[Cite as In re J.L.C., 2023-Ohio-4081.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

BUTLER COUNTY

IN RE:

J.L.C.

:

:

:

:

:

:

CASE NO. CA2022-05-046

O P I N I O N

11/13/2023

APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

JUVENILE DIVISION

Case No. JS2014-0963

Michael R. Bassett, for appellant.

Rapier & Bowling Co., L.P.A., and Kyle M. Rapier, for appellee.

Jeannine C. Barbeau, guardian ad litem.

BYRNE, J.

{¶ 1} Mother appeals from a decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, 

Juvenile Division, which granted a change in custody of her son "Jonathan,"1 a juvenile. 

1. "Jonathan" is a pseudonym adopted in this opinion for purposes of privacy and readability. In re D.P., 12th 

Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2022-08-043 and CA2022-08-044, 2022-Ohio-4553, ¶ 1, fn.1.
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 2 -

Mother previously had custody of Jonathan and was the residential parent, but the court's 

decision awarded custody of Jonathan to Father and made Father the residential parent. 

For the reasons described, we affirm the juvenile court's decision.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} The record in this case is voluminous. The evidentiary hearing alone resulted 

in over 1,500 pages of transcribed testimony and nearly 1,500 pages of exhibits. The 

following summary of the key facts in this case is not intended to be comprehensive of all 

testimony and exhibits. However, having reviewed the record and having conducted our 

analysis based on the information available in the record, we believe the following summary 

provides the key information the reader needs to understand our analysis.

{¶ 3} Jonathan was born in April 2014. Mother and Father were not married, and 

their relationship had ended before Jonathan was born. Later that year, Father asked the 

juvenile court for shared parenting or custody, but the court granted Mother custody and 

Father visitation. Not long after, Father was married. More recently, Mother too was 

married.

{¶ 4} In 2016, when Jonathan was only a toddler, Mother began reporting to 

children services that, during visits, Father and especially Jonathan's half-sister "Ashley,"2

who lived with Father, were abusing Jonathan. Mother claimed that it was Jonathan who 

had disclosed the abuse to her. Mother alleged that Ashley—who is only a few years older 

than Jonathan—was sexually abusing Jonathan, often in rather shocking ways. Mother 

claimed that Jonathan had made a "staggering" number of these allegations and had told 

her that Ashley had made him do incredibly bizarre things, like eat feces. Mother also 

claimed that Jonathan was acting out at home after his visits and was afraid of visiting 

2. Another pseudonym to protect the privacy of a minor child.
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 3 -

Father. Mother continued to report similar allegations over the years that followed. Many 

of the allegations concerned sexual abuse by Ashley, but some involved verbal or physical 

abuse by Father. Eventually Mother even alleged that Father's wife (Jonathan's 

stepmother) abused Jonathan.

{¶ 5} But several different children services agencies who were involved with the 

family (two in Ohio and two in Kentucky) investigated Mother's many reports of abuse and 

could never substantiate any of them. One agency initially determined that abuse was 

"indicated." But the agency later dismissed the case after finding that Jonathan appeared 

to have been coached by Mother. Mother stopped making abuse reports in late 2017, but 

a few months later the reports began again, this time coming mostly from Jonathan's

therapist based on what Jonathan told her during sessions.

{¶ 6} Over the next couple of years, Mother and Father each filed several motions 

with the juvenile court. Relevant here are Mother's motion to modify or restrict Father's 

visitation, Mother’s motion to modify child support, and Father's motion for a change of 

custody. A hearing was held before a magistrate on these motions over eight days, spread 

out over more than a year from August 2020 to September 2021. Many witnesses testified 

and many exhibits were presented. Besides Mother and Father, six witnesses in particular 

shed the most light on the question of who should have custody of Jonathan.

{¶ 7} The first was Dr. M. Douglas Reed, a forensic psychologist, who was 

appointed by the juvenile court to provide an independent evaluation of the parents. Dr. 

Reed separately evaluated both Mother and Father and submitted an extensive report for 

each. While Dr. Reed's evaluation of Father revealed little of note, the same was not true 

for Mother. Dr. Reed described Mother as having delusional thinking for continuing to 

believe Jonathan's abuse claims despite no claim ever having been substantiated. Reed 

also diagnosed Mother with "Other Specified Personality Disorder," which features 
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 4 -

symptoms that cause significant distress or impairment but do not meet the criteria for a 

specific personality disorder. He found that Mother had mixed features of histrionic, 

borderline, paranoid, and narcissistic personality disorders. It was Dr. Reed's opinion that 

maladaptive thoughts, moods, and behaviors prevented Mother from being an effective 

parent. Mother, he wrote in his report, was more focused on winning her battle with Father 

than on protecting her child.

{¶ 8} Pamela Miller, an expert in childhood trauma and sexual abuse retained by 

Father, evaluated Ashley in an effort to determine the veracity of the claim that Ashley was 

sexually abusing Jonathan. She submitted a written report. After talking to both Ashley

and Jonathan, Miller concluded that while Jonathan may have been abused by someone at 

some point, Father and Ashley were not the ones who committed the abuse. Miller found 

that Jonathan showed a pattern of fantasizing and of difficulty distinguishing between reality 

and fantasy. Miller also noted that Jonathan had told her that he used to lie about Ashley—

particularly with regard to his statements that Ashley had touched him inappropriately—and 

that he was sorry for those lies. Miller concluded that Jonathan's allegations against Ashley 

appeared to be the product of his imagination or of coaching. Another witness, Brenda 

Patton, the family's reunification therapist, testified that she believed Mother had coached 

Jonathan to make false allegations of abuse.

{¶ 9} The guardian ad litem ("GAL") filed a report and testified at the hearing. She 

had met with Jonathan on several occasions and found no evidence that he had been 

abused by Father or Ashley. The GAL too believed that Mother had coached Jonathan to 

make false allegations. In her report, the GAL discussed the concept of parental alienation 

and the harm that such alienating behavior can have on children. She believed that Mother 

was trying to alienate Jonathan from Father, to Jonathan's detriment, by repeatedly making 

abuse reports to children services and otherwise interfering with the relationship between 
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 5 -

Father and Jonathan. The GAL described Jonathan as having a good relationship with 

Father and as interacting positively with Father during visits—contrary to Mother's depiction 

of Jonathan as anxiety-ridden and sobbing during visits with Father. The GAL 

recommended that Father be given custody of Jonathan.

{¶ 10} Jonathan's therapist, Kim Rosenzweig, a clinical psychologist, testified that 

she believed what Jonathan said and believed that Ashley was sexually abusing him. 

Rosenzweig admitted, though, that she had never met, interviewed, or evaluated Ashley 

and based her belief solely on Jonathan's statements. 

{¶ 11} Finally, Mother presented the testimony and written report of a psychologist, 

Dr. Ed Connor. Mother had asked Dr. Connor to review Dr. Reed's report and to perform 

his own psychological evaluation of Mother. Dr. Connor testified that he had serious 

concerns with Dr. Reed's evaluation. Dr. Connor found Mother's mental state to be quite 

normal and found no indication of any personality disorder. After conducting his 

evaluation—which he admitted was brief—it was Dr. Connor's opinion that Mother was an 

effective parent. He had no concerns about her emotional stability or capability to parent 

well.

{¶ 12} As for Mother's and Father's testimony, perhaps most pertinent was their 

admission that in late 2017 they had an affair. They met for sex, they exchanged sexually 

graphic texts and images, including nude photographs, and on a couple of occasions they 

got drunk together. Sometimes Jonathan was present when they were together. According 

to Mother, she engaged in the affair hoping that Father would leave his wife for her and 

Jonathan so that she could protect Jonathan from Father and Ashley. The affair ended 

after a few months, and Father stayed with his wife. Throughout the affair, Jonathan was 

seeing his therapist to receive counseling for the "abuse" that Mother had alleged was 

occurring in Father's home. Curiously, Mother's reports of abuse stopped during the affair 
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 6 -

but resumed after the affair ended.

{¶ 13} In November 2021, after the change-in-custody hearing, the magistrate 

entered a lengthy and detailed decision recommending that the juvenile court modify its 

custody order and give legal custody of Jonathan and residential parent status to Father. 

The magistrate found Dr. Reed's and Miller's opinions more credible than those of 

Rozensweig and Dr. Connor. The magistrate noted that despite multiple investigations no 

claim of abuse had ever been substantiated and that multiple witnesses suspected that 

Mother had coached Jonathan to make the abuse allegations, in part because Jonathan's 

descriptions of the alleged abuse did not use language that a typical seven-year-old would 

come up with on his own. Among the magistrate's proposed orders was a requirement that 

the parents attend a therapeutic program to address parental alienation. After completing 

certain steps set forth in the order, Mother would at first have supervised visitation with 

Jonathan, and later visitation per the court's standard parenting order. On the issue of child 

support, the magistrate ended Father's support obligation and placed a support obligation 

on Mother, basing the amount on financial information jointly submitted by the parties. 

{¶ 14} Mother filed objections to the magistrate's decision. On April 8, 2022, the 

juvenile court overruled Mother's objections and adopted the magistrate's decision, making 

only a few changes to some of the proposed orders, none of which are relevant here. 

{¶ 15} Mother appealed.

II. Analysis

{¶ 16} Mother assigns five errors to the trial court. The first two relate to the concept 

of parental alienation that the GAL introduced. We will address the first two assignments 

of error together. The third has to do with rebuttal witnesses. The fourth concerns child 

support. And the fifth presents a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence challenge to the decision 

to change custody. We will address the final three assignments of error out of the order 
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 7 -

presented.

A. Parental Alienation

{¶ 17} Mother's Assignment of Error No. 1 states:

{¶ 18} EVEN WERE PARENTAL ALIENATION SCIENTIFICALLY ACCEPTED, 

THE GUARDIAN WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO OFFER AN OPINION AS TO WHETHER THIS 

WAS A CASE OF IT, OR APPROPRIATE REMEDIES THEREOF.

{¶ 19} Mother's Assignment of Error No. 2 states:

{¶ 20} THE DECISION WAS FOUNDED UPON THE ERRONEOUS PREMISE 

THAT APPELLANT HAD ENGAGED IN PARENTAL ALIENATION, A WHOLLY 

INADMISSIBLE THEORY WHICH DOES NOT MEET THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS 

FOR ADMISSION.

{¶ 21} Mother contends in her first assignment of error that the GAL was not qualified 

as an expert to testify about parental alienation. Mother contends in her second assignment 

of error that the GAL's testimony about parental alienation was inadmissible because the 

concept is not based on reliable and scientifically valid principles.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

{¶ 22} Evid.R. 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony, setting out the 

criteria for admissibility. The basic rule is that a witness may testify as an expert about a 

subject beyond the knowledge of lay persons if the witness is a qualified expert and the 

testimony is reliable, that is, "based on reliable scientific, technical, or other specialized 

information." Evid.R. 702(C). 

{¶ 23} Evid.R. 701, on the other hand, governs opinion testimony by lay witness. 

That rule states, "If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the 

form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (1) 

rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of 
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 8 -

the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue."

