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S. HRG. 114–301 

IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN IRAQ AND THE CASE 

OF CAMP LIBERTY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 7, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 7, 2015

Page 

IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN IRAQ AND THE CASE OF CAMP LIBERTY ........................... 1 

Lieberman, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chair of Public Policy and Public 

Service, Yeshiva University, and Former United States Senator .................... 4 

Jones, General James USMC (Ret.), Chairman, Brent Scowcroft Center on 

International Security, and Former National Security Advisor ....................... 7 

Martin, Colonel Wesley USA (RET.), Board of Advisors, U.S. Foundation 

for Liberty, and Former mmander, rward Operating Base Ashraf .................... 15 

Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 112 

Appendix A ............................................................................................................... 114 

(III) 

(1) 

IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN IRAQ AND THE CASE 

OF CAMP LIBERTY 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 7, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in Room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Sessions, Ayotte, 

Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Reed, Manchin, Shaheen, 

Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Kaine, and King. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, good morning. The committee meets 

today to consider the issue of Iran’s influence in Iraq and the case 

of the residents of Camp Liberty. 

I’m pleased to welcome this distinguished group of witnesses: 

Colonel Wes Martin, who retired from the U.S. Army in 2010 after 

a military career that concluded years of service in Iraq, where he 

was, among other positions, senior anti-terrorism and force protection officer for coalition forces and commander of Forward Operating Base Ashraf; General Jim Jones, who has previously been 

National Security Advisor, Special Envoy for Middle East Security, 

Supreme Allied Commander, Commandant of the Marine Corps, 

and, most importantly, the marine liaison officer as part of a Navy 

team led by Captain John McCain. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MCCAIN. I can’t make that up. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MCCAIN. Finally, it’s with profound regret that I welcome back Senator Joseph Lieberman. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you for taking some time away from 

your bingo games at the old-folks home to join us today. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Remember, we have a seat, you know, anytime you want to stop by. It’s a lot of fun there. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MCCAIN. I like the blackout game. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MCCAIN. Anyway, I appreciate the chance for a little levity, because there’s none to be found in the matter before us. 

2 

As my colleagues know, Camp Liberty is the location in Iraq 

where more than 2,000 Iranian refugees currently live since they 

were internally relocated from their previous location at Camp 

Ashraf. The residents of the camp are dissidents who have long 

since opposed the regime in Tehran, at one time violently so. 

When United States forces entered Iraq in 2003, the residents of 

what was then Camp Ashraf renounced violence, gave up their 

weapons, and agreed to come under United States military protection as, quote, ‘‘protected persons’’ under Article 4 of the Geneva 

Conventions. For several years, the U.S. military provided security 

for the camp’s residents. This responsibility ultimately transferred 

to the Iraqi government, and things took a turn for the worse, especially in the aftermath of the full withdrawal of United States 

troops from Iraq in 2011. 

In recent years, the residents of the camp have been the victims 

of frequent harassment, the decreased quality of life, hindered access to food and medicine, and rocket attacks, and violent raids 

that have resulted in the deaths of more 100 men, women, and 

children. Most of these attacks are reportedly the work of radical 

Iraqi military—militia groups and agents of the Iranian regime. It’s 

our hope today that today’s hearing can enhance the committee’s 

understanding of several issues: 

First is the basic humanitarian element of this story. Whatever 

one thinks about the organization to which the residents of Camp 

Liberty belong, there is a basic standard of human dignity that 

must be upheld. The United States Government and military made 

a commitment to protect thousands of people who surrendered 

their weapons and came under our protection as a result. Clearly, 

this commitment has not been sustained. U.S. policy is now to assist in relocating the camp’s residents to foreign countries, including the United States, and that goal deserves support. Until then, 

with United States forces now reengaged in Iraq, I hope our witnesses could address whether the Department of Defense could 

play any role to help improve life and security at Camp Liberty. 

This is not just a matter of our ideals, but also our interests. The 

group to which the residents of Camp Liberty belong has provided 

some very useful intelligence on Iran’s nuclear program, specifically 

revealing the existence of covert Iranian nuclear activities. At a 

time when we need the best information on whether Iran is meeting its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the issue we are discussing today must be a consideration. 

Then there is the issue of U.S. credibility and whether our 

friends feel they can trust us. If we make our commitments, we 

must follow through. But, in this case, or in breaking promises 

made to Ukraine in the Budapest Memorandum or repeatedly during the ongoing conflict in Syria or in the concessions that were 

made to get the nuclear deal with Iran or other reasoned cases 

where our own red lines are crossed, it weakens our country, 

harms our friends, and emboldens our enemies. 

Finally, the case of Camp Liberty is symptomatic of a larger 

problem that we face in Iraq, and indeed across the Middle East. 

The problem of Iran’s malign influence, which has been growing in 

recent years, in part due to a lack of an effective United States regional strategy to counter it. In Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Bahrain, 

3 

Yemen, and elsewhere, the Iranian regime is arming, training, and, 

in some cases, fighting alongside militant groups that are destabilizing United States partners, threatening Israel, and seeking to 

establish forward outposts across the Arab world. Indeed, recent reports suggest that thousands of additional Iranian ground forces 

are moving into Syria to shore up the Assad regime as part of an 

anti-American coalition of Syrian, Hezbollah, and Russian forces. 

Despite crushing international sanctions, the Iranian regime has 

been able to expand its influence in Arab capitals across the region, 

most of all Baghdad. Thousands of radical militia fighters, backed 

and mostly controlled by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, are expanding Iranian influence in Iraq, often in the form of human rights 

violations and reprisal killings. We should fully expect the sanctions relief that Iran’s rulers receive under the nuclear agreement 

to empower them to meddle further throughout the Middle East in 

ways that harm our national interests. 

It’s more important than ever for the administration to work 

with Congress to develop a strategy that can weaken Iran’s efforts 

to destabilize the Middle East and threaten our partners. I hope 

our witnesses today can offer some concrete ideas to assist the committee in that final—vital work. 

Senator Reed. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to welcome back the witnesses. 

It’s great to see Senator Lieberman again, and thank him for his 

collegiality and kindness and friendship. Thank you very much. We 

are having a bit of back-and-forth recalling the many interesting 

circumstances and personalities that we miss. It’s always good to 

see you, Senator. 

Thank you, General Jones, for your extraordinary service to the 

Nation as a marine, as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, 

and as someone that we all admire and respect immensely. 

Colonel Martin, thank you for your service, too, sir. 

So, thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony today. 

This morning, our hearing focuses on Iranian influence in Iraq 

and the plight of the nearly 2,400 residents at Camp Liberty, Iraq, 

members of the Iranian dissident group, the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, or 

MEK. The Iranians dissidents at Camp Liberty are in an increasingly perilous situation, having repeatedly come under attack. 

These attacks, which have killed more than 100 MEK members 

since 2009, clearly indicate the threat to this group from Iran and 

Iranian- backed militias seeking to eliminate and silence these dissidents. 

The deteriorating security situation of Iraq only highlights the 

urgent need to find safe refuge for these individuals outside the 

country. The United States has had a special relationship with the 

MEK, dating back to the height of the Iraq war in the mid-2000s. 

This stems, in part, from the MEK’s agreement, at the United 

States military’s request, to disarm and move into Camp Ashraf in 

northeastern Iraq. The U.S. military extended protections under 

the Geneva Conventions for Camp Ashraf residents. However, as 

the United States drew down its forces, consistent with its obligaVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:58 Jul 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\20721 WILDA
4 

tions under the 2008 security agreement signed by President Bush 

and Prime Minister Maliki, U.S. Forces were no longer well positioned to provide for the safety and security of the Camp Ashraf 

residents. 

In December 2011, the Government of Iraq signed a memorandum with the United Nations in which the Iraq Government 

committed to ensure the safety and security of these residents as 

part of the process of relocating them to Camp Liberty outside 

Baghdad to facilitate the resettlement process. However, the 

United States, through the State Department, has had to repeatedly press the Government of Iraq to live up to its obligation to 

provide for the safety and well-being of the Camp Liberty residents. Camp residents remain in fear that the Government of Iraq 

will extradite them to Iran, at Tehran’s request. 

The State Department now is the lead United States Government agency advocating on behalf of the Camp Liberty residents. 

The State Department is working with the United Nations assistance mission in Iraq and the United Nations High Commission for 

Refugees (UNHCR) to find resettlement options for these residents 

outside of Iraq. 

It is my understanding that, as of the beginning of this month, 

nearly 800 Camp Liberty residents have been processed by the 

UNHCR and resettled outside of Iraq. Unfortunately, this resettlement process has dragged on for years and much more still needs 

to be done to find homes abroad for the remaining Camp Liberty 

residents. I would urge all participants in the resettlement process 

to cooperate fully to advance the relocation of these very vulnerable 

individuals. 

One issue that I expect will arise this morning is whether the 

United States should accept more Camp Liberty residents for resettlement. While the MEK was removed from the U.S. list of foreign 

terrorist organizations in 2012, group members continue to be 

barred from admission to the United States because of their Tier 

3 status under U.S. antiterrorism laws. Nonetheless, I understand 

that the administration has adopted a policy that would allow 

Camp Liberty residents to be paroled into the United States if they 

renounce their affiliation with the MEK. Under this policy, some 

29 Camp Liberty residents have ultimately resettled in the United 

States, making the United States one of the larger recipient countries for these refugees. 

I hope the testimony of our witnesses this morning will help 

shine a light on what more can be done to accelerate the resettlement process so that the residents of Camp Liberty can be brought 

to safety outside of Iraq once and for all. 

Again, thank you, and welcome. 

Senator MCCAIN. I welcome the witnesses. Maybe we could begin 

with you, Senator Lieberman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHAIR OF PUBLIC POLICY AND PUBLIC SERVICE, YESHIVA UNIVERSITY, 

AND FORMER UNITED STATES SENATOR 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed. 

Thanks very much for convening this hearing and for your opening 

statements. 

5 

It would be easy to ignore the condition and plight of 2,400 Iranians who are at Camp Liberty in Iraq. There’s so much before this 

committee, there’s so much disorder in the world. But, the plight 

of these 2,400 really involves some important considerations for our 

country. 

The first is, as you’ve said, What does a promise from the United 

States of America mean, particularly if it comes under local—that 

is, in Iraq—political pressure and the promise is reneged? 

The second is, What does the plight of these 2,400 Iranian dissidents, who are opponents of the dictatorial regime in Tehran; 

what does it say to us about larger policy questions for the United 

States in the region? 

So, I thank you, first, for holding the hearing. As I say, it would 

be easy to ignore, but it would be wrong to ignore. Secondly, thanks 

for your opening statements, both of which show a real understanding of what’s happening at Camp Liberty and why it matters. 

Secondly, I’m honored to be here with General Jim Jones and 

Colonel Wes Martin. Both have served our country with great 

honor and courage and distinction. I’m also grateful to be with 

them because they are really experts at the history, here. To some 

extent, it allows me to speak more broadly about what I think the 

policy implications are of what’s happening there. 

I thought, in the interest of time, it might be most helpful if I 

began, in terms of the background here, by quoting a statement 

from former attorney general and Federal judge, Michael Mukasey, 

at a public briefing on Camp Liberty on October 9th of 2013. It’s 

quite direct and personal. He says, ‘‘The United States Government 

asked the MEK to move from Ashraf to Liberty, asked 3,000 people 

to move, and left 100 behind, by agreement, to watch over the 

property that belonged to the people of Ashraf and the valuable installation there. The United States Government hinted that this 

was the price for removing the organization from the list of foreign 

terrorist organizations’’—again, I’m quoting from Judge Mukasey— 

‘‘a list on which it should never have been and was put on only because of an ill-conceived SOP to the Iranian government that didn’t 

work.’’ 

Then Judge Mukasey tells a personal story. He says, ‘‘I went 

along with Rudy Giuliani to Paris and met with Mrs. Maryam 

Radjavi,’’ who’s the head of the National Council of Resistance of 

Iran, also known as the MEK. ‘‘We looked Mrs. Radjavi in the eye 

and asked her to cooperate in that move, and told her that she 

could trust the assurances of the United States Government. She 

agreed. It’s hard for me to say that,’’ Mukasey says, ‘‘without my 

voice breaking or without my conscience breaking. Those guarantees have not been fulfilled.’’ As the United States Government 

withdrew, the Iraqis refused repeatedly to protect the residents, 

and repeatedly launched attacks. There were rocket attacks on 

Camp Liberty, and he goes on to talk about that, and then the attacks on Ashraf, which killed 52 of the hundred people who were 

remaining there. 

If you look at the history of these Iranian dissidents—you could 

call them ‘‘freedom fighters’’—in Iraq, you see that their status 

rises and falls, is secure and then is jeopardized based on the extent of influence that the Iranian government has in Iraq. That’s 

6 

why they’ve been treated like pawns in a much larger battle— 

struggle that now requires us again, through the State Department, as Senator Reed has said, to make it clear to the Government of Iraq, Prime Minister al-Abadi, that the status of the people 

in Iraq—in Camp Liberty really does matter to us, that they have 

to be protected, they have to be allowed to leave the country. If the 

Iraqi government can’t do it, the United States Government should 

offer to do it until they can be taken safely out of the country. 

If you look at this story, you see a lot that may be obvious, but 

I just want to say it quickly, that distinguishes the current government of the Islamic Republic of Iran from a democratic government 

like our own. We’ve all got political opposition, we enter into campaigns, we battle back and forth, et cetera, et cetera. In the Islamic 

Republic of Iran, if you’re the political opposition, the government 

is likely to try to put you in jail or, worse, to kill you. That’s happened inside the country, as the human rights violations continue, 

but it’s also happened with this particular group outside. 

There’s a history here. I’m going to state it very summarily. 

This—the antecedent to this group, interestingly, began as a matter of principle in opposition to the Shah. They were fighting for 

more freedom from the Shah. They then actually joined—and 

again, I’m making a complicated story simple—with the revolution 

in the late ’70s. Not so long after Ayatollah Khomeini came to 

power, they decided that the Shah had been replaced by a different 

form of dictatorship, of a religious dictatorship, and they went into 

opposition, and the government, ever since, has targeted them. 

I’ve come to know them very well. It seems to me that we ought 

to not only—it was right and just that we took them off the foreign 

terrorist organization list, but the truth is, now, that we ought to 

be supportive of them and others in opposition to the government 

in Iran more than we have been, because this group is not—not 

just because they’re the enemy of our enemies in Tehran; these 

people are our friends. They have quite literally, as many of you 

know provided extraordinarily important intelligence to American 

forces in Iraq during the period after the overthrow of Saddam, 

they have been the source of some of the most credible information 

that we did not have from our own intelligence about the Iranian 

nuclear program, and they’re—they believe in freedom. I mean, 

their leader—it’s quite remarkable, they’re a moderate Muslim 

group, they’re against the extremism of the current regime. They 

are quite refreshingly led by a woman who has put out a 10-point 

plan that embraces freedom of speech, separation of church and 

state, free elections, and a non-nuclear Iran. 

So, let me wind up with this—or conclude with this observation 

and, hopefully, suggestion. The Iranian nuclear agreement with 

Iran has been—is about to be executed. It’s going to go into effect. 

What has struck me with a clarity is that the Islamic Republic of 

Iran, the Government of Iran, has compartmentalized this agreement. I think it’s a bad agreement, but—and we’ll see whether it 

actually is adhered to—but, whatever one things of the agreement, 

the Islamic Republic of Iran has sort of put it in a box, and they 

haven’t changed anything else about their program. They’ve been 

very explicit about it. They’re continuing to support terrorist 

groups throughout the region. Even before the nuclear agreement 

7 

goes into effect, as Chairman McCain said, there—they made a 

deal with the Russians to move more aggressively into Syria to 

back Assad, who we have said we feel definitely has to go. They 

continue to say, ‘‘Death to America.’’ It’s not just a chant. If you 

listen to the Ayatollah or others there, they’re quite clear that they 

consider us to be their ideological, civilizational enemies. 

Here’s my point, Mr. Chairman. We ought to compartmentalize 

that agreement also—that nuclear agreement. We ought to put it 

over there and not let it stop us from confronting what they’re 

doing in Syria, continuing the sanctions for human rights violations 

in Iran and support of terrorism. Here’s the point I want to make 

about the National Council of Resistance of Iran and other democratic opposition groups that are Iranian. We ought to be supporting them. This regime in Tehran is hopeless. It’s not going to 

change. There’s no evidence it’s going to—every piece of evidence 

is the contrary. 

So, I hope we can find a way—we used to do this, not so long 

ago, supporting opposition groups in Iran. They deserve our support, and actually they’re a—they would constitute a form of pressure on the government in Tehran that would unsettle them as 

much as anything else we could do, because it would threaten the 

survival of the regime, which, from every objective indicator I can 

see, is a very unpopular regime in Iran. 

President Reagan provides an example, here. He was negotiating—his administration was negotiating nuclear arms agreements with the former Soviet Union, but that did not stop us during that period of time from supporting the Refuseniks in Russia, 

the Solidarity Freedom Movement in Poland, and on and on. I 

think it’s time for us to do that in Iran. There’s no better place to 

begin than by securing the residents of Camp Liberty and assuring 

their safe passage away from the Iranian thugs. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

General Jones. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES JONES, USMC (RET.), CHAIRMAN, BRENT SCOWCROFT CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, AND FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR 

General JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for recalling our days together in the Senate Liaison Office in 1979 and— 

it was a—beginning of a 5-year period for a young major of the Marines who was lost in the Senate of the United States. I had no 

idea why I was assigned over here. I had no idea what I was supposed to do. Captain McCain helped me a great deal, and the Senate staff, who became friends over my 5-year tour here. I actually 

went over to the Marine Corps Headquarters, reminded them that 

I was still over here, because I thought they had lost my file 

and—— 

But—and then the privilege of coming back as Commandant of 

the Marine Corps and Commander of NATO, working with the 

committee and the staff, was certainly a highlight of my life. Although I have nothing but fond recollections of it, I’m very sorry 

that we’re here today talking about something that I think should 

have been taken care of a long time ago. 

