### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Se pte m be r 4, 200 8 S es sio n
JAM ES A . D ELLIN GER V. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE
App e al b y P e r m iss ion fro m th e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for Bloun t County No. C-14432 D . Ke lly Th om as, Jud ge

No. E2005-01485-SC-R11- P D - F iled Janu ary 22, 2009

We gr anted this appe al to decide an issue of first impression: whether a freesta nding claim of ac tual inn oc e nc e is c og niza

ble in a n in iti a l pe tit ion for po st- c on vic tio n r e lie f u nd e r t he Te nn e sse e Pos tConviction P roce dure A ct, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-30-101 through -122. We have also chosen to discuss t h e p et i t i oner’ s ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel claims and the bur den of proof f or pre vailing on such claims. I n 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction re lief. The post-conviction trial court denied his petition, and the Court of Criminal Appeals af firmed. The Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls h e ld t

hat: (1 ) a fr e e sta

nd ing c la im of a c tua l inno c e nc e is not c og niza ble in an initial petition for post-conviction relief ; (2) the post-c onviction trial court applied the corr ect burden of proof to the pe titioner’s ineff ective a ssistance of counsel claims; and (3) the petit ioner wa s not denied the e ffe ctive assistanc e of counsel. We hold that a claim of a ctual innoce nce ba sed on
new sc ientific evide nce is c og nizable in an ini tial petition for post-conviction relief. We a ffirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’ de nial of relief, however, because the petitioner ha s not met his burden of proof to support such claim. We a lso hold that the post-conviction trial court applied the c orre ct burden of proof to the pe titioner’s ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel claims. To provide c larity in the l aw , h o w e v e r , w e c o n c ur

r e n t l y am e n d

T e n n e s s e e S u

p r e m e C o urtR

u l e 2 8 s e c t i o n 8 ( D ) ( 1 )

. F i n a l l y, we hold that the pe titioner was not denied the eff ective a ssistance of c ounsel

. We affir m the jud g me nt o f t

he Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls i n a ll o the r r e sp e c ts.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 1 1 A ppe al b y P e r m iss ion ; Judgme nt of th e Courtof Crim inal Ap peals Rever sed in Part and Af fi rm ed in Par t

J ANI CE M. H OL DER , C.J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , G AR Y R. W ADE , and W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., J J ., joined.

Catherine Y . Br ockenbor oug h, Donald E. Da wson, and Sara Wil lingham, Nashville, Tennessee, f or the appe llant, J ames A. D ellinge r.2

Robert E. Cooper, A tt o rn ey Gene ral & Reporter ; Michael E. Moore , Solicitor Genera l; Mark E. Da vid so n, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Je nn if

e r L

. S mith, As so c iate De puty Attor ne y Ge ne ra l; Michae l L . Fly

nn, District Attorney

Gene ral; and Rocky

H. Yo u n g, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

. Wade V. Davie s, Knox ville, Tennesse e, for the amicus c uriae , Tenne ssee Assoc iation of Criminal De fe ns e L awye rs

. Patricia He ad Moskal, Na shville , Tenne ssee, a nd Meir F eder , New Y ork City , New Y ork, for the
amic us c ur ia e , T he Inn oc e nc e Pr oje c t.

OPI NI ON

Actual Innocenc e

P roof at Trial

In 1996, the petitioner, J am es A. Delli ng er, a nd his co-def

endant, Ga

ry Sutton, were convicted of

the first degree preme ditated murder of Tomm y Griff in and sente nced to de ath. In the dir e c t a pp e a l of State v. De lli ng e r, we de sc ri be d th e e vid e nc e a t tr ia l:

On the af t er noon of [Friday ,] Februa ry 21, 1992, Delling er, Sutton, and Griff in spent sever al hours at How ie’s Hidea way L oung e (Howie’s) on Hig hway 321 in M ary vil le , T e nn e sse e . T he thr e e me n d ra nk be e r a nd pla y e d poo l until approximately

7:00 p.m., when they

left the bar in a dar

k-blue Camar o. Wit nesses testified that there was no e vidence of hostility among the m en while they wer e in t he bar.

Ar o u

n d 7 :0 0 p .m. Cy

nthia and Ke nneth Walker we re tra veling north on Alcoa Hi g hway near the Hunt Road exit. They observe d three men who appe are d to be fi gh t i n g i n a dark- colore d Camaro on the side of the roa d. Two of the me n wer e standing outside of the car attempting to f orcibly remove the third man from the ba ck seat. Ke nneth W alker used hi s portable radio t o repor t the incident to the dispatche r for Rura l Metro B lount Count y Ambulance

. Sharon Davis, who was also drivingnorth on Alcoa High wa y ar o u nd the same time, obser

ved a shirtless a

nd shoeless man stumbling down the side of the r oad
ne ar t he Hunt R oa d e xit. Wh e n D avis pa sse d th e same are a a bo ut t hir ty or fo rt y minute s late r , s h e s aw tw o me n s ta n d in g o u ts id e o f a d ar

k

- c o lo r e d Ca

ma r o o n the
s i d e o f t h e r o ad

. T h ey

ap p ea re d t o b e l o o k i n g fo r s o m et h i n g.
. . . . Offic er [Dre w] Robe rt s found two men, not De llinger and Sutton, standing next t o a pickup truc k [on the side of Hunt Road]. A shirtless man sitti ng on the be d o f t

he tr uc k id e nti fi e d h ims e lf

a s G ri ff in. Gr if fi n told the of fi c e r t hat hi s3

friends ha d put him out of a car . Griff in would not identify

his fr i en d s o r tell the office r what had happe ned. Of fice r Roberts ar

rested Griff

in for public intox ication. Griff in was booked at the Bl ount County jail at 7:40 p.m. Dellinge r ar rived a bout forty -five minutes to an hour later to a sk about Griff in’s rele ase. Ser g eant Ray Her ron explained to Delling er that depar tment policy

require d a minimum four-hour detention for public intox i ca t i o n and advise d him to come back a t 10:30 or 11:00 p. m. Alvin Henry

was a resident of

Bl uff He ights Road, whe re D ellinge r and Griff in both live d

. At ap p rox imately 9:00 p.m., Henry

looked out of his trailer window and sa

w Delling er’ s white Dodg e pickup truc k. Henr y saw someone enter the pa sse ng e r s ide of

the tr uc k. Th e tr

uc k d rov e up the ro a d a nd pu lle d into Delling er’ s drivewa

y . Henr y then noticed f

ire shooting from Griff

in’s trailer down the roa d. . . . Arson investig ator Ga ry Clabo co n cl u d ed that the fire wa s set intentionally

