IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 08–1628

Filed August 13, 2010

ANDOVER VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT

and TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellees,

vs.

GRINNELL MUTUAL REINSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellant.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Eliza J. 

Ovrom, Judge.

Workers’ compensation insurer for volunteer fire department 

appeals district court decision reversing ruling by workers’ compensation 

commissioner finding a volunteer firefighter died in the course of his 

employment both as volunteer firefighter and as farmhand. DISTRICT 

COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH 

INSTRUCTIONS. 

Charles A. Blades of Scheldrup, Blades, Schrock, Smith, and 

Aranza, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Aaron T. Oliver of Hansen, McClintock & Riley, Des Moines, for 

appellees.
2

CADY, Justice.

Justin Faur died attempting to save the life of another person. He 

was twenty-three years old. His heroic efforts denied him a full life, but 

left behind the true measure of his abundant character. These efforts 

are documented in this opinion because they serve as the backdrop to a 

legal dispute over the interpretation of Iowa Code section 85.61(7)(a) 

(2009).1

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

 We resolve the dispute by affirming the decision of the district 

court. 

Justin Faur died ten days after he sustained an anoxic brain

injury from the inhalation of methane gas. He was employed by Johnson 

Valley Beef, a farm corporation owned by Dwight Johnson and located in 

rural Andover. Justin worked as a farmhand on the farm. The farm 

operation consisted of raising crops and livestock, including

approximately 1200 head of cattle. Justin was a dependable and reliable 

worker and maintained a close relationship with Dwight and his wife, 

Sherril. 

Justin was also a volunteer firefighter for the Andover Volunteer 

Fire Department. As a volunteer firefighter, Justin wore a pager issued 

by the volunteer department. The pager allowed him to be notified when 

his services as a volunteer firefighter were needed. Each volunteer 

firefighter normally had the responsibility to promptly report to duty 

when paged.

 1Although the compensable event in this case occurred in 2005, we will refer to 

the 2009 Code unless otherwise noted for ease of reference to the applicable language at 

issue. Iowa Code section 85.61(7) did not separate the text into subsections until 2008. 

See 2008 Iowa Acts ch. 1031, § 91 (codified at Iowa Code § 85.61(7) (2009)). The 

content of section 85.61(7) remained otherwise unchanged by the amendment. 
3

The pager system was tied to the county 911 emergency system. 

The volunteer fire department was part of the enhanced 911 emergency 

services system in the county. All emergency calls from the public were 

directed to the communication center in Clinton, and a dispatcher at the 

center would notify the appropriate emergency responder. When a call 

required the services of the fire department, the dispatcher would send a 

page to the volunteer firefighters. Some volunteer firefighters carried 

their uniform and equipment in their vehicles and could proceed directly 

to the scene of the emergency in response to a page. Other volunteer 

firefighters kept their uniform and equipment at the fire station and 

would first proceed to the station in response to a page before going to 

the scene of the emergency. Justin kept his uniform and equipment at 

the station. 

On April 16, 2005, Justin and Dwight spent most of the day 

cleaning a manure pit under a cattle confinement barn on the farm. 

After draining and washing the pit, Dwight apparently climbed into the 

manure pit to retrieve a chain that had dropped and was overcome by 

methane fumes. Methane gas inhibits the ability of a person to breathe 

when inhaled into the lungs, and the effects can be immediate and 

dramatic. In addition to its natural state, it is produced by the 

fermentation of organic matter such as manure. Methane gas produced 

by manure can be highly toxic in a closed environment, especially when 

the manure is wet. 

Justin ran to the farmhouse, approximately 150 yards from the 

barn. He told Sherril that Dwight had fallen into the pit and to call 911. 

Justin promptly returned to the barn and apparently attempted to 

remove Dwight from the pit on his own. There were no witnesses, 

however, to the event. Justin was found a few minutes later lying face 
4

down in the pit near Dwight. Like Dwight, he had been overcome by 

methane gas. The gas rendered Justin unconscious and unresponsive. 

The men were removed from the pit after rescue personnel arrived, 

which included members of the Andover Volunteer Fire Department. The 

Andover volunteer firefighters were paged one minute and eight seconds 

after the law enforcement center received the 911 call from Sherril. It is 

unknown if the page was sent to the volunteer firefighters before Justin 

was overcome by methane gas. 

Dwight died four days after the incident. Justin died in the 

hospital ten days later. He never regained consciousness. He 

posthumously received a national award for his heroic actions from the 

Carnegie Foundation. 

The workers’ compensation carrier for Johnson Valley Beef, 

Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance (Grinnell), paid the workers’ compensation 

benefits for Justin’s injuries and death. Grinnell then sought 

contribution or indemnity from the workers’ compensation carrier for the 

Andover Volunteer Fire Department, Travelers Insurance Company 

(Travelers). Grinnell claimed Justin was acting as a volunteer firefighter 

at the time of his death because he had been “summoned to duty as a 

volunteer fire fighter” in accordance with Iowa Code section 85.61(7)(a)

once he witnessed that Dwight had fallen unconscious into the manure

pit.

A deputy workers’ compensation commissioner determined 

Justin’s death arose out of and in the course of his employment with 

both Johnson Valley Beef and the Andover Volunteer Fire Department. 

