alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 430.33 Audits. ( a ) *Purpose.* The Department's Office of Inspector General (OIG) periodically audits State operations in order to determine whether— ( 1 ) The program is being operated in a cost-efficient manner; and
( 2 ) Funds are being properly expended for the purposes for which they were appropriated under Federal and State law and regulations.
( b ) *Reports.* ( 1 ) The OIG releases audit reports simultaneously to State officials and the Department's program officials.
( 2 ) The reports set forth OIG opinion and recommendations regarding the practices it reviewed, and the allowability of the costs it audited.
( 3 ) Cognizant officials of the Department make final determinations on all audit findings.
( c ) *Action on audit exceptions* — ( 1 ) *Concurrence or clearance.* The State agency has the opportunity of concurring in the exceptions or submitting additional facts that support clearance of the exceptions.
( 2 ) *Appeal.* Any exceptions that are not disposed of under paragraph (c)(1) of this section are included in a disallowance letter that constitutes the Department's final decision unless the State requests reconsideration by the Administrator or the Departmental Appeals Board. (Specific rules are set forth in § 430.42.)
( 3 ) *Adjustment.* If the decision by the Board requires an adjustment of FFP, either upward or downward, a subsequent grant award promptly reflects the amount of increase or decrease.
[53 FR 36571, Sept. 21, 1988, as amended at 56 FR 8846, Mar. 1, 1991; 77 FR 31507, May 29, 2012]
#### HIGHLAND RIDGE, INC., Appellant, v. Jay THOMS, d/b/a East Coast Drywall, Appellee.

No. 74-33.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

April 11, 1974.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Broward County; L. Clayton Nance, Judge.

Appeal dismissed.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Lucius E. JONES.

No. 63737.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 26, 1979.

In re Lucius E. Jones, applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and for a stay order. Parish of DeSoto.

Writ denied.
#### Mildred Paula RANDALL, Appellant, v. AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 74-559.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 29, 1974.

Appeal dismissed.
NO. 12-10-00012-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

'

IN RE: MAURICE MOODY,

RELATOR ' ORIGINAL PROCEEDNG

'

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

Relator Maurice Moody filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking an order 

directing the trial court to grant Relator’s motion for a judgment nunc pro tunc.1 In his 

motion, Relator requested the respondent to delete the affirmative deadly weapon finding 

in the judgment of conviction in trial court cause number 18,637-B. By order filed on 

October 16, 2009, the respondent denied Relator’s motion.

The State, as real party in interest in this proceeding, filed a response to Relator’s 

petition. Attached to the response is a copy of an order signed by the respondent, which 

was filed on January 26, 2010. The order states that the respondent has reconsidered 

Moody’s motion for judgment nunc pro tunc, finds that it should be granted, and orders 

that the judgment be corrected to delete the deadly weapon finding. The State urges, and 

we agree, that this order renders Relator’s petition moot. Accordingly, we dismiss this 

original proceeding.

Opinion delivered February 10, 2010.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)

 

1

 The respondent is the Honorable Alfonso Charles, Judge of the 124th Judicial District Court, 

Gregg County, Texas.
§ 455.200 Basis and scope. ( a ) *Statutory basis.* This subpart implements section 1936 of the Social Security Act that establishes the Medicaid Integrity Program, under which the Secretary will promote the integrity of the program by entering into contracts with eligible entities to carry out the activities under this subpart C.
( b ) *Scope.* This subpart provides for the limitation on a contractor's liability to carry out a contract under the Medicaid Integrity Program and to carry out the Medicaid integrity audit program functions.
[73 FR 55771, Sept. 26, 2008]
§ 456.523 Revised UR plan. ( a ) The revised UR plan for the remote facility must specify the methods and procedures that the facility will use if a variance is granted to insure that it— ( 1 ) Maintains effective and timely control over the utilization of services; and
( 2 ) Conducts reviews in a way that improves the quality of care provided to patients.
( b ) The revised UR plan for the remote facility is the basis for validation of UR under sec. 1903(g)(2) of the Act for the period when a variance is in effect.
§ 436.840 Medically needy resource standard: General requirements. ( a ) To determine eligibility of medically needy individuals, the Medicaid agency must use a single resource standard that is set at an amount that is no lower than the lowest resource standard used on or after January 1, 1966, to determine eligibility under the cash assistance programs that are related to the State's covered medically needy group or groups of individuals under § 436.301.
( b ) The resource standard established under paragraph (a) of this section may not diminish by an increase in the number of persons in the assistance unit. For example, the resource level in the standard for an assistance unit of three may not be less than that set for an assistance unit of two.
[58 FR 4938, Jan. 19, 1993]
Editorial Note on Part 457
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 457 appear at 75 FR 48852, Aug. 11, 2010 and 77 FR 17213, 2013.

§ 457.1100 Basis, scope and applicability. ( a ) *Statutory basis.* This subpart interprets and implements— ( 1 ) Section 2101(a) of the Act, which states that the purpose of title XXI of the Act is to provide funds to States to enable them to initiate and expand the provision of child health assistance to uninsured, low-income children in an effective and efficient manner;
( 2 ) Section 2102(a)(7)(B) of the Act, which requires that the State plan include a description of the methods used to assure access to covered services, including emergency services;
( 3 ) Section 2102(b)(2) of the Act, which requires that the State plan include a description of methods of establishing and continuing eligibility and enrollment; and
( 4 ) Section 2103 of the Act, which outlines coverage requirements for a State that provides child health assistance through a separate child health program.
( b ) *Scope.* This subpart sets forth minimum standards for privacy protection and for procedures for review of matters relating to eligibility, enrollment, and health services.
( c ) *Applicability.* This subpart only applies to a separate child health program.
#### Chester McKINNEY v. STATE.

6 Div. 531.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

May 21, 1974.

Ferris S. Ritchey, Birmingham, Robert Eugene Smith, D. Freeman Hutton, Atlanta, Ga., for appellant.

*236William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., and George M. Van Tassel, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

CATES, Presiding Judge.

Selling, etc., obscene printed matter (a magazine, Body and Soul, Volume III, Number 6) which had theretofore been judicially determined to be obscene by the Circuit Court of *Madison*County; fine, $1,000 and one year hard labor for Jefferson County.

This conviction was had on a trial de novo before a jury February 27, 1973. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419, was decided June 21, 1973. However, we see no obstacle to the classical Blackstonian application of retro-activity as a brooding omnipresence revealed. At least the Supreme Court of Alabama has thus spoken, May 9,1974.

The offending magazine offers an editorial hypothesis that since body and soul are inseparable at least in this life “we get a glimpse of the SOUL through the medium of the BODY.” In spite of these sentiments we find little of the Pre-Raphaelite aestheticism to justify the display of male and female genitalia. The pictures are definitely sexually oriented with postures and organic proximity suggestive of fellatio, cunnilingus and coitus.

Certainly, taken as a whole, there is an appeal to prurient interest in sex. The portrayals of conduct are patently offensive and without serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. The girls aren’t too pretty anyway.

Applying “the average person, applying contemporary (Statewide) community standárds” this magazine viewed in its entirety is definitely an appeal to the prurient interest in sex.

This case, aside from the difference in the printed matter, is practically identical with that of Ex parte McKinney, 292 Ala. 484, 296 So.2d 228 (1974).

Accordingly, the judgment below is due to be

. ... Affirmed.

All the Judges concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3575 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 3575

   To amend the Agricultural Market Transition Act to include native 
 pasture for livestock among the list of crops specifically identified 
          as eligible for noninsured crop disaster assistance.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              June 4, 1996

  Mr. Richardson (for himself and Mr. Skeen) introduced the following 
        bill; which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend the Agricultural Market Transition Act to include native 
 pasture for livestock among the list of crops specifically identified 
          as eligible for noninsured crop disaster assistance.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. NONINSURED CROP DISASTER ASSISTANCE FOR NATIVE PASTURE FOR 
              LIVESTOCK.

    Section 196(a)(2)(B) of the Agricultural Market Transition Act 
(title I of Public Law 104-127; 7 U.S.C. 7333(a)(2)(B)) is amended by 
inserting ``native pasture for livestock,'' after ``fish),''.
                                 <all>
```
#### § 438.58 Conflict of interest safeguards.

As a condition for contracting with MCOs, PIHPs, or PAHPs, a State must have in effect safeguards against conflict of interest on the part of State and local officers and employees and agents of the State who have responsibilities relating to the MCO, PIHP, or PAHP contracts or the enrollment processes specified in § 438.54(b). These safeguards must be at least as effective as the safeguards specified in section 27 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 423).
Editorial Note on Part 431
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 431 appear at 75 FR 48852, Aug. 11, 2010.

§ 431.707 Standards. ( a ) The agency or board must develop, impose, and enforce standards that must be met by individuals in order to be licensed as a nursing home administrator.
( b ) The standards must be designed to insure that nursing home administrators are— ( 1 ) Of good character;
( 2 ) Otherwise suitable; and
( 3 ) Qualified to serve because of training or experience in institutional administration.
#### § 441.402 State plan requirements.

If a State that is eligible to provide community supported living arrangements services as an optional Medicaid service to developmentally disabled individuals provides such services, the State plan must specify that it complies with the minimum protection requirements in § 441.404.
§ 423.1016 Filing of briefs with the Administrative Law Judge or Departmental Appeals Board, and opportunity for rebuttal. ( a ) *Filing of briefs and related documents.* If a party files a brief or related document such as a written argument, contention, suggested finding of fact, conclusion of law, or any other written statement, it must submit an original and 1 copy to the ALJ or the Departmental Appeals Board, as appropriate. The material may be filed by mail or in person and must include a statement certifying that a copy has been furnished to the other party.
( b ) *Opportunity for rebuttal.* ( 1 ) The other party will have 20 calendar days from the date of mailing or in person filing to submit any rebuttal statement or additional evidence. If a party submits a rebuttal statement or additional evidence, it must file an original and 1 copy with the ALJ or the Board and furnish a copy to the other party.
( 2 ) The ALJ or the Board will grant an opportunity to reply to the rebuttal statement only if the party shows good cause.
[72 FR 68736, Dec. 5, 2007, as amended at 79 FR 29966, May 23, 2014]
§ 137.299 Are Federal funds available to cover the cost of Self-Governance Tribes carrying out environmental responsibilities? Yes, funds are available: ( a ) for project-specific environmental costs through the construction project agreement; and
( b ) for environmental review program costs through a funding agreement and/or a construction project agreement.
# C_2005217EN.01003701.xml

| 3.9.2005 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 217/37 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.9.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 217/37

---

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

of 30 June 2005

in Case T-347/03 Eugénio Branco, Lda v Commission of the European Communities (1)

1

(European Social Fund - Reduction of financial assistance - Subcontracting - Acquired rights - Reasonable time)

(2005/C 217/82)

Language of the case: Portuguese

In Case T-347/03: Eugénio Branco, Lda, established in Lisbon (Portugal), represented by B. Belchior, lawyer, with an address for service in Luxembourg, against Commission of the European Communities (Agents: initially A. Alves Vieira and A. Weimar and subsequently P. Andrade and A. Weimar, with an address for service in Luxembourg) — application for annulment of Commission Decision C (2002) 3455 of 23 October 2002 reducing financial assistance from the European Social Fund, in Case No 870302 P3 — the Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber), composed of M. Vilaras, President, F. Dehousse and D. Šváby, Judges; H. Jung, Registrar, gave a judgment on 30 June 2005, in which it:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders the applicant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the applicant to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 7, 10.01.2004.

1

---
§ 435.811 Medically needy income standard: General requirements. ( a ) Except as provided in paragraph (d)(2) of this section, to determine eligibility of medically needy individuals, a Medicaid agency must use a single income standard under this subpart that meets the requirements of this section.
( b ) The income standard must take into account the number of persons in the assistance unit. Subject to the limitations specified in paragraph (e) of this section. The standard may not diminish by an increase in the number of persons in the assistance unit. For example, if the income level in the standard for an assistance unit of two is set at $400, the income level in the standard for an assistance unit of three may not be less than $400.
( c ) In States that do not use more restrictive requirements than SSI, the income standard must be set at an amount that is no lower than the lowest income standards used under the cash assistance programs that are related to the State's covered medically needy eligibility group or groups of individuals under § 435.301. The amount of the income standard is subject to the limitations specified in paragraph (e) of this section.
( d ) In States that use more restrictive requirements for aged, blind, and disabled individuals than SSI: ( 1 ) For all individuals except aged, blind, and disabled individuals, the income standard must be set in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section; and
( 2 ) For all aged, blind, and disabled individuals or any combination of these groups of individuals, the agency may establish a separate single medically needy income standard that is more restrictive than the single income standard set under paragraph (c) of this section. However, the amount of the more restrictive separate standard for aged, blind, or disabled individuals must be no lower than the higher of the lowest categorically needy income standard currently applied under the State's more restrictive criteria under § 435.121 or the medically needy income standard in effect under the State's Medicaid plan on January 1, 1972. The amount of the income standard is subject to the limitations specified in paragraph (e) of this section.
