Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 15, 2009 / Notices 47289 

Westinghouse on 10 CFR 20.2002 

Alternate Disposal Request for Hematite 

(ML091690253). If you do not have 

access to ADAMS or if there are 

problems in accessing the documents 

located in ADAMS, contact the NRC 

Public Document Room (PDR) reference 

staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737 

or by e-mail to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. 

These documents may also be viewed 

electronically on the public computers 

located at the NRC’s Public Document 

Room (PDR) at 11555 Rockville Pike, 

Rockville, Maryland 20852. The PDR 

reproduction contractor will copy 

documents for a fee. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day 

of September 2009. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Keith McConnell, 

Deputy Director, Decommissioning and 

Uranium Recovery Licensing Directorate, 

Division of Waste Management and 

Environmental Protection, Office of Federal 

and State Materials and Environmental 

Management Programs. 

[FR Doc. E9–22183 Filed 9–14–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[NRC–2009–0403] 

Notice of Opportunity for Public 

Comment on the Proposed Model 

Safety Evaluation for Plant-Specific 

Adoption of Technical Specification 

Task Force Traveler-446, Revision 3, 

‘‘Risk Informed Evaluation of 

Extensions to Containment Isolation 

Valve Completion Times (WCAP– 

15791)’’ 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC). 

ACTION: Notice of opportunity for public 

comment. 

SUMMARY: The NRC is requesting public 

comment on the enclosed proposed 

model safety evaluation, model no 

significant hazards consideration 

determination, and model application 

for plant-specific adoption of Technical 

Specification Task Force (TSTF) 

Traveler-446, Revision 3, ‘‘Risk 

Informed Evaluation of Extensions to 

Containment Isolation Valve 

Completion Times (WCAP–15791).’’ 

The TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3 is 

available in the Agencywide Documents 

Access Management System (ADAMS) 

under Accession Number 

ML080510164. The proposed changes 

would revise technical specification 

(TS) containment isolation valve (CIV) 

completion times for Westinghouse 

plants. This model safety evaluation 

will facilitate expedited approval of 

plant-specific adoption of TSTF 

Traveler-446, Revision 3. 

DATES: Comment period expires October 

15, 2009. Comments received after this 

date will be considered, if it is practical 

to do so, but the Commission is able to 

ensure consideration only for comments 

received on or before this date. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

by any one of the following methods. 

Please include Docket ID NRC–2009– 

0403 in the subject line of your 

comments. Comments submitted in 

writing or in electronic form will be 

posted on the NRC Web site and on the 

Federal rulemaking Web site 

Regulations.gov. Because your 

comments will not be edited to remove 

any identifying or contact information, 

the NRC cautions you against including 

any information in your submission that 

you do not want to be publicly 

disclosed. 

The NRC requests that any party 

soliciting or aggregating comments 

received from other persons for 

submission to the NRC inform those 

persons that the NRC will not edit their 

comments to remove any identifying or 

contact information, and therefore, they 

should not include any information in 

their comments that they do not want 

publicly disclosed. 

Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for documents filed under Docket ID 

NRC–2009–0403. Address questions 

about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher 

301–492–3668; e-mail 

Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. 

Mail comments to: Michael T. Lesar, 

Chief, Rulemaking and Directives 

Branch (RDB), Division of 

Administrative Services, Office of 

Administration, Mail Stop: TWB–05– 

B01M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555– 

0001, or by fax to RDB at (301) 492– 

3446. 

You can access publicly available 

documents related to this notice using 

the following methods: 

NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR): 

The public may examine and have 

copied for a fee publicly available 

documents at the NRC’s PDR, Public 

File Area O–1 F21, One White Flint 

North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 

Maryland. 

NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access 

and Management System (ADAMS): 

Publicly available documents created or 

received at the NRC are available 

electronically at the NRC’s Electronic 

Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/ 

reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, 

the public can gain entry into ADAMS, 

which provides text and image files of 

NRC’s public documents. If you do not 

have access to ADAMS or if there are 

problems in accessing the documents 

located in ADAMS, contact the NRC’s 

PDR reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 

301–415–4737, or by e-mail to 

pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The Proposed 

Model Safety Evaluation for PlantSpecific Adoption of Technical 

Specification Task Force Traveler-446, 

Revision 3, ‘‘Risk Informed Evaluation 

of Extensions to Containment Isolation 

Valve Completion Times (WCAP– 

15791)’’ is available electronically under 

ADAMS Accession Number 

ML092260664. 

Federal Rulemaking Web site: Public 

comments and supporting materials 

related to this notice can be found at 

http://www.regulations.gov by searching 

on Docket ID: NRC–2009–0403. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. 

Michelle C. Honcharik, Senior Project 

Manager, Special Projects Branch, Mail 

Stop: O–12 D1, Division of Policy and 

Rulemaking, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC, 20555– 

0001; telephone 301–415–1774 or e-mail 

at michelle.honcharik@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

This notice provides an opportunity 

for the public to comment on proposed 

changes to the Standard TS (STS) after 

a preliminary assessment and finding by 

the NRC staff that the agency will likely 

offer the changes for adoption by 

licensees. This notice solicits comment 

on a proposed change to the STS that 

modifies the TS. The NRC staff will 

evaluate any comments received for the 

proposed change to the STS and 

reconsider the change or announce the 

availability of the change for adoption 

by licensees. Licensees opting to apply 

for this TS change are responsible for 

reviewing the NRC staff’s evaluation, 

referencing the applicable technical 

justifications, and providing any 

necessary plant-specific information. 

The NRC will process and note each 

amendment application responding to 

the notice of availability according to 

applicable NRC rules and procedures. 

Applicability 

TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3, is 

applicable to all Westinghouse nuclear 

power reactors. The Traveler requires 

that a licensee’s plant-specific 

application must: (a) address or meet 

the requirements stated in Pressurized 

Water Reactor Owners’ Group (PWROG) 

(formerly Westinghouse Owners’ Group) 

Topical Report (TR) WCAP–15791–NP– 


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47290 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 15, 2009 / Notices 

A, Revision 2, ‘‘Risk-Informed 

Evaluation of Extensions to 

Containment Isolation Valve 

Completion Times,’’ and (b) address or 

meet the requirements stated in Nuclear 

Energy Institute (NEI) 99–04, Revision 0, 

‘‘Guidelines for Managing NRC 

Commitment Changes,’’ (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML003680088), and (c) 

include a demonstration of probabilistic 

risk assessment (PRA) quality for the 

licensee’s Tier 3 assessments. The NRC 

staff approved NEI 99–04, by letter 

dated March 31, 2000 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML003679799). The NRC 

issued the final safety evaluation (SE) 

for TR WCAP–15791–P, Revision 2, on 

February 13, 2008 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML080170680). The PWROG issued 

accepted proprietary and nonproprietary versions of the WCAP 

(ADAMS Package Accession No. 

ML003696998). To efficiently process 

the incoming license amendment 

requests (LARs), the NRC staff requests 

that each licensee applying to 

implement the changes proposed in 

TSTF Traveler-446 include 

documentation regarding the technical 

adequacy of the PRA consistent with the 

requirements of Section 4.2 of 

Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.200, Revision 

2, ‘‘An Approach for Determining the 

Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic 

Risk Assessment Results for RiskInformed Activities,’’ dated March 1, 

2009 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML090410014). Applicants proposing to 

use PRA models for which NRCendorsed standards do not exist must 

submit documentation that identifies 

the characteristics of those models 

consistent with Sections 1.2 and 1.3 of 

RG 1.200 or identify and justify the 

methods to be applied for assessing the 

risk contribution for those sources of 

risk not addressed by PRA models. 

The proposed change does not 

prevent licensees from requesting an 

alternate approach or proposing changes 

other than those proposed in TSTF 

Traveler-446, Revision 3. However, 

significant deviations from the approach 

recommended in this notice or the 

inclusion of additional changes to the 

license require additional NRC staff 

review. This may increase the time and 

resources needed for the review or 

result in NRC staff rejection of the LAR. 

Licensees desiring significant deviations 

or additional changes should instead 

submit an LAR that does not claim to 

adopt TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day 

of September 2009. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Stacey L. Rosenberg, 

Chief, Special Projects Branch, Division of 

Policy and Rulemaking, Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation. 

Proposed Model Application for PlantSpecific Adoption of TSTF Traveler446, Revision 3, ‘‘Risk Informed 

Evaluation of Extensions to 

Containment Isolation Valve 

Completion Times (WCAP–15791)’’ 

Subject: Plant Name 

Docket No. 50— 

Application For Technical Specification 

Change Regarding Risk-Informed 

Justification For Containment Isolation 

Valve Allowed Outage Time Changes 

Dear Sir or Madam: 

In accordance with the provisions of 

Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.90, 

‘‘Application for Amendment of 

License, Construction Permit, or Early 

Site Permit,’’ [LICENSEE] is submitting 

a request for an amendment to the 

technical specifications (TS) for [PLANT 

NAME, UNIT NOS.]. 

The proposed amendment would 

modify [LICENSEE] technical 

specifications (TS) requirements for 

allowed outage time changes for 

containment isolation valves with the 

implementation of Topical Report 

WCAP–15791–NP–A, Revision 2, ‘‘RiskInformed Evaluation of Extensions to 

Containment Isolation Valve 

Completion Times.’’ 

Attachment 1 provides a description 

of the proposed change, the requested 

confirmation of applicability, and plantspecific verifications. Attachment 2 

gives the existing TS pages marked to 

show the proposed change. Attachment 

3 provides revised (clean) TS pages. 

Attachment 4 summarizes the regulatory 

commitments made in this submittal. 

Attachment 5 provides the proposed 

changes to the TS Bases. Attachment 6 

provides the statement of proposed No 

Significant Hazards Consideration. 

[LICENSEE] requests approval of the 

proposed license amendment by 

[DATE], with the amendment being 

implemented [BY DATE OR WITHIN X 

DAYS]. 

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, 

‘‘Notice for Public Comment; State 

Consultation,’’ a copy of this 

application, with attachments, is being 

provided to the designated [STATE] 

Official. 

I declare [or certify, verify, state] 

under penalty of perjury that the 

foregoing is correct and true. 

Executed on [date] [Signature] 

If you should have any questions 

about this submittal, please contact 

[NAME, TELEPHONE NUMBER]. 

Sincerely, 

[Name, Title] 

Attachments: 

1. Description and Assessment 

2. Proposed Technical Specification 

Changes 

3. Revised Technical Specification 

Pages 

4. Regulatory Commitments 

5. Proposed Technical Specification 

Bases Changes 

6. Proposed No Significant Hazards 

Consideration 

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Regional Office 

NRC Resident Inspector 

ATTACHMENT 1 

DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT 

1.0 DESCRIPTION 

The proposed amendment would 

modify technical specifications (TS) 

requirements for allowed outage times 

for containment isolation valves (CIVs) 

associated with the implementation of 

Topical Report (TR) WCAP–15791–NP– 

A, Revision 2, ‘‘Risk-Informed 

Evaluation of Extensions to 

Containment Isolation Valve 

Completion Times for Westinghouse 

Plants.’’ 

The changes are consistent with the 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s 

(NRC’s) approved industry/Technical 

Specification Task Force (TSTF) 

Standard TS (STS) change, TSTF 

Traveler-446, Revision 3 (Agencywide 

Documents Access and Management 

System (ADAMS) Accession No. 

ML080510164). The Federal Register 

notice published on [DATE] announced 

the availability of this TS improvement. 

2.0 ASSESSMENT 

2.1 Applicability of Published Safety 

Evaluation 

[LICENSEE] has reviewed the model 

safety evaluation (SE) dated [DATE]. 

The [LICENSEE] has also reviewed the 

NRC staff SE (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML080170680) approving TR WCAP– 

15791–NP–A, Revision 2, and the 

requirements specified in Nuclear 

Energy Institute (NEI) 99–04, 

‘‘Guidelines for Managing NRC 

Commitment Changes,’’ (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML003680088). 

[LICENSEE] has concluded that the 

justifications presented in the TSTF 

proposal and the SE are applicable to 

[PLANT, UNIT NOS.] and justify this 

amendment for the incorporation of the 

changes to the [PLANT] TS. 


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2.2 Optional Changes and Variations 

[LICENSEE] is not proposing any 

variations or deviations from the STS 

changes described in TSTF Traveler446, Revision 3, and the NRC staff’s 

model safety evaluation, dated [DATE]. 

[If the licensee proposes variations or 

deviations, then the licensee needs to 

describe and justify these variations/ 

deviations and include a statement, 

such as, the proposed amendment is 

consistent with the STS changes 

described in TSTF Traveler-446, 

Revision 3, but [LICENSEE] proposes 

variations or deviations from TSTF 

Traveler-446, as identified and justified 

below.] 

3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS 

3.1 No Significant Hazards 

Consideration 

[LICENSEE] has reviewed the 

proposed no significant hazards 

consideration (NSHC) published in the 

Federal Register [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]). 

[LICENSEE] has concluded that the 

proposed NSHC presented in the 

Federal Register notice is applicable to 

[PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.] and is 

provided as Attachment [6] to this 

amendment request, which satisfies the 

requirements of Title 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 

50.91(a). [LICENSEE] has forwarded the 

NSHC to the appropriate State officials. 

3.2 Verifications, Commitments, and 

Additional Information Needed 

[LICENSEE] has demonstrated the 

applicability of TSTF Traveler-446, 

Revision 3, to [PLANT NAME, UNIT 

NOS] by addressing requirements 

specified in TR WCAP–15791–NP–A, 

Revision 2, in this license amendment 

request (LAR). This LAR provides the 

plant-specific information on 

limitations and conditions specified in 

Section 4.0 and the additional 

information specified in Section 5.0 of 

the SE approving TR WCAP–15791–NP– 

A, Revision 2. In addition, consistent 

with TSTF Traveler-446, [LICENSEE] 

must demonstrate in this LAR 

applicable documentation/evaluation 

for Items 3.2.1 through 3.2.12 as noted 

below. 

3.2.1 Demonstration (Simultaneous 

LCO Entry Consideration) 

Option A: 

[LICENSEE] has incorporated new 

Condition D in TS [LCO 3.6.3 

‘‘Containment Isolation Valves 

(Atmospheric, Subatmospheric, Ice 

Condenser, and Dual),’’] as specified in 

TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3. 

Option B: 

[If the licensee did not incorporate 

Condition D, then it must demonstrate 

that the potential for any cumulative 

risk impact of failed CIVs and multiple 

CIV LCO entries was evaluated by the 

licensee. In addition, the licensee must 

demonstrate that the licensee’s Tier 3 

risk management program addresses the 

possibility of simultaneous LCO entries 

for inoperable CIVs in separate 

penetrations. The licensee must provide 

sufficient information such that defensein-depth for safety systems will be 

maintained.] 

Discussion: 

TR WCAP–15791–NP–A, Revision 2, 

is based on only one CIV being in 

maintenance at any given time. The TR 

states that multiple systems are not 

expected to be out of service 

simultaneously during extended 

completion times (CTs), but it does not 

preclude the practice. Although TS LCO 

3.6.3, Note 2, allows a separate 

condition entry for each penetration 

flow path, proposed Condition D 

addresses an inoperable CIV in more 

than one penetration flow path and 

limits the CT to 4 hours. If the licensee’s 

proposed TS change does not include 

this Condition D, then the licensee’s 

application must demonstrate that the 

potential for any cumulative risk impact 

of failed CIVs and multiple CIV LCO 

entries has been evaluated and is 

acceptable. The licensee must 

demonstrate that its Tier 3 risk 

management program, in accordance 

with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), will address 

the possibility of simultaneous LCO 

entries of inoperable CIVs in separate 

penetrations to maintain defense-indepth for safety systems. 

3.2.2 Demonstration (Penetration 

Configuration) 

Option A: 

[LICENSEE] has incorporated new 

Condition D in TS [LCO 3.6.3] as 

specified in TSTF Traveler-446, 

Revision 3. 