. . . .
J ennife r B rana

m, Griff in’s niece , ran to De llinger ’s trailer when she lear

ned that Griff in’s trailer w as on fire. J u st as Delling er’ s wife wa s telling Jennifer that Delling er was not home , Delling er and Sutton walked down the ha ll from the living
ro om. Th e tw o me n w e re sti ll w e ari ngthe ir ja c ke ts, and

the ir pa nts we re we t up to the kn e e s. Jenn if

e r as ke d the m if Gr if

fi n wa s in hi s b ur

nin g tr a ile r, and

Sutton tol d he r t hat G ri ff in w a s in B lou nt C ounty wi th a g ir l. Whe n J e nn if e r a sk e d th e me n to
ac co mp an y

h er t o th e t ra i l er , De l l i n ger

re s p o n d edth at th ey

we re al re ad y

i nen o u gh trouble.

After returninghome, J ennife r looked out the wi n d o w and sa w Delling er re mov e an o bje c t w ra

pp e d in a sh e e t fr om his tr uc k and pla c e it i nto the ba c k o f h is wife’ s Oldsmobile. J ennife r testified that the object rese mbled a shotg un. Her man L ewis, a relative of J ennife r, also observe d Delling er moving an object fr om his truck to his wife’s ca

r shortly afte r 10:00 p.m. Delling er a nd Sutton t hen lef

t in the Oldsmobile.

At aro un d 11:2 5 p.m. De lli ng e r an d Sutto n r e tur ne d to the B lou

nt C ounty ja il. Delling er paid a c ash bond for Griff in. Office rs in the jail lobby overhe ard one of the defe ndants tell Griffin that they neede d to ge t him back to Sevier County

. 79 S.W .3d 458, 462-64 (Te nn. 2002). No witnesses testified to seeing Griff in alive or spea

king to him af

ter he left the B lount County jail. J ason McDona ld and his mother, B renda McKe ehan, te stified that they hear d two loud guns ho ts at 11 :55 p. m. a nd tha t it wa s v e ry unus ua l to he ar gun sh ots a t th a t ti me of night. B oth witnesses also testified that the gunshots were fired f rom an a rea on the L ittle Ri ver i n Blount County called the Blue Hole, which is approximately 500 y ards down the hill from their reside nce.4

At the time he hea

rd the shots, Mr. M cD onald was writing in his journal. His entr y , which documented that he had he ard the shots from “down the hill,” wa s entere d into evidence

.

The ne x t mor

ning, [Saturday ,] Februa

ry 22, J ennife r B rana

m saw De llinger leave his trailer, re move the objec t he had plac ed in his wife’ s car the nig ht before , and plac e the objec t under his trailer

. . . . . At about 2:00 p.m., Connie Bra nam [J ennife r’ s m o t h er and Gr iffin’s sister] went to J err

y Sulli van’s g roce ry store in T ownsend asking if anyone had se en h er b ro th er

. S u l l i v an t h en s aw Br an am s p ea k i n g wi thtwo m en i na w h i t e D o d ge pic ku p tr uc k in the g ro c e ry

sto re pa rk inglot

.
L ate r t hat a ft e rn oo n, Connie B ra nam a c c omp anie d D e lli ng e r a nd Sutton to Howie’ s. . . .

. . . . When [ Terr

y L illy Newma n] approache d Br anam, De llinger , and Sutton to ask if they

neede d any

thing . . . B ra nam explained that she wa s looking for her br oth e r a nd a sk e d wi th wh om he ha d le ft the ba r. Ne wm an b e c ame c on fu se d b e c a us e she knewthat Griff

in had left with De llinger

and Sutton. Dellinge r aske d Newma n if she reme mbere d them returningto Howie’s a fter the y bailed Gr iffin out of jail, but Newma n knew that the thr ee had not returne d to Howie’s be cause she had w orked
un til c los ing . A ft e r u

ns uc c e ssf ull y a tte mpt ing to c on vin c e Ne wm an to j oin the m in their sea rch f or Grif fin, Sutton asked Newma n if she wa s marrie d. When Newman responde d that she wa s marrie d, Sutton s tated, “[W] ell, y our husband is g oing to be surprised whe never

you’re missing one morning , when he wake s u p and y ou’re mis sin g .” De lli ng e r, Sutton , a nd B ra nam le ft Ho wi e ’s aro un d 6 :30 p. m. About 8:00 p.m. that night, J ames and Ba rbar a Gordon observe d a fire in the woods nea

r the Clear

For k are a of Sevie r C ounty

. The followingmorning , Ba rbar a Gordon watched a

white truck oc cupied by two men leave t h e woods and he ad tow ard the ma in r oa d. She te sti fi ed th at th e tr uc k w a s tr ave lin g ra

pid ly and that it
came from the g ener al ar ea where they had obser

ved the f ire the nig ht before

. On Monday , Fe b ruar

y 24, around 3:30 p.m. Grif fin’s body

was discove red lying fac e- d o wn on a bank at the Blue Hole. He had bee n shot in the back of the neck at the base of t he skul l with a shot g un. Two 12-ga ug e shotg un shell casing s and be er cans w e re fo un d n e ar t he bo dy . T he sh otgun

sh e lls we re fi re d f

ro m th e same g un that fired shells later found in D ellinge r’s y ard. . . . Dr. Er ic Ellington with the B l o un tC o un ty M e d i c a l E x am i n e r ’ s O f f i c e c o n d u c t e d th e a

u t o p s y o nG r i f

f i n ’ s b o dy. He concluded that the c ause of death wa s the destruc tion of the brain stem fr om the shotgun w ound. Ellington re trieved two me tal pellets and two piec es of sho tgun wadding from Griffin’s brain. The pellets wer e consistent with pellets loaded in the 1 2

- g a u g e “ 0 0 ” b u c k s h o t

c a s i n g s f o un d n e ar G r i f f i n ’ s b o dy.D r

. El l i n g t on t es t i f i ed f or t h e St at e i n i t s ca s e- i n
- ch i ef bu t s t at ed t h at h e wa s n ot qu al i f i ed t o r en der a n opi n i on 1

o n G ri f f i n’ s t i m e o f

de at h.