8 

So, I’m honored to be with Senator Lieberman and Colonel Wes 

Martin—— 

Senator MCCAIN. May I also say that you served distinction— 

with distinction as the President’s National Security Advisor, as 

well, General. 

General JONES. Thank you. I haven’t forgotten that. 

[Laughter.] 

General JONES. With Ambassador Linc Bloomfield, also, whose 

work has—I would recommend for anyone who wants to understand the full history of the MEK and the Iran/Iran relationship. 

It’s—it should be required reading. It’s—it—I have copies of it here. 

Linc has done a wonderful job. 

I’m—I want to thank you for holding this important hearing; in 

particular, thank you for focusing a long- overdue focus on the 

plight of approximately 2,500 refugees who still languish at Camp 

Liberty in Iraq. They—and this is a group, as Senator Lieberman 

pointed out, to whom our country made a solemn and, I’m sorry to 

say, still unkept promise years ago. 

The committee has my statement on the topic of the Iranian refugees in Iraq, detailing the outrageous campaign of harassment, intimidation, and murder visited upon them at the behest of the Iranian regime and with the complicity of the Iraqi government. So, 

I’d like to just briefly highlight several key points, first on the larger topic of Iran’s influence and objectives in Iraq, and then address 

the related matter of the refugees’ ongoing tragic situation. 

It will surprise no one when I say that the Iranian regime remains among the world’s most consistent threats to global peace 

and stability, as Senator Lieberman just eloquently pointed out. 

It’s a regime that artfully dodges its commitments, generates international friction to exert greater domestic control on its citizens, 

and constantly hardens its grip on its country. The Tehran government seriously violates human rights, United Nations (U.N.) Security Council resolutions, and international law. It rejects the right 

of Israel to exist by both opposing and actively undermining any 

and all Middle East peace processes. The mullahs remain the chief 

antagonists of democracy and liberalization across the Middle East, 

where a better future for millions of people struggle to emerge. To 

them, human rights, the rule of law, international norms of responsibility and modernity are threats to be snuffed out rather than virtues to be embraced. Its retrograde doctrine is one of power, dictatorship, and domination over its people in the region, no matter the 

human cost. 

The Iranian regime knows that the fall of Assad and the loss of 

Syria as a client state would be an enormous strategic loss. It continues to do everything within its power to avert that end and to 

pursue its hegemonic ambitions, in part by supporting international terrorist organizations and—that pose clear and direct 

threat to the United States and our friends and allies. Unquestionably, Iran’s grand strategy, one that constitutionally compels it to 

export its brand of Islamic revolution, entails consolidating the 

hold it has gained in Iraq, a grip it seeks to tighten, both directly 

and through proxies, by widening the sectarian divide that has 

been such a gross impediment to the brighter future for which the 

9 

Iraqi people, the United States, and our allies have sacrificed so 

much. 

I recall, early in this administration, King Abdullah of Saudi 

Arabia and his warning to our Government that then- Prime Minister Maliki was, quote, ‘‘not our friend,’’ but, rather, an Iranian 

sympathizer under Tehran’s influence. He has been proven right, 

unfortunately for us and for the entire region. 

What might not be as well known is that part and parcel of 

Iran’s subversive program in Iraq has been the persecution of nearly 3,500 Iranian objectors to the region housed first at Camp 

Ashraf and now at Camp Liberty. The timeline provided to the 

committee tells a grim story. Colonel Martin, testifying here today, 

commanded the unit in charge of protecting the refugees at Camp 

Ashraf as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom. No one knows more 

about the antecedents and the course of this tragic situation than 

he and Ambassador Linc Bloomfield, who is also here today and 

who I mentioned just a few minutes ago. 

Ambassador Bloomfield has a statement on the MEK that I respectfully request be made part of the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

STATEMENT OF LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, JR. 

‘‘IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN IRAQ AND THE CASE OF CAMP LIBERTY’’ 

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, members of the Committee, thank you 

for the opportunity to share my views with the Committee. I am a former national 

security and foreign policy official who served in the Departments of Defense and 

State as well as the Office of the Vice President during five previous Administrations. Since 2008 I have served as Chairman of the Stimson Center, a non-partisan 

security think tank. The views I express today are my own. 

Since 2011 I have studied the Iranian resistance in detail, and specifically allegations and commonly-held beliefs that the MEK was a terrorist group in decades 

past, responsible for killing Americans in Tehran during the 1970s, and that the 

people at Camp Liberty constitute a mysterious and untrustworthy cult. One result 

of this widespread mindset is that some if not all of the diplomatic effort to end the 

plight of the Camp Liberty residents has appeared somewhat grudging and colored 

by a sense that the residents are responsible for their own predicament, and thus 

a lesser priority than many other urgent challenges occupying US attention in Iraq. 

The information that follows, now in the public domain, is steadily changing the 

way the residents of Camp Liberty, the MEK, and the Paris-based National Council 

of Resistance are being viewed, along with Iran’s strategic circumstances and priorities. What I learned is that no connection has ever been made between members 

of today’s Iranian resistance—at Camp Liberty, in Paris, or anywhere else—and the 

foreign-trained secular leftists who assassinated six Americans in Tehran in the 

1970s. This, the most prejudicial allegation against the MEK, has been investigated 

and debunked. Even the Department of State, in its 2005 edition of Country Reports 

on Terrorism, cited a ‘‘Marxist element’’ that conducted these murders in its unsuccessful attempt to split away and re-brand the ‘‘people’s Mojahedin’’ for its own purposes. That brief clarification was omitted from the report after 2005. 

Indeed, every allegation of terrorism ever cited in these annual reports during the 

19 years since the inaugural 1993 publication has been mischaracterized, exaggerated or misstated. Judicial review in the United States, the United Kingdom and 

France has led to the MEK’s exoneration and removal from all terrorism lists in the 

West including the US, UK, EU, Canada and Australia. The French magistrate who 

investigated the resistance for eight years concluded in 2011 that ‘‘the dossier does 

not contain any evidence indicating an armed activity that would intentionally target 

civilians. If such evidence were available it would confirm terrorism and would 

annul any reference to resistance against tyranny.’’ The UK Supreme Court of Judicature Court of Appeal, while removing the MEK from Great Britain’s terrorism list 

in 2008, said this: ‘‘The reality is that neither in the open material nor in the closed 

[classified] material was there any reliable evidence that supported a conclusion that 

PMOI retained an intention to resort to terrorist activities in the future.’’ 

10 

Washington officials, analysts and journalists in recent years have become accustomed to thinking of the MEK as a secretive terrorist cult with American blood on 

their hands going back to the 1970s and the hostage crisis. But more than three 

decades ago, in 1984, the State Department wrote to Congress that the MEK’s ideology was ‘‘a major source of the group’s popularity in Iran,’’ presenting a detailed 

program on domestic and foreign issues ‘‘as a dynamic response to the problems of 

modern Iran.’’ The State Department described the MEK’s goal as ‘‘providing a popular voice in all aspects of national life through a ‘truly democratic power structure.’ ’’ In fact, from its inception a half-century ago, the MEK, including the men 

and women at Camp Liberty, has had far more in common with Americans, and 

democratic ideals, than anyone serving the clerical regime they have steadfastly opposed in Tehran. 

This is the group in Iran most identified with the century-long push for democratic, representative government in Iran. Starting with the 1906 constitutional revolution and the mid-century nationalist movement that ended in 1953 when the CIA 

deposed Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, student intellectuals have sought 

to bring Iran’s politics into the modern era, with the same rights and citizen responsibilities that people elsewhere have demanded and successfully gained. 

Who are these men and women in Camp Liberty? If the Committee Members look 

around the hearing room, they will see a lot of Iranian-Americans sitting patiently, 

grateful that the Committee is seeking to understand the long road they have traveled. Many are successful Americans who appreciate the blessing of representative 

government more than most of us can ever understand. 

Ask anyone supporting the resistance how they got involved and why they are so 

willing to sacrifice their time, money and comfort—particularly the residents of 

Camp Liberty. You will hear a similar story over and over again. Someone in their 

family in years past supported the Mojahedin’s effort within Iran to promote popular sovereignty, and was arrested, tortured and executed. I have interviewed countless Iranian-Americans from all over our country and in Europe, and to a person 

each has a story of grievous loss, friends and loved ones brutally killed in the prime 

of their lives. Many have endured cruelty in prison as punishment for acts protected 

in our country by the First Amendment. 

Tens of thousands of Iranians—women no less than men—teens and even children, have gone to their deaths simply for refusing to renounce their affinity for a 

brave movement that opposed the Shah’s brutal suppression of political and human 

rights after 1963 and then refused in 1979 to endorse Ayatollah Khomeini’s constitutional formula for religious dictatorship. 

The fundamentalist regime in Tehran has held onto power for 36 years by coercion, intimidation and brute force. Iran’s first and only legitimately elected president, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, along with MEK leader Massoud Rajavi, campaigned 

against dictatorship and brought eight million supporters into the streets of Iran’s 

cities in June 1981; Ayatollah Khomeini responded with a reign of terror, and the 

two barely made it out of the country alive. That is the story behind the MEK’s 

armed resistance, and it helps explain why the regime has allowed fewer than 10 

percent of registered candidates for President to run in the ten elections since 

1980—fewer than 2 percent in the elections since 1993. 

President Rouhani, often described as a moderate, started his recent U.N. General 

Assembly speech referring to his mandate in a ‘‘competitive election,’’ yet in 2013 

he was one of just eight candidates permitted to run; 678 registered candidates were 

disallowed from running. His Minister of Justice was directly implicated in the mass 

execution of 30,000 jailed dissidents in the summer of 1988 and would surely face 

charges of crimes against humanity in a western tribunal. Iran under President 

Rouhani is on a pace to execute 1000 people this year—about 3 a day—mostly people suspected of having anti-regime sympathies. Others are said to disappear without any official disclosure. 

If this narrative seems far afield from the subject of Camp Liberty and Iran’s influence in Iraq, that is only because Iran has succeeded in obscuring our perspective 

of its war against any who would challenge it politically. Iran backs Syria not because it favors Bashar al Assad’s secular politics but because he turned his guns 

against the Syrian people to prevent the Arab spring from taking hold in 2011. The 

clerics understood that the mass movement for political rights could spread quickly 

to Tehran as it had in 2009 after the fraudulent elections. 

Iran’s big problem is not financial or military, but political: the regime suffers 

from a lack of legitimacy, dating back to the bloodbath of June 1981 and the enormous toll since then of executed dissidents. Its greatest fear is the growing appetite 

among educated people in the region for constitutional, rights-based governance— 

precisely what the United States is supposed to be facilitating. The sectarian warfare promoted by former Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki and Qods Force Commander 

11 

Qasem Suleimani, directing Shiite militia attacks on Sunni cities and towns, is 

meant to prevent any possible reconciliation of Shia and Sunni communities in Iraq. 

As Sunnis become more inflamed and radicalized, American influence and leverage 

is diminished. 

Upwards of 200 of the Camp Liberty residents have Iraqi terrorism charges levied 

against them during Prime Minister Maliki’s tenure. There is no due process; this 

represents Iran’s short list of individual dissidents Tehran wants to take into custody, to face the mullahs’ brand of justice. By now it should be clear that Iran does 

not want the Camp Liberty residents ever to reach freedom in the west, where they 

can tell their stories, as many have already since reaching safety in Albania. 

In sum, the truth behind these men and women at Camp Liberty is entirely different from what most of us have heard from our government and analysts discussing the MEK. We now know that the many terrorist designations and law enforcement actions in the West were done at the specific request of Iran, as a quid 

pro quo for various western priorities. 

It must be very stressful for these people, knowing they face risks of death and 

injury every day and yet enduring these hardships to honor brothers and sisters 

who paid with their lives for a more just and democratic Iran one day. 

How much more stressful must it be knowing that America has not upheld its 

promise of protection, expeditious refugee processing, and living conditions meeting 

at least minimum humanitarian standards? 

How do they feel having been assured by us and the U.N. that the fruits of 25 

years of effort by thousands at Camp Ashraf would be protected, only to have the 

stay-behind contingent brutally bound, gagged and murdered by elite Iraqi forces, 

hostages taken, and their assets pillaged? 

What must they think of our government when they are told that we might consider bringing them to safety here in the United States, but only if they renounce 

everything for which they, their loved ones, and so many before them have made 

such extraordinary sacrifice? 

And yet, fifty years of enduring these and many other hardships and indignities 

has only made the resistance and its many supporters around the world more resilient, more committed, and more confident that the nightmare in Iran cannot and 

will not endure. These are extraordinary people, and every one of them has a worthy story to tell. If we are to improve our understanding of Iran—and it should be 

clear that there is room for improvement—we can learn much from these people. 

First, however, we must recognize how our understanding has been distorted by regime misinformation, bring all of the Camp Liberty residents to safety, and thereby 

restore a principled policy and American credibility. I thank the Committee for inviting my perspective. 

Senator MCCAIN. Without objection. 

General JONES. Allow me to briefly hit some strategic highlights 

about this tragic matter. 

The MEK is a group that has consistently opposed the Iranian 

regime and resided at Camp Ashraf since 1986. During Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, the group welcomed American troops, voluntarily 

disarmed themselves, cooperated with the coalition willingly and 

fully, and aided us by providing highly significant intelligence, and, 

as Colonel Martin will point out, by helping to protect U.S. 

Servicemembers. In exchange, the United States promised to ensure the refugees’ safety and protection. This solemn obligation 

transferred to the Iraqi government as part of its sovereign commitments in the terms of the 2009 United States-Iraq Status of 

Forces Agreement. 

As you will see from the timeline, what followed these commitments has been a litany of bloodshed and mistreatment at the bidding of the Iranian regime, with the complicity and elements of the 

Iraqi government all too eager to accommodate Iranian wishes. 

I would note for the committee the three most lethal events: the 

ground assault on Camp Ashraf that took place in July 2009 in 

which 12 unarmed residents were killed, another attack in April 

2011 in which 36 unarmed residents were killed, and a third attack 

in September 2013 in which 52 unarmed residents were killed. 

12 

Many of these were captured on video, which can be provided to 

the committee if you so desire to see them. Again, Mr. Chairman 

and members of the committee, the victims were unarmed men, 

women, and children who we promised to protect, a duty vested in 

the Government of Iraq upon our departure. 

Despite these atrocities, we have remained slow, ineffective, and 

sometimes even reluctant in responding to our humanitarian obligation to facilitate the swift relocation of refugees out of harm’s 

way. Unfortunately, this is exactly where the vast majority of refugees remain, at Camp Liberty and in harm’s way. We can get into 

all the factors that have been held up—that have held up humanitarian relocation. In part, it’s been complicated by the hesitancy of 

some refugees to leave brethren behind at risk or to renounce their 

association with a group which was removed from the United 

States and European terrorist list over the course of time. 

Primary problem, however, has been our slow and seemingly indifferent response to our commitments and to the refugees’ perilous 

situation. Legal impediments have been erected and allowed to let 

stand. Some may wish to debate them or the group’s history and 

structure. We can certainly have these discussions. But, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, none of it will distract from 

what remains the primary fact and our chief duty, to find the legal 

means and the moral courage to fully aid a group of people who 

have cooperated with us, who have helped us and protected us, and 

who promised to protect—and who we promised to protect, and who 

remain in mortal danger in spite of such a large and growing bipartisan chorus in our country calling for action. 

Before further tragedy ensues, we can and we must meet our 

duty by expeditiously accepting an appropriate number of the remaining refugees here under fair and responsible terms, by exercising our leadership to get allies to do the same, and, above all, 

by keeping a solemn promise we made to our friends of the United 

States. That is what a good and great country does. 

Congressman—former Congressman Lee Hamilton made a stirring speech, about 2 years ago, in which he recited Mrs. Radjavi’s 

10-point plan for the future of Iran. I won’t read the—read it, but 

let me just give you the highlights of the 10 points. First is democracy, pluralism, abolishment of the death penalty, separation of 

church and state, gender equality, rule of law, human rights, respect for private property, peaceful coexistence, and a nuclear- free 

state. Congressman Hamilton looked up at the audience and said, 

‘‘What’s wrong with that?’’ 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General Jones follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC (RET.) 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee, thank 

you for holding this important hearing on Iran’s influence in Iraq—and its implications for the people of Iraq, the stability of the Middle East, and for America’s interests and values. 

In particular, thank you for providing long-overdue national focus on a related 

topic—the plight of approximately 2,500 Iranian refugees who continue to languish 

in great danger at Camp Liberty in Baghdad. 

The People’s Mujahedin of Iran (referred to as MEK or PMOI) are exiles from 

Iran who have lived in Iraq since the mid-1980s. They oppose the regime in Tehran 

which has helped facilitate a campaign of harassment, intimidation, and murder 

13 

against their encampment with the complicity of Iraqi authorities—despite America’s promise to protect the men, women, and children of Camp Ashraf, now residing 

at Camp Liberty. 

Before addressing this ongoing humanitarian tragedy in greater detail, I would 

like to briefly address the larger hearing topic of Iran’s influence and objectives in 

Iraq. It will surprise no one when I say that the Iranian regime remains among the 

world’s most consistent threats to global peace and stability. 

