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96–240 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–49] 

THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S DEAL 

WITH IRAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR 

MISSILE DEFENSE AND 

NONPROLIFERATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

SEPTEMBER 10, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

TIM MORRISON, Counsel 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

MIKE GANCIO, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ............................................................................ 3 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Almont, Christopher J., Senior Defense Intelligence Expert, Defense Intelligence Agency ...................................................................................................... 6 

Klotz, Lt Gen Frank G., USAF (Ret.), Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration .............................................................................................. 3 

Scher, Hon. Robert M., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, 

and Capabilities, U.S. Department of Defense .................................................. 5 

Shepro, Maj Gen Steven M., USAF, Vice Director for Strategic Plans and 

Policy, J5, Joint Staff ........................................................................................... 8 

Syring, VADM James D., USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency ..................... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Almont, Christopher J. ..................................................................................... 43 

Klotz, Lt Gen Frank G. .................................................................................... 28 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 25 

Scher, Hon. Robert M. ...................................................................................... 33 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Letter from Mr. Thornberry and Mr. Nunes to Secretary of State, Secretary of Energy, and Director of National Intelligence ............................ 49 

Two charts on U.S. missile defense funding to Israel ................................... 51 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 59 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 55 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 60 

(1) 

THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S DEAL WITH IRAN: 

IMPLICATIONS FOR MISSILE DEFENSE AND 

NONPROLIFERATION 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, September 10, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. Good afternoon. I call this Subcommittee on Strategic Forces to order. And this afternoon we are here to discuss 

‘‘The Obama Administration’s Deal with Iran: Implications for Missile Defense and Nonproliferation.’’ 

We have testifying today a distinguished panel of witnesses. 

They are the Honorable Frank Klotz, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; the Honorable Robert Scher, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, the 

U.S. Department of Defense [DOD]; Christopher Almont, Senior 

Defense Intelligence Expert, Iran and the Arabian Peninsula, Middle East Africa Regional Center, Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA]; 

Vice Admiral James Syring, Director of Missile Defense Agency 

[MDA]; and Major General Steven Shepro, Vice Director of Strategic Plans and Policy, J5, Joint Staff. 

I want to note that the subcommittee invited a witness from the 

State Department to testify today. We were told in writing that he 

was available. He would be watching us even now from his office 

since his schedule was open. However, he is not here today. I understand that senior officials at the State Department decided not 

to send him because the Department isn’t ready to discuss implementation. 

Well, I think every member of this subcommittee should be angered by the disrespect which this membership and our witnesses 

have been treated by the State Department. Moreover, the entire 

Congress, as it prepares to vote on the Iran agreement, should be 

bothered that we are being asked to vote on this agreement and 

Department of State won’t discuss how it will be implemented. 

With that unpleasantness aside, I will move to the joint hearing. 

In February of 2014, Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, 

a lead negotiator of the Iran agreement whose record reflects she 

also gave us the Agreed Framework with North Korea that gave 
2 

the Kim family its nuclear weapons arsenal, stated in testimony 

before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that, quote, ‘‘It is true 

that in these first 6 months we have not shut down all of their production of any ballistic missile that could have anything to do with 

delivery of a nuclear weapon, but that is indeed something that has 

to be addressed as a part of a comprehensive agreement,’’ closed 

quote. 

Now, let me repeat that, quote, ‘‘But that is indeed something 

that has to be addressed as a part of a comprehensive agreement,’’ 

closed quote. 

We all know what has happened to Iran, Russia, and China instead. In July, the President’s senior military advisor, General 

Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified, 

quote, ‘‘Under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on Iran 

relative to ballistic missile capabilities and arms trafficking,’’ closed 

quote. 

I want to repeat that. ‘‘Under no circumstances’’ is what he said. 

Why is this important? As stated by your senior DOD leadership, 

the ban on technology for ballistic missiles was critical to America’s 

own security, especially since Iran’s ballistic missiles would be dangerous weapons if they were ever equipped with chemical, biological, or even nuclear warheads. 

Even if we assume the Iranians will honor the nuclear agreement, which we would be foolish to assume, we are paying no attention here to the chemical and biological weapons programs. Just 

this weekend, according to press reports, 45 Emirati soldiers fighting Iranian proxies in Yemen were killed by a ballistic missile with 

a conventional warhead. We don’t have missile defense solely because the bad guys may have nuclear capability. 

I will read an excerpt from the most recent arms control compliance report on Iran: 

‘‘Based on available information, the United States cannot certify 

whether Iran has met its chemical weapons production facility declaration obligations, destroyed its specialized chemical weapons 

equipment, transferred CW’’—chemical weapons—‘‘or retained an 

undeclared chemical weapons stockpile. The JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] ignores this violation and provides Iran 

more funding for chemical and biological weapons. Iran is also not 

in compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention, the ballistic 

missiles it needs to deliver them.’’ 

I also want to indicate my strong agreement with the letter sent 

by Chairman Thornberry and House Permanent Select Committee 

on Intelligence Chairman Devin Nunes last week, which I will add 

to the record, that this agreement appears to have already started 

the cascade of proliferation in the Middle East. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 49.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Unfortunately, I can’t say much more in this environment, but I believe Secretary Kerry owes this body information 

before we vote. Chairman Thornberry and Chairman Nunes asked 

for a response by this past Tuesday, and that response has not 

been provided. 

I have stated before that I believe the administration concealed 

material information concerning Russia’s violation of the INF [In-
3 

termediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty from the United States 

Congress while the Senate was considering the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty in 2010. I have come to the same 

conclusion about this. 

I will cast my vote against the JCPOA, but I do not believe that 

the President will heed any call from this Congress about this legacy deal for him. We have a constitutional law professor as a President who seems to be unfamiliar with the Constitution’s checks 

and balances, so we must all turn to cleaning up the mess that is 

being created and what is going to be required to fix it. I only hope 

that generations to come will not pay too high a price for the mistake of this President and what he is doing now. 

Before turning to the ranking member for any opening statements that he may make, I want to remind all my colleagues who 

attended this morning’s classified session on Iran’s malign activities that that was a highly classified briefing, and details from this 

morning should not be discussed in this open session. We will adjourn to a closed briefing at the conclusion of this open hearing, 

and at that appropriate venue we can have discussion of those details. 

And, with that, I turn to my friend and colleague from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper, for any opening statement that he may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 25.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

TENNESSEE, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I, too, welcome the witnesses, and I appreciate this opportunity 

to hear from them. 

Let me emphasize the word ‘‘hear.’’ This is called a hearing. It 

is not a press conference. We call it a hearing so that we can hear 

from the witnesses, which I look forward to doing. 

And I would just urge the chairman and other colleagues who 

may come that we make this open portion as brief as possible so 

that we can get to the classified session, because I think that will 

be also much more useful as well as less risky in terms of what 

people around the world may hear. 

This is the third briefing on Iran today, and it is the only one 

to have an open portion. So, with that, I would particularly urge 

my chairman and my colleagues to keep this open session as short 

as possible so that we can get to the classified session. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I concur with that view. 

General Klotz, we will start with you, if you could summarize 

your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN FRANK G. KLOTZ, USAF (RET.), ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

General KLOTZ. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member 

Cooper. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA, reached between the P5+1 
4 

[China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United 

States, plus Germany], the European Union, and Iran. 

Let me state right up front, the Department of Energy [DOE] 

and the National Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA] value 

your robust support and abiding support for our mission and for 

our people. In that regard, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss 

a critical component of our overall mission, specifically our support 

to the International Atomic Energy Agency, or the IAEA. The 

IAEA, as you know, has a special responsibility in monitoring and 

verifying the nuclear-related measures detailed in the JCPOA. 

I have provided a written statement, and I respectfully request 

that it be submitted for the record. 

As Secretary of Energy Moniz has said, the JCPOA prevents Iran 

from acquiring a nuclear weapon, and it provides strong 

verification measures that would give us ample time to respond if 

Iran chooses to violate its terms. It is a very good deal for America, 

for our allies, and for our global security. And I fully share his view 

and this view. 

The Department of Energy and NNSA’s nuclear experts, national 

laboratories, and nuclear security sites were extensively involved 

throughout the negotiations, evaluating and developing technical 

proposals in support of the U.S. delegation. As a result of their 

work, Secretary Moniz has said that he is confident that the technical underpinnings of the JCPOA are solid and that the Department stands ready to assist the IAEA in its implementation. 

