alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### NATCHITOCHES ELECTRIC, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harold McCAIN, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 8201.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

April 24, 1981.

Harrington & Harrington, Eric Harrington, Natchitoches, for plaintiff-appellant.

Whitehead & McCoy, Kenneth McCoy, Jr., Natchitoches, Cook, Yancey, King & Galloway, James R. Jeter and Herschel E. Richard, Jr., Shreveport, Watson, Murchison, Crews, Arthur & Corkern, William P. Crews, Jr., John G. Williams, Natchitoches, for defendants-appellees.

Before CULPEPPER, FORET and SWIFT, JJ.

FORET, Judge.

Natchitoches Electric, Inc. (Plaintiff) appeals from a judgment of the trial court granting a stay order in favor of defendants: McCain-Winkler Partnership; George Minturn; and The Continental Casualty Company.

This action was consolidated with another action that was recently before us on appeal, *I.D.C., Inc. v. McCain-Winkler Partnership,*396 So.2d 590 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1981).

For the reasons expressed in *I.D.C., Inc. v. McCain-Winkler Partnership,*supra, the stay order issued by the trial court herein is reversed, vacated and set aside, and the case is hereby remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with our views expressed there.

All costs of this appeal are assessed against the defendants-appellees.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                       1,849,461
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,849,461
<PP&E>                                     189,875,741
<DEPRECIATION>                             189,692,528
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,032,674
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,849,461
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     183,213
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,032,674
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                19,416
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   84,722
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              (65,306)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                         0
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Peter and Dominick IMBORNONE.

No. 80-K-2893.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 23, 1980.

In re Peter and Dominick Imbornone, applying for writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. Parish of Orleans. 275-369.

Denied.
41093.

#### STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT v. MARTIN.

Decided March 12, 1965

Rehearing denied March 26, 1965.

Frankum, Judge.

“A charge may be abstractly correct; but unless it is authorized by the evidence in the case, it is nevertheless erroneous. *Butt v. Maddox,*7 Ga. 495 (3); *Towns v. Kellett,*11 Ga. 286 (2), 293.” *Central Ga. Power Co. v. Cornwell,*139 Ga. 1, 5 (2) (76 SE 387, AC 1914A 880).

Where, as in this case, on the trial of an appeal to the superior court to have a jury determine the value of land taken by condemnation, it appears that all of the evidence as to the value of the land taken related to its value for agricultural purposes, and there being no evidence as to the value of the land taken for any other purpose, the court erred in charging the jury “that in estimating the value of the land taken for public purposes, . . . it is not restricted to its agricultural or productive qualities, but inquiry may be made as to all other legitimate purposes to which the property could be appropriated.” *Central Ga. Power Co. v. Cornwell,*139 Ga. 1, supra; *State Hwy. Dept. v. Weldon,*107 Ga. App. 98 (129 SE2d 396); *State Hwy. Dept. v. Allen,*108 Ga. App. 388 (133 SE2d 64); *State Hwy. Dept. v. Whitehurst,*109 Ga. App. 737 (137 SE2d 371); *State Hwy. Dept. v. Godwin,*109 Ga. App. 740 (137 SE2d 351); *State Hwy. Dept. v. Futch,*109 Ga. App. 741 (137 SE2d 350).

An instruction to the jury in a condemnation case which inferentially authorizes them to award damages to the condemnee for the land taken based on the peculiar value of the land to the condemnee alone, as distinguished from its market value, generally is error where there is no evidence to authorize a finding that the land taken had any such peculiar value to the condemnee apart from its market value. *State Hwy. Dept. v. Stewart,*104 Ga. App. 178, 183 (2) (121 SE2d 278); *State Hwy. Dept. v. Whitehurst,*106 Ga. App. 532 (2) (127 SE2d 501); *State Hwy. Dept. v. Thomas,*106 Ga. App. 849, 853 (5) (128 SE2d 520). In this case the only evidence as to the value of the land taken related to its value for agricultural purposes, and there was no evidence that it would not have been as valuable to any other person as to the condemnee here. Under these circumstances the charge complained of in the second special ground was erroneous.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Bell, P. J., and Hall, J., concur.*

*429
      *Eugene Cook, Attorney General, Richard L. Chambers, Assistant Attorney General, Harry T. Lawrence, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,*for plaintiff in error.