It is a regime that artfully dodges its commitments, generates international friction to exert greater domestic control on its citizens, and constantly hardens its grip 

on the country. The Mullahs’ government serially violates human rights, U.N. Security Council resolutions, and international law. They reject the right of Israel to 

exist by opposing and actively undermining the Middle East Peace Process. Tehran 

remains the chief antagonist of democracy and liberalization across the Middle East 

where a better future for millions of people struggles to emerge. 

To the Mullahs, the concepts of human rights, rule of law, international norms 

of responsibility, and modernity are threats to be snuffed out, rather than virtues 

to be embraced. Their retrograde doctrine is one of power, dictatorship and domination over its people and the region, no matter the human cost. Its goal is the consolidation of the revolution which is martially enforced at home by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and prosecuted abroad by the Quds Force and Iran’s many 

proxy groups. 

The Iranian regime knows that the fall of Assad and the loss of Syria as a client 

state would be an enormous strategic loss. It continues to do everything within its 

power to avert that end, and to satisfy its hegemonic ambitions—in part, by supporting international terrorist groups that pose a clear and direct threat to the 

United States and our allies. 

Unquestionably, Iran’s grand strategy—one that constitutionally compels it to export its brand of Islamic Revolution—entails consolidating the hold it has gained in 

Iraq—a grip it seeks to tighten, directly and through proxies; and by stoking the 

sectarian fires that have been such a gross impediment to the brighter future for 

which the Iraqi people, the United States, and our allies have sacrificed so much. 

I recall early in this administration, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia’s warning to 

our government that then-Prime Minister ‘‘Maliki was not our friend’’; but rather 

an Iranian sympathizer under Tehran’s influence. He has been proven right, unfortunately for the region. 

Maliki may be gone but the Iranian tentacles are not. In fact, the fight against 

ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq) has given Iran a new pretext for extending its reach. 

We would be wise not to forget that Tehran isn’t interested in fighting ISIL to stop 

it from imposing an extreme brand of Islam through barbarity and manipulation in 

Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. The Mullahs are only interested in stopping ISIL from 

getting in the way of Iran sustaining a client state and imposing its brand of Islamic 

extremism through violence and manipulation. 

Recently Assad hailed the ‘‘Russia, Iran, and Iraq alliance’’ in battling terrorism. 

I would submit that an Iraq being torn asunder by ISIL and dominated by Iran; 

an Iraq that has become a regional focal point of instability in the Middle East; and 

an Iraq that is allied with Assad, Putin, and the Grand Ayatollah is not the vision 

the United States and our allies head when we freed the country from the yoke of 

Saddam Hussein. It’s not why nearly 4,500 American service members paid the ultimate sacrifice and tens of thousands more wounded. It’s not the future the majority 

of Iraqis had hoped for and deserve. 

This committee knows well the financial and kinetic powers that Iran wields to 

exert its influence and you know the basic tenets of its strategy to export revolution. 

You know the grave implications of Iranian efforts to shore up the Assad dictatorship and to prosecute the malignant Shiite-Sunni conflict in Iraq and foster its 

reach in Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen. What is not as well know is that part and parcel of Iran’s subversive program in Iraq has been the persecution of nearly 3,500 

Iranian objectors to the regime housed first at Camp Ashraf in Diyala Province and 

now at Camp Liberty in Baghdad. 

The timeline accompanying today’s testimony tells the grim story. Colonel Wes 

Martin, testifying here today, commanded the unit in charge of protecting the refugees at Camp Ashraf as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

No one knows more about the antecedents and course of this tragic situation than 

Colonel Martin and Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield. The ambassador is here and 

can be a great resource to you on the issue. He has prepared a statement on the 

MEK that I respectfully request be made part of the hearing record. 

As Ambassador Bloomfield has chronicled in his extensive study, this is a group 

that has consistently opposed the Iranian regime and resided at Camp Ashraf in 

Iraq since 1986. During Operation Iraqi Freedom the group welcomed American 

14 

troops, voluntarily disarmed, cooperated willingly and fully, and aided us by providing highly significant intelligence—and as Col. Martin points out—by helping 

protect United States service members. 

In exchange, the United States promised to ensure the refugees’ protection. This 

solemn obligation transferred to the Iraqi government as part of its sovereign commitments and the terms of the 2009 United States-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement. 

As the timeline shows, what followed these commitments has been a litany of 

bloodshed and mistreatment at the bidding of the Iranian regime complicit with elements of the Iraqi government all too eager to accommodate Iranian wishes. 

I would just emphasize for the Committee the three most lethal events: a ground 

assault on Camp Ashraf that took place on July 2009 in which 12 unarmed residents were killed; another attack in April, 2011 in which 36 unarmed resident were 

killed; and a third attack in September, 2013 in which 52 unarmed residents were 

killed. 

Colonel Martin’s testimony covers many other episodes of mistreatment and 

threat inflicted on the MEK during their tenure at Camp Ashraf and over the course 

of their time at Camp Liberty, formerly known as Camp Hurriya. Let me stress 

again Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: the victims were unarmed 

men, women, and children that we promised to protect—a duty vested in the Government of Iraq upon our departure. 

Despite these atrocities the United States has remained slow, ineffective, and 

even reluctant, in responding to our humanitarian obligation to facilitate the swift 

relocation of the refugees out of harm’s way. Unfortunately, this is exactly where 

the Camp Liberty refugees remain today—in harm’s way. 

We can get into all the factors that have held up humanitarian relocation. In part 

it has been complicated by the hesitancy of some refugees to leave brethren behind 

at risk, or to renounce their association with the group which was removed from 

United States and European terrorist lists—a step that required exacting standards 

and findings. 

The primary problem, however, has been our government’s exceedingly slow and 

seemingly indifferent response to our commitments and the refugees’ dangerous situation. In part, it’s the product of a complex set of legal circumstances and interpretations that have been allowed to impede our receiving a fair number here. 

As I mentioned, MEK was once listed as a Tier 1 foreign terrorist organization 

but our government delisted it several years ago and Europe delisted it years before. 

Nevertheless, the Department of Homeland Security now considers the MEK to be 

a Tier III entity on the basis of its past FTO (foreign terrorist organization) designation, even though Tier III entities are defined as any group ‘‘which engages in’’ [note 

the use of the present tense] a variety of terrorist activity. 

As I understand it, Tier III organizations are not specifically listed by any United 

States agency, but rather are determined on a case-by-case basis. DHS (Department 

of Homeland Security) apparently has taken the position that it will consider every 

resident in Camp Liberty to be barred from admission to the United States for one 

or more of the following reasons: 

• The individual was a member of a Tier I designated organization during the period of its designation, 

• The individual is currently a member of a Tier III entity, or 

• The individual was or is co-resident with MEK members and thus provided 

‘‘material support’’ to a Tier I organization during its period of designation (i.e. 

at some point between 1997 – 2012) or to a Tier III entity now. 

Further I’m informed that DHS has offered to consider the admission of persons 

who would (a) renounce any affiliation with the MEK, and (b) promise not to provide material support of any kind to the group (this could include advocating for 

U.S. political support of the MEK or NCRI). 

Apparently if a person agrees to renounce the MEK and any future support, but 

is later found to have violated this commitment (even if unwittingly, e.g. by providing or accepting material support to or from a MEK member), then that refugee 

is vulnerable to deportation back to his or her country of origin—in this case, Iraq 

or possibly even Iran. 

According to legal counsel there are at least two ways to solve this dilemma. DHS 

could exercise discretion by not designating the MEK as a Tier III entity. Thus persons currently affiliated with the group could be considered for admission without 

having to renounce any future membership or contact with the organization or its 

members. Alternatively, Congress could enact legislation expressly removing the 

MEK from the Tier I – III designations for the limited purpose of refugee admissibility of persons affiliated with the group; all other requirements for refugee admissibility would still apply. 

15 

I’m not a lawyer. While some may wish to get hung up on the legal complexities, 

others will want to debate the group’s history and structure. We can certainly have 

those discussions. 

What we know is that a lot of things we thought were true about the MEK for 

many years have been investigated in detail, and turn out to be untrue or greatly 

exaggerated. But history aside, even the State Department since 2012 has made 

clear that the National Council of Resistance and its affiliate, the MEK, are entirely 

political in character, and have been engaged in political opposition activities for the 

past 14 years at least. 

It is time our government realized that the Iranian resistance has been misunderstood for many years in Washington due to false information, and they should be 

treated the same as our government would treat the political opposition from any 

country. If there are separate rules that should apply to the MEK, they should be 

preferential, not punitive measures, reflecting the fact that the resistance was the 

first to reveal Iran’s secret nuclear enrichment activities in 2002 and then they 

turned over all their weaponry to American forces in 2003 in return for a commitment from the United States under international law that they would be protected. 

Every time we have fallen short of fulfilling this commitment, our country’s reputation has been diminished, and Iran’s regime has gained leverage against voices calling for democratic reform. 

None of the falsehoods, distortions, or legal disputes can distract from what remains an irrefutable obligation: to aid a group of people who have cooperated with 

us, who have helped us, who protected us, who we promised to protect, and who 

remain in mortal danger. That’s why such a large and growing, bi-partisan chorus 

continue to call for action. 

Before further tragedy ensues, we can and we must meet our duty by expeditiously accepting an appropriate number of the remaining refugees here under fair 

and responsible terms; by exercising our leadership to get allies to do the same; and, 

above all, by keeping a solemn promise we made to friends of the United States before further bloodshed is visited on unarmed, vulnerable people. Keeping our promises is what good and great countries do. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I’m confident that with your 

insistence we can and will do what’s right. 

Senator MCCAIN. Colonel Martin. 

STATEMENT OF COLONEL WESLEY MARTIN, USA (RET.), 

BOARD OF ADVISORS, U.S. FOUNDATION FOR LIBERTY, AND 

FORMER COMMANDER, FORWARD OPERATING BASE ASHRAF 

Colonel MARTIN. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and 

members of the committee, I thank you for this opportunity to address the situation endured by the residents of Camp Liberty, Iraq. 

Having served as the senior antiterrorism officer for all coalition 

forces Iraq and as the base commander of Camp Ashraf, where the 

residents were located before resettlement to Camp Liberty, I came 

to know and understand them very well. When I was outside the 

perimeter in missions with the residents, I found them to be a solid 

ally. Inside the perimeter, I found them to be a major learning opportunity. 

While serving as the Ashraf base commander, I personally witnessed the residents doing everything possible to protect and support the soldiers and the marines assigned to my base. They provided critical intelligence that helped reduce danger to American 

service members. Without their help, I have no doubt that many 

Americans would not have survived their tour of duty. That is a 

debt that we can never repay to these fine people. 

Even concerning logistics, when we were running short of water, 

the residents pumped 50,000 gallons of water to us every day. 

There was never-ending cooperation between the residents and the 

Americans. With pride, every resident carried a Protected Person 

16 

identification card issued to them in 2004 by the United States 

Government. 

The MEK was an intelligence source that we didn’t learn fully 

how to use for a long time, even though they were willing to share 

the information. Their relationships in the local area were bringing 

in continual reports of al-Qaeda, Badr Corps, and Mahdi army activities throughout the region. Not until the arrival of the Marine 

Corps Human Exploitation Team were we able to get the information properly into the intelligence network. 

In 2009, the Protected Person Status was revoked without warning, and security of the residents was turned over to the Government of Iraq. The United States and the Iraqi governments provided written assurances that the residents would be treated with 

full security and full humanity. As you are aware, that has not 

been the case. Three ground attacks at Ashraf and three rocket attacks at Camp Liberty have resulted in 117 residents killed, every 

one of them a holder of those Protected Person Status cards. 

Per agreement worked out with the Government of Iraq, 100 

residents were approved to remain at Ashraf to serve as property 

custodians when the rest of the residents moved to Camp Liberty. 

The 2013 ground assault resulted in the murder of 52 property 

custodians and the kidnapping of 7 others. At this point, let me 

leave no doubt, per my investigation, there is—the Iraqi government was fully involved, and the Iraqi government conducted those 

murderous assaults, to include the 2013 massacre. 

Senator McCain, it’s my understanding Governor Tom Ridge has 

provided you a copy of this document. 

Senator MCCAIN. He had. 

Colonel MARTIN. Since the residents relocated to Camp Liberty 

psy-op initiatives by the Iraqi government and the Iranian governments have reoccurred. Most recent took place within the past 

month, causing the residents scheduled for relocation to Albania to 

decline safe passage in the face of clear danger to their fellow residents remaining in harm’s way. Although it is possible to criticize 

the residents’ actions after much effort to arrange their safe exit 

from Iraq, it is understandable that those bearing tickets to safety 

would feel guilty about abandoning their fellow exiles to a fate suggested by the same menacing harassment that preceded previous 

slaughters. 

On a daily basis, Liberty residents endure numerous forms of 

harassment. Camp Liberty was never intended to house people 24 

hours a day. It was an area for American soldiers to rest when off 

duty. The infrastructure was never intended to last long and support so many people consolidated into such a closed area. The T 

walls that provided shelter from rocket attacks were removed after 

the residents arrived at the camp. Despite what is claimed, the 

residents never wanted those walls removed. The sewage tanks are 

rupturing. Preapproved logistical support items purchased at very 

inflated prices are being denied entry into the camp. Artificial 

delays in being escorted to local hospitals result in missed appointments. Several deaths have occurred due to denial of access to 

medical service. There have been at least two food blockades. Their 

vehicles are breaking down, and replacement parts are forbidden 

entry. Freon and parts for refrigeration are not being allowed into 

17 

the camp. The harassments continue. They’re not being allowed to 

sell their Ashraf property, as was agreed by the U.N., the United 

States, and the Iraqi government. 

Senator, the residents of Camp Liberty have asked me to provide 

this book to be included in the record of the hearing. It’s titled 

‘‘Property in Ashraf.’’ 

Senator MCCAIN. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Due to the sensitive nature of this book and additional documents provided to the 

Committee. Please contact the Committee’s Security Manager for access. 

Colonel MARTIN. Thank you, sir. 

As Iraq and the surrounding region face deeper crisis, there remains the possibility that Camp Ashraf residents can avoid becoming further casualties in the Iranian-directed aggression, but time 

is surely not on their side. Secretary Kerry has the authority to accept the residents into the United States without them having to 

renounce the MEK. The claim that they were once members of a 

terrorist organization is now widely understood and documented to 

have been the result of diplomatically inspired designations in the 

United States and allied countries, all of which have been fully investigated and undone by judicial and scholarly review. 

As I close, concerning the future of the residents, former Special 

Representative for the United Nations, Secretary General for Iraq 

Ad Melkert, stated it best, ‘‘Hardly has a humanitarian issue been 

politicized as much as this one, yet already for many years the victims are not the players. It is essential for the international community to understand this and, thus, consider it a duty to intervene in defense of international law and human rights, regardless 

of political interest or bias. This, therefore, should be the moment 

for government and lawmakers to step up and let reason and compassion prevail.’’ 

Senator, thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Colonel Martin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY COLONEL WESLEY MARTIN

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee, I 

thank you for this opportunity to address the situation endured by the residents of 

Camp Liberty, Iraq. Having served from 2003 through 2004 as the Senior Anti-Terrorism Officer for all Coalition Forces in Iraq, from 2005 and into 2006 as the Senior 

Operations Officer for Task Force 134 (Detention Operations), and in 2006 as the 

Base Commander of Camp Ashraf where the residents were located before resettlement to Camp Liberty I came to know and understand them very well. In 2007, 

after my return to the Pentagon, I commenced fulfilling my promise to the Commanding General of Detention Operations to work directly as his representative 

with U.S. State Department to help develop a long-term solution concerning these 

residents. 

After my retirement from active military service in 2010, I continued to be involved in seeking resolution. This involvement is not only because it is the right 

thing to do, but for another very important reason. While serving as Ashraf Base 

Commander I personally witnessed the residents doing everything possible to protect and support the Soldiers and Marines assigned to my base. They provided critical intelligence that helped reduce danger to American service-members. Without 

their help I have no doubt many Americans would not have survived their tour of 

duty in Iraq. Even concerning logistics, when we were running short of water, the 

residents pumped to us fifty thousand gallons of water a day. There was never-ending cooperation between the residents and the Americans. 

Duty my time at Ashraf, I came to know the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) better 

than any other outsider before, and very likely after. I heard the rumors, then purVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:58 Jul 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\20721 WILDA
18 

sued the facts. I challenged them in debate and listened to them in discussion. Having already been the Antiterrorism/Force Protection Officer for all of Iraq, I had a 

solid understanding of the ever-changing threat. To understand what I was working 

to protect, and from whom, I had done an incredible amount of studying. When I 

was outside the perimeter in missions with the residents, I found them to be a solid 

ally. Inside the perimeter, I found them to be a major learning opportunity. We 

didn’t always agree, but we always respected and trusted each other. 

I first learned about Camp Ashraf and the MEK during my earliest days as the 

Senior Antiterrorism/Force Protection Officer for all coalition forces in Iraq. This 

was in 2003. I assessed all my threat sources, the foreign fighters, in-country insurgents, former regime elements, religious insurgents, hostile tribes, and criminals. 

The residents of Camp Ashraf were not among any of these groups. On closer inspection I realized they were working closely with American forces. Recognizing the 

residents of Camp Ashraf were not a threat I concentrated my attention on real adversaries who were determined to undermine our mission and kill coalition soldiers. 

In October of 2003 the Commanding General of Detention Operations told me the 

residents could be among the best allies we have in country. With disappointment 

she informed me coalition leadership had yet to figure out how to deal with them, 

and most important to use them as a potential resource—especially in the area of 

intelligence. 

