To date, over the past, say, 7 

years, we haven’t really pushed back on the Iranians, which is why 

it’s not credible to folks in the region for us to say, ‘‘Well, we’re 

going to start now.’’ This doesn’t look like the way you would start 

a serious strategy of pushing back on the Iranians, nor does it necessarily give you the tools. In fact, you’re sacrificing quite a few of 

the tools you’d use to do that. 

Senator KING. My time is expired, but I—and I take your point. 

I agree that this—there has to be a twofold strategy: nuclear and 

non-nuclear. We haven’t been as effective as we should have been 

on the second part, I agree. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. As a proud foot soldier in the Reagan revolution, I tell my friend from Maine, when Ronald Reagan said, ‘‘Tear 

down this wall,’’ he wasn’t talking about nuclear weapons. Ronald 

Reagan understood that we had to emphasize human rights, we 

had to emphasize all of the aspects and virtues of democracy and 

freedom, and then the nuclear weapons agreements followed. 

That’s history. 

Senator ERNST. Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. This has been one 

of many of a series of great discussions that we have had on this 

issue, so thank you for taking the time and providing the input 

necessary. 

I’m going to sound a little bit like a broken record. I’ve asked this 

question over and over again of the last few panels, but I would 

like to ask each of you: In the middle of July, the President came 

out, and he stated, ‘‘We either sign this nuclear agreement or it’s 

war.’’ Sign the agreement or it’s war. Not, ‘‘We’ll work a little more 

on diplomatic relations, sanctions’’—he said, ‘‘it’s war.’’ So, we either go along with this or America’s going to war, evidently. 

Do you believe that to be true, yes or no? 

Dr. Mead? 

Mr. MEAD. No, Senator. 

210 

Senator ERNST. Mr. Singh. 

Mr. SINGH. No, Senator. 

Dr. TAKEYH. No, Senator. 

Senator ERNST. Dr. Gordon? 

Dr. GORDON. I don’t think it’s automatically war, but it does, as 

I tried to underscore, put us in a position of either seeing Iran’s 

program continue or implementing that credible use of force, which 

is war. 

Senator ERNST. Okay, and I’ll come back to you in a second, Dr. 

Gordon, thank you. 

Mr. Nephew? 

Mr. NEPHEW. Senator, I would agree with Dr. Gordon. I think 

that, over time, it will lead to an escalatory spiral that leads us to 

war, yes. 

Senator ERNST. In time, it could lead to war, but not definitive. 

Is that correct, Mr. Nephew? 

Mr. NEPHEW. Senator, I would say that I find the likelihood of 

getting a diplomatic resolution dims dramatically if we reject this 

deal. So, therefore, I do believe that we will have an escalating Iranian nuclear program, an ever-expanding one that sanctions will 

not be able to control. I think that leads us to war. 

Senator ERNST. Okay. 

Dr. Gordon, I’ll go back to you, because you stated you did work 

in the administration for a period of years, so you were assisting 

with these efforts for the nuclear agreement. Is that correct? 

Dr. GORDON. Yes. 

Senator ERNST. Okay. When I spoke to General Dempsey, the 

other day, who is the President’s senior military advisor, I asked 

him if he had recommended that to the President, and he stated, 

no, that he had not recommended that. He did believe that 

there—— 

Dr. GORDON. I’m sorry, recommended? 

Senator ERNST. That we would go to war if this agreement were 

not signed. He stated that he did believe there were other options 

that could be explored before we automatically made the assumption that the United States would engage in war with Iran. So, he 

rejected that. I asked him if he knew who was advising him on 

that, and he said he did not know. Yesterday, the panel rejected 

the notion that war was the obvious solution if we did not sign the 

agreement. 

So, are you the one that was advising the President that we 

would go to war, or we should go to war, if this deal was not 

signed? 

Dr. GORDON. Senator, I don’t think, and I don’t know anyone who 

thinks, that, if this deal is not implemented, that, very quickly, 

Iran makes a dash for a bomb and the United States uses force. 

That’s not, I think, the realistic way to think about it. 

I think the realistic way to think about it is, there are one of 

three options if this deal doesn’t go ahead. Either, and ideally, we 

get a better deal, the Supreme Leader decides that, after all, he 

can make more concessions, he comes back to the table in 3 months 

or 6 months or a year, and he gives us everything we want. That 

would obviously be ideal. I just don’t think it’s realistic. 

211 

If that doesn’t happen, if the Iranians don’t come back and agree 

to all of the things we would like, then it’s really one of two things. 

They steadily proceed with their program, as they’ve been doing 

over 10 years, and, instead of 19,000 centrifuges, they have 30,000; 

instead of a—an LEU [low-enriched uranium] stockpile of 10 tons, 

they have 20 tons; they complete the heavy water reactor at Arak; 

they do their research and development on the IR8s. Then we have 

to decide: we either watch that happen and then have a hearing, 

in a year or two, when they’ve done all of that and they’re basically 

on the verge of a nuclear weapons capability, or have one; or we 

implement the credible use of force to stop them. That’s what I 

think people mean when they say they’re worried that, if we don’t 

do this deal, there will be a conflict. 

Senator ERNST. I would reject the outright notion that we would 

go to war. I do think we need to take a step back and consider this. 

I want to look at the—because we are talking about regional 

strategy, I do believe that Iran has a regional strategy, and they 

are a state sponsor of terrorism. I think this furthers their reign 

of terrorism in the region and around the globe. I think it makes 

them very powerful. On the other hand, the United States does not 

have a strategy in that region. If we had a strategy, and this nuclear agreement was involved in that, I don’t think it would have 

been necessary to send Secretary Carter from country to country to 

talk with our allies in that region to, you know, ease their fears. 

I don’t see that that would have happened if we had that strategy. 

I would love to visit more, Mr. Singh, about—just very briefly, 

if I might, Mr. Chairman—just very quickly—I would like to look 

at the repercussions in Iraq. Iran is a very powerful nation through 

its proxies of terrorism, whether it’s in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, you name it. What does this do to Iraq, with Iran having further means to empower the Shiite militia? Does that really lend 

credibility to a multisectarian Iraqi government, or do we see that 

falling apart, with greater power going to the Iraqi Shiite militia? 

Mr. SINGH. I don’t think that it’s helpful. I think that the problem with this alliance of convenience with Iran in Iraq to combat 

ISIS, even though neither the United States or Iran likes ISIS, and 

both would like to see ISIS defeated, is that Iran’s actions are 

meant, I think, to sort of bolster Iranian influence in the influence 

of Iran’s proxies in Iraq. So, what I worry that you’ll see is Iran 

using some of its resources, using the freedom from sanctions to 

further strengthen its own militias, which are answerable to 

Tehran rather than to the government in Baghdad, as well as to 

buy political influence. We’ve seen this pattern in places like Lebanon. It doesn’t sort of contribute to our goals and our interests in 

the region. Quite the opposite, in the longer run. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you—— 

Dr. TAKEYH. ISIS is—— 

Senator ERNST.—very much. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen. 

Dr. TAKEYH. Can I just respond to that—— 

Senator ERNST. Yes. 

Dr. TAKEYH.—Mr. Chairman, very briefly? Because I think 

there’s been a discussion about this windfall, where it’s going to be 

felt. I think the ramifications of this nuclear agreement, the ecoVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00217 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
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nomic ramifications—I don’t know how it would affect the trajectory of terrorism; I suspect it will be more. But, it will be particularly felt in Iraq and Syria, in terms of prolongation of the Syrian 

Civil War, when the military balance changes in disfavor of President Assad. 

In Iraq, the Iranians are talking about application of the 

Hezbollah model to the Shiite militias. Mainly, those Shiite militias 

will be used outside Iraq, whether it’s in Syria or whether it’s elsewhere. So, essentially, the notion is that, in due course, you have 

mini Hezbollahs being created along that—Lebanon being the 

model for Iraq, a fragmented state, and Shiite militias following 

the model of Hezbollah, in terms of being employed by Iran in various other exigencies in the region. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator—— 

Senator ERNST. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here today. 

Mr. Singh, I certainly, like Senator King, agree with the premise 

that you’re all making that we need a comprehensive strategy in 

the Middle East. I guess I would take a little issue with the effectiveness of that strategy under President Bush, because, at least 

with respect to the nuclear program in Iran, which is—my recollection is correct, when he became President, they had about 160 or 

so centrifuges, and, by the time he left office, they had 19,000. So, 

I do think we need a different approach to address Iran’s march towards a nuclear weapon. 

What I’m trying to get some better understanding of is what you 

all believe should be part of the comprehensive strategy in the Middle East, in addition to trying to address Iran’s nuclear program. 

Dr. Takeyh, you raised concerns about providing arms to Middle 

Eastern countries. As you’re probably aware, last month Saudi Arabia requested 600 new Patriot missile interceptors. So, can you talk 

about whether you think this kind of support for Arab countries is 

something that we should continue to pursue? Or do you think we 

should say we’re not going to support arms for any Arab countries? 

Dr. TAKEYH. Oh, I think the Saudi state is in considerable degree 

of difficulty today, in terms of thinking about its future. Since the 

inception of House of Saud, in earlier 20th century, they had a sort 

of a national compact, whereby they actually deliberately weakened 

their military, in terms of conscription, in terms of developing an 

officer corps that’s not related to the royal family, and developed 

a national guard for internal security purposes. That actually 

worked well, in terms of preservation of House of Saud. If you look 

at every Middle Eastern country, they had a military coup—Libya, 

Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Yemen. Saudi Arabia is the one 

place where the monarchy has not displaced by military, because 

they have kept the military weak. The purchases that they have 

made of these—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, Jordan hasn’t, either, I would argue. 

Dr. TAKEYH. Yeah, that’s right. The—so, the two monarchies. Basically, they have kept the military weak. They have to rethink 

their national compact. They have to essentially engage in conscription, developing an officer corps. They have the population 

213 

base to do that, but they haven’t had the political will, because of 

the concern about their own population. 

