In the 

Court of Appeals for the 

Sixth District of Texas at Texarkana 

Donny Joe Curry, § 

 Appellant § 

 § 

 v. § Nos. 06-14-00140-CR

 § 06-14-00141-CR

The State of Texas, § 06-14-00142-CR

 Appellee § 

Trial Number CR1301628, CR1301627, and CR1301625 in the 

 The County Court at Law No. 1 of Hunt County 

The Honorable F. Duncan Thomas, Judge Presiding 

STATE’S BRIEF

Greg Willis 

County Attorney Pro Tem

Hunt County, Texas 

Oral argument is requested if 

Appellant also requests argument

Claire D. Miranda 

Special Prosecutor 

2100 Bloomdale Rd., Suite 200

 McKinney, TX 75071 

 (972) 548-4323

 FAX (214) 491-4860 

 State Bar No. 24037121

 cmiranda@co.collin.tx.us 

 

ACCEPTED

06-14-00140-cr

SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS

TEXARKANA, TEXAS

3/16/2015 3:12:21 PM

DEBBIE AUTREY

CLERK

 FILED IN 6th COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS 3/16/2015 3:12:21 PM DEBBIE AUTREY Clerk
i

Table of Contents

Index of Authorities................................................................................. iii

Statement Regarding Oral Argument ......................................................1

Statement of the Case ...............................................................................1

Statement of Facts.....................................................................................1

Summary of the State’s Arguments..........................................................6

Argument & Authorities ...........................................................................7

Issue One ( Sufficiency of the Evidence; Failure to Identify ) ................7

The evidence is sufficient to sustain Appellant's 

conviction for failure to identify. Appellant was 

lawfully detained by the police and refused to 

give his name after the peace officer asked for

that information.

I. Standard of Review...............................................................................7

II. The State proved that Appellant was guilty of Failure to 

Identify.................................................................................................8

A. Appellant was lawfully detained ........................................8

B. Appellant intentionally refused to give his name ............10

Issues Two, Three and Four (Punishment outside the applicable 

range).......................................................................................................13

Appellant was properly sentanced within the 

applicable range of punishment.

I. Standard of review..............................................................................13
ii

II. Appellant was sentanced properly within the applicable 

range of punishment on all Class C offenses ...........................13

Prayer ......................................................................................................16

Certificate of Service ...............................................................................17

Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................17
iii

Index of Authorities

Statutes, Codes, and Rules

Tex. Penal Code 

§ 6.03(a).............................................................................................10

 § 38.02(a).............................................................................................8

 § 38.02(c)(1).........................................................................................8

 §12.23................................................................................................ 13

Tex. R. App. P. 23 ................................................................................ 14

U.S. Const. amend. IV...........................................................................8

Cases

Arizona v. Johnson,

555 U.S. 323 (2009).............................................................................9

Asberry v. State,

813 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. App.—Dallas, 1991)....................................... 14

Brooks v. State,

323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) .............................................7

Ex parte Rich,

194 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ........................................... 13

Hemphill v. State,

505 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Crim. App 1974) ............................................ 10
iv

Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307 (1979).............................................................................7

Mizell v. State,

119 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ........................................... 13

Montgomery v. State,

369 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ......................................... 7, 8

Navarette v. California,

134 S.Ct. 1683 (2014)..........................................................................9

Overshown v. State,

329 S.W.3d 201 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010)...................9

Whren v. United States,

517 U.S. 806 (1996).............................................................................9
1

Statement Regarding Oral Argument

The State does not believe oral argument will assist the Court 

in resolving the issues in this case. However, if oral argument is 

granted to Appellant, the State requests the opportunity to respond.

Statement of the Case

Appellant pleaded not guilty before the Court and the Court returned 

the following verdicts:

Offense Cause No. Class Verdict Punishment

Fail to ID CR13001628 C Guilty $250 fine

FMFR CR1301625 C Guilty $250 fine

No Inspection CR1301627 C Guilty $250 fine

Statement of Facts

On August 26, 2013, Officer Samantha Manrique of the 

Commerce police department was on routine patrol on Highway 24 in 

Commerce, Hunt County, Texas 9 RR 63. At approximately 4:00 pm., 

Officer Manrique observed Appellant’s car swerve to the left, nearly 

striking the median and causing an accident, before heading through 

an intersection. 9 RR 63. Appellant’s car had a broken taillight and 

a homemade paper license plate. 9 RR 63. Due to these traffic 

violations, Officer Manrique signaled for Appellant to pull over by 
2

activating the overhead lights on her patrol car, and she performed a 

traffic stop of Appellant’s car. 9 RR 64.