Let me take a moment to discuss, as you requested, the Department’s important work with the IAEA on nuclear safeguards. 

Safeguards are defined as the set of technical measures applied 

by the IAEA to independently and objectively verify that a state’s 

nuclear material is accounted for and not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives. Safeguards also provide credible 

assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. 

These technical measures include, for example, on-site inspection; nuclear material accountancy; physical measurements; facility 

design information verification; containment using tamper-indicating tags and seals; surveillance, including the use of cameras; 

and environmental sampling. 

DOE and NNSA have closely cooperated with the IAEA’s Department of Safeguards for many decades in developing and enhancing 

these measures. The full range of our involvement with the IAEA 

is actually described in this recently just hot-off-the-press brochure 

prepared by the NNSA, and we have ample copies here for members and for staff if you choose to take one. 

Our work with the IAEA also includes funding, training, technology transfers, and expertise. In fact, since 1980, every new 

IAEA inspector has had nuclear materials measurement training 

at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. And, every year, the Department hosts additional specialized training courses for IAEA inspectors and analysts both here and abroad. 

Our partnership with the IAEA has also generated various technologies for use in safeguard systems. For example, the Online Enrichment Monitor, the OLEM, is one example of the technology 

jointly developed by our national laboratories and the IAEA. The 
5 

OLEM can continuously monitor the enrichment levels of uranium 

in gaseous forms at a centrifuge enrichment plant. And, for the 

first time, as a result of this JCPOA, the OLEM will be used in 

Iran. 

Sir, I would be very happy to provide any additional information 

on our involvement in response to any questions you may have, either in this open session or in the closed session. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General Klotz can be found in the 

Appendix on page 28.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Scher. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. SCHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY, PLANS, AND CAPABILITIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary SCHER. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, 

and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity 

to testify on missile defense and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 

Action, or the JCPOA. I am grateful for this committee’s consistent 

attention to and continuing support of the critical mission of defending our homeland, our deployed forces, allies, and partners. 

I, too, have submitted written testimony for the record so will 

look to keep these opening remarks relatively brief. 

I would like to start by repeating what Secretary Carter has 

noted. The JCPOA places no limitations on the Department of Defense; no restrictions on our plans, programs, capabilities, or what 

we can do with our friends and allies. 

For decades, we have focused on and prioritized the totality of 

challenges that Iran poses to our interests. The Department has organized itself to deal with Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities 

through our preparations, partnerships, force posture, and plans. 

I am happy to speak today about our missile defense policies, 

but, as you had noted, nonproliferation programs and sanction regimes fall outside of my portfolio, so I will have to defer those questions. 

As you have been briefed, the JCPOA is a nuclear deal, not a ballistic missile deal. As such, it does not obviate the need for ballistic 

missile defenses, and it does not change our programs or plans for 

continued cooperation on missile defense. 

Iran has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle 

East and today can strike targets throughout the region and into 

Eastern Europe. While Iran has not yet developed an intercontinental ballistic missile [ICBM], its progress on space-launch vehicles provides Iran the means to develop longer-range missiles. 

There is no doubt in my mind that Iran’s ballistic missile activities continue to pose a risk to the United States and our allies and 

partners in Europe, Israel, and the Gulf. However, this is exactly 

why the United States has maintained a robust missile defense 

posture throughout the region and why we have focused on missile 

defense cooperation with these same partners and allies. 

I also want to reaffirm that the U.S. homeland is currently protected against potential limited ICBM attacks from Iran should 

they deploy such a capability in the future. We continue to 
6 

strengthen our homeland defense posture and invest in technologies which better enable us to address emerging threats in the 

next decade, including continued improvement to the GroundBased Midcourse Defense [GMD] system and the redesigned kill 

vehicle for the Ground-Based Interceptor [GBI]. 

Secondly, the administration continues to recognize the regional 

Iranian ballistic missile threat and remains committed to strengthening regional missile defenses. As President Obama stated in 

Prague on April 5, 2009, and I quote, ‘‘Iran’s nuclear and ballistic 

missile activity poses a real threat, not just in the United States 

but to Iran’s neighbors and our allies. As long as the ballistic missile threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost-effective and proven.’’ 

In 2009, we went on to state that the European Phased Adaptive 

Approach would have the ability to defend all of NATO Europe 

from Iranian ballistic missiles, and that commitment remains. 

Outside of NATO, we are working closely both operationally and 

on counter-ballistic missile development with Israel to address the 

Iranian ballistic missile threat. We are currently codeveloping missile defense technology with Israel on Iron Dome, David’s Sling, 

and the Arrow systems. Since 2001, we have provided over $3 billion for missile defense to Israel. 

As the Secretary also recently noted with Prime Minister 

Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Ya’alon, we are full speed 

ahead on addressing these issues in collaboration with our Israeli 

counterparts. 

The Department also continues to implement the deployment of 

missile defenses that are tailored to the security circumstances in 

the Middle East with a number of Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] 

states, which I detail in my written statement. During the Secretary’s recent discussions with the Saudi Minister of Defense, we 

reiterated our commitment to working with Gulf countries on missile defense, specifically emphasizing the importance of collective 

BMD [ballistic missile defense] among the GCC countries, the importance of interoperability, and a common intelligence picture. 

Members of the subcommittee, to conclude, I want to reiterate 

that, regardless of any deal, the Department will continue to improve our homeland defense capabilities against any potential Iranian ballistic missile threat; maintain a robust BMD posture 

throughout threatened regions, including the Middle East and Europe; and will focus on increasing cooperation with those same 

partners and allies to deter against and respond to any potential 

Iranian aggression. 

I look forward to answering your questions in this session or, 

when necessary, in the following closed session. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Scher can be found in the 

Appendix on page 33.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you. 

Mr. Almont, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER J. ALMONT, SENIOR DEFENSE 

INTELLIGENCE EXPERT, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

Mr. ALMONT. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and members of the subcommittee. I thank you for the 
7 

opportunity to offer testimony today regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, and implications for Iran’s 

missile defense and nonproliferation. 

Iran continues to be a threat to regional stability, as its regime’s 

national interests often diverge with U.S. and our regional allies’ 

security priorities in this dynamic and turbulent region. Understanding Tehran’s support to terrorists and subnational armed 

groups as well as its military capabilities and regional ambitions 

are a priority for DIA’s analysts and collectors. For years to come, 

we expect Iran to be a difficult target. 

For Iran, its national security strategy remains to ensure the regime’s survival, expand its regional influence, and enhance 

Tehran’s military deterrence and regional superiority. 

Iran’s ballistic missile capability will continue to threaten U.S. 

strategic interests in the Middle East. Iran’s overall defense strategy relies on a substantial inventory of theater ballistic missiles capable of striking targets throughout the region. Iran will continue 

to develop more sophisticated missiles and is improving the range 

and accuracy of its current missile systems irrespective of JCPOA 

implementation. 

Iran publicly stated that it intends to launch a space-launch vehicle as early as this year. This vehicle would be capable of intercontinental ballistic missile ranges if configured as an ICBM. 

Post-JCPOA economic growth could provide Tehran more money 

for ballistic missile development, but engineering and infrastructure challenges will remain. U.N. [United Nations] restrictions on 

ballistic-missile-related sales and purchases will remain in place 

for 8 years following adoption day or until the IAEA reaches its 

broader conclusion, whichever is sooner. 

After the U.N. restrictions end, international and domestic tools, 

such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, or MTCR, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and U.S. export controls will still 

apply, and the U.S. will retain its ability to impose missile-related 

sanctions under nonnuclear sanctions authorities, including Executive Orders 12938 and 13382. 

In addition, secondary sanctions will continue to attach to foreign 

financial institutions and other persons that engage in transactions 

with Iranian missile proliferators sanctioned by the Department of 

the Treasury. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity to discuss these 

important topics. I look forward to the subcommittee’s questions 

and a more detailed discussion in the closed session. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Almont can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Almont. 

Admiral Syring, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF VADM JAMES D. SYRING, USN, DIRECTOR, 

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY 

Admiral SYRING. Thank you, Mr. Rogers. Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Cooper, thank you for the opportunity to be here today 

and specifically address missile-defense-related questions. 

I will save time and save my comments for the Q&A [question 

and answer] period. Again, thank you for the invitation. 
8 

Mr. ROGERS. How do you like that, Mr. Cooper? 

