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OVERSIGHT OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION 

AND CIVIL JUSTICE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 28, 2016 

Serial No. 114–72 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia, Chairman 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

RAU ́ L LABRADOR, Idaho 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

RON DeSANTIS, Florida 

MIMI WALTERS, California 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DAVE TROTT, Michigan 

MIKE BISHOP, Michigan 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

KAREN BASS, California 

CEDRIC RICHMOND, Louisiana 

SUZAN DelBENE, Washington 

HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

SCOTT PETERS, California 

SHELLEY HUSBAND, Chief of Staff & General Counsel 

PERRY APELBAUM, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL JUSTICE

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona, Chairman 

RON DeSANTIS, Florida, Vice-Chairman 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

PAUL B. TAYLOR, Chief Counsel 

JAMES J. PARK, Minority Counsel 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

APRIL 28, 2016 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Trent Franks, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Arizona, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil 

Justice ................................................................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Steve Cohen, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Tennessee, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution 

and Civil Justice ................................................................................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Dennis E. Burke, President & CEO, Good Shepherd Health Care System 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 17 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 20 

Larry D. Thompson, Professor in Corporate and Business Law, University 

of Georgia School of Law 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 26 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 28 

Neil V. Getnick, Partner, Chairman, Taxpayers Against Fraud Education 

Fund 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 40 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 42 

Jonathan L. Diesenhaus, Partner, Hogan Lovells US LLP 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 50 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 52 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Prepared statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee 

on the Judiciary ................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement of the Honorable Chuck Grassley, a U.S. Senator from 

the State of Iowa, and Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary .......... 11 

Material submitted by the Honorable Steve Cohen, a Representative in Congress from the State of Tennessee, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee 

on the Constitution and Civil Justice ................................................................. 69 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Prepared statement of the Honorable Steve Cohen, a Representative in Congress from the State of Tennessee, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee 

on the Constitution and Civil Justice ................................................................. 76 

Addendum to the testimony of Dennis E. Burke, President & CEO, Good 

Shepherd Health Care System ............................................................................ 83 

Fraud Statistics from the U.S. Department of Justice ......................................... 87 

Office of Inspector General (OIG) Updated Criteria for Section 1128(b)(7) 

Exclusion Authority ............................................................................................. 95 

Prepared statement of Matthew Solomson, Chief Legal Officer, Federal Government Services of Anthem, Inc. ....................................................................... 102 
(IV) 

OFFICIAL HEARING RECORD 

UNPRINTED MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Material from the Urban Institute. This material is available at the Subcommittee 

and can also be accessed at: 

http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=104871 
(1) 

OVERSIGHT OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 

THURSDAY, APRIL 28, 2016 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION

AND CIVIL JUSTICE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:34 p.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Trent Franks 

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Franks, King, Jordan, Cohen, and Conyers. 

Staff Present: (Majority) John Coleman, Counsel; Tricia White, 

Clerk; (Minority) James J. Park, Minority Counsel; Veronica Eligan, Professional Staff Member; and Matthew Morgan, Professional 

Staff Member. 

Mr. FRANKS. The Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil 

Justice will come to order. 

And, without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare recesses of the Committee at any time. 

I want to welcome you all for being here. The False Claims Act 

is the Federal Government’s primary tool for combatting fraud in 

federally funded programs. In each of the last 6 years, the government has recovered over $3 billion under the FCA and over 3.5 billion for their fourth consecutive year. 

Since the significant 1986 amendments to the FCA, the Federal Government has recovered over $45 billion under the act. These 

numbers show that the FCA has been successful legislation. However, despite its success, the act still fails to prevent massive losses 

of taxpayer dollars. According to a 2015 study by the General Accountability Office, over $120 billion in taxpayer money was lost in 

2014 to improper payments by the Federal Government, which indicates the government is recovering only a fraction of what it loses 

to false claims every year. 

This requires examination, considering Congress has amended 

the FCA three times in the past 7 years to expand its coverage, 

and enhance the ability of whistleblowers to bring suit. Today’s 

hearing will, in part, address what could more be done. 

Some experts who have studied the act, for example, suggest that 

the answer is providing incentives and encouraging those best able 

to detect and prevent false claims—government contractors and 

government program beneficiaries—to self-police and self-report po-
2 

tential FCA violations. Indeed, FCA violations or violators who selfreport generally receive the same penalties and face the same damages as those who are caught violating the act and settle out of 

court with government. 

I think this makes very little sense. The FCA has been successful 

because it’s provided whistleblowers with a tremendous financial 

incentive for uncovering and disclosing false claims. It should be 

possible to complement the current incentives for whistleblowers in 

the act with financial incentives for self-disclosure to uncover even 

more waste, fraud, and abuse of Federal taxpayer money. 

We need to examine ways to give those that do business with the 

government meaningful incentives to detect wrongdoing and selfreport it to the government and thereby return to the taxpayers 

more money than is currently recovered under the FCA. 

The Justice Department itself has acknowledged the limitations 

of the act as currently written. According to the head of the division at DOJ in charge of enforcing the FCA, the Justice Department is, quote, well aware of the fact that litigation can only plausibly reach a fraction of the fraud committed against U.S. Government programs, which likewise makes the prevention of fraud a 

more potent tool for protecting the interest of the United States in 

efforts to undo the damage of completed schemes. Litigation to recover the cost of fraud is far inferior as an option to prevent fraud 

in the first place. 

I hope, through this hearing, we can begin to discuss ways to 

prevent violations of the False Claims Act from occurring in the 

first place. The Federal Government has benefitted greatly from 

the increased accountability that has resulted from the False 

Claims Act and the invaluable aid it has received from current 

whistleblowers. My hope is that today’s hearing provides additional 

insight into how we can detect and prevent even more false claims 

that deplete the vital resources that taxpayers have entrusted to 

this Nation. 

