The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado

2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203

2022 CO 13

Supreme Court Case No. 21SC6

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals

Court of Appeals Case No. 19CA546

Petitioner:

Saul Cisneros,

v.

Respondent:

Bill Elder, in his official capacity as Sheriff of El Paso County, Colorado.

Judgment Reversed

en banc

March 21, 2022

Attorneys for Petitioner:

Holland & Hart LLP

Stephen G. Masciocchi

Denver, Colorado

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Colorado 

Mark Silverstein 

Arielle Herzberg 

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent:

Office of the County Attorney of El Paso County, Colorado

Mary Margaret Ritchie, Assistant County Attorney

Colorado Springs, Colorado
2

JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF

JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE 

HART, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.
3

JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 We granted certiorari to consider whether the division below erred in 

concluding that section 24-10-106(1.5)(b), C.R.S. (2021), of the Colorado 

Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”) does not waive sovereign immunity for 

intentional torts that result from the operation of a jail for claimants who are 

incarcerated but not convicted. 

¶2 We now conclude that section 24-10-106(1.5)(b) waives immunity for such 

intentional torts. In reaching this determination, we conclude that the statutory 

language waiving immunity for “claimants who are incarcerated but not yet 

convicted” and who “can show injury due to negligence” sets a floor, not a ceiling. 

To hold otherwise would mean that a pre-conviction claimant could recover for 

injuries resulting from the negligent operation of a jail but not for injuries resulting 

from the intentionally tortious operation of the same jail, an absurd result that we 

cannot countenance.

¶3 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the division below and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶4 In November 2017, Saul Cisneros was charged with two misdemeanor 

offenses and jailed in the El Paso County Criminal Justice Center (the “jail”). The 

court set Cisneros’s bond at $2,000, and Cisneros’s daughter posted that bond four 
4

days later, but the El Paso County Sheriff’s Office did not release Cisneros. 

Instead, pursuant to Sheriff Bill Elder’s policies and practices, the Sheriff’s Office

notified U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) that the jail had been 

asked to release Cisneros on bond. ICE then sent the jail a detainer and 

administrative warrant, requesting that the jail continue to detain Cisneros 

because ICE suspected that he was removable from the United States.

¶5 Pursuant to Sheriff Elder’s policies and practices, the Sheriff’s Office

complied with ICE’s request, placed Cisneros on an indefinite “ICE hold,” and 

continued to detain him. The jail subsequently advised Cisneros’s daughter that 

the Sheriff’s Office would not release her father due to the ICE hold, and she 

ultimately recovered the bond money that she had posted.

¶6 During his detention, Cisneros, along with another pretrial detainee,

initiated a class action in state court against Sheriff Elder, in his official capacity,

for declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief. Their complaint alleged that 

Sheriff Elder did not have the authority under state law to continue to hold pretrial 

detainees in custody when Colorado law required their release, nor did he have 

the authority to deprive persons of their liberty based on suspicion of civil

violations of federal immigration law. Cisneros also asserted a tort claim against 

Sheriff Elder, seeking damages for false imprisonment, but he subsequently filed 

an amended complaint in which he did not reassert that claim, stating that he 
5

intended to file the requisite notice of such a claim under the CGIA and to reassert 

that claim at the proper time. Cisneros and Sheriff Elder later agreed, however,

that, in order to allow the class action lawsuit to proceed without undue delay, 

Cisneros would not reassert his tort claim in the class action lawsuit and Sheriff 

Elder would not assert claim or issue preclusion as a defense in any future lawsuit 

brought by Cisneros asserting that claim.

¶7 In March 2018, the El Paso County District Court issued a preliminary 

injunction enjoining Sheriff Elder from relying on ICE immigration detainers or 

administrative warrants as grounds for refusing to release pretrial detainees from 

custody when they post bond, complete their sentences, or otherwise resolve their 

criminal cases. The court thus ordered Sheriff Elder to release Cisneros and his 

co-plaintiff, pending resolution of their criminal cases, if they posted bond. 

Cisneros’s daughter did so again for her father, and Cisneros was released from

custody, nearly four months after his initial detention.