When she approached the driver side window, Officer Manrique 

noted Appellant also had a handmade registration sticker and 

handmade paper inspection sticker that matched his “license plate”. 

9 RR 67; 12 RR 39-40. Officer Manrique asked for Appellant’s 

driver’s license. 9 RR 64-65 Appellant stated he had no driver license 

and no insurance. 9 RR 64-65 During her detention of Appellant, 

Officer Manrique asked Appellant’s name. 9 RR 64-65 Appellant 

responded that his first name was “Donny” and stated he did not wish 

to give his last name as it was a family name. 9 RR 64-65. Appellant

refused to give any further identifiers. 9 RR 70-71. After speaking 

with him further, Appellant handed Officer Manrique paperwork 

purporting to explain why he did not need to have a driver license,

insurance, or license plate. 9 RR 66. The paperwork did not provide

any identifying information. 9 RR 70-71. Appellant told Officer 

Manrique he was a sovereign citizen. 9 RR 66. Due to a concern 

about sovereign citizens’ proclivity toward violent behavior, Officer 

Manrique called her lieutenant for backup. 9 RR 66, 122-123.
3

Officer Manrique had to give dispatch a full description of the 

vehicle, as she could not identify the driver from his own statements 

or his “license plate”. 9 RR 66 Lieutenant Mike Pehl and Sergeant 

Steve Scott arrived on scene as backup. 9 RR 68. Manrique told 

Lieutenant Pehl that Appellant identified himself as a sovereign 

citizen. 9 RR 125-126. Lieutenant Pehl was aware through training 

and experience that sovereign citizens believe in a totally different 

form of government that derives from the law of man and the law of 

the land, rather than from the constitution. 9 RR 124-125. 

Lieutenant Pehl and Sargent Scott, both wearing police identification 

on their clothing, approached Appellant’s car and Lieutenant Pehl 

asked Appellant to identify himself. 9 RR 127. Lieutenant Pehl 

identified himself as a peace officer to Appellant. 9 RR 128. He 

informed Appellant that Appellant had to identify himself to a peace 

officer or he was in violation of the law. 9 RR 127-128. Appellant 

refused to identify himself but told Lieutenant Pehl he wanted to 

show him something. 9 RR 127-129 Appellant then reached into the 

top of his briefcase. 9 RR 128-129. Due to his fear about sovereign

citizens’ potential for violent behavior, Lieutenant Pehl drew his 
4

weapon from his holster and told Appellant to show him his hands. 9 

RR 128. Appellant pulled his hands from the briefcase, Lieutenant 

Pehl holstered his weapon and grabbed Appellant’s arm to pull 

Appellant from the car. 9 RR 128. Lieutenant Pehl pulled on 

Appellant’s arm several times but was not able to pull Appellant from 

the car. 9 RR 128-129. Lieutenant Pehl asked Officer Manrique for 

her Taser, which Manrique handed to him, and told Appellant he 

would tase him if he did not step out of the vehicle. 9 RR 129. 

Appellant continued to refuse. 9 RR 129. Lieutenant Pehl then tased 

Appellant. 9 RR 129.

Lieutenant Pehl continued trying to get Appellant out of the 

car, this time from the passenger’s side, but Appellant locked his 

arms on the steering wheel in resistance. 9 RR 97. Lieutenant Pehl 

tased Appellant a second time, this time in his side, to try and get 

Appellant compliant and was ultimately successful in pulling 

Appellant bodily from the car. Once outside, Appellant continued to 

flail about screaming. 9 RR 69-70, 129-130. Lieutenant Pehl held 

onto Appellant’s torso area and was able to secure one handcuff. 9 

RR 69-70, 129-170. Sergeant Scott had to secure the other handcuff 
5

on Appellant. 9 RR 69-70. Appellant was placed into custody at that 

time. 9 RR 69-70. Lieutenant Pehl located identifying paperwork in 

Appellant’s car after the arrest. 9 RR 82.
6

Summary of the State’s Arguments

State’s Reply to Issue One

The evidence is sufficient to sustain Appellant's conviction for 

failure to identify. Appellant intentionally refused to give his name

while he was lawfully detained and after officers requested that 

information.