And I certainly look forward to the witnesses’ testimony and 

yield to the Ranking Member now for 5 minutes for his opening 

statement. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

The False Claims Act is one of the most potent weapons in the 

fight against fraud and is a vital means of protecting taxpayer dollars. 

According to the Justice Department, from ’87 through 2015, 

False Claims Act has been responsible for over $48 billion in recoveries from corporations that cheated the American taxpayer—$48 

billion from corporations that cheated the American taxpayers who 

we are now thinking are going to just self-report and give themselves up and give them some incentive to do that. You know, it 

wasn’t a great idea to tell Jesse James to tell us what you’re going 

to do, and we’ll give you some money and go back to St. Joseph, 

Missouri. You catch the crooks. That’s what you do. 

Of that number, more than $33 billion resulted from litigation 

initiated by qui tam plaintiffs, many of whom are employees of corporate wrongdoers who are in the best position to know of fraudulent activity and to bring it to light. 
3 

In 2009, Congress adopted amendments that further strengthened the act. These amendments sponsored by my former colleague, the beloved and congressionally late Representative Howard Berman of blessed memory, and championed by noted qui tam 

lawyer John Phillips, now residing, I think, in Italy, where he 

takes care of our interests there, resulted in recoveries since 2009 

of almost $27 billion for taxpayers, with more than 19.5 billion resulting from qui tam complaints. 

The fact that almost 70 percent of recoveries since ’87 and more 

than 70 percent since 2009 stem from qui tam suits, highlights the 

central role that the qui tam plaintiffs play in the False Claims 

Act’s enforcement regime in the fight against fraud. 

Whistleblower-initiated action was responsible for the government’s $2 billion recovery from GlaxoSmithKline for paying kickbacks, doctoring scientific research, and illegally promoting certain 

prescription drugs. Last month, Olympus Corporation agreed to 

pay $646 million, including 310.8 million in various False Claims 

Act claims. Olympus put profits before people, among other things, 

refusing to disclose to U.S. regulators potential contamination from 

its duodenoscopes, despite doing so to European regulators, given 

that the U.S. was its largest market for duodenoscopes. 

And just yesterday, Pfizer settled whistleblower-initiated cases 

for $784 million for overcharging Medicaid in a matter that the 

government had initially declined to intervene in. 

These private attorney generals, qui tam lawyers do a great deal 

of good for the United States in seeking out fraud and bringing in 

moneys to our Treasury that was ungainfully garnered. We need 

only look at the state of the False Claims Act prior to 1987 to get 

a sense of how weak qui tam-related progressions can undermine 

False Claim Act’s purposes. 

Before ’86, the act contained strong disincentives for whistleblowers to pursue litigation on behalf of the government and bring 

fraud to light. As a result, the number of false claim qui tam suits 

declined dramatically and fraud against the government ran rampant. 

The 1986 amendments to the act, spearheaded by Senator 

Charles Grassley and Representative Berman, dramatically 

strengthened incentives for the pursuit of qui tam actions and 

greatly enhanced the act’s effectiveness. 

It is perhaps no surprise then that those who are the target of 

fraud allegations are now seeking to undermine what Grassley and 

Berman did with the False Claims Act and, particularly, its qui 

tam and penalty provisions. 

In 2013, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce recommended changes 

to the act that were solutions in search of a problem, unless one 

defines the problem as an effective False Claims Act regime, which 

gets at fraud and abuse. 

For instance, it proposed limiting the share of damages that qui 

tam plaintiffs are able to recover in False Claims Act cases, weakening a major incentive for whistleblowers to come forward. Further weakening the incentives for whistleblowers are proposals to 

bar qui tam actions under several circumstances. One proposal 

would bar those actions by an employee of a corporate wrongdoer 
4 

if the employee did not report the fraud internally to his or her employer within 180 days prior to filing suit. 

This proposal almost invites the corporate wrongdoer to intimidate or retaliate against the potential whistleblower employee, 

gives the company the opportunity to further hide the fraud. Great 

idea. You got to go tell your boss that he’s a crook, and he’s going 

to be caught and exposed, and if you do it, you’re going to false retaliation, and who knows what’s going to happen to you. Well, 

that’s a great way to inhibit the people from coming forward, quieting the whistle. 

Another proposed change would reduce the availability of treble 

damages based on so-called gold standard certifications of a company’s compliance program done by third parties in a process 

where it would be in the interests of the certifying entity, itself a 

profit-making business, to give the necessary certification with no 

way of verifying the accuracy of said certification. 

Finally, corporate wrongdoers have proposed making it substantially harder for any plaintiff, whether a qui tam relator or the government, to prevail in a False Claims Act case by amending the act 

to impose the very high clear and convincing standard of proof to 

demonstrate any violation of the act, rather than current preponderance of the evidence standard. 

We should be very wary of any attempts to undermine the effectiveness of the False Claims Act. And of—the idea that we’re going 

to be able to successfully do it by asking the wrongdoers to selfreport, that hadn’t worked, and many other things—I don’t know 

that it ever works. As the old saying goes: If it ain’t broke, don’t 

fix it. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. FRANKS. And I thank the gentleman. It seems like, in Congress vernacular: If it ain’t broke, break it. 

I want to thank the Ranking Member, and without objection, 

other Members’ opening statements will be made part of the 

record. And before I—okay. Before I introduce the witnesses, I 

would first like to submit for the record the statement of the Honorable John Conyers, the Ranking Member of the full Committee. 