¶8 Thereafter, Cisneros and his co-plaintiff moved for summary judgment, 

asking the district court to grant mandamus relief, declare that Sheriff Elder’s 

challenged policies violate the Colorado Constitution, and enter a permanent 

injunction prohibiting those practices. The court granted this motion and entered 

a judgment declaring that Sheriff Elder had exceeded his authority under 

Colorado law and violated the Colorado Constitution by relying on ICE detainers 
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or administrative warrants as grounds for refusing to release prisoners who post 

bond, complete their sentences, or otherwise resolve their criminal cases.

¶9 Sheriff Elder then appealed. While his appeal was pending, however, the 

legislature enacted and Governor Polis signed into law House Bill 19-1124, now

codified at sections 24-76.6-101 to -103, C.R.S. (2021). This law expressly prohibits 

state law enforcement officers from detaining inmates based on civil immigration 

detainer requests. See § 24-76.6-102(2), C.R.S. (2021). The court of appeals division

considering Sheriff Elder’s appeal then concluded that this intervening legislation 

mooted the appeal, and the division therefore dismissed it. Cisneros v. Elder, 

No. 19CA0136, ¶ 3 (Sept. 3, 2020).

¶10 Cisneros then filed the instant action against Sheriff Elder, in his official 

capacity, alleging that Cisneros’s pretrial detainment constituted false 

imprisonment and seeking damages. Sheriff Elder responded by moving to 

dismiss the complaint under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), asserting that the CGIA immunized 

him from liability.

¶11 The district court ultimately denied Sheriff Elder’s motion, concluding that 

Cisneros’s claim of false imprisonment falls within the CGIA’s waiver of immunity 

for injuries resulting from the operation of a jail under section 24-10-106(1.5)(b), 

which allows claims asserted by claimants who are “incarcerated but not yet 

convicted” if such claimants “can show injury due to negligence.” In so 
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concluding, the district court rejected Sheriff Elder’s contentions that Cisneros’s 

alleged injuries did not result from the operation of a jail because, in the court’s 

view, “the Sheriff’s determination of whether or not to release an inmate lies at the 

very heart of the Sheriff’s duties and is intimately related to the purpose and 

operation of the Jail.” In addition, construing the waiver of immunity broadly and 

seeking to avoid an absurd result, the court determined that the statutory 

requirement that a pre-conviction claimant show “injury due to negligence” is 

satisfied not only if the claimant suffers an injury due to negligence, but also “for 

injuries due to anything greater than negligence, including both gross negligence 

and intentional actions.” To find otherwise, the court opined, “would be to apply 

a narrow, rather than a broad, construction of this ambiguous waiver provision, 

and it would lead to the absurd result that a detainee could sue for negligent 

actions committed in a jail but not for intentional torts.” The court concluded, 

“Such a result would not be just and reasonable, nor would it effect the purposes 

of the CGIA.”

¶12 Pursuant to section 24-10-108, C.R.S. (2021), Sheriff Elder then filed an 

interlocutory appeal, arguing, among other things, that the district court had erred 

in ruling that the CGIA’s waiver of governmental immunity under section 

24-10-106(1.5)(b) extends to injuries caused by intentional torts.
8

¶13 In a split, published decision, another division of the court of appeals 

reversed the district court’s order, agreeing with Sheriff Elder that the waiver of 

governmental immunity in section 24-10-106(1.5)(b) applies only to negligent 

conduct that results in injury and does not provide a remedy for intentional 

misconduct. Cisneros v. Elder, 2020 COA 163M, ¶¶ 4, 39–40, 490 P.3d 985, 986, 990. 

In the majority’s view, “‘[N]egligence’ means negligence; it does not mean 

intentional conduct.” Id. at ¶ 4, 490 P.3d at 986. Thus, the waiver of sovereign 

immunity under section 24-10-106(1.5)(b), which references only “injury due to

negligence,” must be read as applying only to injuries caused by negligence, and 

not to those caused by intentional torts. Id. at ¶¶ 19–20, 490 P.3d at 988. The 

majority was not persuaded otherwise by Cisneros’s argument that because 

intentional acts subsume negligent ones, the waiver provision must extend to 

intentional torts. Id. at ¶¶ 24–26, 490 P.3d at 988–89. According to the majority, 

under settled Colorado law, negligence and intentional torts are distinct, and, by 

definition, negligence does not include intentional acts. Id. at ¶¶ 25–26, 490 P.3d 

at 988–89.