{¶ 24} "Decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence are within the broad 

discretion of the trial court. A decision to admit or exclude evidence will be upheld absent 

an abuse of discretion. Even in the event of an abuse of discretion, a judgment will not be 

disturbed unless the abuse affected the substantial rights of the adverse party or is 

inconsistent with substantial justice." (Citations omitted.) Beard v. Meridia Huron Hosp., 

106 Ohio St.3d 237, 2005-Ohio-4787, ¶ 20.

2. Analysis

{¶ 25} In her appellate brief, Mother provides an extended discussion of "parental 

alienation syndrome," which she describes as a diagnosis proposed by child psychiatrist 

Richard Garner in the 1980s. She also describes the history of courts and scientific bodies

rejecting that diagnosis as scientifically invalid and as "junk science." We need not grapple 

with that history or with the admissibility of the diagnosis under the standard for the 

admissibility of expert testimony under Evid.R. 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow 

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993), because the GAL did not testify 

or make any recommendation regarding "parental alienation syndrome," and the magistrate 

and trial court likewise did not address "parental alienation syndrome."

{¶ 26} Mother suggests that "parental alienation" as referenced by the GAL and the 

juvenile court "stems from the discredited 'parental alienation syndrome.'" She points out 

that "there is no universal or scientific definition of parental alienation." We understand the 

concept of "parental alienation," which is sometimes relied on by parties in juvenile custody 

cases, as generally referring to a situation in which one parent attempts to damage the 

relationship between a child and the other parent. This can take the form of "badmouthing" 

the other parent, limiting access to the child, or encouraging the child to reject the other 

parent. The concern is that this behavior can have serious negative effects on the child 
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 9 -

and the relationship between the parents.3

{¶ 27} It is true that the GAL in this case, in her report, said that she "has researched 

this issue [parental alienation] and is recommending that this family participate in a 

therapeutic intervention program to address parental alienation here." The GAL believed 

that Mother had tried—and would continue trying—to alienate Jonathan from Father and 

that Jonathan was suffering as a result. 

{¶ 28} At the hearing, the GAL was asked about the discussion of parental alienation 

in her report. She conceded that she was not an expert and said that she was not making 

a diagnosis. Rather, explained the GAL, she mentioned parental alienation because she 

believed that a program addressing the matter could help the family. When Mother objected 

to this testimony on the grounds that the GAL was not an expert, the magistrate assured 

Mother that he would not rely on the GAL's opinion regarding parental alienation.

{¶ 29} Mother now contends that—despite the magistrate's statement to the 

contrary—the magistrate did rely on the GAL's parental alienation testimony in making the 

custody decision. 

{¶ 30} We disagree. The GAL's testimony regarding parental alienation was not 

presented as expert opinion, and the magistrate explicitly said that he would not take it as 

such. In addition, the magistrate never made a finding of parental alienation. On the 

contrary, the magistrate was clearly agnostic on the matter, saying in his decision only that 

there "may" be parental alienation in this case. Mother is complaining about a finding that 

was never made and about testimony that the magistrate specifically declined to consider 

as expert testimony. In fact it does not appear that the GAL's testimony regarding parental 

3. We have quoted a marriage and family therapist's explanation that the concept of parental alienation refers 

to a "'highly dysfunctional cross-generational alliance between the child and the triangulating parent to the 

disruption, dismissal and sometimes utter rejection of the child's other parent absent a bona fide protective 

reason.'" Romohr v. Singer, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2021-06-019, 2022-Ohio-50, ¶ 13 (quoting witness 

testimony).
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 10 -

alienation had any affect at all on the custody decision. The basis of that decision was 

plainly the magistrate's finding that Jonathan's allegations of abuse were likely false and 

that Mother's behavior was harming Jonathan. The magistrate explained: 

The conflict caused by the incessant referrals is not good for the 

child, it never has been, but that does not seem to limit the flow 

of them. Allegations of abuse against Father and his family has 

become a cottage industry. It is self-perpetuating. It must stop 

for the sake of the child.

Mother is unhappy with the reports and testimony of Dr. Reed 

and Ms. Miller and the testimony of Brenda Patton. During the 

pendency of this case, Mother has filed complaints with the 

licensing boards of Dr. Reed, Ms. Miller and Brenda Patton.

It is this magistrate's belief that as long as [Jonathan] remains 

in the current environment, allegations of abuse will continue 

unabated until Mother has eliminated Father from [Jonathan]'s 

life. Mother may be knowingly engaged in a form of parental 

alienation or she may well think the abuse is real and ongoing 

when it is not. It could be a combination of these. Regardless, 

it is not good for [Jonathan]. 

(Emphasis added.) It was for these reasons—which do not involve acceptance of the 

concept of parental alienation—that the magistrate concluded that making Father the legal 

custodian and residential parent was in Jonathan's best interest. The mere use of the 

phrase "parental alienation" by the GAL and the court does not mean the court permitted 

inadmissible expert testimony or improperly relied on that testimony. See George S. v. 

Megan L., 5th Dist. Licking No. 18 CA 0020, 2018-Ohio-4088, ¶ 46-51 (affirming a 

determination that a change of circumstances had occurred based in part on the trial court's 

reasoning that "[t]he Magistrate found that the Defendant [Appellant] is committing acts 

which can be characterized as parental alienation, denying the Plaintiff court ordered 

visitation and overall failing to work with the Plaintiff such that shared parenting was no 

longer 'workable'"). 

{¶ 31} Nor does the order that Mother and Father engage in a therapeutic program 
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 11 -

regarding parental alienation mean that the court accepted the validity of parental alienation 

as a scientific concept. This counseling was merely something that the court believed would 

help the family. See Batty v. Batty, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2017-10-151, 2018-Ohio-4934, 

¶ 18 (finding no problem with trial court orders that reflected the court's goal to reduce the 

risk of parental alienation). 

