J-S61027-14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

ROBERTO WALKER FRANKS 

 Appellant No. 515 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of January 30, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County 

Criminal Division at No.: CP-26-CR-0000504-2013 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., WECHT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2014

 Roberto Walker Franks appeals from the judgment of sentence entered 

on January 30, 2014, following a jury trial and conviction of manufacture, 

delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled 

substance (“PWID”); knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled 

substance; use of, or possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia; and 

tampering with or fabricating evidence.1 We affirm. 

 The trial court set forth the following recitation of the facts: 

On October 18, 2012, at approximately 3:00 o’clock p.m., Jason 

A. Cox, Chief of the Uniontown City Police Department (“UCPD”), 

observed [Franks] near the intersection of Morgantown Street 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

1

 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (16), and (32), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

4910(1), respectively. 
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and Robinson Street, in Uniontown, Fayette County. [Franks] 

was leaving a hair salon known to the UCPD as a possible haven 

for drug-related activity. Chief Cox pulled his marked Ford 

Expedition alongside [Franks], to ask him a few questions. 

While speaking with [Franks], Chief Cox noticed that [Franks] 

seemed nervous and evasive. [Franks] also would not make eye 

contact and his hands were fidgeting near his waist. 

Chief Cox decided to radio for backup, and exited his vehicle to 

continue speaking with [Franks]. A short time later, Officer 

Jamie Holland, also of the UCPD, arrived on the scene. 

Officer Holland immediately noticed [Franks] removing his hand 

from his pocket and making a throwing motion behind his back. 

This caused Officer Holland to move quickly in that direction, 

directly behind [Franks], to an area with some shrubbery, where 

he retrieved a tied-off corner piece of a plastic sandwich bag, 

with a white substance inside. That substance was later 

confirmed to be 2.8 grams of cocaine. 

[Franks] was placed under arrest and searched at that time. 

The search revealed $300.00 in cash, a digital scale, and a 

plastic sandwich baggie with one of the bottom corners missing. 

Officer Holland was also recognized by the [c]ourt as an expert 

in the field of narcotics investigation. He provided additional 

expert testimony concerning the indicia of [Franks’] intent to 

deliver the cocaine to another person. In particular: (1) the 

scale seized from [Franks] was capable of measuring minute 

weights, down to one-tenth of a gram, which is the 

measurement system typically used in the sale of cocaine; (2) 

the plastic sandwich bag, with one missing corner, is a half-used 

version of what police often refer to as a “diaper,” which is the 

byproduct of the packaging of cocaine for distribution; (3) the 

amount of cocaine is of a size typically purchased and broken 

down to sell for a profit; and (4) Officer Holland had never seen 

a mere user of drugs in possession of $300, a digital scale, that 

quantity of cocaine, and a baggie with a corner missing. It was 

thus his expert opinion that these items indicated [Franks’] 

intention to distribute the cocaine. 

On cross-examination, Officer Holland stated that [Franks] had 

admitted purchasing the cocaine for his own use, but not to any 

intention of selling the same. Instead, [Franks] claimed to have 

just purchased the cocaine at the nearby hair salon. This was 
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the same salon the UCPD and others suspected of being a 

distribution area for cocaine. 

[Franks] also testified. His recitation of the facts was nearly 

identical to that presented by the Commonwealth. Importantly, 

he did not challenge his possession of the cocaine, his attempt to 

discard it, or that he owned the drug paraphernalia, the scale. 

Rather, the thrust of his testimony was to undermine the 

Commonwealth’s evidence of his intent to deliver the cocaine to 

another person. 

[Franks] explained the amount of money he was carrying by 

stating that he was working two jobs, at or in excess of sixty 

hours per week, as a cook in the South Side of Pittsburgh and a 

recycler at a local waste facility. Likewise, [Franks] explained 

that he normally used the scale to weigh spices at his job in 

Pittsburgh, but had started taking it to buy drugs at the hair 

salon to ensure he was not being cheated. 

As to the baggie corner, [Franks] indicated that was his 

preferred method of transporting cocaine for personal use. 

[Franks] also explained his rationale for buying more than a 

minimal quantity. He explained that, when a user purchases 

three grams of cocaine, they “usually get one free.” [Franks] 

elaborated, “That’s the way it is, the way it’s been since I been 

dealing, like, getting it.” . . . 

On cross-examination, [Franks] restated that his employer 

provided the scale, but avoided the question of documentation or 

other evidence to substantiate that claim. He also provided 

testimony in contradiction with Officer Holland. While Officer 

Holland noted that drug dealers would normally use both corners 

of a plastic baggie before discarding it, [Franks] asserted that 

the drug dealer he purchased from gave him the entire baggie. 

[Franks] could not explain why he retained the baggie instead of 

throwing it away after knotting off the corner. 

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 5/16/2014, at 2-5 (record citations omitted). 