Going forward, I think Saudi Arabia has many problems, in 

terms of changing complexion of the oil market. So, I do agree with 

the President—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. Okay. But—— 

Dr. TAKEYH.—in one respect. 

Senator SHAHEEN.—should we give them those interceptors, or 

not? 

Dr. TAKEYH. I think they should be considered in line with Syria’s deep-seated structural reforms that Saudi Arabia has to make 

to its economy, and the way it deals with its citizens, and—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. So, you think we should qualify that kind 

of—— 

Dr. TAKEYH. Yeah. 

Senator SHAHEEN.—military assistance. 

Dr. TAKEYH. I think—as I said, I think President Obama is absolutely right when he says these countries have to strengthen their 

internal mechanisms and political systems. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Dr. Gordon, can you talk about what other 

kinds of efforts we should be thinking about in the Middle East as 

we’re trying to develop a comprehensive strategy that accompanies 

any arms agreement? 

Dr. GORDON. Sure. I mean, on this issue of comprehensive strategy, I do think it is important to acknowledge, right off the bat— 

and Senator King alluded to this—this deal doesn’t provide that. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Right. 

Dr. GORDON. It doesn’t. It doesn’t resolve the Iran problem, it 

doesn’t resolve the terrorism problem, and it doesn’t deal with this 

huge structural change that we’re seeing in the Middle East. So, 

no one should try to defend it, or even, I think, decide on it, on that 

criterion. What it does is take the nuclear issue off the table for 

a good 10 or 15 years, which is not bad, in the context of all of the 

issues you discussed. So, I think that’s just important to state. 

In terms of what we do in the meantime, I think the two elements of what you’re talking about, and what Ray just replied on, 

are exactly right. We do need to stand by these allies. To the extent 

Iran will use its additional assets to threaten them, I think we do 

have to stand by all of our Gulf partners, give them the reassurance. That includes military sales, intelligence cooperation, and defense. But, I think it is also true, as was just said, that, in the long 

run, their vulnerabilities are less, in terms of advanced missile defense than in terms of the soundness of their societies, and they 

need to work on that, as well. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So, Mr. Nephew, I asked you this question in 

a hearing in the Foreign Relations Committee. I think it’s appropriate to raise it again, because several of you referenced the fact 

that if Iran’s going to cheat on this agreement, it’s likely to be incremental and not flagrant, and therefore, present other challenges 

for the P5+1, in terms of how we respond to that. So, it’s not going 

to be automatic snap-back as the result. 

So, can you talk about some of the other options that we should 

be thinking about, in terms of preparing the partners in this agreeVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00219 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
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ment, should it go forward, that we need to respond to any incremental violations? 

Mr. NEPHEW. Certainly, Senator. I think that the first one of 

those is the fact that sanctions snap-back can be scalable. Secretary Lew has testified to this effect. But, if there were to be a 

smaller-scale violation on the part of the Iranians, sanctions relief 

can be terminated in one particular area or another. That can have 

impact. 

Second, we can also use the procurement channel that’s been established as part of this deal to clamp down on nuclear-related 

transfers going to Iran. 

Third, we can use the dispute process to consider additional constraints on Iranian nuclear activities. If they are found to be enriching too much uranium at one particular point, there can be an 

agreement that, in exchange for not snapping back all the sanctions, that Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile would have to be 

smaller for some period of time. 

I think the point is, the dispute process that’s in this deal gives 

us flexibility to scale our response to what Iran actually does. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Chairman. 

I want to thank all of you for being here. This is very helpful. 

I wanted to ask Dr. Takeyh, what—can you explain for us our— 

the history of Iran when it comes to hiding its nuclear activity at 

facilities, such as Natanz, Fordow, and Parchin, and how the international community—how successful they were at that? 

Dr. TAKEYH. Well, I think every nuclear facility that Iran has 

today at some point was an illicit facility, in terms of the fact that 

it was operated. Iranians do have their own explanations for why 

that is the case. Only after detection, after pressure by the international community, you began to see a measure of inspection and 

verification coming into being. 

I think the international community was successful, in terms of 

application of pressure on Iran over time that caused it to perhaps 

reconsider some of the strategy, but the overall trajectory has been, 

as you suggest, that they essentially embark on illicit programs 

when the opportunity is there. 

Senator AYOTTE. So, I would like to get our panel’s take on—having looked at the language in the agreement on the process for 

undeclared sites, it strikes me as very attenuated. As you look at 

this process, the IAEA first has to provide Iran the basis for the 

concerns, in writing, regarding the undeclared materials or sites, 

activities. They have to let them know, you know, how do they 

want access to this. Iran actually gets to respond with alternatives 

to whatever access the IAEA wants. If you look at the plain language of it, those alternatives don’t necessarily include physical access. That’s been a real issue if we’re thinking about the type of 

testing. There’s been some reports that I’ve seen, that have actually been confirmed, that, in fact, Iran doesn’t want to allow physical testing even at a facility like Parchin, that we’re aware of. 

So, I wanted to ask all of you what you thought, in terms of the 

process that’s in place when it comes to undeclared sites, as opVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00220 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
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posed to the ones that we had—that Dr. Gordon referred to, the 

regular—the very continuous monitoring of. Because I think we 

have a history here that we need to be cognizant of. 

