Note: Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal. 

ENTRY ORDER 

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2011-325 

MARCH TERM, 2012 

Tara (Carter) Trappaso } APPEALED FROM: 

} 

} Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, 

 v. } Family Division 

} 

} 

Jamie Carter } DOCKET NO. 469-5-08 Cndm 

 

 Trial Judge: Linda Levitt 

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter: 

Father appeals a decision of the superior court, family division, denying his motion to 

modify parental rights and responsibilities. We affirm. 

The parties were married in June 2005 and divorced in December 2008. They have two 

children born in January 2006 and June 2007. Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the 2008 final 

divorce order provided that the parties would share equally legal and physical parental rights and 

responsibilities. In April 2011, father filed a motion to modify in which he asked the court to 

award him primary physical parental rights and responsibilities so that he could take the children 

with him when he relocated out of state for work after finishing his doctorate degree. Mother 

opposed the motion, and a hearing was held on July 27, 2011. Before the hearing, the parties 

agreed to continue to share legal parental rights and responsibilities, leaving for the court to 

determine with whom the children would principally reside. In an August 10 decision, the court 

denied father’s request to allow him to relocate to Massachusetts with the children. The court 

stated that father’s impending relocation satisfied the threshold showing of a real, substantial, 

and unanticipated change of circumstances because the parties would no longer be able to share 

equally physical parental rights and responsibilities; however, the court concluded that it was in 

the children’s best interests for them to remain in Vermont because of their close ties to the 

community and their strong relationships with their extended family living there. 

Father appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering all of 

the relevant factors contained in 15 V.S.A. § 665(b), by not adequately explaining its decision, 

and by making erroneous findings. Upon review of the record, we find no error. 

Father first argues that the trial court gave no indication in its decision that it considered 

each of the criteria contained in § 665(b). Father points in particular to criterion (6), “the quality 

of the child’s relationship with the primary care provider.” According to father, the evidence at 

the final hearing demonstrated that he had at least six percent more time with the children over 

the approximately three years since the parties’ divorce and that mother’s time was even further 

reduced by daycare and visits with relatives. Father contends that, without a discussion of all of 

the relevant criteria, it is impossible to know how the court arrived at its decision. 
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Before addressing these arguments, we recognize that the trial court’s decision is only 

two pages long and does not contain separately numbered findings and conclusions. Neither 

party requested findings or submitted proposed findings, so the court was not compelled to 

produce them. See Viskup v. Viskup, 149 Vt. 89, 92 (1987) (“[T]he trial court is not required to 

make findings of fact and conclusions of law when none are requested.”). When the court makes 

findings on its own initiative, however, they must still be adequate for us to determine how the 

court reached its decision. Maurer v. Maurer, 2005 VT 26, ¶ 12, 178 Vt. 489 (mem.). 

Upon a showing of substantially changed circumstances, the family court may modify a 

previous order concerning parental rights and responsibilities if it is in the children’s best 

interests. 15 V.S.A. § 668. “[T]he family court enjoys broad discretion in determining the best 

interests of the child in deciding a motion to modify parental rights and responsibilities.” Sochin 

v. Sochin, 2005 VT 36, ¶ 13, 178 Vt. 535 (mem.). In making a such a determination, the court 

must “consider” the nine factors contained in § 665(b), but that provision “imposes no specific 

requirement on how this consideration is to be manifested in the court’s findings and 

conclusions.” Id. ¶ 6 (quotation omitted). 

Here, the court found that: (1) both parents remained cordial, flexible, and dedicated to 

the well-being of their children following their divorce; (2) they have adjusted their schedules to 

accommodate each other’s employment, vacations, and family get-togethers; (3) the children 

have thrived with the shared parenting custody arrangement; (4) neither parent was the primary 

parent, but rather they shared and cooperated in the parenting of their children; (5) both parents 

are loving, sensitive and capable of providing for all of their children’s physical and emotional 

needs both presently and in the future; (6) both parents will facilitate the children’s continued 

contact and close relationship with the other parent; (7) one of the children is allergic to dog 

dander, but mother, who has had a dog in her home for ten years, tries to minimize the child’s 

contact with the dog, and the child’s allergy is largely controlled by medication; (8) the children 

engage in many activities in their communities, including dance and sports; (9) they are close to 

aunts, uncles, and cousins, who live nearby; (10) they are particularly close to their maternal 

grandparents, who visit the children close to twice a week; (11) the maternal grandparents help 

transport the children to their activities, go on field trips with them, and have the children over 

frequently for sleepovers; and (12) the children are also are very close with their paternal 

grandparents, who live in Vermont and with whom they visit at least once per month. 

