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ADVANCING U.S. INTERESTS: EXAMINING THE

PRESIDENT’S FY 2017 BUDGET PROPOSAL FOR

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 27, 2016

Serial No. 114–183

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

MATT SALMON, Arizona Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

GRACE MENG, New York 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Richard Olson, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan 

and Pakistan, U.S. Department of State ........................................................... 9

Mr. Donald L. Sampler, Jr., Assistant to the Administrator, Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, U.S. Agency for International Development ......... 21

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Richard Olson: Prepared statement ............................................. 11

Mr. Donald L. Sampler, Jr.: Prepared statement ................................................. 23

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 46

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 47

The Honorable David Cicilline, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Rhode Island: Prepared statement ................................................................. 48

Written responses from the Honorable Richard Olson to questions submitted 

for the record by: 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East 

and North Africa ............................................................................................... 49

The Honorable David A. Trott, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan ............................................................................................. 52

(1)

ADVANCING U.S. INTERESTS: EXAMINING THE 

PRESIDENT’S FY 2017 BUDGET PROPOSAL 

FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 27, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in 

room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the Subcommittee on Middle East and 

North Africa) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself, Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member 

Deutch, and Ranking Member Sherman for 5 minutes each for our 

opening statements, I will then recognize other members seeking 

recognition for 1 minute. We will then hear from our witnesses. 

Thank you for being here today. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements will be 

made a part of the record, and members may have 5 days to insert 

statements and questions for the record subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

Before we begin, I would like to express my deepest condolences 

to the families and friends of those killed by the Taliban last week 

in Kabul, a terrorist attack which claimed the lives of 64 people 

and wounded more than 370 others. I know I speak on behalf of 

Chairman Salmon and all members here today when I say we condemn this attack and all terrorist attacks in the strongest possible 

manner. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

This hearing represents an important opportunity for both of our 

subcommittees, allowing members to provide appropriate and necessary oversight of the President’s budget request for Afghanistan 

and Pakistan, each of which fall under our different subcommittee’s 

jurisdictions. This year the President is requesting approximately $1.2 billion for Afghanistan and about $742 million for Pakistan in the foreign 

aid budget. For comparison’s sake, the combined request for these 

countries is about 77 percent of the overall request for the South 

and Central Asia region, and about 4 percent of the entire foreign 

affairs request for this year. It is critical that Congress underVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:09 Aug 17, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\042716\99946 SHIRL
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stands exactly where this money is going and whether we are getting a good return on our investment, and assesses how we can ensure that these funds are helping achieve U.S. interests in the 

most effective way possible. 

When I led a CODEL to Afghanistan in November 2015, I was 

struck by the positive changes that President Ghani and CEO 

Abdullah had made since former President Karzai stepped down. 

Despite their differences, every official we met with said that 

Ghani and Abdullah are a vast improvement over Karzai, and that 

they have proven to be partners who are willing and able to cooperate with the United States, while taking steps to root out corruption and stabilize their country. But last week’s terrorist attack in 

Kabul is a sobering reminder of the challenges that Afghanistan 

continues to face from the Taliban and other terrorist groups. 

While Afghan security forces have had some success since taking 

the lead last year, the Taliban is resurgent in Afghanistan and is 

responsible for most of last year’s 5,500-plus military casualties 

and 10,000-plus killed or wounded civilians. The Taliban is adapting to the Afghan military’s tactics, moving into new territory as 

it gets pushed out of others, and using terrorism to inflict the kind 

of mass violence that we saw in Kabul. The Taliban is also adapting to our restrictive rules of engagement, understanding the extremely limited situations when the U.S. actually does provide air 

support to the Afghan security forces, and adjusting their tactics 

accordingly. 

When I was in Afghanistan in November, our troops did not have 

the authority to target ISIS, allowing it to grow in strength and 

numbers before the President finally authorized ISIS as a target 

earlier this year. The President needs to allow U.S. forces to target 

the Taliban as well, and I urge the administration to provide the 

Afghan security forces with the close air support and surveillance 

assistance they so desperately need. 

It is extremely difficult to negotiate with an enemy who sees its 

position constantly improving. And as President Ghani said yesterday, the Taliban operates freely because Pakistan refuses to take 

action against it inside its borders. Pakistan is a direct contributor 

to the Taliban’s success, not only allowing them to use Pakistani 

territory as a safe haven, but providing it support inside Afghanistan’s borders. It makes little sense to continue giving Pakistan billions of dollars if it is going to continue to work against our interests. 

We must leverage our aid to Pakistan so that it is a better regional partner with Afghanistan, and also helps us to root out terrorists within its borders. That includes stopping the sale of F-16s 

that Pakistan does not need and will probably not use in its supposed fight against terrorism. We should instead be prioritizing assistance for Afghanistan which, in addition to its security needs, 

continues to struggle with an enormous budget deficit, an economy 

almost entirely reliant on donor aid, and rampant and widespread 

corruption. 

With corruption still a significant issue, I continue to be concerned by our provision of on-budget assistance, and question 

whether our aid is getting to the right places. Afghanistan has said 

it needs about $10 billion donated each year until 2025 before it 

3

is self-sufficient. And I fear what will happen to Afghanistan’s 

economy once the donor fatigue that has already set in gets worse. 

In addition, not enough attention is being paid to counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan, which already accounts for 90 percent of the world’s heroin. And I am concerned that the administration’s decision to draw down resources in this area will allow a 

boom in poppy production, if it hasn’t already. 

When I was in Afghanistan, the commanders on the ground told 

us that they do not have the authority to carry out counternarcotics 

operations. And while DEA’s presence has been substantially reduced, INL’s footprint is also restricted due to the reduced DOD 

presence. The Afghan military does not have the resources to focus 

on counternarcotics while it is concentrated on fighting the 

Taliban. 

So with all that said, the question is who is going to cover counternarcotics operations? With the Afghan counternarcotics chief declaring that no eradication will occur in the Helmand Province this 

year due to the Taliban’s presence, the drug trade is poised to expand even more, fueling both the Taliban’s operations and Afghanistan’s massive addiction problem. In all of these areas we need to 

be giving the Afghan Government a chance to succeed, supporting 

it politically and providing it with the right kinds of security assistance, while helping bolster its economy and redoubling our counternarcotics efforts. 

Afghanistan is an important ally in an important region of the 

world, and its security, its stability, and its success are critical for 

U.S. interests. We must remain engaged for the long term. 

I am honored to now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Deutch, 

for his opening statement. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Well, I thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and 

Chairman Salmon, for holding today’s hearing to examine the 

President’s budget request for Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Thanks to my fellow ranking member Mr. Sherman for his longstanding and thoughtful leadership in this region of the world. 

And welcome to our esteemed witnesses. 

For a decade and a half, U.S. troops, along with our international 

coalition partners, have been on the ground in Afghanistan. After 

so many years, after so many tragic losses, the American public is 

understandably weary of continued engagement. 

When President Obama announced his intention to draw down 

troops, many welcomed the end of significant American troop presence in Afghanistan, while others worry that the withdrawal would 

end the significant gains made in development and leave the fledgling Afghan national defense and security force unable to defend its 

country from terrorists. 

I am extremely sensitive to the idea of long-term troop engagement in Afghanistan. And I want our men and women home safe. 

But I believe that the President’s decision last year to maintain 

9,800 troops through the end of the year was correct. The administration must evaluate strategic decisions based on conditions on the 

ground, not on a preset timetable. And with the rise of ISIS, which 

has made clear its intent to attack Western targets, we cannot 

allow Afghanistan to revert to a breeding ground for terrorists. 

4

The United States has committed over $100 billion since ousting 

the Taliban from Afghanistan. After years of corruption under and 

difficult cooperation from the Karzai government, we were hopeful 

that the 2014 transition of power would bring renewed leadership. 