Mr. Singh? 

Mr. SINGH. Sure. Well, I think your assessment is correct. There 

is, first, this back-and-forth of indefinite duration between Iran and 

the IAEA to ‘‘clarify,’’ quote/unquote, the questions the IAEA may 

have about a site. Only after that is complete does—can the IAEA 

make its formal request for access, which starts that 24-day clock. 

You know, we have experience with the Iranians about this in 

the past, which folks aren’t, I think, talking about enough. There 

have been several sites—three, in particular—where this has 

played out in the past, and the Iranians have proven to get better 

every time at hiding evidence of illicit activity. 

So, I disagree with those who say that 24 days is not enough to 

hide evidence of illicit activity. It may be that, if we’re lucky, they 

can’t hide it all. But, that’s very different from saying that we’ll 

know what happened there. I think that places way too much, sort 

of, certitude on this process. 

Senator AYOTTE. If you’re not guaranteed physical access, yourself, to me that becomes insufficient, in terms of knowing exactly 

what has occurred at a facility. 

Mr. SINGH. Even if you have physical access, Senator, you have 

physical access after they’ve had an opportunity to engage in various forms of hiding evidence. We saw this, again, at at least three 

different sites in Iran in the past. 

Dr. TAKEYH. Just one thing. It’s important to acknowledge that 

Iran is in violation of the safeguard agreements today. It—as General Amano is here, his agency does not have access. The first work 

plan between Iran and the IAEA was negotiated in 2007, and that 

remains incomplete. It was negotiated, at that time, by Ali 

Larijani. So, there are problems with that. 

Arms control verification works only when it’s collaborative. If it 

doesn’t—it’s not collaborative, it’s antagonistic, there’s no mechanism that can assure its success. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, I think one of the warnings we’re seeing 

is, they’re already issuing statements that are contrary to what we 

would, I think, expect from this agreement, in terms of inspection, 

access. 

Yes. 

Mr. NEPHEW. Senator, if I may. I would disagree with my fellow 

witnesses here about the inspection access. I actually think it’s a 

material improvement over the current situation. Twenty-four days 

is actually quite sufficient to detect a lot of different nuclear activities, especially the most significant ones. I would just point out 

that I think the three facilities that Mr. Singh was referring to— 

actually, two of them involve pretty dramatic steps that were taken 

to sanitize the facilities, one of which was a complete failure. So, 

in the Clay Electric experience, for instance, the Iranians had over 

6 months to sanitize the facility, and they failed. Enriched uranium 

was detected. In the Lavizan facility, the Iranians were so terrified 

about IAEA access that they bulldozed the entire facility down to 

3 feet of topsoil because they didn’t want to have access. We used 

that, in 2006 and 2007, to sell U.N. sanctions against Iran. 

216 

Senator AYOTTE. Can I ask you this? Don’t you think physical access is important? 

Mr. NEPHEW. Absolutely. Physical access can still be required by 

the IAEA. The IAEA is allowed to consider alternative means of access to the facility, but they can say no. They can say we must go. 

Senator AYOTTE. Yes. 

Dr. GORDON. The only thing I would add, briefly, without getting 

too much into the details of all of this is, the bottom line in the 

agreement is that, if we’re not satisfied after this back-and-forth 

and what you’ve described as this attenuated process—if we are 

not satisfied, sanctions—not just U.S. sanctions, but U.N. sanctions—go back in place. That’s new and different. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, I think the details very much matter in 

all of this. I have many more questions, but this—I appreciate all 

of you for being here, and your expertise on this issue. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Mr. Singh, wasn’t it that Anatan was not detected by anyone but the Iranians of informing us? 

Mr. SINGH. I’m sorry, Chairman, could you repeat that? 

Chairman MCCAIN. Wasn’t the facility at Anatan concealed effectively until the Iranians, themselves, the opposition, gave us that 

information? 

Mr. SINGH. Well, I think it’s a relevant point, absolutely, Mr. 

Chairman, that—you know, this all started when we caught the 

Iranians redhanded at doing exactly the things that we’re talking 

about. The process ends with these facilities not being dismantled, 

not being—you know, not requiring to sort of reverse what they’ve 

done but actually all this being legitimized. You know, we see this 

dynamic, where the less risk-averse party in these treaties—and 

you could draw a connection with the INF Treaty, with the Syria 

chemical weapons issue—has the leverage. It comes down, not just 

to the details of the inspections, but, Where is the political will? At 

the end of the day, if we detect something untoward, do we have 

the political will to do something about it? 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Hirono. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to focus a little bit on what would happen if the United 

States walks away or rejects this agreement. Dr. Gordon has laid 

out—described three things that he believes will happen. One, we 

would get a better agreement. Two, Iran—if we don’t get a better 

agreement, Iran will continue its path toward becoming a nuclear 

power. Third, the United States will—assuming we don’t have another agreement, the United States will either watch Iran doing 

this or, at some point, we will need to decide whether to take military action. 

I’d like to ask the other panelists, Do you agree with these three 

events or description of what would happen if we walk away from 

this deal? 