Their name came up again when an officer reported to Coalition Forces J–3 (Operations), Major General Tom Miller, that Ashraf residents were constructing combat 

trenches between their camp and the Americans. I checked that rumor out and discovered the trenches were for the installation of water pipes to handle the surge 

of new residents caused by the consolidation. I had no way of realizing this was just 

the beginning of all the unfounded rumors I would hear about the MEK. Two years 

later, the Ashraf dilemma would play a bigger role in my life when I became the 

Operations Officer for Task Force 134, Detention Operations. Seven months after 

that, it became my main focus when in June of 2006, I became the first colonel to 

serve as base commander of Camp Ashraf. 

One thing that always impressed me in 2006 about Camp Ashraf was how out 

of the desert an oasis was built. Outside of the perimeter fences was barren land. 

Supported by water pumped from two rivers and purified within the compound was 

a well irrigated community. The residents had also set up outlets along the pipeline 

to allow local farmers to draw water for their use. Electricity was provided to all 

camp facilities; a hospital and clinics served not only the residents but anyone who 

showed up at the gates requesting treatment. Each compound had its own bakery 

and dining facility. Each of these had a special food or item that championed over 

the other facilities. They produced their own ice and made their own soft drinks. 

The uniforms they wore were always well-serviced and clean at the beginning of the 

work day. 

I found Camp Ashraf’s mosque a testimonial to the organization’s founding principles of tolerance of other religions and races as well as the clergy not possessing 

total control over interpretation of the Quran or the congregations. Constructed with 

the two towers of a Shiite religious center, it was open to all. Sunni residents of 

the local area were welcome to come and worship. Americans and all other nationalities of any faith were welcome to come inside the mosque. Unknown to the outside world, one of the biggest celebrations of the year at Ashraf is Christmas. This 

may seem strange to outsiders, but any resident of Ashraf is always ready to point 

out that Christ is the second prophet. 

As base commander, I moved out to develop a professional relationship and gain 

a thorough understanding of this organization. What I found is the vast bulk of proclaimed knowledge among the Americans concerning the MEK was basically rumors. No one had attempted to study the history of the organization. It was almost 

like Greek mythology. The unknown was explained with stories passed on from one 

to another. By western standards, their way of life is considered strange, if not bizarre, but that doesn’t make them bad people. They do live a Spartan life and have 

a closed society. Men and women live separate of each other. Makeup is not worn. 

At the time of my presence, all of the membership wore uniforms. Women have the 

key leadership roles of running the organization. They do have a strong allegiance 

to Massoud and Maryam Rajavi. 

Often their understanding of western attitudes and perceptions is as weak as our 

understanding of what they think and feel. It is easier for westerners who don’t understand them to simplify the situation by proclaiming the MEK to be a cult. I have 

had many detailed conversations and debates with them. They have even asked me 

about the cult label and how they could improve the outside perception of themselves. Often the advice I gave was very hard and direct. To their credit, they accepted the advice and frequently exercised the guidance I provided. 

19 

Unfortunately, while serving as base commander, both the MEK and I had to put 

up with occasional visits from a State Department representative who would come 

in with her own prejudice and refuse to even listen to what anyone else said—to 

include Americans. The most disastrous visit by this representative occurred during 

the same time I was back in Baghdad taking care of several other responsibilities. 

Upon my return, I found myself having to go visit every compound this representative had toured and mitigate every offensive remark she made and unwarranted action she conducted. 

Perhaps the most blatant and irresponsible rumor that came out of State Department occurred in the fall of 2006. An urgent warning came through that the MEK 

was recruiting Iraqis by the hundreds and training them at a specific compound. 

My unannounced inspection of this compound revealed a handful of local Iraqi workers. The MEK hired local labor because there was always too much work at Ashraf 

for the membership to perform. Should the workers come and go every day, their 

chances of getting caught by the Shiite death squads were that much greater. The 

workers preferred to come and go once a week and deliver the earnings to their families. Having seen enough to realize that once again I was chasing State Department 

swamp gas, I started to leave the compound. My MEK escort interrupted my departure and stated that there was another building to examine. I assured him between 

what I already witnessed, and his willingness to show more, I was convinced there 

was no reason to look further. 

Another rumor concerned the MEK keeping people against their will. They did 

have concertina wire fences between their compound and ours. To the outside, it appeared they were trying to keep people in. Upon much closer examination and experience, I came to realize that they didn’t want anyone to defect from the organization without being debriefed and carrying in their possession sensitive documents 

or information. In one case, the MEK took me to a compound they had for people 

wishing to leave. One person was living the good life there and didn’t want to leave. 

He was being cared for with meals and lodging, but didn’t have to work for his keep. 

MEK leadership asked me to talk to him and convince him to come over to our defector camp. Unfortunately, I was unsuccessful. This person had the best of both 

worlds and didn’t want to give it up. Using the logic of Husain, the Prophet’s grandson, the night before the Battle of Karbala in 680 AD, MEK leadership told their 

membership, ‘‘We will turn out the lights.’’ Anyone wishing to leave had that choice. 

MEK leadership just wanted to know about the departure before it happened. 

One unexpected defection afforded me the opportunity to negate another rumor: 

that the MEK were sneaking out of Camp Ashraf without our knowledge to conduct 

business and undermine the Iraqi government. Having shown up unexpectedly in 

the middle of the night, this man caught both the Americans and MEK by surprise. 

The MEK accepted my doing the debriefing of this person who was now under our 

control. They accepted my word that he didn’t bring any sensitive documents, only 

himself. This person’s former role was to do the shopping and bank business trips 

to Baghdad while under American oversight. When I interviewed him, he made it 

clear he wanted nothing more to do with the MEK. He was just tired and wanted 

a new life. That simple. I then specifically asked him if the MEK were leaving camp 

without our knowledge. Even though he was dissatisfied with his former organization, he assured me they were not violating any of our rules and were complying 

with everything we mandated. That conversation, and many other events, further 

proved to me that the MEK was fulfilling the spirit and intent of every requirement 

placed on them by the Americans. 

The MEK was an intelligence source that we didn’t learn to fully use for a long 

time, even though they were willing to share information. This is the organization 

that made the world aware that the Iranian government was conducting nuclear research operations. Their relationships in the local area were bringing in continual 

reports of al-Qaeda, Badr Corps, and Mahdi Army activities throughout the region. 

Not until the arrival of the Marine Corps Human Exploitation Team were we able 

to get that information into the intelligence network. I was always amazed at the 

amount of information they were able to extract out of Iran. One instance was the 

result of a conversation in Baghdad between that same State Department representative and a senior Iraqi official. When the conversation was over, the Iraqi official 

filed his report to Tehran. Within two weeks, all the details of the conversation were 

handed to me by the residents. 

As previously mentioned, upon my return to the Pentagon, I began working with 

State Department representatives in Washington, D.C. to properly address the 

Ashraf issue. What I found were the two primary people at Foggy Bottom responsible for the MEK had almost no working knowledge of the organization. The first 

two meetings I had with them, and several other people in attendance, concerned 

presenting a time-line history of the organization from its earliest days and going 

20 

over about sixty photographs I had taken concerning all aspects of Camp Ashraf and 

its residents. The State Department representatives had no idea what the membership looked like, the uniforms they wore, the layout of the compound, the existence 

of an industrial compound where trailer homes were being manufactured, the fact 

they ran their water through a treatment plant before consumption, had medical facilities, and ate their meals in dining facilities. They did know a lot of the rumors, 

but almost none of the facts. 

Finally we got to the issues concerning the MEK. The biggest one was the accepted-as-fact rumor that in years past the MEK had attacked the Kurds. I produced 

a letter from Hoshyer Zebari, head of Kurdistan Democratic Party International Relations, clearly stating this did not occur. This was checked out by having their 

counterparts in Baghdad talk to Mr. Zebari. I was later assured by my Foggy Bottom counterparts that Mr. Zebari confirmed my information to be true. Yet, several 

months later when the annual report on terrorism was released by the State Department, the accusation for attacking the Kurds was not removed. I questioned the 

same people I had been dealing with and was informed that they don’t communicate 

with the people who put out the annual report. 

Another issue that has plagued the MEK is the Marxist label. While the MEK 

worked for more openness in Islam, the Marxist element discarded Islam in favor 

of Marxism. The best analysis to this situation was provided by former Undersecretary of State George Ball in his August 19, 1981 Washington Post article. Mr. Ball 

stated, ‘‘ . . . The sloppy press habit of dismissing the Mujahedeen as leftists badly 

confuses the problem . . . Its intention is to replace the current backward Islamic regime with a modernized Shiite Islam drawing its egalitarian principalities from 

Koranic Sources rather than Marx . . . ‘‘ 

The leadership of the Ashraf have expressed their willingness to leave Iraq and 

go elsewhere. The problem is they have almost no place to go. The U.S. State Department removed the MEK from the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list only 

because the D.C. Courts of Appeals mandated the legal process for challenging designations would be followed. I was in the court room and watched Justice Department attorney Robert Loeb repeat Ambassador Daniel Benjamin’s earlier comment 

to Congressman Poe that Camp Ashraf had never been searched for weapons. Brigadier General David Phillips and I looked at each other and quietly remarked, ’What 

was it we did?’’ Camp Ashraf had been searched by American forces several times. 

It had also been searched by Iraqi forces with dogs in 2009 and I have a copy of 

the letter from the Iraqi military stating no weapons were found. When Dave Phillips and I returned to looking at the front of the court room we realized one of the 

justices had watched us. 

The D.C. Court of Appeals passed a good ruling. If State Department did not fulfill within four months the administrative process requirements for a designated organization to challenge the FTO listing, then the Court of Appeals would remove 

the designation. Without the evidence to maintain the organization on the FTO list, 

less than 100 hours prior to the D.C. Court of Appeals mandate to follow the law, 

Secretary Clinton removed the organization for the terrorist listing. 

Also it was during this time period that an artificial requirement was place on 

the MEK. State Department mandated that for the residents to be delisted, they 

would need to vacate Camp Ashraf. Since the transfer of Camp Ashraf security from 

American to Iraqi forces in February 2009—with a statement of overwhelming confidence from Ambassador James Jeffries to Senator John McCain, that the Iraqi 

government would not harm the residents—three ground assaults on Camp Ashraf 

have been conducted: July 28–29, 2009 (12 residents killed); April 8, 2011 (36 

killed); and September 1, 2013 (52 killed). 

In 2012, movement of the residents from Camp Ashraf to Camp Liberty (directly 

east of Baghdad International Airport) commenced. Per agreement worked out between the Government of Iraqi (GOI), MEK, United Nations Assistance Mission 

Iraqi (led by Ambassador Martin Kobler), and United States State Department (led 

by Ambassador Daniel Fried), one hundred residents were approved to remain at 

Ashraf to serve as property custodians. The 2013 ground assault resulted in the 

murder of fifty-two property custodians and the kidnapping of seven others. The remaining property custodians were transferred to Camp Liberty within a week after 

the assault. 

From the September 1, 2013 ground assault the bodies of the murdered were 

barely cold before U.S. State Department representatives made a statement that is 

not supported by facts, specifically, ‘‘There is no evidence the Iraqi Government was 

involved in the Ashraf massacre.’’ The truth is as follows: 

21 

• Diyala Province Police Commander, General Jamil al-Shemeri, arrived at the 

Iraqi compound overlooking the residents’ area six hours prior to attack commencement. • In a multi-prong approach, the assault forces crossed over the Iraqi-controlled 

berm and entered the residents’ compound. • Assault force members were wearing the exact uniform of Iraqi Special Forces. 

Additional accessories to the standard green uniforms and white hats were face 

masks and weapon silencers. • At the time of the massacre this organization was assigned to Iraqi Prime Minister/Minister of Defense/Minister of Interior Nouri al-Maliki. The assault was 

very professionally accomplished, displaying extensive preparation and coordination. • In plain view of Iraqi manned watch-towers surrounding Camp Ashraf, the assault force moved steadily, but not showing excessive speed. They knew they 

were not going to be interrupted. At no time, despite all the noise from the explosions and smoke rising out of the compound, was a protective response force 

dispatched from the Iraqi military base located immediately north of the residents’ area. • American-made military explosives were among the ordnance used in this attack. In addition to obvious United States military training, tactics and knowledge gained through ten years of War on Terrorism in Iraq were applied by the 

assault force. • Of the murdered, six were killed in the medical facility while being treated for 

wounds just received. Also machine-gunned was the nurse administering treatment. Even after being wounded, or already dead, residents were again shot in 

the head, face, or neck. Numerous residents were shot in the backs of their 

heads while their hands were secured by handcuffs and/or plastic zipcuffs. Senior leaders, Zohre Ghaemy and Hossein Madani, were shot multiple times in the 

head. Attackers knew exactly which victims were principle targets. • After two hours of killing, the assault force departed to the north and re-entered the Iraqi government compound. Left behind were 52 dead residents. The 

bus used to remove the seven hostages from Camp Ashraf was driven directly 

back to the Iraqi compound and remained parked outside an Iraqi building. As 

mentioned before, all of the deceased had been issued ‘‘Protected Person Status’’ 

cards by the United States Government. 

Not one single survivor was interviewed by anyone other than MEK representatives. Not interviewed that is until January 17, 2015 in Tirana, Albania when I sat 

down with Ashraf survivor Hassam Hamedi. Mr Hamedi revealed some additional 

truths that were never before revealed: 

• In days leading up to the attack, some former Camp Ashraf residents were seen 

on the berms with Iraqi forces conducting reconnaissance of the camp. 

• Ashraf residents had been warned there was a build-up of GOI forces inside the 

Iraqi compound and something bad was about to happen. 

• Five Iraqi policemen (three in standard uniforms and two in trainee uniforms) 

watched from the roof of the water purification station as the entire massacre 

unfolded. 

Another fact pointed out in my interview with Mr Hamedi, and later confirmed 

to me as already being known by United States State Department, was that a 

former Ashraf resident who accepted transfer from Camp Liberty to the Iranian 

Ministry of Intelligence Hotel Mohjaer accompanied the assault force throughout the 

massacre. When the massacre was over, the defector commenced walking back toward the Iraqi compound with the assault force. At that time, a member of the assault force walked up from behind, put a gun to the defector’s head, and fired. Acid 

was then poured onto the face of the deceased defector and his body was left where 

it fell. 

In 2013, three indirect fire operations were conducted against the residents at 

Camp Liberty: February 9th (8 residents killed), April 29th (3 killed), and December 

26th (3 killed immediately and 1 later dying as a result of the attack). Concerning 

the rocket attacks, each time Camp Liberty has been struck, United States State 

Department has worked to deflect attention away from the Iraqi government, specifically Nouri al-Maliki. In each case United States Baghdad Embassy and Foggy 

Bottom immediately embraced statements by militia organizations claiming responsibility. Three facts remain: 

• There was no free movement around central Iraq in 2013. Al-Maliki had military checkpoints established every 300 yards throughout the Baghdad and 

Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) region. 

22 

• In 2013 militias did not drive around freely with 280 mm rockets mounted on 

their vehicles. 

• The June 15, 2013 attack was claimed by Iraqi Hezbollah Commander alBattat. Problem is that in claiming responsibility, al-Battat severely understated the number of rockets fired at the camp. The real person responsible 

would have known the exact count. 

The combined casualties of these six attacks are 100 killed, hundreds wounded, 

and 7 kidnapped to never be heard from again. Furthermore, due to transportation 

harassment resulting in denial of access to medical treatment, 12 more residents 

have died at Camp Liberty. To associate these statistics to real people names of all 

the deceased are provided. This ‘‘roll-call’’ does not include the hundreds wounded 

and maimed during the aforementioned attacks. Every person killed in these attacks had been granted ‘‘Protected Person Status’’ by the United States Government 

in 2004. 

Since the residents relocated to Camp Liberty PsyOp initiatives by the Iraqi and 

Iranian governments have recurred. The most recent took place within the past 

month, causing residents scheduled for relocation to Albania to decline safe passage 

in the face of clear danger to their fellow residents remaining in harm’s way. Although it is possible to criticize the residents’ actions after much effort to arrange 

their safe exit from Iraq, it is understandable that those bearing tickets to safety 

would feel guilty abandoning their fellow exiles to a fate suggested by the same 

menacing harassment that preceded previous slaughters. 

Both the United States and the Iraqi Governments provided written assurances 

to the residents that their safety, security and humane treatment would be a priority as long as they remained in Iraq. It is also indisputable that on multiple occasions Ambassador Martin Kobler, Special Representative of Secretary General 

(SRSG) of the U.N., and Ambassador Fried of the Department of State provided 

similar assurances to our bipartisan political, diplomatic and military group, pledges 

that proved to be the catalyst to persuade the residents to leave their longtime 

home at Camp Ashraf and accept the accommodation being promised by the U.N. 

and U.S. at Camp Liberty. 

Nor were these the only U.N. and U.S. assurances on which the residents relied. 

Both U.N. Ambassador Kobler and U.S. Ambassador Fried assured the residents 

that sale of Camp Ashraf property would be allowed, which is why 100 residents 

were authorized to remain behind at Camp Liberty, protecting the valuable industrial and technological assets along with many vehicles and personal property not 

allowed to go with the residents to Camp Liberty. The bodies of the 2013 massacre 

victims were hardly cold before plundered Camp Ashraf vehicles were seen being 

driven through Baghdad. There is little doubt the buildings have been thoroughly 

looted. Yet, not a single dinar has been paid to the residents. The residents are already being charged inflated prices for life support goods and services. They are also 

having to pay the resettlement costs in Albania and other countries. The lack of effective commitment and action by the United States Government and the United 

Nations has allowed the Iraqi government to impose an onerous financial burden 

on the Iranian Resistance, a goal no doubt supported if not inspired by the fundamentalist regime in Tehran as a continuation of its long and bloody campaign 

against the unarmed political resistance in exile. 