T h e p rio r v io le n t f

e lo n y a g g ra v a ting c irc u m sta n c e w a s b a se d o n the c o n v ic tio n s o f D e lli n g e r an d S u tto n in 2 Sevi er Co un t y i n 1993 f or t he f i r s t degr ee premedi t at ed mur der of Co nn i e B r ana m. I n a dd i t i on, Sut t on ha d been

con v i ct ed of

a g g r av at ed as s au l t i n Cobb Coun t y , G eor g i a, i n 1983.
5 On Fr iday , Fe bruar

y 28, Connie Br anam’ s body was discovere d in he r burne d vehicle in the w ooded ar ea wher e the Gordons had obse rved the fire on F ebrua ry 22. Arson investig ator Ga

ry Clabo determined that the fire ha d been se t by human hands . . . . Investig ators discove red a rifle she ll in the burned vehicle that had bee n fired from the .303 r ifle later

found in Delling er’ s trailer.

I d. at 464-65.

The State’s theory at trial was that Griff in die d late on Fr iday , Fe bruar y 21, 1 9 9 2 , af

t er leavingthe jail with Dellinge r and Sutton. I n his d ef en s e, De llinger

called D r. L arr

y Wolfe, a medical doc tor and fo rmer c ounty corone r. Dr. Wolfe opine d that Griff in was killed betwe en twenty -four

and thirty -six hours bef

ore his body

was found, pla cing the t ime of death betwee n 3:30 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. on Sunday , Fe bruar y 23, 1 9 9 2

. I n forminghis opinion, Dr. Wol fe r eviewe d photogr aph s o f t he body

from the c rime sce ne, the r eport of the para medic who r esponded to the
scene , autopsy

photogr aphs, Dr. E llington’s autopsy repor t, and the re ported tempe rature s on the
w e e k e n d o f F e b r u ar y 2 1 , 1 9 9 2

. H i s o p i n i o nw a s b a s e d o nth e p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o no f th e b o dy, including e vidence of “r igor mortis; . . . early

transitional lividit y , which is skin color ch ang e; the prese nce of

brig ht red blood or c oagulum; the lack of finding s of ea rly decomposition . . . ; a lack of fluid ac cumulation within certa in tissues of the body , and a la ck of sof tening of the G.I . trac t.”

The State did not ca ll an ex pert to opine on Gr iffin’s time of de ath in its case- in-chief but called D r. Charle s Har lan, a fore nsic patholog ist, on rebuttal. After revie wing the photog raphs a nd 1 repor ts, Dr. Har lan t estified that the victim was killed betwe en 11:30 p.m. on Fr iday , Fe bruar y 21, 1992, and 8:00 a.m. on Saturday , Fe bruar y 22, 1992. Dr. Har lan ag ree d with Dr. Wolfe that rig or mortis was prese nt when Gr iffin’s body was found. H e stated, however , that the presence of rig or mortis was consistent with the State’s theory of the time of de ath bec ause a body can r emain in rig or up to s e v e n ty

- tw o h o ur s a f te r d e a th

. D r

. H ar la

n d is a g r e e d w it

h D r

. Wo lf

e ’ s c o n c lu s io n that the autopsy photogr aphs an d re p o rt indicated a “lac k of findingof ea

rly decomposition.” F inally , he testified, contra

ry to Dr. Wolfe, that t he presence of ea rly transitional lividit y , brig ht red blood, and softeningof the G.I . trac t were not helpful in determiningthe time of death in this case

.
B a se d o n th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d a t tr ia l, the jur y c on vic te d D e lli ng e r a

nd Sutton of the fi rs t deg ree preme ditated murder of Griff in. At the sentenc ing hear ing, the jury found that the evidenc e supported the prior v i o l en tfe l o n y aggr av at i n g ci rc u m s t an ce , T en n

. C o d e A n n

. 3 9 -1 3 -2 0 4 (i )( 2 ) (2006 & Supp. 2008), and outweig hed any mitigatingcirc umstances be y ond a re asonable doubt. The jury 2 sentenc ed D el l i n ger and Sutton t o death. The convictions and sente nces w ere aff irmed on direc t appea l. Delling er, 79 S.W.3d at 462, cer t. denied, 537 U.S. 1090 (2002). D ellinge r filed his initialD r. H a sk e ll sta te d tha t “[t]h e stud y o f e n to m o lo g y is t h e stud y o f i n se c ts,” a n d the w o rk o f f o re n sic 3
ent o m o l o gi st s co nsi st s o f “ o b t ai ni ng and revi ewing .

. . t he i nsect s t hat wo ul d have b een co l l ect ed at t he scene, on t he

rem ai ns o r i n co njunct i o n wi t h t he aut o p sy f rom t he rema i ns” t o de t erm i ne t i m e o r l o cat i o n of d eat h.

6 petition f or post-conviction relief from his conviction and se ntence , pr o s e , on Marc h 3, 2003. He
was a ppointed counsel and filed an a mended pe tition on August 11, 2003. The post-c onviction trial court c onducted a

hear ing on O ctober

26-29, 2004, and on January 28, 2005.

P r oo f atth e P os t- Co nvi c ti on H e ar ing Delling er pr esente d the testimony of two experts wh o had re viewed the photogr aphs and
re po rt s p re se nte d at D e lli ng e r’ s o ri g ina l tr ia l. D r. N eal Has ke ll, a bo ard -c e rt if

ie d f or e ns ic entomologist, testified that the appa rent lac k of evide nce of

insects and insec t egg s on the body 3 indicated that it had be en lying in the open less than twenty -four and no more than forty -eig ht hours when f ound. He place d the time of death betwee n 3:30 p.m. on Saturday , Fe bruar y 22, 1992, and afte r sunrise on Monda

y , Fe bruar

y 24, 1992. Dr. Haskell also evaluated clim atolog ical data at the site where the body

was found, inc luding the r eporte d wee kend temperatures and rain on Fe bruar y 23 , 199 2, but w a s una

ble to e xpla in t

he a bs e nc e of ins e c t a c tiv ity . H e a dmi tte d th a t it wa s p os sib le that others had ove rlooked the pr esenc e of insec t activity but that fly

eg g s are “fa irly

larg e” a nd “obser vable.” On cr oss-examination, Dr. Haske ll concede d that none of the repor ts he revie wed expressly stated that no insect ac tivity was obser

ved. In his opinion, however, the la ck of a ny re fe re nc e to i ns e c t a c tiv ity ind ic a te d th a t no ne wa s p re se nt.