Mr. COOPER. That is good. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thought you would like that. 

General, no pressure. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN STEVEN M. SHEPRO, USAF, VICE DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY, J5, JOINT 

STAFF 

General SHEPRO. Very quick. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, 

Ranking Member Cooper, and members of this subcommittee. I 

likewise appreciate the opportunity to address your questions regarding the military implications of the Joint Comprehensive Plan 

of Action. 

The Joint Staff will remain concerned with over all of Iran’s destabilizing activities within the region, among which is its expanding ballistic missile inventory and technology that Assistant Secretary Scher just underlined. 

To address these concerns, we will preserve the military options 

at our disposal. We will likewise preserve our posture and engagements with our longstanding partners in the region to assure our 

mutual security. 

I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, thank you. 

I will recognize myself first. 

General Klotz, you heard my reference to the DOE and State Department letters that Thornberry and Nunes sent. Do you have 

anything that you can tell us on the status of our response, when 

are we going to get a response? 

General KLOTZ. Mr. Chairman, I understand that they are being 

actively worked within both departments as we speak. 

Mr. ROGERS. So, no. All right. 

General, let me stay with you just a minute. Is it correct the socalled 123 Agreement between the U.S. and the Emirates would 

prohibit possession of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology by that country? 

General KLOTZ. I believe that is correct. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, is it correct that we have been seeking an 

agreement with Saudi Arabia for the same so-called gold-standardtype agreement? 

General KLOTZ. That, sir, I think is something, since it is an ongoing discussion, that we ought to discuss in the closed session, if 

I could defer to that. 

Mr. ROGERS. I will do that. 

Mr. Almont, I may get the same response from you, but are you 

aware of any information concerning intentions of the UAE [United 

Arab Emirates] or Saudi Arabia regarding their plans to develop 

uranium enrichment capabilities? 

Mr. ALMONT. And I, too, would like to defer until the—— 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. 

Admiral Syring, are you aware of any discussions post-JCPOA of 

changing the deployment of Phase 3 of the EPAA in Poland? 

Admiral SYRING. No, sir, I am not aware of any changes. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 
9 

Mr. Scher, as the senior DOD witness here today, are you able 

to pledge without hesitation that the administration will make no 

changes whatsoever to the employment of the Aegis Ashore site in 

Romania and Poland as consequences of JCPOA? 

Secretary SCHER. Currently, our plan stands as it always has, 

which is to make those deployments as you have discussed. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

Mr. Cooper, you are recognized. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am so looking forward to the classified session, I thought I would do what I could 

to expedite our movement to 2337. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Lamborn, you are recognized. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

Well, I do think this is an important issue that has public ramifications, as well as secure ramifications that we can talk about in 

closed session. So I want to talk about some things here openly and 

in public that I am curious about and the American people might 

be curious about. 

Mr. Scher, you talked about that with the Israelis and joint missile defense projects that things were, quote, ‘‘We are full speed 

ahead.’’ 

Now, one thing that seems like a disconnect to me is that, when 

it comes to coproduction of the Arrow 3 and David’s Sling, Israel 

has requested that, but we have made no response that I am aware 

of, and the administration provided no budget—no money for it in 

its budget. 

Can you address coproduction of the Arrow 3 and David’s Sling? 

Secretary SCHER. I will briefly, but then Admiral Syring has that 

budget under his control, so I will ask for details from him. 

But, in fact, my understanding is we continue to work together 

with the Israelis to identify what we need to do in terms of production, coproduction, and how much money we work together with in 

terms of how much we transfer to the Israelis as part of the MDA 

budget and that that continues to go along, based on Secretary 

Carter’s recent visit to Israel, as had been planned. 

So I would ask Admiral Syring, if that is okay, sir, Congressman, 

to fill in the details on what that cooperation actually looks like. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, but I may come back to you on this. 

Secretary SCHER. Sure. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Admiral. 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, let me take that. 

There is ongoing dialogue and negotiations specifically on the David’s Sling coproduction agreement, which is very important for us 

and very important for Israel. It is weeks away in terms of draft, 

probably months away in terms of final. But we had great success 

with the Iron Dome coproduction agreement; I expect similar success with David’s Sling. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you for that information. 

What about Arrow 3 coproduction? 

Admiral SYRING. That would follow David’s Sling, sir. We are focused on David’s Sling today, as that will be the next system fielded and operational. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. All right. Thank you for that. I appreciate 

it. 
10 

And back to you, Mr. Scher. The President requested approxi- mately $155 million for Israeli missile defense in the fiscal year 

2016 budget request, but Israel’s actual needs were approximately 

$475 million. 

This seems like a three-to-one underfunding to me, only funding 

one-third of what appears to be the actual need. Can you discuss 

that? 

Secretary SCHER. I know that we work very closely with the 

Israelis to try to figure out what the best funding approach is for 

our support to their programs and the ones that we do coproduction for. 

The President forwarded to the Congress the figure that you talked about. We have had, I think, over $3 billion of cooperation 

up to this point. We have, approximately, I think, overall, about 

half a billion dollars in the next fiscal year development plan for 

cooperation with Israel. And I would say that that is a negotiation 

to go on between Congress and the White House as to what the 

final number looks like. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. 

And changing subjects slightly, we have heard from the administration about missile defense integration and interoperability. We 

have been told that much of this will work through organizations 

like the Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC. 

However, there seem to be problems that are coming up. In an 

article called ‘‘Little Progress Made on Integrated GCC Missile 

Shield,’’ we see that we haven’t even been able to achieve agreement on the establishment of a command and control center or how 

it will be operated or even shared training capabilities and foreign 

disclosure. 

Why is this not coming along better? 

Secretary SCHER. I don’t know the details of the negotiations on 

those, but what I do know is that, based on the Camp David summit, we have reenergized this approach to ensuring that the Gulf 

Cooperation Council countries are able to work more collaboratively 

together and with us. I think we have seen greater cooperation in 

the CAOC [combat air operations center] in terms of other operations, and my hope is certainly that we will continue that greater 

collaboration. 

I know that folks from my team and many others have been out 

to the Gulf recently to work on the results of the Camp David summit, and we are continuing to follow through. The early warnings 

and indications piece is the first element of what we are trying to 

do and work very closely across the regional and also Missile Defense Agency to make sure that we can get over some of the problems that we may have seen in the past on this issue. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. 

And then in my remaining little bit of time, Admiral Syring, let 

me just ask you a general question about the budget. 

If we have to resort to a continuing resolution for next year’s defense, which the House has passed but the Senate appears unable 

to pass, what would that do to missile defense, in particular, that 

is under your portfolio? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. Two items in particular: It would put 

pressure on the procurement accounts because that funding would 
11 

be limited. And, more specifically, it would not enable me to begin 

Poland MILCON [military construction] construction if the 

MILCON is tied up in the CR [continuing resolution]. And I view 

that as critically important, that we have those resources to release 

and the Army has the ability to get under contract as soon as possible, later in the first part of 2016. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. I thank you. 

And Mr. Garamendi is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

Just a question for Admiral Syring, if you could. Does the Iran 

deal change your assessment of the East Coast missile defense 

site? 

Admiral SYRING. No, sir. So I can expand if you want me to. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Would you, please? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. 

I have testified in front of this committee and others that there 

certainly is operational benefit to an East Coast field and capacity 

benefit to an East Coast field, but it is a matter of, where does that 

fit into the priorities, given limited resources on our homeland defense system? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And it would not be a priority? 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, today, in the budget, it is a lower priority 

than in making the GMD program more reliable and more complete in terms of the kill chain. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. So you remain on the same path, that it 

is a low priority and we ought to be spending our money elsewhere. 

For example, on? 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, we are focused on the improvements in the 

homeland defense program, not just in the GBI or the kill vehicle 

itself, but in the radars that we are adding, radar that we are adding in Alaska, and all the other improvements that you and I have 

talked about. 

In this year’s budget, in PB [President’s budget] 2016, sir, we are 

proposing and requesting a shift in directed energy funding, in particular—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Shift towards? 