Further assurances were made that no MOIS presence would occur at Camp Liberty. Ambassador Kobler wrote to the Residents stating ‘‘in respect to your concern 

on the presence of any foreign presence inside Camp Liberty, the Gol has assured 

us that there will be no foreign presence inside Camp Liberty’’ (February 15, 2012). 

In response to similar concerns raised by the residents about the agents appearing 

in Camp Ashraf, or UNAMI facilitating their presence around Camp Liberty, 

Gyorgy Busztin, Deputy SRSG, wrote to the residents’ representative that the Government of Iraq ‘‘categorically denied that there would be Iranian agents lurking 

around Camp Ashraf and stated very forcefully that even raising such an assumption is an insult to their national sovereignty.’’ He added, ‘‘Further, I can assure you 

with absolute certainty that UNAMI is not ferrying anybody to Camp Liberty under 

any guise.’’ We repeat these words because they are utterly irreconcilable with the 

actual situation in and around Camp Liberty. 

As we meet today, the residents are subjected to never ending harassment by the 

Iraqi Intelligence Corps officers conducting camp oversight. They are blocked from 

properly removing sewage from the camp, they are denied receipt of all the 

preapproved life support property, medical patients are harassed and denied timely 

departure from the camp resulting in missed appointments, periodically they endure 

total blockades to include food, repair parts for their already worn out vehicles are 

23 

required to age just outside the gate, they are prevented from receiving building materials to better their existence, and the list goes on. 

Meanwhile, the United Nations Support Mission, depended on approval of the 

Iraqi Government to remain in country, constantly accepts Iraqi Intelligence Corps 

officers’ lies and slander. This is in turn passed on to United States Baghdad Embassy and forwarded to Foggy Bottom. The more ridiculous the more believed. Case 

in point: Iraqi officers claimed the residents were tunneling out of the camp to go 

join the Islamic State. The reality is moderate Shiites are not going to be welcomed 

by radical Sunnis. Furthermore, the water table under Liberty is six feet down. As 

I pointed out when this rumor surfaced, unless the residents were getting assistance 

from Moses then they were not going to be tunneling through water. One slanderous 

rumor is put to rest, another surfaces. 

One of the biggest problems endured by the residents of Camp Liberty is their 

being on the end of ‘‘reverse-engineered intelligence.’’ The rumors and misinformation about the residents of Camp Liberty never end. In part this is caused by the 

United States Embassy staff never leaving the safety of Baghdad’s Green Zone to 

find out what is really happening at Liberty. Sources of misinformation start with 

the Iraqi military intelligence officers and, in turn, that information being embraced 

by UNAMI. 

We promised them in writing protected person status. We even issued them identification cards which they carried with pride. Without warning, in 2009 that status 

was revoked. We promised them expedited resettlement if they would leave Camp 

Ashraf and move to Camp Liberty. They have been at Camp Liberty over three 

years. Ambassador Dan Fried personally promised regular and frequent U.S. Embassy visits to Camp Liberty. Except for visits following slaughters, visits have averaged about one every six months. Concerning the United States Embassy in Baghdad, one resident told it to me this way, ’When they need something from us, we 

see them. When we need something from them, we get nothing.’’ This is a never 

ending story. For the residents it does not stop. It just drags on with the residents 

constantly being criticized and slandered. 

As Iraq and the surrounding region face deeper crisis, there remains the possibility that the Camp Liberty residents can avoid becoming further casualties of Iranian-directed aggression, but time is surely not on their side. Secretary Kerry has 

stated that the United States will accept refugees from Syria. The Liberty residents 

have proven their bona fides, cooperating steadfastly with our own Soldiers and Marines at Camp Ashraf. This is attested by the American commanders who stand up 

for them. Secretary Kerry has the authority to accept into the United States the 

residents of Camp Liberty without the residents having to renounce their lifetimes 

of conscientious objection to religious tyranny in Iran. The claim that they were once 

members of a terrorist organization is now widely understood and documented to 

have been the result of diplomatically inspired designations in the US and allied 

countries, all of which have been fully investigated and undone by judicial and 

scholarly review. 

Reason and compassion do not prevail in anything pertaining to Camp Liberty. 

Political agendas, political careers, and personal bias are united in preventing a 

proper solution, especially on the part of U.S. State Department employees. Meanwhile, U.S. House of Representatives Resolution 3707, ‘‘To ensure the emergency 

protection of Iranian dissidents living in Camp Liberty/Hurriya and to provide for 

their admission as refugees to the United States’’ was introduced December 11, 

2013. Today, fifteen months later, it still remains untouched in committee. 

Concerning the future of the residents, former Special representative of the U.N. 

Secretary-General for Iraq, Ad Melkelt, stated it best: ‘‘Hardly has a humanitarian 

issue been politicized as this one. Yet already for many years the victims are not the 

players. It is essential for the international community to understand this and thus 

consider it a duty to intervene in defense of international law and human rights, regardless of political interest or bias. This, therefore, should be the moment for governments and lawmakers to step up and let reason and compassion prevail.’’ 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

I thank the witnesses. 

There is language in the defense authorization bill, which we’ll 

be voting on this afternoon, that calls for the kind of actions that 

the witnesses have today. 

Colonel Martin, did you personally provide this card to the residents at the camp? 

24 

Colonel MARTIN. Sir, that was provided by General Dave Phillips 

in 2004. I had finished up my tour of duty—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Did that—— 

Colonel MARTIN.—as the Antiterrorism—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Did that card specifically guarantee those individuals safety? 

Colonel MARTIN. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. In other words, the word of the United States 

of America that they would be protected. 

Colonel MARTIN. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. General Jones, in the last few days, we have 

seen—actually, a couple of weeks—a announcement by the Iraqi 

government that they will be having an intel-sharing arrangement 

with Russia, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Then we hear, just today or yesterday, that Prime Minister Abadi is saying he would welcome Russian air strikes into Iraq against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 

(ISIS). Does this indicate to you the increasing influence of Iran in 

the affairs of Iraq? Where does it leave—oh, and—a Shiite leader 

yesterday was quoted as saying that the United States airstrikes 

were ineffective, so, therefore, they needed the Iranian assistance 

and the Russian assistance. What is your assessment of the Iranian influence now in Iraq and how it may more endanger the lives 

and welfare of the residents of the camp? 

General JONES. Sir, I—as I mentioned in my prepared remarks, 

I was present when the former King of Saudi Arabia issued his 

warning about then-Prime Minister Maliki, which was proven to be 

correct. It was my hope that the new Prime Minister and the leader of Iraq would have shown more appreciation for the sacrifice 

that was made on behalf of his country by the United States. I 

think that such statements are not only insulting to our commitment, but also just show—show just how deeply the Iranian influence has permeated the—Baghdad—the capital of Iraq and its 

leadership, unfortunately. 

Senator MCCAIN. Would—suppose that the Russians begin air attacks in Iraq. What—one, what does that mean? Two, what should 

the United States reaction be? 

General JONES. Well, the United—in my view, it means, unless 

the Russians agree to join the international coalition and cooperate 

under the Air Tasking Orders and bring a certain military competence and coordination to the fore, you run the risk of having 

chaos in the skies. The United States—with all due respect, the 

United States should do everything in its power, I think, to avert 

that situation and make sure that what’s happening in Syria does 

not happen in the skies of—over Iraq, regardless of whether the 

Prime Minister welcomes the addition of the Russians. 

Senator MCCAIN. But, he does have a point about the effectiveness of the air campaign against ISIS. 

General JONES. Yes. It does, in the sense that the United States 

has made its decision as to what it’s going to do. My understanding 

is that we are relooking at our commitment, and we’ll hopefully 

ramp it up a little bit more. As you know, my personal belief is 

that the longest road to victory here is purely an air campaign. 

But, if that’s all we have, then we ought to make it a massive air 

campaign. 

25 

Senator MCCAIN. Didn’t we learn in a camp—in a conflict that 

you and I were long ago engaged, that incrementalism doesn’t work 

and air campaigns alone don’t work? 

General JONES. That’s correct. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. 

Senator Lieberman or General Jones or Colonel Martin, is there 

a plan existent today to transfer these individuals from Camp Liberty to safe havens around the globe? Is there no plan? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yeah. So, I’ll start and then yield to my colleagues. 

My impression is that there’s not really a plan. It’s had a stopand-start quality to it, depending on a lot else going on. Also, my 

understanding is—and Colonel Martin and maybe General Jones 

can speak to this—that the MEK has actually been financing the 

resettlement of people from Camp Liberty, and they’ve reached the 

limit of what they can do. That’s why one of the requests now is 

that we use our influence on the Iraqi government to allow the people in Liberty who have title to property in Ashraf to sell it. They 

lived in a beautiful town in Diyala Province when they got—as part 

of this deal we talked about, got moved out. So, no, I don’t see a 

real plan, and certainly not one that’s financed. 

The other thing that Colonel Martin, I believe, testified to, 

there’s a lot of loyalty to one another at Camp Liberty, and there’s 

a fear of some of the people leaving, and leaving a lot of others behind and, they think, making them more vulnerable. So, the ideal 

would be a mass departure from the camp. 

Colonel Martin, do you want to add to that? 

Senator REED. Can I just interject one point—— 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yeah, I’m sorry. 

Senator REED.—so that both you and Colonel Martin and the 

General can comment, is that—and again, this might—my understanding—correct it if it’s inaccurate—is that there was a significant movement of members of the MEK to Albania—— 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Senator REED.—initially. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. The largest group. 

Senator REED. Largest group. Then, from there, there was a— 

they moved to other places that were accommodating. Does it make 

sense to—if we’re eventually getting down, I hope, to the stage of 

planning to focus not only an ultimate destination, but a place 

where a large number could leave, so, therefore, they wouldn’t have 

to leave behind friends and family, et cetera, and then from there 

begin to share the disposition of the personnel? 

But, with that interjection, Colonel Martin. 

Colonel MARTIN. Sir, thank you. 

As of right now, 800 residents have been resettled out of the 

camp. Considering it’s taken 3 years and we were assured by Ambassador—U.N. Ambassador Martin Kobler and U.S. Ambassador 

Dan Fried that it would be a temporary transit location, and they 

would quickly be expedited. General Jones and I were on the telephone calls with Dan Fried when he said, ‘‘As fast as the residents 

26 

come in, it’ll be like a conveyor belt, they’ll be going out.’’ That 

didn’t happen, sir. 

To answer the question, right now, in addition to the 800 resettled, 480 more are scheduled to go ahead and depart Camp Liberty 

and go to Albania. Asking them to renounce their conscience and— 

Senator McCain, you know better than anybody else in this room 

what it’s like to be in a military prison and you’re bonded to the 

people beside you. To tell them, ‘‘Well, you have to leave. You don’t 

know what’s going to happen to the other people,’’ that caused 

them a pause. Fortunately, working with Jonathan Winer at the 

State Department, Maryam Radjavi, Senator Torricelli, and others, 

we were able to get past that, and the resettlement process has 

begun again. But, they have been resettling in small amounts. 

The United States—my position is, and I’ve polled—and behind 

me are a bunch of people that would accept two or three residents 

all across the United States. We could take all 2,400 residents left 

right now, and bring them to safe haven. It can be done, sir. 

Senator REED. But, it requires, one, a plan, and, two, some resources to get that plan going. I think, again, just from my perspective, the—if there was a transition point—not an end point, but a 

transition point—that might be helpful to all concerned, because 

it’ll allow a lot of security checks as well as immediately moving 

people out in a much safer environment so that they could be 

placed. 

Colonel MARTIN. Sir, the security checks have already been done 

by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), twice. The FBI came 

in, in 2004, and did a thorough investigation, convinced they were 

going to find residents at that camp involved in terrorism. The FBI 

cleared all of them and said, ‘‘No, they’re not.’’ Even one of the 

strongest defenders of our group is former FBI Director Louis 

Freeh, and he has gone through and said they’re not terrorists, as 

well. The security checks have been done. 

Senator REED. Very good. 

Colonel MARTIN. The real issue—and Secretary Kerry has the authority right now to say, ‘‘I waive this, bring them in.’’ 

Senator REED. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Senator Reed, let me—I’d just add that I 

think this requirement that these people, who have been very loyal 

to the United States, renounce membership in a group that is off 

the terrorist list—and there really is some question about whether 

it ever should have been on there—is unfair to them, and it’s an 

unnecessary obstacle to a group of people who are very loyal to 

America, who I think would—and have family and friends, including people here in the room today, who would take them in and, 

I think, would make a great contribution to our country. So, I’m 

not sure what can be done, but I wish, together, we could find a 

way to get the U.S. Government to stop, essentially, requiring the 

rejection of a previous status that no longer is accepted by American law. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Tillis. 

General JONES. If I could just add to that, we wouldn’t be sitting 

here today if we just had an airlift a couple of years ago. The— 

there’s just some other points that just, I think, are outrageous. 

27 

The officers—the Iraqi officers that led the attack on Camp Ashraf 

and killed—responsible for killing men, women, and children—are 

the ones that deal with Camp Liberty today. When you talk about 

an insult—adding insult to injury, it’s incredible. I just find it unbelievable that this problem has not been resolved 3 or 4 years ago. 

Although the numbers are going down, and the Albanian government deserves a lot of credit—and, by the way, the cost for relocation is being borne by the MEK. It’s not being borne by us, it’s not 

being borne by the U.N. The money has been allocated—I forget 

the number, but it’s—$20 million, so far, out of their funds to relocate their wives or their brothers, their sisters, their family members, and their colleagues. 

I think that—I just think the United States should show more 

responsibility for the commitment we made, and should exert more 

leadership in bringing this to a close. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Senator MCCAIN. That’s very eloquent. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Tillis. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you all for being here. 

Colonel Martin, I’d like to start with you. Could you give me 

some sense—and I know that maybe your time there is somewhat 

dated, but give me some sense of what the—a day would be like 

for the some-2,400 people that are still in Iraq. 

Colonel MARTIN. I can do that, sir, because I am in continual contact with the residents; and, when I talk to them on the phone, 

when I get their emails, I—their faces automatically pop up in my 

memory. 

When I was the senior operations officer for detention operations, 

I lived at Camp Liberty. As I’ve mentioned, that camp was not designed for housing people 24 hours a day. Their daily life is one 

that they make it, make it useful. They keep themselves physically 

fit. They’re always building upon the camp to make it better. 

Unfortunately, they’re living in a life of tyranny. I remember, 

back in the ’70s, there used to be this little cartoon of a pair of 

goldfish in a blender, and they’re in the water, and there’s a little 

button for the blender, waiting for it to be turned on. One goldfish 

says to the other, ‘‘I can’t handle the stress.’’ That’s what it reminds me of for the residents. They make the best of the situation, 

but they’re living under a dark cloud of tyranny. They’re being denied critical resources, over and over. 

Senator TILLIS. Well, I want to be clear, then. So, they’re living 

in horrible conditions every day, worrying about whether or not 

they’re going to be alive the following day. These are people who 

peacefully disarmed—— 

Colonel MARTIN. Yes, sir. 

Senator TILLIS.—and protected American soldiers when we came 

into Iraq. We made a promise that we would take care of them. 

Colonel MARTIN. That is correct, sir. 

Senator TILLIS. Senator Lieberman, about—sometime in September, Secretary Kerry said that we were going to allow the relocation of, I believe, 75,000 refugees from various countries. A couple of weeks later, he said it would be 85,000, and that that was 

a floor, and that at least 10,000 of those would be Syrian refugees 

28 

fleeing the Assad regime and the violence in Syria. What would 

lead Secretary Kerry to such—to the conclusion that these people— 

and incidentally, those 85,000 that we’re talking about bringing in 

this country haven’t been vetted. We don’t know who they are. 

We’ve got to protect the safety and security of America, and we 

should absolutely welcome refugees that are fleeing hostile regimes. 

Colonel Martin, you said that the FBI’s vetted this population 

twice. 

Colonel MARTIN. That is correct, sir. 

Senator TILLIS. Senator Lieberman, can you give me any idea of 

why our Secretary of State would take a position that he’s taken 

today, with the imminent threat that these men and women and 

children face every single day? Why are they different, and why 

can’t they be included in this some- 6,000 more unallocated refugees that the capacity that the administration says that they want 

to make available to get people to a safer place—why on earth are 

we even having to have this discussion? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Well, I totally agree with you. There’s—to 

me, there’s not, Senator, an acceptable answer to that question. I 

mean, they’re—these are people seeking political asylum. They 

have proven their loyalty to the United States of America, beyond 

what we could imagine. They have been vetted. The problem 

here—and this is why the fact that this committee is holding this 

hearing and that so many of you have been advocates for the residents of Camp Liberty is so important, because they could easily— 

these people are pawns of a larger power struggle in which Iran, 

which despises them and wants to get rid of them, whenever it has 

the opportunity to exercise influence, including in international diplomacy and, of course, with Iraq—Iran’s the big country next door. 

It’s now—it has political influence in Iraq. It’s providing arms, et 

cetera, et cetera. So, you can imagine, without having a conspiracy 

theory, that they are behind what—a lot of what’s happened in— 

what’s happening to the residents. But, that shouldn’t affect us. 

We’re the United States of America. Remember the words on the 

Statue of Liberty about the masses yearning to be free. Boy, if that 

was ever true, it is this group. 

Senator, your comparison of what Secretary Kerry said of these 

2,400 or 2,500 is very powerful. They ought to be put at the top 

of that list. 

