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i 

98–958 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–91] 

CARRIER AIR WING AND THE FUTURE 

OF NAVAL AVIATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 11, 2016 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Vice Chair 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

BRUCE JOHNSON, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

KATHERINE REMBER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ........................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Cropsey, Dr. Seth, Director, Center for American Seapower, Hudson Institute 2 

Horowitz, Dr. Michael C., Associate Professor of Political Science, University 

of Pennsylvania .................................................................................................... 4 

Rubel, Robert C., Professor Emeritus, U.S. Naval War College .......................... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Cropsey, Dr. Seth ............................................................................................. 25 

Courtney, Hon. Joe ........................................................................................... 23 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 21 

Horowitz, Dr. Michael C. ................................................................................. 41 

Rubel, Robert C. ............................................................................................... 58 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

CARRIER AIR WING AND THE FUTURE OF 

NAVAL AVIATION 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, February 11, 2016. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:32 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. FORBES. Today the subcommittee meets to discuss the carrier air wing and the future of naval aviation. 

We have got a distinguished panel of guests, and they include 

Dr. Seth Cropsey, the Director of the Center for American 

Seapower, Hudson Institute; Dr. Michael C. Horowitz, the Associate Professor of Political Science, the University of Pennsylvania; 

and Professor Robert Rubel, Navy War College. 

The distinguished witnesses that are here today have done so 

much to help in furthering this debate and discussion throughout 

the years and we welcome you and we are so glad to have you 

today. 

The subject of our hearing today is the carrier air wing and the 

future of naval aviation. And I don’t want for our discussion today 

to be focused on the past. We want it focused on the future. But 

we also have to look at where we have come in the past and some 

present realities. 

Because of the shortness of time that we have and the fact that 

they are going to call votes perhaps at any time, we are going to 

dispense with our opening comments. I think Mr. Courtney has 

agreed to do the same. We will have those submitted for the record. 

We are going to go right to your opening statements. I told you 

at the beginning that we could have votes in the interim. If so, we 

will have to excuse ourselves, take a recess, go cast those votes and 

then come back. 

So, with that, if Mr. Courtney has no comments that he would 

like to make, then, Mr. Cropsey, since you are sitting on the side 

that you are sitting on, we assume that you are going to start us 

today. And we welcome you here and look forward to your opening 

remarks. 

[The prepared statements of Mr. Forbes and Mr. Courtney can 

be found in the Appendix beginning on page 21.] 
2 

STATEMENT OF DR. SETH CROPSEY, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR 

AMERICAN SEAPOWER, HUDSON INSTITUTE 

Dr. CROPSEY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. By the way, all of your written testimony will be 

submitted for the record, without any objection. 

Mr. Cropsey. 

Dr. CROPSEY. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Courtney, and 

the distinguished representatives gathered here today, thank you 

for the honor of asking me to appear before this committee. 

I have been asked to testify on the future of naval aviation and 

the carrier air wing specifically, with a focus on unmanned systems. 

The testimony that I have offered for the record is divided into 

four parts. I will summarize them very briefly. I have looked at the 

evolution of the carrier air wing from 1980 until today. I discuss 

gaps in the modern air wing. I elaborated on the role that unmanned systems could have in the air wing. And I made broader 

recommendations about the structure of the air wing and the carrier platform. 

I would like to emphasize that without a discussion of strategy, 

the comments offered here are speculative exercises, useful perhaps, but disconnected from the broader strategic ideas that ought 

to govern U.S. and allied security. 

The U.S. has not faced such a diverse and dangerous group of 

threats since the end of the Cold War. At the high end, Chinese 

and Russian military capabilities can challenge American power 

globally as they have not in the past, or at least in the recent past 

for one of them. 

Low-end threats like ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and 

similar insurgencies cannot destroy U.S. power, but can undermine 

regional stability or worse. 

Hybrid adversaries, particularly Iran, employ a mix of conventional and insurgent assets to harass American forces and exploit 

critical vulnerabilities. 

And I won’t go into history here because I think I have handled 

it in the written remarks. But what we are looking at today is not 

unique, is not new. Great maritime powers have always experienced problems that overlapping threats present. Britain serves, I 

think, as the best example. 

On the eve of World War I, First Sea Lord Jackie Fisher and 

First Lord Winston Churchill had to counter the powerful Kaiserliche Marine in the North Sea at the same time defending British 

shipping around the world against commerce raiders and submarines. 