{¶ 32} The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion with regard to its decisions 

concerning the GAL's references to parental alienation. The first and second assignments 

of error are overruled.

B. Rebuttal Witnesses

{¶ 33} Mother's Assignment of Error No. 3 states:

{¶ 34} THE TRIAL COURT DENIED MOTHER'S UNCONDITIONAL RIGHT TO 

PRESENT REBUTTAL WITNESSES.

{¶ 35} Mother contends in the third assignment of error that she was prevented from 

presenting witnesses to rebut the GAL's report, particularly on the issue of parental 

alienation.

{¶ 36} An abuse-of-discretion standard also applies to our review of this assignment 

of error. See Beard, 106 Ohio St.3d 237, 2005-Ohio-4787, at ¶ 20. "Decisions regarding 

the admissibility of evidence are within the broad discretion of the trial court. * * * A decision 

to admit or exclude evidence will be upheld absent an abuse of discretion." Id.

{¶ 37} A few days before the final day of the hearing, Mother filed a motion asking 

the magistrate for more time to prepare for the GAL's cross-examination and for permission 

to call rebuttal witnesses. The GAL had just filed a report in which she mentioned the 

concept of parental alienation, which had never been mentioned before in the proceedings. 

Mother asserted that she was not prepared to respond and did not have enough time to 

prepare a response. 
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 12 -

{¶ 38} At the hearing, the magistrate overruled the motion, and Mother proceeded to 

cross-examine the GAL. After the cross-examination, the following exchange occurred 

between Mother's attorney and the magistrate: 

[MOTHER'S ATTORNEY]: And just, just so that you're aware, I, 

I probably will follow up a motion in regards to the rebuttal 

witnesses I would call based upon what I've heard here but I 

know you've already indicated you would not grant that. 

BY THE COURT: Well, here's the problem we have... March is 

when I'm available. Do we really want this child to sit in limbo 

or do you want me to issue a temporary order between now and 

March? I mean, I'd have to, I'd have to start moving cases to try 

and coordinate and... three (3) lawyers and guardian's 

schedule.

* * *

BY THE COURT: Obviously, I can't keep you from filing 

motions... 

[MOTHER'S ATTORNEY]: I didn't want you to become angry 

when one arrives in your box. 

{¶ 39} A couple of weeks after the hearing, Mother submitted a proffer of rebuttal 

testimony from two of Jonathan's school teachers as well as from her husband. But the 

bulk of the proffered testimony rebutting the GAL's report came from Jonathan's therapist, 

Kim Rosenzweig, who would have testified, in essence, contrary to all the GAL's 

recommendations.

{¶ 40} Mother fails to convince us that the magistrate abused his discretion in 

denying Mother's request to present this rebuttal testimony. The magistrate specifically 

noted in his written decision that he had reviewed and considered the proffered rebuttal 

testimony.4 We note too that because Rosenzweig had already testified at the hearing, the 

magistrate was likely well aware of her opinions on the key matters in this case. Perhaps 

4. The magistrate refers to the testimony of a "Dr. Strasser." We are not sure who Dr. Strasser is. That name 

is not in the proffered rebuttal testimony or in any other documents in the record that we have seen.
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 13 -

most important, though, is that despite Mother's argument in support of her third assignment 

of error that she needed to rebut the GAL's report and testimony on the issue of parental 

alienation, parental alienation is not mentioned anywhere in the proffered rebuttal 

testimony. Finally, as we have already noted, no finding of parental alienation was ever 

actually made. We see no abuse of discretion.

{¶ 41} Lastly, Mother filed a motion for supplemental briefing, citing the Fifth District's 

then recently issued decision in In re R.G.M., 5th Dist. Muskingum Nos. CT2022-0046 and 

0047, 2023-Ohio-685. Mother contended that she believed that In re R.G.M. may be 

important for our decision in the case before us, saying that a conflicting decision from us 

could create a conflict between the districts. We denied Mother's motion, stating that we 

would consider the relevance of the Fifth District's decision in this case, which we do now.

{¶ 42} In In re R.G.M., the Fifth District held that the admission of a doctor's 

psychological report violated the mother's right to procedural due process because she did 

not have the opportunity to cross-examine the doctor. The appellate court relied on In re 

Hoffman, 97 Ohio St.3d 92, 2002-Ohio-5368, in which the Ohio Supreme Court concluded 

that "[i]n a permanent custody proceeding in which the guardian ad litem's report will be a 

factor in the trial court's decision, parties to the proceeding have the right to cross-examine 

the guardian ad litem concerning the contents of the report and the basis for a custody 

recommendation." Hoffman at the syllabus. 

{¶ 43} Mother did not specify in her motion how In re R.G.M. applies here. That case 

concerned the admission of a psychological report in the face of a party's inability to crossexamine the authoring doctor. Here, Mother was able to cross-exam all the witnesses. The 

only relevance of the case we can see is to a contention that Mother was denied the 

opportunity to prepare an adequate cross-examine of the GAL as to the parental-alienation 

concept discussed in the GAL's report. But Mother had the opportunity to cross-examine 
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 14 -

the GAL about it. That Mother thinks she did not have adequate time to prepare for the 

cross-examination is a different issue, which she did not specifically raise but to which our 

discussions above largely apply.

{¶ 44} The third assignment of error is overruled.

C. Weight of the Evidence

{¶ 45} Mother's Assignment of Error No. 5 states:

{¶ 46} THE DECISION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE.