Admiral SYRING. Towards more directed energy funding. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Oh, so directed towards directed energy. 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. And we ask for everybody’s—all four 

committees’ support with that, as we feel it imperative to get on 

with that development. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And with the East, if the legislation that we 

pass, NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] or appropriation, 

would force the money into the East Coast defense—or the East 

Coast missile defense site, that would be money that might otherwise be used for directed energy? 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, it would come across multiple parts of the 

missile defense budget. It is not cheap. The cost estimate is $3 billion to $4 billion over a period of years, and, frankly, I don’t have 

that in my budget control today. 
12 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So the other things would be the higher priorities that would be suffering on missile defense if we were to proceed with the East Coast site? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. No further questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chairman recognizes Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just a point of clarification that I was kind of surprised. 

Mr. Almont, in your testimony, you spoke about the 8-year—the 

lifting of the ban on ballistic missile technology to Iran. And you 

said words to the effect that whatever is sooner, referencing the 

IAEA. 

Did I hear you right, that the IAEA could make an assessment 

whereby that ban could be lifted early, or did I hear you wrong? 

Mr. ALMONT. In fact, I mean, I think this is—I don’t know this 

is necessarily an intelligence question. I think that the answer— 

I hate to say this, but I think that this is something that State 

could answer a little bit better, about how the IAEA could reach 

a broader conclusion. 

But, essentially, I think that there is something in the agreement 

that allows them to make an agreement—draw a conclusion about 

whether or not Iran is in compliance with the terms of the JCPOA 

and that the clock changes in terms of the arms embargo. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. I was not aware of that. So what you are 

saying is—under what circumstances would the IAEA make that 

assessment, that, in fact, that they could be accelerated in terms 

of lifting the ban on ballistic missiles? 

Mr. ALMONT. That, I don’t think I am qualified to answer that 

question. I think that is something—— 

Mr. COFFMAN. Is there somebody here that could answer that 

question? Because this is a pretty critical point. 

General KLOTZ. I would be happy to pursue that in closed session. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Well, I would like to know, is there somebody that 

could answer that question that is here? This is a very critical 

point. 

General KLOTZ. I can pursue it in closed session. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Well—— 

Mr. ROGERS. We are going to have a closed session right after 

this. 

Mr. COFFMAN. I don’t understand. Why would that be classified? 

General KLOTZ. We can take a look at what specifically is written 

in the JCPOA in terms of when the various dates, various milestones take place. 

Mr. Almont is right; there is a provision within the JCPOA for 

adoption day occurring at 8 years or when the IAEA has made the 

broader conclusion. When that takes place—that is known as transition day. When that takes place, the U.N. Security Council can 

lift its restrictions on ballistic missiles. And there is a whole series 

of other things which we can detail that would take place at transition day. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Can you point to where that is in the agreement? 

Is this one of these side agreements, or is this in the—— 
13 

General KLOTZ. No, this is in the agreement itself. 

Mr. COFFMAN. This is in the agreement. Where is that in the 

agreement? 

General KLOTZ. It is in Annex 5, which is called the Implementation Plan. And it describes in some detail specifically what will 

happen. On the copy that I have, it is the second page of Annex 

5 in the actual JCPOA, sir. 

Mr. COFFMAN. So is this anytime within—can you just tell me, 

is it anytime after this agreement is implemented that the IAEA 

then can make that assessment? Or is there a threshold in terms 

of a number of years after the implementation of the agreement 

that the IAEA is free to make that assessment? 

General KLOTZ. Well, the threshold is a list of a dozen specific 

things that Iran has to satisfy in terms of the Arak heavy water 

research reactor, heavy water production plants, enrichment capability, and so on, which it has to, as I said, it has to implement. 

And the IAEA has to verify that it has, in fact, implemented each 

of those steps, which are laid out in great detail in Annex 3 of the 

JCPOA. 

Realistically, that is going to take some time. But, no, in this 

specific thing, it is at 8 years or when that broader conclusion is 

reached by the IAEA that Iran has met its nuclear-related measures as specified in the JCPOA. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. I think the American people need to be— 

well, Congress certainly needs to know, but the American people 

need to be aware of that. I think that is very surprising. 

Mr. Almont, can you tell me about Iran’s biological and chemical 

weapons capabilities and their ability to weaponize biological and 

chemical weapons? 

Mr. ALMONT. If we can wait till the closed session, I can address 

that, sir. 

Mr. COFFMAN. That is amazing. Okay. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. I think everything is pretty much in 

closed session. And I really question the security classifications 

that are being used, that might, in fact, be politically embarrassing, and anything politically embarrassing seems to be classified. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, as Mr. Almont stated, we could have gotten 

some answers to some of your questions if the State Department 

hadn’t refused to send a witness to this hearing. 

Mr. Bridenstine is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am deeply troubled by the Obama administration’s last-minute 

concessions to Iran on lifting the conventional weapons and missile 

embargoes. 

In testimony to this subcommittee, the Defense Intelligence 

Agency stated that, quote, ‘‘Iran’s goal is to develop capabilities 

that will allow it to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons,’’ unquote. Lifting these bans makes no sense. Iran’s words and actions 

clearly show its desire, in spite of the deal, to build longer-range 

and more sophisticated ballistic missiles and proliferate them 

throughout the region. 
14 

In February, Iran conducted its fourth successful satellite launch, 

this one aboard a two-stage Safir booster. The Safir is based on the 

Shahab-3, Iran’s most advanced ballistic missile. Iran’s supposedly 

peaceful space program is simply a cover for long-range ballistic 

missile development. 

Last week, the head of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 

publicly announced plans to expand the range of Iran’s ballistic 

missiles. Iran’s President, Hassan Rouhani, declared last week that 

Iran is, quote, ‘‘not committed to the restrictions on its missile program,’’ unquote. 

Israel is Iran’s number-one target. While the administration says 

it is doing everything possible to help protect Israel, the budgetary 

record tells a different story. 

And, Mr. Scher, you talked about this when you did your opening 

statement. 

I have two charts. Could I get those up on the screen for everybody to see? And then we have handouts, as well. 

[The charts referred to can be found in the Appendix on pages 

51 and 52.] 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Can we get those up on the screen? I was told 

that we could get those up. 

Is that a no, Joy? 

Mr. ROGERS. Apparently. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. 

Well, the charts in front of you illustrate the administration’s requested funding for Israeli missile defense versus actual congressional appropriations. Congress consistently appropriates funding 

much closer to Israeli requirements. 

The first chart covers funding for all Israeli missile defense pro- grams. The President requested approximately $158 million for 

Israeli missile defense in the fiscal year 2016 budget request. The 

House and Senate Defense Appropriations bills both would appropriate Israeli missile defense at over $338 million. So it is a comparison of $158 million to $338 million, a figure much closer to 

Israel’s actual need. 

Secretary Kerry and the President like to tout the administration’s support for Israeli missile defense. Yet, year after year, the 

President’s budget request ends up much, much lower than congressional appropriations, which are much closer to Israel’s needs. 

Congress always appropriates much closer to what Israel asks us 

for based on its national security requirements. 

Mr. Scher, can you explain this difference? 

Secretary SCHER. Congressman, we appropriate with a combination of understanding of what we have worked with the Government of Israel and also understanding the other requirements for 

missile defense money that goes to protection of U.S. homeland and 

articulation of U.S. systems and U.S. programs. 

And the President’s recommendation then gets forwarded to Congress. And then we implement the funding that is eventually 

agreed to by Congress and signed out by the President. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So, when the President sends his budget request—it is now up on the screen. I think everybody can see it. 

Year after year, the President’s budget request is far below what 

Israel asks for. And, of course, Israel is very concerned because 
15 

now there is this agreement with Iran. And it is also far below 

what Congress would like. 

Is that going to change? 

Secretary SCHER. Right now, it obviously did not change for this 

year. I am not willing—I don’t know the answer to follow-on years. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. 

Let’s go to the next chart, please. 

I have particular interest in David’s Sling, as the coauthor of the 

David’s Sling Authorization Act. The President requested approximately $225 million from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2016 for 

David’s Sling. Over the same time, according to the Government of 

Israel, with which this committee agreed, the actual requirement 

was $770 million. The administration underfunded the requirement 

by one-third. 

Mr. Scher, can we expect this underfunding for David’s Sling to 

continue under the Iran deal? Is this what the administration 

means by ‘‘support of Israel’’? 

Secretary SCHER. We will continue to look at how we can better 

cooperate on David’s Sling. Admiral Syring mentioned this previously. I am happy to encourage if there are any—more details. 

But that is a newer program, and, hence, the figures and the viability of those specific figures changes as we look through. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Chairman 

Turner, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Klotz, I would like to talk to you, as our chairman has, 

about the 123 Agreements and nations who have agreements with 

the United States that may or may not be at risk. 

I know that whenever we have an open session and a closed session there is always this sensitivity between the issue of what is 

open and what is closed. So I want to ask you a question about 

that line. 

So if the UAE, the United Arab Emirates, picked up the phone 

and called Secretary Kerry and said, ‘‘We affirm our requirements 

and our agreements with the United States and our 123 Agreements and we will not pursue any uranium enrichment,’’ we could 

discuss that openly, right? Because it is just affirming an ongoing 

commitment that is there that we all know is public. 

General KLOTZ. Yes. The 123 Agreement with the United Arab 

Emirates is public. 

Mr. TURNER. But the affirmation of it, the fact that the UAE has 

no intention of reevaluating it, that there is no discussion about 

pursuing uranium enrichment, that there is no concern about the 

agreement as a result of the agreement with Iran, if all that was 

affirming, you would be able to discuss that in this meeting, right? 

Because it is all the status quo. 

General KLOTZ. You know, I don’t really know the answer to 

that, Congressman, because I am having a little difficulty following 

the question. It would—— 

Mr. TURNER. Well, let me help you. 

General KLOTZ. I suspect it would depend on how that was communicated to the United States. If it was made public by a member 
16 

state, what its intentions were, that would be something which I 

assume we could discuss. If it was something that was passed on 

in confidential—— 

Mr. TURNER. Well, let me help you. 

General KLOTZ. Yeah. 

Mr. TURNER. There are also prohibitions against lying to Congress. Do you have any information that a nation, such as United 

Arab Emirates, has contacted the United States and indicated that 

they intend to walk away from their 123 Agreement obligations 

that restrict uranium enrichment? 

General KLOTZ. I have no knowledge of that. 

Mr. TURNER. No one has informed you from the administration 

or from any other agency that they have information of that? 

General KLOTZ. Not me personally. 

Mr. TURNER. So you have had no discussions with anyone that 

anyone has related to you of their awareness or information of a 

concern of 123 Agreement and the United Arab Emirates and their 

issues with respect to uranium enrichment? 

General KLOTZ. To the best of my knowledge, no, that has not 

been a subject. I am aware of what the UAE 123 Agreement is in 

a general sense, but I have not been involved in any specific discussions on that subject. 

Mr. TURNER. I am troubled by your word ‘‘specific.’’ Have you had 

unspecific discussions? 

General KLOTZ. Congressman, I have not had any discussions or 

any special briefings on UAE 123 Agreement. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay. 

General KLOTZ. I am aware of it because it is one of the 123 

Agreements that the United States has with other nations, and I 

have read a lot in the press and in other documents about that particular agreement but not about the specific issue that you raised. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, you would certainly understand our concern, 

because, as Congress takes up the issue of the Iranian agreement, 

Secretary Kerry has made absolute statements to Congress that 

there is no one in the Middle East who will change their obligations with respect to nonproliferation or their relationship with the 

United States with respect to uranium enrichment. 

And, certainly, if anyone had information that that was other 

than how the Secretary of State has represented it, it should be 

known by decision-makers. Because they are not just voting on the 

issue of Iran; they are voting on nuclear programs by Iran and 

their neighbors. You could see why that would be a level of concern. 

General KLOTZ. I understand—I understand your point, Congressman. 

Mr. TURNER. Excellent. 

Well, we are going into closed session, and I know you have 

availed yourself of the issue of closed session. I am very concerned 

about the issue of the—as we look to the IAEA and the portions 

of the document that are secret, with the IAEA’s relationships and 

deals with Iran concerning inspections. 

Do you have information that you are going to be able to provide 

us in the closed session concerning the secret agreement that we 

have not seen? 
17 

General KLOTZ. I am willing to discuss what we know about that 

particular issue in the closed session. 

Mr. TURNER. Do you have details? 

General KLOTZ. I have information which we can discuss in the 

closed session. 

Mr. TURNER. Have you seen that agreement? 

General KLOTZ. I have not seen that agreement. 

Mr. TURNER. Yeah, that would be fairly consistent with what everyone else has done, but yet we have people who are willing to 

vote in favor of an agreement that includes secret provisions that 

no one has seen and you have not either. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the chairman. 

We can’t get into the SCIF [Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility] for 10 more minutes, so I am going to let Mr. 

Lamborn ask one more question and I am going to ask one more. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging me for 

asking one more question. 

And I will start with Admiral Syring and General Shepro. And 

my purpose isn’t to put you on the spot. My purpose is to get your 

best judgment, because this is such an important issue that we are 

voting on. It is historic. 

Were you, either of you, consulted before the negotiators, whether it was the Secretary or the President, agreed to drop the ballistic 

missile embargo on Iran as part of the JCPOA? Were either of you 

consulted about that? 

Admiral SYRING. No, sir. 

General SHEPRO. No, sir. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. And I guess that is what I assumed. Had 

you been, what concerns would you two have shared to whoever 

asked you? 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, I will take that first. 

You know, my focus in missile defense against Iran is unchanged 

by the agreement. We remained entirely focused on their rapid escalation of capability and capacity over the last several years, and 

we made absolutely the right decision to focus on regional defense 

for that potential escalation. 

And I can tell you that my job is to be pessimistic, not optimistic, 

and everything we do at the Agency is planning for that capability 

to increase and that capacity to increase at the rate it has. And, 

as far as I am concerned, we—and I have read the agreement—we 

remain focused on that very mission. 

Mr. LAMBORN. General. 

General SHEPRO. Sir, I represent the Chairman [of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff], and, as he has said on the Hill before, this agreement addresses one point of friction with Iran. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Excuse me? 

General SHEPRO. This agreement addresses one point of friction 

with Iran, the nuclear arena, and that we must keep pressure on 

the other malign activities. 

And so, as Chairman Rogers has cited in the beginning, I agree 

with the Chairman that we must continue to keep pressure on this 

area of development of ballistic missiles. 
18 

Mr. LAMBORN. And I will just make a comment. It was a nuclear 

agreement, but we all of a sudden see arms embargo lifted and ballistic missile embargo lifted, which are nonnuclear issues. I mean, 

there were enough concessions already, but then to add those on 

top of it really staggers me. 

General, don’t you have a concern about the ballistic missile embargo being lifted? 

General SHEPRO. Again, I will cite Chairman Dempsey’s previous 

statements that, in a perfect world, the embargo would remain, 

but, as it is, we remain concerned about this, and we must continue to keep pressure on this area. 

Mr. LAMBORN. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Aguilar. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Klotz and the Vice Admiral, with respect to budget and 

allocations for missile defense, is it fair to say with sequestration 

technically kicking back in in October that that would also affect 

the support that we could offer for missile defense for our allies, 

in addition to a continuing resolution that could also offer reduced 

support and aid? Is that fair to say, as well? 

General KLOTZ. Well, sir, I don’t deal with missile defense in the 

National Nuclear Security Administration. But let me just say, 

since you have created an opportunity to do that, that there are a 

number of very, very important programs that are underway within the Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration which apply to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal and posturing ourselves for the future that 

would be severely affected by sequestration or budget caps and 

without any relief from that. 

Admiral SYRING. And, sir, for missile defense, and I will just talk 

to your specific concerns on the CR, that certainly procurement account pressure would happen under the CR. But my more specific 

concern earlier was the potential impact on the MILCON for Poland and EPAA Phase 3, which gets to your point on exactly what 

are we doing with our allies and would it affect that. So the answer 

would be yes. 

And then, for sequestration, I have testified in front of this committee and others that sequestration at the levels that are being 

considered would be catastrophic to what we have proposed with 

the improvements that must be made for homeland defense and 

the regional defense systems. 

In particular, the redesigned kill vehicle and the new radar 

would be at risk, and I have testified before that I view that as 

overmatching. If those improvements aren’t made, our system could 

be overmatched by 2020. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield 

back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair is informed that Mr. Turner has one more question. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Klotz, just one more addition. I would recommend that 

you do pick up the phone and call the Secretary of State and ask 

him if there is any additional information that he should provide 
19 

to you that is inconsistent with your statements today and if there 

is any information he needs to update you on. 

General KLOTZ. Well, I will see if he will take my call. I doubt 

if an Under Secretary from the Department of Energy would necessarily get through on the first try. 

Mr. TURNER. The effort, since you put such an admirable effort 

forward here, it would probably be helpful. 