To remedy this strategic problem, Admiral Fisher’s so-called 

‘‘scheme,’’ as it was termed at the time, marshaled heavy dreadnought battleships for major fleet engagements against the Germans in the North Sea, along with fast battlecruisers which were 

intended to destroy commerce raiders. Combined with smaller destroyers from other escorts, this mix of ships was designed to engage in major oceanic battles, at the same time protecting British 

shipping around the world. 
3 

Without such focused, strategic ideas, analysis and recommendations about weapons systems or conglomerations of them don’t 

count as much. 

Since its earliest days, naval aviation in the United States has 

always been defined by a diversity of platforms. The carrier platform, with the limitations it imposes on fuel usage and weight, has 

always required aircraft designers to create a diverse number of 

platforms. 

Two factors have shaped the modern carrier air wing: aerial refueling and sustainable ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] platforms. Aerial refueling extended the range and 

flight time of the carrier air wing, allowing it to remain on-station 

longer and patrol more airspace. This became critically important 

for long-range interceptors and fighter aircraft, since these platforms could now be designed with less of a mind to range since 

range-extending aircraft could be placed aboard the carrier. 

Dedicated airborne early-warning platforms began to enter the 

fleet in the 1960s and that allowed the carrier air wing to monitor 

even more airspace. 

Bringing us up to more recent history, the 1980s carrier air wing 

was the pinnacle of naval aviation diversity. Specialized strike, 

ISR, air-to-air and anti-submarine warfare aircraft gave the fleet 

the ability to respond to the Soviet threat on all levels. Unfortunately, budget cuts and a self-enforced ideology of one interpretation of jointness have forced a decline in diversity in the modern 

air wing. 

Multi-role platforms, like the Hornet and Super Hornet, replaced 

mission-specific aircraft such as the A–6 and the F–14. The carrier 

also lost its organic tanking capability, forcing Navy to rely on Air 

Force tankers, to a certain extent, launched from potentially vulnerable ground targets. 

This state of affairs is untenable considering the anti-access 

threats the U.S. faces today. China, Russia, and Iran have created 

an overlapping access-denial network supplemented by insurgent 

groups in critical regions. 

Unmanned systems can greatly improve the carrier air wing’s efficacy by filling critical gaps in tanking, in ISR, and strike capability. 

In the immediate future, U-class [unmanned] programs could be 

focused on creating a viable carrier-based tanker considering the 

advantages that an unmanned platform has over a manned 

tanking platform. The Navy could also benefit from longer loiter 

time of current unmanned systems and use them to amplify ISR 

and strike/sea control capabilities. 

Finally, the Navy would benefit from, I believe, a broad effort to 

re-diversify the air wing. It would benefit from developing a new 

manned airframe for air-to-air combat, along with creating a lowend platform to perform cheaper strikes against long-term insurgency groups, for example. 

The Navy might also consider increasing the size of the carrier 

air wing to its nominative, its intended strength of 80 or more aircraft, rather than under-equipping each deployed carrier strike 

group. 
4 

Finally, the Navy would benefit, I believe, from considering the 

creation of other platforms to perform consistent strikes against 

insurgencies. Small carriers might be added, not in place of, but in 

addition to large-deck carriers as part of this approach, along with 

low-cost strike aircraft. 

Naval aviation is the cornerstone of the U.S. Navy and, by extension, the back power of American seapower globally. The Navy is 

taking steps to integrate unmanned systems into the air wing. Focusing on these will improve diversity and the overall efficacy of 

manned and unmanned platforms. 

Nevertheless, as I said at the beginning, without a proper strategy, no procurement, operational doctrine or development project 

can really preserve the American-led international order. 

Thank you for your patience. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cropsey can be found in the Appendix on page 25.] 

Mr. FORBES. Dr. Cropsey, thank you. 

Dr. Horowitz. 

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL C. HOROWITZ, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Dr. HOROWITZ. Thank you, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member 

Courtney, other members of the subcommittee and staff and guests 

here today for the invitation to testify before you. It is a real honor 

to be here to speak about the vital importance of the carrier air 

wing and the challenges it faces. 

America’s global reach relies in no small part on naval aviation 

and the carrier air wing. Yet because of long procurement timelines 

and moves by potential adversaries, the decisions made in the next 

several years, in just the next few years, will be critical. The 

United States cannot rest on its laurels in the carrier domain. 

In what follows, I will very briefly describe the rising threat to 

the carrier and then three areas where I think this committee can 

work with the Navy to try to move the carrier forward to sustain 

it as a critical part of the Navy into the middle part of the 21st 

century. 