{¶ 47} In her fifth assignment of error, Mother argues that the trial court's decision to 

award custody of Jonathan to Father was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

1. The Law Governing Custody Modification

{¶ 48} R.C. 3109.04 governs the modification of custody in this case. The statute 

provides:

(a) The court shall not modify a prior decree allocating parental 

rights and responsibilities for the care of children unless it finds, 

based on facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that 

were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree, that a 

change has occurred in the circumstances of the child, the 

child’s residential parent, or either of the parents subject to a 

shared parenting decree, and that the modification is necessary 

to serve the best interest of the child. In applying these 

standards, the court shall retain the residential parent 

designated by the prior decree or the prior shared parenting 

decree, unless a modification is in the best interest of the child 

and one of the following applies:

(i) The residential parent agrees to a change in the 

residential parent or both parents under a shared 

parenting decree agree to a change in the 

designation of residential parent.

(ii) The child, with the consent of the residential parent or 

of both parents under a shared parenting decree, has 

been integrated into the family of the person seeking 

to become the residential parent.
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 15 -

(iii) The harm likely to be caused by a change of 

environment is outweighed by the advantages of the 

change of environment to the child.

R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a). The circumstances described in subsections (i) and (ii) do not apply 

in this case. So the juvenile court in this case was permitted to modify Jonathan's residential 

parent and legal custodian under the statute if it made three findings: (1) that a "change has 

occurred in the circumstances" of Jonathan or Mother, the residential parent; (2) that the 

modification is in the "best interest" of Jonathan; and (3) that the advantages of the "change 

of environment" outweigh any likely harm from the change. R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a); Forney 

v. Forney, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2011-08-057, 2012-Ohio-3427, ¶ 23 (stating that once 

a court finds that there has been a change in circumstances, "the trial court can modify 

custody only if 'the modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child'"). 

{¶ 49} In determining a child's best interest, the statute directs the court to consider 

all relevant factors, including these: the wishes of the parents; the interaction and 

interrelationship with the child's parents, siblings, and any other person who may 

significantly affect the child's best interest; the child's adjustment to the child's home, school, 

and community; and the mental and physical health of all persons involved. R.C. 

3109.04(F)(1)(a)-(j).

2. Standard of Review

{¶ 50} The discretion that a trial court enjoys in custody matters "'should be accorded 

the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court's 

determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned.'" In re J.M., 12th Dist. Warren 

No. CA2008-12-148, 2009-Ohio-4824, ¶ 17, quoting Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 

(1988). Accordingly, "[a] juvenile court's custody decision will not be reversed absent an 

abuse of discretion." (Citation omitted.) In re D.M., 196 Ohio App.3d 50, 2011-Ohio-3918, 

¶ 25 (12th Dist.). See also Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418 (1997) ("[A] trial 
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 16 -

judge must have wide latitude in considering all the evidence before him or her * * * and 

such a decision must not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion"). "When applying the 

abuse-of-discretion standard, an appellate court's role is to ascertain whether the award of 

custody is supported by competent and credible evidence." Id., citing Flickinger. "In 

reviewing a custody determination, an appellate court must 'review the record to determine 

whether there is any evidence in support of the prevailing party.'" Lyle v. Kersey, 12th Dist. 

Fayette No. CA99-11-031, 2000 WL 895268, *1 (Jun. 30, 2000), quoting Ross v. Ross, 64 

Ohio St.2d 203, 206 (1980); Romohr v. Singer, 12th Dist. Clinton CA2021-06-019, 2022-

Ohio-50, ¶ 26 (quoting the same). "No abuse of discretion will be found provided there is a 

substantial amount of credible and competent evidence to support the trial court's findings." 

Id., citing Bechtol v. Bechtol, 49 Ohio St.3d 21, 23 (1990).

{¶ 51} An appellate court must review the evidence bearing in mind that the trial court 

is better equipped to examine and weigh the evidence and to make decisions about 

custody. Sallee v. Sallee, 142 Ohio App.3d 366, 370 (12th Dist.2001); Miller at 74. For this 

reason, deference is given to the trial court's determinations of credibility and of the 

appropriate weight to be given to the various best-interest factors. See Mack v. Mack, 12th 

Dist. Butler No. CA2018-09-179, 2019-Ohio-2379, ¶ 33.

{¶ 52} A final note on our review before we begin. Mother asserts as error that the 

custody decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence, though she argues that 

it constitutes an abuse of discretion. Nevertheless, we still apply the competent-andcredible-evidence test. See Ross at 204 ("This court does not undertake to weigh the 

evidence and pass upon its sufficiency but will ascertain from the record whether there is 

some competent evidence to sustain the findings of the trial court"). Accordingly, if the 

custody decision is supported by a substantial amount of credible and competent evidence, 

we will not reverse it as being against the weight of the evidence. In re R., 12th Dist. 
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 17 -

Madison No. CA2018-04-012, 2019-Ohio-1198, ¶ 16, citing Flickinger at 418.

3. The Magistrate's Decision

{¶ 53} As we have already noted, the record in this case is voluminous. The 

evidentiary hearing resulted in over 1,500 pages of testimony and almost as many exhibit 

pages. The magistrate evaluated all this evidence and distilled it into an over 30-page 

decision that the juvenile court adopted. The discussion and analysis in the decision shows 

that the magistrate considered all the pertinent evidence and made all the requisite statutory 

findings. Where the evidence was in conflict, the magistrate stated which it found more 

credible. Based on the credible evidence, the magistrate made all three relevant R.C. 

3109.04(E)(1) change-in-custody findings—that a change in circumstances had occurred, 

that the change was in Jonathan's best interest, and that the advantages of the change 

outweighed the likely harm. And the magistrate specifically outlined the statutory bestinterest factors and made findings of fact related to each of them.

4. Analysis of Mother's Arguments

{¶ 54} Mother's argument here does not explicitly focus on any particular statutory 

requirement or best interest factor. Rather, she in essence challenges the credibility of the 

evidence that the magistrate relied on and, implicitly, the magistrate's credibility

determinations.

{¶ 55} First, Mother says that the evidence "clearly and overwhelmingly" shows that 

Jonathan suffered significant abuse in Father's home. The evidence of abuse came mostly 

from the testimony of Mother and Kim Rosenzweig, Jonathan's therapist. They testified 

that Jonathan had told them—among other things—that his half-sister Ashley had sexually 

abused him, and that they believed him. But there is substantial credible evidence that 

these abuse allegations were untrue and may have been the product of Mother's coaching. 

Multiple children services agencies investigated the allegations and none could substantiate 
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 18 -

any abuse. The GAL testified that she did not believe the allegations. Jonathan had never 

said anything to her about abuse, nor had she seen any indication that Father or any 

member of his family had abused Jonathan. Rather, the GAL believed that Mother had 

coached Jonathan to make the allegations. In fact, Mother reported that Ashley had abused 

Jonathan on a day that the GAL was present in Father's home, so the GAL knew that Ashley 

was not home that day and could not possibly have abused Jonathan then. The family's 

reunification therapist, Brenda Patton, also believed that Mother had coached Jonathan to 

make the allegations.

{¶ 56} Perhaps most pertinent was testimony of Pamela Miller, the expert in 

childhood trauma and sexual abuse who had evaluated Ashley and had interviewed 

Jonathan. She also found little reason to credit the abuse allegations, at least to the extent 

those allegations concerned Father and Ashley. In her report, Miller noted that Jonathan 

had told her some obviously false stories and that "[t]his pattern of fantastical story-telling 

and seamless oscillation between truth and fantasy is consistent with [Jonathan]'s

disclosures about [Ashley][.]" Indeed, wrote Miller, "[t]he most concerning part of 

[Jonathan]'s presentation is his trouble with memory and reality orientation, and he has 

some self-awareness of this." Miller noted that all Jonathan's fantastical statements were 

made "spontaneously," not in response to pointed questions but to "open-ended prompts" 

asking about himself or his family. "All of [Jonathan]'s statements about his trouble with 

reality, memory, and lying, combined with the fantastical story he told about his pets being 

systemically murdered by other children," wrote Miller, "makes clear that [Jonathan] does 

not know the difference between reality and unreality, truth and fantasy, or honesty and 

lying. He seamlessly oscillates between telling true stories and telling untrue stories." Miller 

noted in her report that, based on her own observations, "combined with the fact that the 

reunification therapist and the GAL believe Mother coached [Jonathan] to make allegations 
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 19 -

against [Ashley], combined with the fact that Dr. Reed found Mother to be personality 

disordered, highly delusional, and out of touch with reality, combined with the fact that 

Mother never mentioned [Ashley] to Dr. Reed, combined with the science of juvenile sex 

offenders [which Miller had discussed earlier in her report]," led to the conclusion that "it is 

more likely that [Jonathan]'s allegations against [Ashley] are the product of coaching, 

fantasy, or both." (Emphasis sic.). And of course, Jonathan himself told Miller that he was 

sorry for having lied about Ashley in the past. Upon our review of the evidence, we conclude 

that Mother's argument that the evidence "clearly and overwhelmingly" shows that Jonathan 

suffered abuse in Father's home is incorrect. The evidence does not support such a 

conclusion. On the other hand, competent and credible evidence supported the juvenile 

court's determination that neither Father nor Ashley (nor his stepmother) abused Jonathan.

{¶ 57} Second, Mother says that Father presented a facade meant to (mis)lead the 

court into believing that he was a good parent but that the evidence showed that he was 

not. Mother is referring here to Father's drug and alcohol use. Father had told Dr. Reed 

that he had stopped using both, which Dr. Reed mentioned in his report. But Father was 

not entirely forthcoming with Dr. Reed. While Dr. Reed believed Father stopped using 

alcohol and drugs in 2012 or 2013, in fact Father tested positive for oxycodone, 

noroxycodone, and amphetamines in 2020, during the custody proceedings.5 And the 

evidence plainly showed that Father continued to drink alcohol on at least some occasions. 

But the magistrate recognized that Father had lied to Dr. Reed about his drug and alcohol 

use and explicitly discounted Dr. Reed's (inaccurate) opinions on this matter. In fact, the 

magistrate ordered Father to undergo a drug and alcohol assessment and to obtain any 

5. According to the lab technician who testified regarding Father's 2020 12-panel drug and alcohol test results, 

noroxycodone is the major metabolite of oxycodone. In other words, oxycodone breaks down into 

noroxycodone in the body.
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 20 -

recommended treatment. (We will return to Father's drug and alcohol use below.)

{¶ 58} Third, Mother argues that there was much testimony presented that when 

Jonathan did not have visits with Father his negative behaviors abated and he was much 

calmer. But once again, there was also evidence showing just the opposite. The GAL's 

descriptions of how Jonathan interacted with Father contrasted sharply with how Mother 

believed Jonathan felt during his visits with Father. Contrary to the anxiety-ridden, sobbing 

child depicted by Mother, the GAL said that she had seen Jonathan run into Father's arms 

and that they passed their time together happily. It was this evidence that the magistrate 

weighed more heavily.

{¶ 59} Fourth, Mother argues that the trial court should not have relied on many of 

Dr. Reed's opinions. She challenges Dr. Reed's opinions in three ways. First, she argues 

his opinions were flawed in that he had improperly diagnosed her with four personality 

disorders—histrionic, borderline, paranoid, and narcissistic. Second, Mother argues that 

Dr. Reed's opinions were biased against her, as he claimed that she was "delusional" 

because she had believed Jonathan's disclosures of abuse. And third, Mother argues that 

Dr. Reed betrayed an unprofessional and bizarre obsession with her appearance, 

suggesting that she was narcissistic because she dressed well, was a model and 

cheerleader, and had worked as a waitress for a Hooters restaurant. Moreover, argues 

Mother, Dr. Reed expressed the sexist opinion that her decision to engage in sexual activity 

at the age of sixteen had been the first step down a path that had led to her rape in high 

school and also caused him to diagnose her with borderline-personality disorder.

{¶ 60} These arguments are largely based on the opinions of Dr. Conner, the expert 

that Mother hired to evaluate and review Dr. Reed's evaluation. Dr. Conner concluded that 

Dr. Reed's personality-disorder diagnoses were improper. According to Dr. Conner, Dr. 

Reed merely pointed to personality traits that Mother shared with people who actually have 
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 21 -

these disorders. Dr. Conner disagreed that Mother was "delusional" for believing 

Jonathan's allegations of abuse. It was his opinion that believing one's child is simply a 

hallmark of a good parent. 

{¶ 61} But Dr. Conner's criticisms of Dr. Reed's opinions fail to engage Dr. Reed's 

opinions fully. After reviewing Dr. Reed's report, we find that Dr. Conner's criticisms often 

seem to be based on over-simplifications of Dr. Reed's opinions, to the point of distortion, 

as though Dr. Conner did not spend much time trying to understand them. For example, 

Dr. Reed did not diagnose Mother with histrionic or borderline or paranoid or narcissistic 

personality disorder. He diagnosed her with "Other Specified Personality Disorder," which 

Dr. Reed explained in his report with a quotation from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 

of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition ("DSM-5").

6

 "This designation," Reed wrote, "'applies to 

presentations in which symptoms characteristic of a personality disorder that cause 

clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas 

of functioning predominate, but do not meet the 'full criteria' for any specific personality 

disorder.'" Dr. Reed was very clear in his report and testimony that he was saying only that 

Mother had features of several personality disorders, "which doesn't mean she has that 

[disorder]. She has features of that, which means some part of that is, is true for her."

{¶ 62} We do agree with Mother that Dr. Reed's comments regarding her sexual 

history, how she dresses, her experiences as a cheerleader and model, and her work at 

Hooter's can appear inappropriate, or even sexist, when read in isolation. However, when 

questioned about these comments Dr. Reed explained that he mentioned these items in his 

report because they potentially related to certain psychological factors he was reviewing, 

and that because they were part of Mother's "history" he included them in his description of 

6. The DSM-5 is published by the American Psychiatric Association and is "one of the basic texts used by 

psychiatrists and other experts." Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704, 134 S.Ct. 1986 (2014).
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 22 -

Mother. At trial, Reed explained that Mother's modeling, work at Hooters, and manner of 

dress were relevant to his "Other Specified Personality Disorder" diagnosis, which was 

based in part on his finding that Mother displayed characteristics of histrionic personality 

disorder. Dr. Reed's report, which appears to paraphrase the DSM-5, states that this 

disorder is characterized by "[a] pervasive pattern of emotionality and attention seeking, 

beginning by early adulthood." The report then lists several specific characteristic 

behaviors, including "[s]ome interactions are characterized by inappropriate sexually 

seductive or provocative behavior" and "[c]onsistently uses her physical appearance to 

draw attention to herself." Dr. Reed explained that Hooters models and servers are 

"sexually glamorized." And the way that Mother dresses is a factor, said Reed, because 

"[i]t draws attention." In his testimony, Dr. Reed made it clear that these are simply factors 

that make histrionic personality disorder a possibility. Dr. Reed also explained that none of 

his comments were intended to blame Mother for her experience of rape, or to suggest that 

because she was raped she had borderline personality disorder. Even if some of Dr. Reed's 

comments were questionable, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court erred as a matter 

of law by viewing Dr. Reed's comments in a more benign light based on Dr. Reed's defense 

of those comments during his testimony.

{¶ 63} It was reasonable for the magistrate to find Dr. Reed's opinions more credible 

than those of Dr. Conner. Dr. Reed was selected by the court to provide an independent 

expert opinion, while Dr. Conner was hired by Mother. Dr. Reed had Mother complete 

multiple psychometric tests and he conducted several other standard evaluations of her, 

which he summarized in a 28-page report. Dr. Conner, as the magistrate pointed out, 

reached his conclusions after interviewing Mother only once and after conducting only one 

psychometric test. Thus, finding that Dr. Reed's evaluation was very thorough, the 

magistrate "place[d] the appropriate weight [on] his opinions." As for Dr. Connor's 
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 23 -

evaluation, the magistrate stated that the concluding paragraph of his relatively short written 

report said it all: "[Dr. Connor's] assessment of Mother was, in his own words, brief." Mother 

fails to convince us that the magistrate should have accepted Dr. Conner's opinions over 

Dr. Reed's.

{¶ 64} Although Mother thinks that the magistrate should have believed the 

testimony given by her witnesses, "[w]e are mindful that the 'knowledge a trial court gains 

through observing the witnesses and the parties in a custody proceeding cannot be 

conveyed to a reviewing court by a printed record, and the reviewing court should be guided 

by the presumption that the trial court's findings are correct.'" Forney, 2012-Ohio-3427 at ¶ 

28, citing Kenney v. Kenney, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2003-07-078, 2004-Ohio-3912, ¶ 7; 

see also Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d at 74. Mother has not rebutted that presumption here. We 

see little reason to disturb the magistrate's credibility determinations or the weight that the 

magistrate assigned to the various statutory factors. Mother challenges the trial court's view 

of the evidence, but "the mere fact that the trial court chose to rely on other evidence in the 

record does not equate to the trial court clearly losing its way and creating a manifest 

miscarriage of justice." Romohr, 2022-Ohio-50 at ¶ 40.

