FIFTH DIVISION

							     	     August 30, 2002 	

No. 1-01-0182

PATSY McCALL,

		Petitioner-Appellant,

	v.

RICHARD A. DEVINE, Cook County

State's Attorney, 

		Respondent-Appellee.

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County

Honorable

Michael A. Toomin,

Judge Presiding.

	JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the court:

	On February 8, 2000, petitioner, Patsy McCall, filed a petition for the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate

and prosecute unknown Chicago police officers for the fatal

shooting death of her son, Reginald Cole.  Cole was in the custody

of the Chicago police department when the shooting occurred.  Cook

County State's Attorney Richard A. Devine filed a motion for leave

to intervene, which was granted by the trial court over McCall's

objections. Devine then filed a motion for judgment on the

pleadings.  Following argument by the parties, the trial court

entered an 18-page order granting Devine's motion and ordering

judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the petition for

appointment of a special prosecutor.

	McCall now appeals.  On appeal, McCall argues that the trial

court erroneously granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings

where the petition established a cause of action for the

appointment of a special prosecutor.  McCall argues that Devine's

relationship with the Chicago police department has created a

conflict of interest that prohibits Devine from conducting a fair

and impartial investigation and prosecution of the officers.

	For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.  BACKGROUND

	On October 30, 1999, Reginald Cole was transferred from the

Illinois River Correctional Facility in Canton, Illinois, to the

Chicago police Area One facility located at 5101 South Wentworth

Avenue in Chicago.  At that time, Cole was in the custody of the

Illinois Department of Corrections serving a 10-year sentence for

armed robbery.  Cole was transported to Area One to be questioned

in connection with an ongoing homicide investigation.  Within hours

of his arrival, Cole died as a result of gunshot wounds suffered while in the custody of Chicago police officers at Area One.  Both

the Cook County State's Attorney's office and the Cook County

medical examiner's office began investigating the incident on the

evening Cole died.

	On October 31, 1999, the medical examiner issued a report

which stated that Cole sustained three gunshot wounds: one to the

abdomen, one to the right arm and one to the mouth.  The report concluded that Cole died as a result of a self-inflicted gunshot

wound to the mouth.  The State's Attorney's office similarly

concluded that Cole's death was not a homicide and determined that

no charges would be filed against any officers involved in the

incident. 

	On February 8, 2000, Patsy McCall, Cole's mother, filed a

petition for the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate

and criminally prosecute the unknown officers involved in the

shooting death of her son.  McCall's claim for relief is based upon

section 3-9008 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/3-9008 (West 2000))

which provides:

	"Whenever the State's [A]ttorney is sick or absent, or

unable to attend, or is interested in any cause or

proceeding, civil or criminal, which it is or may be his

duty to prosecute or defend, the court in which said

cause or proceeding is pending may appoint some competent

attorney to prosecute or defend such cause or proceeding

	***" 55 ILCS 5/3-9008 (West 2000).

McCall's petition alleges that there are gross conflicts of

interest in the State's Attorney investigating and prosecuting

officers in the Chicago police department for Cole's death. 

Specifically, McCall alleged that the State's Attorney and the

Chicago police department have a relationship of "cordiality,

compatibility, support, [and] fidelity" and that this relationship

makes it impossible for the State's Attorney's office to conduct an "independent, unbiased, honest and impartial investigation into the

shooting death of Reginald Cole."  The petition stated that this

relationship has formed as a result of the fact that "well over 90%

of the criminal cases prosecuted by the Cook County State's

Attorney's office have been investigated and brought to the Cook

County State's Attorney's office by Chicago police officers."

	Additionally, McCall's petition alleged that certain unknown

Chicago police officers, assistant State's Attorneys and medical

examiners conspired to conceal, distort and fabricate the

circumstances surrounding Cole's death.  In support of that claim,

McCall asserts that Cook County assistant State's Attorneys and

Cook County medical examiners are not normally called to the scene

of a homicide to investigate, and it is not their duty or

responsibility to investigate the facts and circumstances

surrounding a homicide.  

	The petition also states that representatives of the Chicago

police department publicly provided false and contradictory factual

versions of these circumstances.  In support of that assertion,

McCall cites to five Chicago Tribune articles and commentaries. 