¶14 Writing only for herself, Judge Terry, who authored the majority opinion,

went on to review, “for the sake of completeness,” the legislative history, which 

she concluded reinforced the majority’s reading of section 24-10-106(1.5)(b). Id. at 

¶¶ 28, 37, 490 P.3d at 989–90. In Judge Terry’s view, the legislative hearings on 
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section 24-10-106(1.5)(b) demonstrated that the legislature had introduced this 

provision in response to concerns about inmates bringing frivolous negligence 

claims against jails and correctional facilities, and intentional torts were not part 

of the legislature’s motivation. Id. at ¶¶ 31–32, 490 P.3d at 989–90. Judge Terry 

further believed that statements made by the bill’s sponsors suggested their 

understanding that the law would not cover intentional acts. Id. at ¶¶ 33–37, 

490 P.3d at 990.

¶15 Judge Johnson specially concurred. In her view, because the language of 

section 24-10-106(1.5)(b) unambiguously limits its waiver of governmental 

immunity to cases in which a pretrial detainee can show injury due to negligence, 

Judge Terry’s reliance on legislative history to bolster her analysis was 

unnecessary. Id. at ¶¶ 43–47, 490 P.3d at 991 (Johnson, J., specially concurring).

¶16 Judge Richman dissented, opining that the majority’s interpretation of 

section 24-10-106(1.5)(b) was “not supported by the plain language of the statute 

read as a whole, or by the purpose of the CGIA.” Id. at ¶ 57, 490 P.3d at 993

(Richman, J., dissenting). In Judge Richman’s view, reading section 

24-10-106(1.5)(b) as waiving immunity for the negligent operation of a jail but not 

for the commission of an intentional tort by the jailer is “illogical” and turns the 

CGIA provision’s purpose, which is to waive immunity for injuries resulting from 

the operation of a jail, on its head. Id. at ¶ 62, 490 P.3d at 993. In addition, relying 
10

on other CGIA provisions, Judge Richman reasoned that negligence was intended 

as a “minimal” standard under the statute (i.e., as a floor and not a ceiling). Id. at 

¶¶ 63–64, 490 P.3d at 994. Judge Richman further observed that Colorado courts 

have consistently rejected strict constructions of CGIA waivers when such 

constructions “would improperly vitiate the practical operation of those waivers.” 

Id. at ¶ 65, 490 P.3d at 994 (citing Daniel v. City of Colo. Springs, 2014 CO 34, ¶ 21, 

327 P.3d 891, 897). And Judge Richman pointed out that when a literal 

interpretation of a statute leads to an absurd result, which he believed the 

majority’s reading of section 24-10-106(1.5)(b) did, the legislature’s intent must 

prevail. Id. at ¶ 66, 490 P.3d at 994 (citing AviComm, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 

955 P.2d 1023, 1031 (Colo. 1998)).

¶17 Even if the statute’s language could be said to be ambiguous, however, 

Judge Richman still disagreed with the majority’s conclusion because, in his view, 

section 24-10-106(1.5)(b)’s legislative history revealed a legislative intent to waive 

immunity not only for negligence claims, but also for “more serious” torts, 

including gross negligence and intentional torts. Id. at ¶¶ 68–69, 490 P.3d at 994. 

In support of this conclusion, Judge Richman noted that (1) a previous version of 

the applicable legislation read “only if the person [could] show injury due to 

negligence,” but in the final version, the word “only” was deleted; and 

(2) comments by the bill’s sponsor indicated that the legislature’s principal 
11

motivation was to preclude strict liability for injuries resulting from jail operations 

by requiring a minimum showing of negligence in order for the waiver of 

immunity to apply. Id. at ¶¶ 70–73, 490 P.3d at 994–95 (alteration in original).

¶18 Cisneros petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari, and we granted his 

petition.

II. Analysis

¶19 We begin by addressing our standard of review and the applicable 

principles of statutory construction. Next, we discuss the CGIA generally and

section 24-10-106(1.5)(b)’s waiver of governmental immunity for injuries resulting 

from the operation of a jail and suffered by claimants who are “incarcerated but 

not yet convicted.” Last, we apply these principles to the matter before us and

conclude that section 24-10-106(1.5)(b) waives immunity for intentional torts 

resulting from the operation of a jail for such claimants.

A. Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory Construction

¶20 Governmental immunity implicates issues of subject matter jurisdiction, 

which we determine in accordance with C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). Daniel, ¶ 10, 327 P.3d 

at 894. When, as here, the pertinent facts underlying a trial court’s jurisdictional 

findings are undisputed and the issue presents a question of law, then our review 

is de novo. Id.
12

¶21 We likewise review questions of statutory construction de novo. Ryser v. 

Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 2021 CO 11, ¶ 14, 480 P.3d 1286, 1289. In construing a statute, 

we aim to effectuate the legislature’s intent. Id. To do so, “we consider the entire 

statutory scheme to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its 

parts, and we construe words and phrases in accordance with their plain and 

ordinary meanings.” Id. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, then 

we do not resort to other rules of statutory construction. Oakwood Holdings, LLC v. 

Mortg. Invs. Enters. LLC, 2018 CO 12, ¶ 12, 410 P.3d 1249, 1252. We presume, 

however, that the General Assembly intends a just and reasonable result. City & 

Cnty. of Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Denver Classroom Tchrs. Ass’n, 2017 CO 30, ¶ 11, 

407 P.3d 1220, 1223. Accordingly, “although we must give effect to the statute’s 

plain and ordinary meaning, the intention of the legislature will prevail over a 

literal interpretation of the statute that leads to an absurd result.” AviComm, 

955 P.2d at 1031 (citation omitted).

B. The CGIA

¶22 In general, the CGIA serves to shield public entities from tort liability. 

Daniel, ¶ 13, 327 P.3d at 895. Thus, section 24-10-108 states:

Except as provided in sections 24-10-104 to 24-10-106 and 24-10-106.3, 

sovereign immunity shall be a bar to any action against a public entity 

for injury which lies in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether 

that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by a 

claimant.
13

¶23 The legislature has, however, established a number of waivers of sovereign 

immunity that, when applicable, render public entities subject to tort liability in 

the same manner as if they were private persons. See §§ 24-10-106 to -107, C.R.S. 

(2021).

¶24 Pertinent here, section 24-10-106(1)(b) waives a public entity’s sovereign 

immunity for injuries resulting from that entity’s operation of any correctional 

facility or jail. This waiver does not apply, however, to “claimants who have been 

convicted of a crime and incarcerated in a correctional facility or jail pursuant to 

such conviction.” § 24-10-106(1.5)(a). In contrast, the waiver does apply to 

claimants who are “incarcerated but not yet convicted” of a crime “if such 

claimants can show injury due to negligence.” § 24-10-106(1.5)(b).

¶25 “Because governmental immunity under the CGIA is in derogation of

Colorado’s common law, we narrowly construe the CGIA’s immunity provisions,

and as a logical corollary, we broadly construe the CGIA’s waiver provisions.” 

Daniel, ¶ 13, 327 P.3d at 895. Broadly construing the CGIA’s waivers of sovereign 

immunity allows individuals to seek redress for injuries caused by public entities, 

which is “one of the basic but often overlooked” purposes of the CGIA. Id.

(quoting State v. Moldovan, 842 P.2d 220, 222 (Colo. 1992)).
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C. Application

¶26 Turning to the question before us, we will assume without deciding that 

section 24-10-106(1.5)(b) plainly and unambiguously waives immunity as to

claimants who are incarcerated but not convicted for injuries resulting from the 

operation of a jail, but only if they can establish claims for negligence.

¶27 Assuming such a literal interpretation, however, we initially conclude that 

such a construction would lead to absurd results. Under this interpretation, a 

pretrial detainee could recover damages for injuries caused by the negligent 

operation of a jail but not for injuries caused by the intentionally tortious operation

of the same jail. As a result, defendants sued for injuries resulting from the 

operation of a jail could successfully defend against liability by claiming that they

did not accidentally cause the plaintiff injury but rather they meant to harm the 

plaintiff. In our view, such a result would be absurd. See Absurd, Webster’s Third 

New International Dictionary (2002) (defining “absurd” as “marked by an obvious 

lack of reason, common sense, proportion, or accord with accepted ideas : 

ridiculously unreasonable, unsound, or incongruous”). Indeed, no party has 

offered a reasonable basis for allowing such a result, and we can conceive of none.

¶28 Because a literal interpretation of section 24-10-106(1.5)(b) would lead to an 

absurd result, we therefore may look to the legislature’s intent in construing that 

provision. See AviComm, 955 P.2d at 1031.
15

¶29 In seeking to discern the legislature’s intent, we initially acknowledge that 

the parties each find statements in the legislative history that they believe support 

their respective arguments. We, however, need not wade deeply into that debate. 