General KLOTZ. Thank you for the suggestion, Congressman. 

Mr. TURNER. General Shepro, representing, obviously, the Joint 

Staff, Admiral Syring has said an answer on the East Coast missile 

defense site, of which I am an advocate for, that I don’t criticize 

in any respect. And I think the Admiral has articulated both a 

need and a desirableness for an East Coast missile defense site but 

has recognized the fiscal constraints under which he is under and 

has, you know, identified that as a problem for executing an East 

Coast missile defense site. 

But even though I am an advocate for the East Coast missile defense site, I am obviously not the initiator of the East Coast missile 

defense site. We always, here on the Armed Services Committee, 

look to the experts, those in the military, as to what their needs 

are when we, as the Admiral has so greatly articulated, try to allocate resources. 

And, General, perhaps you could give us an articulation on the 

issue of our response to NORTHCOM [Northern Command]. 

NORTHCOM continues to include in its integrated priority list the 

need for an additional interceptor site, a third site in the United 

States defense of the homeland. 

We didn’t make this up. We are just agreeing that there is the 

need, which I think Admiral Syring has recognized the need and 

the benefits of a third site. And, in that, it is our attempt to try 

to respond to it in allocating resources. 

We are the ones who obviously have to pick where those resources come from. We are not telling the admiral, we are going 

to do this and you have to go take it from your existing programs. 

It is something that we have to find the money for. 

Could you articulate that—NORTHCOM has continued to identify it on the integrated priority list. That still sounds pretty important, isn’t it? 

General SHEPRO. Yes, sir. Important, yes. But if you want to listen to the expert, I have to defer to Admiral Syring, because he is. 

Mr. TURNER. Admiral. 

Admiral SYRING. Mr. Turner, thank you. 

It has showed up in their priority list. And I would just cite, sir, 

that it is a priority list, in terms of—there are many other requirements in that list that we are addressing. And we can go through 

that in detail, in terms of funding allocated to both NORTHCOM 

and STRATCOM’s [Strategic Command’s] priority list—— 

Mr. TURNER. But what I was looking for—and I understand your 

prior answer, Admiral, of the allocation of resources and priorities. 

But I wanted your answer—or, actually, either of your answers— 

on the issue of need. I mean, since it is showing up on the integrated party list, it is a need. Could you describe the need? 

Admiral SYRING. The need or the benefit is operational and capacity. 
20 

Mr. TURNER. And what would that be? 

Admiral SYRING. It would allow more interceptors, which is always better in terms of the warfighter, and it would allow more decision space, as both combatant commanders have testified to. 

Mr. TURNER. Explain ‘‘decision space.’’ 

Admiral SYRING. ‘‘Decision space’’ in terms of a potential threat 

from Iran, an ICBM in particular, and what that would provide in 

terms of interceptor fly-out time and future assessment capability. 

And I will just leave it at that. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, you know, I have a minute and a half left, 

and I would like to not leave it at that. 

Okay, so additional time and interceptors. Obviously, proximity 

is one, right? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. The East Coast is closer than Alaska, where the 

other missiles might be coming from. 

Admiral SYRING. Geographically. 

Mr. TURNER. Correct. 

And you said additional decision making. Well, that would also 

be an issue of what we have referred to and you have referred to 

as ‘‘shoot, look, shoot,’’ right? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. You will be able to apply an asset to incoming 

asset, have an opportunity to assess whether or not the United 

States, hundreds of thousands of Americans at risk require an additional shot, correct? 

Admiral SYRING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. So that is what you are talking about, the ability 

to shoot twice, the ability to try to take something out of the sky, 

the ability to eliminate a threat to mainland United States. 

Admiral SYRING. Sir, I would just qualify that by having a firstshot opportunity sooner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you for elaborating. 

That is all. 

Mr. ROGERS. I think that is it. 

Before we do go into closed session, though, Mr. Almont, I did 

want to ask you something I think you can answer in the open session. 

In your prepared statement, you cite Iranian claims that it would 

launch a space-launch vehicle as early as this year. And you also 

stated, this vehicle will be capable of intercontinental ballistic missile ranges if configured as an ICBM. 

Didn’t they just test that earlier this year? 

Mr. ALMONT. They did tests on the 2nd of September, I believe, 

and they have announced that they are going to attempt another 

launch of that same system sometime in the near future. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

All right. We are going to adjourn and then reconvene in 2337 

in about 5 minutes. We are in adjournment. 

[Whereupon, at 3:02 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in closed 

session.] 
A P P E N D I X 

SEPTEMBER 10, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

SEPTEMBER 10, 2015 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

SEPTEMBER 10, 2015 

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Note: Appropriated Amount is the top graph line; President’s Budget Request is the bottom 

graph line. 
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Note: Appropriated Amount is the top graph line; President’s Budget Request is the bottom 

graph line. 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

SEPTEMBER 10, 2015 

(55) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. Did you, or did any NNSA personnel, see a draft or the final version 

of the confidential agreement between the IAEA and Iran? 

a. Did the national lab ‘‘red teams’’ see the confidential agreement between IAEA 

and Iran? 

b. So, it was the case that the labs red teams relied on representations by the 

administration? Who? Which officials? General Klotz, were you one? 

c. Was the red team tasked with assessing the integrity of the IAEA agreement 

with Iran or assessing whether this regime would in fact answer the question of 

what the Iranians have done at Parchin? 

General KLOTZ. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Please explain Annex 3 of the JCPOA, which spells out the kinds 

of civil nuclear cooperation Iran can expect to receive from the United States and 

other parties to the agreement. 

a. Will Russia or China, or the IAEA for that matter, be able to provide any U.S. 

origin technology, know-how, or material to Iran? 

b. Will we provide any technology, material or know-how to Iran to ‘‘harden’’ its 

nuclear capabilities from foreign cyber capability? 

General KLOTZ. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Is there any legitimate reason for Iran to produce highly enriched 

uranium, which is to say, HEU enriched to above 4%? 

General KLOTZ. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Can you tell us who first revealed Iran’s uranium enrichment capability in 2003? Was it the IAEA? 

a. When did the U.S. first detect it? 

b. Did we share that information with the IAEA? 

c. What covert nuclear capability has even been detected by the IAEA? 

d. Would you support sharing with the IAEA all of our capabilities to detect Iranian cheating with this agreement? 

General KLOTZ. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, you were the Director for Nuclear Policy and Arms 

Control on the NSC from 2001 to 2003. Were you involved in the decision of the 

CIA to, in November 2002, provide Congress with an unclassified estimate on North 

Korea’s nuclear program that the United States had information since the early 

1990s that North Korea had more than one nuclear weapon, notwithstanding its obligations under the Agreed Framework of 1994? 

a. How should Congress ensure that no future administration is able to conceal 

evidence of cheating on these kinds of ad hoc arms control agreements? 

General KLOTZ. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. As the senior DOD witness, are you able to pledge without hesitation 

that the administration will make no changes whatsoever in the deployment of an 

Aegis Ashore site in Romania and Poland as a consequence of the JCPOA? This 

should be a yes or no answer. 

Secretary SCHER. Yes. There are no plans to change the deployment of an Aegis 

Ashore site in Romania and Poland as a consequence of the Joint Comprehensive 

Plan of Action (JCPOA). 

Mr. ROGERS. When the EPAA was announced, and the Ballistic Missile Defense 

Review were announced, were they based on an assumption of free cooperation between Iran, Russia, China and North Korea on ballistic missile defense? 

Is the administration updating its reviews of our ballistic missile posture to respond to the future Iranian ballistic missile program? 

Secretary SCHER. The Administration considered many factors in formulating its 

national ballistic missile defense (BMD) policy in 2009, including our growing capabilities, Alliance relationships, affordability, and the current and projected threat. 

The Department continuously evaluates its global missile defense posture and 

makes adjustments to account for the evolving threat, addition of new capabilities, 

and force sustainment and modernization requirements. If an Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile threat should emerge, our current deployment of GroundBased Interceptors in the United States is postured to respond in the near term. 
56 

If the threat should grow, we have developed hedge measures to bolster our homeland defense system in the future. 

Mr. ROGERS. Does DOD support the Israeli requests for U.S. support for coproduction of Arrow III and David’s Sling? No funds were in the administration budget 

request for it and we’ve heard nothing official from the administration about the 

funds provided in the Strategic Forces Mark provided in the FY16 NDAA. 