Option B; 

[If the licensee did not incorporate 

Condition D, then it must demonstrate 

that the remaining CIVs in the affected 

penetration flow path (or another 

penetration flow path) are closed before 

entering the extended CT for the 

inoperable CIV and that the risk impacts 

(i.e., core damage frequency (CDF), large 

early release frequency (LERF), 

incremental conditional core damage 

probability (ICCDP) and incremental 

conditional large early release 

probability (ICLERP)) were evaluated by 

the licensee.] 

Discussion: 

The existing and proposed TS LCO 

3.6.3 must not allow multiple 

simultaneous extended CIV CTs to 

occur for more than 4 hours, which is 

the existing CT for an inoperable CIV in 

LCO 3.6.3. This is to meet the TR 

assumption that only one valve within 

a single penetration can be in 

maintenance at a time (i.e., for more 

than the 4 hours allowed by the current 

LCO 3.6.3 Condition A). The existing 

LCO 3.6.3 Condition B, and the 

proposed LCO 3.6.3 Conditions A and 

D, ensure that this assumption is being 

met. If the TS do not prevent this case 

(i.e., Condition D is not adopted), then 

this case must be evaluated in the plantspecific applications to demonstrate that 

the risk-impact assumptions of CDF, 

LERF, ICCDP and ICLERP remain less 

than the acceptance guidelines in 

Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, ‘‘An 

Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk 

Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions 

on Plant-Specific Changes to the 

Licensing Basis,’’ and RG 1.177, ‘‘An 

Approach for Plant-Specific, RiskInformed Decisionmaking: Technical 

Specifications.’’ Also, the plant-specific 

application must address whether the 

position of the remaining CIVs in the 

affected penetration flow path (or 

another penetration flow path) have 

been confirmed before entering the 

extended CT for the inoperable CIV. 

3.2.3 Demonstration (Failed CIVs and 

Multiple CIV LCO Entries) 

Option A: 

[LICENSEE] has incorporated new 

Condition D in TS [LCO 3.6.3] as 

specified in TSTF Traveler-446, 

Revision 3. 

Option B: 

[If the licensee did not incorporate 

Condition D then it must demonstrate 

that the cumulative risk impact of failed 

CIVs and multiple CIV LCO entries was 

evaluated, and that remaining CIVs in 

the affected penetration flow path (or 

another penetration flow path) are 

closed prior to entering the extended 

CT. In addition, the licensee must 

demonstrate that the licensee’s Tier 3 

risk management program address the 

possibility of simultaneous LCO entries 

for inoperable CIVs in separate 

penetrations. The licensee must provide 

sufficient information such that defensein-depth for safety systems will be 

maintained.] 

Discussion: 

The licensee needs to address how the 

following basis and general assumptions 

of TR WCAP–15791–NP–A, Revision 2, 

are incorporated in the specific plant 

practices, procedures, TS, and 

probabilistic risk assessment (PRA): 

• Only one CIV is in maintenance 

with an extended CT at any given time. 

This is a Tier 2 requirement, unless the 


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licensee has proposed the additional 

STS LCO 3.6.3 Condition D in its plantspecific application. 

• Before maintenance or corrective 

maintenance (repair) is performed on a 

CIV, the TR evaluation assumes that any 

other CIVs in the penetration flow path 

have been checked to ensure that they 

are in their proper position. This is a 

Tier 2 requirement. 

• Multiple systems are not expected 

to be out of service simultaneously 

during the extended CTs. 

3.2.4 Demonstration (CIV 

Configuration) 

Option A: 

[LICENSEE] has confirmed that (a) the 

CIV configurations for [PLANT NAME, 

UNIT NOS.] match the configurations in 

TR WCAP–15791–NP–A, Revision 2, 

and (b) the risk-parameter values used 

in the TR are representative or bounding 

for [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS]. 

Option B: 

[If the licensee’s does not confirm the 

above, it must provide justification for 

the deviation.] 

Discussion: 

Not all penetrations have the same 

impact on CDF, LERF, ICCDP, or 

ICLERP; therefore, the licensee needs to 

address the applicability of TR WCAP– 

15791–NP–A, Revision 2, to the specific 

plant. This analysis must include 

verification that (a) the CIV 

configurations for the specific plant 

match the configurations in the TR and 

(b) the risk-parameter values used in the 

TR are bounding for the specific plant. 

Any additional CIV configurations and 

extended CTs, not specifically evaluated 

by the TR, or nonbounding riskparameter values outside the scope of 

the TR, will require an NRC staff review 

of the specific penetrations and related 

justifications for the proposed CTs. 

3.2.5 Demonstration (Tier 2 

Evaluation) 

Option A: 

[LICENSEE] has demonstrated that its 

Tier 2 evaluation has identified 

potentially high-risk plant 

configurations associated with the 

proposed CIV CTs that should not be 

entered while a CIV is in maintenance, 

and how these controls have been 

implemented by the licensee. 

Option B: 

[If the licensee’s evaluation identifies 

no risk-significant plant configurations 

associated with the proposed CIV CTs, 

then it must provide justification/ 

evaluation and state applicable 

compensatory measures or 

commitments.] 

Discussion: 

A Tier 2 conclusion of the TR as 

applicable to the specific plant, or the 

plant-specific Tier 2 requirements must 

be provided by the licensee. 

3.2.6 Demonstration (Tier 3 

Evaluation) 

[LICENSEE] has addressed Tier 3 

evaluation for [PLANT NAME, UNIT 

NOS.] by demonstrating conformance to 

the requirements of the maintenance 

rule as the requirements relate to the 

proposed CIV CTs and the guidance 

contained in the Nuclear Management 

and Resources Council (NUMARC) 

document, NUMARC 93–01, ‘‘Industry 

Guideline for Monitoring the 

Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear 

Power Plants,’’ Revision 2, Section 11, 

issued April 1996, as endorsed by RG 

1.182, ‘‘Assessing and Managing Risk 

Before Maintenance Activities at 

Nuclear Power Plants.’’ [LICENSEE] has 

provided documentation on the 

[LICENSEE’S] maintenance rule 

program, with respect to CIVs, includes 

a LERF/ICLERP (i.e., ICLERP as defined 

in NUMARC 93–01) assessment as part 

of the maintenance rule process, and 

that the PRA quality is adequate, as part 

of the basis of a risk-informed licensing 

action. 

Discussion: 

The licensee needs to describe its 

configuration risk management program 

(CRMP) or maintenance rule (10 CFR 

50.65(a)(4)) program (as appropriate), 

including how it reflects the current 

PRA model, any simplifications or 

deviations in the CRMP model from the 

current plant model, and methods to 

update the CRMP to reflect the current 

plant-specific model. 

The licensee needs to address the Tier 

3 aspects of RG 1.177, including a 

description of the CRMP, and confirm 

that the licensee’s Maintenance Rule 

Program (10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)) meets all 

aspects of Section 2.3.7.2 of RG 1.177, 

including the referenced four key 

components. 

Also, the licensee needs to confirm 

that the plant (units) conform to the 

requirements of the maintenance rule, 

as they relate to the proposed CIV CTs 

and the guidance contained in 

NUMARC 93–01, Section 11, as 

endorsed by RG 1.182, including 

verification that the maintenance rule 

program, with respect to CIVs, includes 

a LERF and ICLERP assessment, as part 

of the maintenance rule process, and 

that the CRMP is adequate, as part of the 

basis for evaluating the risk impact of 

CIV maintenance configurations. The 

licensee needs to confirm that its CRMP 

model calculates ICCDP (or ICDP) and 

ICLERP (or ILERP) and that the 

licensee’s model is capable of modeling 

CIVs or has been modified to include 

CIVs. 

3.2.7 Demonstration (Plant-Specific 

PRA Quality) 

[LICENSEE] has demonstrated that the 

plant-specific PRA quality is acceptable 

for Tier 3 application, in accordance 

with the guidelines given in RG 1.174 

and RG 1.177. 

Discussion: 

The licensee needs to describe the 

scope of the plant-specific PRA and 

justify its technical adequacy for this 

application, in accordance with the 

guidance provided in RG 1.174 and RG 

1.177. Specifically, the supporting 

documentation needs to address each 

area in sufficient detail to satisfy the 

following: 

• Assurance that the plant-specific 

PRA reasonably reflects the as-built, asoperated plant. 

• Assurance that plant-specific PRA 

updates, including any plant 

improvements or commitments cited 

and credited in the analysis, have been 

implemented from the individual plant 

evaluation (IPE) and the IPE for external 

events (IPEEE) and subsequent peer 

reviews and self-assessments. Reference 

to past submittals discussing this 

information is acceptable. 

• Assurance that conclusions from 

the peer review, including facts and 

observations (A and B), that are 

applicable to proposed extended CTs for 

CIVs were considered and resolved 

consistent with RG 1.200, Revision 2. If 

not resolved, the licensee must provide 

the justification for the acceptability of 

the conclusions (e.g., sensitivity studies 

showing negligible impact). The 

licensee should indicate the PRA 

revisions that underwent the peer 

review and were used in the plantspecific application. 

• Assurance that there is PRA 

configuration control and updating, 

including PRA quality assurance 

programs, associated procedures, and 

PRA revision schedules. 

• Assurance that there is PRA 

adequacy, completeness, and 

applicability with respect to evaluating 

the risk associated with the proposed 

CIV CT extensions. 

• Assurance that plant design or 

operational modifications that are 

related to or could affect the proposed 

CT extensions are reflected in the PRA 

revision used in the plant-specific 

application or that a justification is 

provided for not including these 

modifications in the PRA. 

As clarified in Regulatory Issue 

Summary 2007–06, ‘‘Regulatory Guide 

1.200 Implementation,’’ dated March 22, 

2007, the NRC staff will use RG 1.200 

to assess the technical adequacy of all 

risk-informed applications received 


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after December 2007. RG 1.200, ‘‘An 

Approach for Determining the Technical 

Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk 

Assessment Results for Risk-Informed 

Activities,’’ describes an acceptable 

approach for defining the technical 

adequacy of an acceptable base PRA. 

This assessment can be performed by 

directly comparing the base PRA to the 

supporting requirements in the 

endorsed American Society of 

Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Standard 

RA–Sb–2005 and addressing the NRC 

staff position on each requirement 

discussed in Appendix A to RG 1.200. 

Alternatively, a licensee can perform the 

assessment starting with the results of a 

previous peer review, performed in 

accordance with the process 

documented in NEI 00–02 and 

addressing the NRC staff position on 

each requirement discussed in 

Appendix B to RG 1.200. 

3.2.8 Demonstration (External Events 

Risk) 

[LICENSEE] has demonstrated that 

external events risk is bounded by TR 

WCAP–15791–NP–A, Revision 2, 

assumptions and will not have an 

adverse impact on the conclusions of 

the [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.] 

analysis for extending the CIV CTs. 

Discussion: 

External events may include seismic, 

high winds, fires, floods, or other 

related events applicable to each 

licensee. The licensee needs to 

demonstrate, by either quantitative or 

qualitative means, that external event 

risk will not have an adverse impact on 

the conclusions of the plant-specific 

analyses with respect to the TR 

evaluation. For some participating 

plants, internal fires and other external 

event risks may contribute significantly 

to the overall plant baseline risk, which 

may affect TR WCAP–15791, so that a 

plant-specific application of the TR 

methodology may not be found 

acceptable in all cases. Specifically, the 

risk from external events should not 

make the total baseline risk exceed 1E4/yr CDF or 1E-5/yr LERF without 

justification. 

The licensee’s submittal must discuss 

the plant risk associated with external 

events and specifically identify 

(quantitatively or qualitatively) that the 

impact of the proposed CIV CTs on the 

risk associated with external events is 

small. The licensee needs to confirm 

that any increase in external event risk 

associated with the proposed CIV CTs 

should be minimal. The licensee must 

address this impact and discuss why the 

risk of external events (including 

internal fires) is negligible. Insights from 

IPEEE screening or quantitative 

approaches may be used to support the 

licensee’s evaluations. 

If the licensee has performed an 

updated analysis of an external event 

since the NRC staff review of the 

licensee’s IPEEE, and a quantitative PRA 

demonstration is used to support the 

submittal, the licensee needs to describe 

the significant changes involved in its 

updated analysis and the impact of 

these changes on plant risk associated 

with the external event and the 

proposed CIV CT extensions. 

For external events for which the 

licensee has a PRA, the licensee needs 

to provide the change in CDF, the 

change in LERF, the ICCDP, and the 

ICLERP associated with specifically 

analyzed external events. The licensee 

needs to also provide the total plant risk 

and total change in risk from all PRA 

contributors (the combination of 

internal events, internal flooding, 

internal fires, and external events). To 

conclude that the quantified risk 

associated with the proposed CIV CTs is 

acceptable, the total CDF and LERF 

values and the change in CDF, change 

in LERF, ICCDP, and ICLERP must meet 

the acceptance guidelines of RG 1.174 

and RG 1.177. 

For external events not included in 

the plant PRA but that rely on a nonPRA method (e.g., seismic margins 

analysis or fire-induced vulnerability 

evaluation) to confirm that plant risk 

remains acceptable, the licensee must 

confirm the following: a) that there are 

no vulnerabilities or outliers associated 

with these external events, b) that any 

vulnerabilities or outliers that were 

identified have been resolved, or c) that 

appropriate plant modifications have 

been implemented according to the 

licensee’s analysis. 

3.2.9 Demonstration (CIV Availability 

Monitoring) 

[LICENSEE] has demonstrated for 

[PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.] how plantspecific CIV availability is monitored 

and assessed at the plant under the 

maintenance rule, and that, performance 

continues to be consistent with the 

analysis assumptions used to justify 

extended CIV CTs, including the 

assumptions in TR WCAP–15791. 

Discussion: 

The licensee needs to address how 

CIV availability is monitored and 

assessed under the maintenance rule, 

which includes confirmation that 

performance continues to be consistent 

with the analysis assumptions used to 

justify extended CIV CTs and needs to 

describe what actions are to be taken if 

a previously approved risk-informed 

licensing action is found to no longer 

meet the acceptance guidelines of RG 

1.174 and RG 1.177. 

3.2.10 Demonstration (Cumulative 

Risk Evaluation) 

[LICENSEE] has demonstrated that the 

cumulative risk has been evaluated for 

[PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.] in 

accordance with guidance in RG 1.174, 

with respect to past [PLANT NAME, 

UNIT NOS.] license amendments or 

additional [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.] 

applications for a TS change under NRC 

review that have not been incorporated 

into the baseline PRA used to evaluate 

the proposed change. 

Discussion: 

The cumulative risk impact of the 

proposed CT extensions for CIVs must 

be addressed in the plant-specific 

application, in accordance with the 

acceptance guidelines in RG 1.174. The 

cumulative risk impact must include 

both previous plant license changes and 

additional plant applications still under 

review. 

3.2.11 Demonstration (PRA 

Uncertainty) 

[LICENSEE] has demonstrated that 

uncertainty caused by plant PRA 

models is addressed in the [PLANT 

NAME, UNIT NOS.] submittal according 

to RG 1.174 guidance. 

Discussion: 

Licensee needs to address that 

uncertainty due to plant PRA models do 

not significantly impact the risk 

assessment results and decisions 

regarding acceptability. 

3.2.12 Demonstration (Regulatory 

Commitment) 

[LICENSEE] has incorporated a 

regulatory commitment addressing how 

LERF/ICLERP is assessed and has 

provided documentation in the [PLANT 

NAME, UNIT NOS.] submittal. 

Discussion: 

Licensee needs to address the plant 

CRMP, including the maintenance rule 

program implemented under 10 CFR 

50.65(a)(4), and explain how the LERF/ 

ICLERP is assessed in the program. 

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION 

[LICENSEE] has reviewed the 

environmental evaluation included in 

the proposed safety evaluation dated 

[DATE]. [LICENSEE] has concluded that 

the proposed determination presented 

in the notice is applicable to [PLANT 

NAME, UNIT NOS.] and the 

determination is provided as an 

attachment to this LAR to satisfy the 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a). 


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Attachment 2: Proposed Technical 

Specification Changes (Mark-Up) 

Attachment 3: Proposed Technical 

Specification Pages 

Attachment 4: List Of Regulatory 

Commitments 

The following table identifies those 

actions committed to by [LICENSEE] in 

this document. Any other statements in 

this submittal are provided for 

information purposes and are not 

considered to be regulatory 

commitments. Please direct questions 

regarding these commitments to 

[CONTACT NAME]. 

Regulatory commitments Due date 

[LICENSEE] commits to implementing a methodology for assessing the effect on large early release frequency and incremental conditional large early release probability when using the 

extended completion times for containment isolation valves in the program for managing risk 

in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4).

[Complete, implemented with amendment, OR 

within X days of implementation of amendment]. 

Attachment 5: Proposed Changes To 

Technical Specification Bases 

Attachment 6: Proposed No Significant 

Hazards Consideration 

Proposed Model No Significant Hazards 

Consideration Determination for PlantSpecific Adoption of Tstf Traveler-446, 

Revision 3, ‘‘Risk Informed Evaluation 

of Extensions to Containment Isolation 

Valve Completion Times (Wcap15791)’’ 

Description of Amendment Request: 

The change requests the adoption of an 

approved change to the standard 

technical specifications (STS) for 

Westinghouse plants (NUREG–1431), to 

allow modification of containment 

isolation valve (CIV) completion times 

associated with the implementation of 

topical report (TR) WCAP–15791–NP– 

A, Revision 2. ‘‘Risk-Informed 

Evaluation of Extensions to 

Containment Isolation Valve 

Completion Times,’’ dated March 10, 

2006. Technical Specification Task 

Force (TSTF) Traveler-446, Revision 3, 

‘‘Risk Informed Evaluation of 

Containment Isolation Valve 

Completion Times (Topical Report 

WCAP–15791–P, Revision 2),’’ dated 

February 19, 2008 (Agencywide 

Documents Access and Management 

System (ADAMS) Accession No. 

ML080510164). The Notice of 

Availability published in the Federal 

Register on [Date] [xx FR xxxxx] 

described the proposed change. 

The proposed change extends the 

completion times for containment 

penetration flow paths with one CIV 

inoperable from 4 hours up to 168 hours 

(7 days) for Westinghouse plants. This 

change is applicable to containment 

penetrations with one or more CIVs, in 

which one CIV is inoperable [for reasons 

other than shield building bypass or 

purge valve leakage not within limit] 

and where the CIV is either intact or not 

intact. In addition, this change 

addresses conditions where there are 

two or more penetration flow paths with 

one CIV inoperable (for reasons other 

than that the shield building bypass or 

purge valve leakage are not within 

limits). Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration: 

As required by Title10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 

50.91(a), the [LICENSEE] analysis of the 

issue of no significant hazards 

consideration is presented below: 

1: Does the Proposed Change Involve 

a Significant Increase in the Probability 

or Consequences of an Accident 

Previously Evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed changes to the 

completion times do not change the 

response of the plant to any accidents, 

have no impact on the reliability of the 

CIV, and have an insignificant impact 

on the availability of the CIVs. The 

proposed changes will not result in a 

significant increase in the risk of plant 

operation. This is demonstrated by 

showing that the impact on plant safety, 

as measured by core damage frequency 

(CDF) and large early release frequency 

(LERF), is not significantly increased, 

and is acceptable. In addition, for the 

completion time change, the 

incremental conditional core damage 

probabilities (ICCDP) and incremental 

conditional large early release 

probabilities (ICLERP) are also 

acceptable. These changes are consistent 

with the acceptance guidelines in 

Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, ‘‘An 

Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk 

Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions 

on Plant-Specific Changes to the 

Licensing Basis,’’ and RG 1.177, ‘‘An 

Approach for Plant-Specific, RiskInformed Decisionmaking: Technical 

Specifications.’’ 

The proposed changes do not 

adversely affect accident initiators or 

precursors nor do they alter the design 

assumptions, conditions, or 

configuration of the facility or the 

manner in which the plant is operated 

and maintained. The proposed changes 

do not alter or prevent the structures, 

systems, and components from 

performing their intended function to 

mitigate the consequences of an 

initiating event within the assumed 

acceptance limits. The proposed 

changes do not affect the source term, 

containment isolation, or radiological 

release assumptions used in evaluating 

the radiological consequences of an 

accident previously evaluated. 

Furthermore, the proposed changes do 

not increase the types or amounts of 

radioactive effluent that may be released 

offsite, nor do they significantly 

increase individual or cumulative 

occupational or public radiation 

exposures. The proposed changes do not 

invalidate the safety analysis 

assumptions and resultant 

consequences. Therefore, the proposed 

changes do not involve a significant 

increase in the probability or 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated. 

2: Does the Proposed Change Create 

the Possibility of a New or Different 

Kind of Accident from any Accident 

Previously Evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed changes do not result in 

a change in the manner in which the 

CIVs provide plant protection. No 

design changes are associated with the 

proposed changes. The changes to 

completion times do not change any 

existing accident scenarios nor do they 

create any new or different accident 

scenarios. The changes do not involve a 

physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no 

new or different type of equipment will 

be installed) or a change in the methods 


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governing normal plant operation. In 

addition, the changes do not impose any 

new or different requirements or 

eliminate any existing requirements. 

The proposed changes do not alter 

assumptions made in the safety analysis 

and do not invalidate the safety analysis 

assumptions and current plant operating 

practice. 

3: Does the Proposed Change Involve 

a Significant Reduction in a Margin of 

Safety? 

Response: No. 

The proposed changes do not alter the 

manner in which safety limits, limiting 

safety system settings, or limiting 

conditions for operation are determined. 

The safety analysis acceptance criteria 

are not affected by these changes. The 

proposed changes will not result in 

plant operation in a configuration 

outside the design basis. The calculated 

impact on risk is consistent with the 

acceptance guidelines contained in RG 

1.174 and RG 1.177. 

Therefore, the proposed changes do 

not involve a significant reduction in a 

margin of safety. 

Based upon the reasoning presented 

above, the licensee concludes that the 

requested change does not involve a 

significant hazards consideration, as set 

forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), ‘‘Issuance of 

Amendment.’’ 

Proposed Model Safety Evaluation for 

Plant-Specific Adoption of Technical 

Specification Task Force Traveler-446, 

Revision 3, ‘‘Risk Informed Evaluation 

of Extensions to Containment Isolation 

Valve Completion Times (WCAP– 

15791)’’ 

1.0 INTRODUCTION 

By letter dated [DATE], [LICENSEE] 

(the licensee) proposed changes to the 

technical specifications (TS) for [PLANT 

NAME]. The requested change is the 

adoption of NRC-approved Technical 

Specification Task Force (TSTF) 

Traveler-446, Revision 3, ‘‘Risk 

Informed Evaluation of Containment 

Isolation Valve Completion Times 

(Topical Report WCAP–15791–NP–A, 

Revision 2) RITSTF Initiative 4b,’’ dated 

February 19, 2008 (Agencywide 

Documents Access Management System 

(ADAMS) Accession No. 

ML080510164). TSTF Traveler-446 

proposes a generic change to NUREG– 

1431, Revision 3, ‘‘Standard Technical 

Specifications Westinghouse Plants,’’ 

issued June 2004, to implement 

containment isolation valve (CIV) 

completion time changes associated 

with the implementation of Topical 

Report (TR) WCAP–15791, Revision 1, 

‘‘Risk-Informed Evaluation of 

Extensions to Containment Isolation 

Valve Completion Times,’’ dated April 

30, 2004. When implemented, the 

traveler would extend the CIV 

completion times for TS Limiting 

Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.3, 

‘‘Containment Isolation Valves 

(Atmospheric, Subatmospheric, Ice 

Condenser, and Dual),’’ from 4 hours up 

to 168 hours (7 days). (For isolation 

valves that cannot demonstrate 

acceptable results for 168 hours, shorter 

times are considered and evaluated). 

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION 

In Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.36, 

‘‘Technical Specifications,’’ the NRC 

established its regulatory requirements 

related to the content of TS. Pursuant to 

10 CFR 50.36, TS are required to 

include items in the following five 

specific categories related to station 

operation: (1) safety limits, limiting 

safety system settings, and limiting 

control settings, (2) LCOs, (3) 

surveillance requirements, (4) design 

features, and (5) administrative controls. 