We all know that America’s aircraft carriers are increasingly vulnerable. From China’s development of an anti-ship ballistic missile 

to the proliferation of anti-ship cruise missiles, like the SSN–22, 

the risk to U.S. aircraft carriers is arguably as large as it has ever 

been since our carriers were actually out there fighting in the Second World War. 

Add to this advances in air-to-air missiles by China, including 

the PL–15, and the carrier air wing itself is increasingly at risk. 

And the history of military innovations demonstrates that established powers using established technologies must continually innovate to keep up. 

The dawn of the carrier age itself is an example of this. The British, who had dominated naval warfare before with the battleship, 

viewed the aircraft carrier as a spotter, something to help find adversary ships. This demonstrates the kind of failure of imagination 

that is crucial for the United States Navy to avoid. By taking seriously these threats to the carrier itself, and the carrier air wing, 
5 

Congress and the Navy can work together to preserve the role of 

carrier aviation in U.S. power projection capabilities to assure that 

what happened to the British will not happen to the United States 

Navy. 

And here are three areas where I think the United States Navy 

could invest and I hope this subcommittee will promote to help ensure that the carrier air wing remains a strong and vital part of 

U.S. military power. 

The first is increasing America’s investment and the Navy’s investment in munitions. One way to ensure the continued strength 

of carrier aviation is extending its range. Range in this space can 

mean two things, the range of the airplanes that launch from the 

carriers—— 

Mr. FORBES. Dr. Horowitz, I am sorry to interrupt you, could you 

just make sure your microphone is on. And maybe if it is not, get 

a little closer. 

Dr. HOROWITZ. Sorry. 

Mr. FORBES. That is okay, thank you. 

Dr. HOROWITZ. One way to ensure the continued strength of carrier aviation is extending its range. Range in this case could mean 

two things: increasing the range of the airplanes launching from 

the carrier or increasing the range of the munitions that those 

planes carry. 

But for a variety of bureaucratic and budgetary reasons, it is 

often easy to under-invest in munitions, not buying enough and not 

investing enough in research and development for the next generation. 

There is good news in this area. The Navy’s development of the 

Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, something this committee has supported, will critically extend the range of the weapons launched 

from current carrier aircraft. But advanced munitions are expensive. One estimate suggests that the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile 

[L–RASM] may cost $2 million per missile. 

That is money well spent, but Congress and the Navy should 

think about ways to reduce the unit cost of advanced munitions. 

One way to reduce costs is through larger buys that generate 

economies of scale, but another is to consider next-generation systems that might employ more off-the-shelf commercial technology 

to take advantage of growth in robotics and related fields. 

The Navy could consider harnessing developments in swarming 

technology, to give just one example, to develop lower-cost munitions where the target is destroyed not by a single munition that 

escapes detection, but through overwhelming adversary defenses 

through mass. 

The second area I think this committee should push the Navy to 

invest in more is unmanned or uninhabited systems. The move by 

the Navy to convert the U-class system into a tanker might be a 

good-news story. It will be a good-news story if that tanker allows 

the Navy to experiment with unmanned systems on a carrier, paving the way for a more advanced, armed platform in the future. 

This would be a really good-news story. 

It won’t be a good-news story if rather than being a bridge to the 

future of combat aircraft the purchase of an unmanned tanker rep-
6 

resents a shift away from thinking about uninhabited systems for 

carrier-based, deep-strike missions. 

If the Navy lacks the bureaucratic appetite to invest heavily in 

next-generation systems, it could increase the structural risks to 

carrier aviation over the long term. Due to their ability to loiter, 

the fact that they are not limited by human endurance, and that 

they can operate in more dangerous missions where American pilots might be at risk, there are several advantages to having unmanned platforms in deep-strike missions. 

There is good evidence that suggests that senior leadership of the 

Pentagon gets it, from the Third Offset Strategy that Deputy Secretary Work has advocated to Secretary Carter’s preview calling for 

the potential of microdrones and swarms, there is a lot to like. But 

this will require close monitoring, especially with a new administration entering next year. 

Finally, given these changes in the threat environment, it is 

worth at least thinking about whether investing in a small number 

of large aircraft carriers should remain the optimal path for the 

United States Navy over the next generation. 

The old aphorism about not putting all of your eggs in one basket 

is potentially appropriate here. It may make sense to diversify risk. 

One path forward might involve investing in some number of 

smaller aircraft carriers. 

Though the air wing would be smaller in number than the current Ford-class aircraft carriers the Navy is building, it might be 

possible to extend the capabilities of such platforms by leveraging 

uninhabited systems or leveraging the potential for what is called 

manned/unmanned teaming or quarterbacking where one advanced 

U.S. Navy aircraft would work together quarterbacking several remotely piloted airplanes. It is a way to leverage the investment 

that the United States has already made and use the aircraft that 

the United States Navy has developed over the last generation. 