*Warren Akin, Jr., J. Beverly Langford, T. L. Shanahan,*contra.
§ 447.371 Services furnished by rural health clinics. The agency must pay for rural health clinic services, as defined in § 440.20(b) of this subchapter, and for other ambulatory services furnished by a rural health clinic, as defined in § 440.20(c) of this subchapter, as follows: ( a ) For provider clinics, the agency must pay the reasonable cost of rural health clinic services and other ambulatory services on the basis of the cost reimbursement principles in part 413 of this chapter. For purposes of this section, a provider clinic is an integral part of a hospital, skilled nursing facility, or home health agency that is participating in Medicare and is licensed, governed, and supervised with other departments of the facility.
( b ) For clinics other than provider clinics that do not offer any ambulatory services other than rural health clinic services, the agency must pay for rural health clinic services at the reasonable cost rate per visit determined by a Medicare carrier under §§ 405.2426 through 405.2429 of this chapter.
( c ) For clinics other than provider clinics that do offer ambulatory services other than rural health clinic services, the agency must pay for the other ambulatory services by one of the following methods: ( 1 ) The agency may pay for other ambulatory services and rural health clinic services at a single rate per visit that is based on the cost of all services furnished by the clinic. The rate must be determined by a Medicare carrier under §§ 405.2426 through 405.2429 of this chapter.
( 2 ) The agency may pay for other ambulatory services at a rate set for each service by the agency. The rate must not exceed the upper limits in this subpart. The agency must pay for rural health clinic services at the Medicare reimbursement rate per visit, as specified in § 405.2426 of this chapter.
( 3 ) The agency may pay for dental services at a rate per visit that is based on the cost of dental services furnished by the clinic. The rate must be determined by a Medicare carrier under §§ 405.2426 through 405.2429 of this chapter. The agency must pay for ambulatory services other than dental services under paragraph (c) (1) or (2) of this section.
( d ) For purposes of paragraph (c) (1) and (3) of this section, “visit” means a face-to-face encounter between a clinic patient and any health professional whose services are reimbursed under the State plan. Encounters with more than one health professional, and multiple encounters with the same health professional, that take place on the same day and at a single location constitute a single visit, except when the patient, after the first encounter, suffers illness or injury requiring additional diagnosis or treatment.
[43 FR 45253, Sept. 29, 1978, as amended at 51 FR 34833, Sept. 30, 1986]
Exhibit 31.1 CERTIFICATION I, Anthony A. Lombardo, certify that: 1.
I
have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of E-Z-EM, Inc.;  2.
Based
on my  knowledge,  this report does not contain any untrue  statement  of a material
 fact or omit to state a material       fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the  circumstances  under which such statements were made, not misleading
      with respect to the period covered by this report;  3.
Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements,  and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in       all material  respects the  financial  condition,
 results of  operations  and cash flows of the  registrant  as of, and for, the
      periods presented in this report;  4.
The
registrants  other certifying  officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining  disclosure  controls and       procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:  (a)
Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information
relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us
by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is
being prepared;  (b)
Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures
and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure
controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such
evaluation; and  (c)
Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter
(the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants
internal control over financial reporting; and  5.
The
registrants  other  certifying  officer and I have disclosed,  based on our most recent
 evaluation of internal control       over  financial  reporting,  to the  registrants
 auditors and the audit  committee of the  registrants  board of directors (or
      persons performing the equivalent functions):  (a)
All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; and  (b)
Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have
a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.  Date: January 11, 2005
                
    
    /s/ Anthony A. Lombardo
      
      Anthony A. Lombardo, President,
      Chief Executive Officer and Director  -38-
**EXHIBIT
      32**


**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. §1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of SpectraScience, Inc. (the “Company”) on
      Form 10-QSB for the three months ended March 31, 2005 as filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, James
      Hitchin, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
      certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1.  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




2.  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.