 A jury convicted Franks of the above-mentioned counts on January 8, 

2014, and on January 21, 2014, the court sentenced him to not less than 

eighteen months nor more than four years’ incarceration. Franks filed post-
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sentence motions on January 31, 2014, which the trial court denied on 

February 24, 2014. On March 5, 2014, Franks timely appealed to this Court, 

and on the same day, filed a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court entered an opinion 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on May 16, 2014. 

 Franks raises the following three questions for our review: 

1. Did the Commonwealth fail[] to prove beyond[ a] 

reasonable doubt that [Franks] possessed the controlled 

substance with the intent to deliver [it] to another party? 

2. Was there insufficient evidence proffered by the

Commonwealth for the jury to [find] that [Franks] possessed the 

controlled substance with the intent to deliver [it] to another 

party? 

3. Was there insufficient evidence presented by the

Commonwealth to support the charge of possession of a 

controlled substance with the intent to deliver [it] to another 

party? 

Franks’ Brief at 7. In his argument, Franks combines these issues into a 

single challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s 

finding that he possessed the cocaine specifically with the intent to deliver. 

Id. at 8-18. He claims that the testimony was “unreliable and contradictory” 

and that “[s]imply because the police use one of their own as an expert and 

to articulate the ‘buzz words’ for each case does not give rise to intent.” Id.

at 17, 18. We disagree. 

When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, our standard of 

review is as follows: 
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We must determine whether, viewing all the evidence at trial, as 

well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury could have 

found that each element of the offense was proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Both direct and circumstantial evidence can 

be considered equally when assessing the sufficiency of the 

evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Bull, 618 A.2d 1019, 1020 (Pa. Super. 1993) (quotation 

omitted). 

In order to prove the offense of possession with intent to deliver 

a controlled substance, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt both that the defendant possessed the 

controlled substance and had the intent to deliver. When 

determining whether a defendant had the requisite intent to 

deliver, relevant factors for consideration are the manner in 

which the controlled substance was packaged, the behavior of 

the defendant, the presence of drug paraphernalia, and large 

sums of cash. Expert opinion testimony is also admissible 

concerning whether the facts surrounding the possession of 

controlled substances are consistent with an intent to deliver 

rather than with an intent to possess it for personal use. The 

expert testimony of a witness qualified in the field of drug 

distribution, coupled with the presence of drug paraphernalia, is 

sufficient to establish intent to deliver. 

Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 955 A.2d 411, 414 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the quantity of drugs and the presence of packing materials 

and paraphernalia, in addition to the expert testimony of Officer Holland, 

which the jury found credible, established intent to deliver beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 
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At trial, Officer Holland, an officer with eight years on the force and a 

member of the Fayette County Drug Task Force, was admitted without 

objection as an expert in the field of narcotics investigation. N.T. Trial, 

1/06/2014, at 27. 

Officer Holland testified that Franks possessed the cocaine with intent 

to deliver because Officer Holland watched Franks discard a baggie that 

contained 2.8 grams of cocaine, and Franks possessed a digital scale, 

$300.00 in cash, and a clear plastic baggie with one of the corners missing. 

Id. at 31-32, 36, 39. Officer Holland testified that the digital scale was 

capable of measuring to one tenth of a gram, a unit of measurement used to 

distribute drugs, and that such a scale would typically be found with 

someone who is packaging narcotics. Id. at 36, 41. He further testified that 

2.8 grams of powder cocaine, such as Franks was seen to discard, was worth 

approximately $300.00 in the Uniontown area. Id. at 40. Although he 

noted that some users do buy in bulk, they usually possess less than a 

gram, and he had never seen a user who had “$300.00 worth of cocaine on 

his person, a digital scale, and a baggie with a corner missing.” Id. at 43. 

Furthermore, Officer Holland stated that street dealers typically package 

drugs for sale by placing them in a corner of a plastic baggie and tying it off, 

and that he would expect the dealer to remain in possession of the baggie, 

whereas a user would only possess the corner. Id. at 38-39, 41-42. 

In Bull, supra, we also found the evidence sufficient to constitute 

intent to deliver. There, the defendant had packaging materials, such as 
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plastic bags, and the expert witness, qualified in the field of drug distribution 

and investigation, stated that the amount possessed by the defendant was 

more than an individual user would have. Bull, 618 A.2d at 1021. Here, 

similarly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the 

PWID conviction where “[t]he testimony and the drug paraphernalia taken 

together established intent to deliver.” Carpenter, 955 A.2d at 415. 

Franks’ argument that the Commonwealth failed to prove intent to deliver 

lacks merit.2

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 11/14/2014 

____________________________________________ 

2

 To the extent that Franks makes a passing reference to “unreliable and 

contradictory” testimony, Franks’ Brief at 17, we observe that this claim is 

waived for failure to identify the alleged contradictory witness testimony. 

Id. at 17-18. Even if he had developed this claim, we would deem it an 

unpreserved challenge to the weight of the evidence; moreover, “[t]his 

Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the jury on issues of 

credibility.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 71 A.3d 1009, 1014 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (citation omitted). Thus, it would not merit relief.