Secretary SCHER. The Department supports the current President’s Budget for 

Fiscal Year 2016 (PB2016) for coproduction of the Arrow 3 interceptor or the David’s 

Sling Weapon System (DSWS). The PB2016 for Israeli Programs was developed 

based on the U.S. assessment of the executable rate of progress for the Arrow 3 and 

the DSWS, and the U.S.-Israeli project agreements currently support the PB2016 

submittal. 

Regarding the DSWS, the additional $150.0 million funding increase for co-production may be premature given the acquisition phase of the DSWS. The Missile 

Defense Agency (MDA) budget request was developed as an integrated and balanced 

approach to meet the needs of the entire ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) 

budget profile. The Department officially responded to Congress in its July 31, 2015, 

Budgetary Appeal recommending that the $150.0 million in the House and Senate 

bills be redirected from this congressional ‘‘add’’ to restore the reductions elsewhere 

to U.S. BMDS programs. 

Concerning the Arrow-3, this co-development program is at an earlier stage of the 

development process, with additional knowledge points and technical milestones required prior to transitioning from development to production. 

Mr. ROGERS. The President requested approximately $155 million for Israeli Missile Defense in the FY16 budget request, but Israeli’s actual needs were approximately $475.2 million. Secretary Kerry and the President like to tout the administration’s support for Israeli Missile defense; how do you explain this underfunding 

then? 

a. Likewise, in FY15, the administration requested $176 million, but the actual 

requirement was $351 million. 

b. Or, David’s Sling. The President requested $46 million in FY11, $41 million in 

FY12, $38 million in FY13, $32 million in FY14, $31 million in FY15, and $37 million in FY16, or approximately $225 million. Over that same time, according to the 

government of Israel, with which this committee agreed, the actual requirement was 

$770 million. The administration underfunded the requirement by one-third. Mr. 

Scher, can we expect this underfunding to continue under the JCPOA? Is this what 

the administration means by support to Israel? 

Secretary SCHER. Our commitment to Israel is ironclad. We recognize that Israel 

faces very real missile threats from a number of actors in the region, and Israel’s 

security remains a top priority. In addition to Foreign Military Financing assistance, 

the United States has provided more than $3 billion in missile defense assistance 

to Israel since 2001. DOD has worked with Israel to develop, produce, and fund a 

multi-layered missile defense architecture that includes the Iron Dome, David’s 

Sling, and Arrow weapon systems. The President Budget request for Fiscal Year 

2016 includes Israeli programs and was developed based on the U.S. assessment of 

an executable rate of progress with the U.S.-Israeli project agreements supporting 

the budget submittal. We will continue to ensure the most effective use and efficient 

investment of U.S. taxpayer dollars for the security of our strategic partner. 

Mr. ROGERS. We’ve heard much from the administration about missile defense integration and interoperability as a solution to our own missile defense shortfalls. 

We’ve been told much of this will work through organizations like the Gulf Cooperation Council. However, based on recent reporting, it appears that is not working as 

planned. In an article ‘‘Little Progress Made on Integrated GCC Missile Shield’’, we 

see that we haven’t even been able to achieve agreement on the establishment of 

a command-and-control center, how it will be operated, or even shared training capabilities and foreign disclosure. What are the obstacles to getting this done? 

Secretary SCHER. The United States continues to engage our Gulf Cooperation 

Council (GCC) partners in pursuit of an interoperable missile defense architecture. 

At Camp David, the President pledged U.S. assistance to the GCC member States 

in their commitment ‘‘to develop a region-wide ballistic missile defense capability.’’ 

This end state will require us to progress from bilateral missile defense cooperation 

between the U.S. and its GCC partners today to a more integrated multilateral approach in which the partners are sharing sensor data, developing joint missile defense operating concepts and training together. While reaching this end state will 

not occur overnight, we believe we are on the right path working with our GCC 

partners to facilitate the purchase of U.S. missile defense systems, engaging them 

in operational discussions through USCENTCOM and supporting analytic and re-
57 

quirements assessments related to developing a ballistic missile defense architecture 

and a GCC-wide Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the likely impact on Iran’s ballistic missile program of its 

ability to test freely its ballistic missile capability? 

Mr. ALMONT. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Please explain the role that foreign ballistic missile technology has 

been assessed to play in Iran’s ICBM development? The JCPOA and resultant U.N. 

Security Council Resolution will phase out the limitations on such development, correct? 

Mr. ALMONT. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Is there any legitimate reason for Iran to produce highly enriched 

uranium, which is to say, HEU enriched to above 4%? 

Mr. ALMONT. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Can you tell us who first revealed Iran’s uranium enrichment capability in 2003? Was it the IAEA? 

a. When did the U.S. first detect it? 

b. Did we share that information with the IAEA? 

c. What covert nuclear capability has even been detected by the IAEA? 

d. Would you support sharing with the IAEA all of our capabilities to detect Iranian cheating with this agreement? 

Mr. ALMONT. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Why do you assess the Saudis are interested in purchase—in fact, 

becoming the first foreign buyer—of the Russian Iskander nuclear-capable ballistic 

missile? 

Mr. ALMONT. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. What country provided Yemen’s rebels with the ballistic missile they 

used to kill 45 UAE troops over the weekend? 

Mr. ALMONT. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. What are Iran’s biological and chemical weapons capabilities? Do you 

assess they have the capability to weaponize biological and chemical weapons? Is 

Iran behaving consistently with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention? 

Mr. ALMONT. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. In a press report ‘‘Iran Already Sanitzing Nuclear Site, Intel Warns’’, 

dated August 5, it was reported that Iran began sanitizing the Parchin site shortly 

after the JCPOA was signed. Mr. Almont, what can you tell us about the activities 

Iran undertook to sanitize the Parchin site? Was this the first time Iran has undertaken to sanitize Parchin? 

Mr. ALMONT. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Can you please describe the status of discussions with Israel concerning David’s Sling development and potential coproduction? 

Admiral SYRING. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has not commenced formal 

negotiations with the Israel Missile Defense Organization (IMDO) regarding a proposed David’s Sling Weapon System (DSWS) Production Agreement. MDA initiated 

preliminary discussions of a technical nature and provided to IMDO what MDA 

views as the basic tenets of a possible DSWS production agreement. International 

agreements typically require 9–12 months to negotiate and conclude; however our 

experience has shown that complicated agreements sometimes lead to protracted negotiations that extend that timeline. For example, the Iron Dome Procurement 

Agreement took 17 months from the start of negotiations to conclusion. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please describe the impact to our BMD (other capabilities) if you are 

forced to operate under sequester level spending or a yearlong CR? 

a. Can you articulate specific impacts to our counter-Iran posture in Europe and 

the Mideast? 

b. Is it correct then that you approve a funding level consistent with what was 

requested by the President in his budget request, such as the FY16 NDAA or FY16 

Defense Appropriations bill? 

Admiral SYRING. If forced to operate under sequestration levels, I testified earlier 

this year that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) would likely scale back or eliminate work that we started last year on the redesigned kill vehicle and the long 

range discrimination radar. Without these improvements, the country would be in 

serious jeopardy as the system would be overmatched over time. 

A. I do not envision a negative impact to our missile defense plans for Europe or 

the Middle East due to sequestration. We are committed to our North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allies and remain on track to field European Phased Adaptive Approach Phases II and III by 2015 and 2018, respectively. For the Middle East, specifically Israel, the only impact of sequestration or a yearlong CR is related to any 

procurement funding Congress may appropriate for David’s Sling or Arrow 3 produc-
58 

tion. These would be considered new starts and we would not be able to transfer 

funding to Israel even if the production agreement is negotiated and concluded. 

B. Yes, I support the President’s FY16 budget 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the likely impact on Iran’s ballistic missile program of its 

ability to test freely its ballistic missile capability? 

Admiral SYRING. I defer any questions regarding Iranian ballistic missile development and testing to the intelligence community. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please explain the role that foreign ballistic missile technology has 

been assessed to play in Iran’s ICBM development? The JCPOA and resultant U.N. 

Security Council Resolution will phase out the limitations on such development, correct? 

Admiral SYRING. I defer any questions related to the specific terms and conditions 

of the JCPOA to the U.S. Department of State and the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy, and any questions regarding Iran’s ballistic missile technology development to the intelligence community. 