Secretary Kerry’s brokered National Unity Government between 

President Ghani and CEO Abdullah brought a renewed hope for 

real reform. And while I believe that both President Ghani and 

CEO Abdullah want to see their reform agenda succeed, they have 

been hampered by disagreements among their political backers. 

So how can the U.S. best support these reform efforts? For our 

aid dollars to be effective, we need a country strategy that supports 

the vision of the unity government, both in development goals and 

in security. We need to see gains in long-term sustainable projects. 

We have made impactful gains in areas like women’s access to education and healthcare, but we need to see economic gains that will 

help Afghanistan become self-sufficient. 

This is a country that is dependent on foreign aid for 95 percent 

of its GDP. How can we continue progress toward creating jobs, 

rooting out corruption, creating an independent fully functioning 

judiciary, while we enter what could be a very difficult fighting season? 

Since the Taliban’s incursion into Kunduz last year, the attacks 

have continued. Fighting in Helmand continued, even throughout 

the normally quieter winter. The large-scale attack in Kabul last 

week was a tragic remainder of the past where truck bombings in 

the city were heard all too frequently. And as we enter the spring 

fighting season, it is now more important than ever that Afghan 

troops are prepared. 

The continued U.S. role of training, advising, and equipping will 

be critical. Afghan forces have shown that they can have the capability to defend and hold territory. They are not the Iraqi military. 

They have not had an experience of cutting and running. And while 

there is still a long way to go to professionalize the Afghan security 

force, rooting out corruption, addressing severe allegations of sexual abuse, and making sure that soldiers are getting adequate 

leave and pay, I don’t believe that now is the time to abandon our 

support for these forces. 

At the same time, we have to continue to encourage reconciliation talks. President Ghani has used a tremendous amount of political capital reaching out to Pakistan in hopes of securing cooperation on the Taliban. Yet Ghani has found himself burned time 

and time again. In a surprising change of tone this week, Ghani 

stated that if Pakistan does not increase cooperation on preventing 

cross-border attacks, he may seek referral to the United Nations 

Security Council. And we are a long way from reconvening reconciliation talks, and there are many steps that need to be taken 

before those talks can begin. 

If Pakistan wants to be a helpful partner, it must take real and 

actionable steps to combat all terrorism. Receiving $742 million 

must yield greater cooperation on what should be mutual regional 

security concerns. Pakistansecurity forces must treat all terrorist 

groups equally, not choose to turn a blind eye to some. 

The conditions set forth in Kerry-Lugar-Berman in 2010 have 

only been met once. They have been continually waived on the 

5

basis of national security, but we have an opportunity here to seriously consider how to incentivize better cooperation. And I must 

say that I share the concerns of leadership of this committee about 

Pakistan’s bid to buy F-16s with American financing. 

As we go forward in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and our aid 

dollars decrease, we need to be sure that what we are doing is sustainable. We need to be funding the priorities of the host country, 

but also ensure that the host country has a vested interest in seeing projects succeed. And USAID must take the lead in prioritizing 

those projects. 

As the number of U.S. personnel in Afghanistan decreases, we 

must have a clear plan how to remotely monitor existing and continuing projects. And I hope today we can hear more as to whether 

those efforts have been working and how we can improve on them. 

We have spent a tremendous amount of blood and treasure in Afghanistan, and as we continue to pour billions of dollars into the 

region, we have to have a clear strategy that can adapt to the kinetic security situation on the ground. We owe it to the men and 

women who have given their lives to protect the security of this 

country and to the future of the Afghan people. 

And I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Amen. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. 

I now would like to yield to the other subcommittee chairman, 

Mr. Salmon, for his opening remarks. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, for working 

with me to convene this important joint subcommittee hearing on 

U.S. foreign assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

As we all know, Afghanistan and Pakistan make up one of the 

most complex foreign policy and security challenges we have. Subsequently, they are one of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign assistance. But even after the billions of dollars we have spent following the 9/11 attacks, I still have serious concerns about the administration’s strategy for the region, about the effectiveness and 

efficiency of our aid programs, and about our partner governments’ 

alignment with our interests and values. 

As chairman on the subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, I will 

focus my attention and my remarks on Pakistan, which presents a 

number of difficulties for our foreign assistance partnership. 

Conduct by the Pakistani Government raises serious doubts 

about the country’s trustworthiness as a partner for peace and 

change in the region. And too often they seem to do the bare minimum to keep the money flowing without committing to any real 

change. Today, I look forward to hearing from our administration 

witnesses about the value of our programs in the region, and their 

strategies for meaningful and lasting improvements. 

One area of concern in Pakistan is foreign military financing, 

FMF. It has been a contentious topic in Congress recently, especially with the administration’s recent attempt to subsidize, with 

taxpayer dollars, the sale of F-16s to Pakistan. Fortunately, an effort paused by the Senate. Many Members of Congress, including 

me, seriously question the judgment and timing of such a sale. 

Additionally, India/Pakistan tensions remain elevated, and some 

question whether the F-16s could ultimately be used against India 

or other regional powers, rather than the terrorists, as Pakistan 

6

has asserted. I would ask the panel to clarify the underlying purpose and timing of the intended sale, and how is it in the best interests of the United States? 

Despite giving Pakistan enormous amounts of counterterror as- sistance over the years, over $25 billion since 9/11, terrorist organizations continue to operate with impunity in Pakistan. Pakistan 

has used terror as a tool of statecraft and terrorist proxy groups 

where the Pakistani military have carried out fatal attacks inside 

India. The Pakistani Taliban is showing signs of unification. Pakistan argues that this may work to its advantage, but the United 

States maintains that this is detrimental to regional security efforts. 

This is just one example of how Pakistan’s priorities and values 

regarding terrorist groups are seriously misaligned with our own. 

In another instance of our priorities not aligning, the Pakistanis 

are holding Dr. Afridi, who aided the United States in finding and 

eliminating bin Laden, on dubious charges. Like many of my colleagues, I am deeply disappointed we have not been able to find a 

solution to his imprisonment. I look forward to hearing the panel’s 

comments on these issues. 

USAID has prioritized health and education programs in Pakistan. An example of the challenges that exist was demonstrated 

just last week when the police escorts of healthcare workers distributing vaccines were killed. Afghanistan and Pakistan are the 

only places in the world with an ongoing polio endemic. And according to Pakistan’s own press, upwards of 45 percent of Pakistanis are intellectually stunted due to malnutrition. While that 

number is distressing in and of itself, it also has the potential to 

add to the region’s instability and should remain a top priority for 

our aid efforts. 

After spending billions in U.S aid in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

it is important to ask, exactly how much leverage has our investment really bought us? Are we undermining our own security interests by supporting a military that props up terrorists? Have we bolstered the wrong leaders, complicating meaningful reform efforts? 

We have not always focused on this carrot approach to aid in 

Pakistan. In the 1990s, we tried the stick approach with sanctions 

which were largely ineffective at curbing Pakistan’s nuclear programs. But the stick approach after 9/11 did work, at least for a 

time, resulting in the capture of some notorious terrorists. 

I am concerned that our current strategy lacks resolve and clarity, and as a result, taxpayer dollars are not being used in a way 

that furthers our national security interests and protects our citizens. 

I look to our panel’s testimony in justification for both the nearly 

$2 billion in funding this year and the strategy for these relationships going forward. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

And I would like to recognize the gentleman in the audience who 

is the Afghan Ambassador to the United States. And we welcome 

you here today, sir. Thank you. 

I now would like to turn to our other ranking member, Mr. Sherman, for his opening statement. 

7

Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the chairwoman and the chairman for 

holding these hearings. 

With the tragedy of September 11th, we understood that Afghanistan can have a profound effect on the United States. We have lost 

2,300 service members killed, over 20,000 wounded. We spent $100 

million in foreign assistance, and our total costs have exceeded $1 

trillion, including our military costs. Pakistan is a nation of 180 

million people with a history of terrorist activities, roughly 100 nuclear weapons, and a very confused body politic. The administration’s requested $740 million in assistance for Pakistan, more than $265 million of this is for military assistance. 

As noted by the chairman of the Asia subcommittee, we have got 

to be concerned what military assistance and whether the F-16s 

constitute the least expensive, most efficient way for the Pakistani 

Air Force to go after the terrorists, and the least disruptive weapon 

system to the balance of power between India and Pakistan. We 

need to offer to Pakistan those weapon systems well crafted to go 

after terrorists and not crafted for a war with India. 

I join also the chairman of our subcommittee on the importance 

of Dr. Afridi, and would not be surprised if Congress made a big 

portion of this aid contingent upon the release of Dr. Afridi and his 

family. 

One question I hope the gentlemen answer for us historically, 

and that is, why we did not install in Kabul a government acceptable to Islamabad back 15 years ago, or whether there are elements in the Pakistani military who look at the pushed-on population of both countries and have reached the conclusion that they 

want a weak and divided Afghanistan, under any circumstances, as 

a matter of Pakistani national unity and national security. 

Many Americans wonder why we are still involved in Afghanistan. Many say why don’t we just turn our back on the greater 

Middle East? I should point out that we were under-involved and 

under-responded when our Embassy was bombed in East Africa, 

both Embassies. We under-responded when the U.S. Cole was hit 

in Yemen, and then we faced 9/11. We can and did and may again 

ignore the Middle East, but the Middle East will not ignore us. 

The way for a terrorist organization to hit the—to be in the vanguard of some mythical world conflagration is to attack the United 

States. We have to win over the people of the Muslim world, and 

in order to do that, we need to speak their language. That is why 

many on this committee have heard me talk of the importance of 

broadcasting in the Sindh language of southern Pakistan, and in 

the other languages where for $1 million, $2 million a year we can 

reach out to huge segments of the Pakistani population. 

But not only the linguistic language, but the language of Islam 

must be understood by our State Department. I worry that for 

every—that there is a lot more understanding of Metternich and 

the European power moves and diplomacy of the 1800s in the State 

Department than there is of the Koran. 

We will never pronounce the words of the Sindhi language without an accent. We will never be the last word in Islamic interpretation. But the fact that we don’t have a half a dozen—we don’t have 

anyone in the State Department whois paid, not to issue a fatwa, 

but to read one and to understand the subtle allusions to particular 

8

events in the life of the prophet indicates that we don’t speak their 

language, aren’t learning their language, and are not in a good position to win what will be a continuing effort against certain elements in Islam. 

Finally, on human rights, the brother of a dear friend of mine, 

Anwar Leghari was assassinated in Sindh. Other Sindhi activists, 

including Kausar Ansari, have been detained. And it is important 

that we speak out for human rights, the rights of religious minorities in Pakistan. The VOA is asking us for another $16 million, yet 

they have not detailed how they are going to reach out to the Muslim world in the various different languages that they should be 

communicating in. 

And my time has expired. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Ranking Member Sherman. 

And now we would like to turn to Mr. Rohrabacher for his opening statement. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I 

am very upset today, more than normally. There it is. The fact 

is——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Drinking a lot of Red Bull? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And I am sorry if I—and I will try to contain 

myself. 

The State Department and this administration has again decided 

to slap the face of a person who we rely upon to defeat radical Islamic terrorism. The administration has again targeted a prominent enemy of radical Islamic terrorism in order to humiliate to his 

own people. I am talking about this administration’s denial of a 

right to the Vice President, the Senior Vice President of Afghanistan, to come here and talk to the Congress. This is a slap in the 

face to the Congress as well. 

Who is going to trust us to be on our side in the fight against 

radical Islamic terrorism if we treat those people who are allies in 

this way? Yes, he is an imperfect person. The fact is that he is 

fighting—that Vice President Dostum of Afghanistan happens to 

have been essential in the defeat of Taliban and al-Qaeda forces 

after 9/11. 

Shame on this administration for that. Shame on them for slapping the face of other people trying to help us defeat the radicals 

who would kill our own people. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Dr. Bera. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

And, again, I thank the chairman and the ranking members for 

this hearing. I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses as 

well. 

When you think about South Asia, the interconnected nature obviously is very complicated, you know, between Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and increasingly China’s presence in South Asia as 

well. You know, I look forward to listening to the witnesses. 

As our mission changes in Afghanistan, you know, and as the 

missionhas changed over the last decade, the reduction in foreign 

troops and their presence really has left an economic hole in AfVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:09 Aug 17, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\042716\99946 SHIRL
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ghanistan. And as our mission changes, you know, I do have real 

worries about Afghanistan’s economy and the impact there. 

India has had a major presence in Afghanistan in terms of, you know, pumping over $2 billion into major projects in Afghanistan. 

The complexity of India’s role in Afghanistan posts our change in 

mission, you know, is going to be important to weigh vis-a-vis Pakistan as well. So I look forward to hearing that. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Dr. Bera. 

Seeing no other requests for time, I will now introduce our panelists. 

First, we would like to welcome back the Honorable Richard 

Olson, thank you, sir, who is the special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. Department of State. Ambassador 

Olson previously served as the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan and 

the coordinating director for development and economic affairs at 

the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan. Thank you, sir. 

And thank you also as we welcome back the Honorable Donald 

L. Sampler, who is assistant to the administrator in the Office of 

Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, OAPA, at USAID. Mr. Sampler 

previously served as senior deputy assistant to the administrator 

in that agency, and he has traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan 

over 60 times since 2001 and lived in Kabul for several years. 

As I had said, your prepared statements will be made a part of 

the record. Please feel free to summarize. 

And we will begin with you, Mr. Olson. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD OLSON, U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member 

Deutch, Ranking Member Sherman, and members of both subcommittees, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today 

to discuss Fiscal Year 2017 foreign assistance priorities for Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

First and foremost, I want to commend the men and women of 

the armed services, the foreign service, the development agencies, 

and intelligence community stationed in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

I am honored and humbled to have served with them in Kabul and 

Islamabad over the past 4 years. 

My written testimony, which has been submitted for the record, 

touches on many of the topics that I expect we will discuss today, 

including updates on Afghanistan and Pakistan, prospects for 

peace and reconciliation, and our budget priorities. 

With regard to Afghanistan, a great deal has been achieved over 

the past 14 years. However, Afghanistan faces very real and 

daunting challenges, challenges that affect our own national security. Afghanistan will need our support as it continues to strengthen its institutions and become increasingly self-reliant. It is essential that we help prevent it from ever again serving as a safe haven 

for international terrorists that would threaten the United States. 

This year, two vital international donor conferences aimed at 

shoring up Afghanistan’s security and development will take place 

10

in Brussels and Warsaw. Robust U.S. and international financial 

support and sustained diplomatic engagement are critical to ensuring that the Afghan Government is able to enact needed reforms, 

spur a stagnant economy, and consolidate the gains made over the 

past 14 years. 

Our relationship with Pakistan, a growing country with more 

than 190 million people, a nuclear arsenal, terrorism challenges, 

and a key role to play in the region will remain a critical one. In 

Pakistan, we see the government in a concerted and difficult fight 

against terror groups that threaten Pakistanis. But, unfortunately, 

Pakistan does not take equivalent steps against groups that threaten its neighbors. 

Our core initiatives in Pakistan include promoting economic 

growth, countering terrorism, fostering regional stability, and promoting the consolidation of democratic institutions. 

Let me emphasize. We have repeatedly and, frankly, underscored 

with the most senior leaders of Pakistan that the Haqqani Network 

must be part of their wider counterterrorism operations in order to 

keep their commitment not to discriminate between terrorist organizations. Effective engagement with Pakistan is grounded in our 

national interest. 

We have carefully calibrated our Fiscal Year 2017 budget request, balancing global funding constraints and our interest in stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our overall combined request 

is just under $2 billion, with $1.25 billion requested for Afghanistan and $742 million for Pakistan. While this is a 14-percent reduction from the President’s Fiscal Year 2016 request, and an approximate straight line from Fiscal Year 2015 enacted levels, these 

levels will enable us to stay engaged in a critically important region, while also responsibly rightsizing our commitments. 

We believe we are on the right track to achieve our goals in the 

region, but we fully recognize serious challenges remain. 

Thank you for the opportunity to address your subcommittees. I 

look forward to our discussion today and welcome any questions 

you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Olson follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Ambassador Sampler. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DONALD L. SAMPLER, JR., ASSISTANT TO 

THE ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AFFAIRS, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. SAMPLER. You are very kind. 

Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman Salmon, Ranking Members Deutch and Sherman, and members of the subcommittees, 

thank you for inviting me to discuss the administration’s Fiscal 

Year 2017 budget request for the U.S. Agency for International Development’s assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is again an 

honor to appear before you with Rick Olson, the special representative. 

I too will begin my testimony by recognizing the sacrifices made 

by our sons and daughters and their families in the military and 

in the civilian agencies who have served and sometimes died in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their tireless efforts alongside those of 

our allies, as well as of our Pakistan and Afghan brothers and sisters, make our work today possible. I have also submitted written 

testimony for the record that gives considerable detail about the 

work that USAID has done and expects to continue. But in the interest of time, I will summarize. 

USAID’s mission is to partner to end extreme poverty and promote resilient Democratic societies, while advancing America’s own 

security and prosperity. I can think of no other region in the world 

today where this mission is more relevant. 

The President’s Fiscal Year 2017 budget request for Afghanistan 

and Pakistan reflects our Nation’s efforts to advance political stability and economic prosperity, which will further strengthen and 

advance our peaceful partnerships with both countries. 

Over the past several years, with vital support from Congress, 

we have taken firm steps to ensure that our assistance in the region is more efficient, more effective, and impactful. No one, least 

of all me, will say that our work in these two complex countries is 

easy or without challenges. Wracked with conflict and instability 

for much of the last three decades, the region remains one of the 

least economically integrated in the world, with the majority of its 

human capital and economic potential still untapped. 

Despite the challenges, on behalf of the American people, we 

have accomplished a great deal. There is a growing understanding 

and appreciation of our support in the communities where USAID’s 

programs have had an impact. USAID has worked to increase 

awareness of our assistance, for example, in Pakistan. Our most recent polling data showed that an awareness of U.S. assistance 

among Pakistani citizens has increased over the 3 years from 34 

percent to 47 percent. 

Whether it is a shop owner in Lahore, whose sales have increased because of more reliable electricity, a result to USAID’s efforts to add over 2,300 megawatts of electricity to the grid; or 

whether it is an Afghan seed provider who now, because of USAID 

programs, is linked to specialty baking industries around the 

world, millions of people in the region have longer life spans, inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:09 Aug 17, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\042716\99946 SHIRL
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creased access to health and education, improved economic opportunities and brighter futures because of America’s assistance in 

their countries. 

Sustainable development will require the regions leaders to make 

some hard and fundamental choices. Our assistance programs act 

as catalysts and incentive to promote that change and are delivering measurable results that contribute to this potential transformation. The Fiscal Year 2017 request reflects our continued 

push toward expanding progress that will build local capacity in facilitating private sector growth, access to essential social services, 

and transparent governance that, in the long term, can undermine 

the support for insurgent groups and help stabilize the region. 

There are inherent risks in doing business in many parts of the 

world where USAID operates. But USAID around the world 

prioritizes the effective and accountable use of taxpayer dollars. 

There is no acceptable level of fraud, waste, or abuse in any of our 

programs. All of our projects receive proper monitoring and oversight, and we adjust our efforts as necessary to respond to dynamic 

security and operational environments where we work. 

In addition to standard oversight procedures and measures implemented worldwide, specifically in Afghanistan and Pakistan, our 

project managers rely on multiple data sources to provide information on the progress and the effectiveness of USAID activities. We 

triangulate this information to determine whether adjustments to 

programming are required. We have also taken specific measures 

to prevent funds from being diverted from their development purpose to malign actors. Since 2011, our vetting efforts in Afghanistan have kept over $660 million from being awarded to organizations who did not meet our vetting standards. 

As USAID looks to 2017 and beyond, the agency is committed to 

making every effort to ensure that our programs in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan are sensible, sustainable, and developmentally sound. 

And we will continue to support our national security objectives in 

this complex but important part of the world. It is an honor to be 

able to share with you today a small glimpse of what USAID is 

doing in that regard. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sampler follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much to both of you. 

Ambassador Olson, last week’s terrorist attack in Kabul highlighted the limits of our policy in Afghanistan, especially our restricted rules of engagement. The Taliban is increasingly using terrorism as a tool as it targets and adapts to the Afghan military and 

coalition forces. But as General Campbell testified in February, 

U.S. forces are not allowed to target the Taliban in an offensive 

manner to get ahead of the attacks like the ones we saw last week. 

Can you explain why U.S. forces are not allowed to target the 

Taliban? And is the administration discussing whether the Taliban 

should be authorized for targeting in the future? 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

First of all, let me join you in robustly condemning the attack of 

19 April. These clearly undermine the efforts to make peace in the 

region. And I would just add that we have pressed the Government 

of Pakistan on its commitment not to discriminate amongst terrorist groups. We believe there across the region must be zero tolerance for safe havens. 

With regard specifically to the question of combat authorities, I 

think I would have to refer you to my colleagues in the Department 

of Defense for a more detailed discussion of what they are seeking 

and the state of deliberation on those questions. But I would emphasize that the administration’s position, the President’s position, 

is that our combat operations in Afghanistan ended in December 

2014. And so we will continue to work on a policy on that basis. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

President Ghani made a good-faith effort to engage Pakistan and 

enlist its assistance in eliminating the Taliban from within Pakistan’s borders. And yesterday, he called again on the Pakistani 

military to eliminate this threat. 

What are we doing to press Pakistan to take action against the 

Taliban? And besides giving it safe haven, what kind of support is 

Pakistan providing to the Taliban? 

Mr. OLSON. Madam Chair, I think that Pakistan is at a strategic 

crossroads. We have made very clear at the highest levels that we 

believe, first of all, that Pakistan has made great progress over the 

past couple of years in addressing its domestic counterterrorism 

priorities. That is to say, it has taken robust action against those 

groups, principally the TTP, the Pakistani Taliban, that threaten 

Pakistanis. 

Their stated policy, which we agree with, is not to discriminate 

amongst terrorist groups. We believe there is considerable room for 

improvement in the application of that policy on the ground. And 

we believe, in particular, that Pakistan has not taken as vigorous 

action against groups that threaten its neighbors as it has against 

those that threaten it domestically. So Pakistan has also been very 

helpful in the reconciliation process, but I do believe that there is 

a strategic choice right now. With the Taliban having refused to 

come to the table, it seems to us that it is time to address more 

robustly the question of groups that threaten Afghanistan. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. And I have two remaining 

questions. One is about the F-16s sale to Pakistan. I think that we 

need to leverage our military sales to Pakistan in order to get some 

more cooperation within the region. 

32

Can you please update us on the status of the F-16s sale, and 

how would you describe our ability to leverage our aid to Pakistan? 

Mr. OLSON. Madam Chair, the administration is supportive of 

the F-16 sale to Pakistan. This has been developed between our 

military coordinating groups over the course of time. It is consistent with our overall program of support for the Pakistan military, which is based on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. 

The Pakistanis have developed a precision strike capability that 

they use in the F-16s they have right now to take out targets. As 

I mentioned before, these are principally the Pakistani Taliban. 

But we think that that is a good thing. 

The Pakistani Taliban has been involved in attacks against 

Americans at FOB Chapman in Afghanistan in 2009, and indeed 

in supporting the Times Square bomber. So we applaud the actions 

that the Pakistanis have been taking against their domestic terrorism threat, even as we call upon them to take more robust action against those groups that threaten their neighbors. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And lastly, when I was in Af- ghanistan last year, officials described the SIGAR report of a $47-

million gas station as inconsistent with their understanding of the 

situation. What can you tell us about that gas station, how much 

did it cost, what is the status of it? Do they give free towels and 

detergent or anything good? Car wash? 

Mr. OLSON. Well, my understanding, Madam Chair, is that the 

total number referred to several different projects, including the rehabilitation of the Sheberghan gas fields, some of which were funded through, I believe, through USAID, but much of which was 

funded actually through the Department of Defense and the 

TFBSO operations. 

I was involved in this when I was in Afghanistan, and I think 

we would have to get you a more detailed breakdown for a response. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Deutch is recognized. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

It has been reported that refugees of Afghan origin represent the 

second largest group of refugees trying to enter Europe. Just a couple of questions there. 

First, what are the numbers of refugees? And secondly, howis the 

U.S. responding both politically and, Mr. Sampler, programmatically as well? 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Ranking Member Deutch. With regard to 

numbers, I think I will have to get back to you on that. Our understanding is that it accords with yours, that Afghans have represented a significant number of refugees that have shown up in 

Europe. 

I think it is worth noting that our impression, and we don’t have 

hard numbers, but certainly our impression is that many of them 

are actually coming from other countries than Afghanistan. In 

other words, they are coming from countries where they have been 

resident for some period of time. But that is not to suggest that 

there aren’t ultimately some Afghan causes for this. 

I think the downturn in the economy, the transition, the economic transition that accompanied the security transition in 2014 

33

is still being felt. We have been at a diplomatic level very supportive of our European allies’ approaches to the Afghan Government to see if there are ways that we can assist. The Europeans 

are seeking arrangements for the return of those who don’t qualify 

for refugee status, and we are supportive of that. 

And, of course, ultimately I think this highlights the importance 

of continuing engagement on the development side with Afghanistan to strengthen the Afghan economy so that it can absorb the 

population coming on the market. 

Mr. DEUTCH. But, Mr. Sampler, and then I have a followup, 

please. 

Mr. SAMPLER. Yeah, please. The—very specifically, $50 million in 

Fiscal Year 2015 in previous year money is allocated specifically to 

helping the Afghans address this issue. I would define the issue as 

having two components that they have to address. The most fundamental, of course, is growing their economy. If there is a silver lining in this issue, it is that the pressure on the economy is being 

driven by 200,000 young Afghans graduating from high school and 

entering the job force every year. That is a positive thing, but only 

if there can be jobs made available for them. 

So this $50 million is intended to help grow the economy through 

internship programs, which will allow some of these students to 

move straight from high school into employment, as well as the National Solidarity Programme that the Afghans themselves have designed to generate employment and economic growth across the 

country. 

Second point I will make that they also have to address is strategic communications. If young Afghans graduating from high 

school now with critical thinking skills, access to the Internet, and 

understanding that there is a bigger world out there, which they 

didn’t have in the past, that understanding, that access, and that 

critical thinking is going to lead them to make very hard decisions 

about do they stay or do they go. So the Afghans must do a better 

job at messaging to their own young age bulging population that 

there are prospects for you to stay in Afghanistan. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Well, if we don’t—if we think that, Ambassador 

Olson, that the significant number of those, the majority of those 

are coming from other countries where they have lived, are we—

I guess again for both of you, if we have seen an uptick, is it because they are looking at what is happening on the ground in Afghanistan realizing that they are not going back? And shouldn’t 

there be a coordinated effort to address this refugee issue, given 

the numbers and regardless of where they are coming from, since 

they are ultimately all—they all originated in the same place? 

Mr. OLSON. Well, if I may, Congressman, I think these are excellent questions. And I think we are still in the process of working 

with our European allies to identify what exactly the nature of 

these movements are. I mean, obviously the immediate response, 

and this is outside of our purview here, but has been to be supportive of our European friends and allies. I know my boss, Secretary Kerry, is extraordinarily focused on this topic. But I think 

these questions probably do require a greater degree of analysis 

and beyond the immediate sort of crisis management we need to 

be thinking about how we can respond. 

34

Mr. DEUTCH. I couldn’t agree more. And I would urge that that 

analysis, to the extent that it is being done, be done as quickly as 

possible and that you share it with the members of this committee. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You are welcome very much, Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. Salmon. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Pakistani Dr. Shakil Afridi assisted U.S. efforts in tracking down 

Osama bin Laden, and later was jailed for 23 years for alleged 

links to terrorist groups. Congress has, in the past, withheld aid to 

Pakistan to encourage the release of Afridi. What progress has 

been made on the effort, and what more can we do to aid this 

friend of the United States in his freedom? Should we look for any 

other possible restrictions on aid? 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me say that we 

share your sense of outrage with regard to the plight of Dr. Afridi. 

I can assure you that we have raised this issue at the very highest 

levels of our Government. It has been the subject of very direct conversations. We have requested the release of Dr. Afridi, and we 

continually request updates on his health and his status. 

So far, I have to say we have not—those result—those approaches have not yielded any results, but we will continue to raise 

them. There are already conditions, as you know, on assistance. 

And we make the point to our Pakistani colleagues that the very 

strong sentiment on Capitol Hill in particular, which is completely 

shared by the administration. 

Mr. SALMON. If they are listening today, I just want to tell them 

for the record that as I talk to different members about financial 

support, financial aid for Pakistan, it is the single biggest impediment to members wanting to be supportive. And if they are truly 

interested in furthering relations, strong relations with us, I would 

really hope that they take a second and a third and a fourth look 

at the incarceration of this man and look to his expedited release. 

One of the biggest drags on Pakistan’s economy has long been 

corruption. In Transparency International’s 2015 Corruption Perception Index, Pakistan ranked 117 out of 168 countries. Prime 

Minister Nawaz Sharif was one of the world leaders identified in 

the recently leaked Panama Papers. How is the United States assisting Pakistan in reducing corruption, and how do we ensure our 

own programs and activities do not suffer because of corruption 

within Pakistan? 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With regard to the question of the Panama Papers, we actually would not, the administration would not have any comment on these allegations that have 

surfaced. Globally, of course, we are in favor of greater financial 

transparency. With regard to corruption efforts in Pakistan, there 

have been, I think, an uptick in anticorruption efforts, particularly 

in conjunction with some of the military operations that have been 

taking place in the settled areas of Pakistan. There was a strong 

anticorruption drive in Karachi at the same time that there were 

operations to round up miscreants. 

These are primarily conducted by the National Accountability 

Bureau, and, of course, as long as these investigations are done in 

accordance with due process, the U.S. Government is supportive, 

35

and we do have some links with the National Accountability Bureau. I think I would probably defer to my colleague, Larry, if he 

had anything to say on the assistance piece. 

Mr. SAMPLER. Congressman, just to your specific question about 

how do we ensure this doesn’t affect our programming, our programs are very aggressively monitored and overseen. We asked our 

own inspector general, in fact, to create a hotline, and there is now 

the equivalent of a 1-800 number in Pakistan that implementing 

partners, suppliers, and even Pakistani citizens, are encouraged to 

use. It was intended to use that hotline to report on our own programming, but it has become much broader, and this 

anticorruption hotline is actually quite popular in Pakistan. 

I am reasonably confident the programming we are doing is not 

just safeguarding our own programs, but it is serving as an example to the government and the governments within Pakistan as 

well. 

Mr. SALMON. Thanks. I am out of time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Salmon. Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. I want to join with the ranking member of the Asia Subcommittee and everyone else in Congress in 

talking about Dr. Afridi. I think the Pakistanis understand that 

you will give them the money whether they turn Afridi over or not, 

but I hope you convey that Congress probably won’t, and next year, 

I would suggest Congress is much less likely to. 

So what would happen if we simply didn’t provide the aid until 

Dr. Afridi and his family were released? We could reprogram that 

money to other parts of the war on Islamic extremist terrorism, 

and defend ourselves perhaps much more effectively than aid 

through Pakistan. What would be the Pakistani response if we cut 

all aid until Dr. Afridi was released? 

Mr. OLSON. Well, Congressman, first of all, let me say that your 

message has been received loud and clear, and we will indeed convey it as we have conveyed it, to the Pakistanis on Dr. Afridi. I 

would just respectfully suggest to you that our assistance program 

is crafted to advance our national interests. 

Mr. SHERMAN. There are many things we could do with that 

money that don’t involve giving it to the people who are holding Dr. 

Afridi. Your focus is Afghanistan and Pakistan. There are things 

we could do in the war on terrorism outside your jurisdiction that 

could perhaps do more to safeguard America and its interests. And 

the Pakistanis shouldn’t think that we have unlimited resources so 

we might as well spend them on anything that seems useful. 

I want to shift to Sindh. Vice Chairman Kehar Ansari has been 

kidnapped, arrested. He is the vice chairman of the leading Sindh 

party. We have got assassinations that have not been investigated, 

including Anwar Laghari, but also a host of others, Mr. Raja Dahir, 

Mr. Samiullah Kalhoro, Mr. Sirai Khuhawar, and Mr. Maqsood 

Qureshi. Is this something you are bringing up in Islamabad or 

just leaving to the Karachi Consulate? 

Mr. OLSON. Well, first of all, our Consulate in Karachi is tracking this closely but with the full support of our Embassy in 

Islamabad——

36

Mr. SHERMAN. Have you personally raised either Mr. Laghari’s 

case or Mr. Ansari’s case? Well to how high a level have you personally conveyed it to Pakistanis? 

Mr. OLSON. Yeah. The Laghari case we have raised at the provincial level, and——

Mr. SHERMAN. So you personally haven’t engaged with the top officials in Islamabad on these issues? 

Mr. OLSON. No, sir, I have not engaged on them. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. I want to go on to another question. The 

administration routinely declined to certify that Pakistan is cooperating with the United States in counterterrorism against the 

Haqqani Network and others, and that it is not supporting terrorist 

activities against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan. 

Why is the administration unwilling to make that certification? 

And does it make sense to just waive that and send them the 

money even if you can’t make the certification? 

Mr. OLSON. Congressman, we believe that all of the programs, 

again that we are talking about, are in our national interests, and 

we have to balance the national security interests of the United 

States and——

Mr. SHERMAN. But can you say that they are not cooperating 

with the United States on counterterrorism and they are not supporting terrorist activity? What are the facts that make it impossible to make these certifications? 

Mr. OLSON. We have long had concerns about the fact that despite Pakistan having a stated policy of not discriminating between 

terrorist groups in the application of that policy, they have, in fact, 

not moved against actors that threaten their neighbors. And we 

have raised this with them very directly, and we share the concerns that have been expressed about the Haqqani Network and 

also about Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and other 

groups. 

Mr. SHERMAN. My time is expired. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I don’t want to cut you off if you have another question. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Madam Chairman, that would be a dangerous 

precedent——

Mr. ROS-LEHTINEN. Okay. You are right. All right. What was I 

thinking? Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Obviously from my opening 1 minute, I am very disturbed about 

a major slap in the face to someone who is Vice President, Senior 

Vice President of Afghanistan, who was instrumental in defeating 

the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces shortly after 9/11, and I just don’t 

understand that. But it seems to be a pattern in this administration where they go after the people who are the most friendly to 

the United States and use a very soft approach and conciliatory approach toward those who would slaughter Americans by the thousands if they had a chance. 

Let’s go to Dr. Afridi and why we have to provide F-16s and military equipment to a country, that Dr. Afridi’s imprisonment continues to be basically an act by the Pakistani Government to basiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:09 Aug 17, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\042716\99946 SHIRL
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cally thumb their nose at the United States and the people of the 

United States. 

Here is the man who permitted us with his activity to bring to 

justice the criminal who slaughtered, the criminal terrorist who 

helped slaughter, not helped but planned the slaughter of 3,000 

Americans on 9/11, and here we can’t grant a passport to the man 

who helped defeat the radical Islamists in Afghanistan, but we are 

going to give aid, continue to give aid to the country that holds Dr. 

Afridi, the person who helped us defeat, or bring to justice the man 

who murdered our people, that we can’t even demand that he be 

freed from the dungeons he is being held in. 

That makes no sense. Can you make some sense out of that for 

me? 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you very much, Congressman. First of all, 

with regard to the question of visas, privacy laws prohibit us from 

commenting on the details of any particular consular application, 

but I can tell you that First Vice President Dostum is reported to 

have decided not to travel to the United States in order to remain 

in Afghanistan to deal with the security situation, especially in 

the——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You don’t believe that he really decided that 

on his own? I am happy to see that you are towing the line. It is 

your job to be here and say that to us, but nobody buys that. 

I mean, the bottom line is we have slapped him in the face. Let 

me just put it for the record, General Dostum, now Vice President 

Dostum, was pivotal after 9/11 in organizing the Northern Alliance. 

He put together a force that defeated the Taliban. When his forces, 

by the way, removed the Taliban from Kabul, there were only 200 

American troops on the ground at that time. That was a very hardfought battle. He was in front of the troops most of the time leading the way. This is a very brave man and a very yes, flawed man, 

no doubt. We are all flawed. 

And what they are saying that he committed, the horrible crime 

he committed was in Afghan tradition when someone surrenders, 

they surrender and pledge not to try to overpower their captors. 

The captors pledge not to kill the people they have captured. That 

is so ingrained in the Afghans that otherwise their whole history 

would be killing all the prisoners. 

After the Taliban forces were defeated in one of the first major 

battles, General Dostum had hundreds of prisoners who had surrendered. They were a holed up in a French fort. I happened to 

have visited that fort. We had one CIA agent there trying to figure 

out what was going on. And the prisoners broke their pledge, broke 

the word, committed the atrocity of rising up against their captors 

and murdered a number of General Dostum’s men, as well our own 

CIA agent. And yes after that, Dostum took more lives to defeat, 

more lives to defeat, those forces who were now in charge of that 

fort. And once they captured those men again, he didn’t know what 

to do with them. He put them into container trucks and drove them 

off somewhere, and, yes, they probably died a horrible death. 

They made the decision to rise up against their captors. They 

made the decision to kill an unarmed American CIA agent who was 

there trying to get a figure about what was going on. And for this 

administration to withhold a visa from him and slap him in the 

38

face because of that, knowing that he helped defeat the people who 

slaughtered 3,000 Americans, is insane. 

And then we go to Pakistan, and they have Dr. Afridi in jail. And 

the Pakistanis, we know, what do they use their own weapons for? 

To kill the Baloch by the thousands and to attack their neighbors 

by supporting terrorist incursions into India. 

One last question. Okay. What more can Pakistan do that would 

have us cut off the military aid? What other evil deeds could they 

possibly do that would put us to the point where we won’t any 

longer give them the weapons they need to kill innocent people and 

undercut the security of the region? 

Mr. OLSON. Congressman, with regard to Vice President Dostum, 

we are certainly well aware of the historic role that he has played, 

and let me assure you that we do treat the Vice President, as the 

First Vice President of Afghanistan with all the respect that his office carries. And we are in touch with him at the appropriate level. 

As I say, I cannot comment on the particulars of the status of the 

visa because of Privacy Act considerations. 

With regard to Pakistan, as I have said, I think Pakistan is at 

a strategic crossroads, and I think it needs to make a choice. It has 

been helpful to the United States and the international community 

in trying to bring the Taliban to the table for reconciliation talks, 

but the Taliban have rejected that. And our view is that the 

Taliban need to face the consequences of their decision. So it does 

seem to me that Pakistan right now has some very serious challenges and difficult decisions to make. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. What about the Pakistanis suffering the consequences of their decisions? No. We are just going to keep the 

money flowing no matter what they do. It is debatable whether or 

not they have encouraged the Taliban leaders that you are talking 

about to actually go and try to do something or whether they are 

financing the Taliban leaders with our money. This is insanity. 

This administration has a—it is not just this administration. This 

started when we forced Karzai down the throats of the Afghan people, a man with no popular support whatsoever, a man who has 

family deeply involved with various criminal activities. We laid the 

groundwork before this administration, and this administration 

continues this type of insanity that is leading to many deaths by 

Americans throughout this country. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you. Dr. 

Bera is recognized. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I am going to shift 

toward my concerns about Afghanistan’s economic development 

and the need to maintain some sort of economic growth for stability. We have invested billions of dollars obviously and lost hundreds of lives in the last decade. I do support the administration’s 

current position in terms of maintaining a troop presence to help 

complement the Afghan security forces because obviously as we 

talk to multinational investors, Indian companies, and others, one 

of their chief concerns is the security risks in terms of making 

major investments in Afghanistan. 

I applaud the Indian company’s investments in major infrastructure projects, like the Salma Dam, and the concern I have is how 

do we continue this economic growth? India, as the major economy 

39

in South Asia, clearly has a role in helping increase trade between 

India and Afghanistan. And I am interested in, you know, kind of 

the perspective there. 

Also, as the Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade Transit Agreement kind 

of moves forward, I know India is very interested in also participating in there for the movement of goods and services. In Afghanistan’s interests, I think Afghanistan is certainly interested in making the flow of goods and services easier with India. Obviously 

Pakistan has taken a very different position in terms of the overland transit of goods and services. And I do think it is in our interests as the United States to push Pakistan to be more open to a 

trilateral trade agreement that makes India’s participation available. 

Mr. Sampler, maybe you want to start, or Mr. Olson? 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you. Thank you, Congressman Bera. Let me 

first say, as you mentioned in your opening remarks, we greatly 

appreciate the approximately $2 billion that India has invested in 

Afghanistan in development assistance. I wanted to let you know 

that I traveled to Delhi about a month ago myself and briefed, 

along with General Nicholson joined me, and we briefed on the situation in Afghanistan with regard to the security situation, and 

also development, and reconciliation, Afghan reconciliation. 

I think that it would be particularly helpful, and we made this 

point, to Indian Government officials if India were able to participate in some of the development conferences that are taking place 

later this year, especially the Brussels. The EU-hosted Brussels 

Development Conference focused on the development of Afghanistan, focusing on the years 2018 to 2020, and I think the Indian 

Government is considering that right now. In our view, it would be 

a useful way for them to get some credit for what they are, in fact, 

already doing. 

In terms of regional connectivity, absolutely the U.S. Government favors, and the administration favors, everything we can do 

to promote regional connectivity. As you note, APTTA has so far 

been a bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan. We 

have been very focused on the implementation of that agreement. 

There has been some discussion of extending that to Tajikistan. I 

think that Pakistan has signalled that it is not prepared to extend 

that to India at this point. But, of course, we as a matter of policy 

favor regional connectivity all across the region. 

Mr. BERA. I would continue to encourage the administration and 

the State Department to push for that regional connectivity. Certainly through trade, through transit of goods and services, you do 

have the opportunity to try to start creating some interconnected 

economies, create some stability. The big worry there is tensions 

between Pakistan and India, and you have two nuclear-armed 

countries, two countries that have a history of tension, but through 

economic development, through trade, through transit of goods and 

services, you can create some stability and connectivity. And, 

again, I would encourage State to continue to push that agenda. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Dr. Bera. Mr. Weber of Texas. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, ma’am. This is going to be for Mr. Olson. 

I guess we will start with you. And I had to step out, so forgive 

me if this has been answered. 

40

What is the funding gap between what the Afghan Government 

raises on its own versus what it needs to operate? What other 

countries are contributing to that Afghan Government in order to 

close this gap? And what percentage does the U.S. have? 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Congressman. I would say a rough order of magnitude would be the Afghans raise about $2 billion a year 

in terms of government revenues. This has actually been improving 

of late. The Finance Minister has made it an essential effort of his 

administration to improve revenue collection, and he has won high 

marks from the IMF and the international financial institutions 

generally for undertaking that. 

But as you correctly point out, there is a shortfall in terms of 

what we are planning for for the Warsaw and Brussels Conferences, the Warsaw NATO Conference and the EU Brussels Development Conference. We think that funding the Afghan National 

Security Forces will require about $4 billion a year for——

Mr. WEBER. The $2 billion they raise, is that for just funding the 

Afghan forces? 

Mr. OLSON. The $2 billion they raise is revenues. 

Mr. WEBER. Total revenues? 

Mr. OLSON. Total revenues of all government operations, of which they devote, I believe, about $500 million to the Afghan National Security Forces. They devote another $200 million to the National Directorate of Security, which also plays a critical role in the 

defense of Afghanistan, and in their accounting they would count 

that as a defense cost, so that is about $700 million. 

And then the remaining $1.3 billion, roughly somewhat less than 

that, is what they use to fund the civilian, the government. The 

shortfall, if we want to call it that, would be on the military side, 

about $4 billion a year, and on the civilian side, about $3 billion 

a year. So going into Warsaw and Brussels, our position is that we 

would like the donors to contribute at or near their current levels 

of funding to accommodate the need to fund——

Mr. WEBER. Who are those donors? 

Mr. OLSON. Principally for Warsaw, it is primarily NATO, NATO 

allies, and some partners, including Japan, contributes significantly to certain security measures, in addition to NATO allies. 

On the civilian development side, it is a combination of obviously 

the international financial institutions, World Bank, the IMF, but 

also the European Union is a very significant donor. The EU and 

all the EU member states together probably at or perhaps slightly 

exceed our contribution. 

Mr. WEBER. Which is what percentage? 

Mr. OLSON. It would be roughly, you know, in terms of the targets, it would be about 1 billion each for the years going forward, 

but I would have to get back to you with specific percentages. 

Mr. WEBER. Get those for me if you would. There is some discussion, an Afghan official said they need at least $10 billion in donated funds until 2025, at which time according to this, Afghans 

expect to be self-sufficient. Is this predicated on U.S. troops being 

there that whole time? And then furthermore, there is discussion 

that Afghanistan’s counternarcotics chief said there would be no 

eradication efforts in the Hellman Province, which is because of the 

Taliban’s presence, this is their major drug trafficking area, and is 

41

that going to impact their ability to be self-sufficient in 2025? Are 

U.S. troops going to have to be there until 2025? 

Mr. OLSON. Congressman, the President has been very clear that 

we will have 9,800 troops through this fighting season and a residual force of 5,500 by the beginning of next year. It will, of course, 

be up to the incoming administration to make decisions about future troop levels. 

Mr. WEBER. Fair enough. Just get that percentage to me if you 

would, and I would also like the answer on if they are not going 

to try to eradicate, I guess that would be the heroin production, in 

that one province, why not, and what is that going to do to us? 

And Madam Chair, I will yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Weber. Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I would ask unanimous consent to have my opening statement submitted. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. Thank you to our witnesses. Ambassador Olson, with President Obama’s October 2015 decision to keep 

a larger U.S. military presence in Afghanistan for a longer period 

of time, would you tell us what results, if any, you have seen from 

this change in administration policy and what your expectations 

are going forward? 

Mr. OLSON. Well, I think that the President’s decision to extend 

9,800 troops through the fighting season, and maintain a residual 

force of 5,500 has had a very stabilizing effect on the region. I 

think there is a great concern on the part of Afghans and in the 

region more broadly that the United States would disengage from 

the region. 

I think Mr. Sherman talked earlier in his opening remarks about 

the legacy of the 1990s when the United States did disengage, and 

that is I think one of the contributing factors to the rise of the 

Taliban and ultimately to our own great losses on September 11 of 

2001. I think there is a great deal of anxiety in the region about 

the potential of U.S. and NATO departure, and so the President’s 

decision to keep forces in place I think has done a lot to assuage 

those concerns. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Okay. Would you also, I think this could be principally Mr. Sampler, how is our assistance improving the human 

rights situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan? We still hear horrible stories of abuses, ranging from bacha bazi to sexual abuse of 

young boys by some Afghan Security Forces, the recruitment of 

child soldiers by the Taliban and physical attacks on the women 

and religious minorities. Are any of our programs really addressing 

the root causes of this kind of violence and abuse? Are there things 

we should be doing differently to more effectively reduce these horrific situations? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Congressman, thank you for the question. At the 

macro level, I would say that virtually all of our programs are 

working to address the root causes of these issues because all of 

our problems are working to advance Pakistan and Afghanistan 

civil society to a level of self awareness and self respect where this 

kind of behavior isn’t tolerated. The United States doesn’t have the 

ability or the authority to go into either of these countries and police this sort of inappropriate and illegal behavior. What we have 

42

to do is build communities and then institutions within the state 

that can on their own and in an appropriate way police this sort 

of inappropriate behavior. 

There are two things I will talk about that actually I think are 

having a direct impact. One is the connectivity, particularly in Afghanistan, but also in Pakistan, where rural women in particular 

now have access to cell phone technology that they didn’t have 10 

years ago. This is partly just because of the advances made and the 

decrease in price of cell technology. But USAID is helping civil society learn to use this technology in ways to integrate at-risk populations, whether it be women or children. 

The second point is our support of rule of law and making sure 

that women and at-risk populations have both access to rule of law 

and then an understanding and advocates who can help them make 

use of those systems of rule of law. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. Ambassador Olson, I want to turn for 

a moment to Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. As you well know, these 

laws are widely used and have long been a source of deep concerns 

to international rights organizations and others as they sometimes 

are used to settle feuds, grab land, or persecute religious minorities 

by making false allegations. It seems impossible to change or repeal these laws, and, in fact, the Governor of Punjab Province 

sought to make it more difficult for false cases to be registered, and 

he was assassinated by a bodyguard, a murder that was celebrated 

by the public who was opposed to changing these laws. 

Is there anything we can do? Are there any incremental changes 

that can be made to these laws that would improve the situation 

as this continues to be the source of some very serious both human 

rights violations and rule of law violations? 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you very much, Congressman. First of all, just 

I would provide a little bit of an update. As you may have read, 

the man who killed Governor Taseer was recently executed by the 

Pakistani authorities. The Supreme Court upheld the death penalty in the case of Qadri, and I think this was seen as a, widely 

interpreted in Pakistan, as a signal of resolute opposition obviously 

to vigilantism and to those who would take the law into their own 

hands. There were protests, but the protests at the execution of 

Qadri, but they have not been successful. 

I think it illustrates the divide in Pakistan. There are a lot of 

people in Pakistan who see things the way we do and share your 

concern. I think that they are feeling a bit more emboldened now 

by some of the actions by the Pakistani Supreme Court to limit the 

abuse of blasphemy laws and to also extend fuller protection of law 

to religious minorities. So this is very much a work in progress, but 

I think there are a lot of people who think of these things the way 

we do, and I think we need to do everything possible to encourage 

them as we do. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. Mr. Perry of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ambassador Olson, to 

what extent is Iran a player in Afghanistan affairs? If you can inform us on the policy tools that Tehran employs to further its goals 

in Afghanistan and elucidate those goals in particular, what their 

43

presence is in Iran, and whether they supply assistance or support 

for the insurgent groups in Afghanistan and to what extent? 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Congressman Perry. Iran has by and 

large played a constructive goal with regard to Afghanistan, and 

we would encourage them to continue to play a constructive role. 

There have been some press indications that because of their concern about the emergence of Daesh in Afghanistan, they may be 

tempted to support the Taliban against Daesh. We think that 

would be a mistake, and we would encourage the Iranians to continue to support the Government of Afghanistan, which, of course, 

is taking action against both Daesh, ISIS, and the Taliban. 

Mr. PERRY. So then is it kind of your feeling or your testimony 

that they don’t supply assistance to insurgent groups, or do they? 

Maybe you need to define or I need to define what we would consider an insurgent group in the context of that discussion, that 

question. 

Mr. OLSON. Congressman, there have been some press reports 

suggesting that they are thinking about supporting the Taliban 

against Daesh. We think that that would be counterproductive and 

mistaken. 

Mr. PERRY. Do you consider the Taliban an insurgent group? 

Mr. OLSON. Yes, I would consider it an insurgent group, yes. 

Mr. PERRY. Are you saying right now that they are not supporting the Taliban but just considering it? 

Mr. OLSON. I think this is a subject that would probably require 

us to be in a different setting to really have a thorough discussion 

of this topic, but I would just say as a matter of policy, we would 

encourage the Iranians to focus their energies on supporting the 

Government of Afghanistan. 

More broadly, I think what we would want to see from the neighbors of Afghanistan in general is three things: Its support for the 

territorial integrity and sovereignty of Afghanistan and the idea 

that there will be no restoration of the Islamic emirate of Afghanistan, that is the Taliban, but a recognition, of course, of the Islamic 

nature of Afghanistan; and, thirdly, the idea that the only way and 

the best way to resolve conflicts in Afghanistan is through negotiation and the peace process. 

Mr. PERRY. So how actively are you monitoring their conversations with the Taliban or would-be conversations? Are they having 

conversations, and are they materially supplying currently, or is 

that stuff that you cannot discuss in this forum? 

Mr. OLSON. I really cannot discuss it in this forum, sir. 

Mr. PERRY. All right. I got it. Moving on quickly. The President, 

Ashraf Ghani, recently threatened to file a complaint with the U.N. 

Security Council if Pakistan failed to take military action against 

Taliban leaders operating within Pakistan. The question is, what 

is Pakistan doing to pressure the Afghan Taliban to come to the 

negotiating table, and how has Pakistan used its influenced with 

the Afghan Taliban to bring a reduction in violence to Afghanistan? 

And have we specifically asked Pakistan to do this with regard to 

exerting its influence on the Afghan Taliban? 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Congressman. Pakistan has actually 

been a good partner to Afghanistan and to us in the search for an 

Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation process. We have been 

44

partners in the so-called quadrilateral process, which involves the 

United States, China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, which has called 

for several times direct, face-to-face negotiations between the 

Taliban and the Afghan Government in a publicly acknowledged 

process. 

Unfortunately, the Taliban have refused to come to the table, so 

it is our view that they should face the consequences of that decision. We have long expressed our concerns to the Pakistanis about 

their reluctance to go after terrorists that threaten their neighbors 

with the same degree of assiduousness that they go after their own 

terrorists, and we think that they are at a moment of needing to 

make a very strategic and fundamental choice. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. We thank you for an 

excellent record of public service on behalf of our country. Thank 

you so much. We look forward to getting your answers to some of 

the members’ questions in writing. 

Thank you, gentlemen. And with that, the subcommittees are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

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