And I’d also like to introduce, for the record, the prepared statement of the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator 

Grassley. Senator Grassley was the lead Senate author of the 1986 

amendments to the False Claims Act and has been a tireless advocate for whistleblowers and eliminating false claims for taxpayer 

money. 

I appreciate his dedication to the False Claims Act and his input 

on the issues raised in today’s hearing. 

Without objection, his statement will also be entered into the 

record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Conyers follows:] 
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[The prepared statement of Senator Grassley follows:] 
12 
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Mr. FRANKS. So now let me introduce our witnesses. 

First of all, thank you all for being here. Our first witness is 

Dennis Burke. Mr. Burke is president and CEO of the Good Shepherd Health Care System in Hermiston, Oregon. 

Our second witness is Larry Thompson. Mr. Thompson is the 

John A. Sibley Professor in Corporate and Business Law at the 

University of Georgia School of Law. 

Our third witness is Neil Getnick. Mr. Getnick is the managing 

partner at Getnick & Getnick, LLP, in New York City. 

Our fourth and final witness is Jonathan Diesenhaus. Did I get 

that pretty close? 

Mr. DIESENHAUS. Got it. 

Mr. FRANKS. Yes, sir. Mr. Diesenhaus is a partner at the D.C. 

office of Hogan Lovells. 

Each of the witnesses’ written statements will be entered into 

the record in its entirety, and I ask that each witness summarize 

his or her testimony in 5 minutes or less. 

To help you stay within that time, there’s a timing light in front 

of you. The light will switch from green to yellow, indicating that 

you have 1 minute to conclude your testimony. When the light 

turns red, it indicates the witness’ 5 minutes have expired. 

And before I recognize the witnesses, it is the tradition of the 

Subcommittee that they be sworn. So if you’d please stand to be 

sworn. 

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony that you’re about to 

give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth 

so help you God? 

You may be seated, and let the record reflect that the witnesses 

answered in the affirmative. 

And, again, I want to recognize all of you in the audience, and 

I would now recognize our first witness, Mr. Burke. And if you will 

turn your microphone on before beginning. Get closer. Thank you, 

sir. 

TESTIMONY OF DENNIS E. BURKE, PRESIDENT & CEO, 

GOOD SHEPHERD HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 

Mr. BURKE. Thank you. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Members 

of the Constitution and Civil Justice Subcommittee. As introduced, 

my name is Dennis Burke. I am president and CEO of Good Shepherd Health Care System in Hermiston, Oregon, where I have had 

the pleasure of serving for the past 27 years. 

I appreciate this opportunity to share our experience with the 

False Claims Act. It is my hope that in some small way our experience will shed light on some of the consequences of the False 

Claims Act that I am sure were never intended by Members of 

Congress. 

First, I would like to make it clear that my board and I strongly 

support antifraud statutes, active government programs that seek 

to identify and eliminate fraudulent activity, and whistleblowers 

who have legitimate allegations. Fraud harms all of us, reduces 

limited resources for bona fide healthcare purposes. I will be brief 

today, but it’s my hope that you’ll find an opportunity to read the 

more detailed written account of our experience as outlined in the 
18 

letter attached to my statement addressed to Senator Ron Wyden, 

dated August 23 of 2006. 

We were victims of a disgruntled former employee who returned 

relator. Having said that, we could just as easily have been the victims of a rogue employee who intentionally violated our policies 

and procedures. The process would have been the same. 

Sadly, the FCA makes no distinction between organizations that 

are victims of false allegations and those that have proper antifraud measures in place but fall victim to rogue employees, just as 

it makes no distinction between organizations that are doing everything they can and should do to prevent fraud and those organizations that take minimum precautions. 

What happened to us is what I would call an overreaction, an 

overreaction that cost us dearly in terms of both reputation, dollars, and cents. In the end, it was determined that we had not defrauded the government, and the Department of Justice dropped its 

investigation. This is what happened. 

In 2003, agents from the FBI and the Oregon Medicaid Fraud 

Unit visited our hospital asking questions about our billing practices. A few weeks later, we were raided by a team of agents who 

came to the hospital at night, took records. 

Our hospital counsel was openly able to ascertain that a qui tam 

case had been filed against us, but we were—but was sealed so 

that we were unaware of the nature of the investigation. 

A Federal court in Portland, Oregon, made the FBI affidavit for 

the raid public. Our local newspaper and The Oregonian featured 

all the allegations of the complaint. These stories were extremely 

damaging to our hospital’s reputation. We even had a visiting physician clinic threaten to discontinue the relationship with the hospital. 

The qui tam relator’s allegation included every fraud hot button 

at the time. This included lab unbundling, physician kickbacks, 3- 

day window billing violations, upcoding, billing for services not rendered, and others. 

Due to the nature and scope of the allegations, the investigation 

was heightened from a criminal—from a civil to a criminal investigation. At the time of the raid, I was told by an agent that if even 

part of these allegations were true, someone was going to jail. 

During the course of the investigation, the government began to 

discover significant differences between the relator’s allegations 

and actual hospital practice. In a matter of weeks, the government 

scaled the investigation back to a civil investigation. 

Over the course of 21⁄2 years, the majority of the allegations were 

dismissed outright. However, the investigation did reveal that we 

had some irregularities associated with our emergency room billings. We had installed a new computer system, and the department manager had inadvertently programmed the billing system 

such that the emergency room medical director’s name appeared on 

all of our billing forms as the treating physician and the treating 

physician’s name appeared as the consulting physician. 

