UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

LAMONT JUARQUES BAIRD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF BUNCOMBE, a North

Carolina Body Corporate and

Politic; CHARLES H. LONG, in his

official capacity as former

Buncombe County Sheriff; RICK

RADCLIFF, in his official capacity as

Deputy Sheriff of Buncombe

County; STEVE MYERS, in his official

capacity as Deputy Sheriff of

Buncombe County; KEN LANCE, in

his official capacity as Deputy

No. 97-7207

Sheriff of Buncombe County; SAM

EVANGELOU, in his official capacity

as Deputy Sheriff of Buncombe

County; CITY OF ASHEVILLE, North

Carolina, a North Carolina

Municipal Corporation; JOSEPH D.

PALMER, in his official capacity as

an Asheville Police Officer;

RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY,

INCORPORATED,

Defendants-Appellees.

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF

NORTH CAROLINA LEGAL FOUNDATION,

INCORPORATED,

Amicus Curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville.

Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge.

(CA-95-63-1)

Submitted: February 27, 1998

Decided: September 1, 1998

Before NIEMEYER, HAMILTON, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Howard C. McGlohon, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant.

Sarah Patterson Brison Meldrum, Assistant City Attorney II, CITY

OF ASHEVILLE, Asheville, North Carolina; William F. Slawter,

NESBITT & SLAWTER, Asheville, North Carolina; Frank P. Graham, Jacqueline Grant, ROBERTS & STEVENS, P.A., Asheville,

North Carolina; Stanford K. Clontz, Associate County Attorney,

COUNTY OF BUNCOMBE, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellees. Seth R. Cohen, SMITH, FOLLIN & JAMES, L.L.P., Greensboro, North Carolina; Sandy S. Ma, Staff Attorney, AMERICAN

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NORTH CAROLINA, Raleigh,

North Carolina, for Amicus Curiae.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

 2
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Lamont Baird appeals the district court's orders granting summary

judgment to the Defendants in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) civil

action for damages. Baird claims that the Defendants violated his civil

rights during his detention and warrantless arrest. Our review of the

record and the appropriate legal standards in this case persuades us

that the rulings of the district court were correct. Therefore, we affirm

the judgment of the district court.

On February 26, 1994, Asheville, North Carolina, police officer

Joseph Palmer observed Baird dressed similarly to a robbery suspect

and driving an automobile away from the general vicinity of a recent

robbery. Palmer stopped Baird's vehicle and requested that Baird

identify himself. Baird could not produce a driver's license, but he

provided his social security number and a picture ID issued by his

employer. Palmer placed Baird in the backseat of his police cruiser

to facilitate a drive-by identification by a witness to the robbery. The

witness verified that Baird was not the robbery suspect.

While waiting for the robbery witness, Palmer inquired about Baird

through the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), and the

inquiry returned a report that led Palmer to believe that Baird was

wanted for murder in Maryland. Finding further investigation warranted, Palmer transported Baird to the Buncombe County jail. After

arriving at the jail, Palmer left Baird in the booking area while he

requested additional information about the Maryland suspect from the

Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). While Baird was in the booking area, Buncombe County deputy sheriffs decided that Baird should

be placed in a cell with other prisoners. Baird did not want to go into

a cell and was charged with resisting arrest, assault, and damage to

personal property. After it became clear that Baird was not the Maryland suspect, Palmer returned to the booking area; however, Baird

was not free to leave due to the scuffle with the deputy sheriffs.

A few months later, Baird filed suit alleging that Palmer violated

his Fourth Amendment rights by detaining him after he was cleared

as the robbery suspect. Further, Baird claimed that the other Defen-

 3
dants violated his rights by maintaining a policy or practice that

encouraged Palmer's action and allowed the Buncombe County deputy sheriffs to use excessive force. After a period of discovery, the

district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants

on the grounds of qualified immunity and Baird's failure to set out

facts sufficient to support his claims. Baird appeals the district court's

summary judgment orders.

First, Baird claims that Palmer, in his individual capacity, was not

entitled to qualified immunity because Palmer did not have probable

cause to detain him as a murder suspect. According to Baird, the suspect in the NCIC report was so dissimilar to himself that it was unreasonable for Palmer to believe that he was the Maryland fugitive.

Further, Baird contends that Palmer's action of taking Baird to the

Buncombe County jail was unreasonable because any further investigation could have been done at the scene.

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials are

immune from liability "as long as their actions could reasonably have

been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have

violated."1 Consequently, qualified immunity attaches when the government actor's conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known."2 "Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they

are liable for transgressing bright lines."3 Thus, we must examine

whether, at the time of Palmer's decision to detain and arrest Baird,

Palmer had probable cause.

Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within an

officer's knowledge are "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in

believing that the [individual] had committed or was committing an

offense."4 In this case, Baird broke the law by driving without a driver's license;5 thus, Palmer had probable cause to detain and arrest Baird.6

_________________________________________________________________

1 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).

2 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

3 Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992).

4 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); see also United States v.

Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 376 (4th Cir. 1984).

5 See N.C. GEN. S TAT. §§ 20-7(n), 35 (1993).

6 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, ____ (1996); State v.

Johnson, 446 S.E.2d 135, 137-38 (N.C. App. 1994).

 4
The subjective intentions of Palmer do not make the detention and

arrest of Baird illegal under the Fourth Amendment because Palmer's

state of mind does not invalidate his action as long as that action can

be objectively justified.7 Therefore, Palmer was entitled to § 1983

qualified immunity because he did not "violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known,"8 and the district court properly disposed of this claim

on summary judgment because qualified immunity is"an immunity

from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; .. . it is effectively

lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial."9

Next, Baird contends that the district court erred in determining

that a three-hour delay before having a probable cause hearing before

a magistrate was reasonable, and Asheville or Buncombe County had

a policy, practice, or custom that caused Baird's alleged constitutional

violations.10 To prevail, Baird must show that the three hours he was

detained before seeing a magistrate was unreasonable,11 or that Asheville and Buncombe County had a policy or custom that allowed officers to detain individuals at the Buncombe County jail without

probable cause.

Baird's claim fails because, as discussed previously, Palmer had

probable cause to detain and arrest Baird. The official policies of

Asheville and Buncombe County permit law enforcement officers to

detain individuals at the Buncombe County jail only if probable cause

exists to arrest the individual for criminal conduct, and except for

Baird's unsubstantiated allegations, he presented no evidence that

Asheville or Buncombe County established, condoned, or constructively knew,12 of a law enforcement policy or custom of placing an

individual in jail while a probable cause investigation was conducted.

_________________________________________________________________

7 See Whren, 517 U.S. at #6D 6D6D6D#.

8 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345

(1986).

9 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).

10 See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

11 See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991).

12 See Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1391 (4th Cir. 1987).

 5
Moreover, Palmer's action of contacting the FBI before taking

Baird before a magistrate was intended to minimize Baird's detention

while protecting society from a suspected violent felon. Balancing

Baird's right to freedom against the state's duty to protect society, we

find that a three-hour detention before seeing a magistrate was

reasonable.13

Finally, Baird asserts that the district court erred by denying his

motion for partial summary judgment on whether Palmer had probable cause to arrest him. As discussed previously, Palmer had probable

cause to arrest Baird; therefore, the district court did not err by denying Baird's motion for partial summary judgment.

We therefore affirm the district court's orders granting summary

judgment to the Defendants on Baird's claims. We grant the amicus

curiae's motion to withdraw and deny the motion to participate in oral

argument. Additionally, we dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

_________________________________________________________________

13 See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56-57.

 6