United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 11, 2021*

Decided February 2, 2021

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 20-2754 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

DEXTER FISHER, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of

Indiana, Indianapolis Division. 

No. 15-cr-00157 

Jane Magnus-Stinson, 

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Dexter Fisher, a federal prisoner, sought a sentence reduction under the First 

Step Act of 2018, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court denied him relief.

Because the district court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

Following Dexter Fisher’s arrest for three armed robberies, a jury found him 

guilty of three counts of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); three counts of 

brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); and one count of 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 20-2754 Page 2 

being a felon in possession of a firearm, id. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced 

Fisher to the mandatory minimum sentence—fifty-seven years’ imprisonment—plus 

one year of supervised release for each of four counts, concurrent. Fisher appealed his

sentence. We affirmed it.

On June 10, 2020, after exhausting his administrative remedies, Fisher filed a pro 

se motion under the First Step Act arguing that “extraordinary and compelling reasons 

warrant” a reduction in his sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He argued that the First 

Step Act’s removal of the “stacking” provision that mandated consecutive sentences for

§ 924(c) convictions is an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce his sentence. 

See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403(a), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018). The 

district court denied his motion. 

Fisher now appeals and argues that the district court abused its discretion. He 

renews his argument that the difference between the sentence that he received and the 

sentence that he would have received after the enactment of the First Step Act qualifies as 

an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction. Citing his admirable 

record of rehabilitation in prison, Fisher also contends that the district court erred in 

concluding that he is still a danger to the community.

Following the First Step Act, a defendant may file a motion for a reduced 

sentence, so now “the court, ... upon motion of the defendant ..., may reduce the term 

of imprisonment ... after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent 

that they are applicable, if it finds that ... extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant 

such a reduction ... and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy 

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The

applicable policy statement advises that a court also consider whether “the defendant is 

not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, as provided in 

18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2); see also United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 

1180 (7th Cir. 2020) (explaining that although the Sentencing Commission’s policy 

statements predate the First Step Act, “the Commission’s analysis can guide discretion 

without being conclusive”). Further, § 3353(a) factors include “the nature and 

circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” as 

well as “the need for the sentence imposed ... to protect the public from further crimes 

of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). 

A district court has discretion to determine whether “extraordinary and 

compelling reasons” warrant a sentence reduction. Gunn, 980 F.3d at 1180 (quoting 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)); United States v. Cochran, 833 F. App’x 5 (7th Cir. 2020) (unpublished). 
No. 20-2754 Page 3 

We will reverse such a decision only if the court abused that discretion. Gunn, 980 F.3d 

at 1180. 

The district court did not do so here. After considering Fisher’s rehabilitative 

record, the circumstances of his criminal offenses, his criminal history, and his time 

served, the district court found that Fisher failed to demonstrate that he is not a danger 

to the community. The court noted the violence involved in his offenses—pointing a 

gun at his robbery victims and threatening to shoot them—and his criminal history, 

which includes convictions for conspiracy to commit robbery, unlawful possession of 

firearms, resisting law enforcement, criminal trespass, felony escape, and drug offenses. 

The district court “recognize[d] Mr. Fisher’s efforts toward rehabilitation,” but

“[w]eighing these factors, [it] c[ould not] conclude that Mr. Fisher presents no danger to 

the community at this time.” Fisher “has not demonstrated that the court relied on any 

erroneous facts or otherwise abused its discretion in reaching that conclusion.”1

Cochran, 833 F. App’x 5. 

AFFIRMED

1 Because the district court did not abuse its discretion on this ground, we need 

not reach Fisher’s arguments directed to its other grounds for denying relief.