/s/
                James Hitchin
              James
                Hitchin
              Chief
                Executive & Chief Financial Officer
              July
                13, 2005






Page
          14
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases...Joint Statement on Resumption of Hostilities in Northern Ethiopia

# 									Joint Statement on Resumption of Hostilities in Northern Ethiopia							

Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

October 12, 2022

We, Australia, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, are profoundly concerned by the escalation of the ongoing conflict and humanitarian crisis in northern Ethiopia.  We call on the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray regional authorities to immediately halt their military offensives, agree to a cessation of hostilities, allow for unhindered and sustained humanitarian access, and pursue a negotiated settlement through peace talks under an African Union-led process.  We also condemn the escalating involvement of Eritrean military forces in northern Ethiopia.  We call on Eritrean forces to cease their military operations and withdraw from northern Ethiopia.  All foreign actors should cease actions that fuel this conflict.

Multiple reports, including the joint investigation report of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission/Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the recent report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE), have documented human rights abuses committed by Ethiopian and Eritrean government forces, Tigrayan forces, and other armed actors, such as Fano militia, since the start of the conflict in November 2020.  Human rights abuses documented in these reports include unlawful killings, physical abuse, and gender-based violence.  We are deeply concerned by the ICHREE’s finding that there are reasonable grounds to believe that starvation of a civilian population has been used as a method of warfare.  The resumption of fighting in northern Ethiopia raises a high risk of further human rights violations and abuses.

We denounce any and all violence against civilians.  We call on the parties to recognize there is no military solution to the conflict, and we call on the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray regional authorities to participate in African Union-led talks aimed at helping Ethiopia achieve a lasting peace.  Any durable solution must include accountability for human rights abuses and violations.  We also call on all parties to allow unhindered humanitarian access, ensure the safety and security of humanitarian workers, and cooperate with, and facilitate access for, international human rights monitors.

Tags

Bureau of African AffairsBureau of Conflict and Stabilization OperationsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and LaborEthiopiaHuman RightsOffice of the SpokespersonPeace Process

Back to Top
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-10067

Summary Calendar

TIMOTHY C. YOAKUM, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

SABRE GLBL INCORPORATED, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:18-CV-127

Before WIENER, HAYNES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

AFFIRMED. See Rule 47.6.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 22, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 19-10067 Document: 00515088245 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/22/2019
§ 433.147 Cooperation in establishing the identity of a child's parents and in obtaining medical support and payments and in identifying and providing information to assist in pursuing third parties who may be liable to pay. ( a ) *Scope of requirement.* The agency must require the individual who assigns his or her rights to cooperate in— ( 1 ) Except as exempt under § 433.145(a)(2), establishing the identity of a child's parents and obtaining medical support and payments for himself or herself and any other person for whom the individual can legally assign rights; and
( 2 ) Identifying and providing information to assist the Medicaid agency in pursuing third parties who may be liable to pay for care and services under the plan.
( b ) *Essentials of cooperation.* As part of a cooperation, the agency may require an individual to— ( 1 ) Appear at a State or local office designated by the agency to provide information or evidence relevant to the case;
( 2 ) Appear as a witness at a court or other proceeding;
( 3 ) Provide information, or attest to lack of information, under penalty of perjury;
( 4 ) Pay to the agency any support or medical care funds received that are covered by the assignment of rights; and
( 5 ) Take any other reasonable steps to assist in establishing paternity and securing medical support and payments, and in identifying and providing information to assist the State in pursuing any liable third party.
( c ) *Waiver of cooperation for good cause.* The agency must waive the requirements in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section if it determines that the individual has good cause for refusing to cooperate. ( 1 ) For establishing the identity of a child's parents or obtaining medical care support and payments, or identifying or providing information to assist the State in pursuing any liable third party for a child for whom the individual can legally assign rights, the agency must find that cooperation is against the best interests of the child.
( 2 ) With respect to obtaining medical care support and payments for an individual and identifying and providing information to assist in pursuing liable third parties in any case not covered by paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the agency must find that cooperation is against the best interests of the individual or the person to whom Medicaid is being furnished because it is anticipated that cooperation will result in reprisal against, and cause physical or emotional harm to, the individual or other person.
[45 FR 8984, Feb. 11, 1980, as amended at 55 FR 48606, Nov. 21, 1990; 58 FR 4907, Jan. 19, 1993; 81 FR 86450, Nov. 30, 2016]
```

[Federal Register: April 2, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 63)]
[Notices]               
[Page 16763-16764]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr02ap10-63]                         

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

 
Sunshine Act Notice

AGENCY: U.S. Election Assistance Commission.

ACTION: Notice of public meeting agenda.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, April 8, 2010, 10 a.m.-12:15 p.m. EDT (Morning 
Session), 1:15 p.m.-3 p.m. EDT (Afternoon Session).

PLACE: U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 1225 New York Ave, NW., 
Suite 150, Washington, DC 20005, (Metro Stop: Metro Center).

AGENDA: The Commission will hold a public meeting to receive an update 
on a clearinghouse policy. Commissioners will hold a discussion on a 
public comment version of a UOCAVA pilot program testing and 
certification manual. Commissioners will hold a discussion on a UOCAVA 
pilot voting program and requirements document. Commissioners will 
consider other administrative matters. Members of the public may 
observe but not participate in EAC meetings unless this notice provides 
otherwise. Members of the public may use small electronic audio 
recording devices to record the proceedings. The use of other recording 
equipment and cameras requires advance notice to and coordination with 
the Commission's Communications Office.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ View EAC Regulations Implementing Government in the Sunshine 
Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This Meeting and Hearing Will Be Open to the Public.

[[Page 16764]]


PERSON TO CONTACT FOR INFORMATION: Bryan Whitener, Telephone: (202) 
566-3100.

Alice Miller,
Chief Operating Officer, U.S. Election Assistance Commission.
[FR Doc. 2010-7623 Filed 3-31-10; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 6820--KF-P
```
#### James Millard LIGHT, et al. v. CROWSON WELL SERVICE, INC., et al. and Sallie H. Sentell, et al.