This will be very difficult for the Navy. The Navy is the best in 

the world because of its carriers and because of the carrier air 

wing. But as the Navy’s original investments in naval aviation and 

the carrier in the interwar period show, there is no innovation incubator like the United States Navy when it puts its mind to it. 

And that is something that I hope that this subcommittee will 

continue pushing the Navy on to ensure that the carrier air wing 

remains a vital part of the 21st century Navy. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Horowitz can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Dr. Horowitz. 

And Professor Rubel, we are going to have to wait until we get 

back. Fortunately, Speaker Ryan now has made sure that we are 

there within the 15-minute mark, so we don’t want to take a 

chance of anyone missing votes. 

So, with that, we will recess until the conclusion of votes and 

then we will begin again. 

Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, thank you for your patience during 

those votes. And when we left, I think we had Professor Rubel up 
7 

next. So, Professor, thank you for being with us and we look forward to your opening thoughts. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT C. RUBEL, PROFESSOR EMERITUS, 

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 

Mr. RUBEL. Thank you, Congressman. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Seapower and 

Projection Force Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, it is a distinct honor and privilege to be called to testify as 

a witness on the future of naval aviation, just as it was to be a 

practicing naval aviator for the first 20 years of my 48-year Navy 

career, 30 of which were Active Duty. 

You have read my written testimony that lays out my concerns 

about the readiness of naval aviation to deal with the challenges 

that are emerging. 

In my view, the Navy cannot continue to deploy and operate as 

it has since the end of World War II. A combination of rising naval 

competitors and reduced budgets force a fundamental rethinking of 

both force structure or, as Admiral Richardson, the current CNO 

[Chief of Naval Operations] puts it, fleet design, and operational 

doctrine. This will be a difficult process for a Navy that has been 

accustomed to unchallenged supremacy for the past 25 years. 

Among other things, I advocate relieving the carrier force from 

routine presence duty so that the Navy can develop doctrine and 

training for a concentrated carrier force that can provide adequate 

warfighting capabilities in the face of new threats. 

The need to shift from a dispersed, constabulary posture to a 

warfighting posture was described by our foremost naval theoretician Alfred Thayer Mahan in 1911 as he observed the naval 

arms races occurring in Europe. A concentrated fleet was, at that 

time, needed to support the Monroe Doctrine, the central U.S. strategic policy of the day. Concentration was needed for two purposes: 

deterrence and response. 

Today, we observe a certain rhyming of history, rising naval powers forcing the U.S. Navy to consider military concentration vice 

constabulary dispersion. However, in today’s world, the constabulary function is still critical to the execution of U.S. strategy. 

The Navy must deploy where needed to cultivate the global maritime partnerships to bolster maritime security, to reassure allies 

and friends, and generally defend the global system of commerce 

and security. 

Whereas up to now this presence function could be performed by 

most any kind of unit, today the need is for units that possess credible war-at-sea capabilities in order to deter and disrupt regional 

aggression and constitute a viable crisis response force. The embryonic concept of distributed lethality holds promise for creating this 

kind of force. 

If the Navy is able to constitute such a force and keep the carriers substantially in reserves, new approaches to the design of air 

wings become possible. I outline some illustrative ideas in my full 

testimony statement. 

I believe the Nation needs to invest more in its Navy than currently. But even if funds become available, fleet design should 

change along the general lines I advocate. Doing so will reduce 
8 

strategic risks by allowing the Navy to harmonize tactical and 

operational risks with the stakes involved in any particular crisis 

by avoiding placing the national command authority in an all-ornothing situation. 

I believe in the continuing strategic utility of aircraft carriers, 

but they must be used differently than in the past because geopolitical conditions have changed. I urge the Congress to support 

Admiral Richardson as he undertakes the difficult job of putting 

the Navy’s rudder over and steering a course for change. 

Thank you, sirs. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rubel can be found in the Appendix on page 58.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Professor. 

I am going to defer my questions until the end. 

So, I would like to recognize Mr. Courtney now for any questions 

that he might have. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to all the witnesses for, you know, really great, 

thoughtful, stimulating testimony. And again, as we are about to 

embark on the budget process, the timing is perfect. And again, 

you know, your written comments obviously are going to be made 

part of the record and circulated to all the members. 

Again, there is a lot to sort of ask questions about. I guess one 

I wanted to start with, Captain Rubel, you know, trying to visualize your concluding remarks about sort of moving away from a 

constabulatory role to a more concentrated use of the carriers and 

then distributed lethality to sort of fill the constabulary function. 