We can start with you—— 

Mr. MEAD. Senator—— 

Senator HIRONO.—Dr. Mead. 

Mr. MEAD. Thank you, Senator. 

It’s a good question. I think that it would be wrong to assume 

that all rejections of the deal are equal, in the sense that one might 

really see where perhaps the administration and the Congress 

217 

came together and saying, ‘‘Well, maybe some incremental changes 

or some things would allow Congress to give support for the deal.’’ 

Then there might well be a bit of a momentum, because the other 

parties to this deal do want to see it succeed, that there might be 

ways of making some positive changes. So, I would just suggest 

that one ought to think, ‘‘Okay, it’s not we just—do we turn the 

light switch on or off. Maybe there’s a dimmer switch or something.’’ We need to think—we need to craft the response that—— 

Senator HIRONO. I think that’s a—— 

Mr. MEAD.—the United States makes. 

Senator HIRONO.—that’s a more nuanced way to look at this situation. But, what we are likely going to be faced with is an up-ordown vote on whether or not we agree with the deal. So, let us assume that we are—if the United States rejects this agreement, and 

the three items that were laid out by Dr. Gordon—would you agree 

that those are the kinds of eventualities that we would be faced 

with? 

Mr. MEAD. I would say that’s why I would urge the Senate and 

the administration to try to avoid a kind of a car crash like that. 

Senator HIRONO. Mr. Singh? 

Mr. SINGH. I think that, you know, anything we say is inherently 

speculative. That’s true of what you’ll hear from, say, the European 

Ambassadors, as well, because they want you to approve the deal. 

I think that if Congress were to disapprove, and the U.S. weren’t 

to participate in the deal, then I really see sort of two branches, 

in terms of possibilities. One is that the other parties go ahead and 

implement the deal. That puts us, obviously, in an awkward situation. Second would be, the other parties—and, I think, Iran, in particular—choose not to implement the deal. They also choose to walk 

away. Then, in a sense, we are back to the drawing board. I don’t 

agree that that ends, necessarily, with force, because I think it’s 

important to bear in mind that these other states are not acting 

out of goodwill or anything like that towards the United States. 

They’ll act in accordance to their interests. So, they’ll evaluate 

what’s in their interest to do. Is it more in their interest to take 

diplomatic actions, in hopes of averting this type of military conflict? Or is it more in their interest to simply, say, walk away, and 

so forth? 

I don’t think that our allies who have been part of this process, 

with the objective of stopping Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and with the objective of averting a war over this question, 

would simply abandon that objective. I think they’ll still try to do 

those same things that brought them to this process. 

Senator HIRONO. Well, that’s another interesting perspective, because this is a deal that was made by the P5+1, and there is a 

question as to what kind of a deal remains if the United States 

walks away from it. 

Mr.—Dr. Takeyh? 

Dr. TAKEYH. Certainly. In my testimony, I suggested five, six 

things that could be done to—— 

Senator HIRONO. I believe—— 

Dr. TAKEYH.—revisions to the—— 

Senator HIRONO.—your first was that we should renegotiate a 

stronger agreement. 

218 

Dr. TAKEYH. Well, I think, specific aspects of the agreement—the 

sunset clause, the IR8s, and so forth. So, we can go back and actually try to strengthen the agreement in that particular sense. The 

history of arms control, from SALT–1 on, is replete with renegotiating arms control agreements that have been agreed on. I think 

this—— 

Senator HIRONO. But—— 

Dr. TAKEYH.—falls—— 

Senator HIRONO. Excuse me, I’m running out of time. But, before 

we can get to a renegotiation posture, we would have to reject this 

agreement. 

Dr. TAKEYH. I think, at this particular point, given where we 

are—the only way we can get to the aftermath of—— 

Senator HIRONO. There are a lot of questions as to whether or 

not our P5+1 partners would even get back to the table. In fact, 

yesterday, I specifically asked the Ambassadors to the United 

States from the U.K., China, and Russia whether their countries 

would come back to the table to renegotiate if the United States 

walked away, and they said no. 

Dr. Gordon? We’ve already gotten to your—— 

Mr. Nephew, would you like to respond? Very briefly. 

Mr. NEPHEW. Yes, Senator, I basically would agree with what Dr. 

Gordon was saying. The only point I would just add to Dr. Singh’s 

point about ‘‘Could we get a better deal some down—someday down 

the road?’’—we should all bear in mind, we’ll probably be negotiating over a much larger Iranian nuclear program at that point in 

time. The idea that we managed to get from 10,000 centrifuges 

down to 5 in this deal is somehow going to be improved when we’re 

sitting at 30,000 centrifuges, I think is pretty farfetched. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Mr. SINGH. Can I just say—I’m sorry—in response to that. 

That’s—I think that’s true, no matter what. In the future, Iran will 

have a bigger nuclear program. We’ll still, at—when these things 

start phasing out, the limitations start phasing out, in 10 to 15 

years, want to stop Iran from expanding it in certain ways. So, 

we’ll be back to this issue, trying—I think, with less tools—to renegotiate. So, I don’t think we should be under the illusion that 

this is going to be permanent. We’ll be back to this issue, one way 

or the other, in the future. 

