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BRIDGET ALLEN, Plaintiff,

v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. No. 13-642C (Filed: July 15, 2014) UNREPORTED 

# FILED JUL I 5 2014 U.S. COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 

### Motion for disqualification or recusal; 28 U.S.C. 

### § 455; absence of evidence ofbias**~~~~~~~~~-)** 

### ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION Pending before the court is plaintiffBridget Allen's ("Ms. Allen" or "plaintiff') motion for disqualification, in which she requests the case be transferred to a different judge. 1 Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed suit on September 4, 2013, alleging that defendant, the United States, ("the government") violated the Fifth Amendment ofthe United States Constitution by taking plaintiffs property in connection with the foreclosure ofher home. See Pl.'s CompI.

1 Plaintiffs motion for disqualification seeks the recusal ofthe undersignedjudge and three other judges ofthis court, each ofwhom was recently assigned a case involving plaintiff. The three other cases discussed in plaintiffs motion for disqualification include: Allen v. United States, No. 14-177C (filed on Mar. 3, 2014) (Campbell-Smith, J.); Allen v. United States, No. 14-178C (filed on Mar. 4, 2014) (Damich, J.); and Allen v. United States, No. 14-179C (filed on Mar. 4, 2014) (Letlow, J). See Pl.'s Mot. for Disqualification ("Pl.'s Mot.") at 1. Ms. Allen also seeks the recusal ofall thejudges on the United States Court ofFederal Claims because "the collegial members [ofthe] Court ofFederal Claims are too close to this issue

...." Pl.'s Mot. 19.In her motion for disqualification, plaintiffsuggests that this court is complicit in furthering a conspiracy ofthe "United States government through its agencies and the courts, [to] commit covert and systematic 'takings' ofblack persons['] property and rights, without their knowledge and in violation ofthe laws ofthe United States." Pl.'s Mot. at 5. Plaintiffalso takes issue with the court's practice oflimiting access to docket entries to registered users ofthe court's electronic filing system to licensed attorneys. 2 For its part, the government contends that plaintiffhas failed to identify any reasonable basis for the court's recusal. See Def.'s Consolidated Resp. to Pl.'s Mot. for Disqualification ("Def.'s Resp.") at 1-2. Forthe reasons set forth below, plaintiffs motion for disqualification or recusal is 

### DENIED. I. DISCUSSION A. Standard ofReview for a Motion for Disqualification Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

### § 455(a) The issue ofdisqualification offederaljudges falls under 28 U.S.C. § 455. Shell Oil Co. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1283, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("[§] 455 governs the disqualification or recusal offederaljudges."). Under§ 455(a), "[a]nyjustice,judge, or magistratejudge ofthe United States shall disqualify himselfin any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The purpose behind§ 455(a) is "topromote public confidence in the integrity ofthejudicial

2 Inthis connection, the court notes that plaintiffis mistaken that the record in the case is "under seal" or "subjectto a protective order." Plaintiffs complaint was filed under seal solely in order to protect plaintiffs banking and otherpersonal information, which was included in the complaint. Other filings in this matter-includingthe allegations ofbias and a nationwide conspiracy-are not sealed and can be viewed by registered users ofthe court's electronic filing system.

