COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

DICKENSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD 

AND 

OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0744-98-3 PER CURIAM 

 AUGUST 25, 1998 

PATRICIA KAY MULLINS 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (S.T. Mullins; Street, Street, Street, 

Scott & Bowman, on brief), for appellants. 

 (Clarence E. Phillips, on brief), for 

appellee. 

 Dickenson County School Board and its insurer (hereinafter 

referred to as "employer") contend that the Workers' Compensation 

Commission ("commission") erred in finding that Patricia Kay 

Mullins ("claimant") proved that (1) at the time of her October 

28, 1995 injury by accident, she was in the course of her 

employment acting as an "employee" covered by the Workers' 

Compensation Act; and (2) her right carpal tunnel syndrome was 

causally related to the October 28, 1995 compensable injury by 

accident.1

 Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 1Employer also contends that the commission erred in finding 

that claimant proved that her ganglion cyst was causally related 

to her compensable injury by accident. However, our review of 

the commission's opinion reveals that the commission found that 

the employer was not responsible for treatment or disability 

related to the ganglion cyst. Because the commission ruled in 

employer's favor on this issue, we will not address it on appeal. 
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parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision. Rule 

5A:27. 

I. 

 "A finding by the commission that an injury arose out of and 

in the course of employment is a mixed finding of law and fact 

and is properly reviewable on appeal." Dublin Garment Co. v. 

Jones, 2 Va. App. 165, 167, 342 S.E.2d 638, 638 (1986). 

 In granting claimant's application, the commission made the 

following factual findings: 

 The claimant's job was that of a school bus 

driver. At the time of the accident, she 

was furthering the interests of her 

employer, in spite of the fact that she was 

not required to take the band to North 

Carolina. As a result of the budget 

crunch, bus drivers were encouraged to 

"volunteer" their time for extracurricular 

activities. Such activities were an 

important part of the school's overall 

program. The school board continued to 

exercise control. The claimant was 

required to obtain permission from the 

director of transportation to drive the 

bus. Only school bus drivers employed by 

the county could drive students on these 

extracurricular trips. The claimant was 

responsible for checking the bus systems to 

make sure that they were working properly. 

 She was also responsible for picking up 

trash on the bus. While the claimant was 

not compensated for her time, her expenses 

were paid and she was admitted to the 

extracurricular events. 

 Based upon these factual findings, the commission concluded 

that "the school system exercised sufficient control and that 

there was a sufficient nexus between the employment and driving 
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the bus for extracurricular activities, to place her in the 

position of an employee, as opposed to a volunteer, at the time 

of the accident." We agree. 

 "An injury 'occurs in the "course of employment" when it 

takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the 

employee may be reasonably expected to be, and while he is 

fulfilling the duties of his employment or is doing something 

which is reasonably incidental thereto.'" Lucas v. Lucas, 212 

Va. 561, 563, 186 S.E.2d 63, 64 (1972) (quoting Conner v. Bragg, 

203 Va. 204, 207-08, 123 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1962)). Moreover, 

"compensation under the Act [is] not confined to injuries 

occurring only during working hours." Id.

 "If the voluntary act of an employee 

which causes an injury is sufficiently 

related to what the employee is required to 

do in fulfilling his contract of service, 

or is one in which someone in a like 

capacity may or must do in the interest of 

his employer's business, the fact that the 

employee was not actually required to 

perform the act will not impair his right 

to recover compensation." 

Id. at 564, 186 S.E.2d at 65 (citation omitted). 

 Although the evidence showed that claimant was not required 

to drive employer's school bus to North Carolina to transport the 

students on their field trip, her actions, which were controlled 

and authorized by employer, were obviously for employer's benefit 

and in its interest. When claimant sustained her injuries, she 

was at a place she was reasonably expected to be while engaged in 

an activity incidental to her employment. She was not on a 
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mission of her own wholly unconnected to her employment. Under 

these circumstances, claimant's injuries occurred in the course 

of her employment while she was acting as an employee, not a 

volunteer. See id. Accordingly, the commission did not err in 

finding that claimant's evidence met her burden of proof. 

 II. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party below. See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. 

Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). "The 

actual determination of causation is a factual finding that will 

not be disturbed on appeal if there is credible evidence to 

support the finding." Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Musick, 7 Va. App. 

684, 688, 376 S.E.2d 814, 817 (1989). "Questions raised by 

conflicting medical opinions must be decided by the commission." 

Penley v. Island Creek Coal Co., 8 Va. App. 310, 318, 381 S.E.2d 

231, 236 (1989). 

 In ruling that claimant proved that her right carpal tunnel 

syndrome was causally related to her compensable October 28, 1995 

injury by accident, the commission found as follows: 

 Both Dr. [Sudkhara K.R.] Udupa and Dr. 

[William A.] McIlwain agree that the de 

Quervain's disease is causally related to 

the accident. While Dr. McIlwain did not 

relate the carpal tunnel syndrome to the 

accident, Dr. Udupa opined that there was a 

"high probability" that the accident 

aggravated that preexisting condition. 

Neither physician related the cyst to the 

accident. We are persuaded by the opinions 

of Dr. Udupa and find that the de 

Quervain's disease and carpal tunnel 

syndrome are related to the accident. The 
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employer takes the employee as he finds her 

with all her weaknesses and infirmities, 

and the employer is responsible for the 

aggravation of a preexisting condition, in 

this case, carpal tunnel syndrome. 

 "Medical evidence is not necessarily conclusive, but is 

subject to the commission's consideration and weighing." 

Hungerford Mechanical Corp. v. Hobson, 11 Va. App. 675, 677, 401 

S.E.2d 213, 214 (1991). In its role as fact finder, the 

commission was entitled to weigh the medical evidence, to accept 

Dr. Udupa's opinions, and to reject any contrary medical 

opinions. Dr. Udupa's opinions constitute credible evidence to 

support the commission's decision. "The fact that there is 

contrary evidence in the record is of no consequence if there is 

credible evidence to support the commission's finding." Wagner 

Enters., Inc. v. Brooks, 12 Va. App. 890, 894, 407 S.E.2d 32, 35 

(1991). 

 For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision. 

 Affirmed.