SUPERIOR COURT

OF THE

STATE OF DELAWARE

CRAIG A. KARSNITZ, SUSSEX COUNTY COURTHOUSE

RESIDENT JUDGE 1 THE CIRCLE, SUITE 2

GEORGETOWN, DE 19947

TELEPHONE (302) 856-5263

May 21, 2024

Jarel L. Moore

SBI# 00627217

Howard R. Young Correctional Institution

P.O. Box 9561

Wilmington, DE 19809

Re: State of Delaware v. Jarel Moore, Def. ID No. S2308009768 (R-1)

Dear Mr. Moore:

On March 4, 2024, after a colloquy with me, you pled guilty to two counts of 

Assault in the Second Degree and one count of Resisting Arrest. You were sentenced 

to eight years of Level 5 incarceration, suspended after one year for one year of 

Level 4 home confinement, followed by eighteen months at Level 3 probation. 

On May 3, 2024, I received your first pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief

under Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (the “Motion”), dated April 30, 

2024. You state two (2) grounds for relief, both asserting ineffective assistance in 

your defense by your counsel at trial (“Trial Counsel”). The first ground asserts that 
2

Trial Counsel failed to advocate for a more beneficial plea agreement (specifically a 

shorter period of incarceration) in exchange your guilty plea. The second ground 

asserts that Trial Counsel failed to file a motion to dismiss the case (and seek 

sanctions against the State) because the State failed to indict you within 45 days of 

your arrest.

Your Motion did not request the appointment of postconviction counsel to 

represent you in this Rule 61 proceeding, nor am I obligated to appoint one.

1

I first address the four procedural bars of Rule 61.2 If a procedural bar exists, 

as a general rule I will not address the merits of the postconviction claim.3 A Rule 

61 Motion can be barred for time limitations, successive motions, failure to raise 

claims below, or former adjudication.4 

First, a motion for postconviction relief exceeds time limitations if it is filed 

more than one year after the conviction becomes final.5 In this case, your conviction 

became final for purposes of Rule 61 30 days after I imposed sentence; i.e., April 4, 

1 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(3).

2 Ayers v. State, 802 A.2d 278, 281 (Del.2002) (citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 

1990). 

3 Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748 (Del 2016); State v. Page, 2009 WL 1141738, at*13 (Del. Super. 

April 28, 2009).

4 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i).

5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
3

2024.

6

 You filed the Motion on May 3, 2024, well before the one-year deadline. 

Therefore, consideration of the Motion is not barred by the one-year limitation. 

Second, second or subsequent motions for postconviction relief are not 

permitted unless certain conditions are satisfied.7 Since this is your first motion for 

postconviction relief, consideration of the Motion is not barred by this provision.

Third, grounds for relief “not asserted in the proceedings leading to the 

judgment of conviction” are barred unless certain conditions are satisfied.

8 Your 

grounds for relief are based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. It is wellsettled Delaware law that, as collateral claims, ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

are properly raised for the first time in postconviction proceedings.9 Therefore, 

consideration of the Motion is not barred by this provision.

Fourth, grounds for relief formerly adjudicated in the case, including 

“proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a post-conviction 

proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus hearing” are barred.10 In the Motion, you 

6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(1).

7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).

8 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).

9

State v. Schofield, 2019 WL 103862, at *2 (Del. Super. January 3, 2019); Thelemarque v. State, 

2016 WL 556631, at *3 (Del. Feb. 11, 2016) (“[T]his Court will not review claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel for the first time on direct appeal.”); Watson v. State, 2013 WL 5745708, at 

*2 (Del. Oct. 21, 2013) (“It is well-settled that this Court will not consider a claim of ineffective 

assistance that is raised for the first time in a direct appeal.”).

10 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
4

do not seek to relitigate issues you have previously asserted in the case. Therefore, 

consideration of the Motion is not barred by this provision. 

Moreover, none of these four procedural bars apply either to (i) a claim that 

there is new evidence of actual innocence in fact, or to (ii) a claim that a retroactively 

applied rule of constitutional law renders the conviction invalid.11 You make no such 

claims here.

Since none of the procedural bars under Rule 61 apply, I will consider the 

Motion on its merits.

