IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA No. 150 A 1 8 Filed 16 August 2019 STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. BILLY DEAN MORGAN

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A

- 30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Cour t of Appeals, 81 4 S.E.2d 8 43 ( N.C. Ct. App. 2018), affirming in part and vacating a nd remanding in part judgment s entered on 9 September 201 6 by Judge Jeffrey P. Hunt in Superior Court, McDowell County

. Heard in the Supreme Court

on 8 April 2019

.
Josh ua H. Stein , Attorney General, by Brenda Eaddy, Assistant Attorney General, for the State

. Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Sterling Rozear, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant

- appellant

.
DAVIS , Justice. The issue before us in this case is whether a trial court is permitted to revoke a defendant’s probation after his probatio nary period has expired without making a finding of fact that good cause exists to do so under the circumstances

. Because we conclude that such a finding is statutorily required, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter for further proceedings

. Factual and Procedural BackgroundS TATE V
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- On 20 May 2013, d efendant Billy Dean Morgan was indicted by a McDowell County Grand J ury on two counts of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. A hearing was held in Superior Court, McDowell County on 28 August 2013 before the Honorable J. Thomas Davis at which defendant pled no conte st to those charges. T he court sentenced him to consecutive terms of twenty

- nine to forty

- seven months of imprisonment, suspended the sentence s , and placed hi m on supervised probation for thirty

- six months. D efendant’s probation officer, Chris topher Poteat , filed violation reports on 12 May 2016 alleging that defendant had willfully violated the terms of his probation by (1) fail ing to report to Officer Poteat ; (2) fa iling to pay money owed to the clerk of

s uperio r c ourt ; (3) failing to pay probation super v ision fees ; and (4) committing a new criminal offense. A warrant for defendant’s arrest for felony probation violation s was issued on that same date

. On 23 May 2016, Officer Poteat filed an additional violation report in which he asserted that defendant ha d absconded his probation

. Defendant was subsequently arrested for violating terms of his probation. Defendant’s probationary term expired on 28 August 2016. Twelve days later, a hearing was held in Superior Court, McDowell County before the Honorable Jeff rey P. Hunt. At the hearing, defendant ’s counsel admitted that defendant had “violated probation by failing to report, failing to pay money and supervision fees, and being convicted of a new crime while on probation and absconding.” Officer Poteat testifie d that defendant had missed two consecutive appointments with him in May 2015. HeS TATE V
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- further stated that defendant “started going downhill” in October 2015 and “missed appointments on November 10, February 3, and February 29 that all had to be rescheduled.”
I n addition, Officer Poteat testified that defendant had been admitted to Grace Hospital on 29 March 2016 and remained in th at facility’s mental health ward until 19 April

. According to Officer Poteat, defendant did not contact him until 1 May, which was twelve days after his release from the hospital. On that date, Officer Poteat instructed defendant to report to him the following Wednesday. When defendant fa iled to show up for that appointment, Officer Poteat filed the 23 May probation violation report a lleging that he had absconded

. Defendant did not testify on his own behalf at the 9 September 2016 hearing, but his counsel informed the trial court that his mental health problems had worsened in May 2015 when his ten

- year - old son was removed from his cus tody

. De fense counsel further stated that defendant was able to comply with the terms of his probation wh en he was taking his medication

. Defense counsel asked the court to grant a continuance to giv e defendant, who was then employed, a chance to pay his

o utstanding probation fees. In response, the trial court stated: “No, I am going to revoke his probation for absconding and for the conviction. He will do the sentences that were imposed by the original judgments.”S TATE V
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- On that same date , the trial court en tered judgments using AOC Form CR

- 607 revoking defendant’s probation and activating his suspended sentences. The judgments contained the following pertinent findings:

The defendant is charged with having violated specific conditions of the defendant’s probation as alleged in the

. . . Violation Report(s) on file herein, which is incorporated by reference.

. . . . The condition(s) violated and the facts of each violation are as set forth

. . . in Paragraph(s) 1 of the Violation Report or Notice dated 05/23/201 6 [and] in Paragraph(s ) 1

- 4 of the Violation Report or Notice dated 05/12/2016.

. . . . The Court may revoke defendant’s probation

. . . for the willful violation of the condition(s) that he/she not commit any criminal offense

. . . or abscond from supervision[.]
Th e judgments concluded as follows: Based upon the Findings of Fact set out on the reverse side, the Court concludes that the defendant has violated a valid condition of probation upon which the execution of the active sentence was suspended, and that continuation, modification or special probation or criminal contempt is not appropriate, and the Court ORDERS that the defendant’s probation be revoked , that the suspended sentence be activated, and the defendant be imprisoned[.] On 16 September 2016, defendant filed a handwritten pro se “Inmate Grievance/Request Form” with the McDowell County Jail indicating his intention to appeal from the 9 September judgments

. Defendant’s filing, however, failed toS TATE V
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- specifically identify both the rul ings from which his appeal was being taken and th e court to which he intended to appeal

. D efendant ’s appellate counsel filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Court of Appeals on 30 May 2017 requesting “review of the judgments and orders of the Mc Dowell County Superior Court. ” The Court of Appeals determined that defendant had failed to file a legally valid notice of appeal but allowed his petition for certiorari

. In seeking relief from the trial court’s judgments before the Court of Appeals, defen dant argued that the court erred by revoking his probation after the expiration of his thirty

- six

- month probationary period by failing to make a specific finding that it was doing so for “good cau se shown and stated” as required by N.C.G.S. § 15A

1344(f)(3). State v. Morgan , 814 S .E.2d 843, 847 ( N.C. Ct. App. 2018). Th e majority in the Court of Appeals rejected t his contention , citing that court’s earlier decision in State v. Regan , 253 N.C. A pp. 351 , 800 S.E.2d 436 (2017), in which it conclude d that N.C.G.S. § 15A

- 1344(f)(3) does not require trial courts to make any specific findings of good cause shown in order to properly revoke a defendant’s proba tion after the expiration of his probationary term. Id. at 357 , 800 S.E.2d at 440. In Regan , the Court of Appeals determined that a finding of good cause could be inferred from the transcript of the defendant’s probation violation hearing and th e judgments entered by the court. See id. at 358 , 800 S.E.2d at 440

– 41 (“Both the transcript of the probati on violation hearing and the judgments entered reflect that the trial court considered the evidence and found good cause to revoke D efendant’s probation.”).S TATE V
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- Noting that it was bound by its prior decision in Regan , Morgan , 814 S.E.2d at 847, the Court of Appeals majority held that the trial court did not err by revoking defendant’s probation after the expiration of his probatio nary term, concluding that :

[A]t the hearing, defendant admitted all of the State’s allegations. After hearing from Offic er Poteat and defendant’s attorney, the trial court announced its decision to “ revoke his probation for absconding and for the conviction. ” Consequently, “[b]oth the transcript of the probation violation hearing and the judgments entered reflect that the t rial court considered the evidence and found good cause to revoke ” defendant’s probation.
Id. at 848 (quoting Regan , 253 N.C. App. at 358, 800 S.E.2d at 440

– 41 )

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In a dissent ing opinion , Chief Jud g e McGee asserted that Regan was both in conflict with th is Court’s decision in State v. Bryant , 361 N.C. 100, 637 S.E.2d 532 (2006) , and inconsistent with the text of N.C.G.S. § 15A

- 1344(f)

. Morgan , 814 S.E.2d
at 851

– 53. (McGee, C.J., dissenting). For these reason s , C hief Judge McGee would have held that “ the trial court was required to make a finding of fact that the State demonstrated ‘ for good cause shown and stated that [ Defendant’s ] probation should be

. . . revoked. ’ ” Id. at 853 (alterations in original) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 15A

1344(f)(3)). Defendant app ealed as of right to this Cour t based upon the dissent. Analysis

1 The Court of Appeals also vacated a civil judgment for costs and attorneys’ fees that had been entered against defendant by the t rial court based on its determination that defendant was not provided notice and an opportunity to be heard on the final amount of att orneys’ fees awarded

. Morgan , 814 S.E.2d at 849. This portion of the Court of Appeals ’ opinion , however, is not cu rrently before us.S TATE V
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- The i ssue for resolution in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred by affirming th e trial court’s revocation of defendant’s probation without making a specific finding that good ca use existed to do so despite the expiration of his probationary period

. For the reasons set out below, we conclude that the trial court’s order faile d to comply with N.C.G.S. § 15A

- 1344(f)(3). This Court has made clear that a trial court “ may, at any time during the period of probation, require defendant to appear before it, inquire into alleged violations of the conditions, and, if found to be true, place the suspended sentence into effect.” State v. Camp , 299 N.C. 524, 527, 263 S.E.2d 592, 594 (1980) (citations and emphasis omitted). But the trial court “may not do so after the expiration of the period of probation except as provided in G.S. 15A

- 1344(f).” Id. at 527, 263 S.E.2d at 594 (citations and emphasis omitted)

. Sectio n 15A

- 1344(f) provide s, in pertinent part : (f) Extension, Modification, or Revocation after Period of Probation.

— The court may extend, modify, or revoke probation after the expiration of the period of probation if all of the following apply: (1) Before the expiration of the period of probation the State has filed a written violation report with the clerk indicating its intent to conduct a hearing on one or more violations of one or more conditions of probation. (2) The court finds that the probationer did viola te one or more conditions of probation prior to the expiration of the period of probation.S TATE V
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- (3) The court finds for good cause shown and stated that the probation should be extended, modified, or revoked. N.C.G.S. § 15A

- 1344(f) (2017)

. It is axiomatic that “[ w]hen construing legislative provisions, this Court looks first to the plain meaning of the words of the statute itself. ” State v. Ward , 364 N.C. 157, 160, 694 S.E.2d 729, 731 (2010) (citation omitted). “When the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this Court to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute, and judicial construction of legislative intent is not required.” Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs. , 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006) (citation omitted) ; see als o State v. Beck , 359 N.C. 611, 614, 614 S.E.2d 274, 277 (2005) (“If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court eschews statutory construction in favor of giving the words their plain and definite meaning.” (citation omitted)). We are furthe r guided in our decision by the canon of statutory construction that a statute may not be interpreted “in a manner which would render any of its words superfluous.” State v. Coffey , 336 N.C. 412, 417, 444 S.E.2d 431, 434 (1994) (citations omitted). This Court has repeatedly held that “a statute must be considered as a whole and construed, if possible, so that none of its provisions shall be rendered useless or redundant. It is presumed that the legislature intended each portion to be given full effec t and did not intend any provision to be mere surplusage.” Porsh Builders, Inc. v. City of Winston

- Salem , 302 N.C. 550, 556 , 276 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1981)S TATE V
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- (citations omitted).
I n State v. Bryant , this Co urt construed language in a prior version of N.C.G.S. § 15A

- 1344(f) in connection with the revocation of a defendant’s probation following the expiration of her probation ary period. At the time Bryant was decided, N.C.G.S. § 15A

- 1344(f) provid ed, in relevant part :

(f) Revocation after Period of Probation.

— The court may revoke probation after the expiration of the period of probation if: (1) Before the expiration of the period of probation the State has filed a written motion with the clerk indicating its intent to conduct a revocation hearing; and (2) The court find s that the State has made reasonable effort to notify the probationer and to conduct the hearing earlier. N.C.G.S. § 15A

- 1344(f) (2005 ) (emphasis added) (amended 2008)

. In Bryant , the trial court activated the defen dant’s suspended sentence seventy days after the expiration of her period of probation “without making a finding that the State had exerted reasonable efforts to conduct a hearing before the expiration of the probationary period.” 361 N.C. at 104

– 05, 637 S.E.2d at 536. On appeal to this Cou rt, the State argued that , despite the absence of a n express finding of fact on that issue , the record contained evidence that would h ave supported such a finding and that, as a result, the order was in compliance with N.C.G.S. § 1 5A

- 1344(f). Id. at 103, 637 S .E.2d at 535.S TATE V
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- We rejected the Sta te’s argument and held that the statutory language “ [ t ] he court finds” contained in N.C.G.S. § 15A

- 1 344(f) (2) required the trial court to make a specific finding of fact

. Id. at 104

– 05, 637 S.E.2d at 536. We further held t h at this requirement was not satisfied simply because evidence existed in the record that could have supported such a find ing

. Id. at 103

– 04, 637 S.E.2d at 534

– 35. We explained our reasoning as follows:

In analyzing this statute, we use accepted principles of statutory construction by applying the plain and definite meaning of the words therein, as the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. The statute unambiguously requires the trial court to make a judicial finding that the State has made a reas onable effort to conduct the probation revocation hearing during the period of probation set out in the judgment and commitment.

. . . . The State argues that the unsworn remarks of defendant’s counsel, along with the scheduled hearing date noticed on d efendant’s probation violation report, satisfy the statutory requirement.

. . . Although this argument is creative, it is contrary to the explicit statutory requirement that “the court find

. . . the State has made reasonable effort to notify the probationer and to conduct the hearing earlier.” The statute makes no exception to this finding of fact requirement based upon the strength of the evidence in the record.
Id. at 102

– 03, 637 S.E.2d at 534

– 35 ( footnote and internal citation s omitted).
We ad dressed a similar issue in State v. Coltrane , 307 N.C. 51 1, 299 S.E.2d 199 (1983), in which the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation without affording her the opportunity to confront adverse witnesses at the probation revocationS TATE V
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- hearing. Id. at 51 3, 299 S.E.2d at 201. The controlling statute stated that a defendant at a probation revocation hearing is entitled to “confront and cross

- examine adverse witnesses unless the court finds good cause for not allowing confrontation .” Id. at 513, 299 S.E.2d a t 201 (emphasis added). Because “[n]o findings were made [by the trial court] that there was good cause for not allowing confrontation,” we held that the trial court failed to comply with this statutory requirement and therefore reversed the decision of th e Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s revocation order

. Id. at 516, 299 S.E.2d at 202. In the present case, it is undisputed that the trial court’s 9 September 2016 judgments contained no findings referencing the existence of good cause to re voke defe ndant’s probation despite the expiration of his probationary term. Indeed, the record is devoid of any indication that the trial court was even aware that defendant’s probationary term had already expired when it entered its judgments

. We conclude that bot h the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 15A

- 1344(f)(3) and our prior decision s in Bryant and Coltrane compel the conclusion that the trial court erred by activating defendant’s sentences without first making such a finding

. While Bryant and Coltrane concern ed different statutory provisions than the one at issue here, both cases s u pport the proposition that when the General Assembly has inserted the phrase “the court finds” in a st atute setting out the exclusive circumstances under which a defendant’s probati on may be revoked , the specific finding described in the statute must actually be made by the trial court and such aS TATE V
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- finding cannot simply be inferred from the record

. See Bryant , 361 N.C. at 102

– 03,
6 37 S.E.2d at 534

– 35 ; Coltrane , 307 N.C. at 516, 299 S.E.2d at 202. Our conclusion fully comports with the principles of statutory construction set out above. Were we to hold , as t he State argues , that N.C.G.S. § 15A

- 1344(f) (3) does
not require a specific finding of good cause to revoke a defendan t’s probati on after his probationary period has ended as long as the court has found that the defendant violated a co nditi on of probation, subsection (f)(3) would be rendered superfluous. Subsection (f)(2) of N.C.G.S. § 15A

- 1344 makes clear that in order to revoke a defendant’s probation following the expiration of his probationary term, the trial court must first make a finding that the defendant did violate a condition of his probation. After making such a finding, trial courts are then required by su b section (f)(3) to make an additional finding of “good cause shown and stated” to justify the revocation of probation even though the defendant’s probationary term has expired. Th us, by contending the trial court’s determination that defendant did, in fact, violate condi tions of his probation simu l taneously satisfied subsections (f)(2) and (f)(3), the State incorrectly conflates two separate and distinct findings that must be made by the trial court under these circumstan ces. As such, the State’s argument is inconsistent with well

- settled rules for interpreting statutes. See , e.g. , Lunsford v. Mills , 367 N.C. 618, 628, 766 S.E.2d 297, 304 (2014) (“[I]t is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that courts should ‘ evaluate [ a ] statute as a whole and

. . . not construe an individual section in a manner that renders another provisionS TATE V
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- of the same statute meaningless. ’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman , 349 N.C. 290, 297, 507 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1998) , cert. denied , 526 U.S. 1098 (199 9), abrogated on other grounds by Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson , 353 N.C. 659, 548 S.E.2d 513 (2001) ) ; Coffey , 336 N.C. at 418, 444 S.E.2d at 434 (“We construe each word of a statute to have meaning, where reasonable and consistent with the entire statute, because ‘[ i ] t is always presumed that the legislature act ed with care and deliberation

. . . .’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Benton , 276 N.C. 641, 658, 174 S.E.2d 793, 804 (1970)). To the extent Regan holds that an express finding of good cause s hown and stated is not required by N.C.G.S. § 15A

- 1344(f)(3), that portion of Regan is overruled. Having determined that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the tria l court’s 9 September 2016 judgments , the only remaining question is whether remand
to the trial court is appropriate for it to determine whether good cause exists to revoke defendant’s probation despite the expiration of his probationary period and, if so, to make an appropr iate finding of fact as required by subsection (f)(3). We stated in Bryant that “ [i] n the absence of statutorily mandated factual findings, the trial court’s jurisdiction to revoke probation after expiration of the probationary period is not preserved.” Bryant , 361 N.C. at 103, 6 37 S.E.2d at 534. We further noted, however, that “ [o]rdinarily [ ] when [ there is a failure ] to make a material finding of fact

. . . , the case must be remanded

. . . for a proper finding. ” Id. at 1 04, 637 S.E.2d at 535 (first, third, fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (quoting N.C. Dep’t of Env’t &S TATE V
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- Nat. Res. v. Carroll , 358 N.C. 649, 674, 599 S.E.2d 888, 904 (2004) )

. In Bryant , after determining that the trial court had failed to comply with the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 1 5A

- 1344(f), we proceeded to dete rmine whether the record contained sufficient evidence to permi t the necessary finding of “reasonable effort s” by the State to have conduct ed the probation revocation hearing earlier

. Id. at 104, 637 S.E.2d at 535

– 36. Noting that the record was “devoid of any p ersuasive evidence as to why there was more than a two

- month delay in conducting [the] probation revocation hearing , ” we concluded that “remand is not a proper remedy

. . . because the record lacks sufficient evidence to support such a finding.” Id. at 104, 637 S.E.2d at 535

– 36. In the present case, conversely, we are un able to say from our review of the record that no evidence exists that would allow the trial court on remand to make a finding of “good cause shown and stated ” under subsection (f)(3)

. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the Court of Appeals for further remand to th e trial court for a finding of whether good cause exists to revoke defendant’s pr obation despite the expiration of his probationary period and

— assuming good cause exists

— t o ma ke a finding in conformity with N.C.G.S. § 15A

- 1344(f)(3). Conclusion
Fo r the reasons stated above, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals

an d remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the superior court for proceedings no t inconsistent with this opinion

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- REVERSED AND REMANDED.