### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE December 7, 2000 Session
EXXON CORPORATION v. METR OPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, ET AL 

### . Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County No. 99-2695-II Carol L. McCoy, Chancellor

No. M2000-00614-COA-R3-CV - Filed January 24, 2001

Company acquired a busin

ess that had a previous permit to sell beer at the site. Company then
r emoved the existing structure and built a new building. It applied for a beer per mit which wa s denied by Beer B oard on the grounds that the new structure did not satisfy current distance requirements

in regards to its distance from a playground. Company appealed to the trial court citing grandfather

provisions in the Tennessee Code. Trial court affirmed the denial stating that the term “location” in the Code referred to the actual building and not the property on which it re sted. We reverse. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgmen

t of the Chancery

Court Reversed;

and Remanded
D AVID R. F ARMER , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which B EN H. C ANTRELL , J., joined. H OLLY K. L ILLARD , J., filed a separ ate opinion concu

rring in part and d

issenting in part. Scott K. Haynes, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Exxon Corporation.
Karl F. Dean, Shayna Abrams, and David Diaz-Barriga, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, The Metropolitan Government of Nashville an d Davidson County, Tenness ee and The Metropolitan Beer Permit Board of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee.
OPINION

In 1999, Exxon acquired a business located at 1401 Charlotte Avenue in Nashville, Tennessee in order to

c onstruct a Tigermarket. The previous business had held a beer permit and had sold beer on the pr

operty since May 26, 1992. Exxon removed the existing structure and built a new b uilding on a different site on the property. After the building had be en completed, Exxon1 Exxon had previously obtained a conditional beer perm it from the Metro Beer Board. The M etro Beer Board

makes cond itional app rovals of b eer perm it application s before c onstructio n is com plete in ord er to facilitate th e applicat ion process. Applicati

ons are give

n final appr

oval upon completi

on of the const

ruction if the structure meets all the conditions

required under

the appli

cable Metropol

itan Code se ction. -2- submitted an Application fo r a Beer Permit f

or its new busi

nes s. 1 The Metropolitan B eer Permit Board of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson Count y (“Metro Beer Board”) denied the application on

the grounds that

the new structure

was less than 100 f

eet from a playground in violation of Metro C ode. Exxon appealed this decision to the trial court, citing grandfather provisions under

section57-5-109 of the Tennessee Code. The trial court denied Exxon’s petition seekin g relief fro m the Metro Beer Board’s denial

of a permit. The trial court found that the grandfath e r clause in section

57-5-109 of the Te

nnessee Code did n

ot apply in thi

s case because ‘location ’ as listed in the stat ute referred to the physica l structur e of a buildi ng. The issue, as we p

erceive it, is as f

ollows:
Did the trial court err when it determined that Exxon was not entitled to prote ction under section 57-5-109 of the Tennessee Code?
Our review in this case with respe ct to the trial court’s legal c onclusions is de novo with no presumption of correctness. See, e.g., Bell ex rel. Snyder v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen and Ginsburg, P.A. , 986 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tenn. 1999); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Statute Interpretation
Section 57-5-109 o

f the Tennessee

Code states: A city or county shall not suspend, revoke or de ny a permit to a business engaged in selling, distributing or manufacturing beer on the basis of the proximity of the business to a school, residence, church, or other place of public gathering if a valid permit had been issued to any business on that same location as of January 1, 1993. This section shall not apply if beer is not sold, distributed or manufactured at that location during any continuous six-month period after January 1, 1993. Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-109 (Supp. 2000).
Under the basic rules of

statuto ry construct

ion, “courts are restricted to the natural and ordina ry meaning of the language used by the Legislature within the four corners of the statute, unless an ambigu ity

requires resort elsewhere to ascertain legislative intent.” Austin v. Memphis Pub. Co. , 655 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tenn. 1983). A court must determine the “legislative . . . purpose

. . . primarily from the natural and ordinary meaning of the lan guage u sed, when read in th e context2 Metro Beer Board actually ci tes the seventh edition of Black’s Law Dictionary in its argum ents. This edition defines location as “[t]he spec ific place or p osition of a person o r thing.” Black’s Law Dictionary 951 (7 th ed. 1999). For consistency, we have cited from the fifth edition in this opinion as the differences in the definitions are minor.

