United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted June 29, 2021*

Decided July 7, 2021 

Before 

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge 

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge

No. 21-1160 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MITCHELL MCGHEE, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

 

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 19-10034-001 

James E. Shadid, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

After spending over a decade in prison for drug crimes, Mitchell McGhee 

violated the terms of his supervised release by, among other things, using a controlled 

substance. The district court revoked his supervision and sentenced him to a year and a 

day in prison, followed by six years’ supervision. McGhee now appeals, asserting 

primarily that the court erred in imposing the new sentence. Because the court made no 

sentencing errors, we affirm. 

*

 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 21-1160 Page 2 

 McGhee was convicted by a jury in 2007 of conspiring to distribute at least 500 

grams of cocaine and 50 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and 

possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it. Id. § 841(a)(1). The district court imposed 

a life sentence—the statutory minimum for the conspiracy count at the time based on 

McGhee’s prior convictions for felony drug offenses. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2006). 

We affirmed the convictions and sentence. United States v. Jones, 600 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 

2010). Nearly a decade later, the district court reduced McGhee’s sentence under § 404 

of the First Step Act to ten years’ imprisonment and eight years’ supervision. 

See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2018). McGhee was released immediately and began 

serving his term of supervision. 

Within months of his release, McGee repeatedly violated the terms of his 

supervision. In short order, he tested positive for marijuana, refused to attend 

substance-abuse treatment, and failed to timely inform his probation officer of an arrest 

for criminal trespass. After the arrest, the probation office petitioned to revoke 

McGhee’s term of supervised release. McGhee was released on bond pending a 

revocation hearing. 

Eight months later, McGhee was arrested for battery and aggravated criminal 

sexual assault in connection with allegations that he had abused his girlfriend’s 

daughter. Based on this arrest, the probation officer filed a supplemental petition 

seeking revocation of McGhee’s bond. A magistrate judge found probable cause to 

believe that McGhee had committed battery and aggravated criminal sexual assault and 

ordered him detained pending the revocation hearing. 

 At the hearing, McGhee admitted that he violated two of the terms of his 

supervision (using and possessing marijuana, and failing to timely notify his probation 

officer of his arrest). Based on those admissions, the court revoked his release. The court 

then explained that a prison term was necessary to address McGhee’s pattern of 

obstinance, dishonesty, noncompliance, and multiple arrests while on supervision. The 

court first calculated a sentencing range of 21 to 27 months (based on the government’s 

assertion that the marijuana-possession offense should be treated as a Grade B 

violation, together with McGhee’s criminal history category of VI). But the government 

then proposed a Grade C range—8 to 14 months—based on the difficulties faced by 

someone like McGhee who had spent much of life in jail and was “struggling to re-enter 

society.” The court agreed and imposed a sentence of a year and a day in prison (the 
No. 21-1160 Page 3 

extra day allowing McGhee to receive good-time credit) followed by six years’ 

supervision.1

On appeal, McGhee asserts without elaboration that his year-and-a-day sentence, 

combined with the six years’ supervision, unlawfully exceeds the term authorized by 

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). But the revocation statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), authorizes 

prison terms of up to five years on the conspiracy count (a Class A felony), see 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b)(1)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(1), and up to three years on the possession-withintent-to-distribute count (a Class C felony). See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C); 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3559(a)(3). As for supervised release, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) allows a court to impose up 

to the maximum term that could have been imposed on the original offense minus any 

new term of imprisonment. Here, the statutes of conviction authorize a lifetime of 

supervision, so the six-year term was within the permissible range. See 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(C); see also United States v. Shorty, 159 F.3d 312, 315 n.6 (7th Cir. 

1998) (observing that § 841(b)(1) subsections set a “floor requirement” for term of 

supervised release, “leaving the ceiling open”). 

To the extent McGhee argues that his new sentence is too high, that argument 

fails. As required under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), the district court considered the pertinent 

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors, including the nature and circumstances of the numerous 

violations (cataloging McGhee’s frequent lies to his probation officer, arrests, and drug 

use) and the need to deter McGhee from further criminal conduct. Nothing in the 

record shows that his year-and-a-day sentence—which was well below the guidelines 

range of 21 to 27 months for a Grade B violation—is plainly unreasonable. 

See United States v. Raney, 842 F.3d 1041, 1043 (7th Cir. 2016). 

McGhee also challenges his prehearing detention, urging that the magistrate 

judge improperly revoked his bond based on crimes—aggravated criminal sexual abuse 

and battery—for which he never was charged. But that claim became moot once he was 

convicted on the charges for which he was detained. See United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 

138 S. Ct. 1532, 1540–41 (2018); Jackson v. Clements, 796 F.3d 841, 843 (7th Cir. 2015). 

Finally, McGhee contests the term of supervised release imposed on his 

underlying conviction, pointing to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) to argue that his eight-year 

1 McGhee apparently has finished serving his new term of imprisonment, but his 

appeal is not moot because he remains under supervision. See United States v. Corner, 

967 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 2020). 
No. 21-1160 Page 4 

term of supervision exceeded the six years authorized. But a defendant may not 

challenge his underlying conviction or sentence in a revocation proceeding. 

United States v. St. Clair, 926 F.3d 386, 388 n.2 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing cases). 

AFFIRMED