2process[.]" Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 n.7, 860 (1988). "In enacting[§] 455(a), Congress created an objective standard under which disqualification ofajudge is required when a reasonable person, knowing all the facts, would question thejudge's impartiality." Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 882 F.2d 1556, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citing Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 858 n.7); see also Baldwin Hardware Corp. v. FrankSu Enter. Corp., 78 F.3d 550, 557 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In considering a motion for disqualification, the movant's "subjective beliefs about thejudge's impartiality are irrelevant." Allphin v. United States, No. 2013-5117, 2014 WL 3377157, at *4 (Fed. Cir. July 11, 2014). Moreover, the fact that thejudge has issued prior decisions dismissing a case filed by the movant or has issued rulings against the movant in the pending case is not, in and ofitself, evidence ofthe favoritism or antagonism that would require recusal. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) ("Opinions formed by thejudge on the basis offacts introduced or events occurring in the course ofthe current proceedings, or ofprior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partially motion unless they display a deep-seating favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.") (emphasis added). Indeed, the Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit has described a party's burden in substantiating a recusal claim as "heavy." Baldwin Hardware Corp., 78 F.3d at 557. It is against this backdrop that the court turns to plaintiffs arguments. B. Parties' Arguments on the Motion for Disqualification Plaintiffargues that the court appears biased and prejudicial and thus should be disqualified from this suit. Pl.'s Mot. at 4. Plaintifffurther contends that a reasonable
3person would conclude that the court's impartiality may be reasonably questioned. Id. at 8. Plaintiffasserts that the court's bias is evident from the court's (1) decision to seal her complaint, (2) practice oflimiting access to the court's electronic filing system to licensed attorneys, (3) refusal to sanction the government under Rule 11 ofthe Rules of the United States Court ofFederal Claims ("RCFC") for "cutting and pasting" text in its briefs that was initially used in other cases involving Ms. Allen, and (4) failure to grant plaintiffs request for discovery and for a temporary restraining order ("TR0"). 3 See id. at 9-14. In response, the government contends that under the reasonable person standard, plaintiffhas not stated an appropriate basis for disqualifying the presidingjudge. Def.'s Resp. at 2.C. PlaintiffHas not Carried her Burden ofDemonstrating Recusal Is Appropriate Having considered plaintiffs contentions and the government's response, the court finds that recusal is not appropriate in this case. Plaintiffs allegations do not call into question the court's impartiality. To begin, Ms. Allen's suggestion that the court wrongfully sealed the complaint in order to hide evidence ofthe government's conspiracy is unsupported. To the contrary, the complaint was placed under seal to protect Ms. Allen's personal banking information. See supra note 2. Similarly, the court's standard practice oflimiting access to the electronic filing system to licensed attorneys is not evidence ofany antagonism towards

3 Plaintifffiled an application for a TRO "to enjoin [the government] from evicting the plaintiff from her home" in connection to her alleged taking claims. Pl.'s Appl. for TRO at 1.

4Ms. Allen that mightjustify recusal. Limiting access to the court's electronic filing system to members ofthe bar is the standard practice in most courts. The court's purported failure to sanction the government for "cutting and pasting" text in its briefs is also not grounds for recusal. As an initial matter, the court notes that plaintiffhas not actually moved for sanctions

. Assuming, however, that the plaintiffso moved and the court denied such a motion, such a denial would not, as a matter oflaw, constitute evidence ofbias thatjustifies recusal. Baldwin Hardware Corp., 78 F.3d at 557. A court possesses broad discretion to issue sanctions, and it is not inappropriate to refuse to issue sanctions for copying and pasting arguments in multiple briefs

. See Smeigh v. Johns Manville, Inc., 643 F.3d 554, 566 (7th Cir. 2011) (refusing to sanction appellant for cutting and pasting summaryjudgment argument into his appellate brief). Although the government, in case numbers 14-178 and 14-179, appears to have copied and pasted its discussion ofthe legal standards governing motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)( 1) and 12(b)(6), the court finds that issuing sanctions in this case would be inappropriate. Plaintiffs claim ofbias based on the court's purported delay in considering her motion for a TRO or in staying discovery also is insufficient as a matter oflaw tojustify recusal. Baldwin Hardware Corp., 78 F.3d at 557. The court has allowed plaintiffto file all ofher responses to the government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. While plaintiffmay disagree with the court's case management approach, this disagreement is not grounds for recusal. Ifthe court determines that it hasjurisdiction to hear plaintiffs

case, the court will turn to Ms. Allen's requests for a TRO and to conduct discovery. 

### 5Priorto making such a determination, the court finds thatruling on the requested TRO and for discovery would be premature.4 II. CONCLUSION Forthe reasons stated above, plaintiffs motion for disqualification pursuantto 28 U.S.C. 

### § 455(a) is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED.

4 Inthis connection, plaintiffs suggestion that the court has "allowed the Defendant tojoin a Motion to Dismiss with one a Motion to Deny Plaintiff's Application to Proceed Informa [sic] Pauperis," Pl.'s Mot. at 14, is unsupported. The government's Motion to Dismiss, filed January 6, 2014, does not contest plaintiffs request to proceed in forma pauperis.

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