State’s Reply to Issues Two, Three, and Four

Appellant was sentenced properly within the range of 

punishment for all Class C convictions. 
7

Argument & Authorities

Issue One

(Sufficiency: Failure to Identify)

The evidence is sufficient to sustain the 

conviction.

The evidence is sufficient to sustain Appellant's conviction for 

failure to identify. Appellant was lawfully detained by the police and 

refused to give his name after Officer Manrique and Lieutenant Pehl

requested that information.

I. Standard of review

In a sufficiency review, the appellate court views the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prosecution and determines whether 

any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 

(1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) 

(plurality & concurring opinions). The jury is the sole judge of the 

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their 

testimonies, and the reviewing court must not usurp this role by 

substituting its own judgment for that of the jury. Montgomery v. 
8

State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The duty of the

reviewing court is simply to ensure that the evidence presented 

supports the jury’s verdict and that the State has presented a legally 

sufficient case of the offense charged. Id. When the reviewing court 

is faced with contradicting inferences, the court must presume that 

the jury resolved any such conflicts in favor of the verdict, even if not 

explicitly stated in the record. Id.

II. The State proved that Appellant was guilty of Failure to 

Identify.

Appellant was convicted of refusing to give his name to a peace 

officer while being lawfully detained. The offense of failure to 

identify is defined as follows: “A person commits an offense if he 

intentionally refuses to give his name, residence address, or date of 

birth to a peace officer who has lawfully arrested the person and 

requested the information.” Tex. Penal Code § 38.02(a). An offense 

under this section is a Class C misdemeanor. Tex. Penal Code §

38.02(c)(1).

A. Appellant was lawfully detained

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution

protects individuals from unreasonable seizures. U.S. CONST. amend.
9

IV. When police officers signal that a driver should stop a moving 

vehicle and, in response, the driver actually stops the vehicle, the 

driver has been seized under the Fourth Amendment. See e.g., 

Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009). The seizure continues 

for the duration of the traffic stop and terminates when the police tell 

the driver he is free to leave. Id. A traffic stop is reasonable when 

there is reasonable suspicion to believe a traffic violation has 

occurred. Navarette v. California, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014). A 

traffic stop results in a “detention” of all individuals in the vehicle. 

Johnson, 555 U.S. at 327.

Appellant does not argue that the detention was unreasonable, 

but merely that there was no detention. App. Br. 11. Officer 

Manrique observed Appellant commit traffic violations and she 

stopped the vehicle he was driving. 9 RR 64. Because Officer 

Manrique had an objectively reasonable basis for making the traffic 

stop, Appellant was lawfully detained at the inception of the stop. 

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996); Overshown 

v. State, 329 S.W.3d 201, 207 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010)

(finding that “lawful detention” in the context of a failure to identify
10

case extends to vehicle passengers). Appellant gave his initial refusal 

to identify at the beginning of the stop and thus, the stop was not

unreasonably extended. Appellant remained detained while backup 

officers arrived and again refused to give his name when questioned 

by Lieutenant Pehl. 

There is sufficient evidence to find beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Appellant was lawfully detained when he refused to give Officer 

Manrique his name.

B. Appellant intentionally refused to give his name

“A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the 

nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his 

conscious objective to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” Tex. 

Penal Code §6.03(a). It is well settled that intent is a question of fact 

to be determined by the trier of facts from all facts and circumstances 

in evidence. Hemphill v. State, 505 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex. Crim. App 

1974). 

Officer Manrique asked for Appellant’s name when she first 

spoke with Appellant after the traffic stop. Appellant gave his first 

name only. Appellant explained he was a sovereign citizen and
11

stated he would not give his last name as it was a family name. 9 RR 

64-65. Further, Appellant would not provide the officer with any 

identification. Rather, Appellant gave Officer Manrique paperwork 

that explained why he was exempt from the laws of the State of 

Texas. Appellant further refused to give his name to backup officers 

Lieutenant Pehl and Sergeant Scott, even after being informed that 

by failing to do so he was in violation of the law. 9 RR 127. During 

the course of their interaction with Appellant, Officer Manrique, 

Lieutenant Pehl, and Sergeant Scott were never actually able to 

ascertain Appellant’s full name. The officers identified Appellant 

only after discovering identifying paperwork in Appellant’s vehicle 

post-arrest. 9 RR 82. 