With respect to your claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, I look to the 

dual standards of Strickland v. Washington12 as applied in Delaware.13 Under 

Strickland, you must show that (1) Trial Counsel’s representation “fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness” (the “performance prong”); and (2) the 

“deficient performance prejudiced [your] defense.” (the “prejudice prong”).14 In 

considering the performance prong, the United States Supreme Court was mindful 

that “[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant 

to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”15 Strickland requires an 

objective analysis, making every effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of 

11 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii).

12 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

13 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53 (Del. 1988).

14 Strickland at 687.

15 Id. at 690.
5

hindsight” and to “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within 

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”16 “[S]trategic choices about 

which lines of defense to pursue are owed deference commensurate with the 

reasonableness of the professional judgments on which they are based.”17 

As to the prejudice prong, you must demonstrate that there exists a reasonable 

probability that, but for Trial Counsel’s error, the outcome of the trial would have 

been different.18 Even if Trial Counsel’s performance was professionally 

unreasonable, it would not warrant setting aside the judgment of conviction if the 

error had no effect on the judgment.19 A showing of prejudice “requires more than 

a showing of theoretical possibility that the outcome was affected.”20 

Strickland teaches that there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective 

assistance claim to approach the inquiry in a particular order, or even to address both 

prongs of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. In 

particular, a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient 

before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant because of the alleged 

deficiencies. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of 

16

 Id. at 689. 

17

 Id. at 681.

18

 Id. at 687; Zebroski v. State, 822 A.2d 1038, 1043 (Del. 2003); Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 

1356 (Del. 1996).

19

 Strickland at 691.

20 Frey v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 348, 358 (3d Cir. 1992). 
6

lack of sufficient prejudice, that course should be followed.21 In every case, the court 

should be concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the 

result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the 

adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results.

22

 

I find that neither of your ineffective assistance of counsel grounds satisfies 

the two prongs of the Strickland test.

With respect to ground one, you pled guilty and were sentenced on the same 

day you pled guilty. There is no evidence whatsoever in the record that, at that time, 

you had any issue with your plea, or any disagreement with Trial Counsel about your

plea. You engaged in a lengthy colloquy with me wherein you acknowledged that 

you understood the consequences of the plea agreement, you knew what legal rights 

you were giving up under such an agreement, and that you were satisfied with your 

representation by Trial Counsel. After sentencing, you apparently changed your 

mind about the plea agreement, and now in your Petition you assert that Trial 

Counsel was ineffective for failing to negotiate an “appropriate” plea agreement. 

However, what you are really asserting is that the sentence is excessive, not that 

Trial Counsel was ineffective. Hindsight is 20-20, but your attempt to abrogate your 

plea agreement comes too late.

21 Strickland at 697.

22 Id. at 696.
7

In your Petition, you give no supporting facts, evidence, or legal authority

whatsoever for this ground one. There is no evidence that Trial Counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, or his deficient 

performance prejudiced your defense. Self-serving assertions are no substitute for 

facts, evidence, and legal authority. Thus, I deny ground one.

You ground two, although couched as a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, is essentially that you were denied a speedy trial, as guaranteed by the Sixth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the 

Delaware Constitution. You assert that Trial Counsel should have filed a motion to 

dismiss the indictment23 after the State failed to indict you within 45 days after your 

arrest.24 You were arrested on August 22, 2023 and indicted on November 20, 2023, 

a gap of 91 days. As a backup, you argue that Trial Counsel should have moved to 

reduce your bail and sought sanctions against the State for its failure to indict you 

within 45 days after arrest. You argue that you were prejudiced thereby because, if 

Trial Counsel had made such a Rule 48(b) motion, the indictment could have been 

dismissed altogether and, if Trial Counsel had moved for bail modification, you 

could have been released on unsecured bail.

23 Under Super. Ct. Crim. R. 48(b).

24 Crim. Admin. Order, Del. Super., Ridgely, P.J. (Jan. 16, 1991), at 8.
8

Section Five of the Superior Court’s Criminal Administrative Order " In re: 

Policy, Time Standards, and Procedures Relating to Criminal Case Disposition" 

issued on January 16, 1991 (the "Administrative Order").provides in pertinent part:

(a)Time for Filing an Indictment or information. If an individual is 

arrested on a complaint charging an offense to be prosecuted before this 

Court, any indictment or information should be filed within 30 days 

from the date of arrest.

