2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

5-15-2013

Robert Hankins v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-2516

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Recommended Citation

"Robert Hankins v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania" (2013). 2013 Decisions. Paper 840.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-2516

___________

ROBERT HANKINS,

 Appellant

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; GLORIA POINDEXTER; SECRETARY 

OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; CINDY G. WATSON, 

CHIEF GRIEVANCE OFFICER; MARGARET M. GORDON, CLINICAL 

DIETICIAN; JOHN S. SHAFFER, RIGHT TO KNOW OFFICIAL;

E.P. BUSH, ACTING DEPUTY FOR CENTRALIZED SERVICES; NELSON 

ZULLINGER, RIGHT TO KNOW OFFICER; JOSEPH D., HEARING EXAMINER 

(JOHN DOE #1); E.M. WEAVER, HEARING EXAMINER;

TIMOTHY J. MARK, CHIEF HEARING EXAMINER; L.S. KERNS-BARR, 

HEARING EXAMINER; Z. MOSLAK, HEARING EXAMINER;

KERRI CROSS, HEARING EXAMINER; JOHN ANDRADE, HEARING EXAMINER;

YATES, CHIEF GRIEVANCE OFFICIAL; KRISTEN P. REISINGER, CHIEF 

GRIEVANCE OFFICIAL; RAYMOND SOBINA, FORMER SUPERINTENDENT AT 

FOREST; MICHAEL BARONE, DEPUTY; L.H. HEASTER, DEPUTY;

KEVIN DITTMAN, FOOD SERVICES MANAGER; EDWARD HEBERLING, FOOD 

SERVICES MANAGER 2; DONALD SKUNDA, CCHP; CAROL KENNEDY, 

GRIEVANCE COORDINATOR; KURT GRANDLUND, DEPUTY; JOLENE B., 

R.D.H.;CFMM-111; MCKNIGHT, SERGEANT; WHITEHEAD, CORRECTIONS 

OFFICER; S.S. BEST, CORRECTIONS OFFICER; JOAN DELIE, CHCA;

GLORIA PINDEXTER, HEALTH SERVICES MED. DIRECTOR; RHONDA 

SHERBINE; GARY BROWNFIELD, JR., COURT OFFICERS (FYT. CO.)

GEORGE BARKER, COURT OFFICER; ED DENKER, COURT OFFICER; MARK 

MATTHEWS, COURT OFFICER; MIKE ZAVADA (LT. SALVODA); CHAPMAN 

(LT. CHAPLYN); WARDEN MEDLOCK; C. CROFTCHECK, ASSISTANT 

WARDEN; TIMMIE BURNSWORTH, NURSE; JAMEE WALIGURA, COUNSELOR;

MAYOR JAMES R. SILEO; THOMAS W. SHAFFER, ESQ.; JEFFREY W. 

WHITEKO; MICHAEL J. GAROFALO, ESQ.,; MICHELLE KELLEY, ESQ., (ASSIST 

DIST. ATTY.); EUGENE GRIMM, ESQ., (ASSIST DIST. ATTY.); DEB WOODARD, 

COMMISSARY SUPERVISOR; MILLER, (CORRECTIONS OFFICER); S. 

SATTERLEE, COUNSELOR; HUAPT (UNIT MANAGER); LT. YOUNKIN 
2

(LIEUTENANT); GREGORY PACKING, INC.; P. MCKISSOCK (HEARING 

EXAMINER); JUDGE STEVEN P. LESKINEN; EDWARD FIKE;

TOM CORBETT (FOR THE COMMONWEALTH)

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 1:09-cv-00182)

District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

May 7, 2013

Before: FUENTES, VANASKIE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 15, 2013)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Robert Hankins, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals a judgment in 

favor of the defendants. We will affirm.

Hankins, a Pennsylvania prisoner currently incarcerated at SCI Rockview, filed 

this civil-rights suit in 2009. The lengthy complaint, which named a multitude of 

defendants, addressed a number of incidents surrounding his 2008 trial to his time in 

custody at SCI Forest and the Fayette County Prison. 

Most of Hankins’s claims were resolved before trial; he prevailed on none. The 

District Court granted, in part, the various defendants’ motions to dismiss,1and also

 

1

See Hankins v. Beard, No. 09–182, 2010 WL 3522095 (W.D. Pa. July 29, 2010), report 

and recommendation adopted in part by 2010 WL 3522094 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2010). 
3

dismissed several defendants because Hankins failed to serve them with process.

2

 

Following discovery, the District Court granted portions of the remaining defendants’ 

summary judgment motions, leaving only 1) excessive force claims related to an incident

in which defendants Barker and Brownfield discharged a stun belt and 2) various 

retaliation claims against defendant McKnight.

3

 Barker and Brownfield entered into a 

settlement with Hankins and were dismissed from the case, while a jury entered a verdict 

in McKnight’s favor after trial. Hankins filed a timely notice of appeal directly from the 

District Court’s entry of judgment, attacking both the orders rejecting his claims as well 

as the orders that denied him the services of counsel, declined to re-open discovery, and 

rejected his request to take “judicial notice as to the code of silence in the [Pennsylvania]

prison system.” Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 247. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “[W]e are free to affirm a 

result reached by the district court for any reason supported by the record.” Alexander 

Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Gov’t of V.I., 757 F.2d 534, 547–48 (3d Cir. 1985).

Exercising plenary review, see Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Trust v. John 

Hancock Life Ins. Co. (U.S.A.), 677 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 2012), we agree with the 

District Court that partial dismissal was proper, for substantially the same reasons 

discussed in the report and recommendation and order. For instance, some defendants

 

2

See ECF Nos. 135 (report and recommendation), 138 (order).

3

See Hankins v. Pennsylvania, No. 09-182, 2011 WL 6739289 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30,

2011), report and recommendation adopted in part by 2011 WL 6739288 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 

22, 2011). 
4

were not identified as having the requisite personal involvement in the complained-of 

conduct, see Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); others were

outside of § 1983’s reach. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); see also

Black v. Bayer, 672 F.2d 309, 311 (3d Cir. 1982). Several claims clearly fell short of the 

standard required to survive a motion to dismiss; for example, although Hankins

discussed difficulties relating to the law library at the Fayette County prison, he did not 

properly state an access-to-the-courts claim. See Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205–06 

(3d Cir. 2008) (setting forth the elements of such a claim). Furthermore, claims against 

the Commonwealth defendants in their official capacities were barred by Eleventh 

Amendment immunity. See Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 

2009) (per curiam). Further amendment of the complaint would not have yielded a 

different outcome. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 672 (3d Cir. 2010).

4

 

4

In analyzing Hankins’s lengthy complaint, the District Court discerned twenty-two 

separate claims, an accounting to which all parties acceded in number and substance. See

Hankins, 2010 WL 3522095, at *3–4. In our own de novo, liberal analysis of Hankins’s 

complaint, see Henderson v. Fisher, 631 F.2d 1115, 1117 (3d Cir. 1980), we detected two 

additional claims. Hankins maintained that his meal regimen led to his not being “treated 

like similar[l]y situated prisoners,” which we read to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment’s 

Equal Protection Clause. See Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir. 

2008). Despite invoking the Clause, however, Hankins failed to plead facts sufficient to 

survive dismissal, or to otherwise develop his claim; nor did he show that he constituted a 

“class of one,” to the extent that such a theory would be appropriate in this context. See

Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Second, assuming that 

Hankins attempted to raise a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 

Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et. seq., such a claim could not be maintained against 

the Commonwealth because he did not ask for injunctive relief in connection with his 

religion-based complaints, see Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1663 (2011), and 

also could not be lodged against the defendants in their individual capacities, see Sharp v. 

Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 154 (3d Cir. 2012). 
5

After ruling on the defendants’ motions to dismiss, but before reaching their 

motions for summary judgment, the District Court dismissed several defendants because 

Hankins had not properly served them. While an “indigent prisoner representing himself 

is entitled to rely on the Marshal to achieve service of process,” Sellers v. United States, 

902 F.2d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 1990), we have emphasized that a prisoner must still assist 

the Marshals Service when he is informed of service problems. Young v. Quinlan, 960 

F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Nyhuis 

v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000). As Hankins failed to rectify the service 

problems despite being granted additional time to do so, and in light of the District 

Court’s analysis of the relevant factors from Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 

747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir.1984), we conclude that the Court did not abuse its discretion 

by dismissing the un-served defendants from the suit. See Liggon-Redding v. Estate of 

Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 260 n.1 (3d Cir. 2011).

5

 

We review the District Court order granting summary judgment de novo, and 

apply the same standard it used. Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2012). 

For substantially the same reasons cited in the District Court’s opinion, we agree that the 

defendants met their burden under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) and that Hankins failed, with the 

two exceptions identified by the District Court, to “go beyond the pleadings and by [his] 

own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

 

5 And, in any event, we fail to see how those three defendants could have been personally 

involved in any constitutional violation. Moreover, nothing alleged in the amended 
6

designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (citation and quotation marks omitted). For instance, 

Hankins did not show that his placement in disciplinary housing implicated due process, 

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); that he was “incarcerated under conditions 

posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994);

or that prison officials demonstrated a “deliberate indifference” to his health or safety, id.

at 840. His food claims did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See

LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993); Hamm v. De Kalb Cnty., 774 

F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The fact that [prison] food occasionally contains 

foreign objects or sometimes is served cold, while unpleasant, does not amount to a 

constitutional deprivation.”).6In sum, no reasonable jury could return a verdict in 

Hankins’s favor on the bulk of the remaining claims. Knopick v. Connelly, 639 F.3d 

600, 606 (3d Cir. 2011).

After a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of defendant McKnight on all 

counts. Hankins filed no post-trial motions, and instead directly appealed the District 

Court’s entry of judgment. We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 

discretion in limiting further discovery and in making its pretrial evidentiary rulings. See

Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch. Dist., 283 F.3d 138, 156 (3d Cir. 2002); see also R.R. 

Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1511 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Where no post-

 

complaint would appear to abrogate the judicial defendant’s absolute immunity. See

Capogrosso, 588 F.3d at 184.
7

trial motions . . . were filed, and the appeal is directly from the judgment entered on the 

jury’s verdict, review for sufficiency of evidence is extremely limited or non-existent, 

prejudicial legal error must be shown to have occurred in the conduct of the trial, and the 

action of an appellate court is limited to affirmance or remand for new trial.”). Hankins 

has not otherwise indicated a reason to disturb the judgment in favor of McKnight.

For the foregoing reasons, the District Court correctly resolved Hankins’s claims 

and did not abuse its discretion by allowing Hankins to proceed without appointing 

counsel. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011). We will affirm its 

judgment in favor of the defendants. Appellee Brownfield’s motion to supplement the 

appendix is granted, but to the extent that any of Hankins’s additional filings before this 

Court request independent relief, they are denied. 

 

6

Furthermore, Hankins’s food-related complaints were taken seriously, at least in part. 

See Pl.’s Ex. 8, ECF No. 168-2 (revealing that bad apple juice was detected and 

discarded).