You know, there has been a lot of heartburn over the last couple 

of years or so about carrier gaps, you know, in terms of not being 

out there in different parts of the world where, you know, people 

have kind of grown accustomed to their presence. I guess, you 

know, that is—I wonder if you could just sort of elaborate a little 

bit more in terms of how you visualize the distributed lethality that 

would sort of reassure our allies and, obviously, you know, protect 

our national interests. 

Mr. RUBEL. It is a challenge. The carrier is sometimes referred 

to as an iconic ship type. That is, it is not only its size and advanced capabilities, but also its reputation from World War II on 

give it a status in the eyes of not only American citizens, but citizens around the world, so that when one of those things shows up, 

it means something. 

The intangibles involved in that must be overcome as we work 

to substitute other types of forces for the carriers. I see the distributed lethality force as consisting of cruisers, destroyers, and other 

types of ships. Whether the LCS [littoral combat ships] will work 

out as part of that or not, I don’t know. But our amphibious forces, 

those are big ships. If we pack them with lots of missiles and advertise the fact and use exercises, live-fire demos, et cetera, and 

work the public relations part of it in tandem with the development 

of these new types of forces, I think we can get there. 

It seems to me we don’t have much of a choice. I don’t see us 

going beyond 11 carriers. Maybe we can, but if we can’t there 

aren’t enough carriers to maintain presence like we are used to, 

providing presence around the world, so something has to give. 
9 

Right now it is creating these unplanned gaps, which is a strategically risky way of doing business. 

The United States has a well-founded grand strategy, I believe, 

of maintaining a law-based world order and a free market, liberal 

trading economy globally. That kind of system requires security, it 

requires comprehensive security, and the Navy has to be out there 

with something. If we don’t have enough carriers to do it, we have 

to do it with something else. 

We might as well develop something that allows us to take the 

pressure off the carrier force and constitute a force, a warfighting 

force that will truly deter China, Russia, or whoever. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

Dr. Horowitz, again, you talked about the U-class sort of steps, 

you know, the stepped-up approach that it appears that, you know, 

the Navy is pursuing, starting with the tanker function, but you 

obviously were pretty adamant that, you know, we can’t just sort 

of stop there and that we have got to really, you know, enhance 

that technology to take it to a higher level. 

In terms of a timeline, you know, how do you sort of see that, 

you know, stepped-up use of unmanned aircraft as far as, you 

know, trying to achieve the goals that you laid out? 

Dr. HOROWITZ. Thanks for your question. This area, the intersection of robotics and military technology, is one where the technology is advancing quickly. And one of the biggest challenges, I 

think, for the United States military as a whole in this category, 

to back up a little bit, is how long our procurement timelines, you 

know, are. 

I mean, like, you know, we could have a whole different discussion about the acquisition system, but I think if you want to identify a risk point in the strategy that has been identified in the 

budget, from my perspective, it would be that it takes so long to 

actually acquire and deploy this tanker and then so long to use it 

and feel comfortable with it, so that it is, you know, 25 years later 

and we still really haven’t made progress. 

In some ways, the early discussions about what the next-gen 

[generation] naval fighter look like might be illustrative for understanding the direction that the Navy wants to move in. 

You know, Secretary Mabus made the comment last year, I believe, that the F–35 was likely to be the last manned naval fighter. 

And the rubber will meet the road when the Navy starts thinking 

about their plans for what the next-generation fighter looks like. 

That, I think, will be a really key decision point in ensuring that 

the Navy remains on the right track. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Conaway is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, thank you. 

And I apologize for missing your testimonies. 

Dr. Cropsey, here I am. I am on record as saying we need a 12th 

carrier. Can you talk to us about how many carriers we actually 

need? Is that pie in the sky? I know that may be a little bit aspirational, but can you talk to us about, from your perspective, what 

that would do for today’s Navy or 5 years from now maybe when 

we actually got that 12th carrier in the water? 

Dr. CROPSEY. Thanks for the question. 
10 

Mr. FORBES. Dr. Cropsey, do you have the mike on? 

Dr. CROPSEY. Yes, I do, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay, that is all right. Sometimes you have to keep 

it up—— 

Dr. CROPSEY. I need to talk louder. His point about carriers 

meaning something is right, I agree with that. He is absolutely 

right. They mean ISR, they mean strike, they mean sea control, 

they mean anti-submarine warfare. 

I also think that it is correct that one carrier in each of the areas 

of contention, as we have today, is insufficient now and will become 

more insufficient in the future and does not include the Mediterranean. 

So, it seems to me that we limit ourselves and we limit our capabilities and ultimately we limit our security by looking at this in 

terms of what can we afford. The question is, what do we have the 

will to do and what must be done? 

Before John Maynard Keynes, the idea of government spending 

going into debt was anathema to the rulers of Britain, the aristocracy, to the House of Commons. And when they looked at the cost 

of the Second Boer War, they realized that the sinking fund, which 

was meant to pay off limited debt, was not going to be sufficient 

and that they were really in the red in a way that horrified them. 

And they made changes in their Navy that started them on the 

path toward where they are today with 19 surface ships. 

I am afraid that if we think of the number of carriers in those 

terms, we will find ourselves in the same position in the future, 

which is why I think that we need something like 16 carriers, a 

number of ships that would allow them to operate together, and 

that would also require being able to integrate carrier operations, 

and a number of ships that would allow us to once again be present 

in force in the Mediterranean. Consider what is happening as we 

have left, look at what China and Russia are doing, and you know 

that. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Let me ask this question. I am currently reading 

a book about the First World War in the start and it is talking 

about the way the armies of the Germans and the Austro-Hungarians and Russians continued to train cavalry troops. They would 

finish up all of their exercises with a mass cavalry charge, sabers 

drawn, flags flapping, wonderful, grandiose kind of things. Are we 

at risk of clinging to a carrier concept much like the other outdated 

weapon systems have, you know, gone that direction? Are we at a 

point or at risk at all of something like that going on where we just 

look really foolish trying to cling to a weapon system like that? 

Dr. CROPSEY. I think we are always at risk of something like 

what you are saying. That is a reasonable question. I think that 

it would be that the argument against carriers and the specific argument against carriers in the future would be greatly strengthened by showing that there is an alternative that can perform 

those functions that well. 

And when I see that, then I will be convinced more than I am 

now that the risk you talk about is a real one. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Johnson is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
11 

Dr. Horowitz, while fifth-generation capabilities are critical in 

missions involving high-end threats in an anti-access area-denial 

environment, they are just as important in a low-threat environment, like Afghanistan today. The F–35C has capabilities that exceed the current air wing aircraft, such as the ability to carry over 

30 percent more ordnance and having around 50 percent more onstation time in a close-air-support mission. 

In addition to the fifth-generation capabilities of stealth, sensor 

fusion, combat identification and network connectivity, do you see 

these weapons’ long range and on-station time capabilities important in protecting our men and women on the ground? 

Dr. HOROWITZ. Thank you for your question. I think that the rollout of an effective F–35 throughout the fleet is vital for American 

naval power over the next generation. We can have, and a professor like me might be willing to engage in, an academic debate 

about an alternative. But where we are now, it is crucial that the 

F–35 is made to work and deploys. Because I think you are absolutely right that in Afghanistan, in many of these different scenarios around the world, some of which are not the highest-end 

combat situations, the capabilities that the F–35 will bring to the 

table are important. 

And I would say that is also a reason why I think I have emphasized the necessity of investing in next-generation munitions, because the platform, in some ways, is only as good as what it is firing at the end of the day. You know, the airframe is a means to 

an end. The means to the end in some cases might be surveillance, 

and in some cases it might be strike. 

And one way, to the extent that the F–35 has some limitations, 

to try to help it be better in some ways, is to give it better munitions to work with. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Rubel, do you have anything to add? 

Mr. RUBEL. The F–35 will bring key capabilities to the fleet, 

there is no doubt. I mean, it is the only game in town right now 

and it needs to work. 

We should not ignore the capabilities of the F–35B. The Marine 

Corps model will revolutionize the capabilities of the 10 big-deck 

amphibious ships we have, essentially, if we choose to do so, turning them into light aircraft carriers. There is really no comparison 

between the F–35B and the AV–8 Harrier. 

And so it creates a lot more possibilities for both the Navy and 

the Marine Corps having that airplane aboard those vessels. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Dr. Cropsey. 

Dr. CROPSEY. Congressman, did I understand correctly that your 

question applied also to low-end missions? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. 

Dr. CROPSEY. Yes. Well, sir, I don’t think that if the danger that 

you face on a camping trip is a grizzly bear that you should bring 

a 105 mm howitzer along with you. You can protect yourself with 

less. And the F–35, I do not disagree with my colleagues here about 

its effectiveness. I have had some questions about its radar crosssection and some questions about its usefulness as an air-to-air 

platform. 
12 

But I don’t have a lot of questions about its applicability to, for 

example, ISIS. It doesn’t seem to me as though that makes sense. 