* * *

(c) Sanctions for Indictment Delay. When a case is pending indictment 

for more than 45 days after arrest, the Court may impose any of the 

sanctions as provided in section 18 of this Criminal Administrative 

Order.

The import of this Administrative Order was further underscored by another

Criminal Administrative Order issued by the Superior Court on March 28, 2000 

which declared delays “other than reasonably required ... [to be] unacceptable.”25

Rule 48(b) of the Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure 

provides:

If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or in filing 

an information against a defendant who has been held to answer in Superior 

Court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the court 

may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint. 

25 Crim. Admin. Order, Del. Super., Ridgely, P.J. (Mar. 28, 2000), at 1.
9

The term “unnecessary delay” is not specified or defined, but it certainly does not incorporate 

the 45-day time period of the Administrative Order.

As stated in State v. Willis,

26 for an indictment to be dismissed under Rule 

48(b) for “unnecessary delay,” the delay must be attributable to the State, and must 

have had a prejudicial effect on you.

27 The types of prejudice recognized by Rule 

48(b) include:

“the unexplained commencement of a new prosecution long after a 

dismissal by the State of the same charge in another court; the anxieties 

suffered by a defendant as the result of delay and uncertainty in 

duplicative prosecutions against him; the notoriety suffered by a 

defendant and his family as the result of repeated commencement of 

prosecutions for the same offense; and the expenses, legal and 

otherwise, attendant upon a subsequent renewal in another court of a 

dismissed prosecution.”28

In determining whether the State’s reason for delay is valid, I consider the extent to 

which the State is at fault in causing the delay and the amount of control the State 

has over the event causing the delay.29 “The less control that the State has over the 

event which causes delay, the more valid the reason for delay. The more control the 

State has over the event which causes delay, the less valid the reason for delay.”30

26 2001 WL 789667 (Del. Super. Apr. 24, 2001)

27 State v. McElroy, 561 A.2d 154 (Del. 1989).

28 State v. Fischer, 285 A.2d 417, 419 (Del. 1971).

29 State v. Ellis, 1987 WL 8701 (Del. Super. Feb. 10, 1987).

30 Id. at 3-4.
10

In Willis, there was a five-month delay between arrest and indictment which was 

largely attributable to the State. The Court found this egregious, so it did not even have to 

consider the issue of prejudice to the defendant. In State v. Strzalkowski,31 there was an eightmonth delay in a DUI prosecution, which the Court did not find presumptively prejudicial. 

Moreover, the defendant was not incarcerated and no other prejudice to the defendant was 

shown. The Court found that the defendant’s rights to a speedy trial were not violated.

In your case, the delay between arrest and indictment was 91 days, only 46 days 

beyond the 45-day directive of the Administrative Order. This is far less than the delay in

other cases. There is no evidence that egregious misconduct by the State caused the delay. 

Thus, I find that this delay is not presumptively prejudicial to you. Nor have you 

demonstrated actual prejudice. You argue that you were prejudiced because, if Trial Counsel 

had made such a Rule 48(b) motion, the indictment could have been dismissed altogether 

and, if Trial Counsel had moved for bail modification, you could have been released on 

unsecured bail. However, this is entirely speculative on your part and does not show actual 

prejudice under Strickland; i.e., that the result in your case would have been different.

Moreover, the performance prong of Strickland is not satisfied. Under 

Strickland, I give deference to reasonable strategic decisions made by Trial Counsel. 

Here, Trial Counsel may well have considered these options and concluded that a 

Rule 48(b) motion would have been fruitless and that your bail would not have been 

31 2010 WL 2961519 (Del. Super. July 28, 2010).
11

modified. I will not second guess his judgment absent a showing that his 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

************

I find that, based on your Petition and my thorough review of the record of 

the prior proceedings in this case, you are not entitled to relief. I therefore am 

entering an order for summary dismissal.32 For the reasons discussed above, there is 

no need for me to expand the record to consider additional evidence33 or to hold an 

evidentiary hearing.

34 Your Rule 61 Motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Craig A. Karsnitz

Craig A. Karsnitz

cc: Prothonotary

Heather A. Lingo, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General

Stephen E. Smith, Esquire

32 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(5).

33 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(g).

34 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(h).