Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1710-JT-2550 | April 27, 2018 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Matthew J. McGovern

Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General

Katherine A. Cornelius

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Involuntary 

Termination of the Parent-Child 

Relationship of A.S.M. (Minor 

Child) and

A.M.M. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner

April 27, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

22A01-1710-JT-2550

Appeal from the Floyd Circuit

Court

The Honorable Robert L. Bennett, 

Senior Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

22C01-1705-JT-414

Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] A.M.M. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order involuntarily terminating her

parental rights to her minor child, A.S.M. (“Child”). Mother contends that the 

trial court’s order is clearly erroneous in several respects. Finding no error, we

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child is the biological child of Mother and S.M. (“Father”) and was born in 

June 2008. In June 2015, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) 

filed a petition alleging that Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”) 

based on Mother’s and Father’s substance use, domestic violence, and concerns 

of sexual abuse by Father. After an initial hearing in July 2015, the trial court 

appointed a court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) for Child and ordered 

Father to have no contact with Child. In August 2015, the trial court issued an 

emergency order for Child to be removed from Mother’s home based on

concerns regarding Mother’s use of methamphetamine. After a hearing in 

October 2015, during which Mother admitted that Child was a CHINS, the trial 

court issued an order finding Child to be a CHINS based on “substance abuse 

issues within the home and sexual abuse by” Father. Ex. Vol. at 24. As set 

forth more fully below, the trial court also issued a dispositional order imposing 

numerous requirements on Mother and Father.

[3] In May 2017, DCS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s and 

Father’s parental rights. In September 2017, the trial court held a factfinding 
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hearing and issued a bench ruling in favor of DCS. In December 2017, the 

court issued a written order that reads in pertinent part as follows:

12. A dispositional order was entered on November 2, 2015 

which required Mother and Father to participate in the following 

services:

a. Contact case manager;

b. Notify the case manager of pertinent changes;

c. Notify case manager of arrest or criminal charges[;]

d. Case manager to visit home;

e. Enroll in programs recommended;

f. Keep all appointments;

g. Sign releases or authorizations to monitor compliance;

h. Maintain suitable housing;

i. Maintain a suitable source of income, such as employment;

j. Assist with protection plan for child to protect child from 

abuse and neglect;

k. Prohibit the use of drugs;

1. Obey the law;

m. Complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all 

recommendations;

n. Random drug screens;

o. Refrain from domestic violence[.]

13. As part of the dispositional order entered on November 2,

2015 Mother only was required to participate in the following 

services:

a. Case manager to visit child;

b. Ensure child is not removed from the county;

c. Attend to all of child’s medical and mental needs;

d. Attend all scheduled visitations;

e. Help care for child and provide food clothing and supervision;

f. Not allow any person with a no contact order to have access or 

communicate with child;
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g. Receive caregiver approval from case manager;

h. Provide child with a safe, secure and nurturing environment.

14. Mother has failed to substantially comply with the 

dispositional order and specifically, Mother:

a. Failed to complete a drug abuse assessment or drug 

rehabilitation program;

b. Failed to gain sobriety and continued to abuse 

methamphetamine during the life of this case with the last drug 

screen dated September 1, 2017 showing positive for

methamphetamine, less than a month before the final TPR 

hearing;

c. Failed to maintain suitable housing and was homeless for a 

significant amount of time during the pendency of this matter;

d. Failed to maintain employment and remained largely 

unemployed throughout the pendency of this matter;

e. Failed to submit to random drug testing as requested and only 

completed 65 drug screens out of more than 250 that should have 

been taken;

f. Failed to attend all scheduled visitations.

....

17. CASA filed a report that supports the termination of parental 

rights in this instance.

18. The plan of adoption is suitable and in the best interests of 

the Child.

....

24. Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that DCS has 

met its burden of proof, proving its petition to terminate Mother’s 

and Father’s parental rights by clear and convincing evidence 

that:
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a. The child has been removed from the home and custody of his 

parents and has been under the supervision of DCS for at least 

fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, and has 

been removed from the Child’s Mother and Father for more than 

six (6) months pursuant to the terms of the dispositional decree.

b. There is a reasonable probability that:

i. The conditions which resulted in the child’s removal and 

continued placement outside the home will not be remedied by 

Mother or Father; or

ii. That continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a 

threat to the Child's wellbeing.

c. Termination of parental rights is in Child’s best interests.

d. There is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the 

Child, that being Adoption.

....

26. All rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties, and 

obligations concerning the Child, including the right to consent 

to adoption, pertaining to that relationship are permanently

terminated.

Appealed Order at 2-5. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Parental rights are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution, but they are not absolute and must be subordinated to the 

child’s interests in determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate 
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parental rights. In re W.M.L., 82 N.E.3d 361, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Thus, 

parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet 

her parental responsibilities. Id. A petition for the involuntary termination of 

parental rights must allege in pertinent part:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least 

six (6) months under a dispositional decree.

....

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has 

been under the supervision of a local office or probation 

department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most 

recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date 

the child is removed from the home as a result of the child 

being alleged to be a child in need of services or a 

delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;
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(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (emphasis added). DCS must prove “each and 

every element” by clear and convincing evidence. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 

1261 (Ind. 2009); Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2. If the trial court finds that the 

allegations in the petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child 

relationship and enter findings of fact that support the conclusions required by 

that determination. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a), -(c).

[5] “Our standard of review is highly deferential in cases concerning the 

termination of parental rights.” In re D.P., 27 N.E.3d 1162, 1165 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2015).

We neither reweigh evidence nor assess witness credibility. We 

consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to 

the trial court’s judgment. Where the trial court enters findings 

of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard 

of review: we first determine whether the evidence supports the 

findings and then determine whether the findings support the 

judgment. In deference to the trial court’s unique position to 

assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a 

parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous.

C.A. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 15 N.E.3d 85, 92-93 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) 

(citations omitted).
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Section 1 – The trial court’s conclusion regarding DCS’s plan 

for Child’s care and treatment is not clearly erroneous.

[6] Mother first contends that the trial court’s conclusion that there is a satisfactory 

plan for Child’s care and treatment is clearly erroneous because “[n]owhere in 

the findings does the trial court outline any specific facts about the DCS plan, 

the success of its implementation to date, or how the plan has served [Child’s] 

best interests.” Appellant’s Br. at 20. It is well settled that a plan for the care 

and treatment of a child need not be detailed, as long as it offers a general sense 

of the child’s direction after the parent-child relationship is terminated. In re 

A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. A DCS plan is 

satisfactory if the plan is to attempt to find suitable parents to adopt the child. 

Id. “In other words, there need not be a guarantee that a suitable adoption will 

take place, only that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive parent.” Id. 

Mother’s demand for more specific findings is unwarranted, and therefore we 

conclude that the trial court’s order is not clearly erroneous in this regard.

Section 2 – Finding 14 is not clearly erroneous.

[7] Next, Mother claims that finding 14 improperly focuses on her “historical 

failures” and “does not at all address whether the conditions which led to 
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[Child’s] removal would be remedied ....” Appellant’s Br. at 23.1 She also 

claims that the finding does not address Child’s best interests. We disagree.

[8] To determine whether the conditions that resulted in a child’s removal will not 

be remedied, the trial court engages in a two-step analysis. In re A.W., 62 

N.E.3d 1267, 1273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “The court first identifies the 

conditions that led to removal and then determines whether there is a 

reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” Id. The 

court then judges a parent’s fitness at the time of the termination hearing, 

“taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions, and balancing any 

recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether 

there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” Id. 

(quotation marks omitted). “Trial courts have discretion to weigh a parent’s 

prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination, 

and the court may find that a parent’s past behavior is the best predictor of her 

future behavior.” Id. The trial court may consider services offered by DCS and 

the parent’s response to those services as evidence of whether conditions will be 

remedied. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2013), trans. denied. DCS “is not required to provide evidence ruling out 

all possibilities of change; rather, it need only establish that there is a reasonable 

 

1 Mother also argues that the finding does not address whether she is a threat to Child’s well-being. Because 

Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, we need not address this argument.
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probability that the parent’s behavior will not change.” Id. (quotation marks 

omitted).

[9] The condition that resulted in Child’s removal was Mother’s methamphetamine

use. The evidence supports the trial court’s findings that Mother continued to 

abuse meth and tested positive for that substance less than a month before the 

termination hearing. The evidence also supports the trial court’s findings that 

Mother failed to complete a drug abuse assessment or drug rehabilitation 

program and completed less than a third of the random drug screens that should 

have been taken. Finding 14 is supported by the evidence and also supports the 

trial court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that Mother’s meth 

use will not be remedied. Accordingly, we cannot say that it is clearly 

erroneous in this regard.

[10] In determining what is in a child’s best interests, the trial court must look to the 

totality of the evidence and subordinate the interests of the parent to those of 

the child. In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied

(2016). “The court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed before 

terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. The evidence supports the trial 

court’s findings regarding Mother’s continued meth use, unstable housing and 

employment history, and failure to attend all scheduled visitations with Child. 

Finding 14 is supported by the evidence and also supports the trial court’s 

conclusion that termination is in Child’s best interests. Therefore, we cannot 

say that it is clearly erroneous. The trial court’s order is affirmed. 
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[11] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.