In reaching this decision, the deputy concluded a volunteer firefighter is

not in the course of employment for purposes of Iowa Code section 

85.61(7)(a) until summoned by a third party. However, he determined 
5

Justin was summoned to duty by the dispatcher either before or after he 

was overcome by the methane gas. In any event, the deputy determined 

the summons preceded his death, which meant that some of the injuries 

he sustained that led to his death occurred in the course of employment 

as a volunteer firefighter. As a result, the deputy found Travelers was 

responsible for one-half of the workers’ compensation benefits payable as 

the result of Justin’s injuries and death. 

Travelers appealed.2

For by acting immediately the firefighter would 

jeopardize the firefighter’s or any dependent’s entitlement to 

workers’ compensation benefits if the firefighter were injured 

while so acting. Given that result from immediate action, 

the rational volunteer firefighter would call 911 and then 

wait to receive a summons from the appropriate entity before 

initiating actions consistent with a firefighter’s duties to the 

general public. Certainly, in situations of imminent peril 

minutes and seconds do matter. A volunteer firefighter’s 

failure to act immediately could well increase the peril to the 

public or decrease the possibility of averting disaster. 

Common sense compels the conclusion that the legislature 

did not intend such absurd results. 

 The workers’ compensation commissioner 

affirmed the decision of the deputy, but on different grounds. The 

commissioner concluded the timing of the page was not critical to the 

determination of coverage under section 85.61(7)(a) because Justin had 

been summoned to duty as a volunteer firefighter by the circumstances 

themselves. The commissioner determined that the failure to allow 

volunteer firefighters to call themselves to duty after witnessing an 

emergency situation would have the absurd result of deterring them from 

immediately rendering assistance upon encountering an emergency. The 

commissioner stated: 

 2Grinnell also cross-appealed, claiming Justin acted solely in his capacity as a 

volunteer firefighter at the time of his injury. Grinnell abandoned the claim on appeal.
6

The commissioner determined a volunteer firefighter is summoned to 

duty when “a reasonable firefighter faced with the circumstances 

presented would have felt called upon to act in a manner consistent with 

the duties a voluntary firefighter assumes as regards the general public.” 

Travelers sought judicial review. The district court rejected the 

ruling of the commissioner. It concluded a volunteer firefighter cannot 

be summoned to duty by circumstances, but can only be summoned by 

the fire department or some other official channel. It concluded that 

Justin could only be summoned in this case by a page from the 

emergency communication center. It remanded the case to the workers’ 

compensation commissioner for further proceedings under the correct 

legal standard. Grinnell appealed. 

II. Scope of Review. 

The standards of chapter 17A are applied to determine whether the 

conclusions we reach are the same as those of the district court. 

Mycogen Seeds v. Sands, 686 N.W.2d 457, 464 (Iowa 2004). If the 

conclusions are the same, we affirm. Id. Otherwise, we reverse. Id. Our 

review of agency decisions begins with proper direction from Iowa Code 

chapter 17A. Renda v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 784 N.W.2d 8, 10 (Iowa 

2010). Ordinarily, “the interpretation of a statute is a pure question of 

law over which agencies are not delegated any special powers by the 

General Assembly . . . .” Arthur E. Bonfield, Amendments to Iowa 

Administrative Procedure Act, Report on Selected Provisions to Iowa State 

Bar Association and Iowa State Government 62 (1998). However, we 

recently clarified that we defer to the agency’s interpretations of statutes 

when the legislature has clearly vested the agency with the proper 

authority to do so based on the agency’s expertise on the subject matter. 

Renda, 784 N.W.2d at 11. We do not focus our inquiry on whether the 
7

agency does or does not have the broad authority to interpret the act as a 

whole. Id. at 10. Instead, when determining whether the legislature has 

clearly vested the agency with authority to interpret, “each case requires 

a careful look at the specific language the agency has interpreted as well 

as the specific duties and authority given to the agency with respect to 

enforcing particular statutes.” Id. at 13.3

In the absence of an explicit grant of authority to interpret in the 

agency’s enabling statute, we turn to other indications that the

interpretation of the applicable law has been clearly vested with the 

agency. In this case, we are unable to find any indication the legislature 

intended to grant the workers’ compensation commissioner the authority 

 If we find the legislature has 

clearly vested the agency with interpretive authority for the phrase under 

consideration, we reverse only if the interpretation is “irrational, illogical, 

or wholly unjustifiable.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10(l). On the other hand, if 

we do not find that the legislature has clearly granted the agency 

authority to interpret, we do not defer to the agency’s interpretation. Id.

§ 17A.19(11)(b). We will reverse if we find the agency’s decision was 

“[b]ased upon an erroneous interpretation of a provision of law.” Id.

§ 17A.19(10)(c).

 3Our prior cases have appeared to treat the workers’ compensation 

commissioner differently. In Mycogen Seeds, we held the legislature had not delegated 

special authority to interpret any statute to the workers’ compensation commissioner. 

686 N.W.2d at 464. The same year, we made a similar statement broadly excepting the 

commissioner from any case-by-case approach to deference. P.D.S.I. v. Peterson, 685 

N.W.2d 627, 633 (Iowa 2004) (“We see nothing in the workers’ compensation statutes 

that convinces us that the legislature has delegated any special powers to the agency 

regarding its interpretation of . . . statutes.”). Most recently, we explicitly disavowed the 

case-specific analysis for the workers’ compensation commissioner’s interpretation of 

any workers’ compensation statutes. Rojas v. Pine Ridge Farms, L.L.C., 779 N.W.2d 

223, 231 (Iowa 2010) (“It is well-settled law that the legislature did not clearly vest the 

workers’ compensation commissioner with the power to interpret the workers’ 

compensation statutes.”). In accordance with our clarification of the appropriate 

analysis for all agency discretion decisions in Renda, we will examine the workers’ 

compensation commissioner’s interpretations on a case-by-case basis.
8

to interpret the phrase “summoned to duty.” Generally, “summoned to 

duty” is not a phrase “uniquely within the subject matter expertise of the 

agency.” Renda, 784 N.W.2d at 13. In fact, in interpreting “summoned 

to duty,” the commissioner relied on social policy reasons rather than 

special subject matter expertise to conclude a volunteer firefighter may 

summon himself or herself to duty when an emergency arises. Moreover, 

the phrase has a broad range of meanings that touches several areas of 

the law, which makes it unlikely the legislature intended to authorize the 

commissioner to interpret the phrase by granting the commissioner 

general rule-making and enforcement powers. See Iowa Code § 86.8(1)

(establishing the commissioner’s duty to “[a]dopt and enforce rules 

necessary to implement” workers’ compensation laws). Finally, we can 

find no other feature of the statute that reveals a clear intent to vest 

authority with the commissioner. Accordingly, we do not give deference 

to the commissioner’s interpretation of the statute in this case, Iowa 

Code § 17A.19(11)(b), and we will reverse or otherwise grant relief from 

the agency action if the rights of the appellant have been prejudiced 

because of an erroneous interpretation of the statute, id. § 17A.19(10)(c).

III. Statutory Interpretation. 

The resolution of this case requires us to interpret Iowa Code 

section 85.61(7)(a). The statute provides: 

Personal injuries sustained by a volunteer fire fighter arise in 

the course of employment if the injuries are sustained at any 

time from the time the volunteer fire fighter is summoned to 

duty as a volunteer fire fighter until the time the volunteer 

fire fighter is discharged from duty by the chief of the 

volunteer fire department or the chief's designee. 

Iowa Code § 85.61(7)(a). 

Grinnell claims a volunteer firefighter can be “summoned to duty” 

as a volunteer firefighter by circumstances. Travelers asserts a volunteer 
9

firefighter can only be “summoned to duty” under the statute by a means 

or method approved by the fire chief to call a volunteer firefighter to duty, 

which in this case would have been an audible page. 

We begin our resolution of this case with a firm understanding of 

our task. It is only to determine the intent of the legislature. In re Det. of 

Shaffer, 769 N.W.2d 169, 173 (Iowa 2009). Fundamentally, this task is 

tied to the separation-of-powers doctrine, as well as two important 

underlying principles that the legislature makes the law and courts 

interpret the law. Courts are given the role to interpret statutes enacted 

by the legislature because even the most carefully drafted law can never 

eliminate all uncertainty when applied to future unanticipated 

circumstances. Teamsters Local Union No. 421 v. City of Dubuque, 706 

N.W.2d 709, 713 (Iowa 2005). Uncertainty is inherent in statutes largely 

because it is inherent in the English language itself.4

The first task for courts in interpreting statutes is to identify the 

presence of an ambiguity. Larson Mfg. Co. v. Thorson, 763 N.W.2d 842, 

859 (Iowa 2009). Of course, if no ambiguity exists, the statute is

 See Ronald Benton 

Brown & Sharon Jacobs Brown, Statutory Interpretation: The Search for 

Legislative Intent 2 (2002) (noting statutory language is often unclear 

“because the English language by its very nature . . . is an inherent 

breeding ground for ambiguity”). Thus, courts resolve uncertainties in 

the application of statutes, but only in a way that captures the will of the 

legislature. 

 4A major reason effective communication can be difficult is because a single 

word frequently represents numerous distinct meanings. Jon L. Ericson & Robert F. 

Forston, Public Speaking as Dialogue: Readings and Essays 40 (1970). For example, 

the Oxford Dictionary lists an average of twenty-eight separate meanings for the five 

hundred most commonly used words in the English language. Id. The difficulty in 

communicating with clarity was perhaps best captured by Mark Twain, when he wrote: 

“The difference between the right word and the almost right word is the difference 

between lightning and the lightning bug.” Id. at 39. 
10

rationally applied as written. Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum 

Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Shell Oil Co., 606 N.W.2d 376, 

379 (Iowa 2000). 

In this case, the ambiguity in the statute is found in the 

application of the phrase “summoned to duty.” Grinnell claims a 

volunteer firefighter can be “summoned to duty” by the circumstances 

encountered by a volunteer firefighter that present the type of danger to 

which a volunteer firefighter has been trained to respond. Travelers 

asserts a volunteer firefighter can only be “summoned to duty” by the fire 

chief or someone else authorized to call a volunteer firefighter to duty. 

We have said that an ambiguity exists when more than one reasonable 

interpretation is presented by the circumstances. Shell Oil Co., 606 

N.W.2d at 379–80 (“[I]f reasonable minds could disagree over the 

meaning of a word or phrase of a statute, the statute is ambiguous 

. . . .”). Because the separate meanings claimed by the parties can be 

attributed to “summoned to duty,” we find ambiguity exists in this case. 

See Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2290 (unabr. ed. 2002) 

(providing five definitions for “summon”). Numerous intrinsic aids can

help courts discover the intent of a statute in the face of an ambiguity. 

In this case, two rules of construction are particularly pertinent. First, 

we interpret statutes in their context. Griffin Pipe Prods. Co. v. Guarino, 

663 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Iowa 2003). Second, undefined words used in the 

statute are normally given their ordinary and common meaning. Mason 

v. Schweizer Aircraft Corp., 653 N.W.2d 543, 548 (Iowa 2002).

A. Context of Statute. The context of a statute is an important 

consideration in the search for legislative intent because “[w]ords may 

have different meanings when used in the context of a special subject.” 

2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory 
11

Construction § 47:27, at 443 (7th ed. 2007) [hereinafter Statutes and 

Statutory Construction]. Additionally, we look to the statute as a whole to 

make sure our interpretation is harmonious with the entire legislative 

enactment. Griffin Pipe Prods. Co., 663 N.W.2d at 865. 

The statute in dispute is found within the definitions section of the 

Workers’ Compensation Act. It is a subsection enacted in 1985 as a part 

of a broader definition of the phrase “personal injury arising out of and in 

the course of employment” and is part of an even larger body of law 

extending workers’ compensation benefits to volunteer firefighters. See 

1985 Iowa Acts ch. 46, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 85.61(6) (1987)) 

(entitled “Time of Volunteer Fire Fighter’s Employment”); see also Iowa 

Code § 85.61(7). While regular firefighters across Iowa are excluded from 

workers’ compensation benefits, the legislature included volunteer 

firefighters within the workers’ compensation statute in 1945.5

When volunteer firefighters were included in Iowa’s workers’ 

compensation system, they also became subject to the body of law 

governing entitlement to benefits. This law includes the basic principle 

 See 1945 

Iowa Acts ch. 75, §§ 2, 3 (codified at Iowa Code §§ 85.1(4), .61(8) (1946)) 

(defining “volunteer firemen” and providing for compensation under the 

Workmen’s Compensation Law). In that year, the legislature specifically 

excepted volunteer firefighters from the statutory exclusion for 

firefighters and amended section 85.61 by adding a definition of 

“volunteer fireman,” which also made it explicitly clear that a volunteer 

firefighter could not be excluded from benefits as a casual employee. Id. 

 5In Heiliger v. City of Sheldon, we held that volunteer firefighters were impliedly 

excluded from the protections of the workers’ compensation statute by the general 

statutory exclusion for firefighters. 236 Iowa 146, 162, 18 N.W.2d 182, 190 (1945). A 

week later, the legislature amended the statute to specifically exempt volunteer 

firefighters from the general exclusion for firefighters. Maurice H. Merrill, Fifteen Years 

More of Workmen’s Compensation in Iowa, 32 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 16 (1946).
12

of compensation that employers are required to pay workers’ 

compensation only for personal injuries sustained by an employee 

“arising out of and in the course of employment.” Iowa Code § 85.3(1). 

Generally, we have indicated an injury “arises out of” employment when 

a causal connection exists between the employment and the injury. 

Thayer v. State, 653 N.W.2d 595, 599 (Iowa 2002). We have said the 

injury “arises in the ‘course of employment’ when the injury and the 

employment coincide as to time, place, and the circumstances.” Id. at 

600. 

Notwithstanding, the legislature has contributed its own definition 

of the phrase “personal injury arising out of and in the course of the 

employment.” Under section 85.61(7), the legislature identified two 

components to the definition. First, the phrase includes “injuries to 

employees whose services are being performed on, in, or about the 

premises” of the employer. Iowa Code § 85.61(7). Second, the phrase 

includes “injuries to those who are engaged elsewhere in places where 

their employer’s business requires their presence and subjects them to 

dangers incident to the business.” Id. Clearly, the legislature 

understood that compensable injuries can occur both on and off work 

premises. This definition is consistent with our long-standing approach 

used to evaluate the “in the course of employment” prong. Generally, an 

injury arises “in the course of employment” when an injury is within the 

time period of the employment, the space boundaries of the employment, 

and in the course of an activity connected to the employment. 

Waterhouse Water Conditioning, Inc. v. Waterhouse, 561 N.W.2d 55, 57 

(Iowa 1997)); see also 1 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s 

Workers’ Compensation Law § 12:01, at 12–1 (2010) (“The course of 

employment requirement . . . demands that the injury be shown to have 
13

arisen within the time and space boundaries of the employment, and in 

the course of an activity whose purpose is related to the employment.”). 

Under section 85.61(7)(a), however, the legislature has provided a 

special, more narrow “course of employment” rule for volunteer 

firefighters. Instead of relying on time, place, and circumstances to 

determine “course of employment,” section 85.61(7)(a) reduces “course of 

employment” to a single factor—time period of employment. It provides 

that 

[p]ersonal injuries sustained by a volunteer fire fighter arise 

in the course of employment if the injuries are sustained at 

any time from the time the volunteer fire fighter is 

summoned to duty as a volunteer fire fighter until the time

the volunteer fire fighter is discharged from duty by the chief 

of the volunteer fire department or the chief’s designee. 

Iowa Code § 85.61(7)(a) (emphasis added). Thus, the legislature has 

adopted a more arbitrary “course of employment” rule for volunteer 

firefighters covering a time period beginning with the summons to duty 

and ending with the discharge from duty. Any other factors and further 

circumstances are removed from consideration. 