These findings address each of the factors contained in § 665(b), albeit briefly. The 

bottom line is that the court found both parents to be equally capable of caring for the children, 

but the deciding factor for the court was the benefit of maintaining the children’s relationships 

with family members and others in the community. The basis for the court’s decision is plainly 

stated therein; we are not left to wonder how the court arrived at its decision. Thus, the case is 

distinguishable from Maurer, where we reversed and remanded a custody transfer decision 

because the trial court explained that one of the parents had to be responsible for decisions due to 

the parties’ failure to communicate, but failed to explain why that parent should be the mother. 

Father himself acknowledges that the trial court appears to have found most of the criteria 

to favor neither party. Although he asserts that there was ample evidence and testimony to 

permit favoring one party over another, for the most part he fails to specify how certain criteria 

favored him. One exception is his contention that the court should have found him to be the 

primary care provider because he actually spent a higher percentage of time with the children 

than mother did. 
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We find no merit to this argument. The final divorce order incorporated the parties’ 

agreement that the parties share legal and physical parental rights and responsibilities equally. In 

his motion to modify, father stated that the parties had “followed the terms of the Final Order 

regarding the schedule with our children” and that during their separation and divorce they “also 

shared equally the physical parental rights and responsibilities of the children.” Father did not 

contend at trial that he was the children’s primary care provider, but rather argues for the first 

time on appeal that he was, citing his trial testimony indicating that he cared for the girls six 

percent of the time more than mother over the course of the previous three years since the 

parties’ separation. Assuming this fact is true, it does not demonstrate that father was the 

primary care provider or that the court erred in finding that neither party was the primary care 

provider. Indeed, the record demonstrates that the parties followed their agreement to share 

equally in the care of their children. 

Father also challenges the court’s finding that mother tries to minimize contact between 

her dog and the parties’ allergic child. At the same time, father acknowledges mother’s 

testimony that she keeps the dog away from the child as much as possible and has taken other 

measures, such as using hypoallergenic bedding and air filters, to minimize the child’s reaction. 

The court’s finding is not clearly erroneous. See Sochin, 2005 VT 36, ¶ 4 (“We will disturb the 

family court’s findings of fact only if, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party and excluding the effect of modifying evidence, there is no credible evidence to 

support the findings.” (quotation omitted)). 

Father further contends that the trial court cut off testimony on the dog dander issue. In 

father’s view, the court’s finding that the child’s symptoms are largely controlled by medication 

is “nothing short of sanctioning abuse as long as one controls the resulting symptoms.” He states 

his belief that the presiding judge has dogs and that her emotional attachment to them colored her 

consideration of the issue in this case. We find no basis to disturb the court’s decision. Father 

himself testified that the child’s allergy was “generally relatively well-controlled,” as the court 

found. Father also testified that he had never talked alone to mother about the dog or suggested 

that she remove the dog from her home after the parties consulted with an allergist. There is no 

evidence in the transcript that the situation here rises to the level of abuse or that the court was 

prejudiced in favor of mother on this point. 

Finally, father contends that mother presented misleading testimony by informing the 

court that she was healthy, when in fact she was pregnant with her fourth child. The fact that 

mother may have been pregnant does not suggest that she was not healthy or that she misled the 

court by testifying she was healthy. 

Affirmed. 

 
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BY THE COURT: 

_______________________________________ 

Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice 

_______________________________________ 

John A. Dooley, Associate Justice 

_______________________________________ 

 Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice