J udg e Da vid G. Trag er of

the United States District Court for the Easter n District of * New Y ork, sitting by

desig nation. 1 07
- 18 30
- cr U SA v. C ap ers 

### UN ITED STA TES C OUR T OF AP PE ALS F OR TH E S EC ON D C IR C U IT

_____________________ August Term, 2007 (Argued: J uly

11, 2008 Dec ided: Dec ember 1, 2010) Docke t No. 07-1830-c r

_____________________ UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA,

Appellant ,

- v. - WI L L I AM CA PER S,

Defendant-

Appellee
.

_______________________
BEF ORE: POOL ER and HAL L , Circuit Judges , TRAGER, District Judge. *

_______________________ The g overnme nt appea ls from an orde r ente red in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ne w York ( McKe nna, J .) to suppress inculpatory

statements made by defe ndant-a

ppellee while in custody . We AFF I RM the order of the district court on the ground that the initial interrog ation conducte d by an investig ator a

war e of the obvious need for a2

Miranda wa

rn ing , f oll ow e d 9 0 mi nute s late r b y a se c on d, po st-

Miranda interrog ation by the
same inv e sti g ator , o n th e same su bje c t matte r, un de r s imi lar c ir c ums tanc e s a nd wi th n o e xplic it
c ur ativ e langua g e amou

nte d to a de lib e rate , tw o- ste p inte rr og a tio n te c hn iqu e de signe d to
un de rm ine the de fe nd ant’ s Miranda ri g hts
. J udg e Tra g er dissents in a se parate opinion.

_______________________

Anna E. A rre ola, Assistant United States Attorney (Katherine Polk Fa illa, Assistant United States Attorney , of counsel ), for Preet B hara

ra, United States Attorney for the Souther

n District of Ne w York, N ew Yor k, New Y ork, for Appellant
. J err old L . Steigman ( Cy

rus R. Vanc e, Jr., on the brief ) , M o r v il lo , Ab r amo w it z, Gra nd, I ason, Ane llo & B ohrer , P.C., New York, Ne w York, for De fe nd an tAppellee
.

_______________________
H A LL , Circuit Judge : The g overnme nt appea ls from an orde r ente red in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ne w York ( McKe nna, J .) to suppress inculpatory

statements made by defe ndant-a

ppellee while in custody . We AFF I RM the order of the district court on the ground that the initial interrog ation conducte d by an investig ator a

war e of the obvious need for a Miranda wa

rn ing , f oll ow e d 9 0 mi nute s late r b y a se c on d, po st-

Miranda interrog ation by the
same inv e sti g ator , o n th e same su bje c t matte r, un de r s imi lar c ir c ums tanc e s a nd wi th n o e xplic it
c ur ativ e langua g e amou

nte d to a de lib e rate , tw o- ste p inte rr og a tio n te c hn iqu e de signe d to
un de rm ine the de fe nd ant’ s Miranda ri g hts
.3 BACK GR OUND In Marc h 2005, the United States Postal Service suspe cted de fenda nt-appe llee Willi am Ca pe rs , e mpl oye d a s a

ma il h and le r, of

ste a lin g mon e y

or de rs fr om E xpre ss M a il e nv e lop e s. Postal I nspectors de cided to conduc t a sting ope ration targ eting Capers. I n Dec ember

2005, Inspectors pla

nted two Express Mail envelopes in the mail-sor ting f acility wher e Cape rs worke d. One e nvelope c ontained $30 ca sh, and the other contained two $80 mone y order s and wa s equipped with an a larm devic e. The alar m was set to trig g er a

utomatically

in the event the envelope with the money order s was opene d and its contents re moved. Havingplanted the e nvelopes in a ma il container, Postal Inspectors H oti, Del Giudice, M o o n , an d

C h o wc o n d

u c t e d s ur v e i l l an c e o f

C a p e r s th r o u g h o u tth e d ay. A ta p p r o x i m a t e l y 5 p.m., Capers notice d the enve lopes for the first time. Approxim ately two hours later , Capers a nd J uan L opez, a fe llow employ ee, e ntere d a tra iler holding mail container s and brief ly disappea red from the inspec tors’ view. L ess than one minute late r, the a larm in the enve lope sounded, a nd the postal inspectors r

ushed into the trailer

to appre hend both Caper s and L opez. The inspector s handcuf fed both suspec ts. I nspector H oti inst ructe d Capers to follow him into a supervisor’ s of fi c e . Ins pe c tor s D e l G uid ic e and Mo on a lso e nte re d th e of

fi c e . T he y

ins tr uc te d Ca pe rs to s it i n a cha ir, still handcuffe d, while the thre e inspec tors stood around him. None of the inspectors g ave Ca pers a Miranda wa rn i n g. Ac c or din g to t

he te sti mony

of De l G iud ic e , H oti sa id t o Ca pe rs : something like, look, y ou know, t alk t o me or don’t talk to me, I don’t ca re but I ’m telling y ou ri g ht no w or I ’l l te ll y ou

that I ’m g oin g to d o my

be st t o ma

ke y ou g o a wa y , a nd Ijus t4

wa nt you to k no w. An d I ’v e be e n w a tc hin g y ou all day
. I kn ow e ve ry

thi ngthat you

did ton ig ht. (H r’ gTr . 9 5, Se pt. 5, 20 06 .) Ho ti the n a sk e d Ca pe rs wh e re the c on te nts of the Expr e ss M a il envelope wer e located. Caper s g estured towa rd his rig ht side pants pocket, a nd Hoti asked Capers what was in his pocke t. Capers re plied the money order s. (Hr’ g Tr. 34.) H oti asked for Capers’ permission to “g rab” them, and whe n Capers sa id “y es,” H oti removed the mone y order s from Cape rs’ poc ket. (Hr ’gTr. 34.) H oti asked Caper s if the money order s belong ed to him, and Ca pe rs sa id n o. (H r’ g Tr . 3 4. ) C a pe rs tol d H oti tha

t he g ot t he mon e y or de rs fr om t

he Expr e ss Mail envelope . (Hr’ g Tr. 64.) H oti also questioned Capers a bout the $30 cash that had bee n planted in the other

Ex press Mail enve lope, but Capers state d that he did not know any thing about it. The entire questioning took less than f ive minutes. Reg ardingthe lack of a Miranda
war ning, H oti testified that he did not rea d Capers his rig hts beca use he w as in a hurr

y to track down the missing money

order s so that they

did not ge t lost i n the larg e mail-sortingfac ility and be c a us e he ne e de d to qu e sti on L op e z, w ho wa s h e ld h and c uf fe d o uts ide the su

pe rv iso r’ s o ff

ic e to deter mine his level of involvement in the cr ime. Del Giudice and Moon then e scorted Ca pers to a va

n to transport him to another Postal Service fac ility

(the “ Br onx Domicile”) for f urther que stioning. They waited in the va

n for approximately

15 to 20 minutes while the other inspec tors located the alar m device f

rom the opened e nvelope. In the van, De l Giudice eng ag ed Cape rs in conver sation primarily about Capers’ automobile. Capers r emained ha ndcuff ed throug hout this t ime, which included 15 to 20 minutes of waiting and 20 minutes of drivingto the Br onx Domicile.5

When they

arr ived at the B ronx Domi cile, the inspec tors place d Capers in a n interview
ro om a nd ha nd c uf fe d h im t o th e c ha ir

in whic h h e sat. D e l G iud ic e and Mo on re ma ine d w ith him, eng ag ing him in furthe r conve rsation, and g ather ing r eleva nt personal infor

mation from Capers f or their pa

perw ork. At one point, Caper s asked De l Giudice about the possibility of beingfired, a

nd Del Giudice told him t hat “it’s in your best intere st to tell t he truth whe n Inspector H oti comes down. B e honest. It’s alway s better if you’re honest.” (H r’gTr. 117.) Ca pe rs and the tw o p os ta l in sp e c tor s w a ite d f or a pp ro ximate ly

30 to 4 0 mi nute s unti l Ho ti e nte re d th e ro om. Ho ti the n a dv ise d Ca pe rs of his Miranda rig hts. Hoti made no ref ere nce, ho we ve r, to t

he state me nts Ca

pe rs ha d a lr e a dy

ma de duri ngthe ini tia l in te rr og a tio n. Ho ti explained in his t estimony , “I don’t reme mber the spe cific que stion and its sequence , and I don’t
see a need to sa

y what did you do with the contents of this Express Mail when I alre ady have the
answe r to that. So Iwould not have a sked that same que stion.” (Hr’ g Tr. 72.) Cape rs sig ned a Postal S ervic e Warningand Waiver of Rights form, a

nd Hoti proce eded to que stion Capers about the eve nts of the eve ning, spe cifica lly askingabout what he did with the Ex press Mail enve lopes
e arl ie r t hat ni g ht. Ca

pe rs ve rb a lly

c on fe sse d to takin g the mon e y or de rs . Wh e n H oti a sk e d h im to provide a written statement, Cape rs re plied by asking , “What’s in it for me? ” (H r’gTr. 51.) Hoti told C aper s “there ’s nothing I can pr omise y ou,” and the n ended the questioning. ( Hr’gTr. 51.) C a

p e r s w a s i n d i c t e d

i nM ar c h2 0 0 6 , c h ar g e d

w i tho n e c o un to f

th e f to f m a i l m a t t e r

b y a postal employ ee, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1709. He moved to suppre ss the inculpatory statements he made both before and af ter re ceivingthe Miranda war ning, a nd on Marc h 30, 2007, the district court e ntere d an orde r suppre ssing the statements. The district cour t found that6

“[t] he g overnme nt has not shown that . . . defe ndant re linquished his right to rema in silent voluntarily

with a full awa

rene ss of the rig hts being waived a nd the conse quence s of doing so.” Un ite d S tates v . Ca

pe rs , No. 06 Cr. 266, 2007 WL959300, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Ma r. 29, 2007) (interna l quotation marks omitted). Although the district court found that the posta l inspectors did not have the “ specific intent” to circ umvent Capers’ Miranda rig hts, id. , it did fi nd the ir interrog ation tactics de prived Cape rs of a “g enuine r ight to re main silent,” id. at *14. The United State s f ile d a tim e ly no tic e of a pp e a l. DI SCU SSIO N I. Stand ard of Review “We re view a district c ourt’s dete rmination reg ardingthe constitutionality of a Miranda waiver de novo .” United States v. Carter , 489 F.3d 528, 534 ( 2d Cir. 2007). In doing so, w e revie w “a district court’s unde rlying f actua l findings f

or cle ar e rror .” Id. II. Miranda and t he Two- St e p Int e r r og at ion Te c hnique The issue be fore us is whether H oti and the other postal inspec tors deliberately deprive d Capers of the rig hts to which he is entitled under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The g overnme nt argues that the de fenda nt was g iven an e ffe ctive Miranda war ning pr ior to making voluntary inculpatory

statements, and ther efor e the state ments he made following the war ning should not have bee n suppressed by the district court. Cape rs ar g ues that the rule that the Supreme Court announc ed in Mi sso ur i v . S

e ibe rt , 542 U.S. 600 (2004), and that this C ourt further clar ified in Carter, require s us to conclude that the posta l inspectors’ two- step interrog ation in this case constituted a de liberate violation of Capers’ Miranda ri g hts
.7

“The purpose of

the Miranda war

ning is to ensur e that the pe rson in custody has sufficie nt knowledg e of his or he r constitutional rig hts relatingto the interrog ation and that any waiver of such r ights is knowing , intelligent, a nd voluntary .” Carter , 489 F.3d at 534. The Supreme Court, in Oregon v . Elstad , 470 U.S. 298 (1985), and Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. 600, has twice addre ssed situations like this one in which a suspect in custody

confe ssed without having
rec eived a Miranda war

ning, subse quently

rec eived a Miranda war

ning, a nd then conf

essed ag ain. Elstad

inv olv e d a

sit uatio n in wh ic h a su sp e c t ma de a

se lf -i nc ri min a tin g state me nt whil e two police off

icer s were at his home investigating a robber y . At the time he had not r ece ived a Miranda war

ning. Elstad , 470 U.S. at 300-01. The of fice rs transpor

ted the suspec t to a police station where they

g ave him a Miranda war ning pr ior to obtaining both a n oral a nd written confe ssion. Id. at 301. At trial, the de fenda nt moved to suppress the postwar ning c onfessions on the g ro un d th at th e state me nts ma de at th e po lic e statio n o nly c ame a bo ut a s a re su lt o f t

he fi rs t inadmissable statement made at his house. Id. at 302. The Supre me Court ultimately reje cted the “f ruit of the poisonous tree ” ar g ument, see W ong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963), a nd held that “[t] houg h Miranda require s that the unwar ned admission must be suppressed, the admissibili ty of any subsequent stateme nt should turn in these circumstanc es solely on whether

it is knowingly

and voluntarily

made,” Elstad , 470 U.S. at 309. The Court
rea soned that the police did not employ any coer cive tac tics to elicit either conf ession and that the def endant made his postwarningconfe ssion voluntarily
. Id. at 316. The Court c oncluded that “the dictates of Miranda and the g oals of the F ifth Amendment prosc ription ag ainst use of compelled testimony

are fully satisfied in the circ umstances of this case.” Id. at 318.T h e S u p re m e C o urt n o t eda p o l i ce o ff i ce r’ s t es t i m o n y

attri al th atth e t wo -s t ep s tra t egy 1 was promoted by

his department, a s well as by a national police trainingorg anization and was corr oborate d by

a manua l from the Police L aw Institut e, which pr ovided instruction on the technique. Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 609-10 (plura lity opinion). 8 Whe re a s Elstad

involved a g ood-fa ith effor t by the police to administer a proper Miranda
wa rn i n g, Se ibe rt

a dd re sse d th e us e of

a tw o- ste p inte rr og a tio n s tr a te g y de signe d to e lic it a

po stMiranda waiver

and conf ession afte r the de fenda

nt had alre ady

confe ssed bef

ore he was g iven Miranda war

nings. In Se ibe rt , th e p o l i ce d ep art m en th ada p o l i cy o f w i th h o l d i n g Miranda
war nings until an a

rre stee c onfesse d and then r eadingthe ar restee Miranda war

nings a nd asking for a waiver prior to eliciting a sec ond confe ssion. Se ibe rt , 5 42 U. S. at 60 9- 10 (p lur a lity opinion). The police in Se ibe rt employ ed this strateg y

when they

arr ested the de fenda

nt for 1 setting a fire that killed a teena g er. Id. at 604. Afte r takingthe def endant into custody

and d el i b er at el y

wi th h o l d i n g Miranda war nings, the police elicited a confe ssion. Id. at 604-05. The police then g ave the defe ndant a 20- minute break afte r which the y provided he r Miranda
war nings, obta ined a sig ned wa iver of r ights, a nd tape- rec orded a

second c onfession. Id. at 605. A m a jor ity of the Court

a dmo nis he d a g a ins t th e us e of thi s “ qu e sti on -f

ir st” te c hn iqu e and

he ld that this strateg y

violated Miranda
. Id. a t 61 7; id. at 620-21 (K ennedy , J ., concur ring ). The Se ibe rt plurality

conclude d that “[u] pon hear ing w arning s only in the afte rmath of interrog ation and just after making a conf

ession, a suspec t would hardly think he had a g enuine rig ht to remain silent, let alone pe rsist in so believing onc e the police beg an to lead him over the same g round ag ain.” Id. at 613 (plura lity opinion). The plura lity

focuse d on whether

the mid str e am Miranda wa

rn ingwa s e ff

e c tiv e , a nd qu e sti on e d whe the r “ it w ou ld b e re a so na ble to fi nd that in the se c ir c ums tanc e s th e wa rn ing s c ou ld f

un c tio n ‘ e ff

e c tiv e ly ’ a s Miranda require s9

. . . . [and] advise the suspe ct that he ha d a re al choice about g iving a n admissible statement at that juncture.” Id. at 611-12. Writing f or the plura lity , J ustice Souter laid out five f actor s to be weig hed whe n analy

zing the ef

fec tiveness of the w arning : (1) “the completene ss and detail of the questions and answe rs in the first round of interrog ation,” (2) “the ove rlappingcontent of the two state me nts ,” (3 ) “ the tim ingand se tti ngof the fi rs t and

se c on d” int e rr og a tio n, (4 ) “ the c on tin uit y of police pe rsonnel,” a

nd (5) “ the deg ree to which the interr og ator’s que stions treated the se cond round as c ontinuous with t he first.” Id. at 615. The plura lity

voted to suppress the se cond conf ession beca

use, unlike in Elstad , the
unwar ned interr og ation was “ sy stematic, exhaustive, and mana g ed with psy cholog ical skill.” Id. at 616. Applying the five fa ctors, the plura lity focuse d on the fa cts that both phases of questioning oc curr ed while the suspe ct was c lear ly in custody ; there w as no advic e g iven to the
su sp e c t th at he r f

ir st s tate me nt w a s in a dmi ssi ble ; th e same po lic e of fi c e r c on du c te d b oth interrog ations in the same location with only a 15 to 20 minute brea

k betwee n the two; and
re fe re nc e s to the e a

rl ie r c on fe ssi on

fo ste re d a

n “ imp re ssi on

that th e fu

rt he r q ue sti on ingwa s a
mere continuation” of the first interrog ation. Id. Th e plu ra lity ult imate ly

c on c lud e d th a t “ [t]he se circ umstances must be see n as cha lleng ing the compre hensibility and ef fica cy of the Miranda
war nings to the point that a r easona ble per son in the suspect’s shoes w ould not have under stood them to convey

a messag e that she r etained a choice about continuing to talk.” Id. at 617. Justi c e Ke nn e dy

a g re e d w iththe plu

ra lity ’s c on c lus ion

tha t th e po stw arn ingstate me nts should be suppresse d, but he believe d the plurality ’s test “c ut too broadly ,” id. a t6 2 2 ( K e n n e dy, J
. , co n cu rr i n g), b ec au s e i tap p l i edi ni n s t an ce s o f “ b o thi n t en t i o n al an d un i n t en t i o n al two -s t age interrog ations,” id. at 621. Under J ustice Ke nnedy ’s appr oach, the first question would be10

wh e the r l aw e nf

or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs us e d a

“ de lib e ra te tw o- ste p s tr a te g y ” in “ a c a lc ulate d w ay

to undermine the Miranda war ning,” id. at 622, and “ to obscure both the pr actica l and leg al signific ance of the a dmonition when finally g iven,” id. at 620. I f the a nswer to that que stion
wer e “no,” then the suppre ssion analy sis would be g overne d by the voluntariness standa

rd set forth in Elstad
. Id. I f the a nswer w ere “y es,” how ever , the next question would be whether a ny
c ur ativ e me a sure s w e re take n “ to e ns ur e tha t a re a so na ble pe rs on

in t he su sp e c t’ s si tuatio n w ou ld understand the import and eff ect of the Miranda war

ning a nd of the Miranda waiver .” Id. Justi c e Ke nn e dy

pr ov ide d tw o e xamp le s o f s uc h c ur a tiv e me a sure s: ( 1) “ a su bs tanti a l br e ak in time and circ umstances be tween the prew arningstatement and the Miranda war ning . . . [because] it allows the acc used to distinguish the two conte x ts and appre ciate that the int e rr og atio n h a s ta

ke n a ne w t ur n” ; and (2 ) “ an a dd iti on a l w arn ingtha t e xpla ins the lik e ly inadmissibil ity

of the pre war

ning c ustodial statement.” Id. Reasoningthat the police ha d used a deliberate two-step inter

rog ation technique a

nd that no curative steps had bee n taken, Justi ce Kenne dy conclude d that the postwarningstatements wer e inadmissible. Id. In Carter , th is C ourt

joi ne d th e El e ve nth , F if

th, Ni nth , T hir d, and

Ei g hth Cir c uit s in applying Justice Kenne dy ’s appr oach in Se ibe rt , h old ingthat “ Se ibe rt lay s o ut a

n e xce pti on

to Elstad fo r c a se s in

wh ic h a de lib e rate , tw o- ste p s tr a te g y wa s u se d b y

law e nf or c e me nt t o o bta in the postwarningconfe ssion.” Carter , 489 F.3d at 535. Cf. United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 12 98 , 1 31 2 ( 11 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; United States v. Courtney, 463 F.3d 333, 338 ( 5th Cir. 2006); United States v. W

illiams, 43 5 F .3 d 1 14 8, 11 57 (9 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; United States v. Kiam, 432 F.3d 52 4, 53 2 ( 3d

Cir . 2 00 6) ; United States v. He rnandez, 384 F.3d 562, 566 ( 8th Cir. 2004). But see United States v. He ron , 5 64 F .3 d 8 79 , 8 84 -8 5 ( 7th Cir . 2 00 9) (Jus tic e Ke nn e dy ’s c on c ur re nc e is11

not controlling) . In Carter , law enf orce ment ag ents rec overe d a lar g e bagof drug s after
sear chinga re staurant owne d and oper ated by the suspect. Id. at 531. Approximately 30 minutes afte r the sea

rch c oncluded, a

n ag ent noticed the suspe ct sitting outside the re staurant a nd, in a
c a su a l f a sh ion , a sk e d h im a

bo ut a br ow n s ub sta

nc e fo un d in

the ba g of

dr ug s. Th e a g e nt a sk e d if the substance was he roin, and the suspe ct re plied, “No, it’s bad.” Id. at 532. The a g ent then asked, “ Ba d what? ,” to which the suspe ct re plied, “B ad coke .” Id. The a g ent later testified that he aske d the suspect a

bout the drug s solely

“out of c uriosity .” Id. Approxim ately 30 minutes later, a fter the defe ndant was g iven a Miranda war ning a nd afte r he sig ned a Miranda waiver form, a dif

fer ent ag ent conduc ted a f ormal interr og ation and elicited a full confe ssion. Id. at 533. The latter ag ent had no knowle dg e of the suspect’s pr evious statement about the br own substance and did not lear

n about it until s hortly

befor e the tria l commence d. Id. Th e de fe nd ant m ov e d to suppress the se cond conf

ession on the g rounds that he did not knowing ly and voluntarily

waive his Miranda rig hts. Id. at 534. Analy zing “[t] he fa ctual diffe renc es betwe en [Carter’ s] case and Se ibe rt ,” id. at 536, we deter mined that the ag ents in Carter d i d n o td el i b er at el y

u s e atwo -s t ep i n t erro gat i o ns tra t egy de signe d to c ir c umv e nt Miranda for thre e re asons: (1) ther e wa s almost no overlap be tween the suspect’s f

irst statement and his subsequent c onfession; (2) diff ere nt office rs questioned the
su sp e c t at di ff

e re nt l oc atio ns (t

he fi rs t outsi de the sto re tha t w a s b e ingse arc he d a

nd the se c on d in an interr og ation room), and the second of fice r wa s not awar e of the suspect’s pr evious inculpatory

statement; and (3) “the postwa rningquestioning w as not a c ontinuation of theBe cause we c oncluded that the Se ibe rt approa ch wa s inapplicable in Carter , we did not 2 rea ch the issue of

whether the police unde rtook any curative measure s such that the suspec t “would under stand the import and ef fec t of the Miranda war

ning a nd of the Miranda waiver .” Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 622 (Ke nnedy , J ., concur ring ). 12 prew arningquestion.” Id. at5 3 6
. Ac co rd i n gl y , ap p l yi n g Elstad , we de termined that Car ter’s 2 postwarningstatement wa s made knowing ly and voluntarily , and it was prope rly admissible at trial. Id. at 536-37. Her e, in a de cision that predated Carter , the district court found that Capers did not g ive his po st- Miranda war

ning statement “voluntar ily with a full awa

rene ss of the rig hts being waived and the c onsequenc es of doingso.” Cap e rs , 2007 WL959300, at *15 (interna l quotation marks omitted). For that rea son, it suppressed Caper s’ statement. In so doing, the district court re jected J ustice Ke nnedy ’s appr oach in Se ibe rt , explaining that J ustice Ke nnedy ’s conc urringopinion

“ c ann ot r e a so na

bly be take n to be the law o f t he land ,” be c a

us e it d id n ot r e pr e se nt t

he ma jor ity opinion of the Supreme Court. Id. at *11 (interna l quotation marks omitted). In a fo otn ote to i ts d e c isi on , th e dis tr ic t c ourt re mark e d th a t “ if

Justi c e Ke nn e dy ’s Se ibe rt
concur renc e re prese nted the law, suppr ession would be denie d.” Cap e rs , 2007 WL959300, at *15 n.17. The district cour t based this statement, which unde r the c ircumstance s constituted dictum, on its understanding that J ustice Ke nnedy ’s test turned on “ the subjective intent of the police,” id. at *1 0, c ou

ple d w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt ’s own d e te rm inatio n th a t th e ins pe c tor s in thi s
case did not have the “ specific intent” to evade Miranda , id. at *12. Our interve ning de cision in Carter , howeve r, re quires a dif fer ent ana ly sis. Under Carter , we must addre ss whether the offic ers e mploy ed a “ deliberate, two-step strateg y , predic ated upon13

v i o l at i n g Miranda duringan extended intervie w,” Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 621, and if so, whe ther “spec ific, cur ative steps,” id. , wer e take n to obviate the violation that occur red. III . D e libe r at e ne ss In Se ibe rt , beca

use the re cord w as cle ar that the interrog ating office rs intentionally and purposef ully employ ed a te chnique in which the y had bee n instructed, id. at 609-10, Just ice Kenne dy had no re ason to explore how a c ourt should determine when a two- step interrog ation str ate g y ha d b e e n e xec ute d d e lib e rate ly . Wr e stl ingwi th t he pr ob le m w e no w a dd

re ss, the Ni nth Circuit has stated: As an initial matter, we n ote that J ustice Ke nnedy did not articulate howa cour t should determine whe ther a n interrog ator used a

deliberate two-step strateg y . . . . For example, J ust ice Ke nnedy ’s opinion is sil ent as to what, if any presumptions a pp ly or wh ic h p art

y be ars the burd e n o f p ro vin g or dis pr ov ingde lib e rate ne ss. United States v. W

illiams , 435 F.3d 1148, 1158 & n.11 (9th Cir. 2006). In constructinga method to deter mine deliberateness, the Ninth Circuit in W illiams looked to whether

“objec tive evidenc e and a ny available subjective e vidence , such as a n office r’s testimony , support an infe renc e that the two- step interrog ation proce dure w as used to under mine the Miranda war

ning.” Id. at 11 58 . F oll ow ingon the Ni nth Cir c uit ’s g uid anc e , th e te st articulated by

the Eleve nth Circuit to determine deliber atene ss relies upon “the totality of the circ umstances including‘the timing, se tting and c ompleteness of the prew arninginterrog ation, the continuity

of police pe rsonnel and the overla pping c ontent of the pre - and post-w arning statements.’” United States v. Stree t , 4 7 2 F. 3 d 1 2 9 8 , 1 3 1 4 (1 1 thC i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g W ill iam s, 43 5 F .3 d at 11 59 ). Th e F if th C ir c uit ’s art ic ulatio n o f whe n d e lib e rate ne ss m ay be inf e rr e d a lso
re lie s u po n th e tot a lity

of the c ir c ums tanc e s su

rr ound ingthe int e rr og a tio ns :In a n unp ub lis he d O rd e r a

nd Judg me nt t

he Te nth Cir c uit , w hil e de c lin ingto e nd or se 3 either K ennedy ’s conc urre nce or the Se ibe rt plurality

opinion as the holding of Seibert, explained in United States v. Crisp, No. 09-5063-c r, 2010 U.S. App. L EXI S 7077, at *19-21 (10th Cir. Apr. 5, 2010), that the de fenda nt’s argument that his pre-w arningstatement wa s the product of a deliberate two-step inter

rog ation was unavailing be cause no coer cion was e vident in either the surroundingcirc umstances or the content of

the questioning , the pre -ar rest stateme nt “occ urre d afte r the pa

rties had ba

ntere d about the pursuit and in re sponse to a question about the ma rijuana use” of the def endant’ s female companion, and “ the pre-M iranda statements also we re unr elated to the post-Miranda statements re g ardingcoca ine base .” 14 [T]he re wa s n oth ingin t

he c ir c ums tanc e s o r t

he natur e of the qu e sti on ingto i nd ic a te that coer cion or other improper tactics wer e used. All evidence sug g ests that Nunez w a s c a l man d

c o o p e r at i v e , an d

th e a g e n t s d i d

n o ta c t w i tha g g r e s s i v e n e s s o r h o s t i l i ty. The district cour

t stated that “the de fenda nt initi ally

had done n o t h ing mor e than voluntarily respond to que stions as to his name, place of birth, and i m m i gration status.” United States v. Nunez-Sanc hez , 478 F.3d 663, 668- 669 (5th Cir. 2007). 3 In our Court’s opinion in Carter, 489 F.3d at 528, without ex pressly stating that we we re doing so, w e similarly

analy zed objective fa ctors. In the context of the interrog ation that took place there , we ne eded only to consider thre e fa ctors to conc lude that the interr og ating office rs did not deliberate ly

employ a two-step inter

rog ation proce dure: (1) there was no ove rlap be tween the suspect’ s first and sec ond statements; (2) diff ere nt office rs questioned the suspe ct at diffe rent loc atio ns , a

nd the se c on d o ff

ic e r w a s n ot a

wa re of the su sp e c t’ s p re vio us inc ulp a tor y state me nt; and (3) “the postwa

rningquestioning w as not a c ontinuation of the prew arningquestion[i ng ].” Carter , 489 F.3d at 536. Th e se c on sid e ratio ns , w hil e de te rm inativ e of the ana ly sis of

de lib e ra te ne ss o n th e fa c ts prese nted in Carter , are by no means the only

fac tors to be consider ed whe n seekingto divine whether the offic ers’ actions ar e suff iciently indicative of a

deliberate circ umvention of Miranda to require that a def

endant’ s statements must be suppressed. We r ecognize the wisdom of J ustice15

Soute r’ s o bs e rv atio n th at “ the int e nt o f t he of fi c e r w ill ra

re ly be a s c and idl y

a dmi tte d a s it

wa s” in Se ibe rt , wher e the inter rog ating office r testified not only that he wa s trained to execute atwostep interrog ation proce dure but a lso impl ied that the tac tic is taug ht nationwide. Se ibe rt , 542 U. S. at 61 6 n .6 . In li g ht o f t he a bo ve , w e joi n o ur

sis te r c ir c uit s in

c on c lud ingthat a

c ourt sh ou ld
re vie w the tot a lity

of the ob je c tiv e and

su bje c tiv e e vid e nc e surr ound ingthe int e rr og a tio ns in
or de r t o d e te rm ine de lib e rate ne ss, wi th a re c og nit ion

that in mos t in sta

nc e s th e inq

uir y wi ll r e ly heavily , if not entirely , upon objective e vidence
. Cf. Seibert, 5 4 2 U
. S
. a t6 2 2 ( K e n n e dy,
c on c ur ri ng ) ( “ [A] mu lti fa c tor

te st that a

pp lie s to e ve ry

tw o- sta g e int e rr og a tio n ma y se rv e to undermine th[e] clarity

[of Miranda ].”). Recog nizi ng the inhere nt difficulty in proving deliberateness, and a lso conce ding that “dete rmining the office r' s state of mind at the time of the inter rog ation can be difficult,” we turn to the unsettled question of which pa rty bear s the burden of

provingdeliberateness or a bsence there of. Un ite d S

tates v . O lli e , 4 42 F .3 d 1 13 5, 11 42 (8 th C ir . 2 00 6) . F or the fo llo wi ngre a so ns , we ho ld t hat th e burd e n r e sts on

the pr os e c uti on

to d isp ro ve de lib e rate ne ss. “[W ]hen a confe ssion challeng ed as involuntary is sought to be use d ag ainst a cr iminal defe ndant at his trial, he is entitled to a re liable and c lear -cut de termination that the conf ession was in fa ct voluntarily

rende red.” Lego v. Twomey , 4 0 4 U
. S
. 4 7 7 , 4 8 9 ( 1 9 7 2 )
. A c c o r d i n g l y, courts plac e upon the g overnme nt the burden to prove that a def endant’ s confe ssion was voluntary
. See, e .g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986). The question of deliberateness, while distinct from voluntarine ss, will nonetheless be dispositive of a de fenda nt’s challeng e to the voluntarine ss of a c onfession g arne red f rom a two-ste p interrog ation proce dure. Se e Un ite d S

tates v . S te war t , 5 36 F .3 d 7 14 , 7 19 (7 th C ir . 2 00 8) . T he Ei g hth Cir c uit , w hic h a lso16

place s the burden on the g overnme nt to disprove deliberateness, ca utioned that while “the la w g e ne ra lly fr ow ns on

re qu ir inga

pa rt y to p ro ve a

ne g a tiv e ,” the Sup re me Court ha s c on sis te ntl y
re qu ir e d th e g ov e rnme nt t o p ro ve the a dmi ssi bil ity of a c on fe ssi on

a g a ins t a c ri min a l de fe nd ant, Ollie, 442 F.3d at 1143. See also Brown v. I llinois , 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) ( requiringthe g ov e rnme nt t o s ho w that a c on fe ssi on

wa s n ot t he fr uit of an e arl ie r i lle g a l arr e st) ; Connelly, 479 U. S. at 16 8 ( re qu ir ingthe g ov e rnme nt t o s ho w that de fe nd ant’ s Miranda waiver g iven duringan alleg ed psychotic episode , was knowingand voluntary ). Indeed, the Supreme Court has “ alway s set high sta ndards of proof f or the wa iver of constitutional rights . . ..” Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 470 (1980). In Tague , the Court held: “Since the State is re sponsible for esta blishing the isolated c ircumstance s under whic h the interrog ation takes plac e and ha s the only means of making a

vailable c orrobor ated e vidence of
war nings g iven duringincommunicado interr og ation, the burde n is rightly on its shoulders.” Id. G u i d e d b y Tague, we are min df

ul t hat e vid e nc e of

de lib e rate ne ss o r l a c k th e re of is s imi larl y

in the hands of the g overnme nt, and we a re f urther pe rsuade d that the par ty seekingto introduce the confe ssion should remain responsible for showing that it was not obtained throug h a subterf ug e. Withre sp e c t to the qu antum of pr oo f n e c e ssa

ry , w e are min df

ul t hat Miranda may impose a “he avy

burden [upon] t he g overnme nt to demonstrate that the de fenda nt knowingly

and intelligently

waived his privileg e ag ainst self-incr imination,” and that in order to satisfy that burden a “hig h standar[d] of proof” is applica ble. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 2 0 1 0 U
. S
. LE X IS 4379, *43-44 (June 1, 2010) (Sotomay or, J. , d iss e nti ng ). No ne the le ss, “ [w]he ne ve r t he State bear s the burden of

proof in a motion to suppress a statement that the def endant c laims was obtained in violation of our Miranda d o c tr i n e , th e S t a t e n e e d p r o v e w a i v e r

o n l y b y a17

preponde ranc e of the evidenc e.” Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168. We apply the pre pondera

nce standard to Miranda c ha lle ng e s in re c og nit ion

tha t Miranda is an exclusionary rule “ aimed at deter ringlawless conduc t by

police and pr osecution,” a nd that imposing a hig her bur den of pr oof would do littl e to mitigate prosec utorial overr eac hing while at the same time conce aling troves of probative e vidence from the e y es of the jur y . Twomey , 404 U.S. at 489. For simil ar r easons, we hold that the g overnme nt must m eet its burden of disproving the deliberate use of a two-step interrog ation technique by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. L ooking to the totality

of the c ircumstance s in the case befor e us, the e vidence proff ere d by the g overnme nt to show that Capers wa s not the subject of a deliberate, two-step inter rog ation is outweig hed by

subjective a

nd objective e vidence to the contra ry . Hoti testified that he dela y ed issuing a Miranda w ar

n in g b e c a u s e h is “ mi n d s e t w a s o n , o n e . . . r e c o v e r in g e v id e n c e , . . . [a ]s well as de termining if the two of them or if — either both of

them or only

one of the m had any role to play

in committi ng the cr ime.” (H r’gTr. 65.) H oti testified that he was c oncer ned about losing the mone y

order s in the “ver

y , very larg e” f acility beca use the money

order s were about the size of a U.S. dollar a nd the def

endants c ould “toss them, hide them . . . [and] [y ]ou’d have a
rea l, rea l tough time finding[t hem] in t his larg e fa cility like that with all the packa g es and othe r ty pe s o f m a il. ” (H r’ g Tr . 3 1- 31 .) As to m akin g a de te rm inatio n a

bo ut d e fe nd ant L op e z, H oti testified that “[i] f I

could deter

mine fairly

quickly that, in fac t, he had no r ole to play in that crime, I need to take those cuff

s off a nd basica lly

cut him loose.” (Hr ’g . Tr. 35.) When a sked wh e the r h e wa s in

a po sit ion to r e a d Ca

pe rs his Miranda war

nings be fore askinghim about the money order s, Hoti replied “a

bsolutely .” (H r’g . Tr. 65.)18

T h e d i s tri ctco urt co n cl u d edfr o mth i s t es t i m o n y th atHo t i ’s p urp o s e i nd el ay i n g a Miranda war

ning w as not to undermine Cape rs’ F ifth Amendment rig hts, but rather “ to preve nt the loss or conc ealment of the cur renc y and money

order s that the Express Mail envelopes contained, a

nd to asce rtain whe ther L opez was involved in the cr ime, so that he could be fre ed or not.” Id. at* 1 2 n . 1 3 (c i t at i o no m i t t ed ). Ne i th er o f t h es e r ea s o n s , h o we v er , j u s t i fi es d el ay i n g a Miranda wa

rn ingon c e it i s o bv iou s th a t a su sp e c t is in c us tod

y . T he re is n o e xce pti on

to Miranda th atal l o ws a d el ay i ngi v i n g Miranda war

nings in orde r to prese rve e vanesc ent evidenc e. Ne ither is there an exception to Miranda that pe rm its de layingthe wa rn ing s in or de r t o
a sc e rt a in whe the r a

su sp e c te d c o- c on sp ir a tor may be e nti tle d to re le a se . Ind e e d, we a g re e wi th the W ill iam s Court

in i ts o bs e rv atio n th a t [o ]n c e a l awe n f o r c e m e n to f

f i c e r h a s d e t a i n e d

a s u s p e c t an d su bje c ts h im to interrogation . . . there is rare ly , if eve r, a le g itimate rea son to delay g iving a Miranda war ning until af

ter the suspe ct has confe ssed. Instead, the most plausible rea son . . . is an illegitimate one, wh i ch i s the interrog ator’s de sire to wea ken the wa

rning ’s eff ectivene ss. 435 F.3d at 1159. The only leg itimate rea son to delay intentionally

a Miranda war

ning until af

ter a custodial interr og ation has begun is to protect the saf ety of the a rre sting off

icer s or the public -- neither of which wa s an issue her e. See, e .g., United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 677 ( 2d Cir. 2004) (re cog nizi ng this “narr ow exception” to the Miranda rule). Inexperience , while not a leg itimate excuse for postponing a Miranda wa rn i n g,
never theless may

save a confe ssion from exclusion under Se ibe rt. Se e Un ite d S tates v . Na ra njo , 426 F.3d 221, 232 ( 3d Cir. 2005) (implying that an “inadve rtent” Miranda omi ssi on , o r a “ ro ok ie mis take ,” sh ou ld n ot w arr ant Se ibe rt scrutiny ). In the ca se bef

ore us, howe ver, suf

ficient subjective e vidence was a dduced to r ule out the offic ers’ inexperience as we ll as raise sig nificant19

doubts as to whether

a mistake ha d been ma de. The district court found it clea r fr om Hoti’s testimony and fr om his ex perie nce in law enfor ceme nt that his failure to Mirandize Caper s was not an ac cident. The district court explained: “Inspector H oti did not m ere ly forg et to g ive de fe nd ant Miranda war

nings . . . Inspector H oti had serve d as a N ew Yor k City police off

icer for some three y ear s, and as Inspector D el Giudice te stified, postal inspectors ar e ‘tra ined to provide Miranda when ther e is a c ustodial interrog ation.’” Capers, 2007 WL959300 at * 12. Indeed, Ho ti e xplic itl y

te sti fi e d th at he “ a

bs olute ly” wa s in

a po sit ion to i nf or m Ca pe rs of his Miranda rig hts once Cape rs was c onfined to the super visor’s offic e. (H r’gTr. 65.) The arr est of Cape rs did no t oc c ur “ out of the blu e ,” a s it

mig ht w e re Ho ti d

ri vin g to w or

k a nd wi tne sse d a

c ri me in prog ress, or w ere he re sponding to a radio c all repor

ting a crime in progress. Cape rs’ a rre st was th e c u l m i n at i o no f

a n i n e - m o n thi n v e s t i g a t i o ni n t o C a p e r s ’ s u s p e c t e d

c r i m i n a l a c t i v i ty . In surveiling Capers a

nd deter mining whe n to give the orde r to his team to desce nd on Capers a nd L opez, theref

ore, H oti had time to think t hroug h what proc edura l steps he would nee d to take following arr est in order

to build his case for pr osecution. B eca use, as the district c ourt found, Hoti had suffic ient experience to know that a Miranda wa rn ingwa s unq

ue sti on a bly ne c e ssa ry in
connec tion with C aper s’ post-ar rest interr og ation, the cor ollary to that finding must also obtain. H o t i w a s e x p e r i e n c e d

e n o u g ht o kn o wth a ti nth i s c a s e th e r e w a s n o v a l i d r e a s o nt o d e l ay a Miranda w ar

n i n gun t i l a f

t e r qu e s t i o n i n g a

s u s p e c ti nc u s t o dy. The district cour

t found that there was “ no evidenc e . . . that Inspector H oti had the specific intent to use the two-stag e questioningtechnique” to undermine Cape rs’ Miranda rig hts. Capers, 20 07 WL95 93 00 at * 1 2. Th e dis se nt e nd or se s th is f ind ing , a rguin g tha

t “ the re is nothing suspicious about the r easons put for th by Inspector H oti.” Dissent at 39. Considering20

the totality

of the c ircumstance s, howeve r, we find Inspector H oti’s proffe red r easons f or delay ing the Miranda wa

rn ingto l a c k n ot o nly

le g iti ma c y , b ut a lso c re dib ili ty . Ins pe c tor Ho ti
e xpla ine d th at he de lay e d in fo rm ingCa pe rs of his Miranda rig hts beca

use Hoti had to dete rmine if L opez was involved in the sche me, and if he was not, re lease him. I f Caper s had told Inspector Ho ti d ur ingthe ini tia l inte rr og atio n th a t L op e z ha d n oth ingto d o w iththe sc he me , w ou ld Inspector H oti, who had just witnessed the two men e nter a storag e conta iner a

nd the enve lope alar ms subsequently

sound, then have rele ased L opez on his own recognizance? We consider such a c onclusion dubious. W ith respec t to Hoti’s claim that he did not want to lose the money order s and ca sh in the larg e postal fa cility , this assertion is belied by the testimony

of the
arr esting office rs that Caper s and L opez were detained a lmost di rec tly afte r the e nvelope a larm
s o un d e d an d w e r e f o un d e i th e r s t i l l i nth e s t o r a g e c o n t a i n e r , o r i nth a ti m m e d i a t e v i c i n i ty . In light of the above, a s well as objec tive evidenc e discussed be low, the district court’s f inding that there was “ no evidenc e” of a deliber ate, two- step interrog ation tactic at work wa s clea r er ror. Capers, 2007 WL959300 at * 12. Th e dis se nt a sse rt s th at th e “ te st u se d b y the ma jor ity to d e te rm ine wh e the r I

ns pe c tor Ho ti de lib e rate ly

uti lize d a tw o- ste p inte rr og a tio n te c hn iqu e e ff e c tiv e ly un de rm ine s th e su

bje c tiv e te st established by

J ustice Ke nnedy

. . . beca use it ignor es subjective e vidence showing that the inspector did not deliber ately utiliz e a two- step technique , and instead r elies exclusively on the
o b j ec t i v e f ac t o rs l i s t edi nth e n o n -c o n tro l l i n g Se ibe rt plu ra lity op ini on .” Di sse nt a

t 38 . T his conclusion misrea ds our ana ly sis and conflates J ustice Ke nnedy ’s test with that articulate d by J ustice B reyer in his conc urringopinion in Se ibe rt . 5 4 2 U. S
. at6 1 7 (B re y er , J
. , co n cu rr i n g) (“Courts should exclude the ‘f ruits’ of the initial unwar

ned questioningunless the fa ilure to war n21

was in g ood faith.”) (citations omitted). By contra st, our analy sis considers the subjec tive evidenc e adduc ed at the suppr ession hear ing in the c ontext set forth by J ustice Ke nnedy

— as instructive but not automatically dispositi ve. Just ice Ke nnedy ’s conc urre nce in Se ibe rt does not advocate a test whe reby

a deliber ate two- step interrog ation will be found only when a law enfor ceme nt office r admits to executing suc h a strate g y . Nor doe s this test envision bl ind,
un qu e s t i o n i n g r e l i an c e o nth e t e s t i m o n y o f ar r e s t i n g an d

i n t e r r o g a t i n g o f

f i c e r s . T o th e c o n tr ar

y, beca use Jus tice Ke nnedy ’s test seeks to e x clude only those statements that ar e the r esult of deliberate and calculated police strate g ies to undermine Miranda, a sea rchingand pene trating i n qu i ry o f t h e o ff i ce r’ s t es t i m o n y

an d p ro ff er edre as o n s fo r d el ay i n g Miranda wa rn ingis there fore nece ssary

to determine when these strateg ies are beingemploy ed. The dissent asse rts that the above consideration “g ives absolutely no weig ht to the ins pe c tor ’s te sti mony

that hi s r e a so ns fo r n ot i mme diate ly a dv isi ngCa

pe rs of his Miranda ri g hts
we re to p re ve nt t

he los s o r c on c e a lme nt o f t he c ur re nc y and mon e y or de rs tha

t th e Expr e ss M a il envelope contained a

nd to asce rtain whe ther L opez was involved in the cr ime.” Dissent at 38. The dissent ar g ues that Judge Mc Kenna “witnessed I

nspector H oti’s testimony and wa s theref

ore better a ble to assess his cre dibilit y .” Dissent at 11. Althoug h appellate courts do not have the op po rt un ity to o bs e rv e wi tne ss t e sti mony and are , th e re fo re , p re c lud e d f ro m makin g c re dib ili ty deter minations, in l ight of

the clea r inconsistency

betwee n Inspector H oti’s stated rea sons for d el ay i n g Miranda war

nings a nd the objective a

nd subjective e vidence constituting the re mainder of the re cord be aringon this point , it is clear the district c ourt’s dete rmination “that there is no evidenc e . . . Inspector H oti had the spec ific intent to use the two-stag e questioningtechnique with the purpose of

first obtaining unwar

ned incr iminating stateme nts in order, in a subse quentWe note that in light of the district c ourt’s conc lusion that “J ustice Ke nnedy ’s 4 c on c ur re nc e . . . c ann ot r e a so na

bly be take n to be the ‘l aw o f t he land ,’ ” it l ike ly

did no t ava il its e lf of a numbe r o f o pin ion s b y

our s ist e r c ir c uit s, wh ic h h ave be e n in str uc tiv e in o ur

ana ly sis , a dv isi ngtr ia l c ourt s h owto g a ug e de lib e rate ne ss u

nd e r Jus tic e Ke nn e dy ’s Se ibe rt concur renc e. See Stre et, 47 2 F .3 d at 13 12 (1 1th Cir . 2 00 6) ; Courtney, 463 F.3d at 338 (5th Cir. 2006); W illiams, 43 5 F .3 d at 11 57 (9 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; Kiam, 43 2 F .3 d at 53 2 ( 3d Cir . 2 00 6) ; He rn an de

z, 384 F.3d at 566 (8th Cir. 2004). Indeed it appe ars a s though the district court thoug ht that the Kenne dy test require d it to analy

ze only the statements of the offe nding of fice r, without ref

ere nce to any other fa cts, possibly

contra dictory

to the statements of the of fice r, that appe are d on the rec ord. 22 war ned interr og ation, to obtain simi lar incr iminating stateme nts,” Cap e rs , 2007 WL959300 at *1 2, a ff or de d b lin d a

nd a bs olute we ig ht t o th e te sti mony of the arr e sti ngof

fi c e rs and ig no re d a ll the other r eleva

nt evidence which we here announce must also be considere d. I f Jus tice 4 Kenne dy ’s test is to have any meaningoutside of the unique a nd never -ag ain-to-be -re peate d circ umstances of Se ibe rt , the district court’s unidimensional ana ly sis cannot be de terminative of the outcome in this case
. Ob je c tiv e e vid e nc e a lso le a ds us to c on c lud e that th e Go ve rnme nt h a s f a ile d to me e t it s burd e n o f d e mon str atin g that Ca pe rs wa s n ot s ub

je c te d to a

tw o- ste p inte rr og a tio n. F ir st, the re is considera ble over lap betwe en the state ments elicited fr om the defe ndant duringthe first and second inter

rog ation. Hoti’s initial int err og ation of Caper s resulted in a c onfession and “ there
rema ined ‘little, if any

thing, of incriminating potential left unsaid.’” Cap e rs , 2007 WL959300, at* 1 3 (qu o t i n g Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 616) (plura lity opinion). The cir cumstance s surroundingthe two sessions of the interr og ation, including the nature of the re spective e nvirons in which the interrog ation took place a nd the continuity

of the c ast of interr og ating office rs, was indicative of a deliber ate two- step interrog ation. Whil e the location of the interrog ation sessions chang ed, the23

first takingplace in a room at the post off ice a nd the sec ond in the Domicile, the inquisitorial
e nv ir onme nt o f t

he qu e sti on ingwa s c on sis te nt. Unlike in Car te r, the ini tia l c onve rs a tio n b e tw e e n Ca pe rs and Ho ti w a s in

no wa y c a su a l. See Nune z-Sanche z, 478 F.3d at 663-69. I t beg an with Hoti’s openingstatement to Caper s that “I ’m g oing to do my

best to make you g o awa y , and I just want y ou to know.” (H r’gTr. 95.) Capers w as handc uffe d throug hout the proce ss. On the fa cts prese nted, the district cour t
corr ectly conclude d, and we ag ree , that Hoti’s initial questioni ng was indee d a for mal interrog ation. Se e Cap e rs , 2007 WL959300, at *4 (c oncluding that Capers w as in custody from the moment he wa s handcuf fed)
. B e tw e e n th e tw o p ha se s o f t he int e rr og a tio n, Ho ti’ s f

e llo w i ns pe c tor s e ng a g e d Ca pe rs in “small talk,” a

nd advised him that it was in his interest to tell the truth when Hoti ar rived. Capers c ontinued to be handc uffe d throug hout the proce ss. The sec ond phase of the interrog ation also opene d with a hostile remar k, namely Hoti’s observation that Capers wa s “one of the most laziest employ ees I ’ve e ver se en.” Cf. Nunez-Sanchez, 478 F.3d at 668-69 (finding that there was “ no evidenc e of a deliberate attempt to employ a two-step strateg y ” bec ause, inter alia, “the a g ents did not act with ag g ressivene ss or hostilit y ”). I n combination with the Miranda
war ning, the inspectors c lear ly established that this second e ncounter was not a c asual
c onve rs atio n. F or

the mos t, p art

the re wa s a lso c on tin

uit y in t he of fi c e rs pr e se nt a

t bo th interrog ations. Duringthe first interr og ation Hoti asked the que stions, while Del Guidice a nd Moon were prese nt in the room. The sec ond interrog ation, at the outset, involved the same three ins pe c tor s w ithHo ti a g a in a sk ingthe qu e sti on s a nd De l G iud ic e and

Mo on re ma ini ngsil e nt.The dissent ar g ues that under the test outlined above “ in almost all cases whe re a pre- 5 wa rn ingc on fe ssi on

is s up pr e sse d d

ue to a vio latio n o f t

he su sp e c t’ s Miranda rig hts, a subsequent po st- wa rn ingc on fe ssi on

wi ll a lso be su

pp re sse d b e c a

us e the int e rr og a tin g of

fi c e r w ill be un a

ble to articulate a ‘le g itimate’ rea son for not advisingthe suspect of his or her Miranda ri g hts pr ior to the initial interrog ation.” Dissent at 40. This conc lusion also mis rea ds our re asoning . To the contra ry , there be will many

occa sions where the totality of the c ircumstance s surroundingthe two interrog ations leads to the conc lusion that a two-step interr og ation was the pr oduct of a “rookie mistake,” re sulted from poor c ommunication among investigating of fice rs, or oc curr ed when a n experience d office r suffe red a momentary

lapse in judg ment. What will require hig her scrutiny are situations where, a s here , an experienc ed off icer conducts both interr og ations, and th e r e a s o n s p r o f

f e r e d f o r n o ti n i t i a l l y Mirandizing a su sp e c t are no t on ly

qu e sti on a

ble but a lso inh e re ntl y la c k c re dib ili ty

in l ig ht o f t

he tot a lity of the c ir c ums tanc e s. 24 F ina lly , th e te mpo ra l pr oximi ty of the pr e - a

nd po st- wa rn ingint e rr og a tio ns , a lon g wi th the c on tin uit y of Ca pe r’ s c us tod

y , r e a so na

bly le a ds to t he c on c lus ion

that th e latte r w a s a
c on tin uatio n o f t

he fo rm e r. On ly

90 min ute s se pa ra te d th e tw o inte rr og a tio n s e ssi on s. An d w hil e not car ried out to the degree it was in Seibert, at least to some extent the latter session wa s “esse ntially

a cr oss-examination using information g ained dur ing the first round of interrog ation.” See Carter, 489 F.3d at 536. Accor dingly , the g overnme nt has not produce d sufficie nt objective evide nce to mee t its burden to dispel a conc lusion that Hoti’s conduct
amou nte d to a de lib e rate “ qu e sti on

fi rs t” int e rr og a tio n ta c tic de signe d to un de rm ine Ca pe rs ’
e xer c ise of

his Miranda rig hts. 5 IV. Curative M easures Deliber atene ss having been e stablished, we must next consider whethe r any curative
me a sure s inte rv e ne d to re sto re the de fe nd ant’ s o pp or tun ity vo luntari ly

to e xer c ise his Miranda rig hts. Se e Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 622 (Ke nnedy , J. , concur ring ) (“ [P ]ost war

ning statements that
are related to the substance of pre war ning statements must be excluded unless curative measure s
are taken be fore the postwarningstatement is made.” ). As noted, Justi ce K ennedy provided two25

examples of potential curative measure s: (1) “a substantial break in time and circ umstances betwee n the pre war

ning statement and the Miranda war ning,” and (2) “an a dditional warningthat explains t he likely

inadmissibil ity

of the pre war

ning c ustodial statement.” Id. B a se d o n th e fa c ts befor e us, we cannot sa

y that any such cur ative mea sure oc curr ed such that it rendere d eff ective the Miranda war

nings g iven to Capers be fore the sec ond interrog ation. As discussed, althoug h approximately 90 minutes passed betwe en the f irst and sec ond interrog ations, the two rounds of que stioning bra ckete d one continual pr ocess. De l Giudice and Moon were with Capers throug hout the 90 minutes, eng ag ing in “ small talk” and a dvising Cape rs to t e ll the tr

uth . D e sp ite the dif

fe re nt l oc a tio ns of

the int e rr og a tio n s e ssi on s, bo th o c c ur re d w hil e Capers r emained in ha

ndcuff s and in settings that clear ly established the a

uthoritative nature of the questioning . There is lit tle meaning ful diffe renc e betwe en the c ircumstance s surrounding Ca pe rs ’ t wo int e rr og atio n s e ssi on s, and the re wa s c e rt a inl y

no “ su bs tanti a l br e ak” tha

t w ou ld have re sto re d h is Miranda ri g hts
. Mo re ov e r, de sp ite Ho ti’ s k no wl e dg e that Ca

pe rs ’ f ir st s tate me nt w ou ld b e ina dmi ssa ble in court, he ne ver a lerted Cape rs to that fac t. Cap e rs , 2007 WL959300, at *14. Hoti continued his line of questioning w ithout dis pelling Ca pers’ probable assumption that he had alr eady incriminated himself ba sed on his first confe ssion. Hoti revea led as much in his testimony
. When asked whe ther he posed some of the same que stions at the Bronx Domicile as he ha d
a sk e d e arl ie r i n th e su

pe rv iso r’ s o ff

ic e , H oti re pli e d th a t he did no t se e the ne e d to a sk

the same questions for which he alre ady had answ ers. ( Hr’gTr. 72.) B y the same toke n, Hoti did build on Capers’ admission of theft in the orig inal session by structuringthe sec ond interrog ation session to elicit a play -by -play

descr iption of how Capers we nt about stealingthe money order s. CapersConsideration of whe ther or not c urative me asure s were taken is an inquiry separ ate a

nd 6 apar t from deter

mining deliber atene ss. When analy zing deliber atene ss, however , courts may c on sid e r a

n e xpe ri e nc e d o ff

ic e r’ s f a ilure to w arn

a su sp e c t th a t an e arl ie r a dmi ssi on , k no wn to the interrog ating office r, is inadmissible. I ndeed suc h an omission on the part of the inter rog ating of fi c e r i s p ro bativ e of

a “ c a lc ula te d” pla n to su bv e rt Miranda.
26 thus had no rea son to know that his first broad conf ession could not be used a g ainst him when,
on ly 90 min ute s late r whil e sti ll i n c los e c us tod y , h e a c tua lly

“ wa ive d” his Miranda rig hts. On 6 these fa cts, there wer e no mea sures take n to cure the inspectors’ use of the de liberate , two-step interrog ation strateg y . Be cause on the objective a nd subjective e vidence we a re le ft to conclude that th e ins pe c tor s e mpl oye d a str ate g y to c ir c umv e nt t

he de fe nd ant’ s Miranda ri g hts and be c a us e the re we re no c ur ativ e me a sure s to e ns ur e tha t th e de fe nd ant w a s n ot m isl e d w ithre g ard to h is ri g hts pr ior

to h is s e c on d c on fe ssi on , Ca pe rs ’ w a ive r o f h is Miranda rig hts was invalid. The district court, there fore , proper ly suppressed his post-wa

rningconfe ssion. CO NC LU SION For the fore g oing r easons, we AFF I RM the district court’s dec ision to suppress the de fe nd ant’ s p os t-Miranda state me nts .27

TRAGER, District Judge , d i s s en t i n g: Ire sp e c tf ull y dis se nt. My

c oll e a g ue s c la im t o f

oll owthi s Co ur

t' s p re vio us de c isi on

in Carter v. United States , 4 8 9 F. 3 d 5 2 8 (2 d C i r. 2 0 0 7 ), an d

b y ex t en s i o nJ u s t i ce Ke n n ed y 's
concur ringopinion in Mi

sso ur i v . S

e ibe rt , 542 U.S. 600 (2004) – both of whic h require the district court to deter

mine an interr og ating office r' s subjective intent for f ailing to wa

rn a suspe ct of his Miranda rig hts. But the novel test c raf ted by the majority , which examines whethe r the interrog ating office r' s rea sons would be dee med " leg itimate" unde r Miranda an d i t s p r o g e n y, instead make s subjective evide nce vir tually irrele vant in near ly

ever y two-step interr og ation case
. As such, the major ity ' s decision under mines J ustice Ke nnedy ' s controlling opinion in Se ibe rt and
re p l ac es i twi thth e o b

j ec t i v e "e ff

ec t i v en es s " t es tp ro p o s edb y th e n o n -c o n tro l l i n g Se ibe rt plurality opinion. A m or e fa ith fu l a

pp lic atio n o f Jus tic e Ke nn e dy ' s Se ibe rt c on c ur re nc e re qu ir e s a
co n cl u s i o nth atC ap er s ' p o s t -w arn i n g s t at em en t s ar e a dm i s s i b l e b as edo nth e d i s tri ctco urt 's fac tual finding – made a fter a thoroug h revie w of a ll of the evidenc e – that Inspector H oti did not deliberately

utiliz e a two- step interrog ation technique. T he majority improperly

undertakes a de novo revie w of the district c ourt' s fac tual finding s rather than re viewingthem using the traditional " clea

rly err oneous" standard. T he majority sug g ests that a de novo r eview is made
nece ssary by its purported construc tion of a novel " totality of the c ircumstance s" te st for deter mining whe ther a

n interrog ating office r purpose fully utiliz ed a two- step interrog ation technique. B ut this new test is entirely consistent with the one used by the district court to find that Inspector H oti did not deliberately use such a

technique, a

nd there fore provides no basis to reviewthe district court' s fac tual finding s de novo.28

Mo re ov e r, e ve n if

de no vo re vie w i s a

pp ro pr iate in t

his c a se , I wo uld sti ll d isa g re e wi th the majority ' s decision to suppress the post-wa rningconfe ssion because the g overnme nt has met its bu rd e n o f p ro vin g by

a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e that Ins pe c tor Ho ti d id n ot i nte nd

to utiliz e a two- step interrog ation technique. T o the extent that the majority finds that any

of the dis tr ic t c ourt ' s f

a c tua l f ind ing s w e re c le arl y

e rr on e ou s, the ma

jor ity mis a pp lie s th e c le arl y
err oneous standar d by

making cre dibilit y

deter minations reg arding

witness testimony . Such
c re dib ili ty

de te rm inatio ns , w hil e ne ve r a pp ro pr ia te fo r a n a pp e llate c ourt

to m ake , a

re pa rt ic ula rl y inappropriate wher e, as he re, the re is nothing in I nspector H oti's testimony that is either contra dicted by

the re cord e vidence or inhere ntly unbelievable
. Be cause a prope r re view of a ll the evidence (includingthe subjective e vidence )
e sta bli sh e s th at Ins pe c tor

Ho ti d id n ot d e lib e ra

te ly uti lize a tw o- ste p inte rr og a tio n te c hn iqu e to
c ir c umv e nt Miranda , the voluntary statements made in r esponse to the post-wa rning interrog ation should not be suppressed.

I Th is c a se inv olv e s a

su sp e c t w ho ma de a

se lf -i nc ri min a tin g state me nt i n r e sp on se to qu e sti on s f

ro m an inte rr og atin g of

fi c e r p ri or to b e ingwa

rn e d o f h is Miranda rig hts, and then late r m a de a dd iti on a l se lf -i nc ri min atin g state me nt a ft e r b e ingwa rn e d o f h is Miranda rig hts. The Supreme Court has twice considere d case s of this nature – f irst in Oregon v . Elstad , 470 U.S. 298 (1985), a nd ag ain in Mi

sso ur i v . S

e ibe rt , 542 U.S. 600 (2004). In Oregon v . Elstad , two office rs went to the home of Michae l Elstad – an individual they suspected of

robbinga neig hbor' s house – with a wa rra nt for his arr est. Whil e ther e, one of the29

of fi c e rs ha d a

br ie f c onve rs atio n w iththe su sp e c t w ith out w arn inghim of his Miranda rig hts. 470 U.S. at 300-01. The of fice r appa rently failed to issue the w arning s beca use it was not clea

r to him whether the suspe ct was in c ustody at the time. Id. at 315. Duringthe conve rsation, the office r aske d the suspect whe ther he knew the individual whose house had be en robbe d, to which the suspect r esponded by

making an incr iminating stateme nt. Following that statement, the suspect wa s arr ested a

nd transporte d to the station house. Approxim ately one hour later, the
same tw o o ff

ic e rs wh o h a d a

rr e ste d th e su sp e c t at hi s h ome a dv ise d h im o f h is Miranda ri g hts , and then pr ocee ded to take a full statement from him. Id. at 301-02. The Supreme Court found that, althoug h the initial unwarne d statement wa s inadmissibl e, the late r p os tw arn ing

state me nt w a s a dmi ssi ble be c a us e it w a s v olu

nta ri ly ma de . A c c or din gto the Court, "[t]hough Miranda require s that the unwar ned admission must be suppressed, the
a dmi ssi bil ity

of any su bs e qu e nt s tate me nt s ho uld tur n in the se c ir c ums tanc e s so le ly on wh e the r i t is kn owi ngly

andvo lu nt ari ly

mad e." Id. at 309. Th e iss ue of

pr e - a nd po st- wa rn ingc on fe ssi on s a g a in c ame be fo re the Sup re me Court in Mi sso ur i v . S

e ibe rt . In that case , the Court was c onfronted w ith the intentional use of a two- step interrog ation technique where office rs in the Rolla, Missouri poli ce de partment ha d been tr ained to " w it h h o ld [] Miranda warn in gs un ti l af ter in terrogat in g and d rawi ng ou t a c on fes si on ," Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 609 (plurality opinion), in order to " g et a c onfession the suspec t would not make if he
un ders to odhi s ri ghts at t he o ut set ," id. at 613. The Court produc ed seve ral opinions, none of which g arne red the support of a ma jority of the Just ices. Writing f or four J ustices, J ustice Souter fo un d th at th e po st- wa

rn ingstate me nts we re ina dmi ssi ble (e ve n th ou g h th e y we re vo luntari ly made within the mea

ning of Elstad

) b e c a us e " the qu e sti on -f

ir st t a c tic e ff

e c tiv e ly thr e a te ns to30

thw art Miranda ' s purpose of r educingthe risk that a c oerc ed conf ession would be admitted, and beca use the fa cts here do not rea sonably support a conc lusion that the warning s g iven could have
servedth eir

pu rpo se . . . ." Id. at 617. J ustice Souter' s plurality

opinion sets forth an objec tive test from the pe rspec tive of the
su sp e c t be ingint e rr og ate d, wh e re by a c ourt de c idi ngthe a dmi ssi bil ity of po st- wa rn ingstate me nts that followed inadmissible pre- war ning statements should determine " whether it would be
rea sonable to find that in these c ircumstance s the war nings c ould function ' eff

ectively ' as Miranda requ ir es. " Id. at 611-612. The plurality descr ibed " eff

ectivene ss" a s "[whether ] t he
wa rn ing s e ff e c tiv e ly a dv ise the su sp e c t th a t he ha d a re a l c ho ic e a

bo ut g ivi ngan a dmi ssi ble statement at that juncture " a nd "[whethe r] they

rea sonably

convey that he could c hoose to stop tal ki ng even if

he h ad t alk ed ear li er." Id. Ac c or din g to t he plu ra lity , a c ourt sh ou ld p e rf

or m th is inquiry in all case s where the admissibilit y of post-wa

rningstatements is challeng ed base d on the linge ringeff

ects of a n inadmissible pre-wa

rninginterrog ation. Id. This test would be perf ormed in addition to the Elstad inq uir y int o whe the r t

he state me nts we re kn ow ing ly and vo luntari ly made. The plura lity

then listed sever al objective f actor s that a cour

t should consider whe n deter mining whe ther the w arningcould func tion effe ctively . These f actor s included: (1) the completene ss and detail of the questions and answe rs in the first round of interrog ation, (2) the overla pping c ontent of the two stateme nts, (3) the timing a nd setting of

the first and se cond, the continuity of police pe rsonnel and ( 4) the de g ree to which the interr og ator' s questions treated the second r ound as continuous with the first. Id. at 615.31

Justi c e Ke nn e dy , w ri tin g se pa rate ly in a n o pin ion joi ne d b y Justi c e B re y e r, a g re e d w ith the plu ra lity that th e po st- wa

rn ingstate me nts sh ou ld b e su pp re sse d, but su g g e ste d a dif fe re nt t e st f o r d e t e r m i n i n g th e i r

a dm i s s i b i l i ty. In c o n tr a s tt o th e p l ur a l i ty’ s o b j e c t i v e t e s t , J u s t i c e K e n n e dy – fo c us ingmor e on

the c on du c t of

law e nf or c e me nt –

pr op os e d a

" na rr ow e r t e st a

pp lic a ble on ly in the infre quent ca se, such a s we have her e, in which the two- step interrog ation technique w as used in a ca lculated wa

y to undermine the Miranda warn in g." Id. at 622 (Ke nnedy , J ., concur ring ). A c c o r d i n gt o J u s t i c e K e n n e dy: " W h e nani n t e r r o g a t o r u s e s th i s d e l i b e r a t e , tw o - s t e p s tr a t e g y, p re d i ca t edu

p o nv i o l at i n g Miranda duringan extended intervie w, postwarningstatements that ar e related to the substance of pre war ning statements must be excluded absent spec ific, cur ative st eps ." Id. at 621. I f the c ourt finds that the interr og ator did not delibera tely use a two- step strategy , then " the admissibilit y of postwar

ning statements should continue to be g overne d by the principles of Elstad ." Id. at 622. In r e a c hin g thi s c on c lus ion , Just ic e Ke nn e dy re je c te d th e ma

jor ity ' s p ur e ly

ob je c tiv e te st, wh ic h w a s to be a

pp lie d in c a se s o f b oth

int e nti on a l and

un int e nti on a l tw o- sta g e int e rr og a tio ns , as "cu t[ ti ng] to o b road ly ." Id. at 62 1- 22 . Ins te a d, Justi c e Ke nn e dy fe lt that a

c ourt sh ou ld o nly consider whether

the Miranda war

ning w as ef

fec tive – or, in J ustice Ke nnedy ' s words, whe ther "c urative me asure s are taken be fore the postwarningstatements ar e made " – in c ases whe re the interrog ator intentionally used the two-ste p technique. Id. at 622. In case s where the interrog ator did not intentionally

use a two- step technique to undermine Miranda , J ustice Ke nnedy felt that the " eff ectivene ss" test should not be applied. Id. Despite the f

rag mented natur e of the decisions in Se ibe rt , both the Supreme Court' s and this Court's pre cede nts make cle ar that J ustice Ke nnedy ' s concur ringopinion controls. "When aThe a pplicability

of Ma rk s to Se ibe rt is unaffe cted by this Court's opinion in United 1 States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. , 3 15 F .3 d 1 79 (2 d Ci r. 20 03 ). Th a t c a se fo un d th a t Ma rk s was inapplicable to the Supre me Court' s splintered dec ision in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfe l , 5 24 U. S. 4 9 8 (1 9 9 8 ), b ec au s e J u s t i ce Ke n n ed y 's co n cu rr en ce wa s "n o ta l o gi ca l s u b s et " o f t h e p l ura l i ty 's analy sis. Alcan Aluminum Corp. , 315 F.3d at 189. I n Ea ste rn En te rp ris e s, a four -Jus tice plurality found that the Coal Industry Retiree H ealth B enef

its Act (" Coal Act" ) violated the Taking s Clause of the F ifth Amendment. 524 U.S. at 537-38 ( plurality opinion). J ustice 32 fra g mented Court dec ides a c ase a nd no single rationale explaining the re sult enjoy s the assent of five Just ices, ' the holding of the Court may

be viewe d as that position taken by those Member s who con curr ed i n t he j ud gment on th e narrow est groun ds ." Marks v . United States , 4 30 U. S. 188, 193 (1977). In Se ibe rt , J ustice Ke nnedy ' s opinion, which provided the f ifth vote for suppressingthe self- incriminating statements made by the def endant, c ontrols beca

use it provides
a nar rowe r exception to Elstad tha n th e te st p ro po se d b y

the plu ra lity . Wh e re a s th e plu

ra lity sug g ested that a ll cases whe re a two-step interr og ation took place should be revie wed f or the objective e ffe ctiveness of the Miranda war

ning, Justice Kenne dy ' s concur ringopinion holds t hat such a r eview should only take plac e in ca ses wher e the inter rog ator intentionally

used a two- step te c hn iqu e to c ir c umv e nt Miranda . The tests sug g ested by the plurality

and Just ice Ke nnedy d i v e r g e i nc a s e s w h e r e th e i n t e r r o g at o r un i n t e n t i o n a l l y

p e r f o r m e d a tw o - s t e p i n t e r

r o g a t i o n . In those ca ses, J ustice Ke nnedy ' s concur ringopinion states that the Elstad inquiry into whether statements wer e " knowing ly and voluntarily

made" still controls, wher eas the plurality opinion states that the new ly -cr afte d "e ffe ctiveness" test should also be applied. B eca use the test stated in J ustice Ke nnedy ' s concur ringopinion applies the " eff ectivene ss" inquiry

– which wa s approve d for use in at least some cir cumstance s by a majority

of the Court – to a na

rrowe r set of
case s than the test stated in the plura lity opinion, Ma rk

s dictates that it be c onsidered the
c on tr oll ingop ini on

fr om Se ibe rt . 1Ke nn e dy

joi ne d in the re su lt r e a c he d b y

the plu ra lity but r e je c te d it s T akin g s Cl a

us e ana ly sis , finding instead that the Coal Ac t violated substantive due proc ess. Id. a t 53 9- 50 . U nli ke in Eastern Enterprises , w he re the plu ra lity op ini on and the c on c ur

ri ngop ini on

re a c he d th e same result on entire ly

separ ate g rounds, the conc urringopinion in Se ibe rt a do pte d th e same "e ffe ctiveness" test as the Se ibe rt plurality , but held that the test should be applied to a na rrowe r subset of ca ses than the plura lity would have he ld. As the majority

rec og nizes in i ts opinion, t his view has bee n adopted by the Third, F ifth, 2 Eig hth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. Majority Op. at 10. But see United States v . Heron , 564 F.3d 879, 884- 85 (7th Cir. 2009) (c oncluding that the Ma rk s rule is inapplicable to Se ibe rt beca use " J ustice Ke nnedy ' s intent-based te st was re jected by both the plurality

decision and the dissent")
. 33 Even more importantly

for our purposes, this Court has alre ady held that J ustice Kenne dy ' s concur

ringopinion in Se ibe rt is the controlling opinion. In United States v. Carter , 489 F.3d 528 ( 2d Cir. 2007), dec ided af ter the district c ourt issued its decision in the case at bar , thi s Co ur t st ate d: " We n owjoi n o ur sis te r c ir c uit s in

ho ldi ngtha

t Se ibe rt lay s o ut a

n e xce pti on

to Elstad fo r c a se s in

wh ic h a de lib e rate , tw o- ste p s tr a te g y wa s u se d b y

law e nf or c e me nt t o o bta in th e po st warn in g confe ss io n. " Id. at 536. Althoug h the district court did not have the bene fit of g uid anc e fr om t

his Court wh e n it c on sid e re d th e qu e sti on

of wh ic h o pin ion

fr om Se ibe rt c on tr ols , Car te r has since de finitively answe red that question. My c oll e a g ue s d o n ot d isp ute that, p os t- Carter , Just ic e Ke nn e dy ' s c on c ur ri ngop ini on

in Se ibe rt clea

rly controls in this circuit (as we ll as most other circuits that have decide d the issue ). 2 The majority

writes: " Under Carter , w e mus t a dd re ss whe the r t

he of fi c e rs e mpl oy e d a

' de lib e rate two -s t ep s tra t egy , p re d i ca t edu p o nv i o l at i n g Miranda duringan extended intervie w,' and if so, whether ' specific , curative steps' wer e take n to obviate the violation that occur red." Majority

Op. at1 2 (qu o t i n g Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 621 (Ke nnedy , J ., concur ring )).Although the majority does not expli citly

state that it is applying a

de novo standa

rd of 3 revie w to the district court' s fac tual finding s, its analy sis clear ly demonstrates that it is doing so. See Majority

Op. at 17 (" L ooking to the totality of the c ircumstance s in the case befor e us, the evidenc e prof

fer ed by the g overnme nt to show that Capers wa s not the subject of a deliberate, tw o- ste p inte rr og atio n is outw e ig he d b y su bje c tiv e and

ob je c tiv e e vid e nc e to t

he c on tr ary ." ); see also id. at 22 (" Ob

je c tiv e e vid e nc e a lso le a ds us to c on c lud e that th e Go ve rnme nt h a s f a ile d to meet its burden . . . ." ). 34 Havingrec og nized that J ustice Ke nnedy ' s concur ringopinion in Se ibe rt c on tr ols , th is
case should be ea sily

resolved ba sed entire ly

on the district court' s fac tual finding s. Instead, the
ma jor ity g oe s a str ay

by re vie wi ngthe dis tr ic t c ourt ' s f a c tua l f ind ing s d e no vo , inc or

re c tly 3 applying the applicable test on de novo re view, and doingso in a way that undermines Justi ce Ke n n ed y 's co n tro l l i n g Se ibe rt opinion. In Jud g e Mc Ke nn a ' s th or ou g h a nd we ll- re a so ne d o pin ion

be low , h e state d th a t " [t]he re is no evidenc e . . . that Inspector H oti had the spec ific intent to use the two-stag e questioning technique w ith the purpose of f irst obtaining unwa

rned inc riminating state ments in order, in a subsequent wa

rned inter rog ation, to obtain simi lar incr iminating stateme nts." United States v. Cap e rs , N o. 06 -C R- 26 6, 20 07 WL95 93 00 , at *1 2 ( S.D .N .Y . M ar. 29 , 2 00 7) . B a se d o n h is fi nd ingof a la c k o f i nte nt, Judg e Mc Ke nn a c on c lud e d: " [I ]f Jus tic e Ke nn e dy ' s Se ibe rt
con curr ence r epre sen tedth e la w, s up pres si on wou ldbe d eni ed. " Id. a t *1 5 n .1 7. Un de r t he te st
e sta bli sh e d in Justi c e Ke nn e dy ' s Se ibe rt op ini on , th e a bo ve fa c tua l f

ind ingis s uf

fi c ie nt t o deter mine that suppression should be denie d, as the district cour t rig htly noted. The district cour

t's f actua l findings made at a suppre ssion hearingshould not be overturne d unless they

are found to be c lear ly

err oneous. United States v. Ansaldi , 372 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 2004). " The trial c ourt is in a unique position to evaluate witnesse s' cre dibilit y ,"Although the majority states that the " district court' s [s ubsidiary ] finding that there was 4 ' no evidenc e' of a de liberate , two-step interr og ation tactic at work wa s clea r er ror," Majority

Op. at 20 , it no ta bly do e s no t fi nd

that th e dis tr ic t c ourt ' s u lti mate fa c tua l f ind ingtha

t Ins pe c tor

Ho ti did no t inte nd

to u se a tw o- ste p inte rr og a tio n te c hn iqu e to c ir c umv e nt Miranda was c lear err or. Instead, it revie ws the evide nce in the r ecor d de novo and f inds that "the g overnme nt has not 35 Un ite d S tates v . D av is , 967 F.2d 84, 86 ( 2d Cir. 1992), and is there by better positioned than a

n
a pp e llate c ourt

to m ake the ne c e ssa

ry fa c tua l f ind ing s. In this case, the district c ourt consider ed the testimony from the inter

rog ating office r – Inspector H oti – and deter mined that he testified c redibly with reg ard to his re asons for not g ivi ngde fe nd ant Miranda war nings pr ior to questioning him at the B ronx DMU when he sa id: Ag ain, the importanc e to me in under standing this facility , Idid not want to lose any

of the e vidence , Idid not want to lose any of the e vidence in the case
. Obviously

the importance of it, to recove r that evide nce a s quickly as I can. Secondly , Ihave a

nother individual that' s – y es, he' s cuff ed outside of the of

fice , Mr. L opez. I f I

could deter

mine fairly

quickly that, in fac t, he had no r ole to play in that crime, I

need to take those cuff

s off a nd basica lly

cut him loose. Cap e rs , 2 00 7 WL

95 93 00 , at *3 (q

uo tin gTr . 3 5) . T he dis tr ic t c ourt fo un d th a t th is testimony supported a f

inding that Inspector H oti did not deliberately utiliz e a two- step interrog ation technique, id. at *12, and f urther de termined that the obje ctive evide nce in no wa y contra dicted his testimony , id. (" Th e re is n o e vid e nc e . . . th a t Ins pe c tor Ho ti h a d th e sp e c if

ic intent to use the two-stag e questioningtechnique w ith the purpose of f irst obtaining unwa

rned incriminating statements in order , in a subsequent wa rned inter rog ation, to obtain simi lar incriminating statements." ). B ased on a ll of the ava ilable evidenc e, the district cour t found that Inspector H oti did not deliberately utiliz e a two- step interrog ation technique to c ircumvent Miranda
. Ev e n my c oll e a g ue s in

the ma jor ity are unwi lli ngto s ay

that th is f

a c tua l f ind ingis c le arl y
e rr on e ou s. I f t

he ma jor ity ha d r e vie we d th e dis tr ic t c ourt ' s d e c isi on (i nc lud ingits ult imate 4pro du ced s uff ici entob jec ti ve ev id ence t o m eetit s b urd en. " Id. a t 24 ; se e als o s up ra note 3. 36 conclusion that Inspector H oti did not i ntentionally utiliz e a two- step interrog ation technique)
us ingthe pr op e r " c le arl y

e rr on e ou s" sta

nd ard , th e n th e outc ome un de r Jus tic e Ke nn e dy ' s te st fr om Se ibe rt would have be en cle ar – suppr ession would have be en denie d beca use the interrog ator did not delibera tely utiliz e a two- step interrog ation technique to c ircumvent Miranda
. B ut i ns te a d o f r e vie wi ngthe dis tr ic t c ourt ' s f a c tua l f ind ing s f or c le ar e rr or , th e ma

jor ity i mp ro p er l y

ch o o s es t o re v i ew th e c o urt 's fa ct u al fi n d i n gs d e n o v o , re p l ac i n g th e d i s tri ctco urt 's
cre dibilit y

deter minations with i ts own and re -we ighingthe evidenc e base d on information obtained entire ly

from the wr itten rec ord. The majority

justifies its reexamination of the district court' s fac tual finding s by claiming th ati ti s " c o n s tr

u c t i n g a m e th o d t o d e t e r m i n e d e l i b e r a t e n e s s , " M a j o r i ty O p . a t1 3 , n am e l y, establishing which par

ty bear s the burden of

provingdeliberateness, and what that burde n is. But
even a cce pting that the ma jority ' s opinion clarifies a spects of a test that were previously unsettled in t his c ir c uit , th e re is s til l no ba sis fo r i g no ri ngthe dis tr ic t c ourt ' s th or ou g h f a c t- fi nd ingon

thi s issue beca

use the test ar

ticulated by

the majority

is the exact same test that wa s applied by the dis tr ic t c ourt . Th e ma jor ity state s: " [W]e jo in o ur

sis te r c ir c uit s in

c on c lud ingtha

t a c ourt sh ou ld
re vie w the tot a lity

of the ob je c tiv e and

su bje c tiv e e vid e nc e surr ound ingthe int e rr og a tio ns in
or de r t o d e te rm ine de lib e rate ne ss, wi th a re c og nit ion

that in mos t in sta

nc e s th e inq

uir y wi ll r e ly he avil y , if

no t e nti re ly , u

po n o bje c tiv e e vid e nc e ." Ma jor ity Op . at 14 -1 5. I t g oe s o n to state :Even thoug h the district court found that the objective e vidence did not support 5 de fe nd ant' s c on te nti on

that Ins pe c tor

Ho ti d e lib e rate ly

us e d a tw o- ste p inte rr og a tio n te c hn iqu e , it nonetheless c onsidered a ll of the objective f actor s articulate d by

the Se ibe rt plurality

in rea ching that conclusion. Se e Cap e rs , 2007 WL959300, at *13-15. The ref ore, the majority ' s claim that the district court " ignor ed all the . . . r eleva nt evidence " be sides the testimony of the a rre sting office rs, Majority

Op. at 21, is clea

rly contra dicted by

the district court' s written opinion. The district cour

t also clea rly applied this preponde ranc e standa rd in its written opinion. 6 As stated above , the district court found that none of the e vidence in the rec ord contra dicted Inspector H oti's testimony that he did not intend to use a two-ste p technique to c ircumvent Miranda
. Se e su

pra at 34-35. 37 "[ W ] e ho ldth at t he b urd en re st s o n t he p ros ecut io n t o d is pro ve d eli bera ten ess ," id. at 15, and that the burde n is that of a pre pondera nce of the evidenc e, id. at 16-17. The test used by

the district court to dete rmine whe ther Inspector H oti util ized a de lib e rate tw o- ste p inte rr og atio n te c hn iqu e to c ir c umv e nt Miranda is e nti re ly c on sis te nt w ith
eac h of the a

bove holding s by

the majority . In its written opinion, the dist rict cour t examined

" the tot a lity

of the c ir c ums tanc e s" in m akin g its fa c tua l de te rm inatio n r e g ard ingde lib e rate ne ss, consideringboth subjective and obje ctive evide nce that it found releva nt to determining whether Inspector H oti deliberate ly utiliz ed a two- step interrog ation technique. Cap e rs , 2 0 0 7 WL 959300, at *11. 5 Although the district court does not explicitly state in its opinion which side bears the burden of provingdeliberateness, ther e is no doubt that the district court re quired the g overnme nt to prove de liberate ness by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. At ora l argument in the district
c ourt , Jud g e Mc Ke nn a

a sk e d th e pa

rt ie s, " [A]m I

c or re c t in a ssumin g tha

t th e g e ne ra l r

ule applies, and that is, since this is a moti on to suppress statements, that the g overnme nt has the burden of proof by a pre pondera

nce," (J.A. at 349), to which the attorne y for the g overnme nt responde d, "T hat' s corr ect, your Honor." (J.A. at 350). 6The majority claims that its "ana ly sis considers the subjec tive evidenc e adduc ed at the 7 suppression hea

ring. . . as instructive but not automatica lly dispositi ve," Majority

Op. at 20, but f i n d s th at , i nth i s c a s e , In s p e c t o r H o t i ' s t e s t i m o n y m ay b e d i s r e g ar d e d b e c a u s e i tl a c k s c r e d i b i l i ty, id . B ut e ve n if

the ma jor ity ha d f ound tha t Ins pe c tor

Ho ti' s te sti mony

wa s c re dib le , th e ma

jor ity would still have r efuse d to consider the te stimony beca use it deems Inspector H oti's stated rea sons as beingillegitimate. Id. at 17-18. Notwithstandingthe majority ' s proclamations to t he contra ry , it is clear that the " leg itimacy " te st adopted by the majority

would make subjec tive evidenc e irre levant in almost ever y two-step interr og ation inquiry
. See infra at 39-41.

38 II Even if de novo revie w of the district c ourt' s fac tual deter mination reg arding d el i b er at en es s we re ap p ro p ri at e i nth i s ca s e, Iwo u l d s t i l l b e u n ab l e t o agr ee wi thth e m aj o ri ty 's finding that Inspector H oti deliberate ly utiliz ed a two- step interrog ation technique to c ircumvent Miranda
. The test used by

the majority

to determine whether

Inspector H oti deliberate ly utiliz ed a two-step interr og ation technique e ffe ctively undermines the subje ctive test established by J ustice Kenne dy in his concurr ing opinion in Se ibe rt (and a dopted by this Court i n Carter ) b e c a us e it ignor es subjective e vidence showing that the inspector did not deliber ately utiliz e a two- step technique, a

nd instead re lies exclusively on the objective f

actor s listed in the non-controlling Se ibe rt plurality

opinion. In revie wing the evidenc e of whether Inspector H oti util ized a two- 7 step interrog ation technique, the majority g ives absolutely

no weig ht to the inspector' s testimony that hi s r e a so ns fo r n ot i mme diate ly a dv isi ngCa

pe rs of his Miranda rig hts were to preve nt the loss or conce alment of the c urre ncy and money

order s that the Express Mail envelope c ontained
and to a sc e rt a in whe the r L op e z wa s invo lve d in the c ri me so that he c ou ld b e re le a se d if
ne c e ssa ry . M a jor ity Op . at 17 -1 9; se e als o Ca pe rs , 2007 WL959300, at *12 & n.13 (citingTr. 32 & 35)
.39

Despite the f

act that Judge McKe nna – who witnesse d Inspector H oti's testimony and wa s there fore better a

ble to assess his cre dibilit y – found that the inspec tor' s testimony was c redible, the ma jor ity c ho os e s to g ive it n o w e ig ht whatso e ve r b e c a us e , a c c or din g to t

he ma jor ity , H oti did not articulate a leg itimate exception to Miranda . N ota bly , th e ma

jor ity state s: Neither of these r easons [g iven by Inspector H oti] justifies delaying a Miranda wa rn ingon c e it i s o bv iou s th at a su sp e c t is in c us tod

y . T he re is n o e xce pti on

to Miranda th atal l o ws a d el ay i ngi v i n g Miranda war

nings in orde r to prese rve evane scent e vidence . Neither is there a n exception to Miranda that pe rm its delay ing the war

nings in orde r to asce rtain whe ther a suspected c o-conspirator may be entitled to re lease
. Majority Op. at 17-18. Even a ssuming the major ity is corre ct in finding that Inspector H oti's testimony did not
e xpre ss " le g iti mate " re a so ns fo r n ot i mme diate ly a dv isi ngCa

pe rs of his Miranda rig hts, that conclusion would be of

littl e import to the inquiry at hand – whe ther he deliberately utiliz ed a two-step interr og ation technique. Under the test established in J ustice Ke nnedy ' s concur ring opinion in Se ibe rt , the oper ative question is not whether Inspector H oti had a legitimate rea son fo r q ue sti on ingCa

pe rs pr ior to w arn inghim

of his Miranda rig hts, but inst ead whether his reason for doingso was to deliber ately utiliz e a two- step interrog ation proce dure w ith the intended p urp o s e o f u n d erm i n i n g Miranda . In an opinion joined by retire d J ustice David Souter sitti ng by desig nation, the Fir st Circuit recog nized as much and he ld that an interrog ation for the pur poses of re cover ing e vidence did not constitut e a de liberate two-step strate g y beca use the initial interrog ation was " aimed primar ily at sec uringthe [stol en] weapon" that the police we re
sear chingfor. United States v. J ackson , 6 08 F .3 d 1 00 , 1 04 (1 st C ir . 2 01 0) (B ou din , J.) . In th is light, ther e is nothing suspicious about the r easons put for th by Inspector H oti for why

he did notThe majority sug g ests that subjective e vidence may rar ely exis t in cases involving two- 8 ste p inte rr og atio ns . M a

jor ity Op . at 14 -1 5 ( " [I ]n mo st i ns tanc e s th e inq uir y wi ll r e ly he avil y , if not entirely , upon objective e vidence .") . But e ven if that we re so, the pote ntial scarc ity of su bje c tiv e e vid e nc e pr ov ide s n o ju sti fi c a tio n f or ig no ri ngre le va

nt s ub je c tiv e e vid e nc e wh e n it do e s e xist. Although the majority ' s test could still find that a two-ste p technique w as not 9 intentionally

used whe n the pre -wa

rninginterrog ation was pe rfor med by a diffe rent off

icer than the post-war

ning inter rog ation, and the se cond off icer was not aw are of the initial interrog ation, see, e .g. , Carter , 489 F.3d at 536, J ustice Ke nnedy ' s concur ringopinion makes clea

r that, eve n when the sa

me offic er pe rfor

ms both the pre- a

nd post-war

ning inter rog ations, a cour

t may find that the illeg itimate pre-w arninginterrog ation was not done f or the purpose of utiliz ing atwo40 a dv ise Ca pe rs of his Miranda rig hts prior to interrog ating him. Both rea sons, under the circ umstances, we re quite c redible. By importing the te sts establishing leg itimate exceptions to Miranda int o th e fa c tua l te st fo r whe the r a

n inte rr og atin g of

fi c e r d e lib e ra

te ly uti lize d a tw o- ste p te c hn iqu e , th e ma jor ity
c omp le te ly

un de rm ine s th e su

bje c tiv e te st that li e s at th e he art of Justi c e Ke nn e dy ' s Se ibe rt opinion. The Elstad

/Se ibe rt lin e of c a se s is on ly

re le va nt whe n s tate me nts ma de in r e sp on se to th e i n i t i a l qu e s t i o n i n g ar e e x c l u d e d b y Miranda . I f district courts a re nowrequire d to disreg ard
su bje c tiv e te sti mony

a bo ut a n inte rr og a tor ' s r e a so ns fo r n ot w arn inga su sp e c t of

his Miranda
r i g h t s w h e n e v e r

p r e - w ar n i n g s t at e m e n t s w o u l d

b e e x c l u d e d

b y Miranda , then cour

ts considering tw o- ste p inte rr og atio ns wi ll b e fo rc e d to dis re g ard wh a te ve r s ub

je c tiv e e vid e nc e may

e xist. 8 Un de r t he ma jor ity ' s te st, in a lmo st a ll c a se s w he re a pr e -w arn ingc on fe ssi on

is
su pp re sse d d

ue to a vio latio n o f t

he su sp e c t' s Miranda rig hts, a subsequent post-wa rning confe ssion will also be suppressed be cause the interrog ating office r will be unable to articulate a "le g itimate" r eason f

or not advisingthe suspect of his or her Miranda rig hts prior to the initial interrog ation. Under

this approac h, there would almost never be an occ asion when Justi ce Kenne dy ' s approa ch would be a pplicable. 9ste p te c hn iqu e to c ir c umv e nt Miranda
. Se ibe rt , 5 4 2 U
. S. a t 6 2 0 ( K e n n e dy , J. , c o n c ur r in g ) ( " [I ]t would be extravag ant to treat the prese nce of one stateme nt that cannot be a dmitted under Miranda as suffic ient rea son to prohibit subsequent statements prec eded by a prope r wa

rning .")
. Elstad is an example of such a case – the pre -wa

rninginterrog ation was pe rfor med by an off icer who also par

ticipated in the post-wa

rningconfe ssion. See E lstad , 470 U.S. at 301-02. Ye t Justi c e Ke nn e dy

fo un d th at th e Court ' s d e c isi on no t to e xclu de the po st- wa rn ingstate me nts in Elstad "was co rrectin it s re aso ni ng andit s re su lt ." Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 620 (Ke nnedy , J ., concur ring ). 41 Th e ine vit a

bil ity of thi s r e su lt i s ma de c le ar whe n th e ma jor ity state s th a t " [t]he on ly leg itimate rea son to delay intentionally

a Miranda war

ning until af

ter a custodial interrog ation has begun is to protect the saf ety of the a rre sting off

icer s or the public," Majority Op. at 18 (c i t i n g United States v. Newton , 3 69 F .3 d 6 59 , 6 77 (2 d Ci r. 20 04 )) , b e c a us e thi s e xce pti on

c ou ld
never apply to two-step interrog ation case s. The Elstad /Se ibe rt inquiry only comes into play
w h e np r e - w ar

n i n g s t at e m e n t s ar e e x c l u d e d b y Miranda . In c a se s whe re the pu bli c sa fe ty exception applies, eve n those pre- war ning statements are admissible, making the entire Elstad /Se ibe rt inquiry unnece ssary . I f the public saf ety exception were the only

"le g itimate"
re a so n th at an o ff

ic e r c ou ld g ive fo r f

a ili ngto a dv ise a

su sp e c t of

his Miranda ri g hts pr ior

to i n t erro gat i n g h i m–

an d thu s th e o n l y

re as o nth atwo u l d

al l o w aco urt t o co n s i d er th e o ff i ce r's t es t i m o n y – th en i two u l d

n ev er b e p ro p er

fo r c o urt s t o co n s i d er

an i n t erro gat i n g o ff

i ce r's te sti mony in t wo -s te p inte rr og atio n c a se s. Th is w ou ld e nti re ly un de rm ine the su

bje c tiv e te st
e sta bli sh e d in Justi c e Ke nn e dy ' s Se ibe rt opinion. Mo re ov e r, e ve n if

the le g iti ma c y

of an inte rr og a tin g of

fi c e r' s a c tio ns we re an a

pp ro pr iate
c on sid e ratio n f

or de te rm ini ngwh e the r t

he of fi c e r i nte nti on a lly

us e d a tw o- ste p te c hn iqu e to undermine Miranda , there is nothing illeg itimate about the re asons put forth by Inspector H oti. All of the evide nce sought by Inspector H oti is bey ond the scope of the Miranda protec tion. Although Ca

pers' pre- war

ning statements would not have be en admissible ag ainst him in a42

c ri min a l pr oc e e din g , Ins pe c tor Ho ti t e sti fi e d th a t he wa s n ot i nte rr og a tin g Ca pe rs in o rd e r t o pr oc ur e a c on fe ssi on . Ins te a d, he wa s se e kin g phy sic a l e vid e nc e (t he c ur re nc y and mon e y or de rs )
and inf or matio n a bo ut C a pe rs ' c o- c on sp ir a tor , L op e z. A n inte rr og a tin g of fi c e r' s f a ilure to a dv ise
a su sp e c t of

his Miranda rig hts does not require suppression of the phy sical fr uits of the suspect’s
unwar ned stateme nts. See U

nited States v. Patane , 542 U.S. 630 (2004) (holdingthat phy sical
e v i d e n c e o b t a i n e d

a s a r e s u l to f un w ar n e d s t a t e m e n t s i s n o te x c l u d e d b y Miranda ); United States v. Morales , 788 F.2d 883, 886 ( 2d Cir. 1986) (" The Miranda presumption of coe rcion ha s not barr ed the use of unwa

rned, voluntar

y statements . . . to locate non- testimonial evidence . . . .")
. And Miranda , which prote cts a suspec t's F ifth Amendment rig ht ag ainst self-incr imination, does not protect suspec ts from makingstatements that incriminate othe r individuals. As such, there was nothingper se illegitimate a bout asking Capers whether L opez was involved in the cr iminal activity or attemptingto determine the location of phy sical evide nce.

III In addition to improperly finding that Inspector H oti's prof fer ed re asons for de laying the Miranda war

ning should not be c onsidered be cause they lack leg itimacy , the majority also finds that th os e re a so ns la c k c re dib ili ty wh e n c on sid e re d in

lig ht o f t he ob je c tiv e e vid e nc e . M a

jor ity Op . at 19 -2 0. Al tho ug h th is f ind inga pp e ars to b e e nti re ly

su pe rf luo us to t he outc ome of

thi s appea l based on the ma

jority ' s novel " leg itimacy " te st, see supra no te 7, to t he e xtent it

is at a ll rele vant to result the majority rea ches, it is an improper application of the clea

rly err oneous standard.43

Whil e a district c ourt' s findings of fac t may be over turned if this Court determines that they are clea rly err oneous, this Court is not entitled to overturn a district court' s assessment of the
cre dibilit y

of a w itness – an assessment whic h is the "pr ovidence of the district cour t." United Sta te s v . M ald on ad o-Ri v e ra , 9 22 F .2 d 9 34 , 9 72 (2 d Ci r. 19 90 ); c f. Un ite d S

tates v . R ad

da tz , 447 U. S
. 6 6 7 , 6 8 1 n . 7 (1 9 8 0 ) ( "[ I ] ti s un l i k el y th ata d i s tri ctj u d ge w o u l d re j ec ta m agi s tra t e's p ro p o s edfi n d i n gs o ncr ed i b i l i ty wh en th o s e f

i n d i n gs ar e d i s p o s i t i v e a n d s u b s t i tu t e t h e j u d ge's
own a pp ra isa l; t o d o s o w ith out se e ingand he ari ngthe wi tne ss o r w itn e sse s w ho se c re dib ili ty is in question could well g ive rise to ser ious questions . . . ."). F urthermor e, " [w] here there are two pe rm iss ibl e vie ws of

the e vid e nc e , th e c ourt ' s c ho ic e be tw e e n th e m c ann ot b e de e me d c le arl y
erro neo us ." Ma ldo na do -R iv e ra , 9 2 2 F. 2 d at9 7 2 (c i t i n g An de rso n v . Ci ty of B esse me r Ci ty

, N. C. , 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). The se rules a re not mer ely

based on the belief that the district court is better positioned to make de terminations of cr edibility (as we ll as more experienc ed at making
s u ch d et erm i n at i o n s ), b u tal s o o np ru d en t i al co n ce rn s th at"[ d ] u p l i ca t i o no f t h e t ri al j u d ge's eff orts in the court of a

ppeals would ve ry

likely contribute only

neg ligibly

to the acc urac y

of fa ct det erm in ati on at ahu ge cost in di vers io n o f j ud ici al r eso urce s. " Anderson , 470 U.S. at 574-75. The majority

disreg ards the a

bove limits on t he role of an a ppellate c ourt, choosing instead to reje ct the cr edibility deter minations made by

the district court that it consider s "dubious." Whil e such a

revie w of the district c ourt' s cre dibilit y deter minations in never ap p ro p ri at e, i ti s p art i cu l ar l y p ro b l em at i c i nth i s ca s e w h er e t h er e i s n o th i n g i nIn s p ec t o r H o t i 's testimony that is either contr adicted by the re cord e vidence or inhere ntly unbelievable . As such, the re asons g iven by

the majority

are insufficient to satisfy the clea rly err oneous standar d, which44

requ ir es t hi s C ou rtto hav e a "firm co nv ict io n t hata mi st ake h as b een co mm it ted ." United States v. Iodic e , 525 F.3d 179, 185 ( 2d Cir. 2008). Wit h reg ard to I

nspector H oti's c laim that he had to dete rmine whe ther L opez was involved in the scheme , and if he was not, re lease him, the majority states that it is dubious t hat Inspector H oti would have simply rele ased L opez had Caper s said that L opez had nothing to do with the theft. Majority

Op. at 19. B ut nothing in Inspector H oti's testimony sug g ests that he would have taken Cape rs' statements at fa ce va lue and r elea sed L opez based entirely on tho se statements. Instead, Inspector H oti's testimony demonstrates that he knew ve ry littl e about L opez wh e n h e too k h im i nto c us tod y . A lth ou g h Ca

pe rs wa s a

su sp e c t pr ior

to t he da y of his arr e st, Inspector H oti had never

seen L opez and knew nothingabout him prior to that day . (J.A. 62-63.) An d a lth ou g h Ins pe c tor

Ho ti c e rt a inl y

ha d p ro ba

ble c a us e to b e lie ve that L op e z wa s invo lve d in the incident base d on evidenc e ac quired the da y of the a rre st, that evidence consisted entire ly of a g lance from L opez towards the bulk mail ca rrier (" BMC" ) conta ining the E x press Mail enve lopes
an d Lo p e z ' s p r e s e n c e i nth e tr u c k w i thC a p e r s w h e nth e a l ar

mw e n to f

f
. ( J
. A
. 6 2 , 6 4
- 6 5
. ) It would have be en per fec tly rational for

Inspector H oti to want to confirm his suspicion that L opez was involved in the thef

t, espec ially

if it was true that I nspector H oti knew absolutely nothing
a bo ut L op e z pr ior

to o bs e rv inghim

on the da y of the inc ide nt. Wit h reg ard to I

nspector H oti's c laim that he did not want to lose the money order s, the majority finds that this claim is "belied by the testimony

of the a rre sting off

icer s that Capers a

nd L op e z we re de ta ine d a lmo st d ir e c tly a ft e r t he e nv e lop e a larm

so un de d a

nd we re fo un d e ith e r s til l in t he sto ra g e c on ta ine r, or

in t hat imme diate vic ini ty ." Ma jor ity Op . at 20 . B ut t

he ma jor ity fa ils to expl ain how those fa cts are sufficie nt to leave this Court with "the f irm conviction" thatEven if Inspector H oti's fe ar of losing the mone y

order s was irrational, a findingthat he 10 did , in fa c t, h old

that ir ratio na l be lie f w ou ld s til l be su ff ic ie nt t o s ho w that he did no t in te nd

to utiliz e a two- step interrog ation technique. I t should be noted that Inspector H oti could have r etrieve d the money order s simply

by 11 perf orming a sea

rch inc ident to arre st, and such a se arc h would not have r un afoul of a

ny of C ap er s ' co n s t i tu t i o n al ri gh t s . No n et h el es s , th i s wo u l d n o th av e r es o l v edth e i s s u e o f Lop ez 's inv olv e me nt. 45 Ins pe c tor Ho ti d id n ot a c tua lly

fe ar l os ingthe mon e y

or de rs . Whe n th e a larm we nt o ff , b oth 10 Capers a nd L opez were out of Inspector H oti's line of sig ht, hidden behind a lar g e B MC in the back of a mail transpor

tation truck. (J.A. 64-65.) Inspector H oti then had to slide down a ladde r, exit the lookout where he had be en obser ving Ca pers, a nd run ar ound the building to the a rea wher e Cape rs and L opez were loading the truck be fore he could a pprehe nd Capers a

nd L opez. (J.A. 67.) After Inspectors H oti and Chow handcuf fed Cape rs and L opez, the inspectors e ntere d the bac k of the truc k wher e they wer e able to find the Express Mail envelopes, but not the money order s. (J .A. 67-68.) A t that point, I nspector H oti took C aper s to the supervisor' s office so that he could e nsure that Cape rs was not a ble to hide the money

order s – which we re both e vidence and the e quivalent of c ash – somewhe re in the f acility . Given the c ircumstance s, it would have been e ntirely

rational for

Inspector H oti to segr eg ate Cape rs in the supervisor' s office and attempt to retrieve the money

order s as soon as possible. 11 B e c a us e Ins pe c tor

Ho ti' s te sti mony

is e nti re ly

pla us ibl e (a nd c e rt a inl y no t so imp la

us ibl e as to raise a " firm conviction that a mistake has bee n committed") , it was not clea r er ror f or the district court to find that the g overnme nt met its burden of provingby a pre pondera

nce of the
e vid e nc e that Ins pe c tor

Ho ti d id n ot d e lib e ra

te ly uti lize a tw o- ste p inte rr og a tio n te c hn iqu e toB e c a us e Ins pe c tor

Ho ti d id n ot d e lib e ra

te ly uti lize a tw o- ste p inte rr og a tio n te c hn iqu e , it 12 is unnece ssary

to decide whether

"c urative me asure s [were] taken bef ore the postwarning st ate men ts [ were] mad e." Se ibe rt , 542 U.S. at 622 (Ke nnedy , J ., concur ring ). 46 c ir c umv e nt Miranda . Acc ording ly , Capers' voluntary post-war ning statements should not be excluded, and the district cour t's de cision to ex clude the statements should be re verse d. 12 F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , I

re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.