Because of this error, the Department of Justice requested that 

we perform an extensive audit, at our expense, through an independent third-party reviewer recommended by the Department of 

Justice. The results of the audit showed that all services were pro-
19 

vided by qualified physicians and that services were appropriately 

coded. In fact, the audit revealed that Medicare and Medicaid was 

actually slightly underbilled vis-a-vis the level of coding that could 

have been supported by the documentation. Following the results 

of this audit, the State Medicaid Fraud Unit and the Department 

of Justice dropped their investigation. 

In its entirety, we were subjected to a humiliating raid and an 

investigation by the Federal Government due to a disgruntled 

former employee. The relator took advantage of the law’s protections to, in essence, throw everything on the wall to see if anything 

might stick. 

We experienced a 3-year investigation, which consumed hundreds of internal man hours and well over $1 million in attorney 

fees, consultation fees, and undeserved settlement costs, not to 

mention the significant harm to our reputation. Having experienced what we considered to be a frivolous complaint of false allegations and an expensive investigation, here are our observations. 

Relators should be required to demonstrate that they have 

brought their concerns to the attention of the targeted organization 

before they bring the matter to the government. Without being required to make specific allegations, it is not fair that targeted organizations like ours are subject to over $1 million expenses, and in 

the end, the accuser is able to just walk away and say: Oops, I 

guess we were wrong. 

The penalty provisions of the False Claims Act are astronomical. 

As such, the financial risks posed by the law, in most cases, cause 

a hospital like ours to avoid the uncertainty of a trial and instead 

choose the safer, more predictable route of settlement. 

The Department of Justice offered a 750,000 rough justice settlement that was very tempting to my board, but we knew the claims 

were unjustified and decided to take a stand. Unfortunately, not 

everyone is in the position to take the same leap of faith due to 

the risks they face for doing so. That is our experience in an 

abridged telling. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burke follows:] 
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Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Thompson. 

And I would now recognize our second witness. I’m sorry. I got 

that wrong, didn’t I, Mr. Burke? 

I now recognize our second witness, Mr. Thompson, please. 

TESTIMONY OF LARRY D. THOMPSON, PROFESSOR IN CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA 

SCHOOL OF LAW 

Mr. THOMPSON. Chairman Franks, Ranking Member Cohen, 

Members of the Subcommittee, I am Larry Thompson. 

Mr. FRANKS. I forgot to ask you to pull that microphone toward 

you. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Oh, I’m sorry. 

Mr. FRANKS. There we go. 

Mr. THOMPSON. May I just repeat? 

Mr. FRANKS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Chairman Franks, Ranking Member Cohen, and 

Members of the Subcommittee, I am Larry Thompson. I appreciate 

the opportunity to testify before you this afternoon on the False 

Claims Act and how we can possibly continue to prevent fraud, 

which is so harmful to the public, consumers, the government, and 

shareholders of public companies. 

I practiced law for 42 years, and during this time period, I have 

handled scores of fraud cases and investigations, both as a Federal 

prosecutor and as a defense counsel. I’ve also served as a general 

counsel of a large public company, where I was responsible for implementing and administering what we strive to have as a worldclass high-quality ethics and compliance program. 

The False Claims Act is probably the most important antifraud 

tool the government has but, I think, perhaps, when coupled with 

more focused informed enhancements, can play an even more important and effective role in preventing fraud, as the Chairman 

mentioned. 

I really believe we can do an even better job of focusing on prevention, which allows the government to use its limited resources 

more in dealing with the very bad actors that are out there. My 

written testimony focuses on the work of the Ethics & Compliance 

Initiatives’ blue ribbon panel. 

Mr. Chairman, when I was asked to participate in the panel, I 

was delighted to do so because a great deal of my career in both 

the public and private sectors has been spent on ethics and compliance issues. The panel brought together a group of super people 

and experts who set out to determine what really are the perimeters of a high-quality ethics and compliance program. I am very 

pleased with our work product as set forth in my written testimony. 

To be clear, Mr. Chairman, I recognize that the widespread development and implementation of high-quality compliance and ethics programs is not going to happen overnight. These programs 

need adequate resources, dedication of time and effort to training 

and retraining, a commitment to consistent and transparent discipline, a commitment to investigate all reports of wrongdoing. In 

sum, a commitment to make ethics and compliance, doing the right 

thing, a core business strategy. 
27 

Simply put, in my experience, I found that high-integrity companies perform better in the marketplace than companies who do not 

put a premium on ethics and compliance. And I believe, quite 

frankly, that what the panel has recommended is very important 

today, especially when we see many shortsighted and short-term 

investors push for deeper and deeper unthinking cuts in corporate 

budgets. 

As I said, the widespread development and implementation of a 

high-quality ethics and compliance program will be a marathon 

and not a sprint, but I do believe that their reality can be greatly 

accelerated by providing concrete incentives for businesses to develop authentic bona fide high-quality ethics and compliance programs. These programs will focus on prevention and self-disclosure 

and provide a—and provide a measure of certainty and predictability for doing so. 

The public and government clearly benefit from increased selfdisclosure. Of course, I’ll be pleased to answer any questions you 

or the Members of the Committee may have, and thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thompson follows:] 
28 

*Supplemental material submitted by this witness is not printed in this hearing record but 

is available at the Subcommittee and is included in the witness’s statement at: 

http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=104871 

Prepared Statement of Larry D. Thompson, Professor in Corporate and 

Business Law, University of Georgia School of Law* 
29 
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Mr. FRANKS. And thank you, Mr. Thompson. 

And I now recognize our third witness, Mr. Getnick. And please 

turn that microphone on. 

TESTIMONY OF NEIL V. GETNICK, PARTNER, CHAIRMAN, 

TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUCATION FUND 

Mr. GETNICK. Thank you. 

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I am Neil Getnick. I am 

the managing partner of the law firm of Getnick & Getnick, based 

in Manhattan, and I’m testifying today in my capacity as the chairman of the Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund. 

The TAF Education Fund is a nonprofit public interest organization dedicated to combatting fraud against the government and 

protecting public resources through public-private partnerships. 

This year is the 30th anniversary of the seminal 1986 amendments to the False Claims Act. When it comes to the FCA, my dad 

would say, ‘‘Nothing succeeds like success,’’ because the 1986 

amendments have been and are a fantastic success. Prior to 1986, 

the Department of Justice recovered less than $50 million a year 

under the FCA. Last year alone, DOJ recovered more than $3.5 billion, and for every dollar that the government spends on Federal 

FCA healthcare enforcement, it recovers $20 in return. 

Does anyone know of any other government program that can 

boast those results? But these numbers are incomplete. They are 

an incomplete measure of the FCA’s success, which has generated 

cases that have reformed corrupt industries, stopped unconscionable and illegal practices, and saved lives. 

The main change of the 1986 amendments was to loosen certain 

restrictions on qui tam suits. This change created a new paradigm 

of public-private partnerships between the Justice Department, qui 

tam whistleblowers, and their counsel. And under this new paradigm, a backstop was created that let both the government and the 

fraudsters know that cases could be pursued and won by whistleblowers even when the government declined to intervene or pursue 

the fraud. 

This is crucial because this private right of action is the actionforcing mechanism that ensures that fraud on the government will 

be exposed and dealt with. Pleas by industry lobbyists to weaken 

or eliminate the private right of action are misguided, and those 

are often accompanied with misleading statistics purporting to 

demonstrate that only a small percentage of non-intervened cases 

result in recovery. Yet a significant number of successful cases only 

come about because the relator pursued the case after an initial decision of non-intervention. 

Furthermore, the FCA provides more safeguards and oversight to 

protect against frivolous or ill-advised lawsuits than just about any 

other civil enforcement statute in the Federal code. Most FCA defendants are very big companies that participate in large government-funded programs or compete for big government contracts, 

and a handful are repeat offenders. 

Among other things, this hearing addresses the so-called unintended consequences of the FCA. But industry lobbyists for large 

government contractors have intended consequences. Their in-
41 

tended consequences are to use the occasional story of a defense 

verdict or an investigation that negatively impacted on a small 

business as a pretext—a pretext—to gut the FCA that has resulted 

time after time in them paying restitution to the government for 

repeated fraudulent harmful schemes, and this posturing is transparent, and it should be rejected. 

The main proposal advanced by these lobbyists is to require corporate whistleblowers to report frauds internally before filing qui 

tams. And repeatedly, they seek to eliminate or narrow FCA liability if they adopt a so-called gold standard or certified corporate 

compliance programs. 

But allowing companies to face reduced liability from FCA action 

because they checked the boxes on how to establish a compliance 

program will merely encourage them to game this new compliance 

regime. That doesn’t reduce fraud; it enables fraud. 

In fact, and this is very important, the FCA already contains a 

provision that allows corporations to reduce their liability by onethird if they self-report a fraud within 30 days of becoming aware 

of it. 

So the FCA 1986 amendments have revealed unexpected benefits. The ever-increasing recoveries have exceeded all expectations. 

The provision allowing relators to pursue declined cases has resulted in billions of dollars of recoveries that would otherwise have 

been lost and has led to reforms in critical industries. 

Yes, my dad would say, ‘‘Nothing succeeds by success,’’ and to 

that, I now add, ‘‘Don’t tamper with success.’’ 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Getnick follows:] 
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Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Getnick. 

And we’ll now proceed to our fourth witness and final witness, 

Mr. Diesenhaus. 

And if you turn that microphone on. Yes, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF JONATHAN L. DIESENHAUS, PARTNER, 

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 

Mr. DIESENHAUS. Certainly. I made it work. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished Members of the 

Subcommittee, as you heard earlier, my name is Jonathan 

Diesenhaus. I’m a practitioner. I do investigations and litigation 

under the False Claims Act and have been doing it for 25 years. 

I am not the chairman in my firm, haven’t had the privilege of 

being a general counsel or a high-ranking spot at the Justice Department, but I did have the privilege of working for Mr. Thompson 

as senior trial counsel in the Civil Fraud Section enforcing the 

False Claims Act from 1998 to 2005. 

I am here today, and I appreciate the invitation, but my message 

is one about how we handle these cases, how they are litigated, and 

improving on a statute that already seems to work pretty darn 

well. And that’s where Mr. Getnick and I disagree is that I think 

there can be improvements to better protect some of the defendants 

who get caught up in the False Claims Act food mill. 

As I explained in my written testimony, over the course of my 

career, I’ve become more and more concerned about the impact of 

qui tam investigations and litigation on small businesses, small 

providers, all of whom we rely on for, on the one hand, employment; on the other, care. These entities operate in a complex regulatory environment, an environment often made even more complex 

by perhaps unintentionally vague and ambiguous terminology and 

regulations. 

It could even be that one man’s heartfelt belief that his interpretation of a regulation is correct—let’s say a whistleblower’s belief— 

happens to be incorrect. And more often than not, in healthcare 

cases, these types of disagreements or allegations of regulatory 

fraud arise when everyone agrees that high-quality care and highquality products have been delivered to sick patients. 

My concern isn’t for the types of cases Mr. Getnick and others 

on the relators’ side always point to, successes like Mr. Cohen 

pointed to in his opening statement. During my time at DOJ, I 

handled cases like those, big ones. I helped to advance new theories 

of law. I helped to uncover frauds. I’m proud of that time. 