The alleged versions were summarized by the trial court as follows:

		"In the first version, set forth in the commentary

of Salim Muwakkil, November 8, 1999, the writer notes

that first accounts of the incident reported 'that the 38

year old Cole was shot by officers when he allegedly

attacked them during a mysterious October 30 interrogation at the Wentworth Headquarters.'

		In the second version, reported in the Chicago 

	Tribune by Lisa Donovan and Jeffrey Bliss, October 31, 

	1999, the writers state that Cole 'was shot and killed 

	inside an interview room...after he allegedly attacked 

	a detective, that Cole was shot in the head and 

	the abdomen...there was a struggle and the offender was 

	shot.'

		In the third version, which lacks attribution, Cole

grabbed a metal paper spindle and attacked the detective,

that Cole grabbed the detective's gun from his holster

and then shot at the detective as he was fleeing from the

room, that two other detectives who witnessed the

incident returned the fire, striking Cole and that Cole

then turned the gun on himself and inflicted one gunshot

wound to the head area.

		In the fourth version reported in the Chicago

Tribune by Margaret O'Brien and Naomi Dillon, November 1,

1999, according to Wentworth Area Commander Frank Trigg:

	'Cole grabbed a seven-inch paper spike...and lunged at

the detective...that while the two were struggling, Cole

grabbed the detective's gun ripping the holster strap in

the process...Cole then fired at the officer but missed. 

A second detective outside the office heard the shot,

came to the door and fired at Cole, who was crouched against a cabinet and pointing a gun at the one door to

the room....After the shot missed Cole, the second

officer took cover behind the door frame as the first

officer took cover on the floor. A third shot was then

heard...that police believe Cole put the gun in his mouth

and shot himself in the head...that after the third shot,

Cole was still crouched at the file cabinet with his gun

pointed toward the door. At that point, another detective

came to the door and shot Cole in the left side of his

torso, after which Cole slumped to the ground.'

		In the fifth version, set forth in another Chicago

Tribune article by Monica Davey, December 1, 1999, the

writer reports that according to police spokesman Pat

Camden:

		'About 7:00 p.m, on October 30, at Wentworth, 5101

South Wentworth Ave., Cole asked the detective who was

questioning him to be moved from an ordinary

interrogation room to somewhere that he couldn't be

overheard.  After moving to a small office, Cole grabbed

a 7-inch paper spike intended for phone messages and

lunged at the detective.  In the struggle, Cole grabbed

the detective's gun.  He fired at the officer but missed. 

With the sound of the shot two other officers bolted into

the office, and each fired at Cole.  Almost

simultaneously, Cook County prosecutors say, Cole shot himself in the mouth.  Camden said he was not sure the

order of the last shots fired.  A medical examiner's

report shows three gunshot wounds on Cole's body: in his

mouth, in his abdomen, and on his right arm.  The

examiner's report, which categorized Cole's death as a

suicide, said the wound in Cole's mouth was what killed

him.'"

	On April 12, 2000, following courtroom assignment, Richard A.

Devine, in his official capacity as Cook County State's Attorney,

filed a motion to intervene in the instant matter.  McCall filed an

objection to the motion and, following oral argument, the trial

court granted Devine's motion to intervene.

	Subsequently, on September 21, 2000, Devine filed a motion

under section 2-615(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS

5/2-615(e) (West 2000)) for judgment on the pleadings.  The motion

alleged that McCall failed to establish, as a matter of law, that

there was a conflict of interest which precluded Devine from

investigating and deciding whether to prosecute anyone for Cole's

death.  For purposes of the motion, Devine admitted as true the

allegation that over 90% of the criminal cases prosecuted by the

Cook County State's Attorney's office have been investigated and

brought to the Cook County State's Attorney's office by the Chicago

police department.  Devine asserted, however, that the fact that

Chicago police officers "investigate crimes and seek the initiation

of criminal prosecutions does not mean that the State's Attorney of Cook County has a personal interest in each member of the

department sufficient to remove him from his statutorily mandated

responsibilities."  Devine asked the court to disregard McCall's

remaining allegations as either conclusory in nature or surplusage. 

Devine denied interest in the matter as a private individual and/or

as an actual party to the action.   

	On December 5, 2000, following oral argument, the trial court

entered a written order granting Devine's motion for judgment on

the pleadings.  Specifically, the trial court rejected McCall's

allegation that the police offered false and contradictory factual

versions of the circumstances of the shooting.  The court found

that the allegations were "wholly conclusory" and stemmed from

hearsay statements contained in newspaper articles.  Moreover, the

court found that the differences in the versions of events could be

attributed to "shifting details as a natural outgrowth of any

evolving investigation."  The trial court found McCall's assertion

that assistant State's Attorneys and medical examiners are not

called to the scene of homicides, and that it is not their duty to

investigate such crimes, was "utterly unfounded."  Finally, the

trial court found that McCall failed to establish as a matter of

law that Devine was interested in the instant matter. 

Specifically, the court found that Devine would not be a party to

any investigation or proceeding sought by McCall and that Devine

was not interested as a private individual in the investigation of

Cole's death.

	McCall now appeals from that judgment.            

II.  ANALYSIS

	McCall argues that the trial court erroneously granted

Devine's motion for judgment on the pleadings where the petition

filed established a cause of action for appointment of a special

prosecutor to investigate and prosecute the death of Reginald Cole. 

Specifically, McCall alleges that the relationship between the Cook

County State's Attorney and the Chicago police department creates

a conflict of interest that prevents Devine from conducting a fair

and impartial investigation and prosecution.

	Judgment on the pleadings is proper only where no genuine

issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.  Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Steinitz, 288 Ill. App. 3d 926, 934 (1997).  In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, only those facts apparent from the

face of the pleadings, matters subject to judicial notice, and

judicial admissions in the record may be considered.  M.A.K. v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 198 Ill. 2d 249, 255 (2001).  When evaluating the facts, a court must construe the

evidence strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the

nonmoving party.  Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 483 (1998). Our review is de novo.  Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. City of Chicago, 317 Ill. App. 3d 569, 571 (2000).

	When a party moves for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to

section 2-615(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735

ILCS 5/2-615(e) (West 1994)), it concedes the truth of the

well-pled facts in the respondent's pleadings.  Richco Plastic Co. v. IMS Co., 288 Ill. App. 3d 782, 786 (1997).  This court has stated that a motion for judgment on the pleadings may be addressed

to a complaint alone.  Pioneer Bank & Trust Co. v. Austin Bank of Chicago, 279 Ill. App. 3d 9, 13 (1996).  In deciding the motion, a court must disregard all surplusage and conclusory allegations. 

Teeple v. Hunziker, 118 Ill. App. 3d 492, 497 (1983).

	As previously stated, "Whenever the State's [A]ttorney is sick

or absent, or unable to attend, or is interested in any cause or

proceeding, civil or criminal, which it is or may be his duty to

prosecute or defend, the court in which said cause or proceeding is

pending may appoint some competent attorney to prosecute or defend

such cause or proceeding ***." 55 ILCS 5/3-9008 (West 2000).  In

Environmental Protection Agency v. Pollution Control Board, 69 Ill. 2d 394 (1977), our supreme court interpreted section 6 of "An Act

in regard to attorneys general and state's attorneys" (Ill. Rev.

Stat. 1975, ch. 14, par. 6), which provided:

		"Whenever the attorney general or state's attorney

is sick or absent, or unable to attend, or is interested

in any cause or proceeding, civil or criminal, which it

is or may be his duty to prosecute or defend, the court

in which said cause or proceeding is pending may appoint some competent attorney to prosecute or defend such cause

or proceeding ***."  Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 14, par.

6. 

Effective January 1, 1988, chapter 14, section 6 was amended so

that Attorneys general and State's Attorneys would be considered

under separate acts compiled in the Illinois Revised Statutes. The

appointment of counsel to replace the Attorney General is now

addressed by section 6 of the Attorney General Act (15 ILCS 205/6

(West 1998)).  The pertinent language of section 3-9008 of the

Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/3-9008 (West 2000)) is identical to that

of section 6, which was interpreted by our supreme court in

Environmental Protection Agency, 69 Ill. 2d 394.

	In Environmental Protection Agency, the supreme court agreed with the Attorney General's interpretation that "interest" under

section 6 exists only in two situations: "[t]he first is where the

Attorney General is interested as a private individual. [Citation.] 

The second situation is where the Attorney General is an actual

party to the action."  Environmental Protection Agency v. Pollution Control Board, 69 Ill. 2d at 400-401.  The court specifically held that "[t]he provision of section 6 that special counsel may be

appointed where the Attorney General is interested should be

limited to the situations above." Environmental Protection Agency, 69 Ill. 2d at 401.

	At oral argument, McCall's attorney acknowledged that his

complaint never alleged Devine was "interested" in either of the two manners discussed in  Environmental Protection Agency.  Namely, the complaint never alleged that Devine was interested as a

"private individual" or that he or the State's Attorney's office

would be "an actual party to the action."  McCall's attorney argues

that the required statutory interest is not limited to these two

instances alone.

	The decision to appoint a special prosecutor under section 3-

9008 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/3-9008 (West 2000)) lies

within the trial court's discretion.  People v. Morley, 287 Ill. App. 3d 499, 504 (1997).  This provision's purpose is "to prevent

any influence upon the discharge of the duties of the State's

Attorney by reason of personal interest." Morley, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 503-04.  This court has consistently held that a State's

Attorney is "interested" for purposes of section 3-9008 only where

he is interested as a private individual or his office is a party

to the action.  People v. Tracy, 291 Ill. App. 3d 145, 151 (1997); People v. Morley, 287 Ill. App. 3d 499, 504 (1997); People v. Dall, 207 Ill. App. 3d 508, 530 (1991); People v. Trolia, 107 Ill. App. 3d 487, 496 (1982)(interpreting section 6).

	On appeal, McCall relies heavily on People v. Courtney, 288 Ill. App. 3d 1025 (1997), for its holding that it is improper for

an attorney to represent conflicting interests or undertake to

discharge inconsistent duties, and "the public must be able to

maintain the right to believe in the total integrity of the Bar as

a whole."  Courtney, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 1032-33.  In Courtney, the defense attorney who represented the defendant for the first 14

months his sexual assault case was pending was appointed as the

State's Attorney of Kankakee County.  The Kankakee County State's

Attorney's office informed the trial court that a special

prosecutor would be appointed.  After several continuances, the

case was tried by a member of the Kankakee County State's

Attorney's office.  The appellate court found that prior to becoming

State's Attorney, defendant's counsel answered discovery, "made

numerous court appearances on behalf of the defendant and was

clearly privy to the defendant's confidences."  Courtney, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 1032.  The court held that a per se conflict existed and a special prosecutor should have been appointed. Courtney, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 1034.

	The facts in Courtney bear no relation to those in the present case and, consequently, its holding is of negligible assistance to

this court.  However, the State has cited a case in which the

appellate court seems to apply a more expansive interpretation of

the principle of conflict of interest than that set out by our

supreme court in Environmental Protection Agency.  In Baxter v. Peterlin, 156 Ill. App. 3d 564 (1987), the plaintiff, an Ottawa police officer, filed a complaint seeking appointment of a special

prosecutor to prosecute the alleged wrongdoings of the mayor of

Ottawa.  Plaintiff alleged the defendant, the State's Attorney of

La Salle County, had a disqualifying interest in any prosecution of

the mayor as a result of the political relationship between the State's Attorney and the mayor.  The circuit court, in accepting

the complaint's factual allegations as true, dismissed the

complaint, finding plaintiff's allegations insufficient.

	On appeal, the Third District of the Appellate Court held:

		"We agree with plaintiff's contention that a

political alliance may create sufficient conflict of

interest to require appointment of a special prosecutor. 

Nevertheless, 'political alliance' is an amorphous

concept.  It might range from a prosecutor belonging to

the same political party as the person he is called upon

to prosecute, to a situation in which a prosecutor is

clearly beholden to a potential defendant for political

reasons. Before a court need appoint a special prosecutor

because the State's Attorney has a conflict of interest

because of a 'political alliance,' a petitioner must

plead and prove specific facts regarding the nature of

the alliance as well as facts tending to show the State's

Attorney would not zealously represent the People of the

State of Illinois because of the alliance.  To require a

petitioner to plead and prove anything less would open

the door to requiring a special prosecutor be appointed

any time a public official of whatever rank is suspected

of wrongdoing."  Baxter, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 566.

The court went on to state that absent specific facts regarding the

alleged political ties which would make it improbable that the State's Attorney would carry out his duties in an unbiased manner

on a specific case, the statute does not require appointment of a

special prosecutor to substitute for the State's Attorney.  Baxter, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 566-67.  Because the plaintiff's allegations

regarding any political ties were "speculative and conclusory," the

circuit court properly declined to appoint a special prosecutor.  Baxter, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 567.