Senator TILLIS. They’re fully vetted. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yeah. 

Senator TILLIS. They’re people who have been friends of the 

United States. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Senator TILLIS. They’re in an area where they, every single day, 

face an existential threat. This administration doesn’t recognize 

that that—— 

Their policy right now is despicable, and I appreciate Senator 

McCain holding this hearing. I think we need to put the pressure 

on. This is wrong. It’s not what America stands for. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Manchin. 

29 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all—I’m trying to get my head around all of this and 

what’s going on, and I think I got a little bit of a flow of it. What 

has happened to the leader of MEK? I know Maryam Radjavi is 

the—— 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Senator MANCHIN.—leader now. What happened to her husband, 

Massoud? We haven’t heard from him since 2003. Does anybody 

know what happened to him? 

Colonel MARTIN. Sir, he was wounded in an attack. And—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Is he alive? Is he still alive? 

Colonel MARTIN. The information I have, yes, sir. 

Senator MANCHIN. Is he in the camp? Camp Liberty? 

Colonel MARTIN. No, sir, he is not. 

Senator MANCHIN. In the United States? 

Colonel MARTIN. No, sir. 

Senator MANCHIN. He’s somewhere. 

Colonel MARTIN. He’s in—the information I’ve been provided, he’s 

in France. 

Senator MANCHIN. He’s not consider the leader anymore? 

Colonel MARTIN. He is still the co-leader with Maryam Radjavi. 

Senator MANCHIN. But, she’s the front person. 

Colonel MARTIN. She is the person that is with all the activities, 

all the events, yes, sir. She is the leader. 

Senator MANCHIN. Let me ask another—and, General Jones, this 

might be to you—in your testimony, you cite that the three most 

lethal events occurred between 2009 and 2013 during Prime Minister Maliki’s time in office. Since Prime Minister Abadi took office 

in 2014, have there been any changes to the situation at Camp Liberty when it comes to the security or resettlement? Have you seen 

any changes? 

General JONES. I’d defer to Wes for the details, but, you know, 

I think the attacks have been less—lessened. But, the fact that 

they—the Iraqis’ military who are regularly in the camp are still 

the ones who conducted the raids in previous years, and the 

killings, is indicative of the—kind of the pressure that they want 

to keep on the citizens in the camp. 

So, Wes, you might have some more details on the—on that. 

Senator MANCHIN. Has it improved, is probably what I’m asking—— 

Colonel MARTIN. It hasn’t improved, and it hasn’t—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Has not. 

Colonel MARTIN. It has not improved, sir, and it has not deteriorated. It is—they’re still in that blender, waiting for that button to 

be pushed. 

Abadi, he is the Prime Minister, but he is in a very precarious 

position, because Maliki still controls Dawa Party. Maliki still has 

the ear of Tehran. As you recall, Maliki was forced out only after 

ISIS took over major parts of the country. Both the Ayatollah in 

Tehran and President Obama was blessing him for a third term, 

which was against the constitution—the Iraqi constitution. But, he 

was forced out when General Soleimani went to him and said, ‘‘You 

have to step down.’’ Then a member of his Dawa Party was brought 

up. 

30 

Abadi has made a lot of great promises. There are demonstrations going on throughout Iraq. He’s drawn the support of them. 

He’s drawn the support of Ayatollah Sistani. Surprisingly, he’s 

drawn the support of the head of the Mahdi Army, Muqtada alSadr. 

Senator MANCHIN. I have another one. This is my—this is a most 

difficult question. This is—when the State Department delisted the 

MEK as a foreign terrorism organization in 2012, it stated, ‘‘The 

Department does not overlook or forget the MEK’s past acts of terrorism, including its involvement in the killing of United States 

citizens in Iran in the ’70s and an attack on United States soil in 

1992. The Department also has serious concerns about the MEK as 

an organization, particularly with regard to allegation sf abuse 

committed against its own members.’’ 

How has the MEK addressed the concerns raised about potential 

abuse of its own members since the delisting, sir? 

Colonel MARTIN. Since the delisting, it hasn’t needed to be addressed. In this same document that Governor Ridge provided Senator McCain—I’ll get you a copy of it—I addressed that thoroughly. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

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Colonel MARTIN. I investigated those—when I was the base commander as a military policeman, I went and investigated the allegations of abuse and along with a lot of other allegations. They 

were unfounded. What I found while I was there, and since then, 

the MEK is the most lied- to, lied-about—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Has the State Department corrected its findings? 

Colonel MARTIN. No, sir. It—this report was generated when 

Julia Frifield sent to Congressman Royce a repetition of the previous lies and all the misinformation. They had been given the requirement—— 

Senator MANCHIN. But, they haven’t changed anything, because 

2012 was when they delisted them, right? 


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Colonel MARTIN. They delisted in 2012, and, even when that 

delisting was being done—that was Ambassador Dan Benjamin 

that was pushing forth that misinformation, ‘‘Well, we haven’t forgot what they’ve done.’’ I sat down with the State Department 

when I came back, under the promise to Major General Jack Gardner that I would continue to be his representative with the State 

Department while I was at the Pentagon—I thoroughly investigated. Behind me is Linc Bloomfield, who has thoroughly investigated all the allegations. The allegations—there were two 

mujahideens for a period of time, and then finally, when Massoud 

Radjavi was released from prison and he was able to take back control of the MEK, what became known as ‘‘the struggle’’ disappeared, and they disbanded, basically. But, the current organization is taking the blame for all the other atrocities that had happened. 

The MEK has never attacked Americans. They did not kill Turner, Schaefer, and Hawkins, the Air Force officers back in the ’70s. 

They did not do these things. They—and probably the most embarrassing report that ever came out was the RAND study, because 

the RAND study was focused just on—and the State Department 

paid for it—they got friends of their position. I was at the Pentagon. I was never consulted. Others were never consulted. Only 

the people who was going to tell that State Department story. It’s 

kind of like the old John Wayne western, ‘‘When the legend becomes a fact, print the legend.’’ 

Senator MANCHIN. Mr. Chairman, I’m so sorry. 

Senator MCCAIN. Go ahead. 

Senator MANCHIN. I was—I really wanted to—I really wanted to 

ask the question about, Are you three recommending to this committee that we help to relocate or bring them to America, or help 

relocate them with their loved ones throughout Europe? 

Colonel MARTIN. I’ll let the other two gentlemen speak, but I 

definitely am. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Well, I’ll start at the beginning. First, thank 

you for the fact that the defense authorization bill has some components to it that really move in a direction that we would want. So, 

you’ve already done some of that. 

The second is, on an ongoing basis, to pressure, either when you 

visit—members visit Iraq or through the State Department, 

through our embassy, pressure the Abadi government to know how 

important this is to us, because they’re going to get—how important the security and ultimate exit of the 2,400 at Camp Liberty 

is to the United States of America. Because, trust me, they’re going 

to get daily pressure in the other direction, from Iran. Up until this 

time, we’ve said we should find a place like Albania to go, but— 

I mean, I—as an American, I’d be proud and very secure in having 

these 2,400 come here, and I think they’d be great Americans. 

General JONES. I completely agree with Senator Lieberman. I 

think it would show leadership, it would show some responsibility 

in this. I think the most important thing is to get everyone out of 

Camp Liberty as soon as possible. 

Senator MANCHIN. I’m sorry, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. No problem. It was a good line of questioning. 

Senator Rounds. 

54 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, let me begin by just saying, I appreciate the Chairman’s 

work in bringing this testimony and information to the committee. 

I agree, it’s very important, and I appreciated the Senator from 

West Virginia’s line of questioning and comments. 

I would just ask this, just to begin with. Is the focus today with 

regard to how we resolve the issue surrounding Camp Liberty, is 

this an activity which requires more action on the part of our government, or is this a case of where it is more work being required 

of the Iraqi government, a combination of the two? Where is the 

biggest challenge we have in resolving this issue? 

General JONES. Senator, I think that when we—when the State 

Department removed the MEK from the Tier 3 category, and the 

Department of Homeland Security—I’m sorry—Tier 4, right? Tier 

3? Yeah, but they were Tier 1, right? 

Colonel MARTIN. Yes, sir. 

General JONES. Yeah. But, then the Tier 3 designation was 

instated by the Department of Homeland Security, which is kind 

of an arbitrary designation, but it triggered another obstacle that 

delayed the departure of the residents. 

So, I think the easiest way is to make a decision to remove that 

Tier 3 artificial designation, which, from my standpoint, is valueless, and to step forward and lead this effort to get these remaining 

people out of Iraq, whether they go to Albania—I would prefer that 

they come here, simply because I think it sends a positive message. 

When you look at Mrs. Radjavi’s 10-point plan for the future of 

Iran, it tracks very nicely with our own Constitution. 

So, this MEK group is a democratic group, and we need to respect that, I think. We need to do the right thing. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I’d just say briefly that the very fact of this 

hearing is important today, because the greatest enemy of the people in Camp Liberty is invisibility, because then they get to be a 

pawn for the Iranians. The fact that the hearing is being held, and 

very strong supportive statements by the Chairman, Ranking 

Member Senator Reed, members of the committee, they’ll get— 

they’ll hear about this, both in Camp Liberty, so it’ll give them 

hope, but also they’ll hear about it in the government offices in 

Baghdad and, I hope, in Tehran. 

I mean, the danger here is that, as part of what some people 

think is a new era in United States-Iranian relations, that the Iranians will try to leverage our State Department to turn away from 

what’s happening in Camp Liberty. That’s where the kind of bipartisan leadership that is reflected in this committee is so important. 

But, the ultimate—the immediate goal: protect the security of the 

people in Camp Liberty, and get them out of there to somewhere 

else as quickly as possible. 

I’ll just come back to what I said in my opening statement real 

briefly. This is a—to me, a message to us that we ought to be supporting political opponents, including the MEK, but others as well, 

to the Iranian regime, because that’s probably the best way we can 

guarantee long-term better relations with that great country. 

Colonel MARTIN. Sir, I’d defer to a note that was just passed to 

me by a man who I served with in combat and a close advisor to 

55 

the Multinational Force Iraq Commander as well as to Paul 

Bremer. 

Abadi, as I mentioned before, is very weak. This is a golden opportunity for the United States to pressure him into allow the residents to leave and for us to bring all the residents here. As I mentioned, there are enough families throughout the United States, we 

can absorb all them. When you think about all the torment and all 

the horror that they have had to go through, for the past 3–4 years, 

especially—well, since 2009—and yet, they still remain loyal to the 

United States, hoping that we will be able to do something to lift 

them out of that tyranny, it’s time to bring them out. It’s only a 

matter of time before the fight between Maliki and al-Abadi is 

going to come to a head. I fear Maliki has the strongest support 

of the militias, Abadi will be out. 

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator King. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’m new to this subject, so I want to ask some sort of basic questions. 

Several times, you gentlemen used the term that ‘‘U.S. made assurances,’’ the term ‘‘solemn promise,’’ ‘‘guarantees.’’ Colonel Martin, you mentioned a card. What did that card say? What—I’d like 

to know specifically what assurances were delivered by whom and 

when. 

Colonel MARTIN. Yes, sir, this was the Protected Persons Status 

under the Geneva Convention. I have a copy of it. If you give me 

a second, I can find it real quick and—— 

Senator KING. Well, I’d like to know what it says. 

Colonel MARTIN. Okay. 

Senator KING. I mean, what I’m searching for here is: What were 

the assurances and the—specifically—and who delivered them, and 

when? I think that’s a fair question, given that’s—seems to be the 

premise of this discussion. 

Colonel MARTIN. ‘‘This cardholder is Protected Person under the 

agreement of the terms of the fourth Geneva Convention. Should 

the assigned person’’—it’s a little blurry—should an incident occur, 

it requests that the person contact the Military Police Brigade. 

Then it goes on, the agreement that they made, ‘‘You are being offered your release from control and protection in exchange for your 

promise to comply with certain regulations.’’ It clearly states they 

are protected, they will not be—they will not be arrested, they will 

not be harmed. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. What did they have to do? 

Senator KING. But—— 

Colonel MARTIN. What they had to do, sir, is go ahead and sign 

an agreement. 

Senator KING. That’s when they were moved from Ashraf to 

Camp Liberty? 

Colonel MARTIN. No, sir, that was a whole different set of promises. If I may, sir. 

Senator McCain, if it’s all right, I’d like to have this submitted, 

too. 

Senator KING. Well, you can make this for the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

56 

Senator KING. But, I want to know who made assurances—— 

Colonel MARTIN. Yes, sir. 

Senator KING.—and what those assurances were. Saying ‘‘You’re 

a Protected Person under the’’—— 

Colonel MARTIN. Yes, sir. 

Senator KING.—‘‘Geneva Convention’’ isn’t a promise that the 

U.S. will take you in. I mean, I just—I want to understand what 

the promise is that we’re being urged to honor. 

Colonel MARTIN. Yes, sir. I understand. 

The first one is, they would be protected and they would remain 

at Camp Ashraf. That was 2004. That was with the U.S. State Department, in agreement with the United States Department of Defense. Rumsfeld was the actual person that finally approved it, but 

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The person who issued those cards, under order of the U.S. Embassy, was Brigadier General Dave Phillips, who was also part of 

this group that works closely, that they would be protected—— 

Senator KING. But, it’s your position that this Geneva Convention assurance of being a protected person constitutes a solemn 

promise of the United States to look after these people indefinitely? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Part of this was—you correct me, Wes—that 

the residents gave up their arms. They were disarmed. That was 

part of a post-Saddam policy of our military in Iraq. General 

Odierno was actually involved, in some ways, not at the higher 

level he ultimately reached, but he was on the ground in these negotiations. 

I’ll tell you, Senator King, to me one of the most—I’ve had it happen two or three times—most compelling moments in my own understanding—or getting more understanding of what happened 

here was to hear leaders of the U.S. military, including General 

Phillips, but then people on up who were Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff at the time, standing up and saying, at a public 

meeting, ‘‘We made a promise to these people, and we broke it.’’ I 

mean, it was—— 

Senator KING. Well, all I’m looking for is, What’s—what was the 

promise, when was it made, and who made it? Perhaps you could 

submit that for the record. That’s what I’m interested in. 

Colonel MARTIN. We can do that, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

UNITED STATES PROTECTION AND COMMITMENT TO THE RESIDENTS: 

Senator King asked about the commitment of the United States to the residents 

of former Camp Ashraf and now Camp Liberty, requesting that a written statement 

be provided to demonstrate how and by whom the residents were declared ’protected 

persons’ and who in the United States Government recognized them as such and 

made the commitment to protect them. 

As to this request, I would like to inform the Committee that the United States 

military, on behalf of the U.S. Government, signed an agreement with each and 

every single resident of Camp Ashraf that in return for ‘‘rejecting violence’’ and ‘‘rejecting participation in or support for terrorism’’ and delivering ‘‘all military equipment and weapons’’ under their ‘‘control and responsibility,’’ they will ‘‘remain under 

the protection of the United States forces until their final disposition. These final 

disposition options included, among others, voluntary return to Iran or seeking refuge outside Iraq through relevant international organizations. The protected person 

status under the 4’’ ’ GenevaConvention was granted following the signing of this 

agreement. 

In a letter dated July 21, 2004, Maj. General Geoffrey D. Miller, then-Deputy 

Commanding General Multi National Force-Iraq, congratulated ‘‘each individual living in Camp Ashraf on their recognition as protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention.’’ (Letter is enclosed) 

I am providing the following factual narrative, which describes the timeline and 

a series of actions undertaken by the United States Government regarding the legal 

status of the MEK and the U.S. obligation and commitment to protect its members 

in Camp Ashraf . This narrative is based on my conversations with United States 

commanders in the Iraqi theater, public sources, and submissions by the MEK to 

the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in which it explained the change of circumstances of the organization following the post-Iraq war. 

In addition, I am also attaching a legal opinion on the subject by two highly acclaimed International Humanitarian Law scholars, Prof. Marco Sassoli, Professor 

of International Law and Director of the Department of International Law and 

International Organization at the University of Geneva, Commissioner of the International Commission of Jurists’ (ICJ, and Associate Professor at the Universite ́ du 

Que ́bec a` Montreal, Canada; and Dr. Siobha ́n Wills, an expert in public interVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:58 Jul 15, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\20721 WILDA
58 

1 Agence France Presse, ‘‘US says Iran opposition in Iraq agrees to disarm,’’ April 10, 2003. 

2 Ibid. 

3 Ibid. 

4 CENTCOM statement, ‘‘MEK Consolidating under Coalition Control,’’ May 10, 2003. 

5 CENTCOM statement, ‘‘Update on the Consolidation of the Mujahedin-E Khalq (MEK),’’ May 

17, 2003. 6 Defense Link, United States Department of Defense, ‘‘Maj. Gen. Odierno Video-teleconference fromBaghdad,’’ June 18, 2003. 7 Douglas Jehl, ‘‘U.S. Sees No Basis to Prosecute Iranian Opposition ‘Terror’ Group Being 

Held in Iraq,’’ The New York Times,. July 27, 2004. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/ 

national law, particularly the law of armed conflict, human rights law, and the law 

relevant to peacekeeping operations at University College Cork in Cork Ireland. 

This legal opinion, citing various International Humanitarian Law and several articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention, makes it clear that even as of today, the 

United States is still legally bound to protect the residents of former Camp Ashraf 

and now Camp Liberty. 

THE FACTUAL NARRATIVE: 

1. MEK DISARMS: 

Before the United States-led invasion of Iraq, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK/ 

PMOI) declared its complete neutrality in the conflict. In a letter to the Secretary 

of State Colin Powell in February 2003, the MEK’s umbrella group wrote that it will 

take no part in the war and its only aim is to struggle against the Iranian regime. 