If the target is an ISIS convoy, do we need a platform as advanced 

and as sophisticated as the F–35? I don’t think so. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And what would be the alternative? 

Dr. CROPSEY. Well, for example, the old OV–10, the observation 

plane which can land on aircraft carriers, can carry ordnance, it is 

a good design, low speed. Why are we using such an expensive and 

powerful platform against such a relatively small target? 

Mr. JOHNSON. What do you say, Dr. Horowitz? 

Dr. HOROWITZ. My concern is that I am not sure we have a 

choice, given the current procurement plans of the Navy. And I 

think the F–35 is, as I think my colleague said, perhaps, you know, 

the only game in town for those kinds of missions. 

I agree that it would be better if there was a lower-cost option 

that we could use to deliver strikes in cases where the full range 

of capabilities of the F–35 are not needed. But given current procurement plans, the F–35 will be necessary. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. 

Dr. Cropsey, the Navy seeks to decommission the 10th carrier air 

wing in the President’s budget for this year. But the fiscal year 

2012 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] directs the Secretary of the Navy to ensure that the Navy maintains a minimum 

of 10 carrier air wings and for each such carrier air wing a dedicated and fully staffed headquarters. 

How do you see the decommissioning of the 10th wing? Would 

that be running counter to the law? And do you think it is a good 

idea to decommission one of our carrier air wings? 

Dr. CROPSEY. I think you are, Mr. Chairman, in a better position 

to answer the question about whether it runs counter to the law. 

On the question of the advisability of the idea, I think it is another of the salami slicing that the Navy has been forced to and 

has chosen to do over the past 10 to 15 years. And the way I look 

at it is that the more slices you take away from the salami, the less 

salami you have left. 

So, this strikes me as an ill-advised idea and one that will not 

improve the carrier air wings as a whole or naval aviation’s capability. It is very simple. We keep on reducing like this and we keep 

on talking as though the constraints that we are looking at right 

now are absolute ceilings, we are going to end up as the British 

did. That is a certainty. 

Mr. FORBES. Dr. Horowitz, you mentioned earlier that you believed we should be looking at a smaller-type aircraft carrier. The 

Navy has testified before to us that they have examined that and 

over and over again come back with the conclusion that we should 

not, that we should stay with the size that we have. 

There is some discussion, and I know Professor Rubel has even 

talked about, that we may be moving away from what we have 

seen of late for our carriers, which is to provide strike capacity to 

land targets, and they may actually be involved in warfare at sea, 

which would require us to have more planes coming together. 
13 

What advantage do you think the smaller aircraft carrier would 

have, given the fact that you would still need the same platforms 

to defend the small carrier as you would a large carrier and it may 

necessitate having to have more small carriers to get that kind of 

mass of planes together? 

Dr. HOROWITZ. That is a great question. And I think that the potential value of small carriers lies, in part, in the way that it will 

help the Navy diversify risk. In a threat environment where the 

large carriers are not at risk of being essentially in naval combat, 

that it makes a lot of sense to have a small number of large carriers that act as mobile airfields for land-based strike more than 

anything else. 

But if losing ships becomes something that is possible in war 

once again, as it seems like it potentially is, given the changes in 

the threat environment, then from a strategy perspective, setting 

aside sort of cost efficiency and budget for a moment, a diversity 

through increasing the carrier fleet through some small carriers 

makes sense. 

I think the Navy is not wrong that it would certainly be expensive to do. 

Mr. FORBES. Professor Rubel, looking at all the roles unmanned 

carrier aircraft could fulfill, do you see the need for a single or multiple types of unmanned aircraft to perform the ISR, buddy tanker, 

and long-range strike missions? And how would you prioritize those 

missions? 

Mr. RUBEL. As I outlined in my testimony, I do foresee the need 

for a range of different types of unmanned aircraft, ranging from 

a high-aspect ratio, in other words a long, straight, narrow wing 

that is optimized for high endurance and high altitude, to act as 

a relay, line-of-sight relay platform for the battle force network in 

case our satellites get taken out, and other ISR and miscellaneous 

duties; a low-aspect ratio, in other words a swept-wing, strike-fighter-like version that can be used for strike and especially air-to-air 

work; and then maybe a third type that would be the tanker, be 

the ASW, anti-submarine warfare, platform, do any number of 

other support duties around the carrier. 

So, just as we had a family of aircraft aboard the old carriers, 

I mean, when I started flying we had fighters, two types of attack 

aircraft, ASW aircraft plus helos [helicopters] plus the airborne 

early-warning airplane, we had a real variety of specialized aircraft, we should consider specializing our unmanned aircraft in a 

similar manner. 

