J-A11035-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

THE TASA GROUP, INC. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RODERICK GRAHAM

Appellant No. 2301 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Dated July 15, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No.: 2014-10262

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and WECHT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED AUGUST 21, 2015

Roderick Graham, pro se, appeals the trial court’s July 15, 2014 order 

quashing his petition to appeal nunc pro tunc. We affirm.

The trial court set forth the pertinent factual and procedural history of 

this case as follows:

TASA Group, Incorporated [“TASA”] is a Pennsylvania 

corporation that delivers expert witness referrals to attorneys 

throughout the country. [Graham] is an attorney residing in 

Shelby County, Alabama. In July 2009, [Graham] engaged 

[TASA] to refer an expert witness to testify in an Alabama 

federal court case. As a result of [Graham’s] contact with 

[TASA], [TASA] referred [Graham] to an expert. Subsequent to 

the referral, [TASA] sent [Graham] a memorandum of 

confirmation detailing the agreement pertaining to the services 

rendered. This memorandum contained a clause stating that by 

his acceptance of the expert services, [Graham] agreed to 

concurrent exclusive jurisdiction and venue of the Montgomery 

County Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania [(“trial court”)] 

and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania with respect to the enforcement of the contract.
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[TASA] filed a complaint against [Graham] alleging that 

[Graham] owed [TASA] a balance of $5,140.43 for its services. 

[TASA] mailed the complaint to [Graham] via certified mail in 

April 2011. [TASA] also mailed a notice of the hearing on April 

4, 2011. The Montgomery County Magisterial District Court 

[(“magisterial court”)] held a hearing on May 2, 2011. [Graham]

did not appear at the hearing, and immediately following the 

hearing, the [magisterial court] entered a default judgment 

against [Graham] in the amount of $5,300.30, representing the 

amount of the judgment as well as judgment costs. [Graham] 

received a copy of the default judgment on May 28, 2011. 

[Graham] did not file an appeal. This judgment was 

domesticated in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama 

on October 12, 2011.

On May 6, 2014, [Graham] filed a petition to appeal nunc pro 

tunc the judgment of May 2, 2011. On May 20, 2014, [TASA] 

filed a motion to quash the appeal nunc pro tunc. On July 8, 

2014, [the trial court] heard argument on the motion to quash. 

Subsequently on July 15, 2014, [the trial court] granted 

[TASA’s] motion to quash the appeal nunc pro tunc. 

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 8/29/2014, at 1-2 (capitalization modified). 

On August 5, 2014, Graham filed a notice of appeal, which was docketed in 

this Court at 2301 EDA 2014 on August 14, 2014. The trial court did not 

order Graham to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Graham did not file a concise statement.

However, on August 29, 2014, the trial court filed an opinion pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 

Before this Court, Graham presents the following four issues for 

appeal:

1. Whether the [trial court] erred in refusing to accept 

[Graham’s] notice of appeal based on fraud and lack of 

personal and subject matter jurisdiction until [Graham] file[d] 

a petition to appeal nunc pro tunc?
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2. Whether [Graham] can file an appeal to the [trial court] 

based on fraud and lack of personal jurisdiction and subject 

matter jurisdiction after [thirty] days of the execution of the 

magisterial court’s default judgment?

3. Whether [Graham] can file a petition to appeal nunc pro tunc

based on a default judgment rendered based on a forged 

contract after [thirty] days of the execution of the magisterial 

court’s default judgment?

4. Whether the [trial court] erred in granting [TASA’s] motion to 

quash [Graham’s] petition to appeal nunc pro tunc, where 

[Graham] alleges the judgment is based on a feign [sic] 

invoice, and alleges that the [trial] court lacks personal and 

subject matter jurisdiction?

Brief for Graham at 5 (capitalization modified; italics added). These issues 

are of a piece. We address them in a unitary discussion.

Our Supreme Court has characterized the purpose of nunc pro tunc

restoration of appellate rights as follows:

Allowing an appeal nunc pro tunc is a recognized exception to 

the general rule prohibiting the extension of an appeal deadline. 

This Court has emphasized that the principle emerges that an 

appeal nunc pro tunc is intended as a remedy to vindicate the 

right to an appeal where that right has been lost due to certain 

extraordinary circumstances. Generally, in civil cases an appeal 

nunc pro tunc is granted only where there was fraud or a 

breakdown in the court’s operations through a default of its 

officers.

Union Elec. Corp. v. Bd. Of Prop. Assessments, Appeals & Review of 

Allegheny Cty., 746 A.2d 581, 584 (Pa. 2000) (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Our standard of review over an order denying nunc pro tunc

restoration of a petitioner’s appellate rights is deferent:
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The denial of an appeal nunc pro tunc is within the discretion of 

the trial court, and we will only reverse for an abuse of that 

discretion. Freeman v. Bonner, 761 A.2d 1193, 1194 

(Pa. Super. 2000). In addition to the occurrence of “fraud or 

breakdown in the court’s operations,” nunc pro tunc relief may 

also be granted where the appellant demonstrates that “(1) [his] 

notice of appeal was filed late as a result of non[-]negligent 

circumstances, either as they relate to the appellant or the 

appellant’s counsel; (2) [he] filed the notice of appeal shortly 

after the expiration date; and (3) the appellee was not 

prejudiced by the delay.” Criss v. Wise, 781 A.2d 1156, 1159 

(Pa. 2001).

Rothstein v. Polysciences, Inc., 853 A.2d 1072, 1075 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(citations modified; brackets in the original).1 “An abuse of discretion occurs 

when a trial court, in reaching its conclusions, overrides or misapplies the 

law, or exercises judgment which is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of 

partiality, prejudice, or ill will.” U.S. Bank N.A. v. Mallory, 982 A.2d 986, 

994 (Pa. Super. 2009).

In the present matter, TASA filed a complaint against Graham in April 

2011. TASA also mailed Graham a notice of the hearing on April 2, 2011. 

The magisterial court subsequently held a hearing on May 2, 2011, and 

entered a judgment against Graham in the amount of $5,300.30. Graham 

acknowledged having received notice of that hearing; however, he failed to 

appear at the hearing. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 7/8/2014 at 3-4. 

____________________________________________

1 Graham narrows his argument to an alleged existence of fraud or 

breakdown in the court’s operation. Graham makes no argument with 

regard to the three-part test set forth by the Criss Court. See Criss, 781 

A.2d at 1159.
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Graham also acknowledged that he received notice of the judgment on May 

28, 2011. Id.2

Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J. 1002 provides:

A. A party aggrieved by a judgment for money . . . may appeal 

therefore within thirty (30) days after the date of the entry of 

the judgment by filing with the Prothonotary of the court of 

common pleas a notice of appeal on a form which shall be 

prescribed by the State Court Administrator together with a 

copy of the Notice of Judgment issued by the magisterial 

district judge. The Prothonotary shall not accept an appeal 

from an aggrieved party which is presented for filing more 

than thirty (30) days after the date of entry of the judgment 

without leave of court and upon good cause shown.

Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J. 1002(A). The magisterial court entered a judgment against 

Graham on May 2, 2011, thus, Graham had until June 1, 2011, to file an 

appeal. Admittedly, Graham did not file an appeal before June 1, 2011. 

Rather, Graham filed his petition to appeal nunc pro tunc with the trial court 

on May 6, 2014—nearly three years past the June 1, 2011 deadline.

As previously mentioned, a trial court may grant an appeal nunc pro 

tunc when a delay in filing is cause by extraordinary circumstances involving 

fraud or some breakdown in the court’s operations through a default of its 

officer. Fischer v. UPMC Nw., 34 A.3d 115, 120 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

____________________________________________

2

In addition to the testimony in this case, in a separate but related 

lawsuit, Graham filed a complaint against TASA in the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Alabama on April 22, 2013. In his 

complaint, Graham also acknowledges that he received notice of the 

judgment against him on May 28, 2011. Complaint for Graham, 4/22/2013 

at 1.
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Graham’s sole argument alleging a breakdown in the court’s 

operations is that TASA did not provide the magisterial court with his 

complete address, and, as a result, Graham claims that he did not receive 

timely notice of the magisterial court’s judgment within the thirty-day 

statutory period. Brief for Graham at 14. Hence, Graham’s claims that 

there was a breakdown in the court’s operations. However, his claim finds 

no factual support in the record. To the contrary, Graham twice admitted 

that he received timely notice of both the underlying lawsuit against him and 

the resulting judgment. Consequently, Graham has failed to demonstrate 

that there was a breakdown in the court’s operations.

Additionally, Graham claims that TASA “committed fraud by creating 

the false and/or forged invoice/agreement to get a judgment and collect 

bogus expert witnesses’ expenses.” Id. at 17. Graham’s claims, however, 

are in no way directly or indirectly related to his failure to make a timely 

appeal. Clearly, there is no connection between Graham’s claims of fraud on 

behalf of TASA and his failure to make a timely appeal. See Fischer, 34 

A.3d at 120 (granting an appeal nunc pro tunc when the appellant’s delay in 

filing an appeal is the result of fraud or some breakdown in the court’s 

operations).

In a final effort to relitigate the substantive claims of this lawsuit, 

Graham raises general challenges to the magisterial court’s subject matter 

and personal jurisdiction. Brief for Graham at 18-32. Specifically, Graham 

argues that he never received a Memorandum of Confirmation, thus, 
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Graham claims that he is not subject to the forum selection clause contained 

within the Memorandum of Confirmation. Id at 16.

The above-mentioned Memorandum of Confirmation contained the 

following clause:

Consent To Jurisdiction And Venue

You consent to the concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction and 

venue of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas of the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, with respect to the 

enforcement of this Memorandum, the collection of any amounts 

due under this Memorandum, or any disputes arising under this 

Memorandum.

Memorandum of Confirmation, 3/27/2009 at 2.

During the trial court hearing, however, Graham expressly admitted 

that he received this Memorandum of Confirmation. N.T. at 14. Graham 

also admitted that he paid the balance on the Memorandum of Confirmation, 

thereby subjecting him to the jurisdictional clause. Id. Consequently, 

Graham’s claim that he was not subject to the forum selection clause 

contained with the Memorandum of Confirmation is meritless.

For all of the above-mentioned reasons, the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying Graham’s appeal.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/21/2015