Appellant placed a homemade license plate on his car and made 

it impossible for police to identify him. Appellant created fake vehicle 

registration tags, further hiding his identity from authorities. 

Appellant refused to give a full name to Officer Manrique and refused 

to carry identification. Appellant refused to give Lieutenant Pehl and 

Sergeant Scott his name when asked during their interaction with 

him. Appellant stated he was a sovereign citizen and carried 
12

paperwork stating he was not subject to the law. Appellant was 

wholly uncooperative with any state investigation. Appellant’s

identification as a sovereign citizen and related actions speak to his 

purpose in obfuscating his identity and obstructing state laws. 

The totality of the circumstances support the Court’s finding 

beyond a reasonable that refusal to give his name was intentional. 

This issue should be overruled.
13

Issues Two, Three and Four

(Punishment outside the applicable range)

Appellant was properly sentanced within the 

applicable range of punishment.

I. Standard of review

A sentence that is outside the maximum or minimum range of 

punishment is unauthorized by law and therefore illegal. Mizell v. 

State, 119 S.W.3d 804, 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A defendant may 

obtain relief from an unauthorized sentence on direct appeal. Id. 

Nothing in Texas law prevents a court with jurisdiction over a 

criminal case from noticing and correcting an illegal sentence, “no 

matter when or how the relief was sought”. Ex parte Rich, 194 

S.W.3d 508, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

II. Appellant was properly sentenced on all Class C 

convictions

Appellant was convicted of the Class C misdemeanors of Failure 

to Identify, Failure to Maintain Financial Responsibility, and No 

Inspection. “An individual adjudged guilty of a Class C misdemeanor 

shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $500.” Tex. Penal Code 
14

§12.23. Appellant was sentenced to a $250 fine in each case and 

given credit for the fine. 11 RR 7-8. Appellant acknowledges that he 

was properly sentenced on the record, but complains that the Court 

entered a handwritten sentence for jail time, in error, after the fact. 

App. Br. 14.

The failure of the trial court to properly record what is reflected 

in the judgment is an error of a clerical nature. See Asberry v. State, 

813 S.W.2d 526, 530 (Tex. App.—Dallas, 1991). Where a judgment 

and sentence improperly reflects the findings of the court, the proper 

remedy is reformation of the judgment. Id. at 529. Appellate courts 

can reform whatever the trial court could have corrected by a 

judgment nunc pro tunc where the evidence necessary to correct the 

judgment appears in the record and may act sua sponte in doing so. 

Id. at 529-530; Tex. R. App. P. 23. Appellate courts have frequently 

reformed judgments to correct improper recitations or omissions 

relating to punishment by deleting the finding. Id. at 530.

As Appellant was properly sentenced but subject to a clerical 

error outside the record, Appellant’s issues two, three, and four 
15

should be remedied by reforming the trial court’s judgment to reflect 

the proper punishment assessed by the court.
16

Prayer

The State prays that this Court will affirm Appellant’s 

conviction and sentence. 

Respectfully submitted,

Greg Willis

County Attorney Pro Tem

Hunt County, Texas

/s/ Claire D. Miranda

Claire D. Miranda

Special Prosecutor

Asst. Criminal District Attorney

2100 Bloomdale Rd., Suite 200

McKinney, TX 75071

State Bar No. 24037121

(972) 548-4331

FAX (214) 491-4860

cmiranda@co.collin.tx.us
17

Certificate of Service

The State has e-served counsel for Appellant, the Honorable 

Jason Duff, through the eFileTexas.gov filing system and sent a 

courtesy copy by e-mail to jasonaduff@gmail.com on this, the 16th day of 

March 2015.

/s/ Claire D. Miranda

Assistant Criminal District Attorney

Certificate of Compliance

This brief complies with the word limitations in Texas Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2). In reliance on the word count of the 

computer program used to prepare this brief, the undersigned attorney 

certifies that this brief contains 2,157 words, exclusive of the sections 

of the brief exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1). 

/s/ Claire D. Miranda

Assistant Criminal District Attorney