In early 2003, the MEK also gave the coordinates and locations of all of its bases 

and centers in Baghdad to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and subsequently through members of United States 

Congress and the British Parliament to the United States and UK governments. 

In April 2003, the MEK and the Coalition forces signed an agreement of mutual 

understanding and coordination . Subsequently, a further agreement to consolidate 

and disarm was reached in May. General Raymond T. Odierno, who had negotiated 

the agreement, announced it in May 2003 and characterized it not as surrender, but 

as ‘‘an agreement to disarm and consolidate.’’ 1 Concerning the MEK, General 

Odierno added, ‘‘I would say that any organization that has given up their equipment to the Coalition is clearly cooperating with us, and I believe that should lead 

to a review of whether they are still a terrorist organization or not.’’ 2 He noted that 

the MEK and the U.S. shared similar goals ‘‘in forming democracy and fighting oppression and that they had been ‘extremely cooperative.’ ’’ 3

Following this agreement, the MEK handed over all its heavy, medium and small 

caliber weapons to the Coalition. In a statement on May 10, 2003, CENTCOM 

(United States Central Command) welcomed the PMOI’s cooperation. It said, ‘‘V 

Corps has accepted the voluntary consolidation of the Mujahedin-E-Khalq’s (MEK) 

forces, and subsequent control over those forces . . . The MEK forces have been abiding by the terms of this agreement and are cooperating with Coalition soldiers.’’ 4

In a statement a week later, CENTCOM said, ‘‘Coalition forces have consolidated 

2,139 tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, air defense artillery pieces 

and miscellaneous vehicles formerly in the possession of the Mujahedin-e Khalq 

(MEK) forces . . . The voluntary, peaceful resolution of this process by the MEK and 

the Coalition significantly contributes to the Coalition’s mission to establish a safe 

and secure environment tor the people of Iraq.’’ 5

In an interview with the press corps the following month, in response to a question about the status of MEK in Iraq, Gen. Odierno said, ’’They have been completely disarmed. We have taken all small arms and all heavy equipment. They had 

about 10,000 small arms, and they had about 2,200 pieces of equipment, to include 

about 300 tanks, about 250 armored personnel carriers and about 250 artillery 

pieces.’’ 6

2. THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES THE MEK AS ’PROTECTED PERSONS’ UNDER THE

FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION: 

Subsequent to the agreement on the voluntary handover of weapons between the 

MEK and the Coalition and once that process was completed, there followed an extensive investigation, including individual questioning, of each member resident at 

Ashraf (numbering about 3,400) by the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), the FBI 

(Federal Bureau of Investigation), and the State, Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, and Treasury departments, among other agencies. Ultimately, on July 2, 2004, 

the US government concluded that it had ‘‘found no basis to charge members of an 

Iranian opposition group [MEK] in Iraq with violations of American law.’’ 7

59 

2004/07/27/world/reach-war-people-s-mujahedeen-us-sees-no-basis-prosecute-iranian-opposition.html 8 US government declaration on the ‘protected persons’ status of the MEK, July 2, 2004. 

9 Jehl, Op.cit. 

10Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller. Deputy Commanding General, MNF-I. letter to Ashraf residents, July 21,2004. 11Maj. Gen. William H. Brandenburg, Deputy Commanding General. MNF-I. letter to MEK 

Secretary General, Ms. Sedigheh Hossein, October 7, 2005. 12Maj. Gen. John D. Gardner, Deputy Commanding General, MNF-1, letter to MEK Secretary 

General, Ms. Sedigheh Hosseini, February 6. 2006. 13General David Petraeus, Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq, interview, September 4, 2008. 14Georges Comninos, Head of Operations, Middle East and North Africa, International Committee of the Red Cross, April 20. 2004. 15Georges Comninos, Head of Operations, Middle East and North Africa, International Committee of the Red Cross, December 16, 2004. 16http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/12/179695.htm 17http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/12/179695.htm 

That clean bill of health, together with the signing by such individual MEK member of a written agreement renouncing terrorism and rejecting violence led to the 

grant in July 2004 to all MEK members ‘‘protected person’’ status under the Fourth 

Geneva Convention. 8 The New York Times wrote in this regard, ‘‘Senior American 

officials said extensive interviews by officials of the State Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation had not come up with any basis to bring charges 

against any members of the group.’’ 9

By Proclamation of July 2004, the United States affirmed that it had confirmed 

protected person status to the individuals at Camp Ashraf under the Fourth Geneva 

Convention. In a letter to Ashraf residents, Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller, thenDeputy Commanding General of Multi-National Force-Iraq, wrote, ‘‘I am writing to 

congratulate each individual living in Camp Ashraf on their recognition as protected 

persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention . . . You have signed an Agreement rejecting violence and terrorism. This sends a strong signal and is a powerful first 

step on the road to your final individual disposition.’’ 10

The PMOI’s ‘protected persons’ statue was reiterated in a letter dated October 7, 

2005 from Major General William H. Brandenburg, Deputy Commanding General of the Multi-National Force—Iraq, addressed to the General Secretary of the 

MEK, Mme. Sedigheh Hosseini, and the residents of Camp Ashraf. In his letter, 11

Gen. Brandenburg took note that both sides had benefited by their working together 

‘‘in the spirit of common humanitarianism.’’ General Brandenburg ’s meticulous listing in his letter of the rights guaranteed the MEK by the Coalition forces is a testament to the solicitude of the Coalition toward these individuals. 

And in February 2006, Maj. Gen. John Gardner, who replaced Gen. Brandenburg, reiterated the MNF-I’s ‘‘responsibilities with regard to the Geneva Convention 

Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons (GCIV), 1949.’’ 12

On September 4, 2008, Gen. David Petraeus, then-Commanding General of the 

Multi-National Force-Iraq, said, ‘‘the residents or Camp Ashraf, the Mujahedin-e 

Khalq, are in a legal status that is called ‘‘Protected Persons Status’’ by international law. And U.S. Forces still arc responsible for the security of them because 

of that status.’’ 13

International organizations have also recognized the status of the PMOI/MEK as 

protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) wrote in April 2004, ‘‘The PMOI members in Iraq 

fall in general under the protection of the Fourth Geneva Convention.’’ 14 The ICRC 

reiterated its position in a subsequent letter in December 2004. It wrote, ‘‘ . . . those 

persons who were protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention . . . remain protected 

by the Fourth Geneva Convention.’’ 15

3. CONTINUED PROMISE OF SECURITY TO THE RESIDENTS

The Department of State directly or by other means repeatedly reiterated its commitment to safety and security of the residents. The following are a few examples: 

a) Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton, December 25, 2011: 

‘‘We welcome the agreement by the Government of Iraq to allow the United 

Nations to station monitor at this new location around the clock and to observe the move from Ashraf to this new location.’’ 16 She added ‘‘In addition, 

officials from United States Embassy Baghdad will visit regularly and frequently.’’ 17

b) Ambassador Daniel Fried, ‘‘Special Briefing’’, December 29, 2011: 

60 

18http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/12/179792.htm 19http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/12/179792.htm 20http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/08/197002.htm 21 Agence France Presse, October 3, 2012. 22 Ernesto Londo ̃no, ‘‘At least 52 Iranian exiles executed in Iraqi camp, U.N. says,’’ The Washington Post,September 4, 2013. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/at-least-52-iranian-exiles-executed-in-iraqi-camp-un-says/2013/09/03/4eab81fa-14e5- 

11e3-a100-66fa8fd9a50c—story.html 23 Available at: http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/reversingirans-nuclear-program 

‘‘The U.N. will conduct 24/7 monitoring at Camp Liberty—or former Camp 

Liberty.’’ 18 He also said ‘‘In addition, Embassy Baghdad will visit former 

Camp Liberty on a frequent basis to provide robust observation.’’ 19

c) Agreement between Department of State and MEK. August 16, 2012: 

The Department of State ‘‘Commit to support safety and security of the residents until the last of the residents leaves Iraq.’’ 

d) Department of State, August 29, 2012: 

‘‘The United States also reiterates its commitment to support the safety and 

security of the residents throughout the process of their relocation outside of 

Iraq.’’ 20

e) Further assurances, September 1, 2012 

Following discussing with State Department officials in a letter addressed lo 

Mrs. Rajavi, Secretary Tom Ridge, Governor Ed Rendell and Senator Robert 

Torricelli wrote: ‘‘Department officials also stressed their commitment for the 

safety and security of all residents throughout the process of their relocation 

outside Iraq.’’(The letter is attached). 

f) Agreement on 100 residents remaining at Ashraf as custodians of the 

residents’ property, August 16, 2012: 

The August 16, 2012, agreement between Department of State and PMOI recognizes the right of the residents to ‘‘keeping an agreed number of residents 

at Ashraf to oversee the sale of the residents’ possessions.’’ This was the foundation of the quadripartite agreement also including U.N. and GOI for the relocation of the residents to Liberty. Accordingly, all agreed that 100 could stay 

in Ashraf, without a time limit, until the property issue was resolved. 

United Nations Secretary General’s Special Representative lo Iraq, Amb. Martin Kobler, reiterated this point in the ‘‘Final arrangement for the relocation 

of Camp Ashraf residents’’ on September 6, 2012: ‘‘The GOI should provide 

protection for the property and remaining residents in CNI [Camp Ashraf] and 

their until the issue of property is resettled completely.’’ 

Secretary Clinton’s Special Advisor on Ashraf Amb. Fried wrote on September 

6, 2012:‘‘ . . . 100 residual group without time limit remains as guardian of the 

property [at Camp Ashraf]. GOI also must provide protection for property.’’ 

Ambassador Fried was asked ‘‘whether there was a deadline for the last group 

of 100 to leave, he said there was ’no time limit’.’’ 21 (AFP, October 3, 2012). 

Despite such agreement on September 1, 2013, Camp Ashraf was attacked and 

52 residents were massacred, execution-style. 22

g) Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman, Senate 

Foreign Relations Hearing, October 3, 2013: 

‘‘We quite agree that we need to do anything we can to resettle the people [in 

Camp Liberty], to get them out of the harm’s way, to make good on the word 

we gave to the MEK. I know there are strong feelings up here and I understand why.’’ 23

Wesley Mortin (Ret.), 

Colonel (Retired), U.S. Army Military Police; 

Former Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection OIC, for Coalition Forces-lraq; 

Former Senior Operations Officer, Task Force 134 (Detention Operations), Multi-National Forces 

Iraq 

Former Commander-Camp Ashraf, Iraq 

61 


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Colonel MARTIN. Matter of fact, I just did. 

Senator KING. The other piece that I want to follow up on is, I’m 

a little uncomfortable with this hearing because we don’t have anyone here from the administration. We—I—there—I’m old enough to 

realize there are always two sides to every story, and I—you’ve 

made a very strong case. In fact, the case is so strong, you have 

to wonder why isn’t this—why wasn’t this taken care of some time 

ago, and there must be some reason. I would like to hear—— 

Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, we could solicit the comments of the administration or the State Department or the Department of Homeland Security to determine why this hasn’t been dealt with. I’m 


15-77_a_15_23.eps
104 

just—again, I’m not taking any side here, but I—I’m uncomfortable 

not hearing both sides of the situation. 

Colonel MARTIN. Yes, sir. If I may. Congressman Dana Rohrabacher offered them a chance of what you speak of, that I would 

be at the table along with Colonel Gary Marsh and a representative of the State Department. They refused. I would love to sit at 

a table in front of you ladies and gentlemen and go through the 

issues with U.S. State Department. Every time we have made that 

offer, they’ve refused. 

Earlier, your question was—the promises. There’s been a series 

of promises, especially in 2012 from Dan Fried, that these actions 

would be taken to get them out of harm’s way. He came to us. General Jones was on the phone calls, as well as myself, Louis Freeh, 

Tom Ridge, Ed Randell, Howard Dean, and many others, and Hugh 

Shelton especially. ‘‘We will do this, we will do this, we will do 

this.’’ Even one of the promises, ‘‘We’re going to be out at that 

camp on a continual basis.’’ I have that one in writing in this—— 

Senator KING. Well—— 

Colonel MARTIN.—packet. 

Senator KING.—I understand. I understand that the circumstances have changed because of Iran’s influence in Iraq at this 

moment, and that that raises the level of, as you said, stress in this 

situation, and perhaps urgency. I fully understand that. I just want 

to—I just want to get some of the details and some of the background, and I want to understand why, if it’s so obvious we should 

do this, it’s not being done. That—— 

I’m out of time, but—— 

Colonel MARTIN. Yes, sir. 

Senator KING. I appreciate your testimony, and I appreciate the 

urgency of this situation, and just want to be sure we understand 

all the implications when we move forward. 

Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Could I just mention to the Senator that we 

have been trying for years to get the State Department to react— 

correspondence, meetings, every method that I know of, besides a 

congressional hearing—to try to get this issue resolved and these 

people, who are now in greater and greater danger, what we promised them. 

I’ve got to say, Colonel Martin, you didn’t exactly describe—it 

was—that was in return—that guarantee was in return for them 

giving up their weapons, and, in giving up their weapons, we said 

we would guarantee their safety and gave them—under the Geneva 

Conventions. But, that doesn’t mean anything but the United 

States used that as a rationale for guaranteeing their protection. 

It’s been going on for years. And—— 

Go ahead, General. 

General JONES. After you, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Go ahead. Please. 

General JONES. I just wanted to say that we have worked diligently with the administration on a regular basis, on a daily basis 

almost. All of Colonel Martin’s reports have been sent to both the 

National Security Council and the State Department. There are 

three of us at the table, but it’s a part of a larger group, including 

105 

six former Ambassadors, former Director of the FBI, former Attorney General, eight four-star generals, one Speaker of the House, 

four Governors, six Members of Congress, one White House Chief 

of Staff—— 

Senator KING. Now, when you mention those Governors, 

that’s—— 

General JONES.—and three former—— 

Senator KING.—that’s—you’re doing well when you’ve got—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Incidentally, broadly bipartisan. 

General JONES. Yeah, it’s broadly bipartisan. This is not work 

that’s being done in isolation. I mean, every document has been 

provided. All the Colonel’s weekly reports go directly to the State 

Department. So, we have really tried to collaborate with this, and 

we still want a collaborative outcome, but we need an outcome before the next tragedy happens. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you, Senator Reed, for holding this hearing today, and for—our witnesses for being here to testify about what I also believe is a travesty and that we have not lived up to the commitments that we 

have made to the people who are now at Camp Liberty. 

I was in Iraq, back in 2009, and we heard about this issue, and 

I’ve had a chance to see the video—a video of one of the attacks 

on Camp Liberty, and the people being murdered. So, I think it’s 

an area where we need to do much more to address what has happened there. I don’t understand why people who have relatives 

here are not able to come and join their relatives and be resettled 

in America. 

So, I guess I’m—I appreciate that I’m asking you all for a subjective analysis of why the resettlement has been so slow, but is it 

just bureaucratic foot-dragging? Is it because it has not risen to the 

level of the attention of some of the people at State who can make 

it happen to put pressure on Iraq to release the residents of Camp 

Liberty? Or is there something else going on? 

General Jones or Senator Lieberman, I don’t if either of you have 

a perspective on that. 

General JONES. Senator, I don’t know the answer to that. All I 

know is that, for the last several years, things that look like they’re 

finally going to move are replaced by another obstacle. The 

delisting of the MEK, we thought was going to be the end of it, but 

it was replaced by another listing that was somewhat, in my view, 

arbitrary, but it has served to delay the process even more. 

I don’t think the Iraqi government has been particularly helpful. 

They play cat-and-mouse with the residents. Sometimes they deny 

food, they deny protection, they turn off the water, they don’t take 

out the trash or the garbage for days on end. I mean, it’s just a 

constant problem. 

But, I really think that the real answer is for someone in authority to just make a decision, ‘‘Enough. We’re going to do the right 

thing. We made a commitment to these people. We didn’t live up 

to it. It’s time to finish it.’’ I think it’s that simple. It’s a humanitarian gesture that—I, frankly, don’t care what the Iranians think 

about this. I think it’s the right thing to do. 

106 

Senator SHAHEEN. Senator Lieberman, one of the things that I 

have heard from relatives of people at Camp Liberty that they’re 

very concerned about is this requirement that they renounce MEK, 

and concerned about what that might mean in the future and if 

somebody could use that to then come back and address their ability to continue to live in the United States. I’ve not had anybody 

explain to me adequately why that is something that people are 

being requested to do. Have you had anybody explain to you why 

that’s so important? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I have not. 

First, Senator Shaheen, let me thank you for the leadership that 

you’ve shown on this matter. You’ve been a real great advocate for 

the people in Camp Liberty. I know all their families and friends 

appreciate it a lot. 

This requirement of renouncing membership in an organization 

that is no longer considered a threat or a terrorist organization by 

any means, and really there are questions about whether it ever 

should have been on the terrorist organization—seems to me to be 

very un- American. I mean, it’s like—it’s a belief test. It seems contrary to the First Amendment. It—the truth is that the—there are 

a lot of people there who have had a long history in Camp Liberty 

with the MEK. As I mentioned, they’re freedom fighters. I mean, 

they were against the Shah, then they were part of the revolution, 

then they turned against the Ayatollahs, because they replaced one 

dictatorship with a worse dictatorship. So, I have never—and to 

what extent Members of Congress can push the State Department 

to explain that or, really, to rescind it, because it’s an—it’s an unfair obstacle. 