Rather, it suffices for us to observe that the principal concern motivating the 

enactment of section 24-10-106(1.5)(b) was to ensure that correctional facilities and 

jails would not be held strictly liable for injuries incurred by pre-conviction 

incarcerated claimants. See, e.g., Hearing on H.B. 1284 before the S., 59th Gen. 

Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (May 9, 1994) (statement of Sen. Mutzebaugh, Senate 

sponsor of H.B. 1284) (clarifying that under the proposed amendment, a claimant 

“at least has to allege some sort of negligence on the part of the jail or correctional 

facility” to prevail, a requirement that was deemed necessary to avoid the 

“absolute responsibility” for inmate injuries that courts had imposed on counties 

and to counter the argument that counties should be liable based solely on the 

existence of an alleged “special relationship” between inmates and the counties 

that were detaining them); Hearing on H.B. 1284 before the S., 59th Gen. Assemb., 

2d Reg. Sess. (May 10, 1994) (statement of Sen. Mutzebaugh, Senate sponsor of 

H.B. 1284) (“What I intended here was we have a court decision that that [sic] has 

kind of said you don’t have to be negligent. That [jailers] are administratively 

responsible for that person just because he’s incarcerated. And what I want to do 

is put a very minimal standard on the part of those people who are incarcerated, 
16

but not convicted, to show some negligence and gross negligence would have been 

a higher standard than I, than I particularly wanted, but I want to show some 

negligence on the part of the operation of that facility before they can recover. So 

this is to set a minimum kind of standard that someone has to meet before they 

can pursue their claim against the county or the state.”).

¶30 This overriding purpose, when coupled with the above-noted settled 

principle that we construe the CGIA’s immunity provisions narrowly and waiver

provisions broadly, Daniel, ¶ 13, 327 P.3d at 895, convinces us that section 

24-10-106(1.5)(b)’s requirement that pre-conviction incarcerated claimants must 

prove “injury due to negligence” was intended as a floor, not a ceiling. 

Accordingly, we conclude that section 24-10-106(1.5)(b) waives immunity for 

intentional torts, including false imprisonment, resulting from the operation of a 

jail for claimants who are incarcerated but not convicted.

¶31 So concluding avoids the absurd result of allowing pre-conviction 

incarcerated claimants to recover for injuries caused by the negligent operation of 

a jail but not for those caused by the intentionally tortious operation of that same

jail. Moreover, our interpretation serves the CGIA’s purpose of allowing parties 

to seek redress for injuries caused by public entities. See Daniel, ¶ 13, 327 P.3d at 

895; Moldovan, 842 P.2d at 222. And reading section 24-10-106(1.5)(b) to require a 

claimant to make a minimum showing of negligence ensures that those who 
17

operate correctional facilities and jails will not be held strictly liable for any injuries 

resulting from such operations, a prime purpose of that provision.

¶32 In reaching this determination, we are not persuaded by Sheriff Elder’s

argument that, as to “more culpable torts,” the CGIA waives immunity only for 

public employees as a matter of personal liability, not for public entities as a matter 

of governmental liability. The CGIA establishes a regime by which (1) public 

entities are not liable for actions that lie in tort or could lie in tort unless immunity 

is waived, see §§ 24-10-105(1), -106(1), C.R.S. (2021); and (2) public employees are 

generally not liable for injuries arising out of acts or omissions occurring during 

the performance of their duties and within the scope of their employment, unless 

such acts or omissions were willful and wanton, see §§ 24-10-105, -118(2)(a), C.R.S. 