However, the regulation does not 

specify the particular TS to be included 

in a plant’s license. TSTF Traveler-446 

is proposing changes to the TS LCO that 

concern the Category 2 requirements. 

The LCOs are the lowest functional 

capability, or performance levels, of 

equipment required for safe operation of 

the facility. When an LCO of a nuclear 

reactor is not met, the licensee shall 

follow any remedial actions permitted 

by the TS until the condition can be met 

or shall shut down the reactor. 

Furthermore, the completion times 

specified in the TS must be based on the 

reasonable protection of public health 

and safety. As set forth in 10 CFR 50.36, 

a licensee’s TS must establish the LCOs 

that are the lowest functional capability, 

or performance levels, of equipment 

required for safe operation of the 

facility. This requirement includes 

completion times for structures, 

systems, and components (SSCs), such 

as CIVs. These completion times allow 

a certain amount of time in which to 

correct a condition that does not meet 

the LCO before the reactor must be 

brought to a condition that exits the 

mode of applicability, in most cases 

resulting in the reactor being shut down. 

The Maintenance Rule, 10 CFR 50.65, 

‘‘Requirements for Monitoring the 

Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear 

Power Plants,’’ requires licensees to 

monitor the performance, or condition, 

of SSCs against licensee-established 

goals in a manner sufficient to provide 

reasonable assurance that SSCs are 

capable of fulfilling their intended 

functions. The implementation and 

monitoring program guidance in Section 

2.3 of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, ‘‘An 

Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk 

Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions 

on Plant-Specific Changes to the 

Licensing Basis,’’ and Section 3 of RG 

1.177, ‘‘An Approach for Plant-Specific, 

Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: 

Technical Specifications,’’ states that 

monitoring performed in conformance 

with the Maintenance Rule can be used 

when such monitoring is sufficient for 

the SSCs affected by the risk-informed 

application. In addition, 10 CFR 

50.65(a)(4), as it relates to the proposed 

extension of CIV completion times, 

requires the assessment and 

management of the increase in risk that 

may result from the proposed 

maintenance activity. 

The CIVs help ensure that adequate 

primary containment boundaries are 

maintained during and after accidents 

by minimizing potential pathways to the 

environment and help ensure that the 

primary containment function assumed 

in the safety analysis is maintained. The 

following general design criteria (GDC) 

apply to this change and establish the 

necessary design, fabrication, 

construction, testing, and performance 

requirements for SSCs important to 

safety, which provide reasonable 

assurance that the facility can be 

operated without undue risk to the 

health and safety of the public. [PreGDC (PGDC) facilities not licensed 

under the GDC in Appendix A, ‘‘General 

Design Criteria for Nuclear Power 

Plants,’’ to 10 CFR Part 50, ‘‘Domestic 

Licensing of Production and Utilization 

Facilities,’’ are licensed under similar 

plant-specific design criteria, as 

described in the facility’s licensing-basis 

documents (such as updated final safety 

analysis reports).] 

• GDC 54 (or PGDC), ‘‘Piping Systems 

Penetrating Containment,’’ requires the 

following: Those piping systems that 

penetrate primary containment be 

provided with leak detection, isolation, 

and containment capabilities having 

redundancy, reliability, and 

performance capabilities that reflect the 

importance to safety of isolating these 

piping systems. Such piping systems 

shall be designed with a capability to 

test periodically the operability of the 

isolation valves and associated 

apparatus and to determine if valve 

leakage is within acceptable limits. 

• GDC 55 (or PGDC), ‘‘Reactor 

Coolant Pressure Boundary Penetrating 

Containment,’’ requires the following: 

Each line that is part of the reactor 

coolant pressure boundary and that 

penetrates primary reactor containment 

shall be provided with CIVs as follows, 

unless it can be demonstrated that the 

containment isolation provisions for a 


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specific class of lines, such as 

instrument lines, are acceptable on 

some other defined basis: 

(1) One locked closed isolation valve 

inside and one locked closed isolation 

valve outside containment; or 

(2) One automatic isolation valve 

inside and one locked closed isolation 

valve outside containment; or 

(3) One locked closed isolation valve 

inside and one automatic isolation valve 

outside containment. A simple check 

valve may not be used as the automatic 

isolation valve outside containment; or 

(4) One automatic isolation valve 

inside and one automatic isolation valve 

outside containment. A simple check 

valve may not be used as the automatic 

isolation valve outside containment. 

Isolation valves outside containment 

shall be located as close to containment 

as practical and upon loss of actuating 

power, automatic isolation valves shall 

be designed to take the position that 

provides greater safety. 

Other appropriate requirements to 

minimize the probability or 

consequences of an accidental rupture 

of these lines or of lines connected to 

them shall be provided as necessary to 

assure adequate safety. Determination of 

the appropriateness of these 

requirements, such as higher quality in 

design, fabrication and testing, 

additional provisions for inservice 

inspection, protection against more 

severe natural phenomena, and 

additional isolation valves and 

containment, shall include 

consideration of the population density, 

use characteristics, and physical 

characteristics of the site environs. 

• GDC 56 (or PGDC), ‘‘Primary 

Containment Isolation,’’ requires the 

following: 

Each line that connects directly to the 

containment atmosphere and penetrates 

primary reactor containment shall be 

provided with CIVs as follows, unless it 

can be demonstrated that the 

containment isolation provisions for a 

specific class of lines, such as 

instrument lines, are acceptable on 

some other defined basis: 

(1) One locked closed isolation valve 

inside and one locked closed isolation 

valve outside containment; or 

(2) One automatic isolation valve 

inside and one locked closed isolation 

valve outside containment; or 

(3) One locked closed isolation valve 

inside and one automatic isolation valve 

outside containment. A simple check 

valve may not be used as the automatic 

isolation valve outside containment; or 

(4) One automatic isolation valve 

inside and one automatic isolation valve 

outside containment. A simple check 

valve may not be used as the automatic 

isolation valve outside containment. 

Isolation valves outside containment 

shall be located as close to containment 

as practical and upon loss of actuating 

power, automatic isolation valves shall 

be designed to take the position that 

provides greater safety. 

• GDC 57 (or PGDC), ‘‘Closed System 

Isolation Valves,’’ requires the 

following: Each line that penetrates the 

primary reactor containment and is 

neither part of the reactor coolant 

pressure boundary nor connected 

directly to the containment atmosphere 

shall have at least one CIV which shall 

be either automatic, or locked closed, or 

capable of remote manual operation. 

This valve shall be outside containment 

and located as close to the containment 

as practical. A simple check valve may 

not be used as the automatic isolation 

valve. 

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION 

3.1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment 

(PRA) for the Proposed Changes 

[LICENSEE] adoption of TSTF 

Traveler-446, Revision 3, would allow 

extending CIV completion times 

specified in TS [LCO 3.6.3, 

‘‘Containment Isolation Valves 

(Atmospheric, Subatmospheric, Ice 

Condenser, and Dual)’’]. TR WCAP– 

15791–P–A, Revision 2, referenced in 

TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3, 

describes a method to revise the 

completion time for specific conditions 

in TS LCO 3.6.3. The NRC staff 

reviewed, the risk impact, using the 

three-tiered approach referenced in RG 

1.174 and RG 1.177 associated with the 

proposed TS changes. The first tier 

evaluates the probabilistic risk 

assessment and the impact of the 

proposed extension of completion times 

for CIVs on plant operational risk. The 

second tier addresses the need to 

preclude potentially high-risk plant 

equipment outage configurations by 

identifying the need for additional 

controls or compensatory actions to be 

implemented during the time a CIV is 

unavailable because of maintenance. 

The third tier evaluates the licensee’s 

overall configuration risk management 

program and confirms that risk insights 

are incorporated into the 

decisionmaking process before 

equipment is taken out of service before 

or during CIV maintenance. 