Dr . St anto n K e ssl e r, a

fo re ns ic patho log ist , te sti fi e d th a t G ri ff in di e d w ith in t

we lve to twenty -four

hou rs b ef

o re his body

was found, pla cingthe time of death betwee n 3:30 p.m. on Sunday , Fe bruar

y 23, 1992, and 3:30 a.m. on Monday , Fe bruar y 24, 1992. He based hi s opinion on evidenc e of r igor

mortis, the absence of f

ix ed lividity , the lack of

evidenc e of de composition, the prese nce of

undige sted food in G riffin’s stomach, chang es in the appea ranc e of the wound, and the
a bs e nc e of ins e c t a c tiv ity . In D r. Ke ssl e r’ s o pin ion , ri g or mor tis dis a pp e ars wi thi n tw e nty -f

our t o thirty -six hours af

ter de ath. On cr oss-examination, Dr. Kessler stated th at a wh i t e substance on Griff in’s neck a

nd head in one of the c rime sce ne photog raphs was g rains of unbur ned gunpowder , not fly eg g s, but that a small “blackish” imag e next to Griffin’s b o d y in one of the c rime sce ne p h o t o g r a p h s w a s a f l y.
The State called Dr. Wil liam Ba ss, the forensic anthropologist who had testified reg arding the death of C o n n i e Br anam in Dellinger ’s B lount and Sevier County trials. After

revie wing the ph oto g ra ph s and re po rt s reg ard ingGr if

fi n’ s d e a th, Dr . B a ss t e sti fi e d th a t th e fi xed liv idi ty vis ibl e o nG r i f f i n ’ s f a c e w a s c o n s i s t e n tw i tht h e S t a t e ’ s t h e o r y th a tG r i f

f i nw a s k i l l e d

l a t e o nF r i d ay, Fe bruar y 21, 1992. Dr. B ass also re viewed the repor ted wee kend temper ature s, which indicate d a low of twenty -four

deg ree s on the morning of F ebrua ry 22, 1992, and a hig h of six ty -nine de g ree s on Fe bruar

y 2 4 , 1 9 9 2

. I n h is o p in io n , th e c o o l te mp e r a tu r e s w o u ld h av e d e la

y e d th e p r o c e s s of deca y , explaining why t h er e wa s “partially dige sted food” in Gr iffin’s stomach a s noted in the autopsy repor t. Fur thermore , the notation of the pre sence of par tially dige sted food indicate d to Dr. B a ss t hat th e e xami ne r w a s una ble to i de nti fy

sp e c if ic a lly the fo od in Gr if

fi n’ s st oma c h. Dr . B a ssW het her t he exe c u tio n o f a n inno cent pe rs o n vi o l at es t he f ed eral co nst i t ut i o n has no t be en d eci d ed by t he 4 U ni t ed Stat es Sup rem e C o urt

. See H o use v. B el l , 54 7 U

. S. 5 1 8 , 5 5 4

- 5 5 (2 0 0 6 ) (ref erri ng to t he st at us o f

f reest and i ng cl ai m s o f

act ual i nno cence aft er H errer a v. C o l l i ns, 50 6 U

. S. 39 0 (19 9 3 ) as “ l ef t op en” and “ unres o l ved ”).
7 stated that the pre sence of rig or mortis on Fe bruar y 24, 1992, did not contra dict the State’s theor y be c a us e “ [r]ig or

is a lso c on tr oll e d by te mpe ra tur e .” He a lso no te d that a re du c tio n in ins e c t a c tiv ity
was c onsistent with the absence of fly activity in temperatures below f

ifty deg ree s, at nig ht, or in the rain. F inally , Dr. B ass stated that the white substance on Griffin’s ne ck and he ad wa s fly eg g s, not g unp o w d e r , an d

th a tth e s m a l l , b l a c k

i m a g e w a s a

f l y.

Dr . H a sk e ll w a s r e c a lled to tes tif y a ft e r r e vie wi ngthe te sti mony of Dr . B a ss. Dr . H a sk e ll testified that the white substance on Griff in’s neck identified by

Dr. B ass as fly

eg g s was buckshot buffe r and that the fly

identified by Dr. Ba ss a

nd Dr. Kessler was actua lly a lea f tip overlying a

nother leaf . He a lso stated that the repor ted climatologic al data did not contr adict his finding that obvious insect ac tivity

would have be en obser

vable ha d Griff

in’s body been lying in the ope n as long as the State claimed.

On J une 2, 2005, the post-conviction trial c ourt filed “F indings of F act a nd Conclusions of L aw” den y i ng Delling er post-c onviction relief. D ellinge r filed a timely notice of a

ppeal, a nd the Court of Criminal Appeals af firmed the post-c onviction trial court ’s denial of r elief. D ellinge r v. State , No. E2 00 5- 01 48 5- CCA -R 3- PD, 20 07 WL 24 28 04 9 (T e nn . Crim . App . Aug . 28, 20 07 ). Th is Court gr anted De llinger ’s application for per mission t o appea l on Febr uary 25, 2008.

Ana lys is

W e gra n t ed De llinger ’s application for per mission t o appea l to determine whe ther a fre estanding claim of actua l innocence is cog nizable in an initial petiti on for post-c onviction relief under the Tenne ssee Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Te nnessee Co d e Ann o ta te d s e c ti ons 40-30-101 throug h -122 (2006) (“the Act”) . Delling er contends that he may asser t a fre estandingclaim of actua l innocence beca

use he ha s a rig ht under the state and fe dera l constituti ons not to be imprisoned and executed f

or a c rime that he did not commit. Be cause we find that the Act expressly provides for f ree standing cla i m s o f ac tual innocenc e base d on new sc ientific evide nce, w e dec line to rea ch the broade r constitutional issue posed by Delling er. See Owens v. State, 908 S.W .2d 9 2 3 , 9 26 4 (T e nn . 1 99 5) (“ [U]nd e r T e nn e sse e law, c ourt s d o n ot d e c ide c on sti tut ion a l qu e sti on s unle ss resolution is absolutely

nece ssary fo r d et er m ination of the ca se and the rig hts of the par ties.”). Assuming without dec iding, howe ver, that a petitioner mig ht obtai n post-conviction re view of a constitutional claim of actua l innocence , standing alone, the e vidence in this record f ails to meet the threshold showingfor suc h an assumed r ight. See Her rer a, 506 U.S. at 417.