(2021). The fact that the legislature allowed for individual-capacity actions against 

public employees in certain circumstances, however, has no bearing on whether a 

public entity has waived immunity under the CGIA. These are separate and 

distinct issues, and Sheriff Elder offers no applicable authority to support his view 

that because the legislature allowed individual-capacity lawsuits against public 

employees for their willful and wanton conduct, it intended to preserve public 

entities’ immunity from suit arising from their own intentionally tortious 

misconduct.
18

¶33 The case law and other CGIA provisions on which Sheriff Elder relies do not 

indicate otherwise. These authorities generally establish that (1) public employees 

do not enjoy sovereign immunity when sued in their individual capacities for 

willful and wanton conduct and (2) public entities are not liable for the willful and 

wanton conduct of their employees. See, e.g., Middleton v. Hartman, 45 P.3d 721, 

724, 728 (Colo. 2002) (holding that “state employees do not enjoy sovereign 

immunity when sued in their individual capacities for willful and wanton conduct

because, under these circumstances, relief is not sought from the state but only 

from the employees individually,” and opining that “the state is not liable for its 

employees’ willful and wanton conduct”); Carothers v. Archuleta Cnty. Sheriff, 

159 P.3d 647, 654 (Colo. App. 2006) (concluding that a sheriff could not be held 

liable on a respondeat superior theory for the willful and wanton conduct of an 

employee in circumstances in which sovereign immunity has not been waived); 

Ramos v. City of Pueblo, 28 P.3d 979, 980–81 (Colo. App. 2001) (observing that 

nothing in the CGIA indicates that a public entity may be liable for the willful and 

wanton conduct of a public employee); §§ 24-10-110(1)(a), (b)(I), C.R.S. (2021) 

(providing that a public entity is liable for the costs of defense of, and the payment 

of all judgments and settlements of claims against, any of its public employees 

when the claim arises out of injuries sustained from acts or omissions of such 
19

employees occurring during the performance of their duties and within the scope 

of their employment, except when such acts or omissions are willful and wanton).

¶34 Here, Cisneros has not sued a public employee in his individual capacity for 

willful and wanton conduct, nor is he seeking to hold a public entity liable for an 

employee’s willful and wanton conduct. Rather, Cisneros has sued Sheriff Elder 

in his official capacity (based on his policies and practices relating to indefinite ICE 

holds), and such an action is treated as a suit against the public entity itself. See 

Churchill v. Univ. of Colo., 2012 CO 54, ¶ 32, 285 P.3d 986, 997. Accordingly, this 

case does not raise a question as to whether Sheriff Elder can be held liable for the 

willful and wanton conduct of any of his employees, and the authorities on which 

Sheriff Elder relies are therefore inapposite.

¶35 In so determining, we acknowledge that in Gray v. University of Colorado

Hospital Authority, 2012 COA 113, ¶ 27, 284 P.3d 191, 196–97, the division 

concluded that “the CGIA does not provide for the waiver of the sovereign 

immunity of public entities from suit based either on their own willful and wanton 

acts or omissions, or their employees’ willful and wanton acts or omissions,” 

noting that we had reached the same conclusion in Middleton, 45 P.3d at 728. In

Middleton, however, we did not conclude that a public entity is immune from suit 

based on its own willful and wanton conduct. Rather, we addressed whether 

public employees enjoy sovereign immunity when sued in their individual 
20

capacities for willful and wanton conduct. Middleton, 45 P.3d at 724 & n.1. To the 

extent that the division in Gray thus misconstrued our holding in Middleton, we 

disavow that portion of the division’s opinion.

¶36 Finally, we note that Sheriff Elder argues that Cisneros cannot satisfy a 

prerequisite for establishing a waiver of immunity because he has shown neither 

an injury nor that any injury has resulted from the operation of a jail. Sheriff Elder 

also makes a number of arguments as to why he should prevail on the merits. 

Sheriff Elder’s contentions regarding whether Cisneros suffered an injury 

resulting from the operation of a jail is not within the question on which we 

granted certiorari, and we therefore will not address it. See Bermel v. BlueRadios, 

Inc., 2019 CO 31, ¶ 18 n.4, 440 P.3d 1150, 1154 n.4 (declining to address an issue 

that was beyond the scope of the question on which this court had granted 

certiorari). Likewise, Sheriff Elder’s arguments on the merits are not properly 

presented in an interlocutory appeal concerning issues of sovereign immunity. See 

Adams ex rel. Adams v. City of Westminster, 140 P.3d 8, 12 (Colo. App. 2005) 

(“[I]nterlocutory appeals under § 24-10-108 are limited to determining issues of 

sovereign immunity. Determining merits-based issues would expand the nature 

of appellate review beyond that mandated by statute.”).
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III. Conclusion

¶37 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that section 24-10-106(1.5)(b) waives 

immunity both for intentional torts and for acts of negligence resulting from the 

operation of a jail for claimants who are incarcerated but not convicted.

¶38 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the division below and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.