The NRC staff determined that the 

risk analysis methodology and approach 

used by TR WCAP–15791–NP–A, 

Revision 2, to estimate the risk impact 

was reasonable. The NRC staff stated 

that the risk impact of the proposed 

extended completion times for CIVs, as 

estimated by the change in CDF, the 

change in LERF, the ICCDP, and the 

ICLERP, is consistent with the 

acceptance guidelines specified in RG 

1.174 and RG 1.177 and the associated 

NRC guidance outlined in Sections 16.1, 

19.1, and 19.2 of NUREG–0800, 

‘‘Standard Review Plan for the Review 

of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear 

Power Plants.’’ CIV configurations, 

completion times, or nonbounding risk 

analysis parameters not evaluated by TR 

WCAP–15791–NP–A, Revision 2, 

require additional justification of the 

specific penetrations for the proposed 

CIV completion times. 

The NRC staff also noted that Tier 2, 

as presented in TR WCAP–15791–NP– 

A, Revision 2, did not identify generic 

Tier 2 risk-significant configurations as 

a result of the proposed CIV completion 

times. In its review of TR WCAP–15791, 

the NRC staff identified TS and analysis 

bases that allow only one CIV to be in 

maintenance with an extended 

completion time at any given time. In 

addition, before maintenance or 

corrective maintenance is performed, 

other CIVs in the penetration flow path 

shall be checked for proper position. 

The NRC staff’s safety evaluation (SE), 

(ADAMS Accession No ML080170680) 

also noted that, for licensees adopting 

TR WCAP–15791, a plant-specific Tier 2 

evaluation should be performed to 

confirm the conclusions of the subject 

WCAP concerning Tier 2 remaining 

applicable to the licensee’s plant. 

TR WCAP–15791–NP–A, Revision 2, 

did not address Tier 3, and therefore the 

NRC SE concluded that licensees 

adopting the subject TR would need to 

include an evaluation with respect to 

Tier 3 in their plant-specific application 

in accordance with the principles in RG 

1.177. 

The NRC-approved TR WCAP–15791– 

NP–A, Revision 2, for referencing in 

license applications to the extent 

specified and under the limitations and 

conditions stated in the TR and Section 

4.0 of the NRC SE. In addition, per the 

SE, applications referencing TR WCAP– 

15791 must address items specified in 

Section 3.4, ‘‘Regulatory 

Commitments,’’ and Section 5.0, 

‘‘Additional Information Needed’’ of the 

SE. 

The licensee’s plant-specific 

application requesting adoption of TSTF 

Traveler-446 evaluated the conditions, 

limitations, and additional information 

needed that are referenced in the 

Sections 3.4, 4.0, and 5.0 of the NRC SE 

of TR WCAP–15791–NP–A, Revision 2. 

In its application dated [DATE], the 

licensee provided supporting 

information for each of the conditions, 

limitations, and additional information 


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needed that are referenced in the NRC 

SE. The licensee’s supporting 

information for each condition and 

limitation, as well as for the additional 

information needed, met the NRC staff’s 

expectations and acceptance criteria 

[with the following exceptions: List any 

exceptions to the conditions and 

limitations or additional information 

required, as stated in the licensee’s 

submittal, and include the NRC staff’s 

evaluation and conclusions]. 

Technical Assessment for the 

Proposed Changes: 

[LICENSEE] adoption of TSTF 

Traveler-446, Revision 3 would make 

changes to the TS [LCO 3.6.3, 

‘‘Containment Isolation Valves 

(Atmospheric, Subatmospheric, Ice 

Condenser, and Dual),’’] as follows: 

• TSTF Traveler-446 revises [LCO 

3.6.3], which states ‘‘Each containment 

isolation valve shall be OPERABLE,’’ to 

read ‘‘Each containment isolation valve 

(CIV) shall be OPERABLE.’’ Adding the 

abbreviation ‘‘(CIV)’’ to the LCO 

statement is editorial in nature and does 

not change the LCO requirement; 

therefore, this change is acceptable. 

• TSTF Traveler-446 deletes the 

Condition A NOTE, which states ‘‘Only 

applicable to penetration flow paths 

with two [or more] containment 

isolation valves.’’ The existing 

Condition C, which is applicable to 

penetration flow paths with only one 

CIV and a closed system, is being 

deleted and replaced by a new 

Condition B. The new Condition B, 

along with the revised Condition A, 

accounts for all of the CIVs covered 

under existing Condition C; therefore, 

the Condition A NOTE is no longer 

required. Revised Condition A and new 

Condition B apply to all penetration 

flow paths with at least one CIV. This 

is consistent with the NRC SE of TR 

WCAP–15791 and is therefore 

acceptable. 

• TSTF Traveler-446 revises 

Condition A’s applicability from ‘‘[for 

reasons other than Condition[s] D [and 

E]]’’ to ‘‘[for reasons other than 

Condition[s] E [and F]].’’ This change is 

required by the addition of new 

Conditions B and D, which results in 

renumbering the conditions that follow 

Condition D. This change is editorial 

and does not result in a technical 

change; therefore, it is acceptable. 

• TSTF Traveler-446 adds a new 

requirement to Condition A, which 

states ‘‘Containment isolation valve 

pressure boundary intact.’’ This is 

required to meet the entry condition for 

Condition A. This requirement is 

necessary, along with the addition of 

new Condition B, which is applicable 

when the CIV pressure boundary is not 

intact, because existing Condition C is 

being deleted. Existing Condition C is 

applicable to penetration flow paths 

with only one CIV and a closed system. 

In addition, revised Condition A and 

new Condition B are applicable to all 

conditions in which a CIV may be 

INOPERABLE. Revised Condition A, 

along with new Condition B, 

encompasses existing Condition C and 

is consistent with the NRC’s SE for 

WCAP–15791; therefore, it is 

acceptable. 

• TSTF Traveler-446 revises the 

existing 4-hour completion time for 

Condition A to completion times that 

range from 4 hours up to 7 days, 

depending upon the category of the 

applicable CIV (Category 1 through 7). 

This change has been evaluated and 

documented in the NRC SE of TR 

WCAP–15791. This change proposed by 

TSTF Traveler-446 is consistent with 

the NRC SE of TR WCAP–15791 and is 

therefore acceptable. 

• TSTF Traveler-446 adds a new 

Condition B, which states ‘‘One or more 

penetration flow paths with one 

containment isolation valve inoperable 

[for reasons other than Condition[s] E 

[and F]] AND containment isolation 

valve pressure boundary not intact.’’ 

This new condition, in conjunction with 

revised Condition A, accounts for all 

situations where one or more CIVs 

become or are made inoperable. The 

new Condition B required actions and 

completion times are the same as those 

in the revised Condition A, with the 

exception of the Condition B category of 

valves. Condition A completion times 

apply to Category 1 through 7 valves 

and Condition B completion times 

apply to Category 8 through 14 valves. 

The addition of new Condition B has 

been evaluated and documented in the 

NRC SE of TR WCAP–15791. This 

change proposed by TSTF Traveler-446 

is consistent with the NRC SE of TR 

WCAP–15791 and is therefore 

acceptable. 

• TSTF Traveler-446 renames existing 

Condition B and Required Action B.1 as 

Condition C and Required Action C.1. In 

addition, existing Condition B wording, 

which states ‘‘[for reasons other than 

Condition[s] D [and E]]’’ is changed to 

‘‘[for reasons other than Condition[s] E 

[and F]].’’ These changes are editorial in 

nature, are caused by adding conditions 

proposed by TSTF Traveler-446 that 

have been evaluated and documented in 

the NRC SE of TR WCAP–15791, and 

are therefore acceptable. 

• TSTF Traveler-446 deletes the 

existing Condition C and Required 

Actions C.1 and C.2, which are 

applicable to penetration flow paths 

with only one CIV and a closed system. 

The existing Condition C entry 

condition is ‘‘One or more penetration 

flow paths with one containment 

isolation valve inoperable.’’ With 

revised Condition A and the addition of 

Condition B, this covers all CIVs that 

would have been applicable to existing 

Condition C. The required actions for 

revised Condition A and new Condition 

B are identical to the existing Condition 

C. The completion times for revised 

Condition A and new Condition B are 

changed from the existing Condition C 

time of 72 hours and have been 

evaluated and documented in the NRC 

SE of TR WCAP–15791. The deletion of 

existing Condition C is consistent with 

WCAP–15791, is accounted for by the 

revision to Condition A, and the 

addition of new Condition B, and is 

therefore acceptable. 