Chairman MCCAIN. You can rebut, Mr. Nephew. 

Mr. NEPHEW. Thank you, Senator. 

I mean, I don’t think that Mr. Singh is entirely incorrect on this 

point. We will have to be dealing with this problem, going into the 

future. But, I think 15 years from now is a much different environment that we’ll be dealing with than we’d be dealing with at this 

particular moment in time. Second, I think it’s folly to suggest that 

the tools that we have now remain the tools that we have if we reject this deal. 

Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Gillibrand. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. I’d like to continue this line of questioning, 

because this is the area of interest that a lot of us have: What happens if we reject the deal? 

219 

Specifically, I’d like a little more thought on, What do you think 

Iran will do when America rejects the deal? Because what we 

heard from the Ambassadors yesterday is, their skepticism about 

whether anybody would come back to the table was very much informed by their knowledge of their negotiating partners in Iran. 

They, in fact, said that they believed Iran would be so disgusted 

with the United States that they would say—and the hardliners 

would win and say, ‘‘Obviously, you can’t trust America. They’re 

the enemy we always thought they were. We are never giving them 

the opportunity to do this again.’’ They based that conclusion on 

Iran’s previous behavior when the Bush administration attempted 

a negotiation. Because the Bush administration attempted a sincere negotiation, but, at that time, there was no willingness to 

allow any production, even for peaceful means, and so, Iran rejected it, straight out, and we were left with nothing. From that 

time period, they had a few hundred centrifuges, and now they 

have several thousand centrifuges. So, they obviously have continued to invest to perfect their nuclear program, to make it more sophisticated. 

So, from your expertise, I’d like to know, well, What do you think 

the disposition of Iran will be if we reject the deal? From some experts, we’ve heard, to date, that they will complete their production, they will refine to—in 2 to 3 months to have enough fissile 

material for one bomb. If they feel that militarization is their only 

option, then we have several options, most of them are military, to 

respond to that, if we choose to—choose to take that course. So, 

please talk about, if we reject the deal, what are the reactions, specifically with regard to Iran and with a likelihood of full production 

as to a bomb? 

Start on this end and go down. 

Mr. NEPHEW. Thank you, Senator. 

So, my view is that the Iranians would, first off, say that they’re 

not going to negotiate on their nuclear program again under the 

current United States President. I think they would argue that, 

having been defeated in the Congress, there’s no chance that they 

would negotiate with him again. 

Now, the big issue with that is, that means that we’ve got at 

least 18 more months of Iranian nuclear expansion. I think—— 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Right. 

Mr. NEPHEW.—the Iranians would install more centrifuges, they 

would begin to operate them. I think they would complete the Arak 

reactor. I think we’d be, therefore, dealing with a bigger, more 

problematic program. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. And—— 

Mr. NEPHEW. I also think—— 

Senator GILLIBRAND. If they complete the Arak reactor, we can 

no longer bomb it, correct? Because that cannot be a bomb target 

once it’s completed, because then it’s a nuclear fallout site, correct? 

Mr. NEPHEW. Well, certainly once it’s operational, it is much 

more complicated to attack the facility, that’s true. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Okay. 

Mr. NEPHEW. I would make one additional last point, which is, 

I think Iran would also attempt to undermine the international 

support behind our sanctions program. I think they’d be much 

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more successful now than they were in the past, because they’d be 

able to say, ‘‘The original premise of the sanctions effort was international consensus on the nuclear issue. The Americans said they 

wanted a nuclear deal. They’ve just proven they don’t.’’ So, I believe that, at this point, a lot of countries in the region—beyond 

that, in the world—would say, ‘‘What is the reason why we’re supporting these sanctions now?’’ 

Dr. GORDON. Senator, it’s an excellent question. I think you were 

right to bring up precedent in thinking about it, because, obviously, 

looking into the future, we can only speculate. As we do look back, 

we do have a little bit of experience in going to Iran and insisting 

on certain goals, like zero enrichment, and seeing that result in an 

ever-expanding program. 

I find it highly implausible that, if we reject the deal now—and 

we’d be doing so in the name of getting a better agreement—highly 

implausible that Iran would come back to the table—again, whether this year or in 18 months—and renegotiate what they feel they 

negotiated, not, you know, in some quick back-of-the-envelope deal, 

but over a 2-year period of painstaking negotiations with the P5+1 

partners, missing 4 or 5 deadlines because we couldn’t get to a 

deal, an 18-day final end game going over every single painfully negotiated detail—the idea that they would come back to that, even 

after it was endorsed by the Security Council, and give us a better 

deal is unlikely. So, we can go for it, but I think that’s why the 

more likely scenario, as Richard said, was that they would say, 

‘‘Fine, you walked away, we feel free to carry on with this program,’’ which they would do, and it would expand. To be clear, and 

I’ll end with this, I don’t think it means Iran makes a dash for a 

bomb. I don’t think that they suddenly start declaring their intention to pursue a nuclear weapon. They’d do what they’ve done over 

the past decade, which is gradually expand their program—— 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Hold it at 20 percent enrichment. 