3 With this opinion, we by no means suggest that t he word ‘location’ as used by t he Legislature wil

l always refer (continu ed...) -3- of the entire statute, without any forced or subtle construction to limit or exten d the impor t of the language.” Id. at 149 (quo ting Worrall v. Kroger Co. , 545 S.W.2d 736, 738 (1977)).
It is thus necessary to examine s e ction 57-5-109 of the Tennessee Code and, using the “natural and ordinary meaning of the languag e used” within the statute, determine the intent of the legislature. B oth the Appellant a nd the Appellee a

rgue that the de

finition of the ter

m ‘location’ is controlling in this case. Exxon argues the “natural and ordinary” definition of l oc ation is the “designation

of the boundaries of a particular piece of land.” Black’s Law Dictionary 847 (5 th ed. 1979). Thus, Exxon contends, the Tigermart was constructed at the same location as the previous business and is entitled to the grandfather protection in the statute.
Metro Beer Board a

rgues that the de

finitio n of ‘locat ion’ is the “site or place where something is or may be located.” 2 Id. Metro Beer Board cites several cases in which ‘location’ has referred to the building in which beer was sold. See generally, Bostic v. Board of Comm’rs , 1992 WL 62013, at *1 (Tenn

. Ct. App. March 31, 1992); Lones v. Blount County Beer Bd. , 538 S.W.2d 386 (Tenn. 1976); Needham v. Beer Bd. , 647 S.W.2d 226 (Tenn. 1983). None of these ca

ses, however, address the interpretation of the statute currently before this court . Metro Beer

Board argues tha t as ‘locatio

n’ refers to the building in which beer was previously sold, when Exxon demolished

the existing structure to build the Tigermart, the location was changed. As such, Exxon was not entitled to the grandfather protection in section 57-5-109 of the Tennessee Code. Upon review by the court, it is clear that both definitions of ‘location’ are correct. However, this court recognizes that the statute must be read in the context of the language of the entire statute. With an examination of all the language within thestatute, it is possible to determine the legislative intent in using the word ‘location.’
E xaminin g the statute, it is cle ar that the legi

slature intended

to provide protec

tion to businesses that had valid per mits if that permit “

had been iss

ued to any busines s on that same location as of January 1, 1993.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-5-109 (Su

pp. 2000) (emphas

is added). Thus, ‘location’ must be examined in the context of its use in the part of the statute stating “on that same location.” ‘On’ is defined as “upon. . . at or in contact with [the] upper surface of a thing.” Black’s Law Dictionary 981 (5 th ed. 1979). Thus, the phrase “on th

at same location”

as used in the statu

te must refer to a bu

siness that sits upon that same location. Compari ng the definitions of t he word ‘locatio

n’ offered by

both parties, it is c

lear th a t Exxon’s definitio

n of ‘loca tion’ is co

rrect wh en examine

d in conte

xt with the rem ainder of the statute. 3 The legislature

clearly in tended that in this

statute “on that same location” would have the3 (...c ontinued)

to the boundaries of property. It is merely our i ntention to rei

nforce the well-set

tled case law t

hat the proper

definit ion of a word should be determined t hrough an examinati

on of its use in the context of the l anguage of the entire st atute.

4 It is clea

r from the re cord and undisput ed by the part

ies that Exxon met the si

x month requirement

in t h e statute. -4- same meaning as “upo

n that same proper

ty.” We belie

ve that, had the le

gislature inte

nded th e definition contended by

the Metro Beer

Board, it would ha

ve written a statu

te allo wing bu siness “uponthat same building” or “within the s ame buildin g” to be protected under the grandfather provision. Metro Beer Board’s interpretation of the statute is cl

early not c

onsistent with

the “natural and ordinary meaning of the languag e used.” Austin , 655 S.W.2d at 148.
As this court

is “restricted to the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used by the Legislature

within the four cor

ners of the statute

,” it is clear that Exxon meets the requirements set forth under section 57-5-109 of the Tennessee Code. 4 Id. As such, the trial court was incorrect when it failed to grant

Exxon’s petition for re

lief and we rema

nd this case

to the trial court for rulings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoin

g conclusions,

we hereby

reverse the trial court’s judgment. Costs on appeal are assessed ag

ainst the Appellees, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson Cou nty, Tennessee, and the Metropolitan Beer Permit Board of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, and their surety , for which execution may is sue if nece ssa ry.

___________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE