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# 									NATO in the U.S. Heartland							

FPC Briefing

Kristine Berzina, Managing Director German Marshall Fund (GMF) Geostrategy North 

Wednesday, June 5, 2024, 10:00 a.m. ET

Washington, D.C.

June 5, 2024

## 								Summary							

        -  In the lead-up to the upcoming NATO Summit, this on-the-record briefing explores foreign policy conversations in the American heartland with Kristine Berzina, who leads the German Marshall Fund’s Across America effort.  Across America is an effort to cultivate U.S. regional dialogue on transatlantic issues by taking policy conversations to communities across the United States.  The program builds connections and identifies shared interests and security priorities between European and U.S. stakeholders and citizens who live outside national capitals.   

**THE WASHINGTON FOREIGN PRESS CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C.**

**MODERATOR:**  Good morning, and welcome to the Washington Foreign Press Center’s briefing:  NATO in the U.S. Heartland.  My name is Zina Wolfington, and I’m the moderator of today’s briefing.  The briefing is on the record, and the transcript will be posted online after the briefing at fpc.state.gov.  For the journalists joining us on Zoom, please take a moment right now to rename yourself in the chat window with your name, outlet, and country.

And our briefer today is Kristine Berzina, managing director of the German Marshall Fund, Geostrategy North.  Ms. Berzina is an independent subject matter expert, and the views expressed by briefers not affiliated with the Department of State are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Government.  Kristine Berzina will start us off with opening remarks, and after the remarks, I will open the floor for questions.

And with that, over to you.

**MS BERZINA**:  Thank you so much, Zina, and thank you so much for coming and being here today.  So I work for the German Marshall Fund of the United States.  For those who don’t know what GMF, as we call it, is, it’s an independent policy institution, nonpartisan, that seeks to strengthen transatlantic relations.  And we come from a history of the spirit of the Marshall Plan.  But we have offices across Europe and the United States, and understanding that common link between the United States and Europe and making sure to build the connections that already exist, is part of the mission of GMF.

And so when we talk today about NATO in the heartland of the United States and what this means, this is something that I’ve been thinking a lot about over the past few years as a part of a program that I lead at GMF called Across America.  Through this program, we travel with European officials across the United States and talk about and investigate security topics, security and defense.

With this program, I have been to Pennsylvania and West Virginia, to Texas, to Illinois, and Iowa recently to talk about the – why this matters, why NATO matters, why being part of a transatlantic alliance matters, to people who live in normal communities across the United States.  We try to go to blue, purple, and red regions and to talk to various parts of society, from sitting down with people in diners having their morning coffee, through university classrooms in regional and even – and highly ranked but even small colleges, to industrial and factory sites, and local, state-level government visits as well.

This has given us a very broad understanding about what matters about NATO and what doesn’t within the field, within the broader United States.  And there are certain – there are three buckets of reasons why NATO matters for the U.S.  And we hear a lot about, well, does the U.S. matter – does NATO matter at all?  Does the U.S. population care about foreign policy in an election year?  If they care about foreign policy, why would that be Europe that they care about, right?  They have their blood pressure up more on issues of the Middle East or China, as being a very common conversation across the United States.

But I feel much more optimistic about whether the U.S. cares about Europe specifically when I’m outside of Washington, where I work, and in communities.  So the three areas that we see really resonating – first is economic, second is military, and third is cultural, intellectual, moral affinity, right?  So this broad, soft base of – basket of issues.

The most important one, really, though, is the economic one.  The economic relationship between the U.S. and Europe is incredibly strong, and so it matters that across communities in the U.S., European companies are making major investments in everything from automotive manufacturing to, on the other side, serving as an export market for American natural resources for the oil and gas industry, right?  So either European money coming in or Europe serving as a market for American goods is something that is very real and understandable.  It matters when Europe makes an investment or European countries do and build a factory somewhere in an area that typically doesn’t necessarily think very much about Europe.

As we see the increase of manufacturing in the defense space and the revitalization of defense industry on both sides of the Atlantic, the presence of European contracts in the American heartland for the defense industry, and that direct link of having American workers in the middle of the country create rifles, for example, that go into the hands of soldiers on the eastern flank to protect themselves – like, that makes sure that NATO is in the American heartland.  There is a sense that NATO is maybe somewhere far away.

But when you look, for example, at Iowa and the manufacturing that happens there, either in small arms or .155 shells that also are manufactured in Iowa, this shows the direct link of NATO being in the field.  And when you show up and you say – with Europeans, who are there also – saying, look, this is an awesome thing we are buying from you and what you’re contributing to the global good is very important, that resonates tremendously, because it’s economic and it also shows that direct role of what communities play.  So there’s the manufacturing link, the markets link, the creation of jobs.  And that’s absolutely clear.

It’s hard sometimes to say, well, this is a UK purchase or it’s a German purchase or this is an Estonian purchase; well, how does that relate to NATO?  And that’s more where that missing piece is, right?  So you can say you have a foreign manufacturer, or you can have a foreign country that is related to some kind of production, but that is often not made by policymakers in regions or on the other side of the Atlantic as a link directly to NATO.  But when that is made, that makes a lot of sense.  What is NATO?  NATO are these economic partners that we have.

The second big thing is the military relationship.  Sometimes it is not popular to talk about the Middle Eastern wars anymore, and I feel that is especially true in Washington, where there is a sense that that has been an issue for the past few decades and isn’t something we want to talk about anymore.  That is not the case in the parts of the country where people have served.  And when we think about what it means to have had two decades of war in which the Allies have been shoulder to shoulder with Americans, then what does it mean to have allies – if you go into places of the country where people have served, they have served alongside Europeans, Americans have been on bases in Europe, they know what it means to be in Germany, they know what it means to be in the Middle East with Europeans at their side.  And they understand that sacrifice.

And while we forget or don’t want to talk about that mutual sacrifice as much in Washington as we would like – as I think even veterans would like, that is something that is very active when you go out and you talk to people who have served before.  You come there across the U.S. with Europeans, and they very much remember – the American side does, and the vets do, and the local political officials who have served and been officers in the past.  They know exactly what it means to have Europeans at their side.

That is not a conversation we’re lifting up in our daily lives here in Washington as much as we should because the politics of having done those wars for two decades are complicated.  But then we’re ignoring what is an incredibly strong fabric between European allies and Americans because the sacrifice does of course matter, and the memory of that sacrifice is very much there.  So again, that – the two decades of experience and co-service, and now also the ongoing rotational presence, the sense that you do have bilateral and NATO-based rotations from America to Europe – this is very much something that is on people’s minds and there’s a lot of curiosity and interest on this, but also deep respect.

And so it’s harder for a message that goes on TV and says, no, the Europeans are not doing anything, or why should we care about Europe – when you’ve served with Europe and understand that Europeans are willing to die for Americans and with Americans, that’s a bit of a different story.  And I feel like that – there is greater resilience in the relationship than perhaps the more flagrant things on television would give the Americans credit for.

Now, the third thing is the – perhaps where we used to have the basis more on the transatlantic relationship, which is the affinity basket.  So this is heritage ties, diaspora groups, desire to travel to Paris and to Rome, the sense of Europe being pleasant and curious and interesting, or also of the ancestors.  This, of course, maintains a certain curiosity, a willingness to learn more about NATO, to have ties with NATO.  Diaspora ties tend to be a very strong motivating factor also in terms of support for NATO.

But I’d say of the three baskets, that one is the one that perhaps recedes the quickest; that the decades since World War II, you – there is still a cultural affinity that does not necessarily always translate into political support for NATO or for the defense ties in the way that the other relationships do.  And so I think there’s a transformation from what was largely an affinity or culturally or heritage-based tie to one that is more of interest.  And it’s of economic interest, and it’s of strategic and military interest.

When we are concerned with the resilience of NATO support across society, I think people look at that third basket and say, oh, that was such a long time ago and people aren’t automatically understanding this anymore.  I think the basis for thinking that there is a lot of resilience exists on the economic and military co-service side, but we are not talking about it and not making the links between those active interests and what it means on an institutional NATO level.  Why would NATO have anything to do with German car manufacturing, or export markets for American LNG?  But the more those connections are made, I think that those will be much more enduring throughout the next few decades as we see that third basket of affinity recede in terms of its strategic importance and perhaps its policy implications for Americans in their daily lives.

But I’m happy to answer questions about what we are seeing in general.  But again, it’s not just generational.  I mean, there are feelings that, oh, well, it’s the old people who still care about Europe; they might want to take a Mediterranean cruise.  When we go into classrooms and talk with young people who are interested in foreign policy, right, I mean, that’s going to – who’s – that’s who’s going to show up to a lecture hall or a seminar.  They are in – young people are incredibly engaged specifically on the question of great power competition on the issue of Russia’s rise, the Russian aggression, and are very deeply interested in how Europe is going to evolve and step up in this moment.

That is something we see across the board – the desire for Europe to do more – but that does not mean that there is a sense that the U.S. doesn’t have skin in the game or should not be part of it.  And, in fact, I think there’s an incredible nuance of questions that we have seen, specifically about:  Well, what is your spending and how much are you giving to Ukraine and what does that create for your own vulnerability?  And I think a nuance I’d far expect in a roundtable conversation in Washington, less so in a more casual engagement somewhere in the American heartland, in Illinois; and yet we are seeing that.

And so I think that there is – we are not giving enough credit to people across the United States and the U.S. heartland for their interest and engagement with nuance of opinion about this.  We are not giving enough weight to the fact that there are young people who are not just interested in the Middle East or the China rise but do very much also follow other things happening, and in Ukraine, and Russia has been high in the news for the past two years.  And so we simply maybe haven’t yet seen the impact of that.

We have spent the last two decades talking about the Middle East and China, and therefore there’s an assumption that this is where everyone who cares about foreign policy is looking.  But we are going to see, I think, more of the delivery and the engagement of, again, the younger generations – those who are doing their studies right now – on the European and Russia-related foreign policy issues because that is what is happening as they are maturing and starting to think about foreign policy.  And I think our understanding of how important this is and who is going to care about it simply is lagging behind.

**MODERATOR:**Thank you for the remarks, Ms. Berzina.  Now I would like to open it up for questions.  First, we will start with the questions in the room.  If I call on you, please raise your hand and state your name and outlet.  And then we will go to Zoom.  A reminder for journalists joining us via Zoom, please be sure your screen name includes your name, outlet, and country.  And with that, any questions in the room?  Please, go ahead.

**QUESTION:**  Hi.  I am Maria Carou with Radio Nacional de Espana.  I would like to ask you if after your travels, your conversations, do you think the bond between the United States and NATO is strong enough to survive a possible Donald Trump presidency?  And I don’t know if you could tell us a little bit about the feeling you’ve seen during this time about Ukraine, regarding Ukraine and the financial support of United States to the country.  Thank you.

**MS BERZINA:**I think it’s a very mixed picture.  So, again, when I’m in the field, I’m less depressed than when I am in Washington as someone who cares about the transatlantic bond.  And part of it is because you – in the middle of the country, there is tremendous support for Donald Trump.  That is absolutely clear.  But then when you start to ask about, well, why, and what you – and what people having their morning coffee think about Donald Trump’s foreign policy, they can say, well, I don’t think Russia’s great and I think Ukraine is fighting a good fight.  And I think that Trump should care about that more.  Right?

So I think there is disagreement when you ask about it specifically in terms of a – any kind of willingness to cede ground to Russia.  I don’t see that making sense in a lot of the middle of the country in very traditional Republican areas.  There have been – and there’s been an entire Cold War and post-war era in which Russia wasn’t the good guy.  America’s foreign policy, in particular on the conservative side, was oriented towards limiting the threats that Russia could pose to the United States and U.S. allies.  That still makes sense in a very deep level.

And so there’s disagreements as, I don’t – I don’t really agree with what Trump says about Russia, or yeah, I think that Ukraine should win and, yes, we should be helping Ukraine, but I don’t find foreign policy and dissatisfaction with this element of Trump’s foreign policy, potentially.  I mean, we don’t exactly know what it’s going to be if he comes – if he becomes President again.  I don’t see that motivating their voting behavior.  Right?

So I think that they would vote for Trump no matter what and be dissatisfied, perhaps, with this element of foreign policy.  My concern is more that that dissatisfaction doesn’t have a way to be reflected or messaged to the political class that would come in if there were another Donald Trump presidency.  There would just be – there would be satisfaction in other areas that would mute dissatisfaction on elements of foreign policy.

On support for Ukraine, again, I think that the moral argument about why Ukraine is in the right and Russia is in the wrong that – it is an incredibly simple story that people absolutely understand.  The question is, who pays and how much?  And there is a consistent lack of understanding about how much Europe has invested to help Ukraine and to help itself right now, too.  There is, I think, again, a multiple-year lag between what the European investment numbers are and what the European defense spending numbers are and the understanding in the field.  And part of that is the problem of messaging that is – and some of Russia’s talking points that are taking hold across the country about the Europeans not doing anything.

And I’d say that the – Trump’s dissatisfaction with Europeans, publicly across – saying Europeans don’t do more, despite the fact that Europeans are doing more, despite that statistics don’t back what he says – this is causing a problem.  And so yes, there’s a desire for Europeans to do more – from people in college classrooms, or at state-level government positions, or in the diners for Europeans to be spending more money, absolutely.  And yet, there’s not an understanding of what Europeans are doing right now, which would already help, and there’s a lot of interest, like, oh, various – lots of countries along the eastern flank are spending the 2-percent-plus.  Germany is meeting the 2 percent level.  There is tremendous investment – in fact, outpacing American investment – for Ukraine.

This is all very welcome.  But this is – this isn’t really coming through through the passive knowledge that people who don’t spend their days thinking about foreign policy; they’re not aware of this in a regular way.  But they’re also not opposed to helping Ukraine.  They’re just very, perhaps, vulnerable to the point of, well, if this is a hopeless case then why are we spending money on it and why Europe isn’t.  And so going to, well, it’s not a hopeless case.  And even the understanding that Ukraine – that Kyiv is a functioning city.  I think the two years of just showing war footage of crumbled buildings and missile strikes, I think it’s having the opposite effect of motivation.

So I think in general, showing an attack on Kharkiv in the last few weeks, rather than motivating a lot of intra-American sentiment, instead, I think, feeds into the rhetoric of, well, it’s just going to continue forever so why should we help at all.  And instead, what seems not newsy, which is showing functioning Ukrainian cities, life that goes on, the normalcy, the vibrancy still of society, of the arts, of other things that are continuing – that is a story that isn’t being told and isn’t being understood.  And instead, there’s a sense of, well, it’s hopeless, potentially, right, for those who really oppose.  And that also is not reflective of the reality on the ground right now.

So I think there’s a messaging gap in general about what the Europeans are doing, about how bad the situation is in Ukraine.  Of course it is terrible when you look at it and the front line, but a perception of an entirely decimated country, which I think you’d find, for those who really don’t think it’s valuable to put money in, is also inaccurate.  So there is a tremendous job to be done, but also potential to fix that inaccuracy and to simply explain what is going on, and I think being present is incredibly important.

And so it’s not just that – the good conversations aren’t because you put something on the news as you’re making your coffee on a national station, but instead it is a sense of what are the links to your communities and who shows up.  Do Europeans show up or Ukrainians also tell their story in communities and reach out to the heartland and explain these things in a human-to-human way?  And I think honestly, you don’t see any – the rigidity or recalcitrance or other things that perhaps you might expect when you looked at how long it took the supplemental to pass.

**MODERATOR:**Thank you.  Any other questions in the room?  Please, yes.

**QUESTION:**Hi, thank you for doing this.  This is Kushboo from the South China Morning Post.  I’m curious about during your travels, what are the conversations about China’s indirect help to Russia and Ukraine?  Because is it different from what we hear in Washington, the conversations about China trying to play a neutral player here but also indirectly supporting Russia?  How do people in the heartland think about that?  Also given China’s stance on the Middle East, there are two wars happening right now and there are two different positions that China has taken.  What do people really, especially the young people, think about it?

Also how – any conversations about – you said that the economic relationship, so how do people really think about the tariffs on EVs and how EU can align its policy with the U.S. on overcapacity and the non-market policies of China?  And we are hearing that EU is going to come up with some tariffs.  What are the conversations about that around the U.S. outside of the Washington?  Yeah.

**MS BERZINA:**I’d love to say that there were nuanced conversations about this outside the U.S. [Beltway], but there were less so.  So what we’re seeing are the conversation about the Middle East, a conversation about China, which is often a Taiwan-based concern, and a third conversation about Europe.  The nuance and interrelatedness of these different issues is not something that I’m yet sensing.  Is there a concern about all of these?  Yes.  But to understand, well, what are the precise mechanisms in how China is helping Russia with what technologies when, that – no, I feel like that level of the interrelatedness of these issues doesn’t – isn’t something that we are getting questions about.  And instead, it is something that we can bring up and do bring up as the links between what is happening across the world.  But then I think there’s a risk also of the – of a sense of overwhelming doom that could come, right.

So again, we’re talking about people who simply have news on in the background mostly, and they’re, again, a segment in the way that television news in particular, but also all of the media – present is there’s a China article, there’s a Ukraine article, there’s a Middle East and Gaza article, but there’s not that in-between, right?  Or certainly when they don’t get the amount of attention, right, because it kind of is like, what footage are you showing, right?  So that – it is – it is a little bit different.  And so I’d say this concentration still is very much on these issues as isolated, or the understanding of them as isolated, and a less developed understanding about the interrelation between the different theaters and the actors at play.

In terms of Europe, I think there’s a Europe – European investment, whatever it is, is a good thing, but even understanding it as being tied to European policy, again, is – there’s a level of distance between a commercial actor opening any kind of facility or signing a contract and what that means about European foreign policy or transatlantic policy, right?  It’s simply like choosing – the understanding of it is, do you – like, whose jeans do you make?  Do you use – like, what brand, as opposed to, well, what country are you thinking here?  Investment that is visible is great.

I think on the natural resources side, the sense of markets – so I think for gas exports that clearly – there’s been so much attention over the years to Russian gas; well, now there’s American gas.  And especially those states and regions that are producers, are exporters, understanding the value of European allies but also globally as markets and allied markets for American exports.  That, I think, there is a link much more to the country.

But when it comes to EVs and certainly EU – I mean, like, at that point an EU policy, you’re gone, right?  So I think you can kind of – the link already between America – a German car company and then Germany, like, that is already – you’re drawing a commercial to a foreign policy link.  And then to take it to EU policy, which, of course, is going to be incredibly important, especially what happens after the elections in a week or so – that link doesn’t exist in the popular understanding.  I think that EU policymaking is hard for people living in the EU and voting in the EU to understand, and it’s not an issue in the everyday conversations.

**MODERATOR:**I’ll go to Zoom right now.  I see Sangho has his arm up.  Please raise – unmute yourself and ask your question.  Sangho, I see you’re unmuted, but we don’t hear you.  Can you try once again?  Unfortunately, we don’t hear you.  Feel free to type your question in the chat, and I can read it out loud or we can come back to you in a moment.

Do we have any other questions in the room?  All right.

**QUESTION:**  Yeah, this is Macarena Vidal from El Pais in Spain.  You have mentioned briefly the Russia disinformation.  I wonder if you could talk a bit more about what role this is having if it’s having an impact?  Is there a lot of it?  Is there not?

**MS BERZINA:**  I’d say it is – it matters, not because – well, I mean, you still can turn on the radio in Washington and certainly listen to direct Russian channels.  Like that is – that exists.  But if you – it’s the carrying on of messages that have been pushed by Russia about – but also, I think there’s about – from China when it comes to other regions, like the Arctic.  I think there’s a – that the – the absorption of narratives about the West’s culpability, the hopelessness of the effort, the impossible costs, the injustice of the United States helping Ukraine – those are background.  Like, these are concerns that people have, right?

So it’s that the pit in your stomach, the little voice in your head.  It’s the – like, vaccine disinformation or other things, this – like is this going to hurt me in a way?  I have heard this rumor, and it’s making me reconsider certain things.  So I think it leads to skepticism and distrust.  An unwillingness to go look into the issue more deeply because it feels emotionally – it is highly emotional, right?  So like – when it taps into the notion of injustice and generally also overwhelm injustice because the gravity of the Russian threat is so large, or the Ukrainian collapse is so imminent, or the damage done is so profound, that has a long shadow, right?

And so because I think it goes to very large – a sense of inevitability or a limitation of agency, right?  So you shouldn’t be doing anything because it’s not going to matter, or it’s not your job to do anyway, and I think that the effect of the disinformation, of narratives that are specifically about European weakness, Ukrainian weakness, they are leading to inaction or to skepticism as opposed to tapping into that clarity that I think you do get to of Russia attacked an independent neighboring country and has committed grievous war crimes, horrible atrocities, kidnapped children, and this is a bad thing.  And the more it focuses on – but then using, perhaps, that harm and the emotional resonance of the harm it has caused to tamp down a feeling of having agency to fix it or needing to fix it.

Again – so, right, again, this is that overly emotional shadow, I’d say, of the disinformation, and then again when it’s not someone’s job to pay attention to this in their daily lives but instead merely to follow along as they live their lives, it is causing a sense of, well, I don’t agree with what is Russia doing but what can I do about it at all.  Or I don’t agree with Trump’s rhetoric that – sometimes, right, of – or that I wouldn’t want there to be a pro-Russian policy, but, well, what is the point, and certainly why should I object about it, right?  So I think it creates a greater inaction broadly on foreign policy.

And so the question is, from a strategic perspective, is that enough, right?  So is it enough not to change Americans’ minds but to make Americans think that those who are disinclined to do foreign policy anyway should not do anything on it because it is emotionally overwhelming and too expensive and inevitably catastrophic and reminiscent of the last two decades of forever wars, and instead just think about a foreign policy – [rather, a] domestic policy issue that seems simpler and not have a debate about foreign policy and the American role?  And I think that really does lose a lot of the success and what the Europeans are doing successfully, what America has done successfully, what the supplemental – that story therefore doesn’t have a slot to go into anymore, right, because the desire to engage with this issue is shut down because it is tied to feelings of apathy, of inevitability, of – it is not worth emotionally engaging on this issue.

**MODERATOR:**  I’ll go back to Zoom.  Sangho submitted his question in the chat.  Sangho Song from Yonhap News Agency, South Korea.  “South Korea is part of four Asia-Pacific partners of the NATO.  What kind of role do you think South Korea can play in contributing to the NATO, and what kind of benefits Korea can get from being AP4 partner of the NATO in terms of security on the Korean Peninsula?”

**MS BERZINA:**  Well, I think it’s incredibly exciting that this summit that we’re having next month is going to be a summit where we again have all of the Indo-Pacific four partner leaders in town to take – to participate.  There is definitely a rapid evolution of the relationship between the Indo-Pacific partners and NATO itself, and it happens in a way that is first about what is going on in societies, the challenges that an Indo-Pacific four partner – so this is South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.  The challenges that are being – that are – the societies are facing are very much similar challenges to what societies across the NATO countries are facing.  So there are questions of hybridity and hybrid threats and critical infrastructure protection that are very relevant.  There is concern about economic investment and coercion where the partners can learn from each other significantly.  There is a lot – there is a high value in information sharing and best practices sharing.

So I think that the base of common challenge is one that is the foundation for greater conversation and engagement.  So there is that what is – what are NATO countries doing at home to make themselves more secure, what they doing in terms of investment in their own security – how they are approaching, for example, interagency or inter-ministerial approaches to get at the sub-threshold and above-threshold threats that NATO is grappling with.  That conversation is very useful to have with partners.

There are other kinds of investments in technology that are going to be necessary when we come to what happens in the future.  That is a – an area for productive conversation between the Indo-Pacific partners and NATO Allies.  So space – space is an area where Russia puts up anti-satellite space-based weapons, and we see a greater evolution, also, into space, into – so electronic warfare questions – unmanned – the drone, an entire future of this kind of fighting, where there is a need to exchange lessons, to understand where the evolution is happening together, and to find areas potentially for future partnership.  I’d say that what is happening at home and what is going to be happening the future are areas that are the most fertile ground for cooperation and partnership.

The areas that are trickiest are the conventional military cooperation that NATO is mostly associated with, and that is an area where I don’t see in the shortest term significant, formalized cooperation.  I think there is a lot of hesitancy about having a NATO presence in the Pacific that is not – it is questionable what the value added would be given various perception risks that could exist.  And also what are the capabilities that NATO could use and why.  And so I think that is not what this is about.  This isn’t about NATO forces or NATO ships in the Pacific, and it’s instead how do these regions that have to solve similar challenges – how do they do it together in cooperation with each other, again, in partnership?

And I think that’s where when you look at like the language about – like the Indo-Pacific partners, this is where hand in hand, exchanging lessons, learning together really is profoundly important.  And then you get into the question of, well, how do you formalize that partnership in what area.  But again, I do not think it’s going to be in that that straightforward, conventional, rotational troop presence or sending of naval vessels universe.  I think it’s instead what are you doing at home and what are you planning to do in the future, and how can we do this, learning from each other and partnering with each other.

**MODERATOR:**We have time for one more question, if any.  Okay, you can follow up.

**QUESTION:**Yes, I wanted to ask you if you – you mentioned that the NATO summit, it’s next month – if you have any plans.  What are the conversations regarding the summit in – outside of the – out of the Washington.  If people are really aware and they’re looking forward to it, what are the expectations?  And also if your – like in terms of your work, is there anything you have planned out in terms of meetings or conversations on the sidelines of the summit?

**MS BERZINA:**So I think there is, again, limited awareness of the fact that a summit is coming because it is in its nature a birthday party for the Alliance in Washington, D.C.  So if you do not live in Washington, D.C. and work on these policies in Washington, D.C., I don’t think it’s the central feature of your July calendar in the way that, I think for many of us in Washington, D.C., it actually is the central feature of our July calendar.  There – I think it’s going to be important for there to be more things also outside of Washington.  So NATO had a youth summit in advance of the summit, but that happened in Miami.  I think that approach of taking NATO-related activities, specifically outside of those who are very aware of what NATO does, which is within the beltway, mostly, out to communities, I think, is a very, very important and effective way of spreading information and just understanding about the role and interrelation of NATO and society.

We – so the German Marshall Fund is one of the consortium partners for the NATO Public Forum, so that is – that is why that is especially also on my agenda going into July, and this is a public forum that is specifically designed to have open conversations that are linking what is happening within the summit room to what matters in terms of the border policies and presenting the material in an accessible way for those who want to understand it better.  And that’s both media but also those who are online participants and the hundreds of participants in the room who are coming from across the Alliance as well.

So I think there’s an – there is an appetite and an interest for it, but not, again, much awareness.  And I think this is the limitation of the approach that we have had so far, which is across the Alliance, which is keeping Alliance policy very much about particular capitals and not about the parts of society they may engage in it.  But the problem with that is that those who fight don’t live in Washington, right, so those who have served and those who rotate and those who deploy live across the country.  And that is the place where I think we should be having more of these conversations, and when you do a lot of why NATO makes sense and why the Allies are not just freeloaders and the sacrifices they have made and the potential they have in the future, that’s where the conversation makes a lot of sense.

But again, that’s why it shouldn’t be a conversation so much, I think, across the country about a summit because, I mean, effectively, yes, it’s more decisions – it’s a bunch of people in suits in a conference room – but instead the conversation about, well, how is the U.S. manufacturing base critical to ensuring the protection of NATO Allies and how does the financing from the NATO Allies create jobs and support communities across the country.  That is, I think, the deeper NATO link that, again, it comes to that economic and military basis that is entirely based on interest that is very durable but is not discussed nearly as much as it should be.

**MODERATOR:**Well, with that, thank you to Kristine for briefing us today, and thank you to all journalists who participated in today’s briefing.  This concludes the briefing.

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