{¶ 65} We pause here to note that Father—to whom the juvenile court awarded 

custody and designated as a residential parent—has a history of drug and alcohol abuse, 

and that he was not fully honest with Dr. Reed about that history. Father tested positive for 

oxycodone, noroxycodone, and amphetamines in 2020, as mentioned above. However, 

there is also evidence in the record mitigating these facts. First, Father testified that he had 

a prescription for Adderall, which contains amphetamine, at the time of or before his testing 

in 2020.7 Father also testified that in the months before the 2020 drug test he took two 

7. Based on the lab technician's testimony, because the 2020 test was conducted using Father's body hair—
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 24 -

oxycodone pills that he obtained with a valid prescription for pain-relief medication (though 

Father admitted that this was an old prescription). Second, Father was tested for drugs and 

alcohol again later during the trial, in June 2021, and that test was negative with regard to 

all substances. Third, while not exculpatory of Father's more recent drug use and 

dishonesty with Dr. Reed, witness testimony suggests that Mother too has a history of using 

cocaine and abusing alcohol. And, according to Dr. Reed's report, on the Substance Abuse 

Subtle Screening Inventory-4 psychometric test that Reed administered to her, Mother 

"scored as someone with a 'High Probability' to have a Substance Use Disorder." Bottom 

line: neither Mother nor Father appears to be a perfect parent—far from it. But the juvenile 

court was aware of Father's history of abusing alcohol and drugs and nevertheless 

concluded that it was in Jonathan's best interest to be in Father's custody. Also, the statute 

governing a custody change, R.C. 3109.04, which the juvenile court applied, implicitly 

acknowledges that a court may award custody to a parent who, like Father, has faults. The 

statute provides that the juvenile court may change a child's residential parent if it finds that 

the change is in the child's best interest and that "[t]he harm likely to be caused by a change 

of environment is outweighed by the advantages of the change of environment to the child." 

R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a)(iii). Here, the juvenile court determined the potential harm that might 

come from Jonathan residing with Father was outweighed by the harm to Jonathan caused 

by Mother. We note too that the court also directed Father to complete an alcohol 

assessment and to follow up on treatment as recommended by the assessor. 

{¶ 66} We conclude that the juvenile court's decision to award custody to Father was 

"supported by a substantial amount of credible and competent evidence," so we do not 

reverse that decision as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re R., 2019-

rather than head hair or urine—as the tested material, the test results potentially showed substances used 

during a period of time that stretched farther back in the past than is the case with many such tests.
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 25 -

Ohio-1198 at ¶ 16. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.

{¶ 67} The fifth assignment of error is overruled.

D. Child Support

{¶ 68} Mother's Assignment of Error No. 4 states:

{¶ 69} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MOTHER'S MOTION TO MODIFY 

CHILD SUPPORT.

{¶ 70} Mother contends that the juvenile court overruled her motion to modify child 

support without ever addressing it. She argues that, even if the custody modification is 

affirmed, Father's child-support obligation should have been increased at the time her 

motion was filed in March 2019. The juvenile court, Mother says, should have ordered a 

retroactive increase in Father's support obligation for the over two-and-a-half-year period 

between the date Mother's motion was filed and the date the order giving Father legal 

custody was entered in November 2021.

{¶ 71} In the custody decision, the magistrate terminated Father's child-support 

obligation and imposed a support obligation on Mother. The magistrate's child-support 

worksheet (attached to the custody decision) was based on a worksheet jointly submitted 

by the parties. The magistrate included health-insurance expenses in the calculation but 

not childcare expenses, explaining that "the cost of child care was taken out as Mother will 

not incur daycare and no information regarding Father having daycare was provided." The 

worksheet calculations show that if Father had been ordered to pay support instead of 

Mother, the amount would have been higher than what he had been paying before winning 

custody. The juvenile court did not discuss Mother's objection regarding child support, 

saying simply that the magistrate's child-support orders would stand.

{¶ 72} A few things stand out here. First, Mother's original motion to modify child 

support requested modification based on her claim that the amount she was paying for 
Butler CA2022-05-046

- 26 -

Jonathan's health insurance and childcare were not included in the child-support 

calculation. Her objection to the custody decision, though, added another basis, referring 

to evidence showing each parent's "accurate income[]."

{¶ 73} More importantly, though, Mother does not explain precisely why there should 

have been an increase in Father's support obligation beginning in March 2019. The 

information in the worksheet can be assumed valid only as of the worksheet date, 

November 15, 2021. Mother cites no evidence, or reason to think, that the worksheet 

information was also valid over two-and-a-half years earlier, when Mother filed her motion 

for a modification. While her argument vaguely suggests that such evidence was submitted, 

Mother does not identify where it is in the record. We decline to do Mother's legwork for 

her by searching for the evidence in the voluminous record before us.

{¶ 74} "Matters involving child support are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion 

standard." (Citation omitted.) Morrow v. Becker, 138 Ohio St.3d 11, 2013-Ohio-4542, ¶ 9. 

We find no abuse of discretion as to this matter.

{¶ 75} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 76} We do not underestimate nor are we indifferent to the many nuances in this 

complex case. But Mother fails to convince us that the juvenile court erred in its decision 

to grant Father's motion to change custody. Having overruled all the assignments of error 

presented, the trial court's judgment is affirmed. 

PIPER, P.J., and HENDRICKSON, J., concur.