	In analogizing Baxter to the case at bar, it is clear that McCall's petition is similarly insufficient to warrant the

appointment of a special prosecutor.  McCall has failed to plead

specific facts regarding the alleged relationship of "cordiality,

compatibility, support, [and] fidelity" between Devine and the

Chicago police department which would make it improbable that

Devine would conduct an unbiased investigation and prosecution in

this case.  In support of her argument that a disqualifying bond

exists, McCall's petition alleges "well over 90% of the cases

prosecuted by the Cook County State's Attorney's office are indeed

investigated and brought by the Chicago police department."  We

agree with the trial court that this fact alone does not establish

a disqualifying bond.

	 Accepting the allegation as true, the trial court stated "it

hardly follows that the purported fidelity bond and relationship

complained of by petitioner would have impacted on respondent's

investigation or prosecution of police officers suspected of wrong

doing."  The court continued: 

	"On the contrary, the State's Attorney's office in this

court's memory has never hesitated to prosecute law

enforcement officials where the evidence warranted

criminal charges.  See e.g., People v. Davis, 281 Ill. App. 3d 984, (1996) (director of news affairs for the

Chicago police department prosecuted for official

misconduct); People v. Sorice, 182 Ill. App. 3d 949 (1989) (Chicago police officer prosecuted for conspiracy

to commit burglary); People v. Melchor, 180 Ill. App. 3d 372 (1989) (Chicago police officer prosecuted for

delivery of a controlled substance); People v. Earullo, 113 Ill. App. 3d 774 (1983) (Chicago police officer

prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter); People v. McCarthy, 102 Ill. App. 3d 519 (1981) (Chicago police officer charged with attempt murder and aggravated

battery); People v. Molsby, 66 Ill. App. 3d 647 (1978) (Chicago police officer prosecuted for possession of a

controlled substance); and People v. Jordon, 15 Ill. App. 3d 672 (1973) (Chicago police officer prosecuted for

bribery and official misconduct)." 

	For this court to hold that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying the petition would require us to hold that

McCall's allegation that 90% of the Cook County State's Attorney's

office's cases came from the Chicago police department will always

require that a special prosecutor be appointed whenever anyone alleges wrongdoing on the part of Chicago police department

personnel. While this allegation does establish a close

professional working relationship, nothing in the allegation shows

that Devine would not zealously represent the People of the State

of Illinois in this case of alleged police misconduct. 

	McCall further supports her argument on appeal with the

assertion that the State's Attorney failed to investigate or

prosecute police officers involved in "the shooting death of Robert

Russ; the arrest and detention of R.G. and E.H.; the use of

perjured evidence resulting in the convictions and ultimately the

20 year prison terms of Willie Rainge, Kenny Adams, Verneal

Jimerson and Dennis Williams; or the use of perjured testimony to

convict and imprison John Willis and Anthony Porter and other

cases."  The convictions of Rainge, Adams, Jimerson and Williams

arose out of an investigation by the Cook County sheriff's

department and several suburban police departments.  People v. Rainge, 211 Ill. App. 3d 432 (1991).  Using the figures supplied by McCall, significantly less than 10% of the criminal cases

prosecuted by the Cook County State's Attorney's office were

investigated by those departments.  The fact that the State's

Attorney's office failed to prosecute the police officers involved

in the Rainge case actually contradicts McCall's assertion that it is the State's Attorney's office's dependent relationship with the

Chicago police department that prevents that office from

investigating and prosecuting Chicago police officers.  Applying the rationale advanced by McCall on appeal, courts should appoint

special prosecutors to investigate every complaint of possible

wrongdoing by law enforcement officers of any agency that has a

working relationship with the Cook County State's Attorney's

office.  We flatly reject this argument.  

	In affirming the denial of a request for appointment of

counsel other than the Attorney General's office, our supreme court

has explained: "It seems to us that if the Attorney General is to

have the unqualified role of chief legal officer of the State, he

or she must be able to direct the legal affairs of the State and

its agencies.  Only in this way will the Attorney General properly

serve the State and the public interest."  Environmental Protection Agency, 69 Ill. 2d at 401-02. 

	In support of the notion that Devine's office and the Chicago police are so intertwined as to create a conflict of interest,

McCall avers that Devine's office is dependent on the Chicago

police to "obtain evidence upon which to base its prosecutions of

alleged criminal conduct."  Again, all this allegation does is

demonstrate that a close professional relationship exists between

these two agencies and, in a very limited way, defines the nature

of the relationship.  Generally, "[p]erformance of one's official

functions will not create a conflict of interest."  People v. Dall, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 530, citing  Environmental Protection Agency, 69 Ill. 2d 394.  In addition:

	"[T]he State's Attorney does not represent individuals or specific witnesses during the course of criminal

prosecutions.  Criminal prosecutions are commenced in the

name of and on behalf of the people of the State of

Illinois.  To hold that a special prosecutor must always

be appointed whenever a victim or witness is employed by

a state, county, or local agency would be an illogical,

as well as impractical, encroachment upon the authority

of a constitutional officer."  People v. Morley, 287 Ill. App. 3d 499, 505 (1997). 

McCall has failed to allege any specific failure to obtain

evidence, or any specific cover-up of evidence, which would

illustrate that Devine has abandoned his duties to the people of

the State of Illinois in this particular case. 

	In further support of her argument, McCall cites five Chicago

Tribune articles. McCall alleges that the differing police versions

reported in these articles were implausible and are proof that a

conspiracy and cover-up existed between Devine and the Chicago

police department. We disagree.  The contents of newspaper articles

are hearsay and therefore inadmissible.  Betts v. Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust, 225 Ill. App. 3d 882, 924 (1992).  The reason that newspaper articles are treated as hearsay has been

eloquently stated as follows:

	"It is very obvious that factual matters should not be

proven by newspaper reports of occurrences.  While there

is an inclination on the part of the general public to accept newspaper stories at face value-and the quality of

the reporting should be careful enough that such reliance

is generally justified-the fact remains that news stories

are frequently based on the hearsay statements of others,

or on the statements of bystanders, witnesses to the

occurrence, public officers, and other informants. 

Because of this they are often, if not notoriously, apt

to be inaccurate.  This is not always due to careless

reporting or slanting or over-emphasis, but rather to the

pressure of haste and to the inherent fact that the news

story does not purport to present the results of careful

investigations, or at least that it purports to report

only, or mostly, what others have said about the matter."

R. Steigmann, Illinois Evidence Manual § 14:28, at 365

(2d ed. 1995) 

As the articles themselves relate, Pat Camden, police spokesman,

explained that the "shifting details" of the stories were a

"natural outgrowth of any evolving investigation."  Camden also

stated "the night it happens the media wants instant facts....As

the investigation continues, we get additional facts. That's not

unusual."  We agree with the trial court that this allegation is

"wholly conclusory."

	In additional support for her argument, in her petition, 

McCall maintained that a conspiracy was evident where assistant

State's Attorneys and medical examiners were present at Area One, the scene of the crime, which is outside the scope of their duties

and responsibilities. Apparently McCall has abandoned this argument

for it cannot be found in her brief on appeal. However, we 

acknowledge, as did the trial court, any allegation that it is not

the duty or responsibility of members of the State's Attorney's

office or medical examiner's office to investigate such matters is

"utterly unfounded."  As the trial court stated, "it has long been

the practice for [S]tate's [A]ttorneys to assist the police

investigations to determine what charges, if any, are warranted by

the evidence."  In fact, it has been held that the duties of the

State's Attorney require an investigation into the facts of an incident.  McDonald v. County Board, 146 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1055 (1986); see also People v. Wilson, 254 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1039 (1993); Ware v. Carey, 75 Ill. App. 3d 906, 914 (1979); People v. Pohl, 47 Ill. App. 2d 232, 242 (1964).  Additionally, the Cook County State's Attorney's office maintains a felony review unit

specifically for the purpose of fulfilling their investigative

duties.  

	As for the Cook County medical examiner, it is the duty and

function of that office to determine both the cause and manner of

death. Section 3-3013(e) (55 ILCS 5/3-3013(e) (West 2000)) provides

that every coroner in cases of sudden or violent death "shall go to

the place where the dead body is, and take charge of the same and

shall make a preliminary investigation into the circumstances of

the death."  McCall's assertion that, because the body had been removed from the station, there was no need for medical examiner

personnel to go to the station is unconvincing.  That fact does not

alter the medical examiner's duty to conduct an investigation into

the circumstances of the death.  