Dr. GORDON. Maybe. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Do you think they would just, maybe, continue to develop their centrifuges, but keep it at 20 percent, which 

I think is the limit, and not go beyond that? 

Dr. GORDON. I think they would incrementally advance, right 

across the board, and slowly, so that there’s never one moment 

where they’re crossing some—— 

Senator GILLIBRAND. In breach or in—— 

Mr. NEPHEW. Right. We would find ourselves, in X-amount of 

time, with just a much bigger program, and therefore, a much bigger problem. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Your rebuttal, Mr. Singh. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman MCCAIN. Or Mr. Takeyh. 

Yeah, go ahead. 

Mr. SINGH. I think it’s just—it’s important to bear in mind—I 

agree that I think Iran would likely walk away. The sensible thing 

for Iran to do, frankly, would be to implement the deal anyway. I 

don’t think Iran would do the sensible thing. I think they would 

walk away if we walked away. But, the question of what, then, 

would guide their behavior—I think, you need to remember, Why 

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is Iran in this negotiation, anyway? Not because they want to be, 

but because, in a sense, they had to be. So, I think it’ll really depend on, How do we shape the environment in that circumstance? 

I would not suggest to you that it would be easy, but I would suggest to you that things like deterrence, things like credible redlines, things like, you know, sort of, diplomacy will be just as important then as they have been all along. 

The other point I would make about this is—I know that the 

choice facing all of you is binary, and I respect that greatly. But, 

I don’t think we should think of this as a binary situation out in 

the real world. The negotiations, I think, will continue, one way or 

the other. I mean, if you look at the history—and I know you’re all 

very familiar with the history of these arms control agreements— 

say, North Korea, the history of this issue, itself, and the agreements we reached with Iran in 2003–2004—these negotiations are 

likely to continue. We’re, as Secretary Kerry has said, likely to 

going to want to take up other issues with the Iranians. So, one 

way or another, we’re going to have additional issues to bring to 

the Iranians. The question, I think, is, What sort of tools are we 

going to have, going forward? What sort of framework will the next 

President inherit if he or she wants to further strengthen the nuclear constraints on Iran?—which I think will be necessary. That’s 

a very critical question here, as well. This doesn’t end now. This 

continues. 

Chairman MCCAIN. So, then we’ll—the importance of this question will go to you, either Dr. Gordon or Mr. Nephew, and then to 

Mr. Takeyh. 

Please respond on this issue. You want to respond again to—we’ll 

orchestrate this debate. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. NEPHEW. Well, Senator, I mean, again, I don’t want to abuse 

your time. I think my view is that, you know, Mr. Singh may be 

correct, that there will continue to be, you know, ongoing negotiations and ongoing attempts to resolve the issue. But, I think, if we 

look back from 2005, frankly, all the way to 2013, there were P5+1 

meetings with Iran, but they weren’t getting anywhere, because 

the Iranians were insisting on incredibly impossible red lines. It’s 

because, I think, in part, they didn’t believe that international 

pressure was going to require them to make the kinds of concessions we would need. In my view, sir, I think that’s what would 

happen here, as well. Yes, there would be a process, but it wouldn’t 

resolve in a good deal. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Could part of that reason have been the economic sanctions hurting their economy that changed their attitude? 

Dr. Gordon? 

Dr. GORDON. It could. The reason I pointed out the cases—the 

previous cases of North Korea and Iraq is to remind that, even 

when sanctions pressure is enormous and countries are genuinely 

crippled, they don’t necessarily come to the table and give us everything that we want. So, I think it would be wrong to assume that, 

just because—even if we manage to keep sanctions in place, which 

is an open question if we rejected the deal, I think, would be tough, 

as we heard earlier, but, even if we did, I don’t think we can asVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:33 Sep 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00227 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\21483.TXT WILDA
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sume Iran would come back to the table and make major concessions. 

I don’t want to pretend that only this deal could have been negotiated, that our team—you know, that there’s no other conceivable 

deal. You can imagine details that might have come out differently. 

I do think it’s implausible that, on the big questions people are 

worried about, like sanctions relief for Iran, that there would be 

some deal where they would come to the table, ‘‘Give us the nuclear commitments we want for decades,’’ but not get their frozen 

assets released. That—you could give me the best negotiating team 

in history, backed by the most credible force in history, and I don’t 

think Iran comes to the table and does that deal. I think we just 

have to accept that. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Well, let’s hope it’s not like the great deal we 

made with North Korea. 

Dr. Takeyh, go ahead. 

Dr. TAKEYH. I get a chance to rebut everybody. 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. TAKEYH. Why does—it is important to suggest that Iran has 

participated in the negotiations since 2002 for reasons other than 

the nuclear issue, for attempting to get economic measures, for attempting to shield its nuclear installations from military retribution. That doesn’t happen during the—to attempt to shield this regional surge from military pushback, because you don’t push back 

on a country. Of course, it cannot legalize or legitimize its nuclear 

program in absence of the negotiating table. So, the negotiating 

table has served Iran’s purpose, as does, in my judgment, this 

agreement. 