It is understandable that the legislature would want to develop a 

special “course of employment” rule for volunteer firefighters. Unlike 

most employees, the duties of volunteer firefighters are not normally 

connected to a particular premise of the employer. Instead, volunteer 

firefighters are called to duty at all times of the day and night and at a 

variety of locations. The general definition of “arising out of and in the 

course of employment” under section 85.61(7) captures volunteer 

firefighters once they arrive at the scene of an emergency, but does not 

specifically cover their activities between the time they are called to 

report to duty and the time they arrive at the scene of an emergency. 

Nevertheless, from the instant a volunteer firefighter hears an alarm and 
14

proceeds to the scene of an emergency, the volunteer firefighter is 

exposed to special risks connected with employment. See Comments on 

Recent Cases, 32 Iowa L. Rev. 755, 805 (1947). 

As a general rule, workers’ compensation does not cover an injury 

sustained by an employee on the way to or from work. Bailey v. 

Batchelder, 576 N.W.2d 334, 339 (Iowa 1998). Although somewhat 

arbitrary, the rule has its logic. See id. For purposes of workers’ 

compensation, the hazards encountered going to or returning from the 

place of work are not normally incident to employment. Id. When an 

employee reaches a job site, however, there is a physical and tangible 

connection to the employment environment. Id. Thus, while traveling to 

or from work an employee is not ordinarily considered to be “in the 

course of employment.” Halstead v. Johnson’s Texaco, 264 N.W.2d 757, 

759 (Iowa 1978).

The situation of a volunteer firefighter, however, is unique. A 

volunteer firefighter not only has special risks produced by rendering 

services at the scene of an emergency, but also in going to and even 

returning from the scene of the emergency. For example, the need for 

speed in responding to a call is one risk connected with employment as a 

volunteer firefighter. See Comments on Recent Cases, 32 Iowa L. Rev. at 

804. Thus, section 85.61(7)(a) makes it clear that volunteer firefighters 

do not fall within the “going and coming” rule applicable to most other 

employees. Instead, the legislature adopted a rule that the course of 

employment begins when the volunteer firefighter is “summoned to 

duty.” 

This context permits us to make certain observations helpful to our 

understanding of the intent of the statute. The phrase “summoned to 

duty” only exists in the statute to establish the point in time when the 
15

“course of employment” begins for volunteer firefighters for the purposes 

of workers’ compensation. Additionally, the phrase contemplates that 

the summons is preceded by a decision for the period of employment to 

begin. Normally, the decision for work to commence rests with the 

employer, not the employee, especially where the employer is made 

responsible for injuries sustained by employees “arising out of and in the 

course of employment.” 

Furthermore, the duty that is the subject of the summons under 

the statute is the duty “as a volunteer fire fighter.” The statute then 

defines a volunteer firefighter as a “member of an organized volunteer fire 

department in this state and any other person performing services as a 

volunteer fire fighter . . . at the request of the chief or other person in 

command of the fire department.” Iowa Code § 85.61(10). The first 

portion of the definition reveals volunteer firefighters are members of a 

group of volunteer firefighters. Thus, the summons to duty relates to 

duty as a member of a group, not as an individual. Moreover, the second 

portion of the definition reveals the services of all volunteer firefighters 

are performed at the request of a person in command of the group of 

volunteer firefighters. See generally Teamsters Local Union No. 421, 706 

N.W.2d at 715 (describing and applying the interpretive aid ejusdem 

generis by tying the meaning and purpose of general words to the specific 

words that precede to help define a class of statutorily described 

individuals). We find nothing in the background or context of the statute 

to reveal an intent for volunteer firefighters to summon themselves to 

duty. 

We recognize section 85.61(7)(a) does make it clear that a volunteer 

firefighter must be “discharged from duty by the chief of the volunteer 

fire department or the chief’s designee,” yet the same qualifying phrase
16

fails to follow the “summoned to duty” component of the statute. A 

common intrinsic aid for statutory interpretation provides that referential 

and qualifying phrases refer solely to the last antecedent. Statutes and 

Statutory Construction § 47:33, at 487. However, this rule applies only 

when no contrary intention is apparent. Id. Moreover, while the 

qualifying phrase relating to the fire chief or the chief’s designee may be 

restricted to the “discharged from duty” component of the statute, the 

restriction does not aid in identifying the scope and nature of the 

“summoned to duty” component of the statute. For sure, the legislature 

may have intended not to use the same qualifying language for the 

“summoned to duty” component of the statute because different 

communities may have different methods to call or notify volunteer 

firefighters of an emergency, especially at the time the statute was 

enacted in 1985. Thus, the question that remains is whether the 

legislature intended for volunteer firefighters to summon themselves to 

duty based on circumstances that they may encounter in the course of 

each day. This question is not resolved in any way by the rule of 

statutory construction relating to referential and qualifying words. 

B. Common Meaning. Undefined words in a statute are usually 

construed in accordance with their ordinary and common meanings. 

Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:27, at 443–46; Mason, 653 

N.W.2d at 548. However, when a word of common usage has more than 

one meaning, the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the 

statute is used to construe the statute. See Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages 

Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004) (“Absent a statutory definition or 

an established meaning in the law, words in the statute are given their 

ordinary and common meaning by considering the context within which 

they are used.”).
17

The word “summoned” has a variety of meanings. See Webster’s 

Third New Int’l Dictionary 2290 (providing five definitions for “summon”). 