	In addition, it can be persuasively argued that the fact that

Devine's office and the medical examiner's office sent officials to

conduct investigations into Cole's death directly undermines

McCall's entire argument. This fact could be interpreted to

demonstrate that Devine and the medical examiner acted

independently of the Chicago police to conduct their own

investigations in order to zealously protect the public.

	McCall's argument that the fact that the assistant State's

Attorneys went to the police station to conduct an investigation

and decided not to prosecute any police officers is evidence of the

conspiracy is also unavailing.  As the court noted in Baxter, "prosecutorial discretion is an essential component of the criminal

justice system.  No good purpose would be served by permitting a

person in the plaintiff's position to claim impropriety on the part

of a prosecutor based upon hindsight, because he disagreed with the

prosecutor's conclusions regarding a particular case."  Baxter v. Peterlin, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 567.  McCall has not pled any actual or specific impropriety or insufficiency in the investigation

conducted by Devine's office.

	The majority of the cases addressing section 3-9008 arise out

of disputes between governmental agencies that are both represented by the State's Attorney's office or criminal cases where a

defendant who is already charged with an offense requests

appointment of a special prosecutor to take over the pending case. 

A request to appoint a special prosecutor for the purpose of

investigating and possibly charging individuals with a criminal

offense raises different concerns relating to the separation of

powers doctrine.  "It is settled 'that the State's Attorney, as a

member of the executive branch of government, is vested with

exclusive discretion in the initiation and management of a criminal

prosecution. [Citations.]' "  People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 113 (1994); quoting People ex rel. Daley v. Moran, 94 Ill. 2d 41, 45-46 (1983).  This discretion includes the decision whether to prosecute

at all.  People ex rel. Daley v. Moran, 94 Ill. 2d 41, 46 (1983); People v. Edgeston, 243 Ill. App. 3d 1, 11 (1993).  Appointment of a special prosecutor, which infringes upon that exclusive

discretion, will only be warranted based upon specific factual

allegations of "interest" within the meaning of section 3-9008 of

the Counties Code.  55 ILCS 5/3-9008 (West 2000).  And while the

appointment is within the discretion of the trial court,

disqualification of a State's Attorney requires more than mere

suspicion or speculation.  People ex rel. York v. Downen, 119 Ill. App. 3d 29, 33-34 (1983).  As the trial court stated:

	"[R]emoval of a duly elected public official is a drastic

measure for it disenfranchises the very electorate who,

through its votes, has spoken.  As respondent notes, the Office of the State's Attorney is an office of

constitutional dimension reposing in the executive branch

of government.  Under our tripartite system of government

that branch is co-equal to the legislature as well as the

judiciary.  And while the legislature has empowered

judges to disqualify the State's Attorney in certain

limited situations, respect for the doctrine of

separation of powers cautions against the exercise of

such power unless clearly warranted."  

	In this case the record indicates that the trial court clearly

accepted all well-pled facts as true and disregarded all surplus

and conclusory allegations.  Teeple v. Hunziker, 118 Ill. App. 3d at 497.  McCall's petition was insufficient in that it lacked the

requisite specific facts that would establish the alleged

disqualifying bond.  The applicable case law requires us to look at

the individual interest of the State's Attorney.  The only interest

cited in this case is McCall's allegation that over 90% of the

cases prosecuted by the Cook County State's Attorney's office are

investigated by the Chicago police department. While McCall

strongly argues that the facts of this specific case (conflicting

versions of the shooting) require the appointment of a special

prosecutor, none of the facts pled relating to this shooting make

the State's Attorney personally interested in this case. To require

McCall to plead and prove anything less than such specific facts

would open the door to requiring a special prosecutor to be appointed any time a police officer is suspected of wrongdoing. 

See Baxter v. Peterlin, 156 Ill. App. 3d 564, 566 (1987).  Therefore, because McCall's petition failed to state a cause of

action for the appointment of a special prosecutor, we find that

the trial court properly denied McCall's petition and granted

Devine's motion for judgment on the pleadings.  

	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

	Affirmed.

	GREIMAN and REID, JJ., concur.

   .