• TSTF Traveler-446 adds a new 

Condition D, which states ‘‘Two or more 

penetration flow paths with one 

containment isolation valve inoperable 

[for reasons other than Condition[s] E 

[and F]].’’ This condition requires 

isolating all but one of the affected 

penetrations within 4 hours (the 

existing completion time for Condition 

A). Once this completion time is 

satisfied, and since revised Condition A 

and new Condition B will still be 

applicable, this essentially limits the 

completion times in Condition A and B 

to a single penetration. This added 

requirement enforces the basis of 

WCAP–15791 that only one CIV should 

be in maintenance at a time. This 

change addresses Section 4.0, 

‘‘Limitations and Conditions,’’ items 1 

and 2, in the NRC SE of TR WCAP– 

15791 and is therefore acceptable. 

• TSTF Traveler-446 renames 

Conditions D, E, and F, along with 

Required Actions D.1, E.1, E.2, E.3, F.1, 

and F.2, as Conditions E, F, and G, along 

with Required Actions E.1, F.1, F.2, F.3, 

G.1, and G.2. With the addition of new 

Conditions B and D, and the deletion of 

current Condition C, the remaining 

conditions and required actions need to 

be renumbered. This change is editorial, 

results in no technical change, and is 

therefore acceptable. 

4.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

[LICENSEE] proposed adoption of TSTF 

Traveler-446, Revision 3, to modify the 

TS requirements for allowed outage 

times for CIVs associated with the 

implementation of TR WCAP–15791– 

NP–A, Revision 2. The NRC staff has 

reviewed these changes for consistency 

with the current NUREG–1431 and 

found them to be consistent. 

The NRC staff has concluded, on the 

basis of the considerations discussed 


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47298 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 177 / Tuesday, September 15, 2009 / Notices 

above, that (1) there is reasonable 

assurance that the health and safety of 

the public will not be endangered by 

operation in the proposed manner, (2) 

such activities will be conducted in 

compliance with the Commission’s 

regulations, and (3) the issuance of the 

amendments will not be inimical to the 

common defense and security or to the 

health and safety of the public. 

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION 

In accordance with the Commission’s 

regulations, the [ ] State official was 

notified of the proposed issuance of the 

amendment. The State official had [(1) 

no comments or (2) the following 

comments—with subsequent 

disposition by the NRC staff]. 

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL 

CONSIDERATION 

The amendment changes a 

requirement with respect to the 

installation or use of a facility 

component located within the restricted 

area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20, 

‘‘Standards for Protection Against 

Radiation.’’ The NRC staff has 

determined that the amendment 

involves no significant increase in the 

amounts and no significant change in 

the types of any effluents that may be 

released offsite and that there is no 

significant increase in individual or 

cumulative occupational radiation 

exposure. The Commission has 

previously issued a proposed finding 

that the amendment involves no 

significant hazards considerations, and 

there has been no public comment on 

the finding [FR]. Accordingly, the 

amendment meets the eligibility criteria 

for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 

CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 

51.22(b), no environmental impact 

statement or environmental assessment 

need be prepared in connection with the 

issuance of the amendments. 

7.0 REFERENCES 

1. ‘‘Forwarding of TSTFs,’’ dated 

October 21, 2002 (ADAMS Package 

Accession No. ML022960409). 

2. ‘‘TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 1, 

‘Risk-Informed Evaluation of Extensions 

to Containment Isolation Valve 

Completion Times (WCAP–15791),’ ’’ 

dated January 31, 2005 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML050460293). 

3. WCAP–15791, Revision 2, ‘‘RiskInformed Evaluation of Extensions to 

Containment Isolation Valve 

Completion Times,’’ (ADAMS Package 

Accession No. ML071550223). 

4. ‘‘TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 2, 

‘Risk-Informed Evaluation of Extensions 

to Containment Isolation Valve 

Completion Times (WCAP–15791),’ ’’ 

dated January 11, 2007 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML070110620). 

5. ‘‘TSTF Traveler-446, Revision 3, 

‘Risk-Informed Evaluation of Extensions 

to Containment Isolation Valve 

Completion Times (WCAP–15791),’ ’’ 

dated February 19, 2008 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML080510164). 

6. NUREG–1431, ‘‘Standard Technical 

Specifications Westinghouse Plants,’’ 

Revision 3, June 2004 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML041830612). 

7. Nuclear Energy Institute 99–04, 

Revision 0, ‘‘Guidelines for Managing 

NRC Commitment Changes,’’ July 1999 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML003680088). 

8. Final Safety Evaluation (SE) of 

Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) 

Topical Report (TR) WCAP–15791–P, 

Revision 2, ‘‘Risk-Informed Evaluation 

of Extensions to Containment Isolation 

Valve Completion Times,’’ dated 

February 13, 2008 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML080170680). 

[FR Doc. E9–22182 Filed 9–14–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Field Hearings 

AGENCY: Postal Regulatory Commission. 

ACTION: Notice of field hearings. 

DATES: (1.) September 16, 2009: field 

hearing, Independence, Ohio (1 p.m.) 

(2.) September 23, 2009, field hearing, 

Bronx, New York. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ann 

C. Fisher, 202–789–6803 or 

Ann.Fisher@prc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This 

notice informs the public of the 

Commission’s intention to hold public 

field hearings to supplement the record 

in this proceeding. The first field 

hearing will take place on Wednesday, 

September 16, 2009 at the Independence 

(Ohio) Civic Center. The hearing is 

scheduled to begin at 1 p.m. and to 

conclude at 4 p.m. The address for the 

Independence Civic Center is 6363 Selig 

Drive, Independence, Ohio 44131. 

The second field hearing will take 

place on Wednesday, September 23, 

2009 at O’Keefe Commons in O’Hare 

Hall on Fordham University’s Rose Hill 

Campus. The hearing is scheduled to 

begin at 1 p.m. and to conclude at 4 

p.m. The address for O’Hare Hall is 441 

East Fordham Road, Bronx, New York 

10458. 

The format for presentations at the 

field hearings will consist of opening 

remarks by Chairman Ruth Y. Goldway 

and other Commissioners, testimony 

from invited witnesses, a question-andanswer session, and closing remarks. 

Witness lists and any changes affecting 

the dates, times or locations for the field 

hearings will be posted on the 

Commission’s Web site. 

The public is invited to attend the 

field hearings. Any attendee who needs 

special accommodations or has other 

questions about the field hearings 

should contact Ann C. Fisher, Director 

of Public Affairs and Government 

Relations, 202–789–6803 or 

Ann.Fisher@prc.gov, in advance. 

Dated: September 10, 2009. 

Judith M. Grady, 

Acting Secretary. 

[FR Doc. E9–22268 Filed 9–14–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7710–FW–P 

POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Site Visits 

AGENCY: Postal Regulatory Commission. 

ACTION: Notice of site visits. 

DATES: 1. September 16, 2009: site visit, 

Cleveland, Ohio. 2. September 23, 2009, 

site visit, Jersey City, New Jersey. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Stephen L. Sharfman, 202–789–6820 or 

steven.sharfman@prc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This 

notice informs the public of two site 

visits by Commissioners, assistants and 

other designated staff members. One 

visit is to the American Greetings 

Corporation, One American Way, 

Cleveland, Ohio 44144, on Wednesday, 

September 16, 2009. 

The other is to the U.S. Postal 

Service’s New Jersey Network 

Distribution Center, 80 County Road, 

Jersey City, New Jersey 07097–9998, on 

Wednesday, September 23, 2009. 

The purpose of the visits is to increase 

familiarity with mailing practices and 

postal operations. For further 

information, contact Stephen L. 

Sharfman, 202–789–6820 or 

stephen.sharfman@prc.gov. 

Dated: September 10, 2009. 

Judith M. Grady, 

Acting Secretary. 

[FR Doc. E9–22272 Filed 9–14–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7710–FW–P 

POSTAL SERVICE 

Board of Governors; Sunshine Act 

Meeting 

TIMES AND DATES: 6 p.m., Monday, 

September 21, 2009; 1 p.m., Tuesday, 

September 22, 2009; and 8 a.m., 

Wednesday, September 23, 2009. 


sroberts on DSKD5P82C1PROD with NOTICES