You’ve made a good point, it’s going to raise insecurity, anxiety 

in the mind of people coming into the country, that somehow this 

is going to come back, 3, 4, 5 years from now, and they may be subject to deportation. 

I would say to you—Senator King, I’m just taking this moment— 

I think the State Department, if they were here, would not question the promises made to the residents of Ashraf and then Liberty. 

But, what I would like to hear them explain is, Why all the delay? 

What’s—and you’re left—I don’t know this, but we’re left—because 

we know how much the Iranian government wants to torture these 

people, essentially, wants them in the stress, and worse. It leads 

us to, naturally, suspect that the Iranians are putting pressure on 

the Iraqis to do that, and maybe on us, in the diplomatic negotiation. But, it would seem much bigger than the status of 2,400 people in a camp in Iraq. But, you know, again, America’s supposed 

to be about the right, liberty—the right to life and freedom of individuals. There’s 2,400 individuals in this Camp Liberty whose freedom is constantly under stress. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you all very much. My time is up. 

Colonel Martin, I’d—I want to thank you for your good work on 

this, but I do want to disagree with you. My recollection is that nobody was urging Maliki to run for a third term, that, in fact, there 

was a lot of effort put into trying to get him to step aside. 

So, I do hope that we an continue to do everything possible, and 

that this committee will do everything possible, to urge that the 

107 

residents of Camp Liberty are allowed to emigrate either to the 

United States or to someplace safe. 

Thank you all. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you, Senator Shaheen, for a very compelling statement. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, this distinguished panel. 

Senator Lieberman, we’re glad to have you back in your old 

abode. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Sessions. Great to be here. 

Senator SESSIONS. Every now and then we did some good work. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. We did. 

Senator SESSIONS. I appreciate that. 

General Jones, thank you for your service, and Colonel Martin. 

Well, I’ve been sympathetic to the Camp Liberty people for some 

time, but there have been problems. Some of this is their own problem. One of the problems, I understand, with their desire to emigrate to the United States is, they want to come as a group. They 

don’t want to be diversely populated around the country. They 

want to maintain their unity. Is that true? 

Colonel MARTIN. No, sir. They will come anyway they can come 

here. The issue about coming as a group—I was in the room when 

Major General Jack Gardner was talking to Madam Parsai about 

a place that they could possibly go. Madam Parsai said, ‘‘Tell you 

what. We’ll gladly go to California. I’ll tell you what, if they did 

come as a group, find an old ghost town that has water underneath 

it, and, within 2 years, you’ll have a flourishing community.’’ But, 

they are willing to come as individuals. They want to come out of 

that danger. 

What we often forget is, this is the former National Liberation 

Army that was a military unit. So, when people say, ‘‘They’re a 

cult, they wear uniforms’’—well, yes. I was a soldier. I wore a uniform, but I wasn’t in a cult. They’re loyal to their leadership. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, Colonel Martin, there’s something unusual about the bunch. I mean, they’re communists, right—— 

Colonel MARTIN. No, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS.—their heritage? 

Colonel MARTIN. No, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. That’s not so? 

Colonel MARTIN. Communism and Islam does not mix, sir. They 

are—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Well—— 

Colonel MARTIN.—not communists. There was a communist element—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Theistic communist—— 

Colonel MARTIN. No, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS.—is that what you would call it? 

Colonel MARTIN. No. There was a communist element that 

Massoud Radjavi was able to defeat, and that is the organization 

that went away. This is not a communist. They’re moderate, they’re 

democratic. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

108 

The Mujahedin-e Khalq are not communist: 

The mainstream MEK has always been a Muslim movement. In 1966, the organization adopted a set of philosophies that would put them at odds with both the ruling government and rising Islamic fundamentalists. They came to embrace equality 

between those in power and those not, between men and women, and among various 

religions and races. Going even further, they believed the clergy should not have 

total control over interpretation of the Quran, nor should the clerics have total control over their congregations. These philosophies, which still have major influence 

on the MEK, would cast them into fighting successive enemies. 

Even further problems were growing. As in the case of many organizations, an 

internal element often develops that does not share organizational beliefs, but are 

within the ranks because it best suits their purpose at the time. When the opportunity presents itself, this element will either split off or attempt to take control 

of the original organization. This became the situation as a Marxist element 

emerged within the MEK. Often at serious odds with established senior leadership, 

the Marxists soon found themselves in a very advantageous position. 

The Shah’s regime arrested sixty-nine members of the MEK in August of 1971. 

The core of the MEK leadership was off the streets, and most ended up on the gallows, including the three founding members. As very few remaining members of 

MEK leadership survived in the Shah’s prisons, awaiting the end of torture that 

only death would bring, the rift between the rival elements intensified. By May of 

1972, two MEKs existed, with the preponderance of power favoring the Marxists. 

The two elements spent as much time fighting each other as they did engaging the 

Shah’s regime. Meanwhile, one imprisoned member who was not executed by the 

government enforcers, but rather remained captive until the final days of the Shah’s 

rule, was a young Massoud Rajavi. Inside prison he built an organizational structure and a large membership anchored on original MEK concepts and independent 

of Marxist influence. 

In November of 1976, the strength of the Marxist MEK was shaken when they 

lost a major gun battle with Iranian police. In January of 1979, ten days before Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran from exile in Paris, Rajavi was released from prison. As he worked to rebuild the MEK, most of the subordinate leadership he selected also came from Qasr Prison. By then, the Marxist element had abandoned 

any claim to the MEK name and renamed themselves ‘‘Paykar’’ (Struggle). Paykar 

has long been defunct. 

The best analysis to this situation was provided by former Undersecretary of 

State George Ball in his August 19, 1981 Washington Post article. Mr. Ball stated, 

‘‘ . . . The sloppy press habit of dismissing the Mujahedeen as leftists badly confuses 

the problem . . . Its intention is to replace the current backward Islamic regime with 

a modernized Shiite Islam drawing its egalitarian principalities from Koranic 

Sources rather than Marx . . . ’’ 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I’ve been sympathetic because I think 

we’ve been awfully slow to be helpful, here. I thought we could 

have been helpful over the years. I’ve always felt that way. 

I’m not comfortable with a group with a military history coming 

to the United States as a group. I’m not comfortable about that. I 

think that’s one of the problems they’ve had. So, you’re telling me 

they’ll come individually, let’s talk about that. 

Colonel MARTIN. I’d be glad to, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. What is the danger—I don’t want to go back. 

I’m sure you’ve talked about the danger they face today. I’ll try to 

read the transcript and maybe submit some questions. Because I 

assume it is increasing with the Iranian influence in Iraq increasing. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That’s correct. 

Senator SESSIONS. That’s an unfortunate event that I wish 

hadn’t occurred. So, I’m willing to look at this. I see others—maybe 

we’re finishing up in our testimony. But, I do have—question the 

concept of bringing in larger numbers of people that only want to 

adhere together in the country. I’m not sure that’s healthy for us 

at this point in time. 

109 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Senator Sessions, I do want to respond to 

that. As I understand it—and right now, of course, most of the 

folks who have left have gone to Albania. In some ways, we’re raising, today, the possibility—and I know it’s been raised somewhat 

before—about all of them coming here. But, as I understand it, the 

residents of Camp Liberty want a—want to leave together, they 

want to leave Camp Liberty together, because they don’t want to 

leave a smaller number behind. But, they don’t expect to be settled 

in the same place if they come here or if they go to Albania. The— 

here, we know that they have family and friends throughout the 

country, and, you know, each of them—family and friends have 

said, ‘‘I’ll take two’’ or ‘‘I’ll take three,’’ whatever. So, they’ll be 

spread out all across America. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I only—my initial impression was, Why 

are we having such a hard time with this? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. It’s a good question. 

Senator SESSIONS. I’ve then learned that the group is sometimes 

hard to deal with, and they have very firm views about certain 

things they want and don’t want, and it’s made it difficult, and 

they’ve not been able to negotiate effectively with U.S. officials. So, 

it’s presented a difficult problem. 

Thank you for your leadership and for sharing with us. 

Thank—— 

Colonel MARTIN. If I may, for a moment, sir. General Jones will 

back me up. 

We have offered to State Department to help resolve those differences. One day on the telephone, Dan Fried was complaining. 

He says, ‘‘Well, they don’t understand the way we do things, 

they’re a problem.’’ I said to Dan Fried, I said, ‘‘Then let me go 

with your team over to Iraq, and I will bring them to the table, and 

we’ll resolve all issues.’’ Dan Fried snapped back at me and said, 

‘‘We don’t need any outsiders involved.’’ 

Senator MCCAIN. Identify who Dan Fried—— 

Colonel MARTIN. Dan Fried was the Ambassador of the United 

States that worked the arrangement of the residents to leave Camp 

Ashraf and come to Camp Liberty, and then started working the 

resettlement process. 

I did find out one thing. Before I could respond to Dan Fried to 

that comment, ‘‘We don’t need any outside’’—— 

Senator SESSIONS. He was talking about you? Is that who he was 

talking about? 

Colonel MARTIN. He was talking about me, but he was talking 

about everybody. General Jones heard the conversation, ‘‘We don’t 

need any outsiders involved.’’ I started to reply, but, before I could, 

Governor Tom Ridge stepped in. I did learn one thing. Anybody 

who’s going to slam a combat veteran better not do it in the presence of Tom Ridge. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, Tom Ridge is a strong man, I agree. 

Well, thank you for your testimony. We’ll try to wrestle with this. 

I don’t think the State Department’s at all at fault in this. 

Thank you. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Blumenthal. 

110 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

holding this hearing. 

Thank you to each of our witnesses for being here today. 

I want to say, particularly to Senator Lieberman, my former colleague, that you are missed here. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Although—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Not by all. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LIEBERMAN. You’ve visited, and you missed the opening 

statement, when Senator McCain thanked me for taking the time 

to leave the bingo game at the senior center in Connecticut. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LIEBERMAN. But, you’ve been to that senior center. You 

know how good a time we have. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. We have a great bingo game. I’ll take this 

occasion to invite Senator McCain—— 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL.—to join us. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I’ve done pretty well at the bingo table, incidentally. 

Senator MCCAIN. I think I qualify. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. But, I will stay steadfast and true to my 

contention that you are missed. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. But, you continue to do great work. I am 

very sympathetic and supportive of the cause that brings you here 

today, not only because the United States made a promise, and 

promises should be kept, as a matter of morality, but I believe that 

our image and our standing in the world community depends on 

our keeping our promises as a great nation and a nation that follows its ethical prescripts. 

I was particularly struck by your contention, Senator Lieberman, 

that we ought to put aside the nuclear agreement that has been 

reached and continue to pursue interests that may, in fact, put us 

at odds with Iran. I’d like to take this occasion to say that Iran is 

unlikely to change its behavior or conduct in the region in the wake 

of that agreement. If anything, flush with additional financial resources and with the need to demonstrate its revolutionary ambitions, it almost certainly will increase its mischief in that area. I 

would invite you to suggest other areas that perhaps we should 

pursue that could counter that continuing influence. Obviously, our 

keeping our promise in this instance is one that’s important, but 

perhaps other areas where the same goals can be pursued. 

Just to mention that Senator Cardin and I and others have introduced legislation that would provide for additional economic sanctions if it increases its aid to terrorism, and other measures to aid 

our allies in the region, especially Israel, to counter that threat. 

So, if you wish to take this opportunity to comment on that question, I would invite you to do so. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Blumenthal. 

Thanks for your leadership in that legislation with Senator Cardin 

and others. 

111 

So, as I said at the beginning just briefly, the nuclear agreement 

is going into effect. I hope that my skepticism about it is proven 

to be an overreaction and not well founded. But, it’s over there. I 

think it’s amazing. We have to learn from the Iranians. They 

haven’t changed anything else about their behavior, and I think, 

therefore, we should not. So, I think the additional economic sanctions for their continuing horrific support, and contrary to U.S. interests and values—of terrorism, human rights violations—inside 

the country are very important, and the continued enforcement by 

the administration of the existing sanctions. 

I mean, the truth is that, though the lifting of some of the sanctions because of the nuclear agreement will give the Iranians billions of dollars, which I’m afraid they’re going to use not only to 

support the regime inside the country economically, but also to 

support their terrorist proxies outside—the fact is that Iran is still 

not a good place for business to do business, because the existing 

sanctions on—because of terrorism and human rights violations 

continue, and they’re quite significant. So, I think that’s one thing. 

The other that I mentioned today, and I know it’s—it takes a 

step to it in another direction—but, really, the heart of this government is so contrary to the values of the United States. It’s an Islamic dictatorship and really suppresses its people terribly, including—you look at the number of people executed under the so-called 

moderate Rouhani, it’s more than under Ahmadinejad before him. 

Therefore, I think we ought to be explicit about the fact that to 

really have good relations with Iran, they’re going to have to become a more democratic, small ‘‘d,’’ country and to find ways to 

support the opposition to them. 

I mean, I referred to solidarity and the Refuseniks and in those 

days—well, two things. One, as Senator McCain knows, because 

we’ve heard Sharanski say this directly, never minimize—even this 

hearing, never minimize the power to those who are essentially incarcerated—and in Sharanski’s case, it was in the gulag; in this 

case, they’re living in stress, a really frightening situation in Camp 

Liberty—to know that somebody over here cares about it. 

The second is, Who would have guessed that solidarity would 

have overthrown the government in Poland, that the regime in— 

the Soviet regime would have collapsed. But, they did. These things 

always start with small, principled, zealous freedom fighters. 

They’re there—in this group, but also throughout Iran. I think we 

would be derelict and disloyal to our own national values if we did 

not find better ways, overt and covert, to support democratic opposition to the dictatorial regime in Tehran. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you—— 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL.—very much. 

Senator LIEBERMAN.—for the question. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, Senator Lieberman, I don’t think I could 

summarize any better than what you just did. 

So, I want to thank the witnesses, and we’ll continue this effort, 

which has assembled a remarkable coalition, as General Jones just 

pointed out, of former Attorney Generals, former head of the Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security to all walks and 

all—in both political parties. Hopefully we will bring this issue to 

112 

a conclusion, which means that these men and women who are suffering today on a daily basis are able to be freed of both the bondage in which they are existing and the threats to their lives which 

continue to grow as we see the Iranian influence grow. No doubt 

about the Iranians’ desires concerning them. 

So, I thank the witnesses. This is important. Hopefully we’ll— 

this will spur movement forward and we’ll achieve our goal. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CRUZ

STALEMATE ALONG SECTARIAN LINES AND IRANIAN INFLUENCE OVER THE GOVERNMENT

OF IRAQ

1. Senator CRUZ. Despite the efforts of U.S. advisors, the effects of U.S. airpower 

and our support of the Iraqi government, this summer the Iraqi Army lost control 

of Ramadi and it has failed to retake and hold Fallujah. General Jones, what capabilities do the Iraqi Security Forces need to ‘‘ultimately destroy’’ ISIS in Ramadi, 

Fallujah, and Mosul and when do you believe they could have those capabilities? 

General JONES. Please see Appendix A for response. 

2. Senator CRUZ. General Jones, I understand that Iraqi security forces rely heavily on Shi’ite militias, particularly for maintaining control of parts of Northern Iraq. 

Are the loyalties of those Shi’ite militias to the Government of Iraq, or do their primary loyalties lay elsewhere? 

General JONES. Please see Appendix A for response. 

3. Senator CRUZ. General Jones, how much control does Iran exercise over those 

militias? 

General JONES. Please see Appendix A for response. 

4. Senator CRUZ. It is no secret that after U.S. Forces left Iraq, the Iranian government exercised strong control over Baghdad through Nouri al Maliki. General 

Jones, how much influence does Iran maintain over Iraq because of Iraq’s reliance 

Shiite militias to maintain control and security? 

General JONES. Please see Appendix A for response. 

5. Senator CRUZ. General Jones, if Iran called upon the Shi’ite Militias to oppose 

Abadi and the government of Iraq, does Abadi’s government possess the will and 

capabilities to prevail? 

General JONES. Please see Appendix A for response. 

6. Senator CRUZ. General Jones, could Abadi survive politically if Iran rallied 

groups against him during elections, particularly if Iraq fails to extend control over 

the Sunni areas currently controlled by ISIS? 

General JONES. Please see Appendix A for response. 

7. Senator CRUZ. General Jones, do you believe that Abadi exercises control of the 

Government of Iraq only with the cooperation and accommodation of Iran? 

General JONES. Please see Appendix A for response. 

8. Senator CRUZ. General Jones, is liberation of the primarily Sunni regions of 

Western and Northern Iraq in the interest of Iran, or does that actually decrease 

Iranian influence by broadening the Sunni’s base of support in Baghdad? 

General JONES. Please see Appendix A for response. 

9. Senator CRUZ. General Jones, are you concerned that Iran is continuing to expand its influence over the Government of Iraq while the Iraqi Army prepares for 

a ground offensive into Western and/or Northern Iraq? 

General JONES. Please see Appendix A for response. 

10. Senator CRUZ. General Jones, in the wake of Russia’s move into Syria, the 

Russian foreign ministry has indicated that they will provide air support to Iraq, 

113 

if Iraq asks. Five days ago, Abadi said that he ‘‘welcomes’’ Russian air support in 

Iraq. Do you believe that Iraq’s willingness to accept Russian airpower is a sign that 

the United States is failing to provide Iraq with the sufficient air support to meet 

their needs? 

General JONES. Please see Appendix A for response. 

11. Senator CRUZ. General Jones, how do you recommend we turn the Government in Baghdad away from the influence of Iran and Russia? 

General JONES. Please see Appendix A for response. 

114 

APPENDIX A 


15-77-qfr-response1.eps
115 

Æ 


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