Most of the meanings of the word relate to a call or command by a third 

party. Id. Yet, a secondary meaning allows the word to be used in the 

context of an internal call to action, as when a person summons his or 

her courage. Id. In the context of the time period of employment for the 

purposes of workers’ compensation benefits, the common meaning of 

“summoned to duty” as a command from another fits better within the 

legislative scheme than internal forces that would summon a Good 

Samaritan to respond and render aid after witnessing an accident or 

other emergency. There is simply nothing in the statute to indicate the 

legislature wanted the forces that motivate a Good Samaritan to render 

aid in the face of emergency to commence the course of employment for a 

volunteer firefighter who happens to witness an accident and renders 

aid. Instead, we believe the intent of the legislature was to employ a 

straightforward, easily applied rule that the course of employment for a 

volunteer firefighter commences when the volunteer firefighter receives a 

call initiated through official communications to report for duty. 

Importantly, the legislature adopted a rule that removed any 

consideration of the surrounding circumstances relating to the actual 

duties of employment. Having specifically removed such circumstances 

from the “course of employment” test for volunteer firefighters, the 

legislature left no indication of an intention to reopen the rule for such 

circumstances to be considered in the event a volunteer firefighter 

witnesses an accident or other emergency. The test adopted by the 

legislature captures the goal of protecting volunteer firefighters in the 

unique circumstances of their employment, and no legislative intent 

exists to show the legislature further intended to use the workers’ 
18

compensation statute to broaden the “course of employment” rule to 

embrace the principle of a Good Samaritan.

After considering the history and purpose of the statute providing 

workers’ compensation benefits to volunteer firefighters, along with the 

ordinary and common meaning of “summon” in the context of the 

statute, we hold that a volunteer firefighter must be called to duty by a 

third party authorized by the fire chief before injuries that arise in efforts 

to rescue are covered by workers’ compensation. Additionally, a 

summons places a volunteer firefighter in the “course of employment” 

once it is communicated to the volunteer firefighter. The relevant inquiry 

under the statute is whether Justin was summoned to duty as a 

volunteer firefighter by the 911 dispatcher prior to receiving his injuries. 

Any other approach would be contrary to the legislative intent expressed 

in section 85.61(7)(a).

IV. Receipt of Summons.

The next question that necessarily follows is whether the summons 

to duty must be heard or received by the volunteer firefighter. This issue 

could arise on remand, as illustrated by the deputy workers’ 

compensation commissioner’s determination that Justin was in the 

course of employment because the page would have reached him prior to 

his death. 

At this point in the analysis, there are few interpretive aids 

available to guide us. Yet, those that exist remain important. We 

presume the legislature intended for the statute to yield reasonable 

results. W.P. Barber Lumber Co. v. Celania, 674 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Iowa 

2003). We therefore give this statute its plain meaning and avoid 

creating impractical or absurd results. Heartland Express v. Gardner, 

675 N.W.2d 259, 262 (Iowa 2003). We also keep the entire statute in 
19

mind in interpreting the particular provision at issue. Iowa Ass’n of Sch. 

Bds. v. Iowa Dep’t of Educ., 739 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Iowa 2007). In the 

end, we strive to interpret the statute consistent with its purpose. IBP, 

Inc. v. Harker, 633 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Iowa 2001). 

On one hand, it is conceivable the legislature could have 

considered receipt of the summons to be unnecessary for a volunteer 

firefighter. Yet, our rules of interpretation do not lead to such a result. 

The statute specifically refers to “the time the volunteer fire fighter is 

summoned to duty.” Iowa Code § 85.61(7)(a). It does not refer to the 

time the chief or the chief’s designee summoned the volunteer firefighter 

to duty. See id. The language used by the legislature in enacting the 

statute clearly focuses on whether the particular injured volunteer 

firefighter was “summoned,” not whether a summons was sent. 

Additionally, the statute could produce absurd results if it were

interpreted not to require receipt of the summons. Such an 

interpretation would mean an injury sustained by a volunteer firefighter 

in the course of an activity unrelated to the duties of a volunteer 

firefighter would be an injury that occurs “in the course of employment”

as a volunteer firefighter. For example, if a volunteer firefighter was 

injured after being struck by a speeding boat while water skiing on a lake 

and it was later discovered that his or her pager left behind on the dock 

had activated with a call to duty just prior to the accident, it would be 

absurd to conclude the volunteer firefighter was in the course of 

employment at the time of the injury under the statute. 

The receipt requirement is also consistent with the overall purpose 

of the workers’ compensation statute to provide compensation for 

injuries that arise out of and in the course of employment. Workers’ 

compensation was not intended to provide compensation for injuries in 
20

the course of activities detached from employment. More specifically, 

section 85.61(7)(a) was enacted to provide coverage for volunteer 

firefighters while responding to the call to duty. Clearly, a volunteer 

firefighter cannot respond to the call of duty until the volunteer 

firefighter learns of the call. Thus, the receipt requirement is consistent 

with the purpose of the statute. 

At the same time, we recognize the statute expresses no 

requirement that the official summons be received by the volunteer 

firefighter. Instead, to fulfill the purpose of the statute defining “in the 

course of employment,” it is only important that the employer send the 

summons and the volunteer firefighter acquire knowledge that a 

summons to duty has been issued. This approach provides a reasonable 

interpretation of the statute, is consistent with the entire statute, and 

meets our goal of interpreting workers’ compensation statutes 

consistently with the humanitarian objective of providing compensation 

for injured workers. 