I’m very focused, as I have been in this testimony, on IR8 centrifuges that Iran wants to bring online. If there is no agreement, 

Iran will not be able to do so for 8 years. If there is an agreement, 

Iran will not be able to do for 8 years. Why do I say that? In 

March, Abbas Araghchi, their negotiator, and, twice since, Vice 

President Salehi has said that they needed 8 to 10 years to introduce these generation of centrifuges, and that’s the R&D [research 

and development] deal he says they negotiated. So, that’s a very 

disturbing aspect of this particular accord. 

Finally, we do have to be prepared for a massive industrialization of Iran’s nuclear program. Vice President Salehi has gone before the Iranian Parliament and asked for budgetary allocation to 

expand their scientific cadre, nuclear engineers, to 20,000 people. 

Currently, it’s about 5,000. So—and they also put into place, as 

this agreement allows, their technological precursors for advanced 

centrifuges. They are getting ready to embark, within the confines 

and context of this agreement, to a very massive and sophisticated 

nuclear program. 

One more thing that this treaty allows—this agreement allows is, 

international community, during the time that Mr. Nephew and 

Phil were talking about, had tried to sabotage Iran’s program, had 

tried to sanction it, had tried to essentially forestall it. Under this 

particular agreement, it enables it. This agreement stipulates that 

Iran can have access to international market—— 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Can I just ask you one question—— 

Dr. TAKEYH. Yeah. 

223 

Senator GILLIBRAND.—about that? Do you take any—is there any 

benefit to the fact that they’ve created vulnerabilities in their nuclear program, the fact that they’re going to cement Arak, the fact 

that they are going to take centrifuges out of Fordow, which is 

harder to bomb, the fact that the only centrifuges that are going 

to be in production will be in a aboveground facility that’s very 

easy to target, particularly once we’re on the ground—that is creating a military vulnerability, from my perspective, and that was 

agreed to by our Secretary of Defense and our Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs. Does that not show some level of—I don’t know—concession on their part? 

Dr. TAKEYH. I think this agreement has some legitimate and important benefits. I do think those benefits—no agreement is perfect. 

You have to judge the agreement by scale of imperfection. This 

agreement imposes some important short-term restraints, but it 

stipulate a projection of Iranian program. It is the first arms control agreement in history that stabilizes a file and then envisions 

its rapid trajectory upwards. That’s the problem with it. 

It is, I must confess, a uniquely—an American agreement. It 

doesn’t deal—it postpones problems for the later time, has entitlements and everything else. 

Chairman MCCAIN. We’re very good at that. 

Professor Mead, do you want to summarize, here, since you—— 

Mr. MEAD. Well—— 

Chairman MCCAIN.—began this conversation? 

Mr. MEAD. Yeah. Let me conclude with a—with an observation, 

here, which is, I think, that the United States has actually, 

through this entire negotiation, sort of ignored two of our principal 

sources of leverage, things that we might well gain by reasserting. 

One is that, historically, agreements of this magnitude that constitute this fundamental change in American foreign policy, have 

gone through the treaty process, requiring ratification by the Senate. Often, in order to gain ratification, particularly since Woodrow 

Wilson’s misadventure at the Treaty of Versailles, this has meant 

bringing along a bipartisan delegation to be involved in the negotiations, and to ensure the kind of advice and consent of the Senate 

on an ongoing basis. This has actually had the impact of strengthening America’s hands in negotiations, because it brings the will of 

Congress in from the beginning, and, in this particular case, our 

partners in the P5+1 would have understood more clearly what 

America’s real red lines were. By choosing to take this negotiation 

in another way and trying to, I think, fundamentally distort the 

concept of execute agreement to avoid the traditional and, I think, 

legal constitutional process, we actually lost leverage as a country. 

The other element of unsurpassed American leverage in this kind 

of negotiation is our ability to impact the strategic situation in the 

region by a focused, coordinated American policy, which coordinates 

our stance on Iran’s regional expansion with our approach to its 

nuclear weapons in negotiations. Essentially, we’ve abdicated that. 

I’m not trying to say, by the way, that it was great under the 

Bush administration, and now it’s terrible. The last thing I’d want 

to do would be to make some kind of partisan point. I think we can 

all point back to a number of things that have gone awry, here. 

224 

But, nevertheless, we’ve really been—we tied, not one, but both 

hands behind our back. So, I’m not surprised, again, that what 

comes out of this is an agreement, where even the defenders tell 

you how terrible it is and how sorry they are that it isn’t better. 

I—and my suggestion would be that, for the United States, it 

would actually be better to engage in this negotiation using the leverage that, in fact, as a country, we do have. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Could I say that I thank the witnesses. I 

thank them for this discussion. I thank them for their point of 

view. 

This may be, in some respects, the most important vote that any 

Senator, no matter how long we’ve been in the United States Senate, will take. We, I think, have been educated and informed by 

your knowledge and your presentation today. I appreciate it very 

much, and I know that all the members of this committee do, as 

we move forward to a day in September when there will be a very 

seminal vote on this issue. 

I thank the witnesses. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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