No. 55383.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 8, 1974.

In re: Sallie H. Sentell, Jean Sentell Mendenhall, Sallie Sentell Roberts, Charles Sherburne Sentell, Jr., Samuel Webb Sen-tell, Robert L. Efurd, Jr., Euland Efurd, George R. Womack, Jackie D. Nelson, Pincus Gardsbane, Frontier Oil Corp., Jack T Rorex, Sarah L. Fairman & Charles D. Beard, Jr., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Parish of Caddo, 299 So.2d 869.

It is ordered that the writ of review issue; that the Court of Appeal send up the record in duplicate of the case; and that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be notified.

DIXON, J., recused.
41037.

#### LEE v. SWANN.

Hall, Judge.

This is a negligence action in which the plaintiff alleged that he was injured in a collision with a truck driven by the defendant’s employee who was then intoxicated and did not have a driver’s license, and that the defendant was negligent in entrusting his truck to his employee with knowledge that the employee was an incompetent driver. (The plaintiff does not contend that the defendant was liable for the acts of his employee under the doctrine of respondeat superior.) The plaintiff assigns error on the judgment of the trial court sustaining the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

*89Decided January 27, 1965.

*Alford Wall, Hilton M. Puller, Jr.,*for plaintiff in error.

*Wilson, Branch, Barwick & Vandiver, M. Cook Barwick, Thomas S. Bentley,*contra.

The defendant’s deposition showed these facts: The defendant operated a business of selling and delivering supplies to restaurants and employed three truck drivers as delivery men. The defendant was informed when he employed the driver who collided with the plaintiff that this employee had had some drinking problems and some domestic problems and had lost a job; he asked the employee if he had a chauffeur’s license and received an affirmative reply; he did not know that the employee had been convicted of traffic offenses and of driving while under the influence of intoxicants; and he did not check with official sources to learn whether or not the employee had a driver’s license.

The facts in evidence did not prove that the defendant had actual knowledge that the driver was incompetent, which is essential to fix liability on an owner for furnishing his automobile to an incompetent driver; nor was there proof of circumstances that will admit of no other reasonable conclusion than that the defendant’s denial of knowledge of the driver’s incompetency is untrue. *Roebuck v. Payne,*109 Ga. App. 525 (136 SE2d 399); *Hines v. Bell,*104 Ga. App. 76, 84 (120 SE2d 892).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Bell, P. J., and Frankum, J., concur.*