My concern, though, is that qui tam litigation itself is too blunt 

an instrument to be wielded as freely as it is. Today, the Justice 

Department leaves it to defendants to fight to dismiss unfounded 

qui tam lawsuits. Eight out of 10 cases—even after the 1986 

amendments, even after the 2009 amendments—8 out of 10 cases 

are cases the victim of the fraud does not pick up. 

There are a handful of examples, to which Mr. Getnick and his 

colleagues refer, which are cases where the government has continued an investigation alongside a piece of declined qui tam litigation, and those cases often result in significant recoveries. But 

that’s where the partnership continues. 
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My main concern is for companies like the companies I’ve outlined in my written testimony, employers who get caught up in investigations and litigation and can’t fund the defense because of 

how expensive litigation has become today; not for Pfizer, not for 

the big companies that can defend themselves, but for the small 

companies. The Justice Department has, as a matter of practical 

policy, decided not to take on those whistleblower cases but to 

leave it to the defendant to fight them to move to dismiss. 

Those are—those are defendants. Those are targets for whom I 

would ask that the Subcommittee take a second look at the statute, 

take a second look at enforcement practices, and take a look at disclosure policies or disclosure programs like Mr. Thompson has discussed. 

Before my time runs out, I want to comment on the disclosure 

regime. What we’ve heard from today and what we often hear from 

the relator’s bar is that there’s a presumption that inside cheating 

companies, it’s always the boss who’s the head cheat. The presumption isn’t that the boss would like to weed it out. The presumption 

isn’t—isn’t that a disclosure program would help the boss to convince others to weed it out. 

That’s not my experience. My experience is different. 

The Federal Government has a number of self-report programs, 

none of which dovetail well with the False Claims Act. Today, the 

Justice Department has recently announced, under the Foreign 

Corrupt Practices Act, that companies who are investigated or companies who have—who find problems under the Foreign Corrupt 

Practices Act, should come forward, make disclosures, and there 

are significant incentives to bring those companies forward—or to 

bring problems forward to the government and to cooperate in investigations. 

That’s just one example. There are many more where there are 

clear incentives and the programs are working. The False Claims 

Act doesn’t have such an incentive, and it should. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Diesenhaus follows:] 
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Mr. FRANKS. And I thank you, Mr. Diesenhaus. 

And we will now begin questions, and I will begin by recognizing 

myself for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Burke, you had mentioned in your testimony that you had 

been offered a settlement from the Department of Justice, and I 

guess the first question is, what was the process that caused you 

to answer that question ‘‘no’’? I mean, why did you reject that settlement? And in the end, wouldn’t it have been—you know, the 

question occurs, would it have been cheaper for you to accept the 

offer, given the man hours used in the investigation and the overall 

legal costs? 

Mr. BURKE. Well, thank you for that question. Yes, we were offered a settlement, and it came probably sort of mid in the investigation where some of the—I think there was a understanding of 

generally what was involved, but the fine details had not really 

been arrived at. We were offered a $750,000—and their term— 

rough justice settlement. 

Our decision was a hard one. In fact, it was very tempting. We 

had board members that felt that this was the way to go and—but 

we had others that, as we looked at what we did, we thought, you 

know: This is not right, because there is a stigma that goes with 

a settlement. And, frankly, if we had settled, I wouldn’t be here 

testifying today. We would be another check in the success column 

of the FCA and with no ability to really tell our story and what 

the issue was. 

And so we chose not to. We chose to go forward, even though it probably cost us an extra $250,000 in legal fees in order to continue the process to get to the point where both the Department 

of Justice and the State Medicaid Fraud Unit dismissed the claim. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Burke. 

Mr. Thompson, if organizations are given some type of benefit or 

incentive for having a high-quality ethics and compliance program 

in place, when an FCA violation is identified, how then would DOJ 

distinguish between those that simply implement a program and 

those who seek to make the program an ongoing priority? 

Mr. THOMPSON. I’ll turn this on this time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to compliment the Department 

of Justice. The Criminal Division has recognized that having an effective compliance program can play an important role in making 

a prosecuting decision, and they have brought in a person who is 

an expert in compliance programs, and to look at whether or not, 

from the collateral consequence standpoint, or even from the standpoint of making a decision, if a company has a bona fide terrific 

gold-plated compliance program, then it shouldn’t be excessively 

punished because of the acts of one bad employee. The Criminal Division recognizes this. 

And I—what I want to focus on is prevention. If you have a bona 

fide high-quality compliance program—and that was the purpose of 

the blue ribbon panel—you can make a terrific difference in prevention, and prevention should be something, whatever side of the 

aisle you’re on, everyone would benefit from prevention: the public, 

the government, consumers, and shareholders. And I think that’s 

the kind of incentive, especially when you get to matters like selfdisclosure. 
64 

I’m concerned about the collateral consequences more than the 

damages. It’s the collateral consequences which turn a very good 

compliance program that, as our panel found, is business-specific, 

and I think we all would recognize that a business-specific program 

is better than a program that the government or some agency can 

come in and impose upon a company after the fact. 

So I think this is a very good incentive for this Committee to look 

at, and it will do more to prevent fraud than anything else. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, sir. 

Mr. Diesenhaus, I wonder if you could explain how the current 

penalty structure in the False Claims Act might coerce certain defendants to settle even those nonmeritorious FCA cases that are 

brought against them. 

Mr. DIESENHAUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. False Claims Act 

provides for treble damages plus per-claim penalties of 5,500 to 

11,000 per claim. That’s likely to go up by—there’s an—there’s a 

provision that provides for—excuse me—statute provides for an inflation increase, and I think it’s due to reset within the next year. 

In addition, in the Medicaid case, many States have False Claims 

Acts as well, so that would double the amount of the penalty. So 

you’d be looking at, in the Medicaid case, for each $100 dentist bill, 

you’d be looking at a $300 damage recovery for the government and 

11,000 to 22,000 per claim. 

