United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 29, 2022 Decided July 21, 2023

No. 21-3074

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

LOUIS A. WILSON, ALSO KNOWN AS SPUDS,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:96-cr-00319-1)

Anthony F. Shelley argued the cause and filed the 

memorandum of law and fact and reply for appellant. 

Alexandra E. Beaulieu entered an appearance.

David P. Saybolt, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on appellee=s memorandum of 

law and fact were Chrisellen R. Kolb and John P. Mannarino,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
2

Before: CHILDS, Circuit Judge, and ROGERS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

†

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge CHILDS.

CHILDS, Circuit Judge: Louis Wilson appeals the denial 

of his motion for compassionate release made pursuant to 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 

115-391, § 602(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018) (codified at 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). He argues that intervening 

changes in law, in combination with other factors, warrant that 

his motion be granted. 

Wilson waited the required time of thirty days after the 

warden received his initial request for compassionate release, 

but chose not to bring it on his behalf, to file his own motion in 

district court. That motion included additional grounds for his 

release, like his increased weight and a change in sentencing 

law, not found in his request to the warden. See Req. for 

Compassionate Release 1–2. 

The government maintains that Wilson failed to properly 

exhaust his administrative remedies as to these additional 

grounds such that the court may not consider Wilson’s 

contentions on the merits. This Court, however, assumes 

without deciding that Wilson properly exhausted his 

administrative remedies and nonetheless affirms the district 

court’s denial of Wilson’s motion.

We hold that Section 3582(c)(1)(A) is not jurisdictional 

because Congress did not use express language making it so. 

† Senior Circuit Judge Silberman was a member of the panel before 

his death on October 2, 2022. Judges Childs and Rogers have acted 

as a quorum in this opinion. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
3

And per United States v. Jenkins, 50 F.4th 1185, 1192, 1198 

(D.C. Cir. 2022), Wilson’s change in law arguments cannot 

constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons, whether alone 

or in combination with other factors. 

I.

A.

A court can grant a defendant compassionate release from 

prison if they meet certain criteria. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 

They must demonstrate, in the court’s judgment, an 

extraordinary and compelling reason for release. Id. 

(c)(1)(A)(i). And that reason must be consistent with the

various factors Congress instructs courts to consider when 

sentencing defendants. Id. (c)(1)(A)(ii); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

But before defendants may file a motion for 

compassionate release, they must first exhaust their 

administrative remedies. Two pathways are available for them 

to do so. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Either is sufficient. Id. 

First, defendants can “fully exhaust[] all administrative rights 

[by] appeal[ling] a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a 

motion on the defendant’s behalf.” Id. Alternatively, they may 

file a motion for compassionate release “30 days from the 

receipt of such a request [to] the warden.” Id. 

B.

In 1997, Wilson was convicted of several federal crimes, 

including killing a federal witness with the intent to prevent 

him from testifying. Wilson is serving a sentence of life 

imprisonment plus one consecutive five-year term.
4

On September 18, 2020, Wilson first submitted his request 

for compassionate release to the warden at Federal Correction 

Institution (FCI) Petersburg. The warden denied the request on 

October 6, 2020. On April 7, 2021, 201 days after submitting 

his request, Wilson filed a pro se motion for compassionate 

release in the district court. In that motion, Wilson added 

factors not included in his request to the warden, such as his

increased “weight” and “length of time served.” See Req. for 

Compassionate Release 1–2. The government argued that 

Wilson did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies as 

to those additional grounds under Section 3582(c)(1)(A) but 

nonetheless addressed them. United States v. Wilson, No. CR 

96-319-01, 2021 WL 107 5292457, at *3 n.4 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 

2021), recons. denied, 2021 WL 5292460 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 

2021). The district court considered the merits of these 

additional grounds and did not deny the motion for failure to 

issue exhaust. Id. (citation omitted); see also id. at *4–6. 

Wilson maintains that the following extraordinary and 

compelling reasons support his release: (i) if United States v. 

Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 

U.S. 466 (2000), were issued prior to his sentence, he would 

have received twenty-five years instead of life imprisonment 

because the district court considered additional facts during 

sentencing not proven to a jury; (ii) the national sentencing 

statistics for murder have trended downward; and (iii) his 

medical conditions plus his exemplary prison citizenship. 

Wilson argued to the district court that the purported 

intervening changes in law went to his length of time served 

and should constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons.

The district court concluded, however, that time served in 

prison “does not in [and] of itself constitute an extraordinary 

and compelling circumstance.” Wilson, 2021 WL 5292457, at 

*3; see also id. at *4–6. After considering the Section 3553(a) 
5

factors, the district court also decided that “the severity of his 

crime, the need for the sentence imposed, and the risk to the 

public outweigh[ed] th[e] factors that weigh[ed] in Mr. 

Wilson’s favor.” Id. at *6. Thus, the district court denied 

Wilson’s motion. 

Wilson timely appealed. On appeal, Wilson also contends 

that if the district court failed to consider his change in law 

arguments as extraordinary and compelling reasons under 

Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), they should have been considered 

under the district court’s Section 3553(a) analysis. Appellant’s 

Mem. Br. 17–18.

II. 

We have jurisdiction to review this appeal. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291; United States v. Long, 997 F.3d 342, 352 (D.C. Cir. 

2021). This Court reviews the district court’s denial of 

Wilson’s motion for compassionate release for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Jackson, 26 F.4th 994, 1001 (D.C. 

Cir. 2022); see also United States v. Smith, 896 F.3d 466, 470 

(D.C. Cir. 2018).

III.

A.

Because this Court cannot assume it has jurisdiction, we 

first answer whether Section 3582(c)(1)(A) is jurisdictional. 

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). 

Joining our sister circuits that have considered the question, we 

think not and thus address the merits of Wilson’s contention 

without deciding whether issue exhaustion is required under 

Section 3582(c)(1)(A).
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Begin with the text. Section 3582 (c)(1)(A) provides: 

(1) [I]n any case—

(A)the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of 

Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the 

defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights 

to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a 

motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 

days from the receipt of such a request by the warden 

of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may 

reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a 

term of probation or supervised release with or without 

conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion 

of the original term of imprisonment), after 

considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to 

the extent that they are applicable[.]

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 

Jurisdictional rules “govern a court’s adjudicatory 

authority,” Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012)

(quotations and citation omitted), while nonjurisdictional 

claim-processing rules simply “promote the orderly progress of 

litigation . . . . ” Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 

(2011). Congress must “clearly state[]” when a provision is 

jurisdictional. Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1850 

(2019) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Thus, the 

question of whether a statutory provision is jurisdictional is 

governed by a “clear statement” rule where the statute must

“expressly refer to subject-matter jurisdiction or speak in 

jurisdictional terms.” Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 

237, 246 (2016). That high standard makes sense because 

“[j]urisdictional requirements cannot be waived or forfeited, 

must be raised by courts sua sponte, and . . . do not allow for 
7

equitable exceptions.” Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r of Internal 

Revenue, 142 S. Ct. 1493, 1497 (2022). 

Absent Congress’s clear command, mandatory language 

does not transform a statutory provision into a jurisdictional

requirement. Musacchio, 577 U.S. at 246; United States v. 

Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 410 (2015). For example, in Wilkins v. 

United States, 143 S. Ct. 870, 875 (2023), the Court considered 

whether Section 2409a(g), a provision of the Quiet Title Act,

was jurisdictional. The provision at issue stated that action 

“shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of 

the date upon which it accrued.” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g). Yet, 

the Court held that it was nonjurisdictional not only because

the “text sp[oke] only to a claim’s timeliness,” but also because 

the provision was placed outside of the jurisdictional grant 

section of the statute. Wilkins, 143 S. Ct. at 877 (citation 

omitted). In Boechler, a provision of the Tax Code stated that, 

“The person may, within 30 days of a determination under this 

section, petition the Tax Court for review of such determination 

(and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such 

matter).” 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1). Because “to such matter[,]”

id., lacked a clear antecedent and contained “multiple plausible 

interpretations,” the Court still held that the provision was 

nonjurisdictional. Boechler, P.C., 142 S. Ct. at 1498. And this 

Court “presume[s] [that an administrative] exhaustion 

[requirement] is non-jurisdictional unless Congress states in 

clear, unequivocal terms that the judiciary is barred from 

hearing an action until the administrative agency has come to a 

decision . . . .” Avocados Plus Inc. v. Veneman, 370 F.3d 1243, 

1248 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quotations and citation omitted). 

Here, Section 3582(c)(1)(A) is a nonjurisdictional claimprocessing rule. Congress did not speak clearly that this 

provision is jurisdictional, Fort Bend, 139 S. Ct. at 1850, nor 

does it appear in the jurisdictional portion of the criminal code. 
8

See 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Nothing in Section 3582(c)(1)(A) uses 

any mandatory language that would deprive this Court of 

jurisdiction should the defendant fail to satisfy either 

exhaustion pathway. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Therefore, 

the plain text of Section 3582(c)(1)(A) does not permit this

Court to infer that Congress intended it to be jurisdictional.

Every circuit to have considered this question agrees. 

United States v. Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th 48, 52–53 

(1st Cir. 2022); United States v. Saladino, 7 F.4th 120, 121–24

(2d Cir. 2021); United States v. Muhammad, 16 F.4th 126, 

129–30 (4th Cir. 2021); United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 

467–68 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 920 (2020); 

United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833–34 (6th Cir. 2020); 

United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1179 (7th Cir. 2020); 

United States v. Houck, 2 F.4th 1082, 1084 (8th Cir. 2021); 

United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1281–82 (9th Cir. 2021); 

United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1030–31 

(10th Cir. 2021). 

Since we conclude that Section 3582(c)(1)(A) is a 

nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule, we need not reach 

whether it requires defendants to exhaust each issue in their 

submitted requests before the warden before filing in district 

court. See Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th at 53. Instead, this Court 

assumes without deciding that Wilson properly exhausted as to 

each of his grounds for compassionate release. 

B.

We next answer whether Wilson’s change in law 

arguments can be extraordinary and compelling reasons

warranting compassionate release. They cannot. Accordingly, 

this Court need not reach Wilson’s contention that his change 

in law arguments should still be considered as Section 3553(a) 
9

factors because, under Jenkins, the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying Wilson’s motion for lack of an 

extraordinary and compelling reason. 50 F.4th at 1198.

Nevertheless, we recognize that since this Court decided

Jenkins, the United States Sentencing Commission amended its 

guidelines regarding what constitutes an extraordinary and 

compelling reason for release. 88 Fed. Reg. 28,254 (May 3, 

2023). That update will become effective on November 1, 

2023. Id. at 28,254/1. The guidelines state that district courts 

“may . . . consider[]” a “change in the law” to “determine[] 

whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and 

compelling reason” for release if he has “served at least 10 

years” of “an unusually long sentence.” Id. at 28,255/2. 

However, this Court does not decide whether Wilson’s 

contentions would constitute extraordinary and compelling 

reasons under the not-yet-effective guidelines. 

Wilson largely relays the same argument as this Court 

rejected in Jenkins: if Booker, 543 U.S. at 224, and Apprendi, 

530 U.S. at 483–84, were issued before his conviction, he 

would have received a twenty-five-year sentence, instead of a 

life sentence. He then supplements that position with 

additional claims about general downward nationwide trends 

for murder sentences, his overall medical conditions, and his 

exemplary prison citizenship. But intervening judicial 

decisions, regardless of whether they are combined with other 

factors, are barred as extraordinary and compelling bases for 

release. Jenkins, 50 F.4th at 1192, 1198. Consequently, we do 
10

not reach whether Wilson’s arguments were properly 

considered under Section 3553(a).

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of 

Wilson’s motion for compassionate release. 

So ordered.