The issue of whether

Delling er ma

y asser t a fre estandingclaim of a ctual innoce nce unde r the Act is a que stion of law, which we re v i ew de novo with no pre sumption of corre ctness. Gr een v. Mo or e , 1 01 S.W. 3d

41 5, 41 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) . O ur fu nd ame nta l r ole in c on str uin g statut e s is to
asce rtain and g ive ef

fec t to the Gener al Assembly ’s intent. Fletc her v. State, 9 5 1 S.W .2d 378, 381-82 (Te nn. 1997). We must presume that the Gene ral Assembly “did not intend a n absurdity

andT enness ee C o d e A nno t at ed s ect i o n 40

- 3 0

- 1 0 2 pro vi d es: “( b ) N o c o urt s hal l have jur i sdi ct i o n t o co nsi d er a 5 pet i t i on f

i l ed af t er t he expi r at i on of

t he l i mi t at i ons per i od un l es s :

. . . (2) [ t ] he cl ai m i n t he pet i t i on i s b as ed upon ne w
s ci ent i f i c evi dence es t abl i s hi ng t hat t he pet i t i oner i s ac t ual l y i nn ocent of t he of f ens e or of

f ens es f or w hi ch t he pet i t i oner was convict ed [. ]”

T enness ee C o d e A nno t at ed s ect i o n 4 0

- 3 0

- 1 1 7 p rovides: “ (a) A pe t i t i o ner may f i l e a m o t i o n i n t he t ri al co urt 6
t o re op en t he f

i r s t post

- convi ct i on pet i t i on onl y i f

. . . ( 2) [ t ] he cl ai m i n t he mo t i on i s bas ed upon ne w s ci ent i f i c e vi dence est ab l i shi ng t hat t he p et i t i o ner i s act ual l y i nno cent of t he o f f ense or off

enses f o r whi ch t he p et i t i o ner was co nvi ct ed [. ]”

Cl ai ms of

a ct u al i n n oce n ce not bas ed on ne w s ci en t i f i c ev i den ce ma y be br ou g h t i n a pe t i t i on f or w r i t of

e r r or 7

co ram nob i s, T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 0

- 2 6

- 1 0 5 (20 0 6 ), w i t hi n o ne y ear af t er t he judgm ent of co nvi ct i o n i n t he t ri al co urt b ec o m es fi na l , S t ate v. M i xo n, 9 8 3 S .W .2d 6 6 1 , 6 7 0 (T en n. 1 9 9 9 ), o r l ater if t he p eti t i o ne r sho w s t ha t d ue p ro ce ss p re c lud e s a p p lica tio n o f th e s ta tute o f lim itatio n s, W o rk m a n v . S ta te , 4 1 S .W .3 d 1 0 0 , 1 0 3 (T e n n . 2 0 0 1 ). S u c h a c la im may al s o be brough t i n a n a pp l i cat i on f or e xec ut i ve cl em en cy once “ al l poss i bl e s t at e j udi ci al r emedi es ” h ave been exhaust ed

. T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 0

- 2 7

- 1 0 9 (20 0 6 ).
8 adopt, if possible, a re asonable construction which provides for a har monious operation of the la ws.” I d. at 382. At least two provisions of the Ac t are rele vant to our dete rmination of t he Ge nera l Assembly ’s intent conce rningclaims of ac tual innocenc e. F irst, Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 40-30-102( b)(2) does not bar c laims for re lief base d on new sc ientific evide nce e stablishing ac tual inn oc e nc e

. Se c on d, Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 4 0- 30 -1 17 (a )( 2) all ows a pe tit ion e r t o 5
re op e n th e fi rs t po st- c onvic tio n p e tit ion by c la imi ng act

ua l inno c e nc e ba se d o n n e w s c ie nti fi c evidenc e. 6

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tions 40-30 -1 02(b)( 2) and - 117(a) (2) ther efor e supply an avenue for r elief when new sc ientific evide nce of actua l innocence become s available afte r the filing of a post-c onviction petition is time-barr ed. I f newscientific e vidence is available when a pe tition for post-c onviction is filed, both logic a nd judicial economy

dictate that this eviden ce s h ould be permitted at that ti me. We can discern no rational basis for precluding new sc ientific evide nce of
a c tua l inno c e nc e un til a ft e r t he c on c lus ion

of the ini tia l po st- c on vic tio n p ro c e e din g s. 7

The Ac t require s that a petitioner pr ove the alleg ations of fa ct in the first post-convic tion petition by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 4 0 -3 0 -1 1 0 (f); Py lant v. State, 263 S.W .3d 85 4, 868 (Tenn. 2008) . The State’s the ory at trial wa s that Griffin died c lose to midnight
on F ri da y , F e br ua ry 21 , 1 99 2, a ft e r l e avin g the ja il with De lli ng e r an d Sutto n a nd aro un d th e tim e g unshots were hear d in the are a whe re his body was found on Fe bruar

y 24, 1992. The jury ’s ver dict
c o n v i c t i n g D e l l i n g e r

an d S u t t o no f t h e mur d e r

i n d i c a t e s th a tth e j ur

y a c c r e d i t e d th e S t a t e ’ s th e o r y. Delling er’ s claim of ac tual innocenc e rests primarily on the expert testimony

of Dr. H askell and D r. Kessler at the post-convic tion hearingthat Griff in died later tha

n 3:30 p.m. on Saturday , Fe bruar y 22, 1992.