V. Conclusion.

We affirm the decision of the district court. The commissioner 

applied an incorrect legal test in rendering his decision. We remand the 

case to the district court to further remand the matter to the 

commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is 

for the commissioner to resolve this dispute between two insurance 

companies by applying the statute as interpreted in this opinion to the 

facts to decide if Justin’s injuries arose in the course of his employment 

as a volunteer firefighter. 

DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE 

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 
21

All justices concur except Hecht, Wiggins, and Baker, JJ., who 

concur specially.
22

#34/08–1628, Andover Vol. Fire Dep’t v. Grinnell Mut. Reins.

HECHT, Justice (concurring specially).

I write separately because, although I agree this case must be 

remanded to the commissioner, I cannot agree with one aspect of the 

majority’s interpretation of Iowa Code section 85.61(7)(a). The fighting 

issue in this case requires a determination whether Justin Faur 

sustained a personal injury “at any time from the time [he was] 

summoned to duty . . . until the time [he was] discharged from duty by 

the chief of the volunteer fire department or the chief’s designee.” Iowa 

Code § 85.61(7)(a). The commissioner’s interpretation posited broadly 

that a volunteer firefighter can be summoned to duty under the statute 

by any circumstances that could lead a reasonable volunteer firefighter 

“to act in a manner consistent with the duties a volunteer firefighter 

assumes as regards the general public.” Accordingly, under the 

commissioner’s interpretation of the statute, the compensability of Faur’s 

claim as a volunteer firefighter does not turn on whether the pager 

sounded notice of the dispatcher’s call before Faur was injured by the 

gas in the atmosphere of the manure pit.

The majority rejects the commissioner’s interpretation. 

Repudiating the notion that a volunteer firefighter can be summoned to 

duty by mere circumstances, the majority concludes the legislature 

intended volunteer firefighters to be without workers’ compensation 

protection until “a third party authorized by the fire chief” calls them to 

duty. I agree with this portion of the majority’s analysis as I believe the 

legislature clearly expressed the boundaries of “the course of 

employment.” The course commences on the front end with the issuance 

of a call to duty from an authorized person to members of the force (the 

act of “summoning”). In this case the summons was issued by a 
23

dispatcher sixty-eight seconds after a 911 call was placed at Faur’s

direction. Although one witness testified that Faur could have made the 

return trip from the house to the pit in thirty seconds, another opined it 

would have taken Faur more than a minute to cover the distance 

because he was wearing knee-high “manure” boots and was winded as a 

consequence of the trip from the pit to the house. When he arrived back 

at the pit, he instructed the victim’s daughter to summon additional 

assistance before he began to climb down a piece of machinery into the 

nine-foot deep pit. In my view, a reasonable fact finder could on remand 

find that Faur sustained an injury after the dispatcher issued the 

summons to duty to Faur and the other members of the Andover 

Volunteer Fire Department who were available to respond to the 

emergency. 

I write separately because I believe the majority’s interpretation of 

section 85.61(7)(a) adds to the statute language requiring a volunteer 

firefighter prove he or she received the department’s call to duty.6

There is nothing illogical, impractical, or absurd about an 

interpretation of the statute that commences the course of employment 

with an authorized person’s sounding of a call to action to members of a 

volunteer fire department who are available for duty. As the majority has 

acknowledged, the legislature chose to except these public servants from 

the operation of the going-and-coming rule. I view section 85.61(7)(a) as 

 This 

interpretation results in an embellishment of the words chosen by the 

legislature and is justified, the majority suggests, by a purpose to avoid 

an illogical, impractical, or absurd result. I strongly disagree. 

 6This element of the claim is characterized elsewhere in the majority opinion as 

proof that the firefighter “acquire[d] knowledge that a summons to duty has been 

issued.”
24

unmistakable evidence of a legislative purpose to expand the protection 

of the workers’ compensation statute. The majority’s interpretation of 

the statute contravenes this clear legislative purpose by adorning the 

statute with words (“receive” and “knowledge”) not expressed and, in my 

view, not intended by the legislature. This embellishment achieves a 

diminution of the zone of protection for volunteer firefighters, a result 

inconsistent with the legislative purpose, and I therefore reject it. 

An interpretation of the statute that commences a volunteer 

firefighter’s course of employment with the employer’s sounding of a call 

to service is more faithful to the words chosen by the legislature and the 

clear legislative purpose to expand workers’ compensation protection for 

volunteers. The clear legislative purpose to expand the protection for 

volunteers who risk their lives in the service of others amply explains 

why the legislature chose to commence the course of employment in this 

context with the employer’s issuance of a call to service. This purpose is 

illustrated by the legislature’s omission of a requirement that the 

volunteer receive the call as a condition of commencement of the course 

of employment, an omission that does not result in such asymmetry as 

to produce illogical, impractical, or absurd results.7

 7The majority finds support for its conclusion that the call to duty is triggered by 

a volunteer firefighter’s receipt or knowledge of the call to duty in the phrase “the 

volunteer fire fighter is summoned to duty.” As volunteers are not called to duty 

individually, but rather jointly by common dispatch, I believe the majority gives the 

phrase a significance not intended by the legislature. In my view, the employer’s act of 

issuing the summons to available volunteers triggers the course of employment.

 The majority’s 

argument to the contrary uses a strained and inapt “straw-man” 

hypothetical in which a volunteer who is oblivious to the emergency for 

which he is imminently to be called to duty and is clearly unavailable to 

respond to the employer’s call to duty because he is not wearing a pager. 

I agree with the majority that a proper interpretation of the statute 
25

should not support the skier’s workers’ compensation claim because 

there is no basis upon which it could be reasonably concluded that the 

skier was responding to the department’s summons or otherwise serving 

the interests of the employer when the injury occurred. In sharp 

contrast, it was Faur who discovered the need for an emergency response 

while wearing his pager, caused the department to be alerted, and 

diligently positioned himself in the service of his employer to respond to 

the imminent page which sounded a mere sixty-eight seconds after the 

911 call was received by the department’s dispatcher. Moreover, Faur 

knew the call to duty was imminent from the moment he caused the 911 

call to be placed and during the entire time he travelled the 150–200 

yards from the house to the pit. We should not attribute to the 

legislature the intent to shield Andover from liability for workers’ 

compensation benefits in the absence of proof that Faur either heard the 

pager sound or otherwise came to know it had sounded before he was 

injured while responding to the emergency for which the call to duty 

issued. 

It seems perfectly logical that in furtherance of its purpose to 

expand the protection of volunteers, the legislature chose a bright-line 

“trigger” to commence the course of employment. The employer’s 

issuance of the call to duty to available volunteers is readily verifiable 

and therefore serves as a most practical trigger.8

 8Pagers were chosen by the Andover Volunteer Fire Department as the means of 

summoning its members. I would apply the same reasoning had the department 

chosen telephones as its preferred means of communication.

 Further, an 

interpretation that commences the course of employment with the 

issuance of the summons to duty provides protection for volunteers even 

when, sadly, as in Faur’s case, they are unavailable to testify on the 
26

question of whether they received the page, or otherwise came to know a 

summons was sent, before they were injured while clearly in the service 

of the employer. 

The majority’s interpretation of the statute should be rejected for 

yet another reason. This court has in the past fifty years repeatedly 

affirmed that the workers’ compensation statute was enacted to benefit 

workers and their dependents and that it should, therefore, be 

interpreted “broadly and liberally in keeping with the humanitarian 

objective of the statute. We will not defeat the statute’s beneficent 

purpose by reading something into it that is not there, or by a narrow or 

strained construction.” Holstein Elec. v. Breyfogle, 756 N.W.2d 812, 815–

16 (Iowa 2008); see also Stumpff v. Second Injury Fund, 543 N.W.2d 904, 

905 (Iowa 1996); Barton v. Nevada Poultry Co., 253 Iowa 285, 289, 110 

N.W.2d 660, 662 (1961). Reference to this long-standing rule is 

conspicuously omitted from the majority’s incompatible interpretive 

effort.9

The majority’s concern about extending workers’ compensation 

protection to any “Good Samaritan” seems far afield in this case. When 

Faur became aware of a victim’s peril, he was wearing his fire 

department pager and was therefore available to be summoned to duty at 

a location within the department’s coverage territory. His attempt to 

rescue the victim commenced only after he went to the nearby house and 

caused a 911 call to be placed, alerting his department and putting in 

motion the very protocol that culminated with the sounding of the alert 

to all available members of the rescue team, sixty-eight seconds later. 

 9The majority acknowledges the “humanitarian objective of providing 

compensation for injured workers,” but fails in my view to liberally construe the statute 

as our case law commits us to do.
27

Thus, as Faur travelled the 150–200 yards from the house back to the 

pit, he knew the pager summoning him to the rescue would soon sound. 

If the pager worn by Faur had not sounded before he arrived at the pit, 

he knew it would soon sound. If the pager did not sound as Faur 

climbed down into the pit in an effort to effect the rescue, he knew it 

would soon sound. That this court would attribute to the legislature an 

interpretation of section 85.61(7)(a) authorizing the commissioner to 

deny workers’ compensation protection to a volunteer firefighter under 

these circumstances absent proof that the volunteer received the paged 

call to duty or otherwise knew the summons to duty had issued before he 

was injured is completely unfathomable and produces a stunningly 

illogical, impractical, and absurd result which the majority opinion 

claims to renounce.10

For all of these reasons I concur with the conclusion that this case 

must be remanded to the commissioner but cannot join the majority’s 

interpretation of the statute.

Wiggins and Baker, JJ., join this special concurrence.

 10Even under the majority’s erroneous interpretation of the statute, I believe this 

record engenders a fact question as to whether Faur received the call to duty or had 

knowledge of the call to duty before he was injured. The call to duty sounded a mere 

sixty-eight seconds after the 911 call was received. As I have noted above, one witness 

opined the return trip from the house to the pit would have taken more than a minute. 

There is evidence in the record from which a reasonable fact finder could find Faur 

paused to give an instruction to Johnson’s daughter before he began to climb down into 

the pit. In addition to the reasonable inferences from this direct evidence, 

circumstantial evidence could support a finding that additional time passed as Faur 

climbed down into the nine-foot deep pit on a piece of machinery to begin the fatal 

rescue attempt, thus allowing the summons to duty to issue and be received by Faur 

before the injury occurred.