Mr. ROGERS. When the EPAA was announced, and the Ballistic Missile Defense 

Review were announced, were they based on an assumption of free cooperation between Iran, Russia, China and North Korea on ballistic missile defense? 

Is the administration updating its reviews of our ballistic missile posture to respond to the future Iranian ballistic missile program? 

Admiral SYRING. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD–P) was the primary DOD-organization responsible for drafting the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. I defer to USD–P regarding the assumptions in the document and planned future updates. 

Mr. ROGERS. Have you been tasked to update your assessments of Iran’s ballistic 

and cruise missile capability now that the ballistic missile embargo and ballistic 

missile test prohibition have been, or will be, phased out? 

Admiral SYRING. No, the intelligence community is responsible for updating assessments on Iran’s ballistic and cruise missile capability. 

Mr. ROGERS. In May 2009, an unclassified intelligence report issued by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) stated, ‘‘with sufficient foreign assistance, Iran could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States 

by 2015.’’ Then, the administration changed its plans for BMD deployment because 

it claimed there was new intelligence that showed the threat from short and medium range Iranian BMs was already here. What is your best military advice for 

how lifting the embargo will affect the need for missile defenses, and how will it 

impact the rate at which Iran can make progress on an ICBM? 

Admiral SYRING. I am not in position to assess the impact of lifting the embargo. 

This is the responsibility of the intelligence community and I defer to them for any 

assessments on lifting the embargo. 

Mr. ROGERS. We’ve heard much from the administration about missile defense integration and interoperability as a solution to our own missile defense shortfalls. 

We’ve been told much of this will work through organizations like the Gulf Cooperation Council. However, based on recent reporting, it appears that is not working as 

planned. In an article ‘‘Little Progress Made on Integrated GCC Missile Shield’’, we 

see that we haven’t even been able to achieve agreement on the establishment of 

a command-and-control center, how it will be operated, or even shared training capabilities and foreign disclosure. What are the obstacles to getting this done? 

Admiral SYRING. We are working with our counterparts within the Department 

to address GCC ballistic missile early warning system requirements. To that end, 

we participated in an August 2015 meeting with the GCC to further define their 

requirements. We are using the information from this meeting to inform a top-level 

engineering analysis and expect to meet again with our GCC partners later this 

year to review the work. We also plan to issue a request for information to industry 

to enable future evaluation of sensor and command, control and communication solutions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please describe the impact to our BMD (other capabilities) if you are 

forced to operate under sequester level spending or a yearlong CR? 

a. Can you articulate specific impacts to our counter-Iran posture in Europe and 

the Mideast? 

b. Is it correct then that you approve a funding level consistent with what was 

requested by the President in his budget request, such as the FY16 NDAA or FY16 

Defense Appropriations bill? 

General SHEPRO. Sequester-level spending will have minimal impact on the overall enhancement of regional missile defense. The FY16 budget request includes adequate funding, consistent with the President’s request, to enhance our homeland 

missile defense system, increase our regional missile defense capabilities, and main-
59 

tain the Presidential commitment to the European Phased Adaptive Approach 

(EPAA). 

Mr. ROGERS. Representing the Joint Staff, can you articulate why NORTHCOM 

continues to include in its Integrated Priority List the need for an additional interceptor site—a third site—in the United States for the defense of the homeland? 

General SHEPRO. The purpose of an IPL is to identify potential priority capability 

gaps across all mission areas. An individual IPL item details a specific potential gap 

and further identifies a multitude of possible mitigation actions/solutions. 

In this case, an East Coast Site is mentioned as a potential mitigation action/solution, which is consistent with Congressional direction. However, at this time, 

USNORTHCOM does not have a requirement for an additional GMD interceptor 

site, based upon the current threat, and as further stated in testimony by 

CDRUSNORTHCOM over the past several years. 

Mr. ROGERS. Have you been tasked to update your assessments of Iran’s ballistic 

and cruise missile capability now that the ballistic missile embargo and ballistic 

missile test prohibition have been, or will be, phased out? 

General SHEPRO. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. In May 2009, an unclassified intelligence report issued by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) stated, ‘‘with sufficient foreign assistance, Iran could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States 

by 2015.’’ Then, the administration changed its plans for BMD deployment because 

it claimed there was new intelligence that showed the threat from short and medium range Iranian BMs was already here. What is your best military advice for 

how lifting the embargo will affect the need for missile defenses, and how will it 

impact the rate at which Iran can make progress on an ICBM? 

General SHEPRO. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

Mr. ROGERS. What can you tell us about the findings of the Joint Capabilities Mix 

(JCM) Study III completed approximately 4 years ago concerning our ability to respond to the Iranian ballistic missile threat? 

a. Are you familiar with the JCM IV update that’s being conducted at present? 

It will look out as far as the 2020s and beyond, right? b. Will this update take into 

account the impact of the concessions made in the JCPOA concerning Iran’s ballistic 

missile program? 

General SHEPRO. [The information is classified and retained in the committee 

files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. In FY 09 the President’s budget request for the Missile Defense 

Agency was at $9.3 Billion and based on current trend lines it could go as low as 

$7.3 Billion in FY 18. What is the impact of these diminishing funding levels to our 

ability to protect our nation and our allies if the government of Iran violates the 

terms of the nuclear deal? 

Admiral SYRING. Our President’s budget (PB) 2016 request is sufficient to keep 

us on track to meet our missile defense commitments. My biggest concern remains 

the potential impacts to the Ballistic Missile Defense System if sequestration remains in place. As previously discussed before this committee, we have ballistic missile defense capabilities deployed today that address the current North Korean and 

Iranian threat and our PB 2016 budget request puts us in position to defend against 

future Iranian ballistic missile threats including a potential intercontinental ballistic missile. If sequestration remains in place, the Department would likely need 

to delay our planned improvements with the re-designed kill vehicle and the Long 

Range Discrimination Radar. 

Mr. FORBES. What is the likely impact on Iran’s ballistic missile program of its 

ability to test freely its ballistic missile capability? 

a. Please explain the role that foreign ballistic missile technology has been assessed to play in Iran’s ICBM development? The JCPOA and resultant U.N. Security Council Resolution will phase out the limitations on such development, correct? 

b. When the EPAA was announced, and the Ballistic Missile Defense Review were 

announced, were they based on an assumption of free cooperation between Iran, 

Russia, China and North Korea on ballistic missile defense? 

c. Is the administration updating its reviews of our ballistic missile posture to respond to the future Iranian ballistic missile program? 
60 

d. Have you been tasked to update your assessments of Iran’s ballistic and cruise 

missile capability now that the ballistic missile embargo and ballistic missile test 

prohibition have been, or will be, phased out? 

Admiral SYRING. I defer any questions regarding Iranian ballistic missile development and testing to the intelligence community. a. I defer any questions related to 

the specific terms and conditions of the JCPOA to the U.S. Department of State and 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and any questions regarding Iran’s ballistic missile technology development to the intelligence community. b. The Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD–P) was the primary DOD-organization responsible for drafting the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. c. I defer to USD–P regarding the assumptions in the document and planned future updates. d. No, the intelligence community is responsible for updating assessments on Iran’s ballistic and 

cruise missile capability. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. Is it correct that the so-called 123 agreement between the United 

States and the United Arab Emirates would prohibit the possession of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology by that country? 

a. Is it correct that the United States has been seeking the agreement of Saudi 

Arabia for this same so-called ‘‘Gold Standard’’? 

b. Has either country discussed with the U.S. whether or not they too, post negotiation of the JCPOA, can seek enrichment? Does the administration have a position 

on whether or not either country, both U.S. allies in the region and enemies of Iran, 

should continue to be held to these same apparently anachronistic policies? 

General KLOTZ. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. Do you receive a regular intelligence briefing on matters within your 

purview as Administrator, NNSA and Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security? How often? What IC agency or element performs those briefings? 

General KLOTZ. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. I raised in closed session with you a matter based on sensitive intelligence reporting. Was that the first you learned of this matter? Had you not been 

briefed on it before, including during your regular intelligence briefings? Were you 

subsequently briefed on the matter I raised? If so, by whom and when? 

General KLOTZ. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. Are you aware of whether any other U.S. official responsible for this 

subject matter was aware of the issued covered in that sensitive intelligence reporting? If so, who? 

General KLOTZ. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. Are you aware of any information concerning intentions by the UAE 

or Saudi Arabia regarding their plans to develop uranium enrichment capability? 

Mr. ALMONT. [The information is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Æ