As sumin g , w ith out de c idi ng , th a t th e te sti mony of De lli ng e r’ s post- c on vic tio n e xpe rt s c on sti tut e s “ ne w s c ie nti fi c e vid e nc e ,” we wou ld c on c lud e that D e lli ng e r h a s f a ile d to c arr

y his9

burden of proof. The most compelling e vidence Delling er pr esente d was the te stimony of Dr. Ha sk e ll that th e ph oto g ra phs and re po rt s d o n ot i nd ic a te the pr e se nc e of ins e c t a c tiv ity . D r. B a ss stated, howe ver, that one of the photog raphs depicted a f ly next t o the body

as we ll as fly

eg g s on Gri ffi n’s head a

nd ne c k. He a lso e xpla ine d th a t f lie s a re no t a c tiv e in t e mpe ratur e s b e low fi ft y deg ree s, in the rain, or at night. In his opinion, t he temper ature s also explained t h e p re s en ce of undi ges t ed food in Griff

in’s stomach. F inally , contra ry to Dr. Ke ssler, Dr. B ass stated that fixed liv idi ty wa s p re se nt o n G ri ff

in’ s f a c e in t he ph oto g ra

ph s.

In s ho rt , w e a g re e wi th t

he State that th e po st- c on vic tio n tr ia l c ourt he ard the c la ssi c “ battl e of the e x perts” w ith reg ard to G riffin’s time of death. Delling er a rgues nonethe less that this Court shoul d af ford more weig ht to the testimony of Dr. H askell and D r. Ke ssler bec ause the y are more q u al i fi ed t han Dr . Ba ss to render an opinion on the time of death. I n denying D ellinge r re lief, ho we ve r, the po st- c onvict ion tr ia l c ourt

imp lic itl y

a c c re dit e d D r. B a ss’ s te sti mony . It is we ll established that appe llate cour ts do not reassess c redibil i ty deter minations. R.D.S . v. State, 245 S.W .3d 356 , 3 6 2 (Tenn. 2008) (“Q uestions surrounding the cr edibility of witnesses a

nd the ‘re solution of conflicts in the evidenc e are matters entrusted to the trial judg e as the trier of fac t.’”) (quoting State v. Odom, 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996) ).

Fur thermore , “‘[w]here there is any conflict between ex pert testim ony and the testim ony as to the fac ts, the jury

is not bound t o ac cept e x pert testimony in prefe renc e to other te stimony , and must determine the we ight a nd cre dibilit y

of ea ch in the lig ht of all the fa cts shown in the ca se.’” State v. Sparks, 891 S.W.2d 607, 616 (Tenn. 1995) (quoting Edwards v. State, 540 S.W .2d 541, 647 (Tenn. 1976) ). Jason McDonald and his mother, B renda McKe ehan, te stified that they hear d two g unshots at 11:55 p.m. on Friday , Fe bruar y 21, 1992, fired from the a rea wher e Gr iffin’s body

was discovere d. They

both stated that it wa s highly unusual to hear

g unshots at that time of night. Also,
no wi tne sse s te sti fi e d to havin g se e n o r h e ard fr om G ri ff

in a ft e r h e le ft the ja il a

nd be fo re 3:3 0 p .m. the ne xt day , th e e a

rl ie st t ime of de a th pr of

fe re d by De lli ng e r’ s e xpe rt s. I f Gri ff in w e re a liv e , it

is improbable that no one would have be en in contac t with him during that time, e specia lly considering that hi s h ome ha d b ur

ne d d ow n a

nd his fa mil y wa s lo ok ingfo r h im.

I ne ff e c tiv e As sis tanc e of

Couns e l

P r oo f atth e P os t- Co nvi c ti on H e ar ing

In support of his ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel claim, De llinger prese nted the testimony of his appointed trial c ounsel, Mr. Charle s Dea s and Mr. Eug ene D ix on.

Mr. Dea s and Mr. Dixon both beg an prac ticing la w in the mid-1970s. Delling er’ s case was the ir fi rs t c a pit a l murd e r c a se to g o to tr ia l a lth ou g h th e y ha d e a c h tr ie d n on -c a

pit a l murd e r c a se s. Both Mr. Deas a

nd Mr. Dixon were a

war e, howe ver, of

the heig htened standa

rds re quired of attorney s repr esentingcapital d efe ndants. In prepa ration for trial, they

attended por

tions of Delling er’ s Sevier County trial and a

death pe nalty

s em i n ar

. T hey

also worke d closely

with codefe ndant Sutt o n ’s at t o rney s. The attorne y s allocate d the re sponsibili ty for pr epar ation, with Mr.10

De a s ta kin g the “ mit ig a tio n p ha se ” and Mr . Dixon takin g the “ fa c tua l witn e sse s” duri ngthe g uil t phase.

Mr . D ixon t e sti fi e d th a t he con su lt ed wi th a fo re ns ic patho log ist , D r. Cle land B lake , a s a potential expert witness reg ardingthe time of Grif fin’s death. Dr. B lake’ s opinions, however, w ere not helpful to the defe nse. In fac t, the State unsucce ssfully attempted to call Dr. Blake as a n expert witness during its case- in-chief . The trial c ourt did not permit Dr. B lake’ s testimony beca use he ha d been r et ai n ed p reviously by the def ense. Mr . Dea s and Mr. Dixon inst ead obta ined the expert testimony of Dr. L arr

y Wolfe to establish that Griffin died late r than the State theorized. In ref ere nce to Dr. Wolfe’s testimony , Mr. Dea s stated, “We knew it was coming. We knew we had it. W e we re hoping, f actua lly speakingthat it would carr y the day .”

Tr ia l c ouns e l f

ile d a pr e -t ri a l mo tio n r equ esti ngtha t th e State pr ov ide the name s o f i ts rebuttal witnesse s. Dr. Ha rlan’s na me was not provided as a potential rebuttal witness, a nd Mr. Dea s and Mr. Dixon were surprised whe n the State called D r. Ha rlan to re but the testimony of Dr. Wolfe. Mr. Dea s could not rec all, howeve r, why neither he nor Mr. Dixon objected to the State’s lack of notice of D r. Har lan’s rebuttal testimony

. They did, how ever , object to the State’s introduc tion of opinion testimony on rebuttal. Mr. Dix on stated that he and Mr. Dea s discussed the unanticipated testimony but decided not to move f or a c ontinuance be cause Dr. Wolfe’s testim ony had alr eady discredited the State’s theory of the time of de ath.

