RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3748-17T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

G.A.K.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

C.L.L.,

Defendant.

______________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

GUARDIANSHIP OF G.J.K., JR.,

a Minor.

______________________________

Submitted January 17, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Simonelli and O'Connor.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

February 22, 2019
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On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, 

Docket No. FG-07-0231-17.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Steven E. Miklosey, Designated Counsel, 

on the brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Jason W. Rockwell, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Casey J. Woodruff, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, 

attorney for minor (Noel C. Devlin, Assistant Deputy 

Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant G.A.K. (father) and C.L.L. (mother) are the biological parents 

of G.J.K. (George or child), presently four years of age.1 The father appeals 

from the March 23, 2018 judgment of guardianship terminating his parental 

rights to George; the mother does not appeal from this judgment. The father 

argues the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) failed to 

 

1

 We use initials or pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the parties, George, 

and the parties' other children.
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prove by clear and convincing evidence the four-prong standard codified by 

the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).2

After reviewing the record and applicable legal principles, we reject the 

arguments the father advances and affirm substantially for the reasons 

expressed by Judge James R. Paganelli in his comprehensive written decision

dated March 23, 2018. We will not recite in detail the evidence presented by 

 

2

 These four prongs are:

(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been 

or will continue to be endangered by the parental 

relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the 

harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to 

provide a safe and stable home for the child and the 

delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. 

Such harm may include evidence that separating the 

child from his resource family parents would cause 

serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm 

to the child;

(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to 

provide services to help the parent correct the 

circumstances which led to the child's placement 

outside the home and the court has considered 

alternatives to termination of parental rights; and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more 

harm than good.

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]
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the Division in support of terminating the father's parental rights. Instead, we 

incorporate by reference Judge Paganelli's factual findings because they are

well supported by competent evidence presented at trial. See N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012). However, we 

briefly summarize the key facts and the court's principal findings.

The mother and father do not have any children together other than 

George. However, the father has an older son, J.K. (James), now age 

seventeen, and the mother has two sons, presently ages seven and nine. After 

George's birth, defendants lived in the same household with all of their 

children. In December 2014, the mother saw her two older sons performing 

oral sex on each other. The boys told her that James had done "bad things" to 

them and taught them how to perform oral sex. One of the boys claimed James 

made him "lick his butt."

The mother reported the incident to the police when the father failed to 

take any action against James. With the exception of James, the Division 

removed the children from defendants' home and placed them in resource 

homes. The Division filed a complaint, as well as an order to show cause 

seeking the custody of the children who had been removed, which the court 

granted. George was never returned to either defendant's custody.
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Defendants thereafter separated, and the father obtained housing for 

James and himself. For the ensuing three years, the Division endeavored to 

provide services to the father and James designed to enable George to reunite 

with them. Although the father engaged in some services, he spurned others. 

More importantly, the father delayed in arranging for James to be evaluated for 

any disorders or problems that might put George at risk for harm if George and 

James lived in the same household. After James was finally evaluated and 

commenced sex offender psycho-education and treatment in January 2016, the 

father failed to transport James to many of his appointments with his 

psychologist. The father also did not ensure he and James submitted to other 

evaluations arranged by the Division.

The court concluded that George's safety, health, and development 

would be endangered if he were returned to his father's home, because the 

father failed to make sure James complied with recommended services that 

would assure George's safety. As the court stated:

[F]or three years, the Division has attempted to work 

with [the father], through all of his self-constructed 

barriers, to reunify [George] with [the father] and 

[James]. [The father] is the party that refuses to 

follow recommendations to permit [George]'s safe 

reunification.
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Moreover, [the father] is responsible to assure 

[George]'s safety. Even if [the father] does not 

believe the allegations or wants to support [James], he 

is required, at the very least, to have [James] evaluated 

and to follow the recommendations, to insure [George] 

can safely reside in the home. . . .

[T]his court is not looking to have . . . [the father] 

make a choice between his sons[;] however, absent his 

commitment and willingness to take all reasonable 

steps to protect [George], he poses a risk of harm to 

[George]'s safety, health and development because of 

his failure to address the allegations of [James]'s

sexual abuse. . . .

[The father] has obscured a true understanding of the 

family dynamics and presentation. That course of 

conduct provides clear and convincing evidence that 

he cannot provide a safe and stable home for 

[George].

The court also noted that, at the time of trial, the father could not offer 

George permanency, and further delay of a permanent placement for George 

will harm him. George had bonded with his resource mother, who wants to 

adopt him. (The father declined to submit to a bonding evaluation). The court 

determined that if removed from his resource mother's home, George will 

suffer serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm.

In reviewing a case in which the termination of parental rights has been 

ordered, we remain mindful of the gravity and importance of our review. See

N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 151 (2010) ("[T]he 
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process for terminating parental rights is a difficult and intentionally rigorous 

one that must be satisfied by a heightened burden of proof . . . ."). Parents 

have a constitutionally protected right to enjoy a relationship with their 

children and to raise them without State interference. N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 102 (2008).

However, this right is not absolute, as it is limited by the "State's parens 

patriae responsibility to protect children whose vulnerable lives or 

psychological well-being may have been harmed or may be seriously 

endangered by a neglectful or abusive parent." F.M., 211 N.J. at 447. The 

State has a strong public policy that favors placing children in a permanent, 

safe, and stable home. See In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 357-58 

(1999).

In addition, a reviewing court should not disturb the factual findings of 

the trial court if they are supported by "adequate, substantial and credible 

evidence. . . ." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 

(2007) (quoting In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. 

Div. 1993)). We defer to the trial court's credibility findings and, in particular, 

its fact findings because of its expertise in family matters, see N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 343 (2010), unless the trial 
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court's findings are "so wide of the mark that the judge was clearly mistaken." 

N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007) (citing 

J.T., 269 N.J. Super. at 188-89).

We have examined the father's arguments the Division failed to satisfy 

the four prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). After perusing the record, we 

conclude these arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in 

a written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Judge Paganelli's cogent opinion 

fully tracks the statutory requirements of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), accords with 

In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 337; In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 

161 N.J. 365 (1999); and N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 

N.J. 591 (1986), and is amply supported by the evidence, mandating our 

deference. See F.M., 211 N.J. at 448-49. 

Affirmed.