Mr. FORBES. And Dr. Cropsey, given the fact that we are seeing 

the capabilities and capacities of China to produce and deploy antiaccess weapons, including the DF–21, but obviously not limited to 

that one system, is it critical for our air wings to possess longrange, penetrating strike capabilities to maintain a credible deterrent? Or is that something that we should not necessarily be focused upon? 

Dr. CROPSEY. I think we should definitely be focused on that. The 

likelihood is that China’s DF–21 capabilities, once demonstrated, 

will find their ways into other parts of the world as well. So, this 

is not the only place where long-range penetration is going to be 

an issue. 
14 

We might be able to solve that simply by tanking. I am not so 

sure of that. But I am much more certain that we will see this 

problem elsewhere. It will multiply. And as all of us have said 

here, this is where things are going and this is how things are 

changing. Nobody is going to let us amass a force next to their nation the way we did in Desert Storm. That was yesterday. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, we told you at the outset, too, that we 

wanted to give each of you a few minutes if you needed it to put 

anything else on the record that we perhaps haven’t covered, that 

might be outside of the testimony that you offered. I would like to 

offer you that opportunity now. 

And Professor Rubel, maybe we will start with you. Anything 

else you have in summary for this afternoon? 

Mr. RUBEL. The United States, one way or another, has to find 

a way to achieve strategic efficiency. In other words, our goals to 

maintain a law-based, liberal-trading, international order stays the 

same. But we are increasingly challenged by rising threats and 

deep national debt, so we are getting squeezed from two sides. 

To do this, we need to get more strategically efficient in all our 

operations. From the Navy’s point of view, like I have outlined, we 

relieve the carriers of their station-keeping duties, substitute a distributed lethality force, I think the Navy can maintain its support 

for the national strategy with that kind of a three-tiered force, 

which I outline in my testimony, at a cost maybe not the same as 

now, the Navy’s going to need augmentation of its budget, but at 

least an affordable cost for the United States. 

So, we simply have to think about the architecture of our fleet 

differently than we have been. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

Dr. Horowitz. 

Dr. HOROWITZ. Thanks. And thank you again for the opportunity 

to testify before this subcommittee. 

I think that the United States Navy is facing something right 

now that it has proven historically to be incredibly hard, even for 

the best meaning militaries in the world to do, and that is to reinvent itself on the fly while you are the best in the world. And 

that is extremely challenging. And one of the areas where that will 

likely have to occur over the next generation is with the carrier air 

wing. 

I think that it is very fortunate that both through the advocacy 

of this subcommittee and the current leadership of the Pentagon 

that there is positive momentum for investing in next-generation 

systems, particularly, but not limited to, the unmanned space that 

I think will be necessary for deep-strike capabilities in the next 

generation. 

But I think there is a real challenge, given the fiscal environment, in the next administration that will come up, and it will be 

crucial for this subcommittee to ensure that that administration 

understands this challenge as well. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Doctor. 

Dr. Cropsey. 

Dr. CROPSEY. I would also like to thank you again for the honor 

and opportunity to speak here. 
15 

We have gone over the major points here about the carrier air 

wing, I think, to people’s satisfaction. It needs to be more robust 

than it is. There need to be more planes on its decks. Restoring the 

diversity of the air wing is critical to the platform’s capabilities to 

its future, extending the air wing’s range, using drones as tankers, 

and then the follow-on steps that my colleagues have talked about, 

providing cheaper missiles, building them, integrated carrier operations, perhaps adding smaller carriers to the larger carriers of 

which I have said we need more, distributing lethality, increasing 

the naval budget. 

But I think that one of the most important things that this subcommittee has done and can do in the future is to tell people, tell 

your constituents, tell the country what this means, what are the 

stakes here. 

I don’t like to use this term because I hope that it is not true, 

but I fear that we as a nation are becoming sea blind and that 

what was known very well by Army generals and merchants and 

naval, obviously, people in the Navy at the beginning of the republic has been lost and is just not understood anymore and our reliance on strong seapower forces, our reliance on increasing globalized seaborne trade, that these are all subjects that are a little bit 

over the horizon for most people. 

And I think that you play an extremely important role, not only 

by your advocacy of seapower, but in your ability to articulate its 

importance to the public. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, gentlemen, thank you all so much for being 

with us. Thank you for your testimony and helping us to create 

this record. 

We look forward to talking with you in the future as these questions arise. But we really appreciate you spending your time today. 

And Mr. Courtney, if you have nothing else, then we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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