For an entity the size of Mr. Burke’s hospital or some of my 

smaller clients, that risk, especially when you’ve incurred cost and 

spent the money to deliver the healthcare services, it’s too great to 

take, and often the Department will compromise to a much smaller 

number than you’d be exposed to at trial. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you all. 

My 5 minutes have expired, and I will now recognize the Ranking Member for his questions, 5 minutes. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Burke, I don’t know about your case, and I do notice in your 

testimony you say, in the end, you know, you were found not to 

have—the Justice Department surrendered, gave up, and didn’t go 

further. 

Do you know if there was a rule 11 filed for sanctions? The attorney files a rule 11 saying the other counsel had no basis for the 

action. Do you know if your attorneys filed a rule 11 request? 

Mr. BURKE. I don’t believe that they did. 

Mr. COHEN. Do you know if they filed a motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim of action? 

Mr. BURKE. I don’t believe that they did. 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Getnick, wouldn’t that have been the appropriate thing for an attorney representing his company to have done 

if it was not a claim that had any basis? 

Mr. GETNICK. I can’t speak to the specific case, but I think, as 

a general rule, what you’re pointing out is that the False Claims 

Act is replete with protective mechanisms, and you have mentioned 

two. 

Rule 11 is a rule that applies generally that if a matter is not 

well thought through, if it’s not subject to proper due diligence, 

both the party and the lawyer are subject to sanction. 
65 

Then, in addition to that, rule 9 provides an even higher standard because these cases are found in fraud and require specificity 

and particularity, which would give rise to, as you point out, a potential motion to dismiss. 

But there are even greater protections under this statute because 

the Department of Justice has the ability to move to dismiss a case 

if it believes it is not one that has appropriate validity. 

And, finally, the defendant, under 31 U.S.C. 2730 can seek further penalties from the relator if the matter is found to be clearly 

frivolous, vexatious, or primarily for the purpose of harassment. So 

this multifaceted regime is a tremendous bulwark against abuse. 

Mr. COHEN. So while you don’t know the facts of this case, and 

as I don’t either, the fact in Mr. Burke’s statement, he says, ‘‘In 

the end, it was determined we had not defrauded the government,’’ 

could it then determine that there wasn’t sufficient proof to rise to 

the level necessary, that the government felt they couldn’t get to 

the degree of proof they needed, that it may be some proof was 

missing, a witness was missing, or that just the standard was not 

sufficient, but that there was probable cause? 

Mr. GETNICK. There could be any number of reasons why the 

case did not proceed. And, you know, I have heard what Mr. Burke 

has to say today. And, frankly, it concerns me that he and his company had that experience, and I think it’s something worth taking 

into consideration, and it’s worth being concerned about. I’m concerned about it. 

Mr. COHEN. And I am, too. And Mr. Diesenhaus mentions that 

sometimes the powerful parties got so much money and that the 

other side can’t afford go forward, and that happens a lot with usually corporations having to be on the power side and not necessarily the government. 

Is there something where Mr. Diesenhaus talks—he talks about 

the smaller corporations who can’t afford the litigation; they might 

have to settle—is there a place that you all could come to a meeting of the minds to find some way to improve the statute? 

Mr. GETNICK. What concerns me is hearing that there are only 

a handful of examples of declined cases that go on to be successful. 

And while I’m concerned about what I’ve heard from Mr. Burke, I 

also recognize that that’s a case that took place 10 years ago. And 

so if we need to reach back 10 years to find that type of situation, 

that should tell us that this is not a matter of great frequency. 

On the other hand, we only have to reach back to yesterday to 

see how declined cases play a very specific and important role. One 

of cases you pointed out in your opening remarks was the Wyeth/ 

Pfizer/Protonix case. That case settled yesterday for $750 million 

after an initial Department of Justice declination and 14 years of 

work. It’s very important to realize that. 

The Department of Justice, at some point, declined, but because 

this action-forcing mechanism took place, the relator and the relator’s counsel were able to continue investigating the case, continue 

to advance the case and prove it up. Then the Department of Justice said, ‘‘Wait a moment. This is a case we have to become involved in,’’ and then we see that yesterday that Wyeth/Pfizer is 

going to pay $413 million to the United States; the participating 

States, $371 million. And those companies are not denying the gov-
66 

ernment’s allegations of alleged illegal bundling and pricing violations. 

So that case was successfully defended on a motion to dismiss, 

and zero dollars would have come out without the whistleblowers 

and their lawyers pursuing that case after DOJ declined. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you. Let me ask one last question. Is the 

Getnick in Getnick & Getnick your father, your brother, your wife, 

your son? 

Mr. GETNICK. Well, that’s an interesting question. It’s very much 

my father, who I spoke about. 

Mr. COHEN. Okay. 

Mr. GETNICK. But my brother, Michael Getnick, is counsel to the 

firm, and my wife, Margaret Finerty, is also a partner in the law 

firm. 

Mr. COHEN. Family affair. 

Mr. FRANKS. That keeps it in the family, yes, sir. 

I now recognize the Ranking Member of the full Committee, Mr. 

Conyers, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the witnesses here. Let me start off with Mr. 

Thompson. Shouldn’t Congress preserve strong qui tam provisions 

as a core feature of the False Claims Act because it incentivizes uncovering fraud? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Good afternoon, Congressman. 

Mr. CONYERS. Greetings. 

Mr. THOMPSON. It’s good to be here, and it’s been a pleasure 

working with you all these many years. 

I think that Congress should make certain that the False Claims 

Act remains a strong Act. As I said in my—as I said in my opening 

statement, the False Claims Act is a very important antifraud tool. 

But what we talked about with Mr. Cohen’s questions about the 

protective mechanisms and Mr. Getnick’s responses, the concern 

that I have when we’re dealing with collateral consequences to 

business—businesses, present responsibility determinations, corporate integrity agreements, there is absolutely no protective measures for companies who are mistreated or run roughshod over by 

the government. These decisions are made ad hoc. 

All the leverage is with the government. There is—it’s virtually 

impossible for a business to challenge a collateral consequence determination by a government agency, so we need these protections. 

I think we can—Congressman, I think we can have those protections, and I think the False Claims Act can remain a very effective 

and important antifraud tool. 

Mr. CONYERS. Okay. 

Mr. Getnick, let me throw the same consideration to you. What 

do you think about preserving strong qui tam provisions? 

Mr. GETNICK. Thank you, Congressman. 

I don’t think that there is any mutual exclusivity, if you will, between encouraging business-driven integrity and a strong False 

Claims Act. In fact, if business-driven integrity is creating compliance within companies, then there won’t be False Claims Act violations leading to liability and damages. 

I don’t think the problem is with companies that have serious 

business-driven integrity programs of the type that Mr. Thompson 
67 

is talking about today. The problem is companies that have what 

I would describe as law-driven compliance programs, which are 

meeting certain predefined benchmarks, but they’re adopted to 

avoid punishment, and they’re only grudgingly tolerated by executives and employees. And if the company doesn’t develop a deeply 

rooted culture of integrity, then it results in corporate lawyers telling corporate executives how to design a compliance program that 

meets some set of objective tests so that they can enjoy the benefits 

of reduced liability. 

But what Mr. Thompson and I think what Mr. Diesenhaus is 

talking about, frankly, is a potentially better world where we have 

business-driven integrity programs that are much likely to prove 

more effective. And I probably should take a moment and say I 

identified myself as testifying in the capacity as chairman of Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund, but I’m also the managing 

partner of Getnick & Getnick, and our firm has a dedicated business-integrity counseling side in addition to our antifraud litigation 

side. 

So this is very near and dear to me, because if you can encourage 

business driven integrity, then you have something that may prove 

more effective because business people from the top down, not just 

the legal department, I’m talking the C suite, the chairman, they 

embrace and promote that program as essential to the long-term 

success of the enterprise, and then it can be viewed throughout the 

company as a profit center and a competitive advantage. 

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Getnick, let me just ask you: If the Federal 

legislature were to weaken qui tam provisions in the False Claims 

Act, what do you think—what kind of result would we have there? 

Mr. GETNICK. Look, it would be awful. It’s just that simple. Because a program that is producing violations has to be judged on 

its results, not that some list of checkmarks took place where somebody says: Hey, I met the standard. 

In the end, the standard is: Are you defrauding the government, 

or are you not defrauding the government? And if you’re defrauding the government, you need a powerful False Claims Act that 

does it best. 

Mr. CONYERS. Do you agree, Mr. Thompson? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes. As I said, I think we should have a powerful 

and effective False Claims Act, but we need to focus on predictability and certainty when it comes to these collateral consequences 

that businesses come into play when there’s a False Claims Act 

issue. This is completely—completely, in a way, different than the 

False Claims Act in the sense that it follows the False Claims Act 

and it needs to be addressed because we need to do a better job 

at prevention, Congressman. 

Mr. GETNICK. May I just add one thing to that? So I teach a 

whistleblower law class at Cornell, and this Monday was the session on compliance. And, actually, I was hoping that Mr. Thompson 

would have been our guest lecturer. Due to a conflict, the students 

had to have the weak substitute of my speaking to them instead. 

And I completely concur with this approach of encouraging companies to get it right because the alternative is to have the government come in with a deferred prosecution agreement and a monitoring program that is a nightmare. And, in fact, when we teach 
68 

the class, we start out and say: Look at what a monitoring agreement looks like and be lawyers who are ready to show that to your 

client and to convince them they don’t want a monitoring agreement. What they want is a business-driven integrity program that 

gets it right coming from a culture of integrity and understands 

that, by doing good, you can do well and that good conduct is good 

business. 

And if you read the testimony of Mr. Thompson, you will see that 

is precisely the conclusions that he and his colleagues have come 

to and which I share. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to the witnesses very much. 

Mr. FRANKS. Let me also add my thanks to the witnesses and to 

the audience for being here. This is always one of the more enlightening venues because you have people on different sides that really 

know what they’re talking about, so it’s been very enlightening testimony, and I appreciate it. 

And this concludes today’s hearing. 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Chair, before you finish. 

Mr. FRANKS. Please. 

Mr. COHEN. Can I ask, without objection, that we have some 

hearing oversight on the False Claims Act testimony by Mr. Stephen Kohn, K-o-h-n, executive director of National Whistleblowers 

Center, into the record? 

Mr. FRANKS. Without objection. 

[The material referred to follows:] 
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Mr. FRANKS. So now this concludes today’s hearing, and I want 

to again, thank you all for attending. 

Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to 

submit additional written questions for the witnesses or additional 

materials for the record. 

I thank the witnesses. I thank the Members, and I thank the audience. And this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:28 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 
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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD
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Prepared statement of the Honorable Steve Cohen, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Tennessee, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice 
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f 
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Addendum to the testimony of Dennis E. Burke, President & CEO, 

Good Shepherd Health Care System 
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Fraud Statistics from the U.S. Department of Justice 
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f 
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Office of Inspector General (OIG) Updated Criteria for 

Section 1128(b)(7) Exclusion Authority 
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Prepared statement of Matthew Solomson, Chief Legal Officer, 

Federal Government Services of Anthem, Inc. 
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