Burden of

P roof

The Six th A mendment provides that “[i] n all criminal prose cutions, the ac cused sha ll enjoy the rig ht . . . to have the Assistanc e of Counsel for his defenc e.” U .S. Const . amend VI . The rig ht to effe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel is inherent i n t h is right. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1 98 0) . In Stri c kla

nd v. Was hin g ton , 4 66 U. S. 6 68 (1 98 4) , the Un ite d Stat e s Supr e me Cou rt se t f or th a two-pr ong test to prove inef fec tive assistance of counse l. The test require s the petitioner to prove both deficie nt perfor

mance of counse l and pre judi ce t o t h e def

ense. I d. at 687. Def

icient perf ormanc e re quires proof

that “counse l’s repr esentation fell belo w an objective standard of
rea sonablene ss,” id. at 687-88, de spite a “strongpresumption that counsel’s conduct falls withi n the wide ra ng e of r easona

ble profe ssional assistance,” id. at 689. P re j u d i ce re quires proof

of “a
rea sonable proba

bility that, but for counse l’s unprofe ssional error s, the re s u l t o f the proc eeding would have be en diffe rent.” I d. at 694. Delling er a

rgues that Tenne ssee p rocedural r ules, specif

ically Tenne ssee Code A nnotated section 40-30- 110(f) and Te nnessee Supreme Court Rule 28 s ec t ion 8(D)( 1), ar e contr ary to the require ments of Strickland and that the post-conviction trial cour t theref o re ap p l ied an incor

rec t burden of proof to his ineff

ective a s s i stance of counse l claims. Whether the post-convic tion trial court a pplied the cor

rec t burden of pro o f i s a q uestion of law that we revie w de novo with no presumption of cor

rec tness. Gre en, 101 S.W.3d at 418.

Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 4 0- 30 -1 10 (f ) ( 20 06 ) p ro vid e s th a t th e “ pe tit ion e r s ha ll have the burden of

provingthe alle

ga tio ns of f

ac t by c le ar a nd c on vin c inge vid e nc e .” (e mph a sisT e n n . C o d e A n n . § 4 0 -3 0 -2 1 0 (f) w a s re n u m b e re d a s T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 4 0 -3 0 -1 1 0 (f) in 2 0 0 3

. 8

11 added) . This inquiry

does not implicate the Strickland inquiry . Pursuant to section 40-30-110( f), the petitioner is re quired to prove the fact of counse l’s alleg ed er

ror by clea r and convincing evidenc e. I f that burde n of proof is met, the court then must assess unde r Strickland whe ther that
err or “f ell below an obje ctive stan d ar d o f re asonable ness,” Strickland, 466 U .S. at 687-88, and whether the er ror r aised “ a re asonable probability

. . . that the result of t he procee dings w ould have been dif fer ent,” id. at 694.

Whil e not identical to s ection 40-30-110(f) , Tenne ssee Supre me Court Rule 28 section 8( D) (1 ) pr ov ide s that the “ [p]e tit ion e r sha ll be re qu ir e d to pre se nt pe tit ion e r’ s ca se and to e sta bli sh the g rounds alleg ed and the entitlement to relief by c le ar and c on vin c ing e viden ce.” ( emph a sis added) . Delling er c ontend s t h at the post-convic tion trial court applied this standar d and ther eby applied an e rrone ous burden of proof to his claims of inef fec tive assistance of counse l. Dellinge r supports his contention by pointing to a sing le statement in the post-c onvictio n t rial cour t’s “F i n d i n gs o f F ac tan d

C o n cl u s i o n s o f Law ”: “[ t ] h e bu rd en i s o n th e pe t i t i o n er t o p ro v e bo thp ro n gs [of the Str ic kla

nd te st] b y c le ar a nd c on vin c inge vid e nc e . T e nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 30 -2 10 (f ); State v. Bur ns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999) .” Althoug h this statement is im prec ise, we a g ree with the State that the post-conviction trial c ourt did not misapply the law. First, the post-c onviction tr ial court’s direc t c itation to Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40 -3 0- 21 0( f) ind ic a tes th at it lim ite d it s a pp lic a tio n o f t

he c le ar a

nd c on vin c ingsta

nd ard to 8 alleg ations of fa ct in acc ordanc e with that statute. Moreover, in Fields v. State, 40 S.W .3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001) , we de termined that a n almost ide ntical misstatement of law wa s “one of imprecision in the use of [the Court of Cri minal Appeals’] languag e, as it [is] clea r fr om the opinion that the court a pplied the cor

rec t leg al standar d.” We rel i ed i n p art on the intermediate a ppellate c ourt’s
e arl ie r r e fe re nc e to t

he Str ic kla

nd sta nd ard . I d. a t 45 8 n .6 . Si mil arl y , in the c a se a t ba

r, the po stc onvic tio n tri a l court ’s “ F ind ing s o f F a c t and Con c lus ion s o f L aw” inc lud e s an e arl ie r r e fe re nc e to the c o r r e c t S tr ic k la

n d s ta n d ar d : “ D e ll in g e r

mu s t e s ta

b li s hth a t t

h e a dv ic e g iv e no r

th e s e r v ic es rende red w ere not within the rang e of c ompetence demande d of attorney s in criminal case s and that ‘there is a rea sonable proba bility that, but for c ounsel’s unprof essional er

rors, the r esult of the proce edingwould have be en diffe rent.’ Strickla nd, 466 U.S. at 693 (1984).” To provide ne eded c larity conce rning the burde n of proof in claims of i neff

ective a ssistance of c ouns e l and to av oid any a pp e ara nc e of inc on sis te nc y be tw e e n Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court Rul e 28 a nd Te nn e ss ee C od e An no tat ed s ect io n 4 0-3 0-1 10 (f), we co ncu rren tl y ame nd Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court Rule 28 section 8(D)( 1) to rea d as follows: “Petitioner shall be require d to pr esent pe titioner’s
case and to establish the fa ctual g rounds alleg ed by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e.”

Ana lys is

Our re view of D ellinge r’s inef fec tive assistance of counse l c laims, a mix ed question of law and fa ct, is de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss. Finch v. State, 226 S.W.3d 307, 315 (Tenn.12

2007). This Court is bound by the fa ct u al finding s of the post-convic tion trial court unless the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e is otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Va ug hn v. State, 202 S.W .3d 106, 115 (Tenn. 2006)

. Delling er f

irst argue s t h at h i s trial counsel wa s deficie nt in failing to obtain a qualified fore nsic patholog ist to t estify as to Griff

i n ’s time of death. The testimony of Mr. De as and Mr

. Dix on at the post-conviction hear ing indicates that both attorney s wer e aw are that Griff in’s time of death wa s a critica l issue. Mr. Dix on testified that he met a nd exchang ed cor

responde nce w ith a fore nsic patholog ist, Dr. Blake, as a potential expert witness. Dr. Blake’ s opinions, however, w ere not helpful to the defe nse.

I t was only

afte r consulting with a fore nsic patholog ist that trial counsel chose to utiliz e the expert testimony

of Dr. Wolfe, a medical doctor and former county corone r. Althoug h Dr. Wolfe
was not a boar d-ce rtified for ensic pathologist, he ha d experience in examini ng bodies and ha d g iven his opinion as to cause a nd time of d ea t h i n u p t o forty -five c ases. In ref ere nce to Dr . Wolfe’s t es t i m o n y , M r. De as s t at ed , “W e kn ew i twa s co m i n g. W e kn ew we h adi t

. W e we re h o p i n g, fac tually speakingthat it would car ry the day .” Dr. Wolfe did te stify , consistent with the theory of the def ense, that Griffin ha d been de ad no more than thirty -six hours when his body was found.

De ll in ger a ls o argue s th a t tr ia l c ouns e l w a s d e fi c ie nt i n f a ili ngto o bta in a

no the r e xpe rt

to rebut the State’s expert, Dr. Ha rlan. The State did not provide Mr. De as and Mr . Dix on with notice that Dr. Ha

rlan would be calle d t o testify on rebuttal. Althoug h Mr. Dea s and Mr. Dixon did not object to Dr

. Harlan’s testimony on this ground, the y

did object to permitting the State to offer opinion evidence on rebuttal. The State responde d by re m i n d i n g the cour t that the State had prese nted a witness e arlier , presumably Dr. B lake, but t h at d efe nse counse l’s objection pre vented Dr

. Bl ak e f

ro mt es t i fy i n g.

Mr. Dix on testified that he and Mr. Dea s decide d not to move for a c ontinuance be cause they felt that Dr. Wolfe’ s testimony had dis cr ed i t ed t h e State’s time of de ath theory . On a c laim of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e , “th e pe tit ion e r is not entit le d to the be ne fi t of hin ds ig ht, may no t se c on d- g ue ss a re asonably

based tria l strateg y , and ca nnot criticize a sound, but unsucce ssful, tactica l decision
ma de duri ngthe c ours e of the pr oc e e din g s. ” Th omp so n v . St a te , 9 58 S.W. 2d 15 6, 16 2 ( Te nn . Cr im. App. 1997) (c iting Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 347 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)).

Fur thermore , Delling er ha s no t p ro v en a rea sonable proba bility that the re sult of his trial would have been differ ent if the testimony of Dr. Haske ll a nd Dr. Kessler had bee n prese nted during his origina l trial. First, both experts’ testimony was rebutted by Dr. B ass. Second, ne ither expert’s testimony undermines the te st i m o n y of Jason McDonald and B renda McKe ehan, which the jury i mp l i c i t l y a c c r e d i t e d

. B o th w i tn e s s e s t e s t i f i e d th a t th e y h e ar d tw o g un s h o t s a t 1 1 : 5 5 p

. m

. o nF r i d ay, F e br ua ry 21 , 1 99 2, fi re d f

ro m th e are a whe re Gri ffin’ s b od y wa s d isc ov e re d. As we pr e vio us ly state d, “ the jur

y is not bo un d to ac c e pt expe rt te sti mony in pr e fe re nc e to oth e r te sti mony , a nd mus t de te rm ine the we ig ht a

nd c re dib ili ty

of e a c h in the lig ht o f al l the fa c ts sho wn in t he c a se .’ ” Spa

rk s, 891 S.W .2d at 616 (quotingEdwar ds, 540 S.W .2d at 647).13 Conclusion

We conclude that a freesta nding claim of actual innocenc e based on new sc ientific evide nce is cog nizable in an initial petiti on for post-c onviction relief un der the Tenne ssee Post-Conviction Pr o c e d ur e A c t. T h e r e f

o r e , w e r e v e r s e th e Co urt o f Cr im in a l A

p p e a ls ’ d is p o s it io no f

th a t i s s u e

. We
a ff ir m th e Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls’ de nia l of re lie f, ho we ve r, be c a us e De lli ng e r h a s n ot m e t hi s burden of pro of to supp or t su c h c la im. We a lso ho ld t hat D e lli ng e r i s n ot e nti tle d to re lie f o n h is cl aims of ineff

ective a ssistance of c ounsel or his claim that the post-c onviction trial court applied
an er roneous bur den of pr oof to his ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel claims. F i n al l y , we c on c ur re ntl y ame nd Te nn e sse e Sup re me Co urt Ru le 28 se c tio n 8 (D )( 1) to r e a d a s f oll ow s: “Petitioner shall be r equire d to prese nt petitioner’s case and to establish the fa ctual g rounds alleg ed by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e.” The Court of Criminal Appea ls properly deter m i n ed all of the re maining issues r aised by Delling er. Spec ifically , the intermediate appe llate cour t applied the appr opriate standa rd of r eview
and he ld t hat: ( 1) De lli ng e r w a s n ot e nti tle d to re lie f o n h is c la im und e r B ra dy v. Mary land , 3 73 U. S. 83 (1963); (2) Delling er w as af forde d a full and fair hear ing of his post-conviction petit ion; and (3) none of D ellinge r’s c onstitut ional challeng es to the death penalty wer e meritorious. Delling er, 2007 WL24 28 04 9, *1 9-4 3. We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls w ithre sp e c t to
e a c h o f t he se iss ue s. Delling er’ s sentence of death shall be carrie d out on J une 3, 2009, unless other wise orde red b y th i s C o urt o r o th e r p r o p e r a u th o r i ty

. I t a

p p e ar i n g th a t D e l l i n g e r i s i n d i g e n t , th e c o s ts o f t his appea l are taxed to the St ate of Tenne ssee.

JANI CE M . H OL DE R, C HI EF JUSTI CE