( e ) The income standards specified in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section must not exceed the maximum dollar amount of income allowed for purposes of FFP under § 435.1007.
( f ) The income standard may vary based on the variations between shelter costs in urban areas and rural areas.
[58 FR 4932, Jan. 19, 1993]
Exhibit 32.2

Written Statement of Chief Financial Officer
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1850,  as Adopted  Pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The  undersigned,  the Chief Financial  Officer of The Wilber  Corporation  (the
"Company"), hereby certifies that to his knowledge on the date hereof:

      (a)   the Form 10-K of the Company for the Annual  Period  Ended  December
            31, 2005,  filed on the date hereof with the Securities and Exchange
            Commission (the "Report"),  fully complies with the  requirements of
            Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (b)   information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
            respects,  the financial  condition and results of operations of the
            Company.

                          /s/ Joseph E. Sutaris
                          Joseph E. Sutaris
                          Secretary, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
                          Date:  March 10, 2006
                                 --------------

A signed  original of this written  statement  required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the  electronic  version of this written  statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to The Wilber Corporation and will be
retained by The Wilber  Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.


                                                                            89-K
June 11, 2015

Mr. Chris Thompson Birdseyepix and VT

268 Canal Rd. Waterloo, SC 29384

Dear Mr. Thompson:

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption. It explains why we can not process your request and what you should do in the next 30 days.

Why We Can Not Process Your Request

We entered your May 21, 2015, exemption request into the public docket (No. FAA-2015- 1855), but we are unable to process your request any further. The information you sent does not comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For us to consider the request any further, you must send us all of the following:

 The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief, the extent of the relief you seek, and the reason you seek relief.

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would benefit the public as a whole.

 The reasons why the exemption would not adversely affect safety or how the exemption would provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule from which you seek an exemption.

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request.2

What You Should Do

If you want us to process your request any further, you must send the information described earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your petition for exemption at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption.

If We Do Not Hear From You

If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will close the docket without notifying you further. If you have any questions or require additional time, you may call (202) 267-9677.

Sincerely,

/s/

Brenda Robeson Program Analyst, Airmen and Airspace Rules Division

Enclosure
41156.

#### PRICE et al. v. STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT.

Russell, Judge.

The court is never required, even as to a fact uncontradicted and undisputed, to instruct the jury that such fact exists. “The better practice is to allow the jury to determine the question whether any issuable fact proved by either party is uncontradicted.” *Scott v. Valdosta, Moultrie &c. R. Co.,*13 Ga. App. 65 (1) (78 SE 784); *New Ware Furniture Co. v. Reynolds,*16 Ga. App. 19 (1a) (84 SE 491); *Ballentine Motors of Ga. v. Nimmons,*93 Ga. App. 708, 712 (92 SE2d 714); *Limbert v. Bishop,*96 Ga. App. 652, 655 (101 SE2d 148); *Drum v. Shirey,*106 Ga. App. 699, 701 (128 SE2d 92). An instruction to the jury in a condemnation case *256that "if you find as a matter of fact that the property in question had the right of ingress and egress to and from the South Expressway, and that this right was taken by the State Highway Department, you would assess the damages to be awarded the condemnee giving consideration to the right of ingress and egress,” is not error for the assigned reason that it left the issue of whether there was a right of ingress and egress for jury determination when this fact had been established by uncontradicted evidence.

Decided March 1, 1965.

*Kemp' & Watson, John L. Watson, Jr.,*for plaintiffs in error.

*Eugene Cook, Attorney General, Bichard L. Chambers, Horace E. Campbell, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, John B. McCannon,*contra.

Where land which is the subject of a condemnation proceeding does not abut a public highway but has an easement of passage to such highway which passes with the land, it is not ground for reversal that the condemnor fails to offer evidence particularly establishing the value of such easement, the evidence being undisputed that the right of passage is appurtenant to the land taken.

In a condemnation case a verdict which is within the range of the evidence is not subject to being set aside as excessive. *State Hwy. Dept. v. Whitehurst,*106 Ga. App. 532 (127 SE2d 501); *State Hwy. Dept. v. Alexander,*105 Ga. App. 738 (125 SE2d 537).

The trial court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Felton, C. J., and Jordan, J., concur.*
#### Joey ADAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. U-110.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Feb. 7, 1975.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
**EXHIBIT
      32.2**




**CERTIFICATE
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




The
      undersigned, Robert V. Condon, Chief Financial Officer of Merrimac Industries,
      Inc. (the "Company"), hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted
      pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)
      The
      Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending December 29,
      2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
      (the "Annual Report"), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
      or
      15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)
      The
      information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





/s/
                Robert V. CondonRobert
                V. CondonChief
                Financial OfficerMarch
                28, 2008